

● PSF

Great Britain

1937-38

LONDON, January 5, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

I was of course eager to see you and to go home, but I know I need not assure you that I am not only willing but eager to carry out your wishes in this or in any other matter.

So far as the internal situation here is concerned, the British have passed through their dynastic crisis successfully. I have no doubt they are much better off for the present and for the future than would have been possible under the previous régime. The present King is the most stable and reliable of the four brothers and the young Queen is all they could wish for in character and fitness for her position. Her parents were near neighbors of mine during the years when I spent the shooting seasons in Scotland and we are old friends. Indeed, I have known the whole family well for a long time.

The President,

The

The White House,

Washington, D. C.

The Duke of Windsor was surrounded by ^apro-German cabal and many people here suspected that Mrs. Simpson was actually in German pay. I think this is unlikely and that her strong pro-German attitude was the result of flattering propaganda. However, the whole crowd has been cleared out. The Court has become respectable again, and the situation from the dynastic end is immeasurably improved.

My wife is sailing on the AQUITANIA tomorrow to look after some family matters, especially one happy event of great importance since we are expecting a new grandchild this month.

As she is going to Washington, I have asked her to deliver this letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, for delivery to you, and also another letter which I am preparing and expect to finish today dealing with the general situation here.

I know you need no advice from me or anyone on this subject, but I cannot refrain from telling you how vitally necessary I believe a wide measure of discretion is for you in dealing with the question of neutrality. When you last discussed this subject with me, you told me of your statement to a group of Congressmen suggesting the possibility of a hostile landing, for example by the Japanese on Canadian or Mexican territory. That should have been

enough

enough, it seems to me, to convince any reasonable person with any knowledge of the subject. The recent situation in Spain perhaps may be regarded as fortunate since it may have clarified the basic necessities of neutrality legislation to some of those whose minds were still in a fog on the subject. Fundamentally, it is impossible to anticipate and to provide for all the contingencies which might arise. This being true, I have no doubt the widest possible latitude should be left to the discretion of the President.

Anthony Eden committed himself definitely to me more than a year ago on the subject of a trade agreement between our country and Great Britain. Mr. Baldwin committed himself on principle several months ago and told me of an announcement which he would make and did make at the Lord Mayor's banquet early in November. Quite recently, I have sent over a report of a conference I had with Walter Runciman, who for the first time definitely committed himself to the principle of an agreement along the lines of your agreement with Canada. This statement would not have come from Runciman without the approval of the financial and commercial influences in the Government, which had hitherto been holding out on us, so that this marks concrete progress towards some form of trade agreement.

In

In addition, both in and out of the Government, these people are becoming more and more anxious about the debt situation, but their financial element still hopes for a proposal from you instead of taking advantage of the opportunity you have given them to go to you. In the end, in my judgement, they will go to you with some form of proposal, especially if their outlook becomes darker, as it well may.

The spirit of peace and concord which you have created in the whole Western Hemisphere is really the one bright and shining light in an otherwise dark and unhappy world.

With every good wish for you and Mrs. Roosevelt,

As ever,

Sincerely yours,

Robert W. Bingham

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1937

~~Confidential~~

✓
G.H.
1-27

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The British Ambassador advises the State Department that he has received cables from his Government, reporting that the British press has treated the Runciman visit with too much optimism.

The Foreign Office in London suggests to the Ambassador that the British Embassy in Washington and the State Department collaborate in a move to reduce this optimism. The Ambassador received the following statement from his Foreign Office -- evidently a formula for the statement the Foreign Office desires the Embassy to make and which probably will be made by the Embassy tomorrow:

"Talks have been of a general character and further discussions will be necessary before it can be determined whether there is a suitable basis for trade negotiations."

This statement is approved by the State Department, Assistant Secretary Sayre advises me, and the State Department plans to issue a similar statement tomorrow.

This is for your guidance at the press conference this afternoon. If you say anything to the press, please remember not to use the language of the British statement.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSE: G.B.
7/6/2/37

May?
April 28, 1937. [5-28-37?]

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I have read the enclosed eleven pages with great interest and can have no possible objection to their delivery to the British Ambassador. They are completely pious -- I can think of no other characteristic.

F. D. R.

x20
x21
x48
x394
x1561

Reference is made to a memorandum communicated to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Financial Counselor of the British Embassy here, about March 30, last. Also draft of reply to be made by Secretary of State to Mr. Chamberlain's memorandum to be handed to British Ambassador to be communicated to (over)

file personal
Great Britain
PSE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1937

My dear Mr. President:

You will remember that in response to an oral inquiry on the part of the Secretary of the Treasury, communicated to him by the Financial Counselor of the British Embassy here, Mr. Chamberlain sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury about March 30 last. The original of this memorandum is in the possession of the Secretary of the Treasury and I understand that you have read it. In the belief that you may not have a copy in your own files, I am enclosing a copy thereof in the event that you want to refer to it.

The Secretary of State believes that the reply to be made by this Government to Mr. Chamberlain's memorandum should be in the form of an informal memorandum to be handed to the British Ambassador here with the request that the latter see that it is communicated to Mr. Chamberlain.

Before Secretary Hull left the Department last week,

The President,


The White House.

he went over the general outline of our reply which has now been placed in final form and which I submit herewith for your approval. I have gone over it personally with the Secretary of the Treasury who tells me that he would prefer not to make any observations with regard thereto because of his feeling that the matters discussed in the suggested memorandum are outside of the scope of his jurisdiction. He does feel, however, that the reply should be made in the manner indicated.

I shall appreciate it if you will let me know whether the suggested reply meets with your approval and in that event, I shall hand it at once to the British Ambassador for transmission to Mr. Chamberlain.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



5-28-37

MEMORANDUM

The message recently transmitted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Secretary of the Treasury has been read with interest. The confidence shown by Mr. Chamberlain in thus communicating his appraisal of the international outlook as seen by the British Government and his observations in regard to the bearing of various policies of this country upon that situation are greatly appreciated.

Deeply concerned over the absence of a trustworthy basis in international relations and the presence of a constant menace to peace, this Government has been doing its utmost to formulate and to bring about effective application of a program which might serve to bring countries together on a more satisfactory basis than that which now obtains. If this Government emphasizes somewhat more than does Mr. Chamberlain the economic aspect

of the matters which he discusses, it does so because it genuinely believes that if trade relations between nations can be broadened on lines and under conditions where it serves to advance economic welfare, existing political tensions would be thereby eased.

We therefore welcome the affirmation of Mr. Chamberlain that, although he believes that certain political ambitions lie at the root of the economic difficulties in Europe, he recognizes the advisability of trying all practicable means to ease the economic position. We realize that because of the intertwining of economic and political aspects of the present-day situation the British Government feels that it must at all stages keep its actions in the two fields closely related to each other.

This Government welcomes and of course wholly agrees with Mr. Chamberlain's statement as regards the far-reaching effects that would follow the conclusion of a commercial agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. In its reply to the British Government's memorandum of April 13, the Government of the United

States gave full indication of its willingness to examine every feasible possibility of arriving at satisfactory terms for such an agreement. This Government believes that it is wholly within the range of practical possibilities to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement between the two countries of such a character as would have a most beneficial effect upon Anglo-American trade and would, at the same time, serve as a model of the type of contractual arrangements among nations that can and will make for stable and prosperous trade conditions. This Government is convinced that the memorandum transmitted by it to the British Government on May 18 provides a fair and feasible basis for such an agreement.

In this general field we see an opportunity for the two Governments to work together without delay in making a constructive move toward world peace, and nothing is of more paramount urgency at this stage.

With regard to the situation in the Far East, we concur in the opinion that orderly stability is desirable

and we believe that measures which may be expected to contribute toward ensuring harmonious cooperation for the protection and development of the interests of all the powers concerned in that area should be sought, and, when and where discovered, be given support.

There are various matters in and with regard to the Far East in relation to which rights and obligations of the United States and those of Great Britain are alike; also, various matters in relation to which the interests, concerns and objectives of the two countries have many aspects in common. The principles of policy of the two countries are expressed in the Washington Conference treaties, most of which treaties we regard as being still legally in effect. One of the most important of those principles is that of equality of commercial opportunity. That principle has always had and continues to have this Government's hearty support.

In the event of resort by any country or countries to measures of aggression in the Far East, we would expect

to endeavor to afford within the limits of our general policy appropriate protection to our legitimate interests, but we are not, as we assume the British Government would not be, in position to state in advance what methods of protection this country would employ. It is the traditional policy of this country not to enter into those types of agreement which constitute or which suggest alliance. We feel that the governments principally interested in the Far East should endeavor constantly to exercise a wholesome and restraining influence toward conserving and safeguarding the rights and interests of all concerned, and toward preventing friction and development of tensions. We believe that consultation between and among the powers most interested, followed by procedure on parallel lines and concurrently, tends to promote the effectiveness of such efforts. As regards impairments or threatened impairments in the Far East of common or similar interests of the United States and of Great Britain, we shall continue earnestly to desire that there may be

found satisfactory means for collaboration as in the past between our two Governments.

We note the statement that in the opinion of the British Government there are signs that Japan may realize that the recent trend of its policy has not been to its advantage and that Japan is contemplating a change in the direction of better cooperation with her neighbors in the Far East and with the powers which have great interests there. It appears to us that developments within and among the principal countries of the Far East are producing a trend toward or favorable to stabilization of the general situation there. We feel that with regard to Japan and China there are now actively at work within and between those two countries forces operating in the direction of peace. We are not oblivious to the fact that developments in the Far East may in due course call for the making of new political agreements, but we are of the opinion that if and when the time comes to proceed with the negotiation of such new agreements, the principles upon which they

should advantageously be based could not deviate far from those to which the interested powers are already committed in treaties at present in existence.

During recent years the United States has faced -- as has the British Empire -- serious problems arising out of the sudden and marked expansion of Japanese trade. It has been our aim and effort to devise means whereby the interests of our own producers may be safeguarded and at the same time there may be avoided, as far as possible, restraint upon natural and reciprocally beneficial trade. We have made substantial progress toward solving in a mutually satisfactory manner some of the problems involved, and we are currently devoting constant attention to that subject. It is our firm belief that progressive adjustment of trade problems in the Far East, and elsewhere, would contribute to an improvement in political relations in that region.

In general, it is our belief that the powers can in all probability best contribute toward bringing about

conditions of stability and security in the Far East by endeavoring to cultivate good will and confidence by promoting healthy trade relations and while closely observing the trend of events which from recent developments may indicate that the peoples of the Far East are approaching a state of mind wherein those peoples will themselves be able to perceive that pathways of cooperation are the pathways of advantage. As circumstances permit we shall be prepared as heretofore to give hearty support to measures which may appear to give substantial promise of contributing toward stabilization of the situation in that part of the world.

In regard to the Chancellor's observations as to the possible trends and results of pending neutrality legislation in the United States, the Chancellor is of course informed of the recent legislative enactment.

It may be pointed out that the Joint Resolution of May 1, 1937 (Pub. Res., No. 27, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.), does not provide for the imposition of an embargo on

exports of any commodities other than arms, ammunition, and implements of war. This legislation does not prohibit exportation of other commodities; it merely provides that if the President shall find that the placing of restrictions on the export of articles from the United States to belligerent states, et cetera, is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives or commerce of citizens of the United States and shall so proclaim, it shall thereafter be unlawful to export such articles until the American interest therein shall have been divested, i.e., until title shall have passed to the foreign consignees. Similarly the President is authorized to prohibit the transport of belligerents by American vessels of commodities designated by him.

The resolution gives the President considerable discretion. It allows him to determine whether, in view of the then existing situation, these provisions should be invoked and permits him to make exceptions as to commerce

on lakes, rivers and inland waters, and on or over lands bordering on the United States. It also permits him to change, modify, or revoke in whole or in part any proclamation or proclamations previously issued by him in the given premises.

The Government of the United States is convinced that, as regards all of the points raised in the Chancellor's message, the crucial problem confronting the world today relates to the guiding principles which will, in the immediate future, underlie the basic policy and action of the important nations in their international relations. The possibility is clearly not precluded that the ideas of national exclusiveness and its inevitable concomitant of international hostility and strife, may become dominant over a sufficiently large part of the earth to engulf the entire world in a possible succession of destructive conflicts. On the other hand, the Government of the United States firmly believes that an opportunity exists today for directing national policies into a channel of political

and economic cooperation, based upon a common-sense harmonization of national interests and upon a spirit of mutual friendliness and fair-dealing. In the achievement of this aim the Government of the United States is prepared to collaborate in every way compatible with its legitimate sphere of action. It is convinced that the British Government, actuated by the same desires, is equally concerned with the imperative need of exploring all possible avenues that may lead to the same end.

Department of State,

Washington,

about
March 20
1937

The Chancellor of the Exchequer has received Mr. Morgenthau's important message with the greatest interest. He has discussed it with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and wishes to say how warmly they all three appreciate this evidence of Mr. Morgenthau's and - as they understand - the President's earnest desire to find some way in which the United States - possibly in conjunction with the United Kingdom - could help in preventing the outbreak of another war. Beset as they are with the difficulties and risks inherent in the present political situation in Europe, the Chancellor and his colleagues have given their most anxious consideration to this message.

In order to arrive at a proper appreciation of the possibilities of averting war it is necessary first to consider where the menace lies, and what are the causes which keep it alive. These causes are both political and economic and it is sometimes difficult to disentangle them from one another. But Mr. Morgenthau is undoubtedly right in saying that the needs of armament programmes are responsible for a good deal of the economic troubles in Europe and those programmes are in turn the result of political considerations.

The main source of the fears of war in Europe is to be found in Germany. No other country, not Italy, since she has her hands full with the task of consolidating her Abyssinian conquest, not Russia with all her military preparations, certainly not France, England or any of the smaller Powers, is for a moment

credited with any aggressive designs. But the fierce propaganda against other nations continually carried on by the German Press and wireless under the instructions of Dr. Goebbels, the intensity and persistence of German military preparations, together with the many acts of the German Government in violation of treaties, cynically justified on the ground that unilateral action was the quickest way of getting what they wanted, have inspired all her neighbours with a profound uneasiness. Even these islands which could be reached in less than an hour from German territory by an air force equipped with hundreds of tons of bombs cannot be exempt from anxiety.

The motive for this aggressiveness on the part of Germany appears to arise from her desire to make herself so strong that no one will venture to withstand whatever demands she may make whether for European or colonial territory.

With this intention in her heart she is not likely to agree to any disarmament which would defeat her purpose. The only consideration which would influence her to a contrary decision would be the conviction that her efforts to secure superiority of force were doomed to failure by reason of the superior force which would meet her if she attempted aggression.

It is because of the belief that British forces would be available against German aggression that British rearmament plans have been welcomed by so many nations in Europe with a sigh of relief, and if they still feel anxious, their anxiety arises from their doubts whether this country's rearmament will be adequate or will be

completed in time to act as a deterrent to German ambitions.

This being the situation in Europe as His Majesty's Government see it, they have no doubt whatever that the greatest single contribution which the United States could make at the present moment to the preservation of world peace would be the amendment of the existing neutrality legislation. Under this legislation an embargo would be imposed on the export from the United States of arms and munitions, irrespective of whether a country is an aggressor or the victim of an aggression. It is obvious that the existing neutrality law and, a fortiori, any extension of it so as to include raw materials, suits the requirements of a country contemplating an aggression, which can and would lay up large stores of war materials with the knowledge that its intended victim will, when the time comes, be precluded from obtaining supplies in one of the greatest world markets. The legislation in its present form constitutes an indirect but potent encouragement to aggression, and it is earnestly hoped that some way may be found of leaving sufficient discretion with the Executive to deal with each case on its merits. Mr. Chamberlain realizes that this question is, apart from its international aspect, a matter of domestic controversy in the United States, and that it may well be impossible for the U.S.A. Government to take such a step even if they desired it, but in view of Mr. Morgenthau's request for the Chancellor's views he has thought that the U.S.A. Government would wish to have them expressed without reserve.

There is however another aspect of the same question. Japan in the Far East is another Power with far-reaching ambitions which affect the interests of this country in that region, not with the same intensity as those which touch her very existence, but in highly important respects. The strain upon our resources is therefore seriously aggravated by the necessity of providing for the protection of our Far Eastern and Pacific interests, especially as the most favourable moment for any enterprise in that region injurious to our position there would be precisely when we were engaged in hostilities in Europe. The conclusion of the recent German-Japanese agreement is an indication, if one were needed, that if we were seriously involved in Europe we could not count even on the neutrality of Japan. Anything therefore which would tend to stabilise the position in the Far East would pro tanto ease our position there and safeguard us against added embarrassment in the event of trouble in Europe.

The advent of the new Government in Japan may herald a change of attitude, and there are other signs that the Japanese may realise that the recent trend of their policy has not been to their advantage, and that they are contemplating a change in the direction of better co-operation in the Far East and with the powers which have great interests there. We would therefore welcome an exchange of views on the possibility of taking this opportunity to try to put relations between the U.S.A., Japan and Great Britain on a footing that would ensure harmonious cooperation for the protection and development of their respective interests.

Although Mr. Chamberlain believes it to be true that the political ambitions of Germany lie at the

root of the economic difficulties in Europe, he is by no means blind to the advisability of trying by all practicable means to ease the economic situation, and in various directions His Majesty's Government is now engaged in exploring the possibilities of finding some relief. The conclusion of a commercial agreement with the U.S.A. Government would in the opinion of His Majesty's Government have far-reaching effects both by its practical advantages to the two countries and by the example it would set to others. Furthermore, the State Department will by now have been informed in confidence by H.M. Ambassador of a step which His Majesty's Government contemplate taking in concert with the French Government for the purpose of exploring the possibility of securing a relaxation of quotas and other restrictions on international trade. It is proposed to invite the Belgian Prime Minister to undertake for this purpose preliminary investigations in various European capitals, and possibly also in the United States. M. van Zeeland has expressed his willingness to accept this mission, if invited, and would propose in the first instance to ask M. Frere, the Belgian economist, to make the first unofficial enquiries.

In connection with economic questions, there is a further matter that should be mentioned. Dr. Schacht last autumn had discussions with French Ministers on a number of topics and has more recently exchanged views with Sir F. Leith-Ross. The subject matter of these conversations (and so far as His Majesty's Government are

concerned, the fact that the discussions have taken place at all) have been and are for the present to be kept secret. It is possible that these conversations may lead to more formal contacts with the German Government through the normal channels. This question is still under careful consideration by His Majesty's Government, and if no progress has been made up to date, it is because the matters raised by Dr. Schacht have concerned not so much purely economic matters, with which of course he is fully qualified to deal, but rather matters of wider political scope, more particularly the retrocession of the ex-German colonies, which have necessarily wide ramifications.

Mr. Chamberlain hopes that this frank exposition made in response to Mr. Morgenthau's message may prove helpful in clarifying the position and showing how it is regarded by His Majesty's Government. He earnestly trusts that some form of collaboration may be found possible between our two countries since he is profoundly convinced that almost any action common to them both would go far to restore confidence to the world and avert the menace which now threatens it.

DRAFT

*T.S.F.
file
Mr. Britain
state Dept
[1937?
[two?]*

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have reported to the President and to Secretary Hull my interesting and agreeable conversations with you, and likewise those which I had with Mr. Eden.

I told the President that you would probably be glad to make a visit here if he thought it would be desirable and helpful, in case you can get away and provided the ground is sufficiently prepared in advance to give a reasonable assurance that such a visit would not be a mere empty gesture or result in a misunderstanding. The President would very much welcome an opportunity to become well acquainted with you and to have a frank exchange of views on questions of common interest and concern. He believes, as I am sure you do, that world economic and financial stability and hence peace depend largely upon an enlightened policy of Anglo-American cooperation. The more, therefore, that responsible leaders of our two countries meet and exchange views the less likely are they

The Right Honorable
Neville Chamberlain,
10 Downing Street,
London, England.

they to misunderstand one another or to pursue conflicting policies. The President recognizes, however, as you do, that a meeting between two heads of State for any serious discussion is a delicate matter and that it would be desirable for an agenda and a tentative basis for your discussions to be agreed upon before hand. The question is how best to do this. Do you think it preferable that the President send some one to London for that purpose or ^{that} you send some one here.?

As you will no doubt recall, you suggested when I was in London that Sir Frederick Leith Ross and I have a talk together. This we did and I presume he reported our conversation to you. The questions he raised, with some of which I had no authority to deal, were undoubtedly ones that should be pursued further and more definitely. In addition to the questions raised by Sir Frederick there may be other questions such as that of the Pacific and the Far East about which ^{you and I} we had some tentative discussion. The President and the Secretary of State are both of the opinion that a substantial trade agreement between

Great

Great Britain and the United States would not only materially improve trade but that it would facilitate a solution of other questions which are of mutual interest and general benefit. If, therefore, it were possible shortly to announce that the two Governments have reached a basis of accord sufficient to begin actual negotiations on a trade agreement, it might well furnish a logical occasion for carrying on tentative conversations on other subjects preparatory to your visit.

My impression is that within a few months the situation in Europe may possibly develop to the point where it may become possible and advisable to make a concerted and comprehensive effort to achieve economic rehabilitation, financial stability, a limitation of armaments and peace. In the meantime, it would seem to be most desirable for Great Britain and the United States to do what they can to open up the channels of trade, and further an improvement in economic and financial conditions, and thus help to prepare the way for ^{further steps leading to} more stable and peaceful conditions in the world.

[Norman H. Davis]

PSF: Great
Britain

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE MOORE

I am returning herewith the enclosure which you requested in your memorandum to me of June 15th.

M. A. Le Hand

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

Is it all right to return
the enclosure to Mr. Moore as he
requests?

Paula

Yes

file
Confidential
9/11/37

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is a memorandum handed me by Sir Ronald Lindsay this morning. I talked over with the Secretary the suggestion it contains, and there is to be some further consideration given it this afternoon. Apparently there is no reason why you should bother about it at this moment.

The Ambassador also handed me the other enclosure, which you may find of some interest, and which I will thank you to return when you are through with it.

I am glad to believe that you have come back to your desk in the best of health and spirits.

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosures:

Roosevelt memo

Memorandum from
British Embassy, dated
May 15, 1937, relative to
the Spanish Conflict;
Confidential letter from
Ambassador Phipps, dated
April 15, 1937.

The President,

The White House.



*file
Diplomatic*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*file
Great Britain*

June 22, 1937

My dear Mr. President:

I believe that you will find interesting the enclosed copy of telegram No. 394 of June 21, 2 p.m., from the American Ambassador at London, in regard to recent Chinese loan negotiations with Great Britain, conducted by Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance, during his recent visit to London, and in regard to conversations had by Sir Alexander Cadogan with the Japanese Ambassador at London concerning China.

Faithfully yours,

[Handwritten signature]

Enclosure:

From Embassy London
No. 394, June 21, 2 p.m.

The President,

The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

FE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President.

PSF: Grant Britain

JR

London

Dated June 21, 1937

Rec'd 12:34 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

394. June 21, 2 p.m.

Cadogan sent for me this morning and handed me a "very confidential" memorandum regarding Kung's currency loan negotiations here. Inasmuch as he is, according to the radio bulletin, due to arrive in Washington in a few days I am cabling text in full.

"The Chinese Minister of Finance Dr. Kung, during his recent visit to England raised the question of the issue in London of a currency loan for China. Discussions in regard to this proposal are still in an early stage but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire to inform (*) confidentially of their course as they are anxious that in matters of this kind there should be close consultation between the governments principally concerned.

Two. His Majesty's Government are disposed to view Dr. Kung's proposal with favor provided that it forms part of a well considered program for maintaining the stability of the Chinese currency and for the execution of a sound financial policy on the part of the Chinese Government. They feel that the carrying out of such a programme is essential

JR #394, June 21, 2 p.m., from London.

essential in the interests of China and is to the advantage of all countries which trade with China and intend to cooperate in her economic developments.

Three. In particular His Majesty's Government attach importance to the establishment in China of an independent and non-political central reserve bank. The principles for the setting up of a central reserve bank have already been adopted by the Chinese Government and it is satisfactory to note that Dr. Kung has stated his intention of putting these principles into practical effect without delay. In discussing the question of a currency loan it was made clear to Dr. Kung that His Majesty's Government regard it as very important that satisfactory legislation for a central reserve bank should be put into force as soon as possible and that it would be essential that this step should have been taken before the issue of any currency loan.

Four. The programme envisaged would of course include provisions as to the disposal of the proceeds of a currency loan. The sterling would be sold by the Chinese Government to the central reserve bank and would be used by the bank solely for foreign exchange transactions in order to maintain the stability of the Chinese currency. It would clearly not be desirable that the Chinese dollars thus received by the Chinese Government from the central reserve bank should be available

JR #394, June 21, 2 p.m., from London.

available for current budget expenditure and the programme would provide that these dollars should be used by the Chinese Government gradually over a period for the redemption of existing domestic bonds which would have the effect of improving the credit of the Chinese Government in their own internal market. It would also be part of the program that the Chinese Government should pursue a policy of balanced budget.

Five. Provided that a currency loan formed part of a well considered program on these lines His Majesty's Government felt that they could themselves view it with favor and could hope that the proposal would be viewed sympathetically by the United States Government and the other governments concerned. But it was made clear to Dr. Kung that His Majesty's Government could not express any opinion as to whether and on what terms a loan could be successfully issued in the London market and that this must depend on negotiations with the financial institutions concerned.

Six. Dr. Kung proposed that the loan should be secured on the maritime customs revenue in which connection His Majesty's Government stated that they would expect an assurance that the existing system of the maritime customs would be continued. They here emphasized the importance of the resumption of the recruitment of foreign personnel.

Seven

JR #394, June 21, 2 p.m., from London.

Seven. The discussions with the financial institutions concerned are still at an early stage and it is not yet clear whether the Chinese Government will be in a position to offer security which the market would regard as adequate even for a comparatively small currency loan of say not more than pound 10,000,000 to pounds 20,000,000. (If the total were more than pounds 10,000,000 only pounds 10,000,000 would be issued in the first instance). Discussions on this point are understood to be continuing.

Eight. Should these discussions be successfully concluded it is understood to be the desire of Dr. Kung to issue a currency loan in the autumn. In this connection the question of the consortium has of course to be recalled into account. His Majesty's Government trust that they will shortly receive from the French and Japanese Governments, as they have already received from the United States Government, an intimation that they agree to negotiations between the groups for the dissolution of the existing consortium by mutual consent. In that event it may be expected that the consortium will have been dissolved before the Autumn and no question of a formal decision by the group will be involved; but it would of course continue to be the policy of His Majesty's Government to keep in close touch on the matter with the other three interested governments

JR #394, June 21, 2 p.m., from London.

governments. In the alternative event of the consortium not having been dissolved by the Autumn His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government would find no difficulty in using their influence with the United States group to secure the consent to the issue in London of a currency loan as part of a well considered program on the lines described above".

Cadogan went on to say that he had had several conversations with the Japanese Ambassador in the course of which Yoshida made a proposal for an agreement to protect the territorial integrity and independence of China. Cadogan also said that his Government would cooperate with the Japanese or any other government along this line and that Yoshida had then proposed the discussion of an agreement for the proposed action and rehabilitation of China and Cadogan said he had told him the British Government would in no circumstances go into any such agreement; that cooperation with the United States, China and Japan for peace and stability in the Far East would be supported by his Government but no form of special agreement would be considered at all. This allowed me to refer in passing to the purport of your number 1757 of May 24, 1937.

Cadogan then went on to say that Yoshida was to provide him with a memorandum on the Japanese proposals for discussion but that the presentation of this memorandum

had

JR #394, June 21, 2 p.m., from London.

had been much delayed because of the changes of Government in Japan. However he looked for it in the near future. Meanwhile he had undertaken to keep this Embassy informed and would continue to do so and also he had told the Chinese Ambassador that he would keep him informed of any negotiations with Japan.

BINGHAM

HPD

JR

GRAY

London

Dated July 14, 1937

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

469. July 14, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

By 462, July 12, 6 p.m.

The British Government has now completed its proposals for an attempted compromise solution of the Spanish deadlock. They will be communicated to the members of the Nonintervention Committee this afternoon to be referred by them to their respective governments and will come before a meeting of the Nonintervention Committee on Friday.

The text of these proposals which has been received through the courtesy of the Foreign Office and is to be held strictly confidential until its publication here, probably tomorrow morning, is quoted below. An official of the Foreign Office said that they were uncertain as to the reception the proposals would receive in the Committee but that the Foreign Office hoped all the governments represented would at least be prepared to express their views.

"At the last meeting of the Nonintervention Committee, held on the ninth July, His Majesty's

Government

JR #469, July 14, 1 p.m., from London.

Government in the United Kingdom were intrusted by their colleagues on the Committee with the task of drawing up proposals which should aim at closing the present gap in the control scheme and enable the policy of nonintervention to be continued. This task has been no easy one. For any proposals which can be put forward with any hope of success must not only harmonize the widely divergent views which have been expressed but must also give promise of an effective system of nonintervention.

His Majesty's Government have however bent their best endeavors to their task, and have evolved a scheme which they herewith submit to other governments represented on the Committee, in the hope that it may lead to an agreed solution of the present difficulties. In submitting it they would however make one observation. It is admitted a compromise between varying points of view; it can only be successful if it is accepted by the governments concerned in a spirit of compromise. All the nations represented on the Committee have repeatedly expressed the view that they wish nonintervention in the Spanish conflict to continue. They have now an opportunity to give to that wish practical effect. Unless a greater spirit of international cooperation is evident than has been achieved in the past this scheme will fail and the nations of

Europe

JR #469, July 14, 1 p.m., from London.

Europe will be faced with a new and infinitely more dangerous situation. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom therefore urge other nations represented on the Nonintervention Committee to give to those proposals their immediate consideration, and in the event of their being accepted, to devote a real spirit of international collaboration to their practical application.

Outline of proposals.

(a). Reconstruction of the system of supervision.

One. Supervision of traffic entering Spain by sea.

(a) The system of placing observers on ships visiting Spanish ports to be continued.

(b) The naval patrol system to be discontinued and replaced by the establishment, with the consent of both parties, of international officers in Spanish ports under proper safeguards. These officers would perform the functions hitherto carried out by the naval patrol, i.e. ascertaining that the requirements of the scheme as regards carrying observers on both sides are complied with.

Two. Supervision of traffic entering Spain by land.

The system of supervision on the land frontiers to be restored at once.

(b) Further measures for meeting the present situation and for filling certain gaps in the supervision system.

Three

JR #469, July 14, 1 p.m., from London.

Three. With a view to the more effective application of the policy of nonintervention, all governments parties to the Nonintervention Agreement to recognize the two parties in Spain as possessing a status which justifies them in exercising belligerent rights at sea, in accordance with the rules governing such exercise but subject to the following special conditions:

(a) That the contraband lists adopted by the belligerents shall be identical with the list of prohibited goods adopted by the Nonintervention Committee. In other words, the powers will recognize limited contraband lists only. This, however, will not preclude them from adding certain goods to those regarded as contraband under the nonintervention agreement. Such additions will be a subject of negotiation between the Committee as a whole and the two belligerents.

(b) That as a corollary to (a) the two parties will agree, in the exercise of belligerent rights at sea, to allow the unmolested passage of ships carrying observers and flying the flag of the Nonintervention Committee. This, however, will not apply where the ship is engaged in unneutral service (such as the carriage of troops or the transmission of intelligence) or breach of a blockade which have been duly notified and is effectively maintained.

(c) That

JR #469, July 14, 1 p.m., from London.

(c) That since international shipping between countries other than Spain is obliged in certain areas to pass near the Spanish coast, no steps shall be taken by either party to impede or interfere with the passage of neutral shipping not engaged in traffic with Spain.

(d) A government which is a party to the Nonintervention Agreement will be entitled to protect ships flying its flag against the exercises of belligerent rights in cases where the conditions laid down in (a), (b) or (c) are not being complied with.

Four. In order to preclude the carriage of arms on ships which are entitled to have observers on board, the Nonintervention Agreement to be extended so as to prohibit the carriage to Spain, from any port, by ships entitled to fly the flag of any of the parties to the agreement, of goods on the prohibited list.

Five. The committee to inform non member powers of their intention to recognize the belligerent status of the two parties on the above terms and to invite fullest cooperation with a view to making the policy of nonintervention more effective. Any governments which are prepared to become parties to the Nonintervention Agreement and to recognize the belligerent status of the two parties on the above terms to be invited to avail themselves, for ships
flying

JR #469, July 14, 1 p.m., from London.

flying their flag, of the facilities for taking on board observers at the established 'control' ports.

Six. The committee to consider further the question of the employment by the two parties of foreign aircraft which enter Spain under their own power, and to examine in particular the possibility of requesting the two parties to accept foreign observers in specified aerodromes in Spain.

(c) Withdrawal of foreign nationals.

Seven. (a) The committee to pass a unanimous resolution in favor of the withdrawal from Spain of all persons whose evacuation is recommended in the report of the technical sub-committee (N.I.S. 36525).

(b) A commission to be sent out to either party holder to make arrangements for and to supervise the withdrawal of the persons in question as soon as possible.

(c) All governments to undertake to collaborate in such practical measures as may be found necessary for effecting these withdrawals.

(d) Execution of above programme.

Eight. His Majesty's Government propose that the above programme should be carried out in the following stages:

(1) Establishment

JR #469, July 14, 1 p.m., from London.

(1) Establishment of officers in Spanish ports, and withdrawal of naval patrol, as soon as possible;

(2) Establishment of commissions to make arrangements for and supervise the withdrawal of foreign nationals, and extension of the Nonintervention Agreement as proposed in paragraph 5, to follow (1) as quickly as possible;

(3) Recognition of belligerent rights to become effective when the Nonintervention Committee place on record their opinion that the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign nationals are working satisfactorily and that this withdrawal has in fact made substantial progress.

(f) Immediate action by His Majesty's Government to be authorized by the committee.

Nine. His Majesty's Government to be authorized by the committee to enter immediately into discussions with the two parties in Spain on the following points:

(1) The establishment of officers in Spanish ports (paragraph 1 (b) above).

(2) Withdrawal of foreign volunteers (paragraph 7 above) including the establishment of the commissions in Spain.

(3) The conditions on which belligerent rights are

to

JR #469, July 14, 1 p.m., from London.

to be granted (paragraph 3 above)".

It will be particularly noted that the British Government proposes the recognition of the two parties in Spain as possessing a status which justifies them in exercising belligerent rights at sea in accordance with the rules governing such exercise and subject to the fulfillment of certain specified conditions.

BINGHAM

HPD:CSB

file
"personal"

D. E.
Great Britain

July 15, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which the Ambassador is sending to the Secretary, and which he wanted you to see.

Very sincerely,

Emily Ovorman

Private Secretary to the Ambassador.

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

July 6, 1937.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Sir Campbell Stuart, Chairman of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, came in to see me on Saturday, the 3rd of July, to ask me to transmit an invitation to you to make an address under the auspices of the Royal Institute on November 25th, December 2nd, December 13th or December 14th. In case you can accept this invitation, Lord Baldwin will preside.

You doubtless know about this organization. It has a high standing, is non-political and exercises a great influence. The last great occasion under its auspices was when Gen. Smuts delivered a great address two years ago.

I know all the difficulties involved in taking the time to accept such an invitation, but I believe the economic and political situation justifies your giving serious consideration to it. The British Government, as you know, is now committed to the policy of agreement with the United States. The whole trend here, both in and out of the government, is towards attempting to retrieve some of their mistakes in dealing with us and attempting to bring about a fuller measure of cooperation between the British and ourselves. Neville Chamberlain himself, who, until the

responsibility of being Prime Minister approached, was not, I should say, hostile towards us, but uninformed and indifferent, has completely reversed his attitude. His attitude is now that of all the members of the Cabinet of sufficient weight to count.

I told Sir Campbell I would not transmit this invitation unless the Foreign Office was informed, and he agreed with me and told me he would communicate with Anthony Eden at once. I expect to see him this morning, and have no doubt the suggestion of the invitation will be welcomed.

There are too many considerations involved for me in any way to urge your acceptance of this invitation, but I do feel it is worthy of serious consideration. I may say that if the Secretary of State of the United States should come here, on the whole, as I see it now, I should prefer for him to come on such an invitation as this rather than as the guest of the Government, because too much speculation would be attached to a visit under those auspices. I have no doubt the address you would make here would have a profound influence here and throughout the Empire to which it would be carried, but I am fully conscious of all the complications and difficulties which beset such a visit.

I am enclosing a copy of this letter for the
President.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Robert W. Bingham.

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

C O P Y.

PSF: Great Britain - 1937

July 16, 1937.

Dear Bob:

I have received and read with interest your letter of July 1st, in which you refer to a question which arose during the recent visit of Norman Davis to London. I refer to the origin and extent of plans for a visit to this country by the British Prime Minister or by the British Foreign Minister, or both. Manifestly, there is nothing involved which there is the slightest reason for keeping from you. In these circumstances, we might reasonably assume that there was no intention of withholding from you anything that was said about the proposed visits. There has obviously been a misunderstanding with respect to the whole matter.

When it was decided that Norman Davis should head the Delegation to the International Sugar Conference which was taking place at London, I suggested to him that, as Chairman of the Disarmament Delegation, he should make a thorough exploration with the British of the disarmament situation, both in its naval aspects and in connection with the meeting of the Bureau which was scheduled to take place at Geneva. Furthermore, as has been the case with several other important American citizens going abroad, and in view of the fact that at this time demands were coming from many quarters that this Government take some initiative in the economic or disarmament field, I expected him to discuss with the British the possibilities of some subsequent concerted effort in respect to armaments and to aid you in any way in bringing about an Anglo-American trade agreement.

It is my understanding that the question of the Prime Minister or some other member of the British Cabinet coming to this country arose incidentally in an informal conversation. There was no preconceived plan to issue an invitation to Mr. Chamberlain or to Mr. Eden, but since the matter had been raised I decided to extend an invitation to Mr. Chamberlain in the manner which you know.

The Honorable
Robert Worth Bingham,
American Ambassador,
London.

I felt that it would be advisable to invite the Prime Minister. His visit could be presented as an opportunity for a general discussion much less specific than would be the case if Mr. Eden were to come, since obviously the Foreign Minister's visit would be concerned almost exclusively with political affairs. As you are aware, some of the outstanding questions which should be discussed and, if possible, settled between the British and ourselves do not fall within the domain of the Foreign Minister. For these reasons, I considered it wiser to invite the Prime Minister and if for some reason he could not make the journey, he would then be given the opportunity to designate the member of the Cabinet whom he would select to take his place.

I entirely agree with your premise that our representatives abroad within their respective jurisdictions must be paramount at all times to any other officials or citizens of this Government visiting the countries to which they are accredited. I am sure that no one appreciates this fact more fully than Norman Davis himself and, while I regret extremely the concern which you have been occasioned because of your feeling that you were not kept fully informed by Washington and by Norman himself, I need only reiterate that if such failure occurred, there was no intention nor disposition on the part of either to disregard you.

Yours very sincerely,



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I return herewith your letter from Ambassador Bingham, together with a draft reply which Welles and I have prepared. I trust this may meet your desires.

Ifree

July 1, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

At the time when Norman Davis was coming over on his last mission here, there was much publicity emanating from American sources to the effect that he was coming over to discuss the debt, the economic situation in general and the trade agreement in particular, and especially to arrange for an international disarmament conference in your behalf. This caused much excitement in France, which began to spread here, and I was on the point of communicating with you on the subject when Ambassador Bullitt gave out a statement to the French press, which was reprinted here, stating that Davis's instructions limited him to the field of the sugar conference.

When Davis arrived he told me that he regretted the publicity and that his mission was limited to the sugar conference, as Ambassador Bullitt had stated.

Both the Prime Minister and Anthony Eden have stated to me definitely and positively that they made no proposals or requests to Davis with reference to a visit to the United States; that, on the other hand, the entire initiative was taken by him, and that he urged upon them such a visit, to which they gave courteous but indefinite

replies.

Be that as it may, it is not possible for your representatives in foreign capitals to give you the maximum of service if important negotiations are conducted with the Heads and Foreign Ministers of governments to which they are accredited without the knowledge of your representatives.

Sincerely yours,

Robert W. Bingham

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

Copy of letter to Norman Davis enclosed.



In reply refer to
PR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 17, 1937.

135 G. Britain 1937

File Jan

My dear Mr. McIntyre:

With reference to your memorandum of August 11, 1937, and to the telephone conversation which took place between an officer of this Department and Mr. Kannee of your office, I am enclosing a suggested draft of a letter for the signature of the President, thanking King George for the two photographs of himself and of the Queen which he sent to the President through Mr. Gerard. If this letter is satisfactory to the President and it is signed by him I would suggest that you have the letter returned to me so that I may transmit it to Ambassador Bingham at London for transmission to His Majesty.

In accordance with your request, I am returning Mr. Gerard's letter herewith.

Sincerely yours,

H. Charles Spruce

Acting Chief of Protocol.

Enclosures:

From Mr. Gerard to
Mr. McIntyre;
Draft letter.

The Honorable
Marvin H. McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Your Majesty:

I deeply appreciate your great kindness in sending me, by the Honorable James W. Gerard, signed photographs of yourself and Her Majesty the Queen. I shall treasure them as tokens of your friendship.

Your Good Friend,

His Majesty
George VI, of Great Britain, Ireland,
and of the British Dominions beyond
the Seas, King, Emperor of India,
etc., etc., etc.

THE WHITE HOUSE

His Majesty

George VI, of Great Britain, Ireland,
and of the British Dominions beyond
the Seas, King, Emperor of India,
etc., etc., etc.

JAMES W. GERARD

40 WALL STREET

NEW YORK CITY

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 4-0010

August 4, 1937.

Honourable Marvin H. McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. McIntyre:

When in London King George VI sent me two handsomely framed photographs of himself and of the Queen and signed by them, but with no dedication, for the President.

I have not had a chance to deliver them but suggest that you get the President to write a letter acknowledging the receipt of this gift.

I do not think that it should be delayed much longer but I have been afraid to send the pictures down by parcel post lest they be smashed on the way.

Sometime when the President has a little leisure I should like to see him, hand him the pictures and give him such gossip as I have been able to collect in England and the Continent.

The mayoralty situation here in New York is much confused and it seems to me prudence requires a calm survey of the situation before a commitment is made.

Yours very sincerely,

James W. Gerard

*file
private*

PSF: *St. Britain*

THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:


I wish you to know that since you instructed me to have an investigation made of the ownership of islands in the Pacific, that matter has received, and is still receiving, constant and careful attention, and it is expected that within a very short time all of the available evidence will be accumulated, not only with reference to Canton Island, but several other islands to which our Government has as good a claim, and in some instances a better claim than the British.

Since our note on the subject, which you approved, was handed the British Ambassador, we have been informed that the suggestion it contains is receiving consideration and that we may expect a reply at an early date. This statement is based upon Mr. Pierrepont Moffatt's conversation with the British Chargé during the Ambassador's absence.

There is reason to believe that pending a possible agreement by the British to discuss with us the claims of the two governments, the British have been more or less active in some of the islands in question, but it is certain
that

The President

The White House.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
—
THE SECRETARY

*file
private
Great Britain*

October 19, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MISS LE HAND.

By direction of Secretary Hull, I am returning herewith the attached correspondence for the President, which is self-explanatory.

H. A. McBride
(WR)

H. A. McBride.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Hyde Park, N. Y.,
October 16, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Do you think this calls for
an answer?

F. D. R.

No -
C H

PS F. Great
Britain

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1937.


My dear Mr. President:

The British Chargé d'Affaires called upon me this morning and handed me the enclosed letter, which he told me was addressed to you by the British Prime Minister. Mr. Mallet added that this letter referred to your last letter to Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. Mallet left no copy of this letter with me. If you consider the letter to be of interest to the Secretary of State or to myself, may I ask that when you have read it you let us have a copy of it for our information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



The President,
The White House.



10, Downing Street,
Whitehall,

28th September, 1937.

My dear Mr. President,

Your personal letter to me of the 28th July reached me in the latter half of August while I was on holiday in Scotland. I was very glad to receive it and to note that we were in agreement as to the necessity of careful timing and preparation before I could usefully make the visit to the United States which you were good enough to suggest. Since however you asked for further suggestions as to additional preparatory steps that might be taken as between ourselves with a view to expediting the time when my visit might appropriately be made I thought it best to defer my reply until I had returned to London and could gather up the latest developments in the situation here.

As you will no doubt appreciate that situation changes so often and so rapidly that any account of it is liable to be out of date in a very brief space of time. At the present moment so far as Europe is concerned I think I may say that it is less menacing than it has appeared for some months past, but we still seem to be



10, Downing Street,
Whitehall,

a long way from the resumption of cordial relations between the Totalitarian States and the democracies. At the same time various circumstances have combined to ease the tension and to encourage the friends of peace.

On the other hand the Far Eastern situation has justified our worst fears and I see little prospect at the present time of being able to improve it by action on the part of the Western Powers. At any moment some incident may arise with repercussions which cannot even be guessed at.

In these circumstances I am afraid that I cannot suggest any way in which the meeting between us could be expedited, though I greatly regret this both on personal and official grounds. Perhaps the community of sentiment between our two countries as to the events in the Far East and the developments in the European situation may be doing something to create a favourable atmosphere and the conclusion of an Anglo American commercial agreement when we have found ways of overcoming its obvious difficulties will undoubtedly be an important step in the right ...



10, Downing Street,
Whitehall,

right direction.

In my view then we must wait a little longer, but I hope I need not assure you that I shall watch the course of events most carefully, as I am sure you will too, for any opportunity of furthering the purpose we both have in view.

Believe me, my dear Mr. President, with renewed thanks for your letter.

Yours sincerely,

R. Chamberlain

The President
of the United States of America.

Bingham

August 2, 1937.

Dear Bob:-

Will you take this to the Prime Minister at your convenience? I think it clears up everything.

Many thanks for your letter about my position in Europe. I am "laying low." You are right.

As ever yours,

Honorable Robert W. Bingham,
American Embassy,
London,
England.

(Enclosure)

*File
Personal*

July 28, 1937.

My dear Mr. Chamberlain:

I have read with much interest your letter of July 8 to Mr. Norman Davis in reply to a letter which he wrote to you at my suggestion. I am pleased to learn that you think it would be desirable to make a visit here - as suggested - as soon as conditions appear to warrant your doing so; and also that we are in accord as to the importance of Anglo-American cooperation in the promotion of economic stability and peace in the world. I agree with you that however desirable a meeting between us may be, it is necessary that it should be properly prepared and timed if it is to have fruitful results.

My suggestion to Mr. Davis, which he conveyed in his letter to you, was that if the ground could be sufficiently prepared in advance, it would be most agreeable to me if your visit could be made in the early fall. I recognize however that events have not so shaped themselves as to make such an early visit practicable.

I appreciate the desirability of making such progress as is possible on other lines which would have a bearing upon the timing of your visit here.

The Right Honorable
Neville Chamberlain,
10 Downing Street,
Whitehall,
London, England.

I would be glad, however, to receive any suggestions you may have as to any additional preparatory steps that might be taken as between ourselves in the near future to expedite progress towards the goal desired.

I am, my dear Prime Minister, with assurances of high esteem

Yours sincerely,

President's longhand notation
→ I have asked the Ambassador
to deliver this to you in person

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*PSF:
Great
Autumn*

October 21, 1937.

MEMO FOR MAC

I want to see Admiral
Leahy and R. Walton Moore to-
morrow morning for fifteen
minutes. Will you give me the
attached when they come in?

F. D. R.

*Let
Confidential*

PSF: Gk.
Britain

THE COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1937.

Dear Mr. President:

Several hours after I saw you yesterday the British Charge came in and handed me a note, a copy of which is herewith. In the conversation he indicated that his Government is not contesting our ownership of Howland, Baker and Jarvis Islands, but in making its reservation has in mind particularly Canton Island. It is quite apparent that the British are unwilling to negotiate with respect to their claim to that island, while they are willing to negotiate about all others, including even Christmas and Hull, their claim to which is probably much better than ours.

I made the Chargé understand what your views are, as expressed to me in your note of October 13th, and ventured to go a little further by saying in a very friendly manner that the British, already having possession of a large part of the earth's surface, are constantly making further claims and maintaining their status as the prize claimant of territory. Of course I did not omit to minimize the contention that a British Order-in-Council creates a title.

I

The President,

The White House.

I think the note should receive a speedy reply, and I further think that there should be considered what, if anything, we should do in asserting our ownership of Canton Island, and in that regard perhaps parallel what the British have done in constructing a small building there and placing one or two men in charge of it.

I have just talked with an official of the Navy Department who is to talk with Admiral Leahy this morning, and perhaps before you leave Washington for Hyde Park you may wish to have the Admiral and myself see you.

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosure.

Robert M. Munn

PSF: St. Britain

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

October 20th, 1937

No. 360

Sir,

With reference to the note which you were so good as to address to Sir Ronald Lindsay on the 9th August last, I have the honour to inform you, on the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom deeply appreciate the offer of the United States Government to discuss with them the question of conflicting claims to ownership of various islands in the Pacific, and that they are ready to enter upon such discussions.

In view, however, of the facts that not only were the Phoenix Group of islands incorporated in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony by Orders-in-Council of the 18th March, 1937, but that His Majesty's Government were already in effective possession of Canton and Hull Islands before the receipt of the proposal conveyed in your note under reference, they can only regard the Group as definitely British territory, and
they/

The Honourable

Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State of the United States,

Washington, D.C.

they would accordingly be unable, in participating in the discussions referred to above, to include in them the question of the islands of that Group.

Subject to this reservation, His Majesty's Government readily agree that, pending the outcome of such discussions as have been suggested, neither Government should take any action which would render adjustments of any conflicting claims more difficult.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

humble servant,

(SOD) V.A.L. HALLIDAY

H. H. Chargé d'Affaires

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


November 6, 1937

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received from the British Ambassador a letter of which I transmit a copy herewith. The letter, as you will see, contains a message addressed to you by the Duke of Windsor, which the Ambassador was requested to transmit.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. H. Kelly', written over the typed name 'Faithfully yours,'.

Enc.

The President,

The White House.

C O P Y

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
November 6th, 1937.

Dear Mr. Acting Secretary of State:

His Royal Highness the Duke of Windsor having reluctantly decided to postpone his visit to the United States, has requested me to convey the following message to the President:

"Circumstances over which I have no control have prompted my decision not to sail for America tomorrow. The Duchess of Windsor and I much regret that certain factors of which you are aware have forced us to postpone our long looked forward to visit to your country and the opportunity of meeting you. I sincerely hope that once this regrettable misunderstanding is cleared up, and the reasons which prompted my independent desire to study American housing and industrial conditions are properly understood, you will renew your invitation to visit you which we anticipated with so much pleasure."

I shall be grateful if you will kindly cause this message to be conveyed to its high destination.

Very sincerely yours,

R. LINDSAY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1937

My dear Mr. President:


I have just received your memorandum of November 8th and the draft of the letter you propose sending to the Duke of Windsor.

I am heartily in accord. I think the letter you have drafted could not be nicer and I think it will be helpful in hastening the obliteration of recent occurrences.

When you have signed it, will you have the letter sent back to me and I shall then transmit it with a personal letter to Bill Bullitt.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'W. D. Coolidge'. The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'W' and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The President,

The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Great Britain*

November 8, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

In view of all the circumstances, don't you think it would be a decent thing to send something like this to The Duke of Windsor via Bill Bullitt?

FDR

F. D. R.

November 8, 1937.

My dear Windsor:-

Ronald Lindsay has sent me the copy of your message, and I am very sorry that certain factors are preventing you and the Duchess from visiting the United States at this time. I am sincerely sorry that these circumstances occurred but I hope that a little later on you will find it possible to come over.

I need not tell you that it will be a great pleasure to renew our old acquaintance.

In going over some old papers the other day, I found the enclosed photograph taken at Annapolis on the day that you reviewed the battalion of Midshipmen, and I think it may interest the Duchess to see it. I shall always remember that without preparation you made a little speech to the Midshipmen which was perfect for the occasion and which is still remembered at the Naval Academy.

Faithfully yours,

His Royal Highness
The Duke of Windsor.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

file
Mason
November 9, 1937


My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made by telephone a few minutes ago, I am sending you herewith a copy of the letter which I sent to the British Ambassador on Sunday morning conveying the message you wished him to transmit to the Duke of Windsor in reply to the message the latter had sent to you.

The British Ambassador has advised me that he sent your message to the Duke of Windsor by telegraph before noon on Sunday and that it was received by the Duke Sunday night.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.

November 7, 1937.

My dear Sir Ronald:

The President desires me to ask that you be so kind as to inform His Royal Highness the Duke of Windsor by telegram that the President has received with much appreciation the message the Duke of Windsor sent to him through you; that the President regrets that the Duke's visit to the United States has been postponed, and that the President hopes to have the pleasure of receiving His Royal Highness in Washington at some future date.

The President has requested me further to let you know that he yesterday addressed a

His Excellency

The Honorable

Sir Ronald Lindsay,

P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., C.V.C.,

British Ambassador,

Washington.

personal letter to the Duke of Windsor which
will be transmitted to him by the American
Ambassador in Paris.

Believe me, my dear Sir Ronald,

Yours very sincerely,

SUMNER WELLES

LMS
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (B)

London

Dated DECEMBER 13, 1937

Rec'd 3:05 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

772, DECEMBER 13, 8 p. m.

(GRAY) My 767, DECEMBER 13, 1 p. m.

Cadogan has just read to me the telegram sent to Sir Ronald Lindsay, containing an expression of British views, which he said has by now doubtless been conveyed to you. The British have not yet, he said, received any factual reports which would throw any additional light on the incidents. He reemphasized what Mr. Eden had already said this morning that they regarded the situation as serious. He also said they attach great importance to the British and American action being at least along synchronized parallel lines if it is to have any effect on the Japanese. What they really hope for, as set forth in the telegram to Lindsay, is that we will consent to joint action. Cadogan pointed out that they realize that our views as to the advisability of joint action in the past has been different from theirs but

he

LMS 2-No. 772, December 13, 8 p. m., from London

HE FEELS THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION MIGHT PERHAPS CAUSE US TO RECONSIDER THIS ATTITUDE.

(END GRAY)

The Government obviously attaches great importance to having as united an Anglo-American front as may be possible to present to the Japanese and I gather that they are not displeased that America's interests should have been so decidedly involved by these unfortunate incidents. There are indications from varying sources that the British authorities are hopeful American official and public opinion will react strongly towards these sinkings and that some positive action, such as the moving of the fleet, will be authorized. In such circumstances Great Britain would undoubtedly increase her own Far Eastern naval contingent. The British do not now see any early termination of the Sino-Japanese conflict and fear that hostilities will shortly move to the Canton area where their interests predominate.

JOHNSON

CSB

P.F.G.B.

*file
private
confidential*

*Pittman
Borah
McReynolds*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

published in
Foreign Relations
of the U.S. - 1938
VOL. I PAGES 115-117
General

January 10, 1937. [1938]

Butcher

Step No. 1

Take up confidentially the proposal with the British Government in order to secure the latter's support at such time and in such manner as may seem desirable to this Government.

Norman Davis believes that we should simultaneously communicate our intention of making such proposal to the French, German and Italian Governments for their confidential knowledge in order that we may thus make the effort to secure the assurance of their willingness to lend support and in order to avoid any belief on their part that any secret and prior agreement as to the nature of the recommendations to be formulated had been entered into between Great Britain and ourselves.

Step No. 2

The President calls in the diplomatic representatives of all nations to meet with him at the White House in order to hand to them copies of the proposal. The proposal is immediately thereafter made public.

Step No. 3

Should the replies to the proposal prove to be

satisfactory, the President will direct the Secretary of State to proceed as follows:

(a) Request the governments of the other American republics to cooperate by selecting two individuals, nationals of two American republics other than the United States, whom they consider most qualified to collaborate in the formulation of the recommendations listed in the proposal.

(b) Request each of the following governments to designate a representative to take part in such formulation:

Sweden	Switzerland	Turkey
The Netherlands	Hungary	
Belgium	Yugoslavia	

In order to avoid delay and to obtain the benefits resulting from personal interchange of views between the individuals so selected, it is urgently recommended that the nine individuals so designated be invited to meet in Washington with the representatives of the United States.

(c) Inform simultaneously the Governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia that this Government will keep them closely advised of all developments throughout the formulative period in order to receive such suggestions and to hear such views as they

may desire to express.

Step No. 4

Upon the completion of the formulation of the recommendations listed transmission of such recommendations to all governments.

It is my belief that the proposal in itself will lend support and impetus to the effort of Great Britain, supported by France, to reach the bases for a practical understanding with Germany both on colonies and upon security, as well as upon European adjustments. Great Britain and France are now equally persuaded that no approach to Italy is feasible unless this prior understanding with Germany is successfully attained.

Should this practical readjustment be discussed and pushed during the period when the recommendations envisaged in this Government's proposal are being determined, it is obvious that each of the two parallel negotiations will be guided in part by the decisions arrived at in the other; this Government serving as a channel of information, and no more, insofar as the negotiations between and among the great powers of Europe are concerned. It is however probable that the influence of this Government with regard to the problem of limitation of armaments in both parallel negotiations

would be helpful.

In this connection it is important to remember that in the Hitler-Halifax conversations Hitler expressed his willingness to agree immediately to the elimination of offensive armaments. It is equally important to recall that Mussolini six months ago publicly suggested that the President take the leadership in a move for immediate limitation and eventual reduction of armaments.

Step No. 5

It is impossible at this time to forecast with any precision beyond this point. Should the procedure indicated in Step No. 4 prove successful, the governments of the world will need do little more than ratify formally their approval of the recommendations formulated as the result of the President's proposal, since their agreement in principle will have been made plain during the course of the negotiations. This formal ratification might be undertaken through diplomatic channels or through a general conference called specifically for that sole purpose.

If the German and Italian Governments do not reach a practical understanding with Great Britain and France as a result of their parallel negotiations above men-

tioned, it is possible that they will not acquiesce in the recommendations formulated as a result of the initiative of the United States. In such event, which would seem to be the worst of possible contingencies, this Government would at least have obtained the support of all of the governments of the world, other than those inseparably linked with the Berlin-Rome axis, for practical recommendations which would insure world peace and which would safeguard modern civilization. The rallying of public opinion on a world scale to those policies which alone can make for peace and economic progress would in itself be productive of practical good because of its inevitable repercussions on the German and Italian populations, as well as upon those smaller countries of Europe which have been feeling increasingly during these past three years that the great democracies have surrendered their leadership and that consequently they themselves, as a means of self protection, must align themselves with Rome and Berlin.

Finally, if Germany and Italy solve their practical problems with Great Britain and France it would seem probable that their present support of Japan will be very greatly weakened - at least to an extent sufficient to obligate Japan to make peace with China upon terms not

inconsistent with the principles of the Nine Power

Treaty.

PSF

Gt. Britain - 1938


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1938.

My dear Mr. President:

The British Ambassador has just given me the attached message to you from the Prime Minister. I have shown it to the Secretary, and he feels that you will wish to give this your personal thought before we meet with you tomorrow at lunch time.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'N. Chamberlain', written over the typed name 'Neville Chamberlain'.

The President,

The White House.

The following is a Message from the Prime Minister

to

The President.

January 14th, 1938.

I appreciate most highly the mark of confidence which the President has shown in consulting me in regard to his plan. I am also greatly encouraged to know that world affairs have been engaging his attention so directly and that he is willing to take so courageous an initiative. The objects which he has in view correspond of course to the aims and hopes of His Majesty's Government and I am most grateful to him for his vigorous initiative which is designed to work as an action by the United States Government parallel to the effort which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are making with the Central Powers.

He has been impelled to make this proposal by consideration of what he has described as progress of deterioration in international relations and consequent danger of general conflagration. No one who has followed closely recent developments can fail to be impressed with the great dangers that beset the world. On the other hand it may be permissible to look forward to some improvement in immediate future. From my correspondence with him last summer and from information which has since reached him President will be aware of the efforts which His Majesty's Government for their part are making to bring about a measure of appeasement. He will be interested to know that recently His Majesty's Government received an enquiry from the Italian Government as to when conversations could be re-opened with His Majesty's Government and that in the last few days I have agreed with the Secretary of State that the latter should on January 16th discuss with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Geneva the possibility of making a fresh approach towards reconciliation with Italy that might bring appeasement to the Mediterranean region at least.

His/....

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have realised that if such appeasement is to be achieved it will not be upon the basis of bargaining in which each side seeks to weigh up what it will get against what it will be asked to give. Our plan (both as regards Germany and Italy) rests upon the view that we and they are in a position each to make a contribution towards the objective we both desire to obtain. There would be no need to discuss whether our contribution were greater or less than theirs. What is needed is to ensure that the contribution of each will, taken with the contribution of the other, make up an agreement which will bring appeasement. Thus in the case of Italy His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared for their part, if possible with authority of League of Nations, to recognise de jure Italian conquest of Abyssinia (by which Signor Mussolini sets great store) and to take certain other action if they found that Italian Government on their side were ready to give evidence of their desire to contribute to the restoration of confidence and friendly relations. I am hopeful that French Government may be willing to join us in this effort.

In another direction, and adopting the same basis, viz. that all parties can and should make their contribution His Majesty's Government are about to embark on a study of the situation revealed by Lord Halifax's visit to Berlin with a view to seeing in what measure German aspirations might be satisfied so that they too could make their contribution to a general appeasement and although this is a very difficult and complicated subject I trust that before long we may be able to begin our conversations with Germany.

I mention these facts so that President may consider - what has occurred to me - whether there is not a risk of his proposal cutting across our efforts here. It is probable that the Italian and German Governments of whom we should have to ask a contribution that they will be none too ready give, might excuse a refusal to continue negotiations on the ground that the subjects under discussion - which for the most

part will be specific and concrete in character - seemed all merged in the wider problems which the President contemplates tackling as a whole. It would I feel be regrettable if what I am sure the President intends to be, as he himself describes it, action taken by him parallel to the efforts which we are making, were found to be capable of being used to block progress in the directions which over recent months we have laboriously worked out and for which we feel the stage has at last been set in not too unfavourable a manner.

This leads me to ask the President to consider whether it would not be wiser to consider holding his hand for a short while to see what progress we can make in beginning to tackle some of the problems - see my letter of May 23rd. This would not of course prejudice any larger effort that President might be willing to make later.

I venture to submit these considerations to the President, not because I differ in any way from his objective, still less because I fail to appreciate the motives which led him to put forward his proposals, but solely in order to obtain the benefit of his opinion as to the timeliness of his proposed action. My fear is that if the President's suggestions are put forward at the present time Germany and Italy may feel constrained to take advantage of them both to delay consideration of specific points which must be settled if appeasement is to be achieved, and to put forward demands over and above what they would put forward to us if we were in direct negotiations with them.

I hold myself in readiness to consider immediately any observations which the President may make on the foregoing and I shall do my utmost to give them consideration and to reply to him without delay.

(Confidential) / 31 Britain June 1938

May 9, 1938

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

Your 384, May 7, 2 p.m.

The figure 45,000 tons was reached after careful study of our needs and as indicated in our 191, May 3, 6 p.m. represents the lowest figure which we would be able to accept as a new upper limit for capital ships of subcategory A. It was largely in the light of the considerations again advanced to you by the British that we agreed to set an upper limit at all. We think the time has nearly come to point out to the British that we are prepared either to conclude an exchange of notes on a 45,000 ton sixteen inch gun basis, or else to recognize that it has not been found possible for the parties to the Treaty to agree on an upper limit for tonnage and armament with the result that each power would retain complete freedom.

Eu:PM:ASD

OK, FAR.

Ally to State 5/10/38

TELEPHONE: LONGFIELD 2170.
FAWKHAM STATION.
SOUTHERN RAILWAY.

P.F.G.B.
FAWKHAM MANOR,
KENT.

P.F.
July 12. 1938

Dear Franklin,

I am going to have another look at your contract. The Gov^t wanted to send a complimentary mission to a Colombian Gov^t on the coronation of a new president and the tercentenary of the City of Bogota and proceeded to ask me to go - and I have accepted. In many ways it will be a great nuisance as I shall hardly see my boy during his holidays (he has got a scholarship at Eton) & I don't much like being separated

from Cynthia, but, to quote odds 1 end. of
poets. Absence makes the heart grow fonder.

I duplicate commendat rarer uses,
and then it was a great honor they
did me, and it will be great fun seeing a
new country. Now look here. Last
time I passed through U.S.A. you ran
away & fished, even if you did lend me your
nic little cabin in Washington. But this
time, will you be at home? I really
should like to see you again, but also the best
abused and also best praised man that
this whole round world contains. Personally.

TELEPHONE: LONGFIELD 2170.
FAWKHAM STATION.
SOUTHERN RAILWAY.
21/1/1921

90
TELEPHONE: LONGFIELD 2170.
FAWKHAM STATION,
SOUTHERN RAILWAY.

FAWKHAM MANOR,
KENT.

I don't expect I shall find you - if I find you -
very different from the Franklin I knew
some years - is it 200 or is it more? - ago.

I believe I arrived at Bogotá about Aug 2 or 3
& stay there 7 to 10 days, & I would like to come
back via Bonaventura & the Panama
canal so should reach N. Y. round about
Aug 22-25. Will you be in any accessible
place about that time? And will you
allow access to this insignificant worm?
I calculate a letter to Bogotá by air mail
should reach me before I leave there, if

indeed you deem this letter worth a reply.

With our kindest greetings to your dear
wife.

Yours very sincerely

Jan Holler

[Sir Thomas Holler]

28th July, 1938.

8, BARTON STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W. 1.

My dear President,

You may have observed during the past few days a new departure made by Great Britain for removing, in so far as it is possible the dangerous elements in the central European situation. Diplomacy has gone some way, but the speaking of March when Germany walked into Austria with all that followed thereon and on May 21st when the menace of further invasion shook the Continent once more, make Prague

PP 69-358(3)

and the Czech frontiers points where the movements of troops may lead to a rupture and invasion.

With this in view we are now trying a new method for preserving the peace. It seemed to be impossible to succeed by agreements reached by ordinary diplomacy and ultimately it seemed to be necessary to try the method of agreed investigation and mediation. Accordingly the British government sought for a man trusted by both sides - and I am now about to be set afloat in an open boat

144.14-385(4)
in a treacherous ocean, independent
of this or any other Government,
in the endeavours to reduce the
points of friction between the
Czechs and the Sudeten Germans
and to guide that unhappy
country into smooth waters.
As we stand at present war
is far too easily excused and
may spring on the old world
at any moment appropriate
to the aggressor.

My conferring with
both sides may take two or
three months. But with free

hands and the trust and confidence which I enjoy just now it may be possible to succeed in the endeavour to maintain the peace and to relieve Europe from its extreme peril.

I am presuming that you may care to hear of these things first hand.

With my warm regards I am

Yours very sincerely,

Amcinda of D.

Personal file

The President,

White House,

Washington

DC

FAST



RCA

DIRECT



RADIOGRAM R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

A RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA SERVICE

TO ALL THE WORLD — BETWEEN IMPORTANT U. S. CITIES — TO SHIPS AT SEA

4WN 31

BOGOTA 1834 AUG 9 1938

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

ABOARD HOUSTON NAVAL RADIO WASHN (DC)

SIR THOMAS HOHLER REQUESTS ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN
REPLY TO YOURS RECEIVED YESTERDAY QUOTE DATE ABSOLUTELY FIT STOP AM
DELIGHTED UNQUOTE.

GREENE

1955SU9AUG

WHITEHOUSE

File personal

RECEIVED AT

1112 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

AT _____

STANDARD TIME

TELEPHONE: NATIONAL 2600

FORM 113 WN-W-TD-106

To secure prompt action on inquiries, this original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the office of R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the place of origin.

St. Britain

FS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated September 14, 1938

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

923, September 14, 4 p.m.

PRIVATE AND ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY
OF STATE.

NO DISTRIBUTION.

I just saw the Prime Minister. He came out of a Cabinet meeting and went into a room with me and told me as follows: He has been thinking every night what he could possibly do, if a crisis should arise and war seemed imminent, to stall it off. Last night he came to the conclusion, and without asking the Cabinet's permission because he thought the thing had arrived at that serious state, he sent word to Hitler that he would like to go to Berlin to see him. Today, while I was there, he told the Cabinet and received their unanimous approval. He said he felt that any plans that Runciman might now present, which is what the French wanted done, would probably not be sufficient under these trying times.

With

FS 2-No. 923, September 14, 4 p.m. from London

With that in mind he felt it absolutely imperative to send a message to Hitler last night and ask him if he would see him to go over the situation with him. Up to now he has not received any answer. He feels that Hitler cannot refuse to see him however for fear of the psychological reaction throughout the world. He said he had great fear as to misconception regarding the British Prime Minister going to see Hitler but he felt that the time had come when he should demonstrate to the world that all efforts of his were bent upon preventing war.

I asked him what he figured was the greatest danger. He told me very frankly it was Hitler's request for a plebiscite. He feels that that would be rather an astute move on Hitler's part in that he would try to make the democracies fight against democratic principles. He said he had considered that and had arrived at two answers: first, he will suggest to Hitler that the Sudeten area take local autonomy for a period of five years and that Hitler demobilize his army at once; at the end of that time, to perceive, other problems and elections might well be held under the auspices of an international body. If Hitler completely repudiates that, on the ground that he wants action immediately, Chamberlain will suggested that
possibly

FS 3-No. 923, September 14, 4 p.m. from London

possibly it be done at the end of six months. The great trouble with this is that Hitler will be winning a victory without bloodshed and make the next crisis whenever and about whatever it comes much easier for him to win out. Chamberlain realizes this but plans to say that he is prepared to talk colonies, economics or any other big plan for the peace of the world, without definite commitment at this time, but will try to get the approval of the British public if Hitler wants to talk business. He will tell Hitler that he has come to try to formulate a settlement for world policy and that after all Czechoslovakia is a small incident in that big cause. If this is turned down, England will have tried everything and made every suggestion that they can and he will then tell Hitler that he will fight on the side of France. Chamberlain told me that France has not been advised of this yet for fear of a leak, but he has been informed in the last 48 hours that they are becoming less and less anxious to fight and he is sure they will throw their hat in the air when they hear of this plan.

He is now waiting word from Hitler and as he went out of the room he asked me to wish him luck and pray for him.

CSB

KENNEDY

**BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

September 26th, 1938.

A message from London:

"Lord Halifax greatly appreciates the President's confidence, which will be most scrupulously observed. He will continue to do his best to keep the United States Ambassador fully informed of developments, but it is extremely difficult for him to forecast events. Every effort has been made to remove anything that might be considered a German grievance, and if the effort fails there will no longer be any doubt as to the real German intentions.

"If the worst should come Great Britain would probably attempt to enforce a blockade, but the situation is very

obscure /

file
private

Frank

"obscure. The position of Italy may yet be doubtful; it is possible that a neutral Italy might be more valuable to Germany as an avenue of supply than an Italy as an ally in arms. A blockade of Germany would be rendered to a great degree ineffective unless Italy were also blockaded or rationed, but even the latter measure might probably bring Italy into action against France. It is therefore possible that a choice may have to be made between a neutral Italy with an ineffective blockade, and a hostile Italy with an effective blockade."

R.C.V.

Personal

to the President.

file
private

4-2-1916

*file
personal*

TSF:
El. Brita

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1938

My dear Mr. President:

I send you herewith the text of two messages left by the British Ambassador this morning, the first being the telegram from Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Hitler, dated September 28th, the second being the text of the message from Mr. Chamberlain to Mr. Mussolini.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

As stated above.

The President,
The White House.



Text of message from the Prime Minister to
Herr Hitler, September 28th, 1938.

"After reading your letter I feel
"certain that you can get all essentials
"without war and without delay. I am ready
"to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss
"arrangements for transfer with you and a
"representative of the Czech Government,
"together with representatives of France and
"Italy if you desire.

" I feel convinced we could reach
"agreement in a week. However much you
"distrust the Prague Government's intentions
"you cannot doubt the power of the British
"and French Governments to see that promises
"are carried out fairly and fully and forthwith.
"As you know I have stated publicly that we are
"prepared to undertake that they shall be so
"carried out. I cannot believe that you will
"take the responsibility of starting a world war
"which may end civilization for the sake of a
"few days' delay in settling this long standing
"problem.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
September 28th, 1938.

Text of message from the Prime Minister to
Signor Mussolini, September 28th, 1938.

"I have to-day addressed a last
"appeal to Herr Hitler to abstain from force to
"settle the Sudeten problem which I feel sure
"can be settled by a short discussion and will
"give him the essential territory, population
"and protection for both the Sudetens and Czechs
"during transfer. I have offered myself to
"go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements
"with German and Czech representatives and,
"if the Chancellor desires, representatives also
"of Italy and France. I trust Your Excellency
"will inform the German Chancellor that you
"are willing to be represented and urge him to
"agree to my proposal which will keep all our
"peoples out of war. I have already guaranteed
"that Czech promises shall be carried out and
"feel confident that full agreement could be
"reached in a week.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 28th, 1938.

Sept 28. 1938.

Dear Franklin,

I have just - 11:40 a.m. - read
your second message. There are no words
in which I can express my admiration for
it. Splendid, splendid & splendid. No
fine phrases like W. Wilson, but just
the straight truth, nobly expressed. I
want to add a blessing on you for it.
It is magnificent. Yours as ever
Tom Holloway.

PSF: Great Britain

[1938.]

Wed. Sept 28

12 noon

Kennedy

Personal for Prime
Minister Chamberlain. Quote
I had been signed Roosevelt
Unquote

Telephoned to
A. Waller to send out message

file
Confidential

October 26th, 1938.

Dear Mac:

After the conversation I had with the President yesterday about the visit of the King and Queen, he asked me to put down on paper a rough outline of the tentative conclusions which we had reached. I enclose this little note herewith, and beg you to be so good as to put it on his desk. I hope it will correspond with his own impressions of what passed between us.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "R. C. Lindsay". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "R. C. Lindsay".

n McIntyre,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Tentative suggestions in regard to the
projected visit of the King and Queen
to the United States.

Owing to shortness of time it is natural to expect that only a very few days will be available for the visit and that these will have to be found in the course of the tour in Canada.

It seems likely that the principal part of Their Majesties' plan should be a formal visit to the President of the United States in his capital of Washington, where they might stay at the White House, do the usual sights, and be received by Congress.

A visit to New York City would also be essential, but this would be rather secondary to the visit to the Capital. They might land at the Battery, where they would be received by State and

City /

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

-2-

City dignitaries, and probably a short inspection of the World's Fair would be inevitable. Perhaps they might go to it by water. Perhaps also it might be arranged that they could look in on some New York institution of cultural importance. A drive through the streets of New York is to be deprecated.

In the third rank, and only to be contemplated if time allowed would be a short visit of only very few hours' duration to some other city - say Chicago - taken perhaps on the way between Canada and the Atlantic seaboard.

The order in which these two or three items in a programme should be taken, the dates, and other details can hardly be usefully worked out until it is known with some precision how many days will be available from Their Majesties' tour in Canada, and when.

-----o-----

MR JOHN STEWART BRYAN

LABURNUM

P.S. G. 1207 in

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/17/38

11-17-38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In reference to the possible visit of His Majesty, George VI, I spoke recently with Sir Ronald Lindsay and pointed out that as the British nation made its first permanent settlement at Jamestown, that was one spot to which the King could come with a sense of reality that would not be afforded by any other place in America.

But apart from any political or geographical connotations, there was another place, namely the College of William and Mary, which, it seems to me, would be devoid of any political, military or trade significance because that College, founded in 1693, was the first institution of higher learning to have a Royal Charter in America. The Charter was granted specifically by Their Majesties, King William III and Queen Mary. It was given special privileges in land taxation and general powers. It was given a coat of arms signed by the College of Heralds and was embellished with buildings reputed to have been designed by Sir Christopher Wren and undoubtedly emanating from the Surveyor General's office in London.

President Roosevelt himself came there and received a degree in 1934 and if the King were to come, as I pointed out to Sir Ronald Lindsay, it could have only the implications which the phrase-maker Caesar used when he said in complimenting Cicero: "I would rather be famous for having extended the boundaries of Roman thought than having enlarged the boundaries of Roman rule."

(continued on next page)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/17/38 - continued.

If, as is reported, a Naval review is to be held in Hampton Roads, Jamestown could be reached in perhaps half an hour. William and Mary is only five miles' distance and can be reached over a road built by the United States Government in a matter of seven or eight minutes.

In expressing his approval of the general idea, the British Ambassador said: "Of course my approval is purely perfunctory for guests, no matter who they are, do what their hosts wish."

It is with the thought that the idea may meet the approval of the President I am making this suggestion.

JOHN STEWART BRYAN
President,
College of William and Mary.

P. H. Belmont

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1938

My dear Mr. President:


In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am sending over to you the memorandum Sir Ronald Lindsay left with me regarding the visit to this country of the King and Queen of England.

His own suggestions as to the schedule for their stay in the United States are contained on the last page of this memorandum.

I am also enclosing a confidential telegram from Joe Kennedy of which I spoke.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



The President,

The White House.

The King's visit to Canada and the United States.

All Canadian plans are still tentative.

The King arrives at Quebec on May 15th.

He was to leave Halifax on return to England on June 10th but the Canadians have some reason to hope that he can delay this till June 15th and are planning accordingly.

They have been asked to spare him night journeys as much as possible, and it has been arranged that his train ties up somewhere nearly every night.

Their tentative plan is to arrange that he shall leave Niagara the night of Tuesday June 6th and arrive at Washington about 3.0 p.m. on Wednesday, June 7th.

And /

And that he should leave from somewhere in the neighbourhood of New York on Saturday, June 10th in the evening (up to 11.0 p.m.) and travel through the Sunday to the Maritime Provinces to Halifax.

8

This would leave:-

from 3.0 p.m. Wednesday, June 7th

to

11.0 p.m. Saturday, June 10th

for the visit to the United States.

UNITED STATES VISIT.

Wednesday, June 7th, arrive Washington about 3.0 p.m.
Sleep at White House.

Thursday, June 8th, in Washington.
Sleep at White House.

Friday, June 9th, leave Washington in afternoon.
Sleep at Hyde Park.

Saturday, June 10th. At New York.
Leave for Canada
at night - 11.0 p.m.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated November 18, 1938

Rec'd 3:05 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1330, November 18, 5 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY.

Replying to your 709, November 17, 7 p. m.

Mrs. Kennedy and I had lunch with Malcolm MacDonald and two friends of his at his country estate last Sunday. Among other subjects discussed was naturally Palestine and the atrocities in Germany. I asked him why in heaven's name England did not show more interest in intergovernmental relief as she had all the land and if she offered some of it, it would give Russia something to go on; then having the place to put the refugees the problem of raising the money to get them out was second. I told him it looked to me that every one was feeling sorry for the Jews but that nobody was offering any solution. The discussion of this item was one of a great many talked about.

Evidently MacDonald discussed this with Halifax and I saw Halifax the next day and he told me the English were doing a lot. Very confidentially they were now admitting

seventy-five

REB

2-#1330, From London, Nov. 18, 5p.m.

seventy-five Jews a day but they did not want their own people to know for fear it might cause trouble. When I told Rublee this he said he and Pell knew this; that the British were looking into the whole matter; they had asked Lindsay to ask you whether you could use the quota the United States had for British citizens and transfer that to Jews. I reiterated to him what I had said to MacDonald: Speed up Lord Winterton and get some land and then find out who felt bad enough to give money. I told him Myron Taylor had told me Baruch said that the Jews in the United States could raise \$100,000,000 if they had a good place to put the Jews. These conversations were repeated to Rublee.

I saw the Prime Minister at a dinner to King Carol and urged speed to get some place.

I know nothing more about what they propose to do except what the Prime Minister said yesterday. If I had any news of any description concerning this matter which I thought would be of interest to you, you would have had it as you always do from me. If I have made any contribution it is that I have urged the British to do

something

3-#1330, From London, Nov.18, 5p.m.

something quickly for the Intergovernmental Committee
but then I have been doing that for four months.

I saw the Prime Minister today to introduce Senator
Reynolds who had requested the introduction. No official
business discussed.

KENNEDY

EMB

Private & Confidential
PSF
G. Britain
1938

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1938

My dear Mr. President:

In one of the last conversations I had with Sir Ronald Lindsay before he left on his vacation, I asked if his Government had any specific information with regard to the agreement recently reported to have been concluded between Germany, Japan, and Italy.

The British Chargé d'Affaires today called to see me with a personal and confidential message from Sir Alexander Cadogan which he was instructed to decode himself and to burn after he had read it to me.

This message was to the following effect: That in the agreement recently signed between the three powers, the first article provided for mutual support in the event that any one of the three powers became involved in a diplomatic dispute with any third power or powers. The second and last article provided for mutual economic, diplomatic, and political support if one of the three powers were to be threatened by any third power or powers.

The President,


The White House.

My attention was specifically called to the fact that in the German-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement the U.S.S.R. was specifically mentioned, whereas in the new agreement any third power is included.

I was further informed that a secret supplementary treaty had been drafted by the Japanese Government and had been submitted to the other two powers. This proposed secret agreement specified just how much support was to be rendered in the contingencies envisaged in the two articles of the agreement above mentioned, and just how far such support should be carried. The British Government was advised that the Italian Government has so far insisted that there be a year's delay before any decision was reached on this Japanese suggestion, and that the German Government has up to the present remained non-committal. I was further informed that the Japanese were very strenuously urging that an agreement be reached on this supplementary treaty without any further delay.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'H. H. H.' or similar, written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned to the right of the typed phrase 'Faithfully yours,'.

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1938


My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation this morning I am sending to you herewith a copy of a letter sent to me by the British Chargé d'Affaires under date of December 23.

I have given Mr. Mallet the message you requested me to communicate to him and he tells me he is cabling his Government accordingly this morning.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A. Mallet'. The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'A' and a long horizontal stroke.

Enc.

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. Acting Secretary:

I have just received the following message from the Private Secretary to His Majesty The King, which I would ask you to be so good as to lay before the President.

According to the Canadian itinerary which has just been received in London Their Majesties could arrive at Washington during the forenoon of Thursday, June 8th, and leave the United States on the night of Sunday, June 11th, so as to reach Sherbrooke at 11:00 a.m. on Monday, June 12th.

I am instructed to ascertain whether these dates would be convenient to the President and Mrs. Roosevelt, in which case Their Majesties would gratefully accept their hospitality during this period.

If the President agrees, it is suggested that perhaps he would not object to deferring the publication of the dates so that it should be simultaneous with the announcement both in the United Kingdom and in Canada in respect of the dates of the Canadian tour. This should be possible within the next week or two.

Yours sincerely,

VICTOR MALLET

The Honourable
Sumner Welles,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1938


My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a letter from the British Chargé d'Affaires of which I am enclosing a copy for your information. From what you have told me on the telephone I assume that the date of publication of the visit of the King and Queen to Washington is agreeable to you.

Will you let me know if I may inform Mr. Mallet accordingly.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'H. Mallet', written over the typed name 'Mallet'.

The President,

The White House.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 30th, 1938.

Personal

My dear Mr. Acting Secretary:

With reference to your letter of December 24th on the subject of the visit of the King and Queen to the United States, I write to say that I have just received a telegram from His Majesty's Private Secretary requesting me to inform you that it is proposed to publish the dates of Their Majesties' visit to this country in the United Kingdom press on the morning of Wednesday, January 4th. The dates to be published would presumably simply be those in my letter of December 23rd, namely: arrival at Washington on the morning of Thursday, June 8th, and departure from the United States on the night of Sunday, June 11th.

I hope that the proposed date of publication will be agreeable to the President.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

VICTOR MALLET

The Honourable
Sumner Welles,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.