The President

My dear Mr. President: Moore and I are on our way home by train. The last crackup out of Seattle scared us a bit. Just got news of my confirmation. Will thank you personally when I get home. I want to say now that I don’t know what kind of a diplomat I shall be, probably rotten, but I promise to get done for you those things that you want done. Rose and I are deeply grateful.

Joe Kennedy.
Feb. 10, 1938.
Pres. Memo to Admiral Leahy--attaches excerpt from Col Lindbergs' letter on German Aviation--number of planes etc. for his information Leahys reply attached also memo from J. Kennedy and Gray

SEE--Navy folder-Drawer 1--1938
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY

Will you speak to me about this?

F. D. R.

MEMO FROM THE PRESIDENT
JOE KENNEDY
TO SEE BRANDEIS & WISE
Dear Mr. President:

Regarding the Culberson matter, since the entire picture subject is in controversy with the British Government, I think that it might be well to wait until we finish our negotiations rather than have any breakup for fear of the harm it might do to the deal that we might make.

I shall be on top of the subject and just as soon as we have it so that no harm can possibly come of it, we can proceed. I think if anything is said to the Department at this time it will mean an upset. It would of course cause a leak and have a bad effect.

Very respectfully yours,

Joe.

JFK/b

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Personal & Confidential.

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.  

Mar 12, 9 o'clock 1938  

Dear Chief,

I have just come from the American Embassy, to put it more simply, from Joe Kennedy. I know you will be glad to hear, though probably you will have heard it before this, that J.K. has already made a very good impression. These Britiaberes will hear, of course in private, language from him to which their dainty ears are not accustomed. He must have said some things to the godly Halifax at their first meeting which that plaster saint of 1936 will not speedily forget.

I write for two reasons, one, to tell you of the joy which is mine in common with most Americans, let us say, 66 per cent. of 1936, in the day which marks the completion of five great unforgettable years of your historic service to our country. They have been war years, but you have been privileged to be the nation's defender, defender of the dispossessed and under-privileged. What higher distinction could any human achieve; and in defending those who could not defend themselves save through force, you have done most to save our democracy from the peril which threatened in the two last Hoover years.

There is one thing more that I must add by way of postscript. After Joe K. told me that he was the first Catholic to hold the London Embassy post, I pointed to Choate's portrait and said: "I suppose you know, J.K., that Choate was nastily anti-Irish at times?" J.K.'s answer was: "I'll ring for the porter and have the portrait removed at once". We both noted that Choate was frowning at us, Joe for being an Irish ambassador, and at me on general principles as Jew and Rabbi. But Joe is going to give the earlier Joe a chance to hang on the wall if he adapts himself
to his new Irish American surroundings.

I must tell you something of much moment to not a few of your friends including Isaiah and Felix and Ben V.C. and Judge Mack, namely, that as a result of typical English manoeuvring, the Foreign Office now plans to give us even less than the Peel partition proposed, namely, to take out everything including and above Haifa, to cut off our access to the Lebanon, to take away the north and upper Galilee which is so important, and to keep the entire Southern Palestine as British, though of course that would make it more accessible to Jewish settlers than it would be if it become Arab. I think you will find that J.K. is going to be very helpful as he is keenly understanding, and there is just enough Irish in him to make him sympathetic to those of us who resent the British promise that is in danger of being broken.

With most affectionate greeting,

Always dear Chief,

Yours,

[Signature]
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Memo to President
From Hull
March 13, 1938

In re-Joe Kennedy's proposed speech in London.

SEE--Hull folder-Drawer 1--1938
March 22, 1938.

Dear Joe:—

Yours of the eleventh has come an hour before I leave for Warm Springs so I cannot even sign this. It is grand to have your news and I hope you will keep on writing.

Poor old Russian Ambassador! I hope he will not die of fright if he is sent for.

Since you left things have not changed greatly here — no better, no worse.

I miss you much. Love to Rose and the children.

As ever yours,

Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy,
American Embassy,
London,
England.

P.S. When you feel that British accent creeping up on you and your trousers riding up to the knee, take the first steamer home for a couple of weeks holiday.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing this at noon, after just having made three courtesy calls on the French, Spanish and Argentine Ambassadors. This afternoon I have the Turkish Embassy, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, the Russian Embassy and the Brazilian Embassy and, if I get anything interesting, I will add it on to this letter.

I don't expect that I will be able to tell you anything you are not familiar with or that you will consider very deeply a judgment formed after ten days here, but there are certain definite signs that would help me to make up my mind in America on a given condition and I think I am justified in drawing the same conclusions here.

First of all, I am impressed in talking with the various Government officials of foreign countries that they regard the situation as acute in Central Europe, but, in the words of the French Ambassador this

The President,
The White House.
this morning, nothing is likely to happen except to have Schuschnigg eventually give in unless there is some indication that France and England are prepared to back him up. The Spanish Ambassador, of course, feels that if a strong position had been taken in the Spanish situation, it would not now be necessary to have to take one in Central Europe in order to save Europe.

My own impression is that Hitler and Mussolini, having done so very well for themselves by bluffing, they are not going to stop bluffing until somebody very sharply calls their bluff. They have made considerable capital in their own countries of the fact that Eden was more or less persona non grata to both; they have persuaded their own people that they were strong enough to force Eden out of the British Cabinet. This is psychologically the worst result that has been obtained; this and the fact that the small countries of Europe are impressed with the fact that England is considerably moved by the positions of Spain and Italy.

The French Ambassador feels that the real point of difference between the Eden and Chamberlain policies was that Eden maintained a policy always looking at
at the outside of Britain and Chamberlain makes his policy looking at the political situation here. If Chamberlain is successful in working out some kind of a deal with either country, he will be a hero; if he isn't successful, he will probably say, "I have done the best I could to avert war; I have used every facility at my command to make a trade with these two nations; I can't do anything." The impression seems to be pretty general among the banking and financial interests that this is probably the way he will finally work himself out.

With all due respect to all these ideas, I am thoroughly convinced and the heads of the various departments in the Government and outside of the Government all feel that the United States would be very foolish to try to mix in. All they are interested in is to have the United States stay prosperous and build a strong navy, and they feel that time will take care of their position with the United States. This feeling is almost unanimous among the top side people.

However, as I say, I am more convinced than ever that the economic situation in Europe is becoming more and more acute and if our American business
does not pick up so that trade is generated for these countries, we will have a situation that will far overshadow any political maneuverings. Great Britain has the same kind of stock market we have; it is thin and nobody is anxious to buy anything. Armament is keeping industry going and they are looking around for methods of increasing taxation. There is some feeling in the industrialist's mind that there is always a potential danger from Germany by air raids, because London's political, financial and industrial centers are practically all one and the same and a hostile air fleet hit into a small part of London would put the whole place out of commission. In a discussion yesterday with Inskip, Minister of National Defense, the question was brought up as to the possibility of this same air fleet keeping off ships carrying food to England, but even though they think about this incidentally, the bankers see the handwriting on the wall and are frightfully disturbed. The standard of living, of course, is getting much worse in all the countries of Europe, except England, and they are finding themselves more and more dependent on America's prosperity than they ever believed possible.
My own belief, on that plan you discussed with me, is that the time is going to come, after Chamberlain has made the political offers necessary, for you to make a worldwide gesture and base it completely on an economic stand, but it should be entirely a question of proper timing. There is nothing, I believe, that could possibly be done at the moment. The obligation of finding a way to accelerate trade and get business started in all these countries should come when there is a mad desire on their parts to have you do it. To my thinking, that is bound to come, and the proper entrance into the field at the right time will make world history never to be forgotten, and it isn't something that may have to be done, it is something that will have to be done.

I am getting some rather strong convictions on personnel and methods of organization, but that will wait for a while.

I think I have made a fairly good start here with the people and seem to be getting along reasonably well with the Government so far.

On the 31st of this month I am going to take the American point of view on the Merchant Marine at a banquet here in London of all the steamship operators and
and builders. I think I have a chance to answer the criticism that has always been so prevalent as to why America should have a Merchant Marine.

I don't know that you want to be bothered with this kind of a letter, but, if you do, just let me know and I will send them along to you when I have any personal observations. A great deal of the stuff that will go forward, it seems to me, might be interesting, but not particularly important. Nobody is going to fight a war over here unless Germany starts shooting somebody. Nobody wants it.

I miss seeing you all very, very much.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Joseph P. Kennedy
P.S. - On my trips this afternoon, there was nothing interesting at the Turkish Embassy. The Cardinal told me that the Apostolic Delegate in Spain, although an Italian, had informed him that there were approximately twenty thousand Italian troops still in the Franco army, but that there is a general feeling that the war is coming to a close.

At the Russian Embassy I had a very interesting time. I told him point blank that America was frankly amazed at the so-called trials in Russia and wondered if he cared to tell me something about them. He told me that they all date back to the original break of the Trotsky-Stalin philosophy; Stalin contending on one hand that Russia was big enough to maintain a social system of her own; Trotsky, on the other hand, saying that Russia could never prosper under a Communist system unless they worked to make the rest of the world Communist. This fight went on in a proper way between the ordinary political opponents for five or six years.

Then came time to lay out the Five Year Plan around 1928, and things started to be very bad in 1932 and 1933. Since they were not able to get outside capital, they were obliged to lay out their own money and, of course, this capital did not earn them any money.
money and therefore conditions were extremely bad. But the Trotsky group, representing a great many men in high places, contended among themselves that there was still a good spot here for planning and plotting and Stalin recognized that this was taking place, but, because of the unsettlement and unrest, did not want to take dire steps. Then conditions started to improve in 1934, '35, '36 and '37, and this group, seeing that they would lose the advantage gained by unrest of the people, now decided to carry on with Japan and Germany, going so far as to pledge the Ukraine to Germany and the maritime port to Japan.

I said all this might be true, but why did these men hold these high places. He said that in a great many cases Stalin knew of their leanings, but tried to win them over, but finally decided it was impossible and took these steps.

He would like to go into this more at length later and I will have a talk with him. To be very frank, he looks scared to death himself. My own belief is that, if the telephone had rung and said "Come back to Russia," he would have died right on my hands.

I don't know whether any of this makes any sense, and, as I say, I never have had any experience as to what you want in news, so please don't hesitate
hesitate to tell me not to bother sending this and just keep up with the quick bulletins, but, if you take my word, these quick bulletins will be newsy but still unimportant as far as the United States of America's policy goes.

J.P.K.

Dear Mr. President:

The St. Georges have arrived and I am planning to see them on Wednesday. I told Mr. St. George that I would open up my London account with him, and I think that pleased him more than anything I could do for them socially.

I will also get in touch with the Gordons and have them in any time they will come.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House,

Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1938

In reply refer to
PR 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./5885

My dear Miss LeHand:

I am pleased to transmit herewith, for the
information of the President, a copy of a telegram
addressed to him personally, which was received
in the Department this morning from the American
Ambassador at London.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Chief of Protocol.

Enclosure:
From the American
Ambassador at London
to the President,
April 15, 1938.

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,
Private Secretary to the President,
The White House.
London
Dated April 15, 1938
Rec'd 6:55 a.m.

315, April 15, noon.

"PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Just finished reading your speech. It is a great spiritual document as well as a great piece of economic reasoning. If we all live to that - business, labor and government - problem is solved. Joe."

KENNEDY

RR
April 18, 1938.

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our telephone conversation of this morning, I am enclosing herewith for your consideration a suggestion of what you might wish to say at your press conference tomorrow with regard to the British-Italian Agreement.

I have spoken on the telephone to the Secretary and he is in accord with the general lines of this suggestion.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
As this Government has on frequent occasions made it clear, the United States, in advocating the maintenance of international law and order, believes in the promotion of world peace through the friendly solution by peaceful negotiation between nations of controversies which may arise between them, as well as in the promotion of peace through the finding of means for economic appeasement. Without attempting to pass upon the political features of the accord recently reached between Great Britain and Italy, this Government has seen the conclusion of the agreement with sympathetic interest.
Secretary of State
Washington

319, April 15, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDERSecretary.

Following personal and confidential letter dated April 14 just received from Lord Halifax.

"You will remember that we spoke together the other day on the subject of the conversations now proceeding between my Government and the Italian Government with a view to the settlement of all matters outstanding between them. I am glad to say that these conversations are now reaching their final stage and I have every reason to believe that an agreement will be signed by Lord Perth, our Ambassador in Rome, and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs within the next day or two.

As you know we have through our Embassy in Washington been trying to keep the President in touch with the developments of these conversations and I think perhaps it might be useful if I were to attempt to give you some account of the contents of the agreement which we hope shortly
shortly to sign.

A number of instruments forming part of the agreement will be annexed to a protocol which will provide that they shall come into force at a date to be determined together by the two governments and that upon their taking effect negotiations will be opened (the Egyptian Government being invited to participate where necessary) for the purposes of dealing with certain questions such as frontiers and trade, affecting their relations in East Africa. In this connection there is to be in the meantime a 'bon voisinage' agreement which the United Kingdom, Italy and (in respect of the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan) Egypt will sign.

The instruments annexed to the protocol will comprise (a) a reaffirmation of the declaration signed by the United Kingdom and Italy on the second January 1937 regarding the Mediterranean and of the exchange of notes between them of the 31st December 1936 respecting the status quo in the Western Mediterranean; (b) an agreement for the periodical exchange of military information in regard to the two parties' forces in certain parts of Africa, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and providing for advance information regarding decisions to provide new naval or air bases in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Red Sea or
EDA - 3 - #319, April 15, 5 p.m. from London

or its approaches; (c) an agreement providing that there shall be no conflict between their respective policies in certain areas in the Middle East, more particularly Saudi Arabia and the Yemen; and (d) a declaration providing that one party shall not engage in propaganda against the other. There will also be declarations on certain African matters of particular interest to His Majesty's Government such as the sources of the Nile in Ethiopia (Lake Tsana), the undesirability of raising large native armies and the treatment of missionaries in Ethiopia. A declaration reaffirming the intention of the United Kingdom and Italy to abide by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 will also be made.

Other subjects will be dealt with by exchanges of letters. These will include the reduction by Italy of her forces in Libya by one thousand men a week until peace time strength is reached and her accession to the London Naval Treaty of 1936. In regard to Spain Count Ciano will send Lord Perth a letter confirming the Italian Government's full adherence to the United Kingdom formula for the proportional evacuation of the foreign volunteers from that country and pledging the Italian Government to apply
apply such evacuation on conditions to be determined by
the Non-intervention Committee on the basis that formula.
He will reaffirm an assurance previously given to His
Majesty's Government that if this evacuation had not been
completed at the termination of the civil war all remaining
Italian volunteers will forthwith leave Spanish territory
and all war material be withdrawn. He will also reaffirm
a previous assurance that the Italian Government have no
territorial or political aims and seek no privileged
economic position in Spanish territories (including the
Spanish zone of Morocco) and do not intend to keep any
armed forces there. In reply to this letter Lord Perth
will take note of these assurances and will state that
His Majesty's Government regard a settlement of the Spanish
question as a prerequisite of the entry into force of the
agreement reached between themselves and the Italian Govern-
ment. In the same letter he will then turn to the subject
of Ethiopia and will inform Court Ciano that His Majesty's
Government being desirous that such obstacles as may at
present be held to impede the freedom of member states as
regards recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia
should be removed, intend to take steps at the forthcoming
meeting
meeting of the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of clarifying the situation of member states in this regard.

I should add that while the agreement will be signed as we hope very shortly it will not as you will notice from the account of the protocol given above, enter into force until 'such date as the two Governments shall together determine'. You will have seen that we have given assurances in Parliament that we shall not conclude this agreement until we are satisfied regarding a settlement of the Spanish problem and so far as we are concerned we shall determine the date when the agreement shall enter into force by reference to the Spanish question. On their side the Italian Government will no doubt determine that date by reference to the steps we may take regarding the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.

From what I have said you will see that the agreement is a fairly comprehensive one and it was in fact our object to try and dispose of all questions outstanding between the two Governments.

The Prime Minister and I hope very much that the President will share our view that this agreement embodies a real contribution towards world appeasement. The state of the world is such that in our opinion it is essential to
to try and get rid of all removable causes of friction. There are, alas, so many causes which are not easily removable e.g. deep-seated cleavages due to ideological convictions and ultra-nationalistic sentiments, that we are the more bound to do what lies within our power to get rid of those that are removable. But to do so means looking facts in the face and this we have attempted to do in the present agreement. Our hope is that we may get more than is written into the protocol and agreements, through a genuine improvement in the relations between the two countries, and by a real cooperation between them, which may lead to better things in the future.

Should the President share these views I need hardly say how grateful both the Prime Minister and myself would be should he feel able to give some public indication of his approval of the agreement itself and of the principles which have inspired it."

KENNEDY
Letter to President
From Sumner Welles

April 18, 1938.

Enclosed suggestion of what Pres. might want to say at press conference with re British-Italian Agreement.

Attached is Halifax's communication to Kennedy on same subject.

SEE--Sumner Welles folder-Drawer 1--1938
My dear Mr. President:

Mr. Kennedy has sent us in a strictly confidential despatch from London, copy of a memorandum he had received from Cardinal Pacelli on the relations of the Vatican with various countries.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Under Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated above

The President,

The White House.
Enclosure 1 in despatch No. 206 of April 19, 1938, from the Embassy in London.

As to your investigation about some rumors concerning the attitude of the Church towards the new rulers in Austria and the possibility of an agreement in this regard between the Holy See and the Nazi Government, I am happy that you brought up this matter so as to allow me to give you my personal views which of course cannot reflect any positive information from the official circles and are just delivered to your confidential use.

The sudden statement of the Austrian Catholic Hierarchy in reference to the new Government, as it was given to the Press, was evidently the result of some compulsory influences. Their unexpected declaration immediately after the military invasion of the country, did not receive any approval either previously or afterwards from the Holy See, as the official Vatican organ, the "Osservatore Romano", stated immediately after the issue of such declaration. One is rather inclined to think that the text of this statement might have been prepared, at least in its main points, by a Governmental Press Bureau, if not by the Government Commissioner Reerckel himself, and that the signing thereof by the Bishops might have been the result of a political pressure rather than of their free initiative and intention. Under this pressure as a matter of fact the Bishops have overlooked to quote in the text of the declaration the fundamental principles of the freedom of the practice of Christian religion, of the respect of the rights of the Church and
of the abolishment of the anti-Christian propaganda, a clause that in view of the persecution in Germany could have appeared quite natural. Rather on this occasion they should have expressed the hope that the beginning of a Kulturkampf should be avoided in Austria and that the Kulturkampf in Germany should be quieted down, a hope, though, which in consideration of the clear evidence of the facts could not be well founded and which - as it happened at the time of the Saar Plebiscite - would undoubtedly be deluded.

Being confronted with so much confusion and critics among Catholic and non-Catholic circles at such a declaration made by the Austrian Bishops, the Holy See did not delay, through the "Osservatore Romano", to sever itself from the said declaration with great tact and marked firmness.

Upon this Vatican statement immediately followed the call to Rome of Cardinal Innitzer, Archbishop of Vienna, and the same official Vatican paper, the "Osservatore Romano", published his open statement in its original German text (English translation of it follows here below). From the text of this declaration and from the above attitude of the Vatican authorities one can easily understand that the Holy See will never be ready to give its approval to any agreement of any Bishop to any Governmental action which might be in contrast with the Divine Law and the freedom and the rights of the Church.

You know that a diplomatic Concordat was concluded and signed between the German Reich and the Holy See a
few years ago and that official diplomatic relations do exist as there is an Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin and a German Ambassador to the Holy See. But, no matter what pretexts are set forth by the German Government, the real fact is that since the early time after the Concordat was signed a more or less open attitude against all clauses accepted in the Concordat was adopted by the German Government. The Holy See has used all possible ways to protect the freedom of the Church and of the Catholics, keeping itself ever ready to do the best in order to avoid any more bitter conflict, and being always promoted by the desire of avoiding to make the situation more and more difficult.

Even now, I feel sure that the Holy See would always be willing to agree and to deal fairly with any political authority whatsoever, but before a real understanding is reached there must be at least the beginning of the evidence of good faith on the other side: evidence that so far has been completely lacking in this instance, for which the possibility of an agreement between the two Powers is out of question for the time being.

I think it will be very fine if you will convey to your Friend at home these personal private views of mine. Ever in my personal judgment, no better opportunity than this for trying to carry on the plan that we had thought of while in America and that I know is amongst your aims. It would make the world think over the ever increasing necessity in the present troubles of keeping in touch with the Supreme Moral Powers of the world, which at times feel powerless
powerless and isolated in their daily struggle against all sorts of political excesses from the bolsheviks and the new pagans arising amongst the young "Arian" generations.

I still think that the planned provision would increase the prestige of the American Government which would appear solely directed to use all means for insuring the peace of all peoples.

You can judge yourself of the inconvenience in this very crucial moment of the European political life that the American Government is without a direct source of information from and a straight and intimate connection with the Vatican circles.

C.P.

I am sure that you have seen in the Press the text of the statement issued by His Eminence Cardinal Innitzer, Archbishop of Vienna.

Anyway, the English translation of same is following here below:

"1) The solemn statement of the Austrian Bishops of the 18th March of this year did not intend evidently to express an approval of what was not and is not reconcilable with the Laws of God, with the freedom and the rights of the Catholic Church. Furthermore that statement cannot be interpreted by the State and the Party as a duty of conscience of the faithful nor must it be used for propaganda purposes.

2) For the future the Austrian Bishops request:

a) That in all matters pertaining to the Austrian Concordat no change be made without previous
previous understanding with the Holy See.
b) That in a particular way all rules in connection with the schools and the educational activities as well as in the training of the youth might be arranged in such a way as to respect the natural rights of the parents and the religious and moral formation of the Catholic youth, according to the doctrine of the Catholic religion.
c) That the propaganda against religion and the Church be forbidden.
d) That the rights of Catholics to proclaim, defend and practise Catholic Faith and the Christian Laws in all the fields of human life with all the means allowed by the present progress of our day science be respected.

Rome, April 6, 1938.

(Signed) Th. Cardinal Innitzer."
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Dear Mr. Platt:

Mr. Biddle tells me you know of this telegram which the Secretary urged onto the President to be without delay.

The Secretary will telephones the President.
about 7:30 am we
must leave to
Walden Kennedy this
morning.

faithfully yours,

[Signature]

6:30 pm Wednesday.
LMS

PLAIN
London
Dated August 31, 1938
Rec'd 4:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
850, August 31, 7 p.m.

Hereewith copy proposed address to be given Friday in Aberdeen. Please let me know tonight whether you see any objection in view existing situation. Call your attention particularly to concluding four paragraphs. The memorial which we are starting on the road to completion today is of a character particularly suited to a combined effort of Scotland and the United States. It typifies a common reverence for principles which we still believe to be of prime importance in individual and national lives, and its construction will constitute a worthy exemplification of the sharing of historic ideals.

We are marking today the consecration of the first American bishop of the Anglican communion. Samuel Seabury was forced to come to Scotland for refuge when he sought to serve God and his fellow countrymen in the vocation
vocation he professed. Here he found the spiritual reinforcement he could not secure elsewhere. Here he found men of God ready and eager to help him on the road he had marked out for himself when he accepted the election of the former colonists to be their first bishop.

The event which this memorial is to mark for posterity is now beyond debate. We need not concern ourselves today with the merits of the controversy which took place more than a century and a half ago. In this day and age, in any English-speaking nation, it is most unlikely that a similar dispute could arise. The political passions which formed its background are ashes, and we all believe they can never again be fanned into flame.

Today we can congratulate ourselves on the happy outcome of the debate over Bishop Seabury's consecration. The Scottish bishops who decided, at considerable risk to themselves, to lay their hands on the humble applicant from across the Atlantic, helped to erect a milestone in the history of religious freedom, and we are accordingly grateful to them. They bore testimony to the principle that religion is authorized by one higher even

than
LMS 3-No. 850, August 31, 7 p. m., from London.

than a king -- that the apostolic succession was not instituted by any earthly political organization and cannot therefore be limited or stopped by any worldly authority.

The relations between church and state have caused friction throughout the ages. It is inevitable that there should exist a border line of vague delineation marking the limits of the spiritual and the temporal, and it is inevitable that this border line should be the subject of honest difference of opinion. It is extremely difficult, with the best will in the world, to render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, but no more. The unhappy controversy is causing serious repercussions in certain parts of the world. The profession and practice of religion is being called a political offense. Men and women are being deprived of their natural-born citizenship, they are being thrown out of the land of their nativity, because they profess a certain religion which the political authorities have decided to uproot. Indeed, many who do not profess the forbidden religion, but whose ancestors did are being treated with equal rigor.

Other
LMS 4-No. 850, August 31, 7 p. m., from London.

Other religions are likewise threatened. The Church, in order to be allowed to exist, is forced to take its place as part of the political, or worldly, organization of the State. It must be subordinate to the State in matters spiritual as well as temporal. It cannot teach what it believes to be the word of God, but rather what the authorities of the State decide it should impart in the interest of national discipline, national psychology, racial solidarity or other political aims.

In other parts of the world, the attempt is being made to eliminate all religion as a factor in human life. Churches and religious establishments have been dispersed. If allowed to function at all, the churches are so restricted as to be unable, by our standards, to minister to the spiritual needs of the people they want to serve.

I am stating these things as facts, and not as subjects of controversy or debate. We are not concerned, as we are gathered here, with the internal conduct of other countries. We are celebrating an outstanding example of freedom of religious worship and I know we all want to see more of it in our own countries as time goes on.

For
For the purpose of this ceremony we can content ourselves with putting and keeping our own houses in order.

To do so, we can legitimately observe events in other lands and profit from them. We can and must be eternally on guard that our own nations do not swerve from the path of free living which our forefathers marked out for us so plainly, and at such great cost. The preservation of the essentials of democracy is as precious a goal in Scotland as it is in the United States.

One of the main -- perhaps the main pillar of the edifice of democracy is freedom of worship. Many bitter wars have been fought over the issue. Its infringement -- or what they believed to be its infringement -- led a band of determined, courageous, but bitter men to leave England three hundred years ago to build what was to become the United States of America. Then, as now, the kind of people we are will not stand for any abridgment of their fundamental right to worship as their consciences dictate.

It would appear safe at this moment to predict that freedom of religion is beyond attack in our countries. There seems to be no serious threat, and there has not been one for many years, to that particular civil liberty --
LMS 6-No. 850, August 31, 7 p. m., from London.

the most precious of them all. But we must not become too complacent and decide there never will be.

There are other civil liberties which are only slightly, if at all, less precious. Freedom of speech, freedom of peaceable assembly, the right to trial by jury, protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and the other rights which we associate with citizenship are worthy of our most ardent defense. Their violation is often less easily recognized than is the abridgment of freedom of worship, but their preservation is as essential.

The important thing is that we still admit and treasure the principle that these freedoms are inalienable from the individual. No state and no political organization can take them away from him. It is this conception of the rights of man which marks off the democracies from other forms of political life, and it is this conception to which we must cling if we are to go on living as we have been accustomed to live and as we want to live.

It was such a conception which prompted the brave and commendable action Bishop Robert Kilgour, Bishop John Skinner and Bishop Arthur Petrie performed on the day
LMS 7-No. 850, August 31, 7 p. m., from London.

day they carried out the traditional laying on of hands on Samuel Seabury in the upper room of Bishop Skinner's house. They passed on to him, in the full conviction that they were doing the right thing, what they fittingly described as "a free, valid, and purely ecclesiastical episcopate".

They sent him forth as the first bishop of the Anglican communion to plant a diocese outside of the British Isles. Since his day, of course, countless other bishops have gone to the ends of the earth to establish outposts of that same communion, to convert the heathen and to labor among their own who live abroad. They are all the spiritual descendants of Samuel Seabury and of his zeal to perpetuate in far lands the church he loved.

They have gone forth in faith, and faith is one of the rarest qualities in the world today. It appears to me we have come to a point where spiritual values have so declined in men that incentive is disappearing. More and more I talk with individuals who are discouraged, who have laid their burdens down, who are victims of a hopeless apathy. We must reawaken the flame of faith and spiritual courage which has always enheartened the men
I should like to ask you all if you know of any dispute or controversy existing in the world which is worth
LMS 9-No. 850, August 31, 7 p.m., from London.

worth the life of your son, or of anyone else's son? Perhaps I am not well informed of the terrifically vital forces underlying all this unrest in the world, but for the life of me I cannot see anything involved which could be remotely considered worth shedding blood for.

Whether our counsel and our aid will be accepted by men already immersed in the heat of quarrel, we cannot tell. We can only hope that reason will carry the day, and that we will be able in all good faith to help all of those who are in such deep trouble as to feel they must fight their way out. For we shall have to stand for judgment before our children and their children for the manner in which we regulate the world's affairs just now.

The contemporary verdict on Bishop Seabury was that he was a great organizer and a strict churchman. That is a good enough verdict for us, I am sure. May we all, when we come to the end of our lives, merit as good a one -- as deserved a tribute to careers devoted to persistent loyalty to conscience and to God.

KENNEDY

HPD
September 7, 1938.

PRIVATE

Dear Joe:-

As you know, we were all greatly disturbed by the appearance of an "exclusive" message of advice from you which was published as having been given to the Boston American and then passed on to the other Hearst papers.

I know that the Secretary wired you about it and the other day I saw what you sent to the Secretary. It is not a question of "getting along reasonably well with the agencies" -- for, of course, you do that but it does involve the use by an American newspaper or single news agency of a "special interview" or "special message of advice" to people back here.

I know you will understand.

As ever yours,

Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy,
American Embassy,
London,
England.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accord with your memorandum regarding the Boston Evening American article, I communicated with Ambassador Kennedy on September first. I enclose copies of my telegrams to him and his reply thereto.

C. H.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

London
Dated September 3, 1938
Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

860, September 3, 11 a.m.
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Replying to your 492, regarding special telegraphic interview with BOSTON EVENING AMERICAN.

The only conversation they had with me was to the effect that people were very excited over there and I told them to keep cool. They asked me if I had any message for my father-in-law and I told them no and I told them my children were leaving for Scotland and Ireland on a trip.

I manage to get along reasonably well with the agencies and have not heard any complaints and it is my custom to answer any telephone call that comes from Boston because that is where my family is.

I am sorry if everybody was disturbed.

ALC KENNEDY
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

September 1, 1938.
4 p. m.

AMEMBASSY
LONDON (ENGLAND)
492
PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The President and I have read your recent telegrams with the utmost interest. With reference to the last paragraph of your 846, August 31, 5 p. m., I feel that the recent public speeches and public statements of the President and myself, which were prepared with great care, accurately reflect the attitude of this Government toward the European and world situation, and that it would not be practicable to be more specific as to our reaction in hypothetical circumstances.

For your information our attention has been called to the appearance here of a special telephonic interview with you copyrighted by the Boston Evening American and the International News Service. This will undoubtedly be regarded as unfair to other agencies and would, if the practice were pursued by our representatives abroad, result in great confusion.

Hull
State Department copy published in
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1935, Vol. I, General
pages 607-608.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

950, September 17, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The Cabinet meeting is still on but I asked Cadogan to see me and bring me something to report at once. He says that Chamberlain found Hitler in a very bad mood. Those around him had just reported another incident in the Sudeten area in which 300 Sudetenls were killed. Chamberlain said he knew nothing of that and urged Hitler not to take it for granted unless it was confirmed. The sum and substance of the conversation after this bad start was that Hitler wants the recognition at once of the principle of self-determination. Chamberlain told him he was not prepared to make any such agreement until he had a chance to consult with the Cabinet and possibly Parliament. Hitler told Chamberlain that the latter was familiar with his ideas on race and that it was not necessary to repeat them but he insisted that something be done immediately. Chamberlain told him that he must return home and received an agreement from Hitler that he
he would not march—although Chamberlain was convinced that the order was about to be given when he arrived—unless an extremely big incident took place in the Sudeten area. I do not know just what comfort Chamberlain expects to get from this promise, because Cadogan says they have evidence that the groundwork is laid for an incident large enough to furnish the Germans with an excuse to come in.

Chamberlain then told Hitler that, of course, if the British did not agree to this principle and Hitler went in, England would be obliged to go in with France, and Hitler said he was perfectly willing to take on a world war.

I am leaving now to see the Military Attache who saw Cadogan just before me and I am hoping to see Halifax at the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting. Cadogan told me this morning that Halifax had said he regarded it extremely unlikely that an agreement would be reached at the morning meeting and that they would probably have to adjourn until this afternoon or this evening.

I received very good information this morning that there are many rumblings among members of the Cabinet. First, they are displeased that the so-called inner Cabinet is being conferred with constantly. This inner Cabinet consists
consists of Simon, Hoare and Halifax. In addition to that there are intimations among them that if Chamberlain tries to force the principle of self-determination there will be a row in the Cabinet.

I will send you a message on the reaction of the French Ambassador within a short time and an account of my talk with Halifax as soon as I can see him. Then if at all possible I will try to see the Prime Minister, either tonight or tomorrow, but I judge if he is having a row in the Cabinet he would rather not discuss the matter with anybody outside.

My own opinion from my discussions and from what I have heard from the other members of the Cabinet last night and this morning is that the issue is going to be self-determination or war and the responsibility for declaring war, I think, will be left with the anti-Chamberlain group. The Labor people up to now have played along very well but Cadogan is not sure what will happen.
I have the honor to bring you my congratulations as
R. RÉGIS DE OLIVEIRA
Ambassadeur du Brésil

[Handwritten note:]
Saw command of the weight of your feet
President's attitude and efforts look bad in the peace move.
Dear Mr. President,

While I was out to lunch today, the senior Ambassador here dropped this card. In addition to this, I am receiving letters praising your action. I thought you might be interested.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.

My dear Ambassador,

Following our recent talk, I enclose herewith copy of a Memorandum on the Spanish question, together with a note containing a few observations on the granting of belligerent rights to the Spanish insurgents. (Attached to the latter you will find a copy of the note I handed yesterday to the Foreign Office on the bombing of the civilian population.)

These documents contain observations of a purely personal nature, but in full agreement with the general policy of the Government.

I was very much interested in what you told me about the Catholics and Monsignor Pacelli. I shall certainly bring up the matter in Barcelona, and I should like to discuss this with you on my return.

My wife asks me to send her best wishes to Mrs. Kennedy and yourself, in which I join.

Believe me, my dear Ambassador,

Yours very sincerely,

H.E. The Honourable Joseph P. Kennedy,
United States Embassy.
MEMORANDUM ON THE SPANISH QUESTION.

In examining the present situation in Spain, especially in its international aspect, the following observations, in the opinion of the Spanish Government, should be taken into account:

First: In its internal, purely Spanish, aspect, the most elementary common sense shows that the political and moral position of the Republic, as it has been defined in the speeches made recently by President Azana and the Prime Minister Dr. Negrín, is bound to come nearer to the general feeling of the Spanish nation on the whole than that of the rebel leaders. For in the first place it is a frankly Spanish position, after the elimination carried out spontaneously and by our own initiative, of all the foreign elements fighting in the Republican Army. In the second place it is conceived under the sign of "reconciliation" of all Spaniards for the reconstruction of the country, and in this respect we must insist particularly on the two points relating to the amnesty and the plebiscite, which figure among the thirteen formulated by the Spanish Government as the essence and summary of its programme.

In contrast with this policy, the rebel leaders continue to cling stubbornly to their position of a complete victory, unconditional surrender, the elimination from the national life of all those who do not accept their ideas and principles.

Under these conditions it is clear that the only thing which could bring together once more the general mass of the country, re-establishing a pacific and judicially normal national existence, is the policy of national reconciliation preached by the Republic, on the basis of a broad amnesty and the establishment of a liberal political régime, democratic and parliamentary, inaugurated with a great national plebiscite.
Second: In its international aspect, and in so far as it especially concerns Italy, there are no longer any grounds for failing to realise that Italy finds herself now in the impossibility of securing by her intervention the aims which she has thereby pursued. Things have gone too far for Italy ever to succeed in disposing of Spain as another element in her political game, by establishing a government of the dictatorial-fascist type which would be fixed in her orbit of international policy. This result could not have been obtained except by ensuring an absolute and complete domination of the country. Now in the present circumstances not even a military victory for the rebels could ensure to Italy that absolute and complete domination of the country which is indispensable to her own plan. Among other reasons, because this military victory could only be obtained through an enormous intensification of Italian intervention itself, which would proportionately increase the serious internal difficulties which it produces among the Spanish population in the territory held by the rebels. Supposing a military victory for the rebels, it would, in practice, be transformed into a chronic state of popular discontent and agitation, which would force Italy, for reasons of prestige and even against her own wish, to maintain and constantly intensify her military intervention in Spain. In short, by this road and in the most favourable conditions which can be supposed for Italian policy, Spain would be an item inscribed not in the "active" but in the "passive" account of Italy's international policy. And on this question an immense error with the most serious consequences is committed by anyone who does not succeed in estimating, at their true value, the material possibilities, present and future, of the Republic, and the unshakeable determination of the Spanish people in defence of their political independence.
Third: The maintenance and consolidation of the Republic in Spain will assure the normal functioning of a democratic and parliamentary régime, clearly and profoundly Spanish, free from all foreign interference and faithful to the traditional Spanish policy of friendship and collaboration with England and with France, and cannot constitute any sort of threat or risk for legitimate Italian interests in the Western Mediterranean. Less than ever, if a policy of rapprochement and friendship between the three great Mediterranean Powers has managed to create between them a cordial and trusting collaboration. The Spanish Republic would not only be without opposition to such a policy, but would even be disposed to join in it, putting whatever Spain is worth by her geographical position, by the properties of her soil and the qualities of her people, into the service of the conciliatory mission which will doubtless, in the practice of such a policy, be incumbent on the British Empire.

Deep as is the resentment caused by the help which the Italian Government has given to the rebels, and profound as is the indignation caused by its methods of warfare, the men who are responsible for the destinies of the Republic have too much sense of political realism not to understand that Spain cannot, without the risk of returning to her fatal isolation, remain outside an Anglo-French-Italian agreement in the Western Mediterranean. The first step, therefore, in this policy will have to consist in persuading Italy that the triumph of the Republic in Spain will not exclude the setting up between the two countries of political and economic relations inspired in their reciprocal interests, based on the most scrupulous respect of each country's internal life, and within the framework of a confident collaboration between the four Powers with admitted interests in the Western Mediterranean.
Fourth: Naturally there would be no question of obtaining from Italy positive action. It would be a question, purely and simply, of Italy becoming aware of the fact that the integral and complete withdrawal of her help from the Spanish rebels, determined and sincerely carried out in fulfilment of her international undertakings, would be the policy best conforming to an effective defence of her political and economic interests in the Western Mediterranean. And this because on the one hand the prospects of her attempt at domination in Spain are daily more gloomy, and on the other because the victory of the Republic would not mean for her the dangers which she may have feared. If this total and complete withdrawal, sincerely carried out, proved not to be an obstacle for the victory of the rebels, she would have lost nothing. If it should occasion the triumph of the Republic, then there would be the undertakings offered by the responsible men of that Republic, the fulfilment of which could be guaranteed, for example, by the British Government, after arrangements to be negotiated with the Government of the Republic.

Fifth: A solution of this nature could only be found on condition that the Government of the Republic is maintained with its present composition. It is only through the greatest possible authority conferred on the Government by the fact that it represents all the elements and parties making up the Republic, that the pledges and guarantees offered by it would have a worth and a solidity which would permit them to be accepted for the future. The presence of Dr. Negrín at the head of the Government would be an indispensable condition; his undisputed authority in all section of opinion constitutes the best guarantee of obtaining a speedy pacification of Spain, for everyone would be ready to accept from him directions which would not perhaps be accepted from another. When we speak of the Republic, we mean the Republic of to-day; with its significance and its men, who are
the only ones to whom the masses (those who have defended the Republic with their arms and their toil) concede the right to be its spokesman and to represent it. A Republic which needs neither additions nor corrections, because in its significance and its aims there is nothing which cannot be accepted by all Spaniards who have not been blinded by the mad desire to try and impose on the country (illegally and with foreign help) a political régime, approved perhaps by a minority, but profoundly repugnant to the temperament and idiosyncrasy of the whole country. Moreover, a régime against which the people would rise en masse simply because it would be imposed on us by foreigners and would symbolise our submission to a foreign power. Against this stands the Republic, displaying a real and a vital characteristic of its own: namely that it is integrally, radically, unyieldingly Spanish, without admitting outside interference from anyone; founded on what in general terms corresponds to the general will of the Spanish nation: a sincerely democratic régime based on the 13 Points in which the Government, from the lips of Dr. Negrín, has summarized its programme, and in which the yearning for justice, culture and well-being of the Spanish people are satisfied. And all this under the sign of reconciliation of all Spaniards for the recon-stitution of the country, a reconciliation that is no empty word, since among the 13 Points are two, which have moreover been several times confirmed by Dr. Negrín himself, and which it is right that we should insist: amnesty and plebiscite.

London, December 1938.
VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF THE RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS IN FAVOUR OF THE SPANISH INSURGENTS.

Firstly: The British and French Governments have stated that the concession of belligerent rights can only be made in conformity with the plan drawn up by the London Committee for the withdrawal of foreigners taking part in the Spanish struggle. According to this plan, belligerent rights in a limited form cannot be conceded until the non-Intervention Committee is satisfied that "substantial progress" has been made in the withdrawal of foreigners, it being understood that in accordance with the formula contained in the plan itself, "substantial progress" consists in the withdrawal of 10,000 foreigners from the side which has the least, with a proportionate number from the other side.

Secondly: There is a reason of first importance for the stipulation of the Non-Intervention Committee that the concession of belligerent rights shall be dependent on the virtually complete withdrawal of foreigners. This is that without such withdrawal it is impossible to ascertain to what extent the actual situation which the Spanish rebels have succeeded in creating, is due, not to the support of genuine Spanish elements, but to that received from foreign powers. The fact that the insurgents dominate a large part of the national territory, when in order to maintain law and order they have to impose a rule of terror, would in no circumstances justify the granting of belligerent rights. But leaving on one side this aspect of the question, it would be obviously iniquitous even to bring up the matter of the recognition of belligerent rights without the most certain guarantee that this domination of a large proportion of the national territory and the "law and order" maintained by the insurgent leaders, were based on the strength afforded to them by the support of genuine Spanish elements and not on that given them by the support of foreign powers.
Thirdly: It can be seen from this that whatever may be the fate of the plan of the London Committee, and whether or not it is considered as being in force, there is a fundamental and permanent reason for opposing the concession of belligerent rights to the insurgents before the withdrawal of all the foreigners taking part in the Spanish struggle has been, by one means or another, within or without the framework of the London Committee's plan, virtually completed. It is not a question of a purely formal connection between the recognition of belligerent rights and the London plan, which might disappear so soon as the latter ceased to be considered in force. Respect of the basic principles of international morality demands the maintenance of the principle which inspired the plan of the London Committee. This principle requires that the recognition of belligerent rights shall not even be discussed until the virtually complete withdrawal of foreigners has shown that the actual situation which the insurgents bring forward as a justification of their demand is a genuinely Spanish one and not the result of foreign assistance.

Fourthly: That this is the case as far as the Spanish Government is concerned, has been proved not only by their immediate and unreserved acceptance of the plan of the London Committee for the withdrawal of foreigners, but also by their proposal for the unilateral withdrawal, under the auspices of an international commission appointed at the Government's request by the League of Nations, of the genuine foreign "volunteers" who were fighting in its army. (This proposal was immediately acted upon, and as a result all the foreigners have been withdrawn from the fronts and the majority repatriated.) And if the acceptance of the plan of the London Committee, and the proposal of unilateral withdrawal of their own foreigners is authentic proof that the situation of the Government has been brought about by exclusively from the support given by genuine Spanish elements, the refusal of the insurgents to accept this plan, and the absence of any proposal on their part for the integral and complete withdrawal, under international control, of all the foreigners assisting them, must be logically considered as equally authentic proof of the contrary. To
sum up: until the virtually complete withdrawal of all foreigners fighting for the insurgents has taken place by one method or another, with guarantees equivalent to those surrounding the withdrawal, spontaneously decided upon and carried out by the Spanish Government, of those who voluntarily joined the ranks of its Army, the recognition of belligerent rights in favour of the insurgents will be a juridical iniquity, in complete opposition to the laws of international morality.

Fifthly: Just as it would be essential, before granting belligerent rights in favour of the insurgents, to ensure that their domination of a large part of the national territory is not due to the support which they receive from foreign powers, so in the same way would it be necessary to have a guarantee that law and order in this territory is not maintained by terrorist methods incompatible with the elementary rules of humanity. In contrast with the situation in Government territory, where order has been established by juridical means in keeping with the methods of a civilized State, all information shows that in that part of the country under control of the insurgent leaders, terrorist methods continue to prevail. In this connection it should be remembered that whilst the Government was in a position immediately to accept the suggestion of the British Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners, under the Presidency of Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, to suspend capital punishment, the insurgents categorically refused to do this; so that where the latter have continued to carry out the death sentences in Government territory no executions have taken place since September 1st.

Sixthly: One final point which should be taken into account when the problem of granting belligerent rights is under consideration, is the employment of methods of warfare contrary to the laws of humanity, and especially the aerial bombardment of the civilian population with the object of causing terror and demoralization. This last point is dealt with in a note handed by the Spanish Government to the Government of the United Kingdom on the 8th. December 1938, and made public in London on the 9th. December, a copy of which is attached hereto.

In view of the recrudescence of the aerial bombardments of the Spanish civilian population by the Italo-German air forces, the Spanish Government thinks it necessary to communicate the following to Your Excellency:

(1) The Spanish people cannot contemplate without indignation and bitterness the cold indifference with which the democratic Governments accept the repeated and cynical application against them of a method of warfare which these very Governments have not hesitated to condemn as barbarous and inhuman. As long as the facts were not demonstrated in a convincing manner, there may have been some justification for an attitude of not indifference, if not of reserve. Today that is no longer possible. The democratic Governments and the whole world are aware of the reports of the British Commission of Investigation, which show in the most categorical manner how the aviation in the service of the Spanish rebels is systematically applying the bombardment of the civilian population as a method of warfare. Indeed, apart from the attacks on Alicante, which with the exception of four, have been deemed by the Commission to be directed against the harbour zone, the Commission's conclusions force one to consider the following cases as attacks on a civilian population, either deliberate or through negligence:

4 raids on Alicante, carried out 25.5.38; 25.7.38
6.3.38 and 10.1.38.

Raid on Barcelona carried out 19.8.38
# Sitges # 8.8.38
# Torrevieja # 25.8.38
# Figueras # 14.10.38
# Tarragona # 7.11.38
# Barcelona # 23.11.38

Objective proof exists. There is now no room for doubt as to the reality of the systematic employment in Spain of aerial bombardments on the civilian population. Deliberate, or arising from negligence, they all come within the formula used by the British Prime Minister before Parliament to define the frontiers between legality and crime, in the matter of aerial bombardments, a formula which was taken and reproduced in the resolution adopted by the League of Nations Assembly on 30th September.

(2) Very well; once the machinery set up by the Government of the United Kingdom itself has irrefutably proved the systematic employment of bombardments of the civilian population in Spain, how is it possible that there is no attempt to prevent them? Are we not all agreed in
considering this method of warfare as barbarous, inhuman and contrary to all the rules of international law? How is it possible that, once the systematic employment of such a method has been proved, thanks to the praiseworthy initiative taken by the Government of the United Kingdom, the democratic Governments should remain passive or indifferent, without attempting to apply the effective measures which are no doubt at their disposal, so as to halt and terminate such usage? Why, then, was the Commission of Investigation instituted? To cover up the absence of adequate reaction, after having perfectly established the reality of the crime?

(3) Nevertheless it is only just to recognise that when the British Commission of Investigation was designated, and when it was decided in the last League Assembly that its findings should be transmitted to the Secretary-General to be published and communicated to the Council, it was hoped, and believed, that if these reports showed the systematic application of aerial bombardments of the civilian population in Spain, then the mere publication of them would provoke such a movement of public opinion in the world as would render impossible, or at least restrain the employment of such methods of warfare. If this movement of opinion has not come about, and if consequently the publication of the findings of the Commission not only has failed to limit the aerial bombardments on the Spanish civilian population, but has not even helped to prevent their recrudescence and intensification in these last days, that fact does not diminish the responsibility of the democratic Governments; on the contrary, it makes that responsibility greater and more precise. The reports of the Commission have not produced the result expected of them, but, on the other hand, they have brought conclusive proof of the deeds themselves; things which could formerly, with reason, have been considered as hypothetical, must now be admitted as real and positive. And faced with this reality, established and proven as it is beyond all doubt by the findings of the Commission, no one can now escape his heavy and solemn responsibilities.

(4) The Spanish Government proclaims with pride its "helplessness" to protect the civilian population of its towns and countryside against the aerial bombardments, by application of the one effective method -
reprisals. And it proclaims it with pride because this helplessness arises not from the lack of insufficiency of technical means, but from the firm decision of the Spanish Government not to commit the monstrous action of taking reprisals against people innocent of the crime as is the Spanish population in the territory dominated by the rebels. But the origin of this same "helplessness" which springs from the spirit of humanity and the sense of responsibility of the Spanish Government, only augments the moral force of this new appeal, which it directs to the spirit of fair play and the traditional public uprightness of the British Government, to put into action the fitting measures of pressure or persuasion so as to bring to an end, once and for all, this spectacle of the aerial bombardments of civil populations, which must daily fill with horror and shame every clear conscience, and the continuation of which would leave everyone covered with opprobrium before the judgment of history.

(5) The Spanish Government will not commit the impertinence of pointing out which methods the Government of the United Kingdom can apply with the greatest efficiency to attain this end, which after all was the one inspiring its initiative when the British Commission of Investigation was constituted. No one can doubt that the Government of the United Kingdom has at its disposal the means and resources to achieve an end so consonant with its own policy and the unanimous opinion of the British nation. So much the more so when, in fact, everything depends on two Governments with whom the British Government is linked by ties the cordiality of which has been solemnly confirmed in recent declarations.
December 13, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY

TO READ AND RETURN. THIS IS ONLY FOR YOUR EYES.

F. D. R.

Unsigned memorandum dated Dec. 6th, 1938, in re Chamberlain and what happened at the time of the crisis.
Dear Mr. President:

The enclosed memorandum is not an aggregate opinion, but merely the viewpoint of one of the half dozen people whom I have working on this situation.

Very respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM

The question posed is what would be the effect on the United States of the decline or collapse of the British Empire. This question may be considered from three points of view.

1.

The first is that in a general war in which Great Britain and France fight Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously, with or without assistance from Russia, and with the United States neutral, Great Britain is defeated and has to make peace, as Germany had in 1918, on the best terms she can obtain. In that event the victorious totalitarian powers would certainly demand the transfer to themselves of the British navy, or of such parts of it as could not be sunk in time. This is what the Allies did to Germany in 1918. The totalitarian powers would also certainly demand the transfer:

(a) of all overseas strategic naval and air bases such as Gibraltar, the Falkland Isles, Egypt and the Canal, Aden, Ceylon, Singapore, and some at least of the South Pacific islands. They would do this because it is the occupation of these places which has given the British navy control of the seas in the past, and because the ultimate objective of a totalitarian victory would be to take over from Great Britain the control of the oceans and sea highways so that they could dominate the world.

(b) of large colonial territories in Africa and elsewhere. These territories would be valuable to them partly for economic and settlement reasons and partly for strategic reasons. If they continued their present totalitarian economy they would almost certainly include all these territories within their own Zollverein, so that they used their own currency and the territories became economically part of their own home lands, doing only such trade with the rest of the world as they decided to allow on the principle of barter. Strategically the occupation of French and British colonies in West Africa would give Germany
and Italy naval and aerial control of the passage from the north to the south Atlantic. This would compel South Africa and possibly parts of South America to make terms with the victorious totalitarian powers. The occupation of Singapore by Japan would give her control of the Indian Ocean and enable her to impose such terms as she liked on Australia and New Zealand as the price of not interrupting their trade communications with Europe on the one side and the Americas on the other. "It is the destiny of the Fascist to do more with the German Wolf out of the wilderness of defeat.

The political and economic consequences of such a transformation of the world on the United States are discussed in Section 5 of the Memorandum. The strategic consequences would be to compel the United States in the interests of their own defence not only to multiply armaments enormously, but to demand control over the balance and down the Rhone valley. If necessary seize aerial and naval bases, at least in the Atlantic, a thousand miles from her shores, just as to-day she has the Aleutian Islands and Hawaii far out in the Pacific. In order to buy off her hostility the victorious totalitarian powers would probably offer to transfer to the United States the British West Indian Islands and possibly French and British Guiana. On the other hand they might demand the use of a naval and aerial base in Ireland, which in the last resort Ireland would be impotent to refuse. Portugal and Spain would almost certainly come within their orbit, so that they would obtain control of the Azores, Madeira and Tenerife. What the political effect of this totalitarian triumph on South America would be is difficult to estimate, but it would certainly make the military defence of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States a tremendously formidable undertaking.

The second alternative is that the traditional method of "squeeze" through power politics, that is to say the placing of your opponent in such a position that at the particular point it is impossible for him to resist the "gangster" technique which was applied both in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Great Britain and France so that gradually they have to hand over vital possessions because they are not strong enough to hold them by force. The following is a statement attributed to a leading Nazi as to their programme along these lines:

"It is the destiny of the Fuehrer to do more than lead the German Volk out of the wilderness of defeat. We shall become supreme and strong. France for certain, England probably, are decadent peoples and must make way for a powerful people who are ready, as all the world has seen, to make unlimited sacrifices for national greatness. We shall absorb Austria and extend our control over the Balkans and down the Danube Valley. Czechoslovakia, a nest of Bolshevism, must disappear. It is an anachronism. Neither England nor France will fight for the Czechs. We must gain access to the Mediterranean so that a German bloc extends from Danzig to Trieste. When we have established effective military and economic control over Central and Eastern Europe we shall have secured ourselves against the danger of blockade, thanks to the Four Year Plan for self-sufficiency and the raw materials, especially corn, timber and oil, in Eastern Europe. Now will come the supreme moment when, being secure in Europe, we shall demand colonies in order to lay the foundations of a world empire. Will England concede our demands? I think she will give way. You ask why? Because you will not be strong enough to refuse. You will very likely be in trouble in the Far East and in India and the Middle East. The Americans won't help you - not until it's too late anyhow. I don't deny that Great Britain is making a big effort in the air, but that is not the point. Even if your Air Force is as good as ours, and I hear you are behindhand in your plans, nothing can alter the vulnerability of London and your tightly packed industrial areas. That's where you are at a disadvantage as compared with my country and it's one you can't get away from, and so I believe England will give in over the colonies."

On this assumption the "squeeze" would result first in the transfer of, say, ex-German colonies and islands and facilities for communications and trade. The totalitarian methods of trade and development would then be applied, but what would be more serious,
they would certainly be organized as bases for the German, Italian and Japanese air forces and probably for their naval vessels as well. The consequence of this would be that the power of resistance of Great Britain and France to a further "squeeze" later on would be enormously reduced until finally the totalitarian powers were able to attain, not the whole programme outlined in Section 1 above, but to its essential features, namely the transfer to themselves of control of world bases for air and sea which would give them control of the oceans, would reduce Great Britain and France to dependence and leave only North America and, so far as the United States could protect it, South America outside their orbit.

The effect of the successful policy of "squeeze" of Great Britain and France on the United States would inevitably be that the United States in the interests of her own security would have to present her own demands for the transfer of British or French overseas territories to her own control. She certainly could not afford to see the transfer to the totalitarian powers of some of the British or French West Indian or Pacific possessions, and she would probably in the interests of the Monroe Doctrine have to present a claim for the control of part of West Africa.

Unless, therefore, she adopted a policy of confining her attention solely to her own territories and leaving Europe and Asia to control the seas right up to her territorial limits, she would be driven, as Great Britain and France declined, to enter to some degree into the game of imperialist competition in the interests of her security.

But there is a deeper aspect to be considered. It is generally
recognised that democracy and free institutions begin to develop from below under conditions of peace and security and tend to decline where war or revolution are constant. An important by-product of the control of the seas by Great Britain in the past has been the growth of freedom and democracy behind the shield of British sea power. Not only has Great Britain steadily become more democratic in the last century, but Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand have become in effect independent nations, and self-government has been rapidly developed recently in India, Ceylon, Burma and among all peoples of the British Commonwealth who are ready for it. This is due to no special virtue among the British people. It is partly due to the fact that Great Britain has long been a satisfied and prosperous power. It is far more due to the fact that the stable peace and security created by the control of the seas by an increasingly liberal Britain made possible an uninterrupted pressure for freedom and self-government from below both in Great Britain itself and in all its possessions. The control of the seas by Great Britain has also been the first line of defence behind which North and South America have enjoyed the unusual advantage of being able to develop along their own lines without having to engage in international struggles and war for more than a century before 1914. The virtue of the system is seen in the fact that the nineteenth century saw the greatest expansion of freedom all over the non-European and non-Asiatic world ever recorded and that during that period there was no world war, until British sea-power was once more challenged in 1914.

It is this system which is now under attack. The basis of the British control of the seas was twofold:

(a) The policy of the balance of power in Europe, which sought to prevent any authoritarian or militarist power from obtaining control over
the whole European continent and so threatening the safety of Great Britain itself.

(b) The maintenance of a superior navy to prevent the fleets of Europe from entering the Atlantic partly by controlling the exits from Europe by the North Sea and the English Channel, by Gibraltar and Suez, and partly by maintaining overseas bases at Gibraltar, Cape Town, the Falkland Islands, Suez, Aden, Ceylon, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia, which enabled the British fleet to mobilise effective superiority to any hostile fleet which might attempt to appear on the high seas, anywhere. This system is challenged by three facts:-

(1) By the now unchallenged superiority of Germany in Central Europe, though not yet extended over the whole of Europe.

(2) By the rise of totalitarian Japan, which has driven Great Britain out of the Far East and back to Singapore.

(3) By the rise of air power, which renders Great Britain itself vulnerable to direct attack.

Nevertheless, because the United States, for reasons of her own defence, holds impregnable Alaska, Hawaii and Panama, the control of the high seas and of the bases necessary to that control is still in democratic hands, and will continue to be so so long as the Maginot line holds, as Great Britain controls the North Sea and the English Channel, as France and Great Britain control the Mediterranean and its exits, as Singapore is controlled by Great Britain and Hawaii by the United States.

This system of sea power, behind which free institutions still flourish over about half the globe, while they have been overthrown everywhere else, was vindicated in 1918, but only because the United States
threw in her weight behind it. Without her aid Great Britain and France could not have continued economically and financially till 1918, nor could they have ejected Germany from Belgium and Northern France without the assistance of the 2,000,000 American soldiers in Europe in that year. President Wilson attempted to make the world a safe place to live in by trying to induce the whole world to go democratic and low tariff, and to substitute for British sea power and the balance of power the system of the League of Nations. It was a magnificent conception. But the world was not ready for it, and to-day not only has the League gone but the alternative system of preserving liberty over half the world, the control of the seas by Great Britain alone coupled with something approximating to free trade is rapidly disappearing also. On the one hand economic nationalism and still more totalitarian economics are undermining the old free capitalist exchange. On the other hand the strategic balance is going rapidly against Great Britain. The population of Germany is 90,000,000 of Italy is 45,000,000, of Japan is 70,000,000, and all of these countries are now on a war basis. The population of Great Britain is 45,000,000 and of France about the same. Both are only half on a war basis. With Russia for the time being outside the picture, there is now a balance of some 200,000,000 peoples organised on totalitarian lines, against about 100,000,000, including the overseas Dominions, organised on democratic lines, though the latter are still in possession of the strategic keys to sea power.

Two possible conclusions can be drawn from this. One is that the United States is once more going to be confronted, as it was indeed in 1917, with the choice of whether, with her population of 150,000,000 and immense
resources, she is going to back the control of the oceans by the democracies, which has been the ultimate basis of her own and their security in the past, or whether she is going to let it go, allow the totalitarian powers to dominate not only Europe and Asia but the oceans also both politically and economically, and content herself with building up an armed ring fence round North America by occupying all vital positions 1000 miles from her shores. On that view the retreat of the democracies has gone so far, that there is, for the United States, now no middle course, for if she allows the European democracies to be defeated or squeezed into submission, she will no more be able to rely upon the armed resources of Britain and France in a crisis than they can now rely upon the armed resources of Czechoslovakia. The world, in fact, outside America will be totalitarian. From one point of view this analysis leads back to the Wilsonian thesis - that the United States must enter the struggle once more to "make the world safe for democracy" by overthrowing, by defeat or propaganda, the dictatorial systems.

But there is another possibility. One of the most formidable pressures to-day, making for poverty, Communism or Fascism, arises from the political anarchy of Europe. Both the old British system of the balance of power and the League of Nations perpetuated the anarchy of armies, tariffs and sovereignties in Europe. The integration of Europe, either by a voluntary federation or through the dominating influence of one or more great powers is long overdue, and is essential to a decent level of living for its people and to peace. It is, in fact, taking place in the latter form through the predominance of the Third Reich to-day. That may be fatal to France and England alone. But it would not be fatal to a democratic world united in self-defence. It is not impossible that peace and
and prosperity can only be found in our modern world of shrunken time and space, by its integration into four or five economic and political groups - the Monroe system, the Franco-British system, the Germanic system, Russia, and the Japono-Chinese system. Each would be relatively self-supporting economically. Each could make itself defensively secure at not too great cost. Each could obtain what it wanted from outside either by barter or between the democratic groups by relatively free trade. The world might settle down to a long peace and security in which the forces for freedom everywhere would once more have an opportunity to develop.

But the condition of such a development is not only that the League powers no longer claim to dominate or maintain anarchy in Europe and the Far East - a claim destroyed at Munich and Shanghai but that the democracies are sufficiently strong and united to make attack on their oceanic system of defence an impracticable task.

The decision of these vast issues now rests with the United States. Great Britain and France are no longer strong enough to do it alone. They are on the defensive; the totalitarian powers are on the offensive. Whichever way we look the future of the world rests with the United States. The choice is inexorably presented to her. Either she will become the centre of the world, not crusading in Europe or Asia, but the main director of the policies of the democracies and organizer of their security; or she will watch the gradual disintegration of the old oceanic defences of democracy and become almost the last really independent democratic state in the world - with what results on her internal condition none can predict.
FROM: THE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT.
TO: THE PRESIDENT.

0021 THE FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF A LENGTHY TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM AMBASSADOR KENNEDY:

HALIFAX PREDICTS BRITISH LOAN TO CHINA BY CABINET DECISION WEDNESDAY, EXPECTS SUCH ACTION WILL BE PROVOCATIVE AND HOPES WHEN ANNOUNCED SOMEONE WILL RECALL ALL THAT UNITED STATES HAS DONE, THUS CONVEYING IMPRESSION BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE ASSISTED CHINA. HALIFAX STATES NO CHANGE IN BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARD SPANISH SITUATION. RECOGNITION IS FAIRLY DOMINANT. BRITISH, WHILE DISTRUSTFUL OF HITLER, BELIEVE CHANCES FOR EXPLOSION ARE SMALL. HALIFAX REITERATED OUR ACTION (WILSON'S RETURN, YOUR REMARKS TO SENATE COMMITTEE, AND OUR REARMSMENT PROGRAM) AND SPEEDING UP OF BRITISH PRODUCTION HAS BEEN BODY BLOW FOR PEACE.

HENDERSON, BRITISH AMBASSADOR, BERLIN, REPORTS GOERING CONTINUES TO EVOKE GREATEST INTEREST IN A DEAL WITH ENGLAND. KENNEDY, AFTER TALKS WITH HOARE, CHATFIELD, AND SIMON, IN ADDITION TO HALIFAX AND CHAMBERLAIN AND MANY OTHERS, STATES HIS IMPRESSION THAT ALL OF THEM THOROUGHLY BELIEVE ENGLAND IS ON HER WAY, THAT GERMANY WILL NOT ATTACK, THAT CONDITIONS WHICH FORCED THEM TO DO THINGS LAST FALL THAT PERHAPS THEY WOULD NOT HAVE DONE OTHERWISE HAVE CHANGED, AND THAT WHILE BRITAIN WOULD NOT GO TO WAR FOR GERMAN MOVE TO EAST, SHE WOULD AT ONCE DECLARE WAR IF GERMANY MOVED TOWARDS SWITZERLAND OR HOLLAND. KENNEDY STATES THAT PSYCHOLOGY RESULTING FROM WHAT UNITED STATES HAS DONE IS A DETERMINING FACTOR IN THE PEACE OF MIND WHICH EXISTS AT THE MOMENT.

FROM HULL.

Distribution:

President, Naval Aide, Mil. Aide, Adm. Leahy
For original of this Summary and Mr. Kennedy's letter of March 3, 1939 which accompanied it; also President's conf memo to Admiral Leahy making the Summary available to Operations and the General Board.

See: General Board corres (Joint Army & Navy)....Navy folder Drawer 1-1939
SUMMARY

During the nineteenth century it was Britain's control of the sea which enabled the peoples of the Low Countries, the Baltic littoral, and of North and South America to develop unhindered their own institutions, and which permitted minor European Powers such as Portugal and Holland to maintain colonial empires.

It is this system which is now under attack. Should the British Empire disintegrate as a result of war, or by a slower but equally effective undermining of its essential bases, the consequences to the United States must be most serious.

Great Britain no longer occupies its former predominant position in Europe, where it could maintain a balance of power. Britain and France are now subject to a simultaneous pressure on three vital fronts. The effectiveness of blockade has been seriously diminished by the German control of the Danubian Basin and the growth of air power has rendered the United Kingdom very vulnerable to direct attack.

Can the United States afford to run the risk of seeing Britain and France defeated by the totalitarian regimes? The result of such a defeat would be the disintegration of the last bulwarks of democracy in Europe.
Europe, and the rise of Germany as the sole Great Power in Europe. It would mean the Mediterranean as a German-Italian lake; Russia at the mercy of Germany and Japan; the division of the British and French, Dutch and Belgian colonial empires between Germany, Italy and Japan—with the latter holding an unassailable position in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

The effects of such a victory upon the United States would be:

1. About fifty percent of America's total export trade and seventy-five percent of its foreign investment would be lost or in the hands of potential enemies who would seek to use this power to extract concessions from us.

2. The reduction of foreign trade and the tremendous burden of necessary arms would severely depress the standard of living in the United States and would require a radical alteration in the American economic structure.

3. These conditions in turn would cause unrest and dissatisfaction in the United States, creating a soil favorable to foreign ideologies. Fascist and Communist ideas would spread from Europe and Asia to the Americas, resulting in a serious threat to the very democratic institutions which we are arming to maintain.

4. Alone, the American navy would be unable to protect American trade routes across the Pacific and Atlantic. Sources of essential raw materials such as rubber and tin would be in hostile hands.

5. While the United States, with aid of a gigantic expansion in armaments and a drastic alteration in its way of life, should be able to defend North America from invasion, a simultaneous attack
attack on both the Atlantic and Pacific fronts, with Latin America under totalitarian influence, might well be more than the American navy could handle alone.

6. A defeated Britain and France would mean, as far as Europe and Asia are concerned, the end of liberalism in trade, in thought and in social organization, and the effects of this would soon penetrate into every American home.

7. The resources of the conquered peoples, instead of acting as a protection for the United States as now, would be used against us.
Events during the past year have resulted in outstanding changes and serious potential alterations in Britain's international position. The deterioration in the situation of the European democracies vis-à-vis the totalitarian states necessitates an appraisal of the possible consequences to the United States of a disintegration of the British Empire.

What were the foundations of Britain's power, which resulted in the Pax Britannica being maintained from 1814 to 1914 without a world war and which enabled the United States to develop its present economy and form of government without interference from abroad? They were basically:

First, the maintenance by Britain of superior sea power with far flung strategic bases. This gave the United Kingdom effective control of the world's oceanic highways.

Second, the British policy of maintaining the balance of power in Europe by seeking to prevent any one State from obtaining an overwhelmingly dominant position on the European Continent, which might threaten the safety of Great Britain itself.

This state of affairs is now imperilled by the following four major developments:

1. The actual supremacy of Germany in Central Europe
Europe since Munich and the serious threat of the Reich's future Continental domination from the Rhine to the Dnieper.

2. The rise of a totalitarian Japan which has largely vitiated Great Britain's influence in the Far East and appears to be driving the Empire's point of resistance back to Singapore. The threat to Australasia is apparent.

3. The development of air power which renders Great Britain, with its highly concentrated industrial areas, vulnerable to attack.

4. A situation whereby Great Britain, for the first time, can be threatened simultaneously on three major fronts, i.e., in the North Sea, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East.

This threatening situation gives rise to the question of what would be the effect on the United States and on the democratic way of life, of a defeat of the United Kingdom and of the resulting disintegration of the British Empire. Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to assume the following probable hypotheses:

1. That the British Empire is defeated in a war
war in which the U.S.A. has not participated, by a coalition between Germany, Italy and Japan; that its colonial territories have been divided among the victors; and that the United Kingdom has become a second-class Power, which may have purchased some degree of economic well-being at the price of establishing a government and pursuing a policy acceptable to Germany.

2. That Germany has become the dominant Power in Europe; that its satellite, Italy, is in control of Spain and North Africa; and that The Netherlands have fallen under Germany's control or influence.

3. That France, shorn of her Empire, has sunk to the level of a minor Power.

4. That Russia has been crippled by joint German-Japanese action.

5. That the smaller States of Europe have fallen under the economic and political domination of Germany and Italy.

6. That Japan has become the dominant Power in Asia and the Western Pacific directly controlling East Asia (including Hongkong, Singapore and Manila) and annexing, alone or jointly with Germany,
Germany, the East Indies and Malaya.

7. That India has become an independent federation, torn by internal strife, and struggling against pressure from Germany and Japan.

8. That Canada has thrown in her lot with the United States, and that the British West Indies have been annexed by the United States at their own request.

9. That Australia and New Zealand may have been forced to accept imposed terms, providing for the opening of Australia to Japanese immigration and their subjection to economic control by Japan.

On the basis of these assumptions three groups of Powers would stand face to face in the world:

a) A totalitarian coalition formed by the Berlin-Rome axis - dominant in Europe and Africa.

b) Japan dominant in Asia and the Eastern Pacific.

c) A predominantly democratic group consisting of the U.S.A., Canada and the Latin-American Republics.

The extent to which the defeat and disintegration of the British Empire as indicated above would affect the interests of the United States (1) strategically, (2) politically, (3) commercially and (4) ideologically, is examined below.
1. The Strategic Effects

In Europe at the present time the continuance of the political independence of the Low Countries and of the small states of Northern and South-eastern Europe, including the Middle East, depends upon the power and resources of the British Empire and France.

The essence of this power is the naval supremacy of the British fleet and the land defenses of France. Assuming the defeat of the United Kingdom and France, consequent upon a failure to maintain command of the sea and to protect themselves adequately from aerial attack, the British and French navies could no longer exist. The strategic bases now occupied by Great Britain would pass to the victors, and Germany, Italy and Japan, as a naval coalition, would be dominant in European waters, the Eastern and South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.

As a result, although the United States now holds Alaska, Hawaii and Panama, it is not improbable that America might find it impossible to maintain the strategic triangle Dutch Harbor-Hawaii-Panama against such a coalition adequately supplied with naval bases.*

*E.G., Singapore, Hongkong, Manila, Sydney (?) Simonstown, West African ports, the Canaries, the Azores, Gibraltar, the West Coast of Ireland, and the Falkland Islands.
Also, without sufficient bases of its own, the United States Navy would be unable to protect American trade routes across the Pacific and Atlantic and could be cut off from vital sources of supply in Malaya and Dutch East Indies. Even the coastwise traffic to South America might be subject to attack by raiders in a manner similar to the damage inflicted on Greek vessels in the Mediterranean during the past year.

Because of the possibility of the blocking of the Panama Canal by sabotage, the United States would have to maintain adequate naval forces on the Atlantic Coast as well as in the Pacific. In spite of the fact that distances in both the Pacific and Atlantic decrease to a certain extent the possibility of a successful naval attack, a very large fleet - two fleets, in fact - would be necessary to meet these requirements.

An imponderable in the situation is, of course, Soviet Russia. There is, however, no warrant for believing that the Soviet Union would be on the side of the United States. It seems just as likely that Germany would be able to exert a preponderant influence on Russia without actual invasion, or that the doctrinaires of the Kremlin would retire into splendid isolation, hoping for the day when the pickings in Europe or Western China
China were ripe. It would, in any event, be the height of optimism to expect Russia to come to the aid of the United States after a victory of Germany, Italy and Japan over the British Empire.

The air factor, also, cannot be overlooked. The effective radius of bombers is increasing rapidly and to this danger must be added the potential threat of aircraft carriers and of air raids from bases in Latin America. When all these possibilities are assumed, it appears clear that the United States would be forced to construct at an enormous cost a naval and air armament, requiring sacrifices in time of peace on the part of the American public which it would be difficult for a popularly elected Government to demand.

The preceding examination of the American position in the event of the destruction of the Empire warrants the deduction that the United States, with the aid of a gigantic expansion of armaments should be able, for a time at least, to defend North America from any actual invasion. If, however, it was subject to attack simultaneously on both the Atlantic and Pacific fronts, and if Latin America were to fall under Fascist or Nazi control, there would be more than a 50-50 chance that even though these attacks were repulsed, the ensuing
ensuing alterations in the American system would be so great and so violent as to wreak permanently democratic government in the United States. Should the American fleet be destroyed by a joint attack on two fronts, the very independence of certain sections of the country might be difficult to maintain.

3. The Political Effects

Democracy and free institutions develop under conditions of peace and security and tend to deteriorate where war or the danger of war is constant.

An important by-product of Britain’s naval supremacy in the past has been the growth of freedom and democracy behind the shield of British sea power. While Europe east of the Rhine and south of the Baltic remained mostly under autocratic regimes during the last century, not only has Great Britain become steadily more democratic but Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand have become, in effect, democratic self-governing nations. It was because of Britain’s power that the Low Countries and the Scandinavian Kingdoms were able to develop their democratic regimes. And who can deny that it was British naval supremacy during the nineteenth century which permitted
permitted North and South America to enjoy the unusual advantage of being able to evolve along their own lines without interference from Europe?

The Pax Britannica, which fostered the expansion of liberal institutions, vanishes with the defeat of Britain. The little countries, from Belgium via Scandinavia to the Baltic States, Poland, Spain, Portugal, the Balkans, Turkey, Iran and Trans-Jordania, would be forced to make terms with the totalitarian victors. Thus, the disintegration of the British Empire would mean that the United States would face alone a hostile concentration of a great part of the combined peoples of Europe and perhaps even those of an Asia dominated by Japan.

The sullen and half starving population of the defeated nations, bitterly resentful against those who thought like them but hesitated to give aid, might be persuaded, if offers were held out of material improvement in their lot, to assist their oppressors to beat down the last stronghold of democracy. The Latin American States, many of which have been built up by dictators, would tend to come under the sway of new rulers of Europe.
Europe. The very strength and prestige of the victorious totalitarian states would result in an internal situation in the United States which could be exploited by elements in collusion with the Dictator Powers.

Today the United States, with a population of 130 millions and its vast wealth and resources, holds the balance of power in the world. The defeat of the British Empire would mean the disappearance of this predominant rôle. Vast as are American resources they might well be less than those of a totalitarian world in arms.

Finally, the huge and unprofitable expenditure upon armaments and the consequent taxation, together with the necessary national regimentation for defense, would inevitably mean the destruction of the American form of Government as at present conceived, in the very effort to defend the country from alien authoritarian forms of control.

3. The Economic Effects

Out of the total American exports the British Empire took 43 percent in 1936 and 40 percent in 1937. Exports taken by the United Kingdom or by Canada
Canada alone exceed by $200 millions total exports to South America.

While all this trade would not disappear with the defeat of Britain and the downfall of the Empire, it can certainly be anticipated that every effort would be made by the victors to divert Europe's purchases to totalitarian sources of supply, and the vastly increased prestige and power of the dictator States would be fully utilized to curtail American sales to Latin America and the Far East. Furthermore, the United States at such time would be primarily preoccupied with military measures and would be handicapped in promoting its own overseas commerce. The defeat of Britain and France would give such an impetus to the German system of government controlled foreign trade that, in self defense, a parallel system would have to be adopted in the United States. It would not be an exaggeration, therefore, to say that the downfall of the British Empire would cut American exports at least 50 percent in volume.

It is estimated that approximately 3 million American workers are directly engaged in producing for the export trade. Half the cotton, a third
of the tobacco, a third of the petroleum products, and one-fifth of the wheat we produce are normally marketed abroad. Certain sections of the country, such as the Southern States, part of the Middle West and the West Coast, are particularly dependent on the export of their produce. A loss of foreign markets to the extent of 50 percent or more would have most serious repercussions in large areas already adversely affected and might well require a complete reorientation of the Nation's basic economy at a time when other preoccupations rendered such an alteration in the economic setup extremely difficult. It is, of course, true that a greatly enlarged rearmament program would take up some of the slack resulting from shrunken exports, but it is doubtful whether the raw material and food-producing areas would greatly benefit from rearmament which would mainly affect the larger industrial centers of the country.

As regards foreign investments, the total involved is estimated to amount of $15.6 billions* (compared with a British total of about $20 billions). Outside of Canada and Newfoundland where American holdings total $3.9 billions, or a quarter of

*As of December 1930
the total private American foreign long term investments, it seems probable that the United States would lose all its investments in Europe, China, Africa and eventually Latin America. Even the Canadian tranche would greatly depreciate in value in consequence of the impoverishment of the mother country and the possible preponderant influence of the totalitarian states in the remainder of the Empire.

The dislocation in the American economy and the necessary heavy armament expenses would so alter the balance of economic forces in the United States as to require a regimented industrial order under Government control. Such centralization would tend to reproduce, possibly under other names, the basic features of the Fascist state: to fight totalitarianism we would have to adopt totalitarian methods.

4. **Ideological Effects**

The defeat of Britain and her allies would mean a tremendous impetus for totalitarianism in all those states which would fall under the domination of the victors.

In all probability, political upheavals in Britain and France, as a consequence of defeat, would
would result in the establishment in those countries of governments in harmony with national socialist doctrines. In support of this supposition, one need only to recall the political evolution in those states which, having fallen from time to time under the domination of Napoleon, went so far as to furnish troops and to apply the "Continental system" against Great Britain.

With Europe in the grip of a totalitarian ideology, little time would elapse before such ideas established themselves firmly in at least some of the States of Latin America. The discussions at the Lima Conference in December 1938 provide not only sufficient evidence of the reality of this danger but also of some indication of the suspicions and differences of outlook existing in South America, which might be exploited in such a way as to render fruitless the efforts of the United States to unite the Western Hemisphere in self-defense against the intrusion of foreign influences and propaganda, or even as to turn those efforts against their originator by raising the cry of "Yanqui Imperialismo".

It cannot be overlooked that many of the

Republics
Republics of South America are, actually or virtually, dictatorships and that the ground is, in consequence, not unprepared for the seed of National-Socialism, which would in the first instance be given a South American character, but would soon be revealed as the projection of its European prototype into the New World. The menace which such a development would constitute to the continuance of democracy in the United States does not require to be underlined.

Finally, the depression in the American standard of living consequent upon the high cost of necessary armament, and the serious effect upon industrial production from the reduction and interruption in America's foreign trade, would cause much unrest and dissatisfaction. Such a state of affairs would provide just the proper soil in which foreign ideologies could take root.

**Conclusion**

Great Britain and France are no longer able to maintain the old world order. They are on the defensive; the totalitarian states are on the offensive with the rise of air power. The pre-eminence of Great Britain has disappeared,
for obviously a country so vulnerable to air attack cannot be the center of a really stable world system.

One must, therefore, envisage the possibility, at best, that the totalitarian powers may confront Britain and France with a military and aerial superiority so great that the latter will be forced progressively to yield strategic positions vital to the future of the United States as a world power. The United States would, thereafter, be unable to rely upon the armed resources of Britain and France in a crisis — any more than they can now rely upon the armed resources of Czechoslovakia.

At the most the actual defeat of Britain and France in war would mean not only the occupation of their Colonial Empire and the possible subjection of South Africa and the Antipodes, but also the placing at the disposal of the Axis powers the resources and strategic positions of the Dutch and Belgian Colonial Empires and the disappearance as independent entities of the small states of Europe. Indeed, it is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that, in
the bitterness and misery of defeat, the very
man power and resources of France and Britain
might be placed at the disposal of the authoritarian
powers for action against America.

Were Great Britain to be defeated, a tre-
mendous, indeed a decisive, alteration in the
balance of world forces, military, moral and
political, would occur to the grave disadvantage
of the United States. We would be compelled to
watch the disintegration of the old oceanic de-
fenses of democracy. The world, in fact, outside
America would be totalitarian and she would be
unable to do anything effective to prevent it.

With the axis powers dominating Europe, Asia
and Africa, and quite possibly having a major
influence in South America, the United States
would be forced to build an armed fence around
North America by occupying all vital positions
1,000 miles from her shores.

But that would not be all. The terrific
burden of rearmament and the loss of a major
portion of our foreign trade, with its consequent
dislocation of our internal economy, would
necessitate the complete re-ordering of our

industrial
industrial structure and probably the adoption of stringent government control over business. It can also hardly be doubted that the victorious powers would endeavor to destroy our morale by boring from within. This would necessitate the initiation of counter measures that would restrict severely the liberty of the individual and the press.

In short, America, alone in a jealous and hostile world, would find that the effort and cost of maintaining "splendid isolation" would be such as to bring about the destruction of all those values which the isolation policy had been designed to preserve.
Gray
London
Dated April 20, 1939
Rec'd 4:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

529, April 20, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL: FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

On my way to Edinburgh with speech. All international affairs omitted, talking about flowers, birds and trees. The only thing I am afraid of is that instead of giving me the freedom of the city they will make me Queen of the May.

Kennedy

KLP
LEGAL INSTITUTE
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA
APRIL 28-29, 1939

MODERN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A SERIES OF THREE LECTURES
DESIGNED FOR THE PRACTISING LAWYER

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THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
VIRGINIA STATE BAR
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AT JOHN MARSHALL HOTEL
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL CONFERENCES
OF
THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

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FOREWORD

The field of Administrative Law in a few years has broadened to such an extent that it has become vital to the practising lawyer.

The Virginia State Bar Association is fortunate in being able to announce that, through Messrs. Dobie, Cox and McGuire of the Committee on Legal Conferences, and in cooperation with other organizations of the Bar and the Law Schools of the State, it has succeeded in bringing together outstanding teachers and practitioners in the field of Administrative Law, who are also leaders in their profession. These are Dean Roscoe Pound, Honorable Eugene L. Garey, Honorable J. Warren Madden, Honorable Joseph Padway, and Professor Roswell Magill.

The importance of the subject, and of the Institute which has been arranged, is also attested by the attendance of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, the Senior Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, and the Attorney General of Virginia, who will preside, each at one of the three sessions of the Institute.

The American Bar Association, recognizing the importance of such legal institutes, has adopted their promotion as one of its major activities at this time.

The charges for the lectures, including taxes, will be $3.00 for the series. Students of Law Schools will be admitted to the lectures for a fee of $1.00. The proceeds will be used for defraying the expenses of the Institute, which are being underwritten by The Virginia State Bar Association.

Tickets for the series can be obtained by application to Mr. Cassius M. Chichester, Secretary-Treasurer of The Virginia State Bar Association, 903 State Office Building, Richmond, Virginia, or at the John Marshall Hotel at the time of the meeting.

In order that ample provision for the meeting may be made, you are asked to secure your tickets in advance.

LEWIS C. WILLIAMS, President
THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

(See Program on Reverse Side)
CASSIUS M. CHICHESTER, ESQ., Secretary-Treasurer,
Virginia State Bar Association,
903 State Office Building,
Richmond, Virginia.

Please send me................................tickets for the Legal Institute, to be held
at the John Marshall Hotel, Richmond, Virginia, April 28-29, 1939, for which
I enclose check (or money order) at the rate of $2.72 admission, tax $0.28,
total $3* per ticket, or $..................................

Address..............................................

*(Note.—Students’ tickets—Admission $0.91, Tax $0.10, Total $1.01—Reduced price $1.00.)
Does F. D. R. Want Joe Kennedy Out?

Carter Says Envoy Came Home For Showdown—Won’t Quit Post

CARDINAL HITS ‘MEDDLING’

British Deny “Encirclement”

READY TO GIVE HITLER PLEDGE, SAYS HALIFAX

Opposing Fronts Race to Add to Alliances

LONDON, April 19 (A. P.)—Britain offered a “no encirclement” pledge to Adolf Hitler last night as the Cabinet urgently stepped up its drive for more arms and allies.

Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, discussing the “cry of encirclement” raised by Germany and Italy against the French British defensive front, declared:

“I would be prepared at any time to give a most solemn undertaking on the authority of the Government that so such idea would ever find a place in British policy.”

Lord Halifax said negotiations with Soviet Russia for an air pact were being actively pursued. And he hoped “recognition of different points of view” would permit the “preparations that we all desire.”

It was reported reliably that as part of the armaments spending, Prime Minister Chamberlain had agreed to set up a department of supply to equip the expanding British military forces.

Prelate in Warning On Foreign Affairs

Tells K. of C. ‘True Patriotism’

Of Washington Less Evident In Government Today

William Cardinal O’Connell, speaking through Rt. Rev. Mgr. Francis L. Phelan, S. T. L., chancellor of the diocese, last night praised Washington’s advice “not to meddle in the affairs of other nations” and said that “this true patriotism... is not so evident in the affairs of Government today.”

Mgr. Phelan, who told 800 members and guests of the Massachusetts State Council of the Knights of Columbus at the Copley-Plaza that he was telling them what His Eminence “gave me to give to you,” differentiated between false and true patriotism.

He charged that “there is a great deal of hysteria about the dangers which face our people at this moment. It is being stirred up by certain individuals for their own selfish purposes, as it manifestly is not for the good of the nation.”

K. of C.—
LEWIS ORDERS ALL SOFT COAL MINES CLOSED

NEW YORK, April 19 (A.P.)—In the face of a coal strike, the President today ordered the closing of all soft coal mines in the U.S. That move, it was announced, is the result of a settlement reached with the operators who work in the industry, as well as with the operators of the coal mines whose activities are subject to the regulation of the government.

The order is in effect immediately, and it covers all soft coal mines in the U.S., including those in the anthracite region.

HITLER ACCLAIMED IN BIRTHDAY FETE

BERLIN, April 19 (AP) — The celebration of the 50th birthday of Adolf Hitler, held in Berlin today, was marked by a parade of 500,000 people, including 100,000 members of the Nazi party. The event was attended by the Führer, who delivered a speech to the crowd, calling for continued support for the Nazi regime.

AUSCHWITZ DEPORTATION

The deportation of thousands of Jews from the Auschwitz concentration camp to the Lublin area was reported today. The deportations were carried out by the SS, and the victims were sent to forced labor camps.

BENES SAYS DEMOCRACIES WILL CONQUER IN EUROPE

Speaking at a meeting of the Council of Europe, the president of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš, said that democracy will prevail in Europe. He called for continued efforts to support democratic movements in Europe and to prevent the expansion of totalitarian regimes.

KELLOGG-FOURNIER BROWN (LEFT) AND LESLIE PAVSON

The holder of the old record congratulates the man who set a new one.

BROWN BREAKS ALL MARKS FOR RECOGNIZED MARATHON

First Five in Marathon

In a finish at the Boston Marathon, held on the first day of April, Brown broke all records. The new marks were set at 2 hours, 34 minutes, and 15 seconds.

KEEP POWDER DRY, TOBIN'S PLEA ON 19TH

"We will stand against any attempt to overthrow the Constitution of the United States," said President Roosevelt today. "This is a time of great national emergency, and we must not fail in our duty to the country."

Brown Began Running

Brown began his run on the track at 2 p.m., and after a distance of 10 miles, he was ahead of the field.

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KELLOGG-FOURNIER BROWN (LEFT) AND LESLIE PAVSON

The holder of the old record congratulates the man who set a new one.
SAYS EMPLOYERS PREFER A.F. OF L.
Madden Makes Assertion at Senate Hearing
WASHINGTON, April 29 (P.R.)-Charles E. Madden of the American Federation of Labor, with Secretary of Labor Robert B. Harris, has said that employers generally preferred to depend on A.F. of L. rather than on A.F. of L., unless Madden made the statement before the Senate Committee considering proposals for the Wagner Act. Senator Holt, of Ohio, who sponsored the measure to incorporate extension of the Labor Act, said that Madden had been asked by the board on the ground of "collusion" between em-
ployers and union representatives, and that the board was investigating allegations that Madden had been associated with the C.I.O. in his most recent activity.

"CASH-CARRY" PLAN ADVOCATED BY LONG
Ex-Ambassador Opposes Embargo on Aggressors
WASHINGTON, April 29 (A.P.)-Com-minded to the "cash-and-carry" plan, Senator Long, of Georgia, has said that the Senate should consider a proposal to embargo aggressors. Senator Long said that he would introduce a bill to this effect as soon as possible. He added that the embargo would be a necessary precaution in view of the increasing threat of war in the Far East.

SENATE TAKES UP RELIEF BILL TODAY
Act Would Consolidate Existing Agencies
WASHINGTON, April 29 (A.P.)-The Senate has taken up a measure to consolidate existing relief agencies. The measure, introduced by Senator Long, of Georgia, would eliminate the present complex of relief agencies and replace them with a single agency that would have the power to allocate funds and resources as needed.

Booke Carter-
Continued from the First Page
Booke State Department

MEANS TO AVOID A FIRE but UNHURT
MEN'S reversible and other NEW TOP COATS

F. D. MAY PLACE R. F. C.
IN HOPKINS' DEPARTMENT
OF AIR FORCE

NEAR A FIRE
but UNHURT
MEN'S reversible and other NEW TOP COATS

With cotton gabardine
Choose from brown, blue, green or purple reversible ones in large sizes.

NOT the same grade; better grades available for extra cost.

Automatic Bargain BASEMENT for
AIR CONDITIONED

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626 Washington Street, Boston, Mass.

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Without paying a penny more—
you can now enjoy Dunhill's!

A Superior Cigarette...at the popular price of ordinary brands. Banded to the private formula of Alfred Dunhill, Ltd., London, Eng. Trademark Dunhill quality...in superb tobaccos...in skillful blending. At your regular tobacco counter... discover Dunhill's repute.

THE BOSTON GLOBE—THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1939

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THIS OVERSIZED ITEM HAS BEEN MICROFORMED IN SECTIONS.
MEN'S wool REVERSIBLE COATS
with cotton gabardine.

ALL WOOL TWEED, PLAIN COLOR,
HERRINGBONE TOPCOATS.

ALL WOOL WANTED FLY FRONT
COVER CLOTH TOPCOATS.

Use this Chart

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1. A low financing and insurance cost—kept low especially to make the new General Motors cars easy to have as well as easy to want.

2. An insurance policy in the General Exchange Insurance Corporation, a member of the General Motors family, protecting your car against fire, theft, and accidental damage, including deductible collision, earthquake, hail, windstorm, flood and other similar hazards.

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6. It's a complete General Motors service—friendly, helpful and understanding.

LOOK FOR THE EMBLEM

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
Park Square Building, Ft. St., Kansas Avenue, Detroit.
Letter to President
From Sumner Welles
May 11, 1939

In re-Pres. memo of May 10, 1939 about the British Gov. making an announcement about Palestine—attaches letter from Kennedy of May 10, 1939. Also telegram to Brandeis from Henry Montor.

See Palestine folder—Foreign File-Drawer 1-1939
THE WEEK
May 17th 1939.

THE CRISIS

Key-points in the crisis as it develops towards its climax are these:

(1) The Anglo-Soviet situation is much less bright than the Downing Street inspirations to the British press suggest. The position in a nutshell is that on April 16 the Soviet Government proposed a Pact of Mutual Aid against aggression, based on a defensive military alliance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union, and on that basis erecting a really unbreakable barrier of small states too.

The British Government gave no reply to that proposal until May 8th, but in the meantime while telling the House of Commons that everything was going well, suggested to everyone that on the one hand the Poles would object to such an arrangement, and -- to other people -- that Mussolini, Franco, Salazar and the Japanese would dislike it too.

On May 8th the British Government rejected the Soviet offer.

On the same day the Germans and Italians concluded their military pact.

Izvestia Article

The outline of the Soviet reply to the British rejection was contained in the now famous Izvestia article of the middle of last week -- which even now several British newspapers could not bring them elves to publish in full, though it was very evidently the hottest news available on the possibility of preserving the peace.

Then came the Soviet official reply. And to-day (Wednesday May 17) the Cabinet is due to turn it down -- with the proviso that the whole thing had better be discussed at Geneva.

"Impersonal"

There was a comical feature to a tragic affair in so far as the British Government, believing that the Soviet Government is conducted on as "personal" a basis as is the British Government, and that -- as British officials always suppose -- "if you only enflaft the right men" you get to do business regardless whether the business you do makes sense or not, thought that if only they could get Molotov to Geneva they would thereby persuade the anxious British public that things were going well.

Then they learned that the Soviet Government was not at the moment thinking of sending Molotov but might send Potemkin.

Just after that came the Soviet reply to the British "counter-proposals" and the British press, inspired directly from No.10, suddenly issued (on Tuesday May 16) a series of suggestions to the effect that the
British found these proposals unacceptable but would be prepared to
stall the whole thing, and start all over at Geneva in conversations
with Potemkin.

Already the British Foreign Office was beginning to "play up"
as quite a coup the fact that Lord Halifax would now "get together"
with the Vice-Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

"Human Element"

The British Government is of course not really so foolish --
though its enemies and even its friends often accuse it of so being --
as to suppose that the diplomacy of the new world is really based on
whether this person or that -- Litvinov or Potemkin or Maisky --
happens to be in charge of particular negotiations. The British
Foreign Office, which (although it often has to pretend the contrary
in deference to the wishes and inner political necessities of No.10
and the Conservative Central Office) is really very well-informed on
everything except really basic matters, is perfectly aware that
Soviet diplomacy and Soviet policy are not one-man affairs.

Geneva illusions.

Precisely for the reason however that a good deal of British
Foreign Office propaganda had been put out to the effect that the
Soviet Government were no so interested in the British counter-pro-
posals that they were actually going to send somebody all the way
over from Moscow to talk to Halifax, they put their chins out to be
smacked by the Soviet Government which, as it had already repeatedly
stated, did not in fact regard the British proposals as anything but
a somewhat naive and desppicable manner of gaining time.

So when it was suddenly announced that after all M. Maisky a
Soviet diplomat who by the very nature of his job really does under-
stand the English inside out -- would be going to Geneva -- there was
some quite unseemly petulance in Whitehall.

The petulance in question is not due to the personality of
M. Maisky, who is justifiably popular in London, but to the fact that
his appointment to the Geneva job neatly cut across the British
Government's plan for "playing up" Geneva as an "example" of how well
the British Government was really getting on with the Soviet Union.

The Game

For in view of the British public's presumed ignorance of the
fact that a representative of the Soviet Government is a representative
of the Soviet Government and neither more nor less, it had been the
purpose of the British Government to use the presence of Potemkin or
even Molotov in Geneva as a ground for convincing the British public
that the Russians do not after all think so badly of the British
counter-proposals.

This game has in fact been going on ever since the original
Soviet proposals for the conference at Bucharest which were made on
March 18, three days after the invasion of Prague. It will be re-
called how on that occasion the Foreign Office and No.10, in order to
head off Opposition -- and above all Conservative -- anxiety regarding
the possibility that the Chamberlainites would sabotage the Russian
talks, deliberately encouraged the newspapers to run a big line of
Anglo-Russian friendship, to the extent that the Evening News of all
papers headlined "Moscow is with us".
The same thing has occurred at various intervals throughout the -- in fact -- mainly deadlock conventions with the Soviet Union; every time that things are going badly (because the British Government has refused a Soviet offer of assistance, because Spain, Portugal, Japan and Italy have entered a covenant against Anglo-Soviet commitments) the British Government and its press pour out assurances of how nicely things are going.

**The Facts**

The real position -- and it is one of life and death for the British -- is that so far:

It is not true, as the British press has suggested, that there has been an "approximation of view" between the British and Soviet Governments.

The Soviet Government persists in calling for a practical defence system including mutual guarantees and if possible military talks, and the British Government persists in refusing mutual guarantees and refusing military talks.

**Contradiction**

The contradiction could hardly be sharper, especially as it is based on the fact that the British Government's refusal is backed by all those "opponents" in the British Government who are perpetually "explaining" to their colleagues that the thing to do is to make some further concessions to the Japanese, to Mussolini, to Portugal, and -- of all people -- to France, and that the only concession that can be made is that the British should refrain from making any definite commitments to the Soviet Union.

(2) All this is perfectly well known in Moscow, and the intrigues of the British Government in this sense -- unreported for the most part in the British press -- being common knowledge there and in the USA provide at least a part of the basis for that "mysterious" scepticism regarding the "aims" the "sincerity" of the British Government in its alleged opposition to Fascism, which the British press finds so surprising. Nobody else, unfortunately, is in the slightest degree surprised.

(3) The position of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations -- and above all the delay in them -- remains (in the view of Berlin-Rome, London, Paris, and Moscow) the crucial factor in the whole position, and in all calculations as to when "the balloon is likely to go up".

(4) Best information from Berlin, Rome, Paris, and London, offers the following as an approximate sketch of the alternatives before the Axis Government (now definitely centred in Berlin with Benito Mussolini more than ever fulfilling simply the role of Caudillo Italian) the following:

(a) In view of the delay in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations successfully engineered by the German diplomats working through Rome, Burgos, Tokyo and Lisbon, there remains in Berlin a profound belief that in fact the British Government is not serious about the whole affair.

For it is more or less logically argued in Berlin that if the British Government were really serious in its alleged attempt to organise a general defence -- or even a purely British defence -- against the
Axis attack, the obvious thing to do would be to achieve an immediate
alliance with the Soviet Union.

The fact that the somewhat naïvely concealed representations
of German agents in the above-mentioned capitals have proved to have
so impressive effect upon Mr. Chamberlain, is taken in Berlin --
rightly or wrongly -- as proof that the British Government is after all
not serious.

(b) This being so, or at least believed to be so in Berlin, the
German and Italian Governments are faced with the choice between one
of two almost equally attractive lines of policy: That is to say, they can --
either, in the belief that in the long run the British opposition -- meaning particularly the Conservative Opposition -- will force the Anglo-Russian alliance which spells the end of the Hitler ambitions, attack now at Danzig

or, in the belief that another apparent "lull" will permit the
"appassionati" to find their feet again and come to the top, allow things to slide a little further, running a continuous terrorism and victimisation campaign, in the hope that very soon both in Britain and in France the anti-Munichers will get	
tired, and the Munichers will begin to be able to say "after all, these people have not invaded any independent state for several weeks, what reason is there for not treating them as in fact very decent chaps?"

The market.

In fact, putting the thing market-wise, it is one of those
situations in which a really strong-nerved bear will make more money
than anybody, but a nervous bull will make more money than a nervous
bear. And, as is notorious all over the world, the London market is
full of nervous bulls who read their newspapers in the morning and
get the pep-talk and start buying forward, and then talk to their
friends over lunch and telephone the continent, and begin to get the
facts, and start hedging before midday.

(c) There is being put about in London this week a heavy propa-
ganda barrage to the effect that the Germans and Italians have been
"stopped anyway" and that therefore there are no further unpleasant
surprises to be expected. Investigation in Berlin and Rome does
not support this view, but rather suggests that it is in fact being
put out from precisely those two centres: again with the central
notion of delaying, or giving the impression that there is no longer
any necessity for, the Anglo-Soviet Pact.

It has to be reported that so far as the German General Staff --
which is the same thing as the Italian General Staff -- is concerned,
the view is that everything stands or falls by the success or failure
of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. Whatever the views of Dr. Salazar
(and his friends in the British Conservative Party) there are no illusions in the German General Staff as to the decisive change in the situation which would arise from a definite military commitment between the British and the Russians.

The general impression in informed circles both in London and Paris is that the situation is reaching its most critical point; and that the key to it lies in London, and particularly in the question of whether or not the "appenders" continue to be able to delay signature of a practical Anglo-Soviet Pact.

For it is pointed out in both capitals that although -- except in the columns of The Times -- the appenders have been lying comparatively low in public during the past week, they have in fact been doing so because their principal concentration has been precisely upon the wrecking of the Pact, or at least upon the prolongation of the endless delay.

As a result, Berlin estimates very high the chances that the "appenders" are still in fact in power in Britain: and so long as they are strong enough to delay the Pact, no amount of finger-wagging from members of the Government and in the editorial columns of the London press will have any effect in "persuading" Herr von Ribbentrop that he is mistaken in this matter.

The danger therefore is a double one: first that the appenders without actually being in power may give to the German Government the impression that they are long enough and deeply enough to provoke a disaster; and secondly, that, having produced that situation, they may actually turn out to be near enough to power to make of that disaster not a resistance but "a second Munich".

The Eaglecliffe Letter.

From an exceedingly well-informed source it is confirmed to us this week that the real author of the now notorious "Eaglecliffe Letter" to The Times, calling for "a second Munich" all along the line really was drafted by Sir Horace Wilson, and therefore represented exactly the views and aims of the appenders at No.10.

It appears, according to sources in Berlin, to be this fact above all -- communicated of course by the German Embassy and by unofficial agents -- which accounts for what all agree to be an air of immense confidence and jauntiness on the part of Herr von Ribbentrop. Confident that the Eaglecliffe letter (a) represents the views of No.10 and (b) would never have been published in such a form unless it did, he is still this week advising the Fuehrer that everything pointing the other way -- including the Chamberlain speech at the Albert Hall -- is and must be the merest bluff.

The fact that after relegating the "appeasement" correspondence to its inside columns for a day or two, The Times suddenly gave it pride of place again was also -- absurdly as some think but seriously nevertheless -- taken in Berlin as a useful straw in the wind.

It was also remarked there that The Times went so far as to publish a letter from a Territorial Officer of which the argument, if
pushed to its logical conclusion, come perilously near to incitement to refusal of military service. In it appeared in fact the same type of argument that was last seen in this country in the days of Lord Carson and "Gallipot Smith" -- the first overt hint that the "Fifth Column" is prepared actually to urge people not to serve in the armed forces except in support of its own policies. It was a minor straw in the wind, but appearing where it did, an important one, and one which, if it had come from another quarter -- for instance a Trade Union leader -- would certainly have been denounced by The Times in no uncertain terms.

London (and perhaps Washington) was becoming increasingly puzzled this week by the "mystery of Mr. Kennedy" -- and still more, by the mystery of why Mr. Roosevelt maintains Mr. Kennedy in the post of Ambassador to Great Britain. His role has been and still is of very much greater importance in its effects on both sides of the Atlantic, than the general public supposes.

Before his recent trip to Washington, Mr. Kennedy was already well known in both capitals as an "appeaser" of the first water. He was the principal apologist for Mr. Chamberlain in Washington, and at the same time was known to be informing Mr. Chamberlain that in reality American opinion -- serious American opinion -- so far from being hostile to Munich, was really supporting it and that therefore Mr. Chamberlain did not really need to worry about the apparent outbursts of indignation from the other side, regardless of the quarter from which they came.

Mr. Kennedy, whose relations with certain representatives of General Franco were common knowledge, played a particularly important part in the politics of non-Intervention", and was actively engaged in supporting, from his strategically very strong position, the policy which resulted in the great break through of the Axis in Spain. His trip to Washington was, as everyone expected, the occasion of a very severe dressing down by the President. But the mystery began when Mr. Kennedy, instead of being sent on holiday, after all returned to London as Ambassador. For since his return, his activities have become more remarkable than ever. He has for instance gone to the length of informing members of the British Government that they "need not worry" about anything that Mr. Roosevelt may say, for the reason that

(1) "It will be my friends that are in the White House in 1940.

(2) "Roosevelt is run by the Jews and all the anti-fascist sentiment in the United States is really created by the Jews, who control the press".

The bland assurance with which Mr. Kennedy circulates these staggering opinions about the Government which he is after all supposed to represent, have occasioned some considerable eyebrow lifting even among those -- in the "appeasement" camp -- who find them very useful.

There have in fact been several occasions during the past three or four weeks, on which the opinions of the American Ambassador have been not merely quoted but decisively used at British Cabinet meetings, when the suggestion has been made that the continued signs of "appeasement", and above all the Federation of British Industries Agreement with the German Government, are producing a disastrous effect upon the other side of the Atlantic. To those who try to suggest that the American Ambassador -- a wealthy Catholic speculator -- is probably not representative of all of American opinion, and is playing a game of his own, the retort is made: If that is so, why does he remain Ambassador?

(Subscription rates to THE WEEK 8/- half yearly, 16/- yearly. Foreign rates 12/- and 24/-, USA and Canada and Dominions where Air Mail rates of 3d per oz do not apply 10/- and 20/-, Dominions where Cheap Air Mail rates are in force 15/- and 25/-, Printed & published by Claud Cockburn at 29 Victoria St, London, S.W.1.)
GRAY  
LONDON  
Dated June 7, 1939  
Received 1 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington  

795, June 7, 5 p.m.  
FOR THE PRESIDENT:  

If any of the British party start talking about the hot Washington weather, will you please inform them that we have had the two hottest days in fifty years right here in London. It may take Washington weather out as a subject for consideration.

KENNEDY  

HPD
London, June 8, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I thought you might like to have this "United States Number" of the TIMES as a souvenir.

Faithfully,

The President,

The White House.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

June 9, 4 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Your thoughtful wire sent to me today in the midst of the great excitement in Washington touches me deeply.

Our regret at not being with you is lessened only by our joy in seeing you achieve another great success.

KENNEDY

HPD
My dear Mr. O'Connor,

I received this morning the following clipping of the Swiss Democratic party paper: "National Zeitung, Basel" with the article of the well known Italian diplomat Count Sporja (since several years in exile). The Count Sporja is a personality of highest political experience and has the best relations with all the leaders in the world.

I believe it will be of a special interest for you to keep this article. The most important paragraph deals with the American Ambassador in London, Mr. Kennedy. I give you a short translation of this paragraph:

"The American Ambassador in London, Kennedy, is speaking with the Germanophile circle which is behind the London Times not only in a defamatory manner, but more in a way extremely hostile against President Roosevelt. He is sympathizing in such a way with General Franco - and means that he is doing a very good work for his church - that he often explains that the Democratic policy of the United States is only a Jewish matter and that Roosevelt will disappear 1940."

The Count Sporja is publishing the fact with the mention that until the date of the edition of his article, nobody has had the courage to tell this special fact in all publicity notwithstanding many people have knowledge about Mr. Kennedy's talks against the President.

Hoping you have an interest to know that

I remain

With best regards

Yours very sincerely,

W. L. Colze (sgd)

Encls.
Amerikanische Stimmungen und Gegenstimmungen

Ernst Grigole

Obwohl heute, der Jahrestag William McKinlys Todestag, seine Stimme, die er während seiner Präsidentschaft sprach, auf den Sternen steht, ist es nicht, als ob seine Worte heut' auf die Zukunft hin beschrieben. Die Zukunft ist ein Traum, der heute,selectors, in der Vergangenheit seiner Worte, zu seiner Zeit, zu seinem Eigen, zu seinem Eigentum war.

Da ist eine der vielen Erinnerungen, die ein einziges Amerikanisches Straten durchzeichnet, durch die präzise Definition unserer Haltungen, durch die genaue Formulierung unserer Gedanken. Es ist nicht nur eine Formulierung, sondern auch eine Identifizierung, eine Identifizierung, die nicht nur einen, sondern auch mehrere Positionen, mehrere Worte, mehrere Phasen, mehrere Momente, mehrere Situationen beinhaltet.

Es ist nicht die Formulierung, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird, sondern die Formulierung, die in der Vergangenheit durchgeführt wurde. Es ist nicht die Zukunft, die in der Vergangenheit durchgeführt wird, sondern die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird. Es ist nicht die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird, sondern die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird. Es ist nicht die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird, sondern die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird. Es ist nicht die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird, sondern die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird. Es ist nicht die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird, sondern die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird. Es ist nicht die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird, sondern die Zukunft, die in der Zukunft durchgeführt wird. 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