

PSF

Great Britain 1942

Great Britain folder
1-#8

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1943.

file
Confid

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY.

I think this can be filed, but
the President may wish to send it to
the State Department.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 31st, 1942.

~~Secret~~ and Personal

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of
a telegram which I have just received from
the Foreign Office.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of *British Hist.*
Telegram 112122
By *RHP* Date **FEB 14 1972**

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Int. Telegram Unit

By RHP Date FEB 14 1972

Text of a telegram from Mr. Eden to

Viscount Halifax dated December 31st, 1942.

Secret and Personal

The Prime Minister would be grateful if you would inform the President that the following directive was given to Mr. Macmillan before departure:-

Mr. Harold Macmillan, M.P., has been appointed Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in North West Africa.

Mr. Macmillan's primary function will be to report on the political situation and future plans for the territory and to represent to the Commander-in-Chief the views of His Majesty's Government on political questions. His reports will be addressed to the Prime Minister.

He will work in closest touch with his United States colleague, establishing relations of confidence and amity with him.

He is not at present accredited to any French authority. The present French administration in North Africa is treated by Allied Commander-in-Chief as a temporary de facto local administration. Mr. Macmillan's relations with French authorities will accordingly be of an informal character.

Mr. R. M. Makins of the Foreign Office will accompany Mr. Macmillan as his assistant and will act for him should he at any time be absent from Algiers.

Mr. W.H.B. Mack of the Foreign Office has for some time past held the post of British Civil Liaison Officer on General Eisenhower's staff. He will continue

to/

to hold this appointment and will not join Mr. Macmillan's staff though he will look to him for guidance on any political matter affecting interest of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Macmillan will superintend the activities of such British civilian experts as may be appointed to collaborate with United States authorities in French North Africa.

His Majesty's consular officers in French North Africa will be instructed to repeat to Mr. Macmillan political reports which they address to the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Macmillan may communicate direct with them when necessary and they with him.

TBF: Great Britain



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

January 12th 1943

My dear President Roosevelt,

I am so glad that you & Mr. Churchill are going to meet once again. You will have many problems to discuss as to our future strategy of the War in 1943.

The efforts of our two countries, whether separate or combined, have ^{already} shown to the World that we are determined to destroy the enemies of civilization. Your deliberations on this occasion, will, I feel sure, pave the way to a successful

& victorious conclusion of the War.

My only regret is, that it is not possible for you to come here for your conversation, when we could meet & renew the friendships we made in the White House & at Hyde Park in 1939.

The Queen & I were so delighted to entertain Mr. Roosevelt here last October, & we hope that she returned to you none the worse for her strenuous visit.

I have asked Mr. Churchill to hand you this letter.

With my very best wishes to you

Believe me

Yours very sincerely

George R.I.

Great Britain folder

The
President of the United States of America

GR

7DP to King George VI

June 24 1943

Reg. NPx 59-144

10

Copy

Casablanca

Jan 24 1943

My dear King George -

I wish much that you could have been with us, the past two days - a truly unique meeting, in its thoroughness and in the true spirit of comradeship between each officer and his "opposite number".

As for Mr Churchill and myself I need not tell you that we make a perfectly matched team in harness and out - and incidentally we had

lots of fun together as we
always do - Our studios
and our numerous agree-
ments must and will bear
good fruit.

My wife was thrilled by
all that she saw and ~~heard~~
in England - and I am
most grateful to you and
the Queen for all you did
for her -

My warm regards to
you both

Always sincerely yours
Franklin Roosevelt



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Winant spoke to me this morning of the proposed visit of Mr. Anthony Eden to this country, and handed me your memorandum on the subject which I am returning herewith. I would suggest, if it suits your convenience that Eden be invited to come and the sooner he comes the better, as that will also suit my convenience. This could be any time beginning next week as I understand that Madam Chiang Kai-shek's visit will be finished by the end of this week.

It would seem to be advisable in order to avoid any undue significance being given to Eden's visit that an announcement be made when the news is given out that he is coming over in order to be brought up to date with regard to matters concerned with the furtherance of the war effort, and that his visit is a part of a series of contacts made between the high officials of the United Nations in order to keep up the mutual exchange of ideas and information which is undertaken with a view to keeping all the interested governments informed of current developments.

Enclosure:
The President's memorandum.

*file PSF G. Br. J. Alder
Eden
personal.
1-43
17*

CH

File

at the invitation of that body
to talk very informally
in regard to methods of
holding United Nations conferences
before the end of the war,
and where such conferences
on different subjects should
be arranged. It is the
thought ^{of the Pers.} that the next steps
would be for similar
informal conversations to
be held with Russia
with China, and that
subsequently ~~there~~

invitation would be sent
out to all the United
Nations.



Admiral
Glas
Feb: 23rd
1943

Thank you for the letter?
I am sure
long

Dear Mr. Roosevelt,

Some weeks ago
I had the pleasure of
meeting some of your
Officers here Chatterboxes,
among these, General Hunter,
Gen: Reddick & Col: Tves.
The accompanying photo-
graph was taken at
the time, & I send
it to you as it

may interest you and
the President. On my
right is seated Field
Marshal Lord Biddisford.
On Christmas day I enter-
tained two charming
Engineer Officers in your
Army, Capt: Badley &
Lieut: Brewster, who happened
to be staying in our
neighbourhood, I am
sorry to say they left
very soon afterwards.
We often talk of your

pleasant but all too short
visit to this house, you must
have been thankful to
get back safely after your
heavy time in the
country, + I hope that
you had a good rest.
With many messages to
you + the President

Believe me
Yours very sincerely

Henry R

By hand

PSF

El. Britain -

1943

Mr. F. D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington

E. J. A.

James
Henry



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

London, February 23, 1943.

Dear Miss Thompson:

The Duchess of Kent has asked the Ambassador's office if we know whether the photograph of young Prince Michael Charles Franklin which she sent to the President reached him safely. Our recollection here is that the photograph was received by the Embassy just before Mrs. Roosevelt left, and that it was taken back to Washington with her luggage, but no one seems to be absolutely sure. Could you let me know whether it reached the White House safely?

If the American Outpost in Great Britain has not sent Mrs. Roosevelt direct a copy of a recent bulletin of theirs containing an article based on her brief visit to University College, Oxford, it might interest her to see it. I am enclosing a copy.

With renewed good wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dorothy Fisher".

Miss Malvina Thompson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Great Britain folder

1-43

*full
secret*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

LORD HALIFAX

Many thanks for that most
interesting report of the physical
condition of your national guest
in England!

F.D.R.

Great Britain folder
1-45

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 30th, 1943.

file →
Dear Mr. President,

In my letter of March 9th I sent you a copy of a report by two British doctors on the subject of Hess' health. This report was to be handed to a representative of the International Red Cross for transmission to Frau Hess under cover of a letter emphasizing that it was confidential, that it was for Frau Hess' personal information, and that there must be no publicity whatever.

The International Red Cross have now informed His Majesty's Government that it is impossible for them to convey this information to Frau Hess without taking the German Government into their confidence. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to trust the German Government

to/

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt. Telegram 112/72
By RHP Date FEB 14 1972

-2-

to refrain from undesirable publicity. The International Red Cross have therefore been advised that no communication should be made to Frau Hess.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Kalifax

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 9th, 1943.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President,

You will perhaps remember that on December 8th last I gave you a copy of a Foreign Office memorandum on the subject of Hess.

Since that date the Foreign Office have been approached by the International Red Cross with a request from Frau Hess to find out the true state of her husband's health. Refusal of this request might have made the task of the International Red Cross delegates who are dealing with prisoner-of-war questions in Germany more difficult. It was therefore decided that while permission could not be granted to representatives of the International Red Cross to see Hess, a report on his health signed by two well-known

British/

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt. Telegram 14172

By RHP Date FEB 14 1972

**BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

-2-

British doctors should be communicated to them. This report, a copy of which is enclosed, has now been handed to a representative of the International Red Cross, who is passing it on through confidential channels to the International Red Cross Headquarters in Geneva under cover of a letter emphasizing that it is confidential, that it is for Frau Hess' personal information, and that there must be no publicity whatever.

You will see that this report makes no explicit reference to Hess' mental state as described in the last paragraph of the memorandum which I gave you on December 8th. This was done deliberately to avoid the danger that the medical certificate might be used publicly by the Germans to expose our original propaganda that Hess was sane, and to bear out their own original contention that he was mentally deranged when he flew to the
United/

**BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

-3-

United Kingdom. They might even be able,
on grounds of insanity, to claim Hess'
repatriation.

The above information has also
been brought to the notice of Mr. Stalin.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Balfour

—

Text of Report on Herr Hess' Health.

At the request of the Foreign Office we have today seen and examined Herr Rudolf Hess after having read all previous medical reports.

Herr Hess is suitably accommodated and he made no complaint about his circumstances. The services of an experienced physician are available, whenever required.

Since his arrival in this country Herr Hess has experienced (1) phases of depression and emotional instability, and (2) recurring upper abdominal discomfort. Herr Hess told us that the latter had troubled him from time to time in Germany in recent years, and that an X-ray examination had proved negative. He himself attributes this symptom to overwork and nervous strain and it seems clear that it is a functional disturbance, without any organic basis. More recently he has noticed a feeling of exhaustion on walking and (quite wrongly) he has attributed this to "weakness of the heart" and has therefore taken less exercise.

Today Herr Hess complained of no symptoms except slight upper abdominal discomfort and a tendency to constipation, which he relieves by an occasional mild purgative. He informed us that his appetite is good and that he is sleeping well without the use of sedatives. He occupies himself with reading and writing; he is able to take walking exercise.

Herr Hess looks healthy, is well nourished and shows no indication of anaemia. A complete and thorough physical examination revealed no evidence of organic lesion in any system and left us in no doubt that he is in excellent physical health.

There/

There was today no evidence of depression or anxiety and he appeared to be mentally normal but it is clear that he is liable to fluctuations of mood.

We explained to him our conviction that his bodily symptoms - which are slight - are purely functional in nature - a view which appeared to please but not to surprise him. Herr Hess has had the services of both dental and ophthalmic surgeons. The reading glasses prescribed by the latter are thought by Herr Hess to be "too strong" and the ophthalmic surgeon is to see him again.

No further treatment is necessary beyond that which is now provided for him.

~~254~~
hm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
personal.*

March 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Yes, I agree that this should be discussed with Mr. Eden. Tell Mr. Eden my old story of January, 1919.

The British Navy Board valued what we should pay for rents, damages, etc., in each of the places occupied by American Naval forces. The American Board did the same thing. The two values were somewhat apart. I went in to see the British Secretary for Air -- he offered to match shillings with me in each of the fifteen or twenty cases. I told him we would be hanged if the matching became public. He then suggested that we split the difference in each case. I readily accepted and the whole problem was ended in ten minutes.

F. D. R.

PS F-Great Britain folder
1-43

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 8. 1943

My dear Mr. President:

We have not yet made payment to the British for private property taken for use in the United States Bases acquired under the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940, as we are required to do. Some differences have arisen as to valuations - on the whole the values fixed by the Colonial authorities amount to approximately \$7,500,000 while those fixed by the appraisers for the War and Navy Departments amount to approximately \$5,500,000. These differences can undoubtedly be adjusted but some little time will be required.

Under the procedure agreed upon between the two Governments the British authorities are to pay the private property owners and we, in turn, are to reimburse the British Government. We have discussed with the War and Navy Departments the matter of settling these claims through reverse lend-lease and they would be glad to have it done that way.


If

The President,
The White House.

If you agree we will discuss the matter informally with Mr. Eden on his forthcoming visit to this country and suggest that the British Government consider whether it would care to propose officially to us that it undertake the payment of these private property claims under reverse lend-lease. We will, of course, make it clear that we have no desire to go back on our original undertaking, which preceded the Lend-Lease Act, but that we feel that a gesture of this sort would have a salutary effect on our whole cooperative program. I have in mind the desirability of avoiding the necessity of asking Congress for an appropriation should this eventually be found to be necessary.

I have enclosed a memorandum outlining the plan in detail.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. H. H. H.', written in a cursive style.

Enclosure:
Memorandum.

Department of State

BUREAU

Eu

DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **2/22/43**

ADDRESSED TO

The President.

MEMORANDUM

In the exchange of notes dated September 2, 1940 with the British Government, providing for the base - destroyers exchange, the following provision was made in respect to payment by the Government of the United States for private property included in the leased areas:

"All of the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period of ninety-nine years free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question."

To implement this provision, it was agreed that the local authorities would acquire the necessary privately owned lands to be leased to the Government of the United States for ninety-nine years and that this Government would, after having the properties examined by its own appraisers, reimburse the British Government if our valuations were in accord with the amounts paid out by the local authorities; the British Government in turn would reimburse the local Governments in the eight areas involved.

The privately owned lands acquired in connection with the construction of these eight Bases have now been appraised. The total value of the United States appraisals is approximately \$5,500,000 United States currency. As regards a considerable number of individual tracts of land, our appraisals accord with the prices paid by the local authorities for the properties. In practically everyone of the eight areas, however, there are differences in the total value of such private property between prices paid by local authorities and the amounts set by the United States appraisers as a fair market price. In Bermuda, for instance, the total of our United States naval appraisals was \$109,000 while the awards of the Bermuda Property Board for the same properties reached a total of \$184,000. This is the most serious discrepancy. Elsewhere the discrepancies range from five to fifty per cent.

It

It is estimated that whereas our Army and Navy appraisals for the eight properties totaled \$5,500,000, the local prices paid or awards approved would approximate \$7,500,000 to \$8,000,000. These discrepancies are due to a variety of causes. In some cases they are honest differences of opinion. In others the local awards include bonuses to compensate landowners for temporary loss of earning power and extra expense of moving and resettlement. In Newfoundland, for instance, we urged the Newfoundland Government strongly to require the local residents to vacate properties urgently needed for base construction. To induce the owners to move in a hurry and in the middle of a severe winter, the Newfoundland Government agreed to pay each owner a special bonus of twenty per cent of the value of his property. Under United States practice, we do not pay such bonuses and our appraisers could not, therefore, include these amounts. In practically all cases the local authorities have allowed their people to include modest sums for legal fees. Our appraisals cannot include such fees. Taking everything into account, the discrepancies between our appraisals and the local awards are understandable and probably not in excess of what was to be expected.

We can of course continue our discussions of these discrepancies with the British authorities, and doubtless in the course of the next few years we could reach a reasonably satisfactory solution in respect to them. The procedure in such matters is, as you know, slow and tedious. Upon reaching an agreement as to amounts, we should then have to pay these sums to the British Government. Presumably appropriations from Congress will have to be sought for the purpose -- possibly some of them after the war is over. In the meantime, the people in the Colonies will grow restive at not receiving their money.

In all these circumstances it is recommended that an informal suggestion be made to Mr. Eden on his forthcoming visit to this country that the British Government consider whether it would not care to propose officially to us that the British Government undertake the payment of these private property claims under Reverse Lend-lease. Officers of both the War Department and the Navy Department have informally at various times suggested this procedure to officers of the Department of State, and the Secretaries of War and the Navy have approved this proposal.

It

It seems to us that the British Government by making such a gesture would receive an amount of good will in this country worth many times the comparatively small amount of money involved. These Bases should be a lasting tangible reminder to our people of a generous gesture on the part of the British Government. Moreover the matter could be finished at an early date and the people in the Colonies could obtain prompt payment for their properties to which they are of course entitled.

If you approve, we shall take this up personally and informally with Mr. Eden along the following lines. We shall make it clear to him that we recognize that the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940 antedates the Lend-lease policy and has no connection with it; that by that exchange of notes the United States assumed an obligation to pay for the private property required for the Bases and we are, of course, prepared to carry out that obligation, but that it has occurred to us that the British Government might desire to consider offering to assume this obligation under Reverse Lend-lease; that if his Government should think well of this personal and informal suggestion, we would be glad if it would make the proposal officially; and that if the suggestion is not viewed with favor we shall proceed with our efforts to reconcile existing differences and in due course pay the claims in accordance with the obligation assumed under the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1943

Memo. for Miss Tully

The President wants all this
to put in the Archives.

M.C.T.

I would want a copy of
my autographs & all in as-
chines!

Then mail letters by parcel

PSF Great Britain

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Copy

March 14, 1943

My dear Queen Mary,

My husband and I were both so glad to hear from you and to see the photograph. You were very kind to entertain some of our officers on Christmas Day and it must have made them less lonely.

*in photo of the -
Pr. Britain, Mary,
Queen of*

I think with pleasure of my visit with you and hope that I have used all the information I gathered there in Great Britain to good advantage since my return.

The winter has been a busy one and our boys are for the most part far away, but I hope soon to go to the West Coast and visit our hospitals and see our daughter and youngest son, who may soon get his wish and be ordered to sea.

My husband sends his warm regards, and with renewed thanks,

Believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

(Eleanor Roosevelt)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSF G. B. J. J. J.

Anthony Eden's 1-43

Itinerary

file

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

Proposed itinerary:

<u>First Day</u>	<u>Eastern War Time</u>	<u>Central War Time</u>	
Lv. Washington	7:00 a.m.		Lunch on plane
Ar. Keesler Field, Miss.	12:40 p.m.	11:40 a.m.	Inspection of basic training center and mass review by about 25,000 trainees; inspection of shop and other training of all types, except radio and weather, at Technical Training School.
Lv. Keesler Field, Miss.	3:00 p.m.	2:00 p.m.	
Ar. Montgomery, Ala.	4:30 p.m.	3:30 p.m.	Inspection divided between Maxwell Field and Gunter Field. Program to include brief view of facilities and also inspection and air review with 100 or more planes involved. Some of these must be brought in from Selma, Alabama.
Lv. Montgomery, Ala.	7:00 p.m.	6:00 p.m.	
Ar. Fort Benning	7:30 p.m.		Dinner; brief presentation of Benning activities; and spend night
<u>Second Day</u>			-----
			Breakfast; inspect Infantry School; witness parachute tower jumps, review 10th Armored Division.
Lv. Benning	Noon		Lunch on plane
Ar. Fort Bragg	2:30 p.m.		Airborne demonstration, including parachute jumps and glider descents by General Ridgeway's division or other airborne troops.
Lv. Fort Bragg	6:15 p.m.		Dinner on plane if desired.
Ar. Washington	8:00 p.m.		

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-14-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

Tracy
McCarthy



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(840)
hm

PS F Great Britain folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS

Will you read this and bring
it up when Eden comes back?

F.D.R.

Want?
Personal and confidential ltr. 3-10 to the
President from J.G.W. re notes on Mr. Eden's
trip to Washington.

PSF Great Britain folder

file
personal

March 24, 1943.

Dear Max:-

It is a long time since I have written to you but I want you to know that you have been in my thoughts, and I hope much that all goes well with you and yours.

I was, of course, delighted about your boy's decoration and very soon thereafter my boy, Elliott, got the Distinguished Flying Cross in the field in North Africa.

I have a hunch that you are due for another holiday over here. I hope you may find it possible to come over this Spring and, incidentally, to talk with me about many things.

The war goes on and on -- and while I think we are gaining, it is difficult for you and me to curb our impatience, especially when our military and naval friends keep saying that this cannot be done and that cannot be done and their time schedule seems so everlastingly slow to us.

With affectionate personal regards and with the hope that I shall see you soon,

Always sincerely,

His Excellency
Lord Beaverbrook,
London,
England.

PMW

PLAIN

London

Dated DECEMBER 23, 1942

Rec'd 10:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

7300, Twenty-third.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LORD BEAVERBROOK.

Dear Mr. President: I send you the devoted good wishes for Christmas and the new year of a British citizen. Upon you depend the hopes of man and the future of the world. May you have health to bear your burdens and the brightening prospect of victory as the new year grows older. And with affectionate personal regards, yours ever, Max Beaverbrook.

MATTHEWS

VWC

file
Normal

W. J. Feltner

FDR
+
Wilson
March
19 43

Revised
DRAFT STATEMENT.

During his visit to the United States of America Mr. Eden has had a series of intimate conferences with the President, the Secretary of State and their advisers, at which current military and political affairs and other questions arising out of the war have been the subject of discussion.

These conferences have disclosed a close similarity of outlook on the part of the two Governments and there has been a most fruitful meeting of minds on all matters that have come under discussion.

The conversations have touched, among other things, upon the ^{task} ~~problems~~ that will face the Governments of the U.S.A., the U.K., China and the Soviet Union and of the other United Nations in safeguarding the world from further aggression ~~after the defeat of the Axis Powers.~~ Reference has been made to the problem of political decisions ^{connected with military operations} and to the ~~problems that will arise upon the surrender of the enemy.~~

when the practical problems that will arise upon the surrender of the enemy and

While it has not been the purpose of these exploratory meetings to reach final decisions, which indeed is impossible at this stage, a large measure of general agreement has been reached which will be of great value in further discussions between the two Governments and with other powers.

All who took part in the conversations look forward with increased confidence to the development of harmonious and effective collaboration among the United Nations, both now and after the war.]

April 6th 1843Foreign Office,
S. W. 1.

My dear W. President,

The Liberator carried us
safely home and I saw
Lincoln last night ^{some}
account of our talks. He
was, I think, very pleased.

I really cannot thank
you enough for all your
kindness to me, and
the gifts of fruit
and countless other

Generous presents. How
especially I am proud
to have the photograph
with its inscription.

Everybody here seems
pleased with the work
done in America, and
I feel immensely encouraged
by all I heard and
saw while on my visit.
No doubt there are plenty
of difficulties ahead,

—
but I refuse to believe
that it is beyond the
wit of ~~the~~ man and ~~the~~ ^{the}
wisdom of statesmanship
to resolve them.

With renewed thanks
and very best-wishes at
all times to you and
Mr. Roosevelt.

Very sincerely yours

Anthony Eden

Personal

—
↑
J.M.

PS F

Great Britain
folder

The President of the United States
of America

White House

Washington

D.C.

By way
A.R.

PSI = Great Britain

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

X

April 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

To follow up on this and see
what can be done.

F.D.R.

Have phoned to H. Davis
and he spoke to Halifax
who called in turn
to London & has never heard
Anthony Eden is also
informed who said
let it wait
— GMM

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

March 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I spoke to Mr. Norman Davis about Lady Mountbatten's visit. He took the matter up with Lord Halifax who cabled London to take it up with the British Red Cross, but has had no reply. Mr. Norman Davis also spoke to Mr. Eden about the matter.

G.

Grace:

To find out from Donovan if it
is all settled about Lady Mountbatten
coming over here.

FDR

PSE Great Britain folder
1-43

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 25, 1943

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to bring the
attached letter to the attention of the President.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 25, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Here is a copy of a letter I have received
from Lord Mountbatten.

Sincerely,


William J. Donovan
Director

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

COPY

COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS
1a, Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall, S.W. 1

9th March, 1943.

My dear Colonel,

Please forgive my worrying you again but after what the President told me at Casablanca and after your kind messages it seems clear that Edwina is to receive an invitation from the American Red Cross.

We fully appreciate that it may take some while yet to come through but if you could give us an inkling of the dates during which they are likely to want her in the United States it would make the planning of her programme of visits in the United Kingdom and Ireland much easier as she now has such an immense job going round inspecting the St. John's Organization in all parts of the Kingdom that it would be very helpful to have fairly early warning of when she will be wanted.

When are you coming over here again? I shall look forward to seeing you.

Yours sincerely

(signed) Louis Mountbatten

From: Lord Beaverbrook.

P37 - Gr. Britain folder 1-43

STORNOWAY HOUSE,
CLEVELAND ROW,
ST. JAMES'S.

Cherkley,
Leatherhead,
Surrey.

*File
Pres.*

12th April, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter.

It so happens that Winston spoke to me a week ago and made the proposal that I should go out to the United States. After the receipt of your letter, I have answered him my willingness to cross over as soon as he finds it convenient to inform me fully of events.

I wish I might say or do something that would be of use to you in the necessary conflict with elements too far removed from the war to understand the nature of it.

That is where the British Government has an easy time. British citizens have an advantage over American citizens. The enemy menace is always present in England.

The enemy planes flying overhead exercise a correcting influence. The sight of Cape Gris Nez on a clear day always discloses the distant scene with sufficient clarity to justify us in singing with one voice, "Lead kindly light".

But it is possible that I can disclose to some of my colleagues in America just a little of the devotion we have here for the people over the sea who have sustained and strengthened us.

To me it is indeed a pleasure to get your personal regards, and my devotion to your cause gives me the prospect of doing useful service once again.

With kindest regards,

Yours ever,

Max

The President,
The White House,
Washington. D.C.



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

May 4th 1943

My dear President Roosevelt,

I take this opportunity of sending you a line by my Prime Minister. It brings my cordial greetings & hopes for some useful talks between you both on the present situation & our future plans.

I know how much Mr. Churchill enjoys these meetings, which, as he has

The

often told me, are on such agreeable & friendly terms. I would like to congratulate you on the successful issue of your 2nd Corp. leaving fighting in the capture of Mateur, which I feel sure is only a forerunner of other achievements.

I await with great interest the results of your discussion. The Queen joins with me in sending our kindest regards to you & to Mr. Roosevelt.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely

George R. I.

RAF Great Britain [May 4, 1943]

The
President of the United States
of America
The White House
Washington

GRT

are on such
usually terms
to congratulate
enough mine
is heavy
capture of
feel more
of other

PSE - Great Britain folder
1-43

*file
personal*

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
5th May, 1943.

Dear Mr President

I was very distressed to learn that Bishop Leonard, about whom you wrote to me, had been killed in the same accident which cost General Andrews his life. Bishop Leonard was to have come to see me on his return from Iceland and before going off on a visit to North Africa. I need not say how sorry I am that his journey has ended so tragically and I should like to send you my very sincere sympathy in the loss of a friend.

With kindest regards

Yours very sincerely

Anthony Eden

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.

1099
hm

PSE Great Britain folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

Will you get in touch with Captain Tollemache and tell him that I have a letter from Lord Mountbatten telling me that he is sending me three photographs by the Captain, but that I haven't received them as yet?

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 5-3-43, from Lord Mountbatten, Combined Operations Headquarters, 1a Richmond Terrace, White-Hall, S.W.1, saying he is not proceeding with remainder of the British Chiefs of Staffs Committee. Has sent 4 members of his Staff to take part and one of them, Capt. Tollemache, will remain in Wash. as his rep. in Wash. and he is sending by him 3 photos for Pres. to sign - one to go to Town Hall of town of Romsey.



PST

From
Lina Blanche

Great Britain friend
5-28-43 file personal

The Waldorf-Astoria

Dear Mr President

The memory of my
stay at your home
in the forest, is
my happiest recollection
of many joyful events
in America.

When you talked
of your predecessors
at the White House

-the just & generous
judgments of The
President of half a
Century surpassed any
conversation I have
ever heard.

It is my hope that
you will see me
again before I go back
to the Island Kingdom
You devoted follower
Mort

May 28 - 1943.

PSI-

Retained for preservation
Gt. Britain -

1943

May 28, 1943.

Dear Mr President

On my return here I was delighted and touched to find your kind gift of your photograph which I shall greatly treasure. It was a great privilege to meet you and to enjoy so much hospitality at your hands. I am sure that this meeting of yourself and the Prime Minister will be as fruitful

of our success and cooperation as other meetings have been.

For myself, it has given me great pleasure and increased confidence to meet your naval and military leaders and to know personally those of whom I had heard so much.

I am very glad that Stilwell and Lennault are coming to England to give us further opportunity of discussing the Eastern problem. We have a stiff job before us to dispose of the Jap but we shall certainly do it between us!

With very many thanks
Yours very sincerely
Archie Wavell.

*PSE Great Britain folder
1-43
file
Personal*

BRITISH MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT

BOWLING GREEN 9 - 5310

REPRESENTATIVE IN THE U. S. A.

25 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

May
29,
1943

My dear Mr. President,

Thank you very much for your letter of the 28th of May, in which you enclosed a letter addressed to the Prime Minister, which I will hand to him as soon as I get back.

I must, however, say one word of gratitude at once to you and to your advisers for the cordiality, friendliness and understanding which I have constantly received.

I most heartily reciprocate the kind wishes which you sent me and I look forward to returning before very long, as you


filed Churchill folder

suggest, to discuss those further subjects
which you have in mind.

Your letter was a most pleasing
finish to a very enjoyable and interesting
visit to Washington.

Thanking you once again,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Eleanor Roosevelt". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed phrase "Yours sincerely,".

The President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

PSE Gr. Britain - 1943

AIR MINISTRY
100, CHARLES STREET,
WHITEHALL, W.1

30th May 1943

Dear Mr President,

May I offer you my very sincere thanks for your kindness in giving me the signed photograph of yourself which I received yesterday?

The inscription does me great honour and emboldens me to write personally to tell you how much your gift is appreciated.

Yours sincerely

C Portal.

TELEPHONE:- 3352.

PSF: Great Britain

*JLB
Personal*

CHRIST CHURCH,
OXFORD.

May 31st 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I hope I
am not committing a breach
of etiquette in writing to
thank you and Mr. Roosevelt
for all your kindness and
hospitality during my
stay in Washington.

The various occasions on
which I was privileged
to visit you will ever
remain red-letter days
in memory's calendar,-
especially the less formal
ones. And I am none

the less grateful because
I realize that I owe them
to your appreciation of the
qualities of my friend
the Prime Minister rather
than to any merit of my own.
I feel sure that the conference

will prove another, and
perhaps perhaps a milestone mile-
stone on the road to victory.

If the truly friendly welcome
we all of us enjoyed is any
measure of American public
feeling it must also encourage
the hope that the English
speaking peoples can continue
to work together when victory is
won to give the world the
blessings of a lasting peace.

Once more with warmest thanks
I pray believe me yours sincerely
Cherwell.

PSF

Great Britain files
1-43

The White House
Washington

file
Personal

JUN 3 5 07 PM 1943

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LONDON JUNE 3 1943 848P

THE PRESIDENT

WHITEHOUSE

PLEASE ACCEPT MR PRESIDENT MY WARMEST THANKS FOR YOUR KIND
BIRTHDAY MESSAGE STOP I HEARTILY APPRECIATE THE GOOD
WISHES WHICH YOU HAVE EXPRESSED TOWARDS ME PERSONALLY AS
WELL AS THOSE WHICH YOU HAVE SENT ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE
OF THE USA TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE NP WHAT OUR SOLDIERS
SAILORS AIRMEN AND WORKERS HAVE ACHIEVED IN AFRICA IS A
BRILLIANT AUGURY OF COMING FEATS OF ARMS IN OTHER
CONTINENTS NP AS THE TALE OF COMMON VICTORIES GROWS
SO I AM SURE WILL GROW THE SENSE THAT A COMMON PURPOSE

DIRECTS AND INSPIRES THE VAST EFFORT WHICH OUR TWO PEOPLES WITH
THE PARTNERS GREAT AND SMALL ARE PUTTING FORTH IN THESE DECISIVE
YEARS NP THE MORE DEEPLY AND WIDELY THIS SENSE IS FELT THE MORE
SURELY CAN WE ALL TRUST IN VICTORY TO BRING US LASTING PEACE

GEORGE RI.

PSF Lt Britain - 1943

9th June.

Dear Mr. President.

I am indeed most grateful for the photograph you so graciously sent me.

Even had it only had your signature it would have been a most prized possession, but having autographed it as you did it becomes doubly so.

We all returned from Washington feeling very fit and thanks to everyone's kindness we enjoyed our visit so much.

Would you please convey my respects to Mr. Roosevelt and accept my sincere good wishes for all success in the stupendous work you are doing.

Sincerely yours

Stedley Dowd

M^r Franklin D. Roosevelt.

President of the United States

White House

Washington

U. S. A.

6-14-43

PSE Great Britain



The Waldorf-Astoria

My dear Mr President

I have always been curious about the lives of the Presidents of the United States. And I have read much on that subject.

But never had I imagined that I should myself see and hear the President who has the biggest task of all, who has performed his duty with the greatest genius, and at the same time displays such

Charm in his private life &
such gentleness and kindness
of manner to those around him.

The opportunity which you
have allowed me of entering
and staying for days & days
in your own circle, has been
to me a moving and inspiring
experience.

Your devoted friend
Max

June 14th
1943.

*file
personal.*

June 17, 1943.

Dear Max:-

That was another grand weekend and I got the kind of real relaxation and fun which comes too rarely these days.

I have not let those marvelous Kiplings out of my sight -- in fact, I have already re-read three of them and I am taking them to Hyde Park to go into the locked bookcase beside my desk. I am ever so grateful for them and I am confirmed in my thought that they are excellent material for movies. After this show is over I have visions of a visit to Hollywood by Beaverbrook and Roosevelt, joint producers of Mrs. Hawksby, Mrs. Gadsby and the Brushwood Boy. We might then catch a live Viceroy to ~~that~~ that part. Perhaps Winston will select one!

Give the latter my love when you see him.

Have a good trip with Averell and do be sure to come back soon.

As ever yours,

Right Honorable
Lord Beaverbrook,
Waldorf Towers,
301 Park Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*RAF Great Britain folder
1-43
Hold &
then file*

July 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Some time ago you asked me to arrange for the transportation of Sir William and Lady Beveridge to London on or after July 10, in order to arrive at their destination by July 15.

I have just received a telephone call from the Air Transport Command to the effect that the plane, on which reservations have been made for the Beveridge party, is scheduled to leave on July 10. Of course, this departure date is contingent on weather conditions. Pan American is notifying the Beveridges directly and asking them to be ready to depart from New York on the above date.

B. W. Davenport

B. W. DAVENPORT
Major, General Staff,
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-16-59

Signature- *Carl T. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

Mr. B. folder 1-43
From Lord Beaverbrook

CHERKLEY,
LEATHERHEAD,
SURREY.

2
7th July 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

On my return I see a marked decline in the fortunes of the Labour Party. It finds itself debarred, by its participation in the Government, from wide criticism of the war effort, while the praise of victories goes not to its leaders, but to Churchill. It is a body in a vacuum.

That decline is emphasised by the position of Herbert Morrison. The Party at its Annual Conference tried to humble him, and succeeded in exalting him. His defeat by Arthur Greenwood for the Party Treasurership has raised his prestige, so that he stands now in the public esteem second only to Churchill. He is in fact the actual leader, even though Attlee is the titular leader of the Labour Party.

Churchill is safe and well in the political arena. He will remain in high authority, provided he does not get too certain. But that is unlikely. He had too many years of opposition and unpopularity to make that mistake.

Acland, the leader of the new Common Wealth Party, is not making headway. The Christian Communism which he preaches has its attractions in wartime. The Bishop of Bradford is the Chairman. And though His Grace has never shown himself a maker of Party leaders, he has the glory of launching the movement which made a King into a Duke.

I have seen Gilbert Winant. They say that he looks like Lincoln. But I think he looks like Nancy Hanks.

How very much I liked the weekends you allowed me to spend in your company. They are the lasting memory of my visit to America. And I am frankly looking for another invitation another day.

Your dutiful follower resident abroad,

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Max

PSF: Great Britain fdr.
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY PERSONAL FILES.

F.D.R.

Letter, 7-5-43, from Mr. Averell Harriman,
London, re his talk with Mr. Churchill in
regard to three-cornered meeting; re Stalin
; and re sending him to Moscow.

file Personal Great Britain
Noted folder
W.H. 1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY PERSONAL FILES.

F.D.R.

London - July 5, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

In order that you may understand the Prime Minister's reaction to the number one matter you asked me to discuss with him, I think I should explain in more detail his reactions and the circumstances under which I discussed it with him.

Max and I arrived late Wednesday afternoon after two nights on the plane with little sleep to find an invitation to dine with the Prime Minister that evening. Max was tired and would have preferred to go to bed. He was not, therefore, in too good a mood. The dinner, which included Mrs. Churchill and Kathleen, was argumentative and some of the fundamental disagreements between the two men came out. This type of argument with Max always upsets the Prime Minister.

Max left at midnight. I stayed to give the Prime Minister alone your several messages. The talk, which started with the proposed meeting, developed into a two hour discussion on every subject - from de Gaulle to China to India to Poland, etc., coming back throughout the talk to Russia and the question of the meeting.

July 5, 1943.

I have never had a better opportunity to be direct and frank and, as he has since been more friendly than ever, it is obvious that he accepted the sincerity of my statements even though he did not always agree with them.

He firmly believes a three-cornered meeting is in the interests of the war but he admitted that his viewpoint is colored by considerations of the reaction in Great Britain. My main argument was based on the long view as against the immediate - (1) the value of the intimate understanding that in all probability would result from a tete-a-tete, impossible with three persons, and (2) the great importance of the favorable reaction of the American people to it and to your participation. I explained the difference in the public reaction in the United States to a personal meeting of two as compared with a three cornered meeting on British soil in which it would appear that he, Churchill, had been the broker in the transaction.

There is no doubt in my mind as to his sincere desire and determination to back you up in anything that you finally decide to do and, although I must emphasize his disappointment if he is not present, I am satisfied he would accept it in good part and that it would in the long run improve rather than adversely affect your relations with him.

July 5, 1943

If a meeting of three were held reasonably soon after your first meeting alone, he recognizes, I believe, the logic of the historic sequence of the two tete-a-tete meetings culminating in the third with three present.

Should Germany not attack this summer, there is much in the Prime Minister's argument of the need for a closer military understanding between the Chiefs of Staff of the three countries. The question is whether much would come of a large meeting of the Staffs now unless you had first created a foundation of understanding which I am satisfied would come from the type of meeting you have in mind. In fact I am not all sure that you would not be able personally to accomplish more toward an immediate military understanding in the meeting you propose than would be accomplished by the larger meeting he proposes.

I explained to the Prime Minister the first night that there was no need for hurry in his reply, but he prepared a cable to you the next day, discussed it with Eden, and called me over to Number 10 (Annex) at one o'clock the following evening. I think he expected another argument from me and he seemed relieved when my only comment was that I thought his cable, although I did not agree with his reasoning, fairly

July 5, 1943.

expressed his views. On my way out I had a few words with Eden and got the impression from Eden that he personally was not unsympathetic to your position and was quite satisfied to let the decision rest with you.

I spent the week end at Chequers. The de Gaulle question came up a number of times and I can say with great assurance that the Prime Minister is ready to seize any opportunity that opens up in directing British Government policy or in public statements in the House in which he would take full responsibility for any moves to control de Gaulle's ambitions to the point of his elimination if it comes to that.

The Prime Minister was full of his speech which he has since delivered on his receiving the freedom of the City of London. He considered this a historic occasion and he put a great deal into it. We had some arguments about what he should say about China. I hope you are not too disappointed by the brevity of his reference to China. He will always refuse to picture the world reconstructed on four great columns of which China is one, but he is becoming a bit more unbending and realistic.

July 5, 1943

He showed me his rough cable from Stalin and his latest reply. I regret that he sent it without consultation with you. I told him that I thought his recent interchange of cables with Stalin had shown no profit. He referred to the subject several times later and agreed that this type of interchange should not be pursued and that perhaps he had made a mistake in answering Stalin's first cable. He defended, however, the need for his answering the last one because of the implications of bad faith in the last paragraph.

I am puzzled by the Stalin cables. Churchill's only explanation is that Stalin wants us to become involved in Western Europe to avoid our entry in the Balkans. This may be true. On the other hand your reaction that he is drafting cables for the satisfaction of his military advisors is, I feel, a better guess. We must always realize, too, that Stalin's expressions are crude. I have heard him say things in a way which would be unforgivable between Anglo-Saxons.

July 5, 1943

I called on Maisky last week before his departure for Moscow. The subject of the Stalin-Churchill cables came up. The interchange had not disturbed him. He said, laughing "You know that Stalin speaks his mind bluntly." He also indicated no concern over the possibility of our increased military influence in the Balkans.

As you know, I am a confirmed optimist in our relations with Russia because of my conviction that Stalin wants, if obtainable, a firm understanding with you and America more than anything else - after the destruction of Hitler. He sees Russia's reconstruction and security more soundly based on it than on any alternative. He is a man of simple purposes and, although he may use devious means in attempting to accomplish them, he does not deviate from his long run objectives.

The situation is today in the making and we have much at stake. If you don't get a follow up on the Davies letter, you may want to consider sending me to Moscow soon (assuming that you think I am the man to go).

Reilly

The President

- 7 -


July 5, 1943.

I have thought a good deal about it since you talked with me and have some definite views as to how the situation might be handled. If you consider sending me, I would respectfully suggest that you recall me to Washington and give me an opportunity to put my ideas before you. You could then decide whether I should go. Real accomplishment by an Ambassador in Moscow is a gamble with the odds against success but the stakes are great both for the war in Europe and in the Pacific - and after.

I would know within a couple of months in Moscow whether I could be of value and would ask that, if I have not been able to do a job, I could then return or be fired.

I am so keen about the work you have given me in London, which I feel is of increasing value as the time for the offensive approaches, that I would like to go back to it if I cannot do a real job in Moscow. I am sure I can be of more use to you and the war in London than to remain in Moscow as a glorified communications officer.

Respectfully yours,



The President,
The White House.

TELEGRAM

PSF Great Britain folder
1-43

The White House
Washington

July 30, 1943.

Admiral of the Fleet,
Sir Dudley Pound, (THROUGH MAP ROOM
c/o The American Embassy, WHITE HOUSE)
London, England.

I have only just heard the sad news of
Lady Pound's passing and do want you to know
that I am deeply sorry and am thinking of you.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

LET
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

WHITE ONE

JULY 24 1943

WORD WAS RECEIVED HERE TODAY THAT LADY POUND HAS DIED X

ADMIRAL LEAHY HAS SENT A MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY 'IN HIS OWN

BEHALF X

SIGNED HAMMOND

*526
" 6"*

PSE Mr Mr folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

September 3, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Lady Dill's plane was grounded in Baltimore for about an hour this evening. It has now taken off and will arrive in Washington at approximately eleven o'clock this evening.

Colonel McCarthy, from General Marshall's Staff, is going to meet her when she comes in.

The above information was passed to you as General Marshall knew you were interested.

Very respectfully,

F. H. Graham
F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt, AGD,
Watch Officer.

*Dameron H. - Brit Wtly Gen
& Biddle - to lunch
on Sunday*

Copy made at FDP Library - 1-24-56

PSFQ 27
Encl

September 4, 1943.

From: Opnav
To : Alusna London

Personal to Winant for the King from the
President.

The visit of the Churchill family at the White House not only affords me a great deal of pleasure but gives us an opportunity to evaluate the work of the conference at Quebec. I know that you will be well pleased with the results when you receive a full report from your Prime Minister. Quebec, Ottawa, and all of Canada could not have been more hospitable. You could not have found more helpful and agreeable representatives to receive us than the Governor-General and Princess Alice. I send you my personal thanks for providing such delightful quarters at the Citadel.

ROOSEVELT.

Sgd. FDR

PS F Mr. R. folder, -43

File
Personal

~~10, Downing Street,~~

~~Whitehall.~~

9-13-43

Somewhere in Maine.

13. ix. 43

Dear Mr. President,

A great many children must have been brought up in the White House nursery, but I am sure none of them enjoyed it more than I did. These visits to the White House and your extreme kindness to the children are a privilege I shall be proud to remember to the end of my days. Please accept my respectful thanks,

Yours sincerely

Ann M. Martin



File
Personal

PSF *Ex. Pr. folder 1-43* Retired for preservation.

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

On the Train.

13. September.

Dear Mr President.

May I send you my warm thanks for all your kindness and hospitality to me, and especially for asking me to Hyde Park and showing me round. It really is a most delightful spot and the library and High Schools are most interesting and impressive.

I have had the chance this time to see more than I did last time of your country and countrymen and realised how much I had to

Dear Sir,

May I send you my
respectful good wishes to you in
your great work both now and in
the future.

With my kindest thanks

Yours sincerely

Thomas Herrie Ronan

14 Sept. 1843.

2

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

My dear Mr. President,

May I offer to you my
most sincere thanks, as well, for
the great pleasure it was to stay
at the White House & Hyde Park,
as, for the honor which you have
once here done me by extending
to me your generous hospitality.

I am indeed most

File
Personal

fortunate and certainly am
most grateful.

May I send my best
wishes for a comfortable & safe
return for Mr. Roosevelt from
his great adventure.

Yours sincerely with

my duty.

C. Thompson
2

PSF Great Britain

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 21st, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

You may recollect that on December 8th, 1942 Lord Halifax gave you a memorandum on the subject of Rudolph Hess.

Interest in Hess has revived as a result of Mr. Brendan Bracken's recent remarks in New York, and the Cabinet have decided that the time has come when a statement should be made regarding the circumstances of Hess' arrival in Great Britain and the purpose for which he came. Mr. Eden proposes to reply to a question on the subject in the House of Commons on September 22nd, approximately on the lines of Lord Halifax's memorandum but with certain important omissions and additions. No reference will be made to Hess' mental state for the reasons set out in the third

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

paragraph of Lord Halifax's letter to you of March 9th, 1943, that is to avoid the danger that the medical certificate might be used publicly by the Germans to expose our original propaganda that Hess was sane and to bear out their own original contention that he was mentally deranged when he flew to the United Kingdom. They might even be able, on grounds of insanity, to claim Hess' repatriation.

The Soviet Government are being informed of the action which is being taken.

Believe me,

My dear Mr. President,

Very respectfully and sincerely yours,

R. J. Campbell

IMMEDIATE.

2320 S

ble

in D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

ourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America.

PS 15 Mr. Br. folder
1-43

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION,

MALET ST., W.C.1.

September 23. 1943.

Dear Mr President

A word of thanks to you
for all your hospitality.

I shall not lightly forget
the happy times I've spent at the
White House & Hyde Park.

There was but one lively
hour in our Atlantic crossing. Just
after Winston had drafted the part
of his speech which dealt with the
punishment given to German submarines,
we got news that a couple of U. Boats
had sunk a ship within a hundred
miles of the Renown. How the Huns miss
their opportunities!

Yours sincerely
Brendan Bracken

Priority Air Bag .

The President of the United States of America

SAFE HAND .

Ministry of Information

B.B.

file PSF West Britain folder 1-43 (filed 9/29)

BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES further report that:

[9-29-43]

Berlin.

The Berlin Press radio to Europe (in German) said that German troops in Italy are adequately guarded against all surprises and are prepared for treachery. They compared the situation to that in Yugoslavia in March 1941.

Tokio.

Domei, the Japanese official radio, said that Japan's war policy remained unaffected; the war in South-East Asia would be carried on to a victorious conclusion. The Japanese people (they said) remained calm and composed.

Stockholm.

It is reported that ships of the Italian fleet have left Spezia to surrender themselves at Sicily.

PSF 42.134. folder 1-13

PRIVATE AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 8, 1943.

Dear Mickie:-

It is good to get your letter via Brehon Somervell and he confirms all that you say about the success of the Chungking meeting. I trust you are giving a full account to Edwina of all that happened! Be a good boy.

I am really thrilled over the fact that for the first time in two years I have confidence in the personality problems in the China and Burma fields --- and you personally are largely responsible for this.

As you probably know, we succeeded in Russia in having China included in the Four Power Declaration toward saving the world from aggression during the immediate and post-war periods. I really feel that it is a triumph to have got the four hundred and twenty-five million Chinese in on the Allied side. This will be very useful twenty-five or fifty years hence, even though China cannot contribute much military or naval support for the moment.

As you will know by the time this reaches you, I am "on my way" with full confidence that the joint meeting will be as successful as its predecessors.

I much wish you could be there.

work. Take care of yourself and keep up the good

As ever yours,

Acting Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, G.C.V.O., D.S.O.

23rd October, 1943

Dear Mr. President,

You wished me to let you know how my visit to the Generalissimo passed off, I am therefore sending this letter by hand of General Somervell who will be able to confirm to you that it was an unqualified success.

I was invited to stay at the Hyde Park of China, Huang Shan, and was so able to meet them in very pleasant circumstances.

My preliminary meeting was alone with the Generalissimo and Madame Ch'iang Kai-shek. I began by telling the Generalissimo that I had come to Chungking at the earliest possible moment even before my own staff had formed up at Delhi, as I was so anxious to make his acquaintance and to discuss matters with him. I pointed out what a young and relatively inexperienced officer I was for such a high appointment but if I could feel that I could lean on his vast wisdom and experience for help and advice that it would be of the greatest help to me. This line went over very well with him and he promised me his support, advice and friendship.

I went privately with him through the various points that were to be raised in the Conference to be quite sure what his reactions would be in each case.

The interview closed after two hours and I then had one hour alone with Madame. I told her that I fully realised that the success or failure of my Mission depended upon the degree of support and help which I could count on from her. She told me that she was used to sizing up men quickly and that she had decided to become my firm friend and that I could rely on her for the utmost help and support. During subsequent interviews she amply proved that she meant what she said and was indeed of the greatest help both at the meetings and with advice between meetings.

She helped me in formulating the correct line of approach on some of the more ticklish problems and there is no doubt that her help enabled the informal conferences to pass off more smoothly, I am told, than any Conference within the memory of those who took part.

The Generalissimo and Madame gave Edwina and me the most charming carved Chinese jade seals and fortunately I had brought out a present from Edwina consisting of a little Cartier vanity case made after the Chinese style.

When we parted I felt I had made two real friends and they were good enough to express the same views to me.

The only difficulty still to be settled is the question of the Assam lines of communication and the air lift into China. Somervell was present at all the discussions in Chungking and at Delhi and thoroughly understands the position and will be able to explain it to you in person.

Although we held out an optimistic picture of being able to build up the lines of communication to a sufficient extent to enable the campaign to be carried out without interfering with the air lift into China, I had it recorded at the meeting that I could not undertake the campaign if I were tied in any way and that the British forecasts were by no means so optimistic and that I might well have to encroach on the supply to China to enable the campaign to take place at all. He accepted this and said that he would trust me to do the right thing and would have every sympathy with me in my endeavours to increase the lines of communication. I thought you would be glad to know that during my visit to the Burma front I found the British and American troops and airmen in very good heart and burning with a real desire to get at the enemy.

If only we can get our logistics to come out right, I look forward to the future with every confidence.

Yours very sincerely,

Dickie Howthorpe

By Hand

The President

The White House

Washington D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T file

GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1.

PRIME MINISTER

Gold and Dollar Balances

Thanks to gold from South Africa and pay to American troops in the U.K. and the Empire, our gold and dollar balances have increased to £ 1200 million and may rise to £ 2000 million by the end of the war. Much of the increase is not really ours at all but represents profits of Empire countries who choose to use us as their banker. Actually our reserves are far outweighed by our liabilities, especially in India and the Middle East, which are rising about five times as fast as our reserves and may amount to £10,000 million by the end of the war. Thus our net overseas position is deteriorating rapidly and our reserve when the war ends is likely to be only one fifth of our liabilities.

Certain Americans, ignoring these liabilities, claim that supplies on Lend/Lease should now be reduced and that we should be made to pay with our gold and dollars for goods supplied. Why they should pick on us for such treatment is not clear; it is never suggested that Russia and France with their enormous gold balances should pay for goods supplied to them.

The Lend/Lease administration who, with the State Department, are favourable to us, are reluctantly proposing to cut supplies since the United States Treasury maintain that the President issued a directive limiting British reserves to £ 1000 million.

The President has appointed a Committee to examine the matter, whose report may be already in his hands. It is vital to us that he should make the right decision. If our Lease/Lend supplies are cut off and our balances reduced to £1000 million, it will be almost impossible for us to tide over the difficult post-war period while we are building up our export trade.

(signed) Cherwell

12th November, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of State Dept.
Letter 1/20/72
By RHP Date FEB 9 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prime Minister

There is a matter affecting our financial relations with the United States of America which I think I must bring prominently to your notice at this particular juncture. We have reason to believe that the President is about to give a decision which is of absolutely vital importance to our financial capacity to get through the transitional period and, indeed, to our diplomatic independence during that time.

We are all concerned by the mounting accumulations of sterling balances in the hands of other countries. These represent a post-war liability upon us to convert the sterling into gold or other foreign exchange which the holders of the balances may need.

It looks indeed as though we may come to the end of the war with external liabilities of not less than £2,500,000,000 (ten billion dollars).

On the other side, after being almost cleaned out by the middle of 1941, we have been gradually building up a modest reserve. Our free balances of gold and dollars have now reached £300,000,000, and there is a reasonable hope of their reaching £500,000,000 (two billion dollars) by the end of the war, or about one-fifth of our assumed liabilities at the same date. These balances represent our only quick assets against the liabilities and constitute in fact the central reserve of the whole Commonwealth, since they include dollars turned over to us under the sterling area arrangements by the Dominions and other countries in the sterling area.

These balances will be absolutely essential to see us through the difficult transition period after Lend/Lease has ceased, and before the measures

we shall have to take to restore the balance of our external trade have had time to bear fruit.

Early in the year we heard, almost accidentally, that the President had authorised a directive to the effect that the British reserves were not to be allowed to rise beyond a billion dollars (£250,000,000). It is not clear that this directive was ever issued in such explicit terms, and we were certainly not consulted about it. But the U.S. Treasury maintain that this alleged directive puts the Departments under orders to cut off Lend-Lease as soon as our total reserves exceed the limit of a billion dollars.

In course of time, this figure has been passed. Our reserves are now more than £1,200 million. From now on they are likely to increase, owing to our receiving the dollar equivalent of the pay of the American troops in the sterling area. According to present estimates of the numbers of American troops who will be drawing their pay in those areas, our reserves may increase by as much as £600 million in the next year.

This does not mean, however, that we are getting richer. Our liabilities are increasing five or six times as rapidly as our reserves, and we are constantly getting deeper into the pit of net indebtedness. Indeed, I doubt if we can maintain our external financial fabric on its present basis, unless some moderate proportion of our increased liabilities is covered by reserves against them.

All this has been explained in great detail to the American Administration. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote a long letter to Mr. Morgenthau, rather more than two months ago, which the latter acknowledged and promised to answer. No reply has been received. When our Delegation was recently in Washington in connection with the currency and commercial talks, Lord Keynes and his colleagues

submitted

submitted a memorandum to the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration and the American Treasury on our balances and on our liabilities, asking the American Government to recognise that, in view of our growing external liabilities which arose directly from the war, the position of our balances should not be regarded as open to criticism. This view received strong support in some of the American Departments, though not in all. Mr. Stettinius and the State Department are wholly convinced that, in the circumstances, there should be no reduction of Lend-Lease, and that this small mitigation of our growing indebtedness should be allowed to accrue to us. The Lend-Lease Administration (at any rate before they were merged in the new body) were of the same opinion. The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, has been taking up a sticky line, for reasons which have never been explained to us. They have shown a disinclination to discuss the matter with any of our representatives or to give any reasons.

Some elements in the Administration maintain that Congress was given to understand that Lend-Lease was only to apply to the extent to which the recipient countries were utterly unable to pay for imports, whether of food or military equipment. In other words, however great our liabilities, we are not entitled to Lend-Lease as long as we have a dollar in the till. This view might have been sustainable in some quarters before Pearl Harbour. But it is, of course, utterly contrary to the principle of the pooling of resources between Allies, and also to the principle that the most convenient supplier shall provide the materials, irrespective of financial liability.

Moreover, it is a doctrine apparently to be applied to us only, for no such suggestion has been made to Russia. Nor, of course, do we apply it in giving reciprocal aid to the Americans or to any other country.

To

million dollars. To resolve the difference of opinion between his own advisers, the President set up, several months ago, an interdepartmental, ministerial Committee, to report to him. Owing to the difference of opinion on this Committee, no report emerged, and sundry meetings of the Committee were adjourned when the time came to call them. This position has gradually become intolerable from our point of view. As the U.S. Treasury takes the line that the existing Presidential directive must be followed until it is superseded, the Lend-Lease Administration is reluctantly and half-heartedly falling in with this by proposing to cut off various items of Lend-Lease, though on nothing like a large enough scale to keep our balances down to the prescribed figure. We have been urging, therefore, on the American Departments concerned that the matter should be brought to a head. During Lord Keynes's recent visit, the State Department and the Lend-Lease Administration both agreed that this was the right course. Colonel Llewellyn and Sir Ronald Campbell urged Mr. Harry Hopkins to bring it to a head. As a result, the President has instructed Mr. Morgenthau to expedite the Committee's report.

It may be that this report is already in the President's hands. In any case, it is absolutely vital to us that he should make the right decision when it reaches him.

There are several reasons for hoping that he will :-

(1) The force of our case, to anyone who takes the trouble to understand it, is overwhelming.

(2) Russia's gold and dollar reserves are nearly twice ours, and they have no liabilities against them. The Americans are not proposing to tackle the Russians with a similar proposal. We, however, are thought to be easier game.

(3) A change of policy sufficient to keep our balances down to one billion

billion dollars would have to be a very drastic one. The Americans will either have to ask us to meet the pay of their troops throughout the world (at a rate approximately double ours); or they will have to cut off Lend*Lease from some major item, such as food. At the very same time that the President has been emphasising the importance of our mutual aid, and when we have only just offered them raw materials, it would be a bit stiff to take either of these measures.

A favourable decision could take various forms. In no circumstances, of course, should we agree, on our side, to allow the amount of this country's reserves to be settled by the Congress of the United States. But that is no reason why the President should not give instructions to his own Departments to the effect that they need not begin to worry about our reserves until they exceed a certain figure.

The most satisfactory revised directive would be one that fixes no limits, but asks that we should keep in consultation with the Administration about liabilities and balances. Failing that, if there is to be a ceiling, it should be raised to something not less than \$2,000 million.

Apart from our post-war liabilities, which, as I have said, are likely to approach five times that amount, our adverse balance of trade in the first two or three years after the war will by itself exceed it. It is about the same amount as the Russian reserves, and they, as I have said, have no corresponding liabilities.

I attach a brief version of our case in a form which may have reached the President. This was prepared by Lord Keynes for Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Harry Hopkins, so that they could have something brief in their hands for use at an appropriate opportunity.

I again emphasise that an adverse decision would have the gravest consequences to our financial independence; whilst a favourable decision would remove a constant source of anxiety and friction.

11th November, 1943.

THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH GOLD AND DOLLAR BALANCES

1. Some time back, in different circumstances from the present, the President approved a line of policy which would permit the British gold and dollar reserves to reach some figure between \$600 million and \$1,000 million. There was no agreement by the British to limit their reserves to this figure.
2. For some little time past the British reserves have exceeded \$1,000 million, and may be increasing at a rate of some \$600 million a year. This includes gold and represents their total resources against growing liabilities in all parts of the world, which amount to six or seven times these reserves.
3. This increase in the British reserves does not reflect an improvement in their financial position. Their quick liabilities, largely caused by heavy cash outgoings in the Middle East, are increasing at four or five times the rate at which the reserves against them have increased. Their net overseas position, in fact, is deteriorating at a rate of about \$3 billions a year.
4. The increase in their gold holdings is due to certain receipts from South Africa and Russia. The increase in their dollar balances is due to their receiving the dollar equivalent of the local currency provided to meet the pay of American troops within the sterling area. Indeed, if it were not for the pay of the American troops the British dollar balances would be going down.
5. Apart from certain raw materials, the British are already giving reciprocal aid to the fullest extent of American Government requirements. They have now offered raw materials purchased by the U.S. Government in Great Britain and the Colonies on reciprocal aid terms. This would retard the growth of their
balances

balances by about \$100 million a year, and by \$200 million if India and Australia join in.

6. The British argue that some growth of their reserves is indispensable to the delicate system they are operating by which they finance the war on credit throughout a large part of the world, and that the retention of some part of the above receipts, as a support to this credit system and an offset to a much larger increase of liabilities, is not open to legitimate criticism. They point out that the Russians are believed to hold gold reserves nearly double the total reserves of the British and have no significant liabilities against them. But, in the case of Russia, it is not at present proposed to require them to surrender any part of their reserves as a condition of further Lend-Lease assistance.

7. The British feel that they ought not to be asked to agree to a ceiling to their balances, since their reserve position must be their own concern. Nevertheless, if the British argument is accepted as valid, the position could be regularised by a new Directive, which would set up a revised formula for the guidance of American Departments. If the figure given by the new formula was being approached, then the whole question could be re-opened.

8. The new formula might provide that an increase in British reserves is not unreasonable if the increase does not exceed, say, 30 per cent, of the increase of British liabilities.

9. Figures furnished to Congress hitherto have not disclosed the full burden of British overseas liabilities, or their rate of growth. It might be necessary to justify the new arrangement to provide that the information given to Congress in future should be fuller, and should show in some fashion, which would not be dangerous to British credit, the growth of liabilities as well as the growth of reserves.

26th October, 1943.

~~SECRET~~

PSF; Great Britain folder
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*file
Confidential*

From: London
To: President of the United States

Unnumbered, 15th December 1943

From Winant to the President.

I am forwarding to you in my immediately following message the complete text of Eden's address to the House of Commons on the conferences as reported in Hansard. You will note that Eden's reference to France is in effect an answer to Marshal Smut's address of some ten days ago. I did what you asked me to do the morning you left Cairo on the Greek situation.

Thank you for a great trip. I got a lot out of it which will be most useful to me as a member of the European Advisory Commission.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

From: London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, 14 December 1943

To the President. Following is complete text of Eden's speech

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden):

"My first sentence must be to express my warmest thanks to this House for their generous treatment of me in so kindly re-arranging business as to enable this debate to take place in the last week before the Christmas recess. I understand, of course, that that re-arrangement must have been inconvenient to many of my Hon. Friends in all parts of the House, and I am the more grateful to them. The fact is that it would not have been possible for me to take part in these recent Turkish conversations in Cairo and get back, despite the best efforts of the Royal Air Force, in time for a debate last Thursday. Again I express my thanks. Let me say also that I only too well understand the disappointment that Hon. Members must be feeling that the Prime Minister is not able to be here himself to give a firsthand account of these three conferences in which he has played so leading a part. My right Hon. Friend asked me to express his regret to the House, but there is still important work for him to do in the sphere where he now is, and he is sure the House would wish him to see that work through to the end. So this poor substitute "struts and frets his hour upon the stage."

We have spent three very strenuous weeks. Into that short time have been compressed three conferences of world significance any one of which in the ordinary leisured times of diplomacy would have taken a full month. But, with the rapid development of air communication, methods of consultation have been transformed, so it was possible within only a month of the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in Moscow to open the yet more authoritative conferences of the heads of Governments in Teheran. These meetings between the three men who bear the chief responsibility in their respective countries must be a rare event. Their value can hardly be exaggerated. They impose a considerable additional burden on those who travel or take part in them. It is not so

much the intensity of the work that has to be done as the wide range of subjects through which the mind has to move from one to the other which adds so heavily to the burden. I do not believe even my Right Hon. Friend the Prime Minister, ardent as we know him to be for work, has ever devoted more hours of the day, and alas, of the night to unremitting labour than during these conferences. I am glad to be able to report to the House that, in spite of that, I left my Right Hon. Friend, though perhaps a little tired, in good health, stout of heart and most confident in spirit.

Now let me describe our work. It fell into three main, easily defined chapters. First, the first Cairo conference for the prosecution of the war against Japan, next the Teheran conference for the prosecution of the war against Germany, and then the second Cairo conference for discussions with the President and the Foreign Secretary of Turkey. I propose to say something about each, and also about a number of subsidiary and important matters which were discussed and dealt with in both Cairo and Teheran. The greater part of the time of the first two conferences in Cairo about the Far East, and in Teheran about the war against Germany, were taken up with military matters. It was possible for us to bring these matters to a state of complete and collective preparation far exceeding anything that had hitherto been realised in this war. The thought is, I think, quite well expressed in two sentences of the Teheran communique, to which I draw the attention of the House because they are, I think, the most important of all. It states:

"Our Military Staffs have joined in our round table discussions and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the east, west and south."

That is a message which it has never, as yet, been possible to give to the Allied peoples in this war. The words must ring ominously in German ears and in those of Germany's unhappy satellites. They could be applied textually to the earlier conference at Cairo in respect of the Far East. That conference had certain special features. It gave the Prime Minister, for instance, his first opportunity of meeting the Generalissimo and Madame

Chiang Kai-Shek. I think it was also the first time the President had met the Generalissimo. By the luck of good weather I arrived in Cairo on the evening when the Prime Minister was entertaining the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, this leader of indestructible China and his most gifted wife. It was a most memorable experience when the Prime Minister took his guests and Admiral Mountbatten, who is Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command, and who, of course, also came to Cairo for the conference into his map room, where for some hours we dived deep into war plans and projects.

If I may just strike one personal note, I would say that it is difficult not to be deeply impressed by the Generalissimo, even at a first meeting. Some of my Hon. Friends have already met him. I had never met him before, and that impression deepens as time goes on. Under the outward gentleness and gracefulness of this remarkable personality there is a core of supple steel. His is a strength, you feel, that cannot be broken; it can only be bent and then strike back with even greater force. From what I have said, the House will understand how readily the Generalissimo and our Prime Minister understood each other. They speak just the same language of determination. And all through that evening and many subsequent discussions and meetings Madame Chiang Kai-Shek was always there to help us with her sagacious counsel, her unrivalled experience of east and west, and her brilliant gifts as an interpreter. I am sure the House will not wish me to apologise for giving just this personal impression of meeting these very remarkable personalities. As I have said, our military mission agreed in Cairo upon future military operations against Japan, but we also thought it well to take this opportunity to set out the political principles for which we are fighting, and we did so in these words:

"The three great powers are fighting this war to resist and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion."

Such being our purpose, it is our determined intention that Japan shall be deprived of opportunities for further mischief; that she shall be expelled from all the territories, to whomsoever they belong, which she has taken and that reparation shall be made to

China for the wrongs which have been done to her. We thought it well, too, to take this opportunity to tell the people of Korea that we had not forgotten them and that their country would, in due course become free and independent again. The House may say and it is true, that there is, in all this, no new declaration of British policy. The House will remember that even before Pearl Harbour, the Prime Minister warned Japan that if she attacked the United States we would declare war within the hour. From that moment we have been committed to the objectives which are set out now, for the first time, internationally, in the Cairo agreement. We are committed to them because we understand that to destroy Germany and then make a compromise peace with Japan, would only sow the seeds of a Third World War.

Let me emphasise. The war with Japan is not one in which we in this country are playing the part of benevolent assistants. Even if we are compelled, for the time being, to devote the greater part of our human and material resources to the task of defeating Germany. We are still principals in the Far Eastern war. Japan is just as great a menace to the security of the British Commonwealth as she is to the security of either the United States or China. Ask any one of the splendid fighting men from Canada, Australia or New Zealand who are in this country, whether they have any doubts on this score or whether they could contemplate any future for their countries unless the power of Japan were broken. They and thousands of their fellows came here in 1939 to help us in our defense here. Many of them are still here, in spite of the dangers to their own countries and we should be utterly unworthy of our heritage and traditions, if we did not, at the earliest possible moment, deploy all our resources for the purpose of establishing their security on a firm basis. For that we have to fight Japan to the bitter end whatever the cost and however long it takes.

I have no doubt that this meeting between the leaders of the three great powers, upon whom rests the heaviest share in the conduct of the war against Japan, has been of the greatest service to our cause in the political as well as in the military sphere. I was able during these conversations to have some discussion with our Chinese friends on another matter in which I know the House takes an interest -- post-war collaboration between our two

countries both in policy and in commerce. I told our Chinese friends that it was the desire of this country that that collaboration should be as close and as cordial as possible. I found that to be their attitude also, and I hope, in fact I feel sure that we are going to be able to make steady progress in both those spheres.

Now, I invite the House to leave Cairo and the Far Eastern conference and, if they will, to take their places with me again upon the magic carpet --- in this instance the good aircraft "York" --- and fly across the Dead Sea over Iraq and the Persian hills to Teheran. This long journey which many, like my noble friend opposite, have performed in the past, we performed in the incredible space of five-and-half hours. The Teheran conference lasted four full working days and they were crowded days. We had, every afternoon, a plenary session of the heads of the Governments and their principal diplomatic and military advisers. All the mornings were devoted to preparation and to those numerous consultations which have to take place between delegations in the course of any successful conference. There was a welcome absence of formality about all our meetings. Both lunches and dinners served for the further prosecution of business. Except, perhaps for the Prime Minister's birthday celebrations, the party at these meals never totalled more than eight, with the necessary addition of interpreters. In this way, it is fair to say that all the waking hours and many hours normally devoted to sleep, were, during these four days and nights, devoted to discussions on any and every topic between the leaders of these three countries.

When I came back to this House from Moscow I ventured to give the House a message that I was confident that the foundation had been laid for enduring collaboration between this country, the United States and the Soviet Union. I am many times more confident of this today. The work of Teheran began just where the work of Moscow left off, but the Teheran conference, being a conference of leaders, carries a still more stirring message to the world. I would like to quote just an extract about the conference from the Soviet newspaper "Pravda," and I quote it because it expresses exactly my own feelings at the end of this conference. They say this:

"Only a short time separates us from the Moscow conference of the three Foreign Ministers of the Allied powers, the decisions of which not only demonstrated the strengthening of friendly co-operation between Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in the war period, but laid the basis for fruitful work together after the war. But what a tremendous step forward has now been taken along this path!"

I am convinced that that is true. Let me try to sum up the results of the Teheran meeting. The first result is that the war will be shortened. The close co-ordination of all our military plans which was reached at the conference will ensure it. Clearly, we can do better when there is a close interplay at every move, which we have not had until now. The Teheran conference laid the plans to this end. All is now agreed. Every plan is now agreed, and the timing is now agreed, and, in due course, the decisions of the Teheran conference will be unrolled on the fields of battle.

Even this is not all, because victory is a means to an end, and the end is a peace that will last. More than once before Allies have stood together in war and fallen apart in peace. In the last year or so many Hon. Members in all parts of the House must have said to themselves, "Is this going to be our experience once again?" Well, that will certainly be Germany's game. Let the House not doubt that. She will play it with all she knows from the moment the last shot is fired --- to sow confusion, to sow doubt and division. That will be Germany's game, and thus to prepare for the next war. This recurrent threat of war can only be met if there is an international order firmer in strength and unity than any enemy that can seek to challenge it. Is there or is there not the possibility of creating such an order? Do the foundations exist?

Six months ago I could not have given any certain answer. It might have been so; it might not have been so. But today I can give the answer. It is an emphatic "yes". The foundations do exist, and I am truly confident that there is a possibility, and more than a possibility, a desire, among the three powers for continued co-operation not only during the war, not only in reshaping Europe when the armistice comes, but also, thereafter, in maintaining in the world an orderly progress and continuing peace. The foundations of that understanding were laid by us in

Moscow. They have been strengthened and confirmed in Teheran. We three worked together. We have set our hands to the task, and heavy is our responsibility to ensure that we do not fail.

I would like to give two illustrations of the beginning that has been made. When I came back from Moscow a month ago I told the House that we had set up there an advisory council for Italy, on which there would be representatives of our country, the United States, Soviet Russia and France. That committee -- that council -- has begun its work. Its members have had a number of meetings. They have been to Italy and surveyed the position there. I had the opportunity when I was away to see the representatives of all four of the countries, and each and all told me that the work was proceeding smoothly and well. That is the first step. And then there is the advisory commission for Europe, the commission agreed on in Moscow, which is to sit here in London. That has now been completed by the nomination by the United States of the American Ambassador in London, Mr. John Winant, a most admirable choice. I understand I am not telling secrets about another body which is to have its first preliminary informal meeting tomorrow. That is the beginning. These two bodies were planned in Moscow, but the scope of their work was greatly increased by the decisions taken at Teheran.

I will now pass to another matter - Turkey. It was decided in Teheran to invite the president of the Turkish Republic to attend a conference with the representatives of the three powers - The United States, Soviet Russia and ourselves in Cairo, on what was our homeward journey. The Turkish President accepted, and he was accompanied by his Foreign Secretary and the Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Office. The British, the American and the Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara accompanied him. Unfortunately, Mr. Vyshinsky, who was to have been the Russian representative to join us in that capacity, was away at the front in Italy, and he could not reach us until after the close of the talks, but I was able to see him before I left Cairo, and I gave him a full account of all that had passed, and discussed with him the outcome of our work. These conversations were in the nature of a fuller and more complete development of the earlier meeting which I had had with the Turkish Foreign Secretary in Cairo five weeks ago. I clearly cannot at this stage give details of these confidential discussions - too many people might be listening - but I can say that I have good hopes that they will

be found to have established a sound basis for future cooperation between the four countries -- ourselves, Soviet Russia, America and Turkey.

Since his return to Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister himself has made a statement which the House, perhaps, may not have noticed in which he said that the conversations in Cairo were so intimate and far-reaching that he could now say that Turkey's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union were almost as cordial and as strong as with Great Britain. Those who know the past history of this business will realize what an important statement that is. It augurs well, I think, for the progressive development of future relations between us four, and were it on account of this development alone I should feel justified in telling the House that we regard the Cairo conference No. 2 as encouraging. Further than that I cannot go to-day.

While we were in Cairo my Right Hon. Friend the member for Stockton (Mr. Harold MacMillan) and with my Hon. and Gallant friend the member for Carlisle (Major-General Sir Edward Spears), who is our minister at Beirut, as well as with the Minister of State in the Middle East. The House has already been informed of the development and of the conclusion of that crisis, but, if the House will allow me, I want to take this, my first opportunity, to say something about it*. We have sympathy, deep sympathy, with the national aspirations of the Arab world.

We are the only country that has ever concluded a treaty with and withdrawn from an independent Arab state. Yet at the same time the preservation of order and tranquility in the Lebanon is an allied interest, for it closely affects the whole of our war effort in the Middle East. I understand that General Catroux is going back to Beirut on behalf of the French Committee of National Liberation, and he is to conduct negotiations to try and bring about a modus vivendi in the Levant states. No happier choice of representative, I think, could have been made by our French friends, and I am sure the House will share the earnest hope, which we have expressed already through diplomatic channels to the authorities concerned, that these negotiations will be conducted in a conciliatory spirit on both sides and that they will lead to early agreement. I am confident that all our Allies, all the members of the United

*Our interest in this matter is twofold.

Nations, share that view.

It so happened that on my return journey one of the engines of our four-engined aircraft became tired of operating. Luckily when we were getting near the aerodrome of Algiers, and so we were landed and delayed there. As a consequence I had opportunities of meeting both M. Massigli and General Catroux himself and of conversations with them about this situation. Here let me say just one word --- which I hope the House will endorse --- to the people of France. We are at the heart of the fifth winter of this war. The suffering of the French people has been harsh and cruel. She has spent a long ordeal, which perhaps, but for the hazard of geography, the British people might have had to share. We believe that this great people, 40,000,000 strong, enriched by the moral and intellectual qualities that have been theirs throughout history, will find the spirit to lift them up again from the heavy blows which have been dealt them during the last four years. We believe that in the Colonial and French forces in Tunisia and in Libya, of which I have heard from our own officers who served with them, and in the heroic and ever increasing resistance movement in France, some of whose representatives I have met within the last few days --- we believe that in those people we have the real soul of France. So I say at this time that despite all the difficulties we extend to France our sympathy and our confidence.

What I have said, and said deliberately, applies not only to France but to all those nations now under German occupation. What we are seeking, what we are working for, when we approach these matters in harmony with the United States and Russia is not to impose a three-power will upon Europe. We are seeking to liberate those countries so that each and all can take their place in the European family again. There could not be anything exclusive in the arrangements between the three powers. We want to restore the liberty of these nations of Europe, great and small, so that they can play their part in Europe. I am one who believes that Europe has still perhaps the greatest contribution of all to make to the future of mankind.

Having said that, I must come to one or two of our troubles, for it would not be fair to ignore our troubles. There are two

countries in the Balkans about which I must say a word or two --- Yugoslavia and Greece. It is, perhaps, inevitable that after three years of enemy occupation and guerilla fighting there is not a little internal confusion and chaos. It must be remembered that German propaganda, day and night, is trying to increase that confusion, trying to spread false reports of our intentions, trying to divide us from our Allies and play one off against the other. So I hope I may say to the House that in approaching these matters in public discussion we should use all possible restraint and above all, if I may add it, resist the temptation of fighting our own elections in all these Balkan lands. I laid down some time ago, with the assent of the cabinet, of course, three rules to try to guide us in this state of affairs, and I will give them to the House. First, to give all the practical help in our power to those elements in these countries which are actively resisting the enemy. Second, to make clear that so far as we can exert any authority it shall be used to ensure that these countries shall be free to choose their own Governments when they are liberated. Third, to work in the closest possible concert with our Allies.

Having said so much, may we, on the basis of these rules, look at Yugoslavia? For many months past the head and front of resistance to the enemy in Yugoslavia have been the Partisans under their Commander-in-Chief, General Tito. From all the reports which we have received it is clear that these Partisans are containing and engaging a large number of German divisions. We are doing all we can to supply them with munitions and to support them in every possible way. Our action in this respect has, of course, been endorsed by our Allies.

Mr. Bellenger (Bassetlaw): By whom has it been endorsed?

Mr. Eden: By the Soviet Government and the United States Government several times over, at various conferences. Now if I may I would like to go back a little into past history. I want to show the House the development in this matter. As a result of information which we had, we decided as long ago as the spring of this year that we should ask General Tito to receive a British military mission. He replied, "Yes", and British officers have been with him ever since. Our mission has been and, as it happens, is under the leadership of a member of this House, my Hon. and Gallant Friend the member for Lancaster (Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean)

who has established most excellent relations with General Tito. As the House will have seen from the newspapers today, the Soviet government have decided also to send a military mission to the Partisan Commander-in-Chief. I want to make it quite plain where we stand in this. Mr. Molotov was good enough to discuss this project with me, both when I was in Moscow and more recently in Teheran. He said, "You have a mission with them, and we think of sending a mission, too." We, of course, endorsed this proposal --- the Prime Minister and I --- Mr. Molotov and I agreed that our two missions shall work together in the closest collaboration when the Soviet mission reaches the country. That is the position.

Now for another development since I left Teheran. As the House is aware, a supreme legislative committee and an executive national committee of liberation have recently been set up under the auspices of the Commander-in-Chief of the Partisan forces. So far as I am aware, this national committee does not claim authority outside the borders of the area in which it operates. It has certainly not claimed any form of recognition from His Majesty's government. As I understand the position and as it has been reported to me by our officers, the Partisans emphasise the provisional nature of this administration, and they hold that it is for the Yugoslav people, as soon as their country is liberated, freely to choose the form of government they prefer. If that is the position, this, too, is the view of His Majesty's government. It is also, as I know, because he has told us so, the desire of King Peter himself and the policy of His government. (Hon. Members: "Oh.") They have publicly declared it as their policy. We must be fair in all this. A public statement was made by the government that the moment the war was over they would lay down their portfolios and the country would choose what government they preferred.

Mr. A. Bevan (Ebbw Vale): Do the radio pronouncements of the Yugoslav government from Cairo confirm that statement?

Mr. Eden: Certainly, Sir. I am not trying to say that the government in Cairo agree on all points with the Partisans. Clearly that is not so. I am trying to make a fair approach to this very difficult question and what I am saying is that all, including the government in Cairo, have declared that the moment their country is

liberated they will lay down their offices and it will be for the country to choose its government. That is a point on which all are agreed -- the King, General Tito and the Yugoslav government. (Interruption.) I feel myself the greatest sympathy for this young king. He came to his responsibilities at a most critical hour in his country's history. He did his best to rally his country to the Allied cause, and he is now faced with the most difficult problems that any young monarch could be faced with. I repeat that we must try to be fair, and, if I may use the word, not too, partisan in our actions in the literal and not the military sense of the word. Finally on that subject, let me tell the House this. We are in consultation with other Allied governments on this policy, and the Prime Minister and I devoted no little time to it while we were in Cairo. We are now at work in conjunction with our Allies to bring all those in Yugoslavia or out of it together who want to fight the common German enemy. I hope that the contributions of this House will be made to that end.

One word about Greece. The position there is not on all fours with the position in Yugoslavia. There are warring bands, all of them in different degrees hostile to the Germans. There are also political controversies which cut right across the matter. It is our aim there to try and unite all these bands, or almost all of them, in common action against the enemy. We have some hope that we may have a measure of success in that. The recently published letter of the King of the Hellenes which he had written last November to his cabinet, shows clearly that the king is anxious to make his contribution so that his position shall not be a matter of controversy or get in the way of unity. I am not without hope that we may see some progress in the near future, though I do not pretend that the task is particularly easy.

I want to say something about the progress of the fighting in Italy, because it is wrong that we should adjourn for Christmas without the House being informed of the latest information that the government has. We must admit, first of all, that the advance of the Allied Armies in Italy during the third and fourth months of the campaign has not covered quite the spectacular distances we achieved in the first two months. That, of course, is not due to lack of initiative on the part of our armies. The truth is that we have now reached what is the narrowest part of the Italian peninsula. The Apennines stretch almost from coast to coast, and where the Apennines stop the swollen rivers take over. That is the position which confronts us. These natural facilities afford

exceptional opportunities for skillful defense, and the Germans, as they are forced relentlessly back, are making good use of these advantages. Add to this heavy persistent rains which swell every river and turn every approach into a sea of mud, and we have a fair picture of the background against which the Italian events should be reviewed. On 8th November, after a surprise sea borne attack on Termoli, the Eighth Army pressed on and secured a bridge head over the river Trigno while inland their left flank was moving up through the Apennines. Meanwhile, on the west General Clark's Anglo-American Fifth Army crossed the Volturno and fought their way to the next river obstacle. By the 8th, by a lightening thrust most characteristic of him, General Montgomery swept the Germans back across the Sangro River. The whole of the rest of his line moved forward at the same time while the Fifth Army kept pace in the western Apennines. It was then when, as I know, our commanders felt the campaign to be developing as they wished that we had another deluge and steadily worsening weather conditions which called a halt along the whole group of armies. That time was spent building up stocks, preparing rivers and roads and getting ready for the next offensive, General Montgomery waiting for a spell of fine weather.

At last it came and on the night of 27th November the Eighth Army, further strengthened by the arrival of the Second New Zealand Division, that most gallant veteran division, was able to launch its main assault. It was preceded, as has become almost the custom now, by a familiar and shattering bombardment and the full support of the Royal Air Force. The 78th and the 18th Divisions, both of them also veterans in fighting, advanced and secured Fossa Cesia Ridge. Down came the rain again and still our troops fought grimly on, as they are doing now to the line of the Moro and beyond. Far on the left Canadians have now relieved the 78th Division and they are pressing on towards Ortona. Inland the New Zealand Division is trying to gain the high ground which will help the Canadians further in their advance. Meanwhile, on the west of the Anglo-American Fifth Army began the battle for the Mignano Gap. There was a struggle to secure this mountain feature and the enemy had plenty of time to prepare formidable defenses. But thanks to the gallantry of the Allied infantry all the more important of the hill features are now in our hands and it seems that the Germans may be forced to withdraw further. It would be unjust to make these references to the fighting in Italy without paying tribute to the

Royal Engineers and the administrative services. Theirs has been an immense task to keep communications open and to reconstruct them where they are destroyed, and yet throughout this fighting the army has never lacked for a moment a shell or food or supplies of any kind. It is my duty to give the House the casualties from the moment of the landing on the mainland to 23rd November. The British casualties were 3,212 killed, 9,709 wounded and 3,153 missing. Total 16,074. The American casualties were to 25th November: 1,603 killed, 6,361 wounded, 2,685 missing. Total 10,649. Up to the most recent counting the German prisoners taken by the Allies total just over 6,000.

Let me sum up my impressions of these three weeks. My Right Hon. Friend and I were greatly encouraged by the outcome of our three conference. So I believe were all our Allied colleagues. To that extent I bring the House a message of good cheer. These events, of course, give no cause for easy optimism---far from it. If I were to do that I would give my message falsely. The truth, on the contrary, is that the very magnitude of the plans to which we have set our hands, to which the heads of other governments have given their approval, will call for an immense effort in the coming months from each and all of the United Nations. Plans, however good, can only yield results if the force of the citizens in all the lands is behind them. We have set ourselves a hard task in our determination to achieve victory at the earliest possible date. Great battles are impending. For this effort we shall need all our strength, all our courage, all our unity in greater measure perhaps than ever before. I ask this House to give the pledge that for our part that effort will be forthcoming."

Signed Winant