Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany

1. Demilitarization of Germany.

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. Partitioning of Germany.

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the attached map, (Appendix A).

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

(d) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. The Ruhr Area. (The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the attached map, including the Rhineland, the Keil Canal, and all German territory north of the Keil Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power, the caldron of wars. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled and removed from the area or completely destroyed. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked.

It is anticipated that the stripping of this area would be accomplished in three stages:

(i) The military forces immediately upon entry into the area shall destroy all plants and equipment which cannot be removed.
(ii) Removal of plants and equipment by members of the United Nations as restitution and reparation (Paragraph 4).

(iii) All plants and equipment not removed within a stated period of time, say 6 months, will be completely destroyed or reduced to scrap and allocated to the United Nations.

(b) All people within the area should be made to understand that this area will not again be allowed to become an industrial area. Accordingly, all people and their families within the area having special skills or technical training should be encouraged to migrate permanently from the area and should be as widely dispersed as possible.

(c) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objectives.

4. Restitution and Reparation.

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

5. Education and Propaganda.

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.
6. Political Decentralization.

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany into three states. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Lander) corresponding to 16 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

7. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

8. Controls over Development of German Economy.

During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.


There is attached (Appendix B) a program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups.

10. Wearing of Insignia and Uniforms.

(a) No person in Germany (except members of the United Nations and neutral countries) shall be permitted to wear any military insignia of rank or branch of service, service ribbons or military medals.
(b) No such person shall be permitted to wear, after 6 months from the cessation of hostilities any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.

11. Prohibition on Parades

No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.

12. Aircraft

All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate such aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.


(a) The responsibility for the execution of the post-surrender program for Germany set forth in this memorandum is the joint responsibility of the United Nations. The execution of the joint policy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international body which emerges from United Nations discussions.

Consideration of the specific measures to be taken in carrying out the joint program suggests the desirability of separating the task to be performed during the initial period of military occupation from those which will require a much longer period of execution. While the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. will, for practical reasons, play the major role (of course aided by the military forces of other United Nations) in demilitarizing Germany (point 1) the detailed execution of other parts of the program can best be handled by Germany's continental neighbors.

(b) When Germany has been completely demilitarized there would be the following distribution of duties in carrying out the German program:

(i) The U.S. would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs.

(ii) The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

(c) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time. Actual withdrawal of United States troops should not precede agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. on the principles set forth in this memorandum.
14. Appointment of an American High Commissioner

An American High Commissioner for Germany should be appointed as soon as possible, so that he can sit in on the development of the American views on this problem.
APPENDIX B

Punishment of Certain War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups.

A. Punishment of Certain War Criminals.

(1) Arch-criminals.

A list of the arch-criminals of this war whose obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and transmitted to the appropriate military authorities. The military authorities shall be instructed with respect to all persons who are on such list as follows:

(a) They shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer of the General rank.

(b) When such identification has been made the person identified shall be put to death forthwith by firing squads made up of soldiers of the United Nations.

(2) Certain Other War Criminals.

(a) Military commissions shall be established by the Allied Military Government for the trial of certain crimes which have been committed against civilization during this war. As soon as practicable, representatives of the liberated countries of Europe shall be included on such commissions. These crimes shall include those crimes covered by the following section and such other crimes as such military commissions may be ordered to try from time to time.

(b) Any person who is suspected of being responsible for (through the issuance of orders or otherwise), or having participated in, causing the death of any human being in the following situations shall be arrested and tried promptly by such military commissions, unless prior to trial one of the United Nations has requested that such person be placed in its custody for trial on similar charges for acts committed within its territory:

(i) The death was caused by action in violation of the rules of war.

(ii) The victim was killed as a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of other persons.

(iii) The victim met death because of his nationality, race, color, creed, or political conviction.

(c) Any person who is convicted by the military commissions of the crimes specified in paragraph (b) shall be sentenced to death, unless the military commissions, in exceptional cases, determine that there are extenuating circumstances, in which
case other punishment may be meted out, including deportation to a penal colony outside of Germany. Upon conviction, the sentence shall be carried out immediately.

B. Detention of Certain Groups.

All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined:

(a) The S.S.
(b) The Gestapo.
(c) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.
(d) All high Government and Nazi Party officials.
(e) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

C. Registration of Males.

An appropriate program will be formulated for the re-registration as soon as possible of all males of the age of 14 or over. The registration shall be on a form and in a manner to be prescribed by the military authorities and shall show, among other things, whether or not the person registering is a member of the Nazi Party or affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S., S.A. or Kraft Korps.

D. Labor Battalions.

Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

E. Dissolution of Nazi Organizations.

The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

F. Prohibition on Exercise of Certain Privileges.

All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade:
(1) The Nazi Party.

(2) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.

(3) The Junkers.

(4) Military and Naval officers.

G. Junker Estates.

All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

H. Prohibition on Emigration.

(1) A Proclamation shall be issued prohibiting any person resident in Germany from leaving or attempting to leave Germany, except with permission from the Allied Military Government.

(2) Violation of this Proclamation shall be an offense triable by military commissions of the Allied Military Government and heavy penalties shall be prescribed, including death.

(3) All possible steps shall be taken by the military authorities to prevent any such person from leaving (without permission).

[Signature]
Secretary of State,

Washington.

U.S. URGENT

NIACST 7430, September 9, Midnight.

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

This morning Ambassador Gousiev told me that as Chairman of the European Advisory Commission he was calling a meeting for Monday afternoon. We have already forwarded the draft surrender terms, which have been accepted without conditions by the U. S. and USSR Governments and by the British subject to conditions which, I have been informed by Mr. Eden, will be cleared. Gousiev told me that he is now in a position to agree to recommend acceptance by the EAC of the German protocol covering zones, leaving in blank the designation of the U. S. and U. K. zones with the understanding that the U. S. Government and the U. K. Government will decide on their respective zones and areas of occupation in Germany and Berlin. That means that this document will have received informal clearance in all other respects.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-31-72

By J. Schaalbe Date FEB 9 1972
-2- #7430, September 9, Midnight, from London.

respects from the three governments and is recommended by the Commission.

We will have before us this week officially the question of control machinery, basic proclamations and orders, as well as the protocol on Austria in which I have already gotten agreement for tripartite control with U. S. participation limited to a small contingent force. We are now analyzing the recommendations of the other Allied Governments with respect to the treatment of Germany. You are also aware of our work on the Bulgarian armistice terms; we are proceeding to formulate the terms for Hungary.

I would greatly appreciate your getting this message to the President together with a copy of the German protocol.

WINANT

JT
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I enclose herewith a copy of a telegram from Ambassador Winant, outlining the present status of the work of the European Advisory Commission. There is likewise enclosed a copy of the draft protocol regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" which is referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram.

Enclosures:

1 Telegram from Ambassador Winant, September 9, 1944.
2 Draft protocol.
The President
EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION.

DRAFT PROTOCOL

between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the
administration of Greater Berlin.

(as amended at the meeting held on 2nd August, 1944.)

Washington, D.C.

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the United States of America have reached the following agreement
with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of
Surrender of Germany :-

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st
December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided
into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the
three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under
joint occupation by the three Powers.

2. The boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area,
and the allocation of the three zones as between the U.S.S.R.,
the U.K. and the U.S.A. will be as follows :-

Eastern Zone (as shown on
the annexed
map 'A')

The territory of Germany
(including the province of East
Prussia) situated to the East of
a line drawn from the point on
Inbeck Bay where the frontiers
of Schleswig-Holstein and
Mecklenburg meet, along the
western frontier of Mecklenburg
to the frontier of the province
of Hanover, thence, along the
eastern frontier of Hanover, to
the frontier of Brunswick;
thence along the western frontier
of the Prussian province of Saxony
to the western frontier of Anhalt;
thence along the western frontier
of Anhalt; thence along the
western frontier of the Prussian
province/
province of Saxony and the western frontier of Thuringia to where the latter meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the Berlin area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.

The Territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined above, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the western frontier of Thuringia meets the frontier of Bavaria; thence westwards along the southern frontiers of the Prussian provinces of Hessen-Nassau and Rheinland to where the latter meets the frontier of France will be occupied by armed forces of

All the remaining territory of Western Germany situated to the south of the line defined in the description of the North-Western Zone will be occupied by armed forces of

The frontiers of States (Under) and Provinces within Germany, referred to in the foregoing descriptions of the zones, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree of 25th June, 1941 (published in the Reichsgesetzbblatt, Part I, No. 72, 3rd July, 1941).

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of "Greater Berlin" as defined by the Law of the 27th April, 1920) will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. For this purpose the territory of "Greater Berlin" will be divided into the following three parts:

North-Eastern part of "Greater Berlin" (Districts of Pankow, Pfaueninsel, Mitte, Weinsberg, Friedenau, Lichtenberg, Trepkow, Köpenick) will be occupied by the forces of the U.S.S.R.

North-Western part of "Greater Berlin" (Districts of Reindlendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilnsendorf), will be occupied by the forces of

Southern part of "Greater Berlin" (Districts of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Neukölln) will be occupied by the forces of

/The
The boundaries of districts within "Greater Berlin" referred to in the foregoing descriptions, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on 27th March, 1938 (Amtsblatt der Reichshauptstadt Berlin No. 13 of 27th March, 1938, page 215).

3. The occupying forces in each of the three zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.

4. Each of the three Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has participated in military operations against Germany.

5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Kommandatur) consisting of three Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area.

6. This Protocol has been drawn up in triplicate in the Russian and English languages. Both texts are authentic. The Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.

LANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

3rd August, 1944.
3rd August, 1944.

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION.

DRAFT PROTOCOL

between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the
administration of Greater Berlin.

(as amended at the meeting held on 2nd August, 1944.)

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the United States of America have reached the following agreement
with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of
Surrender of Germany:

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st
December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided
into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the
three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under
joint occupation by the three Powers.

2. The boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area,
and the allocation of the three zones as between the U.S.S.R.,
the U.K. and the U.S.A. will be as follows:

Eastern Zone

The territory of Germany
(including the province of East
Prussia) situated to the East of
a line drawn from the point on
Labbeck Bay where the frontiers
of Schleswig-Holstein and
Mecklenburg meet, along the
western frontier of Mecklenburg
to the frontier of the province
of Hanover, thence, along the
eastern frontier of Hanover, to
the frontier of Brunsbüttel;
thence along the western frontier
of the Prussian province of Saxony
to the western frontier of Anhalt;
thence along the western frontier
of Anhalt; thence along the
western frontier of the Prussian
province/
province of Saxony and the western frontier of Thuringia to where the latter meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the Berlin area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.

North-Western Zone
(as shown on the annexed map "A")

The Territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined above, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the western frontier of Thuringia meets the frontier of Bavaria; thence westwards along the southern frontiers of the Prussian provinces of Hessen-Nassau and Rheinprovinz to where the latter meets the frontier of France will be occupied by armed forces of

South-Western Zone
(as shown on the annexed map "A")

All the remaining territory of Western Germany situated to the south of the line defined in the description of the North-Western Zone will be occupied by armed forces of

Berlin Area
(as shown on the annexed map "B")

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of "Greater Berlin" as defined by the Law of the 27th April, 1920) will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. For this purpose the territory of "Greater Berlin" will be divided into the following three parts:

North-Eastern part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Pankow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, Weissensee, Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Treptow, Köpenick) will be occupied by the forces of the U.S.S.R.;

North-Western part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Reinickendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilhelmsdorf), will be occupied by the forces of

Southern part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Neukölln) will be occupied by the forces of
The boundaries of districts within "Greater Berlin" referred to in the foregoing descriptions, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on 27th March, 1938 (Amtsblatt der Reichshauptstadt Berlin No. 13 of 27th March, 1938, page 215).

3. The occupying forces in each of the three zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.

4. Each of the three Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has participated in military operations against Germany.

5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Kommandature) consisting of three Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area.

6. This Protocol has been drawn up in triplicate in the Russian and English languages. Both texts are authentic. The Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.

LANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

3rd August, 1944.
THE SECRETARY
September 11, 1944

This map, showing the zones of occupation for Germany, was prepared in the Department on the basis of the data contained in the draft protocol regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" as amended in the meeting of the European Advisory Commission held on August 2, 1944. The map referred to in the protocol itself has not yet been received.
GERMANY
1939 POLITICAL DIVISIONS

1939 POPULATION, TOTAL 69,316,586

PRUSSIA 4,602,245
EAST PRUSSIA 2,488,122
BERLIN 4,388,756
BRANDENBURG 3,007,937
POMERANIA 2,393,844
SILESIA 4,815,757
PROV. OF SAXONY 3,618,458
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 1,599,257
HANOVER 2,476,056
WESTPHALIA 5,209,401
HESSE-NASSAU 2,675,111
RHINE PROV. 7,915,830
HOFENZOLLENN 73,706

BAVARIA 6,132,750
SAXONY 5,231,739
WURTTEMBERG 2,896,920
BADEN 2,502,442
THURINGIA 1,742,624
HAMBURG 1,711,877
HESSE 1,469,215
MECKLENBURG 900,413
BRUNSWICK 589,336
OLDENBURG 577,648
BREMEN 450,084
ANHALT 431,482
LIPPE 187,230
SCHAUMBURG-LIPPE 53,185
SAA 84,454

SOURCE: CENSUS OF MAY 17, 1939

ZONES OF OCCUPATION DESCRIBED BY THE DRAFT PROTOCOL OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION, AUGUST 2, 1944

NORTHWEST
POPULATION 24,800,000
AREA 50,600 SQ. MI.

SOUTH
POPULATION 15,600,000
AREA 45,000 SQ. MI.

EAST
POPULATION 24,400,000
AREA 65,300 SQ. MI.

BERLIN
POPULATION 4,300,000
AREA 300 SQ. MI.

NATIONAL BOUNDARY AS OF 1937
This map, showing the zones of occupation for "Greater Berlin" was prepared in the Department on the basis of the data contained in the draft protocol regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" as amended in the meeting of the European Advisory Commission held on August 2, 1944. The map referred to in the protocol itself has not yet been received.
E. A. C. (44) 9th Meeting
12th September, 1944

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

MINUTES of Meeting held at Lancaster House, London, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 12th September, 1944, at 5 p.m.

Present:
Mr. F.T. Gouge (in the Chair),
Mr. G.F. Saksin,
Mr. N.V. Ivanov.

Sir E. Strange,
Major-General A.W. Anderson,
Mr. C. O’Neill.

Mr. J.C. Minart,
Brigadier-General V. Meyer,
Mr. H.E. Hooley.

Secretary:
Mr. L.G. Frigorny,
Mr. W.D. McAfee.

AGENDA

Approval of text of Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

THE COMMISSION:

(a) approved the text of the Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin", as agreed between the U.S.A., U.K. and U.S.S.R. Delegations, the boundaries of the zones of occupation in Germany and Greater Berlin being as marked on the annexed maps "A" and "B" in accordance with the text of the said Protocol (the text of the Protocol in English and Russian and map "A" and four sheets of map "B" are annexed);
(b) submitted the allocation of the North-Eastern and South-Eastern zones of occupation in Germany, as indicated in paragraph 2 of the Protocol and shown on map "A" annexed thereto, and similarly the allocation of the North-Eastern and Southern parts of Greater Berlin, as indicated in the same paragraph of the Protocol and shown on the four sheets of map "B" annexed thereto, for discussion and joint decision by the Governments of the U.S.A., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R.

(c) decided to submit the Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin", with the annexed map "A" and the four sheets of map "B", to the Governments of the U.S.A., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. for consideration and approval.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission

J. S. WILCOTT

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission

W. STRANG

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission

P. T. GOSSEY

LANDMARK HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

12th September, 1944.
PROTOCOL

between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following agreement with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender of Germany:

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers.

2. The boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area, and the allocation of the three zones as between the U.S.A., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. will be as follows:

| Eastern Zone | The territory of Germany (including the province of East Prussia) situated to the East of a line drawn from the point on Lübeck Bay where the frontiers of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg meet, along the western frontier of Mecklenburg to the frontier of the province of Hanover, thence, along the eastern frontier of Hanover, to the frontier of Brunswick; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony to the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along |

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-1-
the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony and the western frontier of Thuringia to where the latter meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the Berlin area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.

The territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined above, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the western frontier of Thuringia meets the frontier of Bavaria; thence eastwards along the southern frontiers of the Prussian provinces of Hesse-Nassau and Rheinprovinz to where the latter meets the frontier of France will be occupied by armed forces of . . . . . . . .

All the remaining territory of Western Germany situated to the south of the line defined in the description of the North-Western Zone will be occupied by armed forces of . . . . . . . .

The frontiers of States (Länder) and Provinces within Germany, referred to in the foregoing descriptions of the zones, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree of 25th June, 1941 (published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 72, 3rd July, 1941).

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of "Greater Berlin" as defined by the Law of the 27th April, 1920) will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the U.S.A., U.K., and U.S.S.R., assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. For this purpose the territory of "Greater Berlin" will be divided into the following three parts:

North-Eastern part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Pankow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, Weißensee, Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Treptow, Köpenick) will be occupied by the forces of the U.S.S.R.;
North-western part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Reinickendorf, Lichtenberg, Neukölln, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilmersdorf) will be occupied by the forces of.

Southern part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Schöneberg, Neukölln, Steglitz, Tempelhof, Frohnau) will be occupied by the forces of.

The boundaries of districts within "Greater Berlin", referred to in the foregoing conscription, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on 27th March, 1930 (Anzeiger der Reichshauptstadt Berlin No. 1 of 27th March, 1930, page 215).

3. The occupying forces in each of the three zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.

4. Each of the three Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has participated in military operations against Germany.

5. An Inter-allied Governing Authority (Kommandatura) consisting of three Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area.

6. This Protocol has been drawn up in triplicate in the English and Russian languages. Both texts are authentic. The Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.
The above text of the Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 12th September, 1944, with the exception of the allocation of the North-Eastern and South-Western zones of occupation in Germany and the North-Eastern and Southern parts of "Greater Berlin", which requires further consideration and joint agreement by the Governments of the U.S.A., U.K. and U.S.S.R.

Representative of the Government of the U.S.A. on the European Advisory Commission:

J.C. Irwin

Representative of the Government of the U.K. on the European Advisory Commission:

W. Strong

Representative of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the European Advisory Commission:

F.I. Gusev

Lancaster House,
Kensington, S.W.1.

12th September, 1944.
ЕВРОПЕЙСКАЯ КОНСУЛЬТИВАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ.

ПРОТОКОЛ заседания, состоявшегося в Ланкастер Хаус, во вторник 12 сентября 1944 года.

Заседание началось в 17.00, окончилось в 17.40.

ПРИСУТСТВОВАЛИ:
Г-н Ф.Т. Гусев /Председатель/,
г-н Г.Ф. Сакоин,
г-н Н.В. Иванов;
Сэр У. Стрэнг,
Ген.-майор А.В. Андерсон,
г-н К. О’Нил.
Г-н Л.Г. Вайднент,
Ген.-ордегер В. Мелер,
г-н Ф.Б. Минли.

СЕКРЕТАРИАТ:
Г-н И.Г. Пригорный,
г-н У.Д. Макафи.

ПОВЕСТКА ДНЯ:
Утверждение текста Протокола Соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином".

УТВЕРЖДЕНИЕ текста Протокола Соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином".

КОМИССИЯ РЕШИЛА:
а/ утвердить текст Протокола Соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином", согласованный между Делегациями США, Соединенного Королевства и СССР, о границах зон оккупации Германии и "Большого Берлина", обозначенных на приложенных картах.
"A" и "B", согласно тексту данного Протокола.
/Текст Протокола на английском и русском языках прилагается/;

6/ передать распределение Северо-Западной и Юго-Западной зон оккупации Германии, как они указаны в п. 2 Протокола и обозначены на приложенной к Протоколу карте "A", равно как и распределение Северо-Западной и Южной частей "Большого Берлина", как они указаны в том же пункте Протокола и обозначены на приложенной к Протоколу карте "B" на четырех листах на обсуждение и совместное решение Правительств США, Соединенного Королевства и СССР.

в/ передать Протокол Соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Совеа Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином" с приложенными картами "A" и "B" на рассмотрение и решение Правительств США, Соединенного Королевства и СССР.

Представитель Правительства США в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии: Представитель Правительства Соединенного Королевства в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии: Представитель Правительства СССР в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии:

Джон Э. Фрэнсис
Л. Г. Вейнант.
У. Стрэйн.
Ф. Т. Гусев.

ЛАНКАСТЕР ХАУС,
ЛОНДОН.

12 сентября 1944 года
ПРОТОКОЛ
Соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином".

Правительства Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик пришли к следующему соглашению относительно выполнения статьи II Документа о безоговорочной капитуляции Германии:

1. Германия в границах, существовавших на 31 декабря 1937 г., будет разделена для целей оккупации на три зоны, по одной из которых будет отведено каждой из трех держав, а также будет выделен особый район Берлина, оккупируемый совместно тремя державами.

2. Границы трех зон и района Берлина, а также распределение трех зон между США, Соединенным Королевством и СССР устанавливаются следующие:

Восточная зона, территория Германии /включая провинции Восточная Пруссия/, расположенная к востоку от линии, проходящей от пункта на берегу Дьобекского залива, где оходят границы Шлезвиг-Гольштейна и Мекленбурга, по западной границе Мекленбурга до границы провинций Ганновер, затем по восточной границе Ганновера до границы Брауншвейга, затем по западной границе прусской провинции Саксония до западной границы Ангальт, далее по западной границе Ангальт, затем по западной границе прусской провинции Саксония и западной границе Тюрингии до пересечения ее с баварской
границией и далее на восток по северной границе Баварии до чехословацкой границы 1937 года, занимается вооруженными силами СССР, за исключением района Берлина, для которого ниже предусматривается особый порядок оккупации.

Территория Германии, расположенная к западу от линии, описанной выше, и ограниченная с юга ли- нией, проходящей от пункта пересечения западной границы Тюрингии с границей Баварии, и далее на запад по южным границам прусских провинций Гессен-Нассау и Рейнпфрих до пересечения последней с границей Франции, занимается вооруженными силами

........................................................

Вся остальная территория западной Германии, рас- положенная к югу от линии, указанной в описании северо-западной зоны, занимается вооруженными силами

........................................................

В вышеприведенных описаниях зон границы земель /Ландер / и провинций внутри Германии являются теми, которые существовали после вступления в силу декрета от 25 июня 1941г. / опубликован в Reichsgesetzblatt, часть I, № 72 от 3 июля 1941г./.

Район Берлина /под этим выражением подразумевается территория "Большого Берлина", определенная законом от 27 апреля 1920г./ занимается совместно вооруженными силами США, Соединенного Королевства и СССР, виделевыми соответствующими главнокомандующими. С этой целью территория "Большого Берлина" разделяется на следующие три части:
Северо-восточная часть "Большого Берлина"
/районы: Панков, Пренцлауэрберг, Митте, Зелен-
зее, Фридрихсхайн, Лихтенберг, Траптов, Кепеник/
занимается вооруженными силами СССР;
Северо-западная часть "Большого Берлина"
/районы: Рейнхендорф, Ваддинг, Тиргартен, Хер-
лоттенбург, Шпандау, Вильмсдорф/ занимается
вооруженными силами ...........................................
Южная часть "Большого Берлина" /районы:
Целлендорф, Шеглиц, Шенберг, Крайцберг, Темпель-
гоф, Нейкольн/ занимается вооруженными силами
.................................................................
З в приведенных описаниях границы районов внутри
"Большого Берлина" являются теми, которые сущест-
вовали после вступления в силу декрета, опублико-
ванного 27 марта 1938 г. /Anzeiger der Reich-
shauptstadt Berlin, № 13 от 27 марта 1938 г.,
стр.215/.

3. Оккупационные вооруженные силы в каждой из трех зон,
на которые разделяется Германия, подчиняются главнокомандую-
щему, назначенному правительством той страны, вооруженные
силы которой оккупируют данную зону.

4. Каждая из трех держав по своему усмотрению может вклю-
чать в число вооруженных сил, предназначенных для выполнения
оккупационных обязанностей под командованием своего главно-
командующего, вспомогательные контингенты из числа вооруженных
сил любой другой оккупированной державы, которая принимала участие в
военных операциях против Германии.

5. Для совместного управления районом "Большого Берлина"
создается Межсоюзная Комендатура в составе трех комендантов,
назначаемых их соответствующими главнокомандующими.


3. Настоящий Протокол составлен в трех экземплярах, каждый на английском и русском языках. Оба текста являются аутентичными. Протокол вступает в силу одновременно с подписанием Германней Документа о безоговорочной капитуляции.

Впоследствии текст Протокола Соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большого Берлина" разработан и единогласно принят Европейской Консультативной Комиссий на заседании от 12 сентября 1944 года, за исключением распределения Северо-западной и Юго-западной зон оккупации Германии, а также Северо-западной и Южной частей "Большого Берлина", что подлежит дополнительному обсуждению и совместному решению Правительств США, Соединенного Королевства и СССР.

Представитель Правительства США в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии: Представитель Правительства Соединенного Королевства в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии: Представитель Правительства СССР в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии:

/Д.Г.Вайнант/ /У.Стренг/ /Г.Т.Гусев/
MEMORANDUM FOR: Miss Grace Tully
FROM: Jonathan Daniels

Senator Kilgore asked me to pass on to the President the attached memorandum written by Henry Hoke, author of "Blackmail." Hoke thinks that it is very important upon the occupation of Germany for the United States to seize a mailing list used by H. R. Hoffman and others in Munich for propaganda purposes in the United States.

I am not sure the President would be interested in it. However, if you think he would like to see it, please pass it on.
Memorandum to The President:

If Germany (or the National Socialist Party) is to be prevented from starting all over again ... someone during the first occupation of Germany should be tipped off to:

Seize the mailing list used by H. R. Hoffman and others in Munich to disrupt German-Americans and others in the United States.

The Allied Governments should also be interested in seizing and destroying the mailing lists used in disrupting other countries by mail ... especially the South American nations.

This may seem to be a small detail ... but if studied carefully the possibilities for maintaining peace are tremendous.

I am attaching a copy of "Black Mail." See paragraphs marked on pages 11, 12, and 13. See also paragraphs on page 69.

It is estimated that the Hoffman set-up in Munich built a mailing list of approximately 250,000 German-Americans with relatives still in Germany. From 1933 on there was a constant flow of propaganda originating in Germany. This large mailing list was broken down into selective units. To a very special list, the Germans sent bundles of propaganda for hand-to-hand distribution. And to selected Americans, special material was shipped for local printing in the United States.

If this mailing list (and others for other countries) were destroyed, it would be nearly impossible for the Germans to start another campaign of disruption by mail.

If any publicity was given to this suggestion, the Nazi leaders would hide their mailing list ... just like the mailing lists of subversive organizations in the United States were hidden after publicity prior to and following the outbreak of war.

We will be very glad to help anyone in authority determine where these lists might be found.

H.
September 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of September 15 from Quebec on the postwar treatment of Germany which received the agreement of the Prime Minister and yourself, it occurs to me that several steps should be considered in connection with the adoption of the policy which will be carried out in Germany after its surrender or collapse.

It would seem highly advisable to have the firm agreement of the Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the policy to be adopted as we have thus far acted on the basis that every action followed with respect to Germany, particularly in the post-hostilities period, would be on an agreed tripartite basis. It has been our understanding that the Soviet Government has also acted on this general assumption, and of course the European Advisory Commission, established by the Moscow Conference, was set up for the purpose of working out the problems of the treatment of Germany. We must realize that the adoption of any other basis of procedure would enormously increase the difficulties and responsibilities not only of our soldiers in the immediate military occupational period but also of our officials in the control period following.

Our information up to the present has been to the effect that the British Government no doubt has ideas of its own with respect to the application of economic controls to Germany, and we have not yet had any indication that the British Government would be in favor of complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar. We have no idea as yet what the Soviet Government has in mind. Would it not be well at this time for the State Department to sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry either through the European Advisory Commission or otherwise?
The President announced today that the Cabinet Committee which he had appointed some time ago to advise him regarding certain aspects of the American policy towards Germany after the collapse or surrender of that country, had completed its responsibility and accomplished its purpose.

In the first place, the Committee has examined and approved the American recommendation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the post-surrender directive to General Eisenhower, which represents the American position as to the control of Germany during the period immediately after the collapse of that country.

Secondly, the members of the Committee have submitted to the President their respective views relative to the American position as to what the Allied Powers' long-range policy toward Germany should be. While there are, naturally, differences of approach to this complex and important subject, there has been a large measure of agreement, especially on the fundamental questions of German disarmament, control of German industry and utter destruction of the Nazi Party and all its institutions.

These several memoranda will now receive the consideration of the President and the Secretary of State, and American representatives conferring with our allies in respect to the long-range policy, will be advised of the position of this government at an appropriate date.
Start to the President
before the Secy of War

I attached to FDR's Shinnen 9/5, 9/15, 9/20.
September 26, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

When I returned to Woodley last Sunday afternoon, I found a beautiful bunch of roses with a very kind card from you indicating that you had remembered my birthday. Birthdays at my age are not desirable memorabilia, but the kindness which lay behind the gift was very touching to me. I thank you greatly.

I also found your memorandum of September 22nd asking me to speak to you the next time I saw you about my memorandum of September 15th in respect to Germany. I should have gone to see you at once but found that you were in Hyde Park. The publicity which has been excited over this matter is of course most deplorable, but fortunately from the mutually contradictory forms of the rumors even an outsider can recognize that probably none of them are accurate. In the meanwhile we all, from the State Department, the Treasury, and my own Department, have been going ahead in an attempt to make progress on the immediate steps before us without any further disagreement. I am happy to say that we have all three Departments agreed upon a form of post-surrender interim directive to General Eisenhower which, after it is cleared by the British, can be sent at once to him without further disagreement. Harry Hopkins has seen it and approved it. I think it will be a step in the right direction. It does not attempt to conclude any of the long distance future steps about which we may have different opinions.
I was sorry to learn from Bob Patterson that you had been worried by rumors as to what the Army Pearl Harbor Board might find in its report. The Congressional Joint Resolution directing the creation of such a board was passed while I was in Europe, and the Board was appointed before I returned. I looked into the matter and found that the members had been selected by the General Staff from a careful study of the persons available and with an eye to the selection of responsible men representing the three elements of the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the National Guard. Each member had a good record. After its selection it had been approved by Marshall.

I found awaiting me a request to appear before it. I postponed my appearance until now in order that I should have time to make a careful study of the documents and thus make an appearance which would answer any possible false rumors that have arisen. This work has occupied a good deal of my time during the past week or ten days, but this morning I was before the Board for two hours and a half, and I think satisfied them on the subject matter of some of these speculations. One can never tell but I felt at the end of the hearing that they were satisfied with my account of the sequence of the events. I had the advantage which, so far as I know, none of the other witnesses have had of having kept a daily account of my meetings and work during that critical period so that my testimony was all based upon records and thus lifted above the danger of faulty memory. For myself, I can hardly imagine a picture of more close cooperation and anxious desire to warn our outposts of impending attack than was shown by this documented
record. According to my memory, you were yourself so painstakingly on the job throughout that period that I should be greatly distressed if you were victimized now by ignorant or malicious rumors. It has been my feeling that the best way to avoid such erroneous findings as you evidently feared was to meet with the Board and give them the true facts. I hope that it worked.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Will you speak to me about your memorandum of September fifteenth the next time we see each other?

F.D.R.
September 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since the meeting with you on September 9th attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other memoranda. I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory,—that is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.

The point of difference is not one of objective, - continued world peace - it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather
whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.

If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.

The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of
seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims—it would be a crime against civilization itself.

This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive
many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.

The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people's lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand.
any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.

I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England's need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.

The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open
confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.

I plead for no "soft" treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.

I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War
Memorandum for the President

September 9, 1944

Our discussions relate to a matter of method entirely; our objective is the same. It is not a question of a soft treatment of Germany or a harsh treatment of Germany. We are all trying to devise protection against recurrence by Germany of her attempts to dominate the world. We differ as to method. The fundamental remedy of Mr. Morgenthau is to provide that the industry of Germany shall be substantially obliterated. Although expressed only in terms of the Ruhr, the fact of the matter is that the Ruhr and the adjacent territories which Mr. Morgenthau would include in his program constitute, particularly after the amputations that are proposed, the core of German industry. His proposition is

"the total destruction of the whole German armament industry and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength."

In speaking of the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas, he says:

"This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future become an industrial area—all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed
by military action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or completely destroyed, all equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked."

I am unalterably opposed to such a program for the reasons given in my memorandum dated September 5 which is already before the President. I do not think that the reasons there stated need again be elaborated. In substance, my point is that these resources constitute a natural and necessary asset for the productivity of Europe. In a period when the world is suffering from destruction and from want of production, the concept of the total obliteration of these values is to my mind wholly wrong. My insistence is that these assets be conserved and made available for the benefit of the whole of Europe, including particularly Great Britain. The internationalization of the Ruhr or the trusteeship of its products--I am not prepared at the moment to discuss details of method--constitutes a treatment of the problem in accord with the needs and interests of the world. To argue that we are incapable of sustained effort to control such wealth within proper channels is to destroy any hope for the future of the
world. I believe that the education furnished us by the Germans in two world wars, plus the continuity of interest which such a trusteeship would stimulate is sufficient insurance that we can be trusted to deal with the problem. The unnatural destruction of this industry would, on the other hand, be so certain, in my judgment, to provoke sympathy for the Germans that we would create friends both in this country and abroad for the Germans, whereas now most of the peoples of the world are thoroughly antipathetic to them.

The other fundamental point upon which I feel we differ is the matter of the trial and punishment of those Germans who are responsible for crimes and depredations. Under the plan proposed by Mr. Morgenthau, the so-called arch-criminals shall be put to death by the military without provision for any trial and upon mere identification after apprehension. The method of dealing with these and other criminals requires careful thought and a well-defined procedure. Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at least the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his defense. I do not
mean to favor the institution of state trials or to introduce any cumbersome machinery but the very punishment of these men in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization, will have all the greater effect upon posterity. Furthermore, it will afford the most effective way of making a record of the Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to terminate the system and prevent its recurrence.

I am disposed to believe that at least as to the chief Nazi officials, we should participate in an international tribunal constituted to try them. They should be charged with offences against the laws of the rules of war in that they have committed wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the prosecution of the war. This law of the Rules of War has been upheld by our own Supreme Court and will be the basis of judicial action against the Nazis.

Even though these offences have not been committed against our troops, I feel that our moral position is better if we take our share in their conviction. Other war criminals who have committed crimes in subjugated
territory should be returned in accordance with the Moscow Declaration to those territories for trial by national military commissions having jurisdiction of the offence under the same Rules of War. I have great difficulty in finding any means whereby military commissions may try and convict those responsible for excesses committed within Germany both before and during the war which have no relation to the conduct of the war. I would be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a violation of the Rules of War but there is a certain field in which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such courts would be without jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any foreign court would be without jurisdiction to try those who were guilty of, or condoned, lynching in our own country.

The above are the two main points with which I differ from the proposed program submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Partition

I have an open mind on partition and although I have given the matter substantial consideration I have,
as yet, come to no conclusion as to wisdom or method of partition. I feel we cannot deal effectively with that subject until we have had an interchange of views with the English and the Russians. I, myself, seek further light on this subject. I, certainly, would not discourage any spontaneous effort toward separation of the country into two or more groups.

Amputation

I understand that there is some general recognition of the probability of Russia or the Poles taking East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. I suggest that we interpose no objection to this but that we take no part in the administration of the area. On the Western border the primary question is the matter of dealing with the Ruhr but it has also been suggested that the Rhineland and the Saar be delivered to France. Naturally I am in favor of the automatic return of Alsace and Lorraine to France but though my mind is not irrevocably closed against it, I feel that the burden of proof lies on those who suggest giving France more territory. She will come out of this war with her Empire practically intact, with a reduced population and already possessing
a very valuable bit of ore in the Longwy Briey area. To give her a substantial territory of German-speaking and German-bred people would create another problem in the balance of Europe. To counteract this, I would give France a share in the benefits of the internationalization of the Saar and the Ruhr and the advantage which this gives of what would in effect be an international barrier between France and Germany.

There are certain other methods of punishment affecting the personal lives of individual Germans proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to which I am opposed as constituting irritations of no fundamental value and, indeed, of considerable danger, but these are primarily matters of administration which I think need not be discussed at this time. In some part, at least, they had best be determined by those who have the primary responsibility for the administration of the occupation.

As a suggestion, I propose that during the interim period, which is all that we can deal with at the moment, the President be recommended to approve a program generally in accord with the memorandum submitted by
the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Tuesday, September 5, except for a modification of subparagraph 2(h) of that memorandum and certain other conditions on which I hope we can all agree, which suggested changes I append hereto.

Henry L. Stimson
September 5, 1944

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

With minor reservations about language which do not affect the intent of the document, "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President", I approve of it.

If there be agreement on policies, then it becomes of the utmost importance for the proper Government Officials to indicate how the policies in this document are to be implemented.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose here my comment on the
"Suggested Recommendations on the Treatment of
Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President"
which we discussed this morning at our meeting.

I should be very much obliged if you
would convey it with the paper in question to the
President as was proposed this morning.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

Hon. Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State.
I have considered the paper entitled "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President", dated September 4th, submitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State and have discussed it with my colleagues on the Committee.

With the exception of the last paragraph I find myself in agreement with the principles stated therein and they are in conformity with the lines upon which we have been proceeding in the War Department in our directives to the Armed Forces.

The last paragraph, however, is as follows:

"h. The primary objectives of our economic policy are (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production".

While certain of these statements by themselves may possibly be susceptible of a construction with which I would not be at variance, the construction put upon them at the discussion this morning certainly reached positions to which I am utterly opposed. The position frankly taken by
some of my colleagues was that the great industrial regions of Germany known as the Saar and the Ruhr with their very important deposits of coal and ore should be totally transformed into a non-industrialized area of agricultural land.

I cannot conceive of such a proposition being either possible or effective and I can see enormous general evils coming from an attempt to so treat it. During the past eighty years of European history this portion of Germany was one of the most important sources of the raw materials upon which the industrial and economic livelihood of Europe was based. Upon the production which came from the raw materials of this region during those years, the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated. Upon that production Germany became the largest sources of supply to no less than ten European countries, viz: Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France. By the same commerce, which in large part arose from this production, Germany also became the best buyer or customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; and the second best
customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. The production of these materials from this region could not be sealed up and obliterated as was proposed this morning, without manifestly causing a great dislocation to the trade upon which Europe has lived. In Germany itself this commerce has built up since 1870 a population of approximately thirty million more people than were ever supported upon the agricultural soil of Germany alone. Undoubtedly a similar growth of population took place in the nations which indirectly participated in the commerce based upon this production.

I cannot treat as realistic the suggestion that such an area in the present economic condition of the world can be turned into a non-productive "ghost territory" when it has become the center of one of the most industrialized continents in the world, populated by peoples of energy, vigor and progressiveness.

I can conceive of endeavoring to meet the misuse which Germany has recently made of this production by wise systems of control or trusteeship or even transfers of ownership to other nations. But I cannot conceive of turning such a gift of nature into a dust heap.
War is destruction. This war more than any previous war has caused gigantic destruction. The need for the recuperative benefits of productivity is more evident now than ever before throughout the world. Not to speak of Germany at all or even her satellites, our Allies in Europe will feel the need of the benefit of such productivity if it should be destroyed. Moreover, speed of reconstruction is of great importance, if we hope to avoid dangerous convulsions in Europe.

We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty. This would mean
condemning the German people to a condition of servitude in which, no matter how hard or how effectively a man worked, he could not materially increase his economic condition in the world. Such a program would, I believe, create tensions and resentments far outweighing any immediate advantage of security and would tend to obscure the guilt of the Nazis and the viciousness of their doctrines and their acts.

By such economic mistakes I cannot but feel that you would also be poisoning the springs out of which we hope that the future peace of the world can be maintained.

It is primarily by the thorough apprehension, investigation, and trial of all the Nazi leaders and instruments of the Nazi system of terrorism, such as the Gestapo, with punishment delivered as promptly, swiftly, and severely as possible, that we can demonstrate the abhorrence which the world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our determination to extirpate it and all its fruits forever.

My basic objection to the proposed methods of treating Germany which were discussed this morning was that in addition to a system of preventive and educative punishment they would add the dangerous weapon of complete economic
oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war; they tend to breed war.

[Signature: Henry L. Stimson]
Insert at beginning of rewrite paragraph 2 (b)

“Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all its affiliated and associated organizations should be effected immediately and ......
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN CABINET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
AS STATED IN PAPER SEPTEMBER 4 1944
ALREADY SUBMITTED TO THE DEAN OF SHEAD

To paragraph 2(a) should be added the following:

"At least for an indefinite period Germany shall
be denied the means or power to manufacture or design aeroplanes
or gliders of any sort whether military, commercial or private,
and Germany shall have no license to operate any airlines.
During this period no schools or courses for the study of air
flight in any form shall be permitted.

All machines, plants and other instruments which
are peculiarly adapted to the manufacture of arms and lethal
weapons of any sort shall be dismantled or destroyed."

Paragraph 2(b) should be rewritten to read as follows:

"All members of the Gestapo, viz., the so-called
security or political police, prominent Nazis in whatever activ-
ity they may have operated, substantially if not all members
of the S.S. organizations, and others who are suspected of having
taken part in or had responsibility for the perpetration of war
crimes, should be apprehended and held for further disposition.
Prompt and summary trials shall be held of those charged with
such crimes and punishment should be swift and severe.

Studies should be instituted at once to determine
the procedures to be followed in such trials, and they should
be cleared with the British, Russians, and French as quickly
as possible, so that they can be communicated to the appropriate
occupying authorities without delay.

All laws discriminating against persons on grounds
of race, color, creed, political activity or opinion, should
be annulled."

To Paragraph (e) should be added the following:

"The territories of Germany which are to be ceded
to other countries are understood to be all or most of East
Prussia and some parts of Silesia. The question of the Rhine-
land and the Saar is closely connected with the treatment of
the Ruhr. We recommend as the present view of the United States
that a strong control over the products of this area must be
maintained by means of some form of international trusteeship
of its products and resources. It should not be obliterated
as an industrial productive center, but it must be actively
managed by others than Germans and otherwise completely taken
from German domination.

On the other hand no efforts shall be made to
rebuild any of the destroyed plants in Germany until permission
is given by appropriate Allied or United Nations authority."
Substitute for paragraph (h) the following:

"The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the permanent elimination of German economic domination in Europe and (2) the conversion of German economic capacity in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production."

Henry L. Stimson

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
September 6, 1944

My dear Cordell:

I was delighted at the attitude which you expressed yesterday in regard to the treatment of the German people.

We here in the Treasury have prepared a much more detailed memorandum, and I feel that it might serve a useful purpose if the President were given a copy of it. I am also enclosing a copy for yourself.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Cabinet Committee has not been able to agree upon a statement of American policy for the post-war treatment of Germany. The memorandum presented by the Secretary of the Treasury is decidedly at variance with the views developed in the State Department. In the meantime, I have received your memorandum of September 15, with the statements of views respecting the Ruhr, Saar, etc., and the conversion of Germany into an agricultural and pastoral country, which was formulated at Quebec. This memorandum seems to reflect largely the opinions of the Secretary of the Treasury in the treatment to be accorded Germany. I feel that I should therefore submit to you the line of thought that has been developing in the State Department on this matter.

1. Status of Negotiations with the British and Russians

The instrument of unconditional surrender of Germany has been recommended by the European Advisory Commission and has been formally approved by this Government. It is anticipated that British and Russian approval will be forthcoming. The question of the American and British zones of occupation was, according to your memorandum, worked out at Quebec and there will presumably be no more difficulty over this matter. In the meantime, the European Advisory Commission is going ahead on plans for a tri-partite control machinery and military government for Germany during the occupation period. All three governments have submitted proposals which are similar in their general outline. The American proposal contemplates a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanding Generals of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., which would coordinate Allied control of Germany and supervise such centralized governmental functions and economic activities as the three

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State Dept. Letter 1-11-71
By J. Schaeble Date FEB 9 1972
three powers deemed essential. A Control Council, composed of representatives in equal numbers from each of the three Allied Governments, would be established by the Supreme Allied Authority and will coordinate the administration of military government throughout Germany, including detailed planning for the execution of directives received from the three governments. We expect to have a recommended plan on this from the European Advisory Commission in the near future.

2. Important Problems For Which High Policy Decisions Must Be Worked Out by the Three Governments

The fundamental question to be decided is what kind of a Germany we want and what policy should be put into effect during occupation to attain our objectives. The most important of these problems are set forth below with an explanation of the State Department's views. It should be emphasized, however, that these objectives will have to be worked out with our principal Allies if they are to be applied throughout the German Reich.

(a) Demilitarization of Germany. The complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, paramilitary and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war should be effected. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

(b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations. The Nazi Party should be immediately dissolved. Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be arrested and interned and war criminals should be tried and, if found guilty, executed. Active party members should be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be annulled.

(c) Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda for the purpose of eliminating Nazi doctrines or similar teachings.

(d) Extensive controls over German educational system should be established for the purpose of eliminating all Nazi influence and propaganda.

(e) No
(e) No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany (as distinguished from territorial ampu-"tations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principal Allies on this question. We should encourage a decentralization of the German government structure and if any tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise they should not be discouraged.

(f) Economic Objectives. The primary and continuing objectives of our economic policy are: (1) to render Germany incapable of waging war, and (2) to eliminate permanently German economic domination of Europe. A shorter term objective is to require the performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation for injuries done to the United Nations.

To achieve the first two objectives, it will be es-sential (1) to destroy all factories incapable of conversion to peaceful purposes and to prevent their reconstruction, (2) to enforce the conversion of all other plans, (3) to eliminate self-sufficiency by imposing reforms that will make Germany dependent upon world markets, (4) to establish controls over foreign trade and key industries for the purpose of preventing German rearmament, and (5) to eliminate the position of power of large industrialists and land-owners.

This Government has little direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germany and no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. However, the U.S.S.R. and a number of other states which have been victims of German destruction and exploitation may press claims for German production and labor service for rehabilitation and construction.

Extensive controls over industry and foreign trade will be essential during the immediate period of demilita-
rization and dismantlement, as well as during the period of reparations. After this phase, a system of control and supervision of German industry and trade will have to be worked out in the light of world security developments. This system should be of such a character that the victor powers will be able and willing to enforce it over a considera-
ble period.

It is of the highest importance that the standard of living of the German people in the early years be such as to bring home to them that they have lost the war and to impress on them that they must abandon all their pretentious theories that they are a superior race created to govern the world. Through lack of luxuries we may teach them that war does not pay.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

October 19, 1944

In connection with the attached proposed draft of a statement, I would like to speak to you about it when you get a chance.

I will call you shortly after you receive it.

Oscar Cot

Attachment
The Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Foreign Economic Administrator announced that:

1. Mr. Dewey's statement about the lack of plans for the occupation of Germany is inaccurate.

2. Beginning about a year ago plans were started in the American Government to work out a joint and unified policy by the War Department, Navy Department, State, Treasury, Foreign Economic Administration and the other interested departments and agencies.

3. Contrary to popular speculation, the basic plans to be used immediately after the occupation of Germany were worked out and unanimously agreed upon by all the interested agencies of the United States Government months before any American soldiers set foot in Germany. All of the pre-surrender terms and the directives to be used by the American military were worked out in concrete form even before this.

4. The proclamation issued by General Eisenhower as Allied Commander was based on the agreed pre-surrender plans and on the other plans for the occupation of Germany as were his orders for the abolition of the Nazi racial, sterilization, concentration camp and other similar Nazi laws and institutions.

5. The detailed plans for the unconditional surrender of Germany have been worked out not only in the American Government but with our Allies.
6. The long range plans dealing with what should be done over a period of years to control Germany's will, power and capacity to make war have been worked on for a long time in the American and in the Allied governments but no final decisions can obviously be made on all phases of this problem until the relevant facts are known about what the conditions are in Germany after it is completely defeated.

7. If the Germans senselessly continue their resistance, in view of the certainty of victory, they will invite increased destruction of their industries and their economic system by Allied bombers and Allied land forces. A good part of Germany's industrial and economic system has already been destroyed or damaged by the Allied air forces. The destruction from bombing raids continues to mount. Now with land fighting on German soil, the Germans, as illustrated at Aachen, are inviting further and more devastating destruction by United Nations artillery and other land force action. If, in addition to this destruction which the Germans are bringing on themselves, they wantonly follow a scorched earth policy, the destruction of the German industrial and economic system will be even greater and more complete.

When we and our Allies know with definiteness how much the Germans have destroyed their own industrial and economic system, we will know better what to do about it.
8. One central thing is clear. Our plans do not envisage the
destruction or enslavement of the German people; but they do envisage
effective control to insure that the Germans will not have the will,
power and capacity to make war again.

9. Based on this central principle, the available facts and
the alternative possibilities depending upon the length of the war
against Germany and what the Germans do to destroy their industrial and
economic system, work on the long range plans both in the United States
Government and the Allied Governments is moving along as speedily as
possible.
Miss Tully:

Mr. Stettinius has asked that I send this memorandum to you and tell you that there is considerable urgency about it.

[Signature]

B. Hall
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schneble Date FEB. 9 1972  

October 27, 1944  

PROPA GANDA TO GERMANY  

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT  

I am enclosing a paraphrase of a telegram received from Ambassador Murphy in regard to proposals made by the Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF for the issuance of a directive redefining the objects of Allied occupation of Germany. I am also enclosing a memorandum which reflects the joint views of the Department of State, the War Department, and the Office of War Information concerning the various points raised by the Psychological Warfare Division.

The total effect of these proposals, particularly those relating to food and employment in Germany, is considered to be dangerous. They constitute in fact a commitment to the Germans which may be unwise not only from the point of view of infringement upon the principle of unconditional surrender but also because of the possibility that military considerations may make impossible the fulfillment of such a commitment. The Department, the War Department, and the Office of War Information believe that these proposals can be so altered as to attain the basic objective without making commitments of any sort. Suggestions to this end are set forth in the attached memorandum. Do you approve of the transmission to Ambassador Murphy of a telegram embodying the substance of these suggestions?

Enclosures:
1. Paraphrase of Secret Telegram No. 8842, October 17, from Ambassador Murphy, American Embassy, London.

Copy of memorandum "Comments on Murphy Cable of October 17."

( carbon of this copy returned to Mr. Sethlow, 11-2-44)
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

RECEIVED

FROM: AMBASSAD ORY, LONDON.

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE.

DATED: October 17, 1944, 7:48 p.m.

NUMBER: 8842.

Ambassador Murphy states that during a recent staff meeting the Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF recommended the issuance of a SHAEF directive which would redefine the objectives of Allied occupation of Germany with special reference to the presurrender period. He suggested a priority list as follows:

1. to maintain the output of key industries and essential services;
2. to obtain from the purged German administration at least that degree of collaboration which will prevent administrative sabotage;
3. to induce in German civilians in occupied territories non-resistance and obedience to our orders thus reducing the number of garrison troops necessary;
4. by the example of life under military government to counter the effect of Nazi propaganda in the German army and to weaken its spirit of resistance and
5. to obtain from the civilian population at least that degree of acceptance of our rule which will make them unwilling to harbor Nazi guerrillas and saboteurs.

Murphy states that no decisions have yet been taken on these points but that a committee has been established to consider these questions and to formulate local directives.

Murphy adds that SHAEF points out that military operations require the continued operation of railways, public services and the coal mines in addition to other services. German personnel will be needed.
needed for this work and must be fed. Since some German territory is not self-sustaining food imports will be necessary. PWD made the point that present directives permit food imports and economic rehabilitation measures when demanded by military considerations. A narrow interpretation of the directive would prevent food imports unless and until industrial unrest is present or starvation has been proved. A broad interpretation would look toward an economic policy designed to maintain tolerable living conditions throughout the occupied area. This would reduce the necessity for garrison forces and provide for the maintenance of essential production. PWD states that a narrow interpretation will result in infinitely worse conditions for the population under military government than under the Nazis. PWD states that this would mean large garrison forces and that eventually the Allies would probably be compelled to introduce widespread relief measures. Therefore, it was proposed that the German population generally should be assured that they would not starve under Allied rule and it was also suggested that military considerations will compel the maintenance of employment at as high a level as possible.

During the meeting Ambassador Murphy urged that no broadcast or announcement should be made which could even remotely be construed as a general commitment or long term obligation. He stated his belief that factual news should be employed to demonstrate that there is no starvation or brutality under Allied rule.

Murphy now states his belief that there should be a wall of complete silence on the Allied propaganda front to Germany.

He also
He also requests instructions in regard to the American information effort in Germany during the post defeat period when such activity will be conducted in the political section of the Control Council.

WINANT.
COMMENTS ON MURPHY CABLE OF OCTOBER 17

The proposed PWD Directive, as reported by Mr. Murphy, sets forth broad aims which, taken individually, are perhaps defensible. Taken together and worded as they are, however, they provide the basis for a propaganda campaign which might be much too conciliatory and ingratiating. The following points seem pertinent:

1. There is danger that the proposed PWD Directive, in the form reported by Mr. Murphy, would result in appeals to the Germans, which we do not want in any form.

2. The PWD suggestion that the military government fears that conditions might be worse for the German population under military government than under the Nazis is open to grave question. Certainly the Allies will not under military government expect to provide for the German people in defeat BETTER food and employment conditions than they enjoyed under their own government, and when they lived off food looted from other countries of Europe and had jobs making implements of war. The liberated countries of Europe would understandably resent any program which seemed to promise the Germans better treatment than the liberated peoples are getting.

3. By giving the Germans the reassurance proposed by PWD, the Allies would be putting themselves on a spot. The Nazis seem intent upon creating chaos in Germany; food looted by the Nazis in other European countries will soon be unavailable, and shortages are inevitable. If we gave assurances and failed to make good, the average German's wrath which otherwise might be directed at the Nazis would be deflected to the Allies.

4. The proposal that we maintain a "wall of silence," except for straight news to the Germans seems impracticable. It also seems undesirable, since there will be propaganda points which we should hammer home to the Germans.

It is suggested that the directive should be altered and should follow the general tone stated by President Roosevelt in his address of October 22, 1944, as follows:

"As for Germany, that tragic nation which has sown the wind and is now reaping the whirlwind -- we and our allies are entirely agreed that we shall not bargain with the Nazi conspirators, or leave them a shred of control -- open or secret -- of the instruments of government.

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972
'We shall not leave them a single element of military power - or of potential military power.

'But I should be false to the very foundations of my religious and political convictions, if I should ever relinquish the hope - and even the faith - that in all peoples, without exception, there live some instinct for truth, some attraction toward justice, and some passion for peace - buried as they may be in the German case under a brutal regime.

'We bring no charge against the German race, as such, for we cannot believe that God has eternally condemned any race of humanity. For we know in our own land how many good men and women of German ancestry have proved loyal, freedom-loving, peace-loving citizens.

'There is going to be stern punishment for all those in Germany directly responsible for this agony of mankind.

'The German people are not going to be enslaved - because the United Nations do not traffic in human slavery. But it will be necessary for them to earn their way back into the fellowship of peace-loving and law-abiding nations. And, in their climb up that steep road, we shall certainly see to it that they are not encumbered by having to carry guns. They will be relieved of that burden - we hope, forever.'

'The following specific points might form the basis of a proper directive:

AIMS

a. To show German civilians that it is to their interest to obey Allied orders.

b. To show them that if they wish to prevent the chaos which the Nazis are fostering, and save themselves from starvation and want, they will keep essential services and key consumer goods industries, particularly agriculture, (but not necessarily 'key industries') going.

c. To make clear to minor administrative officials that it is to their and Germany's interest for them to cooperate with Allied authorities.
d. To demonstrate to the Germans the foolhardiness of harboring or assisting Nazi guerrillas.

e. To counteract Nazi propaganda and reduce resistance by showing how Allied Military government functions.

f. To hold forth to the Germans that Allied occupation will bring an end to the spying, ruthless vengeances and other excesses of the Gestapo, the S. S., and other Nazi agents and bring about a release from regimentation and political persecutions.

g. To make clear that the responsibility for German suffering rests squarely on the Nazi government and not on the Allies.

The tone of all Allied output should reflect the feeling that the degree of cooperation given Allied authorities by the Germans is a matter of complete indifference to us; that we have our ways of dealing with non-cooperation and, if any Germans prefer this course, it will be they and not the Allies who will suffer. We should make clear that we intend to establish firm and orderly administration in each area but the well-being of each community will depend largely on the Germans' own behavior.

Some reassurance to the average German is undoubtedly in order. However, this should not go beyond the following: we are completely determined to eliminate the Gestapo, the S. S., the Nazi Party and German militarists. We are determined to punish severely all those guilty of war crimes. At the same time, the average German and his family will have opportunity to live and work peacefully and without molestation if they abide by Allied regulations, if they have committed no crimes and if they demonstrate willingness to work their way back into the family of nations.

Allied output should make clear that it is the Nazi leaders who are responsible for whatever chaos exists in Germany. It should seek to establish in the German mind the concept that any guerrilla activity is a conflict between lawabiding Germans and Nazi outlaws rather than between Germans and the Allies.

Emphasis should be put on the premise that every day the Nazi leaders are able to prolong the war will merely result in further destruction of German industrial and all other facilities and thus increase the suffering of the German people.
through an increasing lack of resources which will be needed when the war ends. It should be made clear that the responsibility for the bad conditions which are bound to exist at the close of the war will rest squarely upon the Nazi leaders who, solely in frantic efforts to save their own skins, are deliberately wasting German resources. The point here is that it is not so much a question of what policy the Allies will pursue once they get there but how much destruction of Germany's own resources will have resulted meanwhile.

METHODS

There should be no appeals whatever by Allied authorities. In all media we should use the technique of issuing only news, announcements and objective commentaries. These may be used skillfully to put across propaganda points (largely through selection and emphasis) but they should be handled as statements of fact and not as attempts to persuade. In this output, the Allies should particularly emphasize:

1. Announcements and warnings from the Allied military authorities.
3. Any news that can be found about occasional clashes between law-abiding Germans and Nazi outlaws.
4. Factual and colorful news of orderly life in Allied occupied enemy territory (both German and non-German.) This should cover the orderly appearance of the towns, the justice of Allied authorities, the cooperation of local sub-officials, the number of babies born, the fact that women still hang out the wash.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of the Treasury is asking if he can see a copy of the letter which the President sent to Secretary Hull last week on treatment of Germany. He wants to see it in connection with the British Army handbook on which he is working.

The attached is all we have on that subject.
September 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I do not think that at the present stage any good purpose would be served by having the State Department or any other department sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry. Most certainly it should not be taken up with the European Advisory Commission which, in a case like this, is on a tertiary and not even a secondary level.

The real nub of the situation is to keep Britain from going into complete bankruptcy at the end of the war.

Somebody has been talking not only out of turn to the papers or on facts which are not fundamentally true.

No one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation again, and yet somebody down the line has handed this out to the press. I wish we could catch and chastise him.

You know that before the war Germany was not only building up war manufacture, but was also building up enough of a foreign trade to finance re-arming sufficiently and still maintain enough international credit to keep out of international bankruptcy.

I just can not go along with the idea of seeing the British empire collapse financially, and Germany at the same time building up a potential re-armament machine to make another war possible in twenty years. More inspection of plants will not prevent that.
But no one wants "complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar".

It is possible, however, in those two particular areas to enforce rather complete controls. Also, it must not be forgotten that outside of the Ruhr and Saar, Germany has many other areas and facilities for turning out large exports.

In regard to the Soviet government, it is true that we have no idea as yet what they have in mind, but we have to remember that in their occupied territory they will do more or less what they wish. We cannot afford to get into a position of merely recording protests on our part unless there is some chance of some of the protests being heeded.

I do not intend by this to break off or delay negotiations with the Soviet government over lend-lease either on the contract basis or on the proposed Fourth Protocol basis. This, however, does not immediately concern the German industrial future.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to your memorandum of September twenty-ninth, I think it is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It may be in a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.

Your memorandum paragraph #1.

I agree except for going into too much detail and directives at the present moment, and we must emphasize the fact that the European Advisory Commission is "advisory" and that you and I are not bound by this advice. This is something which is sometimes overlooked and if we do not remember that word "advisory" they may go ahead and execute some of the advice, which, when the time comes, we may not like at all.

Your memorandum paragraph #2.

In view of the fact that we have not occupied Germany, I cannot agree at this moment as to what kind of a Germany we want in every detail.

In regard to the problems involved, there are some which are perfectly clear and which can be approved now.

Sub-paragraph (a) on the Demilitarization of Germany is, of course, correct but should include everything to do with aircraft. This should be made specific. It must apply not merely to the assembly of aircraft but to everything that goes into an aircraft. We must remember that somebody may claim that the aircraft is for non-military purposes, such as a transport plane. Germany must be prevented from making any aircraft of any type in the future.
I am in hearty agreement with Sub-paragraph (b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations.

In the same way, I agree with Sub-Paragraph (c) Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda.

Sub-paragraph (d) Extensive controls over German educational system. I should like to talk with your experts in regard to just what this means.

I agree with Sub-paragraph (e) No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany.

Sub-paragraph (f) Economic Objectives. I should like to discuss this with the State Department in regard to some of the language. I agree with it in principle, but I do not know what part of it means. Much of this sub-head is dependent on what we and the Allies find when we get into Germany -- and we are not there yet.

F. D. R.
COPY OF INCOMING TELEGRAM

EOC-346
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Secret)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
8485, October 7, 8 p.m.

COMEA 108

I am glad to have Department's 8047 (October 2, 11 p.m.). When the question of censorship and public information control is raised in the EAC, I shall be able to comment informally on it in the spirit of the directives. However, lacking formal clearance, no written statement of United States policy on these subjects can be put before the Commission. In this, as in many other questions pending before the EAC, continued delay in clearing United States policy places the American viewpoint and American interests at a decided disadvantage.

I have noticed in EAC discussions that the Soviet delegate is well-informed even in rather small details of the provisions which have been outlined in the 25 British draft directives on Germany which have been informally circulated. If we wish American policy to be similarly studied and given due weight by the other two Governments and, particularly, by the Soviet Government, it is necessary to circulate authoritative policy papers without further delay. Speed is imperative for mechanical reasons also. Each document when submitted has to be laboriously translated into Russian, then transmitted to Moscow for study and comment by the interested departments of the Soviet Government and returned to London for negotiation by the Soviet delegation in the EAC.

Our experience so far shows that although the Russians may be slow in presenting their own proposals, they meanwhile make a close study of United States and United Kingdom papers and their positions when presented are well thought out and well supported. When the Russians do formally in-
a paper into the EAC or state their conclusions, the policy presented has been completely cleared by their Government and can be considered authoritative. I have found in negotiating that advancing papers which have not had full clearance by our Government and on which, I am not, therefore, able to take a definite position simply confuses our relationship with the other two delegations, and particularly with the Russian delegation, and retards business rather than expediting it.

I feel it my duty to call your attention most urgently to the tremendous lag in clearing our documentation on Germany. Since the first meeting of the EAC in January nine months ago, I have received only five fully cleared policy papers relating to Germany. By Department's instruction 3667 (January 28) I received WS - 10 A and WS - 12. By Department's instruction 3735 (February 12) I received a draft instrument of surrender and a commentary thereon. By Department's instruction 3784 (February 26) I received the United States paper on control machinery (W3-15 C). By Department's instruction 4347 (July 25) I received the Working Security Committee's comments on the British directive on control of German inland transport. Since March 1 I have received only one United States policy paper with authoritative clearances.

From time to time in answer to my specific requests, I have received telegraphic comments on urgent matters under immediate negotiation. I have also received a substantial number of memoranda prepared in the Department. These latter studies are helpful to the United States delegation but lacking clearance by the Working Security Committee, they cannot be used effectively in discussions of the EAC. Despite the promises contained in EACOM 29 (Department's 6315, August 10) I have not received any fully cleared materials of the type urgently requested in COMEA 68 (my 512, July 8, 8 p.m.) and COMEA 82 (my 7433, September 10, 3 p.m.).

I request first priority consideration and clearance for the following documents: (One) Proclamations and general orders transmitted by my despatch 17222 (August 1); (Two) United States directives prepared by Army Planning Committee and reviewed by my advisers of which 21 have been transmitted to date.

Except for one or two minor details which have been fully reported in my despatches, the proclamations, general orders and draft directives have been approved unanimously by
by my EAC delegation which includes representatives of State, Army, Navy and Air Force. In organizing the United States delegation on the EAC, it was understood that the Departments and the services concerned would coordinate policy in joint recommendations and I have done my utmost to see that all their points of view are fully taken into account in preparing the directives which I have forwarded to the Department. Since the establishment of the United States Group Control Council (Germany) under General Wickersham, its sections and representatives have also participated actively in drafting and approving these directives.

Comments on British directives of which 29 have been transmitted to date should also be helpful; so far I have received Working Security comments on only one of the United Kingdom directives.

If, as mentioned in Department's 8047 (October 2, 11 p.m.) certain general decisions are still pending, this factor should not delay consideration and clearance of our draft directives which it will be noted do not prejudge such long range problems as for example, partition and de-industrialization but deal with practical questions requiring immediate tripartite handling after Germany's collapse or surrender.

If, on the other hand, these delays have occurred because of the present cumbersome machinery for interdepartmental clearance in Washington, I must urge that the Department examine most seriously means for expediting the consideration of these questions and for providing me with the materials which I have been promised for several months if negotiations are to be carried on successfully in the EAC. The responsibility for these delays should be ascertained, but what is even more important, the present arrangements including the procedures of the Working Security Committee as set forth in Department's instruction 3667 (January 28) should be reviewed and revised.

In recent years I have tried to study the negotiations which have shaped the relationships among the great powers. I would like to say that I do not think that any conference or commission created by governments for a serious purpose has had less support from the governments creating it than the European Advisory Commission. At least I do not know of any like example in recorded history.

Please show this telegram to the President, to the Secretary of State, and to the Secretary of War.

WINANT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of September 15 from Quebec on the postwar treatment of Germany which received the agreement of the Prime Minister and yourself, it occurs to me that several steps should be considered in connection with the adoption of the policy which will be carried out in Germany after its surrender or collapse.

It would seem highly advisable to have the firm agreement of the Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the policy to be adopted as we have thus far acted on the basis that every action followed with respect to Germany, particularly in the post-hostilities period, would be on an agreed tripartite basis. It has been our understanding that the Soviet Government has also acted on this general assumption, and of course the European Advisory Commission, established by the Moscow Conference, was set up for the purpose of working out the problems of the treatment of Germany. We must realize that the adoption of any other basis of procedure would enormously increase the difficulties and responsibilities not only of our soldiers in the immediate military occupational period but also of our officials in the control period following.

Our information up to the present has been to the effect that the British Government no doubt has ideas of its own with respect to the application of economic controls to Germany, and we have not yet had any indication that the British Government would be in favor of complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar. We have no idea as yet what the Soviet Government has in mind. Would it not be well at this time for the State Department to sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry either through the European Advisory Commission or otherwise?
E. A. C. (44) 11th Meeting.
14th November, 1944.

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

MINUTES of Meeting held at Lancaster House, London, S.W.1., on 14th November, 1944, at 5.00 p.m.

Present:
Dr. F. E. Mosely (in the Chair)
Brigadier-General V. Meyer.

Sir William Strang.
Mr. C. O'Neill.

Secretariat
Mr. E. P. Donaldson.
Mr. I. G. Frigorny.
Mr. W. D. McFie.

AGENDA

1. Approval of text of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Control Machinery in Germany.

2. Approval of the Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

THE COMMISSION:

1. Approval of text of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Control Machinery in Germany.

(a) approved the text of the Agreement on control machinery in Germany, agreed between the Delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (The text of the Agreement in English and Russian is annexed).

(b) decided to submit the above-mentioned Agreement to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for consideration and approval.

THE COMMISSION:

2. Approval of the Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Approved the text of the Report by the European Advisory Commission and decided to submit it, signed by the three Representatives on the European Advisory Commission, as a covering document to the text of the above-mentioned Agreement, to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (The text of the Report in English and Russian is annexed).

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:
Philip E. Mosely

For the Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:
William Strang

For the Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:
REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNION OF
 SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

In virtue of the Terms of Reference of the European Advisory Commission agreed upon at the Moscow Conference, the Commission has given attention to the machinery required to ensure the fulfilment of the terms of surrender to be imposed on Germany, as well as of any additional requirements which may be presented to Germany in accordance with those terms. Accordingly, we submit herewith, for the consideration of the three Governments, a proposed Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany.

2. At the present time, it is difficult to determine the course of events in Germany after surrender or cessation of organised resistance. The immediate problem is to decide what Allied agencies should be set up in Germany directly after surrender or cessation of organised resistance and immediately upon the occupation of Germany by armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. The plan contained in the attached proposed Agreement provides for the tripartite agencies of control and administration to cover the period of occupation of Germany following her defeat, during which Germany will be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.

4. The purposes of these agencies of control and administration will comprise the control of the disarmament of Germany, including the most urgent tasks of economic disarmament; the abolition of the Nazi regime; and the preparation of conditions for the creation in Germany of organs based on democratic principles.

5. We have not found it possible to indicate what should be the duration in point of time of the period to be covered by the proposed Agreement. We would recommend, however, that the tasks assigned to the organs of control during that period should be carried out as short a time as possible, and that the moment for the inauguration of the second period should be decided by the three Governments after consultations with their Commanders-in-Chief.

6. We have based our draft on the assumption that there will at the outset be a central administration in Germany through which the organs of control will operate. The machinery of tripartite control which we recommend would, however, be capable of adjustment to meet other conditions.
7. We have individually reported to our respective Governments on the course of the discussions which have taken place in arriving at the contents of the Agreement which is hereto attached. It is unnecessary for us, therefore, to repeat the history of those discussions.

8. In order to ensure that the control machinery proposed in the Agreement will be prepared to assume its functions with minimum delay, we recommend that nuclear control machinery, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, be established on a tripartite basis as soon as possible after the Agreement has been approved.

9. We recommend, with reference to Article 8 of the Agreement, that the three Governments should jointly issue a public statement at the time of the signature of the Instrument of Surrender to the effect that, in connection with the exercise of the powers assumed by them in the Instrument of Surrender, they will consult with the Governments of other United Nations.

10. We further recommend that the main points of the attached Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany be published by the three Allied Representatives as a Proclamation to the German people immediately after the signing of the Unconditional Surrender Instrument or immediately following the cessation of organized resistance in Germany. This Proclamation would also include a description of the Zones of Occupation.

For the Representative of
the Government of the
United States of America
on the European Advisory Commission:

Philip E. Mooney

Representative of the
Government of the
United Kingdom on
the European Advisory
Commission:

William Runcie

Representative of the
Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the European Advisory Commission:

Leonid Byelyi

LANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

14th November, 1944.
AGREEMENT ON CONTROL MACHINERY IN GERMANY

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following Agreement with regard to the organisation of the Allied control machinery in Germany in the period during which Germany will be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender:

Article 1.

Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.

Article 2.

Each Commander-in-Chief in his zone of occupation will have attached to his military, naval and air representatives of the other two Commanders-in-Chief for liaison duties.

Article 3.

(a) The three Commanders-in-Chief, acting together as a body, will constitute a supreme organ of control called the Control Council.

(b) The functions of the Control Council will be:

(i) to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation;

(ii) to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government;

(iii) to control the German central administration, which will operate under the direction of the Control Council and will be responsible to it for ensuring compliance with its demands;
(iv) to direct the administration of "Greater Berlin" through appropriate organs.

(c) The Control Council will meet at least once in ten days; and it will meet at any time upon request of any one of its members. Decisions of the Control Council shall be unanimous. The chairmanship of the Control Council will be held in rotation by each of its three members.

(d) Each member of the Control Council will be assisted by a political adviser, who will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council. Each member of the Control Council may also, when necessary, be assisted at meetings of the Council by naval or air advisers.

Article 4.

A permanent Co-ordinating Committee will be established under the Control Council, composed of one representative of each of the three Commanders-in-Chief, not below the rank of General Officer or the equivalent rank in the naval or air forces. Members of the Co-ordinating Committee will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council.

Article 5.

The duties of the Co-ordinating Committee, acting on behalf of the Control Council and through the Control Staff, will include:

(a) the carrying out of the decisions of the Control Council;

(b) the day-to-day supervision and control of the activities of the German central administration and institutions;

(c) the co-ordination of current problems which call for uniform measures in all three zones;

(d) the preliminary examination and preparation for the Control Council of all questions submitted by individual Commanders-in-Chief.

Article 6.

(a) The members of the Control Staff, appointed by their respective national authorities, will be organised in the following Divisions:

- Military;
- Naval;
- Air;
- Transport;
- Political;
- Economic;
- Finance;
- Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution;
- Internal Affairs and Communications;
- Legal;
- Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons;
- Non-power.

Adjustments in the number and functions of the Divisions may be made in the light of experience.
(b) At the head of each Division there will be three high-ranking officials, one from each Power. The duties of the three heads of each Division, acting jointly, will include:

(i) exercising control over the corresponding German Ministries and German central institutions;

(ii) acting as advisers to the Control Council and, when necessary, attending meetings thereof;

(iii) transmitting to the German central administration the decisions of the Control Council, communicated through the Co-ordinating Committee.

(c) The three heads of a Division will take part in meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee at which matters affecting the work of their Division are on the agenda.

(d) The staffs of the Divisions may include civilian as well as military personnel. They may also, in special cases, include nationals of other United Nations, appointed in their personal capacity.

Article 7.

(a) An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Kommandatura) consisting of three Commandants, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" area. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-Allied Governing Authority.

(b) A Technical Staff, consisting of personnel of each of the three Powers, will be established under the Inter-Allied Governing Authority, and will be organised to serve the purpose of supervising and controlling the activities of the local organs of "Greater Berlin" which are responsible for its municipal services.

(c) The Inter-Allied Governing Authority will operate under the general direction of the Control Council and will receive orders through the Co-ordinating Committee.

Article 8.

The necessary liaison with the Governments of other United Nations chiefly interested will be ensured by the appointment by such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Control Council, having access, through the appropriate channels, to the organs of control.

Article 9.

United Nations' organisations which may be admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany will, in respect of their activities in Germany, be subordinate to the Allied control.
machinery and answerable to it.

Article 10.

The Allied organs for the control and administration of Germany outlined above will operate during the initial period of the occupation of Germany immediately following surrender, that is, the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.

Article 11.

The question of the Allied organs required for carrying out the functions of control and administration in Germany in a later period will be the subject of a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above text of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 12th November, 1944, and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:

Philips E. Mosely

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:

William Fleming

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:

[Signature]

LANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

14th November, 1944.
ЕКК/44/II заседание.
14 ноября 1944 года.

ЕВРОПЕЙСКАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ.
ПРОТОКОЛ заседания, состоявшегося в Ланкастер Хаус
14 ноября 1944 года.

Заседание началось в 17.00,
окончилось в 17.30.

ПРИСУТСТВОВАЛИ:
Г-н Ф.Э. Мовли /председатель/,
gen.-бригадир В. Мейер.
Г-н Ф.Т. Гусев,
г-н А.А. Рост,
г-н Н.В. Иванов.

СЕКРЕТАРИАТ:
Г-н И.П. Дональдсон,
г-н А. Г. Фригольф,
г-н У. Д. Макафи.

ПОВЕСТКА ДНЯ:
1. Утверждение текста Соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Совета Советских Социалистических Республика о контрольном механизме в Германии.

2. Утверждение Доклада Европейской Консультативной Комиссии Правительств Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного королевства и Совета Советских Социалистических Республика.

1. УТВЕРЖДЕНИЕ ТЕКСТА
СОГЛАШЕНИЯ МЕЖДУ
ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВАМИ СОЕДИНЕНИХ ШТАТОВ
АМЕРИКИ, СОЕДИНЕНИНОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА И СОВЕТА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК О
КОНТРОЛЬНОМ МЕХАНИЗМЕ В ГЕРМАНИИ.

КОМИССИЯ решила -

а/ утвердить текст Соглашения о контрольном механизме в Германии, согласованному между делегациями Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Совета Советских Социалистических Республика. /текст Соглашения на английском и русском языках прилагается/;
0/ представить вышеупомянутое Соглашение
Правительствам Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик на рассмотрение и утверждение.

2. УТВЕРЖДЕНИЕ ДОКЛАДА ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНОЙ КОМИССИИ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВАМ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ, СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА И СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК.

КОМИССИЯ решила —

утвердить текст Доклада Европейской Консультативной комиссии и, по подписании тремя Представителями в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии, представить его, в качестве подготовительного документа к тексту вышеупомянутого Соглашения, Правительствам Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик.

/Текст Доклада на английском и русском языках прилагается./

За Представителя Правительства Соединенных Штатов Америки в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

Philip E. Mosely

Представитель Правительства Соединенного Королевства в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

William Strong

Представитель Правительства Союза Советских Социалистических Республик в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

ЛАНКАСТЕР ХАУС,
ЛОНДОН.
14 ноября 1944 г.
ДОКЛАД ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНОЙ КОМИССИИ
ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВАМ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ, СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА И СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК.

1. В силу Положения о задачах и компетенции Европейской Консультативной Комиссии, принятого на Московской конференции, Комиссия уделила внимание механизму, требуемому для обеспечения выполнения условий капитуляции, которые должны быть навязаны Германии, а также любых дополнительных требований, которые могут быть предъявлены Германии в соответствии с этими условиями. В соответствии с этими мы представляем при сем на рассмотрение трех Правительств проект Соглашения о контрольном механизме в Германии.

2. В настоящее время трудно определить развитие событий в Германии после капитуляции или прекращения организованного сопротивления. Актуальным представляется вопрос о том, какие органы Советников должны быть созданы в Германии непосредственно после капитуляции или прекращения организованного сопротивления и сразу после оккупации Германии вооруженными силами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик.

3. План, изложенный в прилагаемом проекте Соглашения, предусматривает тройственное управление и управления на период оккупации Германии, следующий за ее поражением, в течение которого Германия будет выполнять основные требования безоговорочной капитуляции.

4. В задачи этих органов контроля и управления будут входить контроль над разоружением Германии, включая самые неотложные задачи экономического разоружения, ликвидация нацистского режима и подготовка условий для образования в Германии органов, основанных на демократических началах.
5. Мы не нашли возможным определить, как долго будет продолжаться период, охватываемый предлагаемым Соглашением. Однако мы рекомендуем, чтобы задачи контрольных органов в течение этого периода были выполнены в кратчайший срок и чтобы момент начала второго периода был определен третья Правительствами после консультаций с их генерал-генералами.

6. Наш проект основан на предположении, что в Германии с самого начала будет центральная администрация, через которую будут действовать контрольные органы. Однако рекомендуем нами механизм тройственного контроля может быть приобретен и к другим условиям.

7. Мы индивидуально докладивали нашим соответствующим Правительствам о ходе обсуждения, которое имело место в процессе разработки содержания Соглашения, которое при этом прилагается. Поэтому нам нет необходимости повторять вопрос о его обсуждении.

8. Для того чтобы обеспечить готовность предлагаемого в Соглашении контрольного механизма приступить к выполнению своих функций с минимальным промежутком, мы рекомендуем как можно скорее после утверждения Соглашения создать на тройственной основе зародыш контрольного механизма в соответствии с положениями этого Соглашения.

9. Мы рекомендуем далее, оставаясь на статью 6 Соглашения, чтобы в момент подписания Документа о капитуляции три Правительства совместно опубликовали заявление о том, что в связи с осуществлением полномочий, принятых ими на себя по Документу о капитуляции, они будут консультироваться с правительствами других Объеди-ненных Наций.

10. Мы также рекомендуем, чтобы немедленно после подписания Документа о безоговорочной капитуляции или непосредственно за прекращением организованного сопротивления в Германии основные
Положения прилагаемого Соглашения о контрольном механизме в Германии были опубликованы тремя Представителями Союзников в качестве прокламации к германскому народу. В эту прокламацию было также включено описание зон оккупации.

За Представителя Правительства США в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

Philip E. Mosely

Представитель Правительства Соединенного Королевства в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

William Lang

Представитель Правительства СССР в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

Янкастер Хаус, Лондон.

14 ноября 1944 г.
СОГЛАШЕНИЕ
О КОНТРОЛЬНОМ МЕХАНИЗМЕ В ГЕРМАНИИ.

Правительства Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства Великобритании и Северной Ирландии и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик пришли к следующему соглашению в отношении организации контрольного механизма Совенков в Германии на период выполнения Германией основных требований безоговорочной капитуляции:

Статья 1.
Верховная власть в Германии будет осуществляться главнокомандующими вооруженных сил Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, каждым в своей зоне оккупации, по инструкциям от своих соответствующих Правительств, а также совместно, по вопросам, затрагивающим Германию в целом, действующими в качестве членов верховного контрольного органа, учрежденного по настоящему Соглашению.

Статья 2.
При каждом главнокомандующем в его зоне оккупации будут состоять военные, военно-морские и военно-воздушные представители двух других главнокомандующих для выполнения функций связи.

Статья 3.
а/ Три главнокомандующих, действуя совместно, образуют верховный контрольный орган, называемый Контрольным Советом.
6/ В функции Контрольного Совета будет входить:
1/ обеспечение соответствующей согласованности в действиях главнокомандующих в их соответствующих зонах оккупации;
2/ выработка планов и достижение согласованных решений по главным военным, политическим, экономическим и другим
вопросам, общим для всей Германии, на основании инструкции, получаемой каждым главнокомандующим от своего Правительства;
3/ контролирование германской центральной администрации, которая будет действовать под руководством Контрольного Совета и будет нести перед ним ответственность за обеспечение выполнения его требований;
4/ руководство через соответствующие органы администрацией "Большого Берлина".

в/ Заседания Контрольного Совета будут созываться не реже одного раза в десять дней и в любое время по просьбе какого-либо из его членов. Решения Контрольного Совета должны быть единогласными. Обязанности председателя Контрольного Совета будут выполняться по очереди каждым из его трех членов.

g/ Каждому члену Контрольного Совета будет помогать политический советник, который, когда это окажется необходимым, будет присутствовать на заседаниях Контрольного Совета. Каждый член Контрольного Совета может также в случае необходимости пользоваться на заседаниях Контрольного Совета помощью военно-морского и военно-воздушного советников.

Статья 4.
При Контрольном Совете будет создан постоянно действующий Комитет по коordinationи, состоящий из трех представителей в звании не ниже генерала или ему соответствующих в военно-морских и военно-воздушных силах, по одному от каждого из трех главнокомандующих. Члены Комитета по коordinationи, когда понадобится, будут присутствовать на заседаниях Контрольного Совета.

Статья 5.
В задачи этого Комитета по коordinationи, действующего от имени Контрольного Совета и через контролирующий аппарат, будет входить:
а/ проведение в жизнь решений контрольного Совета;
б/ повседневное наблюдение и контроль за деятельностью соответствующих органов германской центральной администрации и учреждений;
в/ согласование текущих вопросов, требующих единообразных мероприятий во всех трех зонах;
г/ предварительное рассмотрение и подработка для контрольного Совета всех вопросов, поднимаемых отдельными главнокомандующими.

Статья 6.

а/ Из персонала контролирующего аппарата, назначенного соответствующими национальными властями, будут созданы следующие отделы: военный, военно-морской, военно-воздушный, транспортный, политический, экономический, финансовый, по репарациям и поставкам, внутренних дел и связи, правовой, по делам военнопленных и перемещенных лиц и отдел рабочей силы.

Уточнение числа и функций отделов может быть произведено в свете приобретенного опыта.

б/ Во главе каждого отдела будут стоять три высокопоставленных чиновника, по одному от каждой Державы. В обязанности этих трех начальников каждого отдела, действующих совместно, будет входить:

1/ осуществление контроля над соответствующими германскими министерствами и германскими центральными учреждениями;
2/ исполнение функций советников контрольного Совета, присутствуя, когда это необходимо, на его заседаниях;
3/ передача германской центральной администрации решений Контрольного Совета, сообщаемых через комитет по координации.
в/ Три начальника отдела будут принимать участие в заседаниях Комитета по координации, на которых рассматриваются вопросы, затрагивающие работу их отдела.

g/ В состав отделов могут входить как военные, так и гражданские лица. В него могут также в особых случаях быть включены граждане других Об"единенных Наций, назначаемые в качестве частных лиц.

Статья 7.

в/ Для совместного управления районом "Большого Берлина" будет создана Междусоюзная Комендатура в составе трех комендантов, по одному от каждой Державы, назначаемых их соответствующими главнокомандующими. Междусоюзная Комендатура будет возглавляться Главным Комендантом, обязанности которого будут выполняться поочередно каждым из комендантов.

6/ При Междусоюзной Комендатуре из персонала каждой из трех Держав будет создан технический аппарат, структура которого будет отвечать задачам наблюдения и контроля за деятельностью местных органов "Большого Берлина", ведающих его городским хозяйством.

в/ Междусоюзная Комендатура будет действовать под общим руководством Контрольного Совета и будет получать приказы через Комитет по координации.

Статья 8.

Необходимая связь с правительствами других наиболее заинтересованных Об"единенных Наций будет обеспечена назначением такими правительствами военных миссий при Контрольном Совете /в состав которых могут быть включены гражданские лица/, имеющих доступ через соответствующие каналы к органам контроля.

Статья 9.

Организация Об"единенных Наций, которая может быть разрешено Контрольным Советом действовать в Германии, в отношении своей де-
ияльности в Германии будут подчинены контролльному механизму Советников и ответственны перед ними.

Статья 10.
Органы Советников по контролю и управлению Германией, указанные выше, будут действовать в течение начального периода оккупации Германии, следующего непосредственно за капитуляцией, т.е. в течение периода выполнения Германией основных требований безоговорочной капитуляции.

Статья 11.
Вопрос о том, какие органы Советников должны осуществлять функции контроля и управления в Германии в более поздний период, будет предметом особого соглашения между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Советов Советских Социалистических Республик.

За Представителя Правительства США в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

[Подпись]

Филipe Морс

Представитель Правительства Соединенного Королевства в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

[Подпись]

Уильям Финч

Представитель Правительства СССР в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

[Подпись]

Двуглас

ЛАНКАСТЕР ХАУС,
ЛОndon.

14 ноября 1944 г.
E.A.C. (44) 12th Meeting.
14th November, 1944.

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION.

MINUTES of Meeting held at Lancaster House, London, S.W.1., on Tuesday, 14th November, 1944, at 5.30 p.m.

Present:

Dr. P. E. Mosely (in the Chair).
Brigadier-General V. Meyer.
Sir William Strong.
Mr. C. O'Neill.

Mr. E. F. Donaldson.
Mr. I. G. Prigorny.
Mr. W. D. McFetrie.

Secretariat.

Approval of text of Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

ACENDA

Approval of text of the Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

THE COMMISSION:

(a) approved the text of the Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin";
(b) decided to submit the Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin", with the annexed map "C", to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for consideration and approval.

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:

Philip E. Mosely

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:

William Piang

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:

LAGANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

14th November, 1944.

Printed in F.R. U.S. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1943, pp 131-133

Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

1. In place of the description of the North-Western Zone given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, the description of the North-Western Zone will read as follows:

"North-Western Zone
(as shown on the annexed map "C")

The territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined in the description of the Eastern zone, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the frontier between the Prussian provinces of Hanover and Hessen-Nassau meets the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony; thence along the southern frontier of Hanover; thence along the northwestern, western and southern frontiers of Hessen-Nassau to the point where the River Rhine leaves the latter; thence along the center of the navigable channel of the River Rhine to the point where it leaves Hessen-Darmstadt; thence along the western frontier of Baden to the point where this frontier becomes the Franco-German frontier will be occupied by/"
2. In place of the description of the South-Western Zone given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, the description of the South-Western Zone will read as follows:

"South-Western Zone
(as shown on the annexed map "C")

The territory of Germany situated to the south of a line commencing at the junction of the frontiers of Saxony, Bavaria and Czechoslovakia and extending westward along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the junction of the frontiers of Hessen-Nassau, Thuringia and Bavaria; thence north, west and south along the eastern, northern, western and southern frontiers of Hessen-Nassau to the point where the River Rhine leaves the southern frontier of Hessen-Nassau; thence southwards along the center of the navigable channel of the River Rhine to the point where it leaves Hessen-Darmstadt; thence along the western frontier of Baden to the point where this frontier becomes the Franco-German frontier will be occupied by armed forces of the United States of America."

3. The following additional paragraph will be inserted after the description of the South-Western Zone:

"For the purpose of facilitating communications between the South-Western Zone and the sea, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces in the South-Western Zone will

(a) exercise such control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the necessary staging areas in the vicinity thereof as may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements;

(b) enjoy such transit facilities through the North-Western Zone as may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements."

4. At the end of the description of the North-Western part of "Greater Berlin" given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, insert the following words:

"the United Kingdom"

5. At the end of the description of the Southern part of "Greater Berlin" given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, insert the following words:

"the United States of America"

6. In the English text of the sub-paragraph in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol beginning with the words "The frontiers of States (Länder) and Provinces," the words "descriptions to the zones" will read "descriptions of the zones."

The above text of the Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol...
of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on the 14th November, 1944.

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:

Philip E. Mosely

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:

William Strang

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:

(Handwritten signature)

LANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

14th November, 1944.
ЕВРОПЕЙСКАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ.

ПРОТОКОЛ заседания, состоявшегося в Ланкастер Хаус
14 ноября 1944 года.

Заседание началось в 17.30,
окончилось в 18.00.

ПРИСУТСТВОВАЛИ:
Г-н Ф. С. Моази /Председатель/,
ген.-бригадир Э. Меллер.
Г-н Ф. Т. Гусев,
Г-н А. Р. Фиш.
Г-н Я. М. Аланов.
Сэр Уильям Странг,
Г-н К. О’Нил.

СЕКРЕТАРИАТ:
Г-н К. П. Дональдсон,
Г-н И. Г. Пригорный,
Г-н У. Д. Макафи.

ПОВЕСТКА ДНЯ:
Утверждение текста Соглашения относительно изменений в Протоколе
Соглашения от 12 сентября 1944 года между Правительствами Соединенных
Етатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Сове Советских
Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об
управлении "Большим Берлином".

Утверждение текста Соглашения относительно изменений в Протоколе
Соглашения от 12 сентября 1944 года между Правительствами Соединенных
Етатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Сове Советских
Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином".

КОМИССИЯ решила —
а/ утвердить текст Соглашения относительно изменений в Протоколе Соглашения
от 12 сентября 1944 года между Правительствами Соединенных Етатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Сове Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином", согласованный между делегациями США, Соединенного Королевства и СССР, с
границами зон оккупации Германии, обозна-
ченными на прилагаемой карте "C", согласно тексту Протокола от 12 сентября 1944 года и тексту прилагаемого Соглашения относительно изменений в нем / текст Соглашения относительно изменений на английском и русском языках и карте "C", которая заме- няет карту "A", приложенную к Протоколу от 12 сентября 1944 года, прилагаются/;

6/ представить это Соглашение относительно изменений в Протоколе Соглашения от 12 сентября 1944 года между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином" о приложенной карте "C" на рассмотрение и утверждение Правительств США, Соединенного Королевства и СССР.

За Представителя Прави-
тельства Соединенных
Штатов Америки в Евро-
пейской Консультативной
Комиссии

Philip E. Mosely

Представитель Прави-
тельства Соединенного
Королевства в Европе-
ской Консультативной
Комиссии

William Strong

Представитель Прави-
тельства Союза Совет-
ских Социалистических
Республик в Европей-
ской Консультативной
Комиссии

ЛАНКАСТЕР ХАУС,
ЛОНДОН.
14 ноября 1944 г.
СОГЛАСОВАНО

относительно изменений в Протоколе Соглашения от 12 сентября 1944 года между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Совнар Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином".

1. Вместо описания северо-западной зоны, приведенного в п. 2 вышеупомянутого Протокола, принять новое описания северо-западной зоны и изложить его в следующем виде:

"Северо-западная зона /как показана на прилагаемой карте "C"/.

Территория Германии, расположенная к западу от линии, установленной в описании восточной зоны, и ограниченная с юга линией, проходящей от пункта пересечения границы между прусскими провинциями Ганновер и Гессен-Нассау с западной границей прусской провинции Саксония, далее по южной границе Ганновера, далее по северо-западной, западной и южной границам Гессен-Нассау до пункта, где последняя пересекает следователь реки Рейн, затем по центру судоходного руслла реки Рейн до пункта, где она выходит из Гессен-Дармштадт, далее по западной границе Бадена до пункта пересечения ее с франко-германской границей, занимается вооруженными силами Соединенного Королевства."

2. Вместо описания юго-западной зоны, приведенного в п. 2 вышеупомянутого Протокола, принять новое описание юго-западной зоны и изложить его в следующем виде:

"Юго-западная зона /как показана на прилагаемой карте "C"./.

Территория Германии, расположенная к югу от линии, начинающейся от окончания границ Саксонии, Баварии и Чехословакии и идущей на запад по северной границе Баварии до окончания границ Гессен-Нассау, Тюрингии и Баварии, далее к западу и югу по восточной, северной, западной и южной границам Гессен-Нассау до пункта, где южная граница Гессен-Нассау пересекает
следовать реке Рейн, затем на юг по центру судоходного русла реки Рейн до пункта, где она выходит из Гессен-Дармштадт, далее по западной границе Бадена до пункта пересечения ее с франко-германской границей, занимается вооруженными силами Соединенных Штатов Америки."

3. После описания юго-западной зоны вставить следующий дополнительный пункт:

"С целью облегчения сообщения между юго-западной зоной и морем главнокомандующий вооруженными силами Соединенных Штатов в юго-западной зоне будет

а/ осуществлять такой контроль над портами Бремен и Бремерхафен и необходимыми пересадочными площадками вблизи их, который в будущем может быть признан необходимым военными властями Соединенного Королевства и Соединенных Штатов для удовлетворения его потребностей;

6/ пользоваться такими возможностями транзита через северо-западную зону, которые в будущем могут быть признаны необходимыми военными властями Соединенного Королевства и Соединенных Штатов для удовлетворения его потребностей."

4. В конце описания северо-западной части "Большого Берлина", приведенного в п.2 вышеупомянутого Протокола, добавить следующие слова: "Соединенного Королевства".

5. В конце описания южной части "Большого Берлина", приведенного в п.2 вышеупомянутого Протокола, добавить следующие слова: "Соединенных Штатов Америки".

6. В английском тексте пункта 2 вышеупомянутого Протокола во фразе, начинаящейся словами "В вышеуказанных описаниях зон ..."
сказав "descriptions to the zones" следует читать "descriptions of the zones".

Вышеизложеный текст Соглашения относительно изменений в Протоколе Соглашения от 12 сентября 1944 года между Правительствами Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Совета Советских Социалистических Республик о зонах оккупации Германии и об управлении "Большим Берлином" подготовлен и единогласно принят Европейской Консультативной Комиссией на заседании, состоявшемся 14 ноября 1944 года.

За Представителя Правительства Соединенных Штатов Америки в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

Phèlip E. Mosby

Представитель Правительства Соединенного Королевства в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

William Stirling

Представитель Правительства Советских Социалистических Республик в Европейской Консультативной Комиссии

ЛАНКАСТЕР ХАУС,
ЛОНДОН.
14 ноября 1944г.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached you will find an interesting cable, No. 10115, we have just received from London giving the present British views on the economic treatment of Germany.

[Signature]
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

London
Dated November 18, 1944
Rec'd 5:52 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

10115, November 18, 3 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THOSE CONCERNED WITH REPARATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARDS GERMANY. NO. 3.

Following are points arising out of personal conversations which Penrose had with Jebb of the Foreign Office on the Massigli Plan and with UK officials in EIPS and in the iron and steel control on the question of controlling Germany stocks of strategic minerals.

One. Jebb characterized the Massigli Plan as vague and sketchy. It provides for international control of productive activities operated by an international authority superimposed on the German authorities which would continue to function for most governmental purposes. It is apparently intended as a sort of half way house between partition and a complete unitary state. Neither Jebb nor other UK officials with whom we have spoken on the subject up to now

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaubie Date FEB 5 1972
to now think it a practicable plan. The economists among them believe that eventually it would either have to be abandoned or the further step would have to be taken of setting up an economic boundary between it and rest of Germany similar in scope to the economic boundaries between nations. (See Embassy's 9977, November 15).

Having regard to this advice from the economic side, political advisers evaluate the Massigli Plan as partition dressed up in softclothing. Although we have not had time to check up on opinions among all political advisers, we have not up to now found evidence of any going away from the view that Germany should remain "a substantial unitary state" as assumed in the Malkin report.

Both Jebb and other officials thought that an attempt to adopt the Massigli Plan might be interpreted by the Soviet as an attempt to set up a special sphere of economic influence designed to strengthen France, UK and US. Hence the Soviet might claim another sphere.

Officials in Whitehall, though they do not seem to take the Massigli Plan very seriously, have noted with satisfaction that the French show no desire for
3- #10115, November 18, 3 p.m., from London

a peace of vengeance and no sympathy for proposals for the general destruction of all German industries.

Two. Economists and industrial technicians in the Iron and Steel Control of the Ministry of Supply expressed the view that adequate control of strategic materials needed in the metallurgical industries would be an effective check on renewed German aggression. They thought that thorough control of chrome, tungsten, molybdenum, manganese and nickel would probably suffice. However, they stressed the difficulties of such control and the necessity of thoroughgoing measures. They thought that a complete international control would be essential. By this they meant that an international body would have to make a complete check on world production of the minerals in question and on the manufacture of products which incorporate them together with trade in both raw materials and manufactured products so that all the raw material produced anywhere in the world is accounted for. German stocks should not be allowed to rise above specified low working levels.

They particularly stressed that neither control of imports at the frontier by the ACC or other body nor
visits of inspectors to German plants would be sufficient and cited instances of easy evasion of such controls after the first World War.

In a discussion of the question of what body and international control should be attached to it, they said that the most important thing was that it would work in very close touch with the trade. A group of statisticians working in some international center like Geneva before the war could not accomplish much. Extremely difficult questions of interpretation of trade statistics would arise. The classifications adopted for statistical purposes were a great oversimplification. The officials in the control should be in constant touch with trade and industry and trade associations should be drawn into cooperation. If these conditions were fulfilled it would not matter much whether the control were attached directly to the security organization or were a part of one of the international economic bodies.

Though these officials are not on EIPS we believe that their views on the necessity for an international control of a specified number of essential minerals have been adopted...
-5-10115, November 18, 3 p.m., from London

been adopted by EIPS and will be expressed in the forthcoming discussions.

Three. There is reason to believe that UK thought on economic policy towards Germany is influenced by the desire to avoid encouraging an undue growth of product substitutes in Germany that are not simultaneously adopted in Allied countries. An unduly restrictive policy towards existing German industries might encourage invention of substitutes, some of which would be efficient. Thus the Allies might be taken at a disadvantage in some future period through not having kept pace technologically with these developments.

WINANT

WTD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Agreement With Regard to Control Machinery in Germany

There is attached hereto a photostatic copy of an agreement reached in the European Advisory Commission for submission to the American, British and Soviet Governments, with regard to control machinery in Germany, together with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on November 14, 1944, at which the agreement was signed.

I should appreciate being informed whether this agreement, which is the result of careful consideration and close consultation with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments, is agreeable to you in order that Ambassador Winant may be informed as soon as possible of the United States Government's approval of this agreement. Copies are also being submitted to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

Enclosure: As stated.
AGREEMENT ON CONTROL MACHINERY IN GERMANY

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following Agreement with regard to the organisation of the Allied control machinery in Germany in the period during which Germany will be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender:

Article 1.

Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.

Article 2.

Each Commander-in-Chief in his zone of occupation will have attached to him military, naval and air representatives of the other two Commanders-in-Chief for liaison duties.

Article 3.

(a) The three Commanders-in-Chief, acting together as a body, will constitute a supreme organ of control called the Control Council.

(b) The functions of the Control Council will be:-

(i) to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation;

(ii) to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government;

(iii) to control the German central administration, which will operate under the direction of the Control Council and will be responsible to it for ensuring compliance with its demands;

(iv)
(iv) to direct the administration of "Greater Berlin" through appropriate organs.

(c) The Control Council will meet at least once in ten days; and it will meet at any time upon request of any one of its members. Decisions of the Control Council shall be unanimous. The chairmanship of the Control Council will be held in rotation by each of its three members.

(d) Each member of the Control Council will be assisted by a political adviser, who will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council. Each member of the Control Council may also, when necessary, be assisted at meetings of the Council by naval or air advisers.

Article 4.

A permanent Co-ordinating Committee will be established under the Control Council, composed of one representative of each of the three Commanders-in-Chief, not below the rank of General Officer or the equivalent rank in the naval or air forces. Members of the Co-ordinating Committee will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council.

Article 5.

The duties of the Co-ordinating Committee, acting on behalf of the Control Council and through the Control Staff, will include:

(a) the carrying out of the decisions of the Control Council;

(b) the day-to-day supervision and control of the activities of the German central administration and institutions;

(c) the co-ordination of current problems which call for uniform measures in all three zones;

(d) the preliminary examination and preparation for the Control Council of all questions submitted by individual Commanders-in-Chief.

Article 6.

(a) The members of the Control Staff, appointed by their respective national authorities, will be organised in the following Divisions:

Military; Naval; Air; Transport; Political; Economic; Finance; Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs and Communications; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Man-power.

Adjustments in the number and functions of the Divisions may be made in the light of experience.
(b) At the head of each Division there will be three high-ranking officials, one from each Power. The duties of the three heads of each Division, acting jointly, will include:

(i) exercising control over the corresponding German Ministries and German central institutions;

(ii) acting as advisers to the Control Council and, when necessary, attending meetings thereof;

(iii) transmitting to the German central administration the decisions of the Control Council, communicated through the Co-ordinating Committee.

(c) The three heads of a Division will take part in meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee at which matters affecting the work of their Division are on the agenda.

(d) The staffs of the Divisions may include civilian as well as military personnel. They may also, in special cases, include nationals of other United Nations, appointed in their personal capacity.

Article 7.

(a) An Inter-allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of three Commandants, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" area. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-allied Governing Authority.

(b) A Technical Staff, consisting of personnel of each of the three Powers, will be established under the Inter-allied Governing Authority, and will be organised to serve the purpose of supervising and controlling the activities of the local organs of "Greater Berlin" which are responsible for its municipal services.

(c) The Inter-allied Governing Authority will operate under the general direction of the Control Council and will receive orders through the Co-ordinating Committee.

Article 8.

The necessary liaison with the Governments of other United Nations chiefly interested will be ensured by the appointment by such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Control Council, having access, through the appropriate channels, to the organs of control.

Article 9.

United Nations' organisations which may be admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany will, in respect of their activities in Germany, be subordinate to the Allied control.
machinery and answerable to it.

Article 10.

The Allied organs for the control and administration of Germany outlined above will operate during the initial period of the occupation of Germany immediately following surrender, that is, the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.

Article 11.

The question of the Allied organs required for carrying out the functions of control and administration in Germany in a later period will be the subject of a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above text of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 14th November, 1944, and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:

Philip E. Mosely

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:

William Strang

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:

[Signature]

LANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

14th November, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached hereto a photostatic copy of an agreement reached in the European Advisory Commission for submission to the American, British and Soviet Governments, with regard to control machinery in Germany, together with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on November 14, 1944, at which the agreement was signed.

The Department of State would appreciate being informed whether this agreement, which is the result of careful consideration and close consultation with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments, is agreeable to you in order that Ambassador Winant may be informed as soon as possible of the United States Government's approval of this agreement. Copies are also being submitted to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

Enclosure:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Agreement With Regard to Control Machinery in Germany

There is attached hereto a photostatic copy of an agreement reached in the European Advisory Commission for submission to the American, British and Soviet Governments, with regard to control machinery in Germany, together with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on November 14, 1944, at which the agreement was signed.

I should appreciate being informed whether this agreement, which is the result of careful consideration and close consultation with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments, is agreeable to you in order that Ambassador Winant may be informed as soon as possible of the United States Government's approval of this agreement. Copies are also being submitted to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure: As stated.
Carbon of this Memo
initiated by the President
and returned to Secy [Secretary]
Dec. 4, 1744
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 30, 1944

Subject: Protocol and Amendments with regard to the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin.

There is attached hereto a photostatic copy of a Protocol agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission for submission to the American, British, and Soviet Governments, with regard to the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin," together with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on September 12, 1944 at which the Protocol was signed.

There is likewise attached a photostatic copy of an Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of September 12, 1944 just cited, together with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on November 14, 1944 at which the Agreement for amendments to the Protocol was signed. These amendments were made as a result of the decisions reached at the last Quebec Conference.

I should appreciate being informed whether this Protocol and the amendments thereto contained in the subsequent Agreement, which represent the result of careful consideration and close consultation with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments, are agreeable to you in order that Ambassador Winant may be informed as soon as possible of the United States Government's approval of the Protocol as amended. Copies of the Protocol and the Agreement for its amendment are also being submitted to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

Enclosures:
As stated.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

I have yours of November 29th on the Economic Treatment of Germany. There are two things which I think the State Department ought to keep in the linings of their hats. (1) That in the Economic Treatment of Germany we should let her come back industrially to meet her own needs, but not to do any exporting for sometime and we know better how things are going to work out.

(2) We are against reparations.

(3) We do want restitution of looted property of all kinds.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Views on the Economic Treatment of Germany

For your convenience I have summarized below a series of telegrams received from the Embassy in London on the British views on the economic treatment of Germany.

The reports generally confirm the statement of the British position which was outlined in the Department's draft of November 10 on the economic treatment of Germany. British officials seem strongly opposed to sweeping measures of de-industrialization and extreme impoverishment of Germany. They are continuing to explore selective economic controls and restrictions, but detailed examination of specific proposals has served to make clear the difficulties and limitations of most such measures.

The British emphasize the need for selecting measures which will enjoy lasting public support and which will be enforceable a generation hence, after the emotions of wartime have cooled down.

They advocate conversion of the German economy to peacetime production and payment of reparation in kind.

They are eager to begin discussions on restitution of looted property even if discussion of broader economic questions is not yet practicable, and they intend to introduce shortly into the European Advisory Commission a proposal on machinery to handle restitution.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

Please speak to me about this at your leisure. It is very old but it is still current.

F. D. R.

Letter to Gen. Watson from Bernard M. Baruch, 9/21/44, in re occupation, reparation and economic treatment of Germany and the other countries.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
S. I. R.

Will you read and talk
with me about this when we get
up the Annual Message?

F. D. R.
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  

Dear Grace:  

The President will probably be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from our Berne representative. I will appreciate your seeing that it reaches his desk.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the attached report from the OSS representative in Berne, which came to us via radiotelephone. It is a rather full summary of an article in the 8 December issue of Neue Zuercher Zeitung, concerning Germany's power of resistance.

William J. Donovan
Director
GERMANY

The Neue Zuercher Zeitung of today has a long and interesting article from its Berlin correspondent on Germany's power of resistance. I give here a rather full summary of this article, as it seems to me to reasonably express the present situation in Germany.

Germany's power of resistance is still strong. It has survived three great crises - Stalingrad, the loss of Italy, and the smashing of the Atlantic Wall, all of which seemed at the time to be mortal blows -- and yet Germany was able each time to summon new forces and continue the fight with fresh energy. This is a riddle, and what follows is an attempt to explain it.

Imperial Germany gave up the fight after the defeat in France in 1918. The German position today is perhaps still more dramatic than it was then. The German armies have been thrown back to the frontiers in the East and West, The Reich would be fully justified in quitting now. But the Nazis are insuperably more robust than the politicians of the Kaiser, and are determined to continue their resistance to the bitter end. They know no such word as quit. It is their slogan that no one is licked as long as he refuses to admit defeat. Hitler and his aids have no inhibitions about sacrificing the lives and property of the German people. The cost does not count.

Last Summer there was no sign of weakening in the High Command. Troops and staffs may have failed here and there, but the reaction from above was immediate and severe. Marshal Model, known for his energy, was placed in command of all endangered sectors. His predecessor, von Kluge, disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Dr. Goebbels was put in charge of total civilian mobilization. The revolt of July 20 was brutally crushed, and sweeping measures were taken against all oppositional elements. Again, the catastrophe was averted. The Nazis were forced to take the most ruthless action. No privileges were respected (?) no individual was able to escape the claws of total warfare.

Such Draconian measures are only possible with Germans. They
would not have been possible in any other European country, because the population would have revolted. The strength of the Nazi regime lies in the knowledge that it is easy to rule the German people with an iron hand, for they are trained to do it. The people look upon the State as the supreme authority, to which the strictest obedience is due. The Germans have no tradition of personal rights and liberty, such as exists in the Anglo-Saxon countries and Switzerland. Prussia, from which the Reich sprang, was always a country where the mass of subjects bowed to the rule of a master clan. It is the same today. The Weimar Republic failed in the end because of the lack of any strong democratic spirit. The people today obey the Nazi leaders, just as they obeyed their princes and kings in the past.

However, no amount of abject obedience and no political police could account for the accomplishments of Germany in this war. They are inconceivable without a good measure of spontaneous, voluntary cooperation. There is no doubt that National Socialism has taken deep roots in the German people. At the time of Hitler's great triumph, he had practically the whole nation behind him, and this applied particularly to his foreign policy. Through intuition, he aroused a latent instinct. His plan of expansion and European hegemony found general approval in Germany. The Germans are convinced that they did not get a square deal when the riches of our planet were divided. They demand world power, and they do not care much whether other European nations fare badly in the process. There was no great enthusiasm in Germany when the war broke out in 1939, but the people were very happy to receive the fruits of victory and fully backed up the Nazis in their objective of elevating Germany to the rank of a world power. There was complete agreement between government and people in that respect. The Germans are a military nation. They enjoy militarism, and their achievements and decorations are highly rated. In no other country is a soldier so respected and so pampered as in Germany. This is the strong support of National Socialism, as they know that any appeal to the martial virtues will always find a response. The German youth burns to show its mettle at the front.

It is true that now the time of easy victories has passed. The reverses following Stalingrad have created new postulates in the country. Inevitably, National Socialism has lost prestige, but it has succeeded in maintaining much of its domination of the soul of the people. This is their appeal: "We are all in the same boat. You cannot get out. Whether you agree with us or not does not matter, for if we sink, you will go down with us. So help us as best you can, if your life is dear to you." After Stalingrad, Dr. Goebbels resolutely revamped his propaganda. The line of world power was changed to the line of self-preservation. He arouses great fear of the consequences of defeat. The German is inclined to paint the future black respecting the country and himself. He imagines that invasion
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM: Berns
TO: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RECEIVED

by the Red Army must be accompanied by an orgy of blood. He trembles before the idea of what the foreign workers and prisoners of war would do when disorder comes, and these millions of aliens are let loose to plunder and ravage the cities and land. He feels that the Allies will disarm Germany, take away its riches, and give up its frontiers to bitter enemies. The soldiers at the front, the workers in the ammunition factories, and the inhabitants of the bombed cities are holding out because they feel that they have no choice, as their very existence is at stake.

The Nazis are profiting by this state of mind for their own purposes. They are spurring on national energy by painting the consequences of defeat in the blackest colors. Berlin complains of the lack of effect of German propaganda in foreign countries, which is attributed to the fact that others are incapable of understanding the psychology of the Germans. It is also pointed out that foreign countries fail to realize that the same propaganda satisfies the needs of the people within Germany to an astonishing degree. Mistakes have been made, of course, and even the cleverest propaganda cannot cover up facts, but, again and again, Dr. Goebbels has succeeded in keeping in touch with the sentiments of the people, and they still listen to him.

Germany's enemies have so far materially facilitated his task by prosecuting the war in a non-political manner in certain respects. Because they wish to forestall any legend of a stab in the back such as was spread after the last war, they deliberately refrain from any promises which might invite the German public to give in. They do not even announce any concrete peace plan. This may have its advantages, but the price they pay is very high. It took a catastrophe last Summer to bring the internal opposition into the open. Could that opposition offer the German people a better peace than the Nazis? We think not. So far, the Allies have not offered the opposition any serious encouragement. On the contrary, they have again and again welled together the people and the Nazis by statements published, either out of indifference or with a purpose. To take a recent example, the Morgenthau plan gave Dr. Goebbels the best possible chance. He was able to prove to his countrymen, in black and white, that the enemy planned the enslavement of Germany. Goebbels handled the Morgenthau statement in his own way. The press described it as the official policy of the British and Americans, but said nothing about the criticism which the plan aroused in England and America. In general, the German propaganda deliberately exaggerated all statements of this sort.

Of course, intelligent newspaper readers were soon aware of this trick, but that did not calm their apprehensions. The conviction that Germany has nothing to expect from defeat but oppression and exploitation still prevails, and that accounts for the fact that the Germans continue to fight. It is not a question of a regime, but of the homeland itself, and to save that, every German is bound to obey the call, whether he be Nazi or member of the opposition.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Comparison of the recommendations of the Kilgore Subcommittee with those of the Department on the economic treatment of Germany.

For your information I attach herewith a memorandum comparing the recommendations of the Kilgore Subcommittee for the economic treatment of Germany with the Department's draft proposals which I submitted to you on November 11th.

I believe the Department's recommendations on the treatment of cartels, of German industrialists, and of the arms industry are very nearly the same as those of the Kilgore Subcommittee. The Kilgore proposal, however, for the complete dismantling of the metallurgical and chemical industries is much more drastic than that which the Department has believed to be sound and desirable.

Enclosure: Memorandum.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Comparison of the recommendations of the Kilgore Subcommittee with those of the Department on the economic treatment of Germany.

The present recommendations of the report of the Kilgore Subcommittee with respect to the economic treatment of Germany are as follows:

1. There should be a sweeping reform of the structure and control of German industry to permit a peaceful and democratic Germany to arise. This reform should consist of a breaking up of monopolies and cartels, punishment of, say, ten thousand of the leading imperialist-minded German industrialists, and confiscation of German property abroad and patent rights.

2. All direct munitions industries should be dismantled and the primary indirect munitions industries including the metallurgical and chemical industries should be dismantled and removed to devastated areas of Europe. The fate of the remainder of German industry is made dependent upon future political developments in Germany.

The Kilgore report also contains certain recommendations affecting international cartels, patent licensing agreements, and the exchange of technological "know how".
The recommendations of the Kilgore Subcommittee with respect to reform of the structure and control of German industry, although more drastic and positive in tone, are not markedly at variance with the views of the Department. In the Department's draft memorandum on the economic treatment of Germany it was recommended we should attempt to reach an agreement with the British and Russians regarding control of large German industrial firms and the elimination of Nazi industrialists from positions of influence, and it was proposed that we should advocate a policy more drastic than the British now favor but less drastic than Russia might be inclined to apply. The Kilgore suggestion that as many as ten thousand leading industrialists require punishment seems rather extreme. With respect to the breaking up of industrial combinations and cartels, it remains to be seen how far Britain and Russia will go along with American views on this subject and the need must be kept in mind for a maximum degree of uniformity of policy between the three Powers.

The Kilgore recommendations for dismantling of the munitions, metallurgical and chemical industries is much more drastic than the proposal contained in the Department's draft which recommended:

1. The destruction of all specialized facilities used for the manufacture of land and naval armament and all types of aircraft, and,

2. The transfer of such German capital equipment as can be promptly put to effective use in liberated countries during the initial period of rehabilitation. While a considerable portion of the capital equipment of the metallurgical and chemical
chemical industries could usefully be transferred to liberated countries to aid in their rehabilitation, the Kilgore proposal for the thorough dismantling of these industries conflicts sharply with the views expressed in the Department's draft.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Participation in the Control of Germany

The enclosed telegram from Winant summarizes a formal memorandum presented by the French representative on the European Advisory Commission setting forth explicitly the wishes of France in regard to participation in the German surrender instrument and the military control of Germany.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 11575 from London, December 30, 1944.
ASB-502
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Secret)

London
Dated December 30, 1944
Rec'd 4:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

US URGENT
11575, December 30, 8 p.m.
COMEA 140.

The French representative on the European Advisory Commission has circulated a memorandum setting forth the views of his Government with respect to the instrument of unconditional surrender for Germany, the protocol on zones of occupation with its amendment, and the agreement on control machinery. The memorandum expresses general approval of the contents of these agreements and sets forth in some detail the desire of France to take part in the occupation and control of Germany as well as in the signature of the surrender instrument. The memorandum asks the Commission to adopt recommendations for

(One) Participation of France in the supreme authority for Germany.

(Two) French participation in the signature of the surrender

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date 1-11-72
surrender instrument.

(Three) Assignment to the French army of a zone of occupation in Germany and a part of greater Berlin.

(Four) Substitution of quadripartite for tripartite agencies in the agreement on control machinery.

(Five) Preparation of a French text of the surrender instrument to be equally authentic with the English and Russian texts.

In conclusion the memorandum states that draft amendments to this purpose will shortly be presented in the Commission. Full text of French memorandum follows by air.

WIN. NT

IMS

Telephoned Mr. Leveridge (C.E.) 12-30-44 G.H.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

During the last few months we have been giving further study to the problem of what to do with Germany after her defeat.

We are more convinced than ever that if we really mean to deprive Germany of the ability to make war again within a few years it is absolutely essential that she be deprived of her chemical, metallurgical and electrical industries. We don't think that this alone will guarantee peace, but that it is one of the steps we must take now.

We base this conclusion on the following premises, which seem to us unassailable:

(1) The German people have the will to try it again.

(2) Programs for democracy, re-education and kindness cannot destroy this will within any brief time.

(3) Heavy industry is the core of Germany's war-making potential.

Nearly all Americans grant the first point. A few, such as Dorothy Thompson, appear to disagree with the second; but all that we know and have learned recently—our experience with war prisoners, for instance—seems to argue against them. As to the third, America's own accomplishments in four years seem to us a shining lesson of what an equally versatile people can do. Our industry was converted from the world's greatest peacetime producer in 1940 to the world's greatest producer of military weapons in 1944. The Germans are versatile. Leave them the necessary heavy industry to build on and they can work as fast and as effectively as we.
The more I think of this problem, and the more I hear and read discussions of it, the clearer it seems to me that the real motive of most of those who oppose a weak Germany is not any actual disagreement on these three points. On the contrary, it is simply an expression of fear of Russia and communism. It is the twenty-year-old idea of a "bulwark against Bolshevism"—which was one of the factors that brought this present war down on us.

Because the people who hold this view are unwilling (for reasons which, no doubt, they regard as statesman-like) to come out in the open and lay the real issue on the table, all sorts of smoke screens are thrown up to support the proposition that Germany must be rebuilt. Examples are:

(a) The fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial Germany.

(b) The contention that recurring reparations (which would require immediate reconstruction of the German economy) are necessary so that Germany may be made to pay for the destruction she has caused.

(c) The naive belief that the removal or destruction of all German war materials and the German armament industry would in itself prevent Germany from waging another war.

(d) The illogical assumption that a "soft" peace would facilitate the growth of democracy in Germany.

(e) The fallacy that making Germany a predominantly agricultural country, with light industries but no heavy industries, would mean starving Germans.
We can submit to you studies which in our opinion will demonstrate that these propositions and others leading to the same conclusions are false.

This thing needs to be dragged out into the open. I feel so deeply about it that I speak strongly. If we don’t face it I am just as sure as I can be that we are going to let a lot of hollow and hypocritical propaganda lead us into recreating a strong Germany and making a foe of Russia. I shudder for the sake of our children to think of what will follow.

There is nothing that I can think of that can do more at this moment to engender trust or distrust between the United States and Russia than the position this Government takes on the German problem.

Henry M. Warrener
Secretary of the Treasury.

P.S. I have sent a copy of this letter to Ed. Stettinius.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
JOHN BOETTIGER

TO READ AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY "TRIP FILE".

F. D. R.

NOTED BY
J.B.
POST-WAR GERMANY

1. Dismemberment
No enforced partition of Germany into two or three autonomous states. Acquiescence with such arrangement as may be agreed upon by the European neighbors of Germany regarding East Prussia, Silesia, the Ruhr, the Saar and the Rhineland. Encouragement of plebiscites (in Bavaria, for example) whereby the people may themselves decide for or against inclusion with Prussia in a German state.

2. Reparations
No attempt to exact payment of reparations in money, credits or manufactured goods. Removal from Germany of such items as railroad equipment, machinery, livestock and works of art to be not a punitive operation but for the purpose of restoring or replacing stolen property to the people who have been plundered.

3. Control of expression
During the period of control of Germany by Allied Military Government the country will be in effect under martial law, which means control of all activities. As the strict control by martial law is relaxed, and finally ends, control of all forms of expression -- newspapers, magazines, books, radio, school curricula and texts -- will performce be restored to the Germans, under the government which will have been set up under AMG control.

4. Punishment of War Criminals
There is no recognized international civil code under which "war criminals" can be indicted, tried and convicted by
judicial process. Under martial law the civil code is suspended. Those who have violated accepted military codes can and should be punished by military procedure.

5. Relief
Any relief to the people of Germany to come after relief to the peoples of the liberated countries has been accomplished.

6. Political control
To be exercised only during the regime of Allied Military Government. When that ends, political control of Germany from without should also end.

7. Industry
The return (or replacement) of stolen machinery to the plundered countries, plus the removal from Germany of all machinery usable for the manufacture of war goods or easily convertible to that purpose, will be the one effective means of rendering it impossible for the Germans to prepare for another war. This operation should therefore be carried out thoroughly and energetically, with no concessions to any groups or pressures. The additional step necessary to make Germany physically incapable of preparing for another war is to place allocation of all raw materials in Europe -- both those originating in Europe and those imported -- under control of an international commission of the United Nations. Only such raw materials should be allowed to Germany as are manifestly necessary for manufacture of domestic consumer goods, and checks should be devised to insure their use solely for that purpose. Establishment of this control as applied specifically to Germany industry should be determined not by the calendar, but by the political orientation of the new German regime and by
the degree of security from war offered by a United Nations world peace organisation.

8. Conscription of labor

The justice of the demand that Germans help to rebuild what they have destroyed is acknowledged. Also the detention of large numbers of German men in other countries for periods ranging from two to five years would help to counteract the results of the biological warfare practised by the Germans since 1939. Acquiescence in such decisions regarding it as may be made by those who have suffered most - the people of the countries which the Germans have occupied and despoiled.

9. General

All details of the treatment of Germany should be based on decisions by the United Nations, not by any one country or group.

The restoration of political autonomy to Germany should begin with small units - villages, towns, cities, sections - and should proceed gradually toward the final objective of centralized authority in a state. The tempo of procession toward that final objective and the duration of the regime of Allied Military Government should be determined solely by the course of events, both as regards the development of democratic forces among Germans and as regards the establishment of a world organization competent to preserve the peace against the threat of aggression from any quarter.
These are the Facts.

Twice within 25 years, Germany has plunged the world into war. Incomplete knowledge of the past has led many people to believe that wiping out Hitler and Nazism will be sufficient to secure a lasting peace.

Directly after World War I, a campaign of sympathy and rehabilitation for Germany was organized in the English-speaking countries, with the avowed aim of destroying the Versailles Treaty.

Powerful groups have tried and are still trying (even today in many American Universities) to create the belief that Germany was not guilty for World War I, and that consequently the German people were treated with great injustice.

The resurrection of German power after World War I was due to a large extent to the systematic activities of well-organized pro-German groups which exerted growing influence on the political, economic and cultural life of many countries during the last decades, primarily in the Americas.

Germany and her General Staff established thousands of agents in various countries to carry out military, economic and political missions.

German economic penetration in the various countries, achieved very often with unfair methods, was the forerunner of German political activities in those countries. German businessmen everywhere have been the tools of the German General Staff in its plans for world conquest.

For many decades, America's cultural life has been indoctrinated with German propaganda through the universities and intellectual circles.

Countless "German-conscious" groups like the Steuben Society and fraternal clubs outwardly respectable as Turnvereine, singing societies, and "old hometown" German newspapers, whose subtle effectiveness can be appreciated or even detected only by students of German semantics—have been useful instruments for Pan-Germanism and a vehicle for pro-Nazi propaganda, at the same time opposing the World Court and all other forms of international cooperation.

Leaders of German-American groups and of their press publicly incited their adherents to use their right to vote to advance purely German interests, i.e., to vote only for candidates who were friendly to the Third Reich.

Right after the first World War, the pro-Germans started their whining campaign and the Steuben Society of America has officially admitted that they struggled for the return of enemy alien property, that they fought the Treaty of Versailles and that they helped the German people to prosperity again.
This time the pro-Germans do not even wait for the end of the war and, while our boys are being killed, while Germans are murdering American prisoner of war, a campaign to "salvage the German people" and to differentiate between the bad Nazis (who probably came from the moon) and the good, misled German people—is in full swing.

Councils and committees, backed by powerful industrialists, clergymen, university professors, leading liberals, writers, etc. are being formed, actively engaged in a struggle to obtain:

1. That Germany should get the benefits of the Atlantic Charter.
2. That the political and economic strength of Germany should be maintained.
3. That the productive power of Germany must be preserved.
4. That the German people shall be given a peace which they can regard as just.

For example, such policies are being advocated now by the Council for a Democratic Germany, led by German refugees like Paul Hagen, Hermann Budzislawski, Paul Tillich etc. and by American liberals such as Dean Christian Gauss, Prof. John Dewey, Reinhold Niebuhr, Dorothy Thompson, Hiram Motherwell, Robert McIver and many others.

Since the country is at war, many pan-German groups have cleverly wrapped themselves in the national flag, eagerly waiting for the day when they can strive again to alienate us from our erstwhile comrades-in-arms, and resume the drive back to isolationism, just as after World War I.

All the abovementioned activities combined, if not checked, might result in the winning of the peace by Germany.

Furthermore, it is not for our self-interest, as well as the duty of every democratic organization, to warn the world of the danger to humanity embodied in a strong Germany, nourished upon the Pan-German principles which have been the basis of German Kultur for so many generations and have brought so many tragedies upon the world.

Must our paramount consideration be our own security and should not every approach to the German problem be based primarily on the need for that security?

In one word, are we going to let history repeat itself or are we going to protect ourselves by studying this problem, understanding it, and insisting on its solution?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Agreement with regard to control Machinery for Germany

There is attached hereto a copy of my memorandum of November 25, 1944 recommending that you approve the agreement reached in the European Advisory Commission with regard to control machinery for Germany.

The members of the Commission were formally notified of the approval of this agreement by the British Government on December 5, 1944 and similar approval by the Soviet Government is expected momentarily. It is, therefore, a matter of the utmost urgency that Ambassador Winant be advised forthwith whether this basic document has the approval of the United States, if we are to avoid placing ourselves in an embarrassing position in the European Advisory Commission. It is for this reason that I urge you to give me your decision on this agreement at your earliest convenience.

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy in a letter dated December 27, 1944, which was received by the Department of State on January 5, 1945, have recommended its approval.

Enclosure:
Memorandum as stated.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1945
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted January 18, 1945

ADDRESS TO

The President
November 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached hereto a photostatic copy of an agreement reached in the European Advisory Commission for submission to the American, British and Soviet Governments, with regard to control machinery in Germany, together with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on November 14, 1944, at which the agreement was signed.

The Department of State would appreciate being informed whether this agreement, which is the result of careful consideration and close consultation with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War, and Navy Departments, is agreeable to you in order that Ambassador Winant may be informed as soon as possible of the United States Government's approval of this agreement. Copies are also being submitted to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

/s/ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
January 22, 1945.

Dear Miss Tully:

I shall appreciate your placing this among the President's papers. It is a matter about which he might like to know and perhaps he may have an opportunity to study it a little before he gets to the conference.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM BRIEFLY DESCRIBING FEA'S STUDY PROJECT

RELATING TO GERMAN ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DISARMAMENT

Pursuant to the President's request, FEA is making a study of German industry and resources in cooperation with the Department of State.

We will not undertake to determine policy but will develop material that should inform the President on all phases of the German economy, cataloging the facts relative to each activity or resource, indicating the controls that may be necessary to accomplish the desired objectives, and projecting the effects of the controls, both for the country as a whole and by such areas as may be assigned to each of the Allies.

With this material available the President can avoid the situation President Wilson faced after World War I when the British were the much better informed, as reported by Churchill in a book entitled "The Aftermath," published in 1929.

At present, the British have the advantage in their current studies since they embarked on a full-fledged program well in advance of even preliminary consideration of a similar project in this country. We do not know what the Russians have done in this field.

We hope to overcome one present deficiency by having the fullest cooperation of all agencies which have developed information or have technical personnel qualified to assist in hastening the completion of the project. In this connection we will have the full use of the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (T.I.I.C.) which was recently established within FEA.
In general, the project contemplates:

(1) the preparation of a series of factual reports cataloging the industrial, agricultural and natural resources and productive capacity of Germany by areas;

(2) the submission of tentative recommendations as to steps that might be taken to accomplish desired objectives based on assumed hypotheses as to overall policy;

(3) a preparation of a series of reports projecting the probable effects of various forms of control which may be exercised; and

(4) the preparation of reports, if desired, projecting the effect of controls and policies finally determined upon.

The general premises on which the project will be based are:

(1) that the production of armament, munitions and implements of war should be prohibited and the facilities therefor removed or converted to other useful production;

(2) that the German aviation industry, military and civilian, should be wiped out;

(3) that it may be desirable to eliminate certain key industries or segments thereof which are essential to war, with the result that essential civilian needs in Germany for the products of the selected industries should be supplied from external sources;

(4) that it may be desirable to limit or regulate certain industrial and economic activities so as to prevent either a re-establishment of industrial war potential or an undue German domination of the European economy.
It is hoped that our work in this field will make it possible for the President to be completely informed about all economic and industrial aspects of Germany, both for the country as a whole and by such areas as may be assigned to each the United States, Great Britain and Russia, presenting a picture of the situation as it exists at the end of the war and as it changes after giving effect to programs agreed upon.
January 23, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Protection of our Prisoners of War

The British Government has expressed through its Embassy concern lest chaotic conditions resulting from a German collapse or deliberate threats by Hitler and his associates to murder Allied prisoners of war as a last resort may place our prisoners of war in Germany in grave peril. It has therefore proposed that the American, British, and Soviet Governments prepare a joint warning that individual commandants and guards, no less than the German military authorities, will be held responsible for the safety of prisoners of war in their charge. The British propose that this warning not be issued until either (1) organized German military resistance has ceased, or (2) Hitler has issued a threat to murder prisoners of war or a clear indication of such an intention has reached the Allied Governments. A copy of the text of the proposed warning is attached.

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur that it would be advisable to issue a statement, they have drawn up two alternative statements which they suggest be substituted for the British proposal. Copies of these statements are attached.

Although there are certain merits to the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal, it is felt that the threat to retain a thousand German prisoners to be employed in the interest of the Allied nations for each American prisoner murdered carries with it definite political implications which it would be best to avoid. For this reason it is recommended that we should agree to accept the British approach.

It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that such statements would be issued only after it had been determined on a governmental level that there is concrete evidence of German purpose to take action against Allied prisoners. The Joint Chiefs suggest, however, that it might be appropriate to communicate these statements at the present time to the British and Soviet Governments with
With a view to obtaining their concurrence in advance should the necessity arise for the issuance of the statement as a joint action.

Instructions are requested as to whether you concur with the Department's recommendations or whether we should submit counter proposals to the British and Soviet Governments along the lines suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JOSEPH C. GREEW

Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Text of proposed warning by the British.
2. Two proposed statements.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I have read your memorandum of November eleventh on Economic Treatment of Germany. Frankly, I do not understand it and I think you had better bring this with you and talk with me about it some day.

F.D.R.

(over)

FDR memo, 11-11-44, with attached secret draft re economic treatment of Germany;
FDR memo, undated, with attached memo re status of plans for treatment of Germany and Austria; also attached copy of FDR memo, 10-20 to Sec. of State;
FDR memo, 11-22, with attached memo re Economic Treatment of Germany;
FDR memo, 11-22 to Miss Tully, re wish of the Pres. to red dictate memo on Economic treatment of Germany before submitting it to Secretaries of War, Navy and Treasury.
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1938

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I have now your memorandum of November 19 on economic treatment of Germany. Frankly, I do not understand it any better now than I did then, and I think you had better take it up with you any time you are in Paris.

Yours,

J.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reported German Surrender Approach

I am transmitting herewith a message from Kirk in Caserta in regard to a report that high German military officers have arrived in Switzerland with a view to discussing surrender terms.

[Signature]

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 893 from Caserta, March 9, 1945.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

AMT-1755
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Caserta

Dated March 9, 1945
Rec'd 12:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

For General 893, March 9, 6 p.m.

NOT (REPEAT NOT) FOR DISTRIBUTION

We have received information from American and British sources that General Karl Wolf, a high SS officer stationed in north Italy, has arrived at Lugano accompanied by an OKW (repeat OKW) member of Kesselring's staff together with Messrs. Sinner and Dollmann. Report stated that these men are ready to discuss definite surrender. If this should indeed be the case, SAC may consider sending a member of his staff into Switzerland in civilian clothes under secret cover. We have received previous reports in past ten days with regard to desire of Germans in north Italy to negotiate conclusion of hostilities but have not heretofore reported to Department because we did not feel there was sufficient reason to take them too seriously. Incasmuch as this latest report would appear

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By J. Schauble Date FEB 1972
appear to be reliable, we are informing Department on it. If there should be discussions held in Switzerland, conversations, of course, would be conducted only on basis of unconditional (repeat unconditional) surrender.

KIRK

LMS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have just read Special
German series #2 from Winant.

I think our attitude should
be one of study and postponement
of final decision.

My original thought, which
I still maintain, is with the
purpose of elimination of the
word “Reich”. This question
goes beyond payments which
deeply affect the problem of
what Germany will be ten or
twenty years from now.

F. D. R.
April 4, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Dismemberment of Germany

In response to a request from Colonel Park there is transmitted herewith the full text of a telegram from Ambassador Winant on the work of the London Committee on Dismemberment of Germany, the gist of which was sent to you in the Department's daily information summary of March 30.

Enclosure: Acting Secretary

Copy of telegram no. 3278 from London, March 29, 1945.
SECRET

US URGENT

3278, March 29, 9 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY DUNN and MR MATTHEWS.

Special German series 2.

I want to keep you fully abreast of the work of the Committee on Dismemberment of Germany, which was set up by decision of the Yalta Conference. It is now possible to summarize the initial phase of the Committee's proceedings.

In order to facilitate handling, I shall label my telegrams on this potentially explosive subject as "special German series" and address them as above. In London these matters will be handled by me personally, with Mosely's assistance. For purposes of numbering, my 1952, February 22, 8 p.m., should be considered as "Special German
German series."

The Dismemberment Committee has held one meeting, on March 7, attended by Mr. Eden, Gousev, Strang and myself, which was devoted to defining the mandate of the Committee. At the close of the meeting Strang agreed to reduce our understanding of this mandate to writing for submission to the three representatives.

Strang's draft for the Committee was circulated on March 9. Paraphrase follows: one. In examining the procedure for German dismemberment the Committee will approach its task having in mind following considerations:

(A) the Allies primary objective in treatment of Germany after surrender or end of resistance is to prevent German aggression in future; (B) In considering how this objective can best be achieved, one question is whether it can be attained by measures such as control and destruction of German industry, as supplement to demilitarization and disarmament, or whether it will be necessary, in addition, to divide Germany; (C) if, for attainment of this objective it should be found necessary to divide Germany, inquiry should be made as to (sub one) in what fashion Germany should be divided, into what sections, with what boundaries.
boundaries for those parts, and what interrelationship to exist among the parts; (sub two) at what time division should be carried out; (sub three) what measures the Allies would have to take in order to effectuate and maintain such division. two. Inquiries of the Committee along lines set forth under (c) above will be conducted in the light of subjects set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b). END OF PARAPHRASE

I objected to paragraph one B of this draft, asking that instead of the words "destruction and control of German industry" we substitute the words "elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production" as set forth in the Yalta communique. Strang accepted this change and Gousev said he had no objection to it. I have written Mr. Eden to say that with this modification I have no objection to Strang's draft.

In reply to Strang's letter of March 9 Gousev has now written Mr. Eden, setting forth his understanding of the mandate of the Committee and stating that he has no objection to the formula contained in Strang's draft. Beginning of paraphrase of Gousev's statement submitted as "a proposal"
as "a proposal for consideration of the Committee". Soviet Government understands Crimea Conference decision in respect to Germany's dismemberment not as an obligatory plan for dismemberment but as a possibility for exercising pressure on Germany with aim of rendering Germany harmless in case other means should prove inadequate. END OF PARAPHRASE. Gousev's reply has been sent to me informally, and I assume that Mr. Eden will now acknowledge Gousev's letter and will formally communicate to me copies of Gousev's letter and of his own reply.

The Soviet statement of March 26 represents a notable success for the concept that the Committee on Dismemberment is intended to consider not merely the question of "procedure" for effecting dismemberment but also, and in the first instance, the substantive question of the desirability and feasibility of dismemberment. Thus far there is no indication of a fixed Soviet view on dismemberment. Gousev's letter makes it plain that at this stage his government is not committed in principle to a policy of dismemberment.

I appreciate the indication received from the Department that it sees no objection to enlarging the membership of the committee.
of the committee to include a French representative. In view of the simultaneous discussions about including France in the reparations committee in Moscow, Mr. Eden and I have refrained from raising the question of French membership in the Dismemberment Committee. Meanwhile the formal adherence of France to the surrender instrument for Germany is also in abeyance until the three powers decide to inform the French of the addition to Article Twelve of the instrument as agreed at Yalta (my 1852 February 22, 8 p.m.). Yesterday Massigli made representations to Mr. Eden, urging prompt formal adherence by France to the instrument. In any case the French would probably be embarrassed if they were asked to join in discussions of dismemberment until they know the attitudes of the other three governments on this question.

In private talks I have asked Gousev if the dismemberment of Germany would not react unfavorably on the amount of reparation which could be secured from the German economy. Gousev professed to see no connection between German economic unity and the total amount of reparation obtainable. On another occasion I asked Gousev if his information led him to believe that any strong separatist movements would arise in Germany proper as a result of defeat and if he thought the German people would itself either
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either seek or support partition. To both questions Gousev replied with an unhesitating "no".

WINANT

WWC