CONTINUED
Mr. Minister:

It gives me great pleasure to receive from your hands the letters by which you are accredited as His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary with the special object of representing in the United States the interests of the Commonwealth of Australia.

I greatly appreciate the expression of good wishes for myself and for the American people which you have just conveyed to me from your Government, and I take this occasion to reaffirm my abiding sentiment of good will toward the Government and people of Australia. I likewise entertain the confident hope that your presence in the United States and the presence of a Minister of the United States in Australia will tend to strengthen still further the friendly relations between the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

To your most agreeable description of the link which this meeting consummates and to your exposition of its great significance and your hopes for its success, I can only add that the belief of myself and of the Government of the United
United States in the wisdom of its establishment and our
feeling of happiness over the choice which your Government
had made in yourself leave no doubt that the friendship
between our two countries will be more firmly cemented.
You may be assured that the welcome extended to you
reflects a desire on the part of this Government to give
you its most earnest cooperation and to make your sojourn
in your high capacity a pleasant one.
I got through to London early this morning as a result of representations made by the Secretary of State and the President yesterday. Lord Halifax told me that the following action would be taken to-day:

1) His Majesty’s Government was making a public statement to the effect that it had no intention whatever of intervening in the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch Government has been asked to make a public statement that it has no desire for any assistance from outside in order to deal with the internal situation. Lord Halifax is seeing the Japanese Ambassador to-day and communicating this statement to him. It will also be published in the press.

2) The following statement is being published to-day in London and is being given to the American and Japanese press:

“As soon as the Dutch and the Allied Governments are satisfied that the internal position in Curacao and Aruba have been fully established or as additional Dutch forces are available in sufficient numbers/
numbers arrangements will at once be made for
the immediate withdrawal of the British and French
forces on the islands. There has never of course
at any time been any intention to alter the status
of the islands."

(As this statement was only obtained by
telephone I cannot guarantee its verbal accuracy.)

3) This action has been reported to the British
Ambassador in Tokyo.

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(This given at noon
by Lithian

[Signature]
Memo to FDR from Capt. Callaghan—June 3, 1940

Re: attached report from Capt. Kirk from London re Great Britain re failure of separate Air Defense in naval and land operations.

Fdr's memo of June 5, 1940 attached.

See: Navy-Drawer 1-1940 (June 5, 1940 memo)
The President  
The White House

It has given me particular pleasure Mr. President to receive your kind and understanding message on this year's celebration of my birthday. My peoples will share the gratitude which I feel for this further proof of your country's sympathy with us in our heavy struggle. They will draw from it fresh encouragement and inspiration in their fight for the preservation of their ancient liberties and for the complete and final overthrow of the sinister forces which are seeking to destroy democracy.

George RI.

4:18pm/d
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 14, 1940

I attach a memorandum of a conversation with the British Ambassador, which is self-explanatory. With reference to that part of the conversation suggesting staff conferences with the British Navy, I shall be very glad to pass on to the Ambassador any comment which you would care to make.

G.H.
The British Ambassador called at his request and said that he had received from Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister, a suggestion that there might be staff conferences between the naval people of our two Governments in regard to fleet movements both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. I made clear to him my views about all the public talk in regard to the disposition of the British fleet in the event of the defeat of Great Britain. I said, in brief, that any friend of Great Britain like myself would expect her to fight to the last dollar, to the last man and to the last ship, if necessary; that the people primarily interested in the Navy were the members of the British
British Empire; that, of course, Great Britain would not think of turning the fleet over to Germany if she expected to recover from a wholly unexpected temporary defeat due to sudden attack with new devices or weapons. The Ambassador said Churchill's position did not remotely contemplate Germany's getting the British fleet so far as his Government was concerned; that the only contingency in this respect would arise in connection with some successor government of the Mosley or Communist type. I then remarked that in the World War a new peace government took charge in Germany to negotiate peace, but that peace government sank the German fleet before peace terms were formulated. I then added that I doubted whether there would be any occasion for staff conferences, but that I would be glad to pass the suggestion on to the President.

The Ambassador stated that Argentina was slow to ban submarines from her ports and that the British were afraid that the Italians might send submarines to Argentine ports. I replied that we would give attention to this matter and that Argentina would probably come around to our position before long.

The Ambassador then inquired whether the British Military Attaché here might confer with the appropriate officials in the War Department in regard to the effect of
of British and French bombings inside Germany. I replied that I was sure our military people would be glad to give his Attaché any information at all feasible; that, of course, we could not be connected with any exchange of information of that nature.

C.H.

S:CH:MA
Re: Memo of June 18, 1940 to FDR from Morgenthau

Subject: giving the English additional destroyers--attached is Most Secret message from Former Naval Person thru U.S. Ambassador for Arthur Purvis.

See: Morgenthau-Drawer 1-1940
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 24, 1940

I attach a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum of my conversation with the British Ambassador this morning and I would like to see you about it at your convenience.
The Ambassador of Great Britain called at his request. He brought up again a subject mentioned to me by him several days ago to the effect that there might well be some confidential staff conferences between appropriate military and naval persons in our two governments with a view to discussing the question of policies that might or might not be pursued in the light of various possible developments that might arise at a later stage of the war between Great Britain and Germany. The Ambassador then referred to the possible final disposition of the British fleet in the event - which neither he nor I contemplated at all - of British defeat. He proceeded to discuss possible movements of his Government to Canada, accompanied
accompanied by more or less of the British fleet. He added that it might be very important to have conversations with respect to these possible future movements so that each Government would know what was in the mind of the other. I thanked him earnestly and then said that I would be glad to bring the matter further to the attention of the President. I said that, furthermore, it might prove more desirable to have some exchange of information through diplomatic, at least during this stage, rather than through Army and Navy officials; that it was all important to avoid publicity, which might be misunderstood, even though nothing would be said in such conferences that would need to be concealed from the public if correctly interpreted and understood.

C.H.

S:CH:AR
Memo to FDR from Hull--June 24, 1940

Attaches memo of his conversation with Lord Lothian of morning of June 24th
Subject:--Confidential Staff Conferences

See:Hull folder-Drawer 1-1940 (June 24th memo)
Sir R. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.--(Received July 2.)

My Lord,

June 27, 1940.

BEFORE giving your Lordship a consecutive account of events from the date of His Majesty’s Embassy’s departure from Paris up to the acceptance by Marshal Pétain’s Government of cruel and humiliating armistice terms, I should like, by way of preface, to say that our activities during the whole of this period were considerably hampered by the conditions in which we were living and working. The Government had persistently refused to face up to the possibility of having to remove from the capital, with the result that, when it had to do so at short notice or risk falling into the enemy’s hands, it was obliged, in the absence of other arrangements, to fall back on the scheme prepared before the outbreak of war to meet the event, which then seemed probable, of Paris being subjected to constant aerial bombardment. The essence of this plan was to spread the executive and administrative services over a wide area in the Touraine rather than concentrate them in one spot, such as the town of Tours itself, where they would have offered a single and tempting target. During the three days of our stay in Touraine it was thus extremely difficult to maintain close contact with Ministers or their departments.

2. In Bordeaux, whither the Government shortly repaired, our difficulties, though for different reasons, were nearly as bad. Conditions at the consulate, where, in default of other premises, I attempted to establish His Majesty’s Embassy, defy description. The diplomatic and consular staffs, numbering some thirty people, had only three rooms (one of them small) in which to carry on their work, including that of dealing with British refugees who streamed in day and night, demanding to be evacuated, and who at one moment got out of hand and filled the staircase in a solid mass, completely blocking access or egress. Conditions in our hotel, where we later decided to set up the chancery, were little better. A further difficulty was that Ministers were dotted about in different parts of the town and frequently changed their habitat. No sooner had I succeeded in locating one than I was informed, on my subsequent visit, that he had moved to another address which no one could tell me. The town was packed with refugees, both on foot and in vehicles of every kind and description, and circulation was consequently a slow and laborious process.

3. I have felt bound to give this picture of the physical conditions in which we lived and moved as they constituted a serious handicap to our activities.

4. Passing now to a narrative account of events from the date of our departure from Paris, it will be convenient to record them, as they occurred day by day, in chronological sequence.


5. The French Government decided to put into force the second stage of their plan for the evacuation from Paris. Several Government Departments evacuated hurriedly the greater part of their personnel, leaving only a nucleus in Paris. This decision had been accelerated by the imminent fall of Rouen. I accordingly decided to send on the following morning an advance party of my staff to the Château de Champchévrier at Cleré, in Touraine, which had been allotted to His Majesty’s Embassy before the outbreak of war, and which had already been reconnoitred.

Paris, June 10.

6. The advance party of the embassy left. I had arranged through the air attaché for a wireless receiving and transmitting set to be sent out by the Air Ministry in order that it might be possible to maintain communication with London by this means wherever we might be.
7. At about noon I learned from Captain de Margerie, M. Reynaud's "chef de cabinet," that the Government was leaving that day, and that all the remaining members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were leaving at 3 p.m. I accordingly decided to hand over the embassy to Mr. Bullitt, the United States Ambassador, and to leave Paris with the rest of my staff the same evening. The Secretary of State for the Colonies arrived in Paris by air during the afternoon. Lord Lloyd was able to see M. Reynaud, General Weygand and members of the French Government before leaving with me later in the evening. He left for England from Châteaudun by air on the following morning. The impression that the general situation was better than I had at one time thought possible. The morale of the army was improving, and there appeared to be a general determination to fight to a finish. General Weygand seemed more calm and resolute than he had been for some days, and M. Reynaud himself was in good heart. I drove out of the embassy shortly before 9 p.m. Mr. Spurgeon, the head chancery messenger, was left in charge, assisted by Mrs. Spurgeon, Gabriel Trowbridge, chancery messenger, and Mr. Christie, the gate porter, with his wife. They had all volunteered to remain. The United States Ambassador had told me that he would send a representative to the embassy on the following morning to take over and to affix seals and printed notices stating that the premises were under the protection of the United States Embassy.

Touraine, June 11.

9. After a nightmare drive over roads crowded with streams of motor cars, farm-carts, army transport and other means of locomotion, I arrived at the Château de Champchevrier at about 4 a.m. At times there were no less than three lines of traffic on the roads proceeding towards the south-west. The refugees from the north were already on their way beyond Paris, and the evacuation of Paris itself was now in full swing. In the circumstances I was fortunate in only taking some seven hours to reach my destination. The appalling conditions may be realised by the fact that Colonel Vanier, the Canadian Minister, who was detained in Paris and left about two hours later than I, took nineteen hours for the same journey owing to the ever-increasing congestion on the roads and to delays caused by air-raid warnings. I should here mention that during the days preceding our evacuation from Paris and subsequently I maintained the closest contact with Colonel Vanier and Mr. Bain-Marais, the South African Minister, and our close and daily contact continued until our arrival in England. On parting at Paddington station on arrival in London they were good enough to express their appreciation of what I had done in this respect.

10. On reaching our destination in the Touraine, we found that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established at Langeais, about 18 kilom. from the Château de Champchevrier, the Ministry of Finance was at Chinon, about 50 kilom. distant, the Ministry of the Interior was at Tours, about 26 kilom., the Air Ministry was at Amboise, and the Ministry of War was still further, while the Ministry of Supply was established somewhere in the Massif Central, 200 kilom. away. No attempt had been made beforehand to improve telephonic communication, which was purely rural. It was almost impossible to get into telephonic communication with any Ministry, and the only way of getting into touch with anyone was to get into a motor car and go to what was supposed to be his headquarters, but frequently was not, over roads thronged with refugee traffic of every description. I had also arranged for the assistant provost-marshal and his staff from Paris to be accommodated in the village of Cleré, and the two motor-cyclist despatch riders whom Major Bassett-Wilson placed at my disposal proved invaluable, as I was thus enabled to maintain a regular service to the telegraph office at Tours, where all our telegrams were received and from which all our telegrams were despatched (the wireless set proved a failure), with a minimum expenditure of petrol—a most important consideration.

11. In the above circumstances it was inevitable that much of my time should be spent on the road. M. Reynaud had not yet reached Tours, and after leaving Paris he had spent the night of the 10th-11th June at General Weygand's headquarters. The Government at Tours was thus without a head, though M. Mandel, the Minister of the Interior, did his best to contend with the situation and to reduce the chaos to some form of order.
12. During the morning I succeeded in finding the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where I saw M. Baudouin, the Under-Secretary of State, and M. Charles Roux, the Secretary-General. They were in complete ignorance of what was going on, having had no news since they left Paris on the previous day. There were about 300 telegrams at the post office at Tours, which the cyphering clerks of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had been travelling all night, were too tired even to look at. It was clear that the wiser heads considered Touraine to be only a stage of the French Government's retreat, and the only question seemed to be whether they would move to Brittany, which was M. Reynaud's idea, or to Bordeaux. I was able to transact some current business with M. Baudouin, who informed me that he had been empowered by the President of the Council to take any decisions that might be required of M. Reynaud in his capacity of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cabinet councils were held both in the morning and in the evening, but no business could be transacted as M. Reynaud had not yet arrived. I was able to see M. Mandel at the Préfecture at Tours during the afternoon. He told me that he was trying to concentrate all Government Departments in Tours itself, as it was impossible to transact business owing to the distances which at present separated them.

13. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War flew over from England and met M. Reynaud and General Weygand at the latter's headquarters at Briardi. I did not learn of this meeting until after the Prime Minister's arrival. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden returned to England on the following morning, the 12th June.

Touraine, June 12.

14. I continued my efforts to establish contact with French Ministers. M. Reynaud arrived towards evening and established his office at the Château de Chissay, between Tours and Amboise, a drive of about two hours from my headquarters. It was necessary either to make a long detour or to spend half an hour or so crossing the bridge at Tours, where the traffic confusion was indescribable. General Spears joined me at the Château de Champagne the same evening, and was able to inform me of what had passed at the meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden and M. Reynaud and General Weygand.

Touraine, June 13.

15. During the morning I called on M. Reynaud at his headquarters, accompanied by His Majesty's Minister and General Spears. M. Reynaud informed me that he had decided to follow up the appeal which he had made to President Roosevelt on the 10th June by a further appeal, making it clear that the salvation of France depended on an imminent declaration of war by the United States of America, and that France was in the position of a drowning man calling for succour. He also told me that he had been in telephonic communication with the Prime Minister, and had asked him to come out again for a meeting of the Supreme War Council on the same day. Mr. Churchill, accompanied by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Beaverbrook, Sir A. Cadogan, and members of the War Cabinet Secretariat, arrived in Tours shortly before 2 p.m., and the meeting of the War Cabinet, at which I was present, was held at the Préfecture during the afternoon.

16. M. Reynaud, who was assisted by M. Baudouin, opened the proceedings by stating that he had been urged by his colleagues to enquire whether, since the complete military defeat of France was only a matter of days, His Majesty's Government would be willing to release the French Government from their obligation not to sue separately for armistice terms or conclude a separate peace. He said that he had decided to send a last appeal to President Roosevelt in which he would make it clear that a declaration of war by the United States of America was the only thing which could give the French people the courage to continue the struggle until there was not a man left standing. The Prime Minister spoke in warm and generous terms of the sufferings of France, and said that he understood that in her desperate plight she might be forced to lay down her arms. It was a different matter, however, for His Majesty's Government to become a consenting party and to give the French Government in advance a formal release from their engagement. Before pursuing the matter further, it would be well to await President Roosevelt's reply, on receipt of which a
number of questions, apart from that put by M. Reynaud, would have to be discussed. At this point the meeting adjourned, and the British Ministers had a brief consultation in the garden of the Préfecture. They decided that the line taken by the Prime Minister must be maintained. This was conveyed to M. Reynaud on the resumption of the meeting. Reference was made to certain military matters, but as they are not germane to this report I will pass them over.

17. The Prime Minister and his party left for England by air at about 5:30 P.M. At about 8 P.M. I learned that selected members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had received orders to have their suitcases packed, their motor cars ready, as they would probably have to take the road to Bordeaux at dawn on the following day. They were awaiting a final decision. We accordingly made preparations for another move. We reduced our already exiguous archives still further, and cut down our personal luggage to a suitcase or two apiece. It was necessary also to leave in the Château certain office furniture, which was had brought with us from Paris.

18. It became clear during the day that the political situation had deteriorated. Rumours spread at Tours, after the departure of the British Ministers, to the effect that Great Britain would liberate France from her engagements if America did not declare war. M. Mandel advised General Spears privately that it would be most desirable to make it clear in documents that must be placed before the French Cabinet that in no case would England do this. His Majesty's Government should at the same time make it clear that they undertook to carry on the struggle with all their strength. The French Cabinet had got as far as discussing the fate of the French navy in the case of an armistice, and if a vote had been taken the majority of the French Cabinet would have been in favour of an armistice. The only Ministers who showed any backbone at the Cabinet meeting were M. Mandel, M. Marin and M. Campinchi; M. Reynaud himself was in a mood of indecision.

Tours, June 14.

19. General Spears arrived at about 12:30 A.M. with a message for me from M. Mandel that the embassy should be on the road to Bordeaux by 10 A.M. as tanks had broken through at Evreux, were heading south and might reach Tours during the day. I sent letters round by despatch riders to the Canadian and South African Ministers informing them of the position and that I was leaving at 10 A.M.

20. I should here place on record that the Baronne de Champchevrier did everything she could to make our stay in her Château comfortable and agreeable. She contrived to supply meals for the sixteen members of the embassy, who were accommodated in the Château, and for about thirty others, who were accommodated in the outbuildings.

21. At 10 A.M. we left for Bordeaux, where we arrived at about 7 P.M. The first part of the journey, especially the passage through Tours, was obstructed by the flood of refugees, but the latter part was uneventful.

Bordeaux, June 14.

22. On arrival at Bordeaux I went to the consulate-general, where I was told by Mr. Dible that he had been summoned to the Préfecture two hours previously and informed that the embassy had been allotted the Château Filhot at Sauternes, about 50 kilom. distant. I confirmed from the Préfecture that this was indeed the arrangement and learned that there was no accommodation available in Bordeaux itself. I at once visited the Minister of the Interior, and M. Mandel kindly arranged to have ten rooms in the Hôtel Montré requisitioned for me and the indispensable members of my staff. I accordingly moved there with the chancery and the military and air attachés. The remainder went to Château Filhot. I summoned Commander Cunard, the assistant naval attaché, who was at Nantes, to join me with all speed. The naval attaché, in his capacity of naval liaison officer, was still with the French Ministry of Marine in the neighbourhood of Tours.

23. The chase for Ministers now began once again. After dinner, General Spears and I succeeded in running M. Reynaud to earth and handed him the messages of encouragement contained in your telegrams Nos. 351 and 352.
M. Reynaud was in an un receptive mood and did not respond to my remarks to the effect that I did not think that His Majesty's Government would willingly accept the idea of France abandoning the struggle. He said that his position was not an easy one, faced as he was with the possibility of Marshal Pétain and General Weygand handing in their resignations. The only bright spot in the conversation was that M. Reynaud spoke of the withdrawal of the Government to North Africa and told us that he had sent General de Gaulle to London to enquire about the transport of war material. We reminded him that the Prime Minister and your Lordship had said that you preferred not to commit yourselves in any way until President Roosevelt's answer to M. Reynaud's second appeal had been received. It was impossible to get M. Reynaud to talk rationally. In reporting this interview, I expressed the fear that the majority of his colleagues were working on him all the time in a defeatist sense, while he himself swayed backwards and forwards, and I recommended that, in order to strengthen M. Reynaud's hands with his colleagues, it should be made plain that His Majesty's Government would not be able to condone the breach of the no-separate-peace agreement.

24. During the first few days in Bordeaux I was able to be in telephonic communication with London, but this was later interrupted.

Bordeaux, June 15.

25. The situation was now deteriorating rapidly. It became more and more difficult to obtain a straight answer to a straight question or a definite expression of opinion. Ministers sought refuge in talking about the impossibility for the French troops to stand firm in their present state of fatigue, and of the necessity of putting an end to present conditions and of preventing anarchy. Throughout these days I was bringing all the pressure I could to bear on French Ministers and other prominent political personalities with whom I was able to make contact, with a view to stiffening their will to resistance. I continued to make it plain that His Majesty's Government could not be expected to liberate France from her word.

27. I felt that, if President Roosevelt's reply to M. Reynaud's message of the 14th June did not contain the assurance that the United States would come into the war at a very early date, the French decision to ask for an armistice might follow very rapidly. In this event, General Spears and I would do our utmost to obtain a satisfactory decision in regard to the fleet. In reporting to your Lordship in the above sense at midday, I felt bound to add that we had little confidence left in anything. The situation reached the stage when I found it necessary to ask for a warship to be sent to Bordeaux as soon as possible for the evacuation of the stables of His Majesty’s Embassy, of the Canadian and South African Legations and of the Polish and Belgian Governments, if His Majesty's Government agreed to receive them.

28. The French Cabinet met in the early afternoon. The tendency now was to have two Governments, one in France to negotiate with the enemy, the other to continue the struggle from Africa. Marshal Pétain was to be head of the former and M. Reynaud of the latter, but the plan, as I reported in my telegram No. 409, was unlikely to materialise if the United States did not declare war. Marshal Pétain was asked to resign unless an armistice was given, or unless the United States declared war. General Weygand was of the same opinion. In these circumstances I expressed to your Lordship the hope that the British troops would be withdrawn to cover the harbours, and that as many French troops as possible should be embarked.

29. Shortly after I had drafted the above telegram, M. Reynaud informed me that he was summoning a Cabinet Council, that he could no longer withstand the constant pressure which was being brought to bear on him, and that the time had come when he must have a clear understanding with his colleagues. He intended to take the line that, whatever terms the Germans might offer, whatever promises they might make, France, if she failed her Ally and made a dishonourable peace, would sooner or later share the fate of all the countries which had hitherto fallen under Nazi domination. Such a peace would mean centuries of servitude, and reduce France to the status of Slovakia. If M. Reynaud failed to get sufficient support, he would resign. At best he expected four or five resignations, including possibly that of Marshal Pétain. At one stage in the
conversation M. Reynaud said that in no circumstances would he ever be a party to surrendering the French fleet and allowing it to be used against a loyal Ally. I assumed from this that some of his colleagues would not stop short of this act of treachery. I delivered to M. Reynaud the message contained in your telegram No. 397, to the effect that General Weygand had informed General Brooke that organised French resistance had ceased. In these circumstances, disembarkation of any further British forces in France was being stopped and the very large Line of Communications personnel between Rennes and Nantes were being evacuated.

30. Late in the evening, M. Reynaud communicated to me a message for the Prime Minister, which represented a formal decision taken after a meeting of the Cabinet presided over by the President of the Republic. The message was to the following effect: The Council of Ministers decided that the Government should not leave France unless it were established that the peace conditions imposed by Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini were unacceptable, as being contrary to the honour and the vital interests of France. The council did not doubt that these conditions would be unacceptable, but they considered it indispensable that this should be proved beyond doubt, in default of which the Government would break up, a large number of its members refusing to leave the soil of France. In order to learn the German and Italian conditions, the council decided to seek His Majesty's Government's authorisation to enquire what armistice terms would be offered to France by the German and Italian Governments. If His Majesty's Government authorised the French Government to take this step, the President of the Council was authorised to declare to His Majesty's Government that the surrender of the French fleet to Germany would be considered an unacceptable condition. If the British Government withheld its consent to this step, it seemed probable that the President of the Council would have no alternative but to resign. The President of the Council had just received the answer of Mr. Roosevelt, who had declared himself unable to give the Allies the military assistance asked of him. It had been agreed at the meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Tours on the 13th June that the question of authorising the request for an armistice would be reconsidered if President Roosevelt's reply was negative. This eventuality having materialised, the question must now be put afresh. M. Reynaud begged insistently for a reply early on the morning of the 16th June. (The text of the document containing this message, as handed to me by M. Reynaud, forms Annex 1 to this despatch.)

31. M. Reynaud explained verbally to General Spears and myself that the majority of the Ministers had taken the line that the Government would be regarded as having taken flight if they moved overseas without having previously ascertained that the armistice terms were unacceptable. M. Reynaud, who seemed to have put up a good fight, but to have been beaten by numbers, made it clear that, if His Majesty's Government refused to authorise the French Government to ask for armistice terms, he would resign, as he would in no circumstances repudiate a document to which he had put his signature. Great pressure, he added, had been exercised by General Weygand, who had said that the army might break up at any moment.

Bordeaux, June 16.

32. During the afternoon I received your Lordship's telegrams containing His Majesty's Government's reply to the above communication, which stated in effect that, although the Anglo-French Agreement forbidding separate negotiations, whether for an armistice or peace, involved the honour of France, His Majesty's Government nevertheless gave their full consent to an enquiry by the French Government to ascertain the terms of an armistice for France, provided, but only provided, that the French fleet was sailed forthwith for British harbours pending negotiations. The message added that His Majesty's Government, being resolved to continue the war, wholly excluded themselves from all part in the enquiry concerning an armistice. His Majesty's Government also stated that they expected to be consulted as soon as any armistice terms were received, and in stipulating for the removal of the French fleet to British ports they had in mind French interests as well as their own. General Spears and I delivered the above messages as soon as they had been deciphered. M. Reynaud, who was in a dejected mood, as he had that morning with difficulty induced Marshal Pétain
to return his written resignation to his pocket, did not take them well, and at once remarked that the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet to British ports would invite the immediate seizure of Tunis by Italy, as well as create difficulties for the British fleet. At this stage in our conversation General de Gaulle telephoned from London a message from the Prime Minister suggesting that M. Reynaud should join in issuing forthwith a declaration announcing the immediate constitution of the closest Anglo-French union in all spheres in order to carry on the war. The draft declaration, as authorised by His Majesty's Government, stated that France and Great Britain should no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British union; there would be joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies, joint citizenship, a single War Cabinet, and the two Parliaments would be formally associated. The union would concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy no matter where the battle might be.

33. The message, the full text of which forms Annex 2 to this despatch, acted like a tonic on M. Reynaud, who said that for a document like that he would fight to the last. M. Mandel and M. Marin, who joined us for a moment, were equally relieved, and M. Reynaud left with a light step to read the document to the President of the Republic. At this point I received a message stating that the communications which I had just made regarding the conclusion of an armistice should be regarded as cancelled, and I informed M. Reynaud accordingly.

34. Later the same evening I learned that a ministerial crisis had opened, and that the President of the Republic was consulting the Presidents of the Chamber and Senate. In these circumstances the meeting which had been arranged to take place the following day between the Prime Minister and M. Reynaud at an intermediate spot had unfortunately to be cancelled. (The Prime Minister had, in fact, already left London by train on his way to the place of meeting in Brittany.) We saw M. Reynaud again that night, when he informed us that the forces against him in the Government had been too strong and that he had handed in his resignation. The combination of Marshal Pétain and General Weygand, who were living in another world and imagined that they could sit round a green table discussing armistice terms, had proved too much for the weaker members of the Government, on whom they worked by waving the spectre of revolution. He had read the Prime Minister's message twice to the Council of Ministers, and explained its import and the hope which it held for the future, but all to no avail. M. Reynaud had not informed the Council of Ministers of the two earlier messages referred to in paragraph 32 above, but there had been general assent when he said that he assumed that they still held that the surrender of the fleet, which would be a stab in the back of an ally, would be regarded as an unacceptable condition.

Bordeaux, June 17.

35. Marshal Pétain succeeded in forming a new Government in the early hours of the morning. Its chief members were:

- M. Chantemps, Vice-President of the Council.
- General Weygand, Minister for National Defence.
- General Colson, Minister for War.
- Admiral Darlan, Minister of Marine.
- General Pujo, Minister for Air.
- M. Baudouin, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- M. Bouchillier, Minister of Finance.
- M. Pomaret, Minister of the Interior.
- M. Frossart, Minister of Public Works.

M. Mandel, M. Marin and M. Campinchi, who had been the most stalwart supporters of M. Reynaud in pursuing a firm policy, were conspicuous by their absence from the new Government, whose complexion was clearly defeatist. Its first act was to ask for armistice conditions. M. Baudouin, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed me at 1 A.M. that this decision had been inspired solely by the fact that the French armies, surrounded and broken up, were no longer able to stand up to the enemy. France was militarily beaten, and it was only a matter of a very few days before the German armies would have become masters.
of the whole country. General Weygand had been warning the Government for several days that he could no longer guarantee that the men would not turn on their officers. The sufferings of the civil population were appalling. No Government could have left France at this moment under the appearance of abandoning the people to their fate. The new Government had, therefore, felt compelled to ask, through the Spanish Government, for the cessation of hostilities, and to be informed on what conditions an armistice would be granted. If the conditions were such that their acceptance would be a stain on the honour of France, they would be refused, but the people would then know that their sufferings could not have been avoided. Among such conditions, the most dishonouring would be the surrender of the fleet, and he was authorised to give me the Government’s formal assurance that, although they expected this to be one of the conditions, it would be in no circumstances be accepted. The appointment of Admiral Darlan as Minister of Marine would offer His Majesty’s Government an additional guarantee, if it were needed. The change of Government, continued M. Baudouin, implied no change of heart towards their ally. The generous words spoken by the Prime Minister at Tours encouraged them to hope that, although His Majesty’s Government could not approve of the French Government’s action, they would understand it.

36. M. Baudouin repeated several times the assurance about the fleet. On each occasion I said that I took formal note of his words on behalf of His Majesty’s Government. Apart from expressing great distress that a French Government should have gone back on the signature of an agreement expressly designed to prevent such a thing happening, I thought it well to restrain myself from indulging in any severe recrimination, such as might create an impression that His Majesty’s Government would henceforward wash their hands of France and thereby give any who would be ready to grasp at it the shameless pretext to claim that the Government was released from its understanding about the fleet, to which it was essential to hold them.

37. I had seen Admiral Darlan a couple of hours earlier and had said a few words to him intended to provoke some personal assurance in regard to the fleet. He responded at once, saying: “So long as I can issue orders to it, you have nothing to fear.”

38. Having asked for an armistice with Germany, Marshal Pétain’s Government took similar action in regard to Italy. They asked the Papal Nuncio to transmit to the Italian Government, through the Holy See, an intimation of their French Government’s desire to seek the basis of a lasting peace. No mention was made of the cessation of hostilities. In informing me of this step, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had no doubt that the terms offered would be wholly unacceptable.

39. At noon Marshal Pétain broadcast to the French people. He stated that he had assumed direction of the Government, and, after paying tribute to the French army, declared that he gave himself to France to help her in her hour of misfortune. “It is with a heavy heart that I say we must cease to fight. I have applied to our opponent to ask him if he is ready to sign with us, as between soldiers after the fight, and in honour, a means to put an end to hostilities. Let all Frenchmen group themselves around the Government over which I preside during this painful trial and affirm once more their faith in the destiny of our country.”

40. I established contact with Marshal Pétain as soon as possible, and saw him just before the meeting of the Council of Ministers. I told the marshal that I had gladly received his solemn assurance that in no circumstances would the fleet be handed over, but that it was absolutely essential that, when the demand for it was presented, it should be in British control and no longer in the power of the French Government to dispose of it. Otherwise, not only we but the French Government itself would be in an intolerable situation. From our point of view it was the least we could expect. The marshal said that his own idea was that the fleet should be scuttled. I then spoke on the question of the ports, and said that they must not be simply handed over. The marshal said that, unfortunately, the situation was that the enemy would soon be able to take them whenever he wanted, but he would ensure that they were rendered unusable.

41. I asked the marshal what his intentions were. If, as was to be presumed, the German conditions proved to be unacceptable, would the Government remove to North Africa? He said that he personally would stay, but he
supposed that a small Government might remove overseas. I said that it was absolutely vital that it should, as it was the best hope of ensuring that France would one day be restored. I failed to elicit any satisfactory response.

42. In reporting the above conversation, I stated that the marshal was very dispirited, that he was thinking mainly of the sufferings of the people, and that conversations with him were fruitless.

43. In response to my appeal for the despatch of a man-of-war, the Admiralty had sent H.M.S. Berkeley to Bordeaux, and H.M.S. Arethusa to Le Verdon. Two passenger ships had also been sent to Le Verdon for the embarkation of British subjects and members of the Polish and Czech armies which it was desired to remove. Considerable numbers had already been despatched to Le Verdon by train and by road, and I sent all the members of my staff with whose services I could dispense, the staff of the Ministry of Information, and the lady members of the Canadian and South African Legations to Le Verdon in H.M.S. Berkeley. His Majesty's Embassies to Poland and Belgium embarked in H.M.S. Arethusa on the same day, and Sir Howard Kennard brought with him the President of the Polish Republic and his family, and selected members of the Polish Government and their families. I asked the officer commanding H.M.S. Berkeley to return to Bordeaux as soon as she had disembarked her passengers.

44. I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the afternoon, when he informed me that the armistice terms had not yet been received. I stipulated to him, as I stipulated to other Ministers, that His Majesty's Government must be consulted before any terms were accepted. I was, however, very doubtful whether we would obtain satisfaction. The new French Government, having already broken its engagement by violating the no-separate-peace agreement, was unlikely to hesitate at violating the obligation to consult His Majesty's Government when the terms were received.

45. The position now was that, whereas M. Reynaud had set his face against asking for armistice terms without being released by His Majesty's Government from the no-separate-peace engagement, the first act of Marshal Pétain's Government was to ask for an armistice, thus breaking their word, as I made very clear to them. In every conversation I had with Ministers and public personalities, I reverted in the terms contained in your telegrams Nos. 368 and 369 (see paragraph 32 above) to the question of the fleet being placed in British control, but I never got any satisfaction beyond the reiterated assurance that the surrender of the fleet to Germany would in no circumstances be contemplated. I did not cease to urge sailing for a British port. My naval attaché informed me that the fighting spirit of the French fleet was high. He had reason, however, to believe that the senior naval officers held the view that the men would refuse to abandon France, and become a part of the British navy, but he, also, continued to receive assurances that the fleet would be scuttled rather than surrendered.

46. In order to make absolutely certain that no member of the French Government should be in any doubt as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government I asked the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to see that the contents of your telegrams Nos. 368 and 369 (see paragraph 32 above) were brought formally to the notice of the Council of Ministers in writing.

47. During the day the telephone line to London was cut. The naval attaché, who had now joined me with his staff, installed a portable wireless set in the consulate, and it was possible to send messages through the Admiralty by this means. Delays were, however, inevitable owing to jamming and telegrams were accordingly sent to you by the ordinary telegraph line to London and by New York, the latter having been recommended to me as a quicker and more reliable route.

48. The newspaper services in France had become completely disorganised, and few people in France knew what had been happening until they heard Marshal Pétain's broadcast. Every attempt was made to jam French broadcasts from England, both, I was told, by the French as well as by the Germans. The result of all this was that public opinion was not only kept in ignorance, but was deprived of all means of expressing itself. There was thus no check on the Government, which could do what it liked and inform the public afterwards in carefully chosen terms.

49. In the evening I went to see M. Chautemps, the Vice-President of the Council, who had led the movement in favour of ascertaining the terms on which

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an armistice would be granted on the ground that until they were proved to be dishonouring no French Government could leave the country in order to carry on the war from overseas. He assured me that he could not support, and that of his supporters to reject dishonouring conditions remained as strong as ever, but he added rather ominously that the present Government contained new elements whose opinions he could not guarantee beyond all manner of doubt. The surrender of the fleet would be considered the most dishonouring condition of all.

50. I told M. Chautemps very forcibly that His Majesty's Government expected to be consulted on the armistice conditions before any reply was sent, and also that the fleet should be sent forthwith to British waters. He admitted the first point, but suggested that there might not be time. On the second point I could extract no more than that the fleet would in no case be surrendered.

M. Chautemps confirmed that the armistice conditions had not yet been received. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me a formal undertaking to inform me at once when they came.

Bordeaux, June 18.

51. In the early hours of the morning I received your Lordship's telegram No. 397 instructing me to communicate the following personal message from the Prime Minister to Marshal Pétain and General Weygand. I was also to communicate copies to the President of the Republic and Admiral Darlan:

"I wish to repeat to you my profound conviction that the illustrious Marshal Pétain and the famous General Weygand, our comrades in two great wars against the Germans, will not forget their ally strong and ever over to the enemy the fine French fleet. Such an act would scarify their names for a thousand years of history. Yet this result may easily come by frittering away these few precious hours when the fleet can be sailed to safety in British or American ports, carrying with it the hope of the future and the honour of France."

General Weygand later spoke to me of this message in terms of great indignation, saying that he did not admit that anyone should use such language to him.

52. In your Lordship's telegrams Nos. 398 and 399, which I received early the same morning, you furnished me with additional arguments concerning the disposal of the French fleet and the folly of accepting any terms which the Germans might offer. At the same time, you extended an invitation to the French Government to proceed to the United Kingdom.

53. I duly delivered the Prime Minister's message to Marshal Pétain, who undertook to communicate it to General Weygand when he arrived, shortly before the Council of Ministers. The marshal said that I need have no misgivings whatever. I replied that this did not satisfy me, and that the decision which I had been constantly urging during the past days must be taken within the few hours that remained. I asked whether he realised that it was only by placing the fleet beyond the enemy's control that the French Government could avoid a situation which would be mortally for them and might well be mortal for Great Britain. We were then joined by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said that the decision as regards the fleet had already been taken and only remained to be confirmed by the Council of Ministers that morning. He had no doubt that this would be done, and was absolutely categorical on this point. As I reported at the time, however, I could not feel entirely happy until I knew that the order had actually been given and was being carried out. In these circumstances, I decided to defer asking for an audience with the President of the Republic.

54. At about 1 P.M. I learned that the above decision had not been ratified by the Council of Ministers, but had been replaced by an unanimous decision to refuse terms which included the surrender of the fleet.

55. I was informed that the Council of Ministers had taken the attitude that it was a point of honour for France to receive the armistice terms with her armies and fleet still fighting. An unanimous decision (engaging the honour of Marshal Pétain, General Weygand and Admiral Darlan) was taken to the effect that any terms whatever which included the surrender of the fleet would be rejected, and that France would go on fighting (as she was still doing) for so long as she could. Before she capitulated on land the fleet would go to join up with the British navy, or, in the last resort, would carry out prearranged
orders to scuttle itself. I was assured that orders to that effect had been made out and would be issued immediately if this had not already been done. There would also be an order to disregard any order having the appearance of cancelling the scuttling order, this being presumably to meet the case of a fresh order being issued by some subsequent Government.

56. In reporting the above, I expressed my deep regret at the non-ratification of the decision of which I was informed earlier. I believed, however, at that moment that the French were playing straight with us. Marshal Pétain, General Weygand and Admiral Darlan were all men of honour, and I was assured that General Weygand would be given formal instructions to discuss no armistice terms whatever if they included the surrender of the fleet. The change of mind since this morning was due, I thought, partly to Admiral Darlan’s reluctance to part with his fleet while still fighting, and to a rather stiffer attitude on the part of the Government as a whole. To that extent it was a healthy sign. Moreover, I was told that French forces were still destroying tanks and killing Germans.

57. The First Lord of the Admiralty and the First Sea Lord arrived in Bordeaux in the late afternoon. After a conversation with Admiral Darlan, they reported that the French fleet would continue to fight until the terms of armistice were known. If these contained, as presumably they must, a suggestion for the surrender of the fleet, the terms would be considered dishonourable, the armistice would be and fighting would be resumed. It would continue until this was no longer possible, when, before capitulation, the French fleet would be sailed to friendly ports, if practicable, or, in the last resort, destroyed. Certain active steps had already been taken, previous to the ports falling into enemy hands; ships in fighting trim would go to their war stations, those under construction or repair but capable of steaming would go to Dakar, and the remainder would be destroyed. All merchant ships, especially those carrying war material, were being sailed for British ports as soon as the French ports were clear of magnetic mines. The destruction of oil supplies was covered by the general instructions which had been issued, and the First Lord obtained Admiral Darlan’s authority to send demolition parties to various ports on the understanding that they would report to the French Senior Naval Officer on arrival and inform him that they were there with Admiral Darlan’s consent. Admiral Darlan was very friendly and determined, and Mr. Alexander and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound were impressed by his consistency and sincerity. Admiral Darlan was convinced that the French fleet would obey whatever orders he gave. The First Sea Lord returned to England that night by flying-boat. The First Lord decided to remain until the following day.

58. I reported by telegram that evening that the situation, as I then saw it, remained extremely confused. The rot, I said, had been originally started by General Weygand, who informed the Government, each day that his terms that he could not hold the situation, and that, as France was militarily beaten, it was useless to allow further carnage. Marshal Pétain backed him up. M. Reynaud, faithful to the Anglo-French declaration, had stood out for fighting to the last and then removing the Government to carry on the war from overseas. He was gradually outnumbered and Marshal Pétain, on assuming the Presidency of the Council, replaced the firmer elements in M. Reynaud’s Government by weaklings.

59. I was unable to extract any clear indication of the French Government’s intentions, particularly as to removing to some French colonial possession. This might be because they did not themselves know, being much embarrassed by the declared intention of Marshal Pétain and General Weygand to remain with the French people in France. Meanwhile, the sands were running out; the Germans were steadily advancing and no reply to the request for an armistice had been received. The French Government asserted with increasing decision that any dishonouring terms would be rejected, and that the French army would continue to fight until it could fight no more and was obliged to capitulate. At that moment, presumably, the Government would leave. There were indications, such as the removal of material towards Africa, which seemed to show that that was in their minds; but they still evaded any question that I put on that point. In conveying this appreciation of the situation to your Lordship, I added that much political manœuvring was going on, and that, except for Marshal Pétain, who would only talk of generalities (mostly about the suffering of the people), I had a feeling that I could not believe anyone implicitly.
President Roosevelt, through Mr. Biddle, the United States Ambassador to the Polish Government, who had been appointed Deputy Ambassador to the French Government as Mr. Bullitt had remained at Paris, continued to press the French Government to despatch the French fleet to ports out of reach of the enemy. That morning Mr. Biddle delivered to the French Government a very strong message from President Roosevelt to the effect that they would forfeit the friendship and goodwill of the United States if they did not put the French fleet in a place of safety before the armistice. This communication only had the effect of infuriating the French Government, who regarded it as intolerable interference from a neutral country, especially as the United States Government had failed to come up to the French Government's expectations.

Bordeaux, June 19.

61. Mr. Alexander and I saw Marshal Pétain and the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the morning. They informed us that the Spanish Ambassador had delivered a message shortly before to the effect that, if the French Government would nominate plenipotentiaries, the German Government would indicate the time and place of the meeting at which the armistice terms would be negotiated. The Council of Ministers had nominated the following delegation: General Huntriger (head); M. Noël, Ambassador of France; Admiral Leluc; General Parisot; General (Air) Bergeret. They would not be plenipotentiaries, and the authoritative decision would remain with the Government.

62. We were also informed that the Council of Ministers had decided that, on the approach of the enemy to Bordeaux, the President of the Republic, the Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, and three or four Ministers would proceed overseas to carry on the Government. The Ministers would be nominated by the President of the Republic and would leave with a written order from him, countersigned by Marshal Pétain. General Weygand would probably go, too, in order to co-ordinate the further French war effort. The destination of the overseas Government would probably be Algiers.

63. It was satisfactory that the decision, which I had been constantly urging, to establish the Government overseas had at last been taken, and the First Lord and I applauded it on behalf of His Majesty's Government. Our conversation left us with a good impression. If words meant anything, there was no weakening as regards the rejection of dishonouring terms.

64. Lord Lloyd arrived in Bordeaux at about 5:30 P.M. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lloyd and I had an audience with the President of the Republic the same evening, at which Lord Lloyd delivered the message from His Majesty's Government, saying that they charged him to convey to M. Lebrun the great satisfaction with which they had learnt the unanimous decision of the French Government to accept no dishonouring terms. This satisfaction had been accentuated by the conversation which Mr. Alexander and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound had had the previous day (the 18th June) with Admiral Darian, and again by the later news that it had been decided that the President of the Republic and a small Government would proceed overseas. This decision was a guarantee that the soul of France would continue to live and offered the surest hope of the restoration of France perhaps at no distant date. Lord Lloyd then made the offer of shipping in order to help to get away personnel, material, &c. The President was obviously gratified by this message, but he was in a pitiable condition and nothing definite emerged from the conversation.

65. A little later Mr. Alexander, Lord Lloyd and I called on Marshal Pétain, who was assisted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom Lord Lloyd repeated his message. When we came to the subject of the fleet, Marshal Pétain gave the most categorical assurances that it would never be handed over to Germany, but said that it might have to be scuttled. M. Baudouin explained to me that, in the highly improbable event of the armistice terms proving acceptable, apart from the question of the fleet, the latter would be scuttled rather than handed over to us, whilst, in the contrary event, it would go on fighting. The First Lord pressed the fleet question with the utmost vigour and with obvious effect.

66. When Lord Lloyd came to the question of the departure of the Government, Marshal Pétain was indefinite. When we pressed the point, M. Baudouin said that the departure had been decided in principle and would be finally settled (including the time of departure) the following morning. When reminded that he had said earlier in the day that the matter had been settled, M. Baudouin
replied that that was in principle, but that it remained to be finally ratified the following morning. We all pressed the point with the utmost firmness and emphasised the danger of delay. M. Baudouin said that he hoped that the party might be got off in the early afternoon.

67. Lord Lloyd and I then called on the President of the Senate and the President of the Chamber, who were together, both of whom assured us that they had not ceased to work for the despatch of the Government overseas and showed us an admirable letter which they had addressed jointly to the President of the Republic, pleading for the rejection of dishonouring terms, which they specified as follows: any condition which must result in the rupture of the alliance with Great Britain; anything which could lower France in the esteem of friendly nations, particularly those which had made common cause with her; anything which would jeopardise French relations with the United States of America; and last, but not least, the surrender of the French fleet. (M. Herriot subsequently begged me to treat my knowledge of this letter as most private and confidential.) They were both distressed at the delay which was occurring.

68. In the course of our interview M. Jeanneney and M. Herriot begged us to have a small ship sent to Bayonne to convey to England a small number (they mentioned fifty) of officers who wished to place their services at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, and of certain politicians who were marked men. As it seemed possible that considerable numbers of French officers might wish to respond to the appeal which General de Gaulle had broadcast from London, I thought it well to ask that one or two ships should be sent to Bayonne in order to embark them and any further persons or any material that it might be possible to get away at the last moment.

69. The First Lord of the Admiralty left for England at about 10 P.M. Lord Lloyd remained for the night.

70. I would here make a digression to say that since our arrival in Bordeaux we had been doing everything possible to secure the evacuation of British subjects, who were pouring into the town from all parts of France. In response to my request shipping was sent to Le Verdon, and considerable numbers of refugees were sent to England from there. Some were also evacuated in ships leaving Bordeaux itself, but we had several disappointments, notably when the crews of two Dutch vessels in the harbour, which had promised to take passengers, went on strike and the ships were unable to leave. German aeroplanes had been laying magnetic mines regularly every night at the entrance to the Gironde, and H.M.S. Arethusa had had to have a channel swept for her by two mine-sweepers. In these circumstances the Admiralty had instructed the naval attaché that the port of Bordeaux was to be cleared of shipping. British subjects were now arriving in Bordeaux only in dribbles, but the vice-consul at Bayonne reported that a number had assembled there. I accordingly felt that shipping should be diverted to Bayonne and that it was no longer necessary to keep the consular staff in Bordeaux. Mr. Dible, with the members of the consulate and of the naval control office, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Redman and the remainder of the War Cabinet Secretariat, Lieutenant-Colonel de Chair and other members of No. 1 Mission and the staff of the Canadian and South African Legations, left Bordeaux that afternoon. The naval attaché and the military attaché detailed members of their staffs to proceed to Bayonne in order to superintend the evacuation from there, not only of British subjects but also of the remnants of the Polish and Czech armies and of any foreign political personalities whom it was desirable to remove. His Majesty's Consul handed over the consulate building to his American colleague, but I was able to arrange with Mr. Biddle that the strict formalities should be waived and that I and my staff could occupy the offices as long as we wished. This was essential as the wireless transmitter and receiver was installed there, and also because I considered it necessary that some official should be permanently there in order to help and direct to the port of embarkation such British subjects as continued to trickle in. In this task the military and naval and air attachés and their staffs also co-operated, and the French authorities were very helpful in providing train accommodation and lorries to take the parties of British subjects which were collected to Bayonne.

Bordeaux, June 20.

71. Shortly after midnight Bordeaux was bombed by German aircraft, and Lord Lloyd and I drafted the account of our conversation with M. Jeanneney and
M. Herriot by the light of one guttering candle to the accompaniment of whistling bombs and machine-gun fire. The object of the raid seems to have been mainly to terrify the French Government. Bombs were dropped more or less indiscriminately, and one fell very close to the Presidency of the Council. Ships in the harbour were machine-gunned. Several houses were destroyed, and casualties amounted to about fifteen killed and about fifteen wounded. The raid lasted for over an hour and some German machines returned after daylight, presumably in order to photograph the result. No bombs were dropped on this occasion.

72. The chief effect of the air raid was to decide the Government to move to Perpignan during the afternoon in order that it might be able to consider the armistice conditions in the requisite calm. The President of the Republic, the Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber and a nucleus Government would thereafter leave, I was assured, for North Africa from Port Vendres.

73. During the morning Lord Lloyd and I saw Admiral Darlan, who showed us written instructions in regard to the fleet, which were broadly as follows: in the event of the Admiral-Commanding-in-chief being no longer able to exercise command, the fleet would take orders from Admiral Esteva or, in default of him, Admiral Abrial. It was to go on fighting fiercely unless it received orders to the contrary from a properly constituted Government outside enemy control.

74. Shortly after midday I learnt that the French representatives would meet the Germans for the receipt of armistice terms that night at Tours. The Minister for Foreign Affairs that morning again gave me a positive assurance that in no case would the fleet be surrendered.

75. I made arrangements for myself and a further reduced staff to move to Perpignan that evening, and for the remainder of my staff to return to England. I would be accompanied to Perpignan by the Canadian and South African Ministers. I asked your Lordship whether one of His Majesty’s ships, or, if this were difficult for the Admiralty to arrange, a flying-boat or boats, could be sent to Port Vendres to convey us to North Africa.

76. At 5-30 p.m. I learnt that a last-minute change of plan had been made. The Germans having offered to reinstate the telephone line with Tours, the Government decided to remain in Bordeaux to receive the armistice terms, which they expected during the evening. In these circumstances I asked that H.M.S. Galatea, which had replaced H.M.S. Arethusa, should remain off Arcachon until further notice.

Bordeaux, June 21.

77. At 12.15 p.m. the armistice conditions had not yet been received, and all that was known was that fighting had ceased in the Tours area in order to let the French delegation through. I subsequently learnt that the French delegation had been delayed by the destruction of a bridge and only arrived at Tours at 4 a.m.

78. At about 6 a.m. I sent my military attaché to find M. Baudoin and hand him the following written communication from me, dated the 20th June: “I think it my duty to remind you that my Government expected to be consulted as soon as any armistice terms were received.” In reporting this action to your Lordship, I stated that the German conditions, which however, be subject to a short-time limit and that it must be anticipated that no effective consultation, if any at all, would be feasible. The German armies had paused, but, when they moved again, armoured and motorised columns could reach Bordeaux in a very short time. There was nothing to stop them. Apart from the question of the fleet, which I believed to have been safeguarded by the instructions issued on the 20th June, I proposed to insist on the despatch of a nucleus Government overseas, this step being, as I had told the French Ministers over and over again, the only thing which would encourage His Majesty’s Government to stand by France to the end.

79. In reply to my written communication mentioned above, I received a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that he did not think it necessary to inform me afresh that it had always been the intention of the French Government to have an exchange of views with His Majesty’s Government as soon as the armistice conditions were known. M. Baudoin added that, according to his latest information, he did not expect to receive the armistice conditions until
later that evening. It was satisfactory to have obtained this acknowledgment, but it did not alter the fact that, if a very short time-limit were set, no effective consultation would be possible.

80. When the French Government decided to move to Perpignan the President of the Chamber secured a ship in Bordeaux and put on board a number of parliamentarians for shipment overseas. They were now kept up somewhere in the mouth of the Gironde. Unfortunately, they were those, of course, who stood for resistance. The weaker politicians were still in Bordeaux, and M. Laval and his friends were active. M. Herriot told me that there was still a majority in the Cabinet among the civilians in favour of resistance, but it was significant that there was no longer unanimity. I feared that the majority might dwindle yet further. The decision to move to Perpignan having been cancelled, it seemed all too likely that the next step might be a decision to abandon entirely the idea of sending the President of the Republic and a nucleus Government overseas. The situation, in fact, was changing from hour to hour, and I could not believe anything I was told except by Marshal Pétain, who was evasive or silent about the things I wanted to know, and by the Presidents of the two Houses, who were not kept informed by the Government.

81. At 2:30 P.M. I learned that the French armistice delegation had been compelled to proceed to Paris. (They subsequently had to proceed from Paris to Compiegne and to receive the armistice conditions from Herr Hitler in the same railway carriage in which the German armistice delegation had been received in November 1918.) The French delegation would demand that the French Government be allowed to examine the conditions in peace, i.e., free from aerial bombardment. The same message was sent to the Spanish Ambassador, accompanied by the hint that otherwise the French Government might have to move elsewhere.

82. Bad signs were now multiplying. An order instructing colonial governors to carry on independently, although under discussion, had not yet been signed. The French censor was suppressing all news messages favourable to the Allied cause, such as the admission of Republican representatives into the United States Government, increased supplies of war material by the United States to Great Britain, the success of the Royal Air Force in Italian East Africa, General Nogues’s address to the people of Morocco, &c. The situation was clearly not improving. I continued to encourage M. Herriot to stimulate the forces of resistance, but in existing conditions his capacity in that direction was limited. In the meantime, an armoured division was reported to have passed Valence on the way to Marseilles with the obvious intention of cutting off the retreat of the French Government to Perpignan.

83. At 4 P.M. I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs again. He said that he had as yet heard nothing from the French delegation, and did not expect to receive the armistice conditions until late that night or the earliest. He assured me that the Government’s intentions were unchanged; but it was clear to me that, even if that were true at the moment, evil influences were at work. M. Baudouin was quite categorical that the intention was still to send the President and a small Government overseas, and he told me that Admiral Darlan had been instructed to provide a warship at Saint-Jean-de-Luz.

84. Immediately after this conversation I saw M. Chautemps, whose ideas were still sound, both as regards the rejection of dishonouring or severe terms and the despatch of a Government overseas. He confirmed the intrigues and kaleidoscopic character of the situation. A lamentable influence, he said, was General Weygand’s mystic mood, which led him to believe that France, having made mistakes, deserved to suffer. I worked on M. Chautemps for half an hour and thought I had succeeded in putting fresh heart into him. During my stay in Bordeaux I refrained from seeing M. Reynaud, as I felt that to do so would compromise him in present circumstances. M. Reynaud was, however, seeing Marshal Pétain once or twice a day and was doing his best to stiffen him.

Bordeaux, June 22.

85. I was informed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about midnight by telephone that the armistice conditions had been received by telephone and would be considered by the Council of Ministers at 1 A.M., after which the Minister for Foreign Affairs would receive me. I went at once to the Presidency of the Council, where the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs told me
broadly the main conditions. On hearing the condition about the fleet (article 8) I hastily wrote a note calling attention to its insidious character and the folly of placing any reliance on the German word so many times broken, and demanded that the note should be taken into the council, which by that time was sitting at the Presidency of the Republic nearby, whither I then went, accompanied by the Canadian and South African Ministers, whom I had asked to join me there. We sat in a darkened hall, where people talked in whispers and gloomy officers flitted backwards and forwards until about 8 a.m., when, on the termination of the Ministerial Council, I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as he came out, to inform me of the nature of the conditions and of the result of the council's deliberations. He said that he was going away to draft the reply which had to reach the Germans by 9 a.m., and that he had not time to speak to me. I said that I and the Dominion Ministers must be received and informed of the conditions and of the reply which it was proposed to send. M. Badouin replied that what interested us was the condition about the fleet, of which he gave us a hasty outline, adding that, on the suggestion of Admiral Darlan, it had been decided to make a counter-proposal by which the fleet would be sent to French North African ports, where it would be dismantled. I said that it ought to be sent further away. If sent to a Mediterranean port, it would risk falling into Italian hands. M. Badouin said that, in that case, it would be scuttled in accordance with the decision already taken. He then moved away, saying, in response to my demand, that he had not got a spare copy of the German conditions. On my continuing to insist, he eventually gave me one. I then said that I must protest formally against this procedure and insisted on being received somewhere where we could talk quietly. With bad grace M. Badouin showed us into the council room, where we found the President of the Republic. Much the same scene occurred and I renewed my protest in the presence of the President, who merely made some irrelevant remark. It proved impossible further to detain M. Badouin, whose attitude throughout was, to say the least, discourteous. When I reminded him of the letter which he had written me that very morning admitting the intention of the French Government to consult His Majesty's Government on receipt of the armistice conditions, he confined himself to saying that the French reply would not be definitive, but would "put questions." When I finally said that I must formally insist on being received before the draft reply to the German terms was submitted to the Council of Ministers, he agreed with bad grace to see me at 8 a.m.

86. This shameful scene, witnessed by Ministers and their secretaries who were standing round, sufficed to show me that the French had completely lost their heads and would thenceforward be unmanageable. The French text of the armistice terms and the summary which I at once telegraphed to your Lordship form Enclosures 3 and 4 to this despatch. I will here confine myself to the question of the disposal of the French fleet.

87. Article 8 of the armistice terms required that the French fleet, except that part left free for the safeguard of French interests in the colonial empire, should be collected in ports to be specified, where it would be disarmed under German or Italian control. Normal peace-time base ports would be taken for the purposes of this specification. The German Government solemnly declared that it had no intention of using during the war for its own purposes the French fleet stationed in ports under German control, except those units necessary for coast surveillance and mine-sweeping. The German Government further declared that it had no intention of making claims in respect of the French fleet at the time of negotiations of the peace terms. Except for that part (to be determined) of the fleet destined for the protection of colonial interests, all ships outside French territorial waters must be recalled to France.

88. I sent the following first appreciation to your Lordship:—

"Diabolically clever German terms have evidently destroyed the last remnants of French courage. If, as I presume is certain, the Germans reject the French counter-proposals as regards the fleet under threat of continuing their advance, I do not believe for a moment that the French, in their present state of collapse, will hold out against the original German condition to recall the fleet to French ports, and might even reverse the scuttling order. They could still square their conscience by saying that the ships could not be used against us. We are then thrown back on Admiral Darlan's assurance to the First Lord. I will get into touch with him as soon as possible."
89. Having drafted telegrams reporting the above events, I left my hotel at 7.45 A.M. I insisted on seeing Marshal Pétain, which I did with great difficulty in the company of the Minister for Foreign Affairs before they entered the Ministries Council to consider the draft of the French reply.

90. I said that at an hour when France had laid down her arms and her ally was about to be plunged into a life and death struggle, I came to the marshal, whose name throughout the world was synonymous with honour, to beg him on behalf of His Majesty's Government to see to it that France kept the solemn engagement binding the honour of France, and renewed more than once in recent days, not to allow the fleet to fall into German hands, and thus strike a mortal blow at an ally who had always been loyal and with whom France had had a no-separate-peace engagement. If France was no longer in a position to hold to that obligation, she could hold to the one to which I was referring. To recall the fleet to French ports to be disarmed under German control was equivalent, as my hearers must realise, to surrender.

91. At this point the marshal interrupted me to say that His Majesty's Government need have no qualms as I had already been informed many times. The French Government hoped to get the fleet away to African ports, such as Dakar and Madagascar. It would sink itself if ever in danger of falling into enemy hands.

92. The interview took place whilst Ministers, standing round, were waiting to go into the council. At the point I had reached the marshal indicated that he could not keep his Ministers waiting any longer.

I was unable to explain the discrepancy between the statement made to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 4 A.M. as to the fleet being sent to Mediterranean ports, and the statement which had just been made to me by the marshal. It might conceivably be the result of what I said to M. Baudouin as to the danger of sending it to be disarmed in Mediterranean ports under Italian supervision or, more probably, to confusion. At the previous council, Ministers may have talked merely of African ports. They were, in fact, distraught, except the marshal, who was becoming increasingly difficult to approach (notwithstanding my utmost insistence) and more and more silent. I was being kept now at arm's length and was becoming the object of hostile looks from the rank and file of Ministers.

94. The French reply contained a request for other modifications, such, for instance, as the reduction of the occupied area. The text of the reply is enclosed as Annex 8 to this despatch.

95. While the above interview was taking place, the naval attaché on my instructions was seeing Admiral Auphan, the Naval Chief of Staff, who assured him again that no unit of the French fleet would be handed over to the Germans. He said that the French Government hoped to arrange for the interment of the fleet away from French metropolitan ports, and mentioned Dakar, French Congo and Madagascar as possible places. Admiral Auphan stated categorically that the ships would remain under the French flag and with orders that should the Germans or Italians attempt to interfere with them in any way or at any time their crews would sink them at once.

96. The fleet clause in the French reply ran as follows:—

"The French fleet (with the exception of that part which is left at the disposal of the French Government in order to safeguard French interests in the Colonial Empire), after having been demobilised and having disembarked ammunition under German or Italian control, will be based on French-African ports. The crews of each ship shall not exceed half the normal peace-time crew."

The remainder of the article to remain unchanged.

This was wholly unsatisfactory and was, indeed, little if any better than the German version. As soon as I had secured the text I forced my way into the house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and demanded to be received at once. I argued that once in German hands for the purpose of control, no ship would be allowed to leave German hands. The Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that in the case of ships absent from their base ports (the very large majority) the Germans would be invited to send control commissions. As regards the others (if any) the scuttling order would be carried out if there was any attempt to remove or otherwise interfere with French crews.

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98. I said vehemently and at length that all this was totally unsatisfactory and would, as he must realise, lead to a breach of faith by France. The Minister for Foreign Affairs continued to argue that the key of the whole situation was the scuttling order, and he offered to instruct Admiral Darlan to tell me exactly how this would work out in practice.

99. I had little remaining doubt that we were confronted with deliberate bad faith. I could only pray that we could still rely on Admiral Darlan whom I intended to see at the first possible moment. There was an organised conspiracy to keep me from ascertaining the facts. I was doing everything I possibly could, but the scales were weighted against me from the moment the Germans set a short-time limit. There was growing Anglophobia among the ministers and parliamentarians. The result of clever and successful Fifth Column work. I had to deal mainly with M. Baudouin, who had become the leading spirit in the Government, but in whose word I no longer had any faith, and an old man who seemed incapable of grasping the situation, but whose word of honour, nevertheless, remained our only hope. The reply of the French Government, who were given a short extension of time (the Germans had originally demanded to receive their reply by 9 A.M.) was sent off and discussions were resumed at Compiègne.

100. At 4 P.M. I reported to your Lordship as follows:

"You should know that the situation, after rising and falling for some days, has become (I think for good) about as bad as it could be. There is no fight left in anyone, and French soldiers back from the front are selling their arms in Bordeaux."

At 6 P.M. I reported that I had been unable to get a straight answer, but that I took it that in the altered circumstances (now approaching a land-slide) there was no longer any question of setting up a Government overseas.

101. I continued my efforts with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was in vain that I pointed out to him that after our exchange of letters about consultation, he was under an obligation to keep me promptly and fully informed of each stage and step. M. Baudouin merely replied that he was doing so. He was becoming even more evasive and more evasive.

102. At about 6 P.M. I was informed by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the German reply. The French counter-proposals (some of which were rejected and some partially accepted) had been embodied in a document which was to be annexed to the Armistice Convention, and would be taken into account when the time came to conclude the treaty of peace. The fleet clause ran as follows:

"The proposed modification is not accepted for insertion in the convention. The Germans do not refuse to contemplate acceptance of the proposal made, but they consider that it is a measure of application falling within the competence of the Armistice Commission."

The German comments on the other points raised by the French are contained in my telegram No. 529, a copy of which forms Annex 6 to this despatch.

103. When handing me, in confidence, the text of the German reply, which I had to copy hastily myself, M. Charles-Roux stated that he was authorised to make to me secretly the following statement, which I took down in writing:

"The dispositions taken by Admiral Darlan are such that no ship would be utilisable were an attempt to use it to be made."

The Secretary-General said that this should give us complete satisfaction. I naturally repudiated this with contumely, and said that this lamentable clause might well make just the difference to us between victory and defeat, and, therefore, jeopardise also all hope of a future for France. I could not express my profound regret that the Anglo-French Alliance, on which such confident hopes had been founded, should have dissolved in such circumstances.

104. At the close of this interview I told M. Charles-Roux that it was my intention, as soon as the armistice had been signed, to leave with my staff for England. He affected surprise and asked me for my reasons. I replied that I had been accredited to a free and Allied Government, and did not think that my Sovereign and Government would wish me to stay with a French Government which within a few hours would be under the control of the enemy with
which the British Commonwealth of Nations was still, and would remain, at war. Apart from that consideration, it would be quite useless for me to remain, as, even if I and my staff were not removed to Berlin, as had happened to His Majesty's Ambassador at Brussels, it was futile to suppose that communication of any kind would be allowed between the French Government and myself; we should both of us be in a ridiculous and impossible position. As I could be of no further use it was my duty, in any case, to return home for report and consultation, after which His Majesty's Government would no doubt review the situation in the light of further developments. I thought it well to add that rider in order not to give the impression that His Majesty's Government might abandon France altogether, and thereby encourage the French Government to consider themselves released from any further obligation, notably the undertaking to scuttle the fleet rather than allow it to be used against us.

105. Later in the evening I went, accompanied by the two Dominion Ministers, to call on General Weygand, who informed us that the armistice had been signed about an hour previously. I thereupon spoke to the general in much the same language as that which I had used with M. Charles-Roux. He, too, seemed surprised at first by my decision, but afterwards appeared to realise the force of my arguments. The general remarked at one point in our conversation that, although the Germans seemed to have paused in their advance on Bordeaux from the north, they might well be there next day if they decided to push on. There was nothing to stop them.

106. An hour or so later (it was then about 10 P.M.) I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the same object in view. He had retired to bed and came down to receive me with apologies in his dressing-gown. He, likewise, affected surprise on learning of my imminent departure, but accepted it when I had put my case. I asked if I could see Marshal Pétain, but M. Baudouin said that he had gone to bed and must on no account be disturbed, and that he himself would be responsible for delivering my message.

107. In the course of the evening I also went to see if I could have an audience of the President of the Republic. I was received by the head of the civilian household, who told me that the President was in bed. I said that in that case it seemed unnecessary for me to disturb him, as I had not come to ask for a farewell audience. After I had explained the situation to him, M. Magre agreed, and said that he would deliver a suitable message to the President in the morning on my behalf. By arrangement with me the two Dominion Ministers also called immediately after me both on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and at the Presidency of the Republic.

108. I can only offer two explanations of the surprise evinced at all these interviews by my decision to leave. The first is that my interlocutors had so deluded themselves into believing that a French Government would be allowed to function freely that they honestly thought that I could render further service. The other, much more likely, is that the French Government hoped by detaining me to give the French public and outside world the impression that His Majesty's Government had condoned their actions. It was not possible for me to seek and receive your instructions in time, but I felt reasonably sure that you would not wish me in all the circumstances to give the French Government that satisfaction. They had violated the no-separate-peace engagement; they had broken their word, recently renewed in writing, to consult His Majesty's Government on receipt of the German terms; they were meeting my representations with evasions and were treating me personally with discourtesy; and they were on the point of falling under enemy control. In these circumstances it was clear that I could render no further service, and I trust that my decision to evacuate His Majesty's Embassy when I did will be approved. Once I had decided to do so, I accelerated the final preparations as I had been told that the officer commanding H.M.S. Galatea was anxious to leave at the earliest possible moment for the reason that at least one enemy submarine was known to be operating in the neighbourhood.

109. We accordingly left towards midnight for Arcachon, embarked early the following morning in a sardine boat, from which after reaching the open sea we transferred to the Canadian destroyer Fraser, which conveyed us to Saint Jean-de-Luz where we transhipped to H.M.S. Galatea.

110. The steamship Etrick Castle was off Saint Jean-de-Luz and had already taken on board a large number of British subjects and members of the
Anglo-French Ambulance Corps, the Spears-Hadfield Ambulance and the Motor Transport Service, and was engaged in embarking Polish and Czech troops. Other shipping was also available. Naval officers, assisted by Major Withington, my assistant military attaché, remained on shore to superintend the embarkation.

111. I omitted to mention that your Lordship’s telegram No. 458, with its renewed intimation that His Majesty’s Government were prepared to make every possible effort to assist France to continue the struggle, whether in France itself or in French overseas territories, did not reach me until several hours after the armistice had been signed.

112. It was not until just before H.M.S. Galatea was due to sail that I received your further telegram instructing me to deliver to President Lebrun a message from His Majesty in the following terms:—

"I learn with deep anxiety and dismay that your Government, under the cruel pressure of these tragic days, contemplate sending the French fleet to French North African ports, where it would be dismantled. This must, in effect, leave the French fleet where it would be in evident danger of falling into hostile hands.

"I need not remind you, M. le Président, should this occur, how great would be the danger involved to our common cause, and I rely on the solemn and explicit word of France, already given to my Government, that in no circumstances would your Government assent to any condition that involved this consequence."

113. As I had no further means of delivering this message personally I decided to forward it to its destination by telegraph from Saint Jean-de-Luz.

114. After the admiral had transferred his flag to H.M.S. Calcutta, H.M.S. Galatea sailed at midnight and reached Plymouth at 8.30 p.m. the following evening. The kindness and hospitality which we received at the hands of Admiral Curtis, Captain Schofield, the officer commanding the Fraser and their subordinate officers was beyond all words, and I should be very glad if an expression of our grateful appreciation could be conveyed to them.

115. On arrival at Plymouth I found that the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief had most kindly sent his barge to convey me to Admiralty House, whither I accordingly proceeded, accompanied by His Majesty’s Minister and the two Dominion Ministers, and where we were recipients of very gracious hospitality at the hands of Sir Martin and Lady Dunbar-Nasmith. Admirable arrangements had also been made for the remaining members of the party.

116. During the run to Plymouth in H.M.S. Galatea I received your Lordship’s kind telegram running as follows:—

"Please accept the grateful thanks of my colleagues and myself for your unremitting labours in the Allied cause performed towards the end in conditions of danger, discomfort and acute personal embarrassment. Your work and that of your staff has been beyond praise."

117. I need not tell you with what profound gratitude I and every member of my staff received this kind and comforting message.

118. On reading through the above recital I find there is not very much that I need add unless it be an attempt to explain, in so far as I am able to do so, how the sorry tale which it unfolds can have come to pass. It is, perhaps, inevitable that in the process I shall be found to have fallen here and there into the error of repetition.

119. As I reported at the time, the French nation, which had been led to believe that it was secure behind the Maginot line, was completely paralysed by the news that this bastion had been turned and that German armies were pouring through a breach made in the Allied defences in the neighbourhood of Sedan. From that moment the spectre of defeat was never absent from the vision of every Frenchman who knew the true situation. General Weygand, who, when the Prime Minister and officers of the Imperial General Staff talked with him at Vincennes the day after he had assumed the supreme command, had inspired confidence in his ability to redress the situation, if anyone could, quickly gave way to despair. From the day when he formally intimated that, if the French armies failed on the Somme-Aisne line to hold up the enemy’s advance, no further organised resistance would be possible, the French Government ceased to have
any real heart in the fight. Marshal Pétain, whom M. Reynaud brought into the Government in order to cover its responsibility, exercised from the first a defeatist influence which rapidly infected his colleagues.

120. It was in this mood, aggravated by the remorseless German advance which a brief and fragmentary return of spirit among the French troops failed to check, that the Government started on its flight across France, which ended at Bordeaux in a complete surrender to the German conditions.

121. During the three days spent in the Touraine M. Reynaud, who, up to the time of the departure from Paris, had seemed to dominate his colleagues, began to lose ground. This was clearly demonstrated by his compliance with the demand, made by the majority of his colleagues, that he should put forward a plea to the British Ministers during their visit to Tours to release France from her engagement not to sue separately for armistice terms or conclude a separate peace. By the time we reached Bordeaux M. Reynaud, who continued to assert that he would be no party to the breach of an agreement to which he had subscribed, was warning me that, unless the miracle of an American declaration of war supervened, it was only a matter of a day or two before he was overwhelmed by the growing majority in his Government, which favoured asking the enemy on what conditions an armistice would be granted. The argument used by this faction, as stated in the earlier part of this report, was that no French Government, or even individual politician, could leave France, without appearing to be fleeing in order to save his own skin, until the conditions had been ascertained and shown to be unacceptable. It was only then that the people would understand the necessity for continued resistance and the despatch of a Government to carry on overseas. There was no doubt something in this argument, but I never felt that it was wholly sincere. In the light of after events I am inclined to think it was not, although I was assured on two occasions that Admiral Darlan had actually been instructed to hold the necessary transport in readiness.

122. When, late in the evening of our second day in Bordeaux, M. Reynaud was forced to resign after failing to get a majority in favour of accepting the offer of His Majesty's Government of complete fusion of the two countries for the purpose of pursuing the war to victory, he was followed into the wilderness by the few stout hearts who had supported him, notably M. Mandel, M. Campinchi and M. Dantry. The new Government formed by Marshal Pétain was predominantly defeatist. I was assured on more than one occasion that it had registered a unanimous decision to accept no dishonouring or humiliating terms, but it is a question whether it was not merely going through certain motions designed to save its own conscience and to tranquillise His Majesty's Government.

123. Be that as it may, my task from this moment became infinitely more arduous. M. Reynaud had always made what I believed to be a sincere attempt to keep me adequately informed. M. Baudouin, who replaced him as Minister for Foreign Affairs, either withheld information or gave it belatedly. My interviews with him were brief and wholly unsatisfactory. They consisted, on his side, mainly in the repetition, in a manner which failed to convince, of the assurance that no dishonouring terms would be accepted, and that in no event would the fleet be surrendered or allowed to fall intact into German hands. My interviews with Marshal Pétain were even more disappointing. He seemed quite unable to grasp the necessity either of not succumbing as long as any resistance, however feeble, could be offered, or of sending a Government overseas to keep the flag flying. He was entirely absorbed with one thought, and one only—that of putting an end to further bloodshed and of remaining himself in France in the hope of mitigating the sufferings of the people under German occupation. On one occasion, after admitting that there was a question of sending a Government overseas, he added that, if the British navy torpedoed their ship on the way, he personally would have no regrets. Nor was anything to be gained by talking to the President of the Republic. He was in a state bordering on collapse and could only talk of the sufferings of the people, which he described as greater than any known in the history of the world.

124. During all this time I never ceased to employ and to develop the arguments with which you furnished me. I said that His Majesty's Government were entitled to expect from the great French nation a line of conduct at least as stiff as that followed by those of our smaller and weaker Allies who, even after they had been overwhelmed, had not caved in. I insisted that it was a fallacy to suppose that any leniency of treatment could be bought at the price of
premature surrender; that, even if the German conditions appeared not to be unduly harsh, the jackboot would be donned as soon as it suited the German leaders to employ the methods which they had applied to other peoples lured into submission. If my hearers (many of whom agreed with me) thought that by giving in they could alleviate the future sufferings of the people, no greater mistake could be made. I harped constantly on the no-separate-peace engagement, designed to meet just the circumstance which had arisen; and I emphasised that it was only by holding out, or at least by fulfilling the condition stipulated by His Majesty’s Government (the despatch of the fleet to British ports), that Great Britain would be encouraged to stand by France to the bitter end. In the later stages, when it had become clear that the Government was bent on surrender, my efforts were mainly devoted to urging some course which would ensure that the French fleet could never in any circumstances be used against us, and to insisting that the only hope of any future for France lay in the setting up of a French Government overseas to preserve the colonial empire and to keep alive the flame of French nationalism.

125. As I have already shown, these and other arguments were of no avail against the mood of abject surrender which daily gained in strength after M. Reynaud’s retirement from the stage. The only two political personalities whose attitude throughout was sound, and who never faltered were M. Janneney, the aged President of the Senate, and M. Herriot, President of the Chamber. I saw them many times, both separately and together, and urged them not to slacken in their efforts to rally the forces of resistance. But their situation was difficult for the reason, deliberate no doubt, that they were kept in almost complete ignorance of what was going on. They eagerly welcomed the enlightenment which I was able to give them.

126. In the final stages, dating from the decision to apply for the conditions of armistice, I was no longer kept properly informed and every device was employed to evade or delay my visits. I was driven to the undignified expedient of waiting about in darkened halls, thronged with little groups of whispering secretaries and aides-de-camp, in the hope of forcing an interview either with the marshal or with M. Baudouin as they went into or came out from a meeting of Ministers. It was only by violent insistence that I succeeded in obtaining copies of the German terms, of the French counter-suggestions and of the final German reply.

127. Up to the last every French Minister whom I saw, from Marshal Pétain downwards, continued to assure me in the most categorical terms that His Majesty’s Government need have no anxiety in regard to the fleet, which in the last resort would be scuttled. It was in vain that I argued that the Germans, who knew something about scuttling, would contrive by one means or another to prevent it. This was so obvious that I was fitted with the suspicion that these assurances, whose reiteration tended to shake my confidence, were the expression of a pious hope rather than of a sacred pledge. I ceased at last to have faith in anything but the word of honour of Admiral Darlan, to whom as a sailor it would be repugnant to hand over his ships in fighting condition to the enemy, and who continually repeated that the necessary orders had been given and who declared that they could and would be carried out. But at the very end I began to have doubts even of the admiral’s good faith. It had been a very clever move (prompted, I suspect, by M. Baudouin) to bring him into the Government as Minister of Marine. From that moment he had a double capacity—that of a member of the Government and that of commander-in-chief of the French naval forces. In the former capacity he subscribed to the German armistice conditions, and he was morally bound to ensure that they were carried out. Although I felt there was some risk in showing doubt of his word by continually pressing him to repeat it, I thought you might none the less wish me to have a final interview with him. Accordingly, during the afternoon of our last day in Bordeaux I sent my naval attaché to ask when he could receive me. The answer was that he was too busy to do so, but that I need have no anxiety. This obvious prevarication could be interpreted in two ways. It did not, however, increase my confidence, and I finally came away with the feeling that it would be inadvisable to rely implicitly on Admiral Darlan doing the right thing.

128. Coming now to the crux of the matter, the reason of the French collapse, I find myself unable to give a simple answer. It seems incredible that the great French army should have crumpled up in the way that it did. At the
outbreak of war I am convinced that the spirit was excellent. By the end of
the year men coming home on leave from the front were beginning to say that,
whilst they had been ready to die for their country, they were not ready to sit
about doing nothing indefinitely. As the months went by German propaganda,
cleverly and insidiously conducted, played further havoc with the morale of the
troops. The assurances which General Gamelin was fond of addressing to them
to the effect that in this war, unlike the last, everything possible would be done
to avoid unnecessary sacrifice of life were also not conducive to maintaining a
fighting spirit. Lastly, it may well be that the presence in every battalion of
a certain number of Communists played a certain part. In spite, nevertheless,
of these adverse factors, I am disposed to think that, if the French army had
only had some initial success, it might have lived up to its traditional reputation.
As it was, it never fought anything but rearguard actions (always discouraging
to the best of troops), and from the first the men felt there was nothing to be done
against the shock tactics, the superior numbers and the seemingly inexhaustible
wealth of material against which they were pitted. These disadvantages were
accentuated by the practical (as opposed to theoretical) incompetence of General
Gamelin in the earlier stages, and later by the half-hearted conduct of
operations by General Weygand, who, from the moment he had sized up the
situation, seemed to have made up his mind that it was hopeless. To make matters
worse, the hordes of panic-stricken civilian refugees which it was part of the
German tactics to drive before them, not only had a shattering effect on the
French troops, but seriously interfered with their operations. I cannot insist too
strongly on this point, for it played a big part, and there is, moreover, a lesson
to be learnt from it.

129. The fact, then, was that even before Paris had been evacuated the
French army was beaten. What of the politicians? In fairness, it must be
admitted that, in the face of the continued insistence of Marshal Pétain and
General Weygand that further resistance was useless and would only involve
unnecessary suffering, none but a really strong leader could have kept the
situation in hand. There was no one to fill the part. The evolution of French
politics, making for the multiplicity of small parties and individual political aims before the welfare of the State, had militated against
the emergence of a leader. M. Reynaud was the nearest approach to one, but he
was far from being man enough to contend with the Herculean task which fell
to him and which he had coveted. M. Mandel, the disciple of Clémenceau, might
have risen to the necessary height had he not been put out of court by his Jewish
blood and the fact that he had neither party nor following in the country.
M. Dautry, who at one time had seemed a dark horse, proved to be no more than
an able administrator, lacking in the qualities of leadership. The rest of
M. Reynaud's team were all men of inferior stamp.

130. To the question whether there was treachery from the first in the
ranks of the politicians, I can only say that I never had any evidence of it.
Had the army been able to withstand the German onslaught I have no reason
to suppose that France would not be fighting as a loyal ally to-day. I am not
sure of M. Laval or of M. Baudouin. The former had always stood for com-
position both with Germany and with Italy, and it may well be that in the final
stages he was in communication with the enemy, although, if he was, it is difficult
to see what he gained by it: certainly no alleviation of the terms imposed.
M. Baudouin is a man of quite different type. Two months ago his name was
scarcely known, and it is amazing that he should have succeeded in becoming,
as he did, the dominating influence in Marshal Pétain's Government. Voluminous
and unreliable, he may well have played a shady part. But, again,
if things had gone well, I have no reason to suppose that he would have sold his
country. With him, I think the dominating motives were fear and the desire
to stand in well with the conqueror after the inevitable defeat.

131. If I were asked how it was that in those dark hours there was no
time to come forward to rally the forces of resistance, I can only repeat that
the shock of learning that the army, which was the pride of France, was broken
up and in full retreat was so paralysing that no Frenchman seemed capable of
reacting. In the later stages, the public was kept completely in the dark, whilst
the presence in the Government of Marshal Pétain, General Weygand and
Admiral Darlan seemed to afford a guarantee that the honour of France was in
safe keeping.
132. Finally, the question may be asked whether there was something rotten in the state of France. It is also a difficult question to answer by a plain "yes" or "no." In conversation with me a number of Frenchmen (M. Reynaud among them) ascribed the collapse in part to the abuse of the democratic system: life in France was too easy; facilities and favours were too readily obtained. Whilst there may be something in this, I do not accept it as an explanation of what occurred. From all accounts the mass of the French people was sound. It never had a chance to prove its worth. I should rather describe France as a man who, stunned by an unexpected blow, was unable to rise to his feet before his opponent delivered the coup de grâce.

133. I cannot conclude this despatch without paying a tribute to my staff, every one of whom did most valuable work. Although racked with fatigue from a long succession of sleepless nights (there was an occasion when I found four of them at 5 o'clock in the morning asleep over their cyphers from sheer exhaustion), they were always ready to carry on uncomplainingly. Their willing and cheerful help did much to encourage me and to mitigate the horror of those last days in Bordeaux, when, powerless to exercise any further influence, I watched a great nation write with its own hand the darkest page in its history.

I have, &c.

R. H. CAMPBELL.

Annex 1.

Message for the Prime Minister handed to His Majesty's Ambassador by
M. Reynaud on the Evening of June 15, 1940.

LE Conseil des Ministres, réuni cet après-midi, a jugé que le départ du Gouvernement hors de France, en abandonnant le peuple français au moment où l'ennemi envahira tout le territoire national et imposera à la population de cruelles privations et souffrances, peut provoquer une violente réaction de l'opinion publique s’il n’est pas établi que les conditions de paix de MM. Hitler et Mussolini sont inacceptables, comme contraires à l’honneur ou à l'intérêt vital de la France.

Le Conseil ne doute pas que ces conditions le seraient, en effet, mais il considère comme indispensable que la preuve en soit rapportée, faute de quoi le Gouvernement se disloquerait, un grand nombre de ses membres refusant de quitter le territoire national.

Pour parvenir à connaître les conditions de l’Allemagne, le Conseil a décidé de demander au Gouvernement britannique l’autorisation de faire poser au Gouvernement de Berlin par le Gouvernement des États-Unis la question de savoir quelles seraient les conditions d’armistice de l’Allemagne et de l’Italie envers la France.

Le Président du Conseil a été autorisé à déclarer au Gouvernement britannique que la remise de la flotte à l’Allemagne serait considérée comme une condition inacceptable si le Gouvernement britannique autorisait le Gouvernement français à faire cette démarche.

Au cas où le Gouvernement britannique refuserait son consentement à cette démarche, il paraît vraisemblable qu’en raison de l’opinion qui s’est manifestée au Conseil d’aujourd’hui le Président du Conseil serait appelé à donner sa démission.

Le Président du Conseil vient de recevoir la réponse du Président Roosevelt, qui se déclare incapable de fournir aux Alliés le concours militaire qui lui était demandé.

A la réunion qui eut lieu à Tours jeudi dernier il avait été convenu, sur votre demande, que la question de l’autorisation d’une demande d’armistice serait posée à nouveau si la réponse du Président Roosevelt était négative. Ce cas s’étant produit, la question est de nouveau posée.
Annex 2.

Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Campbell (Bordeaux).

[By Telephone.]

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"At this most fateful moment in the history of the modern world, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic make this declaration of indissoluble union and unyielding resolution in their common defence of justice and freedom, against subjection to a system which reduces mankind to a life of robots and slaves.

"The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union.

"The Constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies.

"Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France.

"Both countries will share responsibility for the repair of the devastation of war, wherever it occurs in their territories, and the resources of both shall be equally, and as one, applied to that purpose.

"During the war there shall be a single War Cabinet, and all the forces of Britain and France, whether on land, sea or in the air, will be placed under its direction. It will govern from wherever it best can. The two Parliaments will be formally associated.

"The nations of the British Empire are already forming new armies. France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea and in the air. The Union appeals to the United States to fortify the economic resources of the Allies and to bring her powerful material aid to the common cause.

"The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy no matter where the battle may be.

"And thus we shall conquer."

(Repeated to Washington, No. 1142.)

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Annex 3.

ARTICLE 1st.

LE Gouvernement français ordonnera la cessation des hostilités contre le Reich allemand.

Il ordonnera que les troupes françaises déjà encerclées déposent immédiatement les armes.

ARTICLE 2.

En vue de sauvegarder les intérêts du Reich, le territoire français au nord et à l'ouest de la ligne tracée, sur la carte, partant de la région de Genève, Dôle, Chalon-sur-Saône, Paray-le-Montal, Moulins, Bourges, Vierzon, puis en direction de Tours jusqu'à 20 kilomètres à l'est de Tours, cette limite se dirigera parallèlement à la voie ferrée Angoulême-Bordeaux, jusqu'à Mont-de-Marsan et Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port, sera occupé par les troupes allemandes. Dans la mesure où les régions du territoire occupé ne se trouvent pas encore sous le contrôle des troupes allemandes, leur occupation sera effectuée immédiatement après la conclusion de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 3.

Dans les régions occupées, le Reich allemand a tous les droits de la Puissance occupante (à l'exclusion de l'administration du pays sans immixtion dans son régime).

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Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faciliter par tous les moyens les règlements relatifs à l'exercice de ces droits et à la mise à exécution avec le concours de l'administration française. Le Gouvernement français invitera immédiatement toutes les autorités et services administratifs français du territoire occupé à se conformer au règlement des autorités militaires allemandes et à collaborer avec ces dernières.

Le Gouvernement allemand a l'intention de réduire au strict minimum l'occupation de la côte occidentale après cessation des hostilités avec l'Angleterre.

Le Gouvernement français est libre de choisir son siège dans le territoire non occupé, ou bien, s'il le désire, de le transférer même à Paris.

Dans ce dernier cas, le Gouvernement allemand s'engage à accorder toutes facilités nécessaires au Gouvernement français et à ses services administratifs centraux, afin qu'ils soient en mesure d'administrer de Paris les territoires occupés et non occupés.

**Article 4.**

Les forces armées françaises sur terre, sur mer et dans l'air, devront être démobilisées et désarmées dans un délai encore à déterminer, mais sont exceptées de cette obligation les troupes nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre intérieur. Leur effectif et leur armement seront déterminés par l'Allemagne ou l'Italie respectivement. Les forces armées françaises stationnées dans les régions occupées par l'Allemagne devront être ramenées sur le territoire non occupé et seront démobilisées.

Avant d'être ramenées en territoire non occupé, ces troupes déposeront leurs armes et leur matériel aux endroits où elles se trouvent au moment de la conclusion de l'armistice. Elles seront responsables de la remise régulière du matériel et des armes aux troupes allemandes.

**Article 5.**

Comme garantie d'observation des conditions de l'armistice il pourra être exigé que toutes les pièces d'artillerie et chars, engins anti-chars, les avions militaires, les canons armes d'infanterie, tous les moyens de traction et les munitions des unités de l'armée française engagées contre l'Allemagne, et qui se trouveront au moment de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention sur le territoire ne devant pas être occupé, soient livrés en bon état. La Commission allemande d'Armistice décidera de l'étendue de ces livraisons.

**Article 6.**

Les armes, munitions et matériel de guerre de toute espèce, restant en territoire français non occupé dans la mesure où ceux-ci n'auront pas été laissés à la disposition du Gouvernement français pour l'armement des unités françaises autorisées, devront être entreposés ou mis en sécurité sous contrôle allemand ou italien respectivement. Le Haut Commandement allemand se réserve le droit d'ordonner à cet effet toutes les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher l'usage abusif de ce matériel. La fabrication d'un nouveau matériel de guerre en territoire non occupé devra cesser immédiatement.

**Article 7.**

Les fortifications terrestres et côtières avec leur armement, munitions, équipements, les stocks et installations de tout genre se trouvant dans les régions à occuper devront être livrées en bon état.

Devront être remis en outre les plans de ces fortifications ainsi que les plans de celles déjà prises par les troupes allemandes. Tous les détails sur les emplacements minés, les barrages, les fusées à retardement et les barrages chimiques, &c., sont à remettre au Haut Commandement allemand.

Ces obstacles devront être enlevés par les troupes françaises sur la demande des autorités allemandes.

**Article 8.**

La flotte de guerre française (à l'exception de la partie qui est laissée à la disposition du Gouvernement français pour la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans son empire colonial) sera rassemblée dans des ports à déterminer et devra
être démobilisée et désarmée sous le contrôle de l’Allemagne ou respectivement de l’Italie. Les ports d’attache du temps de paix de ces navires serviront pour la désignation de ces ports.

Le Gouvernement allemand déclare solennellement au Gouvernement français qu’il n’a pas l’intention d’utiliser pendant la guerre à ses propres fins, la flotte de guerre française stationnée dans les ports sous contrôle allemand, sauf les unités nécessaires à la surveillance des côtes et au dragage des mines. Il déclare en outre solennellement et formellement qu’il n’a pas l’intention de formuler des revendications à l’égard de la flotte de guerre française lors de la conclusion de la paix.

Exception faite de la partie de la flotte de guerre française à déterminer qui sera affectée à la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans l’empire colonial, tous les navires de guerre se trouvant en dehors des eaux territoriales françaises doivent être rappelés en France.

**Article 9.**

Le Haut Commandement français devra fournir au Haut Commandement allemand des indications précises sur toutes les mines posées par la France, ainsi que sur tous les barrages de mines dans les ports et en avant des côtes, ainsi que sur les installations militaires de défense et de protection. Le dragage des barrages de mines devra être effectué par les forces françaises, dans la mesure où le Haut Commandement allemand le l’exigera.

**Article 10.**

Le Gouvernement français s’engage à n’entreprendre à l’avenir aucune action hostile contre le Reich allemand avec aucune partie des forces armées qui lui restent, ni d’autre manière.

Le Gouvernement français empêchera également les membres des forces armées françaises de quitter le territoire français et veillera à ce que ni des armes, ni des équipements quelconques, ni navires, avions, etc., ne soient transportés en Angleterre ou à l’étranger. Le Gouvernement français interdira aux ressortissants français de combattre contre l’Allemagne au service d’États avec lesquels l’Allemagne se trouve encore en guerre. Les ressortissants français qui ne se conformeraient pas à cette prescription seront traités, de la part des troupes allemandes, en francs-tireurs.

**Article 11.**

Jusqu’à nouvel ordre, il sera interdit aux navires de commerce français de tous genres, y compris les bâtiments de cabotage et les bâtiments de port se trouvant sous contrôle français, de sortir des ports. La reprise du trafic commercial sera subordonnée à l’autorisation préalable du Gouvernement allemand ou du Gouvernement italien respectivement.

Les navires de commerce français se trouvant en dehors des ports français seront rappelés en France par le Gouvernement français et, si cela n’est pas possible, ils seront dirigés sur des ports neutres. Tous les navires de commerce allemands arraisonnés se trouvant dans des ports français seront rendus en bon état si la demande en est faite.

**Article 12.**

Une interdiction de décollage à l’égard de tous les avions se trouvant sur le territoire français sera prononcée immédiatement. Tout avion décollant sans autorisation préalable allemande sera considéré par l’aviation militaire allemande comme avion ennemi et sera traité comme tel. Les aérodromes et les installations terrestres de l’aviation militaire seront placés sous contrôle allemand ou italien respectivement. Il peut être exigé qu’on les rende inutilisables. Le Gouvernement français est tenu de mettre à la disposition des autorités allemandes tous les avions étrangers se trouvant en territoire non occupé ou de les empêcher de poursuivre leur route; ces avions devront être livrés aux autorités militaires allemandes.

**Article 13.**

Le Gouvernement français s’engage à veiller à ce que, dans les territoires à occuper par les troupes allemandes, toutes les installations, outils et stocks militaires soient remis intacts aux troupes allemandes. Il devra en outre veiller

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à ce que les ports, les entreprises industrielles et les chantiers navals restent dans l'état dans lequel ils se trouvent actuellement et à ce qu'ils ne soient endommagés d'autre façon ni détruits. Il en est de même pour les moyens, voies de communications de toutes natures, notamment en ce qui concerne les voies ferrées, les routes, les voies navigables, l'ensemble des réseaux téléphoniques et télégraphiques, ainsi que les installations d'indication de navigabilité et de balisage des côtes. En outre, le Gouvernement français s'engage, sur l'ordre du Haut Commandement allemand, à procéder à tous les travaux de remise en état nécessaires. Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que, sur le territoire occupé, soit disponible le personnel spécial nécessaire et la quantité de matériel roulant de chemins de fer et autres moyens de communication correspondant aux conditions normales du temps de paix.

**Article 14.**

Tous les postes émetteurs de T.S.F. se trouvant en territoire français devront cesser sur-le-champ leurs émissions. La reprise des émissions par T.S.F. dans la partie du territoire français non occupé sera soumise à une règle spéciale.

**Article 15.**

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à effectuer le transport en transit des marchandises entre le Reich allemand et l'Italie à travers le territoire non occupé dans la mesure requise par le Gouvernement allemand.

**Article 16.**

Le Gouvernement français sera tenu de procéder au repatriement de la population dans les territoires occupés d'accord avec les services allemands compétents.

**Article 17.**

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à empêcher tout transfert de valeur à caractère économique et de stocks du territoire à occuper par les troupes allemandes vers les territoires non occupés ou à l'étranger. Il ne pourra être disposé de ces valeurs et stocks se trouvant en territoire occupé qu'en accord avec le Gouvernement du Reich.

**Article 18.**

Les frais d'entretien des troupes d'occupation allemandes sur le territoire français seront à la charge du Gouvernement français.

**Article 19.**

Tous les prisonniers de guerre et prisonniers civils allemands, y compris les prévenus et les condamnés, qui ont été arrêtés et condamnés pour des actes commis en faveur du Reich allemand, devront être remis sans délai aux troupes allemandes. Le Gouvernement français est tenu de livrer sur demande tous les ressortissants allemands désignés par le Gouvernement du Reich qui se trouvent en France, de même que dans les possessions françaises coloniales, territoires sous protectorat ou sous mandat. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à empêcher le transfert des prisonniers de guerre ou des prisonniers civils allemands de France aux possessions françaises ou bien à l'étranger.

Pour ce qui concerne les prisonniers déjà transférés hors de France, de même que les prisonniers de guerre allemands malades, inévacuables ou blessés, des listes exactes portant la désignation de l'endroit de leur séjour doivent être présentées.

Le Haut Commandement allemand s'occuperà des prisonniers de guerre allemands malades ou blessés.

**Article 20.**

Les membres des forces armées françaises qui sont prisonniers de guerre de l'armée allemande resteront prisonniers de guerre jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.

**Article 21.**

Le Gouvernement français est responsable de la mise en sécurité de tous les objets et valeurs dont la rémission en bon état ou la tenue à la disposition de l'Allemagne est stipulée dans cette convention ou dont le transfert en dehors de la France est défendu.
Le Gouvernement français sera passible de dommages et intérêts pour toutes les destructions, dommages ou transfuges contraires à la présente convention.

**Article 22.**

Une commission d’armistice allemande, agissant sous les ordres du Haut Commandement allemand, réglera et contrôlera l’exécution de la convention d’armistice.

La Commission d’Armistice est, en outre, appelée à assurer la concordance nécessaire de cette convention avec la convention d’armistice italo-française.

Le Gouvernement français constituera au siège de la Commission d’Armistice allemande une délégation chargée de représenter les intérêts français et de recevoir les ordres d’exécution de la Commission allemande d’Armistice.

**Article 23.**

Cette convention d’armistice entrera en vigueur aussitôt que le Gouvernement français sera également arrivé avec le Gouvernement italien à un accord relatif à la cessation des hostilités. La cessation des hostilités aura lieu six heures après que le Gouvernement italien aura annoncé au Gouvernement du Reich la conclusion de cet accord. Le Gouvernement du Reich fera part par radio de ce moment au Gouvernement français.

**Article 24.**

La présente convention d’armistice est valable jusqu’à la conclusion du traité de paix. Elle peut être dénoncée à tout moment pour prendre fin immédiatement si le Gouvernement français ne remplit pas les obligations par lui assumées par la présente convention.

La présente convention d’armistice a été signée le juin 1940 à 1 heures, dans la forêt de Compiègne.

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**Annex 4.**

*Summary of German Armistice Terms, June 22, 1940.*

*Article 1.*—Immediate cessation of hostilities. French troops already surrounded to lay down arms.

*Article 2.*—For security of German interests territory north and west of following line to be occupied: Geneva, Dôle, Chalon-sur-Saône, Paray-le-Monial, Moulins, Bourges, Vierzon, thence to 20 kilom. east of Tours, thence south parallel to Angoulême—Bordeaux railway to Mont de Marsan and Saint-Jean-de-Pied-de-Port. Areas not yet occupied in this territory to be occupied immediately on conclusion of present convention.

*Article 3.*—In occupied area Germany to have all rights of occupying Power, excluding local administration. French Government to afford all necessary facilities. Germany will reduce to minimum occupation of western coast after cessation of hostilities with Great Britain. French Government to be free to choose its seat of Government in non-occupied territory or even to transfer it to Paris if desired. In latter event Germany will allow necessary facilities for administration from Paris of both occupied and unoccupied territory.

*Article 4.*—French naval, military and air forces to be demobilised and disarmed within a period to be decided with exception of troops necessary for maintaining order. Size and armament of latter to be decided by Germany and Italy respectively. French armed forces in occupied territory to be brought back into unoccupied territory and demobilised. These troops will previously have laid down their arms and material at the places where they are at moment of armistice.

*Article 5.*—As a guarantee Germany may demand surrender in good condition of all artillery, tanks, anti-tank weapons, service aircraft, infantry armament, tractors and munitions in territory not to be occupied. German Armistice Commission will decide extent of these deliveries.
Article 6.—All arms and war material remaining in unoccupied territory which are not left for use of French authorised forces to be put in store under German or Italian control. Manufacture of new war material in non-occupied territory to stop immediately.

Article 7.—Land and coast defences with armaments, &c., in occupied territory to be handed over in good condition. All plans of fortifications, particulars of mines, barrages, &c., to be handed over.

Article 8.—The French fleet, except that part left free for the safeguard of French interests in the colonial empire, to be collected in ports to be specified, where it would be demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian control. Normal peace-time base ports would be taken for the purposes of this specification. The German Government solemnly declared that it had no intention of using during the war for its own purposes the French fleet stationed in ports under German control except those units necessary for coast surveillance and mine-sweeping. The German Government further declared that it had no intention of making claims in respect of the French fleet at the time of negotiations of the peace terms. Except for that part (to be determined) of the fleet destined for the protection of colonial interests, all ships outside French territorial waters must be recalled to France.

Article 9.—All information about naval mines and defences to be furnished. Mine sweeping to be carried out by French forces.

Article 10.—French Government not to undertake any hostile action with remaining armed forces. Members of French forces to be prevented from leaving French soil. No material to be conveyed to Great Britain. No Frenchmen to serve against Germany in service of other States. Those who do so will be treated as "franche-tireurs."

Article 11.—No French merchant shipping to leave harbour. Resumption of commercial traffic subject to previous authorisation of German and Italian Governments. Merchant ships outside France to be recalled or if not possible to go to neutral ports.

Article 12.—No French aircraft to leave the ground. Aerodromes to be placed under German or Italian control. All foreign aircraft in unoccupied territory to be handed over to German authorities.

Article 13.—All installations and military tools and stocks in occupied territory to be handed over intact. Ports, industrial enterprises, naval building yards to be left in their present state and not destroyed or damaged. Same to apply to all means of communication, particularly railways, roads, canals, telephones, telegraphs, navigational and coast lighting marks. Material for repairs and personnel to be made available.

Article 14.—All wireless transmitting stations in French territory to stop. Special rules for wireless in unoccupied territory.

Article 15.—French Government to facilitate transport of merchandise between Germany and Italy across unoccupied territory.

Article 16.—French Government to repatriate population to occupied territory.

Article 17.—French Government to prevent transfer of valuables and stocks from occupied to non-occupied territory or abroad.

Article 18.—Cost of maintenance of German occupying troops to be paid by France.

Article 19.—All German prisoners of war to be released. French Government to hand over all German subjects indicated by German Government who are in France or French overseas territory.

Article 20.—All French prisoners-of-war in German hands to remain so until conclusion of peace.

Article 21.—Provides for safeguard of material handed over.

Article 22.—German armistice commission will carry out armistice and will also co-ordinate it with Franco-Italian armistice.

Article 23.—Armistice will enter into force as soon as French Government have concluded similar agreement with Italian Government. Cessation of hostilities six hours after Italian Government notify its conclusion. German Government will announce this by wireless.

Article 24.—Present armistice valid until conclusion of peace treaty and can be denounced at any moment if French Government do not fulfil obligations.
Annex 5.

French Reply to Armistice Terms.

22 June 1940, 8 heures 30.

Question préalable.—Le Gouvernement français a demandé à plusieurs reprises que l'avance allemande en direction de Bordeaux soit arrêtée afin de lui permettre de délibérer librement. Hier soir le Maréchal Pétain a adressé à ce sujet un appel personnel au Chancelier du Reich.

Aucune réponse n'a encore été reçue. Les négociations telles qu'elles sont prévues avec l'Allemagne, puis avec l'Italie, pouvant durer plusieurs jours, le Gouvernement français demande d'une façon pressante cette assurance au Gouvernement allemand. Cette question capitale doit être réglée au préalable pour que puissent se poursuivre les délibérations du Gouvernement.

Article 1er.—Répétition du texte.

Article 2.—Il est demandé que Paris dont le Gouvernement allemand reconnaît l'importance pour l'administration du territoire ne soit pas occupée et que la capitale soit reliée à la zone non occupée. En conséquence, les départements de Seine, Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne, Loiret, Cher et Loir-et-Cher seraient partie du territoire non occupé.

Article 3.—S.O.

Article 4.—S.O.

Article 5.—Rayer les avions militaires du matériel dont la livraison en bon état peut être exigée. En remplacement de cette mesure, proposer que les avions militaires non compris dans les effectifs autorisés pour le maintien de l'ordre à l'intérieur et dans les colonies soient détruits.

Article 6.—S.O.

Article 7.—S.O.

Article 8.—Mise à jour du premier paragraphe.

La flotte de guerre française (à l'exception de la partie qui est laissée à la disposition du Gouvernement français pour la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans son empire colonial), après avoir été détruite et après avoir été débarqué sous le contrôle de l'Allemagne ou respectivement de l'Italie, sera basée dans les ports français de l'Afrique. Les effectifs de chaque navire ne devront pas dépasser la moitié des effectifs normaux du temps de paix.

Les deux autres paragraphes, sans changement.

Article 9.—S.O.

Article 10.—S.O.

Article 11.—S.O.

Article 12.—S.O.

Article 13.—S.O.

Article 14.—S.O.

Article 15.—S.O.

Article 16.—S.O.

Article 16 bis.—La situation des militaires étrangers ayant servi dans l'armée française ou à ses côtés et celle des ressortissants des pays étrangers ayant cherché asile en France sera l'objet d'un accord ultérieur fondé sur les principes d'honneur et d'humanité.

Article 17.—Le Gouvernement allemand s'engage à faciliter le transfert du territoire occupé ou territoriale occupé des produits et denrées nécessaires aux besoins des populations.

Article 18.—S.O.

Article 19.—Le Gouvernement français considère la clause de livraison sur demande de tous les ressortissants allemands comme contraire à l'honneur en raison de la pratique du droit d'asile. Il demande la suppression de la deuxième phrase de l'article 19.

Article 20.—S.O.

Article 21.—S.O.

Article 22.—S.O.

Article 23.—Afin d'éviter toute ambiguïté sur la validité de la signature par les plénipotentiaires français de la convention d'armistice avec l'Allemagne, il est demandé de modifier ainsi le début de l'article :

「La convention d’armistice n’entrera en vigueur que si le Gouvernement français arrive avec le Gouvernement italien.」
Annex 6.

*German Reply to French Proposals, June 22, 1940.*

*Article 2 (Paris).*—If the development of the situation permits, consideration might be given to a solution going some way to meet the request of the French Government. It is among the possibilities. The treatment accorded to Paris will depend on the internal situation of that great city, in which neither of the two Governments has any interest in seeing disorders take place. The occupation will involve only the number of troops indispensable for this purpose and for the sake of military discipline, which the chief of the French delegation will appreciate. In all events, when hostilities with England cease, a new situation will arise both for this and for the other questions which interest the French Government.

*Article 5 (Service Aircraft).*—General von Keitel has agreed to place himself immediately in personal communication with Marshal Göring, whose reply is awaited. Meanwhile, he observes that in the text of article 5 delivery is only contingent ("événementelle").

*Article 8 (Fleet).*—The proposed modification is not accepted for insertion in the convention. The Germans do not refuse to contemplate acceptance of the proposal made, but they consider that it is a measure of application falling within the competence of the Armistice Commission.

*Article 16 bis (Foreigners in France).*—The German Government, not having itself raised the question, considers that it can only be settled in the peace treaty. The provisional situation at present existing will continue therefore in principle until the treaty. The German army puts forward no demand on this subject.

*Article 17 (Food-stuffs).*—The French proposal is being examined.

*Article 19 (German nationals in France).*—Formal refusal to suppress this paragraph, but a formal declaration, on the other hand, that Germany will confine her demands to the war-mongers of German nationality.

*Article 23 (Entry into force).*—The French translation as given does not correctly represent the German text. The two texts were compared this morning, and it follows that the phrase proposed by the French Government is that which corresponds best to the German text. This phrase is adopted in the French text and the German text needs no modification.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach three memoranda relating to my conversation with the British Ambassador on July 5.

C.H.

S:CH:GB
The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me an aide-mémoire dated July 3, 1940 (copy attached), which reviewed at length the altered situation of the British in view of the collapse of the French. This aide-mémoire pointed out certain considerations and situations which the British Government hoped would receive the careful attention of the United States Government.

I thanked the Ambassador and said the matters would receive due attention.

C.H.
AIDE MEMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire to invite the attention of the United States Government to the grave consequences to the Allies and to the cause of civilisation, of the collapse of French resistance to totalitarian aggression. They feel that they are entitled to place the results of their own review of the conditions thus created before the United States Government, because the United States Government have repeatedly stated that they are deeply concerned with the preservation wherever possible of free institutions, because successive United States Administrations have declined to recognise the validity of the forcible annexation of territory by an aggressor, and because within the limits imposed by their international obligations and the Neutrality Act they have throughout rendered all the assistance they could to the Allies.

2. His Majesty's Government do not wish to discuss in this Aide Memoire the military consequences of the collapse of France further than to say that the economic and manufacturing resources of almost the whole of Europe are now at the disposal of the Nazi and Fascist Powers for the purposes of attack on Great Britain, now almost the last free country left in Europe. They would only repeat what they
they have said before, that the immediate sale of destroyers and power boats, aeroplanes and seaplanes, and guns, rifles and ammunition of all kinds is of the utmost importance if the impending attack on Great Britain is to be beaten off before winter sets in. His Majesty's Government gratefully acknowledge the great value of the war material that the United States Government have already released to them, but feel constrained to emphasise once more that further releases, if promptly made, would be of immeasurable value.

3. His Majesty's Government desire in this Aide Memoire rather to call attention to the economic situation which follows from the French collapse. In this field they desire to impress upon the United States Government the conviction to which they have been driven, that if victory over Nazi aggression is to be achieved, they must seek from the United States equipment, supplies of aircraft and other munitions and essential raw materials on an altogether larger scale than hitherto. This is partly because the Nazi successes in Europe have deprived the Allies of many sources of supply to which they have hitherto had access and partly because incessant bombing is likely to reduce their own manufacturing capacity, while intensive submarine and air blockade is likely to reduce the quantity of foodstuffs and materials they can import from abroad.
4. In these altered circumstances, His Majesty's Government believe that the United States Government will not take it amiss if they express the conviction, founded upon their own experience, that the United States Government will find that if they are to complete their own rearmament programme in the shortest possible time and at the same time provide the increased supplies necessary to enable Great Britain and the Dominions and their allies to maintain the struggle, that far-reaching changes in the industrial organisation of this country are essential. His Majesty's Government have found that their own programmes have suffered severely from slowness in realising this necessity and they are anxious to place their own experience in this matter at the disposal of the United States Government.

5. The natural tendency of all democracies engaged in rearmament is to believe that it is possible to expand the production of guns and to enjoy a full supply of butter at the same time. His Majesty's Government have found by bitter experience that this is not true and that full production cannot be secured solely by expansion and development of munitions and auxiliary industries, other industries being left unaffected. The establishment of requisite priority for labour, materials, machine tools, etc., necessarily involves the early curtailment of production for domestic civil consumption. This reorganisation becomes all the more necessary if more than one country is engaged in expanding
expanding its production of armaments and if raw material supplies are limited. Where total available supplies are restricted (e.g. raw materials such as aluminium and steel or machine tools) His Majesty’s Government hope that the Administration will agree to open immediate discussions with them on allocations as between themselves, Great Britain and Canada to secure the maximum possible production with the utmost promptitude. As regards raw materials they hope also that it will be possible that those Central and South American States who are important producers should be included in the proposed arrangements.

6. So long as gold and other foreign assets at their disposal permit, His Majesty’s Government will of course continue to pay cash for essential armaments, raw materials and food stuffs. They feel however that they should in all frankness inform the United States Government that it will be utterly impossible for them to continue to do this for any indefinite period in view of the scale on which they will need to obtain such resources from United States. Their immediate anxiety arises from the necessity of entering into long term contracts.

7. There is a considerable risk that, with the development of total war and the consequent great increase in the calls on the Royal Navy, the merchant marine serving the Allies
Allies may for a time at least suffer from a much higher rate of losses than hitherto. The temporary expansion of Allied shipping facilities due to the fact that certain Norwegian, Danish and other merchant vessels are now available would not offset the situation created by such losses. His Majesty's Government therefore feel compelled to ask whether the United States Government can take steps by whatever procedure seems most expeditious, to secure the withdrawal of the present prohibition on ships flying the United States flag entering the "combat areas" and belligerent ports to the extent necessary to permit such ships to bring imports to Great Britain. If they are prepared to do this His Majesty's Government would urge that the Administration jointly with themselves should immediately examine the possibilities of taking measures to secure the most effective joint use of the mercantile fleets of the United States, of the United Kingdom and their Allies and those of the Central and South American states.

8. His Majesty's Government regard it as a matter of the utmost urgency, from the point of view of wartime control as well as from that of post-war reconstruction, that the plans of the British nations and their Allies for dealing with their export surpluses should be concerted with those of the United States and of the other American

Republics
Republics for dealing with theirs, and this is especially so as regards those products of which there is likely to be a world surplus, e.g. cotton, corn, wheat, edible oils. A fuller statement of the view of His Majesty's Government on this subject is given in the British Ambassador's separate memorandum "A" of July 3rd, 1940.

There are a number of ways in which Germany and Italy might obtain resources from America, and His Majesty's Government accordingly desire to urge strongly that:-

(a) The United States Government should use any means in their power to cut off from Germany, Italy and the territories occupied by those states, including France, all direct and indirect exports from the United States of America; and to limit exports to other destinations from which they might subsequently reach German or Italian controlled territory. The more detailed views of His Majesty's Government on this vital subject are contained in the British Ambassador's separate memorandum "B" of July 3rd, 1940.

(b) The United States Government should take measures to block financial balances belonging to Germany or Italy, as has been done in the case of occupied countries, and obtain any supplementary powers needed for this purpose. The previous exchange of views on this subject, ending with Mr. Sumner Welles' letter to His Majesty's Ambassador
of 20th June, 1940, has not been overlooked, but His Majesty's Government would once more emphasise the great importance which they attach to action of this kind, and would urge that the previous decision should be reconsidered.

(c) Steps should be taken to prevent the return from the United States to Europe of German and Italian technicians either for military service or for employment as skilled operatives in the war industries.

9. In the event of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom deciding to invite the Governments of the Central and South American States to adopt measures parallel with those referred to in paragraph 8 of this Aide Memoire, His Majesty's Government wish to express the earnest hope that the United States Government may see their way either to take the initiative in the matter or to use their good offices with those Governments in support of that approach. These governments have an equal interest with the United States in preventing the Nazi and Fascist powers from obtaining the resources which may enable them to adopt a policy of aggression in America.

As regards financial measures, His Majesty's Ambassador had a preliminary discussion on the 26th June with Mr. Sumner Welles, who promised to look further into the matter. Certain action has been taken by the Governments of
of the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and Uruguay, but it does not appear to go far enough, while in Chile no action has been taken. A note giving more detail of the direction in which action is desired will shortly be submitted to the United States Government.

10. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom realise that in the above statement they are making wide and even difficult requests to the United States Government. It is only right therefore that they should conclude by stating in the gravest possible manner their considered opinion that the measures outlined are necessary if the civilisation which the United States and the nations of the British Empire share in common is to be successfully defended from attempts to overthrow it.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

July 3rd, 1940
The British Ambassador called at his request. He handed me a memorandum dated July 5, 1940 (copy attached) marked "A", which dealt with the British study of and interest in surplus commodities and joint marketing of important staple products. I thanked him and said the matter would receive full consideration.

C.H.
MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are greatly interested in that part of the statement issued to the press by the President on June 21st relating to proposals which are being placed before other American Governments for cooperative economic action by the American Republics and possibly by other countries, to include an effective system of joint marketing of the important staple exports of the American Republics.

His Majesty's Government have themselves been making a survey of the problem of dealing with surplus commodities produced in territories of the British Empire and in such parts of the French, Dutch and Belgian Colonies as can be controlled. This survey will include the investigation of the possibility of dealing with surpluses by regulated sales, storage, destruction where necessary, and restriction of excess production.

His Majesty's Government will give full information to the United States Government on the progress of their survey. They hope that the United States Government will do likewise and that any decisions taken on the United States proposals at the forthcoming Pan-American Conference at Havana will not preclude cooperation with them.

The
The United Kingdom and the British Empire provide the principal foreign markets for a large-range of surplus commodities from North and South America. At the same time British Empire surpluses of commodities which the American Republics also produce might, if unregulated, impinge upon American interests. From the point of view of wartime control and also from that of post war reconstruction it appears to His Majesty's Government that American regulation and British Empire regulation should be brought into line, and it is their desire to find agreement with the United States as well as with other American countries on this question.

As regards those products of which there is likely to be a world surplus, (e.g. cotton, corn, wheat, edible oils) His Majesty's Government feel that it is of the utmost urgency that the plans of the British nations and their Allies for dealing with their export surpluses should be concerted with those of the United States and of other states in the Western Hemisphere.

His Majesty's Government realise that in origin the examination of the United States Government was directed to an economic and political problem while theirs is at least to an equal extent an urgent problem of withholding supplies from Germany and countries under her control.
On this aspect of the question His Majesty's Ambassador is addressing a separate memorandum to the Secretary of State.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 3, 1940.
The British Ambassador called at his request. He handed me a memorandum (copy attached) marked "B", in which the hope was expressed that the United States Government would regard it as an American interest to extend to the British full economic support by denying all supplies to Germany and Italy or countries under their control, and by endeavoring to induce other American countries to take the same line.

I thanked the Ambassador and said this communication would receive due consideration.

G.H.
MEMORANDUM

In the altered situation following the capitulation of France, His Majesty's Government regard it as vitally important for the success of their war effort that supplies of all kinds should be denied to Germany and Italy and to all territories, including France, now occupied by them. A corollary to this is that all supplies to "dangerous" neutral destinations, i.e. to countries from which supplies could reach Germany and Italy and occupied territories, should also be strictly limited.

Hitherto the Allied Governments have sought to achieve this end by contraband control. On account of recent developments, however, the prevention of shipments to Europe by naval action may become increasingly difficult and incomplete. It is therefore extremely desirable and it may soon become essential to relieve as far as possible the actual machinery of the blockade. The only effective means of doing this is by the strictest possible control at the source.

His Majesty's Government realise that the immediate economic export problem confronting the United States and other American Governments is different in origin from their own, which is one of blockade. The two do, however, overlap. The sole object of the blockade is to embarrass totalitarian aggression
aggression and to bring the war to the earliest possible successful conclusion. His Majesty's Government, who have no intention of using the blockade for their own commercial interests, believe that the deterioration of economic conditions in Europe will be the most important influence in rendering German successes illusory, and in lessening their capacity for economic, political and military aggression on the American continents or elsewhere. This is the object of their policy, and a review of the factors as they exist today has convinced them that success can only be attained with the active cooperation of the United States Government. They therefore earnestly hope that the United States Government will regard it as an American interest to extend to the Allies full economic support by denying all supplies, direct or indirect, to Germany and Italy and to countries under German and Italian control, and by endeavouring to induce other American countries to take the same line.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 3rd, 1940
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For your information.

F. D. R.

enclosure  fdr/tmb

The original letter of the King to his famous People free - February 3, 1940
[Now in Great Britain: King and Queen]
Buckingham Palace
22nd June, 1940

My dear President Roosevelt,

Your letter of May 1st dealing with the emergency conditions which will exist at the end of the war, was very welcome to me. Every day which passes goes to show that these conditions will indeed be grave and the expert study which you suggest of available stocks of food and clothing, and of the possibility of increasing vitally necessary supplies should be of great value in making it possible to direct effort in the best way when the time comes.

It has been decided to undertake, through a Governmental Committee in this country, an enquiry on the lines indicated in your letter, and I am hopeful that the interchange of information through Governmental channels between the American and British Committees may prove to be of real assistance in preparing to meet this most serious problem.

I am very grateful for your ready cooperation in this work, which will mean so much to the peoples of Europe.

I am

Yours very sincerely,

George R. I.
July 15, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a letter addressed to you by King George of England, which the Secretary of the Navy and I have discussed. We have prepared a suggested draft reply, which is enclosed.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Draft reply.

The President,

The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE TO
7-15-40
Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO
The President
I have received Your Majesty's letter of June 26th and can assure You that I am giving every possible consideration to the question it raises.

It has been a matter of profound satisfaction to me personally to note the response of private American interests to the call for assistance and to learn how much of American industry is now devoted to the production of material and supplies for Great Britain.

Aside from the difficulties presented by existing American legislation the problem of naval vessels is, however, a matter involving the Federal Government of the United States, the position which it has taken, and the responsibilities it has assumed toward its citizens. Although deeply conscious of the gravity of the situation I have not yet been able to find a solution for this problem. I can at the present only repeat to Your Majesty that I am continuing to seek an answer to this question which will correspond to the needs and interests of both our peoples.

I often think of you and of the Queen in these difficult days and Mrs. Roosevelt and I send our kindest personal regards.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
July 27, 1940

Dear Mr. Elmhirst:

The President has asked me to thank you ever so much for your letter to him of June seventeenth. He was very much interested in what you said and asks me to send you all his very best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

M. A. LeHand
Private Secretary

Leonard K. Elmhirst, Esq.,
Dartington Hall,
Totnes,
Devon,
England.
June 17, 1940

Dear Miss Lehand,

I should apologise to you for having troubled you with a long distance call from London - now five weeks ago, but there are moments when such desperate measures seem to have their own special justification. They've been a grim five weeks and I think it may be of interest to your folk to get some impressions of what the
political weather looks like. No one of course can or would dare to prognosticate what is coming to us in these islands, but in a few short weeks the whole pattern of the world has changed. This evening outside our club a soldier in battle dress saluted an admiral, stopped him and asked if he could tell him what the French fleet would do. Would it be handed over to the Germans? That may sound a very obvious thing for a soldier to do - but it says a lot of things all at once.
Dear Franklin,

A week ago Dorothy asked me whether I thought she could have lessons with a rifle, - quite seriously. That will tell you something of the revolution that is going on in folks' minds, at the present time. However it's not the events I want to write you about but the ideas that lie behind, for ideas have a way of living on; of generating new ideas & new energies & Britain
Is trying to make up tonight for twenty years of refusal to think and to face issues squarely. Can we emerge from the chrysalis of our isolationism quickly and without a bloody revolution? That is the root question. Whether we can put up sufficient resistance to Hitler now depends upon the navy and the air force remaining to be seen. Whether we succumb or hold on is in doubt — but changes are going on behind the scenes rapidly — will they be rapid enough to avoid setting up a current that none can
stem. Revolutions don't start from the working man, but from disillusioned aristocrats, business men, and when they begin to demand changes the workers catch the fever & talk freely about "They": at the top who must be "strong to a lamp post", "put against the wall". This spirit has not been prevalent here since the sixteenth forties - it is prevalent tonight. So far the changes among civil servants have been quietly taking place but with increasing momentum, among politicians - who knows? If these can take place quietly & quickly, we may weather
the storm of anger - anger over the failure to equip, to supply & to foresee, anger over a long tale of appeasement, over an attempted isolationism that didn't work & has left us sprawling like a disconnected planet far from our empire & shut out of Europe & at a slower rate than Nazi Germany.

The situation has not been handled well on the air, or in the Press or by the politicians - too little frank speaking, too much wishful thinking. But now with Hitler on the docket can we do two things at once - watch the door & the kettle boiling or the fire? Do you remember warming me that
it was a 50:50 proposition this time, not like the last war. One horse has a broken winding in a afraid.

What sort of a world is it to be? In September I urged here an immediate discussion of a proper basis upon which the USA + G.B. could agree to deal with the Far East - no one would listen. Craigie, not in an easy position, didn't help. Japan will use her chances + perhaps whilst she is busy spreading herself China + Russia will find a closer partnership. The U.S. has at last begun to friction wool in the Argentine - what a knitter together of countries is wool.
All our cathedrals were built on the export trade in it. They you build something as lasting & beautiful in the Americas. Will the Latin States find some partnership of their own, or will Catholicism which has helped Fascism to take root be forced to recede in front of this new force? Will the German general staff bargain with Hitler for some concession in return for their accomplishments & if so what? Will Russia try to build a wall from Turkey to Archangel or can the "isms" lie down peacefully alongside one another? Friction - aer, oil - psychological?
DARTINGTON HALL,
TOTNES, DEVON.

If the French fleet escapes & the British navy & air force can hold the sea can Britain hold the blockade & wake up & build? We are all in doubt.

But whether Hitler wins or not the ideas of the Normans & Chamberlains are dead meat tonight & the combination of the Social Services State & of Publicly Controlled Utilities will grow & perhaps offer a middle road between laissez faire & communism.

Can our civil service learn to value initiative, research & the liveness & energy of the best business men. Can the business men turn their businesses
into a civil service. Can we marry individualistic enterprise into a planned economy which must in some degree span the world? Can we civilise international commodity control, and use the control for policing purposes?

When the trouble is over, hunger & unemployment will beset whole stretches of Europe & Asia. Can we cooperate to set up TVA's in China, India, South East Europe & so remove both urban & rural unemployment? Why not?

Yours sincerely,

Leonard Ehrlich
SECRET

Telegram from London dated
September 24, 1940

I was encouraged by your reception of information conveyed by Lord Lothian about Dakar. It would be against our joint interests if strong German submarine and aircraft base were established there. It looks as if there might be a stiff fight. Perhaps not but anyhow orders have been given to ram it through. We should be delighted if you would send some American warships to Monrovia, Freetown, and I hope by that time to have Dakar ready for your call. But what really matters now is that you should put it across the French Government that a war declaration would be very bad indeed for them in all that concerns United States. If Vichy declare war that is same thing as Germany, and Vichy possessions in Western Hemisphere must be considered potentially German Possessions. Many thanks also for your hint about invasion. We are all ready for them. I am very glad to hear about rifles.

An original of this:
See Great Britain folder - Drawer 4 - 1940