

● PSF

India

India Folder  
1-42

Jan. 2, 1942

My dear Lord Linlithgow:

I have received your note of October eighth which has been presented to me by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Agent General of India, and assure you that it is extremely agreeable to have with us a man of his distinguished attainments.

I am delighted to have met Sir Girja and I have been very happy to have had him in the conferences which Mr. Churchill and I have had recently.

With cordial good wishes for the New Year to you and to the people of India, I am

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency  
The Most Honorable  
The Marquess of Linlithgow, P.C., K.T.,  
G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., O.S.E.,  
Governor General of India,  
New Delhi.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to  
PR

January 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

In compliance with the President's memorandum of December 29, 1941, I am returning herewith a draft of a suggested letter for his signature, addressed to the Governor General of India. Lord Linlithgow's letter to the President is also enclosed herewith.

If the President approves the draft and if you will return it to me when signed, I shall be glad to forward it to the American Commissioner to India for appropriate delivery.

  
George T. Summerlin.

Enclosures:

Original letter from  
Lord Linlithgow to the  
President, October 8, 1941;  
Draft reply.



To

His Excellency Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America.

Dear Mr. President,

I write with the greatest pleasure to introduce to you Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, on his assuming charge as the Agent General for India in the United States of America.

2. Before accepting his present appointment Sir Girja was a Member of my Executive Council, and my deep regret at losing a trusted colleague is tempered by the knowledge that his new duties (for which I conceive him to be eminently suited) will provide him with ampler opportunity to serve India at a time when her common interests with the United States of America are so great.

3. You will, I know, be interested to hear that Sir Girja first visited America in 1921 as a Member of the Indian delegation to the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments; he has the happiest recollections of your great country and its people, and I have the fullest confidence that his acquaintance with them, officially and privately, will be renewed with cordiality.

Governor General of India.

Simla,

The 8<sup>th</sup> October 1941.

PSF: India

*Gen. Conroy*  
B  
3-42

R. D. 3  
PERKASIE, PENNSYLVANIA

March 7, 1942

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mrs. Roosevelt;

Again I must ask you to forgive me for writing as an American citizen who has lived most ~~most~~ of her life in the Pacific war area. If what I say is already well known to you and the President, then forgive me indeed. But I write it anyway, because I find that so many Englishmen even in high official position either do not know or do not realize the situation at this moment in India. It would not be surprising if we did not, either.

I am moved to write this letter because of Raymond Gram Swing's statement in his news broadcast last night that it may be planned to have the allied stand against Japan take place in India. I cannot pretend to know what is the best place to take a stand, but I do know India and the Indians at this moment. The situation there is that the Hindus feel very desperate over the Moslems under Jinnah. The separation between Moslems and Hindus has grown in the ~~last~~ <sup>Themselves</sup> last year to even deeper and more serious proportions. This separation has <sup>long</sup> been fostered by the British divide-and-rule policy, which however unconsciously they have pursued, has nevertheless actually been <sup>followed</sup> ~~done~~. Upon this already fostered separation between eighty million Moslems and the some two hundred and fifty to seventy Hindus has been built a further separation by Japanese propaganda, which has told the Moslems that they may have India, and has allowed that Moslem leader Jinnah to believe that he will be the ruler of India once the Japanese get control.

Jinnah is a demagogue of the most dangerous type who does not love his country first. He is the perfect tool for the Axis. He is anti-Chinese. I suppose you saw what he said about Chiang's recent visit to India. He has no sympathy with any of the allies. He is in fact ready to act for Japan at the first possible moment. Add to this fact the one that the Moslems, though smaller in number than the Hindus, are war-like, dominating, and fierce in comparison to the quiet, passive and peace-loving Hindus, and that they have long had a desire to rule India, and one has the picture now ready to come to life. There will be in India the strongest fifth column that any country has yet had when the Axis attacked.

It is a fallacy to think that the people of India will defend their country as the Chinese have done. They

or may

people.

will make an effort but it is doubtful whether they will succeed. In addition to the fifth column movement among the powerful and bitter Moslems under a most disloyal and dangerous leader, it is also true that the Indians as a whole, and particularly the Hindus, have the mind of a dependent race. This is inevitable in a country which has been a colonial possession for a hundred and fifty years. It takes a period of readjustment for the dependent mind to feel and become free and fearless and ready to act on its own initiative. The Indians have too long been used to having their thinking done for them, whereas the Chinese have always been a free people.

I say this in order to warn us all that we must not count on strong successful action from the Indians. It will not come soon enough. Even if they do the best they can I doubt it will be enough in the present crisis *to save India.*

I doubt they will even do the best they can. They are as a group so filled with bitterness against the English that we must look for revengeful massacres against all white people on a scale much greater than have taken place in Malaya and Burma. This I know and I heard it ~~say~~ stated again only last week in a confidential conversation with an Indian friend of many years, an Indian of great wisdom and intelligence who deplored what he foresaw.

Therefore I hope that if our American boys are sent to India they will realize the situation and will know that they must be prepared for a revenge which may fall upon them, too, only because they are helping white men whom the Indians hate. There are of course Indians who do not want to see the English defeated, but these, I grieve to say, are very few and mostly in high place in officialdom. The rank and file of the people are appallingly bitter. Surely those who lead our men will be put on their guard against all this.

I write this letter out of private knowledge *long* directly obtained, and I am typing it myself so that I have no copy. Please destroy it when you are finished with it, and don't in any case trouble to answer it. I don't want it on my conscience that I did not speak when speaking might have shed a little light. Doubtless all this is known. If it is, then please just take this letter as corroboration.

Yours with highest personal regard,

*Frank J. Buck*

*PSF: India*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. ROOSEVELT:

You can tell Pearl Buck  
that I have read her letter of March  
7th with real interest. I am keeping  
her letter in my files.

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE *x20*  
AND GENERAL MARSHALL

*x25-7*

Will you be good enough to pre-  
pare a joint reply to the enclosed for me  
to send to Louis Johnson?

*x4069*

F.D.R.

Cable from Johnson, New Delhi, April 17  
No. 190 re Indian situation.

/s/

S W

OK

FDR

4/24/42

India folder 1942

(S E A L)

Department of State

Washington

April 24, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your memorandum of April 21, 1942, addressed to General Marshall and to me, directing that a joint reply be made to Colonel Johnson in answer to his telegram No. 190 of April 17, 8 p. m., in which there was incorporated by reference his telegram No. 155 of April 6, 5 p. m., quoting a letter from General Wavell requesting American aircraft for the defense of India.

This matter has been discussed by officers of the Department with General Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department, who states that General Marshall has acted upon General Wavell's request after discussing the question with you. Expressing the opinion that it would be inadvisable to transmit information regarding the precise nature of the action taken through other than military channels, General Eisenhower suggests, on behalf of General Marshall, that the following message be transmitted to Colonel Johnson:

General Brereton has been fully informed of the reinforcements in airplanes he is to expect in the near future and has been directed to operate under the operational control of the appropriate British commander operating in defense of the eastern coast of India.

It is General Eisenhower's opinion that, upon receipt of this message, it will be possible for Colonel Johnson to make appropriate arrangements to acquaint General Wavell with the information which has

x48-7  
x249 official  
x4193

been conveyed to General Brereton by the War Department. Accordingly, there is enclosed for your signature, if you approve, a telegram to Colonel Johnson containing the statement prepared by General Eisenhower on behalf of General Marshall.

In as much as I have already replied to the last paragraph of Colonel Johnson's telegram No. 190 of April 17, 8.p.m., the telegram which is enclosed for your consideration relates to only the first section of Colonel Johnson's message.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Sumner Welles

Enclosure:

Telegram to  
New Delhi.

*x 6 State World War II*

TELEGRAM SENT

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington,

April 23, 1942.

AMERICAN MISSION

NEW DELHI

With reference to your no. 190, April 17, 8 p. m.

The President desires that the following message from him be conveyed to Colonel Johnson:

Quote     General Brereton has been fully informed of the  
reinforcements in airplanes he is to expect in the near future  
and has been directed to operate under the operational control of  
the appropriate British commander operating in defense of the  
eastern coast of India     Unquote

/s/ ROOSEVELT

NE:WLP:DF



India - 1942

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE,  
NEW DELHI.

May 1, 1942.

Dear Mr President,

I have received your letter of March 19, 1942, which has been presented to me by Colonel Louis Johnson and write to assure you how glad we are to have with us in India one of his personality and distinguished attainments, a man moreover who enjoys the President's personal confidence.

2. It has been a pleasure to me to meet Colonel Johnson and I am confident that his experience and personality, particularly in problems relating to military supply, will be of the greatest assistance to India and America in the prosecution of the joint war effort. His presence among us is an earnest of high endeavour in the common cause.

May I send you an expression of esteem and cordial good wishes on behalf of the Princes and peoples of India and from myself.

His Excellency Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the U.S.A.,  
The White House, Washington.

Yours very sincerely  
Kinloch

President,  
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Sexagram, Via Wardha  
(India)

1st July 1942

*Dear Friend,*

I twice missed coming to your great country. I have the privilege of having numerous friends there both known and unknown to me. Many of my countrymen have received and are still receiving higher education in America. I know too that several have taken shelter there. I have profited greatly by the writings of Thoreau and Emerson. I say this to tell you how much I am connected with your country. Of Great Britain I need say nothing beyond mentioning that in spite of my intense dislike of British Rule, I have numerous personal friends in England whom I love as dearly as my own people. I had my legal education there. I have therefore nothing but good wishes for your country and Great Britain. You will therefore accept my word that my present proposal, that the British should unreservedly and without reference to the wishes of the people of India immediately withdraw their rule, is prompted by the friendliest intention. I would like to turn into good will the ill will which, whatever may be said to the contrary, exists in India towards Great Britain and thus enable the millions of India to play their part in the present war.

My personal position is clear. I hate all war. If, therefore, I could persuade my countrymen, they would make a most effective and decisive contribution in favour of an honourable peace. But I know that all of us have not a living faith in non-violence. Under foreign rule however we can make no effective contribution of any kind in this war, except as helots.

The policy of the Indian National Congress, largely guided by me, has been one of non-embarrassment to Britain, consistently with the honourable working of the Congress, admittedly the largest political organisation, of the longest standing in India. The British policy as exposed by the Crápps mission and rejected by almost all parties has opened our eyes

and

has driven me to the proposal I have made. I hold that the full acceptance of my proposal and that alone can put the Allied cause on an unassailable basis. I venture to think that the Allied declaration, that the Allies are fighting to make the world safe for freedom of the individual and for democracy sounds hollow, so long as India and, for that matter, Africa are exploited by Great Britain, and America has the Negro problem in her own home. But in order to avoid all complications, in my proposal I have confined myself only to India. If India becomes free, the rest must follow, if it does not happen simultaneously.

In order to make my proposal fool-proof I have suggested that, if the Allies think it necessary, they may keep their troops, at their own expense, in India, not for keeping internal order but for preventing Japanese aggression and defending China. So far as India is concerned, she must become free even as America and Great Britain are. The Allied troops will remain in India during the war under treaty with the Free India Government that may be formed by the people of India without any outside interference, direct or indirect.

It is on behalf of this proposal that I write this to enlist your active sympathy.

I hope that it would commend itself to you.

Mr. Louis Fischer is carrying this letter to you.

If there is any obscurity in my letter, you have but to send me word and I shall try to clear it.

I hope finally that you will not resent this letter as an intrusion but take it as an approach from a friend and well wisher of the Allies.

I remain  
Yours sincerely  
Mahatma

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

August 1, 1942

My dear Mr. Gandhi;

I have received your letter of July 1, 1942, which you have thoughtfully sent me in order that I may better understand your plans, which I well know may have far-reaching effect upon developments important to your country and to mine.

I am sure that you will agree that the United States has consistently striven for and supported policies of fair dealing, of fair play, and of all related principles looking towards the creation of harmonious relations between nations. Nevertheless, now that war has come as a result of Axis dreams of world conquest, we, together with many other nations, are making a supreme effort to defeat those who would deny forever all hope of freedom throughout the world. I am enclosing a copy of an address of July 23 by the Secretary of State, made with my complete approval, which illustrates the attitude of this Government.

-2-

I shall hope that our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Enclosure:

Copy of speech by  
Secretary of State,  
July 23, 1942.

Mr. M. K. Gandhi,  
Sevagram Via Wardha,  
Central Provinces, India.

PSF; India

August 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MICHAEL McDERMOTT:

Dear Mac:

Attached is a note from Bob Sherwood to the President. It was delivered to me. I have not as yet given it to the President. Before doing so, I should like very much to have the benefit of the State Department's opinion.

If the Department concurs in Sherwood's suggestion, a draft of an appropriate statement to be issued by the President would be appreciated. Will you be good enough to follow through and let me know?

S. T. E.

Enclosure. Copy attached.

COPY

Deliver to Mr. Early

To the President  
from Bob Sherwood

As you know, the All India Congress has a crucial meeting the day after tomorrow, August 6th.

Any statement by the President would exert a profound effect on this meeting.

Ghandi's greatest argument is that he has the support of the overwhelming majority of the American people, and that he would hold this support even if the Congress decided to engage in civil disobedience.

This is a dangerous illusion. Of course, the American people are sympathetic to India's aspirations to freedom and independence. We believe that this is also the sentiment of the British people. But we can have no sympathy with a policy which would aid our enemies who are warring to destroy all hope of freedom and independence in India and everywhere else in the world.

- - -

India

BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

~~Most Secret~~ and Personal

August 7th, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of a message which I have just received by telegram from the Foreign Office for you from Mr. Attlee. I have been told to ask that this should be regarded as being for your own most secret and personal information, and for that of Mr. Hull, to whom I have also been instructed to communicate it.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*R. I. Campbell*

The Honourable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States  
of America,  
Washington, D. C.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Dept. State copy  
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942, Vol. I, General, British  
Commonwealth, The Far East

Pp. 703-705

RS 7/20/60

[8-7-42]

My colleagues and I would have wished that you should have known in advance the Government of India's decision, only communicated to us at the last moment, to publish on August 5th the documents relating to the Congress Party Working Committee's discussions on Congress Party's resolution of May 1st. These papers, with their damaging revelations of the defeatist outlook of the Congress Party leaders and particularly of Gandhi, had been in Government of India's hands for some time but they forbore from disclosing them or from placing any restraint upon Congress leaders in hope that counsels of moderation and especially the opinions expressed in the United States might avert any extreme decision. Unfortunately this hope has gradually diminished and after much searching of heart the Government of India decided almost at the last moment on publication which they felt might help to check waverers in the Party by showing up its leaders in their true light.

2. In considering now how best to deal with the situation created by the Congress Party's threat of a mass-movement to enforce their demand for a British withdrawal, Government of India have been guided by available indications of the extent to which movement may interfere or be intended to interfere with conduct of the war on Indian soil. The indications are unfortunately grave. More than one leader has threatened that movement would be short and swift, and the declared intention of Congress is to throw into it

/all

all non-violent strength accumulated in the past twenty years. Detailed information has been derived from a circular issued locally by the Andhra provincial Congress Committee in Madras indicating that programme is designed to effect pressure on Government officers to resign, organization of labour strikes, interference with railway transport (though without danger to life) and with telegraphs and telephones and picketing of troops. The crippling effect on the war effort of such activities carried out on a widespread scale is manifest.

3. For these reasons Government of India with approval of His Majesty's Government have decided that most vigorous steps must be taken to suppress the movement at the outset. It is noteworthy that this is a decision of Governor General in Council and that this Council is now comprised of eleven prominent non-official Indians and, counting the Viceroy himself and the Commander-in-Chief, only five Europeans, one of whom is at present out of India.

4. It is the intention of the Government of India, as soon as the All-India Congress Committee pass or endorse a resolution containing threat of mass civil disobedience, promptly to order the detention of leaders, that is, of Gandhi and members of the Working Committee under the Defence of India Rules and it is possible that the more prominent of them will be deported from India. The Working Committee, the All-India Congress Committee and each provincial Committee, but not the Indian National Congress Party as a whole, will be declared to be unlawful associations, their offices and funds seized, and all

individuals/

individuals arrested who are considered competent and likely to attempt to organize and launch a mass movement. The main object of this action will be to render the movement abortive by removing and detaining its leaders. All possible precautionary measures will be taken in consultation where necessary with military authorities to deal with danger of widespread demonstrations and disorders. If hope of paralyzing movement at outset by above methods should not succeed it will be necessary to introduce stronger measures against Congress Party as a whole. These intentions are of course strictly secret for the time being.

5. His Majesty's Government feel confident that you will share their view that no other choice is open to them than to restrain with whatever means may be necessary the activities of politicians who are bent on pursuing a course which His Majesty's Government sincerely believe would not only hamper and frustrate the war effort of the United Nations but would shatter indefinitely all hope of peace and orderly political advance in India itself.

India

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CECIL GRAY \*  
Secretary to the Secretary

*y State*

The enclosures are self-  
explanatory.

M. H. McINTYRE  
Secretary to the President

**Enclosures**

Tele to the President 8/5/42 from  
Louis Fischer, Hotel Dusne, 237  
Madison Avenue, NYC - sent from Miami  
Just returned from India with verbal  
message from Gandhi for the President  
Wants also to give impressions and  
views of Indian situation.  
Copy of telegram from MHM replying  
and stating due to extreme pressure  
here, has arranged for Secy Hull to  
see him and suggesting contact  
Mr. Gray for definite appt.  
Telegram of reply dated 8/7/42

FROM

The White House  
Washington

AUGUST 7 1942

# TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

LOUIS FISCHER  
HOTEL DUANE \*  
237 MADISON AVENUE  
NEW YORK NEW YORK

DUE TO EXTREME PRESSURE HERE WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR SECRETARY  
HULL TO SEE YOU. SUGGEST YOU PHONE MR. GRAY HIS SECRETARY  
AND ARRANGE DEFINITE APPOINTMENT. BEST REGARDS.

M. H. McINTYRE  
Secretary to the President

x48-7  
x20

...  
DST:  
Lindin

W. H. ...  
H

TELEGRAM \* COPY COPY COPY

Aug 5, 1942

Miami Flo

President Roosevelt

White House ~~W~~ashington, D. C.

ARRIVED TODAY FROM EIGHT WEEKS IN INDIA WHERE SPENT WEEK WITH  
GANDHI AND HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH EACH OF FOLLOWING  
NEHRU J RAJAGOPALACHARI JINNAH WAVELL VICEROY AMBEDKAR STOP  
GANDHI GAVE ME LETER FOR YOU WHICH I HANDED TO GENERAL GRUBER  
FOR DELIVERY STOP GANDHI ALSO GAVE ME BRIEF ORAL MESSAGE TO  
YOU WHICH I THINK IS KEY TO HIS PRESENT THINKING STOP I SHOULD  
LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY IMPRESSIONS AND VIEWS OF INDIAN  
SITUATION STOP I WILL BE IN NEW YORK TODAY AND CAN BE REACHED  
THEREAFTER AT HOTEL DUANE 237 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK.

VERY RESPECTFULLY

LOUIS FISCHER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
August 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.



DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

Letter from the Vice President to the  
Pres. 8/7/42 calling atten. to a letter  
on India which the Board of Economic  
Warfare has sent to the Chiefs of Staff.  
(An economic program for India)

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date \_\_\_\_\_

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE  
~~ECONOMIC DEFENSE BOARD~~  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

*India Folder*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
AUG 7 12 09 PM '42  
RECEIVED

August 7, 1942

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

I want to call your attention to a letter on India which we have just sent to the Chiefs of Staff. A summary of our engineering report which covers possible industrial development in India directly related to the military effort there is also enclosed. Copies have been sent to half a dozen interested agencies so that they may be prepared for their part in any possible program which might subsequently be directed.

We are calling this detailed engineering program to your attention now for whatever broad political use you might possibly want to make of it.

Respectfully yours,

*H A Wallace*

H. A. Wallace

Enclosures

ECONOMIC DEFENSE BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

program should, of course, be undertaken only if it is  
that a United Nations effort will be made, if  
to defend India and Ceylon and as a result of the  
vital industrial area of Calcutta.

*Copy*

August 7, 1942

In giving further consideration to this program, the  
Board of Economic Warfare would welcome an expression of the  
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the military  
importance of this program.

Brigadier General W. B. Smith  
Secretary, U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff  
19th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.

Dear General Smith:

The Board of Economic Warfare has prepared a detailed program to implement the recommendations of the American Technical Mission to India. Because a program of this magnitude raises fundamental questions of military strategy, as well as of economic policy, I am forwarding to you a set of reports on the individual projects, together with a brief summary statement.

The American Technical Mission, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Henry F. Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State, surveyed Indian industries during April and May of this year. Following its return to Washington, cost estimates and engineering details in connection with the recommended projects were prepared by the engineering staff of the Board of Economic Warfare, assisted by Mr. H. E. Beyster, a leading industrial engineer, who had served as a member of the Mission. Preparation of this program represents the culmination of several months of inquiry in which the staff of the Board has drawn upon the information and recommendations available, not only from the Mission, but from a great number of specialists having knowledge of Indian resources.

While certain strategic materials would be required out of the stockpiles of the United States, the primary purpose of this program would be to release within a period of a few months considerable productive power which could not otherwise be called upon in the service of the United Nations. The

program should, of course, be undertaken only on the assumption that a United Nations effort will be made, if necessary, to defend India and Ceylon and especially to defend the vital industrial area of Calcutta.

In giving further consideration to this program, the Board of Economic Warfare would welcome an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the military factors which may be involved.

Sincerely,

*S/*

H. A. Wallace

Enclosure

P. S. Mr. Beyster and Mr. Grady will be in town on Friday, August 14th and will be available for any discussion you might desire to have with them.

## AN ECONOMIC PROGRAM FOR INDIA

This program is intended to implement the recommendations of the American Technical Mission, which, under the chairmanship of Dr. Henry F. Grady, surveyed Indian industries during April and May 1942.

The recommendations of the American Technical Mission rest on the assumption that India is a strategic area of prime importance to the United Nations. On this tentative assumption, the Board of Economic Warfare has prepared a detailed statement of the measures which would be required to put the Mission's recommendations into effect.

### Strategic Importance of India

The Mission, in its report, has indicated that the advantages to be gained from India's position and resources appear to be so great that measures must be taken to exploit them to the fullest possible extent.

### Position

1. Through India alone, at present, can the United States and the United Kingdom supply China.
2. From India alone can the United Nations launch a campaign for the recovery of Burma. The route through Burma is the only one by which supplies sufficiently large to equip China for a major offensive can be delivered.
3. Control of India (and of Ceylon which depends on India) means control of Japanese threats to shipping in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.
4. India's central location enables United Nations air power to strike east or west.
5. India is the beginning of important supply routes into Iran and the U. S. S. R. These routes will be even more essential if the military situation in South Russia deteriorates further.
6. In short, the full control of India is essential (a) to insure the United Nations control of the Indian Ocean, (b) to support the Chinese forces and to recover Japanese-occupied territory in the east, and (c) to continue to support the Anglo-Russian positions in the Middle East.

Resources

1. India has the only United Nations industrial plant between Great Britain and Australia.
2. It has reserves of manpower of very great military and industrial value.
3. It has extensive coal and iron deposits which are already supplying an efficient iron and steel industry.
4. It possesses the world's only considerable source of mica, a material that is vital to the production of aircraft and communications equipment.
5. It has large deposits of manganese obtainable in quantities limited only by the shipping which can clear from Indian ports.
6. India is the world's only producer of jute and it has a major portion of the world's jute manufacturing industry.
7. Its production of shellac accounts for practically all of that commodity available to the United Nations.
8. It produces a wide variety of other essential raw materials, including oil seeds and hides and skins.
9. Its cotton textile industry is able to supply the bulk of India's own requirements, as well as the requirements of other United Nations' forces in the Middle East.
10. Its transportation system, although congested at present, is the largest in Asia and one of the largest in the world. This system could be a major factor in efficiently supplying the United Nations forces based on India.

Prior decision as to strategy

It is apparent that, before any economic measures can be undertaken for India, a decision must be arrived at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the validity of the assumption on which the program is based. If it is decided that an attempt will be made, even at great cost, to defend the vital industrial area of Bengal and Bihar and to build up

India's great potential strength as a military base, economic measures commensurate with that task must be undertaken at once.

The program would include such economic measures as those mentioned herein. It would also include, besides expanded military preparations, civilian defense measures of the type which the people of Britain and Russia have found indispensable for their protection and their morale. India would have to be speedily transformed from a territory occupied by foreign armies to a nation aroused and organized to participate in a defense of its own vital interests.

By means of a program comprising all of these factors, India could not only be successfully defended; it could be made ready for the inevitable United Nations offensive against the common enemy.

The decision to adopt such a program will rest with those who determine allied strategy. Its implementation, by economic means, will be the task of many agencies of the allied governments, working in closest technical collaboration.

#### Recommended Program

The projects discussed below are among those recommended by the American Technical Mission to India. They have been determined to be the most important that can be undertaken with a view to strengthening India to the maximum extent in the shortest possible time. All of these projects can be completed within seven months from the time that materials are ready and work initiated in India; many of them can be completed in two to three months. The value, to the United Nations, of an India strengthened by a program of this magnitude will be very great.

Other projects recommended by the Mission are now being studied by the Board of Economic Warfare and will be submitted for consideration at a later date.

In considering the projects which are discussed in more detail below, it would be well to weigh the statements made by Sir Bertram Stevens, in a memorandum entitled "Draft Appreciation of the Strategic Position", which was written in February 1942. Sir Bertram was the Australian member of the Eastern Group Supply Council, and was stationed in India for ten months prior to the writing of this paper.

- (1) "All the foregoing plainly points to a long war. It above all, exposes the fallacy, in all situations or circumstances of any argument to the effect that any proposed measures are of too long range a nature to be efficacious."
- (2) "From the long range point of view, the obvious plan is the development of Indian indigenous production. Arguments that this will take too long must be rejected for the cogent reasons already advanced."
- (3) "The only way to get the bulk of this plant is to import it. . . . The difficulty will be to get it--that is a question of awaking those in charge in Britain and U. S. A. not only to India's need of it, but to the need of strategy, that it should be located and set up in India."

All the projects recommended herein are designed either to serve directly in the supply of the United Nations forces, or to help existing Indian establishments to raise their production of war materials.

The most important of the projects from the standpoint of strengthening the United Nations forces in India and improving India as a base for counter offensive action against the Japanese, as well as a supply base for China, are those which concern gasoline supply, road improvement and improvement of harbor facilities.

The other projects fall into two categories, both of which are intimately connected with supplies for military forces based on India. One category is comprised of projects which will strengthen the industrial economy of India for the production of war goods. Projects in this category are those for the production of guns, shells, alcohol, tool steel, scientific instruments, lumber, aluminum, sulphur, coal tar derivatives and drugs. The other category is comprised of projects dealing with cold storage facilities, slaughter houses and bakeries.

The following is a list of the proposed projects and their estimated cost:

Gasoline pipe line	\$ 46,000,000
Roads in India	18,232,000
Cold storage facilities and slaughter houses	4,800,000
Harbor facilities	29,600,000
Lumber mills <sup>1/</sup>	4,700,000
Scientific instrument plants	1,700,000
Gun factory	15,800,000
Shell plant	6,600,000
Tool steel plant <sup>1/</sup>	2,700,000
Oil drum plants	2,475,000
Bakeries <sup>1/</sup>	6,840,000
Alcohol plants	22,000,000
Drug manufacturing plant <sup>1/</sup>	3,100,000
Aluminum plants	11,050,000
Sulphur plant <sup>1/</sup>	<sup>2/</sup> 1,500,000
Coal tar derivatives plant	6,874,500
Salt purification plant	483,000
Sanitation and water purification	1,000,000
Total	\$212,154,500

<sup>1/</sup> This project is already the subject of negotiations on the part of the Indian Supply Mission to secure equipment and technical assistance in the United States.

<sup>2/</sup> This sum may be only \$750,000 if the sulphur can be mined in solid form.

Gasoline Pipe Line. The most important project having to do with gasoline supply for United Nations forces in India is a project for the construction of a gasoline pipe line from Karachi to Calcutta. This project will require an estimated 130 days to complete, but will be useable in substantial part in an estimated 60 days. The route of the pipe line has been determined with an eye to supplying most efficiently the military air fields between Karachi and Calcutta from storage tanks established at each air field between these two points. It will relieve a critically overburdened rail system which is unable to move required quantities of petroleum products from the West to the East of India due to an insufficiency of tank cars. Despite the scarcity of 8" pipe which will be required for this pipe line, the military value of it in supplying sufficient gasoline for forces based on India and those in China makes it particularly worth considering at the present time. Even if Calcutta is reopened, the pipe line will be of great value in relieving the strain on the inadequate supply of tankers available for the United Nations.

While the United Nations hold the Near and Middle East, petroleum products such as aviation and other gasoline will be supplied from that area. The saving in shipping from Abadan to Karachi as against shipping from Abadan to Calcutta is obvious.

It may very well be that an adequate defense, particularly of the industrial triangle of Northeastern India, will depend on sufficient aviation gasoline and gasoline for motor transport being available in that area. Although Calcutta's storage capacity is ample, it is extremely improbable that the United Nations can, without a pipe line, supply sufficient gasoline to that area to permit a strong defense.

It is probable that two pipe manufacturing concerns in India can expand their facilities to supply a substantial percentage of the required tonnage of pipes.

The capacity of the line has been so calculated as to permit the unloading of large size tankers of 240,000 barrel capacity within 24 hours after arrival at Karachi in order to lessen the possibility of air attack while the tankers are in port and to permit a quicker turn around of shipping. Cost of the pipe line is estimated to be \$46,000,000.

Roads. It is proposed to strengthen greatly the existing road ways of India, which at the present time are wholly inadequate for any extensive motor traffic. It is estimated that roads carry about 2 percent of India's total traffic as measured in ton miles. It is believed that in a period of approximately five months the main roads of India could be so improved as to relieve much of the pressure on the railways by permitting the motor transport of substantial quantities of goods. The strategic value of an improved network of roads should also be considered as an additional reason for endorsement of this project. The cost of improving the main roads of India and certain secondary routes would be about \$18,232,000.

Cold Storage Facilities and Slaughter Houses. Two other projects are planned to increase the number of cold storage and slaughter houses in India. The six cold storage plants and the two slaughter houses which are planned will be completed in approximately four months from the date that construction is begun. If a large United Nations force is based on India, additional cold storage and slaughter houses will be of vital importance; existing facilities are far from adequate. An additional advantage to be gained from the construction of such facilities is the substantial saving of shipping which will result from providing out of local production a large amount of the meat, vegetable and fruit needs of United Nations forces in India. This will only be possible if the recommended facilities are constructed. It is estimated that the cost of the cold storage and the slaughter houses will be about \$26,700,000 and \$4,800,000 respectively. Additional complementary equipment, such as refrigerator cars and trucks, will also be required. Their cost has not been included in the figures just mentioned.

Harbor Facilities. The present virtual blockade of the East Coast of India has brought about an almost crippling congestion of the three main ports on the West Coast of India. It is proposed, therefore, that facilities at the Ports of Bombay, Karachi, and Cochin be greatly strengthened to permit the expeditious handling of larger quantities of materials than at present, thereby increasing the amount of shipping available to the United Nations by substantial reduction of the turn-around time of ships at those ports. It is estimated that the harbor facilities can be improved to the desired degree in 4 1/3 months and that increased unloading facilities will be available in 30 days. The problem of port congestion has been one of the most serious limitations on India's ability to supply war materials to the United Nations, and the improvement of facilities will be one of the most important contributions that the United States can make in strengthening India's economy for war. The estimated cost of this project is \$29,600,000.

Lumber. It is proposed that two lumber mills be created in India primarily to save that substantial amount of shipping which would be required to make up the difference between India's supply of and need for lumber. The mills will comprise such units as to permit the shipment of finished lumber in India, thereby effecting considerable savings of space which would otherwise be required if logs or unfinished lumber were shipped.

A large portion of the plant which will be required to complete the lumber project can be acquired in the United States from certain timber areas which have been cut out and whose facilities are idle.

The large saving in trans-ocean shipping is undoubtedly the most important factor in the support of this project, since substantial quantities of space would be required to meet even the minimum needs for war purposes. Total cost of the two sawmills will be about \$4,700,000.<sup>1/</sup>

Scientific Instrument Plants. Instrument plants are projected owing to the dire shortage and great need of this type of equipment in India. The recommended plants can produce range-finding equipment, surgical instruments, optical instruments, periscopes, telescopes, and later such instruments as are required for airplane and marine work, as well as all other desired types of scientific instruments. They will also be able to repair such instruments. Cost of the two plants is estimated to be \$1,700,000.

<sup>1/</sup> This project is already the subject of negotiations on the part of the Indian Supply Mission to secure equipment and technical assistance in the United States.

Gun Factory. It is proposed also to increase India's capacity for the production of rifles from its present level of 125,000 per year to a level of 500,000 per year. It is estimated that 130 days would be required to equip a factory building which is already in existence at Cawnpore. The bulk of the equipment for the plant would be procured from India. While the project has been designed to produce the British standard .303 gun, very little change will be necessary to produce the American standard .30 caliber gun, if it is decided that it will be more advantageous to do so.

The value of the plant is unquestioned in view of India's probable future importance as a base of supplies for forces in that area. Its cost is estimated to be \$15,800,000.

Shell Plant. This project is planned for two purposes--(1) to make United Nations forces in the area less dependent on other countries for supplies of 3" to 6" shells which are consumed in large numbers; (2) to save the substantial tonnage of shipment required to move shells of these sizes into India and the area which might be served from India.

The project would require approximately five months to complete from the day construction was initiated. The more vital parts of the plant would have to come from the United States, but all the remaining equipment and practically all the raw materials would be supplied by India. Capacity of the plant would be 500 shells per hour. Its cost would be about \$6,600,000.

Tool Steel Plant. There is an acute shortage of tool steel in India and China. India possesses deposits of many of the alloy ores, such as chromite, vanadium, molybdenum, cobalt and tungsten. It is proposed, therefore, to build a tool steel plant which will have a productive capacity of 200 tons per month.

India can furnish most of the equipment required for the plant which will, after its completion in a period of seven months, be able to supply a substantial proportion, if not all, of India's requirements for steel of this type. Cost of the plant will be about \$2,700,000. ✓

Oil Drum Plants. Closely connected with the pipe line project is a project to expand the production of oil drums in India.

There is at the present time a critical shortage of drums or barrels for the transport of aviation gasoline within India for its own

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✓ This project is already the subject of negotiations on the part of the Indian Supply Mission to secure equipment and technical assistance in the United States.

air fields, as well as for shipment to China, Russia and the Far East. Full utilization of the proposed pipe line, mentioned above, could not be had without drum facilities to be used in connection with it. Indeed, the shortage of drums is so critical, that additional manufacturing capacity is essential whether or not the proposed pipe line is constructed. It is estimated that the three proposed plants can be completed within 60 days. Equipment for these plants can be obtained easily in the United States. Steel sheet required to operate the plants can be furnished by India. Cost of this project is estimated to be \$2,475,000.

Bakeries. India has inadequate facilities to produce bakery products for forces which must be served from India. The shortage will be even more critical if large numbers of additional troops are based on that country. It is proposed, therefore, that two bakeries be built in wheat growing areas to supply the present and probable demand. These bakeries can be built within four months of the time that work is initiated. The United States will probably have to supply a supervisory staff to serve for the duration of the war. It is recommended that some large American bakery company take a management contract for that length of time. There is no indication as to what percentage of equipment can be supplied by India, but it is probable that some part at least can be supplied by that country. Cost of the proposed bakeries is estimated to be \$6,840,000.<sup>1/</sup>

Alcohol Plants. The American Technical Mission has recommended that ten alcohol plants, in addition to two small ones at present on order in the United States, be constructed in India. The alcohol produced in the plants would be mixed in a ratio of 1 to 5 with gasoline to be used for practically all purposes except in airplanes. While this will reduce the amount of gasoline which must be imported by 20 percent, greater advantages than this also accrue from the production of industrial alcohol. A relatively large proportion of glycerin can be obtained by modifying the conditions of fermentation in these plants. The main uses for alcohol, other than as a substitute for gasoline, are in the manufacture of explosives, munitions, pharmaceuticals, fuels, paints, varnishes, shellacs, chemicals, etc.

Molasses, which is available in large quantities in India, and which is at present being wasted for the most part, will be the raw material for this alcohol production. The equipment for these plants must be provided in the United States and will require supplies of some materials which are extremely scarce at present. The advantage obtaining to the United Nations in the form of power alcohol, munitions, and explosives, etc., in India makes the project one well worth pressing to completion. The ten proposed plants can be completed within six months from the time that materials are ready and work is initiated in India. Cost of the project will be about \$22,000,000.

<sup>1/</sup> This project is already the subject of negotiations on the part of the Indian Supply Mission to secure equipment and technical assistance in the United States.

Drug Manufacturing Plant. Centrally located at Bombay, the drug manufacturing plant which is projected will supply drugs to three fronts, China, Russia, and the Middle East, and will also supply the military and civilian needs of India.

The drug plant can be completed in five months. Most of the materials required are available in India, but it will be necessary to provide a complete management staff from the ranks of a United States company now in operation. Cost of the plant will be about \$3,100,000.<sup>1/</sup>

Coal Tar Derivatives Plant. A coal tar derivatives plant will be an important addition to India's war plant, producing the essential bases of many explosives and chemical products. It will require 160 days to complete. Most of the equipment can be obtained in India. Its by-products will include coke, gas, sulphate of ammonia, light oils and tar.

Located in Jamshedpur, the plant will be near its supply of coal, and can supply needed gas to the Tata Iron and Steel Company of that city. Tar will be a useful by-product in view of the road construction project recommended elsewhere in this report. The light oils will be used in the production of T. N. T.

The project will help to meet India's lack of the basic raw materials for a chemical industry and for production of explosives. Its cost will be about \$6,874,500.

Salt Purification Plant. The salt purification plant is projected because the supply of salt in India is not only inadequate to meet the existing demand but is also full of impurities. Pure salt is essential for the chemical industry and for the food supplies of expeditionary forces.

The plant will require three months to build and will necessitate importation of a small amount of machinery from the United States. Its cost will be about \$483,000.

Aluminum Plants. There is a general shortage of aluminum throughout the United Nations. India has abundant raw materials for the production of aluminum and has two partially completed plants which were designed for this purpose. Much of the equipment for these plants is already in India.

One of the proposed plants will produce about 9,000 tons and the other about 6,000 tons of aluminum per year. The larger of the two plants can be in operation in approximately three months from the time

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<sup>1/</sup> This project is already the subject of negotiations on the part of the Indian Supply Mission to secure equipment and technical assistance in the United States.

that work to complete it is initiated. About six months will be required to complete the other plant. A survey of the existing plant and the equipment already in India will be necessary before the remaining requirements can be accurately estimated. The cost of completing the two plants will be about \$1,050,000.

Sulphur Plant. The value of sulphur to a wartime economy is unquestioned. Despite the fact that India has rich sulphur deposits, it has not been able to process the raw material and has, therefore, been importing large amounts of sulphur from the United States. When the proposed plant is completed, and that should be possible in a three to five months' period, India will be largely independent of imports. It is not known what percentage of the equipment would be obtained from the United States and what percentage from India, but it is probable that both countries will be called on to furnish some portion of the equipment which will be required. The estimated cost of the plant is \$1,500,000.<sup>1/ 2/</sup>

Sanitation and Water Purification. The lack of sanitation throughout India and the necessity for water purification in that country is well known. It is very probable that a substantial industrial expansion in certain areas and the location of large numbers of United Nations troops in those or other areas will require substantial improvements in existing facilities for water purification and sewage disposal. Approximately \$1,000,000 could be expended advantageously on the extension and improvement of such facilities. A survey to determine the area in which such improvements should be made should be undertaken immediately, as the forerunner of actual construction projects.

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<sup>1/</sup> This project is already the subject of negotiations on the part of the Indian Supply Mission to secure equipment and technical assistance in the United States.

<sup>2/</sup> This sum may be only \$750,000 if the sulphur can be mined in solid form.

India - 1942

*(Circled)*  
L. F.

*State*  
*World War II*

August 11, 1942.

Dear Mr. Fischer:

I am trying to keep in very close touch with the situation. I get the latest news from several sources every day.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Louis Fischer, Esq., x  
Hotel Duane,  
237 Madison Avenue,  
New York City, N. Y.

fdr/dj

x48-7

August 7, 1942

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President,


A telegram from M.H. McIntyre has just arrived telling me that you could not see me and suggesting I talk with Secretary Hull. I think it desirable, however, to communicate the following directly to you:

When I saw Gandhi in June he asked me to urge the Viceroy to see him. Before I left Gandhi's village, Desai, Gandhi's secretary, reminded me of the importance ~~it~~ of saying to the Viceroy that Gandhi would like to come and discuss the situation with him. The day after I returned to New Delhi from Gandhi's village I had an interview with the Viceroy. I told him Gandhi, although he was bent on getting independence for India, was in a conciliatory mood and ready to compromise. "Wouldn't you see one of the Congress leaders," I urged. The Viceroy replied: "That is a matter of high policy and has to be decided on his merits". The Viceroy has not seen Gandhi or any Congress leader since the present emergency arose.

Secondly, Gandhi assumed that I might see you when I returned to America and he said to me: "Tell your President that I wish to be dissuaded". Gandhi has deferred the launch of the civil disobedience campaign by putting it up to a long session of the Working Committee and now to the current session of the Central Committee although his word is law with Congress and millions of people and he could have started long ago. He wants to be dissuaded. He wanted to talk it over with the Viceroy.

I am convinced that the British authorities will do nothing. I am convinced that the right approach by you might save the situation. A terrible disaster may be impending in India.

Very respectfully,



Dep't. State copy <sup>73 F India</sup>  
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

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Pp. 721-722.

RLS 7/10/60

PSF

India

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 15, 1942.

Memorandum for the President

*Do you think we need do anything more about this? Personally, I think it can just file*

With reference to the attached communication of August 7 to you from Mr. Attlee, you and other officials of this Government during past months earnestly laid before Prime Minister Churchill and other British officials the unequivocal attitude of yourself in favor of an adjustment on a basis that could and should be mutually agreed upon in the relations between the home Government of Great Britain and either officials or certain political leaders headed by Mr. Gandhi in India.

In addition to your plain statements to Mr. Churchill to the foregoing effect, I on one or two occasions, and I think it was two, brought up the whole question of concessions and further adjustments on a mutually agreed upon basis, with Ambassador Halifax. As early as six months ago further earnest efforts on the part of your personal representative in India, Col. Louis Johnson, were made in support of a mutually satisfactory settlement. Our attitude has not been one of partisanship toward either contender, and of course it is not today. In these circumstances, there is scarcely more to add in relation to the accompanying document.

It would seem that if the British Government would repeat with full emphasis its proposal of independence to India at the end of the war, and accompany it by a statement of the adjustments to be made prior to the announcement of independence, including some reference to the equal interest of India with the twenty-eight nations in resisting the Axis powers, it would clarify public opinion and might lead to the resumption of discussions between Great Britain and the Indian leaders. In any event, it ought to have the effect of reducing the feeling of tension in India. You, of course, and all of us, are closely observing to find any way that is at all feasible and acceptable to further encourage and promote a mutually satisfactory settlement.

*CH*

Miss Tully

PSF: India

New Delhi  
12th Aug. 1942.

Dear President Roosevelt,

We the young men and young women of India are shocked at the Brutal and suppressive treatment accorded to our reasonable demand for Self Government in this hour of National peril.

We cannot believe that your Government subscribes to this policy. We know your friendliness and sympathy for India as demonstrated many times in the past. We realise your grave responsibilities in other parts of the world do not permit you actively intervening in the Indian deadlock. However we wonder if you realise, that most Indian people now believe that the United States of America is completely identifying itself with the Imperialist policy of Britain .

We as friends of America regret to see the situation developing for it has always been our hope that free India and America can work together in harmony and democratic spirit. It is a pity that today our two countries should be drifting farther and farther.

If America is to keep the good will of the Indian people it is necessary for you to dissociate yourself from the British policy which is heading this country towards disaster. Our revered leaders Mahatma Gandhi, the Congress President and Mr. Nehru have repeatedly declared their sincere friendship for the cause of United Nations.

We realise you cannot dictate to Mr. Churchill. But you owe it to the American people and to us to disown any responsibility for the day to day shooting of innocent people in all parts of the country. We pray to God to give you strength to remain true to the noble traditions laid down by George Washington, who was not only an American hero but beloved hero of lovers of liberty all over

the world.

With cordial greetings to the people of America,

We remain,

The Youth of India.

Kaushalya Chamanlal  
and others.

The President

Given me by  
Halifax  
Sept 13  
42

Copy of a letter from Mr. Leo Amery to

Mr. Eden dated September 1st, 1942.

I have just been reading Campbell's letter about the President's suggestion that we should set up some sort of provisional system in India pending the creation of a constituent body later on to frame a final constitution, this on the basis of the American colonies after their secession.

The difficulty is that the American colonies already had each their own constitution before they seceded and were in a position after the recognition of their independence by this country either to remain separate or to come together. They came together on an interim arrangement which proved none too satisfactory and so were led on to framing the constitution under which they now live. The trouble in India is that India is already an administrative and economic entity and that it is very difficult to find any interim constitution which would not involve the break-up of that entity except on lines which would not prevent one element, namely Congress, prejudging that future entirely during the interim period. That was precisely why the Cripps proposals reserved an ultimate say in the matter to the Viceroy during the interim period, and my answer to the President would in fact be that what he would like to see done is precisely what we attempted to do through the Cripps proposals and what, in some measure, we are doing to-day with a predominantly Indian Executive working together without prejudice to a future constitution.


The/

The other point raised by the President, namely that India belongs more truly to the western orbit than to the Far Eastern, is eminently sound. A great deal of talk about "Asiatics" naturally working together arises from the historical accident that of the various sub-continent into which the great Eur-Asiatic Old World block is divided, the westernmost is given a name of its own and all the rest lumped together as Asia. As a matter of fact, racially and linguistically most of India belongs to the European family. Historically the main influences which have been exercised upon it have been Greek and then, far more intense and prolonged, those of the Moslem world of the Middle East. India is indeed far more an extension of the Middle East, which in its turn is and always has been intimately associated with Europe, than in any way connected by race, culture, or history with the Far East.

You may possibly care to pass these points on to Campbell or to Edward in case they in turn care to pass them on to the President.



PSF: India - 1942  
SEP 12 1942



September 9. 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your letter of August 1, 1942 to Mr. Gandhi, a copy of which is enclosed. The letter reached India after Gandhi had been placed in confinement and the Mission at New Delhi requests instructions regarding the disposition to be made of it. Unless it is now desired that the letter be destroyed, there appear to be three possible procedures:

845,00

- (1) Let the letter be delivered to the British authorities with the request that they deliver it to Gandhi;
- (2) Let it be delivered to Rajagopalachariar, the only prominent Congress leader not in confinement, for eventual delivery to Gandhi;
- (3) Let it be retained in the Mission's files until such time as its delivery to Gandhi may appear possible and appropriate.

845-00/1644 PS/TL

The

The President,  
The White House.

FILED  
SEP 17 1942

The advisability of following the first procedure is questioned by the Department unless this Government is prepared to reveal that Gandhi's letter to you was brought to this country by Mr. Louis Fisher, who very possibly evaded the censorship regulations in taking it from India. If the authorities have no record of Gandhi's letter being dispatched, they will almost certainly inquire, at least informally, with regard to the manner in which its delivery was effected, and if no explanation is given they will suspect that the official pouch was improperly used. The authorities in India have never been generous in their interpretation of pouch privileges and it is considered undesirable that they be given any reason to believe that the pouch has been used to permit Indian nationalists to communicate with officials or others in this country without censorship of the correspondence in question.

The second procedure is also considered undesirable as it is not considered that it would serve a useful purpose and as Rajagopalachariar has recently been conspicuous for his disagreement with Gandhi.


The Department feels therefore that the most satisfactory procedure would be to instruct the Mission to

retain

retain the letter until it can be delivered to Gandhi. It might be desirable to require the Mission to communicate with the Department at that time to ascertain whether delivery of the letter is then considered appropriate.

An indication of your wishes in the matter would be appreciated.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

Enclosure:

Copy of President's letter  
to Gandhi, August 1, 1942.

14  
2898

**Department of State**

BUREAU  
DIVISION

**NE**

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **9/5/42**

ADDRESSED TO

**The President**



*India folder*

*file  
personal*

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE,  
NEW DELHI.

The 18th January 1943.

*Dear Mr. President,*

Mr. William Phillips has presented to me your letter of the 3rd December, and I write to tell you how cordially we welcome among us so distinguished and widely experienced a diplomatist as your new Personal Representative to India.

Mr. Phillips' charm of manner has already made a deep impression on all those who have met him here. I am sure that our common war effort will derive fresh impetus from him, and we take the deputation to this country of a man of his personality and eminent attainments as further indication of the high regard you have for India.

*Yours very sincerely*  
*Kinneth Jones*

His Excellency  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America,  
The White House,  
Washington.

25.

His Excellency  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America,  
The White House,

Washington.

( U. S. A. )

Viceroy.

New Delhi, India

February 11, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

The complex political situation here has become aggravated by Gandhi's "fast to capacity", whatever this new phrase indicates. Evidently he does not intend to commit suicide but he is over seventy and is said to be frail and there is danger that he may not survive the strain; at least, that is the Viceroy's fear.

After my return from a visit to the Punjab where I met and talked with Muslims of all types,--with members of the Union Government, Pakistan enthusiasts, Hindus and Communists, I felt that I could not properly carry out my mission unless I had an opportunity to talk with Congress leaders, all of whom are now in detention. Since my arrival, now five weeks ago, I have had to parry the question as to whether I was planning to see Gandhi and if so, when. It has been an awkward question, for if I had said anything which could have been interpreted as a yes or no, I would have been in serious trouble either with the Government or with the Congress Party.

I am planning to spend a few days in Bombay on my way to Hyderabad and Madras, and Poona, where Gandhi is confined, is only a short distance from Bombay and almost on the route to Hyderabad. I felt that if I passed Poona  
without

The President,

The White House.

without even an effort to see the Congress leader who, as you know, is not in prison but is confined in the palatial residence of the Aga Khan, I would run the risk of alienating the Congress Party and press, which is already beginning to show some critical tendencies. And so I decided to approach the Viceroy and ask for permission to call on Gandhi.

Accordingly I called by appointment at seven o'clock on the eighth and stated the reasons for my request. I explained that my duty was to keep you informed of the situation here and that I could not do this without at least a call upon the leader of the principal party,-- that I was to see Jinnah, the head of the Muslim League, in Bombay, and Rajagopalachari in Madras, and that a call upon Gandhi as I was passing by would have the advantage of a visit in the ordinary routine.

Linlithgow did not give me a straight answer but instead told me of the serious situation which was then developing in view of Gandhi's threat to fast. He explained that Gandhi was to be freed for the duration of the fast and that as no member of the Government would see him he had to request me not to make the visit. In the circumstances, I could only acquiesce.

I detected for the first time a suspicion on the Viceroy's part with regard to my motives. He asked me directly what were my intentions, a question which I did not welcome, but when I explained again that I was here to keep you fully informed and not to "intervene", he said, "I see that we understand each other." He became  
very

very friendly, called for drinks, and since then has kept me by personal letters in close touch with developments.

It is too early yet to know whether we are facing a serious situation or not. A rather general but perhaps British view in Delhi today is that there will be no serious complications, that Gandhi's stock has fallen of late, that other Congress leaders are all in detention and that while there may be a few strikes and local disturbances, there can be no widespread trouble, nothing in fact comparable to last summer's disturbances. On the other hand, Linlithgow, I know, is deeply concerned.

In the circumstances, I have decided to postpone my departure for Calcutta, Bombay and the South until the atmosphere is somewhat clarified.

Meanwhile, I am continuing to receive visits from all manner of people. Unhappily for me, more and more attention seems to be centered upon this Mission and upon me personally. Every Indian who comes to see me feels that through my influence the present deadlock with the British can be solved. Naturally I am in the picture only because of the popular feeling that the President of the United States alone can bring any influence to bear upon the British Government. I find it very difficult to know what to suggest. I do feel that the Gandhi fast has complicated the situation and made it even more difficult for the British to move, if they had any intention of doing so. But as long as he has no intention of "fasting unto death" he may come out of it without having caused any material change in the situation.

As

As I have indicated to the Department, the key to the present problem is in the hands of the British Government. It would seem wise for Churchill to "unlock the door" which he could do by convincing the Indian people that the promise of their complete independence after the war is an iron-bound promise. New words and phrases will not, I fear, carry enough weight, and therefore a new approach must be made in order to accomplish results. It must be a willingness on the part of the British Government to transfer as much civil power as possible now, on the understanding that the complete transfer will be made after the war. This would be the invitation to the leaders of the opposing parties to get together, which they cannot do now, not only because the leaders of one party are under arrest but because there is no inducement for them to make the necessary concessions to one another, and in view of the general distrust of British promises.

I have not touched upon the problem of the Princes, which is also a part of the picture. I have discussed it with the ruler of Nawanagar, who is the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes and appears to be their spokesmen. His idea is that when an Indian Government has been arrived at, the Princes will transfer to that Government rights and ownership of all transportation, mails, telegraphs, et cetera, et cetera, which are now for the most part the property of the Princes. The representatives of the people of the States whom I have also met will not be satisfied with this. They maintain that the old treaties between the Princes and the British Government are obsolete, *William Phillips* that


that the Princes should not expect to have any greater powers in their respective States than the King of England himself, that hereafter they should occupy the same position as that of Governors of Provinces, although they would still be "hereditary" and not subject to a five year limitation of office. The powers formerly exercised by them should be in the hands of the State Legislatures. There are 562 of such princelings and it is held that the great majority of their States, many of which are only estates, should be merged into larger units.

The entire picture of States and Provinces and the unanimous demand for a new approach on the part of the British Government is a matter of extraordinary interest which I only wish I could convey to you far more satisfactorily than I am doing, but which is almost impossible to present by letter. I feel acutely the fact that public attention is centered upon me in the hope and even expectation that I can do something constructive, and yet here I am, quite unable to do anything but listen to appeals, realizing as I do the importance of not prejudicing my position with the British authorities.

At the same time I want to avoid any impression on the part of the Indians that the presence of United States forces and my own presence here indicate that we Americans are strengthening the British hold over India.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William Phillips". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Sincerely yours,".

*File personal* *India folder 1-43*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


February 18, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have read with much interest Bill Phillips' letter to you of January 22 which you sent me with your memorandum of February 16. In accordance with your request, I am returning it herewith for your files.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. Phillips". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "W" and a long horizontal stroke.

Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

*India folder*  
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. SUMNER WELLES

To read and return for  
my files.

F. D. R.

**Enclosure**

Let to the President from William Phillips  
1/22/43, New Delhi, India reporting on  
his first two weeks in India.

Excerpt from  
Phillips letter published in  
William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy  
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952)  
pp. 354-355

New Delhi, India

January 22, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

I have never had a more interesting two weeks than those since my arrival. The journey from London was somewhat longer than I had expected on account of the delay at Bristol, but once on board the Clipper everything went on schedule. In Liberia I transferred to an Army transport plane which took me to Cairo, via Accra and Khartoum instead of the more direct route to Aden. I did this in order to visit the Indian troops in their desert camp near the Pyramids. I was told that this would be a sympathetic gesture and it was clearly so regarded.

On arrival in Karachi I was met by General Ferris, Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Forces in China, and the Secretary of our Mission, both of whom had flown from Delhi to take me there the following day. Before leaving London the Viceroy had invited me through the Secretary of State for India to spend the first three days with him. I should like to have avoided the visit but was assured that it was a customary procedure for all official visitors to Delhi and so I accepted, and am now glad that I did so.

The

The President,

The White House.

The presentation of your letter was without ceremony and was delivered during my first private talk with the Viceroy in his library. He was most cordial and friendly and wanted me to feel free to move about the country as I wished and to meet and converse with all shades of opinion. He said that later he would give me his own views on the political situation. He promised not to "propagandize" me and assured me that he wished me to form my own judgment. He is a good example of the Tory type, a huge man physically, very reserved before people, but he warms up in private conversation.

My days are filled with people and I am gradually becoming acquainted with the terrific problems which face this country. The Hindus are united in their distrust and intense dislike of the British but they are not altogether united behind Gandhi. Since the arrest of the Congress leaders an organization known as the Hindu Mahasabha under the leadership of Mr. V. D. Savarkar has sprung into prominence. Mr. Savarkar is even more uncompromising than the Congress leaders in his demand for a Hindu rule over all minorities including the one hundred million Muslims.

Jinnah and the Muslim League are equally resentful of the presence of the British but because of their fear of the Hindu claims for an all India administration, they would probably prefer to have the English remain unless their own claims to Pakistan were guaranteed. Neither the League nor Congress has any faith in the British promise to free India.

The

The Indian members of the Viceroy's Council, - the so-called Government of India - condemn both Hindu and Muslim extremes and are doing their best to carry on the government and at the same time to keep their own jobs. They have no popular following because they represent the voice of the Viceroy.

The Princes live aloof and do not attempt to inject themselves into the religious and political controversies. Some of their States, I am told, have liberal and advanced governments, while others are pitifully backward and have made little or no progress since the Dark Ages.

Then there is the caste system, which again divides the people into more rigid categories.

In all this confusion resulting from religious, political and caste differences, four men stand out who dominate the scene; Churchill and his Viceroy, Gandhi and Jinnah. The Viceroy represents England of the old school, of the tradition of Empire, of British responsibility to govern backward peoples. Behind him are the six hundred British Indian Civil Servants who are devoting their lives to India and who know little of what is going on in the world outside and who in their hearts want to preserve the status quo, since their livelihood depends upon it. Undoubtedly their views must have some influence on the Viceroy.

While in London I got the impression that the English people were ready and even eager to grant dominion status to India if only the Indians would agree among themselves with regard to the form of their government. I cannot say

as much of Churchill, but certainly several members of his government with whom I have talked feel that way and have it much in their minds. The British press too is moving along more advanced lines in this respect.

But here in India the situation appears to be the reverse. The British whom I have met seem unaware of the changing attitude in England and cannot really envisage a free India fit to govern itself. They point out that eighty-five percent of the country is illiterate, that the great mass of the people are utterly indifferent as to who governs as long as there is a government to which they can look for food and relief in times of stress. They see the antagonism of the Hindu and Muslim political parties and feel that it is hopeless to expect them to reach any practical agreement. They speak of civil war the moment England departs, et cetera, et cetera. Naturally these views are reflected in the Indian leaders, and convinces them that British promises are worthless.

Gandhi is the third great personality, - the god whom people worship and, I imagine, a wholly impractical god who talks peaceful methods but who would probably not be averse to bloodshed to gain his objective. But if he could be convinced that the British are sincere in their desire to see India free, there is hope that he might be unexpectedly reasonable in his approach to Jinnah and the League.

To all inquiries as to whether I was planning to see him I have replied that I would consider an answer to the question later. Gandhi is still in prison and I think it is wiser not to make any such request of the Viceroy just yet.

yet. When, however, I have some helpful suggestion to discuss with Gandhi I shall not hesitate to ask for permission, but just now, my call upon him would raise speculation to fever heat without any compensating advantage.

Jinnah is the fourth person who has to be reckoned with. He and Gandhi distrust each other and are bitter political enemies. Jinnah's Muslim League, which in fact represents the great bulk of Muslim India, stands for Pakistan, that is, a complete independent Muslim State free from any interference whatsoever from British and Hindus alike. Recently it has been growing in power and influence, and is therefore a formidable opposition to the Hindu claim. But Jinnah's well-known vanity may come in usefully, if Gandhi would be willing to offer him a high position in an Indian Government.

I have seen something of Gandhi's son, who runs the principal Congress paper in New Delhi, and we have had frank talks. Jinnah is in Bombay and is coming to Delhi about the middle of February but I have already talked with his representative here.

Whenever I have an opportunity I urge the importance of another attempt by the leaders to reach a compromise agreement before allowing India to drift into the position of a house divided within itself. Gandhi's son assures me that his father is ready for another attempt at compromise, if he were out of jail, and that may be true.


And so there seem to be four men who hold in their hands the destiny of three hundred eighty-eight million people;

people; Churchill dominates the Viceroy, the Viceroy dominates the Government of India, Gandhi controls the Congress and Jinnah the great mass of the Indian Muslims.

There seems to me only one way to bring about an agreement between the Indians themselves and that is to be in a position to convince them of Britain's sincerity. How can this be done is the heart of the problem. I hope that I may have some suggestions to offer later but not until I have more information. Meanwhile, I am planning to visit various parts of the country; first, the Punjab, where constitutional government is said to be flourishing; then to Bengal, where constitutional government functions but less successfully; then to Assam, to visit our forces; then to Bombay, Hyderabad and perhaps to the far South if I have time. I am also planning to visit several of the Hindu and Muslim universities. To all invitations to speak I have replied that I have come to study and to learn and so to be in a better position to report to you, and too I appreciate the danger of speaking in public to any group in this divided country.

I hope, Mr. President, that I may have the benefit of your judgment and guidance, for this is not an easy task that you have set me to and I would welcome any thoughts that you may have on the subject.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William Phillips". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "William Phillips".

Published in William Phillips,  
Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston: The  
Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 360-362.

*file  
confidential*

*India folder*

New Delhi, India

February 23, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Since my last letter the Gandhi business has given us a lot of trouble. A strict censorship has kept from the American press the widespread consternation caused by the official bulletins which indicated that he could not survive the fast. Muslims, Nationalists, Christians joined in the appeal of the Hindus for clemency, partly out of real sympathy and partly out of dread of what would happen throughout India if Gandhi died during the fast.

It is difficult for Anglo-Saxons to understand the deep-seated feelings which have been aroused by this performance of an old man of 73 years. Many Indians have told me that during his previous "fasts unto death" there was nothing like the present nation-wide consternation. The explanation given is that to vast numbers of Hindus Gandhi has a semi-divine quality which separates him from, and elevates him above, the rest of mankind. That such a being is willing to sacrifice himself for the cause that every Indian has at heart, namely, the independence of India, has touched the people as a whole. While, of course, Gandhi's methods in the past are not  
approved

The President,

The White House.

approved, probably by the majority, nevertheless his honesty of purpose is respected and Indians who have been violently against him have now joined the chorus of appeals in his behalf. There could be nothing like it in any other country but India.

As an example, I attended a banquet last evening given by one of the Indian members remaining in the Viceroy's Council in honor of the Governor of the United Provinces. I was told that fifty guests out of approximately one hundred and fifty acceptances gave out of the dinner at the last moment and even the host's wife and two daughters boycotted the dinner out of sympathy for Gandhi.

This is the fourteenth day of the fast and he has seven more days to go to complete his announced twenty-one days. Lately the bulletins have been far more reassuring and there is reason to believe now that he will survive.

Unfortunately, the whole episode has brought the United States prominently into the picture and I have been literally besieged by callers and overwhelmed by telegrams from all parts of India, asking whether there could not be something done from Washington or by me to relieve the present deadlock. An important conference of political leaders from various parts of India assembled in Delhi last week to urge the Viceroy to clemency and many of them called upon me. To the telegrams we have merely given formal acknowledgment. To the callers I have

have listened by the hour. While I had to be sympathetic, I gave them no reason to think that we would intervene, and it was only after the Department's authorization to say, in case I felt the need, that matters affecting the Indian situation which required handling were being dealt with by high officials of the American and British Governments, that I gave them that much comfort. I did this in the hope that it would lessen the pressure on the Mission and at the same time show the Indians that we were not completely indifferent.

But the Viceroy has remained adamant and has refused to listen to any appeals. He regards the case as one of defiance to law and order which must be dealt with accordingly. He does not feel, I fear, the pathos in the appeal of these millions for freedom for their own country. He is certainly a man of determination, for he has shown no weakening in his policy to let Gandhi bear the consequences of his fast and die in the process if necessary, no matter what the results may be. Perhaps he is a "chip off the old block" that Americans knew something about in 1772.

I realize perfectly that neither you nor the Secretary could do much but I had hoped that the Secretary's talks with Halifax might bear fruit in some way. At least I hoped to avoid the impression here, signs of which have already appeared, that by the presence of our forces in India and my own presence we were openly encouraging the British to retain their hold over India. For, rightly or wrongly, there is one fixed idea in the minds of Indians-- that Great Britain has no intention of "quitting India"

and

and that the post-war period will find the country in the same relative position. In the circumstances, they turn to us to give them help because of our historic stand for liberty.

I fear that the Office of War Information in India has been too active in advertising in the press, under the caption of the American flag and the Statue of Liberty, that the President "has declared the extension of these fundamental liberties to all men the base of the American people's war aims", et cetera, et cetera. Certainly Indians look to us for the help in their struggle, which presumably it will be difficult for us to give during the war. And after the war they believe that any such help will come too late, since whatever persuasion we can exercise over the British can be done better now than when the general scramble begins for post-war settlement. That is their view, I think, and one cannot live here without having a great deal of sympathy for it.

I am looking forward to the opportunity of talking over the situation with you when I return to Washington, and before then I hope to do a certain amount of travelling in the central and southern parts of the country to get a wider view of its problems.

With kindest remembrances and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

*William Phillips*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
Personal*

March 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS

Please read this from Bill Phillips. It is amazingly radical for a man like Bill, but he has been there fairly long now and has his feet on the ground.

What would you think of speaking to Eden about it -- even showing it to Eden?

F.D.R.

Dear Grace:

I showed this to Eden and now it can be filed.

Harry L. Hopkins

Excerpt published in William  
Phillips, Venture in Diplomacy  
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952),  
pp. 377-378.

PSF: India folder

New Delhi, India

March 3, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Gandhi has successfully completed his fast and the only result of it has been increasing bitterness against the British from large sections of the people. The Government has handled the case from the legalist point of view. Gandhi is the "enemy" and must not be allowed to escape from his just punishment and at all cost British prestige must be maintained.

Indians look at it from a different angle. Gandhi's followers regard him as semi-divine and worship him. Millions who are not his followers look upon him as the foremost Indian of the day and that since he has never had an opportunity to defend himself it is a case of persecution of an old man who has suffered much for the cause which every Indian has at heart--freedom for India. And so presumably Gandhi comes out of the struggle with an enhanced reputation as a moral force.

The general situation as I see it today is as follows:

From the British viewpoint their position is not unreasonable. They have been in India for 150 years and except for the mutiny in 1857, generally speaking, internal  
peace

The President,

The White House.

peace has been maintained. They have acquired vast vested interests in the country and fear that their withdrawal from India would jeopardize those interests. The great cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras have been built up largely through their initiative. They have guaranteed the regime of the Princes, who control territorially about one-third of the country and one-fourth of the population. They realize that new forces are gathering throughout the world which affect their hold over India and they have therefore gone out of their way, so they believe, to offer freedom to India as soon as there are signs that the Indians themselves can form a secure government. This the Indian leaders have been unable to do and the British feel that they have done all that they can in the circumstances. Behind the door is Mr. Churchill, who gives the impression that personally he would prefer not to transfer any power to an Indian Government either before or after the war and that the status quo should be maintained.

The Indians, on the other hand, are caught in the new idea which is sweeping over the world, of freedom for oppressed peoples. The Atlantic Charter has given the movement great impetus. Your speeches have given encouragement. The British declarations that freedom would be granted to India after the war have brought the picture of Indian independence as never before in the thoughts of the entire Indian intelligentsia. Unfortunately, as the time approaches for ending the war,

war, the struggle for political prestige and power between the parties has increased and this has made it more difficult than ever for the leaders to be willing to reach a compromise agreement. And furthermore, Gandhi and all Congress leaders, not to mention the fifty or sixty thousand Congress supporters, are in jail and as Congress is the strongest political party, there is no one available to speak for it.

There is thus a complete deadlock and I should imagine that the Viceroy and Churchill are well satisfied to let the deadlock remain as long as possible. That is, at least, the general impression in most Indian circles.

The problem, therefore, is, can anything be done to break this deadlock through our help? It seems to me that all we can do is to try to induce the Indian political leaders to meet together and discuss the form of government which they regard as applicable to India, and thus to show the world that they have sufficient intelligence to tackle the problem. We must not assume that they will adopt the American or British systems. In view of the importance of guaranteeing protection to the minorities, a majority form of government may not be applicable and a coalition may prove to be the only practical way of guaranteeing internal harmony. We cannot suppose that the British Government can or will transfer power to India by the scratch of a pen at the conclusion of the peace conference unless there is an Indian Government fit to receive it. The question remains, therefore, how to induce

induce the leaders to begin now to prepare for their future responsibilities.

There is, perhaps, a way out of the deadlock which I suggest to you, not because I am sure of its success, but because I think it is worthy of your consideration.

With the approval and blessing of the British Government, an invitation could be addressed to the leaders of all Indian political groups on behalf of the President of the United States, to meet together to discuss plans for the future. The assembly could be presided over by an American who could exercise influence in harmonizing the endless divisions of caste, religion, race and political views. The conference might well be under the patronage of the King Emperor, the President of the United States, the President of the Soviet Union and Chiang Kai-shek, in order to bring pressure to bear on Indian politicians. Upon the issuance of the invitations, the King Emperor could give a fresh assurance of the intention of the British Government to transfer power to India upon a certain date as well as his desire to grant a provisional set-up for the duration. The conference could be held in any city in India except Delhi.

American chairmanship would have the advantage, not only of expressing the interest of America in the future independence of India, but would also be a guarantee to the Indians of the British offer of independence. This is an important point because, as I have already said in previous letters, British promises in this regard are no longer believed.

If either of the principal parties refused to attend the conference, it would be notice to all the world that India was not ready for self-government, and I doubt whether a political leader would put himself in such a position. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery may be obstacles, for, notwithstanding statements to the contrary, India is governed from London, down to the smallest details.

Should you approve the general idea and care to consult Churchill, he might reply that, since the Congress leaders are in jail, a meeting such as is contemplated is impossible. The answer could be that certain of the leaders, notably Gandhi, might be freed unconditionally in order to attend the conference. The British may even be searching for a good excuse to release Gandhi, for the struggle between him and the Viceroy is over with honors for both--the Viceroy has maintained his prestige; Gandhi has carried out his protest against the Government by his successful fast, and has come back into the limelight.

There is nothing new in my suggestion, except the method of approach to the problem. The British have already announced their willingness to grant freedom to India after the war, if the Indians have agreed among themselves as to its form. The Indians say they cannot agree because they have no confidence in the British promises. The proposed plan perhaps provides the guarantee required by the Indians, and is in line with British declared intentions.

Possibly this is a way out of the impasse, which if  
allowed

allowed to continue, may affect our conduct of the war in this part of the world and our future relations with colored races. It may not be successful, but, at least, America will have taken a step in furthering the ideals of the Atlantic Charter.

I offer the suggestion now in order that it may have your consideration before my return to Washington at the end of April or early May, when I shall be able to give you at first hand further information on the subject.

Sincerely yours,

*William Phillips*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*file personal*

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*India folder*  
*1-43*

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Madras, India, March 19, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending this line to you from Madras, during my travels, merely to show you what I am about, rather than to give you any information of consequence, since from here there is no way of sending a confidential letter to you.

Accompanied by Major Heppner I left Delhi on March 5, 1943 for Bombay, where I was the guest over the week-end at the Governor's house and for the rest of the time at the residence of our Consul. I had exceptionally good opportunities to meet representative Indians of all parties and filled up my time after leaving Government house with interviews with them. Bombay is a center of political thought and is one of the best places in India to study the general situation.

After Bombay I went to Hyderabad which is regarded as the Premier State in India, although in many ways it is not the most advanced. It is under the autocratic rule of the Nizam, who after the last war was given the title by the British Government, for  
services

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

services rendered during the war, of Exalted Highness and Faithful Ally. There I was the guest of the Prime Minister, whom I had previously met in Delhi and liked. He put us up in his own house and proved a most devoted host. The Nizam is said to be the richest man in the world with barrels of jewels hidden somewhere, but who lives personally an austere life. Certainly he spends nothing on himself nor, as it was quite apparent, on his clothes. The State is a bit of old India. It has also contributed generously to the present war effort, having an army of its own, which is in training with other units of the Indian Army and has also furnished two squadrons of airplanes and, I believe, one or two corvettes. It has a magnificent new University, a very remarkable school of art, modern hospitals and broad streets, and yet it preserves an ancient form of government which is probably passing. But the poor remain ignorant and there is terrible poverty behind the facade of prosperity.

I am here in Madras only for three days and am doing the usual things, - receiving representatives of political groups, visiting war activities, and being entertained by groups of American and English people. Although Madras is less important politically than some other parts of India, it has its special interests and, so far as the English point of view is concerned, it represents a distinctly conservative attitude. From here we go to Travancore and Mysore, the two States lying at the southern tip of India, which are said to be the most advanced of all the States,

States, socially, educationally and in many other ways. Particularly among women they have a much higher percentage of literacy than that found in other States or Provinces, and I am keenly looking forward to this part of the trip. After Mysore, I return to Delhi where I should arrive about April 1st.

My travels will be of immense value to me personally for I have come to realize, as I did not fully realize before, the important part which the Indian States are playing in the whole picture of the India of the future. I can talk to you more about this when we meet, but it is enough now to say that, comprising as they do one-third of the territory of the country and about one-fourth of the population, their attitude towards a future central government is of the highest importance.

With all good wishes.

Always sincerely yours,

*William Phillips.*

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# The Japan Advertiser

昭和六年三月廿八日 第三種郵便物認可

TOKYO, THURSDAY MAY 24, 1934

## ROERICH COMMENDS HAYASHI AS LEADER AFTER MEETING HIM

Visiting Artist Says He Is Impressed by War Minister's Understanding and Ability

### LEAVING TODAY FOR KYOTO

Museum Head and His Son Will Stop in Kwansai Before Going to Manchukuo and China

### TO RETURN TO INDIA LATER

"Japan is fortunate in having as one of her leaders such a great man as General Senjuro Hayashi," Professor Nicholas Roerich, noted artist, cultural leader and director of the Roerich Museum in New York, told a representative of The Japan Advertiser yesterday following an interview with the War Minister at the latter's official residence at 9 o'clock. "General Hayashi is a man of wonderful temperament," Mr. Roerich continued, "and I was greatly honored in having had the privilege of meeting and talking with him. He is a man of sterling character, and his understanding and appreciation of cultural activities and their ideals shows that he is a leader of great ability."

The cultural leader was accompanied by his son, Mr. George de Roerich, distinguished as a student of Tibetan language and history and of Sanskrit. They are leaving today for Kyoto, and after visiting in the Kwansai for a fortnight will continue on to Manchukuo, China and then India, where Mr. Roerich will continue his cultural work at the Urusvati, an institute of science and art in India of which he is honorary director.

#### Plensed at Reception

In an interview with a representative

## Club in Harbin Decides to Buy 1,000 Pounds of Coffee from Salvador

HARBIN, May 22.—As a sequel to the club's official recognition of Manchukuo, the Harbin Japan-Manchukuo Club has decided to purchase 1,000 pounds of Salvadoran coffee and has requested the Manchukuo foreign affairs commissioner here to make the necessary arrangements. It is understood the commissioner has already placed an order through the Salvadoran Consul-General in Tokyo, Mr. Leon Gutierrez. Settlement of the account is expected to be made in July.

## PROBLEM OF CAFES INCREASES IN KOREA

Some of Wealthy Families There, Discontented, Seek Surcease in Seductive Bars

### OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED

Dancehalls Strictly Banned—One Source of Problem Is Lack of Jobs for Educated

#### By Setsuo Uenoda

Some of the wealthy families in Korea are taking more and more to the joys of night life. This tendency is clearly reflected in the increasing popularity of cafes and bars in Korea among Korean youth, and it is one of the problems over which the authorities of the Government-General are most concerned. It is reported that there has been a tendency for similar to this catering to Japanese residents in Korea to decline in popularity.

In Korea the establishment of public dancehalls is prohibited. This dancehall craze in the peninsula is due to a youthful population that seeks amuse-

*India folder  
1-43*

March 24, 1943.

A reminder to ask Hon. William Phillips to speak to the President about this when he gets back from India.

*file*

G. G. T.

*pending folder*

India folder  
1-43

Excerpt published in William Phillips,  
Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston: The  
Beacon Press, 1952), p. 372.

New Delhi, India

April 7, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

I have returned from my trip to the south of India and have sent a brief summary by cable of my impressions. I shall not burden you with details of the trip, which were, however, of intense interest. Travelling is not easy or comfortable in India, especially in the hot weather, but I managed the trip without loss of a day or of an engagement. Major Heppner, my Personal Assistant, accompanied me. We travelled by train, plane and motor through the Provinces of Bombay and Madras, and the States of Hyderabad, Travancore and Mysore, going as far south as Cape Cormorin, the southern tip of India. At every stop I was the guest either of the Indian State Governments, of British officials or of American citizens, and in this way I had exceptional opportunities of obtaining a cross-current of political views and opinions.

I was greatly impressed by the two southern States, Mysore and Travancore, which are in many respects in advance of the Provinces of British India. Educationally, Travancore is far ahead of all the other States and Provinces because of her ancient custom through which the wife rather than the husband has had control of the family property, and the mother, being responsible for the up-bringing

The President,

The White House.

bringing of the children, has, for generations, insisted upon their education. This custom has now been modified in favor of the father. It is interesting to note that the heir-apparent to the Throne is not the son of the ruler but the eldest son of the ruler's eldest sister. There is much natural wealth in these two States and I was astonished to see the extent of the rubber, teak, tea and cotton cultivation in Travancore. Mysore has important iron and gold deposits, and extensive coffee and vegetable cultivation.

Being the guest of the State Governments, I saw many picturesque sights and met literally hundreds of Indians. In the north of Travancore there is one of the finest game sanctuaries in the world, where, during evening and early morning tours of a lake, I counted about eighty elephants, many bison and sambhurs, (a giant type of deer) all in their wild state. It is thrilling to watch at close quarters from a launch a dozen elephants playing on the water's edge.

It so happened that the sister of the Maharajah of Mysore had just been married and the presentation of the bridal couple to the people took place the evening of my arrival in the city of Mysore. The vast palace was illuminated with sixty thousand electric bulbs. It was a fairy-like apparition rather than an illumination. In the center of a torch light procession, headed by soldiers and mounted lancers in quaint costumes, came the giant elephant, covered with trappings of gold, its eyes and tusks brilliantly painted, and on its back the bridal couple enthroned. An escort of three or more elephants followed

and then came more soldiers and cavalrymen. It was a scene from the Arabian Nights.

But to turn for a moment to more important matters, may I give you a summary of my impressions gained through conversations with many different types of Indian leaders.

My previous impression of increasing anti-British sentiment was confirmed. In those States where there is much natural wealth, the discontent arises from the impression that the British do not welcome full development of the States' natural resources if there is any danger of competition with British industry. As an example, the State of Mysore owns and controls an important rubber factory. While the factory produces many articles required by the Indian Army, it is not permitted to produce automobile tires. This is particularly galling to the authorities of the State because the raw rubber obtained within the State has to be shipped to Madras and turned over to the Dunlop Tire Company, British owned, which has the privilege of tire manufacture in India.

The same under-current against British rule, coupled with the feeling that the Indians themselves are capable of handling their own domestic affairs, was apparent in all three States, which are, in fact, examples of advanced socialism, under the autocratic rule of the semi-independent sovereigns. Industry is owned and controlled by the States. It is a strange form of government from our point of view but it is one that has brought peace and prosperity to these States.

The Dewan (Prime Minister) of Travancore, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, is one of the most intelligent Indians

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I have met. He believes strongly in the necessity of a provisional coalition government at the center and that the immediate crying need is for a transfer of power to such a government. He does not think that the British Parliamentary system would be appropriate for India, since such a government would be turned out in no time. The American system of guaranteed duration for a four year period, in his opinion, comes nearer to suitability. He thinks that it is better not to try for any written constitution at first but to let habits grow and change with use. And he would leave the Provinces as they are for the present.

Everywhere the hope was expressed that Great Britain could find a way to solve the present deadlock but everywhere it was felt that the present Viceroy would not help in this respect. There was a general agreement as to what he should do if he would, and it was along the following lines:

That, (1) the King Emperor should make a new declaration, guaranteeing independence at a suitable time after the war, thus assuring India of equal status with Canada and the other Dominions. Previous assurances to this effect are not taken seriously.

(2) Meanwhile, a provisional government should be set up in Delhi which would represent the various political parties. In order to create such a coalition, the Viceroy should invite one or two, or possibly three, prominent Indian leaders to undertake the task. This would necessitate, of course, the gradual release from prison of the members

members of the Congress Party, but it was said that this could safely be done, since the provisional government itself could exact guarantees of good conduct from them.

(3) There should be a generous transfer of power to the provisional government on all matters except those affecting the conduct of the war. In this connection it was suggested that the Viceroy and Field Marshall Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief in India, might have associated with them an advisory group of officers representing the armed forces of Britain, India, United States and China. In case there might be differences of opinion with regard to the jurisdiction of the provisional government or that of the Viceroy, this advisory committee would be called into action to support the views of the military.

It is realized that the problem of the future constitution for India is so complex that much time and preparation will be required.

(4) The problem of Pakistan is a very real one and will have to be dealt with at the appropriate time. But meanwhile it is held that a provisional government for the duration of the war would be a wise approach to the greater problem of constitutional reform, although some leading Hindus believe that the idea of Pakistan has become so well established and has made such a popular appeal among the Muslims that the right to it will have to be conceded before the Muslims will participate at the center.

In this connection Jinnah's views are important. He recently came to Delhi and yesterday I had a long talk with him. He is, as you know, the most powerful political figure in

in opposition to Gandhi. He and his Muslim League have been growing in influence as the idea of Pakistan has taken hold of the imagination of the Muslim people. I found him not unreasonable. He stands for the right to Pakistan, if the forty million Muslims in northern India decide by ballot that they wish to become a separate nation. He believes that such a state would be able to conduct its own affairs within the Commonwealth of Nations, and that its relations with a Hindu India could be regulated by treaty. He is certainly much concerned with India's war effort and would like to see a situation created whereby all parties could make a real contribution.

Since last August Jinnah has insisted that before associating with any provisional government at the center, the League must have a British guarantee of the right of Pakistan. I talked to him at length about this and asked whether such insistence on his part would not muddy the waters more than they are muddied already. He did not give me a straight answer, but said that I could count on him to take no step which would impede the progress of the war and that his position with regard to Pakistan was purely "defensive".

I believe that this statement has some significance.

(5) Returning to the problem of the States, it was said that the States will not feel disposed to play any part in the creation of a provisional coalition government in view of their semi-independent status through treaty with the British Government. But in my talks with some of the leading statesmen of the three States, I had the impression that once a firm central government was established,

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the more important of the States, at least, might agree to be associated with it, not as members of the government but through an advisory council near the government.

There are, of course, many different shades of opinion but I think this brief survey represents a cross-current of intelligent views.

However, since the Viceroy has refused to allow a group of four responsible Indians to see Gandhi for the purpose of obtaining his views with regard to the present and future of India and since he has even refused to discuss with such a group the reasons for their desire to approach Gandhi, it is now clearer than ever that Lord Linlithgow prefers not to make any change in the present situation during the remainder of his term of office, which will expire, unless again extended, next October. It may be that he fears to take the "lid off" in any respect and that it is wiser, in the interests of the war, to carry on as at present, in spite of the general dissatisfaction and anti-British attitude of the Indian people. And it is fair to assume that Mr. Churchill shares this view.

In conclusion, may I repeat, that there is everywhere a feeling of frustration, discouragement, and helplessness. America is still looked upon as the one and only hope, and that our Government should use its good offices to bring the opposing forces together, in the interests of India and of the United Nations.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

William Phillips

Excerpts published in William  
Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy  
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952),  
pp. 379-381.

*India folder*

*file  
personal*

New Delhi, India

April 19, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Now that I shall soon be heading for Washington, in accordance with your instructions, I shall try to summarize briefly some generalizations with regard to the situation here as I see it. They do not make a happy picture and I am sorry that I cannot be the bearer of more encouraging views. But, nevertheless, I shall give them to you for whatever they may be worth.

India is suffering from paralysis, the people are discouraged and there is a feeling of growing hopelessness. The political leaders remain hostile to one another, although they maintain that if the British would open the door to negotiation they could manage to pull together on a provisional basis for the duration of the war and to prepare for post-war responsibilities. More and more they realize that constitution making is a serious business and will have to be tackled in a more hopeful atmosphere than the present. Meanwhile, there is very little thought given to the war among Indians. India is in a state of inertia, prostration, divided counsels and helplessness, with growing distrust and dislike for the British, and disappointment and disillusion with regard to Americans. Indians say that while they are in sympathy with the aims of the United Nations,

they

The President,

The White House.

they are not to be allowed to share the benefits of such aims, and they feel, therefore, that they have nothing to fight for. Churchill's exclusion of India from the principles of the Atlantic Charter is always referred to in this connection.

The British are sitting "pretty". They have been completely successful in their policy of "keeping the lid on" and in suppressing any movement among the Indians which might be interpreted as a move towards independence. British armies dominate the picture and the fact that large Indian forces have been moved out of the country is a further guarantee of the British power and purpose to dominate the scene, according to their own views. Twenty thousand Congress leaders remain in jail without trial and the influence, therefore, of the Congress Party is diminishing, while that of the Muslim League is growing.

At the same time, the prestige of British justice is on the decline, because of the refusal of the Government to allow the political prisoners to speak in their own defense, which is not the way, Indians believe, that British justice is administered in England.

The British position becomes clear. There is to be no change, no effort to open the door to negotiation among the leaders, no preparation for the future until after the war, and that date is so uncertain that I believe the Indians generally feel there will be no material changes in their favor even after the war. For it will always be easy to find, in this vast country, plenty of justification, if one is looking for excuses, to preserve the status quo now and in the years to come.

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The British maintain that the present situation is wholly satisfactory for the conduct of the war, and that the country is comparatively quiet, thanks to their energetic measures. Indian indifference and even hostility, they say, will make no difference, for British forces are able to preserve law and order and crush any movement dangerous to the war effort. It is true that comparative quiet prevails throughout the country, but, in my opinion, it is a quiet pregnant with disturbing potentialities.

But it is hard to discover, either in Delhi or in other parts of India, any pronounced war spirit against Japan, even on the part of the British. Rather, it seems to me, the British feel that their responsibility lies on this side of the Burma-Assam frontier. Presumably they will join us in our efforts in Burma, and during the last month there have been British expeditions into Arakan, which, because of their feebleness, have been checked and routed by the Japanese. As I see it, unless the present atmosphere is changed for the better, we Americans will have to bear the burden of the coming campaign in this part of the world and cannot count on more than token assistance from the British in British India.

As time goes on, Indians are coming more and more to disbelieve in the American gospel of freedom of oppressed peoples. They have long ago lost any confidence in words and phrases, for they have had plenty of such reassuring and friendly comments emanating from high British sources and from agreeably framed speeches in Parliament. To them, America has more recently merely repeated the old British assurances

assurances without, however, indicating any willingness to go further, even at moments when the public expected some evidence of willingness to take action in support of the well-known American principles. Again looking at it as always from the Indian point of view, America has allowed such moments to slip by in silence, and this has convinced them the more that America stands solidly with the British in the past, present and future Indian policies of the British Government.

We here ask ourselves, day after day, "Will there be a new Viceroy next autumn, who will bring new hope to the people of India? Will he be a man of human sympathies, whom Indian leaders feel that they can approach, confident of his desire to help them solve their domestic problems?" If this is not to be, then there is no hope of improvement, and the picture will be dark indeed. My own presence here under such conditions might easily be misinterpreted and misunderstood, and would not help our own prestige in India.

In conclusion, may I add one more thought which is expressed without any official confirmation but which nevertheless is constantly in my mind. India and China and Burma have a common meeting ground in their desire for freedom from foreign domination. In spite of all we read in the press about the magnificence of the Chinese military effort, the leadership and forcefulness of the Generalissimo, the actual picture as viewed from here is distressing and disturbing. Chinese apathy and lack of leadership and, moreover, Chinese dislike of the British, meet a wholly responsive chord in India, where, as I have said, there is  
little

little evidence of war effort and much evidence of anti-British sentiment. Color consciousness is also appearing more and more and under present conditions is bound to develop. We have, therefore, a vast bloc of Oriental peoples who have many things in common, including a growing dislike and distrust of the Occidental.

I see only one remedy to this disturbing situation, and that is, to try with every means in our power to make Indians feel that America is with them and in a position to go beyond mere public assurances of friendship.

It was for this reason that I have laid so much stress on asking the Viceroy for permission to see Gandhi. If the record shows that I have never made a serious effort to obtain the views of the Congress Party from Gandhi, then indeed my future usefulness here is at an end. For it would be assumed that I have not been interested in the picture as a whole and have been satisfied to give my Government a one-sided and incomplete report of the situation. My stock would fall very low indeed, unless it were known that I had, at least, made the effort. I shall, therefore, make my request of the Viceroy when I see him at the end of this week.

May I add that I fully appreciate the position of our Government in its relation to the British Government and the difficulties involved in carrying out, during the war, such ideas as I have indicated. But I have felt that you would wish me to express my views of the situation, as seen from here.

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I need not assure you, Mr. President, that I am  
eagerly looking forward to my return to Washington, and  
to my talks with you and the State Department.

Sincerely yours,

William Phillips

FILE MEMO:

8-30-44

This is the letter which was published  
by Drew Pearson in his Merry-Go-Round column,  
7-25-44, with a follow-up column, 8-28-44.  
Corres. re this incident is filed - Gen Corres  
"P", dr. 4-44.

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*India folder  
1-43*

*(May 14<sup>th</sup> 1943(?))*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

May I add a few words to what I said to you on Tuesday afternoon when I had the pleasure of giving you an oral report of my impressions on the Indian situation.

Assuming that India is bound to be an important base for our future operations against Burma and Japan, it would seem to me of highest importance that we should have around us a sympathetic India rather than an indifferent and possibly a hostile India. It would appear that we will have the primal responsibility in the conduct of the war against Japan. There is no evidence that the British intend to do much more than give token assistance. If that is so, then the conditions surrounding our base in India become of vital importance.

The President,  
The White House.

importance.

At present the Indian people are at war only in a legal sense as, for various reasons, the British Government declared India in the conflict without the formality of consulting Indian leaders or even the Indian legislature. Indians feel that they have no voice in the Government and therefore no responsibility in the conduct of the war. They feel that they have nothing to fight for as they are convinced that the professed war aims of the United Nations do not apply to them. The British Prime Minister, in fact, has stated that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter are not applicable to India, and it is not unnatural therefore that the Indian leaders are beginning to wonder whether the Charter is only for the benefit of the white races. The present Indian Army is purely mercenary and only that part of it which is drawn from the martial races has been tried in actual warfare and these martial soldiers represent only thirty-three percent of that Army. General Stilwell has expressed to me his concern over the situation and in particular in regard to the poor morale of the  
Indian

Indian officers.

The attitude of the general public toward the war is even worse. Lassitude and indifference and bitterness have increased as a result of the famine conditions, the growing high cost of living and the continued political deadlock.

While India is broken politically into various parties and groups, all have one object in common, — eventual freedom and independence from British domination.

There would seem to be only one remedy to this highly unsatisfactory situation in which we are unfortunately but nevertheless seriously involved, and that is to change the attitude of the people of India towards the war, make them feel that we want them to assume responsibilities to the United Nations and are prepared to give them facilities for doing so, and that the voice of India will play an important part in the reconstruction of the world. The present political conditions do not permit of any improvement in this respect. Even though the British should fail again it is high time that they should make a new effort to  
improve

improve conditions and to reestablish confidence among the Indian people that their future independence is to be granted. Words are of no avail. They only aggravate the present situation. It is time for the British to act. This they can do by a solemn declaration from the King Emperor that India will achieve her independence at a specified date after the war and as a guarantee of good faith in this respect a provisional representative coalition government will be established at the center and limited powers transferred to it.

I feel strongly, Mr. President, that in view of our military position in India we should have a voice in these matters. It is not right for the British to say "this is none of your business" when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the future struggle with Japan. If we do nothing and merely accept the British point of view that conditions in India are none of our business then we must be prepared for various serious consequences in the internal situation in India which may develop as a result of despair and misery and anti-white sentiments of hundreds of millions

millions of subject people.

The peoples of Asia--and I am supported in this opinion by other diplomatic and military observers--cynically regard this war as one between fascist and imperialist powers. A generous British gesture to India would change this undesirable political atmosphere. India itself might then be expected more positively to support our war effort against Japan. China, which regards the Anglo-American bloc with misgiving and mistrust, might then be assured that we are in truth fighting for a better world. And the colonial peoples conquered by the Japanese might hopefully feel that they have something better to look forward to than simply a return to their old masters. Such a British gesture, Mr. President, will produce not only a tremendous psychological stimulus to flagging morale through Asia and facilitate our military operations in that theater, but it will also be proof positive to all people--our own and the British included--that this is not a war of power politics but a war for all we say it is.

Sincerely yours,

William Phillips

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Gen. Watson  
6/21/43

India folder  
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE  
HIGHOVER  
NORTH BEVERLY MASS.

JUN 30 9 26 AM '43

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Dear Mr. President.

I have been giving a great deal of thought to your very kind suggestion with regard to the boat at Ottawa and have discussed it from all angles with Caroline.

If it is not asking too much, may I have a little more time for further consideration, and if possible, a few minutes with you when I am next in Washington which I expect to be on June 9<sup>th</sup>?

It occurs to me that an announcement now of my appointment to Canada might be construed by India, as a decision not to interest yourself

Further in Indian aspirations for  
independence. It is unfortunate,  
but nevertheless true that the eyes of  
Indians are focussed on Washington,  
hardly, I think, due to any return  
to report to you. Their great hope  
now is in you, and in what influence  
you may be able to exert over the British  
government.

While there is any possibility of  
helping the situation through Eden, as  
you suggest, might it not be wise  
to await developments, rather than  
give the impression that you have asked  
us to turn my back on India  
and to become associated with

another part of the British Empire?  
Perhaps I am inquiring things.  
But the situation over there is so delicate  
that I would not want to do anything  
which would seem to the Indians, to  
be the result of a change of position or a  
lack of interest on the part of the  
President of the United States. We  
must somehow manage to keep their  
sympathy in spite of Churchill's intransigent  
attitude.

I am having a few days of rest  
which I discovered I needed badly.  
With great respect,

Yours sincerely,

William Phillips

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Excerpt published in William  
Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy  
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952),  
p. 392.

RJ 3/30/56

Excerpt published in William  
Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy,  
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952),  
p. 395.

RJ 3/30/56



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*India folder 1-43*  
*file personal*

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
London

September 30, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

I called this morning upon Lord Wavell to pay my respects, as he is leaving next week for Delhi. I came away feeling more hopeful than I had expected.

In his recent speech before the Pilgrim Society, he had made a very friendly reference to India, adding that "all classes and sections of opinion in this country (England) are firmly united in the desire to give every possible assistance to India in her aspirations to full freedom." I complimented him on his speech and expressed the hope that he would find it possible to implement his reference to India's aspirations.

I thought it a good occasion to tell him of our interest in India's problems and that you stood ready to be of help, if help was desired, in the event that steps might be undertaken to break the present political deadlock. He asked me whether I

was

The President,  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

was planning to return to India. I explained your position, which I understood to be that if I could contribute, as the representative of the President, you might ask me to return, otherwise I would not do so. Lord Wavell expressed his appreciation, indicating without actually saying so, that he might be glad of such help. He added that he would let us know if an opening presented itself when American assistance would be useful.

He talked of the difficulties but he admitted rather significantly that they alone should not prevent a genuine effort, if such seemed feasible.

I told him that we thoroughly understood the difficulties; that we were sympathetic to the Indian plea for independence by reason of our historical background; that we were more than ever interested now because of the presence of American forces and that we felt the importance of holding India friendly to the white races rather than to allow a situation to develop which might tend to turn her sympathies more and more in the direction of the East.

I expressed the hope personally, that he would have a try at breaking the deadlock and even though he failed, I thought the mere try would have a beneficial affect.

While Wavell may not be, and probably is not, carrying an

olive

olive branch from Churchill, there was nothing in his attitude to indicate the same rigidity of policy as that of Lord Linlithgow. In manner he is slow and unapproachable but he is a good and a highly-principled man, and we can hope at least, that he will make an effort at collaboration with the Indian political leaders and see whether anything can be done along the lines of negotiation. And that is about all that can be expected in the immediate future.

The American and British Members of Cossac have given me a cordial welcome and I am gradually learning to understand their language. I only hope that I may be able to contribute something towards the great undertaking.

With kindest remembrances,

Sincerely yours,

*William Phillips*

Published in William Phillips,  
Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston:  
The Beacon Press, 1952), Pp. 393-395.

RJ 3/30/56

India folder 1-43

File  
Personal

[Sept. 1943]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. President:

Before leaving for London, I feel it my duty and my responsibility to express to you my concern with regard to the Indian situation. In previous letters from New Delhi I have dealt somewhat in detail with the growing resentment against the British among the political parties as a result of the political deadlock which is permitted to continue without hope that negotiations will be permitted among the leaders themselves or between the leaders and the British Indian Government.

While it is true that the political unrest largely affects only the more educated Indians, there is in addition a disturbing and even alarming situation developing among the uneducated masses, particularly in Bengal, on account of the famine. It should be borne in mind that the frontiers of Bengal touch those of Assam where American

air

The President,

The White House.

air forces are being concentrated in great numbers. In fact, Assam is the principal base from which our future efforts against Burma will be directed. Is it not therefore important that the attitude of the people near and around our principal base should continue to be friendly and cooperative? If only from the point of view of strategy, should we not avoid having a hostile population close to our important base and to our lines of communication? And yet, so far as I know, nothing has been done or is being done by the British Indian Government to remedy this situation which, in my estimation, has become serious. In this connection the following telegram recently received from our Mission in New Delhi is illuminating:

"In a very frank conversation with Berry [Secretary at the Mission] last night, the Director General of Supply bitterly criticized the food policy of the Central Government and particularly the manner in which it is handling very serious famine conditions in Bengal. He said it had been obvious for a year that imports of wheat are only solution and added that six shiploads of wheat from Australia or elsewhere would remedy matters. He contends that United States or Britain should immediately make these ships and supplies available in view Bengal's strategic relation to war effort. People of Bengal who are daily dying of starvation in large numbers will, he said, eat wheat in absence of rice despite considerable contrary opinion. He added he had just come from conference with high ranking British General to whom he had said in substance:

"It is all very well for military to say 'Give us the stones to throw and we will do the rest' but how am I to get the stones from a hostile and starving population'.

"He

"He said neither present Viceroy nor British military appreciate the grave dangers involved in operating from a base where economic and political conditions are such as exist in India today. He expressed hope Wavell would view matter differently."

Further information is to the effect that many of the rural areas in Bengal are foodless, with the villagers wandering into the cities to die there of starvation. Deaths from starvation on the streets of Calcutta are reported to have become so numerous that prominent European members of the community have addressed open letters to the municipal authorities requesting that more adequate means be found for the removal of the bodies. Similar letters have been addressed to the authorities in an endeavor to prevail upon the latter to provide means of assistance for persons taken to hospitals in a state of collapse from starvation and who because of their numbers are unable to gain admittance. It is reported also that in eastern Bengal--always a site of unrest--one finds much increased evidence of pro-Japanese sympathy among the peasants who are said to be hopeful of a Japanese invasion in the belief that the Japanese would bring with them rice from Burma. Instances of lawlessness throughout India occasioned by a desire to obtain food are said to be becoming of common and increasing occurrence.

I am venturing to bring this matter to your personal  
attention

attention because I do not want anything in the records to appear to indicate an indifference on my part to a situation in India which might develop in such a way as to affect and even hinder our operations.

May I repeat that it is not alone the continuation of the political deadlock nor is it merely the famine conditions among the masses of Bengal that disturbs me, for, it is only too true, that in the past India has suffered from famines of similar severity. But it is the combination of the two, the deadlock and the famine, and the fact that there are Indians of high and low degree, many millions of them, who are resentful against their present conditions, hostile to the British because of the failure of the British to help them, and distrustful of Americans because of our close association with the British, that to me renders the situation of consequence to our military effort.

The remedy, if there is one, is for the British to open the door to negotiations and to do everything possible to lessen the famine conditions in the province of Bengal.

Faithfully yours,

*William Phillips*

Cairo, Egypt.  
18 November 1943.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

During my recent trip to India I conferred with many British and American civil and military officials. Foremost among them was Lord Wavell, now Viceroy of India.

I had the pleasure of serving with Lord Wavell, then General Wavell, in Java shortly after we entered the war. During our conversations at New Delhi I found the Viceroy very frank and lucid in all matters pertaining to Indian problems. He showed a keen perception of the existing political and diplomatic issues in that country. In addition, his long experience as a military leader enables him to understand completely the military strategy and tactics of the Asiatic Theatre.

I had a number of conferences with Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theatre. I found Lord Mountbatten direct and eager to give me a general picture of the problems with which he is confronted.

Lord Mountbatten is quite anxious to include the Chinese Theatre in his

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GENERAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

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Papers of President Franklin D. Roosevelt

O. F. 200



command. The President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, told me that he likes Lord Mountbatten but, as President of China and Generalissimo of the Chinese Armies, he felt it would be injurious to him and an unsettling factor on all China if he were to accept a position subordinate to anyone in the Chinese Theatre of Operations. He said, however, that if a Chinese Army or Armies were operating outside of China, in cooperation with American and British forces, he would, if conditions at that time made it seem proper, consent to having such Chinese forces under Lord Mountbatten or such other United Nations officer as might be deemed appropriate.

Among other military officials with whom I conferred in India were Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander in Chief in India; Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Commanding General of U. S. Army Air Forces India-Burma Sector; Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff to Lord Mountbatten; and Brig. Gen. B. G. Ferris, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Echelon, China-Burma-India Theatre Command.

I have kept notes on my conversations in India so I might be able to discuss with you the problems of that area but I have not made a written report to you on India. My reason for refraining from preparing such a report is that you already have a personal representative to India, Mr. William Phillips. Mr. Phillips was absent from the theatre while I was there but I conferred with Mr. George Merrill, acting head of the American Mission. Under the circumstances, however, I thought that a written report from me on India might be inappropriate unless specifically requested by you.

I am grateful to you for having given me the opportunity to see India

- 2 -

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

The National Archives

THE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT  
LIBRARY

Hyde Park, N. Y.

Three Centimeters


Papers of President Franklin D. Roosevelt

O. F. 200



and to get a first hand knowledge of the problems with which the United Nations are confronted in that area.

Respectfully yours,



PATRICK J. HURLEY,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.



India folder 1-44



file  
personal

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
CALCUTTA.

February 10<sup>th</sup> 1944

My dear Mr President,  
Just before I left  
Cairo I was delighted to receive,  
through Mr Alexander Kirk, a  
signed photograph of yourself.

I need hardly say how very  
pleased my wife and I were to  
receive this very pleasant evidence  
of your kindness and consideration.

There is nothing that we would  
have appreciated more - and it  
has already taken an honoured  
place in this Government House.

I am rapidly forgetting the  
trials and tribulations of the  
Middle East - and am accumulating  
knowledge of a new set of problems  
and responsibilities.

I have already met many of

PTO →

your senior officers in this area -  
and you may be sure that my  
wife and I will continue to  
maintain the closest possible  
contact with your representatives  
in this part of the world.

May I wish Mr Roosevelt  
and yourself all good fortune  
in the strenuous period that  
still lies ahead -

My sincere thanks again  
for the great courtesy that you  
have been good enough to  
show me.

With all good wishes, Sir -  
believe me

yours very sincerely

W. Casey

*the area -  
to my  
with  
substantive*

The Hon'ble  
Franklin D. Roosevelt

President, United States of America,  
*THE WHITE HOUSE.* WASHINGTON.  
D.C.  
U.S.A.




DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

I am enclosing herewith a sealed letter addressed to the President by His Excellency the Governor of Bengal, which has been received by pouch from the American Consul General at Calcutta.

  
George T. Summerlin

Enclosure:  
Sealed letter.

FOR DEFENSE



(3086)

lms

*EPS Dr.  
I think not  
is best for  
Carbon initialed  
and returned to  
State 6/12/44*

*India 1944*

*State  
World War II*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*x48-7*

Request for Information regarding the President's wishes as to Disposition of his Letter of August 1, 1942 to Gandhi

I informed you on September 9, 1942 that delivery of your letter of August 1, 1942 to Gandhi was impractical because of the latter's imprisonment. You agreed to the suggestion that the letter be retained in the files of the Mission at New Delhi until delivery to Gandhi might be feasible and appropriate.

The Mission now requests instructions. It recommends against delivery on the grounds that the context is not now entirely timely; that failure to have received a reply will be understood by Gandhi because of his having been held incommunicado; that difficulty may be experienced in convincing the Government of India that this Government was not a party to the evasion of censorship which occurred when Gandhi's letter was delivered to you; and that it is inadvisable at this time to encourage Gandhi to communicate further with you. A copy of the Mission's telegram no. 357 of May 19, 1944 on the subject is attached.

There appear to be three possible procedures: (1) that the letter not be delivered, with the resultant possibility that some day Gandhi may accuse you of a lack of interest in India's problems; (2) that the original letter be delivered with appropriate explanation from the Mission, and--in order that no charge of subterfuge may be brought by the Government of India--after prior advice to the Government of India; (3) that a new letter with more timely context be drafted for delivery in the same manner, with the resultant possibility that, as in procedure no. 2, difficulty may arise from the censorship angle, and that Gandhi may be encouraged to endeavor to communicate further with you in a manner embarrassing to you and both embarrassing and annoying to the Government of India.

An expression of your wishes in the matter is requested.

Enclosure:  
From New Delhi, no. 357,  
May 19, 1944.

*C H*  
*x20*

845.01/239, 272

*x. G. F. State*

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972

Department of State

BUREAU  
DIVISION

ME

ENCLOSURE  
TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

DVS-273  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone (SC)

New Delhi via Army

Dated May 19, 1944

Rec'd 1:08 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

357, May 19, 1 p.m.

May I now in accordance with the Department's 505-  
September 12, 4 p.m., 1942, request the Department's in-  
structions regarding the disposition of the President's  
letter to Gandhi?

I feel sure that Gandhi understands why he did not  
receive a reply to his letter of July 1, 1942, and he  
probably would not expect one at this late date. If a  
reply is made it might encourage him to correspond further  
with the President. It is probable too that the receipt  
of the reply would become known to the Government of India  
whose suspicions would be (my 674, Sept 3, 3 p.m., 1942)  
aroused as to how Gandhi's letter evaded censorship in  
India; The mission however is in position to assure the  
Government of India that it had nothing to do with the  
transmittal of Gandhi's letter.

In view of the changes in the world situation as  
well as the present political situation in India, I  
doubt that the implied emphasis in the President's let-  
ter on military considerations is any longer time low;

and I

-2- #357, May 19, 1 p.m., from New Delhi via Army.

and I anticipate that paragraph five page five of the Secretary's radio broadcast of July 22, 1942, would awaken only skepticism now as Gandhi in common with most Indian Nationalists probably doubts that the U.S. has used the full measure of its influence during the past two years to support the attainment of freedom by India.

I accordingly feel that no reply should be sent unless it is one which takes cognizance of the circumstances existing at present and is intended to serve a constructive purpose vis a vis the Indian political situation. Such a purpose might be served by the inclusion in a new letter of the following:

"I am hopeful that you will experience a speedy recovery from your illness and am pleased to note that, according to reports reaching me, you intend upon your return to health to discuss Hindu-Muslim understanding with Mr. Jinnah; I feel sure that the reaching of such an understanding would enlist maximum world sympathy."

With reference to the above suggested paragraph, Gandhi on May 14 telegraphed to the leader of the Khaksars in response to latter's suggestion that Gandhi and Jinnah should meet to explore the possibilities of an agreement

-3-#357, May 19, 1 p.m., from New Delhi via Army.

agreement and said that as soon as he was well enough,  
he would be ready to discuss the question with Jinnah.

MERRELL

RR

x

3957 - Carbon of this memorandum returned to the Secy. State, as per notation,  
1/3/45. *Ms Miller has noted.*

*India folder 1-45*

Jan. 2, 1945

"E. R. S., Jr.,

**SECRET**

O.K.

F. D. R."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Designation of Mr. George R. Merrell  
as Commissioner at New Delhi, India

I recommend that Mr. George R. Merrell, Secretary in charge of the American Mission at New Delhi, be designated as Commissioner, with the rank of Minister. The purpose of this recommendation is to strengthen our representation in India. The rank and position are entirely justified by the responsibilities of the post.


Mr. Merrell, a Foreign Service Officer, formerly Consul General at Calcutta, has served as senior diplomatic secretary in New Delhi since 1942 and has remained in charge of the Mission since Mr. Phillips left India eighteen months ago. Mr. William Phillips thought most highly of him.

Information reaching the Department from many sources indicates Mr. Merrell is held in highest esteem, officially and personally, by the Government of India. Also, such cordial personal relations have been maintained by the Mission with members of the opposition groups in India that the Mission has been able to cover fully in its reports the complex political situation prevailing in India and according to our understanding, to avoid any suspicion that the members of the Mission are "anti-Nationalist". The Mission's relations, under Mr. Merrell's supervision, with representatives of other agencies of this Government, and with the United States military authorities in India have been equally cordial and effective.

It is not intended that this designation will affect in any way the position of Personal Representative of the President in India. Mr. Merrell is now in the United States on leave and expects to return to New Delhi shortly.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972



4009

hms

Carbon of this memo sent to the Sec. State

1/12/45

hms

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~See Serial "A" 4-45~~

PSF: India

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

"ERS JR  
OK  
FDR"


January 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: William Phillips

I enclose for your information a letter I have just received from William Phillips in which he raises the question as to whether this would be an appropriate time for him to offer his resignation as your Personal Representative in India.

We in the Department are inclined to think that now at the time of Mr. Merrell's appointment as Commissioner would be a good time for this step to be taken. If you agree and will so advise me, I will, of course, pass the information along to him.



Enclosure:

Letter of January 5, 1945  
from Mr. William Phillips.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972

Hotel Charlesgate  
535 Beacon Street  
Boston, Massachusetts

January 5, 1945

Dear Ed:

Perhaps sometime when you are talking with the President you would be good enough to ascertain his wishes in regard to my continued connection with India. You may recall that before I went to London as Political Officer on General Eisenhower's staff, the President asked me to continue my relationship with India as his Personal Representative. At the same time it was understood that I would not concern myself while in London with Indian affairs and this I was very careful not to do.

Shortly after my return to the United States last September, there appeared in the press a copy of one of my confidential letters to the President, written a year and a half previously, and this was followed shortly by the equally mysterious publication in Washington of a cable dispatch from the British Indian Government in New Delhi to the Secretary of State for India in London, stating that because of the views expressed in my letter to the President I was no longer *Persona Grata* to the British Indian Government. On the other hand, the British Government, through Lord Halifax, issued a statement at about the same time to the effect that I was not *Persona non Grata* to the British Government.

When I had the pleasure of seeing the President last October he thought that in the circumstances it was better to "let the matter ride" for the present, rather than that I should appear to resign as a result of the New Delhi dispatch.

That is where the matter stands today, and it would seem from letters from Indians which I still receive occasionally, that my official connection with India is still in their minds.

Since now it is, of course, impossible for me to resume my work in India, I am wondering whether the time has not come for me to resign and so leave the President

C O P Y

free to name a successor, should he desire to do so.

If it is true that the Department intends to give Mr. George Morrell, at present the Secretary of the American Mission in New Delhi, the rank of Commissioner, this might be the appropriate moment for me to slip out of the picture. I should be grateful for the President's wishes.

I shall always continue my vivid interest in India and her many problems, and if at any time I can be of help to you and the President in this connection, or in any other connection, do not hesitate to call upon me.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) William Phillips

Hon. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

12/1/60

Original of this document filed:

Group 42 - Dept State  
Box 54 Condolences  
April 18, 1945

RLJ


PSF, India

AIR MAIL

Enclosure to Despatch No.1984, dated April 18, 1945 from  
Howard Donovan, American Consul, Bombay, India, entitled  
"Telegram of Condolence sent by Mr. Gandhi to Mrs. Roosevelt."

COPY - ace

"Mrs. Roosevelt  
Hyde Park  
New York (U.S.A.)



My humble condolence and congratulations latter because  
your illustrious husband died in harness and after war had  
reached a point where allied victory had become certain He  
was spared humiliating spectacle of being party to peace which  
threatens to be prelude to war bloodier still if possible.

Gandhi

16th April 1945  
Bombay"

No. 1984

AMERICAN CONSULATE




Bombay, India, April 18, 1945.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SUBJECT: Telegram of Condolence Sent by Mr. Gandhi to Mrs. Roosevelt



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to Bombay telegram No.195 of April 18, 1945 and to Bombay's Despatch No.1983 of April 18, 1945 entitled "Statement By Mr. Gandhi Regarding the San Francisco Conference." There is enclosed a copy of a telegram of condolence sent by Mr. Gandhi to Mrs. Roosevelt on April 16, 1945. The telegram speaks for itself and is indicative of Mr. Gandhi's opinion regarding the steps taken by the United States for world peace and security. His ideas on this subject are fully outlined in the press statement which he issued at Bombay yesterday evening and which is the subject of Bombay's Despatch No.1983 of April 18, 1945.

To me, personally, Mr. Gandhi's telegram exhibits an appalling lack of tact and understanding and is merely another illustration of the unpredictable manner in which his mind works. It is, of course, doubtful whether this telegram will be passed by the Censors at Bombay. However, in view of the unfortunate tone and wording of the message the British censors might consider it advisable to let it go through. Mr. G. D. Birla asked me how a telegram should be addressed to Mrs. Roosevelt and I informed him that it should be addressed to her at Hyde Park, New York. I carefully avoided giving any indication that the Consulate would assist in the transmission of the telegram.

Respectfully yours,

*Howard Donovan*  
Howard Donovan  
American Consul

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram from Mr. Gandhi to Mrs. Roosevelt, April 16, 1945.

800  
HD:ace

HECTO SENT TO

Original and hectograph to the Department.  
Copy to the American Consulate General, Calcutta, American Mission, New Delhi, American Embassy, London.



811.001 ROOSEVELT CONDOLENCE/4-1845

MAY 1 1945

CS/MAU