PSF: Greece, 1943 - 45.
It is a real pleasure to have you speak of this Roosevelt. I am in the White House, Washington.

By Air Punch
Coppice, March 14th 1943

Dear Mr. Roosevelt,

A little while ago I had a letter from my mother from Athens. She thought that you might still be in England when I received her letter. She asked me to ask you if you could possibly have 'nothing' sent to Greece - the way
That next to the food situation this one is the most important, as the people are there. Yet in says if there is nothing to give them.

My mother asked me to convey this to you as she does not dare sign a personal letter. The mastdomain is in the churchground I do not wish to attract any authority to herself. Then too you will understand this.

I know how much you
have done for the American Greek Relief Fund, but if you could possibly see your way to granting this request, it would be a God-send for which the Greek people would be deeply grateful.

I want enclosing a copy of a memorandum drawn up by the Greek Gov. which I thought would interest you, which explains the terrible situation.

I have told my Courtes...
King George of Greece that it was writing to you, he asked me to remember him to you. I send you many messages as well as to The President. We all admired The President for considering that long journey to Athens. The result of which has given fresh hope to everyone.

Will you please remember me to him? Hoping that you are
As I have told you that I shall have the pleasure of meeting you again some day.

Believe me dear Mrs. Roosevelt,

yours very sincerely,

Maria.

P.S. Please tell the President that his Godson is flourishing & hopes to make his remain säute before he is very much older!
Information from various neutral and trustworthy sources, including the International Red Cross headquarters at Geneva, presents the clothing situation of the children in Greece as lamentable.

Since last year considerable efforts have been made for the food and medical relief of Greek children resulting in an improvement of the situation in this respect; last winter's tragedy when starvation caused the death of thousands of children, especially in the Athens-Fireus area, has not recurred this year - at least not to the same extent. It was through the understanding and generosity of the American and British Governments that these efforts were made possible. Those, however, who are well acquainted with the situation in Greece emphasize that the lack of clothing is so grave as to constitute a threat to the children's health equal to that of starvation.

Thanks to the generous action of certain Greek and other organisations children's clothing has been collected in the United States. The Greek Government have approached the American and British Governments with a view of obtaining their consent for the despatch of these stocks to Greece; but so far no favourable reply was received.

If it is decided that these stocks of clothing and shoes together with others to be collected in the future should be despatched to Greece, they could be loaded on the Swedish vessels which are being used for the transport of Canadian wheat, and their distribution in Greece could be made by the Swedish Red Cross in co-operation with the International Red Cross, both of which organisations are doing such splendid and impartial work for the food relief of the Greek population.

A decision on this vital matter should be reached without delay, so that the unfortunate children of Greece who are already suffering so much from under-feeding and other causes under the enemy yoke, may be spared the additional suffering of exposure through lack of clothing and shoes.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN

O.K. on (a), (b) and (c).

I will make a few amendments on (d) which is very good.

I wonder if it would not be worthwhile to ask the President of the Order of Ahepa, an organization which has Chapters all over the United States. I happen to have been a member of it for many years. I think it is principally Venezuelan but I see no reason why he should not be asked, as the Order is composed of Americans and is very little, if at all, mixed up in Greek politics. You might ask the State Department, or even the Greek Minister, what they think.

F. D. R.

Memorandum for the Naval Aide to the President, 5/29/43, from A. D. Struble, Office of the (over)
Chief of Naval Operations, with enclosures, in re P.O. Boat for Greece. The items referred to are (a) Outline of proposed ceremony at Washington Navy Yard, (b) List of guests whom Greek Ambassador desires to invite, (c) Proposed draft telegram to be sent by President to King George of Greece, and (d) Proposed draft of President's speech of presentation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
S.T.E.

Will you go over this? I want to take it up on Monday.

F.D.R.

Message in connection with presenting ship of war, built by American hands, delivered under terms of Lend-Lease, to the fighting Greeks. The ship will be a part of the Royal Hellenic Navy and christened King George Second.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR

JIM BARNES

June 7, 1943.

I, too, am a long time member of the Order of Ahepa. Please tell my friend, Mr. Vournas, that we had already lend-leased an identical ship to the Netherlands which was named QUEEN WILHELMINA; another identical ship to Norway which was named KING HAAKON VII; and this ship, in accordance with usage, be called the KING GEORGE II.

Tell him also that the political future set-up in Greece has nothing to do with it.

The fact remains that King George II is the representative of Greek sovereignty because he was such when Greece was invaded and the Government fled.

The matter was called to my attention sometime ago and I made the decision as to the name in accordance with law and precedent.

Tell him also that I sincerely hope that all persons of Greek origin in this country will accept this decision as being in the best interests of the liberation of Greece from the German and Italian occupation and the successful winning of the war by the Allies.

F.D.R.
Letter from George C. Vournas, Supreme President, Supreme Lodge of the Order of Ahepa, Washington, 6/3/43, marked "Personal and Confidential", addressed to Hon. James M. Barnes. Suggests that the small war vessel to be presented to the Govt. of Greece be named "Admiral Miaoulis" instead of "King George II".

I beg to urge upon you the importance of the Order of Ahepa to Greece, which is not sufficiently understood. In light of the gravity of the situation in the world, in view of the importance of the Order of Ahepa to Greece, it is evident that the Order of Ahepa's contribution to the war efforts of Greece must be emphasized.

The vessel named "Admiral Miaoulis" is of great importance to Greece and it is hoped that this vessel will be presented to the Greek Government. The suggestion to change the name to "King George II" is acceptable. It is proposed that the vessel be named "Admiral Miaoulis" as this is the name of a Greek admiral who served with distinction in the Greek fleet.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

George C. Vournas
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JAMES M. BARNES
SUBJECT: NAMING OF SMALL WAR VESSEL PRESENTED TO
GREEK NAVY BY GOVERNMENT, JUNE 10, 1943.

Honorable George Vournas, President of the Order of
Ahepa, has advised me that our Government is giving
the Government of Greece a small war vessel and they
are going to name the same, "King George II".
Mr. Vournas advises that the use of that name would
be a tremendous mistake. I am attaching herewith
a letter of explanation.
MISS TULLY:

TELEGRAM WAS GIVEN TO THE PRESS LATE YESTERDAY -- I'M RETURNING IT TO YOU.

Alice W.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

THE PRESIDENT
WASHN DC

ON THE OCCASION OF THE HANDING OVER OF THE NEW UNIT WHICH THE
UNITED STATES ARE OFFERING THE ROYAL HELLENIC NAVY I WISH TO
EXPRESS TO YOU PERSONALLY MY DEAR MR PRESIDENT AND THROUGH YOU
TO THE CHIVALROUS AMERICAN NATION MY WARMEST THANKS FOR THIS
GENEROUS GESTURE WHICH CONSTITUTES A NEW TOKEN OF YOUR SYMPATHY TOWARDS
FIGHTING GREECE AND REAFFIRMS THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP EXISTING BOTH
IN PEACE AND WAR BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND OUR NAVIES IN
PARTICULAR STOP I AM FULLY CONVINCED THAT THE COMRADESHIP IN ARMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BRING PEACE AND HAPPINESS TO THE WORLD AND RESTORE THE SADLY SHAKEN EDIFICE OF CIVILIZATION IN WHICH TASK THE UNITED STATES HAVE THE HONOUR TO TAKE A FOREMOST PART BY THE BRILLIANT EFFORTS OF THEIR GALLANT FIGHTING SERVICES AND THE GENEROUS DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR INEXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES

GEORGE II KING OF THE HELLENES
My dear Mr. President:

Let me thank you again from the bottom of my heart for the many courtesies which you extended to me during yesterday's ceremonies. I am fully conscious of the fact that it was my country which was honored in my person by the great leader of the American people but, nevertheless, I deem myself fortunate in expressing to you my deep gratitude.

I wish on this occasion to point out to you that the Greek people who have suffered so much for the common cause and are resolved to fight to the end look upon the American people and upon you, Mr. President, for their rehabilitation and for the restoration of Greece in her national rights.

Please accept, my dear Mr. President, the assurances of my constant devotion and of my highest consideration.

C. L. Stamourakis

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: PC Boat for Greece.

1. The Greek Naval Attache has informed me that the date October 27, 1940 appearing on line eight of page one and on line three of page two of the proposed speech for the President should be changed to October 28, 1940.

Respectfully,

A.W. Strong

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date 6-30-66
Signature Carl L. Spicer
September 9, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a copy of a telegram from Ambassador Kirk regarding your reply and that of Mr. Churchill to the recent appeal to you both by His Majesty King George II of Greece. You will note that the Greek Prime Minister has requested permission to give publicity to these replies.

I second the Ambassador's suggestion that such publicity would be unwise at present. It would probably stir rather than quiet political controversy among the Greeks and might well arouse resentment not only against the King but against the British and ourselves as well.

In view of the similar request being made to Mr. Churchill you may desire to discuss this matter with him.

The President,

The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaufele Date FEB 9 1972
If you agree that public release of your message to the King would be undesirable at this time, I shall so inform Ambassador Kirk.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. From Cairo, Greek Series 58, September 7, 8 p.m.

2. To Cairo, Greek Series 28, September 6, 8 p.m. (for convenient reference)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Has this telegram gone to
Ambassador Kirk? If not, I think
it is all right.

F.D.R.

Secret letter from the Secretary of State, 9/9/43, to the President, transmitting
copy of a telegram from Ambassador Kirk, 9/7/43, regarding the President's reply
and that of Mr. Churchill to the recent
appeal to the President and Mr. Churchill
by His Majesty King George II of Greece.
The Greek Prime Minister has requested
permission to give publicity to these
replies. Also attached is copy of the
Secretary of State's telegram of 9/6/43 to
the American Legation mfr at Cairo, requesting
that message from the President be communicated
to the King of Greece in re Greece. Mr. Kirk
feels that the Ambassador's suggestion

(over)
to publish these replies would be unwise at present. If the President agrees that public release of his message to the King would be undesirable at this time, Mr. Hull will so inform Ambassador Kirk.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. A. A. BERLE, JR.

I suggest that this matter of the Island of Samos be referred to the British Embassy in view of the fact that this area is under British military and naval command.

F. D. R.

State Department Memorandum of Conversation between the Greek Ambassador, Mr. Cimon P. Dismantopoulos, and Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., 9/27/43, in re Liberation of the Island of Samos, and Incidents at Leros.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Greek Ambassador, invoking the precedent of the messages exchanged on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the German attack on Poland, has requested an exchange of messages between you and King George II of Greece for publication on October 28, 1943, third anniversary of the Italian attack on Greece.

I recommend that the Ambassador's request be met, and submit for your approval a suggested text of a message to the King. The delicacy of the Italian situation has been borne in mind in the drafting of this message.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:

Message to King George II.
Three years ago today a resolute Greek people hurled back a defiant "No" to the arrogant demands of the Fascist dictator that they supinely surrender their lands, their liberty and their sacred honor. Greece was eventually overrun only after the combined forces of the Axis had been hurled against her. The heroic and successful resistance of Greece during six long months aroused the admiration of the world, upset the Axis timetable and destroyed forever the myth of Axis invincibility.

Despite the unparalleled suffering of the Greek people under the cruel oppression of Axis occupation, the Greeks fight on, both inside and outside the country. On this anniversary of the wanton Fascist attack, I am glad to pay tribute to their unceasing resistance and to give expression to our pride in being associated in a common struggle with such gallant and tested Allies. Already the Axis front has been breached. The Fascist regime has been destroyed and the Italian people are grimly expiating its crimes. The hardest tasks still lie ahead, but I am confident that an unflinching determination to devote our whole united effort to the struggle against the enemy will speed the day of our complete victory; and that liberated Greece, restored and strengthened, will take the honored place among the democracies of the world to which her deeds have proved her so worthy.
Wednesday, Dec. 2, 1943

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Embassy of the United States of America near the temporarily
of Greece and Yugoslavia

Shari Walda
Cairo

Dear Franklin,

Just want to let you

know that I got here last Sunday
afternoon from South Africa, to take
up the new duty you have assigned
to me.

I have already presented my
credentials to the King of Greece and
expect an audience with the King of
Yugoslavia soon. Meanwhile I have
met with the two Premiers and with
American and British officials have concerns with Tolkien problems.  
Shall you find it desirable and possible to see me. I am at your service.  

Your trip must be a very tiring one, but I hope you are not finding it too much so.

Affectionately as always,

Lindeth MacVeagh

To The President

I sent you my resignation, and will go to the King at

Washington, and with the King 

I have
To: The Ambassador
From: Mr. Archer
Subj: Situation within Greece

This winter will be the worst since 1941-42 due to:

(a) The people have used up personal treasures which were used to eke out by barter the relief shipments which averaged 700 calories per person for less than half the population.

(b) The relief shipments are 30,000 tons in areas.

(c) Food and other reserves in hiding were used up during the summer when the people expected early liberation.

(d) Physical strength exhausted by prolonged lack; the Swedish authorities state that two and a half million people are suffering from acute effects of malaria; T. B. greatly increasing.

(e) Clothing and shoes, not replaced for three years, are completely worn out.

Laird Archer
Chief of Mission
Office of Foreign Relief

SOLUTION:

1. The Turkish government has offered 30,000 tons of grain for distribution in Greece IF SHIPPING IS PROVIDED (according to the British commercial attaché); the Greek Government is asking for assignment of a Greek ship by the Maritime Commission to Turkey for this special use.

2. One or more additional boats added to present Swedish shipping for relief supplies from Canada and U. S. A.
MEMORANDUM

There are two essentials in regard to the Greek situation. Firstly, it should be made absolutely clear that the King is not going to be forced on the country against its will; and secondly, the present collapse in Greek morale consequent on the loss of Kos, Leros and Samos should be countered with some assurance that winter relief is not also going to fail.

In regard to the first, the so-called Communist forces at present making so much trouble in the country are spreading the charge that the Allies intend to force the King back on Greece in their own interests. This is a tremendous propaganda weapon because of the independent spirit of the Greeks. The British proposal that the King declare now that he will not return until asked to do so by the Greek people themselves is, therefore, a good one. It would deprive subversive elements of their chief appeal to the Greek people. It would also be in the King's own interest, tending to strengthen his cause, which has been inevitably weakened by his association with the Metaxas dictatorship and his own subsequent absence from the country. But only a declaration by him personally can fill the bill in view of the widespread distrust of the Allies on this matter
matter which has been sown in Greece.

In regard to the second matter, not only the recent military failures in the islands but the publicity given to Allied plans in nearly every quarter of the globe except in the Balkans, is operating today to make the Greeks, who have given their all to the cause, feel that they are a forgotten people, and pushing them fast into a chaotic state of desperation. It should be made at once clear to them that our relief plans for them this winter will not also fail. Grain is ready for shipment to them now, but transportation is lacking. It is vital that this be somehow supplied, and that the Greeks be made aware that it will be supplied.

I attach a memorandum on the King's problem, drawn up by the British Ambassador to Greece, with which I thoroughly agree, and a brief note as to the present critical relief situation.
Main talking points with the King of the Hellenes

1. Refer again to your previous conversation when you told the King that the strategic situation had changed and that it was most unlikely that any but quite insubstantial British forces would be sent to Greece when the Germans evacuate.

2. Point out that at the time when we thought a considerable British army would go to Greece to drive the Germans out, we strongly supported the King's desire to enter Greece with the British and Greek forces. Under the changed conditions such British forces as might go to Greece would be mainly concerned in ensuring law and order and in assisting in the distribution of relief supplies.

3. It would be essential for the Greek Government to function at the earliest possible date in close association with the British and in an atmosphere as far removed as possible from political controversy. This Government would have to be mainly composed of leading personalities who had lived in Greece during the period of the occupation.

4. During the whole period of the German occupation acute controversy has continued and grown increasingly strong on the subject of the King's return before the will of the people has been expressed. The immediate return of the King in the teeth of this opposition would inevitably raise this controversy to fever point, and it would be impossible for the King himself to remain outside political dissension. He would find himself confronted with a situation even more acute than that which led to the Metaxas Dictatorship, and would therefore start under every disadvantage, which would make it impossible for him to return in the role which he and we desire for him — that of a constitutional monarch.

5. The immediate confusion that will result from the difficult social and economic conditions caused by the occupation will make it essential for the Government to be in the hands of a leading personality, who has made his mark through his bold resistance to the Germans within the country. He will have to form an emergency Committee prepared to act firmly and to put down disorder. The first administration to be formed will be of a temporary character to tide over the period until normal conditions can be established and elections held. It would be an undesirable situation for the King, when he first returned to Greece, to be associated directly with an administration bound to become unpopular and unable to accord all those freedoms associated with a constitutional monarchy.

6. In these circumstances, the King should consider the choice of the most suitable personality to head a Regency Committee in Athens the moment the Germans evacuate. Archbishop Damaskinos is prepared to undertake this responsibility, but must know in advance that he can announce to the Greek people, as soon as the Germans quit Athens, that he has the legal authority of the King for so doing.

7. There is therefore every advantage for the King, in his own interests as well as those of his country, to make it clear now to his people that he does not intend to return to Greece until such conditions have been established as will allow him to function as a constitutional monarch. He has no desire to return to Greece unless he can so function, but he also has no desire to return unless he is convinced by a clear expression of the people's will that the system of constitutional monarchy is desired by them.
8. An immediate declaration to this effect would rally moderate opinion against any attempt made by a small section, who seek to impose their will by force as soon as the Germans leave Athens. This section have made capital out of the failure of the King so far to make such a declaration.

9. There is reason to believe that if Zervas knew that such a declaration would be made by the King, he would immediately ask that his irregular forces should be incorporated in the Greek regular army. If this were immediately granted by the King it would act as a magnet to draw large numbers of the officers and men in the ELAS forces to break away from purely sectional political control and make a similar request for incorporation on the same terms as those accorded to Zervas. This would bring the Greek Government in Cairo into close association with the resistance movements inside Greece, and would thereby enormously enhance the authority and prestige of the King and his Government, which would then be reformed to include personalities from Greece and would consequently provide a Government of which Archbishop Damaskinos could avail himself when he set up his Regency Committee in Athens.

British Embassy to Greece,
CAIRO

25th November, 1943.
Dear Franklin,

Yesterday George & Grace told me this morning that he is very anxious to see you and has asked me to convey to you his request for a meeting before you leave.

As I told you the other day, I believe it would be a good thing for you to see him
If you can possibly arrange it, as he is distressed in his mind as to whether he should make the declaration which has been suggested to him by the British, and a talk with you might not fail to reassure him and help him come to a decision.

Ever yours affectionately,

[Signature]

[Address]
Dear Franklin:

The enclosed memorandum has been sent to me by the King of Greece for personal forwarding to you. I am sorry to say that he is unhappy again, this time concerning the developments covered in the last part of my letter of December 13th. He is very anxious to assure you that he has really strictly conformed to your advice not to make any more "declarations," and is afraid you may have seen some erroneous press reports concerning the letter which he wrote to his Prime Minister, published after you left. Furthermore, although in the approved text of that letter he said "that when the desired moment of liberation arrives I will establish the time of my return to Greece in agreement with the Government," he does not conceive that this constitutes any "public statement" on his part, and denies that it adds anything new to the situation, since he would naturally, in any event, consult his own appointed Ministers when making an important decision.

I have of course told the King that I will transmit his memorandum to you and convey his assurances. But for your information, since I know you to be personally interested in his fortunes, I think I should add that his own Government is not taking his point of view in this matter - which is perhaps the real reason for his anxiety rather than the erroneous press reports, which were quickly corrected. The Government clearly considers his letter as a public statement, quite on a par with

The President,
The White House.
a par with his declaration of July 4th, in which he promised that a constituent assembly would decide on the future regime in Greece, and this was shown only last night, beyond a peradventure, when the Prime Minister said in a radio broadcast to the Greek people, "the King has already given an example of unity by his declaration of July 4th and subsequently by his letter of November 8th". It would appear to be the Prime Minister's view that since not only the present Government, but any Government which the King may be able to form prior to his return, is likely to be against his returning in advance of an expression of the people's will, the King has now practically bound himself to await such expression. The King doesn't want to recognize this, but unfortunately he allowed his letter to be published.

In all this, it seems possible that the King may have given us another example of his inability to think as fast as his subjects, but in any case, if there are any further developments in this matter, which Gilbert and Sullivan might be tempted to call a pretty kettle of fish, I shall not fail to let you know.

Affectionately yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure
After the declaration of the King of the Hellenes published on July 4th, His Majesty made no further public statement.

On December 12th, however, the Greek Prime Minister deemed it opportune to make public an extract from a letter addressed to him by the King on November 8th and to comment on it at a Press Conference held the following day.

Unfortunately, the wording of the above-mentioned extract has been erroneously published in the Press and the subsequent interview of Mr. Tsouderos was also incorrectly reproduced giving rise to further misinterpretations.

Therefore, it must be stressed that all discussions on the question of the future regime in Greece should be closed until the day of the country’s liberation. Till then Greeks should be left to their sole aim which is to fight and resist the enemy in every way, thus contributing to the final victory of the United Nations.

Cairo, December 19th, 1943.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral Brown

Will you take this up with
the State and Navy Departments
for preparation of reply for my
signature?

F. D. R.

Message from the Royal Greek Embassy,
Washington, D. C., 1/4/44, quoting
message for the President from His
Majesty The King of the Hellenes,
reading "It is with particular satisfac-
tion that I have been informed that
the United States Government has under
consideration the provision for Greece
of four ships of the destroyer escort
type. This was very welcome to Greek
circles and to the Greek Navy which has
sustained very severe losses during
the war. This new renewal token of your
interest toward my people impels me to
convey to you my heartfelt thanks. George
II, R".

(over)
At the bottom of this message is the following: "For the information of the President, the Greek ambassador wishes to add that by a note addressed to the State Department, dated November 19, 1943, the Greek Government applied for the above ships under Lend Lease Agreement".
January 21, 1944.

Dear King George:

The United States Government has given careful consideration to the application of the Greek Government, for the transfer to it of four ships of the destroyer escort type under the Lend Lease Agreement.

I am indeed sorry to tell you that there are at present no such vessels which can be made available to the Greek Navy.

Being very sensible of the distinguished part which the Greek Navy is playing in the war and of the severe losses which it has sustained, I especially dislike to be the bearer of such information. At the same time, I can assure you of the continuing interest of the United States in cooperating, whenever possible, with the Greek Navy in order that its strength against our common enemy may be maintained.

With my warm regards,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Majesty

George II,

King of the Hellenes.

Cop. of this letter has been send to Lt. Col. Wm. Regan.

Dm.
OPERATIONS

January 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE MAIL ROOM:

Please let Lt. Rigdon (in Admiral Brown’s office) know when this letter has been signed.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN

Will you take this up with the State and Navy Departments for preparation of reply for my signature?

F. D. R.
FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HELLENES
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT.

My dear Mr. President:

It is with particular satisfaction that I have been informed that the United States Government has under consideration the provision for Greece of four ships of the destroyer escort type. This was very welcome to Greek circles and to the Greek Navy which has sustained very severe losses during the war. This renewed token of your interest toward my people impels me to convey to you my heartfelt thanks.

GEORGE II, R.

For the information of the President, the Greek Ambassador wishes to add that by a Note addressed to the State Department, dated November 18, 1943, the Greek Government applied for the above ships under Lend Lease Agreement.
FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HELLENES  
TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT.

My dear Mr. President:

It is with particular satisfaction that I have been informed that the United States Government has under consideration the provision for Greece of four ships of the destroyer escort type. This was very welcome to Greek circles and to the Greek Navy which has sustained very severe losses during the war. This renewed token of your interest toward my people impels me to convey to you my heartfelt thanks.

GEORGE II, R.

For the information of the President, the Greek Ambassador wishes to add that by a Note addressed to the State Department, dated November 18, 1943, the Greek Government applied for the above ships under Lend Lease Agreement.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The President.

Subject: Letter to King George of Greece in reference to a letter of thanks for a proposed gift of four (4) DDs.

1. Neither the State Department nor the Navy Department are able to explain the King's letter of thanks to you, as they have not been able to find any explanation of his assumption that we will turn over four (4) DDs.

2. It has just been learned that the British have turned over to the Greeks five (5) ships -- one (1) DD and four (4) corvettes.

3. The enclosed letter for your signature has been prepared in the Navy Department after consultation with the State Department.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

WILLIAM BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President.

As requested in your memorandum dated 8 January 1944 there is enclosed herewith a proposed reply from the President to King George II of Greece.

The proposed reply has been cleared with the State Department. It is also consistent with my reply to the Secretary of State, dated 2 January 1944, on the same subject.

The State Department, in discussing the matter, expressed concern over the possibility that the British might be approached by the Greeks in their desire for escort vessels, and expressed the hope that ships of the same or similar type would not be furnished by the British to the Greeks.

[Signature]
My dear King George:

The United States Government has given careful consideration to the application of the Greek Government, for the transfer to it of four ships of the destroyer escort type under the Lend Lease Agreement.

It is with deep regret that I have to inform Your Majesty that there are at present no such vessels which can be made available to the Greek Navy.

Being very sensible of the distinguished part which the Greek Navy is playing in the war and of the severe losses which it has sustained, I especially deplore the necessity of conveying this information. At the same time I can assure Your Majesty of the continuing interest of the United States in cooperating, whenever possible, with the Greek Navy in order that its strength against our common enemy may be maintained.

Very sincerely yours,

His Majesty
George II,
King of the Hellenes.
FELICITATIONS ON THE FOURTH OF JULY.
C. P. Diamantopoulos
Ambassador of Greece
p.f.
The President
of the U.S.A.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Greek Situation

Mr. Churchill informed you direct from Italy, I understand, of certain military plans for Greece which you approved.

Further information from Ambassador Murphy indicates that Mr. Churchill also arranged, during his visit to Italy, to have the Greek Government removed from Cairo to Salerno (the King going to London), and that Greek Premier Papandreou agreed to this during his political talks with the Prime Minister. The reasons for deciding to undertake such a disruptive move on the eve of the liberation of Greece are obscure, though the objective may well have been to place the Greek Government directly under the control of General Wilson during its last few weeks in exile. In any case, the immediate result has been the destruction of the recently hard-won Greek unity. Our Chargé near the Greek Government at Cairo reports that, at a stormy session following Papandreou's return from Italy, Vice Premier Venizelos and the two other liberal Ministers resigned, and that it seems doubtful whether the five prospective cabinet members representing EAM (actually en route to Cairo from inside Greece), will now join the exiled Government.

Ambassador MacVeagh has been sent back to Cairo, where his presence is now required for the Bulgarian negotiations. The Embassy has been directed to make no preparations to move to Italy for the time being, in view of the existing uncertainties, and has been informed that the Department will consider this matter after the establishment of the Greek Government in its prospective new seat, in the light of the military and political situation then prevailing.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Greek Situation

With reference to my memorandum of September 2, 1944, our Chargé near the Greek Government reports that the EAM representatives from occupied Greece were sworn in as members of the Greek Government on September 2, taking over the Ministries of Finance, Communications, National Economy, Labor and Agriculture. The leader of the group, Professor Alexander Svolos, now Minister of Finance, has told our Chargé that while they were distressed to find the liberal cabinet Ministers had resigned they had decided to join the Cabinet in order to forestall civil war. He said that the members of the group had entered reservations regarding their oaths to the Crown and that they would endeavor to secure a reversal of the decision to move the Greek Government to Italy, which they feel will disrupt urgently necessary planning.
Mr. Latta
for the President's
approval.

B. Haller
Room 296
Message from Mr. Papandreou to the President on occasion of Naval victory in Philippines (REUNTIL 12, November 5) reached Department on November 28. Please convey following message to Mr. Papandreou with appropriate explanation of unavoidable delay.

QUOTE I thank you for your kind message on the occasion of the success of our Navy in its recent operations against Japanese aggressors in the Philippines. It is a source of satisfaction to the American people, as it is to you, that your words could be sent from Greek soil so deservedly liberated from Nazi occupation.
Franklin D. Roosevelt. UNQUOTE

O.K.

Stretinius
(6 pm)

MR: REB: CC
12/2/44
740.0011 F.W./11-2544

Original returned to Mrs. Halla, Room 296 State Department Dec.6,1944
Caserta

Dated November 28, 1944
Rec’d 8:44 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1522, November 28, 1 p.m.

The Royal Hellenic Ministry for Foreign Affairs
has requested me to transmit (No. 12, November 5,
3 p.m. for Department from MacVeagh) the following
telegram to the President from His Excellency Georges
Papandreou, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Greece:

"Please accept and convey to the Government and
people of the United States and in particular to the
American Navy, the heartfelt congratulations of the
Hellenic Government and myself for the great naval
victory of the Philippines, which has inflicted a
decisive blow to the treacherous sea power of Japan.
The Greek people, free again after these long years
of unprecedented struggle and plight, rejoices on
these shores which have witnessed the view of Salamis,
at this splendid..."
-2-, #1522, November 28, 1 p.m., from Caserta

at this splendid achievement of your sailors, and
the glorious step which it marks in the majestic
progress of the United Nations toward a world of
justice and peace".

KIRK

HRM
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Crisis

I believe you will be interested in looking at the enclosed message from Kirk which summarizes Churchill's instructions to the British Commanding General in Athens as to the manner in which he shall deal with the uprising there.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 1605 from Caserta, December 5, 1944.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1605, December 5, 8 p.m.

Churchill has sent a message to General Scoibie in Athens stating that he has given instructions to S.I.C. to make certain that all British forces in Greece are left there and all possible reinforcements should be sent. He informed Scoibie that he would hold him responsible for maintaining order in Athens and for neutralizing or destroying all EAM ELAS groups who come near the capital. Churchill has authorized Scoibie to make all regulations he wishes for strong control of the streets or for rounding up any numbers of truculent people. He pointed out that he expected ELAS would put women and children in the advance line when shooting began and that he, Scoibie, must be clever about this and avoid mistakes. Churchill added that Scoibie should not hesitate to fire at any armed male in Athens who assailed British authority or Greek authority with which British are working.

Churchill
December 5, 3 p.m. from Caserta.

Churchill stated that it would be well if Scobie command could be reinforced by authority of some Greek Government and added that Papandreou was being told by British Ambassador not to hesitate.

In addition Churchill stated that Scobie should not hesitate to act as if he were in a conquered city where a local rebellion were in progress and suggested that with the forces at his command he should be able to give ELAS bands approaching from outside a lesson which would make others unlikely to behave similarly.

Churchill's message to Scobie concluded with statement that he would give his support to Scobie on all action taken on this basis and stated that British must hold and dominate Greek capital. He commented that it would be a great thing if Scobie could succeed in doing this without bloodshed if possible but that he should not hesitate to go through with bloodshed if necessary.

KIRK

JLS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
150, December 15, Noon.

According to the British Ambassador with whom I have just talked, the King has replied from London that he must have the advice of his Ministers before agreeing to the proposed Regency. Papandreou is already in agreement with the proposal and the British expect that the consent of the others can be obtained today. They feel that the solution proposed is most hopeful of success in stopping the civil war as the Archbishop is confident that he can deal with ELAS. His program if he is named Regent is to proclaim at once that if arms are laid down (one) there will be a general amnesty (two) the British Army will see to it that no (repeat no) reprisals against ELAS occur and (three) he will constitute a new government of all parties and resistance movements represented in the recent coalition.

I asked Mr. Leeper if there is anything that we could do to help bring the present dreadful conditions in Athens to an end and he said "I hope the American Government will support..."
support this effort as it constitutes the only reasonable hope of saving the Anglo-American (sic) position here." I personally feel that the effort is as well conceived as anything could be under the present circumstances in which compromise and moderation appear essential though the amnesty regarding which LMS is reported to be particularly anxious and the reacceptance of the Communist party into the government are bound to be very unpopular with the extreme Right. Meanwhile, the British are continuing to bring in reinforcements and should have all of their two new divisions here today or tomorrow. Their plan according to the Ambassador is to show themselves strong enough to face any eventuality while at the same time attempting conciliation and placing the settlement of internal political questions squarely in Greek hands.

MACVEAGH

LMS

NOTE: Shown to N. E. at 5:49 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Situation as viewed by
Alexander, MacMillan and Leeper

I believe you will be interested in the enclosed telegrams from Kirk and MacVeagh setting forth in some detail the views of Field Marshal Alexander, Harold MacMillan and Ambassador Leeper in regard to the Greek situation.

Enclosures:

1. Telegram no. 1776,
   December 15, 1944,
   from Caserta.
2. Telegram no. 153,
   December 16, 1944,
   from Athens.
MFD-1005
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (......)

Caserta
Dated December 15, 1944
Rec'd 7:30 a.m., 17th.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1776, December 15, 9 p.m.

FOR SECRET.
FOR THE SECRETARY.

Reference my 1750, December 14, 3 p.m.

I have learned that on his return from Athens on December 12 Field Marshal Alexander reported to Churchill that he found the situation in Athens much more grave than he had felt it to be when he was in London. He stated he was obliged to travel in an armored vehicle from the airfield into town; that the British airfield (Kalamaki) and road to Athens were under fire and not at all securely held. He said the initiative in the fighting did not rest wholly with the British. The British in fact were beleaguered in the heart of the city and held less of Athens than he thought. Port Heracles was not in firm possession of the British nor was the Piraeus area. ELAS held electrical power station and had cut off the water supply of the city. The British were not in a

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-1-72

FEB 9 1972

By J. Schauble Date
-2-#1776, December 15, 9 p.m., from Caserta.

position to unload ships freely due to the military situation. He recommended that the port would have to be cleared as a primary military objective. He suggested that it should be proclaimed that all those who were fighting as rebels, and at the same time those who were found in civilian clothing and were carrying weapons or rifles would be shot. He suggested also certain military measures which I will not report for security reasons.

Alexander added that it was most imperative that he and MacMillan be authorized to proceed with the proposal to name the Archbishop of Athens as Regent. Alexander stated that he was firmly opposed to discussing at this time any terms of settlement with ELAS lest they be regarded by ELAS as a sign of weakness. He said it was most desirable that no time should be lost before negotiations regarding the regency should begin and this might produce the effect of conciliation without the British themselves being pictured as the initiators of such negotiation.

I am further informed that MacMillan has cabled personally to Churchill in similar vein urging him to take up
take up with the King of Greece in the strongest possible terms the desirability of obtaining the King's agreement to the appointment of Archbishop of Athens as Regent. (See my number 1750, December 14, 3 p.m.) He said he did not believe that the Archbishop would accept the title of Prime Minister, as such a measure would not give him the authority to handle the situation and remove the most powerful cry against the British which is that of foreign intervention. MacMillan said the King must not be permitted to ignore this appeal and said he felt certain that the King does not realize that Greece is a mass of violent internal hatred and that the country is on the brink of a bloody civil war. He added that the King must consent to this proposal for the sake of his people and that Churchill should point out to King George that such an act on his part would be regarded as that of a statesman and of a patriot. He suggested that King George ought to be told that this was his last chance to try to save the monarchy, otherwise any hope of doing so would be gone forever. MacMillan went on to say
December 16, 9 p.m., from Caserta.

to say that the King must be told that this proposal is not the idea of the British Government but a spontaneous desire of the Greek people and that everyone in Athens is in favor of this arrangement.

He pointed out to Churchill that if this matter should not be settled there is great danger of the British Government and the British people being accused of connivance with King George's selfish policy. He added that the British and American press would be quick to take up such a line of attack. MacMillan added that there must be no compromising with the King and that he must agree to the regency as he felt certain that the Archbishop would not agree to act as Prime Minister. To be Prime Minister would not give him the dignity of that distance from the political scene which he would require in order to successfully handle the task which lay before him.

MacMillan added that the parties of the Right felt that this was the last chance to save Greece from terrorist dictatorship of the Left and that the Archbishop must be appointed at once as Regent for a period of time calculated to give him the requisite
-5-/1776, December 15, 9 p.m., from Caserta.

requisite confidence. MacMillan's final appeal to Churchill was very strong and moving and it is clear that he is deeply concerned over the gravity of the present situation. He said that unless Churchill could put this matter through with the King the situation resulting would be a long and costly military operation in Greece to the embarrassment of the British in the field of international affairs. He added that the parties of the Left feel that if they should quit now, there will be reprisals from the Right.

According to our informant, Churchill has replied urgently to MacMillan stating that both he and Eden talked with the King who has asked for more time to consider the matter. The King apparently stated that he had in particular to take account of advice which he is constantly receiving from Papandreou and others. He told Churchill and Eden that according to his information there was no enthusiasm in Greece for the proposal that the Archbishop be made Regent and the King read to Churchill and Eden a telegram which he had just received from Papandreou.
Papandreou advising him strongly against accepting the proposal regarding the regency. Churchill then asked MacMillan to send him immediately reasons for supporting this proposal, who in Greece could be expected to back it, and suggested that MacMillan should see Papandreou, Sophoulis and other Greek party leaders at once to sell them this line and urge them to address themselves in the same sense directly to the King.

KIRK

WFS
ATHENS VIA ARMY
Dated December 16, 1944
Rec'd 2:06 p.m., 17th.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

PRIORITY
153, December 16, 2 p.m.

British Ambassador has just told me that while Sophoulis as head of the Liberal Party telegraphed the King yesterday supporting the proposal to name the Archbishop as Regent (see my 150, December 15, noon) Papandreou unexpectedly failed to concur and persuaded the Cabinet that a better idea would be to have a regency council of three composed of the Archbishop, Plastiras and Dragoumis, present Under Minister for Foreign Affairs. A telegram carrying this recommendation has, therefore, also gone to the King. It is obvious that if this council of three were to be set up it would strengthen Papandreou's chances of retaining the Premiership since it would remove the possibility of competition from Plastiras and the naming of the Royalist Dragoumis would appear to have been included as a bait to secure the King's acceptance.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schausle Date FEB 1972
-2- #153, December 16, 2 p.m., from Athens via Army acceptance. However, both Leeper and MacMillan are much alarmed as well as disgusted at this recrudescence of political maneuvering at this critical time and believe—as I feel correctly—that passions can now be calmed only by the appointment of a single chief of state enjoying the confidence of the people and by an act which will completely and clearly remove the King question from the present picture (repeated to Caserta). They have, therefore, telegraphed Churchill that he should at all costs and today, if possible, persuade the King to appoint the Archbishop as sole Regent. Meanwhile the battle of Athens continues with the British forces consolidating their new reinforcements at Piraeus and Kalamaki and preparing an onward movement to Athens where at present they remain on the defensive.

MACVIAGH

JT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Crisis

You will be interested in the two attached messages on Greece.

Enclosures:

1. Copy of telegram no. 11208 from London, December 18, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram no. 1804 from Caserta, December 18, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scourby Date FEB 9 1972
MH-1265
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ( )

Secretary of State,
Washington.

11208, December 18, 8 p.m.

We discussed today with the Foreign Office official directly concerned with Greek affairs the question of the Regency. He said the following:

"MacMillan and Leeper wired the Foreign Office that it was believed in Athens that the appointment of the Archbishop of Athens as Regent might bring about a solution of the existing crisis. The idea was put to the King in London, who, however, is lukewarm regarding Damaskinos, as he believes the latter to be personally ambitious and not strong enough to solve the crisis. The King said, moreover, that he had been receiving messages from Greek politicians in Athens not to appoint a Regent. Foreign Office again communicated with MacMillan, and Sophoulis then sent a message to the King advocating the appointment of a Regent; and Papandreou agreed.
-2-#11208, December 18, 8 p.m., from London

agreed with the British in Athens that this was all right. However, he surreptitiously sent a message to the King, advising him against the appointment. The latest development is a suggestion in Athens that a Regency of three be created.

In view of the fact that the King has received messages against a Regency, and particularly in view of Papandreou's latest message to him, the Foreign Office is reluctant to urge the King to take positive action regarding the Regency.

Another feature is that the King believes that by appointing a Regent he will damage his own position, and he says that if Demaskinos cannot, as he thinks, solve the crisis, there would be little use in appointing him as Regent.

WINANT

WTD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (*****)

Caserta
Dated December 18, 1944
Rec'd 10:06 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1804, December 18, 10 a.m.

It is now reported from Greece that four-fifths of the mainland is in control ELAS. Athens water supply is still interrupted and there is imminent risk of spread of typhoid and typhus.

In Crete the military governor states he has the situation well in hand but there are rumors of possible coup d'etat by ELAS.

KIRK
WSB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Situation in Greece.

Our latest reports from Greece indicate that the fighting continues bitterly and inconclusively, and that little progress has been made toward a real solution.

Ambassador MacVeagh, in a telegram from Athens received this morning, reports that telegrams which various Greek leaders have received from the King "would appear to indicate that he is once more in one of his characteristic moods of fatal indecision."

In the circumstances, it seems likely that a message from you to the King of Greece might be most helpful in breaking the impasse. We have drawn up a suggested message which is incorporated in the attached draft telegrams to Mr. Churchill and to Ambassador Winant.

If the Prime Minister agrees that the message would be helpful, he is requested to inform the Ambassador, who will then deliver it to the King.

Enclosures:
1. Draft telegram for Ambassador Winant.
2. Draft telegram for Prime Minister Churchill.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, L11-72
FEB 9 1972
By J. Schaufee Date
Following is text of a proposed communication from me to the King of Greece. I have telegraphed the text direct to the Prime Minister asking him to let you know if he considers that it would be helpful to him in connection with his efforts to find a solution to the Greek crisis. If he notifies you that it would, I should be grateful if you would deliver the message to the King.

QUOTE I have been profoundly distressed, and I know how anxious you must be about the situation which has arisen in Greece. We are not directly involved in this matter and are anxious not to intrude ourselves into the internal affairs of Greece or of any other of our liberated allies. We have welcomed Your Majesty's statements and those of your Government assuring the Greek people that they shall have full opportunity to pronounce themselves as to their future form of government, and we have had full confidence that these pledges would be carried out. Unhappily, however, it seems evident from the reports which I receive from Greece that there is still widespread confusion on this issue within the country. Whether or not this confusion has been deliberately spread by Your Majesty's opponents, it would seem to constitute a very real problem which must be disposed of if unity and order are to be restored. I am reluctant at this distance from the scene to offer what may appear to be gratuitous advice, but it has seemed to me increasingly clear that only a courageous and patriotic action of Your Majesty could restore confidence and clear the way for successful negotiations. The great love we Americans have for Greece emboldens me, therefore, to express our hope that you will give most earnest consideration to the recommendations which I understand have been made to you for the naming of the Archbishop as Regent of the Crown in Greece. It seems to me that this action might be particularly efficacious if it were accompanied by a reaffirmation of Your Majesty's intentions and by an assurance that elections will be held at some fixed date, no matter how far in the future.

My heartfelt sympathy goes to you in these difficult and unhappy days. UNQUOTE
DRAFT TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

I am telegraphing to Ambassador Winant the text of the message, quoted below, which I am authorizing him to deliver to the King of Greece if you consider that it would be helpful in connection with your efforts to find a solution to the Greek crisis. If you do think it would help, please notify the Ambassador who will deliver it to the King. If not, I should be glad to have your comments and any suggestions as to how I might be helpful.

QUOTE I have been profoundly distressed, and I know how anxious you must be about the situation which has arisen in Greece. We are not directly involved in this matter and are anxious not to intrude ourselves into the internal affairs of Greece or of any other of our liberated allies. We have welcomed Your Majesty's statements and those of your Government assuring the Greek people that they shall have full opportunity to pronounce themselves as to their future form of government, and we have had full confidence that these pledges would be carried out. Unhappily, however, it seems evident from the reports which I receive from Greece that there is still widespread confusion on this issue within the country. Whether or not this confusion has been deliberately spread by Your Majesty's opponents, it would seem to constitute a very real problem which must be disposed of if unity and order are to be restored. I am reluctant at this distance from the scene to offer what may appear to be gratuitous advice, but it has seemed to me increasingly clear that only a courageous and patriotic action of Your Majesty could restore confidence and clear the way for successful negotiations. The great love we Americans bear for Greece emboldens me, therefore, to express our hope that you will give most earnest consideration to the recommendations which I understand have been made to you for the naming of the Archbishop as Regent of the Crown in Greece. It seems to me that this action might be particularly efficacious if it were accompanied by a reaffirmation of Your Majesty's intentions and by an assurance that elections will be held at some fixed date, no matter how far in the future.

My heartfelt sympathy goes to you in these difficult and unhappy days. UNQUOTE

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Situation

I believe you will be interested in the enclosed telegrams from Kirk and MacVeagh giving recent developments in Greece.

Enclosures:

1. Copy of telegram no. 1837 from Caserta, December 19, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram no. 154 from Athens, December 17, 1944.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (underline)

Caserta

Dated December 19, 1944

Rec'd 3 p.m., 20th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1837, December 19, midnight.

It is learned from OSS sources that Plastiras and Porfyrogenis have been Scobie and stated that EAM and Communists would accept Plastiras as Regent, Premier or simply as a guarantor of democratic solution of the crisis and that ELAS would withdraw from Attica if the formation of a government were acceptable to all parties. The gendarmerie and mountain brigades would be ordered to barracks, the security battalions put in concentration camps, while British troops would keep order. OSS also reports that Porfyrogenis further added that if there was a fair election and the people chose the King, the Communists would accept the decision and continue working within a democratic framework. Plastiras expressed astonishment and satisfaction at moderate attitude of the Left, but agreed that Scobie had no alternative but to carry out orders and proceed to a general offensive.

A Royalist
A Royalist source contacted by OSS condemns the present hands-off policy of the United States, asserting that most American correspondents and OSS representatives were pro-Leftist. Other Rightist and conservative liberals are circulating stories that if American troops had been employed, ELAS would have been more brutally crushed than by British, stating that the Americans in France and Belgium had killed 40,000 civilians. These same sources are reported not to favor a Regency under the Archbishop whom they consider to be pro-ELAS.

Other reports from American sources are that the British have artillery on the Acropolis but have requested that the press not report it. Also that British propaganda contends that the actions of ELAS are preventing Red Cross distribution whereas in fact trucks have been seen bearing Red Cross insignia transporting Greek Government troops and other Red Cross trucks presumably used by ELAS have been machine gunned by British or Greek Government forces.

At Florina a mass meeting on December 15 demanded that UNRRA take over relief and that the British leave Greece.

KIRK

LMS
SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

154, December 17, 1 p.m.

The King's reply to his Government, received yesterday, was to the effect (see Embassy's No. 153 December 16, 2 p.m.) that he is not (repeat not) convinced that a regency is necessary. This reply appears to have been owing, at least in part, to the fact that the Cabinet's telegram included, along with the suggestion of a council of three, a statement (unknown to the British Ambassador yesterday) that the Ministers were themselves not (repeat not) in favor of a regency and were making their suggestion only because the British desired such a solution. On receipt of the King's answer, Mr. Leeper and Mr. MacMillan conferred last night with the Archbishop and Mr. Papandreou, and the last named promised that he would (z) it is the Greek Government's desire that the regency be conferred on the Archbishop. Mr. Leeper is hopeful that this will have the desired effect, but telegrams which I understand on good authority that the
that the King has sent to other persons here, including Mr. Caphandaris and even General Plastiras, would appear to indicate that he is once more in one of his characteristic moods of fatal indecision.

Meanwhile General Scobie has told the ELAS that there can be a cessation of hostilities only if the latter's "regular" forces from the provinces will withdraw outside limits of Attica and the "city reserves" (about 10,000 see my 140, December 11, 3 p.m.) lay down their arms and so far ELAS has indicated willingness to accept first of these terms but has made no mention of the second while communicating own. British Embassy feels that ELAS morale may be weakening though this is not apparent in the fighting. According to same source Archbishop is now inclined should he be made regent (see my 150 of December 15, noon) not (repeat not) to make any change in government until Scobie's terms are accepted and thereafter to call General Plastiras to the Premiership with Sophoulis and Papandreou as Vice Premiers forming rest of Cabinet after receiving recommendations of a council of all political chiefs and resistance leaders.

Mr. Leeper says that with appearance of British reinforcements the leaders of the Right here seem to be hoping
-3- #154, December 17, 1 p.m. from Athens

be hoping that British will carry their battle for them throughout whole of Greece but he emphasized to me that British intend only to protect Athens and thereafter by all means possible to effect conciliation. He confirmed my information that trouble still seriously threatens in Salonika and Patras but that he hopes and expects it will not develop if matters here can be composed soon along lines of present effort (repeated Caserta) however ELAS forces have attacked already Indian units north of Gulf of Patras and these units have evacuated after suffering some casualties.

MACVEIGH ?

(*) Apparent omission has been serviced

WSB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Situation

You will be interested in the enclosed telegrams from Kirk and MacVeagh reporting recent developments in the Greek situation. You may wish to notice particularly MacMillan's reference, as reported by Kirk, to Mr. Churchill's "king mania".

Enclosures:

1. Copy of telegram no. 1872 from Caserta, December 22, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram no. 168 from Athens, December 20, 1944.
ALH-668
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Caserta
Dated December 22, 1944
Rec'd 11:59 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1972, December 22, midnight

TOP SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

MacMillan called at this office before his return to Athens yesterday. He stated he had returned to Caserta for only a few hours in order to confer with Alexander and discuss with him the present status of the situation in Greece. He added that he was discouraged as to prospects of a peaceful settlement. He said there has already been wide destruction and fairly large loss of life in the Greek capital. He said that thanks to the restrictions on circulation in Athens, the true picture had not yet gotten to the outside world. In his opinion at the moment it looked as though a military solution was the only feasible thing at this time. MacMillan said that he was disgusted with the attitude taken by the King in this matter and spoke

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972
December 22, midnight from Caserta

and spoke with contempt of the duplicity and lack of character shown by Greek leaders with whom he has been dealing in the past 10 days. He commented that he regretted that Churchill was not more firm in his representations to the King and in discussing the Greek affair stated impatiently "Winston insists on retaining his King mania".

MacMillan went on to say that he, of course, regretted the Secretary's statement on Greece but insisted that he was grateful for our sympathy with regard to the British position in the Greek dilemma. The British Resident Minister asserted that he did not know how things would work out but that he was thinking of establishing some sort of a committee embodying all Greek parties to be presided over by the Archbishop of Athens or possibly General Plastiras as a solution in the matter. He made it clear, however, that he was not at all certain that such a plan was practicable.

MacMillan was tired and harassed and in discussing the Greek situation and other Balkan problems stated that "the war has been going on too long and people are tired. There is no use fooling ourselves, we are not as good as we were 5 years ago".

KIRK

MJF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BLACK)

Athens
Dated December 20, 1944
Rec'd 5:50 p.m., 22nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

168, December 20, 4 p.m.

In connection with fact that no (repeat no) reply has yet been received from King (see my 164 of December 19, 8 p.m.) my British colleague has just told me that the Prime Minister while telegraphing his recommendation allowed members of cabinet to telegraph individually as well and that a host of political figures here both great and small outside present government have also sent personal messages so that King as usual has been deluged with advice. Leeper says he "knows" that besides that Social Democrat Papandreou, Liberals Sophoulis Caphandaris and Sophianopoulos the Agrarian Mylonas and the Independent Isatsos all recommended Archbishop's appointment and that in addition Svolos of EAM is personally in favor of it while Porphyrogennis Communist has indicated to Plastiras Benizelist that "the left" would welcome it. Hence it can only be that such advice as King has received against it derives from the popular party now apparently reunited in

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaalie Date FEB 9 1972
December 20, 4 p.m., from Athens

reunited in support of royalism. This group and the King's stubborn preference for the interests of his dynasty over all other considerations in this country seem threatening now to extend indefinitely the present deplorable struggle. Mr. Leeper feels that at any moment the ELAS may agree to General Scobie's terms after which a political conference will immediately have to be called and points out that the left will certainly not agree to come to a conference held under any auspices but those they feel they can trust. MacMillan has gone to Italy to consult with Alexander and Leeper is laying urgently before the Foreign Office this danger of a breakdown of a possible military settlement owing to failure to supply machinery acceptable to both sides for working out a political solution.

MACVEACH

JMS
GEM-1433
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Athens
Dated December 26, 1944
Rec'd 10:45 a.m., 27th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE
FOR THE PRESIDENT
185, December 26, 7 p.m.

I have just come from a meeting called by
Mr. Churchill and attended by representative Greek
leaders of all factions including the resurgents for
purpose of starting negotiations for the composition
of political differences underlying present troubles.
Mr. Eden, Field Marshal Alexander and Mr. MacMillan
were also present and I attended as an observer at
Churchill's invitation along with French Minister and
Chief of Russian Military Mission there being no other
United Nations representatives in Athens.

Churchill made a firm but very friendly speech
stating that British troops originally came here to
fight the Germans under arrangement with you and Marshal
Stalin but that developments had compelled them to inter-
vene in a Greek struggle to save the people from
destruction.
-2-#185, December 26, 7 p.m., from Athens.

destruction. He said that General Scobie's military terms for ceasing fire must be accepted but emphasized that Britain wants nothing here for herself but only the welfare of the country, the continuance of Anglo-Greek friendship and most-favored-nation treatment for her trade. He reiterated his recent statement made in London to effect that whether Greece has a republic or a monarchy is a matter for Greeks alone to decide. Finally he said that Britain wants to see Greece united free and prosperous taking her place in the Councils of United Nations in a manner worthy of Greeks who broke the Italian power and fought so bravely against Germany "I beseech you to believe me; I speak in the name of His Majesty's Government".

Both the Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, and the insurgents who included Siantos, Communist leader, expressed appreciation of Churchill's initiative and following these preliminaries Churchill turned meeting over to the Greeks with Archbishop in the chair and British together with foreign observers withdrew. The Greeks are still conferring and it is not (repeat not) to be expected that agreement on a "Government of General Confidence" which the insurgents have alleged to be
-3-#185, December 26, 7 p.m., from Athens,

to be their prime objective will immediately be
realized but an earnest and spectacular attempt has
at least been made toward allaying suspicions and
substituting talking for shooting which are crying
needs of the house.

Mr. Churchill told me that he would be telegraph-
ing you himself tonight.

M. CVEAGH

REP
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Situation

The enclosed telegram from MacVeagh gives further information in regard to the critical military situation of the British in Athens as of December 22.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 175 from Athens, December 22, 1944.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington

175, December 22, Noon

According to my British colleague this morning, no (repeat no) advances have been made toward a solution of the present trouble here in Athens since my last telegram on this subject (No. 168 of December 20, 4 p.m.). No word has come from either the King or E.L.S headquarters. Meanwhile bitter sporadic fighting continues and the extent to which the British have so far underestimated both the size of their military task and the spirit of the opposition has become clear from information now released regarding the capture of the R.F headquarters in Kephissia December 20. Located for the most part in comfortable suburban hotels twelve miles from town in E.L.S held territory, this large administrative formation, comprising some 650 officers and men, was not (repeat not) withdrawn when the trouble started, and a relief column

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date 2/6/72
column arrived only after a siege of several days when it was too late to save more than 100 from death or capture. The final assault on the headquarters was participated in by women and children throwing grenades. The prisoners have been taken to the mountains.

The British claim to have made some progress "clearing" the Piraeus, but after nearly three weeks of fighting, the EL.S still controls four-fifths of Athens. For several days past, it has been actively dynamiting apartment houses and other buildings to form barricades and anti-tank defenses in the principal streets, while British guns and planes continue to pound built-up areas in town and in the suburbs.

Members of the EL.S have openly boasted that they will turn Athens into another Stalingrad, and it would appear that if some such fate, relatively speaking, is not to befall this miserable city, either many more British reinforcements, especially infantry to occupy "cleared" areas, must come in, or a composition, facesaving to both sides, must be arrived at without much further delay.

Repeated to Caserta.

MACVEAGH

IMS
GEM-1676

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Shh!)

Athens

Dated December 27, 1944

Rec'd 7:10 a.m., 28th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

U.S. URGENT

TOP SECRET

FOR THE PRESIDENT

190, December 27, 7 p.m.

I communicated your message this morning to Mr. Churchill, who expressed his appreciation, and this afternoon, had a long talk with him. He is clearly deeply disturbed over the situation here, and its dangers for British prestige and his own position, but is also determined to persist in military operations until Athens and its surroundings are cleared, unless the present Greek negotiations for a settlement of the Governmental issue, which he himself set in motion yesterday, bring about an earlier acceptance of General Scobie’s terms. After that he appears to be thinking of the possibility of composing matters in the

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaeble Date FEB 9 1972
-2-#190, December 27, 7 p.m., from Athens.

in the rest of Greece through the medium of a commission of the three great powers, somewhere along the lines of my suggestion to you in my letter of December 8. He showed himself to me, both yesterday and today, to be resentful of American press criticism of his Greek policy and deeply disappointed over what he feels to be our Government's lack of understanding of his attitude and its failure to support him. I asked him if he wanted me to send you any message and he replied "tell him that I hope he can help us in some way. We want nothing from Greece. We don't want her airfields or her harbors - only a fair share of her trade. We don't want her islands. We've got Cyprus anyhow. We came in here by agreement with our Allies to chase the Germans out and then found that we had to fight to keep the people here in Athens from being massacred. Now if we can do that properly - and we will - all we want is to get out of this damned place."

While I was talking with him word came in from the Archbishop that the Insurgents insist on a regency as a prerequisite for continuing conversations and that the other members of the conference initiated yesterday but
-3-#190, December 27|7 p.m., from Athens.
yesterday but now including a larger number of
political figures have all voted for a regency to
be set up under the Archbishop either now or after
the cease fire has sounded. Mr. Churchill said that
he would probably leave here tomorrow and have another
go at the King on this question.

MACVEAGH

Lt.deB.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Situation

I believe you will be interested in the enclosed telegram from Kirk reporting Field Marshal Alexander's reluctant compliance with Churchill's instructions to send further reinforcements to Greece.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 51 from Caserta, January 6, 1945.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Field Marshall Alexander just before his departure for Greece three days ago manifested considerable annoyance to his intimate collaborators at AFHQ with regard to insistence of Churchill that further reinforcements should be sent to Greece. Although the military position in the Athens -- Piraeus area has improved considerably, situation remains unchanged throughout the country and at Patras, ELAS forces have concentrated outside the town area and are conducting themselves in a menacing manner. Alexander who is still in Athens yesterday very reluctantly ordered substantial further reinforcements to be sent to the Patras area. For reasons of security, I shall not go into detail as to numbers and source of these new forces but I assume that our military authorities at AFHQ will keep War Department fully informed.

Caserta
Dated January 6, 1945
Rec'd 11:05 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Greek Situation

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram from Winant reporting that Eden informed him on January 10 that he hoped the situation in Greece would be cleared within forty-eight hours.

Acting Secretary of State

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 357 from London, January 10, 1945.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
357, January 10, 10 p.m.

PERSONAL AND TO THE SECRETARY.

Today Eden told me that he hoped that the situation in Greece would be cleared within the next forty-eight hours.

I think you would also be interested in my 358, January 10, which is a paraphrase of a TOP SECRET message sent by Brigadier MacLean from Belgrade to the Foreign Office. Sent and received January 9.

WINANT

LMS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 15, 1945

Subject: Letter to the President from the King of the Hellenes.

I have received your memorandum of March 9, 1945, asking that a reply be prepared for your signature to a message from the King of the Hellenes transmitted to you by the Greek Ambassador on December 19, 1944.

You may recall that on December 28, 1944, you sent a telegram to the King, the text of which is attached for your convenience. While the Department was not then aware of the King's earlier message, I believe that your telegram constituted an adequate reply thereto and that no further reply is necessary.

If you agree, I shall be glad to notify the Greek Ambassador orally that a message was sent to the King following your receipt of his letter.

Enclosures:

1. Text of telegram to the King of Greece, December 28, 1944.
2. Note from the Greek Ambassador transmitting letter to the President from the King of the Hellenes.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE TO

Letter drafted 3/14/45

ADDRESSED TO

The President
TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE KING OF GREECE, DECEMBER 28, 1944.

I have been profoundly distressed, and I know how anxious you must be about the situation which has arisen in Greece. We are not directly involved in this matter and are anxious not to intrude ourselves into the internal affairs of Greece or of any other of our liberated allies. We have welcomed your statements and those of your Government assuring the Greek people that they shall have full opportunity to pronounce themselves as to their future form of government, and we have had full confidence that these pledges would be carried out. Unhappily, however, it seems evident from the reports which I receive from Greece that there is still widespread confusion on this issue within the country. Whether or not this confusion has been deliberately spread by your opponents, it would seem to constitute a very real problem which must be disposed of if unity and order are to be restored. I am reluctant at this distance from the scene to offer what may appear to be gratuitous advice, but it has seemed to me increasingly clear that only a courageous and patriotic action on your part could restore confidence and clear the way for successful negotiations. The great love we Americans bear for Greece emboldens me, therefore, to express our hope that you will give favorable consideration to the recommendations which I understand have been made to you for the naming of the Archbishop as Regent of the Crown in Greece. It seems to me that this action might be particularly efficacious if it were accompanied by a reaffirmation of your intentions and by an assurance that elections will be held at some fixed date, no matter how far in the future.

My heartfelt sympathy goes to you in these difficult and unhappy days.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 1972
My dear General:

I beg to enclose herewith a message addressed by H. M. the King of the Hellenes to the President, and I would be much obliged to you if you would be kind enough to transmit it to its high destination.

Please accept, my dear General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signature]

Major General Edwin Watson
The White House
Washington, D. C.
A Message from His Majesty the King of the Hellenes:

The tragic vicissitudes the Greek people are going through today and mention of my name in connection with the news relative thereto compell me to bring to the attention of the President of the United States, the following elements pertinent to the situation:

In whatever I was able to accomplish as the leader of my people during the present war, I had not and do not now have any desire other than to bring the Greek people back to a normal political life, so that they might enjoy in full freedom the blessings of the peace. With this in view, I declared from the first moment that I too, would abide by its sovereign will. I agreed not to return to my country without previously consulting my Government, though I had the happiness of leading Greece to victory through so many difficulties. I further agreed not to raise the issue of my return at a moment when the entire Greek people were celebrating their freedom. And I agreed also to form all my cabinets in exile from persons well known for their anti-monarchical opinions, in the hope that I would contribute to the general appeasement. Instead of this, unfortunately, an organized minority to whom the Allies had furnished arms in order to fight the Germans, used them immediately upon the liberation of the country, aiming at the violent usurpation of authority, and disruption of the Government composed of all parties, after the agreement of Lebanon. All the political parties of the land backed by a huge popular majority, with the exception of the Communists,
are today confronting the rebels. The British forces, which from the very first declared their intention not to interfere in our internal rifts, were compelled, in the face of Communist refusal to surrender their arms, to intervene reluctantly in order to protect the legitimate government and to preserve order in an Allied held territory. Consequently the present contest is waged not about any person or party, but as to whether or not the guerrilla groups, which had been armed by the Allies themselves to fight the enemy, have the right to impose by force the government and the country and to remain armed as an independent power within the State; whether in other words, democratic freedom is to be real or not. I do not wish to express an opinion as to whether or not Allied policy should secure to the liberated countries the reestablishment of their real freedom. But concerning Greece, there is a special obligation which cannot be overlooked, namely, that the guerrilla bands were armed by the Allies themselves, while the rest of the people for obvious reasons, remain unarmed. It is not, therefore, permissible for these people to be left at the mercy of the minority armed by the Allies. The President will readily understand my deepest disappointment when I hear of the charge expressed here and in the United States that both I and the British Government are seeking to impose a definite form of government in Greece. I agree to whatever assurance or guaranty may be asked for the ascertainment of the genuine will of the Greek people. But that which no true democrat can accept is that an armed minority impose in advance its will upon the
government of the country or on me. I am ready to make any personal sacrifice, provided it is for the benefit of my people and is freely asked by them. Today all the major political parties are on my side in this policy, and Mr. Sophoulis, leader of the Liberal party, who is known for his anti-monarchical stand, notified me a while ago that he seeks my intervention for the exercise of my constitutional prerogatives for the settlement of the political situation. I intend, on the termination of the present crisis, to form an all-party government, for a plebiscite and free elections.

I bring these matters to the attention of the President in the certainty that his personal prestige will assist me and my country in dispelling the misunderstanding which I find existing in the United States, to the detriment of the national policy which I am endeavoring, in the midst of infinite difficulties, to put into operation in Greece.
F.D. Presents Ship to Greece

President Roosevelt yesterday presented the Greek government an American-built patrol boat as a lend-lease token of this country's hope and prayer for an early dawn of liberation for the starving peoples of Greece.

In turning over the sleek 173-foot vessel to Greek Ambassador Cimon P. Diamantopoulos at ceremonies in the Navy Yard, the President said Greece today is a "land of desolation, stripped bare of all the essentials of living" and a "gaunt and haggard example of what the Axis is so eager and willing to hand to all the world."

Fighting on Other Shores

"But within their own land and upon other shores," he said, "the Greeks are fighting on. They will never be defeated.

"And the day will come when liberated Greeks will again maintain their own government within the shadow of the Acropolis and the Parthenon."

The craft, to be manned by a Greek crew and used to combat Axis submarines, was christened King George II for the present head of the Greek state.

The King, now in Egypt, described the transfer in a message to Mr. Roosevelt as a reaffirmation of the bonds of friendship between the two nations.

Ceremony By Archbishop

After Diamantopoulos accepted the pocket-sized warship, the commanding officer of the American crew ordered the Stars and Stripes run down and the Greek crew took over. The Most Rev. Archbishop Anthenagoras of the Greek Orthodox church, concluded the ceremony with benediction and the ancient rite of "bathing" the new vessel.

Vessels of similar type were presented as outright gifts to the governments of Norway and The Netherlands, but Congress later stipulated that no ships could be transferred except by lend-lease.