PSF Great Britain 1939
Mr. Woodward
Mr. Lansdell
Dear Mr. Summerlin:

Shortly after receiving your telephone call this morning, I got into touch with Dr. Skelton by telephone, who suggested that I might talk in regard to the matters you discussed with Mr. Hugh L. Keenleyside of the Department of External Affairs, who has been placed in charge of the arrangements for the King's visit to Canada.

Mr. Keenleyside called at the Legation this afternoon and I advised him first of your suggestion as to the advisability of utilizing for the United States the same train which will bring the Royal party to the border at Niagara Falls on the afternoon of June 7th. He thoroughly concurred in this idea. I told him of the information given to you by Mr. Bannerman, to the

George T. Summerlin, Esquire,
Chief, Division of Protocol,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C. U.S.A.
effect that it was your understanding that some
cars on this train belonged to the Canadian National
Railways, others to the Canadian Pacific Railways,
and that there would probably be two private cars. He
confirmed the fact that there would probably be cars
belonging to both of these two railway systems, and
he estimated the number of private cars as three, or
more likely four, although he said that there was no
decision as yet regarding how many private cars there
would be.

I told Mr. Keenleyside that the United States
Government would pay all necessary expenses which
might be involved in the King's trip, from the moment
the train entered the United States until the time
of the King's departure on his return to Canada.

As to the number of persons who will be in the
party on the train when it enters the United States,
Mr. Keenleyside was unable to give me even an
approximation. I asked him whether he thought that
all those who were making the tour in Canada would
enter the United States, or whether only a small
group of them would do so. He said that there would
certainly be a number of persons who would not proceed
further than the Canadian border on the downward trip. He explained in this general connection that no estimates of the number involved could be attempted at the present time since (1) they had as yet received no final word as to the composition of the English party and (2) there was no final word as to the number of Canadians. He said that it was quite certain that the Prime Minister would proceed with the party into the United States, and that he would do so in his capacity of Secretary of State for External Affairs rather than as Prime Minister. He said that the Prime Minister would certainly take with him a personal staff of about three people. He said that the protective staff for the King's party would accompany the King only as far as the border and would be withdrawn there. He also said that certain other "supernumeraries", such as the National Defence officer furnished by the Canadian Government, would be withdrawn. He said that he himself would doubtless proceed on the trip all through the United States and that probably Dr. E. W. Coleman, Under Secretary of State, would also do so. He explained that, as far as the Canadian trip was concerned, he would establish a kind of business office on the train for handling countless routine matters and making various
arrangements for the trip. He said that this office arrangement on the train would probably be continued throughout the trip in the United States.

Mr. Keenleyside took the opportunity afforded by our conversation to ask me to let you know that it must not be felt that all the Canadians who are going on the trip through the United States will expect to be entertained, and he felt that you should know this in order to be relieved by any feeling of responsibility on that score.

He said that it would be most useful for the Canadian Government to know as soon as possible the exact itinerary in the United States, including the various lines over which the President will wish to route the party, and every other detail of the trip which can be made available. He also said that it would be of great assistance to him to know the names of the American railway men with whom the Canadian Government should correspond in relation to various details of the trip. He indicated that no definite plans for the trip could be made until the exact routing and the names of the various lines could be ascertained, since certain railway cars could not be sent over certain lines and this information would be indispensable as a basis for making further plans. I believe that a
request for information of this type has already
been made by the Prime Minister direct to the President
in a letter which he recently sent to the President
on these subjects.

In closing, I may add that the Prime Minister, in
talking with me at the State dinner at Government House
on January 11th, indicated that he would be very grate-
ful if any available information might be sent to him
along the lines of the inquiries on this subject con-
tained in his recent personal letter to the President.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]
January 16, 1939

Mr. Summerlin:

Have noted contents of Mr. Simmons confidential letter to yourself.

It is very important to have the travel routing definitely determined as soon as possible on account of the correspondence necessary to determine whether the cars to be used by the Royal Party will pass through certain tunnels and bridges etc.

I understand the Canadian railway officials have already decided that a second train to follow or precede the Royal train will be necessary in order to accommodate the various railroad men, protection units, clerical and press staff traveling with the party.

[Signature]
Arrive Niagara Falls, 4.00 p.m. June 7.
leave . . 9.30 p.m. . .

In the U.S. June 8, 9, 10 & 11.

Arrive Sherbrooke 11 a.m., June 12.
February 4, 1939

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE SUMNER WELLLES:

I enclose herewith copy of your letter to the President of February third together with his memorandum to me, which is self-explanatory.

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Original of Mr. Welles' letter retained.
2/4/39. Memo for Mac: "Tell Sumner Welles, in regard to this, to talk to George Summerlin about it as he knows all about it." F. D. R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

The British Charge d'Affaires called to see me this morning with a message which he had just received from the private secretary to the King of England.

Mr. Mallet reminded me that in a letter which I had written to him by your instructions on December 24, I had told him that you were writing a further letter directly to the King which would be transmitted through the American Embassy in London in which letter you would make certain suggestions as to the precise arrangements for the King's visit. Mr. Mallet said that this letter had not been received and since the King wanted very much to talk over with Sir Ronald Lindsay some of the suggestions made before the latter leaves London on February 11 to return to Washington - he wondered whether it would not be possible, if your letter had been delayed and would not reach London before February 10, for the suggestions contained in your

The President,

The White House.
letter to be communicated to him by telegram either through the British Embassy here or through the American Embassy in London.

Will you let me know what answer you wish me to make to the British Chargé d'Affaires.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,
Published in
Foreign Relations of the U.S.
Vol. III, 1939, the Far East

VOL. PAGES 5
The British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me this afternoon with a strictly secret message from his Government. The British Government referred first of all to an article which had appeared in the NEWS CHRONICLE in London on January 17 and stated that information which it had now received showed that that article was true in part but only in small part.

The British Government had learned on authority it believed completely authentic that the Japanese Government was not prepared to accept the new form of alliance proposed by Germany and Italy; that it was
formulating counter-proposals and that these counter-proposals would envisage an alliance directed against the Soviet. The British Government believed that Japan was greatly concerned at this moment by reason of the possibility that Great Britain and the United States would shut her off from raw materials and other supplies needed in her military campaign and that she was further of the opinion that if a general war broke out in Europe whether or not she was a partner in such an alliance as that proposed made no difference since in any event she could lay her hands upon such possessions of the other powers in the Far East as she desired.

The British Government went on to say that the German policy unquestionably was to persuade Japan to enter this alliance in the new form proposed since, if war broke out, Germany desired Great Britain's attention to be focused in the North Sea, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East and desired for that purpose to utilize both Italy and Japan as "junior partners". Italy, on the other hand, believed that the announcement of the alliance would cause Great Britain and the United States to bring pressure to bear upon France to grant the concessions sought by Italy in order to avert war and that the mere announcement of the alliance itself would have such an effect on public opinion in France as to break down any existing French determination to resist the Italian demands.
My dear Mr. President:

I have received this afternoon from the British Chargé d'Affaires the texts of two messages which he has received from Lord Halifax "for the personal and secret information of the President". I am enclosing herewith copies of these two messages for your information.

As was the case with recent messages of the same character, the texts of these messages have already been telegraphed to the Department of State by our Embassy in London, and I understand that copies of these telegrams have already been sent to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures.

The President,

The White House.
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have now given further consideration to the question referred to in Lord Halifax's message contained in the British Embassy's aide memoire of January 30th and have reached the following conclusions.

a. His Majesty's Government confirm the view expressed in paragraph three of the British Embassy's aide memoire as to the threat that any German attack on Holland would constitute to the security of the Western Powers and consider that in the event of a German invasion of Holland they would be obliged to go to war with Germany.

b. In addition they consider that any attempt by Germany to dominate Holland by force or threat of force would also have to be regarded as a menace to the security of the United Kingdom.

c. A German attack on Switzerland would also be clear evidence of an attempt by Germany to dominate Europe by force and from this point of view a German attack on Holland and an attack on Switzerland are in the same category. Consequently if the French Government should enquire whether if Germany invaded Switzerland and France
thereupon declared war upon Germany we should go to the assistance of France our answer should be in the affirmative.

2. In view of the general position His Majesty’s Government have decided to continue staff conversations with the French Government on broader lines than hitherto and to extend their scope.

3. His Majesty’s Government are further considering making a public statement about their attitude in regard to the Netherlands which, without being so specific as to conclusions summarized above, would make plain that our interest in both the Netherlands and Belgium is so vital as to pass beyond legal obligations and that His Majesty’s Government would therefore be bound to regard as affecting interests which are vital to the security of the United Kingdom any attempt to infringe or compromise the full independence and integrity of the two countries.

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
7th February, 1939
PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE
FROM LORD HALIFAX

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have now received the replies of the French and Belgian Governments and some indication of the views of the Netherlands Government in regard to the matters referred to in Lord Halifax's message of January 30th.

The French reply states that their reports although not confirmed are similar to those received by His Majesty's Government and afford the same justification for fears of German aggression towards the West either spontaneously or in support of Italian claims. The French Government consider that the Western Powers are all equally threatened whatever the initial direction of a German or Italian attack and that this community of risk should logically entail a real solidarity in face of any unprovoked attack by Germany or Italy. On this understanding the French Government agree with His Majesty's Government in considering the contingency of an invasion of Holland as a casus belli although they point out that this would not involve any contractual responsibility on the part of France and that her joint action with Great Britain would be of a preventive character. The French Government have also requested an assurance that His Majesty's Government would regard an invasion of Switzerland in the same light as an invasion
of Holland. The French reply finally welcomes His Majesty's Government's decision to accelerate their defensive and counter-defensive measures and suggests that conscription appears essential for effective British participation in the organisation of common defence on the Continent. The French Government have also communicated the above views secretly to the Belgian Government. The French reply is now being considered by His Majesty's Government.

The Belgian reply expresses gratitude for His Majesty's Government's message and asks for any similar information in the future but the only view expressed is that the Belgian Government resolutely maintain their policy of independence which they claim to be unanimously approved in Belgium and to be best suited to the situation of Belgium and to the interests of Europe. When communicating this reply the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he could not believe Germany contemplated the seizure of Holland but in any event the Belgian Government were convinced that their only chance to maintain independence and avoid invasion was to have no commitments at all with any country.

On the receipt of a telegram from the Netherlands Minister at Washington reporting his conversation with President Roosevelt on January 26th the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs asked His Majesty's Minister
at The Hague whether His Majesty's Government could con-
firm the President's information. His Majesty's Minister
on instructions from His Majesty's Government informed
Dr. Patijn that some of the many reports received by His
Majesty's Government suggested that Herr Hitler was con-
sidering an attack on the Western Powers in the near future
and that his plan might involve the occupation of Holland.

Sir Nevile Bland explained that His Majesty's Govern-
ment could not vouch for the reliability of any of these
reports but that in view of their number it would not be
safe to ignore them and that His Majesty's Government were
therefore carefully considering the position. Dr. Patijn
informed Sir Nevile Bland that he was satisfied that there
were no German troop movements against Holland at the moment
but he added that his latest information had not reassured
him. He indicated that if the worst came to the worst the
Dutch would defend their front line defences as long as
possible and then fall back and let in the water. They
were about to spend ten million florins to strengthen the
frontier and he estimated the period of possible resistance
at three to four days. Dr. Patijn is visiting London on
February 14th for the Grotius anniversary celebrations
and I hope to have a conversation with him then.

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
February 7th, 1939
Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
176, February 7, 3 p.m.

SECRET IN Confidence AND PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY
AND UNDERSECRETAry.

My 175, February 7, 2 p.m.

Sir Alexander Cadogan furnished me with a copy of
the following second message sent last night to the
British Charge d'Affaires:

"My immediately preceding telegram.

One. The following message should also be communicated
to the State Department for the personal and secret
information of the President.

Two. His Majesty's Government have now received
the replies of the French and Belgian Governments and
some indication of the views of the Netherlands Govern-
ment.

Three. The French reply states that their reports,
although confirmed, are similar to those received by

His
His Majesty's Government and afford some justification for fears of German action towards the West either spontaneously or in support of Italian claims. The French Government consider that the Western Powers are all equally threatened whatever the initial direction of a German or Italian attack and that this community of risk should logically entail a real solidarity in face of any unprovoked attack by Germany or Italy. On this understanding the French Government would agree with His Majesty's Government in considering the contingency of an invasion of Holland as a casus belli, although they point out that this would not involve any contractual responsibility on the part of France and that her joint action with Great Britain would be of a preventive character. The French Government have also requested an assurance that His Majesty's Government would regard invasion of Switzerland in the same light as an invasion of Holland. The French reply finally welcomes His Majesty's Government's decision to accelerate their defensive and counter defensive measures, and suggests that conscription appears essential for effective British (in?) participation if the organization of common defense on the Continent. The French Government have also communicated
communicated the above views secretly to the Belgian Government. The French reply is now being considered by His Majesty's Government.

Four. The Belgian reply expresses gratitude for His Majesty's Government's message, and asks for any similar information in future, but the only view expressed is that the Belgian Government resolutely maintain their policy of independence, which they claim to be unanimously approved in Belgium, and to be best suited to the situation of Belgium and to the interest of Europe.

When communicating this reply, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he could not believe that Germany contemplated the seizure of Holland, but in any event the Belgian Government were convinced that their only chance to maintain independence and avoid invasion was to have no commitments at all with any country.

Five. On receipt of a telegram from the Netherlands Minister in Washington reporting his conversation with President Roosevelt on the 26th January, the Netherlands Minister asked His Majesty's Minister at The Hague whether His Majesty's Government could confirm the President's information. His Majesty's Minister, on instructions from His Majesty's Government, informed Dr. Patijn on January
January 30 that some of the many reports received by His Majesty's Government suggested that Herr Hitler was considering an attack on the Western Powers in the near future and that his plans might involve the occupation of Holland. Sir N. Bland explained that His Majesty's Government could not vouch for the reliability of any of these reports, but in view of their number it would not be safe to ignore them and His Majesty's Government were therefore carefully considering the position.

Dr. Patijn informed Sir N. Bland that he was satisfied that there were no German troop movements against Holland at the moment, but he added that his latest information had not reassured him. He indicated that if the worst came to the worst, the Dutch would defend their front line defences as long as possible and then fall back and let in water. They were about to spend ten million florins to strengthen the frontier and he estimated the period of possible resistance at three to four days. Doctor Patijn is visiting London on February 14th for the Grotius anniversary celebrations and I hope to have a conversation with him then."

The British Government has not yet replied to the French communication referred to in numbered paragraph three. With regard to the French suggestion that the
British should introduce conscription, the Under Secretary said that this suggestion of course was not a new one but had been broached in French circles from time to time. He quite understood their attitude in view of the probability that if a war did break out involving both countries, the French would probably have to suffer, as they did in the last war, appalling military casualties on land before a British army would be ready. On the other hand, as he has pointed out to the French Ambassador, the British carry a much larger complement of men in their navy than the French do; their air force is now not only larger but better than the French; and there is no use in talking in Great Britain about conscription being introduced now when there is not yet in existence sufficient equipment to fit out a conscripted army. The Under Secretary indicated that when a formal reply is made to the French the suggestion in regard to British conscription will not be mentioned.

Sir Alexander further said that the French reply was received before the Prime Minister's important statement in the House of Commons yesterday (my 173, February 6, 8 p.m.) and that he felt that that statement, which
#176, February 7, 3 p.m., from London.

which he again characterized as something necessary and extremely important, had done real good in France in allaying apprehensions. He considers that the political situation in France under Monsieur Daladier has greatly improved.
February 15, 1939.

Dear Roger:—

Many thanks for your note and that extremely interesting excerpt from Trevelyan.

I wish the British would stop this "We are about to die, salute thee" attitude. Lord Lothian was here the other day, started the conversation by saying he had completely abandoned his former belief that Hitler could be dealt with as a semi-reasonable human being, and went on to say that the British for a thousand years had been the guardians of Anglo-Saxon civilization — that the scepter or the sword or something like that had dropped from their palsied fingers — that the U. S. A. must snatch it up — that F. D. R. alone could save the world — etc., etc.

I got mad clear through and told him that just so long as he or Britishers like him took that attitude of complete despair, the British would not be worth saving anyway.

What the British need today is a good stiff grog, inducing not only the desire to save civilization but the continued belief that they can do it. In such an event they will have a lot more support from their American cousins — don't you think so?

As ever yours,

Professor Roger B. Merriman,
Master's Lodgings,
Eliot House,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
His Excellency The President of the United States  
Executive Mansion  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Franklin:

I have been following with interest and, on the whole, with approval the course of your foreign policy. The fact that I have had to speak so much on the Spanish situation has kept me more closely in touch with current events than I usually am. Arthur Willert spent twenty-four hours with me here a couple of weeks ago, and I shall be curious to know how he will influence your views when he visits you at the White House.

In the meantime I send you a quotation from a letter from one of my oldest English friends, George Macaulay Trevelyan, Regis Professor of History in the University of Cambridge and author of many books most of which you have doubtless read. One has to "make allowances" in considering the verdicts of all Trevelyans, but George is saner than most of them, closely in touch with the people who count in Downing Street, and not (like your old teacher) a "mere don".

Yours always,

Roger B. Freeman
Excerpt from a letter to Mr. Merriman from Professor George M. Trevelyan, dated January 28, 1939.

You ask for my 'views' on the world situation. I would not have bothered you with them otherwise. They are of course very gloomy.

I think Chamberlain was quite right not to have fought a war to 'save' Czecho Slovakia in October last, because the war must have been unsuccessful. Russia is down and out and can be written off -- she won't or rather can't even save China from Japan. In the Czech question the Germans had Poland and Hungary on their side and the Czechs would have been overrun at once by all three. The only way to 'save' them would have been for France to break the German lines in the West and with England's help conquer Germany and Italy, aided by the Japanese fleet attacking our trade. It would in short have been an offensive war on our part strategically -- to smash through Germany to Czecho Slovakia, and our military and well informed people all said and say it was hopeless. The French found that out, too late as usual. The Czechs were their 'allies' not ours, and they (and we) ought to have told them in the spring that we could do nothing for them and they must make the best terms they could with Germany about their three million German subjects.

If, as I understand, your fellow citizens think we ought to have fought this war, I think they misunderstood the possibilities, as you were to remain neutral yourselves. Munich saved the Czechs so far as it was possible to save them. But it does not follow that if (as seems likely soon) Germany and Italy attack France and England, we shall be conquered in a defensive war. We may or may not be, but we are preparing to die in the last ditch at worst. However, we may defend ourselves successfully. In any case nothing will be left of civilization except machinery -- which I don't care about -- after the war is over, whoever 'wins' it. The only thing that will stop a war coming pretty soon -- since Hitler and Mussolini are both 'rabid' men -- would be the United States letting them know that you will take part if they make aggression. But as I gather there is little chance of that, I think the prospects are very black indeed.

In the last war England plus France plus Italy plus Russia plus Japan plus (half way through) the United States only just beat Germany and Austria. How do you expect England plus France alone to "crush the dictators" with Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan against us? If you don't want Europe and Africa to be prostrate at the feet of Germany and her allies, with Japan in possession of Asia, you had better be reconsidering your isolation policy before you are indeed 'isolated'. Naziism, as contagious as Jacobinism of old, has already landed in South America I understand. But whatever you choose
to do, we will put up a jolly old fight, in which everything I care for will disappear.

.....

P.S. Remember that Russia, besides being internally rotten and incompetent for all offensive military purposes, has no longer got a frontier coterminous with Germany. She cannot attack Germany across a hostile Poland and Hungary, who do not wish to be Bolshevized. You must no longer think of the forces in terms of 1914.

Dearest love to you, your family, and your country.
Dear Franklin:

A thousand thanks for your letter. I shall relay a copy to Trevelyan, but I shall tell him that it was marked "Private" so that he will use it with discretion.

I think you are a bit hard on "the average Britisher". Some of his itinerant exports over here are intolerable -- I see shoals of them and know whereof I speak -- but the bulk of the stay-at-homes are of better quality. The fact is I think that a lot of those who come over here for the first time don't quite know how to behave with us, and hit the wrong note at the outset.

I hope you will get a lot of fish.

Yours always,

Roger B. Merriman

His Excellency The President
of the United States
Executive Mansion
Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the message from you which Steve Early gave me this morning, I have informed the British Ambassador that you will receive him at the White House tomorrow, Sunday, at 2:30 p.m.

I am enclosing herewith a secret memorandum which the Ambassador left with me when I saw him a couple of days ago, as well as a memorandum of my conversation with the Ambassador. I believe you may wish to read these two papers before you talk with the Ambassador.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

The President,
The White House.
The British Ambassador called to see me this morning. The Ambassador asked me to lay the following matter before the President upon his return. He said that when the King of England paid official visits to other countries it had been the invariable practice from time immemorial for the King to be accompanied by one of the members of the British Cabinet, normally the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He said that Lord Halifax was personally anxious to take the trip to the United States to accompany the King, particularly in order to have the opportunity of talking with the President and the Secretary of State, but that realizing that his visit to the United States might be misinterpreted by American public
opinion and might be understood as implying that the British Government was engaging in some secret negotiations with the United States at the time of the King's visit, he desired to refrain from the visit if the President believed that it was preferable for him not to come.

I told the Ambassador that I would, of course, be glad to lay the matter before the President immediately after his return and that I would advise the Ambassador in due course of the President's reaction.

The Ambassador asked me how I myself felt about the matter. I said that of course I could only give him a personal and snap judgment. I said that while I did not know Lord Halifax personally I had always understood that he gave the impression of being a very sincere and straightforward man and that since I understood the King would not receive American press correspondents, it would appear to me that if Lord Halifax were with the party and could speak directly with the American press correspondents he could make it clear to them that his coming with the King was merely a matter of custom and that no negotiations of any kind with this Government were being undertaken. I said that of course I had no idea of what the President's own opinion would be and that the matter would, of course, have to be determined by him.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the message from you which Steve Early gave me this morning, I have informed the British Ambassador that you will receive him at the White House tomorrow, Sunday, at 9:30 p.m.

I am enclosing herewith a secret memorandum which the Ambassador left with me when I saw him a couple of days ago, as well as a memorandum of my conversation with the Ambassador. I believe you may wish to read these two papers before you talk with the Ambassador.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

Our own reports on the European situation have not been as pessimistic as those mentioned to His Majesty's Ambassador by the Under Secretary of State on February 20th. We now think that it will be best to communicate in the utmost confidence the following summary of our information.

2. While we are not disposed to underrate the latent danger in the present international situation, our latest information inclines us to think that Herr Hitler has for the time being abandoned the idea of precipitating an immediate crisis such as he seemed to be contemplating at the beginning of the year.

3. Our information suggests that this is largely because the German Government has since January been impressed by the firm attitude of the French Government towards the Italian claims, by the progress of British rearmament and by the Prime Minister's statement of February 6th on Anglo-French relations and not least by the recent attitude of the United States Government. It may also be due in part to temporary deterioration in German railway system.

4. According to reliable reports no preliminary signs of impending mobilisation are apparent.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
apparent in Germany and there would not appear to be any special troop concentrations in Austria. There has probably been an acceleration of arms deliveries in Hungary which may have given rise to stories of assembly of material in the East. Meanwhile however the German army is working at high pressure and training of reservists is being expedited but reports of special military preparations would seem to be based on the probability that the German army was warned to be prepared for all eventualities in the Spring and has been making the necessary preliminary preparations. While recent secret information suggests that any plan for mobilisation in early March may have been postponed, reports have recently reached us pointing to the possibility of a military occupation of Czecho-Slovakia.

5. Herr Hitler is clearly preparing for every possible eventuality. Rumours of one or other of these plans are continually reaching us and cannot be lightly discounted. On the other hand there is no evidence at present that any one of them has been irrevocably adopted by Herr Hitler and a date fixed for its being put into force.

6. Sir Nevile Henderson had conversations with Herr von Ribbenthrop, Field Marshal Goering and Baron von Weiszaker on his return to Berlin last week and gained the impression that Herr Hitler was at present planning no immediate adventure. But of course it was not possible for him/
him to adduce positive facts in support of this.

7. Against this Herr Hitler's pledge to Italy in his Reichstag speech of January 30th is disquieting in view of the present state of Franco-Italian relations, particularly as Baron von Weiszaker replied to an inquiry regarding the precise significance of Herr Hitler's words that any close analysis was superfluous since it was quite clear that Germany would support Italy in the event of war.

8. As regards Italy we believe the average peace strength of the Italian army at this time of year, i.e. before the annual class of recruits has joined the colours may be a little over two hundred and fifty thousand rising to as much as four hundred and fifty thousand when the recruits have joined. We believe that sixty thousand reservists of 1901 class have been called to the colours but that many of them have been found unfit for service or unable conveniently to leave their jobs and have therefore been released; their places have however been taken by other reservists from later classes particularly that of 1902. We have heard reports that 1918 class may join the colours in the immediate future instead of at the beginning of April which is the usual time. If definite evidence of this were obtained it might be a pointer, though the presence of so many untrained recruits in the army would temporarily decrease its efficiency. Apart from this a number of individuals of various classes have been called up but we have no information as to the numbers involved nor as to the use to/
to which they will be put. We have no information to show that anything like three hundred thousand men have been called up or that a general or even partial mobilisation is in progress.

9. Fact that thirty thousand of the sixty thousand men referred to above are to be sent to Libya is at first sight disquieting but it should be noted that they are rather old for active military service and have had only very scrappy training during post-war period. It is of course possible that despite the definite statements of the Italian Government younger men will be sent to Libya instead.

10. It appears to be true that some German experts have been in Libya but we do not believe that there can be any German military units there.

11. Recently there have been some signs of unusual naval activity in Italy.

12. Our general impression is that there has been an abnormal amount of military activity in Italy of late but that it is at least premature to deduce that Signor Mussolini has decided to resort to war in the immediate future. The present activity may be merely an insurance against unexpected developments in Spain or a prelude to an attempt to blackmail the French into meeting Italian demands; but such explanations are of course highly speculative. Certain Italian officials have recently been asserting that Signor Mussolini will make war on France if the position of the Italian colony in Tunis is not settled to his satisfaction. This may however merely be part of a campaign to frighten the French
and ourselves into meeting Italy's demands but the situation certainly needs careful watching. In this connexion there are reports from sources that cannot be ignored that instead of risking a major war by pressing her demands on France Italy might seek cheap glory in annexation of Albania.

13. We still greatly doubt that Japan has come into line over the anti-Comintern pact. On the contrary Japan's counter proposals will only be submitted early next month for consideration by the Germans and Italians. But this will of course not prevent the three Powers playing into one another's hands as and when it suits them to do so. The Japanese diplomats' meeting in Paris last month attended by the Ambassadors from London, Rome, Brussels, by the Minister from Berne and by the Secretaries only from Berlin and Paris did not we think make the recommendation attributed to them by the Under Secretary of State though quite possibly the Ambassador from Rome in a minority of one made the recommendation in the sense suggested.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
February 28th, 1939.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS LE HAND:

The British Ambassador advises that in his conversation with the President, yesterday afternoon, he forgot to say that he hopes the program of the King and Queen will not be released or anything pertaining to it given out for publication until there has been an opportunity to submit it to the King and to obtain his approval.

This for the President's information.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am sending you the confidential message from Lord Halifax which I have just received from the British Ambassador.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From the British Embassy, March 21, 1939.

The President,

The White House.
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.

The Rumanian Minister told me on March 17th that he understood that the Rumanian Government had been asked by the German Government to agree to give the latter a monopoly of Rumanian exports and to accept measures of industrial restriction inside Rumania in German interests. On this basis Germany would guarantee the Rumanian frontier.

The Rumanian Government, he said, were disposed to regard this as in the nature of an ultimatum though I understand that on their refusal to accept these terms further terms had been suggested.

The Rumanian Minister, emphasising the extreme urgency, proceeded to ask whether His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be able to give a precise indication of their position in the event of Rumania becoming the victim of German aggression. He enquired whether it would make it easier for His Majesty's Government to do this if Poland and Rumania agreed to make the treaty provisions between them clearly applicable as against German aggression and if the Balkan Entente proclaimed their joint determination to guarantee each other's frontier.

I told the Minister that I should report what he had said urgently to the Prime Minister and

my/

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
my colleagues but that I anticipated that an essential element in their judgment would be the knowledge, if it could be supplied, of what in fact would be the attitude of the Polish, Turkish, Greek and Yugoslav Governments in the circumstances foreshadowed.

His Majesty's Representatives in these four countries were then instructed urgently to sound the governments to which they are accredited. His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow was also instructed to inform the Soviet Government of the Rumanian démarche and to enquire whether they could give any indication that they would, if requested by the Rumanian Government, actively help the latter to resist German aggression. His Majesty's Government also consulted the French Government with a view to concerting policy.

Subsequent information has cast doubt on the accuracy of the account given by the Rumanian Minister of what had passed between the German and Rumanian Governments. None the less His Majesty's Government have thought it essential in view of the situation resulting from the German action in Czechoslovakia to pursue their enquiries in the capitals chiefly concerned. They have therefore instructed His Majesty's Representatives in Paris, Moscow and Warsaw in the following terms:-

In spite of doubts as to the accuracy of reports of a German ultimatum to Rumania, the recent
German absorption of Czechoslovakia shows clearly that the German Government are resolved to go beyond their hitherto avowed aim of the consolidation of the German race. They have now extended their conquest to another nation and if this should prove to be part of a definite policy of domination there is no state in Europe which is not directly or ultimately threatened.

In the circumstances thus created it seems to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to be desirable to proceed without delay to the organisation of mutual support on the part of all those who realise the necessity of protecting international society from further violation of the fundamental laws on which it rests.

As a first step, they propose that the French, Soviet and Polish Governments should join with His Majesty’s Government in signing and publishing a declaration the terms of which they suggest should be on the following lines:

"We the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, hereby declare that inasmuch as peace and security in Europe are a matter of common interest and concern, and since European peace and security may be affected by any action which constitutes a threat to the political independence of any European state, our respective Governments hereby undertake immediately to consult together as to what steps should be taken to offer joint resistance to any such action."

It/
It appears to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that publication of such a declaration would in itself be a valuable contribution to the stability of Europe and we should propose that publication should be followed by an examination by the signatories of any specific situation which requires it with a view to determining the nature of any action which might be taken.

Please endeavour immediately to obtain the views respectively of the French, Soviet and Polish Governments. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared to sign the declaration immediately the three other Governments indicated their readiness to do so.

Instructions in the above sense have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Moscow and Warsaw. His Majesty's Representatives in Athens, Bucharest, Angora, Belgrade, Cairo, Lisbon and Bagdad have also been informed of the position and told that His Majesty's Government propose that nothing shall be said to the Governments to which they are accredited until the French, Soviet and Polish Governments have agreed with His Majesty's Government on the declaration. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin has also been informed of the position.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.

---------------------------

His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest was assured on March 20th by King Carol that there had at no moment been any question of a German ultimatum although there was much that was unpalatable in German proposals. King Carol stated that Roumania would resist German pressure but could not do so indefinitely without support. King Carol hesitated however to give His Majesty's Minister detailed information of the German proposals. Roumanian General Staff also remained worried at the news of mobilisation preparations in Germany and troop movements in Czechoslovakia which they consider greater than are warranted by recent events. They are convinced that Hungary would not resist passage of German troops through that country.

Preliminary replies have now been received to the enquiries mentioned in paragraph 5 of Lord Halifax's message of March 21st. The Greek Prime Minister stated that in the event of aggression against Roumania, Greece would fulfill her obligations under the Balkan Pact. As regards the guarantee of the Roumanian frontier, which went beyond limits of the Balkan Pact, Greece would examine objectively and in collaboration with Turkey and Yugoslavia any Roumanian proposal, while taking deep account of eventual attitude of Great Britain and France. In

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
his view everything depended on Yugoslavia since without its support it would be impossible for Greece and Turkey to guarantee military assistance to Roumania.

The Prince-Regent of Yugoslavia in his turn made a similar enquiry regarding the intentions of His Majesty's Government. He expressed surprise that the Roumanian Government had not approached him and subsequently confirmed that no ultimatum had been presented to the latter.

The Turkish reply also states that no communication had been received from Roumanian Government but that the Turkish Government would study in a friendly spirit any proposal His Majesty's Government might wish to make and would carry out their obligations under Balkan Entente.

The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs also doubted whether an ultimatum had been delivered and stated that if so he would have to go into the question fully with his own Government and the Roumanian Government before expressing any view.

The Soviet Government have replied expressing surprise that the Roumanian Government had not approached them but proposing a conference of British, Soviet, French, Polish, Roumanian and Turkish representatives.

The French reply states that their information generally agrees with that received by His Majesty's Government. They were making enquiries of the Polish, Yugoslav and Soviet Governments whose replies would have an important bearing but they considered it to be the last obstacle to the triumph of German Imperialism and therefore declared themselves ready/
ready to assist Roumania if she were the object of German aggression. The question of assistance was however dependent on common Franco-British resistance and the French Government were therefore ready to collaborate with His Majesty's Government in an examination of concerted action. His Majesty's Minister at Paris was assured verbally that France would go to Roumania's assistance irrespective of Polish, Yugoslav and Soviet replies.

The above views represent the reactions to our first enquiries based on the Roumanian Minister's disquieting information regarding German-Roumanian economic negotiations as described in the opening paragraphs of Lord Halifax's message of March 21st. No final replies have yet been received to the later proposal (summarized in paragraphs 6 to 12 of Lord Halifax's message of March 21st) which relates not only to aggression against Roumania but to any action threatening independence of any European state.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 25, 1939.

I enclose herewith a further message from Lord Halifax received through the British Ambassador.
March 25th,

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I enclose herein a further message for the President from Lord Halifax regarding the European situation.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) R.C. Lindsay.

The Honourable

Cordell Hull,

Department of State,

Washington, D.C.
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have now received the final replies of the French and Soviet Governments to the proposals summarized in my message of March 21st. They have also received a preliminary indication of the views of the Polish Government.

The Soviet reply expresses agreement and accepts the text of the proposed declaration which the Soviet Government will sign as soon as France and Poland have accepted. The Soviet Government are anxious that not only the Balkan but also the Baltic and Scandinavian countries should be invited to adhere after publication.

The French reply expresses entire assent. In conversation with the Prime Minister and myself in London the French Minister for Foreign Affairs has however emphasized the importance of Polish participation and the difficulty of securing this in view of Soviet participation.

The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Warsaw on March 21st that the proposal demanded very serious consideration. His chief preoccupation was the suggested participation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in view of which Polish participation/
participation would definitely range Poland in the Soviet camp against Germany. He has instructed the Polish Ambassador in London to propose that His Majesty's Government and the Polish Government should enter into a secret agreement of consultation on the lines of the suggested declaration. This would not however prejudice any official decision regarding the declaration on which he would communicate the views of his Government later. Nor would it affect the position of France as the existing Franco-Polish treaty already contains a consultative clause. His Majesty's Ambassador at Warsaw has suggested that publication with Polish consent might be possible if Poland were assured that the Western Powers contemplated effective and immediate steps to resist German aggression.

The present difficulty is therefore to reconcile the Polish and the Soviet positions.

Extensive mobilization measures have been undertaken in Hungary and Roumania and although both Governments deny any aggressive intentions the position is dangerous. The Roumanian army now has approximately 450,000 men under arms. His Majesty's Government and the French Government are doing their best to urge moderation and demobilization in Budapest and Bucharest and the Polish Government appear to be very active in this direction. The Polish Government have invited categorical assurances from the Hungarian Government that they have no bellicose intentions towards Roumania and the Hungarian military authorities/
authorities have categorically stated that no negotiations are proceeding between Hungary and the German Government regarding the passage of German troops through Hungary.

I informed the Turkish Ambassador generally of our proposals for a joint four-Power declaration on March 21st. Emphasizing that he was speaking with full knowledge of the policy of the Turkish Government, the Turkish Ambassador replied that they would be prepared to go all lengths with Great Britain if assured of British support and of direct British assistance if they were themselves attacked in the Mediterranean. This attitude was unconditional regardless of the Polish and Russian replies. Apart from this Turkey would in all cases observe all her existing treaty obligations.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
March 25th, 1939.
Paris, March 23, 1939

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to submit herewith to the Chief of State in accordance with his request made to me at Warm Springs, Georgia, the recommendations as to the personal needs of Their Royal Majesties, George VI and Elizabeth, King and Queen, By the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, King and Queen Defender of the Faith, Emperor and Empress of India.

I may add that my most onerous diplomatic labor since reaching Paris has been the extraction of these recommendations and that I expect you to decorate me at once with the Order of the Royal Bathtub.

I ask for this particular decoration because the President of the French Republic, at vast expense, had installed in the Palais d'Orsay for the reception of

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
Washington, D. C.
Their Royal Majesties two superb bathrooms containing mosaic tubs with gold faucets which, during the stay of Their Royal Majesties, were never once used!

I may add that it has been indicated to me by the Government of the French Republic that the preferences of Their Majesties in the way of wines do not go beyond Veuve Clicquot and Pommery-Greno champagne of the best years. I have, therefore, prepared against the arrival of Their Majesties in Washington, one hundred bottles of Pommery-Greno, 1928, which I shall be glad to place at your disposal provided the situation in Europe should seem to indicate that there may be some chance of Their Royal Majesties going to America. My parsimony is motivated by the fact that the grand smash seems fairly imminent. I prefer, therefore, to restrain the departure of these bottles until my next departure for the United States in the hope that we may drink them together.

With my profound obeisances, I am,
Your humble and obedient servant,

[Signature]

Enclosure
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FURNISHING OF HER MAJESTY'S ROOM.

Large bed
No bolster - two pillows
Bed cushion supplied by Her Majesty's maid
Light, but warm, blankets with a silk cover
No eider down coverlet - a soft silk cover folded in four on the foot of the bed, with one corner turned up.

Bedside table with lamp.

Bathroom

A large dressing-table, or a table for the bottles.
Four glasses, one of which is graduated.
Bathrobe type of bath towel.
Quantities of hand towels.
Basket for putting linen after use.
Bath thermometer.
Several spoons, large and small.

Dressing-room or Boudoir

Dressing-table perfectly lighted day and night, with armchair of corresponding height.
Near the dressing-table a small table with drawers for hairdressing and toilet articles. This table should be easily removable.

Very comfortable settee with soft linen blanket.
One or two ash trays and matches for the King. The King does not smoke.

On the desk:
inkstand with blue ink
thin penholder with "J" pen (or similar make) of medium size
red pencil
blue pencil
ordinary black pencils with very sharp points
ordinary, and typewriter erasers.
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FURNISHING OF HIS MAJESTY'S BEDROOM.

Large bed "de milieu" (in center of panel) with the bed against the wall. (Never with the side along the wall.)

No bolster - two pillows.

Special bolster supplied by His Majesty's valet.

Warm, but light, blankets, with a silk cover.

Very soft eider down quilt, which can be accordion-pleated at the foot of the bed.

On each side of the bed a bedside table with a lamp.

In the bathroom or bedroom (according to possibility) and preferably in a window recess on account of light, a dressing table with a triple mirror, high enough to enable contemplating oneself when standing.

Very comfortable settee.

Ash trays, matches, cigars, and cigarettes for the guests, His Majesty having his own cigarettes.

Great number of hangers: some of them very wide with the back slightly curved; others with a double bar for trousers; no special clip hangers for trousers.

On the desk an inkstand with two inkwells: one full of blue-black, the other of red ink.

-----------------

No towelled bathrobe. His Majesty prefers large bath towels.

-----------------

To be ready to supply, if requested, garnet-red and white carnations for boutonnières.

-----------------
MESSAGE FOR THE PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF
THE PRESIDENT.

The situation as His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom see it is that the absorption
of Czechoslovakia has clearly revealed Germany's
intentions. It marks the first departure from the
Nazi racial theory and there is little reason to
suppose that it is not Germany's intention to extend
over other countries in Europe, notably Rumania and
Poland, a control equivalent to that obtained over
Czechoslovakia.

It is of importance to Germany to avoid a
war on two fronts and her recent behaviour has
stiffened the attitude at any rate of Poland and
created strong apprehension in other countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. It is Germany's purpose
gradually to neutralize these countries, to deprive
them of their power of resistance and to incorporate
them in the German economic system.

When this has been done the way will have
been prepared for an attack on the Western European
Powers.

Germany may seek to achieve her aims
directly by way of military attack, or indirectly by
undermining the independence of other countries by
economic penetration or national disintegration or
threat of force.

His Majesty's Government in the United

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Kingdom/
Kingdom have and are still engaged in consultation with a number of other governments on the present situation which is one of grave potential menace to the countries of Western Europe and of the whole British Commonwealth.

The policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has been described by the Prime Minister in his statement in the House of Commons on March 23rd as follows: "I wish to make it clear however that there is no desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to stand in the way of any reasonable efforts on the part of Germany to expand her export trade. Nor is this Government anxious to set up in Europe opposing blocs of countries with differing ideas about the forms of their internal administration. We are solely concerned here with the proposition that we cannot submit to a procedure under which independent States are subjected to such pressure under a threat of force as to be obliged to yield up their independence and we are resolved by all the means in our power to oppose attempts if they should be made to put such a procedure into operation."

The purpose of the consultations upon which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are engaged is to fortify by as wide a measure of international collaboration as may be achieved the natural resistance which States are bound to offer to attempts that may be made to constrain them directly or indirectly to yield up their independence.
At the recent conversations with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in London general agreement was reached between the French Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as to the best course of action to adopt in view of the reluctance of the Polish Government to accept the proposed four-Power declaration.

Instructions have accordingly been drafted for His Majesty's Ambassador at Warsaw and His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest prescribing the lines of an approach they are to make to the Polish and the Rumanian Governments.

The purpose of these instructions is given in an appendix to the present message. The intention is that approach to the Polish and Rumanian Governments should be made in similar terms by the British and the French representatives at Warsaw and Bucharest. The terms of these instructions have been submitted to the French Government for their assent and if the French Government agree the British and the French representatives at Warsaw and Bucharest will be requested to act accordingly.

It has been pointed out to the French Government that the Soviet Government while not associated directly with the proposed arrangements would be kept in touch with developments and invited to undertake to lend their assistance in certain circumstances in the most convenient form; and His Majesty's/
Enquiries in the various capitals concerned have shown that it will not be possible to proceed without modification with the proposed four-Power declaration. While the French Government have accepted the proposal and while the Soviet Government have accepted, subject to acceptance by France and Poland, the Polish Government are reluctant to associate themselves with the Soviet Union in a public declaration of this kind.

It is becoming clear that our attempt to consolidate the situation will be frustrated if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is openly associated with the initiation of the scheme. Recent reports from a number of His Majesty's Missions abroad have warned us that the inclusion of Russia would not only jeopardize the success of our constructive effort but would tend to consolidate the relations of the parties to the Anti-Comintern Pact as well as to excite anxiety amongst a number of friendly governments.

Some alternative method of approach must therefore be sought. In any scheme the inclusion/
inclusion of Poland is justifiable as one of the strong Powers bordering on Germany in the East and the inclusion of Rumania is also of the first importance since Rumania may be the state primarily menaced by Germany's plans for eastern expansion.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have therefore decided to make an approach to the Polish and Rumanian Governments in the following sense:—

(a) Germany may either direct attack on Poland or Rumania or may undermine either country's independence whether by processes of economic penetration or national disintegration as in the case of Czechoslovakia or by indirect military pressure which in the case of Rumania might take the form of Hungarian troop concentrations. Are Poland and Rumania respectively prepared actively to resist if their own independence is threatened in any of these ways?

(b) If so, Great Britain and France would be prepared to come to the help of the threatened State. It would be understood that as a counterpart for an undertaking by Great Britain and France to support Poland and Rumania, Poland and Rumania would keep Great Britain and France fully and promptly informed of any developments threatening their independence.

(c)
(c) The assurance offered in (b) is dependent upon Poland coming to the help of Rumania if the latter is the State threatened. We should wish to know whether Rumania would be prepared to come to the help of Poland if the latter were the State threatened.

(d) (Present section (d) of the communication is to be made to the Polish Government only since Poland, unlike Rumania, has a treaty of mutual assistance with France and is a stronger military power than Rumania). The undertaking given by Great Britain and France under (b) would be given as part of a reciprocal arrangement by which if Great Britain or France were attacked by Germany or if they went to war with Germany to resist German aggression anywhere in Western Europe or Yugo-Slavia, Poland would come to their help.

If the position of Poland and Rumania can be consolidated Turkey and Greece could more easily be rallied to the common cause and would more likely be able to make an effective contribution.

It is important that the Polish and Rumanian Governments should be made aware of the manner in which we would preserve the interest of the Soviet Union in this scheme. The intention would be at some convenient moment in the discussions to explain to the Soviet Government that it was proposed in the first place to proceed with the Governments of the two countries nearer to Germany/
Germany and most likely to be affected by a potentially dangerous situation. In the event of an attack on Poland or Rumania there would be good reasons on the merits of the case for trying to secure some measure of Soviet participation. We believe that even the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet would be to the advantage of these two countries in case of war and that they might indeed be grateful in an emergency to have at their disposal such war material as the Soviet industry would be in a position to furnish. We are disposed in the first place to ascertain the views of the Soviet Government as to their likely attitude to this market. It is important not to reinforce their tendency towards isolation and we propose to consider in due course how best to retain their close interest which is after all to their own general advantage.

It is essential of course that the present approach to the Polish and Rumanian Governments should be kept secret as well as any negotiations that may follow it. Once however agreement has been secured it would be necessary for constitutional reasons that some statement should be made in Parliament. His Majesty's Government would at any rate have to state in public the assurances which they had given to the Polish and Rumanian Governments. It is possible that/
that the Polish Government might be reluctant to agree to make public such counter-assurances as they would have given us but His Majesty's Government would certainly be pressed to say whether any such counter-assurance had been given and they would very much hope to be in a position to announce the fact.

Your French colleague will receive similar instructions and you should after consulting him speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of the present telegram.
MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. SUMMERLIN

I have talked with Governor Lehman, Mayor LaGuardia and Dr. Butler on the telephone and you can now go ahead and make arrangements with them.

F. D. R.
Memo for Mr. Jewett

Mr. Summerlin

Thought perhaps the President should this called to his attention before going for Warm Springs.
March 27, 1939.

Memorandum for Colonel Watson:

In drawing up detailed plans in connection with the visit of the King and Queen of Great Britain, we have come to the matter of visiting "The Battery" in New York City.

In one of the conferences the President stated that he would get in touch with Governor Lehman and Mayor LaGuardia about the kind of ceremony to be held, but last Thursday the President indicated that he had not yet written to these officials, and he intimated that he might have them come to Washington for a short conference in regard to the matter. Possibly the President might wish to telephone the Governor and the Mayor.

Also, we know nothing as yet about the ceremony to take place at Columbia University, in honor of the King and the Queen, on the afternoon of June 10th.

George T. Summerlin.
MESSAGE FROM LORD HALIFAX FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.

We do not regard Hitler's speech at Wilhelmshaven as at all reassuring and all our information goes to show that he is irritated with us for our efforts to organise a common resistance against his aggressive policy.

The German press warns us that Germany intends to take preventive action against the so-called "encirclement policy" of England. One newspaper even maintains that our "effort...to confine Germany's living space through alliances with smaller states is an unprovoked attack by Britain on German freedom and equality of rights".

Our Embassy at Berlin inform us that the attitude of the press accurately reflects Hitler's frame of mind. They add that they learn from a reliable source that the first sign of German intentions which will be kept secret until the last moment will be a lightning attack on the British fleet with the object of delivering a knock-out blow. There will be neither an ultimatum nor a declaration of war but Hitler alone will decide the time for action and will personally issue the vital order without consulting his military advisers.

We are arranging to take suitable precautionary measures.

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
April 5th, 1939.
Dear Mr. President,

I am enclosing herewith a most secret report of British aviation and their estimate of German aviation. Sir Kingsley Wood, after talking with the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax, decided to send this on to you for your own personal information. No one, not even the members of the Cabinet, has this information in detail.

Sir Kingsley Wood wished you to have it for your own information, so that you would have a more complete idea of what was going on here.

I have not given it to anybody in this office, nor have I shown it to any of the Army or Navy Officials. No copy is being made and I am not advising anybody that you have it.

All this is at their request.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM ON THE BRITISH AND GERMAN AIR PROGRAMMES

1. The German Programme

Details of the German air programme are a well kept secret. Nevertheless, a wide variety of information is available to the Air Ministry from which it is possible to form certain deductions. By a process of checking and cross checking a reasonably firm estimate can be made of the first line strengths of the present German Air Force, and a forecast - necessarily more conjectural - of future intentions.

2. The Air Ministry believe that the first line strength of the German Air Force on the 1st April 1939 was approximately 3,750 aircraft. They also believe that, unless there is some radical change in German plans, the first line strength in February 1940 will not exceed 4,500 aircraft. It is believed to be the German aim to hold 100% of modern reserves behind this first line. These estimates are believed to be reliable; they fit in with the available evidence and they have been duly correlated with figures of present and estimated future German aircraft production.

3. The Air Ministry have made a detailed analysis of the very considerable mass of information available about German aircraft production. On the basis of the most up-to-date information in their possession the Air Ministry believe that the rate of production of all types of aircraft for the German Air Force (a figure which is generally exaggerated by visitors to Germany) probably averaged 700 per month during 1938 and that a monthly average of 900 to 1,000 may be achieved in 1939. As the output of first line types represents about two-thirds of

* See note at end of Paper.
the total production of all types for the German Air Force the above output amounts to about 7,500 first line types during the year. With such an output of first line types it would be possible to raise the first line strength to the 4,500 mentioned in paragraph 2, to re-equip 50% of the existing first line and to raise the reserve to about 100% modern types as well as meeting normal wastage requirements.

4. **British policy vis-à-vis the German air threat**

The policy adopted by the British Government to meet the situation brought about by the expansion of German and other air armaments was explained to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Air on 10th November, 1938. The Secretary of State described our objective as an Air Force adequate for our necessities: our necessities, as previously defined by the Prime Minister, being the protection of the United Kingdom, preservation of the trade routes, defence of British territories overseas, and co-operation in the defence of the territories of our Allies in case of war. The Secretary of State added that the policy aimed at producing a sound and balanced force for war, adequate for our strategic necessities and with the depth behind it to enable it to sustain its efforts should we be attacked.

5. **It is clear from this definition that the British Government do not regard parity of numbers of first line aircraft as a satisfactory test of what is adequate for a sound air defence.** The test of parity in first line has, in fact, no strategic basis, a formidable first line, lacking depth, is no more than a facade which will melt and disappear under conditions of war wastage*. Again, the strength of the aircraft required in the different categories will vary widely from one

---

* A war wastage rate of 50% per month can be regarded as normal
country to another. A country dependent upon its trade routes must provide large numbers of aircraft for trade defence: another country with large land forces must devote a correspondingly large proportion of its aircraft to Army Co-operation duties. Even a numerical comparison of bomber forces will be misleading unless due weight is given to such factors as range and bomb load. In fact, in comparing bomber forces total bomb-lift is probably a better yardstick than numerical strength. These considerations show that the problem of defining what is necessary for an adequate air defence system is not one to be resolved by a simple reference to numbers of first line aircraft; and this fact should be taken into account in connexion with the outline of the British programme set out below.

6. The British Programme.

By the spring of 1940 the Metropolitan Air Force will have reached a strength of 2,370 first line aircraft. Behind this first line there will be reserves amounting to nearly 150%, and all aircraft (including reserves) will be of modern types. The first line will be organized in 138 squadrons: 70 bomber squadrons, 48 fighter squadrons, and 28 squadrons of Army Co-operation and General Reconnaissance aircraft. In addition some 47 Balloon Barrage squadrons will have been created.

By the same date the Royal Air Force abroad will consist of some 500 first line aircraft stationed at the vital strategic points on the Empire trade routes. The overseas squadrons will also be equipped with war reserves.

Mention should also be made of the Fleet Air Arm which is expected to reach a first line strength of about 500 early in 1940. The exact strength will, however, depend on the rate of commissioning of ships.
Implementing the programme.

(a) Aircraft and Engines.

One of the great difficulties of expansion has been that the dictator countries were able to plan their programmes in secret, with the result that, by the time their full intentions had become apparent, they had received a valuable start. A vast programme designed to overcome this serious handicap has been planned and is now making rapid progress. In 1934, when expansion began, there were 15 aircraft firms and 4 engine firms producing material for the Air Ministry. In addition to these firms — and apart from the very large expansion effected in their own capacity — there are today 13 government factories manufacturing aircraft, engines, airscrews, carburettors and bombs, while the general basis of production has been immensely broadened by introducing into the field of aircraft production such large engineering enterprises as Vickers-Armstrong, Associated Electrical Industries, John Brown and Company, Messrs. Harland and Wolff, Messrs. Denny Bros., and the English Electric Company. Use is also being made of some thousands of firms for sub-contracting work for aircraft production, designed to cover 35% as a minimum, of the total man-hours involved in construction. An indication of the extent to which the basis of airframe production has been expanded, can be obtained from the following figures of employment:

Men engaged in the airframe industry, including sub-contracting, on the following dates:

- January 1936.............30,000
- January 1937.............40,000
- January 1938.............50,000
- January 1939.............90,000
- January 1940.............170,000 (estimate)

/(excluding)
(excluding men employed in the production of engines, equipment and fittings).

To achieve the necessary level of production the number of types of aircraft in production has been reduced to a minimum and a new system adopted whereby groups of firms concentrate on particular types.

(b) Dominion and foreign production

Apart from the above sources of production in the United Kingdom arrangements have been made to develop production capacity in Canada, where orders have been placed with the Canadian Associated Aircraft Ltd. and the Canadian Car & Foundry Co., and negotiations with a third firm are proceeding. An Air Ministry Mission is at present visiting Australia and New Zealand with the purpose of negotiating similar arrangements. An order has also been placed in the United States of America with the object of overcoming deficiencies in certain training and reconnaissance types.

(c) Deliveries and Orders.

The drastic measures taken to increase the basis of aircraft production referred to earlier in this Note are now starting to produce their full effect. The rate of production is at present in the neighbourhood of 700 per month and is expected to approach 1,000 per month towards the end of the year. For some months past actual deliveries have tended to outstrip production forecasts and estimates of future production may therefore be regarded as reliable. The total number of military aircraft of all types on order by the Air Ministry (or for which orders have been authorised) is in excess of 20,000. Of this number it is anticipated that some 9,000 will be delivered during the financial year 1939.
(d) War Potential

While the increase in production now being effected constitute what is virtually an exercise in production on a war scale, the quantities of airframes, engines and equipment of all kinds estimated to be required to meet wastage in war naturally represent an even greater production problem. Accordingly in the development and creation of productive capacity for the current programme, close attention has been given to the war supply problem and allowance made for the greater demands for war. Plans are being developed not only for increasing the productive capacity of the professional industry and its present outside helpers, but also for securing the assistance of further outside organisations. Perhaps the most important factor in obtaining an immediate increase in production on the outbreak of war is the existence of adequate jigs and tools. To this end, orders have been placed for additional jigs and tools for the new types coming into production, thus providing in advance, what, in effect, would be an essential instrument for additional war potential. Other steps that have been taken in this direction include the duplication of existing factories that are located in vulnerable situations, and the provision of increased capacity for the production of light metal strip and sheet, which will represent a 50% increase of the total estimated British output of aluminium alloys.

(e) Personnel.

One of the most remarkable features of the expansion has been the response to the recruiting programme. In 1934 the strength of the regular air force was some 30,500, of whom 2,900 were trained pilots and 300 were under training as pilots. By the Spring of this year the corresponding figures will be
104,000, including 6,800 trained pilots and 1,650 under training as pilots; and by the Spring of 1940 it is estimated that the strength will be 130,000, of whom 8,300 will be trained pilots and 1,650 under training as pilots. Service flying training is already being undertaken at over 40 civil and service schools. Great assistance has been afforded by the Dominions in the matter of candidates for flying posts in the Royal Air Force. Substantial progress has also been made in the vital matter of building up an adequate reserve of pilots. The total of reserve pilots (including pilots under training) has been raised from 1,400 in April, 1934 to a present level of roughly 5,000, while a strength of 8,300 will be achieved by April, 1940. In addition some 4,000 pupils are at present undergoing training in the Civil Air Guard, and the total by April 1940, should be at least 5,000.

Apart from pilots, all classes of the reserves are being strengthened and new categories created where necessary. The total personnel reserves of all classes (including Auxiliary personnel), which numbered some 10,600 in 1934, will have been raised to nearly 96,000 by 1940.

(f) The post-1940 programme

Further stages of the programme, in the financial years 1940 and 1941, although making only a relatively small change in first line strength will profoundly increase the war strength of the force. During these two years there will be a concentration on re-armament with new and more powerful types of aircraft and the provision of yet greater depth of reserves. At the end of the period the Metropolitan Air Force will possess a hitting power and endurance out of all proportion to the Force which will exist in 1940.
Cost of the Programme.

An index of the magnitude of the effort now being made is afforded by comparison of the level of Air expenditure in successive financial years, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>(pre-Expansion)</td>
<td>16$\frac{1}{4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>(Scheme A)</td>
<td>17$\frac{3}{4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>(Scheme C)</td>
<td>27$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>(Scheme F)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td></td>
<td>81$\frac{3}{4}$ *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>(Scheme L)</td>
<td>126$\frac{1}{2}$ (estimated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>(Present Scheme)</td>
<td>208$\frac{1}{2}$ (estimated)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including a proportion from the Defence Loan.
NOTE ON FIRST LINE STRENGTH

As the term "first line strength" is employed in different senses by different authorities it is necessary to define the sense in which the phrase is employed in the foregoing memorandum and elsewhere in Air Ministry announcements.

The aircraft provided for a Royal Air Force squadron fall into four categories:-(1) the Initial Equipment aircraft, (2) the Immediate Reserve, (3) the Workshop Reserve, and (4) the Stored Reserve. Only "Initial Equipment" aircraft are operated, and the various categories of reserves are maintained to ensure that the "Initial Equipment" is kept up to establishment in peace and war. Thus the "Immediate Reserve" represents a reserve of aircraft kept with a squadron to make good loss by crashes, etc; the "Workshop Reserve", as the name implies, that margin of aircraft which experience shows will normally be under repair at any one time. Finally, the "Stored Reserve" is the provision made to meet war wastage until such time as it is covered by war production.

The "Initial Equipment" of a squadron is thus its "first line"; and all other aircraft which are provided for the squadron, though identical in type with the initial equipment aircraft, have no other function than to preserve the first line intact against wastage. The first line strength of a squadron is thus the number of initial equipment aircraft it possesses - a number standardised for each type of squadron. The first line strength of the whole Air Force is the aggregate of the initial equipment of all operational squadrons. The first line strength thus excludes reserves of all categories and training aircraft of all categories.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Warm Springs, Ga.,
April 7, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. SUMMERLIN

Will you speak to me
about this?

F. D. R.
April 4, 1939

To The President
White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

It was most kind of you to take the trouble to telephone me yesterday evening from Warm Springs to tell me of the arrangements you are making for the visit of the King and Queen to New York City and to Columbia University. The arrangements as you have outlined them seem wholly admirable and we shall do our best to meet your wishes and expectations. The plan you propose for the reception at Columbia University is ideal. Granted good weather, the occasion may well be a memorable one to record and to remember.

As I said by telephone, it is particularly appropriate that Their Majesties should come to Columbia since this corporation was founded by Royal Charter under date of October 31, 1754, as King's College in the Province of New York. Their Majesties may see not only the original Charter but the iron King's Crown which accompanied it, a reproduction of which we so often use upon our official publications and stationery. Everything can readily be accomplished in fifteen minutes as you propose and there-
fore there will be no appreciable delay in Their Majesties' motor trip from the World's Fair to Hyde Park.

I assume that the Protocol Division of the State Department will keep me advised if additional information reaches them or in case there should be any change whatever in the arrangement.

It occurs to me to suggest that perhaps it might be pleasant for Their Majesties to leave the West Side Parkway at 72nd Street and then to drive east into Central Park at the 72nd Street entrance, swinging around southward and then northward on the east side of the Park, until they should leave it at 110th Street and Lenox Avenue, at which point they would swing over toward the East River to take the Triborough Bridge to the World's Fair. This little detour would not take more than five to eight minutes but would show them Central Park in its best early summer guise, and would bring them near enough to many of the distinguished high buildings of that portion of the city to give a pretty vivid impression of them. The drive east through 110th Street would, I fear, be a rather tiresome alternative as there would be practically nothing characteristic of the city for Their Majesties to see.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
June 20, 1939.

My dear Dr. Butler:

Thank you very much for your letter of June twelfth concerning the visit to Columbia University of Their Majesties the King and Queen of Great Britain.

I had heard that all had gone splendidly concerning their visit there, and am glad to have this confirmation.

May I take this occasion to express my appreciation of your fine contribution to the success of the visit.

Very sincerely yours,

Nicholas Murray Butler, Ph.D.,
President, Columbia University,
New York, New York.
June 12, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

You will be glad to know that the visit to Columbia University on Saturday last of Their Majesties, the King and Queen of Great Britain, was quite perfect in every detail. The very admirable and entirely representative audience assembled in honor of Their Majesties was deeply moved, and the impression produced will last through the lifetime of each one of them.

You and the country as a whole are to be congratulated upon the significance of this royal visit. It goes far beneath the surface of things. It indicates that deep down in the heart and life of the American people there is profound respect and affection for the great political traditions of the English-speaking peoples, which are in all essentials our own.

With renewed congratulations and every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
1. As a result of conversations held in London on April 4th to April 6th, 1939 between the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the one side and the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the other the Polish Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom record the following conclusions:

I.

2. The Polish Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have decided to place their collaboration on a permanent basis by the exchange of reciprocal assurances of assistance. They are accordingly prepared to enter into a formal agreement on the following basis:

a. If Germany attacks Poland His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will at once come to the help of Poland;

b. If Germany attempts to undermine the independence of Poland by processes of economic penetration or in any other way His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will support Poland in resistance to such attempts. If Germany then attacks Poland the provisions of paragraph (a) above will apply. In the event of other action by Germany which clearly threatened Polish independence and was of such a nature that the Polish Government considered it vital to resist it with their national forces His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom/
Kingdom would at once come to the help of Poland;

c. Poland reciprocally gives corresponding assurances to the United Kingdom;

d. It is understood that the Polish Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will keep each other fully and promptly informed of any developments threatening the independence of either country.

3. As an earnest of their intention to enter into a formal agreement to render assistance to Poland in the circumstances contemplated above His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have informed the Polish Government and have stated publicly that during the period required for the conclusion of the formal agreement outlined in paragraph 2 above in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.

4. The Polish Government for their part give His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a reciprocal undertaking to the same effect which is, in the same way as the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government, already in force and will remain in force during the period required for the conclusion of the formal agreement outlined in paragraph 2 above.
II.

5. The following points remain to be settled before the formal agreement can be concluded:

a. His Majesty's Government desire that the formal agreement should provide that if the United Kingdom and France went to war with Germany to resist German aggression in Western Europe (the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark) Poland would come to their help. (M. Beck appreciated the vital importance of this question for the United Kingdom and undertook that the Polish Government would take it into serious consideration.)

b. The obligations which His Majesty's Government have accepted towards Poland during the period necessary for the conclusion of formal agreement have also been accepted by France. It is understood that the obligations to be accepted by His Majesty's Government in the formal agreement itself should also be accepted by France; the method of arranging for this would be a matter for discussion with the French Government.

III.

6. His Majesty's Government wished it to be part of the formal agreement that Poland should come to the help of Rumania if the latter were the State threatened. The Polish Government, while respecting to the full the obligations of mutual assistance which exist between Poland and Rumania, thought it premature to express a definite opinion as to the desirability of including the case of Rumania in the formal agreement. They consider that they should
treat the matter in the first instance directly with the Rumanian Government and the Hungarian Government. They will in the meantime immediately consult His Majesty's Government should developments in relation to Rumania or Hungary render this desirable.

IV.

7. It is understood between the Polish Government and His Majesty's Government that the conclusions recorded above do not preclude either Government from making further agreements with other countries for the purpose of safeguarding their own independence or that of other States.

8. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for their part:

a. to continue the exchange of views which they have already initiated with the Rumanian Government with the object of developing collaboration between the United Kingdom and Rumania and other powers for the purposes set forth above;

b. to initiate exchanges of views for a similar purpose with the Governments of other members of the Balkan Entente.

9. His Majesty's Government while realizing the difficulties standing in the way of associating the Soviet Government with action such as is contemplated above are further persuaded of the importance of maintaining the best possible relations with the Soviet Government whose position in this matter could not be disregarded.

10. The Polish Government for their part declare/
declare that should His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume further obligations in Eastern Europe these obligations would in no way extend the obligations undertaken by Poland.

11. The Polish Government emphasize the importance, in the consideration of any attempt to develop collaboration, of taking into account the position of the Eastern Baltic States.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

April 8th, 1939.
ASK UNDERSECRETARY WELLES AND MR. SUMMERLIN

The President would like to order five sets of his books in sheets, have them specially bound in full morocco with the seal of the country or the royal family and the Presidential seal both on the front cover. He would like to give them to the two Crown Princes, the President of Nicaragua, President de Valera and the King. What do you think of the idea, the State Department to pay for them. Also Mrs. Roosevelt to have one of her books specially bound for the Crown Princesses, Madame Samoza, Mrs. de Valera (?) and the Queen.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

May 16, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PUBLIC PRINTER

The enclosed is what we are going to use on the books for the King and Queen. For the set of the President's books you will use the Crown with G. R. I. underneath it and for the Queen's book - THIS IS MY STORY - you will use the Crown with E. R. underneath it. You will note how they arrange the initials.

I hope this is clear.

Many thanks,
MEMORANDUM

June 3, 1939

Miss Tully,
The White House.

In answer to your request for our suggestions concerning inscriptions to be used on the book the President is to present to King George VI, and on the book Mrs. Roosevelt is to present to Queen Elizabeth, I would suggest that for the King's book the President use either "To George VI from his Good Friend," or "To my Good Friend George VI with my warm and sincere greetings."

For the Queen's book, I would suggest that Mrs. Roosevelt use "To Queen Elizabeth from Eleanor Roosevelt," or "To Queen Elizabeth with sincere greetings from Eleanor Roosevelt."

George T. Summerlin
LONDON.--PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN ANNOUNCED IN COMMONS BRITAIN'S LATEST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS WAR PREPARATION--CREATION OF A MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.

THE MINISTRY WOULD TAKE OVER WAR STORES AND WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF RESERVES OF ESSENTIAL METALS AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS FOR DEFENSE.

THE NEW MINISTER WILL BE LESLIE PUGH, LIBERAL NATIONAL, WHO WILL HAVE FULL CABINET RANK. HE WAS FORMERLY PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF TRADE AND NOW IS MINISTER OF TRANSPORT WITHIN THE CABINET.

THE MINISTRY OF SUPPLY, CHAMBERLAIN SAID, WILL DEAL WITH PROBLEMS OF SUPPLYING THE ARMY, WHICH HAVE BECOME MORE PRESSING BY THE RECENT DECISION TO INCREASE THE ARMY'S STRENGTH; NOTABLY AN INCREASE OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY (HOME GUARD) TO 340,000 MEN.

HE ADDED THAT THE MINISTRY WOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN WAR STORES WHICH THE WAR OFFICE NOW SUPPLIES TO THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE AS WELL AS THE ARMY.

CHAMBERLAIN INDICATED THAT THE MINISTRY IN TIME OF EMERGENCY WOULD BE TRANSFORMED INTO A MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, HAVING THE POWER TO ENFORCE PRIORITY FOR GOVERNMENT ARMS ORDERS.

THE NEW MINISTRY WILL TAKE OVER FROM THE WAR OFFICE THE BRANCHES RESPONSIBLE FOR RESEARCH IN DESIGNING EXPERIMENT, PRODUCTION, INSPECTION AND ROYAL ORDNANCE Factories.

CHAMBERLAIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT WAS EVIDENCE THAT A BIRTHDAY MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION WHICH KING GEORGE SENT TODAY TO ADOLF HITLER WAS NOT AN INDICATION OF A WEAKENING OF BRITAIN'S EFFORTS FOR AN ANTI-AGGRESSION FRONT OR ITS URGENT RE-ARMAMENT.

CHAMBERLAIN DISCLOSED THAT A NEW MINISTER OF TRANSPORT WILL BE APPOINTED WHEN HE TOLD A QUESTIONER IN COMMONS: "OBVIOUSLY THE MINISTER OF SUPPLY COULD NOT ALSO CARRY ON THE DUTIES OF MINISTER OF TRANSPORT."

--R1228P
Memo to the President
From Cordell Hull
May 16, 1939

Attaches two statements of the British on the Jewish-Palestine situation accompanied by an analysis of their proposals. Pres. reply to Hull of May 17, 1939

See Palestine folder-Foreign file-Drawer 1-1939
May 18, 1939.

MEMO. FOR MISS. TULLY.

REMINDE R TO CALL COL. HALSEY.

TEL. & TEL.

MC*

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

I spoke with Colonel Halsey this morning and told him that you and Mrs. Roosevelt had suggested asking the wives. He said the space would not permit asking many more people and that they thought only of asking Mrs. Garner and Mrs. Bankhead. They have it under consideration but are much afraid they will run into all kinds of difficulties unless they are able to ask all of the wives.
This letter dictated by the President for General Watson's signature.
May 24, 1939.

My dear Bishop Manning:—

The President asks me to thank you for your letter of May twenty-third. The program of the King and Queen for Saturday, June tenth, was under discussion for several months and the problem presented was that of cutting down the many appealing visits which many of us wanted our guests to make in the City of New York.

The time was limited by the earliest hour they could leave the World's Fair and the latest hour they could arrive at the President's house at Hyde Park in time for dinner. This has meant that there will be time only to stop for about ten minutes at Columbia University where the King and Queen will view the original Charter of King's College, the predecessor of Columbia.

I understand, however, that the route to be taken will pass the Cathedral. I regret that it is impossible to make any change at this time.

Very sincerely yours,

Secretary to the President

The Right Reverend William T. Manning,
Bishop of New York,
1031 Amsterdam Avenue,
New York, N. Y.
May 23rd, 1939

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States.

My dear Mr. President:

At a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine held today, May 23rd, a resolution was adopted requesting me to write and ask you if it can be arranged for Their Majesties, the King and Queen of Great Britain to stop for a few minutes at the Cathedral when they are here in New York.

As a Trustee of the Cathedral you will I am sure feel as fully as we do the appropriateness of this, especially in view of the close relations between the Episcopal Church and the Church of England.

On their way to Columbia University the King and Queen will pass right by the doors of the Cathedral and a brief stop could therefore be arranged without any disturbance of the program and with practically no delay.

The Trustees will very greatly appreciate it if you can arrange this for us and a letter which I have received from the Archbishop of Canterbury gives me every reason to believe that such an arrangement will be quite acceptable to the King and Queen.

Faithfully yours,

William J. Manning
Bishop of New York.
June 3, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. HELM

The picnic list at Hyde Park is O.K. except for the one change I have indicated -- The Secretary of the Treasury and Mrs. Morgenthau come before Bishop Tucker.
June 3, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. HELM

THE POTOMAC LIST IS O.K.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM

Why is Lady Nunburnholme left off the list for the Tea on Friday afternoon, June ninth? She is staying in the house.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. HELM

Admiral Byrd does not occupy any official position, as he is on the Retired list and not an employee of the Government. I have numbered the others the way they should rank.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. HELM

Will you put General and Mrs. Watson right after Secretary and Mrs. Early, and put Captain Callaghan right after Dr. McIntire?

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. HELM

How about Franklin, Jr.
for one of the dinners at Hyde
Park?

F. D. R.
Dear Mr. President,

Yesterday I found a most delightful present when I got back to the train. I could not have received anything which could have given me more pleasure. I shall value it all my life as a monument of a very wonderful event in history.

Further than that—

I go away with a picture
of a truly lovable family
radiating such a happy
joyful atmosphere: an
atmosphere which blesses all those who are
privileged to enter in
As one of those fortunate ones - it will always remain
true as a treasured back
ground to a wonderful four
day visit.

I trust, Mr. President,
that you will forgive this.
Sincere and humble tribute from one who has gained a great deal of happy hope for the future from this visit.

With deepest respect,

To you, Mr. President.

Yrs. truly,

A. C.ici.
The President of the United States
The White House

Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir President,

With you please accept my most sincere thanks for your kindness and hospitality during our historic visit to your country, for the portrait of yourself and its charming inscription which you were so good as to send me.

We all have brought away
with us the most pleasant memories of our visit and I and my family will always treasure the portrait as a lasting happy souvenir of our stay in your hospitable land.
Believe me yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

To President Roosevelt
Personal

To: The President of the United States of America

White House

Washington

U.S.A.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Attached are copies of letters to and from Mr. Bernheim which have to do with the silver frames for the President's photographs for the Pres. of Nicaragua and the King of England.

R.F. Bruns
April 19, 1939

My dear Mr. Bernheim:

I am sending on this copy of the President's seal which is to be placed on the silver frame for the President's picture, just as the Roosevelt crest goes on the frame for Mrs. Roosevelt's picture.

A photograph of the President goes to you under separate cover today. This is being sent so that you may have the proper measurements. The President has asked that the picture be framed close, leaving sufficient room at the bottom for his signature.

Will you please return both photographs as soon as you have taken the measurements, as they will have to be autographed before they are framed. Will you also return this cut out of the President's seal.

This order is for one frame for the President's picture and one frame for Mrs. Roosevelt's picture, in case I have not made it clear. Of course these crests go at the top of the frames, in the center. Needless to say, we need these frames as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt

Mr. M. Bernheim
347 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Enclosure
April 20, 1939

Dear Mr. Bernheim:

I have just consulted with Miss Tully, the President’s Secretary, who tells me that the President wishes that his photograph be framed in fairly close, leaving enough white on either side proportionately and at the top to make it attractive. There should be enough white left at the bottom to enable him to inscribe a long name and his signature.

You are to make one frame to fit the President’s picture and one frame to fit Mrs. Roosevelt’s picture. The frame for the President’s picture is to have his seal, a likeness of which was sent you yesterday, engraved in the center of the frame at the top. Can this seal be reduced sufficiently to bring in the details and not make too wide a frame?

Mrs. Roosevelt’s picture is to be framed the same as the President’s, with white on either side, at the top and sufficient at the bottom to allow for a name and signature. The frame for her picture is to have the Roosevelt crest, which you have already, engraved in the center of the frame at the top.

The photograph of the President that you now have is the one he wished to be used as a sample. However, to avoid any possible error, I am sending you the actual photograph which he will autograph later and which will be framed in the frame you are making.

As soon as you have finished with both photographs of the President and the one of Mrs. Roosevelt, will you return them to me, as these are the only photographs that I have and it is imperative that nothing befall them. The frames are to be sent to me at the White House as soon as they are ready. The bill for the frames is to be sent to the State Department in Washington, attention of Hon. George T. Summerlin. If this is not perfectly clear, would you mind telephoning me.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt

Mr. M. Bernheim
347 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.
April 22, 1939

Mrs. J. M. Helm
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Helm:

I have both your letters of the 20th and 21st before me, and am very sure that we understand you perfectly. The two frames have been put in work and the photographs themselves will be returned to you by insured mail on Monday. Now, in regard to a few technical details.

The silver on the frame for the President's picture will be one inch wide, which is not too wide for a frame of this size, and at the same time will allow for engraving the President's shield in all its detail. The silver on the frame for Mrs. Roosevelt's photograph will be 7/8 of an inch wide. You were quite right in assuming that we have a copy of the Roosevelt Crest.

In regard to the backs on the frames, unless it does not meet with your approval, these will be made of bakelite. This is superior to velvet, inasmuch as the frame can be cleaned without soiling the back, and there is no chance of its becoming loose or warped as is often the case where there is a velvet back.

We expect to make shipment of both of these frames by the latter part of next week, which we hope will be in ample time for your needs.

Sincerely,

M. Bernheim
April 24, 1939

My dear Mr. Bernheim:

Thank you very much for your letter in regard to the frames. I have passed on this letter to Miss Tully, who will show it to the President. It will be perfectly all right to make the backs of the frames of bakelite.

********

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
WOODSIDE STERLING CO.
347 5th Ave.
April 29, 1939

Mrs. J. M. Helm
The White House

Dear Mrs. Helm:

As is not unusual in special order work, we were somewhat delayed in making these two special frames, but the result has proved very satisfactory. They are both finished and now comes the question of engraving. In one of your letters, you asked that we be sure that they get all the detail of the President's shield.

In going over the matter with the engraver, who by the way makes a specialty of this sort of work, he tells us that while all the detail can be put in by engraving it flat, the effect will be more or less lost. On the other hand, the background is cut away, giving the shield a raised effect, thus making the detail come out strongly and clearly. Now as to the cost. The flat engraving will cost approximately $15.00 while the style suggested by the engraver will cost about $22.00. Inasmuch as this will be held up until we hear from you, would you let us have an answer quickly.

We have told our engraver to hold himself in readiness for this job, and he will stop any work he may have on hand. So you see, it will only be a short time before we make shipment after hearing from you.

Sincerely,
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

We will need another frame for the President's picture for the King.

Is it all right to order it now?

MRS. HELM

N.B. Miss Tully said "Yes" and it was ordered as per letter of May 6th.
May 6, 1939

Dear Mr. Bernheim:

******

There will be two more frames to be made - one for the President's photograph just as you made this past one, and one for Mrs. Roosevelt's picture which I will have to have made just the right size to fit the frame. Will you please let me know exactly the dimensions it should be.

-******

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
Mrs. J. M. Helm
The White House

Dear Mrs. Helm:

It was very nice of you to let us know that the frames proved satisfactory. It is just too bad there was all the misunderstanding.

We have put the two frames that you ordered in work, and would appreciate so much your letting us know just when you wish same delivered. In regard to the President's seal, we still have the original here and would like to keep it until the second frame is finished so that we may check all the detail. However we have a copy of it and if you want yours back, we will gladly send it.

*****

Sincerely yours,

M. Bernheim
My dear Mr. Bernheim:

Certainly, keep the President's seal until the second frame is finished in order to check all the details.

*****

I am sending on today by insured mail the President's photograph for the large frame that you are making. I think it will be easier for you to put this in the frame and return it framed for the President's autograph.

I have asked Harris & Ewing to send you Mrs. Roosevelt's photograph as soon as it is finished, for you to frame and return to me for her autograph. Will you please deliver these as soon as they are finished.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. J. M. Helm
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt
THE ROYAL TRAIN
CANADA

June 14, 1939.

Dear Mr. President,

I am so very sorry that owing to the rush at the last moment I had to get into the train without saying goodbye to you. In thanking you for the great kindness and hospitality which you extended to me, I also add that in the memory of the occasion
will our remain with me.

I am afraid that I did not have the opportunity of thanking you for the kind gift of your photograph which I shall treasure as a happy souvenir of a most delightful and unique visit.

Believe me, my dear Mr. President, yours sincerely,
Peris Lehy.
Personal

The President

United States of America

The White House

Washington D.C.
June 15th, 1939.

Dear Mr. President,

I should like once again to thank you very much for your kindness to me, for your gift of a signed photograph of yourself. This I shall always value and keep by me in memory of some happy hours.

Believe me, Mr. President,

Yours respectfully,

H.E.Y. White.
Personal

ROYAL TRAIN
JUN 15 1939
6 PM
CANADA

The President of the United States of America

The White House
Washington DC

U.S.A.
June 15, 1939.

Dear Bill:-

I am especially glad that Eugene Ware's poetry has been put together in a book -- and thankful to you for sending it to me. I have known some of the verses -- and it has seemed to me that in some ways "Ironquill" has much of the combined philosophy of two other friends of mine -- William Allen White and Will Rogers. It is worth preserving and fostering it.

I wish you could have met the young couple from England. They had a real understanding not only of foreign affairs but also of social problems. I think they enjoyed the rather successful mixture of adequate formality, plus informal family life, which we managed to work out for them during those four days.

As ever yours,

William Allen White, Esq.,
The Emporia Gazette,
Emporia,
Kansas.
June 8, 1939

Dear Miss LeHand:

I am sending the president a book that I think he will enjoy. It is not a serious book. It is a book of verse, gay, beautiful and sometimes satirical and humorous. It is written by a man, a grand old man who died a quarter of a century ago. Enclosed I am sending a letter to go with the book and I am doing so because at one time or another the President has suggested this way as a sure way to get to him.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

What you need just now is a little poetry. You are going too hard and too seriously. So I am sending you a book of verse written by a Kansan, Eugene F. Ware, former Commissioner of Pensions under Theodore Roosevelt. T. R. greatly admired Eugene Ware and used to quote these verses on many occasions in private conversation.

Putnam's are bringing out a new edition and I have written a little introduction for this new edition. I have marked in the Table of Contents some of the verses that I think you might read happily. They are gay, satirical, sometimes a bit tragic but always most humorous and frequently full of the robust humor that men had in the seventies, eighties, nineties, of the old century. It was not Elizabethian but it had the same gusto.

Before closing will you permit one who differed with you about the court plan and who bats his eyes and swallows and gasps a bit as our debts mount to say that I think you did one swell job entertaining the King and Queen from England. No other President in my memory, excepting Theodore Roosevelt and possibly Benjamin Harrison, could have given such social distinction as you gave to the occasion of this week. I'll bet you sent George VI home wondering what George III was thinking about to overlook this American bet. With warm personal regards,

I am

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
White House, Washington, D. C.

Always most cordially yours,

W. A. White
Dear Mr. President,

Conditions on the ship and its somewhat full programme of the last few days in Canada have precluded me from writing a letter to which I give great importance.

It is very difficult for me to convey the great pleasure I
felt on receiving her new portrait. I shall always
value it, not only as a remembrance
of having the honor of meeting you, Sir, but also as a memento
of the historic visit of Their
Majesties to your very great country.
It will bring to my mind the
picture of the "Potomac" flying
Its Presidential and Royal Standards
at the same time; such a sight
of the utmost significance in these times. And not the least to help me to recollect Hyde Park and a family who made me immediately feel “at home” in a strange country and in circumstances which I would generally never mind such a condition as if achieved.

I do thank you, Mr. President, for this photograph and for my stay in the United States of America from the bottom of my heart.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
The President of the United States, America, The White House,
Washington, D.C.
June 22, 1939.

Dear Mrs. Helm:

I know how happy you must be to be back in Grayville after the hectic weeks which ended the so-called social season. I want to tell you that I fully realize what difficult days they were for you and that I appreciate and am grateful for the fine work which you and the Social Bureau did.

I do hope you will have a grand Summer.

My very best wishes to you,

Always sincerely,

Mrs. James M. Helm,
Grayville,
Illinois.
June 22, 1939.

Dear Gus:—

I want to send you this personal note to tell you what an excellent job I think you did on the books and frames for the Royal visitors. They were perfect in every detail and we were all much pleased with them. Many thanks to you and your Staff for such efficient service.

My best wishes to you,

Very sincerely yours,

Hon. Augustus E. Giegengack,
The Public Printer,
Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C.
June 22, 1939.

Dear Jo:—

I know how much you helped to make the books and frames for the Royal visitors a real success, and I am very grateful to you for your fine cooperation and assistance.

My best wishes to you and I hope to see you one of these days.

Very sincerely yours,

Miss Jo Coffin,
Assistant to The Public Printer,
Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C.
June 24, 1939

Memo for Gen. Watson
From Sumner Welles

Attaches confidential despatches from Amb Biddle marked for the President

No. 1069, dated June 1, 1939 concerning the possible reopening of negotiations affecting Danzig and the Corridor;

No. 1072, dated June 3, 1939 reporting the substance of a conversation with the Polish Ambassador to Great Britain on Anglo-German differences:

No. 1074, dated June 3, 1939 concerning status of Polish attempts to obtain British financial assistance.

No. 1075, dated June 3, 1939 concerning reaction in official Polish circles to Molotov’s address of May 31, 1939.

See Poland folder—Foreign File—Drawer 1—1939
Dear Mr. President,

The privilege of being introduced to Mrs. Roosevelt and yourself, during the visit of the King and Queen to the United States, will be kept doubly fresh in the memories of those of us to whom you so graciously presented photographs of yourself, with the characteristically generous inscription.

I think that I express the
feeling common to all who were present in Washington and at Hyde Park in recalling that lively sense of great and good events which charged the whole atmosphere and made such a lasting impression upon us all.

As one of the two Canadian members of His Majesty's suite, the first one of course being my Prime Minister, I should like to express my deep gratitude to you, Sir, for your personal kindness and hospitality and even more for your great service to the cause of friendship between the two great nations with which we are most closely associated.

I am, Sir,

With great respect and kind wishes,
Yours truly,

A.D.P. Heeney.
July 6, 1939.

Dear Jimmy:--

I well remember that when you went to the Coronation I asked you to suggest to the King that if he went to Canada he should come to visit us in Washington; that you spoke to him about it and that he said he would be delighted to.

It is just as well that this be put on paper for future generations, though I see no particular reason for making any announcement about it now.

Thereafter I was more or less in touch with Mackenzie King, and last Summer when I dedicated the International Bridge at the Thousand Islands he told me that the King and Queen would in all probability visit Canada in 1939. Thereupon I started a personal correspondence with the King himself -- and the rest is now history.

It was grand to see you the other day.

As ever yours,

Honorable James W. Gerard,
40 Wall Street,
New York City,
New York.
My dear Franklin:

You may remember that when I went over to represent you at the Coronation you gave me one job, namely, to ask the acceptance by the King of your invitation to visit you in the United States.

I talked to the King directly and he accepted your invitation and I so informed you.

Of course, I have never publicly quoted anything about this but talking to Sir Richard Tute, formerly Chief Justice of the Bahamas, yesterday he told me that he thought it would be a good thing if you announced this because as he said many people believed that the visit at this time was something arranged recently for purely political purposes.

I have no opinion myself one way or the other but am inclined to agree with Sir Richard.

Yours very sincerely,

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Memo for Watson
From Sumner Welles
July 11, 1939

Attaches conf despatch No 1082-June 7, 1939 from Amb. Biddle for the President

Subject-discussion which took place between Biddle and the newly appointed Russian Amb., Sharonov and his observations of the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw on current Anglo-Soviet discussions.

See Poland folder - Foreign File - Drawer 1-1939
The Secretary of State for Air informs me that the United States Navy Department have developed a new type of automatic air bombsight known as the Norden bombsight, and I understand that this sight (together perhaps with a similar development of the United States Army Air Corps) is the most efficient instrument of its kind in existence. We are therefore most anxious to obtain details of the sight and have inquired urgently through our Air Attache in Washington whether they can be given to us. For reasons which I can readily imagine the Air Authorities of the United States have not felt able to accede to our request.

In normal times I should not make a direct approach to you in such a matter, but in the present grave situation I venture to ask you whether you could help us to obtain the information we desire. I make this urgent personal request to you because Great Britain today faces the possibility of entering on a tremendous struggle, confronted ...
confronted as she is with a challenge to her fundamental values and ideals. Moreover, I believe they are values which our two countries share in common, and I am convinced that if there is a certainty, it is that our two countries will never go to war with one another.

Should the war which threatens break out, my advisers tell me that we would obtain a greater immediate increase in our effective power if we had the Norden bombsight at our disposal than by any other means we can foresee. Air power is, of course, a relatively new weapon which is so far untried on a large scale; there is the danger of unrestricted air attack which we for our part would never initiate. I am however most anxious to do all in my power to lessen the practical difficulties which may arise in operations even against legitimate military targets, and I feel that in air bombardment accuracy and humanity really go together. For this reason again I am certain that you would render the greatest service if you could enable us to make use of the magnificent apparatus which your Services ...
Services have developed.

I need hardly say how grateful I shall be if you can see your way to help us.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President of the United States of America.
My dear Mr. President:

I am sending to you herewith a personal letter addressed to you by the British Prime Minister of which I spoke to you on the telephone.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

I have dictated a suggested reply for you to send Mr. Chamberlain in accordance with your suggestions as communicated to me by Captain Callahan. I think that your reply to Mr. Chamberlain might best be sent through Lord Lothian.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been very glad indeed to receive your letter of August 25 and to hear from you directly with regard to the question set forth so clearly and so movingly therein.

The initial survey which I have had made of the situation and which I have myself studied very carefully leads me to the conclusion that under the existing legislation of this Government the request you make could not be granted unless the sight desired by the British Government were made available to all other governments at the same time it was made available to Great Britain. This clearly would not be in the interest of the United States, nor for that matter, I believe you will agree, in the interest of Great Britain.

I am sending you this preliminary reply to your letter because of my knowledge that you desire some indication from me in response to your request at the earliest moment. I may assure you, however, that I shall give continued consideration to the request you have made and to the possibility of acceding to it either under present conditions or under such new conditions as may arise, and that I shall write you again upon this subject as soon as a final decision can be reached.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

The Right Honorable
Neville Chamberlain,
P.C., F.R.S., M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.
Received from the British Embassy at 8:25 p.m. Aug. 28.
Following is substance of His Majesty's Government's reply to Herr Hitler's communication of August 25th.

1. His Majesty's Government reciprocate Chancellor's desire for Anglo-German understanding.

2. Chancellor's message dealt with two groups of questions.
   (1) Matters in dispute between Germany and Poland.
   (2) Ultimate relations between Germany and Great Britain.

3. His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss questions raised by Chancellor if German-Polish differences are peacefully composed.

4. His Majesty's Government agree that German-Polish settlement is first essential but everything turns on nature of settlement and method by which it is to be reached. Chancellor says nothing on these points and an understanding on both is essential to further progress.

5. His Majesty's Government intend to honour their obligations to Poland and would not for any advantage to Great Britain acquiesce in a settlement jeopardising Polish independence. His Majesty's Government consider that German-Polish differences could find reasonable solution on lines of safeguarding Poland's essential interests. But it must be understood in advance that any settlement would be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to participate in such guarantee. His Majesty's Government
Government think that the next step should be direct German-Polish discussions on foregoing basis. His Majesty's Government have made representations to Polish Government that they should express willingness to enter into discussions on this basis and hope that German Government will do the same.

6. His Majesty's Government agree that:

(1) Principal danger in German-Polish situation is reports of treatment of minorities. Present state of tension, frontier incidents and inflammatory propaganda are a danger to peace. These with incidents should be suppressed in order to give time without provocation on either side for examination of possibilities of a settlement. His Majesty's Government are confident that both the Polish and German Governments are alive to these considerations.

7. Because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland this does not mean that they are not anxious to use their influence to assist the achievement of a solution commending itself both to Germany and to Poland.

8. Such a settlement is essential not only for its own sake but in view of wider considerations. The advantage of a peaceful settlement over the resort to force is obvious. The results of a decision to use force have been made clear.

9. If a settlement were reached the possibility of practical measures to effect transition from preparations for
for war to normal activities of peaceful trade. (some words omitted). Reference in Chancellor's message to limitation of armaments is noted.

10/ Failure to secure a just settlement of German-Polish differences would ruin hopes of an Anglo-German understanding and might lead to war with untold suffering and loss to many countries.
Copy of Memorandum for the President
From Gen Watson
August 30, 1939

"The British Embassy phoned that they find they only have the substance of Hitler's reply to the English, and not the full text. Lord Lothian gave the President the impression that perhaps the Embassy had the full text, which is erroneous."

See: Watson folder-Drawer 2-1939
August 31st 1939.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I enclose herein the text of a message for the German Chancellor which was sent on the afternoon of August 30th to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin with instructions that he should not deliver it pending a further communication from London.

I also enclose the text of a telegram sent at the same time to His Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw. He too was informed that no action should be taken on this telegram pending further instructions.

Believe me,

dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours very sincerely,

(rgd) LOTHIAN.

Nordell Hull,

Secretary of State of the

United States,

Washington, D.C.
1. His Majesty's Government appreciate the friendly references in certain sentences of reply of German Government to latter's desire for an Anglo-German understanding and to their statement of the influence which this consideration has exercised upon their policy.

2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government's desire for improved relations, but it will be recognised that they could not sacrifice the interests of friends in order to obtain that improvement. They fully understand that the German Government cannot sacrifice Germany's vital interests, but the Polish Government are in the same position, and His Majesty's Government believe that the vital interests of the two countries are not incompatible.

3. His Majesty's Government note that the German Government accept the British proposal and are prepared to enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government.

4. His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made subject to an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics whose participation in the
guarantee His Majesty's Government have always assumed.

5. His Majesty's Government also note that the German Government accept the position of the British Government as to the Polish Government's vital interests and independence.

6. His Majesty's Government must make express reservation in regard to the statement of particular demands put forward by the German Government in an earlier passage in their reply. They understand that the German Government are drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt the latter's proposals will be fully examined during the discussions. It can then be determined how far they are compatible with the essential conditions which His Majesty's Government have stated and which the German Government express their willingness to accept.

7. His Majesty's Government are at once informing the Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The method of contact and the arrangements for the discussions must obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German Government and the Polish Government. But in His Majesty's Government's view it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as to-day.

8. His Majesty's Government fully recognise the need for speed in the initiation of the discussions and they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two mobilised armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly/
strongly urge that both parties should undertake that during the negotiations no aggressive military movements will take place. His Majesty's Government feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking from the Polish Government if the German Government would give similar assurances.

9. Further His Majesty's Government would suggest that a temporary modus vivendi might be arranged for Danzig which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to render German-Polish relations more difficult.
1. My telegram to Berlin gives the text of the reply of His Majesty's Government to the German communication which has been repeated to you.

2. Please communicate it to M. Beck. In doing so you should point out that whilst the first part of the German Government's reply consists of an indefensible and misleading presentation of the German case, the really important part of the reply consists in Germany's acceptance of proposal for direct discussion of suggestion of proposed international guarantee, and Germany's assertion that she intends to respect Poland's vital interests.

3. It is perhaps unnecessary to take exception at this stage to much that finds place in the German reply, of which His Majesty's Government would be as critical as they have no doubt would be the Polish Government, but His Majesty's Government have made an express reservation in regard to the statement of particular demands put forward in the German note. Point that seemed to call for immediate comment was the German demand that a Polish representative should present himself at Berlin to-day. M. Beck will see the line which we have taken on this and the further reference we have made to the point in our reply to the German Government's latest communication. The German Government are now drawing up proposals for a solution and it will be in the light of these and of other developments that the decision as to future procedure including the place and conditions of discussion will...
will have to be taken.

4. M. Beck will see from the reply of His Majesty's Government that the proposal has been made for a military standstill during the discussions to which His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the Polish Government will have no objection. A refusal to accede is likely.

5. His Majesty's Government will be glad to have the views of the Polish Government urgently. In view of the fact that the Polish Government have authorised His Majesty's Government to say that they are prepared to enter into direct discussions with the German Government, His Majesty's Government hope that provided the method and general arrangements for the discussions can be satisfactorily agreed to, the Polish Government will be prepared to do so without delay. We regard it as most important from the point of view of the internal situation in Germany and of world opinion that so long as the German Government profess themselves ready to negotiate no opportunity should be given to them for placing the blame for a conflict on Poland.

6. You should of course emphasise that His Majesty's Government have made it quite clear to Herr Hitler that they are sincerely determined to implement their obligations without reserve. On this point there is no misunderstanding in Berlin. The position of the Polish Government is very different from that which they occupied last March since it is now supported both by direct British guarantee and promise of British participation in the guarantee of any settlement reached on the bases indicated and the conversations would be carried on
7. Another consideration present in our minds is that reliable information from Berlin gives us reason to suppose that German territorial demands do not represent Herr Hitler's last word. On the other hand a blank refusal to negotiate is likely to increase the German forces working for war and will enable Herr Hitler to place the onus of breakdown on Poland.
Please deliver to the President the following message

in the name of His Majesty’s Government:

“His Majesty’s Government welcome the weighty and moving appeal of the President of the United States against the bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of unfortified cities. Deeply impressed by the humanitarian considerations to which the President’s message refers, it was already the settled policy of His Majesty’s Government should they become involved in hostilities to refrain from such action and to confine bombardment to strictly military objectives upon the understanding that those same rules will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents. They had already concerted in detail with certain other governments the rules that in such an event they would impose upon themselves and make publicly known.”
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
Washington, D.C.  

September 1st 1939.  

CONFIDENTIAL  

My dear Mr. Secretary,  

Yesterday I gave Mr. Sumner Welles a copy of a telegram addressed to the Foreign Office by His Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw reporting M. Beck's reactions on being shown a copy of His Majesty's Government's latest communication to Herr Hitler, a copy of which I sent to you in my letter of August 31st.  

I have now been instructed to send you the enclosed summaries of four further telegrams:  

(A) A telegram dated August 31st from His Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw, reporting a conversation with M. Beck when the latter communicated the Polish Government's reply to our representations.  

(B) A further telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw dated August 31st, giving the text of this Polish reply.  

(C) A telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin sent on August 31st.  

(D) Text of telegram sent to His Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw on August 31st.  

I have been particularly asked to emphasise the confidential nature of the two telegrams from Warsaw.  

Believe me,  

My dear Mr. Secretary,  

Yours very sincerely,  

[Signature]  

The Honourable  
Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State of the United States,  
Washington, D.C.
Summary of telegram of August 31st from His Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw

M. Beck has just handed me written Polish reply to my representations of last night. Translation is given in my following telegram. M. Beck particularly asked that it should be treated as highly confidential.

2. I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs what action he proposed taking to establish contact with German Government. He replied that he would now instruct Polish Minister in Berlin to see either Minister for Foreign Affairs or State Secretary, in order to say that Poland had accepted the British proposals set forth in your telegrams. I urged him to do this at once.

3. I then asked what line M. Lipsky would take if Herr von Ribbentrop, or whoever else he saw, handed him German proposal. M. Beck said the Ambassador would not be authorised to accept such a document since in the light of previous experience it might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum. He felt it was essential that contact should be made first of all and that then details should be discussed as to where, with whom, and on what basis negotiations should be begun.

4. He pointed out that the situation in Danzig was becoming extremely serious. Polish officials were being arrested, railway traffic was held up, and he felt it essential that immediate measures be taken to set up a modus vivendi in order to allow the release of the arrested persons.
persons and the resumption of railway traffic. He suggested that M. Burckhardt might effect this.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed that no other serious incidents had taken place but added that he feared that in connexion with any negotiations he would have to appeal to the intervention of His Majesty's Government.

6. M. Beck added that if invited to go to Berlin he would of course decline as he had no intention of being treated like President Hacha.
Summary of telegram of August 31st from His Majesty's Ambassador at Warsaw.

Following is the text of the Polish reply dated August 31st, 1939.

1. Unconditional confirmation of their already expressed willingness for a direct exchange of views with the German Government naturally on the basis suggested by the British Government.

2. The Polish Government are also prepared on a reciprocal basis to give a formal guarantee that if negotiations are held, Polish troops will not violate the German frontier provided that a corresponding guarantee is furnished regarding the non-violation of the Polish frontier by German troops.

3. In the present circumstances it is essential that a simple provisional modus vivendi be set up in Danzig.

4. As regards the suggestions communicated to the Polish Government, a request has already been made to the British Ambassador for an explanation of what the British Government understood by international guarantees in regard to the relations between Poland and Germany. In the absence of an answer to this fundamental question, the Polish Government feel obligated entirely to reserve their attitude towards the matter until they have received fuller explanations.

5. The Polish Government trusts that if conversations with Germany are initiated, they may continue to enjoy the good offices of His Majesty's Government.
Telegram to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, of August 31st.

Please inform the German Government that His Majesty's Government understand that the Polish Government are arranging to establish contact with them through M. Lipski in Berlin. Please enquire whether in view of the serious situation in Danzig they agree to the necessity for setting up an immediate provisional modus vivendi. We have already made this suggestion to the German Government in paragraph 9 of our recent communication. Would they agree that M. Burckhardt might be employed in this connexion if it were possible to secure his services.
Summary of telegram of August 31st to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Warsaw.

1. His Majesty's Government are gratified to learn that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin has been instructed to get into contact with the German Government.

2. His Majesty's Government fully agree as to the need for discussing detailed arrangements regarding the negotiations and as to the undesirability of M. Beck's visiting Berlin.

3. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government do not understand why the Polish Government should find it difficult to authorise M. Lipski to accept document from the Germans and they sincerely trust that they may feel able to amend their instructions in this matter. No ultimatum was mentioned in the report on the German proposals furnished to His Majesty's Government and the suggestion that the demand that Polish representative should be in Berlin by August 30th was equivalent to an ultimatum was definitely repudiated by German Foreign Minister in talking with Sir Nevile Henderson. If the document were to contain an ultimatum, Poland would naturally refuse to discuss it until ultimatum was withdrawn. On the other hand, for them to refuse to receive the proposal would arouse grave misunderstanding by outside opinion.

4. It would seem M. Lipski could surely be instructed to receive and forward the document and say (a) if it contained anything like the expected ultimatum.
ultimatum the Polish Government would certainly be unable to discuss on such a basis, and (b) that in any case in the Polish view matters such as the venue of the negotiations, the basis on which they should be held and the individuals who should take part in them should be discussed between the two governments.

5. If negotiations are begun, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will at all times be glad if desired to lend any assistance they can to achieve a just settlement.

6. As regards an international guarantee, this matter will no doubt have to be discussed at length. What His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had in mind was a guarantee of the full and proper observance of any settlement reached.

7. Regarding Danzig, His Majesty's Government entirely share M. Beck's views as to the importance of establishing some *modus vivendi*. They have already made a suggestion to this effect to the German Government and will do so again. If the Germans agree, they will approach M. Burckhardt.

Please speak to the Polish Foreign Minister immediately in the above sense.
My dear Mr. Secretary,

I have received instructions to inform you that the following communication is being made to the German Government by His Majesty's Ambassador in conjunction with his French colleague this evening.

"On the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to make the following communication. Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German Army which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions viz. an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to inform Your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government has suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly

The Honourable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland".

Sir Neville Henderson has been instructed to ask for an immediate reply and to report the result of his interview, when he will be sent further instructions. He has been told that in reply to any question he may explain that the communication is in the nature of a warning and is not to be considered as an ultimatum.

Believe me, My dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours very sincerely,

LOTHIAN
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON D.C.

No. 369.

September 3rd, 1930.

Sir,

I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the following declaration has been made on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government:

"The Governments of the United Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly affirm their intention should a war be forced upon them to conduct hostilities with a firm desire to spare the civilian population and to preserve in every way possible those monuments of human achievement which are treasured in all civilized countries. In this spirit they have welcomed with deep satisfaction President Roosevelt's appeal on the subject of bombing from the air. Fully sympathising with the humanitarian sentiments by which that appeal was inspired they have replied to it in similar terms. They had indeed some time ago sent explicit instructions to the commanders of their armed forces prohibiting the bombardment whether from the air, or the sea, or by artillery/

The Honourable

Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,

Washington, D.C.
"artillery on land of any except strictly
"military objectives in the narrowest sense
"of the word. Bombardment by artillery on
"land will exclude objectives which have no
"strictly defined military importance; in
"particular large urban areas situated
"outside the battle zone. They will further-
"more make every effort to avoid the
"destruction of localities or buildings
"which are of value to civilisation. As
"regards the use of naval forces, including
"submarines, the two governments will abide
"strictly by the rules laid down in the
"submarine protocol of 1936 which have been
"accepted by nearly all civilized nations.
"Further they will only employ their aircraft
"against merchant shipping at sea in conformity
"with the recognised rules applicable to the
"exercise of maritime belligerent rights by
"warships. Finally, the two allied governments
"reaffirm their intention to abide by the
"terms of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 pro-
"hibiting the use in war of asphyxiating or
"poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological
"methods of warfare.
"An enquiry will be addressed to the
"German Government as to whether they are
"prepared to give an assurance to the same
"effect.
"It/
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON D.C.
September 3rd, 1939.

No. 360.

Sir,

I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the following declaration has been made on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government:

"The Governments of the United Kingdom and France solemnly and publicly affirm their intention should a war be forced upon them to conduct hostilities with a firm desire to spare the civilian population and to preserve in every way possible these monuments of human achievement which are treasured in all civilized countries. In this spirit they have welcomed with deep satisfaction President Roosevelt's appeal on the subject of bombing from the air. Fully sympathising with the humanitarian sentiments by which that appeal was inspired they have replied to it in similar terms. They had indeed some time ago sent explicit instructions to the commanders of their armed forces prohibiting the bombardment whether from the air, or the sea, or by artillery/"

The Honourable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
It will of course be understood
that in the event of the enemy not observing
any of the restrictions which the Govern-
ments of the United Kingdom and France
have thus imposed on the operations of
their armed forces these governments reserve
the right to take all such action as they
may consider appropriate.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,
My dear Mr. Chamberlain:

I need not tell you that you have been much in my thoughts during these difficult days and further that I hope you will at all times feel free to write me personally and outside of diplomatic procedure about any problems as they arise.

I hope and believe that we shall repeal the embargo within the next month and this is definitely a part of the Administration policy.

With my sincere regards,

Faithfully yours,

The Right Honorable
Neville Chamberlain, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London,
England.
Sir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Viscount Halifax
(Received September 20, 10.40 a.m.)
No. 349 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]
Washington, September 20, 1938, 2.30 a.m.

1. The President telephoned to me himself this afternoon to call on
him at the White House in the evening, and I had a long conversation.
He emphasized the necessity of absolute secrecy. Nobody must know I had
seen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview. I gathered
not even the State Department.

2. He said the Anglo-French note to Czechoslovak Government was the
most terrible remorseless sacrifice that had even been demanded of a
State. It would provoke a highly unfavourable reaction in America. He
himself was not disposed to blame the French or British Governments whose
difficulties he completely understood. He spoke in a most friendly and
appreciative manner of the Prime Minister's policy and efforts for peace.
If the policy now embarked on proved successful he would be the first to
cheer. He would like to do or say something to help it but was at a loss to
know what. He had no illusions as to the effect in Europe of his pre­
vious public statements. Today he would not dare to express approval of
the recommendations put to the Czechoslovak Government. He would be
afraid to express disapproval of German aggression lest it might encourage
Czechoslovakia to vain resistance. He thus felt unable to do anything and
thought at his press conference tomorrow (he has postponed the last two)
he would confine himself to refusing to make any comment at all.

3. As to the immediate future the first possible case he would deal
with was that Czechoslovak Government should acquiesce, but that he re­
garded as virtually impossible. They would fight and his general staff
told him they would be overrun in three weeks. Hungary and Poland would
join in the pillage. And even if Czechoslovakia did acquiesce in the de­
mands made, would Germany rest there? Had Herr Hitler given any pledges
to the Prime Minister as to the future? He was sure that other demands
would follow elsewhere: Denmark, the Corridor or most likely of all a
dangerous and forcible economic or physical penetration through Roumania.

4. The second case that he examined was that the present policy fail­
ing the Western Powers would find themselves at war with Germany and prob­
ably Italy sooner or later, but as he thought sooner. In this case, in
his opinion, even if Great Britain and France and Russia were fighting
loyally together they would be beaten if they tried to wage war on classi­
cical lines of attack. They would suffer terrific casualties and would
never get through.

5. He therefore came to the third case. This is the very secret
part of his communication and it must not be known to anyone that he has
even breathed a suggestion. If it transpired he would almost be impeached
and the suggestion would be hopelessly prejudiced.

1 See Volume II of this Series, No. 937.
6. Assuming present expedients would only delay crisis for a short time if at all, Western Powers might choose to call a world conference for the purpose of reorganizing all unsatisfactory frontiers on rational lines. They should invite active heads of States to attend including Herr Hitler. He himself would be willing to go to it but not if it was held in Europe. That he would never do. But he would go half way and attend a conference in the Azores or some other Atlantic island. This part of his idea viz. the calling of a conference was not strongly emphasised.

7. But assuming Western Powers would find themselves forced to war he believed that they should carry it on purely by blockade and in a defensive manner. He had spoken about this to Lord Runciman when he visited him at the White House. The Powers should close their own frontiers to Germany, stand on an armed defensive and call on all other States adjoining Germany to adopt the same line of non-intercourse. The blockade line should be drawn down the middle of the North Sea through the Channel to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean should be closed at the Suez Canal. Should any of the adjoining Powers refuse to join in this policy of non-intercourse it should be informed that its supplies from overseas would be rationed. He believed that they would indeed protest against this, but that they would acquiesce fairly easily, and would make the rationing system work as it did in the last war. (In passing it is possible that this is what was in the President's mind when he talked about 'quarantine' in his Chicago speech.)

8. To my suggestion that this was reminiscent of sanctions he said that any suggestion of sanctions must be most carefully avoided. Blockade must be based on loftiest humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hostilities with minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and property, and yet to bring enemy to his knees. In this connection he mentioned bombing from the air. He said only defence to this was to retaliate in the same way, but bombing from the air was not the method which caused really great losses of life.

9. This method of conducting war by blockade would in his opinion meet with approval of the United States if its humanitarian purpose were strongly emphasised. Though he himself could not possibly take any initiative in the matter he pointed out that it is entirely within the constitutional prerogative of a President on his own authority, to declare that a blockade was of an effective character. He could thus help blockading Powers and would be willing to do so, in the absence of unfavourable circumstances. Under the Neutrality Act he was empowered to forbid United States vessels to enter a danger zone except at their own risk.

10. On this we came to some discussion of the Neutrality Act, and in reply to my questions he was very hesitant indeed as to the possibility of the United States Government turning a blind eye to any evasion of prohibition of exports of arms and ammunition in our favour. But he insisted that we should be free to export parts of munitions to Canada to be set up there. But he urged with some emphasis that if possible Western Powers should turn this difficulty by not declaring war on Germany
at all. Let them call it defensive measures or anything plausible but avoid actual declaration of war. He had already been able to give himself wide latitude in the interpretation of the Neutrality Law in the Far East and in Ethiopia and if the law was not changed he would be disposed to do so again. He even indicated that even if Germany declared war on us and we refrained from doing so he might yet be able to find that we were not at war, and that the prohibition of export of arms need not be applied to us.

11. Present German aggression would awaken similar tendencies elsewhere perhaps not in Italy though she would have to be watched, but very likely from Japan. He was convinced that the Japanese Government was bound by a secret treaty to come to German support in case of war. It was quite possible that they would extend their operations to Canton or even seize Indo-China or Hongkong. In reply to my enquiry he said that seizure of Hongkong would make a very profound impression on the United States but he was very hesitant indeed as to whether they would do anything about it. He finally said it would take some time before they would do anything.

12. Several times in the conversation he showed himself quite alive to the possibility that somehow or other in indefinable circumstances the United States might again find themselves involved in an European war. In that case he regarded it as almost inconceivable that it would be possible for him to send any American troops across the Atlantic even if his prestige were as high as it had been just after the 1936 elections. But it was just possible that if Germany were able to invade Great Britain with a considerable force, such a wave of emotion might arise, that an American army might be sent overseas.

13. Much of what the President said as reported above was elicited by my questions. His tone throughout was marked by utmost friendliness. I do not think he expects any particular answer.

(vi)

Sir R. Lindsay (Washington) to Viscount Halifax
(Received September 22, 1.20 a.m.)
No. 351 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]

Washington, September 21, 1938, 4.29 p.m.

My telegram No. 349.¹
It is unlikely that I shall be able to see President again in the near

¹ Document (v) in this Appendix.
future but I think it would be useful if you would send me a friendly expression of appreciation of his message which I could convey to him through his Private Secretary. I should be grateful for instructions.

(vii)

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington)
No. 640 Telegraphic [A 7504/64/45]

Foreign Office, September 23, 1938, 4.20 p.m.

Your telegram No. 351.¹

You may certainly convey to President my great appreciation of his having taken you so far into his confidence, and my assurance that I will observe complete secrecy in the matter.

At the present moment it is extremely difficult to forecast events. We have gone as far as we can in an effort to remove what might be considered a German grievance. If our effort fails, there will no longer be any doubt as to Herr Hitler's real intentions.

Should His Majesty's Government be drawn into any conflict, their major role would probably be enforcement of blockade, as President foresees. But situation is very obscure: position of Italy in event of conflict may yet be doubtful: a neutral Italy might be more valuable to Germany, as an avenue of supply, than an Italy as an ally in arms. Blockade of Germany would be rendered to a great degree ineffective unless Italy were also blockaded or rationed, but even the latter would probably turn the scale and bring Italy into action against France. It might be necessary to choose between a neutral Italy with an ineffective blockade and a hostile Italy with an effective blockade.

It is of great encouragement to know that the President has been giving thought to these questions and I am most grateful to him for his confidence. We are doing our best to keep United States Ambassador fully informed.

¹ Document (vi) in this Appendix.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

[Handwritten notes: "Interesting" and "C 4" written at the bottom.]
October 25, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

Note from Ambassador Kennedy transmitting reply from Neville Chamberlain to the President's letter of September 11th, 1939.
London, October 6, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a letter addressed to you by the Prime Minister which was handed to me yesterday.

Yours sincerely,

Enclosure: as stated.

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.
4th October, 1939.

My dear Mr. Roosevelt:

Your letter of the 11th of last month has just reached me and I am very grateful to you for your sympathetic and encouraging words.

These are indeed difficult days and there are many more before us, but I retain full confidence that we shall come out successfully in the end.

My own belief is that we shall win, not by a complete and spectacular military victory, which is unlikely under modern conditions, but by convincing the Germans that they cannot win. Once they have arrived at that conclusion, I do not believe they can stand our relentless pressure, for they have not started this war with the enthusiasm or the confidence of 1914.

I...
10, Downing Street, Whitehall.

I believe they are already half way to this conviction and I cannot doubt that the attitude of the United States of America, due to your personal efforts, has had a notable influence in this direction. If the embargo is repealed this month, I am convinced that the effect on German morale will be devastating.

I hope so much that one day I may have the great pleasure of meeting you personally and discussing with you the happy results of the actions of our two countries in this testing time for democracy.

With kind regards,

Ernst von Wuchte

The Prime Minister

The President of the United States of America.
PRIVATE & PERSONAL.

8th November, 1939.

My dear Mr. Roosevelt,

In your letter of the 11th September you invited me to write to you personally whenever there were any problems on which I wished to consult you. You may be sure that I shall do so. At the moment, I have no question to raise with you, but I cannot forbear from sending you a private line of thanks and congratulation on the great development of the last week-end.

The repeal of the arms embargo, which has been so anxiously awaited in this country, is not only an assurance that we and our French Allies may draw on the great reservoir of American resources; it is also a profound moral encouragement to us in the struggle upon which we are engaged. As I said in my letter of the 4th October, I am convinced that it will have a devastating effect on German morale;
it will also, I am confident, have a great influence on world opinion. We here have derived all the greater satisfaction from it because we realise to what an extent we owe it to your personal efforts and goodwill.

May I send you my sincere thanks, not only for the measure itself, but for your great sympathy to which it is so largely due?

With kind regards,

Emile Justus K

Ernst von Mikulicz-Roosing

The President of the
United States of America.
Private or Personal.

The President of the
United States of America,
The White House,
Washington,
U.S.A.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT. CALLAGHAN

Attaches two letters containing information which may prove to be of interest to the President. One letter is from Allan Kirk-London and the other from Hayne Ellis—Naval Operating Base—Norfolk, Va.

See: Capt Callaghan memo of Dec 8, 1939—Navy folder—Drawer 1—1939
December 8, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Attaches tabulation of British naval losses to Nov. 29, 1939.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939
Memorandum for the President from Capt. Callaghan

Attaches sheets containing compilations in tabular form of the graphic data presented in the attached books of graphs from ambassador Kennedy.

Re-Merchant Marine Losses

BRITISH--ALLIED--NEUTRAL

These are compiled from official British Graphs and prepared by the ONI

See: Joe Kennedy folder-Drawer 1-1939
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, London, December 25, 1939

"Personal for the President from Naval Person [Churchill]...."

[Concerning British naval action off the River Plate]

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MR EARLY, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

TO THE PRESIDENT

0020 FROM HULL THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM ENGLAND GAVE ME THIS MORNING THE TEXT OF A PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE SENT TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND RECEIVED BY TELEGRAM TODAY. AFTER REFERRING TO PREVIOUS MEMORANDA SENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THE MESSAGE STATES THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AS REGARDS SWITZERLAND THAT IF GERMANY INVADED SWITZERLAND AND FRANCE THEREUPON DECLARED WAR UPON GERMANY THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD GO TO THE ASSISTANCE OF FRANCE IN THE SAME WAY THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPORT GREAT BRITAIN IF GERMANY INVADED HOLLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN THEREUPON DECLARED WAR ON GERMANY.  THE REMAINDER OF THE MESSAGE READS TEXTUALLY AS FOLLOWS QUOTE IN REPLY TO THE FRENCH ARGUMENTS REGARDING ANGLO-FRENCH SOLIDARITY IN FACE OF AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY GERMANY OR ITALY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM STATED THAT JOINT ACTION BY GERMANY AND ITALY AGAINST THE TWO WESTERN GREAT POWERS OR AGAINST ANY ONE OF THEM WOULD CLEARLY HAVE TO BE RESISTED IN COMMON BY THE TWO POWERS WITH THE WHOLE OF THEIR RESOURCES; INDEED THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD ASSUMED TOWARDS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
FROM MR EARLY, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRESIDENT

BY TREATY ALREADY COVER THE CASE OF AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK DELIVERED UPON FRANCE BY GERMANY WHETHER ACTING ALONE OR IN SUPPORT OF ITALY. WHILE IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON FRANCE BY ITALY ALONE FRANCE MIGHT FEEL THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY IN HER INTERESTS THAT GREAT BRITAIN SHOULD INTERVENE IF THE EFFECT OF SUCH INTERVENTION WERE TO BRING GERMANY INTO WHAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE A LOCALIZED CONFLICT, HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WERE FULLY CONSCIOUS THAT THE RISKS TO WHICH THE TWO POWERS WERE SEVERALLY EXPOSED COULD NOT BE DISASSOCIATED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NOTED THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FEBRUARY SIXTH. IT WAS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION THAT HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD PROPOSED TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THE EXTENSION OF STAFF CONVERSATIONS AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF LORD HALIFAX'S SHORT MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY SEVENTH.

THE TERMS OF THIS REPLY TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARE BEING COMMUNICATED TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR SECRET INFORMATION END QUOTE 2320