PSF
Great Britain 1942
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

January 1, 1942.

H. M. GEORGE VI
LONDON

We are with you in spirit on this New Year's Day and there can be no doubt that with joined hands our two nations will win through and save the civilization we have prized so long

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

WB156 Cable Britgovt

London 118 128a January 1 1941

The President of The United States of America

The White House

At the opening of a New Year which finds the people of your great country at the side of the British peoples in a war forced on them by the enemies of freedom I send you Mr. President my heartfelt good wishes for your health and welfare. Whatever changes and chances the coming year may bring, I have entire confidence, which I know you share, that our two peoples and those associated with them will in the end overthrow utterly the evil forces which have attacked civilization and have already imposed so much suffering on the peace loving nations of the Earth

George R I

1100p
MISS TULLY:
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION.

L. BERNEY

[Signature]

[Address]

[Date]
10 Downing Street, 
Whitehall

My dear Harry,

Here, at last, is your album. We made it different from the others by way of a change and I hope you approve.

Has the President received the badge of the Prince of Wales yet? I heard from Brendan that there was some doubt about it. He should have got it from Franklin D. Jr., unless the devil has pinched it himself.

We are just beginning to feel the lack of heating in the country so give us plenty of warning if you're coming over and we'll heat up the bathroom for you.

Best wishes,

Yours ever,

/s/ TOMMY

(C.R. THOMPSON)
January 6th, 1942.

Personal and Secret

Dear Mr. President,

A telegram has just been received from General Headquarters in India requesting that the following message should be conveyed to you from General Sir Archibald Wavell:

"I deeply appreciate confidence placed in me which I will do my best to justify. I fully realise the difficulties and dangers ahead but I am confident that they will be overcome. I am on my way to my new command and I will inform you as soon as it is possible to establish heads."

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
The White House
Washington

January 7, 1942.

DAILY BRITISH ROUNDUP

London: -- Roosevelt's declaration banner headlined all morning papers are devoting columns to special dispatches and text, besides pictures of Roosevelt and Cabinet and reproduction photos of first American troops marching through London 1917. Editorials equally devoted thereto are expressing satisfaction bordering on delight of the prospect of American armed forces everywhere, especially Europe; and admiration of the hugeness of the victory program.

Times leads with a Washington Reuter summary subheading: -- Roosevelt proclaims all-out war.

Telegram has heading: -- United States to send forces to Britain.

Mail has: -- United States troops coming here.

Express carries a seven column streamer that the AEF are coming to Britain and reprints its own clipping August 16, 1916 headed: -- Old Glory waves over London.
Chronicle has a four column streamer Roosevelt's gigantic victory plan. Mirror has heading --Yanks Coming Over Here; and Sketch has -- Yanks Coming Again. Mail carries an article on bases prepared by American technicians at Ulster, Scotland. Express prints Morley Richards saying that the B E F and A E F will invade the continent together and forecasts the bombing of Germany day and night with 2,000 planes every 24 hours, though there is a warning that Hitler may try invasion of Britain in the spring to forestall an Anglo-American offensive. Herald's headline --- United States Will Send Army to Britain--devotes almost an entire second page to Roosevelt's text.

Molotoff's declaration and dispute of Russian landing at Crimea have second place on front pages with reports of reverses at Malaya and Rommel's last fight at Libya. Aerial menace at Singapore is emphasized with the tendency to lay blame to the abandonment of Penang and a demand for those who are responsible, but the military correspondent of the Express thinks tis possible that the Chinese may bring relief.

Times turnover describes pull-baker, pull-tailor situation at North French Africa and explains Wavell's reporting Weygand's removal by Vichy as fear of his defiance and points out that if Britain controls the coast from Port Said to Tripoli, north Africa will become springboard for attack of Europe and the Mediterranean will be closed to Axis- if Rommel's retreat continues, Nazi pressure
on Vichy will be intensified. Mail features a study of Malaya strategy developed from Java which is reported by the new general headquarters and an article discussing rubber scarcity demanding the manufacture or synthetic reporting of synthetic products.


Despatches from the U.S. (analysis)

Times main page from Washington in a three quarter column reports the tension of Hitler's army, and on page 3 from New York reports on gallantry at Pearl Harbor. Telegraph leads with deny Smith on Roosevelt address, also a short from New York on blackout and from Chicago on the Sun's success. On page 5 from New York--Churchill's hold on the American public. Mail leads with Farr on Roosevelt. Chronicle leads with Waithman on Roosevelt and on page 2, a Waithman article on revival of vigilantes of America.

-end-
January 13, 1942

My dear Max:

I should have answered your letter of January 5, relative to the expedition of construction of minor naval craft, before this.

I have talked to Secretary Knox and I am sure we are going to get on with this vigorously.

Very sincerely yours,

The Right Honorable
Lord Beaverbrook,
Mayflower Hotel.
January 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I recommend that you sign this letter to Beaverbrook rather than the one submitted by Frank Knox.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
January 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

Is this O.K. for me to sign? (It has to be signed today)

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter has been limited to a specific reply to Lord Beaverbrook's proposals of January 5.

We have also under study the proposals submitted by Rear Admiral Dorling, R.N.

Admiral Robinson is proceeding with letting contracts on the four hundred vessels which you authorized me to add to Lord Beaverbrook's list. These additional four hundred vessels carry a high priority on Admiral Dorling's list.

Frank Knox

P.S. Last paragraph refers to the 250 escort vessels + 150 tank carrier which will be completed by spring of 1943, concerning which I phoned for your approval.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
BOB DIV. 5200.2 (5/27/80)
Date: 5-3-66
Signature: Edward L. Stimson
My dear Lord Beaverbrook:

The proposals contained in your letter of January 5 have received intensive study and there are tabulated below the optimum estimates for completion of six hundred and forty (640) of the six hundred and forty-eight (648) vessels covered in your letter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Tank Landing Craft</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE, U.K. Escort Ships</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallow Draft Tank Landing</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAM, U.K. Mine Sweepers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC, U.K. A/S Vessels</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have directed that work commence on the construction of the above tabulated craft.

With respect to the eight (8) slower vessels for auxiliary aircraft carriers to provide convoy air protection, the considered opinion of those who have studied this project, in which I concur, is that loss of the cargo carrying capacity is not warranted by the results which vessels slower than 16-18 knots can produce as auxiliary carriers.

Very sincerely,

His Excellency
Lord Beaverbrook
Minister of Supplies
London, England
Washington, D. C.,
5th January, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

Now that you have disposed of the programme for weapons of war and also for the mercantile marine, I beg to bring to your notice the naval projects in contemplation.

In 1942, it is expected that 112 major naval craft and 600 minor craft will be brought to completion.

But 600 minor naval craft is not an output consistent with the great projects which have been launched in other directions. And I would make bold to recommend that the building of minor vessels in 1942 be increased by not less than 640 craft.

These might be built in the yards already at the disposal of the navy and also in places engaged in building river vessels and ferry boats.

If this proposal finds favour with you, then I would recommend that 150 of the vessels should be tank landing craft each carrying 20 tanks of 25 tons and equipped to make ocean passages.

These tank landing craft would be made use of by the United States or Britain for landings on the beach in France or elsewhere, according

The President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
to the strategical programme that you may direct.

The 150 tank landing craft should be supplemented by 300 vessels of smaller type, each carrying 4 25-ton tanks, and suitable for landings on shallow sand beaches.

Expeditions on this scale would require in addition to merchant ships, (for which there is an expanded programme) not less than the following protecting vessels to maintain sea communications:

- 80 Minesweepers,
- 60 Small Anti-submarine vessels of 500 tons each,
- 50 Convoy escort vessels of the D.B.E. type.

These 50 convoy escort vessels are already projected and delivery is promised in 1943. But acceleration should bring delivery to pass in 1942.

Outside the naval programme proper is the essential provision of auxiliary aircraft carriers. These will be adapted merchant ships. The present programme is 24 fast vessels. But the merchant ship building programme has been increased by a third. So I suggest that a further 8 slower vessels be adapted to provide convoy air protection.

No doubt questions arise touching ship plate, and certainly turbine and Diesel engine output. All these issues present considerable difficulties.

But determination will certainly overcome the obstacles in the way.

I am, Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
January 7, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

For preparation of reply
by Saturday morning.

F.D.R.

Letter to the Pres. from Beaverbrook
Jan. 5, 1942 re the naval projects in
contemplation.
In the air - crossing the Atlantic
16-1-42

Dear Mr. Roosevelt,

I had no opportunity before leaving the White House to thank you for all your kindness. These last weeks have been the most memorable of my life, and it has been a unique privilege to be admitted into the intimacy of your home and sit at table with the great President and yourself. We, the Prime Minister's party, shared one terrible invasion of the White House, but we were not allowed to feel anything but welcome and I could not bear enough the union and the this member of the staff for all day did to help me.

Thank you so much for the signed photograph, which will always be one of my most treasured souvenirs.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
HYDE PARK, N. Y.
CABLEGRAM

February 21, 1942.

LORD BEAVERTON
VIA AMBASSADOR WINANT
LONDON

I am, of course, delighted that you are coming over here and I want you to know how very welcome you will be. I hope that soon after your arrival you can come to the White House for a day or two and that you will go for a visit to Harry's famous Florida Club. He tells me it is a sure cure for asthma and a number of other things. I have a twenty-four hour Marine Guard stand watch over Harry and will furnish you equal protection if you say the word.

I am counting on seeing you soon. Best regards

ROOSEVELT
Dear Mr. President:

The Duke of Windsor's Miami visit Saturday focuses in my mind a fact probably unknown to you and an important item for you to know—that Hitler has no plans against the island while Edward remains in residence there. He has regarded the Bahamas post as a "thin official and Buckingham Palace excuse" to keep Edward as far from home grounds as possible.

It is a major phase of the Fuehrer's policy to restore the former King, the Nazi viewpoint having been that with Edward VIII all Berlin-London differences would have been accommodated without resort to arms.

Moreover, German diplomacy is predicated upon its belief that both present ruler and government are holding power through a "coerced" and therefore "null and void" abdication. Hitler is convinced that Edward's restoration—a first democratic condition in any peace negotiations Berlin-Rome-Tokyo might control—would have support among England's proletariat, while the possibility of an American woman as Queen Consort is apt to have unusual grass-roots repercussions in the United States.

Though not pertinent or even wise now, my information has been that Hitler would not mind during the British Government to submit the question for a plebiscite. I should not be surprised if at some favoring time he submitted the suggestion openly.

Of course, H.R.H. is unlikely to know or even to have heard about this ace-in-the-hole diplomacy.

Much of this information trickled to me as the oldest of the international writers in this country and I am certain that as of today it is approximately as I report it to you. It would make a sensational or wedge-opening article but I am not so using it at this most opportune moment. However, you may consider it a story to pass along. I wanted to send it to our good friend Josephus Daniels first and then thought to submit it directly.

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Washington, D.C.
126 East 34th Street,
New York City,
March 2 1942.

Dear Miss Tully:

The President will be greatly interested in the enclosed item of information, for it is pregnant with possibilities in these days of one surprise after another.

In submitting it to him I am following a custom I used with Miss Le Hand when I had special privileged information for the Chief.

Visualized officially or as news it is sensational—and I speak as one raised on major European diplomacy, which is not unlikely to revert to such sensational coups so frequent on the continent two or three centuries ago.

I trust you will agree it is worth the President's personal attention first-hand.

Sincerely yours,

Miss Grace G. Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 6, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram I have received this morning from the president of the Baltic-American Society.

I suppose that the White House has received a similar telegram. I have no confirmation as yet of the report that Sir Stafford Cripps made the address to which reference is made in this telegram. If the report is correct, it would seem to me that there might be a possibility that certain elements within the British Government are trying to force our hand.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.
NEW YORK MAR 5

THE HONORABLE SUMNER WELLES

ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

We American citizens united in the Baltic-American Society, Inc. at a meeting of this day have given anxious consideration to press reports regarding the statements of Sir Stafford Cripps, outstanding member of the British Cabinet and leader of the House of Commons. According to these reports Sir Stafford Cripps addressed 300 members of Parliament and made a plea that Britain recognize Soviet frontiers as they stood before June 22, 1941 encompassing the Baltic states. These statements have been received by us with great astonishment as they are allegedly made by a responsible member of the British Government whose Prime Minister solemnly signed the Atlantic Charter assuring all nations, large and small, the restoration of their freedom and independence. The high principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter by President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister of Great Britain were eloquently confirmed by our President in a recent address to the nation and freedom-loving people of all mankind pray that these righteous principles of democracy will remain the shining light and the firm foundation of American policy. We firmly believe that lasting peace can only be established
on the basis of justice and freedom for all nations and that no durable settlement can be achieved by compromising for temporary advantage the principles of the Atlantic Charter and by sacrificing numerically small peoples for the aggrandizement of others. We respectfully bring the above to your attention and we submit that our views are in full accord with the expressed policy and ideals of this our great and glorious United States of America now engaged in war for the total victory of Freedom, Democracy and Justice.

Veteran United States Army
First World War
92 Liberty St., New York, N.Y.
The Mayflower
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President -

I am most grateful for your kindness last night. Your brilliant service and your wisdom have illuminated my many dark places.

It was an evening that will make me lasting memories. It is my belief that I have a place in your
Circle of friends.

I hope so very much
you will receive my
appearance next week
when you have
reflected on the proposed
telegram to Stalin.

Yours ever
Max

March 26
1942
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith copies of letters which I received yesterday under date of March 28 and of March 29 from the British Ambassador transmitting the proposals which Sir Stafford Cripps was instructed by the British War Cabinet to make to the Indian leaders.

Believe me, 

Faithfully yours,

Encs.

The President,

The White House.
My dear Welles,

On instructions from London I send you herewith a copy of the text of the British Government’s proposals regarding India. These proposals are to be published simultaneously in India and in London at 3 a.m. British Summer Time on Monday, March 30th, and arrangements are being made by the British Information Services for its simultaneous release in this country.

Please treat these proposals as confidential until such time as they are published.

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

The Honourable
Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State,
United States Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Published in:
British Cmd. 6350, India (Lord Privy Seal Mission)... April 1942, p. 4.

RLJ 7/20/60
DRAFT OF DECLARATION FOR
DISCUSSION WITH INDIAN LEADERS

The conclusions of the British War Cabinet set out below are those which Sir S. Cripps has brought with him for discussion with the Indian leaders and the question as to whether they will be implemented will depend upon the outcome of those discussions which are now taking place.

His Majesty's Government having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of promises made in regard to the future of India have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty's Government therefore make the following declaration:

A. Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elective body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.
B. Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the constitution-making body.

C. His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed, subject only to:

1) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession, if it so decides.

With such non-seceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.

2) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in future its relationship to the other member states of the British Commonwealth. Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitution/
constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate
a revision of its treaty agreements, so far as
this may be required in the new situation.

D. The constitution-making body shall be composed as
follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the
principal communities agree upon some other form before
the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the
provincial elections which will be necessary at the
end of hostilities, the entire membership of the
Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall,
as a single electoral college, proceed to the election
of a constitution-making body by a system of
proportional representation. This new body shall be
in number about one-tenth of the number of the
electoral college.

The Indian States shall be invited to appoint
representatives in the same proportion to their total
population as in the case of representatives of
British India as a whole, and with the same powers
as British Indian members.

E. While during the critical period which now faces
India and until the new constitution can be framed,
His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear full
responsibility for the defence of India, they desire
and invite the immediate and effective participation
of the leaders of the principal sections of the
Indian people in the councils of their country, of
the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they
will be enabled to give their active and

constructive/
constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future of freedom of India.
March 29th 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Welles,

With reference to my letter of yesterday, I write to let you know that I have just had a telegram from London saying that a last minute amendment has been made in the statement about India, which is to be published tomorrow.

This amendment consists of the revision of paragraph E at the end of the statement. This paragraph should now run as follows:

"During the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the cooperation of the peoples of India, His Majesty's

The Honourable
Sumner Welles,
Acting-Secretary of State,
United States Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future of freedom of India."

Yours sincerely,
April 3, 1942.
10:00 P.M.

Dear Max:

Within the past twenty-four hours the matter came to final discussion and determination. Harry and George Marshall are in the process of leaving this morning. We talked of the great benefit it would have been if you could have been there too, but I had to make a personal decision and I put my foot down for the very good reason that I want you here.

As you know, there is no one else I can talk to when we get word in the course of the next few days. I ought to hear by Tuesday and I hope you can arrange to get here by Tuesday afternoon. If there is delay, I will telephone.

Thank the Lord the matter seems to be moving swiftly toward what I trust will be a momentous and successful conclusion.

As ever yours,

Right Honorable Lord Beaverbrook,
c/o British Consulate,
Miami, Florida.
5th April, 1942

Dear Mr President,

Here is the first summary of British Press comment.

You will see that it only covers the period up to last Thursday. But next time it will be brought up to the end of the week.

I hope you will not find it too long.

Here I am, sitting in the sunshine. But I am 'wearin awa'.

Yours ever

[Signature]

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
BRITISH PRESS COMMENT
March 25th - April 1st.

The British Press during this period was concerned mainly with the Production Debate in the House of Commons, the Government's threat to suspend the Daily Mirror for impeding the war effort, the Indian question, and the need to help Russia.

(1) The Production Debate -- Lyttleton's outline of his functions and aims received a warm welcome from the Press of the Left as well as the Right. Daily Mail (Tory) commended the sense of urgency in Lyttleton's speech. News Chronicle (Liberal) welcomed the idea of a Production General Staff. The Times, after praising Lyttleton, said the Production General Staff must be regarded as part of Allied General Staff co-ordinating production and strategy.

(2) Press comment on the Government's attack on the Daily Mirror was unfavourable. The Times maintained the nation's morale was good and would only be threatened if people were not free to speak their mind. Policy immune from criticism always ended in fatal blunders. Manchester Guardian (Liberal) attacked Herbert Morrison for importing prejudice into the Debate and said the Government took criticism too tragically.

(3) The Press commended the Government's plan for India. The Times said credit belonged to Cripps, whose initiative brought the plan to birth, and to Churchill who had the insight to seize the moment for a revolutionary departure in policy. Socialist Daily Herald as well as Manchester Guardian however complained that the provisions of the plan were not precise enough.

(4) Aid for Russia was the theme of the Daily Mail, the Daily Herald and the Manchester Guardian following Maisky's speech saying that the war would be decided on the Russian front in 1942. Daily
Mail said we must send Russia all we can and attack where and when we can. Daily Herald said Russian belief that we must all strike now called for immediate examination. Manchester Guardian maintained that Maisky's speech was all the more reason for doing all we can to strengthen Russia.

The theme was revived a few days later when the Daily Mirror said that more than ever was the mood of attack necessary when Russia herself was attacking, and when the News Chronicle political columnist stated that in Russia and Libya the decision would be gained this year.

There was also considerable Press comment on the defeat of the Government candidate by an Independent at the Grantham by-election. All newspapers said it was due to public demand for more vigour, urgency and speed in the Government. There was no suggestion that the result was to be deplored. One political correspondent said that local labour parties were increasingly unwilling to support Conservative candidates at elections.

Widespread demand for action was considered by News Chronicle to be the reason for the fall in Churchill's popularity recorded by the latest Gallup Poll in England. This gave 81 per cent of the population satisfied with Churchill as Premier against 89 per cent in January. Only 35 per cent were satisfied with the Government's conduct of the war against 44 per cent last October.

4th April, 1942
My dear Mr. President:

The author of the attached despatch to the Department, Mr. Philip Holland, has been American Consul General in Liverpool for nearly fifteen years. He writes, therefore, with considerable experience and background.

This despatch seems to me so very striking as to make it desirable for me to bring it to your attention. I shall talk to Gil Winant about this as soon as I have the opportunity.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.
From Liverpool,
February 28, 1942.

The President,
The White House.
Required Report

(Prepared in accordance with Circular No. 121 of June 16, 1933, from the Consulate General, London, and Section VI-1, Note 19, of the Foreign Service Regulations.)

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS

From: PHILIP HOLLAND, American Consul General.
Date of mailing: February 28, 1942.

February has brought reverses wherever the British have engaged in the conflict. Some of the people are astounded at their own weaknesses; others have accepted the disasters as incidents to be expected in the struggle; others are obviously indifferent.

Those who are astounded have hitherto believed the Empire to be impregnably prepared for defense and regard their defeats as calamitous and are bitter that they have been misled.

Those who have accepted the disasters as incidents to be expected had not troubled to inform themselves as to the true conditions. Moreover, they expected, trusting in their leaders, to muddle through and somehow win the last battle.
Those who are indifferent are in the minority, but they are the ones who are playing an unfortunate role in bringing their country near final defeat.

The astounded had been buoyed up by statements of the Cabinet members, of the press, and of the B.B.C., most of which were distorted and doctored up to be palatable, and were consequently misleading.

Those who have accepted the disasters as normal incidents in the course of war and have taken for granted that the ultimate outcome will be victory make up no small percentage of the people. Even the events of February have not aroused them from their lethargy.

Unless something can be and is done to stimulate interest among and incite activity in the indifferent, save what America can and will do, when this war is over England may be an overcrowded island kingdom.

That a vast number of the industrial workers are not pulling their weight is obvious. Neither the public speeches of the leaders, the urges of the press, nor the fear of invasion and ultimate defeat is having any effect on them. They are happier and more contented than they have been in the past twenty-five years. They are drawing good wages while loafing on their jobs. They absent themselves from their work when they like, without let or hindrance. This condition pervades the whole industrial life of the country and is demoralizing the working
working people. A railroad official told me recently that "sickness" reduces the numbers of the railroad workmen an average of twenty-five percent. When I asked him what he meant by "sickness" he said, "absenteeism". He said it is not unusual for the railroad lines to be blocked with freight trains waiting to be loaded or unloaded from the convoys. I asked him what he could do about it. He replied, "We don't dare do anything."

I was informed by a responsible employee of Vickers-Armstrongs Limited a few days ago that the average daily absenteeees from that plant are more than three hundred. Wherever I inquired I found the same condition. Moreover, when this class are at work they do the minimum and manage to get in overtime whenever possible. Another man said to me, "We always have full forces of laborers on Sundays, because there is time-and-a-half for Sunday work." This is true among the munitions, shipbuilding, docks, and railroad workers, and everywhere. When Vickers-Armstrongs Limited inquired what punitive measures were to be taken it was told to do nothing.

Some of the laborers do not hesitate to say that winning the war would not better their condition and they point with sneers at what happened to them after the
the last war, declaring that their condition could not have been worse if the country had been under the rule of an enemy.

This condition is serious. Evidently the Government does not know how to remedy it or is fearful to attempt it. Some of the people think the trouble is in the Cabinet and that the labor representatives either do not want it remedied and, therefore, stand in the way of it, or they fear an attempt might incite such reaction among the laborers as to result in social disaster.

This situation has not been helped by the Prime Minister's interest in party politics. He waited too long to give up the leadership of the House of Commons. His holding on to the leadership of the Tory Party may ruin him as well as do irreparable damage to the country. He is regarded as a great war leader, but he is, at the same time, accredited with trying to keep the country under the control of the hereditary aristocracy. Many of the people now think he will not be so fortunate as to maintain the British social structure even until America gets into its stride and wins the war. The people are many who think America's interest in the war is to maintain the status quo of British social structure, and, moreover, are looking to our country to that end.

There
There is another condition which warrants our notice: that is, the complacency which has permeated all classes since America entered the war. Not only have I observed this, but my attention has been repeatedly called to it by the resident Americans and by my Latin-American colleagues. I heard one Englishman say to another recently, "Instead of England sending coordinators to America, it ought to be the other way about".
Dear Mr. President,

This is a big week with much criticism and plenty of advice, with some support for me tomorrow.

Yours ever,

Max

April 12

42
BRITISH PRESS COMMENT

April 1st - April 11th

The press in Great Britain has given praise to the Government over India and is in general less critical than usual. There has been an attack in The Times on Churchill and his Administration over the sinking of the two British cruisers in the Indian Ocean.

An article appeared in The Times from Sir Edward Grigg, demanding the creation of a Combined General Staff with a professional, non-ministerial chief responsible to the War Cabinet. This is of course a demand that Churchill should relinquish his post as Minister of Defence. It is given added importance owing to the fact that Grigg was until recently Under-Secretary of State at the War Office. He was dropped from the Government two months ago. He is connected with the Cliveden school of politics.

The attack is supported by a leading article in The Times which says that the Minister of Defence's authority is now entirely personal and that weak service co-operation has played a part in our disasters.

Attack on Churchill's conduct as Minister of Defence is the surest way to hurt him.

The loss of the cruisers is also condemned by Lord Winster in an article in the liberal News Chronicle. Winster was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty. Unlike Grigg he resigned and was not dismissed.

Winster states that we are losing valuable ships for no apparent purpose. American naval aid, he says, is essential if we are to risk meeting superior force. He declares that the same mistakes seem to be repeated.

This attack is backed up by the leading article in the News
Chronicle which maintains that we need urgent reconsideration of naval direction at the top.

Support for the Government comes from the Socialist Daily Herald, which has for some time been a severe critic of the Administration and the Prime Minister.

The Party Truce, which has been in existence since the formation of Churchill's Government is in real danger. Though temporarily sustained, the Manchester Guardian (liberal) doubts whether local labour parties can be induced to give active support to any Conservative candidate.

There is a widespread demand in many newspapers for more material aid to Russia. "Second Front" is supported by the majority of the Press.

Six by-elections will be held shortly. Independent candidates have been nominated in five of the constituencies.

12th April, 1942
The week has brought forth growing criticism of the Government and an attack upon Churchill's position as Defence Minister.

(NOTE: An attempt was made last February to compel Churchill to give up his post as Defence Minister. But the attack was lost sight of in the general assault made by his enemies at that time).

The new attack was launched by Sir Edward Grigg, a former under Minister to whom reference was made in last week's Report. Now Hankey, a former Minister and head of the Cabinet Secretariat in the last war, continues the assault. Hankey drew a bonus of £25,000 from public moneys for being good at defending Lloyd George a quarter of a century ago. He also pulled down a peerage and got a place in the Chamberlain Government. He knows a great deal and says it at great length.

When Churchill sacked Hankey last February, Hankey replied with a very bitter letter, denouncing in retrospect Churchill's war strategy. Now he charges that this strategy has depended on sentiment. I think he is referring to the Greek expedition.

Hankey is joined by Lord Swinton. He is a former Air Minister who wont do or say very much.

A third protagonist is Lord Salisbury, who is the real leader of the Conservatives in the House of Lords and whose son is the titular leader. Salisbury is a war-scarred veteran, but the scars of course are all political. The Salisbury family always fights at Headquarters, and God is always on the same side. Salisbury is a dangerous foe.

The Times and the Daily Mail are the newspapers carrying the burden of the campaign. The News Chronicle is not far off.

Hopkins and Marshall swept the newspapers into one enthusiastic song of praise. Hopkins should be sent over to London every time there is a crisis. Even the Daily Telegraph, the faithful friend of the Government which has opposed every suggestion of a Second Front, and usually with much criticism, now refers to the "vigorous views from Washington which give great encouragement".
Churchill must face the House of Commons where demands will continue for an explanation about Singapore. A new charge comes from Australia through the Daily Mail to the effect that the Government misled the public about the strength of the troops defending Singapore. Some newspaper editors will think 'Let's hope it's true', but none will dare to say so.

This is a free reading of the newspapers of Great Britain for the week ending April 19th. On the whole Harry Hopkins had better return about the middle of May. There has been nothing like him in England since Strongbow went to Ireland.

21st April, 1942
Dear Mr. President,

Tomorrow, with David Sowerby, I shall be returning to Britain, with our ambition abundantly achieved — I have had the privilege of meeting you for whom I have such high admiration and esteem.

I shall always recall with pleasure and with profit the occasion of your fireside chat and the evening at the White House.

When I left London, my friend H.G. Wells charged me with what I must say to you, if and when, shall the opportunity of meeting you. H.G., who in his 76th year is rather sick and cynical about men and affairs, still joins his hopes in “FDR.”

He was particularly anxious that I should discuss with you “The new Declaration of the Rights of Man” of which he was the initiator and in which he is vitally interested. The “Declaration” itself was drafted by a committee of which Viscount Sankey, the former Lord Chancellor was chairman and I was secretary.
Some day, when pressure of war and world events and the burdens of the President of the United States are less great, I hope I may be able to fulfill his injunctions.

Meanwhile, I hope and think that David and I have been able to make a useful contribution to the joint efforts of our two countries toward the successful prosecution of the war, we both devoutly believe in the instrument of political warfare and we have found here kindred spirits, with whom we have worked in complete harmony and understanding.

May I, Mr. President, thank you again for your kindness and say, like H.G., how much I believe in F.D.R.

Yours very sincerely,

Ritchie Calder
My Dear Mr. President,

I cannot refrain from the line of my departure. I am unable to add one more letter from America, from adding one more letter to your daily load of mail. I feel compelled to tell you how much I appreciated your giving me of your time to discuss the affairs about which I visited your country, and I am exceedingly grateful for the approval you gave to my efforts.

I do also want to say how grateful I am for the universal kindness I met with from all American citizens, and although on rare occasion I found occasion to argue, I cannot deny...
that I enjoy a good argument at times. Bob Sherwood and his people have been of immense assistance and I am sure that all of London with the knowledge that all of London will be forthcoming assistance to cooperation will be forthcoming

Warfare from his department in our joint work for their joint effort as and I shall work for this joint effort as hard as I can.

I leave your country, but President, in the knowledge of having made many last lasting friends - and no man can ask for more than that.

Yours very sincerely,

David Bowes Lyon.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I talked with Col. Angus MacDonald in regard to the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor. He arrives on June 1 and Col. MacDonald thinks they will arrive in time for lunch.

Lord Halifax has to be in Pennsylvania or Ohio on that date to receive a degree. However, Col. MacDonald says he thinks it will help Lady Halifax very much if you were going to have them to lunch, that you have them on Monday. However, they will be here on Tuesday if that is more convenient for you and Mrs. Roosevelt.

What may I tell Col. MacDonald?

G.
My dear Mr. President:

I enclose for your consideration drafts of notes to be exchanged with the British Ambassador and the Australian Minister concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Australia to the armed forces of the United States.

The essence of the proposed arrangement with the United Kingdom is that the war production and war resources of each contracting nation should be used by the armed forces of each, and of the other United Nations, in ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, productive facilities and shipping space. With respect to financing, the general principle to be applied is to reduce to a minimum the need of each Government for the currency of the other.

In

The President,

The White House.
In applying these principles the United Kingdom will furnish United States forces with all military equipment, munitions, military and naval stores, supplies, materials, facilities and services for which the United Kingdom or the British colonial empire is the most effective source of supply.

The proposed arrangement with Australia is identical.

These drafts have been approved in substance by the War and Navy Departments, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Treasury and the Board of Economic Warfare as a basis for negotiation with the British and Australians. If you approve them for this purpose, negotiations will be undertaken immediately.

You have recently approved the conclusion of lend-lease agreements with a number of the other United Nations substantially identical to that with the United Kingdom. It is anticipated that such an agreement or arrangement identical in substance will be concluded with Australia before the proposed exchange of notes is carried out.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
Four drafts, as stated.

Lend-Lease
FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

With a view to supplementing Articles II and VI of the Agreement of February 23, 1942 between our two Governments for the provision of reciprocal aid, I have the honor to set forth below my understanding of the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be correlated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.

1. Each of our Governments pledged itself in the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942 to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those nations with which it is at war. Each Government undertook in the Agreement of February 23, 1942 to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities or information, useful in the prosecution of their common war undertaking, as each may be in a position to supply. The general principle to be followed in providing such
such aid is that the war production and war resources of both nations should be used by the armed forces of each, and of the other United Nations, in ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, productive facilities and shipping space.

2. Where appropriate, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.

3. As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is my understanding that the general principle to be applied is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services to be provided by each Government to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of each Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum. It is accordingly my understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share
of its war production made available to the United Kingdom.

The Government of the United Kingdom will provide, on the
same terms and as reciprocal aid, in accordance with the
Agreement of February 27, 1942, the share of its war
production made available to the United States.

4. The Government of the United Kingdom will
provide the United States or its armed forces with the
following types of assistance, as such reciprocal aid,
when it is found that they can most effectively be
procured in the United Kingdom or in the British colonial
empire:

(a) All military equipment, munitions and
military and naval stores.

(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities and
services for the United States forces, except for
the pay and allowances of such forces and such
local purchases as its official establishments may
make other than through the official establishments
of the Government of the United Kingdom as specified
in paragraph 5.

(c) Supplies,
(c) Supplies, materials and services needed in the construction of military projects, tasks and similar capital works required for the common war effort in the United Kingdom or in the British colonial empire, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.

(d) Supplies, materials and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tasks and capital works in territory other than the United Kingdom or the British colonial empire or territory of the United States to the extent that the United Kingdom or the British colonial empire is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations.

5. Requests by the United States Government for such aid will be presented by duly authorized authorities of the United States to official agencies of the United Kingdom which will be designated or established in London and in the areas where United States forces are
are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.

6. It is my understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of the United Kingdom will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. In so far as circumstances will permit, appropriate record of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.

7. The aid to be provided each other by the signatory Governments under the Agreement of February 23, 1942, and as indicated above, will be provided on the same terms by each Government to the forces of such of the other United Nations as shall enter into similar arrangements with them.

If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

I have the honor to be et cetera, et cetera.
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today's date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom to the armed forces of the United States, the terms of which are as follows:

(The British Ambassador's note is here quoted)

In reply I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States agrees with your understanding as expressed in that note and that, in accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
DRAFT

FROM THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

With a view to supplementing Articles II and VI of the Agreement of May , 1942 between our two Governments for the provision of reciprocal aid, I have the honor to set forth below my understanding of the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of Australia to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be correlated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.

1. Each of our Governments pledged itself in the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942 to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those nations with which it is at war. Each Government undertook in the Agreement of May , 1942 to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities or information, useful in the prosecution of their common war undertaking, as each may be in a position to supply. The general principle to be followed in providing such aid is that
the war production and war resources of both nations should be used by the armed forces of each, and of the other United Nations, in ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, productive facilities and shipping space.

2. Where appropriate, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.

3. As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is my understanding that the general principle to be applied is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services to be provided by each Government to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of each Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum. It is accordingly my understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its war production made available
available to Australia. The Government of Australia will provide, on the same terms and as reciprocal aid, in accordance with the agreement of May 1942, the share of its war production made available to the United States.

4. The Government of Australia will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance, as such reciprocal aid, when it is found that they can most effectively be procured in Australia:

(a) All military equipment, munitions and military and naval stores;

(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Australian Government as specified in paragraph 5.

(c) Supplies,
(c) Supplies, materials and services needed in the construction of military projects, tasks and similar capital works required for the common war effort in Australia, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.

(d) Supplies, materials and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tasks and capital works in territory other than Australia or territory of the United States to the extent that Australia is a more practicable source of supply that the United States or another of the United Nations.

3. Requests by the United States Government for such aid will be presented by duly authorized authorities of the United States to official agencies of the Commonwealth of Australia which will be designated or established in Canberra and in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.

6. It is my understanding that all such aid accepted by
by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of Australia will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. In so far as circumstances will permit, appropriate record of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each government.

7. The aid to be provided each other by the signatory Governments under the Agreement of May 1, 1942, and as indicated above, will be provided on the same terms by each Government to the forces of such of the other United Nations as shall enter into similar arrangements with them.

If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

I have the honor to be at cetera, et cetera.
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today's date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of Australia to the armed forces of the United States, the terms of which are as follows:

(The Australian Minister's note is here quoted)

In reply I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States agrees with your understanding as expressed in that note and that, in accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
MR. HOPKINS:

THIS CAME IN AN ENVELOPE ADDRESSED
TO YOU.

LOIS
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2nd June 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I have had a telegram from the Duke of Windsor asking me to convey to you the following personal message:

"I have arrived in Nassau and thank you very much for all the courtesy and facilities extended to me by the United States Navy for air journey.

"Also appreciate the sending of 75 Military Police who arrived this morning and are rendering valuable assistance.

"Situation quieter and will report to you on my return to Washington.

"Sincere regards.

Edward."

Believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honourable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DATED JUNE 10th, 1942.

"Hearty congratulations on your splendid naval success near Midway Island. We have been greatly cheered by it.

I have just returned from a visit to the Home Fleet where I had the pleasure of going on board the 'WASHINGTON' and the 'WICHITA'. I was given a very warm welcome by the ships' companies and was greatly impressed by their efficiency and keenness. They are working in admirably with our people.

I am hoping shortly to go and see your forces in Northern Ireland.

Best wishes.

George R.I."
Dear Mr. President,

Although I have to be seeing you again before long, I wrote to you to thank you for my delightful stay at the White House, which took place in the circumstances which I shall remember all my life and will go into my memoirs!

May I also tell you...
that every British pulse is beating faster over the successful landings by the American forces?

I suppose this must have been one of the trickiest pieces of staff work and synchronization ever set to a General Staff and it is wonderful how it seems to have worked like a clock.

But I must not ram on, I am happy enough to work
Several pages since the object of this letter is only to tell you that you have never had a more grateful or captivated guest.

Yours very sincerely,

Oliver Lyttelton
Mr. President

It was so kind of you to have found time to read the lovely, charming note and I appreciated it so much.

Dickie was so happy to have had the privilege of seeing you again and came back very thrilled and greatly heartened at all he had seen during his short visit. Wilhelm - who had just -
relieved—loved her visit too.
and thank you and her.
Roosevelt аппeri to all
her hospitality to her.
If it can be managed
I will certainly go and
come to one of the Pole and
perhaps next time Dickie
comes over, or a time.
be here
so happy to her welcomed
Colonel Johnson during
his visit, and her dreaming
he is. Dickie has some
delightful Americans will
know her in Combined Operations
call doing a grand job.
I of late have been free and opportunity to look after them. They come here however as often as possible and I am always so happy to see them both in London and at Broadlands. With many remembrances and greetings to Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Yours truly,

Edward R. Noteham, Jr.
F. B. Ward
Lady Louis Mountbatten

the President
The White House
Washington

P.S.
June 17, 1942.

Dear Edwina:-

It was good to get your note via Dicky. I had a grand evening with him just before he left here -- and, as you know by now, Patricia came here for the night about three weeks ago. She is a dear and we all wished she could have stayed longer.

It would be grand if you could come back here this Autumn and tell some of our people of your own experiences in the voluntary relief work. We are still going through the preliminary throes of organization -- trying to find the right people and, in some places, trying to find really useful work for the ladies to do.

I think Dicky will have to come back here too fairly soon, as there is nothing like personal conferences to get plans put through.

I do hope you can come.

As ever yours,

Rt. Hon. The
Lady Louis Mountbatten,
Broadlands,
Romsey,
Hampshire.
GIVE TO THE PRESIDENT ON WEDNESDAY
AFTER HE HAS SEEN LORD MOUNTBATTEN.
May 31, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

I send this little line by Dickie to say how much I wish it was possible for me to accompany him on his visit this time, and perhaps to have the privilege and pleasure of catching a glimpse of you and Mrs. Roosevelt. Our visit to the White House is such a happy memory and something I will always cherish.

I understand Patricia has not so far plucked up enough courage to avail herself of your very kind invitation! but perhaps while Dickie is over, there might be an opportunity when you would let him bring her to the White House for a few minutes if you are not too busy? She returns home very shortly to do her little bit in the war effort and it will be lovely to be all together once more.

There is much to be done here and I fear we have still far to go, but we are all completely confident in our final combined Victory.

We enjoyed seeing Harry Hopkins so much during his far too short visit, and how I wish it were possible for us to welcome you personally. I shall very much hope later on, if I can be of any use to our Voluntary Relief Organizations or in any way to our mutual cause to return again for a short visit to the United States.
Till then, may I send you many greetings and much affectionate admiration.

Yours,

Edwina Mountbatten
May 31, 1842

BROADLANDS,
ROMSEY,
HAMPSHIRE.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I send this little note by
milk to say how much I
wish it were possible for me
to accompany him on his
visit this time, and perhaps
to have the pleasure of
calling on Mr. and Mrs.
Biddle, or visit to the White
House is such a happy memory
and something I will
always cherish.

I understand Patricia has
not so far plucked up
enough courage to avoid herself of Dr. Zilko's kind invitation. But perhaps while Jackie is here, there might be an opportunity when I could let him know that he, too, might be the while here for a few minutes if we are not too busy — the relatives home by shortly, to do her little bit in the war effort. The little will be lovely to be all together once more.}

There is much to be done here. And I fear we have only a little far to go. But we are all completely confident in the final combined victory.
So much during this far too short visit, and how I wish it were possible for you to welcome Dr. personally. I shall be very much hope that if I can be of any use to our Volunteer Relief Organisation or in any way to our mutual cause to return again for a short visit to the United States.

F. E. Crozier, M.D.
The White House  
Washington  

July 11, 1942.

TELEGRAM FOR STATE DEPARTMENT
TO SEND TO
WINANT
LONDON

Please tell the Duke of Kent that I am away
from Washington and have only just received his message.
"I am much thrilled and very proud to be Godfather to
the youngster and I send him my affectionate greetings.
Tell the Duchess that I count on seeing him as soon as
the going is good. My warm regards to you both."

Signed ROOSEVELT
LSH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated July 6, 1942
Rec'd 1:53 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

3732, July 6, 6 p.m.

TO THE PRESIDENT

The Duke of Kent has just sent me the following note. The King very much approved of his request to you. "My wife and I would be so delighted if you would be godfather to our son. We should be especially pleased, as he was born on Independence Day. "George"

WINANT

NPL
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES
CABLE

His Royal Highness
The Duke of Kent

My affectionate regards to Michael George Charles Franklin. I am anxious to see him as soon as I can. Do send me his photograph. Tell the King that I will hold him to strict accountability until I am able to take over the responsibility of a Godfather myself. My warm regards to you and the Duchess.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FROM
The White House
Washington
August 4, 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE:

Mr. Markham of the British Embassy called to say that the name of the Duke of Kent's child is Michael George Charles Franklin.

djb
Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
4209, July 28, 3 p.m.
FOR THE PRESIDENT
The Duke of Kent has asked me to send you the following message:

"We are so pleased you are to be Godfather. Christening takes place August 4th at Windsor Castle. The King will stand proxy for you. Signed George."

WINANT

RR
Dear Mr. President,

I was very delighted to hear that your photograph has arrived safely and I write to thank you most sincerely for it. I shall always prize it and the inscriptions that you wrote upon it. I shall also long remember all the incidents and conversations of our tour - it is remarkable for me to think that in the course of all the talks with your officials no one ever took a "formal point" while money with a knowledge of official business would find it hard to believe. If I lived a Stove
pipe but I should now doff it and say in very different circumstances than Lord Ponsonby’s lest you have earned the thanks of His Majesty’s Government.

But I only wanted to thank you myself.

I was very sincerely

[Signature]

Porson
August 5, 1942.

His Excellency Harold B. Butler,
British Minister to the United States
British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Butler,

In the course of our talk the other day, you asked me to put down my views on the British American situation. As this letter is likely to be a long one, perhaps I should state my conclusions at the outset:

The maximum effectiveness of democracy is needed to win. Maximum effectiveness depends on real British American unity. Today, there is no such unity. There never can be, until there is one head, one leader, a commander-in-chief absolute over the forces of English-speaking democracy. That commander-in-chief is the President of the United States.

In my opinion, the British American situation is bad. I have never known a time when such large sections of the American public had for Britain and for what Britain is doing, so small a measure of respect.

There is a lack of faith in our capacity to get results. There is skepticism of our ability to fight. Our high command has lost
the confidence of informed opinion. Our recurring forecasts of victory are derided. I put the situation at its worst. You can, of course, find the contrary view. But it is not the controlling view.

All this is the manifestation of a state of fundamental British American disunity. No plan for strategic or economic cooperation can be effective while this state of disunity continues.

It is natural that the situation should be bad.

First of all, there is the normal incapacity of the American to understand the Englishman; with all its resulting indifference and non-friendliness.

America entered the First World War in that state of mind. Nearly everything that has happened in the interval of twenty-five years has worked to turn that non-friendliness into unfriendliness, hostility and sometimes to something too close to contempt.

There was Versailles. Then there was the war debts, then Manchuko, Ethiopia, Spain. After them, there was Munich. After Munich, there have been three years of retreat and defeat.

Add all these together. Then turn them over to the isolationist as a club with which to batter British American unity. It is a heavy club and the isolationist has a strong arm.

This bad situation may grow worse. Nothing can change the administration's wise and gallant strategy to fight this war in Europe. But increasing anti-British feeling can impair the effectiveness of that strategy. Because it strengthens the isolationist, who, lacking any

His Excellency Harold B. Butler -E August 5, 1942.
case in logic, gets backing from an admirable, national misconception.
For the average American still believes that America is invincible on
the home grounds. That is our danger as well as America's.

Nothing effective has been done to meet this situation. I
have no doubt that immense industry and scholarship are being poured
into your propaganda machine. But the machine is whirling in thin
air. In little ways, it may palliate the dangers. But it cannot ef-
fect a cure.

For this is not a problem in propaganda. The job is not
to expound Britain to America. It is infinitely more fundamental than
that. The job is not to tinker up the old situation. It is to build
a new one. It is to change the present ill-designed and relatively
unworkable scheme of British American partnership into absolute British
American unity. It is to convince the common man of America that there
will not be victory unless America and the British Empire are one.

In the philosophy of the old order, America and Britain were
designed to be competitors and opponents. War in itself cannot wholly
overcome that fact. It will take a revolutionary act to unite the
English-speaking people. It will take a new purpose, inspiration,
leadership. It will take a new order of democracy.

This problem in British American unity arose when war began.
For then it was plain to thinking men that world fascism was on the
march against world democracy; that nothing but the maximum efficiency
of English-speaking democracy was good enough to win; that maximum effi-
ciency depended upon the absolute unity of the English-speaking people;
that unity depended upon the declaration and acceptance of a common purpose; that the common purpose was a new world order of freedom for the common man.

But the British Government failed to face that problem. Indeed, it has not faced it yet. It has never squarely admitted the need for democracy's maximum efficiency and so for British American unity. Or if it has, it has not gone far beyond the admission.

Three years ago, the British Government could have given leadership towards the unity of English-speaking democracy upon the highest level of efficiency.

You will remember that when war began, many political leaders in America declared that this war was not America's. But these protests did not wholly reflect the national sentiment. The truth was that many Americans of experience saw through the years ahead to the time when America would also be at war. This preview of events opened their minds to the wisdom of American intervention at the earliest possible moment.

It was also true that, from the beginning, American chivalry, generosity, love of adventure, hatred of despotism, were searching instinctively for a way to get into the fight. At the time of the Battle of Britain, American public opinion was reflecting the spirit of that battle. The right kind of leadership from Britain might have done the trick.

Light upon the real facts. But there was no light. There was, instead, much fog and confusion and along with them, a very unappealing attitude.
of self-sufficiency. Speaking generally, it almost seemed as if the British Government had aimed to set out the reasons why America should not come into the war, rather than why it should.

Yet British leadership towards British American unity could have been given in this way:

1. By a declaration of what democracy was fighting for.

Suppose the British Government had declared that Britain was fighting for a new order of security and happiness for the common man; and that the defeat of Hitler was an incident on the way to that achievement.

Then Britain would have arisen as the champion of the common man not only in Britain but in America as well. The people of America would have moved in spirit and perhaps in fact to the support of their champion.

That would have been the sure way to British American unity. Because that would have been the only way to swing the people out of the mentality of defence into the mentality of attack. You know that defence means defeat. Yet our people cannot attack for what they now have. They can and will attack only for what they have not and want. Today we are asking them to attack for an old order which they already have and do not particularly want.

2. Having declared what democracy was fighting for, the British Government should then have set out to build the new order. It should
have proclaimed its offensive strategy and attacked pursuant to it. Instead, it settled down behind the Maginot line to "comfortably" win the war.

The heroic and effective performance of Britain on the battlefield would have done wonderful things for America. Remember what the Battle of Britain did. But the naivety and incompetence of the British Government during the pre-war decade and when war began, made effective performance impossible.

The heroic and effective performance of Canada would have done even more to exalt the cause of Britain in the eyes of America. Because the American likes the Canadian just as naturally as he does not like the Englishman. In the First World War, the battle record of Canada was nowhere so generously acclaimed as in America. We became a race of supermen credited with fabulous deeds. America, in effect, adopted us.

But in the Second World War, Canada has been stricken with the same infirmities as Britain. In the early days of the war, there were Canadians who realizing the potency of Canada in British American relations, urged both in Canada and in England that the Canadian soldier be given the right and opportunity to display his battle genius. But those of us who wanted our country in the forefront of the fight, got nowhere with this aspiration. The Canadian Government pursued its policy of limited contribution. The British Government though aware of that fact, nevertheless persisted in silly and insincere commendation of our fictional achievements. By so doing, the British Government immobilized decency and patriotism in our country.
August 5, 1942.

I am enclosing copy of a letter dated August 30, 1941, written by me to the Editor of the London Times and by him declined publication. I may say that this letter has been fully approved by many ardent Imperialists in Canada.

Three months after war was declared, I went to England in an attempt to persuade members of the British Government of the value of Canada in the war, and the desirability of Canada entering the conflict. I wrote the letter expressing my views and the case for British-American unity and the Canadian point of view. The letter resulted in the declaration of a war against Germany, which was the right plan, and the right people to support it. With the right plan and the right people, you could have sold the show to Congress, to Washington and to the whole country. You could have ripped off America's mask of neutrality. But you had the wrong plan — and forgive me — the wrong people. In the main, you should have used Canadians. There were thousands eager to help; men with brilliant war records and a real knowledge of America. They could have worked miracles. But instead of Canadians, you persisted in shovelling in Englishmen resplendent in the old school tie. They worked miracles — but of the wrong kind.

But the declaration of purpose which should have been made and the supporting action which should have been taken, were evidently not even within the contemplation of the British Government. Lacking any apparent understanding of the issue confronting democracy and with no plan to meet it, the British Government permitted British American relations to
His Excellency Harold B. Butler -8

August 5, 1942.

drift downstream. You say, "What about the Atlantic Charter?" Too late. And late or early, a pretty unsubstantial diet for a starving man.

Three months after war was declared, I went to England in an attempt to persuade members of the British Government of the vital need for British American unity. I stressed the capacity of Canada to bring about such unity. I broke my heart on the rock-ribbed complacency of British officialdom.

If you desire, I shall send you copies of letters written at that time as well as a year later, upon my second visit to England, which re-state, in part, what on various occasions I had communicated verbally.

After my failure to arouse the British Government to an appreciation of the need for British-American unity, I decided to see what the Canadian Government would do about it. In the spring of 1940, I wrote several letters to our Government in which I pointed out the danger of American isolation, the need for British American unity and how Canada could help to bring it about.

You may be interested to learn that the letters were inspired by certain Americans now among your most steadfast friends. I am not aware that these letters resulted in any constructive action. If you desire, I shall send you copies.

I have been speaking of what might have been done to bring about British American unity. Britain had a great chance. So had Canada.
Both have lost their chance. The situation has moved beyond the Empire's power of control.

English-speaking democracy continues disunited. And all the consequences of that unhappy state grow more manifest. That is why I say that propaganda is in vain. For that is only toying with the consequences. You must get after the disease. The disease is disunity. And only heroic measures can cure it.

How can we achieve British American unity on the highest level of efficiency?

That needs strong leadership. That leadership must come from Washington. I doubt if Washington is yet prepared to assume the duty of leadership. At present, as I say, there is a sort of partnership prevailing; very amiable and friendly but utterly incompetent to take hold and rule. How can a democratic partnership effectively wage war against world fascism?

I know as a member of the public, of the general arrangement or agreement which approves a single British American strategy, the coordination of the operations of the armed forces, an allied General Staff. On paper, the scheme is impressive. In practice, in my opinion, it is impossible. How can you have full and indestructible unity in strategy and operations, until the British Empire and America are moved to set up as a symbol and assurance of their unity, one head, one supreme leader, a commander-in-chief? How can the people of Britain and America become one in spirit and purpose until they have a commander-in-chief, to show the way?
That is what the unity of English-speaking democracy is waiting for. A commander-in-chief. There is only one man who can be commander-in-chief. He is the President of the United States.

If the President of the United States becomes commander-in-chief, then Washington becomes C. H. Q. Then a General Staff can be built out of the best brains in the English-speaking world. This General Staff under the commander-in-chief, would have supreme authority over the fighting forces of English-speaking democracy. The business of production would be a function of the General Staff. A General Staff makes possible one strategy. It therefore lifts the issue of a second front out of the morass of indecision and debate.

Give democracy a Commander-in-Chief, a General Staff, One Strategy, and you free it from its present absurdities, contradictions, incapacities. You give it working unity.

Give democracy working unity and you give it capacity to effectively cooperate with Russia and China.

If the President of the United States becomes Commander-in-Chief, I hope he will begin the fight by proclaiming that:

"Phase one of the war is ended. It was the phase of incompetence and bungling. Democracy was taken by surprise and unprepared. It could only defend.

Phase two begins. This is the phase of attack. Because the people of democracy now set out to build a new order and impose it on the world. This is the order of freedom and it will give the people a new standard of security and happiness. The world order of the Axis powers is a slave order and will be destroyed."
-- But the content of such a proclamation is clear. Its main purpose would be to declare that democracy now makes a fresh start with a new purpose and therefore with a new kind of unity.

How can the President become commander-in-chief of the fighting forces of the English-speaking people?

Or put the question in another way. How can the various leaders of democracy be merged into what virtually will be a dictatorship; though, of course, constitutionally created.

For a dictatorship is what the English-speaking people must have. And that is what the commander-in-chief of the fighting forces of the English-speaking people must be.

You will have to overcome a deep-rooted antipathy to anything savoring of dictatorship, even though it is the symbol of democracy effectively at war. Nowhere is that antipathy more pronounced than in the minds of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. That makes a difficulty. It is unthinkable that Mr. Roosevelt on his own initiative would aim at dictatorship over the English-speaking people. You say it is equally unthinkable that Mr. Churchill would propose that Mr. Roosevelt do so. Yet that is precisely what Mr. Churchill must do. There is no one else to do it. And it must be done. It will be done if Mr. Churchill can agree that absolutism in leadership is democracy's best friend.

The manner and timing of Mr. Churchill's speech of nomination are matters of detail. By arrangement with Washington, he would doubtless speak at Westminster. He would speak on behalf of the British Empire.
August 5, 1942.

In his speech, Mr. Churchill would cover much of the ground later to be covered by Mr. Roosevelt. He would review the history of the war, confess our blunders and defaults and give the reasons for them. He would then declare the need for fundamental change so that English-speaking democracy might achieve unity on the highest level of efficiency. He would make it plain that this kind of unity was a condition precedent to victory.

I hope that Mr. Churchill would go on to say:

"Germany is fighting for a new world order. So is Russia. So must democracy fight for one. The New Deal must be broadened and carried to the four corners of the world. A constructive purpose provides the only basis for unity behind and on the battlefront. Unity on both.

Mr. Churchill has been an exemplary General Staff, one General Staff, a Commander-in-Chief. The President of the United States is that Commander-in-Chief."

I think we could agree on what Mr. Churchill should do. The trick is to get him to do it.

I speak with all respect for Mr. Churchill and with great admiration for his achievements when I say that in my view, Mr. Churchill belongs to the old order. That is to say, he does not realize that it is Roosevelt on a plane of general partnership, forgetting that there is the home front which determines the level of effectiveness on the battlefront; and that the level of effectiveness of the home front is certain to be low unless the common man is moved by the spirit of attack. Furthermore, Mr. Churchill apparently does not understand that the common man cannot and will not attack for what he has, for the old order, for the status quo, but
only for a new order which offers him what he has not and wants.

Therefore, Mr. Churchill, if I may say so without offence, has misjudged the functions of his office in the present circumstances. He has not realized that the mere promise of post-war betterment is not good enough, or he would have denied himself the Atlantic Charter. Nor has he realized that it was his urgent obligation to inspire the declaration of a new order of democracy, so that the common man might set out and attack to get it.

Mr. Churchill has neglected and perhaps derided the question of social and economic reform. I believe that he has looked down upon the New Deal. I fear that his attitude has influenced some of the New Deal's erstwhile devotees to do likewise. CONsciously or unconsciously, Mr. Churchill has been the champion of the status quo both in England and America. To him, this war has been a war of restoration.

Free from the primary responsibilities of his office, Mr. Churchill has concerned himself with technical matters, with questions of strategy and tactics, falling within the authority of the General Staff.

At home he has been supreme. In America, he has moved with Mr. Roosevelt on a plane of genial partnership, forgetting that there can be no such thing as democratic partnership in a war like this. There is either absolute unity or disunity. There is either one head or no head at all.

It is not a matter for surprise, therefore, that Mr. Churchill should have overlooked the vital need for scientific unity of the English-
His Excellency Harold B. Butler - 14 August 5, 1942.

speaking people; or if he saw the need, should have ignored the only basis on which unity could be brought about.

Let me say this, once more. To do better in the old way is not good enough. English-speaking democracy must strike out in a new way. We must attain a new quality of thought. Then we will achieve a new quality of performance. We must start this war afresh. Then we will start to win it.

Give the war a meaning to the common man, give victory a personal significance, and the common man in Britain and America will be one. In that kind of unity, there is no room for criticism and hostility. The isolationist is blotted out.

The only way to energize democracy is to give it hope. Proclaim a new order and give the people a plan by which they can attain it. I tell you that behind that plan, the people of democracy would rise like a great sea.

I know that you are capable of revolutionary thinking. That kind of thinking and that kind of action are essential now. We can win this war. But the time accorded us in which to begin to do so, is distinctly limited.

I could arrange to meet you, if you would like to talk. Indeed, I am at your service in every way, if I can be of service.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

WDL: MLA
Her Majesty
Queen Mary

May I tell you of my great sorrow in hearing of the tragic accident to your gallant boy. Mrs. Roosevelt joins me in very deep sympathy.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Her Royal Highness
The Duchess of Kent

I am shocked beyond measure at hearing of the tragic accident and I want you to know that I feel the loss very deeply and very personally. He has given his life for his Nation and in a great cause. I am thinking much of you and the babies.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Buckingham Palace, London, August 29, 1942 355PM

NLT- PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The White House

Am deeply touched your kind and understanding sympathy and your appreciation of my beloved husband. Am heartbroken.

MARINA.

Duchess of Kent.

Recd/10AM/30th
The White House
Washington

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PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
WASHINGTONDC

MY HEARTFELT THANKS TO YOU AND MRS ROOSEVELT FOR YOUR TOUCHING WORDS OF SYMPATHY.

MARY R.
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

LONDON, August 28, 135Pm 1942

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE

GRATEFUL THANKS FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE WHICH WE ALL APPRECIATE.

WE ARE HEARTBROKEN ABOUT MY BROTHER'S DEATH, HE WAS SUCH A GREAT HELP TO ME PERSONALLY.

GEORGE R I.
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

His Majesty
George VI of Great Britain.

I feel that I have lost an old and true friend and I want you to know how heartsick I am at this tragic accident. My wife and I are thinking much of all of you.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

August 26, 1942.

Death of Duke of Kent
Poplarines,
Sept. 29th, 1942

Dear Mr. President,

I want to

thank you this photograph of your Godson.

That was taken when he was six

years old. It is the

last one of my

husband. I hope
I will have the pleasure of introducing him to you in the not too distant future.

Believe me, the President.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature: Maria]
The President of the United States of America,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.,

U.S.A.

9-29-42
September 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY
AND CAPTAIN McCREA

Will you jointly prepare
a nice letter for my signature?

F.D.R.

Letter from General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander in Chief in India, New Delhi, 8/27/42, to the President, enclosing a personal copy of the despatch which General Wavell has compiled on his tenure of the ABDA Command, together with a copy of the official account of events which he has had drawn up. The first mentioned is a copy of "ABDACOM", An Official Account of Events in the South-West Pacific Command, January–February 1942, General Staff, India, and the second is "Despatch on Operations in South-West Pacific January 15th–February 25th, 1942, by General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., A.D.C."

The above papers sent to Admiral Leahy with the original of the President's memorandum; copy of memorandum and explanation of enclosures sent to Capt. McCrea.
October 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I DON'T THINK THIS NEEDS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

H.L.H.
Dear Mr. President,

I am so grateful to you for giving Dan Tobin this letter of introduction to me.

I have had much interesting conversation with him. And I have entertained him to dinner, once with the members of the Trade Unions Council and once with the hard-faced men of business.

I am bound to say that he seemed to enjoy the men of business more than the Trade Unionists. It is the same old story.

He spoke twice and on each occasion gave a most splendid account of wartime politics in the United States. His explanation of your fixed and settled control in the face of much opposition from newspapers was really very fine and did much good to his audiences, particularly the business men.

I need not tell you that we have plenty of wartime politics here. The Tory party is becoming the chief casualty, just as in the last war the Liberal Party fell by the way. The Conservatives have altogether lost their grip upon the electorate and their cohesion among themselves. They make no
stand in defence of their principles but pursue a policy of appeasement when they are faced by the proposals of their peacetime opponents, the Socialists.

In Parliament a group of Tory back-benchers known as the 1922 Committee are active in criticism of the Government. But they are proving the ruin of their Party, for in the country they are regarded as die-hard reactionaries. Indeed their support of the Government is more likely to lessen its prestige than is their condemnation. They applauded vehemently when Churchill made his last statement on India. And as a result Churchill was damaged.

The Liberals have got a chance now. But it is hard to say if they can take it. There is a large body of radical opinion in the Country which is waiting for a lead. The Communists are much stronger than people realise. They have succeeded in getting the ban lifted from their paper, the Daily Worker, and they came near to getting the Trade Union Congress to revoke the ban on their participation in Local Trades Councils. If things continue to go well for them, they will get their way there too.

A new man has taken for himself the post of the Prime Minister's most violent opponent. Formerly this position was held by Shinwell. But now Aneurin Bevan is far outstripping his rival in
vituperation and criticism. Last week he attacked not only Churchill's conduct of the war but even his manner of dress. He takes exception to the wearing of a siren suit in public. And this is the more strange since Bevan himself is for the most part an untidy man. His hair is seldom brushed, he has no waistcoat and his belly is beginning to run over his breeches. He likes Champagne.

It is the general view that Bevan will do Churchill no harm. And certainly at the moment though he is trying to achieve the parliamentary style of Winston when he wished to demolish an opponent, he is attaining only the platform style of Randolph. But just the same, it would be unwise to underrate his effect on the House of Commons. It is the first time that the Prime Minister has been so violently assailed.

Before the war, Bevan and Cripps were expelled at the same time from the Labour Party for refusing to toe the party line. Now Bevan as a free lance critic can dispense with Party backing. And his star is rising. But Cripps, in office but without a party, is facing political ruin. He has altogether failed to find acceptance as Leader of the House, and his rebuke to members last week for their
failure to keep the war debate going was resented in every quarter. No party feels called upon to support him and he has few friends. Moreover, his prestige as the Man from Moscow is a rapidly wasting asset. His friends say he wishes to leave the Government.

He shares with Churchill the hostility of another opposition group which is now becoming quite strong in its criticisms of the Prime Minister. These are influential Tories of extreme views. I should think the group is made up mostly of admirals and generals out of employment. They abuse Churchill and Cripps alike.

When I was in the Government the Socialists asked Churchill to give a pledge that there would be no election for six months after the war. Churchill was on the point of agreeing but the pledge was strongly resisted by myself and Kingsley Wood. We held that a General Election might be necessary at some earlier period during the war to test the opinion of the electorate on some vital issue.

Now I think a General Election may be Churchill's best weapon. If it comes it will be brought about by a clash of policy between the Tories and the Socialists which will make it
15th September, 1942.

impossible for Churchill to ride the two parties any longer in coalition.

The mention of an Election drives M.P.'s frantic. Particularly is this the case with the Tories. They are determined to wait for a victory election when you may be sure they will make the utmost use of the names of Roosevelt and Churchill.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House,
Washington,
D.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE IF YOU DEEM IT
ADVISABLE.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from
Lord Beaverbrook dated September 15,
1942.
Please deliver the following message to President Roosevelt from The King.

Begins.

October 25th. Mrs. Roosevelt left us this morning to continue her tour. I would like to tell you what real pleasure it gave us to have her to stay at Buckingham Palace. That she should have made the long journey in these dangerous war days has touched and delighted our people and they are very glad to welcome her here. We had some good talks and are looking forward to hearing her impressions of our women's war activities after she has completed the strenuous programme arranged for her.

Many thanks for your letter handed to me by Mrs. Roosevelt. I agree with what you say and only wish we could once again talk things over together. Let us hope this will be possible sooner than we think.

Best wishes from us both.

George R.I.
Hess landed in Scotland by parachute on May 10th, 1941 wearing uniform of a Captain in the German Air Force. He claimed to be on a special mission to see Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton.

2. The Duke of Hamilton had been to Berlin in 1936 in connexion with the Olympic Games but had no recollection of having seen or met Hess. The Duke had previously received a letter dated September 23rd, 1940 from Dr. Haushofer, a German friend of Hess, suggesting a meeting in Lisbon without referring to Hess. The Duke had shown this letter to His Majesty's Government at the time. It was completely ignored and no reply was sent.

3. On May 11th the Duke was ordered by his superior officers in the Royal Air Force to see Hess, then under confinement in Maryhill Barracks, Glasgow. Hess claimed that Germany was bound to defeat England but that this was not Hitler's wish. Hess had therefore come to stop the unnecessary slaughter and to make peace proposals. He claimed to know Hitler's mind but did not claim to have come with his authority. He was evidently under the impression that a party existed in England ready to discuss peace proposals. The Duke replied that there was now only one party in Great Britain.

4. Hess was interviewed on May 13th, 14th and 15th by Mr. Kirkpatrick, formerly of His Majesty's Embassy at Berlin, to identify him and discover his ideas in greater detail. Hess informed Mr. Kirkpatrick that he had come without the knowledge of Hitler. He elaborated his views on the certainty of Germany's victory and repeated that Hitler had no designs against the British Empire. Hess proposed/
proposed a peace settlement on the following basis:

(1) Germany to have a free hand in Europe and to receive her colonies back;

(2) England to have a free hand in the British Empire;

(3) Russia to be included in Asia but Germany intended to satisfy certain demands upon Russia either by negotiation or by war. Hess denied that Hitler contemplated an early attack.

5. Hess insisted however that Germany could only negotiate with an alternative British Government which did not include Mr. Churchill and his colleagues. If this opportunity were rejected Great Britain would be destroyed utterly and kept in a state of permanent subjection.

6. Hess was interviewed twice by the then members of His Majesty's Government, on June 9th, 1941 by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simon and September 9th by Lord Beaverbrook. The object of these interviews was to ascertain any further information of value more particularly as regards the state of affairs in Germany. It has throughout been made clear to Hess that there was no question whatever of any talks or negotiations of any kind taking place with Hitler or his government.

7. The conclusion drawn by His Majesty's Government from these interviews was as follows:

(a) Hess came on his own initiative.

(b) He thought his mission had a considerable prospect of success.

(c)
(c) He thought that he would find a strong anti-war opposition party here.

(d) His "terms" attempted to reproduce Hitler's mind as known to Hess.

(e) Hess had contemplated this mission ever since the collapse of France.

8. As has been publicly stated, Hess has been dealt with as a prisoner of war since his arrival and will so continue to be treated till the end of the war. Apart from the above-mentioned persons, his guard and those attending to his health, Hess has seen no visitors.

9. Shortly after Hess' arrival here his mental state appeared peculiar. Eminent psychiatrists diagnosed mental instability with signs of persecution mania. There is no doubt that Hess is mentally completely unbalanced though his condition varies considerably from time to time.
December 3, 1942.

Dear Dickie:-

General Smith came to dinner on Tuesday and gave me that delightful badge. It is a perfect symbol for our joint operations, and I would have given anything in the world to have been with you in the Northwest African show. Incidentally, I think it was a good idea to change the albatross into an eagle -- because Coleridge has taught us that a gun and an albatross together bring bad luck!

My wife has come back thrilled by all of her trip and her visit has, I think, done good in both countries.

Give my love to Edwina and tell her I hope that the flocks of uniformed ladies from our American armed forces who are winging their way to England are behaving themselves.

Always sincerely,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lord Louis Mountbatten,
The Admiralty,
London,
England.
Dear Mr. President,

The King showed Mrs. Roosevelt the "Combined Operations" Badge, which I had given him and since this Badge is the first one in the history of our two nations to be shared, I asked her if she thought you would honor us by accepting one. She replied "yes" so I am sending one with this letter of the exact type which U.S. Rangers, British Commandos & sailors of both nations who had been through the Combined Training Centres were during the
highly successful landings in North Africa.

The original badge had an allusion
for the Air Force, an anchor for the Navy & a
Tommy gun for the Army but at the suggestion,
& I believe of General Somervell, the badge was
changed to an American Eagle so that this
badge acts as a real link between all the
Services of our two countries.

We are all very proud that General
Marshall & Admiral King should have authorized
the U.S. Army & Navy wearing it.

I shall never forget that in October 1942
you sent the first message to the Prime Minister
informing him suggesting these operations against North
West Africa which has now been carried out.

I cannot get over your great foresight in this matter.
Edenia sends her respectful love to
your delighted & Dickie Montcalm
Personal

The President

The White House
Dear Mr. President,

I had hoped to bring over to you in person this Combined Operations Badge which General Marshall and Admiral King have agreed should also be worn by the U.S. personnel associated with Combined Operations. I hope you will accept this small token of the great bond which exists between our forces.

Although I am glad that there is no need for me to come, I am sorry to have missed the chance of coming over and seeing you again.

I have messages for you from the Crown Prince and Princess of Norway. The latter told me to tell you she is returning in a week's time. Edwina also wishes me to give you many messages.

I was thrilled to read of Jimmy's adventures in the Solomon Isles. How proud you and Mrs. Roosevelt must be of him.

Yours very sincerely,

Dickie Mountbatten

The President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
The President,

White House,

Washington, D.C.,

U.S.A.
The White House
Washington

WALLIS GOVT VIA COMML

DEC 17 8 58 PM 1942

LONDON 343P DEC 17

THE PRESIDENT WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC

MY BEST WISHES TO YOU BOTH FOR CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR

MARINA.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dec. 23, 1942.

Dear Mr. President-

I have this moment received
from the President a Christmas gift in the
shape of a book containing addresses - with
the autographed message at the beginning for
me to add my sketch to its value.

Much more to write. I have to come
in my library - and I am most grateful.

Write me soon having 2 or 3 times - for
Christmas + 1943. May it be a good
year for us all. /S's Edward Halifax
Presumed. By hand.

To the President
In White House.

Halifax
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
The President
of the United States of America.
Washington.
To President & Mrs Roosevelt

WITH BEST WISHES FOR

CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR

1943

George R.I. & Elizabeth R.