

PSF

Germany: William E. Dodd

1936-38

January 6, 1936.

My dear Dodd:-

Thank you for that fine telegram of yours of January fourth, and also for your letter of about two weeks ago. It was your letter which confirmed my previous feeling of extreme disquiet in regard to European and Asiatic affairs. Hence the serious and, at the same time, clear note of my Message to the Congress. I am glad you liked it.

I tried to bring out that in the countries you and I are thinking about the theory of Woodrow Wilson that one can appeal to the citizens over the head of their government is no longer tenable, for the reason that the dissemination of news - real news, such for instance of my Message - is no longer possible. I shall be glad to have your report on how far the German people receive real information as to what I said about autocracies.

I do not anticipate much of a response within the autocratic nations -- but at least enough of the thought behind what I said may seep through to make peace a slightly greater probability during the coming year.

As ever yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
American Embassy,  
Berlin,  
Germany.

DJR: Todd



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1936.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President copies of the telegrams indicated below.

Since the telegrams were transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if they could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

**Enclosures:**

Telegram No. - , January 4, noon, Berlin.

PSF: Todd

MED

GRAY

BERLIN

Dated January 4, 1936

Received 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

January 4, noon.

FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Congratulations on your masterly and unanswerable address. I am sure the people of our country are with you. The McReynolds proposal to Congress is given front page publicity all over Germany. If your address receives similar publicity tomorrow the effect is going to be great in spite of all limitations of free speech and I believe the whole of Europe is going to be deeply moved in the direction of peace. Shall cable official and semi-official reactions as soon as we are reasonably informed.

DODD

TOP SECRET  
JAN 10 1936  
January 7, 1936

Dear Mr. President:

You have the greatest and most difficult task of any leader in the world. What the Supreme Court said yesterday reveals the same spirit which John Marshall applied in the Virginia Convention of 1829, elected to begin gradual abolition: i.e. no

State or Congress has the right to limit  
or regulate the claims of property holders.  
Marshall was more responsible for  
the Civil War than any other man;  
yet judges think him the most  
perfect of all their predecessors.

Your address last Friday showed your  
full appreciation of the opposition shaping  
against you. If you could ~~not~~ win  
with as big a vote as 1932, it  
would be real recovery; if not,  
am uneasy as to our future. If you  
and the State Department could manage  
some way to hold England and France  
up to their duty in the League, great results  
would come here - also benefits at home.

Yours  
William E. Dodd

Our Military Attaché sent  
a cable some time ago stating  
ing a great aircraft com-  
pany of ours make a bar-  
gain with a company here  
whereby 100 war planes were  
to be half made in U.S. fin-  
ished here and sent to Italy!

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1936.

Dear Miss LeHand:

I think the President may like to read the enclosed letter from Dr. Dodd. Dr. Dodd understands that I am at liberty to show his confidential letters to the President and Secretary Hull.

I have refrained from trying to take any of the President's time, but there are one or two matters I will endeavor to talk over with him on his return here.

You can say to the President that two of the people selected by him for appointment to the conciliation commissions, Judge Lumpkin and Mr. Branch, have accepted, and two, Mrs. Harriman and Mr. Garvan, have declined. This is such a relatively unimportant matter that there is no reason for it being further dealt with at the moment.

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosure:  
Letter from  
Dr. Dodd dated  
Feb. 10th.



Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,  
Personal Secretary to the President,  
The White House.

March 4, 1936.

Dear Judge Moore:-

The President asks me to tell you that he has been delighted to read the enclosed, which I am returning to you.

My best wishes to you,

Always sincerely,

M. A. Le Hand  
PRIVATE SECRETARY

Honorable R. Walton Moore,  
Assistant Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

(Enclosure)

March 16, 1936.

My dear Dodd:-

I think the idea of exchanging the burned out palace for something more business-like and less ostentatious would be a good thing and I have so informed the Secretary and Phillips and Moore. If we could make the exchange on the basis of actual going values and really get a place where everything would be concentrated in a reasonable location, there would be no difficulty in obtaining the necessary legislation.

Since you wrote on March third everything seems to have broken loose again in your part of the world. All the experts here, there and the other place say "There will be no war." They said the same thing all through July, 1914, when I was in the Navy Department. In those days I believed the experts. Today I have my tongue in my cheek. This does not mean that I am become cynical; but as President I have to be ready just like a Fire Department!

If in the days to come the absolutely unpredictable events should by chance get to the point where a gesture, an offer or a formal statement by me would, in your judgment, make for peace, be sure to send me immediate word. But the peace must be not only peace with justice but the kind of peace which will endure without threat for more than a week or two.

As ever yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
American Embassy,  
Berlin.

*You see how poor  
a typist I am*

March 3, 1936.

Dear Mr. President:

It seems to me the location of all offices of the Service here would be most advantageous; and to that end an enormous palace was bought some years ago. But this building is now in such condition that it would cost over a million dollars to put it in order; and the consequences of building of a subway under one corner of it are such that I have urged upon the Department the exchange of the palace for another place. If this could be approved this spring, I think we could get a far better bargain than we could hope for later. In case you can give the matter a moment's consideration, I wish you might see Mr. Phillips who was here January 1 and looked into the matter carefully. Carr and Merrill of the Department are still using every influence they have to get more than a million dollars added to the million seven hundred thousand already invested; their attitudes are personal I fear, rather than national.

How many mistakes our greater nations have made since 1920! We refused to give the League of Nations a trial, though we might have withdrawn in case we became convinced membership meant nothing. Then we put through two tariff laws which made the payment of debts impossible, nearly everybody talking about paying in gold! Those two acts did more to set up the barriers to commerce than anything else, and reduced our standard of living sadly. Then France insisted upon armaments to the limit and caused Hitler to be able to seize control of the German nation. And England refused to support us when we tried to stop Japan's imperialism in China! Last November-December Hoare and Laval defeated the first real League movement to stop war at a moment when two-thirds of the German people were hoping to see Mussolini stopped because it would mean later a stoppage here. That was a blunder which now leads to the necessity of alliances; and alliances are only repetitions of 1879 to 1914. I hardly know which people have acted more stupidly; and all this armament business now reaches five billion dollars cost a year - all nations bankrupt!

<sup>His</sup> Long talk last Saturday with Secretary von Neurath, 29th of February, <sup>who</sup> revealed his great anxiety, though he insisted Hitler is really getting uneasy and listens more to the Foreign Office. He agreed as to the terrible blunder of last November and added that the hope of Europe now depends on a restoration of the League and Germany's joining. Then he added, "but your country is forming a League which will have the effect of making our League European and then of creating an Asiatic League: certain war!" Well, I could <sup>only</sup> say "No" with some doubt.

*Yours sincerely,  
William E. Dodd*

*"the  
journal"*

Berlin, April 1, 1936.

Dear Mr. President:

At this critical moment, I venture a summary of conditions and blunders which have brought the more democratic peoples of Europe into their present dangerous status, perhaps repeating some things I have written before.

I cabled from Basle late in August the anxieties of different nations about Mussolini's expected break into Ethiopia. From that date to December 10, I watched popular and official attitudes here. There was no question in my mind that two-thirds of the German people hoped and prayed for prompt application of sanctions, including oil, upon Italy. Germans of semi-official, University, religious and royalist relations were unanimous in their hope that one dictatorship would be broken down, especially through the cooperation of the United States. If that happened, these people thought their own miserable position would be improved, even corrected. If I were to give the names of the people who showed great concern and talked freely, you could hardly doubt my conclusions. From September till the Hoare-Laval blunder even the triumvirate criticized the Duce; they would be neutral and not help him kill Ethiopians.

But as soon as the Hoare-Laval announcement was made, clever leaders like Goebbels began to speak in favor of Italian "colonial needs." Then the remilitarization of the Rhineland zone was talked seriously, but always under cover. About January 1, there was a conference of the generals of the army. They voted unanimously against sending troops into the Rhine zone and also against lending any aid to Nazis who might

The President  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

break into Austria. Conferences and discussions were held frequently between January 1 and March 7. On the 6th of March all opposition ceased; the Führer was in close relations with Mussolini; and the Foreign Office was ready to approve drastic action and criticism of France and Russia. I sent a telegram on February 29 giving positive avowal of Secretary von Neurath's opposition to doing or proposing what was proclaimed on March 7, but on that date he shouted approval. What was the cause of this?

The French had promised their support to Mussolini in January 1935 in case he annexed Ethiopia. This was a violation of the League's solemn agreement. When England became aware of Mussolini's purpose to control the Nile and annex Egypt itself, she called upon France and the League. France defeated England and gave Hitler the best opportunity he had had, since he came to power, to take the lead in European affairs. Before December 15 Mussolini was in grave danger of being overthrown, and influential groups in Italy were working toward that end, even the Pope was lending aid and the King of Italy hopeful of a restoration of the throne he had lost. Frenchmen here and in Paris seemed to have no real understanding of their own blunders. I had a long talk with the French Ambassador on December 12. He could not foresee consequences.

As to the Franco-Soviet pact, nobody here considered it serious before January 1. Von Neurath said to me February 29 it was only a defense agreement and that the Russians had no idea of making war beyond their western boundaries. Even Dr. Schacht, most influential man here after Hitler, said there was no danger in that direction. But Hitler-Goebbels were ready March 1 to use Franco-Soviet pact for propaganda; they were approving Mussolini's right to annex Ethiopia and putting forward Germany's right to having her colonies restored; and making ready secretly to send troops into the Rhine zone. It was the best chance imaginable. Hitler even quoted Woodrow Wilson more than once. How could

France reply to these charges, having violated the League agreement in January 1933? If she approved the Italian seizure of territory, how could she complain if Germany re-seized her historic Rhine country?

Illogical as it was, the French Ambassador here and his superiors in Paris showed great excitement March 7 to 29, called off invitations to parties and talked of sending their army into the German Rhine area. When France then turned to England just as England had turned to her in December preceding, she was terribly angry to learn that England would treat Germany just as France had treated Italy. There had been a slight danger of war in the Mediterranean in December, for a week or two; there was greater danger of war on the Rhine in March. The outcome, as we all know, was German success. Nothing else could have been expected.

In conclusion, the French nation is now on a definite decline toward the position of Spain, her population at a standstill. Although she has her peace pact with Russia, it means little. The Balkan states could hardly be assisted from either direction if Hitler's Rhine peace idea be applied - these states disposed now to line up with Germany or Italy. The English nation, having failed to cooperate with the United States in 1931 and failed in December to balk Mussolini, is beginning a similar decline, her population at a standstill and her relations with her colonies weakening. Will she parallel the history of the Netherlands after 1713?

But Germany's dictatorship is now stronger than ever. If she keeps the pace three more years, she can beat the whole of Europe in a war. No man, no newspaper here is permitted to talk pacifism, except Hitler. Protestants and Catholics, regardless of many imprisonments, all shout and vote hurrah for their second "Jesu Christu" and the population is increasing as no other in western Europe. The 67,000,000 is expected to be 80,000,000 when Austria is annexed. With universal service, both in aircraft and on land, and with a solid front never before enjoyed here or

(including part of  
Czechoslovakia)

elsewhere, Europe can hardly escape domination: Italy taking control of the Mediterranean and Germany the Balkan zone. It looks as if our blunders 1920-1933 and English and French blunders 1920-26 and 1931-36 have given us a new and dangerous world situation: Germany dominating Europe, Japan dominating the Far East and the United States dominating both Americas.

If Woodrow Wilson's bones do not turn in the Cathedral grave, then bones never turn in graves. Possibly you can do something, but from reports of Congressmen's attitudes, I have grave doubts. So many men, including my friend Beard, think absolute isolation a coming paradise.

Sincerely yours,

William E. Dodd

Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
August 5, 1936.

My dear Dodd:-

Many thanks for your note. I am sorry, indeed, that I have not had the chance of seeing you again before you sail.

The election this year has, in a sense, a German parallel. If the Republicans should win or make enormous gains, it would prove that an 85% control of the Press and a very definite campaign of misinformation can be effective here just as it was in the early days of the Hitler rise to power. Democracy is verily on trial. I am inclined to say something a little later on about the great need for freedom of the press in this country, i.e., freedom to confine itself to actual facts in its news columns and freedom to express editorially any old opinion it wants to.

Drop me a line soon after your return. I should like to have your slant, in the utmost confidence, as to what would happen if Hitler were personally and secretly asked by me to outline the limit of German foreign objectives during, let us say a ten year period, and to state whether or not he would have any sympathy with a general limitation of armaments' proposal. You cannot, of course, ask any questions regarding this in such a way as to let any inference be drawn that we were even thinking of such a thing. I should merely like to get your own opinion

on the probability of his attitude under certain conditions.

My warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
American Embassy,  
Berlin,  
Germany.

PSF: Todd

COSMOS CLUB  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 28, 1936

Dear Mr. President:

I am leaving tomorrow on the Washington which arrives in Hamburg August 6. Allow me to thank you and the State Department for allowing me to use my accumulated vacation. It has been worth a great deal to me -

The match at the University of Chicago revealed what seemed to me overwhelming support of you and your <sup>worse</sup> on the part of Faculty people and graduate (teachers) students from all parts of the country. Vice President of the First National Bank said to me he would vote against you, but was sure the people would re-elect you. The President of the Chamber of Commerce, before whose members I spoke frankly July 8, said the same thing. Both were puzzled when I said: "you know England has not had a

bank failure since 1870, and Canada has passed through the great depression without a single bank failure. Why have our bankers operated so as to have failures ever since 1870 and ten thousand failures during the depression? Why should they not expect governmental regulation to stop such disasters to millions of people?"

From what I heard in Chicago, you are to carry that ill-governed city in spite of all the newspaper conduct. I believe you will carry Chicago Illinois too. That would be a great advantage. Every press man I saw, but one, lamented press attitudes and said they would vote for you in spite of all opposition on the part of their bosses. They tried to get the best parts of my addresses printed, but their reports were all misprinted so as to avoid having my judgments on existing situation put before the people.

This is too much for you to read, I fear.

Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

Typed by my  
daughter - strictly  
confidential

File

Berlin, August 19th, 1936

Dear Mr. President:

Your re-election on a safe margin is about the most important thing in the world and this is recognized here. Democracy everywhere may fail if it fails with us. So you must know how much concerned I am. Today the Minister of the Netherlands revealed to me the great interest of his people in your continued success. He said that information had come to him the last few days that the German Party leaders had captivated our former Ambassador Schurman, who has been in Berlin nearly a month; and he added: Schurman is being used to stimulate Republican opposition among Germans in America with the expectation of his being returned here as Ambassador. Judge Moore can give you the details in case it is worth while.

My hope is that your second term may enable you to solve the unemployment problem perhaps by leaving it to states, cities and counties, the Federal Government supervising and granting a certain proportion

of needed money. The greatest problem is to save our country from erosion, dust storms and floods. This can be done but it will require a real free press which will give our people information as to blunders of the past and the necessity of scientific management. If these things are not done the next generation is apt to have one third of the country a desert. You have certainly awakened people to the cause of troubles.

But a free press and genuine education are necessary. I think your re-election on a large margin might enable you to start press reform, perhaps enable you to help start real newspapers at strategic points. Many able young journalists are ready to set up papers of their own if they could have a fair chance. With this I think we ought to have a Department of Education in Washington whose chief would reform gradually state institutions, and see to it that real teachers of the truth about our past be employed in high schools and feel themselves actually free. You know how many states, even the District of Columbia,

have been trying to deny freedom to teachers. It would be a difficult thing, but a genuine national leadership in this realm and direction would have constructive and conspicuous influence in a decade.

As to the second paragraph of your letter I may say that animosity here is such that one may not easily get a quiet answer to such an inquiry as you suggest. I had a talk with Dr. Schacht on the 18th. A hint of the subject mentioned brought a repetition of the present German demand for expansion and colonies. The telegram which I sent on that day was probably handed to you. There is a chance of such a ten year pact in the case of French and British ability to prevent Spain from becoming a dependency of Italy. Schacht did suggest that you call a world conference next winter (I never intimated of course your inquiry). His idea was, however, not so much for peace as to enable him to save Germany from economic disaster. He insisted, though, on your demanding return of German colonies. When I said that was England's business, he said : Oh, England

is losing her position and power every day. During the next few weeks I shall watch every opportunity to make an opening in the direction you mention.

With best wishes, sincerely yours,

William E. Dodd

PSF: Germany: Dodd

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1936.

*File  
Dodd  
August 21-36*

Dear Mr. President:


I would not send you the enclosures except for Dr. Dodd's evident desire to have you know about his predecessor's performance in Germany.

The Department hears only praise of the work done by our officials in Spain in taking care of American citizens and property, and I do not believe there will be any dispraise of the note to the Minister of Uruguay, which was the result of a great deal of careful consideration.

I hope you are enjoying more comfortable weather at Hyde Park than now prevails in Washington, where it is wretchedly hot.

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosures:  
From Ambassador  
Dodd.



The President,

Hyde Park, New York.

Aug. 10, 1936

Dear Judge:

I enclose copy of our daily press summary marking one item which might interest Secretary Hull, were the President. The former Ambassador was here 4 months last autumn. We showed him every courtesy as we have here this time.

But he was too free last fall in trying to "get in with" high party officials and propagandists, i.e. for a former Ambassador. This time he is here as a guest of the Partei-government, has a house, a huge car and a chauffeur at public expense. He is cultivated by Hitler and

other members of the triumvirate every day  
and he makes speeches which seem to "cor-  
rect" careful and non-partisan attitudes  
of our Embassy and Consulate. And  
last night he was a guest of Hitler  
at a dinner (Hitler has never <sup>before</sup> <sup>Italian</sup> <sup>dinner</sup>) to which English and Balkan  
state diplomats were were invited. French  
and other ambassadors not invited. The  
French Ambassador told me yesterday. All  
were not, though we were known to be  
entertaining other people (Germanist Americans)  
It is considered as a scheme to unite Ger-  
many, Italy and certain Balkan states.  
Why should our Ambassador here, 1924-30,  
be making speeches and playing such a  
role? I refer to Schürmann. It may <sup>lead</sup> <sup>lead</sup>  
to embarrassments. Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

AUGUST 13, 1936.

No DD-PK yestersay and today.

OLYMPIC GAMES still front page, with America and Germany 19 Gold Medals each. Germany leads, however, in Silver and Bronze medals. American women ~~won~~ won all three medals in diving so VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER devoted only half the text of the front page to Olympics, ~~featuring Women's Gymnastic where Gold Medal went to Germany. The other half of the front page devoted to foreign politics, headline:~~ featuring Women's Gymnastic where Gold Medal went to Germany. The other half of the front page devoted to foreign politics, headline:

"FREE ENTRY FOR TRAVEL TO AUSTRIA - AUSTRO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED." Other measures drafted are for increasing mutual exchange of commodities, to be signed and put into effect after being approved by both Governments.

Other foreign news has to do mostly with SPAIN either directly or indirectly and is in the well-known anti-Soviet, anti-Front-Populair spirit. French Chief of Staff Gamelin visits Warsaw and VB tries to minimize political importance of the event, saying that while his welcome in Poland was hearty it was meant more for "Latin Culture" than for Front Populair.

RIBBENTROP - in absence of DD-PK comment, German press restricts itself to reproducing biographic data and English and French comment on his appointment to London. The English comment reproduced here is all favorable. The French comment reproduced amounts to saying that the appointment of Ribbentrop indicates importance attached by Germany to Anglo-German relations and preparation for forthcoming Locarno Conference.

SHURMANN - according to PRESSEBERICHT, our former Ambassador, in an interview with N.S.KORRESPONDENZ, said "Only a Germany with equal rights, and sovereign, can arrive at agreement with the two great European states which fought and struggled in particularly close union against the Reich".

SCHWARZE KORPS requests foreign Olympia guests in Germany to open wide their eyes and to see not only official personages but the man on the street and polemizes against an article in the BASLER NATIONALZEITUNG which stated that in Germany not joy stood in the center of life but fear - fear of spies, agents provocateurs, fear of loss of job, fear of imprisonment, etc. (How does the average German, who may be suffering from at least one of these anxieties, feel when he reads his SCHWARZE KORPS - or does he?)

PSF: Jedd

P.F. Wadd

Typed by my daughter  
so entirely confidential

Berlin, August 31st, 1936

Dear Judge Moore:

P. 4

If you think it worth while you might show this letter to the President. It is my summary of things as they appear to me in Europe.

The German people seem to be now 60% behind the Fuhrer; but they are 75% desperately afraid of a European war. Dr. Schacht insists before the dictators that war would ruin all countries involved; but he is overruled and compelled to meet expenses of unprecedented armament. In order to do this he was trying in Paris last week to find a way to buy cotton, copper and other war materials. The French Ambassador here acknowledged this to me August 29th. The idea is to get American exports to France and then have the needed materials re-exported to German manufacturers. This was done by American airplane companies for Italy through Germany last autumn, as you know.

The Fuhrer is so set in his course against Russia that he will not participate in any world conference if the French-Russian treaty is not renounced by France. This I think was also urged by Schacht in Paris. German officials say frankly

that there can be no conference if Russians have anything to do with it. Schacht called upon the Russians through the Press yesterday as he returned to stop all propoganda- the very same day Goebbels was in Venice conferring with the Italian Propaganda Minister; and we know the Nazis have maintained highly expensive propoganda agents and groups in Spain for two years. The Propaganda chief for dissemination of "enlightenment" to other countries now has more than 500 clerks in his Berlin office.

The German journalists have not mentioned the world-wide newspaper story that President Roosevelt had asked for a conference of world leaders for peace. A Foreign Office official laughed when one of our staff people asked him discreetly if the Germans had heard of the matter. How could the Führer leave his country with a thousand armed guardsmen? There is no prospect of a peace agreement except upon the basis of a solid Fascist-Nazi European front. The French Ambassador, himself half-Fascist, a shareholder in the largest iron-ore mines in Lorraine and a member of the Comite de Forges, and very uneasy, said yesterday: If the Schacht negotiations fail war is almost certain to come next year. I think from the tone of the

conversation, Schacht is trying to persuade the French to go Fascist in order to avoid war; and a special leader of Fascist Poland is now working for the same thing in Paris. That would mean Spanish surrender and British helplessness. Such a drift I have felt and sadly prophesied since the autumn of 1934.

A very able and prominent American, talking with Mussolini two weeks ago reported to me: "Mussolini said 'no use for you to go to Vienna, nothing is decided there; I and Hitler tell them what to do; you might stop in Prague, but Berlin is the only other place for you to visit'". A Vienna correspondent of long residence told me yesterday that our Ministry there is of no more use at all; Austria is not annexed but both Nazi and Catholic elements have surrendered with Schusnigg. Even Messersmith admitted personally to him that nothing could be done in Vienna. And we learn that Schusnigg was with Hitler a week ago and Mussolini expected to be with him soon. Hungary is in about the same position as Austria, in addition, strong anti-Semitic feeling and territorial claims which have been used by Nazi propaganda; Roumania's present change of chief official is due to urgent pressure to make a

co-operative treaty with Germany; and I expect the Minister of Czechoslovakia, now in Prague, to report a proposed treaty with, if not surrender to, Germany when he returns. It would not be called that to be sure. As you probably know Mussolini started Franco on his revolt against the Spanish Government July 17th and sent much assistance. Germany supported the same policy and sent many airplanes to Revolutionists up to last week. The neutrality promises were made when these powers felt certain of Fascist dictatorship in Spain.

Europe is, therefore, fast moving in the direction I have feared a long time. France, I am told by Government official from Paris, may get rid of Blum in December, if he does not devaluate, or if his devaluation brings charges of betrayal of promises from the French people. Will there follow a dictatorship? Doriot, paid by Fascists in France and by industrialists, with great appeal to the working classes, is now the most prominent opposition. <sup>leader</sup> England's armament goes on at a terrific rate, but there is no real safety without co-operation with the United States; and that can not be arranged. Moreover, there is increasing activity from London, as in Berlin, against the re-election of President Roosevelt. A competent American journalist told me last week that Lord Beaver-

brook and a large number of London investors in United States securities, especially utilities, were very active in New York in fighting the Administration. There is a "deal" between the Beaverbrook and Hearst Press associations for the same purpose. This supports the accounts I gave you a week ago about what is being done here by Propaganda people. They have been urging Kermit Roosevelt, thought to be against his distant cousin, to attend the grand Partei Tag show in Nurnberg, September 8-15. Kermit is reported to be in Switzerland where Schurman is supposed to be. A correspondent of the United Press was in London a little while ago. He wrote an account to America of what came to him about London business men against Roosevelt. His chief over there telegraphed him refusal to print and a rebuke for telling the story, especially as he had said the British government was opposed to such conduct. Hearst as you know is now in Italy with Mussolini to whom he secured great loans, McAdoo helping, from California a few years ago. All of these activities, among many others already given public attention, point to the possibility of Fascism in our country. We have not yet ascertained whether London and New York have made recent loans to Rome, as reported two weeks ago.

Our country has certainly permitted "interests"

to abuse our system; and we have Tamany Hall in New York and a worse thing in Chicago. If you have time to read chapters XVII and XVIII of my Wilson book you will see why many high officials in Europe criticize us. But the democratic spirit is as real with us now as at any time since 1865. If Roosevelt is defeated it would be a serious set-back which would greatly affect the countries of Europe where democracy is already being abandoned altogether. If we yield in part how much worse our system would be- and over here the historic democracies of Switzerland, Holland and Sweden are almost trembling with fear.

I have been a little surprised at the failure of the Balkan Ministers here since my return. They all formerly talked freely and hoped to see a loose union of their little countries, settling their boundary disputes among themselves. Now they are silent or show such a fear of Germany that they must give up outside relationships- everything depends on the Führer.

More interesting to the President, perhaps, is the fact that Latin- American Ministers here: Brazil, Argentine, Chili, Columbia and Nicaragua are frankly Fascist, although they speak highly of the present United States policy toward them. They all seem to wish Europe

to go Nazi or Fascist; all attend the Partei Tag propaganda event which the representatives of the democratic countries decline to attend. Perhaps this may interest Secretary Hull too.

In conclusion I ought to say that our service people, diplomatic and consular, have indicated their Fascist favor toward German-Italian domination of Spain; they have even indicated their opposition to their President. This is not saying they ought to favor Communism. It is only saying that they have in the last six months swung back into the ranks of privileged capitalists. This adds troublesome elements to my work here for we must have absolutely non-partisan reports and telegrams. Is the western world going to give up the human system of Locke, Adam Smith and Jefferson who labored so hard to secure it? The present campaign is, I fear, the most important we have had since the Civil War, and there will be millions of dollars spent to defeat Roosevelt. If he could only manage to hold his majority of 1932!

With sincere personal regards,

*William E. Dodd*

The Police of  
Berlin are being  
drilled same  
as other same  
also S.S. and S.A.  
men, about three  
million

Sept. 21, 1936

Dear Mr. President:

In spite of the newspaper  
misrepresentations of what you hoped might  
be done for world peace, I indirectly raised  
the question with the most sympathetic  
representative of the Government in the  
Foreign Office here - sympathetic as to  
possible peace movements. He said  
Germany would participate in any confer-  
ence in which the United States played  
a role. He even said Hitler would  
agree to abandon air attacks in  
next war, if it came, provided other greater

nations did the same. You know Hitler frequently declares himself against war. But the Secretary did not think Hitler would attend any conference outside of Germany. He did think he would yield to presence of Russian delegates in case the United States participated.

However, there are grave doubts. My reason for entertaining them will be found in the copy of a memorandum I am sending Secretary Hull in to-day's pouch. I am also enclosing a clipping or two from this morning's German papers. One of them is headed: The Greatest Army Manoeuvre Since 1914 which seems to me a half-

acknowledgment here of Germany's beginning the Great War. If this were the first thing of the sort I would not enclose it. Since March 1935 representatives of all countries have been urged to attend meetings of the Partei where great military performances were made the major affairs. I was in Muenchen ten days ago and the hotel manager told us of the great aircraft attacks and defenses scheduled a week later. The enclosed clipping shows in some respects what was done.

Nothing is clearer here than the general Government belief that the Balkan zone must be subordinated to Hitler. Former Foreign Office people, who really meant to be co-operative in peace movements, are no longer in their positions; or, if so, they have changed their attitudes like von Neurath who

is now maneuvering in that area to extend German power over Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania. Goebbels in Venice two weeks ago is now in Greece and Göring is head of the greatest war aircraft in the world.

Not without interest has been the assistance of our great corporations: Du Ponts, Standard Oil, U.S. Steel and others, even though they can not take earnings out of the country. Many war flying machines have been sold to Göring's organization through Krupp's. Our Military attaché sent a cable last December showing that people in Ohio, who had agreed not to send 100 aircraft to Italy, had sent a hundred or more to Mussolini through Krupp's - an allied company here. You see, therefore, some of the reasons for my doubts. Hope I am wrong.

Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

Den Montag Sept. 21. 1936

Truppenteile mehrerer Armeekorps beteiligt

# Größtes Manöver seit 1914

## Einzigartige Herbstübungen im Beisein des Reichsriegsministers

Drahtmeldung unseres Sonderberichterstatters

Bad Nauheim, 20. September. Am Montag beginnen im Raume Aschaffenburg — Weiningen — Wehra — Treysa — Bad Nauheim unter der Leitung des Oberbefehlshabers der Gruppe 2, Generals der Artillerie Ritter v. Leeb, die großen Herbstübungen des Gruppentkommandos 2. Diese Herbstübungen sind insofern einzigartig zu nennen, als sie die größten und umfangreichsten deutschen Manöver der Nachkriegszeit überhaupt darstellen werden, an denen die Truppenteile mehrerer Armeekorps, und zwar mit allen Waffengattungen, beteiligt sind.

Es wird außerdem die erste Übung in größerem Rahmen sein, an der Heer und Luftwaffe zusammenwirken. Ihrer ganzen Art und Anlage nach wird also die große Herbstübung 1936 mit den Kaisermanövern der Vorkriegszeit vergleichbar sein. Gleichzeitig stellt sie für die beteiligten Truppen aber auch den Abschluß des ersten Jahres der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht dar und wird — darüber ist sich das Oberkommando des Heeres auch klar — als Manöver in einem großen Verband und nach einer so kurzen Ausbildungszeit außerordentlich hohe Anforderungen an Führung und Truppe stellen. Aber der gute Wille und der Geist der Truppe werden mit allen Schwierigkeiten fertig werden. Die Erfahrungen, die bereits bei anderen Manövern dieses Jahres gemacht wurden, bestätigten bereits, daß das neue Heer mit dem Ausbildungsergebnis vollauf zufrieden sein kann, besonders dort, wo es auf den Willen zum Ertragen von Anstrengungen ankommt.

Es wird sich auch um das erste größere Manöver seit dem Kriege handeln, in dem keine Leinwand und Flaggen benutzt werden, die Panzerwagen und Geschütze darstellen sollen. Auch die Ballone, die in den vergangenen Jahren

bei militärischen Übungen die Flugzeuge darstellen sollten, werden nun nicht mehr in Erscheinung treten. Panzerwaffe und Luftwaffe sind an den Herbstübungen voll beteiligt.

Die teilnehmenden Truppen sind bereits seit dem 18. und 19. September in ihre Ausgangsstellungen transportiert worden, oder haben sie im Fußmarsch erreicht. Der Sonntag war überall im großen Manövergelände ein Ruhetag, denn eine große Anzahl der Truppenteile hat bereits die Divisionsmanöver hinter sich. Es handelt sich in erster Linie um das V. Armeekorps unter Leitung des Generals der Infanterie Geper und um das IX. Armeekorps, dessen Führer General der Artillerie Dollmann ist.

Überall in den Quartieren wurden die Truppen mit größter Freude und Begeisterung aufgenommen. Die Einwohner der sehr stark belegten Ortschaften nehmen bereitwillig alle Schwierigkeiten auf sich, die eine so zahlreiche Einquartierung mit sich bringt: Es ist ja seit langer Zeit wieder das erste Mal, daß sie deutsche Soldaten bei sich als willkommene Gäste beherbergen können.

An den Manövern nehmen teil: Der Reichsriegsminister und Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht Generalfeldmarschall v. Blomberg und die Oberbefehlshaber der drei Wehrmachtsteile, mehrere Reichsminister und Reichsstatthalter, zahlreiche Vertreter staatlicher und parteiamtlicher Dienststellen und Behörden, viele ehemalige Offiziere der alten Armee und des Reichsheeres, darunter Generaloberst v. Seckt, der Chef des Infanterieregiments 67, ferner der Stabschef der SA Luze, der Reichsführer der SS Himmler, der Korpsführer des NSKK Sühndlein, der Reichsarbeitsführer Stierl, der General der Polizei Dalwege und der Leiter des Hauptamtes für Kriegsofferfürsorge Oberlindober. Außerdem ist eine große Anzahl von Militärattachés der fremden Nationen zu den Manövern eingeladen.

"file private"

PST: Dodd

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1936.

Dear Mr. President:

I am handing you a letter that has just come in from Dr. Dodd.

I do not believe that there is anything to be gained by making a further effort to obtain a statement from Carter Glass. He has not only failed to reply to my letter to him of September 2nd, but privately I hear that he is grouchy about Bullitt, his hatred of whom is said to have influenced him to make his wretched Hanover speech. He is also reported to have said he intends to answer my letter only when he "gets good and ready". I feel pretty sure, as I have told you before, that mentally he is an old age victim.

Although everybody seems to think Virginia politically is beyond any doubt, I have been urged to broadcast a campaign speech from Richmond and will probably do so early next month. I am so tied up here as to have little opportunity to know anything beyond what appears in the newspapers and what is told me by all sorts of people who drop in to discuss one thing and another, but in some way I sense the fact that Landon has weakened himself by his recent speeches and that your reelection is becoming all the time more certain. This, I believe, will become steadily more apparent as you carry on your own work in the campaign which is really being started only tonight.

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosure:

Letter from  
Dr. Dodd.



The President  
The White House.

November 9, 1936.

My dear Dodd:-

I like your "long story" even though it is not an optomistic one.

I am off in a week to, I hope, Buenos Aires. That visit will have little practical or immediate effect in Europe but at least the forces of example will help if the knowledge of it can be spread down to the masses of the people in Germany and Italy.

Incidentally, I think the results last Tuesday may have made the German and Italian populace a little envious of democratic methods.

I hope to see your daughter before I leave.

As ever yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
American Embassy,  
Berlin,  
Germany.

Oct. 19, 1936

Dear Mr. President:

Perhaps you can see my daughter, Martha, a moment while she is in Washington. She is kindly taking a confidential letter to you which she will mail to Judge Moore as soon as she arrives on the Manhattan in New York. I congratulate you and the country on your most decisive decision.

Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

Berlin, October 19, 1936.

Personal

Dear Mr. President:

I congratulate you on what I think will be your second great popular majority. You have therefore another four years, and I fear your problems are going to be as difficult as those of Woodrow Wilson in 1917.

I

According to your request of early August, I have had three talks with officials here who see the Fuehrer often and who seem to know his purposes. The first of these talks was with Dr. Schacht, who fears war here the most. I wrote you that he was a little hopeful, but that Hitler could not participate. On the 16th of September I saw Secretary Dieckhoff, brother-in-law of von Ribbentrop, one of the favorites of the Fuehrer, now Ambassador in London. Incidentally, the TIMES story was mentioned. He was of the same attitude as Schacht, only less committal. On the 15th of October I saw Minister von Neurath, head of the Foreign Office here, and the subject of German-British relations was discussed. When I asked whether Germany would really participate in the oft-proposed Locarno conference, he said: "In case England satisfies the Italian demands." This led to a reference to the imminent danger of war here, and I asked whether Hitler would agree to participate in a peace conference of the greater Powers. He said: "Only in case the

The President  
The White House,  
Washington.

main points are agreed to beforehand." This I took to mean a previous promise to Italy and Germany of colonies and condemnation of Russia. I asked whether the Fuehrer intended to send the Russian Ambassador home. He said no, but added: "The Russian position here is getting to be so embarrassing that I think he will go home" - no successor to be appointed. This last he did not say, but made me believe.

These interviews and the statements rather definitely made seem to me to mean no approval of a peace conference unless Germany and Italy are granted about all they want. And events in Europe since last December all point the same way: Hitler and Mussolini intend to control all Europe. If that be agreed to beforehand, a peace conference is quite possible; but what sort of a peace? Anyone who knows the sophomoric and egotistic mentalities of these men and their chief supporters can hardly fail to forecast the coming state of European civilization. Is there any way democratic countries can save the civilization which dates back to Luther, Erasmus, the Hollanders and the English?

Our country made democracy possible for Europe between 1776 and 1815, the population 3,000,000 to 8,000,000. It was a "miracle" which made the French Revolution possible, and then all western Europe became substantially democratic before 1860. The war of 1914-18 would have subjected Europe to a single dictatorship but for the intervention of our country: our one aim to save democracy. The blunders all greater nations have made since 1920 surpass anything recorded in modern history. Now we see clearly what is before us. Can our country of 130,000,000 people and more real wealth than all western Europe do anything? Our people say no; and the Senate says the Constitution authorizes one-third of their members to defeat any policy the President

might persuade men to accept: their treatment of Wilson's programme.

II

Much as I believe in peace as our best policy, I cannot avoid the fears which Wilson emphasized more than once in conversations with me, August 15, 1915 and later: the breakdown of democracy in all Europe will be a disaster to the people. But what can you do? At the present moment more than a hundred American corporations have subsidiaries here or cooperative understandings. The Du Ponts have three allies in Germany that are aiding in the armament business. Their chief ally is the I. G. Farben Company, a part of the Government which gives 200,000 marks a year to one propaganda organization operating on American opinion. Standard Oil Company (New York sub-company) sent \$2,000,000 here in December 1933 and has made \$500,000 a year helping Germans make Ersatz gas for war purposes; but Standard Oil cannot take any of its earnings out of the country except in goods. They do little of this, report their earnings at home, but do not explain the facts. The International Harvester Company president told me their business here rose 33% a year (arms manufacture, I believe), but they could take nothing out. Even our airplanes people have secret arrangement with Krupps. General Motor Company and Ford do enormous businesses here through their subsidiaries and take no profits out. I mention these facts because they complicate things and add to war dangers. If you wish proof of this story, talk with our Commercial Attaché here, Douglas Miller, in the United States till early December.

Whether our people can prevent another world war is certainly a grave question. Yet no real democratic President can fail to realize the consequences of a world war to us. There is, however, increasing evidence here, in Rome, Paris and London that we may not have a war soon.

Germany and Italy, with the greatest war equipments any people have ever had, are cooperating in such a way that their dictators may do what they wish. You saw what happened last winter when Mussolini agreed publicly to support Hitler's Rhine move. Everybody recognizes the helplessness of France when Italy and Germany sent men, airplanes and arms to the Spanish revolutionists from July to October. And the second week in September Hitler, Goebbels and Rosenberg delivered offensive attacks upon democracies. If you or the English monarch delivered such an attack on neighboring powers serious results would almost surely follow among one's constituents. The democratic peoples in Europe made no protests, not even Russia. Of course the cruel dictatorship in Moscow could hardly look for international support. At the present moment small European democracies: Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland, according to their representatives, are contemplating some such declarations as ungrateful Belgium made the other day. These Ministers say the League of Nations and the World Court have no more value; one sees readily why small powers resort to armed neutrality.

With so many democracies nervous, even fearful of annexations, and England and France helpless as a result of their foolish decisions since 1930, why may not Hitler annex strategic parts of the Balkan area and Mussolini seize islands in the Mediterranean without war? Spain is to be a protectorate of Italy, perhaps Egypt annexed. High officials here say Germany is to have colonies in the Far East with Italian-Japanese approval. One thing is certain: these dictators mean to dominate Europe and there is a fair chance of their doing it without war.

One serious difficulty is mentioned here by men like Dr. Schacht, and that is the enormous debt situation. According to best possible figures here, Germany owes her own

people 45 billion marks, only 18 billions publicly acknowledged by the Reichsbank. Debts to outside countries certainly amount to something like fifteen billion marks - with interest unpaid to many creditors. This debt situation is known to enough people to cause much uneasiness. If crops were to fail by half for a single year, there would be starvation to millions of people unless international credit could be had. The barrier system forbids imports even of food-stuffs. This dilemma is duplicated in Italy. So loans and commercial concessions may become most vital matters. Of course Germany rarely has a drouth; but five successive years of excellent crops suggest always the possibility of a short harvest. Hitler said a few days ago that a twenty percent shortage would be a calamity of the first order. A few days later Hess (intimate counsellor of Hitler) said: "Do not forget that cannon are better than butter."

The second dilemma will come when German roads from Berlin to all frontiers (roads so built that all crossings are under or above and speed said to be 200 miles per hour) and the German armaments are completed. That will mean three to four millions of unemployed. At present Germany has only one million unemployed. Four or five millions of unemployed would be more serious here than twenty millions with us. A debt here of 60 billion marks is far more serious in comparison to German income than 60 billion dollars with us.

A dictator of sophomoric psychology would probably go to war to avoid possible difficulties, even with his submissive people. Of course successful threats, such as we have witnessed the last year or two, might bring annexations and postponement of war; but these cannot solve serious economic situations. And here comes one more opportunity of the United

States to cooperate with European democracies. The stabilization matter suggests much, and increasing cooperation with the United States suggests more. But can our people ever recognize the importance of lowering tariffs for cooperating countries? Wilson's second method of bringing about world peace was freer trade. His first one was naturally the guarantee by larger powers of the borders and rights of smaller ones. Both of these have been violated almost regularly since 1920 and consequently there has been no real League of Nations.

This long story may not be altogether right; but it represents the best information I have been able to gather. One thing is certain: all well-informed people here, even distinguished Germans, think modern civilization is in grave danger, and they repeat their opinions to me: the cooperation of the United States with European democracies is the only hope we have. How can you lead our people to a correct understanding of things when they allowed a minority of the Senate (contrary to the intentions of the writers of our Constitution) to defeat Wilson's marvellous democratic foreign agreements in 1919, even if the Treaty of Versailles was bad? Certainly it was nothing like the treaty of Brest-Litovsk the year before. If you could only get the great nations to see things as they are and apply their coercive power to any leader who wishes to go back to the fifteenth century morals! That would be what Henry IV of France tried to do, what Jefferson hoped for in 1807 and what Wilson almost accomplished in 1918-19.

Sincerely yours,

*William E. Dodd*

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REF: Judd

Berlin, November 28, 1936.

No. 3165

Subject: A Survey of the German National Socialist  
Foreign Policy and its Development.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by Dept. of State  
(See E. Taylor Parker & Associates  
4/14/63)

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for such attention as it may seem to merit, a survey of the German National Socialist foreign policy and its development, together with a brief statement of the outstanding external objectives of German statesmanship and diplomacy at the moment.

In the past it would appear that foreign statesmen have been given to viewing with surprise and dismay each new bold move of the Nazi Government affecting foreign relations, as though it were

something

something which, having no particular precedent, simply could not be true. At least that is the impression one is apt to gain in following reactions to such moves in other countries. Surprising these moves may have been, but only to the extent that the exact time and manner in which they were sprung were not foreseen.

As a matter of fact, each new development has made it seem increasingly likely that the Nazi Government has followed, and intends to follow, with perhaps a certain amendment or shading here and there, the policy laid down by Hitler years ago in his book of books MEIN KAMPF. In making this statement, Hitler's policy vis-à-vis France should probably be excepted. In MEIN KAMPF Hitler constantly refers to France as the natural enemy which must be fought sooner or later, whereas at present on the surface there is no indication of the continuance of this attitude. The persistency with which all other MEIN KAMPF policies are being pursued, however, makes one reluctant to accept this change at face value over any long period.

There is certain justification for the immediate reactions which have taken place abroad and the consequent nervous tension, and even fear, resulting from each new Nazi move (quite aside from the fact that Nazi policy as laid down in MEIN KAMPF

is alarming enough), in that it is no more than natural to believe that the broad policies of any political group are subject to change and interpretation to meet conditions arising through the passage of time, especially if those policies were evolved prior to rise to power. Furthermore, there appears to have been a great tendency on the part of other European statesmen to place, in the face of Germany's growth, faith and reliance in the sanctity of enforced treaty provisions, the power of the League, and the French formula of collective security, in spite of the probable warnings of alert general staffs against the military diplomacy of a new Germany re-vivified after the supposedly crushing defeat of the World War only a comparatively few years ago. But there is little reason for surprise if one is able to refer to MEIN KAMPF and therein to note that the principle for every developmental step was carefully and publicly outlined long since. Of even more importance, perhaps, is the point that there is but little reason to believe that in future foreign relations there will be any great deviation from the fundamentals therein laid down, regardless of the tragedy which may thereby be brought down upon an already overburdened Europe. There is even less reason for guessing at what the National Socialist government has in mind for the future.

Let

Let me observe here the fact that Dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler cause surprise as much as anything because they really declare their intentions and carry them out. It is not bluff.

It is true that a Nazi action occasionally does not appear, on the surface, to be following the general policies to be deducted from MEIN KAMPF. As an example in point one may cite Hitler's Reichstag speech of May 21, 1935, in which he ostensibly offered peace, albeit on his own terms, to every country except Lithuania. Despite the bellicose attitude towards France in MEIN KAMPF, that country was included in the offer. Closer examination, however, reveals that this was mainly a tactical move undertaken to bring pressure to bear on Lithuania with the object of benefiting the position of the Memel Germans. As for the peace offer, he doubtless argued that it would not be accepted, but that if it were accepted it would furnish Germany with welcome respite and could later be broken when convenient.

This Government operates on a doctrine of stark realism which has as a corollary a brutal frankness and an opacity of vision toward the outside innate in the German character. It is evident that in regimes of the immediate past this characteristic has produced only a bungling type of statesmanship

and

and diplomacy. However, under a highly-g geared system of human regimentation, quite acceptable to the Germans individually, especially after what they may have considered a laissez-faire period, a totally different type of diplomatic maneuvering has rapidly been developed and has apparently caught a number of European foreign offices off guard. It is a type which cannot be discounted and must be considered in all seriousness; in any event, it is a type which, by one method or another, is rapidly placing Germany back among the leading world powers - and the basic principles underlying all foreign policy are carefully set forth in the Hitlerian "Bible". Furthermore, this policy has already taken concrete form, in spite of the fact that many otherwise keen observers seem to be able to go only so far as to say that Hitler's Germany "plans to do things." Whether or not policy is being evolved by a more or less formalistic Foreign Office is of little importance in this type of government.

In examining the actual results of Nazi diplomacy and statesmanship, it is interesting to note that in the "program" of the then skeleton National Socialist Party dated as far back as February 24, 1920, at Munich, foreign policy almost identical with what appears to be the current one was set

forth

forth in four of the 25 points. These four points read as follows in translation:

- (1) We demand the union of all Germans to a greater Germany on the basis of self-determination of the peoples;
- (2) We demand the equality of the rights of the German people vis-à-vis other nations, and the cancellation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain;
- (3) We demand land and soil (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and the settlement of our surplus population;
- (22) We demand the abolition of the mercenary troops and the formation of a popular army.

The last point mentioned above may not appear to have any direct bearing on foreign policy, but as any national action of Germany is so closely allied with its military set-up, it is fundamental, as will be explained further on. For the Department's information there is transmitted as an enclosure a translation of the complete program from which the four points outlined above are taken.

It may also be of interest to note that the conditions and trend of thought in other European countries have been of no little assistance to Germany in the pursuit of her aims, surprising as it may seem. For example, immediately after the declaration of conscription on March 17, 1935, loud outcries were heard from practically every quarter against this blatant violation of a treaty which had stood for approximately 17 years, and the entire

continent

continent was in an uproar. While a number of countries directly affected by this move immediately began various military and diplomatic preparations after the first effects of the stunning blow had worn off, it was not six months after the event that arguments were heard even in the camps of the former Allies that perhaps after all there had been certain justification in Germany's action. The severity of Versailles was apparently a contributory cause to its own downfall. At present, after various other sections of the treaties have been similarly handled, the inviolability of Versailles is scarcely ever brought up in connection with Germany's growth and power. Then there is a decidedly important trend of thought in Europe away from 19th Century democracy and this trend has been extremely helpful, in the furtherance of her ambitions, to a Germany well adapted to the new autocracy of the era.

The aim of all National Socialist foreign policy is power and prestige with the ultimate objective of expansion both economic and territorial. Borne out by MEIN KAMPF, official pronouncements, and past achievements, certain outstanding tenets of Nazi doctrine are seen to be the premises and guides of this policy, as follows:

1. Power, and its correlative prestige, requires a strong army and navy, sufficient

foodstuff

- foodstuff and material bases, and friendship, or at least neutrality, on the part of other outstanding nations.\*
2. The Jew and his product Bolshevism is the one natural enemy of Germany.\*\*
  3. Pan-Germanism - the belief that Germany should include all Germans.\*\*\*
  4. The peasant is the back-bone of the nation, and a strong peasantry requires sufficient soil, to be gained by national expansion.\*\*\*\*

Keeping in mind the factors mentioned above which form the basis for Germany's foreign policy, it might be of interest to outline concisely her progress or retrogression in foreign fields under the Nazi regime. For this purpose one need not go back of the important announcement of conscription on March 17, 1935, as up to that time National Socialism was entirely too occupied with internal reshaping of German institutions to interest itself to any great extent in foreign affairs. The only possible event which might be noted before that date was the withdrawal of Germany's delegates from the League of Nations on October 14, 1933,

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(All documentary notations in which MEIN KAMPF is mentioned refer to the 1933 unexpurgated edition, Franz Eher Nachfolger G.m.b.H.):

- \* 1. MEIN KAMPF: pages 153, 689, 698, 708 and 732  
\*\* 2. " " : " 351, 703, and 750 et seq.  
\*\*\* 3. " " : " 152, 153, 154 and 736  
\*\*\*\* 4. " " : " 153, 154, and 728

and this event might be considered as a gain for the new regime, speaking strictly from the standpoint of the furtherance of its own aims.

\* \* \*

Beginning therefore with the conscription announcement the National Socialistic external gains and losses to date appear to be about as follows, the former being outlined first. In enumerating these points an attempt will be made to classify them according to the four main tenets, but it will be found that in many instances a development represents gain under more than one heading.

1 (a). The announcement on March 17, 1935, of the creation of a popular army, thus violating treaty stipulations and indicating that Germany was about to embark upon a foreign policy that was totally different from that which she had hitherto been forced to follow, was as important psychologically as in any other direction. Internally, it meant the reestablishment of the school of the nation wherein every sound lad took his two-year course, beginning in most instances as a rather callow, purposeless youth and returning as an erect, steady-eyed and alert man, ready to shoulder his share of the responsibility of German citizenship vis-à-vis sectionalism and the world. It meant the eventual direct employment of some 700,000 men and the indirect employment of mil-

lions

lions, with the consequent increase in business and in tax revenue. It meant that every German citizen unconsciously and involuntarily perhaps, according to his private views on National Socialism, could hold up his head and shake off the weight of the defeatist's inferiority complex. Externally, it meant that Germany could no longer be dealt with dictatorially and that her statesmanship and diplomacy with a strong military background had to be reckoned with on a basis of equality mingled with fear, whether it was at a conference table or in lone-hand maneuvering.

Regardless of the justification of this action, the objective viewpoint must concede that the basis for National Socialist foreign policy was thus firmly established.\*

1 (b). The announcement of a naval building program was shortly followed by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, reached on June 18, 1935, whereby the German navy might be constructed up to 35 per cent of the total British navy, and not only gave Germany domination of the Baltic but amounted to de facto recognition of Germany's breach of Versailles. Incidentally, because of the necessary absence of a portion of the

British

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\* 1. National Socialist "Program", Point 22, Munich, February 24, 1920.

2. MEIN KAMPF, pages 298, 307, 647, 648.

3. Embassy despatch No. 1876, of March 26, 1935.

British navy in eastern waters the ratio is more favorable to Germany than would appear at first sight. Furthermore, England's action, independent of France, may be viewed as a diminution of French prestige and a corresponding gain in German prestige.

It will be recalled that rapprochement with England has ever been one of the fundamentals of Hitler's doctrine of foreign policy.\*

1 (c). One of the first fruits of the attainment of armed power was the reoccupation of the Rhineland beginning March 7, 1936. Even more important than as another blow at the Treaty of Versailles, was the effect of this action in two other directions. First, French prestige was vitally impaired in that with the decision of the French general staff not to take military action against Germany, it became apparent to all that France was no longer prepared to take up arms on every major provocation, and in that her allies may well have taken note that France would think twice before deciding affirmatively on what really constituted a casus belli. The action on March 7th shut off France from her eastern allies

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\* 1. MEIN KAMPF, pages 154 (Germany and England against Russia); 699 (alliance with England desirable); 701 (divergence of British and Jewish interests).

2. Embassy despatch No. 2085, of June 26, 1935.

and being unopposed materially meant the end of French hegemony in Central Europe, and the consequent loss to French prestige, therefore, is obvious. Second, the practical success of Nazi policy in this case convinced the dubious elements of the army headed by General von Fritsch, which had hitherto evidenced reserve, of the national efficacy of the party and thus brought about the desired unity of these two factors.

Stresa and the famous British questionnaire, as well as all other attempts thereafter to influence Germany, were, in effect, calmly and successfully disregarded by Hitler in the determined pursuit of his objectives.

1 (d). The obvious instruments of power, the army and navy, together with the para-military organizations, are thus seen to have been developed. The next step of obtaining sufficient foodstuff and material bases is being advanced in the country by the so-called foodstuffs battle and the Four-Year Plan.\* Their effect on foreign policy has thus far been manifested in a striving for control in the Danubian basin - the agreement with Austria the "gateway" to that area, the parallelism with Italy, the rapprochement with Hungary and Yugoslavia, Germany's key state

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in

\* Embassy despatch No. 3106, of October 21, 1936, and No. 3088, of October 8, 1936.

in the Balkans, better relations with Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and the anti-French developments in Rumania brought about by the Franco-Soviet Pact, are steps in that direction. The fostering of these friendships is, aside from the broadening of Germany's supply bases, a distinct gain along the line of political policy, especially as it weakens the position of the Little Entente and the general French idea of collective security and European hegemony.

The agreement with Austria,\* concluded on July 11, 1936, constituted a gain in prestige and afforded an opportunity for broader National Socialist activity which may bear fruit in the future. The fact that this was brought about with at least the tacit approval of Italy has the appearance of a gain, in that it was one of a chain of developments which led to rapprochement with Italy.

1 (e). Germany's power was originally broken by the Treaty of Versailles, but the struggle to regain her strength was continually hampered by the League of Nations. This body, regardless of the intentions of its founders, proved in effect to be an instrument for the perpetuation of the Treaty, skillfully wielded by France with the aid of her satellites whose very existence was based thereon. Under

these

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\* Embassy despatch No. 2941 of July 15, 1936.

these circumstances any loss of prestige on the part of the League must be considered as a corresponding gain for Germany.

Such gains are associated with the failure of the League successfully to settle a long list of international difficulties ending with the fiasco of sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian conflict, and including a variety of outstanding developments such as those connected with the well-known terms Disarmament, Manchukuo, El Gran Chaco and Danzig.

The bungling on the part of the League resulting in antagonizing Italy, was importantly instrumental in bringing about the present "parallelism" of Fascism with National Socialism after a period of vociferous hostility.

2 (a). Under the second main tenet of foreign policy, one is led to believe that National Socialist doctrine of opposition to Jewry and Bolshevism might well be based on the realization that in addition to a series of more or less popular and altruistic slogans such as "Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz" (The Common Good Before The Individual Good), "Blut und Boden" (Blood and Soil), and "Gleichberechtigung" (Equality), etc., a radical political movement must acquire a concrete enemy both internal and external which, even after accession to power, may prove useful as a menace, a scapegoat, an object of ridicule,

or for diverting public attention in turn as occasion requires. Doubtlessly prompted by actual political conditions Jews and Bolshevism were at the very outset selected for this role and have proven increasingly useful to the Nazis, thus justifying their choice.\*

A master stroke of Nazi tactics was the identification of one with the other.\*\* While these tactics may be viewed as first-rate demagoguery, the fact must be admitted that Communism was at least a potential danger in Germany and that the Jews had achieved a position of preeminence ill suited to Nazi mentality. In international relations, opposition to Bolshevism has specifically developed into hostility to the Soviets whereby Nazi ideology and the identification of Communism with Jewry is proving increasingly useful, particularly as a means of propaganda appealing to the instinctive, wide-spread fear of Bolshevism and thus finding fertile soil in at least parts of the population of practically every European country today.

Active opposition to "Jewish Bolshevism" in the field of foreign politics really dates from the inception of the Franco-Soviet Pact. From Hitler

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\* MEIN KAMPF: page 351 et seq.

\*\* " " : pages 750, 751 and 752.

down all active Nazi agencies made valiant efforts to dissuade France from concluding a pact with the Soviets, and, after its consummation, to prevent its becoming effective as a political instrument. The entry of the Soviets into European politics via what Germany insisted on terming an outright alliance with France, and the left swing in France itself, made Soviet-Communism appear as an active threat to Germany, and France, after the apparent lull in the German MEIN KAMPF attitude, once more loomed as an opponent to be actively combated - but with different tactics. In defense against this professed menace, Germany launched an intensive anti-Bolshevik campaign which reached a climax at the Nuremberg Party Rally in September of this year and in which Germany insisted on her self-assumed role of champion of Western civilization as opposed to Eastern barbarism.

A campaign of attrition was then initiated against French prestige, as contrasted with the direct aggressive attitude key-noted in MEIN KAMPF - much more effective and insidious tactics in that they were susceptible of furtherance at all times and almost in any direction.

The anti-Bolshevik crusade served a second purpose in that it furnished a common grounds upon which might be laid the foundation for international friendships - "bloc-politique".

Incidentally

Incidentally, Hitler's reference to the Ukraine, both in REIN KAMPF and later at Nuremberg, gives rise to the unorthodox thought that the ultimate object of anti-Sovietism may possibly be to isolate and thus to weaken Russia as a first step towards at least economic cooperation on a basis agreeable and most useful to Germany. The possibilities inherent in such a constellation are too obvious to require detailing.

The stress placed on anti-Bolshevism on an international basis and the corollary drawing together of Fascist regimes has naturally enough awakened a fear that the Continent is splitting into two blocs corresponding to these alignments. Doubt apparently exists in the British mind as to the relative merits or demerits of the two movements, particularly in view of the undeniable similarity of their tactics and doctrine, and it cannot be predicted which bloc, if either, may find the support of English sympathy - English support is the perennial arbiter of continental power.

2 (b). As outlined above, the Franco-Russian Pact called for a persistent attack against the prestige of France, who was now considered as the ally of Bolshevism. For this attack Germany made skillful use of a number of other developments in the European political arena.

First, in the preliminary discussions with England of a possible five-power conference, Germany

made it clear that her participation in such a meeting would be made contingent on (a) an innocuous authoritative interpretation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and (b) the absence from the conference of the influence of Russia and of French satellites such as Czechoslovakia and Poland.\*

Second, the protraction of the Locarno preliminaries was probably largely instrumental in calling forth the Belgian king's recent statement of policy which placed particular stress on Belgian neutrality and definitely asserted unwillingness to assume commitments involving the guarantee of boundaries other than her own. A force which contributed further to Belgium's official attitude was the unceasing influence of the Rexist movement in that country. This movement shares many National Socialist tenets, particularly in regard to anti-Bolshevism, and there are material indications that there is more than theoretical interest in it on the part of Nazi Germany. The new position thus created by Belgium was a most important gain for Germany, not only morally but, as has been estimated by competent military authorities, it was equivalent to the additional strength provided by fifteen army corps. France, by the same token, suffered a corresponding loss, thus effectively terminating her claim to hegemony - which presumably

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\* Embassy telegrams No. 299 of October 9th, and No. 305 of October 17, 1936.

did not escape the notice of her satellites.

Third, without wishing to assert which was cause and which effect, another development connecting England with the above-mentioned Belgian move is to be noted. According to reliable information\* there is now being considered the formation of a "neutral bloc" to include England, Belgium, Holland, and possibly the Scandinavian countries, which would not undertake a priori to attack Germany on the issue of the maintenance of collective security in the East. The distribution of profit and loss between France and Germany is therefore evident.

Fourth, a result of the Franco-Soviet Pact was the rapprochement between France's new ally Russia and her old satellite Czechoslovakia, which developed into a sort of military alliance much to the disgust of Berlin, and one of the first thoughts occurring to the German Government was, of course, that the flying time between any one of the probable Soviet airports to be constructed in Czechoslovakia, and Berlin, was entirely too short for comfort.

Germany's recent unilateral termination of the international control of German navigable streams\*\* is a step which clearly brings home to the Czechoslovaks their important dependence on Germany as the

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\* The British Embassy, Berlin.

\*\* Embassy telegram No. 335 of November 16, 1936.

only logical outlet to the sea offering almost natural facilities for transportation, warehousing, etc., and in addition the general economic interrelation between the two countries, grown strong through usage, are ever present in the mind of the average practical Czech business man. The further fact that Czech leadership and public opinion are gradually awakening to the realization that no great material assistance is to be expected from France or for that matter England, is creating a feeling that in the long run alignment with Germany might prove more advantageous.\*

The German attitude towards Czechoslovakia is well characterized by repeated confidential statements of members of the German General Staff to the effect that from a military point of view, a complete occupation of the country would be a matter of hours only, and from the political angle it is German policy to support this attitude by isolation in various forms. All progress made towards this end may be counted as a gain for Germany - and there has been progress.

Fifth, one of the most direct blows leveled at the France-Soviet Pact came from Marshal Ridz-Smigly, who, it is understood, in replying to French inquiries in Paris recently, stated that Poland could not see

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\* Despatch No. 534, September 25, 1936, from the Legation, Prague.

her way clear to permit the transit of Soviet forces through Poland under any circumstances nor would she permit the establishment of Soviet air bases on Polish territory, in spite of the considerable credit obtained from France for rearmament.

The independent attitude of Poland thus indicated has been subtly encouraged by Germany, realizing full well Poland's national pride and her inherent hatred of the Russians. The gain to Germany has been indirect only, as there are no indications of increasing friendship between the two countries.

2 (c). So much for the specific ramifications of the Franco-Soviet Pact itself. Independent of this development, certain other countries and situations have reacted definitely to Nazi anti-Bolshevik policy.

In respect to ultimate alignment with Germany, it may be said that Austria's position is even stronger than that of Czechoslovakia. The fiasco of Nazi aspirations in Austria, at the time when Dollfuss met his death and Italy established "the watch on the Brenner", has meanwhile been wiped out and Austria is now officially designated as a "German" nation. The agreement of July 11th and the subsequent visit of Secretary of State Schmidt to Berlin\* led not only to close economic and cultural relations but it is con-

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\* See Embassy's despatch No. 3163 of November 25, 1936.

fidently expected that on Schmidt's return to Vienna a statement will be issued stressing Austria's adherence to the anti-Bolshevik front.

In Hungary, the recollection of the short-lived Bela Khun regime has sufficed to make the people receptive to German anti-Bolshevik propaganda, here suitably combined with reference to world-war brotherhood in arms. In Japan the rising Communist problems and the traditional enmity to Russia seconded by the absence of conflicting interests with Germany, has established a parallelism between the two countries which, just as this report is being written, has been consummated in an agreement to cooperate in combating Bolshevism.\* In England, the natural disinclination of a section of the population towards Bolshevism has permitted the formation of a Fascist party headed by Sir Oswald Mosley which lives on despite repeated accounts of its agony, and it is interesting to note in this connection that queries have been made in Parliament concerning the financing of this party from "abroad" - the German Propaganda Ministry is apparently credited with unlimited means.

In Spain, German anti-Bolshevik propaganda is generally assumed to have taken on the material form of bombing planes and cannon, and the political significance

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\* See Embassy telegram No. 349 of November 25th

ficance of German activities in that field is becoming increasingly momentous.

Even from the Berlin angle, where the view of German activities abroad is constantly and effectively clouded by press control and the party propaganda machine, it has been quite apparent for some time that National Socialist interest in Spain's civil strife was manifested by more than moral support of the insurgent group. Firmly convinced that the Madrid Government had the support of Moscow, Germany, in concert with Italy, on the grounds of combating a common enemy even prior to the publicly announced Italo-German "parallelism", and in spite of her "adherence" to the neutrality agreement, found ample reason actively to interest herself in supporting the national insurgents. Accusations, denials, and recriminations on the part of both Fascist and Bolshevik factions marked a period in which it became increasingly apparent that Spain was likely to become a proving ground for the domination in Europe of one or the other faction.

In this development the most important step of Germany, taken in unison with Italy, was the recognition of a Franco government\* before such a government was established, thus underwriting insurgent success

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\* Embassy's telegram No. 336 of November 18, 1936.

and definitely indicating Germany's alignment with any action whatever which she believes is necessary in any country or situation in combating Bolshevism - a new angle to German foreign policy.

Short of formal military assistance, Franco may now expect whatever aid he may need, as his defeat would mean too great a blow to German prestige in particular and the Fascist group in general. As long as Franco's success is in doubt, a German gain or loss in Spain cannot be registered, but the complete unanimity of thought on the subject between Germany and Italy would seem to preclude the latter eventuality.

2 (d). Last, but probably most important of all, in that it furnished Germany with a powerful and the only active ally on the anti-Bolshevik front, was the at least temporary parallelism with Italy cultivated carefully for some time previously by an endless interchange of official visits, consummated in a gentleman's agreement between Hitler and Count Ciano at Berchtesgaden on October 25, 1936, and manifested in the striking similarity of the texts of official announcements from both countries relative to international developments. Although this parallelism included many other important aspects in regard to the policies of the two countries in Europe, anti-Bolshevism was the flag under which they were united. Certain fundamental opposing interests and an underlying distrust of each other make the union appear somewhat

somewhat incongruous and unsteady, but it is nevertheless a practical one which will hold together as long as advantages to each are apparent. Having committed themselves even to this extent, one may venture to predict that close cooperation may continue during such time as Bolshevism appears to be a major issue in Europe - and in so far as the union does not align England definitely against Germany. Indeed MEIN KAMPF states definitely\* that a triple alliance with England and Italy is the only desirable closer foreign connection for Germany.

One of the first concrete results of the Italo-German agreement was that, together with the Austrian Pact and the Hungarian aims and leanings, it marked the beginning of an anti-Communist block through Central Europe which may involve many advantages to Germany. It may serve effectually in isolating Russia and Communism from Western Europe, and the possibilities thus created of furthering pan-Germanism, another main tenet of policy, are ominously apparent.

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3. Pan-Germanism, now briefly referred to as "Deutschtum", is the theory that all persons of German stock should be united under German National Social-

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\* MEIN KAMPF: pages 705, 755 et seq. and 699.

ism. This idea is implied by MEIN KAMPF \* in criticizing the Reich boundaries of 1914 as not being "complete with regard to the inclusion of the people of German nationality" and is being strongly furthered under the leadership of the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland. With an active staff and extensive means, largely raised by direct popular subscription, it fosters Germanism and cultural relations with the Fatherland among Germans all over the world. Maps distributed by this organization show entire sections of many countries as nationally German, such as the Sudeten section of Czechoslovakia, Memel, Danzig, parts of Poland, the southern portion of Denmark, etc., as well as parts of Russia and Rumania settled by Germans. While for obvious reasons stress is at present placed only on the maintenance of cultural affinities, only the test of time and opportunity will indicate whether Nazi Germany will be able to resist the temptation to establish bonds of a closer nature - with those enclaves near at hand. Already there are definite indications of such ambitions in connection with Danzig and Czechoslovakia. While cultural relations with a political advantage in mind are maintained with German-American elements in the United States and Latin America, closer associations

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with

\* page 736

with these sections is probably beyond the most radical of Nazi dreams.

With the exception of the gains mentioned above, progress in Pan-Germanism has to date evolved but little more than potentialities. Nevertheless, National Socialism, which thinks in long periods of time, gives no indication of relaxing its efforts without regard to existing political boundaries. While they disclaim all instrumentality in effecting this policy, it is interesting to note in this connection the existence of the so-called Auslands-Organisation of the party which ostensibly deals only with German citizens abroad, the somewhat recent mysterious inflation of the Kultur Abteilung of the Foreign Office, and the "election" of numerous Reichstag renegade members from Sudeten Czechoslovakia and Austria.

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4. While there appears to be no prospect of early expansion on the basis of "Deutschum", the drive for colonial expansion under the pressure of economic need of raw materials in the furtherance of their power policy, particularly in view of Germany's foreign exchange distress, has been pressed forward with more immediate urgency by Schacht and the Kolonial-Bund. Although here also no concrete success has been achieved so far, there is to be registered the growth of a section of foreign opinion willing to consider the return

of Germany's former colonies - a thing unheard of a year ago.

In view of the fact that most of the former German colonies were in Africa, we have here an instance in which circumstances, subsequently developed, have occasioned a deviation from Hitler's original MEIN KAMPF attitude \* - which disapproves tropical or semi-tropical colonies as unsuited to satisfy the main object of the colonial expansion he envisaged as providing an outlet for surplus population. Such colonies to be of maximum use must be in temperate zones, as near to Germany as possible, and offer an opening for peasants, the back-bone of the nation.\*\*

Hitler definitely considered expansion to the fertile districts of Eastern Europe a form of colonization which would best permit of organization and administration along the same lines of peasant development he has introduced so extensively in the Reich itself under the slogan "Blut und Boden" (Blood And Soil). Eastward expansion would seem to be the natural corollary to the long-standing and recently stressed anti-Soviet policy.

Certain passages in MEIN KAMPF are so definite on this point as to justify quotation. Thus, as a

broad

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\* MEIN KAMPF: page 153

\*\* " " : pages 153, 154 and 728

broad basis, one reads that "the foreign policy of a national state should secure the existence of the race united in that state by creating a sound natural relation between the number and the growth of the people, on the one hand, and the size and quality of the soil, on the other."\* More specifically, one reads that "however, such a soil policy cannot find its fulfillment for example in the Cameroon, but today almost exclusively in Europe."\*\* From here, one is led directly to the point that "if one wanted soil in Europe, this, on the whole, could only take place at the expense of Russia; then the new Reich would have to start marching again along the road of the old Teutonic knights in order to give, by the German sword, the German plow its soil and the nation its daily bread."\*\*\*

The above theory is quite generally presumed to hold good today, and while no concrete gains along these lines may be noted as yet, one hears constantly in well-informed circles of developments tending towards a realization of these ambitions. At one time a plan of attack against Czechoslovakia with Italian aid is mentioned; at another, Danzig, the Polish Corridor, or Memel on the basis of a deal, perhaps forced, with Poland; while the Ukraine, particularly owing to the

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\* MEIN KAMPF: page 728

\*\* " " : " 152

\*\*\* " " : " 154

attention paid to it both in MEIN KAMPF and recently in anti-Sovietism, is brought up in this connection.

National Socialist foreign policy, treated thus far under the aspect of gains, has also had a number of losses. Frankly and objectively speaking, however, such losses have been comparatively few, are found to be much less tangible than the gains, and seem to be more potential and theoretical than actual at the moment. For these reasons, it does not seem practicable to discuss them under the headings of specific tenets as in the case of gains.

Generally speaking, Germany's rapid rise to armed power has created reactions in Europe which do not make for the "peace" Hitler and his program seem so ardently to desire - in fact, actual advancement towards European appeasement has been exactly nil, due recently in a large measure, to Germany. Diplomacy plus sabre-rattling may be the means of obtaining what Germany thinks she desires of her neighbors, but the psychological effect of fear and uncertainty thereby produced, in itself retards the very progress towards which Germany claims she is striving, and in that respect she may suffer losses.

Thus, in spite of the care with which German diplomats and statesmen have endeavored to handle their relations with Great Britain, the latter has now quite patently come to the conclusion that Germany cannot be dealt with on any acceptable basis,

that

that she "must be written off as a bad job", to use the recent confidential words of a high-ranking British official,\* and that England must therefore proceed with all possible speed to rearm for any emergency.

Likewise, losses must be recorded in the alienation of Poland by Germany's action in Danzig, and in the rearmament of Belgium which might be turned to the advantage of France. Even the armed "neutral bloc" which is believed to be contemplated in the West and which at the moment would give the appearance of an advantage to Germany, might, under the leadership of England, be used against Germany in the event of a war.

Furthermore, the Franco-Soviet Pact which was brought about solely for use against Germany, is still in effect and depending largely on its real military value must be counted as a loss for Germany. Because of the latter's basic enmity towards Russia she also forgoes the possible advantages of arrangements whereby a freer hand might be given her in recovering Memel and the Corridor, or in expanding in the Baltics.

In addition, two other really important losses in prestige abroad must be recorded, both resulting largely from National Socialist internal policy. By the stubborn but perhaps ineffectual doctrine of state domination of religion, Germany has alienated not only  

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\* A member of the British Embassy, Berlin.

the Pope and international Catholicism but Christianity generally; and by her attitude towards the Jews, the Church, the established systems of common justice, and towards real democracy in general, she has injured the sensibilities of, and alienated, a country which might have stood her in good stead during her economic and financial difficulties - the United States.

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In the foregoing survey, an endeavor has been made to indicate the development of National Socialist foreign policy on the basis of certain major theories, and to leave the conclusions to be drawn from an outline of the successes and failures of its ambitious and aggressive program.

If one might venture a prediction in the face of a mad scramble after "peace" through heavy armament for "self-defense" on a continent rendered tense by distrust and abnormal nationalism, it would be to say that for the immediate future there does not appear to be any vital force or combination of forces which will materially impede Germany in the pursuit of her ambitions. However, at least five possibilities must be considered in this connection.

First, the very maintenance of high-powered hair-triggered armament everywhere, although it is ostensibly for "peace" control, is in itself a constant explosive danger. Thus, the situation in

Spain

Spain, largely created by Germany herself, might well overnight result in embroiling the whole of Europe, and German policy could be either tremendously furthered or disastrously damaged. Indeed, it has just been confidentially learned that Hitler already feels remorse - more on tactical than moral grounds - at having succumbed to the blandishments of Ciano who persuaded him to join Italy in recognizing Franco.

Second, Germany's progress depends largely on whether or not she is able to maintain at least neutral relations with England.

Third, the economic and financial situation in Germany is a potential danger to the pursuit of her foreign policy depending on whether or not external political progress can be made to such a rapid extent that the intricate economic problems now facing Germany will thereby be largely solved as a natural sequence. In this respect, the constant pressing of foreign policy may at least be understood.

Fourth, there is always the possibility of a dictatorship getting out of hand in that the necessarily rapid developments on which it thrives internally cannot always be absorbed fast enough externally. In a dictatorship with as broad a foreign policy as Germany's this is particularly true. However, one may understand Germany's power and prestige pace better if it is realized that time plays an important role in her rearmament; most of Germany's so-called adver-

series, notably France, have been fully armed for many years and much of this equipment is consequently now obsolete, whereas Germany's armament is of the latest. If Germany is to carry out her program, it behooves her to be fully rearmed and prepared before old equipment elsewhere can be replaced - and before certain countries, notably England, can arm anew.

Fifth, parallelism with Italy is two-edged and not reliable. There is a constant undercurrent of rivalry going on between Italy and Germany in the Danubian region. The very increase and menace of Germany's power may enable Italy to create a "protective" group there including Rumania and Poland - but this need not be hostile to Germany. In fact its purpose would be to keep on friendly relations with Hitler. In effect, however, it would mean that Germany's aspirations in Central Europe must be kept within bounds. Italy would thus be taking the place of France in Eastern Europe - but not necessarily on an unfriendly basis towards Germany, as was France's position, but distinctly as a "warning" unit.

One other point might be added. Bolshevism as a major menace in Europe must be either kept as such or totally exterminated by Germany's efforts in order to give her the impetus she requires.

Hitler, an instinctively adroit opportunist and a devout student of the methods of Frederick Wilhelm

I, during whose reign Germany's power, without resort to a major war, flourished as it never has since, has undoubtedly passed down to the German Foreign Office the gist of his foreign policy from whence it has been repeatedly doled out to inquiring diplomats in various forms as the occasion seemed to require, by Neurath and his spokesmen. It is that Germany will realize her aims without war, if possible, if not, - .

Respectfully yours,

William E. Dodd.

Enclosure:

1. Translation of  
National Socialist  
Program.

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FCL:AC

Copies to Paris, London, Geneva, Rome, Moscow and Riga.

A true copy of  
the signed original.  
M. A.

Translation.

The Program.

The Program of the National Socialist Party is a permanent program. The leaders decline to set up new aims, when those set up in the Program have been realized, merely for the purpose of making it possible for the Party to continue to exist by means of artificially fostered dissatisfaction of the masses.

1. We demand the union of all Germans to a greater Germany on the basis of self-determination of the peoples;

2. We demand the equality of the rights of the German people vis-à-vis other nations, and the cancellation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain;

3. We demand land and soil (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and the settlement of our surplus population;

4. Only he can be a citizen who is a fellow-countryman (Volksgenosse). Only he can be a fellow-countryman who is of German blood, without consideration of confession. Therefore no Jew can be a fellow-countryman.

5. Anyone who is not a citizen shall only be allowed to live in Germany as a guest and must be subject to legislation dealing with foreigners.

6. Only a citizen can be entitled to decide with regard to the management and laws of the state. Therefore we demand that every public office, of whatever nature, whether in the Reich, a State, or a Commune, must only be held by citizens.

We oppose the corruptive parliamentary system of filling posts merely from party viewpoints without consideration of character and qualifications.

7. We demand that above all else the state assume the obligation to provide for ways and means for its citizens to earn a livelihood. If it is not possible to care for the entire population of the state, the members of foreign nations (non-citizens) must be expelled from the Reich.

8. Any further immigration of non-Germans must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who have immigrated to Germany since August 2, 1914, be forced to leave the Reich immediately.

9. All citizens must have equal rights and duties.

10. The foremost duty of every citizen must be to work mentally or physically. The activity of the individual must not violate the interests of the generality but it must be carried on as a part of the whole and to the benefit of all.

Therefore we demand:

11. The abolition of income without work and effort.  
An end to interest bondage.

12. In view of the tremendous sacrifices of property and blood which every war claims of the nation, personal profit through war must be characterized as a crime to the nation. We therefore demand the confiscation of all war profits.

13. We demand the nationalization of all concerns (so far) already amalgamated (trusts).

14. We demand profit-sharing in all large plants.

15. We demand an extensive development of the old-age pension system.

16. We demand the creation of a sound middle class and its maintenance, immediate socialization of large department stores and the renting (thereof) to small tradesmen at low rentals, the strictest consideration of all small tradesmen when making deliveries to the state, the States and Communes.

17. We demand a land reform adapted to our national needs, the creation of a law for the expropriation without remuneration of land for purposes involving the public good. Abolition of ground rent and the prevention of land speculation of every kind.\*

18.

\* Note. In the face of the mendacious interpretation of Point 17 of the Program of the National Socialist Party by our opponents, it is necessary to make the following statement:

As the National Socialist Party takes a stand in favor of private property, it is natural that the passage "expropriation without remuneration" refers only to the creation of legal means of expropriating, if necessary, property which was acquired in an illicit manner or which is not administered in accordance with considerations of the public good. Therefore this is directed primarily against Jewish companies speculating in real estate.

Munich, April 13, 1928.

Adolf Hitler

18. We demand ruthless war against those who by their activity injure general interests. Public enemies, usurers, profiteers, etc., must be condemned to death, without consideration of confession and race.

19. We demand a substitute for Roman law, which serves the materialistic philosophy of life, in the shape of a German common law.

20. In order to make it possible for every capable and industrious German to attain a higher education and thus to enter into leading positions, the state must provide for a thorough development of our entire popular educational system. The curriculum of all educational institutions must be adapted to the requirements of practical life. Understanding of the idea of state must be achieved by the school as soon as (the age of) reasoning begins (science of citizenship). We demand schooling for mentally particularly endowed children of poor parents at the cost of the state, regardless of the station or profession of their parents.

21. The state must provide for improving the public health by protecting mothers and children, by prohibiting child labor, by bringing about physical vigor by means of a legal obligation to engage in gymnastics and sports, by supporting to the utmost all societies for physical training of young people.

22. We demand the abolition of the mercenary troops and the formation of a popular army.

23. We demand lawful opposition to the willful political lie and its dissemination by the press. In

order

order to make it possible to create a German press, we demand that

- a) all editors of newspapers which appear in the German language and their collaborators must be fellow-countrymen,
- b) non-German newspapers require the express permission of the state to be published. They must not be printed in German,
- c) any financial participation in German newspapers or influence thereon by non-Germans be forbidden by law and we demand as a penalty for contraventions the cessation of such newspapers and the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the participating non-Germans.

Newspapers that are contrary to the general good must be prohibited. We demand legal opposition to a direction in art and literature which exercises a disintegrating influence on our national life, and the closing of organizations that violate the foregoing demands.

24. We demand freedom of all religious confessions in the state, in so far as they do not endanger its existence or offend against the feeling of decency and morals of the Germanic race. The party as such takes the stand of positive Christianity, without binding itself to any specific confession. It opposes the Jewish materialistic spirit in and outside ourselves and is convinced that permanent recovery of our people can only occur from within on the basis of: The Common Good Before The Individual Good.

25. For the execution of all of which we demand the creation of a strong central power of the Reich, absolute authority of the political central parliament over the entire Reich and its organizations in general; the formation of chambers of vocations and professions for carrying out in the individual Federal States the skeleton laws issued by the Reich.

The leaders of the party promise - staking their own lives if necessary - ruthlessly to stand up for the execution of the foregoing points.

Munich, February 24, 1920.

Dodd

December 24, 1936

SUMMARY OF DESPATCH NO. 3165 FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY  
IN BERLIN

Subject: National Socialist Foreign Policy

Hitler's foreign policy should not have been a surprise to students of "Mein Kampf"; the only exception being the present policy toward France which may hew more to the line in the long run.

On the basis of this policy progress or retrogression has appeared in certain fields under the Nazi regime. Under the head of progress may be listed the following:

(1) The basis for a national socialist foreign policy was established in a conscription announcement of March 17, 1935, reestablishing the army and shaking off defeatism. The one event prior to this date which may be noted was the withdrawal of Germany's delegates from the League of Nations on October 14, 1933. Speaking from the standpoint of the furtherance of Germany's own aims, this event might be considered as a gain for the new regime.

(2) The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, gave Germany control of the Baltic and amounted to a de facto recognition of Germany's breach of the Versailles Treaty.

(3) Occupation

(3) Occupation of the Rhine zone on March 7, 1936, cut off France from her eastern allies and internally brought a unity of view to the Nazi party and the German army.

(4) In seeking to promote more friendly relations in central and southeastern Europe the agreement with Austria of July 11, 1936, opened up a "gateway".

(5) The League has been an obstacle to Germany's gaining power and any weakening of the League was to Germany's advantage. The fiasco of sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian conflict was a combination of a long series of such developments.

(6) The Jews and Bolshevism (Communism) have been selected in advance as perennial scapegoats for ridicule to maintain internal political enthusiasm. This maneuver has proven increasingly useful to the Nazis.

(7) The anti-Bolshevist campaign which reached its height at Nuremberg in September, 1936, was aimed at Soviet entry into European politics via the much-opposed Franco-Soviet pact and prepared the way for international friendships (Bloc Politique).

(8) The German attack on French policy took the form of objection to a five-power conference unless the Franco-Soviet pact was interpreted and unless Russian influence was absent from the conference.

(9) The

(9) The recent stressing of Belgian neutrality was an important moral and military gain for Germany and a corresponding loss for France. Arising in this connection is a rumor of a "neutral bloc" to include England, Belgium, Holland and Scandinavia, which would not undertake a priori to attack Germany on the issue of maintenance of collective security in the east.

(10) Czechoslovak dependence on Germany is brought home by the recent unilateral German denunciation of the Versailles navigation clause.

(11) Poland has now adopted an independent attitude encouraged by Germany though friendship between the two countries is not increasing.

(12) In addition to the agreement with Austria, the German-Japanese anti-Communist agreement and participation in the Spanish civil strife manifests further German activity abroad.

(13) Ciano and Hitler consummated a gentlemen's agreement under the flag of anti-Bolshevism at Berchtesgaden on October 25, 1936.

(14) The Pan-German Association (Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland) seeks to maintain cultural relations with Germans all over the world. "Mein Kampf" foresees eventual bonds of a closer nature.

(15) Schacht

(15) Schacht and the "Kolonial Bund" are pressing for colonies. The opposition to tropical colonies expressed in "Mein Kampf" seems to turn the pointer eastward as a natural corollary to anti-Soviet policy.

..... Actual advancement toward peace in Europe has been nil recently due largely to Germany (diplomacy plus saber rattling), and on the loss side the following points appear.

(1) There are indications that England feels that Germany "must be written off as a bad job" and England is re-arming for any emergency.

(2) Germany has alienated Poland to a certain extent through the Nazi's activities in Danzig.

(3) Belgian rearmament could also be turned to the advantage of France.

(4) The Franco-Soviet pact depending on its real military value can be regarded as a loss for Germany.

(5) Germany's internal activities have alienated Catholicism and to some extent christianity generally, and because of the attitude adopted toward racial matters, justice and real democracy, bad economic relations have arisen with the United States.

(6) Germany will seek to realize her aims without war if possible. If not? .....

**Department of State**

---

BUÉAU  
DIVISION

**WE**

**ENCLOSURE**

**TO**

Letter drafted

**ADDRESSED TO**

**The President**

PSF: Jodd

PF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1936

My dear Mr. President:

I have just gone through an interesting despatch from our Embassy at Berlin on the development of national socialist foreign policy. I think you will find this subject of interest also and I enclose a copy of the despatch with a copy of a brief summary thereof.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

- Copy of despatch No. 3165,  
November 28, 1936, from  
Berlin.
- Copy of summary of despatch.

The President,  
The White House.

PSF Book

PSF: Dodd

January 9, 1937.

My dear Dodd:-

I am glad to have your letter of December eighth. It did not reach me until the twenty-eighth. Something must be wrong with the mails or the courier.

From what you write and from what I read of events since then, the leadership in Germany seems to be in a rather difficult situation just now. The trouble about any world conference, as you know, is that it would bring fifty-five or sixty nations around a table, each nation with from five to ten delegates and each nation, in addition, with no authority to agree to anything without referring the matter home. From a practical point of view, the type of conference is an impossibility unless, as in the case of B.A., there are one or two simple principles on which all will agree beforehand.

That story by Arthur Krock was not wholly crazy. If five or six heads of the important governments could meet together for a week with complete inaccessibility to press or cables or radio, a definite, useful agreement might result or else one or two of them would be murdered by the others! In any case it would be worthwhile from the point of view of civilization!

I wish you could have seen those South American crowds. Their great shout as I passed was "viva la democracia." These people

down there were for me for the simple reason that they believe I have made democracy function and keep abreast of the times and that as a system of government it is, therefore, to be preferred to Fascism or Communism.

My warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
American Embassy,  
Berlin,  
Germany.

Berlin, December 8, 1936.

Dear Judge Moore:

I am enclosing a letter to the President which I would like to ask you to hand to him as soon as you have an opportunity to do so. I shall write you a letter in a few days; at the moment I merely have time to get this off.

Sincerely yours,

William E. Dodd

Enclosure.

The Honorable  
R. Walton Moore,  
Department of State,  
Washington.

The letter came to me

enclosed

Rhach Moore

20028

Berlin, December 7, 1936.

Dear Mr. President:

Your addresses in Latin America have occasioned a great deal of discussion here. The German people of the better informed classes are most favorable toward your propositions as to peace. Some university people, in the presence of officials, now as in October-November 1935, criticize the regime here, especially its militarism, which they think will plunge them into a war more disastrous to Germany than that of 1914-18. The Spanish struggle, with Germans supporting Franco, gives much trouble even to high army officials; but Hitler and Mussolini think they will come into control of Spain and still further frighten England and France.

Under these circumstances, I spoke quite freely on the fifth of December with the Assistant Secretary of State here, Dr. Dieckhoff. After his indications of grave concern about war dangers, I asked him what Germany would do if the American Conference now in session asked them to join a world peace and disarmament conference. He indicated more interest than Dr. Schacht or von Neurath did some months ago when I touched upon the same subject (see my telegram of the fifth.) This led me to speak freely about the grave danger of present German armaments and German-Italian-Spanish relations. He then said, in a round-about way, that he thought the Foreign Office would favor such a conference and would support gradual disarmament proposition. His greatest doubt was as to Mussolini's attitude.

The President  
The White House,  
Washington.

From what information I can get, there is a rising doubt here as to Hitler's success in his Italian, Japanese, Spanish procedure. High army generals were positively opposed to the recognition of Franco, and rumors circulate that Hitler fears now that he will not succeed this time as on former occasions - since December 1935. I enclose a news clipping which shows how Party chiefs are preaching to the people the Führer's status with God Almighty. This Gross speech is the third of its kind, i.e., Gross is the third Party man of high position who talks this way to teachers, writers and church people. It is the method of rallying simple souls to the idea that Hitler must always succeed.

There is no doubt that democratic countries in Europe would welcome a call for a world conference. Their representatives here stress this matter every time I see them - always confidential. What Hitler will say no one can say, certainly not Foreign Office officials. But if the Fascists do not conquer Spain, I am convinced there will be a silent popular demand here for international cooperation. Decided success of Mussolini in dominating Spain would not greatly please Hitler unless he could take what he plans to take from the Danube and Polish zones. No one can say what is the Führer's plan at the present moment. He is here every day now conferring with Party people who have been preaching such sermons as are revealed in the enclosed clipping. England is engaged in a quarrel about the King's marriage; France is divided sharply as to her policy; Russia is proclaiming her solid front against anybody that starts a war in the Balkan or Baltic areas; and all the smaller democracies are hopeless. It is my feeling that Hitler is simply waiting for his best opportunity to seize what he wants.

In case both North and South America agree to accept your ideas, there might be a world conference - and Germany might assent to representation if the Führer listens to the officials indicated above and actually fears, as the intelligent people do, that he might not win a war before 1938. Certainly the debt situation is bad. A half or two-thirds crop next year would be a most serious matter. There have been five or six good crop yields and these never rise above 80% of the needs of the country. With a debt about equal to the total yearly income, with new unemployment when arming begins to decline and a single bad crop, the economic situation might give a chance for a real international agreement, might.

Sincerely yours,

William E. Dodd

Enclosure.

We have sent files  
grams about fixing  
attitudes here as to  
international rela-  
tions.

This letter con-  
fidential

PSF:JHdd

Jan. 30, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

Let me add to the thousands  
of letters of congratulation on your 55th birthday-  
and especially your continued good health. No  
other President has had a more difficult or  
so tremendous task to perform. Not only our  
country but modern civilization is deeply  
indebted to you. All good wishes for the best  
possible solution of the problems of the next  
four years. Allow me to add some comment  
even if you have no time to read it.

Your recommendations as to the Civil Service  
are to me very important. Leonard D. White of  
the Civil Service Commission, perhaps the best  
informed person in the country on the problems  
involved, although formerly a Mass. Republican,  
is in full accord and thinks a genuine re-  
form inside the Service highly essential. I  
believe our people need to learn two things: 1.

that people should not seek governmental positions when they are not really equipped with knowledge of the problems involved; 2, that once in the service their country's needs, not personal parading and speculation, must always be the one objective.

My four years here have revealed to me quite as much as the sad experiences of Chicago - as to officials' neglect of the real objectives of their appointments. I found here a staff of seven men. Although State Department officials are always in their offices about 9. A.M., no one here thought he needed to begin his work before 10.30 or 11 o'clock. Now we have four staff men, all at their posts a little after nine when I am at my desk. They are real workers like the British and French staff people - also nine o'clock officials - and our reports cover all needed problems as well as when we had seven staff people.

Another curious habit. Our embassies have

all, so far as I know them from copies, felt free to send five to ten page telegrams repeating news already published at home. One of the first copies I received here from Rome was nine foolscap pages. The new Ambassador to Moscow sent ~~me~~ <sup>me</sup> a five page copy about a conversation with Dr. Schacht. This means enormous expense for our people. My attitude from the beginning has been to send telegrams when anything important was to be reported, to correct newspaper accounts if important and to make telegrams brief enough to be read by the Secretary himself. It may be that millionaire ambassadors pay their own telegraphic bills, but I doubt it. One of the greatest causes of the long telegrams is the inability of Service people to write briefly and to the point. They have never trained themselves and never thought of saving money for their people. If Service people really work in their offices and learn how to write properly, they can save immense sums each year for the Department.

One of the greatest causes of the neglect and waste mentioned above has been the appointment of millionaires as ambassadors and ministers since 1897. I know Presidents are embarrassed when men who have given thousands, perhaps even a

hundred thousand dollars to his party campaign fund, press him for appointments. But the Service is greatly injured. Few other nations have millionaires here. The French is the only one I am convinced has as much as a million dollars. Our ambassadors have for more than thirty years spent large sums of their private income parading themselves, hunting among distant mountains and employing ten to twenty servants. They rarely entered their offices before eleven o'clock; and they did not actually study the history and backgrounds of the governments to which they were sent. Three men here spent from \$50,000 to 80,000 a year. No other ambassadors did such things to same extent.

The influence of such officials upon Service people has been to make them neglect duty and spend more than their incomes. One counselor here spent \$40,000 a year; the next one \$30,000; and some staff members have said to me they would not live on \$7,000 a year, one of them going to Paris or London when he needed a new suit of clothes. I think all Service men and ambassadors should live on their salaries. If millionaires must be appointed let them spend their incomes in proper way at home.

This is a long story, but I think bears directly upon your Civil Service reform. Sincerely yours,  
William E. Dodd



Published in  
Foreign Relations of the U.S.

1937, Vol. I, General

pp. 638-640

*file  
confidential*

*PSF: Dodd  
Dodd*

Berlin, February 27, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

Before you receive this, you will have seen a telegram or two which we shall have sent. This letter is designed to explain things a little further in case you have time to read anything.

Hitler is in a difficult position. His people are afraid of war, but not so much as the English and French. He is trying curious means to unite everybody. Universities and schools are all reorganized with no opponents allowed anywhere, hundreds of professors dismissed or pensioned when too eminent. The Protestants and Catholics must all allow their children from their sixth year to be taken in hand by Party propagandists. Some preachers resist and are imprisoned; others, who are very eminent, continue opposition, but their supporters are declining in numbers. Several eminent Party leaders go about the country proclaiming the Fuehrer as a modern Jesus, reorganizing all churches on "true German" principles. Mussolini is of course the modern Julius Caesar, annexing Spain.

Just how real is the alliance between "Jesus" and "Caesar" one cannot say, the purposes of both conflicting. Certainly there are some doubts. Although many eminent Germans hope and pray for a royalist restoration, about all Germans think annexation or absolute control of the Balkan states is their right. Hitler curiously promises Holland, Belgium and

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

Switzerland complete independence, yet authorizes maps in universities, and for sale everywhere, which show these countries as parts of Germany. At the same time the propaganda in these little countries, as also in Norway, Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, secret and public, contradicts the idea of real independence of any country where there are any considerable numbers of people of German descent. Millions of dollars are spent each year in this direction, and Boehle, chief of Foreign Propaganda organization, is now the most important official in the Foreign Office after von Neurath. There are secret agents of Boehle in all the German diplomatic offices. What this means one can readily see.

Dr. Schacht said to me a few days ago at a table where high Nazi officials sat: "Mussolini is annexing Spain and later annexing Egypt - he is our Julius Caesar." I raised some questions as to the dangers. He insisted that he was right. I raised the point a few days later when von Neurath was in Vienna, and the opinion there was not quite in agreement. However, the Foreign Office has several times asserted that Germany would not protest against Italian annexation of Egypt. On this occasion the Foreign Office again asserted Germany's right to control the "Danube" zone, and hoped von Neurath could unite Austria, Hungary, Germany and Italy - a slight fear that Mussolini might not keep his promises to Germany, he being a masterful Machiavelli. When I talked about better commercial relations with the United States, the Staatssekretär said he favored proper trade and treaty arrangements. I asked why

we had received no reply to the State Department's invitation to send delegates to the proposed April conference in Washington. The reply was that the Economics and Labor ministries objected - i.e., Nazi officials.

When one, therefore, wonders about the possibility of a real peace conference in Washington or elsewhere, the answer is: Will Germany or Italy confer seriously with any other peoples when their major aims are to dominate Europe and do it by frightening the populations of democratic countries? Several times since I have been here the peoples of England and France, especially those of smaller nations, have been frightened so that they yielded, events in Ethiopia and Spain being best examples. At the same time, great business companies of all democratic countries have supported the German-Italian demands by increasing sales of arms and war supplies, ours quite as much as others. Even small countries, like Rumania, have risked their own fates by selling war materials.

So, how can a peace conference succeed? Only through a real economic-finance cooperation between England, France and the United States. Can this be done? You know how much opposition English and French businessmen made to the Buenos Aires proposals - almost as much as Italy and Germany made through secret propaganda before and while you were in Latin America. In case Spain is actually annexed by Mussolini and then Germany proceeds to make moves into the eastern zone (same as the 1900-1914 policy of army officials here), England and France might be frightened enough to join the United States in real peace agreements. But one can never know what the DuPonts and the steel people cooperating in Europe with

I. G. Farben and other corporations would do under cover, as they did more than once at Geneva peace conferences.

You are in the most important position in the world, with amazing economic duties at home. Yet real success at home can not be attained if a world war breaks or if the mainland of Europe becomes a solid dictatorship. You know the possibilities. I have simply tried to appraise things on this side of the Atlantic. I shall once more talk with high officials here, as indicated above, about Germany participating in a peace conference, and wire you the answers I get. All the really informed internationalists hope and pray for your success.

Sincerely yours,

*William E. Dodd*

P.S. - Have been told more than once that all this is reported to the Government here before or soon after it reaches you.

WED

*Grace Wadd*

Memo to R. Walton Moore  
From President

April 5, 1937.

In re-accepting Dodd's resignation to take  
effect Sept. 1st.

SEE--Walton Moore--~~100~~ Drawer 1--1937

*PS F open*

April 28, 1937.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Dodd:

I am dictating this just before I leave for a short holiday off the Texas coast, therefore, I will not even sign it myself. I am glad to have yours of April thirteenth and I know you will agree with me that the debate on the Supreme Court during the past three months has done more to educate the American people in basic principles of the Democratic form of government than any discussion since the issue of the bank of the United States over a hundred years ago. You are right that the coincidence of the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the Constitutional Convention will aid in public discussion and therefore, in public understanding.

Will you send me a little more information on the new German Ambassador to the United States. How far can I go in talking with him either officially or "off the record".

My warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
U. S. Ambassador to Germany,  
Berlin, Germany.

(Dictated but not signed)

*Sent  
By Paul*

Confidential  
Files

PSF: II odd

April 13, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

The Supreme Court's decisions of yesterday show the effects of your January move. I think their influence will be great though the Senate may take this as an excuse to defeat your reform measure. It is a little exasperating<sup>to</sup> have presidents of Harvard, Yale and Princeton, not one of whom has ever studied our history closely, testifying before the Senate committee on the right of Supreme Court judges to do what is not proscribed in the Constitution - defeat the majority of our people. I sent Mr. Hopkins a copy of a letter I wrote sometime ago to Senator Bulkley and hoped you might have time to read it. Our country must learn to decide what policies must be applied - and

not permit overlasting delays. No other President has had a more difficult task than yourself; all our Presidents have been defeated during their second terms when really constructive work was necessary; and the main reason for these defeats was the balancing of powers so that minorities could have their way. If you can correct this the dangers of the future will be greatly decreased. The 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of our Constitutional convention is an excellent time to make your campaign. Discussions should be held in all our Universities, real discussions by people who know what the problems and purposes of 1787 were.

The situation in Europe is puzzling. The German-Italian co-operation plan in Spain has become so unpopular in Germany that three generals of the army told Hitler a few days ago that no more help was to be seen - certainly no more men; and Hitler ranted violently. Another point,

in spite of all the press and Hitler's denunciations of communism; Göring told the Ministers from Czechoslovakia a few days ago that Germany and Russia are getting closer together. Göring said the old Bismarck policy towards America must be re-adopted. That would mean a lot: the main hope is to have a Nazi dictatorship there. I doubt the success of the secret manoeuvres.

The Danube zone is approaching economic co-operation and some sort of mutual assistance against Italian or German domination. Of course it is no easy matter with peoples who have warred upon one another for a thousand years, and speak different languages. However the ministers here all talk independence in a way not indulged before, and they say mutual assistance would make them a little United States. They express the hope that our country can give them assistance similar to that given Latin America. If this group of states should form a loose Union, but firm, it would force peace upon the Rome-Berlin dictatorships. There are 84,000,000 people in that zone. A conference of all these states in Budapest or Vienna with some American minister or commercial attaché present - with some authority - would have a great effect.

Curious: strong friendship towards you is constantly expressed to me here by all Latin American representatives, ~~not~~ except the man from Chili - a

very wealthy Nazi. While all the rest declare friendship and admiration, the Argentines, the Brazilians and the Columbian ministers announce themselves on every occasion as supporters of Franco and fascism in Spain; and they are more intimate with Göring and Goebbels here than anybody, except the Japanese representatives. What <sup>that</sup> may mean I can't say; but it seems to mean their continued devotion to dictatorships in Latin America.

You may have no time to read all this, but I venture me more point. The English and French governments do not seem to grasp the meaning and danger of continued commercial rivalries and even hostility. I never get anything from the Ambassador here on this subject. English public opinion, judged from their press and their new Councillor here, favors co-operation with our country; but Cabinet people seem never to grasp the meaning of heated commercial rivalries and trade barriers. It looks as if the French are in the same frame of mind, though Blum seems wiser. Business men in the countries prevented Mussolini from being halted in Nov. Dec. 1932. And here Russian manufacturers have played the same rōle. Shall western civilization collapse in another great war - "great" industrialists the chief cause?

I certainly hope you can reform our Supreme and Circuit courts!

Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

Entirely confidential,  
if possible have a copy  
made and mailed  
to me at Round Hill,  
Virginia - my brother  
in-law is there.

May 24, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

In addition to what I wrote  
you sometime ago, I may add that the  
new Ambassador is counted more agree-  
able personally than Ribbentrop but of the  
same curious relations to the German For-  
eign Office. He is supposed to be close to  
the Führer and he told me that he had  
been ordered to come back in September,  
report to Hitler and attend the party  
show at Nürnberg. Dieckhoff was, however,  
very liberal and frank-spoken before  
June 30, 1934. Since that time he has  
been most reticent and has even men-

tioned at a British Commonwealth dinner party, his resolute conviction that Germany must control or annex all the Balkan-Danube states. I replied: "we shall then be expected to annex Canada and Mexico!" He did not seem to see the meaning of this. Regardless then of his former Republicanism and excellent information about international affairs, he has surrendered, like Ribbentrop in England, to the aggressive demands of the Führer. I hope I am wrong in this estimate. The United States may influence him - he loves the country, he says.

The other matter I venture to discuss is the importance of this post, although nothing on trade relations is apt to be done. I have wished to retire late in the summer, mainly because I wish to finish my history of the Old South, also because I am frequently asked by Universities to deliver lectures - on our own problems, so impor-

that the next few years. But reports came to me that the Messers man has demanded appointment to this post. I can not think you really favor such an appointment. I need not review his history. He simply knows no German and little or no European history. This is the best post to which such a person should be appointed - spending \$100,000 a year and leaving everything to the state, edit of them is a Nazi.

James J. Shatwell of Columbia knows German well, is highly thought of by intellectual Germans and by most foreign office people; and few men any where know European modern history so well. He would be most useful to you. He is a real friend country to all that lay near Meley may have said about him, and he is highly esteemed by all our universities - an important fact. He has never asked me to do or say anything for him. Question man of great value but not quite so well qualified as Stevenson. When Duggan of New York. The best qualified man of the Middle West, who is also a strong supporter of your democratic policies, is my

personal friend, Charles E. Merriam. Any one of these would be heeded all over Europe if here, the first-named most highly.

Much as I dread to stay longer, I am willing to do so if it helps you name one of these men later. Do not think me personal in this matter. I hope to some very country best and your programme is the best, the real salvation of democracy in the world if it can be realized.

Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

PSF: Dodd

PSF: Dodd

[May 1937?]

These clippings from the Manchester Guardian - regarded here as most reliable.

John's growing influence in the world is most welcome to English masses, most troublesome to the two dictators

[Dialhoff]

New German Ambassador to the U.S. talked freely and critically to me before June 30, 1934; since that time hardly a word except in praise, but not in praise of Goebbels. He is brother-in-law of Ribbentrop in London

## PEACE BASED ON DEMOCRACY

### Mr. Roosevelt's Appeal

From our own Correspondent

NEW YORK, APRIL 14.

President Roosevelt to-day made another strong plea for international peace based upon democracy, mutual confidence between nations, and definite co-operation.

He spoke to the Board of Governors of the Pan-American Union, a body in which all the Republics in this hemisphere are represented. He urged his listeners to make sure that the pledges given at the recent Pan-American Conference at Buenos Aires were transformed into practical action. He said that democracy cannot thrive in an atmosphere of international insecurity. Such insecurity, he said, breeds militarism and regimentation and the denial of freedom of speech, peaceful assemblage, and religion. He reminded his listeners that he had addressed the same body four years ago, and asserted that much progress had been made in this hemisphere in the interval.

After the President's address, which was broadcast, the microphones were cut off, the journalists excluded, and the President made some additional remarks privately. It is understood that he defended the Latin-American policy of his Administration.

## CHILDREN DEPRIVED OF NATIONALITY

### Nazi Decree

BERLIN, APRIL 14.

The name of Vieth von Golssenan, better known as Ludwig Renn, is included in a list of 91 Germans published to-day in the official gazette who have been deprived of their nationality. Ludwig Renn's book "War" was one of the best sellers in post-war Germany.

The list also includes a number of children who are listed as relatives of people hostile to the State. The youngest of these is Peter Hauschild, who is under two years of age, and the ages of other boys and girls range from five to fourteen.—Reuter.

JEW'S IN GERMANY  
Severe New Restrictions  
Imposed  
Guardian May 16.37

From a Special Correspondent

The unhappy position of Jews in Germany has been severely aggravated in the last few days. On the strength of a decree of the State police all Jewish meetings, including those concerned with sport, have been prohibited until June 15. Jews cannot therefore play tennis or football or enjoy river or other sports in public.

For publicity reasons the Third Realm declares officially that the cultural and social life of the German Jews is secured by the Nuremberg laws, but this decree of the secret police removes almost their last means of association for cultural purposes.

At the same time the State police is increasing its activity in another direction. In a great many parts of Germany members of the German aristocracy have been arrested recently and charged with secret monarchistic activities.

PSF: Dodd

May 25, 1937.

My dear Dodd:-

Frankly, I was delighted with your letter to Bulkley. But because you are too honest and sincere to be a publicity expert, you did not realize that that one sentence about the billionaire would be the one thing in the whole letter seized on by the Press and a certain type of false liberal like Borah.

No one can answer the main points you made, and we are truly at another very important crisis. Some of our Democratic "friends" do not at all like the idea that I may keep on making speeches and radio talks for the next three and a half years. They think that a second term President should be duly grateful and retire into innocuous desuetude.

As ever yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
American Embassy,  
Berlin,  
Germany.

May 13, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

I congratulate you on your continued good health and your ability to get real benefit from a short vacation. You have the most difficult work of any President who ever held office in our country, and your good health is therefore one of the most important factors

You are not, I hope, annoyed at the violent talk of Senator Borah and his fellow opponents. March 1, the

Paris Herald reported that my friend, Buckley, had made an address in Ohio against your Court reform measure. As other Democrats had also been reported as opposing your measures I wrote the letter to Mr. B. which I asked Mr. Hopkins to show you if you had time to look it through.

When I heard that parts of my letter were about to be quoted, I sent a copy to Judge Moore three weeks ago for publication in Richmond in case that seemed well. The New York Times man here reported to me the letter had been printed in Virginia. Yesterday Senators took occasion to stress what I said about dictatorship and otherwise attacked me. No one answered the main points which prove how court vetoes and Senate minorities have defeated majorities. I hope the matter does not in

any <sup>way</sup> embarrass you. Nothing since the  
Civil War seems to me so impor-  
tant as your reform work. There-  
fore I wrote the letter and asked both  
Glass and Norris to read it. If we split  
up into groups we invite a dictatorship  
the next time we have a depression -  
and your times competent men told  
me such a thing was desired, three times  
when I was in the U. S. one time  
here. But it was always confidential.

Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

PSF: Todd

*Todd*

**THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 17, 1937.

*file*

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HULL:

Will you speak to me about  
this at Cabinet meeting.

F.D.R.

June 12, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

My daughter mails this outside Germany, so I take the liberty to bother you although I know you have the most difficult task of anybody in the world: just a brief summary of the situation here.

Since von Zeland was named as the man to go to Washington there has been an increasing opposition here to any possible trade arrangements of the U. S. with England, France and Belgium. The subsidies paid for exports have been increased and sales to Latin America, South Africa and China pressed stronger than ever. There is to be no abandonment Dr. Schacht says of the bi-lateral system, not even with us as he had formerly urged. The object, now that an-

manpower work is beginning to decline, is  
capture trade against England, the U.S. and Ja-  
pan, her ally. At the moment the Chinese  
brother-in-law of the ruler there is boast-  
ing here that they a second Hitler and every-  
thing possible is being wryed as to trade be-  
tween Germany and China - subsidies allowed  
to the point of selling at half the cost here.  
You see all this is aimed at two things: to  
find markets enough to escape great un-  
employment and especially to defeat Sec-  
retary Hull's plan. If von Zeeland does  
not succeed or if England is scared out  
of the arrangement, the world situation is  
going to be more controlled here than else-  
where. I hope then something real can  
be done.

Another phase. Russian ruthlessness  
has alienated France considerably and England  
more. Germany is being cultivated now by

both. This involves Balkan states, especially if Italy is isolated. The ministers from those states are more anxious than they have been since I came here. Just what will happen if the U. S. is isolated commercially, you can guess better than I. There is one danger. The Germans are threatened now with a great crop shortage. The worst drought here in 30 years people tell me. More than twice as much wheat has been bought than has been reported. If the drought continues one more week results are greatly feared.

Pardon this hasty note.

Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

*File*  
*(Personal)* R.F. Dodd

Berlin, July 15, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

The death of Senator Robinson is a sad event, not merely because he passed away early and suddenly, but it is even more unfortunate because of his loyal and able cooperation in your long struggle to correct abuses which have so long defeated real democracy in our country. I knew Senator Robinson well, and feel that his loss must be personal as well as political to you and other leaders in your régime.

What a tragic situation! Opponents will now renew their bitter and ill-considered opposition and perhaps urge adjournment of Congress without doing the most important things before them since March. They will not think of their waste of time, but only of their imitation of the blunders of preceding Senates. Think of Cleveland's, Theodore Roosevelt's (defeat of his very best program, 1905-09) and Wilson's defeats. The last defeat was successful because of Newberry's admission and of the behavior of that former Missouri Senator! Curious to me that all the major points, clearly made, in my letter to Senator Bulkley, were overlooked and only the brief statement that there was danger of a dictator struggle in case the leading parties broke into factions or failed to recognize the enormous vote you had in 1936 in spite of eight or ten million dollars spent to defeat you.

You have a great issue on hand, perhaps the greatest of any preceding President. It is now more a question of actual

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

democratic success than at any time since the foundation of our Government - possible exception of Lincoln's struggle for both the Union and democracy; and you know two Senators and the most powerful House leader expressed their satisfaction when Lincoln was murdered. Lincoln's plan for reconstruction was democratic, even his slavery attitude.

The Supreme Court has often had very able judges, but their majorities have nearly always opposed democratic principles. I need not mention again positive proofs of this - think of the Newberry ruling of the Supreme Court on Hughes' argument! The Constitution does not grant power to overrule Congress and Presidents' agreements on measures, much as some lawyers argue that it does. However, an amendment ought now to be passed by the States, only millions of dollars would be spent in critical States to defeat the resolutions to that effect. No other democracy in the world has a court to defeat acts of national legislatures; and the Nazi papers here have more than once spoken of our judicial dictatorship.

What can your Administration do in case your leading measures are defeated? I think there might be a nation-wide campaign in 1938 on the basic question: whether our country will save its democracy. With Europe about to go Nazi or Fascist, our people might be brought to give another great vote like that of 1936. You know how much propaganda is being made in our country for Naziism or Fascism - scores of paid agents active in all the greater cities. I only wish you and your cooperative friends may be able to make our faith in democracy plain to all the world.

Sincerely yours,

*William E. Dodd*

*\* Even communists of Russia  
make propaganda with us.*

167 p

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**THE COUNSELOR**

July 16, 1937.

TR:

Please have the attached translated and return to Mr. Moore.

A. E. Mullen  
Room 202



JUL 16 1937 AM

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[TRANSLATION]

MORGENPOST, Berlin, July 8, 1937.

"GERMANY ENTIRELY RIGHT"

A Sensational Speech of American Under Secretary of  
State Welles

DNB, Washington, July 8th.

On Wednesday, Under Secretary of State Welles delivered an address before the Institute of Public Affairs at Charlottesville, as one of a series of lectures at the University of the State of Virginia, that is held every summer. In his address he gave a very significant and frank exposition of the official American attitude toward the European political situation, to which all the more importance is to be assigned as his remarks must have been submitted to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull.

To begin with, Welles designated Spain as the battlefield on which two mutually hostile views of life are combatting each other. But, he emphasized further, the Spanish War is only an outward indication of the disease from which the world is suffering; it is not the disease itself. The Treaty of Versailles, which stamped the conquered as second-rate nations and robbed them of any hope for a better future is to blame. The injustice and the false basis of the provisions

of

of the treaty of peace were the main reasons for the chaos which followed, and was bound to follow, the World War. Then Welles placed himself fully and entirely on Germany's side with regard to the tearing up of the dictated Treaty of Versailles by solemnly declaring:

" We ought to have learned during the years since the Treaty of Versailles that a permanent peace cannot be founded on feelings of revenge, that millions of human beings cannot be forced to face a hopeless future, that they cannot be expected to devote their whole life to the task of making reparation for the alleged or real misdeeds or mistakes of the leaders of an earlier generation in their fatherland. Men and women forced into such a situation always have taken, and always will take, the first opportunity to free themselves from such intolerable servitude.

"I think that<sup>the</sup> primary and fundamental cause of the ills from which the world suffers today is that the injustices and wrong distributions of territory after the World War have never been rectified or redressed. And these causes are obviously not only of a political but also of an economic and financial nature."

"Now

## America's Program.

"Now what can the American Government do to contribute its share toward the rebuilding of healthier and happier world?", Welles then asked. "America has submitted a broad program, on which she is fully prepared to collaborate:

"1. Faithful observance of treaties, with respect to international obligations assumed voluntarily; 2. the abolition or reduction of the innumerable artificial barriers to international trade; 3. limitation and eventual reduction of armaments; 4. frequent conferences between representatives of governments, and free exchange of views.

"If", Welles concluded, "the European nations on their part correct the political inequities of the Treaty of Versailles, American public opinion will certainly favor by an overwhelming majority the collaboration of America with the other nations in the pacification of the world".

Translator's Note: The German version diverges considerably from the original.

# „Deutschland in vollem Recht“

Eine sensationelle Rede des amerikanischen Unterstaatssekretärs Welles

From MORGENPOST, Berlin, July 8, 1937

DNB Washington, 8. Juli

Unterstaatssekretär Welles hielt am Mittwoch vor dem Institute of Public Affairs in Charlottesville im Rahmen einer allsommerlichen Vortragsreihe der Universität des Staates Virginia einen Vortrag. Er gab in seiner Rede eine sehr bedeutsame offene Darlegung der amerikanischen amtlichen Stellungnahme zur europäischen politischen Lage, der um so größere Wichtigkeit beizumessen ist, als seine Ausführungen dem Präsidenten Roosevelt und Außenminister Hull vorgelegen haben dürften.

Welles bezeichnete zunächst Spanien als das Schlachtfeld, auf dem zwei einander feindliche Weltanschauungen sich bekämpfen. Aber, so betonte er weiter, der spanische Krieg ist nur ein äußeres Anzeichen der Krankheit, an der die Welt leidet, ist nicht die Krankheit selbst. Schuld ist der Versailler Vertrag, der die Besiegten zu minderwertigen Nationen stempelte und ihnen jede Hoffnung auf eine bessere Zukunft raubte. Die Ungerechtigkeit und die falsche Begründung der Bestimmungen des Friedensvertrages waren der Hauptgrund für das Chaos, das dem Weltkrieg folgte und folgen mußte. Sodann stellte sich Welles voll und ganz auf die Seite Deutschlands hinsichtlich der Zerreißung des Versailler Diktates, indem er feierlich erklärte:

„Wir sollten in den Jahren seit dem Versailler Vertrag gelernt haben, daß ein dauernder Friede nicht auf Rachegefühlen aufgebaut werden kann, daß Millionen von Menschen nicht gezwungen werden können, einer hoffnungslosen Zukunft ins Auge zu sehen, daß man von ihnen nicht erwarten kann, ihr ganzes Leben der Aufgabe zu widmen, Reparationen zu leisten für die angeblichen oder tatsächlichen Sünden oder Fehler der

Führer einer früheren Generation in ihrem Vaterland. Männer und Frauen, die in eine solche Lage gedrängt werden, haben stets und werden stets die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, um sich von solch unerträglicher Knechtschaft zu befreien.

Ich glaube, daß die Leiden, an denen die Welt heute krankt, in erster Linie die fundamentale Ursache haben, daß die Ungerechtigkeiten und falschen Gebietsverteilungen nach dem Weltkrieg nie berichtigt oder behoben worden sind. Und diese Ursachen sind ganz offensichtlich sowohl politischer wie wirtschaftlicher und finanzieller Natur.“

## Das Programm Amerikas

Was könne nun die amerikanische Regierung tun, um an ihrem Teil zum Wiederaufbau einer gesünderen und glücklicheren Welt beizutragen, fragte dann Welles. Amerika unterbreite ein weitziugiges Programm, an dem mitzuarbeiten es voll bereit sei:

1. Vertragstreue bezüglich der freiwillig eingegangenen internationalen Verpflichtungen;
2. Abschaffung oder Milderung der zahllosen künstlichen Schranken im Welthandelsverkehr;
3. Begrenzung und spätere Herabminderung der Rüstungen;
4. häufige Besprechungen zwischen Vertretern der Regierungen sowie freier Meinungsaustausch.

Wenn, so schloß Welles, die europäischen Nationen ihrerseits die politischen Ungerechtigkeiten des Versailler Vertrages berichtigten, so werde die amerikanische öffentliche Meinung sicherlich in ihrer überwältigenden Mehrheit die Mitarbeit Amerikas mit den übrigen Nationen an der Befriedung der Welt billigen.

PSF: Dodd

File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1937.

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of July 17th and to the letter addressed to you by Ambassador Dodd under date of July 1st, which I am returning herewith, I fully share Dr. Dodd's opinion with regard to the ability and qualifications of Douglas Jenkins, our present Consul General in Berlin.

I also agree with the opinion he expresses that Jenkins would be a suitable candidate for promotion to be a Minister in certain posts. From 1918 to 1934, he served continuously in various posts in the Far East and was only transferred to his present post in Berlin in 1934. He has had no service on this continent and, consequently, would not in my judgment be available as Minister to any one of the American Republics. I think, however, that he would be well qualified to serve as Minister, should a suitable opening occur, in one of the smaller European capitals or in the Far East.



The President,

The White House.

Robert Frazer, now Consul General in London, to whom you have just offered the Legation in Salvador is senior to Jenkins and, in my opinion, has both had a wider range of experience and is an abler officer. Frazer, of course, has had experience on the American Continent and speaks Spanish fluently. Before being assigned to London, he was Consul General in Mexico City and did there an admirable piece of work.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



July 1, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

Our Consul General here, Douglas Jenkins, has been in the service a long time; he is a real supporter of your democratic regime; and he has shown good judgment and industry in the difficult office here. He <sup>is</sup> from South Carolina which, I hope, is not a disgrace and is now

about 58 years old. I recommend  
him for promotion to a minister's  
post. I have described his case to  
the State Department, but I have  
the feeling that Service men  
there do not always consider  
the merits of a case as de-  
cisive factors. I hope you can  
nominate Jenkins to some post.

What a struggle you have to  
make democracy real in our coun-  
try. I hope you may violate pre-  
cedents and make your second term  
really successful  
Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

German Impressions

Preface

The following pages are not an essay. I have made no attempt at unity or literary form. They are also by no means a unified estimate of present conditions in Germany. Anything of the kind would be entirely beyond my powers. What I have tried to do is to set down some of the more striking things that were said to me while I was in Germany, such comments on these remarks as seem to me probably sound, and a very few general conclusions of my own.

I believe that the principal defects of what I have to report and to say arise from the fact that I had no opportunity to talk with people who represent more or less the opposite type to the intellectual: I mean hard-headed, unimaginative but shrewd and competent men of affairs who have few beliefs about what is good or bad politically but are chiefly concerned for the effective running of things in the present and near future. I suspect that the opinions of such men would often be very different from those of my informants, and not less significant.

*file  
private*

*PSF: [odd]*

*[Aug. 11, 1937]*

## German Impressions

In 1914 at the outbreak of the war I was pretty well acquainted with Germany. I had first visited the country in 1895, had spent four semesters in a German university in 1902, '03 and '04, and later had returned for fairly long visits four times in the summer. But since the war I had been in Germany only once for a single week, under circumstances that made it difficult for me to form clear impressions. Accordingly, when I went to Germany this summer my qualifications as an observer were good only in certain respects, for I had no more than a vague impression of the great changes that had taken place in the last two decades. It is true that I had at least the advantage of being well aware of my ignorance of these changes. One experience in particular served as a warning of this ignorance: I had noticed from time to time that some of my old German acquaintances whom I had seen in this country had quite honestly forgotten many of their prewar opinions and points of view.

The circumstances of my visit were especially favorable in that I was to meet several important Germans in a quasi-official capacity and that I was to see a good many others with whom I had professional relations or, directly or indirectly, personal relations. In all, I had conversations, most of them long conversations, with some 25 people, many of them professors and also many in other walks of life. One was a former minister of state. Another was a former member of the Reichstag, who holds a very responsible position in one of the heavy industries, another a leader of the Protestant church in Prussia. There were two students, there were the wives of several

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Note: Where I purport to quote remarks of other persons or of myself it is obvious that I am at best paraphrasing. I use this form for convenience. The statements must not be regarded as precise reproductions of the original remarks.

professors, there was a civil servant, and there was a man described to me by a responsible person as the most intelligent and experienced foreign newspaper correspondent in Berlin, and there were several others whom I shall not designate.

I had made up my mind to try to inform myself as well as possible about certain aspects of the conditions in the country, and to this end while in Germany to make an effort to listen to what I was told, to remember it and not at the time to form judgments of my own, except concerning the sincerity and objectivity of my new acquaintances. I also originally intended to ask few questions and to avoid leading questions. In many instances, however, this precaution seemed to be quite unnecessary and not infrequently a free and untrammled discussion arose, which, so far as I could judge, entailed none of the familiar disadvantages of a debate. In fact, most people seemed eager to talk, and clearly found relief in talking freely.

There was one person who, after receiving me with great politeness and consideration, delivered a lecture of about three-quarters of an hour and carefully and skillfully avoided any suggestions that I made tending to lead him away from a prepared statement that he had clearly and precisely in mind. I attach no importance to what he said and shall disregard it because it is quite impossible for me to guess how trustworthy his remarks may have been. Two other persons were extremely reticent and gave me little or no information that I could regard as significant. There were three or four others who, speaking in the presence of a third person or for a short time, said very little. They also hardly count. There remain some fifteen or more individuals, old and young, male and female, of widely different experiences and occupations, though all, of course, of the educated classes, who freely and, so far as I could judge, frankly poured out their opinions

and expressed their feelings about a great variety of topics. I shall try first of all to put down certain statements made by these persons that seem to me sufficiently interesting to be recorded, but I shall not try to attribute them to individuals.

I was told over and over again that the situation when Hitler came into power was nearly intolerable and was rapidly getting worse (only one person explicitly denied this), that nearly everybody agreed at the time that something had to be done, and that the establishment of the Nazi regime seemed to be the only thing that could be done. One informant said that big industry, which had taken its part in putting Hitler in, was sorry within two weeks for what it had done. But much as moderates disliked the extravagances of the Nazis, at any rate for the moment nearly everybody had agreed that the step was inevitable. Most of my informants declared that in their opinion many useful things were accomplished at the beginning of the Nazi regime and there is a considerable agreement that Hitler did in a very conspicuous degree restore the feeling of national dignity, pride and confidence, thereby giving a meaning to life for great masses of the population who had come to feel that life was really not worth living. There are some people who deny all this, but it seemed to me that they were probably so strongly hostile to the government or so lacking in ability to control their own feelings that their opinion may be disregarded.

However, I was also told in a particularly impressive interview by a man who made a deep impression on me for his courage, honesty and sincerity that the formation of a new and deep cleavage in the German people began at once, and that in his opinion that cleavage, which has grown steadily, more than counterbalances all the benefits of the two or three first years

of the Nazi government. He fears and expects that this cleavage will be the most important factor in German life for at least two generations to come.

In contrast to the favorable, if grudging and seriously qualified estimate of the results of the first years of the new government, there was substantial agreement in disapproval of the present situation. Accordingly, it seems safe to say that in a certain class or set of people in Germany a very large majority are now thoroughly hostile to the government. This raises the question of the attitude of the various classes of people through the country, and I was told much about this by many different people, mostly, I think, well informed. Here are some of the remarks. The clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, except a small minority who act as spies on their colleagues and who are quite generally regarded as beyond the pale of common decency, are opposed to the government. The great majority of devout Catholics and Protestants agree with and pretty generally follow their priests or pastors. One man whose wish it would be to believe the number as large as possible, but who seemed to me exceptionally honest, told me that this accounts for 20 per cent of the total population of Germany, say 10 per cent Catholic, 10 per cent Protestant, who are opposed to the government because of their religion.

The peasants, I was told, should be divided into two classes, peasant proprietors and agricultural laborers. It is said that the peasant proprietors are now in large majority hostile to the government. The reason given is that the minute regulations imposed upon them, the new laws about inheritance, the conditions under which mortgages may be obtained, and the

apparently arbitrary and unsound petty interferences with their everyday activities combine to irritate them, - often to the limit of their endurance. I feel pretty sure that this is true of many, but can venture no opinion about the proportions. The agricultural laborers are said to be more favorable to the government.

As for the industrial working class, I was given very little information that seemed to me trustworthy. One man seemed to think that a good many former socialists, if not communists, with a docility that is common in Germany, had accepted the present regime and come to like it. Several others were firmly of the opinion that the working men and their wives are merely hiding their feelings, which remain unchanged.

It was pretty generally said that the petty bourgeoisie, out of which the Nazi party arose and in which there were originally high hopes of better economic conditions, has become disillusioned, dissatisfied and hostile. I should guess that this is certainly true of numbers that are absolutely large, but possibly not very large relatively. Again, I have the feeling that my informants were not particularly well qualified to form an opinion.

The students are said to have undergone a great change. Originally they were overwhelmingly in favor of Hitler. I was told by a student in one provincial university that today 90 per cent of the men students in his university are hostile to the government. He added that a majority of women students were in favor of Hitler. The explanation of this latter curious fact, given by him, corroborated by his mother and by a woman of thirty who was also present, as well as by a professor, all of whom took part in the conversation, is said to be this. Hitler is unmarried. He is, therefore,

not the property of any one woman. He is a vegetarian, he does not drink, he does not smoke, and for countless thousands of German women, especially unmarried women, he has become a kind of God. They have his portrait before their eyes at work and in their rooms.

The men students of the universities are said to be hostile to the government for the following reasons: They dislike interference with their private lives, and those of the higher social classes strongly resent the suppression of the old Corps and Burschenschaften. They find the one club that the Nazis have set up in place of these others both perfectly flat and indirectly obnoxious. They resent the attempts that are made to regiment them and to discover their private opinions, and for this reason stay away from certain smaller universities where the system for accomplishing this sort of thing works smoothly. Also, they have begun rather widely to see that their instruction is not only far inferior to what it used to be, but much less than adequate to their needs.

I attach little importance to what I was told about the attitude of the top of society, whether big business or old aristocracy, except that the trend is unfavorable to Hitler.

Coming back now to the professors, who represent the class that I know best, of whom I saw the largest number and who, knowing more about me, were probably most disposed to speak freely, it will perhaps be well to go into further details. There is, I should think, all but universal conviction that the German universities have been practically destroyed as well-balanced, all round institutions of learning and of research. There is little hope that they can be presently restored to anything like their former state, and the general attitude is one of deep depression. The following episode throws light

on the attitude. It seems to me, though a slight affair, as significant as anything in my experience while in Germany. I was dining with an old friend, a professor in the University of Berlin. There were present his wife, a friend of hers who is the daughter of one of the most distinguished Jewish scientists of thirty years ago (the only 'non-Aryan'), a pupil of my friend now an assistant to him, and a pleasant, intelligent medical professor from a provincial university whom I had never seen before. After some general conversation about conditions in the United States which was not without personal significance because one daughter of the Jewess is already in America and another expects to go to America soon, the medical professor said to me something like this, "About 1910 when as an assistant I first began to see American medical men, we found it necessary to make great allowances for them because although they were good fellows their education and training had obviously been defective and they were clearly behind the best Europeans of the same age. Today we look to America as leading the world in medical science. How has such progress been possible in a quarter of a century? How far has it been due to pouring out money? " It was quite apparent that his question was really the expression of a hope that something like this might some day be possible in Germany.

To this question I replied about as follows: "We have indeed made great progress in America, but nothing like what your question implies. You are largely in error for two reasons: (1) You and practically all Germans greatly underestimated the achievements of American science 25 years ago. (2) Today you considerably overestimate our achievements and our present merits. In short, you arrive at far too great an estimate of our progress by subtracting a quantity that is much too small from a quantity that is much

too large." Thereupon there was a good deal of discussion, and at the end everybody agreed that I was probably right. For my part I have no doubt of it. My opinion that the Germans in most respects underestimated Americans before the war is no new one and is probably today generally recognized. As for their overestimate at the present time, at least in the case of the kind of people whom I saw, it seemed to me almost as obvious as the extravagance of the unfavorable criticism of America that one encounters in the daily press. Needless to say, I can form no estimate of how widely this new respectful admiration of America is distributed, but I should think it probably the characteristic of a very small element in the population of Germany and for the present a factor of absolutely no political importance. To one accustomed to the attitude of younger men twenty-five years ago, with whom I naturally associated at that time, the contrast is today, however, almost comic. Twenty-five years ago I often had a feeling that it was necessary to treat many of my contemporaries among the Germans on the intellectual level, because of their naive self-satisfaction, much as one treats the newly rich on the social level. Today I feel the need to guard myself against over-respectful admiration of America on the part of the Germans.

The atmosphere of fear, though it is perhaps exaggerated by liberals in Germany and here, is pretty conspicuous in the universities, and there is good ground for it. I was told the following story under circumstances which made the report seem entirely trustworthy. About a year ago two professors of the University of Leipzig found themselves at the end of the afternoon in the Professors' Room at the University, and one of them noticed as they were leaving that a colleague had forgotten his brief case lying on the table. They decided that they ought to look inside to find out the owner in order to return

it to him, and on opening it discovered careful notes of the private conversations of several of their colleagues, obviously destined for the authorities. The result was that the spy was cut by his colleagues and sometime later when he inquired of one of them why he was being cut, he was told the reason. Thereupon, he said "You don't suppose that I am the only person doing this, do you?"

The administration of the universities causes unhappiness not only for reasons of this kind that are largely emotional, but also on strictly technical ground. One of my informants whom I consider particularly trustworthy said to me, "Perhaps the greatest difficulty in Germany today is that men who have the education and capacity of chiefs are ruled and ordered about by men of the mentality and education of Unteroffizieren." He added that there are two exceptions, the army itself, which is beyond the control of ignorant, incompetent meddlers, and a small group around Schacht. (To this I am inclined to add, from what others have told me, a small group around von Neurath. Incidentally it is amusing, if tragic, to think of the feelings of a person like von Neurath, a Wurtemberg gentleman brought up in a hard-working, cosmopolitan, aristocratic family, and, I suppose, a competent, diplomatic technician, as he now is, firmly embedded in the Nazi regime.)

At all events the universities are run by stupid, ignorant, prejudiced, largely dishonest people. Of that I think there can be little doubt, and the unintelligent mistakes are quite as serious as the deliberate acts in their effect upon competent scholars and scientists as well as upon the instruction.

I found a few indications of sharply limited hopes for the future of the universities. First, one medical scientist said to me, "They like to say they don't need us, but they know that they do." To this I replied

"Yes, of course, they know that they need physicists, chemists and medical scientists, but what about historians?" He replied by shrugging his shoulders hopelessly. I was also told by two or three people who unquestionably know something about it at first hand that the Kaiser Wilhelm Gessellschaft is probably safer from interference now than it was a year ago, and that there is a prospect that it will have some small radiating influence. In this connection it will be interesting to set down what seems to me a remarkable and significant coincidence. Some weeks earlier I had been talking in Paris with an old friend who is one of the most intelligent Frenchmen I know, a professor at the College de France. He said to me, "In the present state of the country with all the financial and political trouble, the College de France which, in accordance with its foundation, is relatively free from government interference will play a more important part in the intellectual life of the country than it has for many years. In short, it will perhaps again fulfill the purpose of its founder." It was only about three weeks later that a man who has had an extremely responsible position in the intellectual life of Germany during the last 30 years said to me, "The Kaiser Wilhelm Gessellschaft, being relatively independent of the government, is destined to play a more important part in the intellectual life of Germany than it has in the past, and our greatest hopes center about it." The bearing of these two practically identical statements on the importance of privately endowed universities in America seems pretty evident.

The influence of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gessellschaft on the development of the physical and medical sciences in the universities is likely to be considerable and in the right direction.

From another source I learned that the organization formerly called the Notgemeinschaft, and which now bears another name more in keeping with Nazi pride, has been given more money to be used in aid of research this year than previously. These I think are small but not negligible signs of betterment.

The reports about the recruiting of young men as scholars and men of science were uniformly bad or at all events expressed deep depression. I was told by many that in general the able, intelligent, energetic young men are going either into the army or into industry and that there are very few who are taking up university careers, even in the favored physical and biological sciences, and I think this is entirely trustworthy information. The result of this and of the events of the past 25 years may be briefly sketched as follows: There was no great destruction of life during the war among university men who are now more than 55 years old, for many of them were already in positions which tended to protect them from risk. On the other hand, this group has been decimated through the treatment of the Jews and of certain others who proved either irreconcilable or unable to take care of themselves. The group between the ages of 40 and 55 is small because probably a majority of those who would have become professors were either killed in the war or in some way or other deflected from what would have been their course. Younger men have been through the evil times and have chosen a university career less often than would have been the case in a happier period. And now the supply of good young men is still dwindling.

The upshot of all this may be expressed in the form of a very rough estimate, as follows: Among the professors and dozenten of the German universities there are less than half as many able men as there were before

the war, and their work is not half as effective as it was at that time. The rest are, in general, a bad lot, stupid, incompetent and often dishonest.

I feel constrained to add that it is my impression that the German universities had been slowly declining for a quarter of a century before the outbreak of the war, and that the present situation represents the result of a long, slowly descending wave on which is superimposed the result of a quarter century of catastrophe.

One final remark about the universities: I was told over and over again that there is hardly a first-rate scientific investigator in Germany who would not gladly accept a call to America or to a moderately comfortable post in almost any other foreign country. Needless to say, I take this statement more confidently as an expression of a strong feeling of hostility to the government and of hopelessness for the future than as a prediction of what people would do.

A few remarks about Hitler may be set down. I was told that both von Blomberg and von Neurath have been much impressed by Hitler's success in educating himself about all sorts of technical or quasi-technical subjects, and that they find their dealings with him personally reasonably satisfactory. My informant added that he had come to believe that Hitler is considerably more intelligent than anyone had at first supposed. At this point I put in a question that I had formulated long before going to Germany, to this effect: "Hitler's principal task has been to rebuild in Germany a feeling of confidence, solidarity, security, national pride, etc. To me it seems that the very best raw material available in great quantity for this purpose is the great mass of the more unintelligent but devout Protestants and Catholics. Accordingly, I think that his treatment of the churches is no less than 'wahnsinnig'. What have you to say to this observation?" The reply was cordial agreement and

the statement that Hitler is certainly not intelligent enough to understand this kind of consideration, and that he is also emotionally so devoted to a few favorite ideas or prejudices that he is quite incapable of objective consideration when they are involved. These are (1) the dogma of race, (2) the hatred and fear of Bolshevism, and (3) the belief that his Nazi religion must be adopted by Germans generally. I was also told that Schacht has twice presented his resignation to Hitler and that on the second occasion Hitler said to him, "If you retire today, you will be dead tomorrow."

Another report was that two of the most distinguished men of science in Germany went to Hitler to try to persuade him to treat the Jews better and that they were dismissed with gross insults. A further story is that he has made a political testament nominating Goering as his successor in the event of his death.

It is said that Goering, who loves the flesh pots, ostentation, and magnificence, is far more friendly to the rich than Hitler and would be glad to preserve the old economic order with himself as one of the favored few. Of course, I heard a great many other things about Hitler, Goering, Goebbels and others that are common knowledge, but it is hardly worth while to go on talking about such questions because there must be hundreds of people who are better informed than I am.

\* \* \* \* \*

So far I have been setting down what was said of the present state of affairs. In many respects, however, trends are more significant than conditions at a moment, and I especially tried to find out what my informants thought about trends. On the whole, the opinions expressed about economic

trends seem to me valueless, but the estimates of trends of opinion, though rather bewildering, are, I think, significant. Everybody agrees that the feeling in Germany was in general very much happier a year or two ago than it was when Hitler came into power, and that most people were far better off. There was also general agreement, with hardly an exception, that people in general are less happy today than they were a year ago, and that the number of people hostile to the government has been increasing rapidly in many if not nearly all classes for more than a year.

I suppose it is pretty safe to guess that this would have happened in almost any strong and vigorous government coming into power under the circumstances that existed in Germany when Hitler began to rule, for under such circumstances no government could possibly fulfill its promises, let alone the hopes of a distracted and unhappy population. But there was, I should say, a general agreement among my informants that something far more significant than such a normal reaction has occurred. This has already been suggested in the case of the students by what I have said, and I think it is obviously true of both devout Protestants and devout Catholics. It is doubtful if the professors as a class have become very much more hostile than they were a year or two ago, because their position was probably already definitively established at an earlier date. I think there is little doubt that the wealthier peasants and the peasant proprietors generally have also become much more hostile in the past year, and my informants were very emphatic that that is also true of the small shopkeeping class and similar people. Once more I think it is fair to say that nobody knows much about the working man. On the other hand, some people say that the 'Kraft durch Freude' activities are having a considerable effect upon large numbers of people who are about

at the level where middle class and proletariat meet.

If one were to average the opinions of all my informants, opinions which on the whole are not widely divergent, I think the upshot would be that three or four years ago a considerable majority of Germans were at least somewhat favorable to the Nazi regime, and that generally the German people could have been divided into three large classes: the strong partisans of the government, the strong opponents, and the rest. Today my informants believe that there are only two large classes, the strong adherents of Hitler and the strong opponents, the adherents making hardly a third of the population, the strong opponents more than half. Of course, I have no independent means of knowing whether my informants are anywhere near right in their quantitative estimates. When one thinks of the different opinions honestly held about the outcome of a presidential election in the United States, it is clear that very little importance attaches to guesses of this kind. But I should like to say at this point that I found myself more and more convinced as I talked with more and more people that there has been for something over a year a strong trend away from Hitler.

Naturally there was a good deal of talk about what is coming. The general opinion is that the Nazis will remain in power for a long time and the only hope is an evolution within the party. But further, I was repeatedly told that decent men find it quite impossible to enter the party, not merely because of their dislike of its policies, but also because of the dishonesty, stupidity, violence and ignorance that are everywhere present. In this connection certain other remarks about Hitler are much to the point. I was told that one of Hitler's most unfortunate virtues is loyalty to his

old associates. Now, of course, the type that is qualified to make a revolution is very far from the type that is qualified to rebuild. So it has come about that he is surrounded chiefly and the party in general is made up of people who are not only inferior in intelligence and ability but who have the wrong kind of temperament and the wrong kind of ability for the work now in hand. In this way, it was said, a vicious circle has been set up. Evolution within the party toward a better and wiser policy of government is the only hope for improving conditions, and the very nature of the party makes impossible the recruitment of the kind of people who could bring about such a healthy evolution.

By this time it must be clear that my informants were generally pretty well all of one kind and that my information is one-sided. I feel this restriction on the significance of what I am putting down very keenly and have no doubt that the people with whom I talked are in no sense a fair sample of the German population. But, as I said in the beginning, they were selected not because of their political views but because of the fact that I had access to them either on business or through professional connections or through old personal associations. Therefore, I think their substantial unanimity of some importance.

There has been talk recently of the beginnings of malnutrition in Germany. One man whom I know well and trust, who is the head of a big clinic in one of the poor quarters of Berlin, told me clearly and emphatically that there are as yet no signs of malnutrition in his hospital. Personally I regard this one piece of evidence as decisive. However, I can well believe from other things that were said that Germany is very close to the line in this respect.

During my stay in Berlin I heard "Heil Hitler" as a form of greeting very rarely indeed, either on the streets or in shops, and I saw no sign of admiration of brown shirts. On the other hand, when the guard marched up and down Unter den Linden it was followed by large and enthusiastic crowds. I should think there can be no doubt that the army is immensely popular today, and, so far as my observation is of any value, the attitude of the public to the Nazis in uniform supports what my informants told me. I had the impression, although it is not clearly supported by anything that I can now remember that was said to me, that a considerable factor in all this is the old, traditional admiration of Germans generally for thoroughness and efficiency. To all appearances the army is as good as ever and however it may be with the civil servants, the ordinary run of members of the Nazi party are, I should think, pretty conspicuously lacking in these qualities. Indeed, I now remember that I was told over and over again that the Nazis are uneducated people, and in addition to the remark that people of the officer kind are ruled by people of the unteroffiziere kind, it was repeatedly said that education is in the hands of people of the volkschullehrer kind. This is equivalent to saying that ignorant, meddlesome, conceited busybodies are very widely in power.

I was told over and over again that nobody in Germany wants war and only once heard anything to the contrary, when in a company of five or six people a student remarked that the story was going about that so and so, an important man in the Nazi party, had said that the four year plan would have no sense if it were not a preparation for war (war a l'echeance as the French say). Nobody else agreed that this remark was to be taken seriously, but I am confident that there is a good deal of wishful thinking in the unanimous opinion of my informants, and of course they know that they are individually and collectively unable to do anything about it. In this respect I fear that my informants do protest too much, not dishonestly, indeed, but wishfully.

Perhaps it will be interesting to put down the two extreme prophecies that I heard about the future. The first represents the point of view of some of the more determined and courageous pastors of the Protestant church and is substantially as follows: "The struggle between the government and the Protestant church will continue, and bids fair to be more serious in the immediate future than it has been in the past. (This prophecy has been fulfilled already.) The government will use every means, honest and dishonest." At this point one of my informants illustrated the methods of the government by turning to a daily newspaper lying on his table and showing me the government statement issued the day before that seven or eight pastors had just been arrested. He then added that the number arrested on that previous day was not seven or eight but forty-five. "The government disposes of all the force and has nearly every other advantage. However, we have one advantage. Our aim is a single one and it will never change. The government has many changing aims. Therefore, we shall finally win, but it will probably be my grandchildren who will take part in the victory. Meanwhile there will be much persecution and suffering, but in the history of the Christian church that has often happened and we Christians have learned that the fate of the individual is nothing compared with a principle."

The second prophecy to which I have referred was given me by a German now no longer in Germany, a few days after I had left the country. In his opinion the army could overthrow the government at any moment without difficulty, or with relatively little difficulty, if a few preparations were skillfully made. Secondly, the higher officers of the army despise the Nazis in general and dislike the present regime. Thirdly, the dominant sentiment in the army that prevents immediate action is the old tradition not to mix

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in politics and above all not to put the army in the position of being responsible for a coup d'etat, let alone a revolution. Accordingly, what will happen is this. The army will wait until the time shall come when in some way or other trouble arises that calls for intervention. Such trouble is not far off, perhaps a year off, perhaps 10, but not longer. Then, the army, being in duty bound to intervene, will put back into power throughout the country the old fashioned, efficient, highly educated, well trained kind of civil servants, and there will be a return to honesty and decency in national life.

It is a striking fact that nobody in Germany expressed such an opinion as this. I may perhaps comment on it to this extent. Some of the elements out of which the theory is constructed are obviously true and correspond to relatively permanent factors in Germany, but the combination, especially in the more elaborate form in which it was stated to me, is far too elaborate to satisfy me, at least.

\* \* \* \* \*

Having now set down, so far as I can remember them, the more significant things said to me while I was in Germany, I shall try to draw a few conclusions.

I am satisfied that there is a deep cleavage in Germany, and that on the whole there are relatively few people (relatively, that is to say, to the numbers in England or the United States) who are neither ardently favorable to the government nor ardently hostile. I think there can be little doubt that for a clear majority the question of where they stand politically is as important as any other question. In other words, the cleavage is real and it is significant day in and day out for most people, and constantly

in their minds. Moreover, in a measure, anyone who is on their side politically is a friend, anyone on the other side an enemy. The cleavage goes right down into families and divides them. (If I am not mistaken, one could find similar remarks about similar circumstances in Thucydides.) So far I am in agreement with my informants.

I also feel confident that the trend has been for the past year in the direction that they describe. But when the question is made quantitative I feel myself, on the one hand, quite incompetent to make a precise estimate and, on the other hand, sceptical of the statements that were made to me. I am inclined to guess, however, that there are at least half as many people definitively hostile to the government as my informants thought. In other words, I think it very safe indeed to say that more than one-quarter of the German population are strongly and definitively hostile to the present regime (in plain English they hate it) and that the number of these people is increasing. Secondly, I am bound to say that it seems to me unlikely that more than about one-third of the population are strongly favorable, for otherwise I think I should have seen more signs of support of the government. Accordingly, I suspect that the number of people who remain relatively non-partisan is greater than I was told. My reasons for this guess had better be indicated. Nearly everyone whom I saw has had the old fashioned German higher education, and among them there is a prevalent tendency to an overintellectual attitude. Moreover, Germans are at least as emotional as other people and they have been subjected to violent provocations to an emotional attitude for many years. I have the feeling that at least most of my informants are really incapable of imagining

an attitude of indifference as a normal attitude under existing circumstances, and yet it seems to me probable that there must be thousands of little people in Germany who are very much more concerned with their own everyday affairs than with considerations of national politics. Moreover, intellectuals tend to forget how many people live merely from day to day with a feeling of reasonable satisfaction when a day passes with reasonable comfort. Of course, when things get bad enough that is no longer the case, but as I have said there is no evidence of malnutrition in Berlin, and the sufferings of the Germans today are what may be described as moral and spiritual rather than physical. I should think that today the amount of physical pain in Germany as in other countries that arises from disease is a hundredfold greater than the physical suffering that may be directly or indirectly of political origin. The truth is that only one remark that I heard while I was in Germany implies a tendency to look at the phenomena with cold objectivity. This remark was made by perhaps the most distinguished of all the persons with whom I talked. It was elicited by my statement that I hoped to understand and did not wish to criticize or to form moral judgments. The reply was something like this. Perhaps after all what has been happening in Germany in the last few years is a process which, apart from its details, was inevitable and determined independently of the plans or ideas or wishes of any single group of individuals. Perhaps, in short, it is the working out of a political, social and economic process, already in many respects determined by forces that were present before Hitler came into power. Now that I have put these words down I realize that they are my own and that something less was said to me. In short, this is my interpretation of the opinion behind what was said, but I think it tolerably correct as an inter-

pretation, and it was, as I have said, the only sign of a really objective point of view that I noticed.

This remark implies another. My informants are, upon the whole, judging moralistically. Now I think there can be no doubt that many of the things done by the present government in Germany, while certainly open to condemnation on any moral grounds that I should be willing to accept, have produced and continue to produce results which are in part useful and not infrequently necessary to the well-being of the country. In cases of this kind the disapproval of intellectuals, however strong, may mean very little. In any case it should be taken with the utmost caution. If there were evidence that anybody in the present government except Schacht is capable of a really mechanistic and objective attitude toward the problems that he has to solve, I should attach very great importance indeed to this remark, and should be tempted to reject much more of what I was told than I do reject. But, as I have said, the evidence is that beyond a certain narrow range Hitler is sometimes even less capable of objectivity than his enemies the intellectuals, and I think that, on the whole, one may take it that there is very little Machiavellian planning in the present government. That is not to say, however, that there is a dearth of selfish, unscrupulous trickery.

I conclude with an opinion that is something more than a guess: In method as distinguished from purpose the great weakness of Nazi policy within Germany is the failure to utilize and to exploit systematically many of the strong sentiments that widely exist in the population rather than to attack them, and try to change them; for many cannot be changed but are activated and strengthened by persecution.

August 11, 1937

August 26, 1937

P.F.

Dear Mr. President:

The situation in Europe is such that American action as to Far East tyranny in connection with England would not start Germany into her war scheme, even if Mussolini were ready. Foodstuffs and trained young soldiers make the problem. You know foodstuffs are short and must be another year. It will take two years more to have enough trained soldiers. The leading generals have opposed aggressive action since January 1936

and some of them Frisco, for example, insist on Stalin's leaving the Churches alone. This religious situation, and that many people talk of a revolt if aggressive war were started. There are then three reasons for democratic peoples to co-operate to save themselves the next two years. Therefore I would, in your position, press wiser-wiser England (the Govt.) to join us in pressure upon Japan, even to send American-British navies across the Pacific. Later Germany and Italy might act together if this were done - now they would not move, even if they advised Japan to annex China.

Russia is in such a critical position at home that she can't act alone to save China alone. If Russia acted alone to keep Japan off the long, rich region in north

China which they intend to seize and fortify,  
Germany and Italy would be far more  
apt to act in the Black Sea region. So, it  
seems to me that just <sup>now</sup> our Govt, England  
and France, with Holland navy in Far East, can  
with co-operation of Russia and save the situa-  
tion. Certainly if this dictatorial system  
goes on two more years unchecked,  
as in Ethiopia, Spain and now China, a  
combination of democratic (near democratic)  
states may <sup>not</sup> save themselves. I am tak-  
ing this liberty to write you because  
I know we have the same ideals and  
because I have watched and studied  
things in Berlin four sad years.  
All representatives of democratic coun-  
tries in Berlin have again and  
again said: "the United States is the only  
nation that can save our civilization"

Yours Sincerely,  
William E. Dodd

In haste

file -  
private

Sept. 16, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

One thing I failed to mention about international: if our country can not halt Japan, democracy in our world is going to be in grave danger in 1938. Our interests are at stake and English-French relations are such that nothing will be done without our positive help

Yours Sincerely

William E. Dodd

file  
private

DSF: Todd  
[unclear]  
[unclear]  
[unclear]  
[unclear]  
[unclear]

Sept. 18, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

I have read with greatest <sup>interest</sup> every paragraph of your address on the constitution and the situation of our country to-day. No one could have stated the basic facts better and I hope you can repeat this address with certain additions in the Middle and Far West. Our people need to have this analysis presented to them by the President. There is no reply; because you are right as to every point made. The newspaper people and such men as

Burser and Wheeler seek, purposely or under pressure, minority control like the slaveholders did in nearly all southern states when Jefferson pressed for gradual abolition to avoid a civil war. Those minority people (and my grandfathers were slaveholders) wrecked themselves and came within an ~~it~~ inch of wrecking the Union of States - such able states rights men as Lee reluctantly taking up arms for slavery. But I must not say more to so busy a man.

I am sending a newspaper report of your address to Mrs. Dodd with the request to show it to our

Service people in Berlin. They will all be interested, practically everybody on our staff there - clerks as well - being sympathetic with your great programme. I am speaking at Richmond, Raleigh, Chapel Hill and The University of Virginia next week-end. What I said yesterday about historic minority blunders and damages to our country at Washington and Lee held an audience of 2000 for an hour and such applause at the end I have only once in my life (Berlin Oct. 1933) received. The people are really interested. The President of W. & L. was entirely with me and spoke most highly of you and your difficult work.

I plan to sail on Oct 8 from Norfolk.  
All good wishes. Yours Sincerely  
William E. Dodd

PSF: Dodd

file  
Dodd  
(5) answer 2-37

October 10, 1937

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose a letter to the President which I wish you would hand to him. I hope the President can read my poor hand-writing. I need not say to you I have never had a fourth so much letter-writing in my life, as during my leave this year: ten to fifteen letters and telegrams each day, only two criticizing what I said about the Nuremberg affair, one undiged, I have been surprised.

You probably know I am no millionaire diplomat, so must write my letters by hand, except in Berlin where I hope not be reported to the Führer -

Yours Truly  
William E. Dodd

PSF; Jodd

full  
plus on

October 10, 1937

Dear Mr. President:

Two things I venture to  
mention to you:

1. Your address in Chicago was most national and appropriate in the present state of the world. It has already had great effect. Those arbitrary leaders think if the United States keeps out of things, they will in a few years dominate the whole world, also our economic relations. The present year and next are the most

promising for democracy if it is  
to survive - and our people would  
wage a terrible struggle to save their  
historic ideals, much as they have  
been abused. I am very glad you  
made your international purpose clear.

<sup>this</sup>  
v. <sup>2</sup> of less importance because you  
know public opinion so much  
better than I can know it. How-  
ever, I lectured frankly before six  
Virginia - Carolina University au-  
diences the last ten days of Sep-  
tember - the largest audiences I ever  
addressed. I dealt fundamentally  
with the problems now before us,  
even the modern world; and both  
for professors and students (many  
visitors too) were everywhere deeply

interested and showed full agreement. Richmond, Virginia, insisted on 20 minutes radio. I agreed if they took first 20 minutes. But, without any information to me, they kept me on radio more than an hour. Associated Press made careful report, but no newspapers carried. However, President Beaufort and others have written enthusiastic endorsements. Washington and Lee and the University of North Carolina have shown similar interest and enthusiasm. There is no doubt of your support by these peoples - though senators are opposed. I alluded to Bailey, not by name, and the Raleigh audience applauded and he has published an explanation which was sent me. I can't help believing that University people all over South and West are with you, even when differences of opinion sometimes are given.

I have been so crowded this vacation that I asked for extension of leave; and I sail ~~on~~ on the Washington October 20. Sometime about January 1, I would like to spend three or four days in London to learn (from really informed people) just what that Government intends to do. I shall of course cable you any special information. In case you have any special instructions to give me let me know, and I will drive down to the White House. All cordial regards

Yours Sincerely  
William E. Dodd

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Secretary

House

Washington

D.C.



Sad news from  
Brussels this A.M.  
J.P. van Zeland is  
5 times stronger  
than the opposition.

UNITED STATES LINES

On Board S.S. Oct. 26, 1937file  
personal

1141

Dear Mr. President:

Two things I venture to call your attention to: The German attacks upon me about my not attending Nürnberg propaganda shows against democratic peoples and our Blücher palace matter.

1. All representatives of democratic countries in Berlin in August 1933 declined invitations to the Nürnberg party show: England, France, the United States and the smaller democracies. The reasons

were that we did not wish to be embarrassed. And I gave three illustrations of Washington's, Madison's and Cleveland's attitudes. They asked the recall of ministers who took part in partisan performances and their requests were promptly agreed to.

But in 1935 and 1936 the smaller democracies - Switzerland, Holland and others ordered their ministers to attend because of threats to their governments. I did not agree to go to Nürnberg, also English and French Ambassadors, <sup>agreed</sup> leading speakers attacked democracies everywhere and classed them with communism of Russia.

This did not weaken my attitude. When asked last July whether I would join the new British Ambassador, I answered that my country's attitude had not changed and that I could not participate in propaganda shows. I wrote my reasons, highly confidential, to Secretary Hull. Some way the letter was shown to journalists (Hull insisted that he could not see how this was done) and it was published in New York newspapers Sept. 4. The Germans at once attacked me in Berlin. I think a German spy did the thing. The Embassy in Washington made protests to Department of State. Yet Dieckhoff understood my attitude in 1933 and von Neunath agreed entirely in 1936. I wish you would let Dieckhoff know how you feel about such <sup>when you see him</sup> performance.

2. A group of our Govt. people under

Hoover went to Berlin and bought the Blücher palace, not a suitable place because of spy system, for \$75,000. Somehow a corporation was organized, all names absolutely secret, and it received \$1,750,000 for the palace - even against the advice of Hoover's Ambassador. Later there was a fire. It became a dangerous structure. I and others of our staff had to pay insurance against dangers. I made arrangement in 1936 for getting a new building on suitable place, without any cost to us. Messersmith approved the exchange. It would have saved us \$60,000 a year rents + c. The Department favored, but was blocked. I tried again but received no encouragement. This seems to me a disgrace. Can't you have this corrected? Yours sincerely  
William E. Dodd

Berlin, November 23, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

I have a letter from the University of North Carolina indicating that Ambassador Josephus Daniels is managing a big anniversary meeting at Chapel Hill, and the man in charge has asked me if I would drop you a note and say that they are very anxious to have you make an address on the occasion, which will be next May. Perhaps you have heard from them already.

This is a conference of North Carolinians greatly interested in political affairs before which I made an address last September. I have the feeling that it would be a very useful thing if you could possibly accept their invitation. Public opinion, as revealed in North Carolina at the time I was there, especially at the University and also at Raleigh, is very much more up-to-date than it used to be and very sympathetic with your efforts to readjust the affairs of our country. People showed also a great interest in international affairs. I am therefore writing you as per the request I have just received.

With all regards,

Sincerely yours,

*William E. Dodd*

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

PSF: Dodd

Berlin, November 29, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

You have very kindly thanked me for my book, which I am afraid you will never have time to read, though there are some conclusions in the book that ought to be worthwhile.

I might say that in the winter of 1935, a day or two after the Senate on such a minority vote rejected your recommendation of accepting the World Court at the Hague, I offered my resignation in a formal letter to Judge Moore. He and Secretary Hull discussed it and seemed not to agree with me. Perhaps they did not even mention it to you. The reason I offered my resignation then was purely domestic. The men who drafted our Constitution did not intend that a minority of Senators should always be able to defeat the majority and the President on matters of foreign policy. I cannot take your time now to give you various evidences of this - the minority definition in the Constitution was intended to apply to four great States which had a majority of the popular vote, i.e., Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina. We should probably have missed the Constitution if this concession to the majority had been denied. But almost from the beginning Senators have seemed to think the purpose was to allow a minority of the Senate to defeat anything in international matters that they wish.

If my resignation had been accepted I would have spoken to various audiences in the country and made the point

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

clear and perhaps might have rendered some service to you and to our Government, in which so many individuals seem to think they can get a few fellows together and do what they want. I had the feeling that one's duty might sometimes be even to give up an important position in order to render assistance; and when I had luncheon with the Foreign Relations Committee one day, two outstanding men who voted with the minority crowd confessed their shame; and those two votes would have made your recommendations successful.

Later on, as it proved impossible to get any treaty relations here and as one's work, strenuous as it was, almost invariably proved unsuccessful, I felt that I ought not to stay much longer and therefore offered my resignation last spring, and Judge Moore must have presented it to you. I am not so sure that diplomats are worth anything like what they cost our country. When I see how many Ambassadors we have and how little they can actually do, it seems something of a waste to continue them in service. The whole of Europe is almost immovable, the possible exception being the little countries that can not do anything, or possibly even England - and yet we have very expensive services, very expensive Ambassadors at many posts. I read Mr. Messersmith's famous report on what was wasted in Paris, and I learned that nothing was ever done. There seems to me to be a group of men in the Department who do not undertake to listen to any advice that may come to them. Nothing proves this better than the treatment of our urgent recommendations to exchange the Blücher Palais for a suitable Embassy which the Germans were ready to give, especially through the year 1936. We have lost about \$60,000 a year ever since I have been here

on this matter. The report of the last expert here states that a company was organized when the Blücher Palais was bought and that their names were all kept absolutely secret. This company bought the Palais for \$75,000 and sold it to our Government for \$1,750,000. I have not been able to learn the name of a single man in that company, and I might add that it was immediately dissolved when the contract was duly recorded. If the waste in London and Paris and this sort of extravagance does not mean anything to departmental administrators, I can hardly see how we can avoid a great waste of the common man's money. The last point I take the liberty of mentioning to you was the urgent and pressing desire of one of the richest men in the United States to be Ambassador to Berlin. From all I was able to learn from our service men who really work, the service of such a man would have been very distasteful and would have led to the requests of several people to be transferred. It had been my expectation to retire September 1, but you agreed with me to the extent of delaying the appointment which was demanded of you and by asking me if I would not return to Berlin and remain some months. Therefore, I naturally did what you wished. As my wife had to rent our house or be compelled to live at the Esplanade Hotel the rest of our residence here, there was nothing to do but make the contract again for a year. The only limitation of this was to be found in the fact that all our contracts have a three-months' notice clause. Consequently, I could retire after being here and giving three months' notice. While this has not embarrassed me as much as I thought it would, I do not like to be considered as ignoring my promises; and Mr. Panofsky, who is in grave trouble and has been for two years, is very anxious to rent his house to the next Ambassador from our country. If that cannot be done, Panofsky is in grave danger of having his \$500,000 house practically taken away from him,

especially as he is trying to migrate to some other nation. He will not only lose nine-tenths of the money he would get for the house, but he will also lose more than nine-tenths of the bank of which he has been president for a long time and which his family has managed for over 100 years. If our next Ambassador could rent the house and pay him American dollars in London, he would at least be able to support his family. I can hardly doubt that the Department would be willing to have this done if the Ambassador wished to cooperate.

When I discussed with you the appointment of Professor James T. Shotwell, I had two objectives in mind. One of them was that he understood European affairs, as revealed in his exceedingly interesting volumes, better than almost any man in our country. I thought, therefore, that his appointment would not only interest you, but that even the service men in the Department would not be able to make any serious objection. The other reason I acted upon is that Shotwell is so well and favorably known all over the United States, especially in the greater university circles, that it would be an advantage to appoint him. I had noticed how frequently he had lectured to large audiences throughout the country, and had also noticed that he approved almost everything you have endeavored to do for our democratic cause. It seemed to me, therefore, that his appointment would add very considerable influence to your regime. Nothing seems more necessary in the United States than to have our universities appreciate the real problems before us, especially in international affairs. I mention this again to you because I feel considerably disappointed. There is no other post in Europe where Shotwell could render such a good service. I have the feeling that somebody in the Department has made positive opposition to such an appointment.

I have taken a good deal of your time; but I hope you have been able to read what I have said. I certainly am grateful for the kindnesses you have shown me during my residence here, as well as on my visits to the United States. The last day that William and I spent with you was certainly a very revealing one as to your objectives in life.

Sincerely yours,

William E. Dodd

PSF: Dodd

December 14, 1937.

My dear Dodd:

Thank you for your note of November twenty-third. I hope much to be able to go to the University of North Carolina and will do so if it is at all possible when the time comes.

Yours of the twenty-ninth has just come and I don't need to tell you that I have fully understood your house rent problem, but as you also know things came to a head because of the German foreign office.

When you get back, of course, I will explain to you more fully. You are right about Shotwell and I hope much that I can send him in Europe where he will be definitely useful.

Very sincerely yours,

Honorable William E. Dodd,  
Ambassador to Germany,  
American Embassy,  
Berlin, Germany.

FDR/dj

R.F.

Berlin, December 23, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

Your most interesting letter of December 14 just received. It certainly would be, in my opinion, a great advantage if Professor Shotwell could be appointed to one of the vacancies in Europe. I thought Berlin would be the best place because of his knowledge of German and also because of his thorough acquaintance of European affairs, as revealed in his books. However, I know you have political complications and shall understand whatever you are able to do.

As to your remarks about the possible attitude of the Foreign Office here, I am a little surprised. Their objections to what was reported to have been a speech of mine September 4 was supposed to have been entirely settled about that time. Secretary Hull did not intimate to me any difficulties, especially when he realized that a confidential letter had been slipped out of the State Department and made use of in such a dishonorable way. However, comment which I hear from many people in the Service indicates great distrust of one of the higher officials in the Department. There is a general belief that he was the cause of these difficulties. Personally, I do not know anything about him; but the marvellously incorrect address which he delivered about a month ago in Washington on the subject of Latin-American countries suggests a great deal. The greatest authority we have on Latin-American affairs says there is no such thing as democracy in any of the Latin-American

The President  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

countries. A book of his which came out something over a year ago gives conclusive evidence. Consequently, I was surprised to see that a high official could make such an address as was reported to us here in the Paris HERALD.

I shall be arriving in Washington sometime about the eighth or ninth of January, dependent upon whether we have too many storms on the Atlantic. When I arrive in Washington I would like very much to have opportunity of talking with you about the somewhat changed European situation. You seem to me to have the overwhelming support of our people, and I hope something can be done that will tend to make an end of warfare.

My address will be the Cosmos Club during my residence in Washington.

Although it is too late, I wish to express our very best wishes for a Happy Christmas.

Sincerely yours,

*William E. Dodd*

January 22, 1938.

Dear Mr. President:

Just a note: it will cost you less time than a visit.

One thing our country ought never to do: send its representative in Berlin to those Nurnberg shows. First these meetings are the greatest propaganda performances Europe has ever pulled off. Hundreds of thousands of German soldiers and Hitler youth are paraded a week with all kinds of army performances. They try to scare Europe. The speeches by Hitler, Goebbels and Rosenberg denounce and ridicule democracies. This has been done in most offensive manner the last two years. Never before has any country tried to compel diplomats to attend such performances.

In August 1933 I looked into the matter and studied ~~our~~ own performances. We invite diplomats to attend conventions but never compel them to do so. Washington sent the French Minister home when he began his career by partisan and propoganda work in Charleston. Madison asked English minister's recall when he attended a purely partisan meeting in Boston (taking part himself) and Cleveland asked the resignation of the British Ambassador in 1888 because he had written a letter to a California friend asking him to vote for Cleveland. The letter was published. These facts seemed to me to show plainly that I should not attend a propoganda meeting in Nurnberg. I explained to von Neurath and he agreed entirely. Representatives of all other democratic countries took the same view and declined invitations. In 1936 coercive pressure was put on smaller governments to send their representatives; and several attended to hear democracies compared with communism in worst sense. The Minister from Holland refused to go and Hitler indirectly caused his recall -- a very able Hollander now minister in London. In 1937 pressure was applied directly by Hitler to the representatives of England, France and the United States. The

The President  
The White House.

The Englishman surrendered. I declined to attend but had already bought my ticket to Norfolk. You know what happened. Everybody but the Norway Minister attended. The attacks on other countries quite as bad as in 1936.

These are the facts. Hitler thinks himself powerful enough to do such things and he has actually scared France and England. Has he scared our country. From the hundreds of letters and telegrams I received last September, when attacked by the Germans, I can not avoid the conviction that our country is nine to one, or even more, against attending Nurnberg propaganda and threatening meetings. If I were in your difficult position, I would say to our Ambassador: "Do not attend".

Yours sincerely,

Jan. 22, 1938

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Yours Sincerely  
William E. Dodd

PSF:Jedg

*file  
president*



THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 25, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the enclosed letter from Dr. Dodd to you about attending the last Nürnberg conference, I think you will recall the governing circumstances. In the first place, the British, the French, and the representatives of all other nations well enough physically to be present, with the exception of Russia alone, felt constrained in the circumstances to accept an invitation of the Government, not of an unofficial political organization, and attend. I doubt if we would have gotten far in combating Nazism merely by falling back in company with the Soviet alone in this connection. It was stated on every hand that such attendance involved no political significance either pro or con.

What I am saying is not intended in mitigation of anything Dr. Dodd says about the merits of Nazism and the methods of combating it. If this visit by the representatives of all the nations some months ago has revealed abuses and disagreeable acts and utterances on

the part

the part of the German officials to the extent Dr. Dodd believes occurred, this ought to make it easily possible for Great Britain, France and all of our countries and their Foreign Offices back at home further to consider and maybe revise the position which they felt constrained to take in connection with the last Nürnberg meeting. In any event, I shall be interested in having the entire matter carefully examined.

The letter of Dr. Dodd is herewith returned.

*True*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1938.

Dear Mr. President:

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Yours sincerely,

William E. Dodd

x Only one opposing;  
and of the hundreds  
received since Jan. 9,  
only two