To The President:

By their Resolution of June 16, 1934, (legislative day, June 6), the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in the Implements of War signed at Geneva, Switzerland, on June 17, 1925, "subject to the reservation that the said convention shall not come into force so far as the United States is concerned until it shall have come into force in respect to Belgium, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and with the further understanding that such adherence to this treaty shall not be construed as denying any right or sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia may have in or to the Persian Gulf or to the waters thereof."

In response to your request for advice regarding the effect of these reservations, I am of the opinion that there can be no objection to the first reservation providing that the Convention shall not enter into force so far as the United States is concerned until it shall have come into force in respect to Belgium, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and with the further understanding that such adherence to this treaty shall not be construed as denying any right or sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia may have in or to the Persian Gulf or to the waters thereof.
as the United States is concerned until it shall have come into force in respect to several foreign countries. The second reservation, however, concerning the sovereignty of the Persian Gulf has raised difficulties which it has proved impossible to surmount.

Upon the adoption of the Resolution by the Senate the Department of State communicated with certain of the governments concerned with a view to preparing the way for the acceptance of the second reservation by the interested Powers. The French Government, as depositary of the Convention, made clear that it would be necessary to circulate the reservation for acceptance by the thirty-seven Signatory Powers and possibly by eleven other Powers to whom the Convention was open for adherence. The mere mechanical details of obtaining the acceptance of those Powers would require many months and we have no assurance of course that the reservation would be favorably received by all of the Powers. Indeed, our inquiries make it evident that the reservation will not prove acceptable to certain Powers and that some governments may be inspired to make new reservations of their own, thus complicating matters and indefinitely
indefinitely prolonging the entrance into force of the Convention.

Under the circumstances it seems clear that it will be impossible to accomplish our purpose of bringing the Convention into force so long as the reservation stands. Accordingly, bearing in mind all the aspects of the case from the point of view of our international relations and otherwise, I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that I have no alternative but to recommend that the Convention be not ratified with the reservation regarding the Persian Gulf.
DRAFT.

To the Senate of the United States:

By their Resolution of June 15, 1934, (legislative day, June 6) the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in the Implements of War, signed at Geneva, Switzerland, on June 17, 1925, subject to two reservations. The Secretary of State advises me that the second of these reservations, namely, that adherence to the Convention "shall not be construed as denying any right or sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia may have in or to the Persian Gulf or to the waters thereof" will not prove acceptable to certain Powers and will delay, if not entirely prevent, the coming into force of the Convention.

Since it is highly desirable that the Convention be brought into force at the earliest possible moment I am re-submitting the Convention to the Senate with the request that the Senate re-consider the reservation in question.

The reasons why ratification of the Treaty with the above reservation is impracticable are stated more fully
in the accompanying Report of the Secretary of State, to which the attention of the Senate is invited. I concur in the views of the Secretary of State and I express the hope that the Senate will give favorable consideration to the ratification of this Convention without the second of the reservations adopted in the Resolution of June 15, 1934.
To the Senate of the United States:

By their resolution of January 19 (legislative day, January 18), 1932, the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration signed at Washington on January 5, 1929, subject to two reservations to be made a part of the ratification. In the opinion of the Secretary of State the second of these reservations, namely, that the provisions of the treaty shall not be applicable to pending international questions or controversies or to those which may arise in the future relative to acts prior to the date on which the treaty goes into effect or to controversies arising under treaties negotiated prior to the date upon which the treaty goes into effect, is so broad that it would make the treaty of little if any value.

I am resubmitting the treaty to the Senate with the request that the Senate reconsider its reservations.

The reasons for desiring reconsideration of the reservations are stated more fully in the accompanying report of the Secretary of State, to which the attention of the Senate is invited. I concur in
the views of the Secretary of State and I express the hope that the Senate will give favorable consideration to the ratification of this treaty with a minimum of reservations.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 19, 1934.

The President:
By their resolution of January 19 (legislative day, January 18), 1932, the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration signed at Washington on January 5, 1929—

with the understanding, to be made a part of such ratification, that the special agreement in each case shall be made only by the President, and then only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, notwithstanding any provisions of the treaty to the contrary;

Also, with the understanding, to be made a part of such ratification, that the provisions of this treaty shall not be applicable to pending international questions or controversies or to those which may arise in the future relative to acts prior to the date on which said treaty goes into effect, or to controversies arising under treaties negotiated prior to the date on which said treaty goes into effect.

Under the previous administration, the Department of State did not recommend to the President the ratification of the treaty subject to these reservations, deeming that the second reservation was contrary to the purpose of the negotiators, as stated in the preamble, to prepare an arbitration treaty with the "minimum exceptions" which they "considered indispensable to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the States", and that it was so broad in its scope as to render the treaty, if ratified thereunder, of little if any practical value.

I concur in the view hitherto taken: for by the second reservation all pending disputes would be eliminated from arbitration under the treaty, as would be also all disputes which arise in the future relative to acts prior to the date on which the treaty goes into effect, as well as all future controversies arising under treaties negotiated prior to that date.

To ratify the treaty with this reservation would be to differentiate our attitude toward Latin American countries with respect to arbitration from our attitude in regard thereto toward the countries of Europe, and would reduce the whole field of arbitration with Latin American countries to a much narrower scope than that with European countries. The United States has now in force general arbitration treaties with twenty-five European countries. None of these treaties was made the subject of special Senate reservations. All provide for the arbitration of all justiciable or legal questions, which include controversies involving the interpretation of existing treaties, and without exception as to the time when such controversies arose.

The adoption of this reservation would not only place the United States in a difficult position with reference to asking the other parties to the treaty to submit any differences which it might have with them to arbitration, but, since reservations necessarily have reciprocal effect, the adoption of the reservation would place Latin American countries
in a position, should they desire to avail themselves of it, to refuse arbitration under this treaty with the United States regarding all pending controversies, those which relate to acts prior to the effective date of the treaty and future controversies arising under existing treaties. Such a situation would be regrettable, as in the main the countries of Latin America have been responsive to the urge of the Government of the United States to arbitrate their differences not only with this country but among themselves as well.

The treaty itself in its second article provides reservations which it is believed are substantially adequate to protect the interest of the United States. These are as follows:

"There are excepted from the stipulations of this treaty the following controversies:

"(a) Those which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any of the Parties to the dispute and are not controlled by international law; and

"(b) Those which affect the interest or refer to the action of a State not a Party to this treaty."

At the time the treaty was before the Senate mention was made in the Senate of reservations appended by governments to the treaty at the time of signing. It should be observed that these reservations are reciprocal in their effect pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the treaty. Consequently, the questions reserved by them are equally available to the United States in the application of the treaty between the United States and the country making the reservation. The adoption of similar reservations by the United States would have the effect of extending the exceptions from arbitration which are made in them to the relations of the United States with all the parties to the treaty. Some of the reservations of other countries are designed to meet particular situations in their foreign relations which have no application to the United States. It is not believed to be necessary or expedient for this country to append reservations to the treaty which not only include practically all the substance of the reservations made by other countries, but also operate to exclude from arbitration under the treaty all questions which may arise in the future regarding existing treaties.

The desire to settle their disputes by pacific means and to promote and preserve good neighborliness and peace among the Republics of the Western Hemisphere was shown at the Seventh International Conference of American States, which recently closed its sessions at Montevideo, when by a resolution presented by Dr. Saavedra Lamas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, the Governments which had not already done so, were invited to become parties to five existing peace instruments. Among these is the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration. It was my pleasure to second the resolution. In doing so, among other things I said:

I arise to say that the delegation of the United States of America is in the heartiest accord with the very timely and vitally important resolution offered by the able Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Dr. Saavedra Lamas. The benefits of this proposal on peace will be far-reaching. * * * The adoption of this resolution and the agreement to sign these five splendid peace instruments will thoroughly strengthen the peace agencies of the twenty-one American States and make peace permanently secure in this hemisphere.
And in conclusion I said:

The people of my country strongly feel that the so-called "right of conquest" must forever be banished from this hemisphere, and most of all they shun and reject that so-called "right" for themselves. The new deal indeed would be an empty boast if it did not mean that.

Let us in the broad spirit of this revitalized policy make this the beginning of a great new era, of a great renaissance in American cooperative effort to promote our entire material, moral, and spiritual affairs and to erect an edifice of peace that will forever endure. Let each American nation vie with the other in the practice of the policy of the good neighbor. Let suspicion, misunderstanding, and prejudice be banished from every mind and genuine friendship for and trust in each other and a singleness of purpose to promote the welfare of all be substituted. Let each nation welcome the closest scrutiny by the others of the spirit and manner in which it carries out the policy of the good neighbor. Let actions rather than mere words be the acid test of the conduct and motives of each nation. Let each country demonstrate by its every act and practice the sincerity of its purposes and the unselfishness of its relationships as a neighbor.

In this spirit and for the foregoing reasons I recommend the resubmission to the Senate of the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration to the end that the Senate may be pleased to reconsider its reservations. The ratifications of 11 countries have now been deposited, and the convention is now in force among them, namely, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela.

Respectfully submitted.

Cordell Hull.

Department of State,

The International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration, Washington, December 10, 1928–January 5, 1929

General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration

The Governments of Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Perú, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Panamá, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the United States of America, represented at the Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration, assembled at Washington, pursuant to the Resolution adopted on February 18, 1928, by the Sixth International Conference of American States held in the City of Habana;

In accordance with the solemn declarations made at said Conference to the effect that the American Republics condemn war as an instrument of national policy and adopt obligatory arbitration as the means for the settlement of their international differences of a jurisdictional character;

Being convinced that the Republics of the New World, governed by the principles, institutions and practices of democracy and bound furthermore by mutual interests, which are increasing each day, have not only the necessity but also the duty of avoiding the disturbance of continental harmony whenever differences which are susceptible of judicial decision arise among them;
Conscious of the great moral and material benefits which peace offers to humanity and that the sentiment and opinion of America demand, without delay, the organization of an arbitral system which shall strengthen the permanent reign of justice and law;
And animated by the purpose of giving conventional form to these postulates and aspirations with the minimum exceptions which they have considered indispensable to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the States and in the most ample manner possible under present international conditions, have resolved to effect the present treaty, and for that purpose have designated the Plenipotentiaries hereinafter named:

Venezuela:
   Carlos F. Grisanti.
   Francisco Arroyo Parejo.

Chile:
   Manuel Foster Recabarren.
   Antonio Planet.

Bolivia:
   Eduardo Diez de Medina.

Uruguay:
   José Pedro Varela.

Costa Rica:
   Manuel Castro Quesada.
   José Tible-Machado.

Perú:
   Hernán Velarde.
   Victor M. Maúrtua.

Honduras:
   Rómulo Durón.
   Marcos López Ponce.

Guatemala:
   Adrián Recinos.
   José Falla.

Haití:
   Auguste Bonamy.
   Raoul Lizard.

Ecuador:
   Gonzalo Zaldumbide.

Colombia:
   Enrique Olaya Herrera.
   Carlos Escallón.

Brazil:
   S. Gurgel do Amaral.
   A. G. de Araujo-Jorge.

Panamá:
   Ricardo J. Alfaro.
   Carlos L. López.

Paraguay:
   Eligio Ayala.

Nicaragua:
   Máximo H. Zepeda.
   Adrian Recinos.
   J. Lisandro Medina.
Mexico:
  Fernando González Roa.
  Benito Flores.
El Salvador:
  Cayetano Ochoa.
  David Rosales, Jr.
Dominican Republic:
  Angel Morales.
  Gustavo A. Díaz.
Cuba:
  Orestes Ferrara.
  Gustavo Gutiérrez.
United States of America:
  Frank B. Kellogg.
  Charles Evans Hughes.

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found in good and
due form by the Conference, have agreed upon the following:

**Article 1**

The High Contracting Parties bind themselves to submit to arbi-
tration all differences of an international character which have arisen
or may arise between them by virtue of a claim of right made by one
against the other under treaty or otherwise, which it has not been
possible to adjust by diplomacy and which are juridical in their
nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application
of the principles of law.

There shall be considered as included among the questions of juridical character:
(a) The interpretation of a treaty;
(b) Any question of international law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would consti-
tute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) The nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.

The provisions of this treaty shall not preclude any of the Parties
before resorting to arbitration, from having recourse to procedures
of investigation and conciliation established in conventions then in
force between them.

**Article 2**

There are excepted from the stipulations of this treaty the following
controversies:
(a) Those which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any of the
Parties to the dispute and are not controlled by international law;
and
(b) Those which affect the interest or refer to the action of a
State not a Party to this treaty.

**Article 3**

The arbitrator or tribunal who shall decide the controversy shall be
designated by agreement of the Parties.
In the absence of an agreement the following procedure shall be
adopted:
Each Party shall nominate two arbitrators, of whom only one may be a national of said Party or selected from the persons whom said Party has designated as members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. The other member may be of any other American nationality. These arbitrators shall in turn select a fifth arbitrator who shall be the president of the court.

Should the arbitrators be unable to reach an agreement among themselves for the selection of a fifth American arbitrator, or in lieu thereof, of another who is not, each Party shall designate a non-American member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and the two persons so designated shall select the fifth arbitrator, who may be of any nationality other than that of a Party to the dispute.

**Article 4**

The Parties to the dispute shall formulate by common accord, in each case, a special agreement which shall clearly define the particular subject-matter of the controversy, the seat of the court, the rules which will be observed in the proceedings, and the other conditions to which the Parties may agree.

If an accord has not been reached with regard to the agreement within three months reckoned from the date of the installation of the court, the agreement shall be formulated by the court.

**Article 5**

In case of death, resignation or incapacity of one or more of the arbitrators the vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

**Article 6**

When there are more than two States directly interested in the same controversy, and the interests of two or more of them are similar, the State or States who are on the same side of the question may increase the number of arbitrators on the court, provided that in all cases the Parties on each side of the controversy shall appoint an equal number of arbitrators. There shall also be a presiding arbitrator selected in the same manner as that provided in the last paragraph of Article 3, the Parties on each side of the controversy being regarded as a single Party for the purpose of making the designation therein described.

**Article 7**

The award, duly pronounced and notified to the Parties, settles the dispute definitely and without appeal.

Differences which arise with regard to its interpretation or execution shall be submitted to the decision of the court which rendered the award.

**Article 8**

The reservations made by one of the High Contracting Parties shall have the effect that the other Contracting Parties are not bound with respect to the Party making the reservations except to the same extent as that expressed therein.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures.

The original treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the Department of State of the United States of America which shall give notice of the ratifications through diplomatic channels to the other signatory Governments and the treaty shall enter into effect for the High Contracting Parties in the order that they deposit their ratifications.

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but it may be denounced by means of one year's previous notice at the expiration of which it shall cease to be in force as regards the Party denouncing the same, but shall remain in force as regards the other signatories. Notice of the denunciation shall be addressed to the Department of State of the United States of America which will transmit it for appropriate action to the other signatory Governments.

Any American State not a signatory of this treaty may adhere to the same by transmitting the official instrument setting forth such adherence to the Department of State of the United States of America which will notify the other High Contracting Parties thereof in the manner heretofore mentioned.

In witness whereof the above mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French and hereunto affix their respective seals.

Done at the city of Washington, on this fifth day of January, 1929.

[Translation]

The Delegation of Venezuela signs the present Treaty of Arbitration with the following reservations:

First. There shall be excepted from this Treaty those matters which, according to the Constitution or the laws of Venezuela, are under the jurisdiction of its courts; and, especially, those matters relating to pecuniary claims of foreigners. In such matters, arbitration shall not be resorted to except when, legal remedies having been exhausted by the claimant, it shall appear that there has been a denial of justice.

Second. There shall also be excepted those matters controlled by international agreements now in force.

[seal] CARLOS F. GRISANTI
[seal] FR. ARROYO PAREJO

[Translation]

Chile does not accept obligatory arbitration for questions which have their origin in situations or acts antedating the present Treaty, nor does it accept obligatory arbitration for those questions which, being under the exclusive competency of the national jurisdiction, the interested parties claim the right to withdraw from the cognizance of the established judicial authorities, unless said authorities decline to pass judgment on any action or exception which any natural or juridical foreign person may present to them in the form established by the laws of the country.

[seal] MANUEL FOSTER
[seal] A. PLANET
The Delegation of Bolivia, in accordance with the doctrine and policy invariably maintained by Bolivia in the field of international jurisprudence, gives full adherence to and signs the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration which the Republics of America are to sanction, formulating the following express reservations:

First. There may be excepted from the provisions of the present agreement, questions arising from acts occurring or conventions concluded before the said treaty goes into effect, as well as those which, in conformity with international law, are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state.

Second. It is also understood that, for the submission to arbitration of a territorial controversy or dispute, the zone to which the said arbitration is to apply must be previously determined in the arbitral agreement.

E. Diez de Medina.

I vote in favor of the Treaty of Arbitration, with the reservation formulated by the Delegation of Uruguay at the Fifth Pan American Conference, favoring broad arbitration; and with the understanding that arbitration will be resorted to only in case of denial of justice, when the national tribunals have jurisdiction, according to the legislation of their own country.

José Pedro Varela.

Reservations of Costa Rica:

(a) The obligations contracted under this treaty do not annul, abrogate or restrict the arbitration conventions which are now in force between Costa Rica and another or others of the high contracting parties and do not involve arbitration, disavowal or renewed discussion of questions which may have already been settled by arbitral awards.

(b) The obligations contracted under this treaty do not involve the arbitration of judgments handed down by the courts of Costa Rica in civil cases which may be submitted to them with regard to which the interested parties have recognized the jurisdiction of said courts.

Manuel Castro Quesada
José Tible-Machado
Hernán Velarde
Víctor M. Maúrtua

The Delegation of Honduras, in signing the present treaty, formulates an express reservation making it a matter of record that the provisions thereof shall not be applicable to pending international questions or controversies or to those which may arise in the future relative to acts prior to the date on which the said treaty goes into effect.

Rómulo E. Durón
M. López Ponce
The Delegation of Guatemala makes the following reservations:

1. In order to submit to arbitration any questions relating to the boundaries of the nation, the approval of the Legislative Assembly must first be given, in each case, in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic.

2. The provisions of the present Convention do not alter or modify the conventions and treaties previously entered into by the Republic of Guatemala.

[Seal]

Adrián Reconos
José Falla
A. Bonamy
Raoul Lizaire

The Delegation of Ecuador, pursuant to instructions of its Government, reserves from the jurisdiction of the obligatory arbitration agreed upon in the present treaty:

1. Questions at present governed by conventions or treaties now in effect;

2. Those which may arise from previous causes or may result from acts preceding the signature of this treaty;

3. Pecuniary claims of foreigners who may not have previously exhausted all legal remedies before the courts of justice of the country, it being understood that such is the interpretation and the extent of the application which the Government of Ecuador has always given to the Buenos Aires Convention of August 11, 1910.

[Seal]

Gonzalo Zaldumbide

The Delegation of Colombia signs the foregoing Convention with the following two declarations or reservations:

First. The obligations which the Republic of Colombia may contract thereby refer to the differences which may arise from acts subsequent to the ratification of the Convention;

Second. Except in the case of a denial of justice, the arbitration provided for in this convention is not applicable to the questions which may have arisen or may arise between a citizen, an association or a corporation of one of the parties and the other contracting state when the judges or courts of the latter state are, in accordance with its legislation, competent to settle the controversy.

[Seal]

Enrique Olaya Herrera
C. Escallón
S. Gurgel do Amaral
A. Araujo-Jorge
R. J. Alfaro
Carlos L. López
Reservation of the Delegation of Paraguay:
I sign this treaty with the reservation that Paraguay excludes from its application questions which directly or indirectly affect the integrity of the national territory and are not merely questions of frontiers or boundaries.

[seal]

Eligio Ayala
Máximo H. Zepeda
Adrián Recinos
J. Lisandro Medina

Mexican Reservation:
Mexico makes the reservation that differences which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts, shall not form a subject of the procedure provided for by the convention, except in case of denial of justice, and until after the judgment passed by the competent national authority has been placed in the class of res judicata.

[seal]

Fernando González Roa
Benito Flores

The Delegation of El Salvador to the Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration assembled in Washington accepts and signs the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration concluded this day by said Conference, with the following reservations or restrictions:

1. After the words of paragraph 1 of Article 1 reading: “under treaty or otherwise”, the following words are to be added: “subsequent to the present convention”. The article continues without any other modification.

2. Paragraph (a) of Article 2 is accepted by the Delegation without the final words which read: “and are not controlled by international law”, which should be considered as eliminated.

3. This treaty does not include controversies or differences with regard to points or questions which, according to the Political Constitution of El Salvador, must not be submitted to arbitration, and

4. Pecuniary claims against the nation shall be decided by its judges and courts, since they have jurisdiction thereof, and recourse shall be had to international arbitration only in the cases provided in the Constitution and laws of El Salvador, that is in cases of denial of justice or unusual delay in the administration thereof.

[seal]

Cayetano Ochoa
David Rosales, hijo
The Dominican Republic, in signing the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, does so with the understanding that controversies relating to questions which are under the jurisdiction of its courts shall not be referred to arbitral jurisdiction except in accordance with the principles of international law.

A. Morales
G. A. Díaz
Orestes Ferrara
Gustavo Gutiérrez
Frank B. Kellogg
Charles Evans Hughes

In the Senate of the United States,
In Executive Session,
Tuesday, January 19 (legislative day,
Monday, January 18), 1932.

Resolved (two thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of Executive AA, Seventieth Congress, second session, a general treaty of inter-American arbitration, signed at Washington, January 5, 1929, with the understanding to be made a part of such ratification, that the special agreement in each case shall be made only by the President, and then only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, notwithstanding any provisions of the treaty to the contrary; also with the understanding, to be made a part of such ratification, that the provisions of this treaty shall not be applicable to pending international questions or controversies or to those which may arise in the future relative to acts prior to the date on which said treaty goes into effect, or to controversies arising under treaties negotiated prior to the date on which said treaty goes into effect.
On March 16, 1860, the Senate voted adversely on the ratification of a treaty with Nicaragua, signed March 16, 1859, and ordered the resolution to that effect laid before the President. Four days later the Senate requested the return of the resolution. The request being complied with, the Senate reconsidered its action, and on June 26 advised ratification of the treaty with amendments. The ratification of an agreement with Venezuela, signed January 14, 1859, for the settlement of the Aves Island claims, was advised, with amendment, June 26, 1860, and the resolution to that effect laid before the President. On January 24, 1861, the Senate requested the return of the agreement for further consideration. In complying with the request, President Buchanan recommended the withdrawal of the amendment. On February 21, 1861, the ratification was advised without amendment. On March 27, 1874, the Senate unanimously advised the ratification of an extradition convention with Belgium, signed March 19, 1874, and ordered the resolution laid before the President. On April 8, after the ratification by the President on March 31, but prior to the exchange of the ratifications on April 30, the Senate passed a resolution rescinding its resolution of March 27, and requesting the President to return the convention and resolution. Two days later, however, the resolution of April 8 was rescinded. On June 12, 1884, the Senate unanimously voted against the accession of the United States to the international convention for the protection of industrial property, signed at Paris, March 20, 1883. The
convention was returned to the Senate, February 2, 1885, by President Arthur, with a message recommending a reconsideration; and on March 2, 1887, the Senate consented to the accession. On January 17, 1900, the Senate requested the President to return the Samoan convention, concluded at Washington, December 2, 1899, between the United States, Great Britain and Germany, together with its resolution advising ratification dated January 16. This request was complied with, but a motion to reconsider the resolution of ratification was defeated, and the original resolution was again laid before the President.

72 Id, XI, 165,218.
73 Id, XI, 222,254,276.
74 Id, XIX, 283,291. See also, Id, XI, 147,153.
75 Id, XXIV, 287,455; XXV, 763.
76 Id, XXXII, 345,348,362.

("Treaties Their Making and Enforcement" - Crandall - pp.83,84)
September 4, 1934.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Herewith the letter to the President regarding the Persian Gulf we drafted in accordance with the instructions which Mr. Cumming telephoned to me this morning. If the letter as now drafted meets with your approval I suggest that, after signing, you return it to me for mailing in order that we may time its arrival at Hyde Park a day or two before Judge Moore sees the President.

[Signature]

Wallace Murray
My dear Mr. President:

You will recall that in connection with the question of the ratification of the Geneva Arms Convention you suggested to Mr. Phillips the inclusion in the ratification proclamation of a statement interpreting the Senate reservation regarding the Persian Gulf, and that recently I showed you a draft of such a statement. We have continued to give this matter most earnest consideration and we have now come definitely to the conclusion that such a method of procedure would not accomplish the end which you have in mind, that is, the entrance of the Convention into force at an early date.

Immediately upon the adoption of the Senate reservation we got in touch with the Governments chiefly concerned and with important officials at Geneva and endeavored to smooth the way for the acceptance of the reservation by the interested Powers. We made the strongest possible representations to that end. Our efforts

The President,

The White House.
efforts in this direction were, however, fruitless. The French Government, as depository of the Convention, made clear that it would be necessary to circularize the reservation for acceptance by the thirty-seven signatory Powers and possibly by eleven other Powers to whom the Convention was open for adherence. The mere mechanical details of obtaining the acceptance of these Powers would require many months and we have no assurance, of course, that the reservation would be favorably received by all of the Powers. Some of them, indeed, might be inspired to make new reservations of their own, thus further complicating the situation.

The British Government likewise has explained its misgivings to our Ambassador at London and on two occasions has instructed its representative at Washington to point out to the Department that the terms of the reservation gave ground for serious concern and raised the fear of further complications in Anglo-Persian relations. Under the circumstances it is most unlikely that Great Britain, in view of its vital interests in the Persian Gulf, would ever accept the reservation; and without the participation of Great Britain the Convention would remain a dead letter.

Moreover, the situation as described above would not be altered by the inclusion in the ratification proclamation
of such an interpretive statement as you proposed, for such a statement would in no way affect the Senate reservation nor would it obviate the necessity of obtaining the acceptance of the reservation by the numerous signatory Powers and by those to whom it is open for adherence. It seems clear therefore that, with or without an interpretive statement, we cannot hope to bring the Convention into force as long as the reservation stands.

I should also mention that the whole question of the revision of the 1925 Convention, including that section to which the Persian Government takes exception, is now before the appropriate sub-committee of the Disarmament Conference which is expected to make its recommendations to the full committee in the near future. It seems undesirable for us to inject ourselves into the matter while it is thus under active consideration.

As of general interest in connection with this whole question and particularly as indicative of the attitude of the Persian Government in the matter, I enclose a copy of a despatch recounting a conversation between the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Hornibrook, our Minister at Teheran.

In view of all the circumstances, I feel confident that a decision to hold the matter in abeyance could not be interpreted as showing any lack of respect for the
Senate on your part. Accordingly, bearing in mind all
the aspects of the case, from the point of view of our
international relations and otherwise, I am reluctantly
forced to the conclusion that I have no alternative but
to recommend that the Convention be not ratified with the
present reservation regarding the Persian Gulf.

I understand that Judge Moore hopes to have an oppor-
tunity of seeing you at Hyde Park within the next few
days and I have asked him to hold himself in readiness to
furnish you with any further information which you may
desire on this subject.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:
No. 157, July 24,
from Legation at Teheran.

[Handwritten note]

NE PHA/WSM/CGALS

[Stamp]

A true copy of
the original.

[Stamp]

SEP 10, 1934 PM
O.K. to hold in abeyance without action to Congress in January.
My dear Mr. President:

You will recall that in connection with the question of the ratification of the Geneva Arms Convention you suggested to Mr. Phillips the inclusion in the ratification proclamation of a statement interpreting the Senate reservation regarding the Persian Gulf, and that recently I showed you a draft of such a statement. We have continued to give this matter most earnest consideration and we have now come definitely to the conclusion that such a method of procedure would not accomplish the end which you have in mind, that is, the entrance of the Convention into force at an early date.

Immediately upon the adoption of the Senate reservation we got in touch with the Governments chiefly concerned and with important officials at Geneva and endeavored to smooth the way for the acceptance of the reservation by the interested Powers. We made the strongest possible representations to that end. Our efforts

The President,

The White House.
efforts in this direction were, however, fruitless. The French Government, as depositary of the Convention, made clear that it would be necessary to circularize the reservation for acceptance by the thirty-seven signatory Powers and possibly by eleven other Powers to whom the Convention was open for adherence. The mere mechanical details of obtaining the acceptance of those Powers would require many months and we have no assurance, of course, that the reservation would be favorably received by all of the Powers. Some of them, indeed, might be inspired to make new reservations of their own, thus further complicating the situation.

The British Government likewise has explained its misgivings to our Ambassador at London and on two occasions has instructed its representative at Washington to point out to the Department that the terms of the reservation gave ground for serious concern and raised the fear of further complications in Anglo-Persian relations. Under the circumstances it is most unlikely that Great Britain, in view of its vital interests in the Persian Gulf, would ever accept the reservation; and without the participation of Great Britain the Convention would remain a dead letter.

Moreover, the situation as described above would not be altered by the inclusion in the ratification proclamation
of such an interpretive statement as you proposed, for
such a statement would in no way affect the Senate reserva-
tion nor would it obviate the necessity of obtaining
the acceptance of the reservation by the numerous signatory
Powers and by those to whom it is open for adherence. It
seems clear therefore that, with or without an interpretive
statement, we cannot hope to bring the Convention into
force as long as the reservation stands.

I should also mention that the whole question of the
revision of the 1925 Convention, including that section
to which the Persian Government takes exception, is now
before the appropriate sub-committee of the Disarmament
Conference which is expected to make its recommendations
to the full committee in the near future. It seems un-
desirable for us to inject ourselves into the matter
while it is thus under active consideration.

As of general interest in connection with this whole
question and particularly as indicative of the attitude
of the Persian Government in the matter, I enclose a copy
of a despatch recounting a conversation between the Persian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Hornibrook, our Minis-
ter at Teheran.

In view of all the circumstances, I feel confident
that a decision to hold the matter in abeyance could not
be interpreted as showing any lack of respect for the

Senate
Senate on your part. Accordingly, bearing in mind all the aspects of the case, from the point of view of our international relations and otherwise, I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that I have no alternative but to recommend that the Convention be not ratified with the present reservation regarding the Persian Gulf.

I understand that Judge Moore hopes to have an opportunity of seeing you at Hyde Park within the next few days and I have asked him to hold himself in readiness to furnish you with any further information which you may desire on this subject.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

No. 157, July 24,
from Legation at Teheran.
TEHERAN, JULY 24, 1934.

No. 157.

Subject: Djalal Memorandum.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that in accordance with instruction No. 22, under date of June 28, 1934, I obtained an interview with the Foreign Minister on July 23, 1934, and read to him the memorandum covering conversations between Secretary Hull and the Persian Minister to Washington.

Before the object of my visit had been made known to the Minister he brought up on his own initiative the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 and expressed his delight at the fact that the Senate has included in the ratification of the treaty a reservation which was most pleasing to the Persian Government. He stated that while he was in Ankara with the Shah he had received a cablegram from the Persian Minister in Washington informing him of the action of the Senate and urging that the Foreign Office authorize him to formally thank Senator Wm. H. King of Utah for his part in obtaining the reservation.

At this point I informed the Minister that the activities of Djalal in connection with the Arms Traffic Convention was the purpose of my visit and advised him that I had been instructed by the Department of State to read a memorandum which had been prepared by Secretary Hull on certain conversations held
held between the Secretary of State and the Persian Minister to Washington. I then read the memorandum.

The Minister stated that he had as yet not seen a report from Djalal on the conversation mentioned in the memorandum; that of course he understood that matters of this character should be taken up with the Department of State and intimated that there had apparently been some misunderstanding on the part of Djalal on the laws of the United States covering this subject. He then launched into a second eulogy of Senator King.

I informed him that, like Djalal, I personally had a great admiration for Senator King but as pointed out in the memorandum submitted by Secretary Hull, neither Senator King nor any other member of the Senate had been criticized, or were now being censured by the Department for their action in advocating the reservation. I made it plain that it was the sole purpose of the memorandum to point out, without going into the merits of the treaty provisions, the fact that the Persian Minister to Washington had overstepped the bounds of propriety and had either intentionally or unintentionally violated the laws of the United States by approaching members of the United States Senate in regard to the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention.

Twice during the conversation the Minister requested that he be permitted to retain the memorandum and both times I told him that unfortunately my instructions were rather specific on this point and that I had been instructed to read the same to the Foreign Minister, but to retain the manuscript for our Legation files. He then requested permission to read the memorandum himself and such permission was granted. After he finished, he informed me that he would go over his files carefully, make a second search for a despatch from Djalal covering
covering the same subject and would discuss the matter with me further in the near future.

At no time during the interview did the Minister show the slightest feeling of resentment at the contents of the memorandum. I gather from his conversation and manner that while he fully realized that Djalal had been extremely indiscreet, he was rather gratified at the fruits of his indiscretion. He was in a most amiable mood, more so in fact than at any previous interview, and my own impression is that he will in due time produce a typical middle eastern explanation for the acts of his Minister in Washington. After this explanation is offered, I am inclined to the opinion that Djalal will be transferred to another post, possibly to London, or to some equally important diplomatic assignment, as a reward for his zeal.

In conclusion I wish to venture this prediction, and it is based not upon information but upon oriental psychology. Persia will hereafter urge that the Senate reservation is in effect a recognition of her sovereignty over islands in the Persian Gulf, which naturally include Bahrein. The reservation in my judgment of course does not recognize such sovereignty, but I am firmly convinced that it will be used before the League of Nations as another specious and fallacious argument for restoring the islands to Persia in the hope of defeating the claims of the Standard Oil Company of California to its present concession and at the same time glorifying the nationalistic program of the present regime.

Respectfully yours,

WM. H. HORNBROOK.

File No. 820.
To the Senate of the United States:

By their Resolution of June 15, 1934, (legislative day, June 6) the Senate advised and consented to the ratification of the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in the Implements of War, signed at Geneva, Switzerland, on June 17, 1925, subject to two reservations. The Secretary of State advises me that the second of these reservations, namely, that adherence to the Convention "shall not be construed as denying any right or sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia may have in or to the Persian Gulf or to the waters thereof" will not prove acceptable to certain Powers and will delay, if not entirely prevent, the coming into force of the Convention.

Since it is highly desirable that the Convention be brought into force at the earliest possible moment I am resubmitting the Convention to the Senate with the request that the Senate re-consider the reservation in question.

The reasons why ratification of the Treaty with the above reservation is impracticable are stated more fully...
in the accompanying Report of the Secretary of State, to which the attention of the Senate is invited. I concur in the views of the Secretary of State and I express the hope that the Senate will give favorable consideration to the ratification of this Convention without the second of the reservations adopted in the Resolution of June 15, 1934.
Votre Excellence a été certainement informé que les forces russes et britanniques ont traversé d'une manière brusque et sans préavis les frontières de ce pays en occupant certaines localités et en bombardant nombre considérables des villes ouvertes.
ET SANS DEFENSE STOP L ANCIEN PRETEXTE QUE LES GOUVERNEMENTS RUSSO ANGLAISE
SOULVAIT CONSISTAIT DANS L INQUIETUDE QUE CES PAYS PRETENDAIENT RESSENTER
DU FAIT DE SEJOUR DE CERTAINS ALLEMANDS EN IRAN STOP MALGRE LES ASSURANCES
DONNEES PAR MON GOUVERNEMENT QUE CES ALLEMANDS QUITTERONT BIENTOT L IRAN
AUCUN SUJET D ENQUIETUDE
NE POUVAIT PLUS EXISTER ET JE NE PUIS PLUS CONCEVOIR POUR QUÉL MOTIF ONT ILS PROCEDE À CES ACTES D'AGRESSION ET BOMBARDANT SANS RAISON NOS VILLES STOP JE CROIS DE MON DEVOIR EN ME BASSANT SUR LES DECLARATIONS QUE VOTRE EXCELLENCE À FAITES À PLUSIEURS REPRISES CONCERNANT LA NÉCESSITÉ
DE LA DEFENSE DES PRINCIPES DE LA JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE ET LE DROIT DES
PEUPLES A LA LIBERTE DE PRIER VOTRE EXCELLENCE DE VOULOIR BIEN VOUS
INTERESSER A CET INCIDENT QUI MET EN GUERRE UN PAYS NEUTRE ET PACIFIQUE
QUI N A EU D AUTRE SOIN QUE LA SAUVEGARDE DE LA
REZA PAHLAVI

TRANQUILITE ET LA REFORME DE SON PAYS STOP JE PRIE VOTRE EXCELLENCE DE FAIRE DES DEMARCHES HUMANITAIRES EFFICACES ET URGENTES POUR METTRE FIN A CES ACTES D AGRESSION STOP ETANT ASSURE DES SENTIMENTS DE BONNE VOLonte DE VOTRE EXCELLENCE JE LUI RENOUVELLE LASSURANCE DE MA SINCERES AMITIES

REZA PAHLAVI
TELEGRAM SENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

DES

PLAIN

September 2, 1941

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY

REZA PAHLAVI,
SHAHINSHAH OF IRAN,
TEHRAN.

RUSH.

I have received Your Imperial Majesty's communication regarding the recent entry of British and Russian forces into Iran. I have been following the course of events in Iran with close attention and have taken careful note of Your Majesty's remarks.

I am persuaded that this situation is entitled to the serious consideration of all free nations including my own, and Your Majesty may rest assured that we are giving it such consideration and are maintaining our traditional attitude with respect to the basic principles involved.

At the same time I hope Your Majesty will concur with me in believing that we must view the situation in its full perspective of present world events and developments. Viewing the question in its entirety involves not only vital questions to which Your Imperial Majesty refers,
refers, but other basic considerations arising from Hitler's ambition of world conquest. It is certain that movements of conquest by Germany will continue and will extend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas, unless they are stopped by military force. It is equally certain that those countries which desire to maintain their independence must engage in a great common effort if they are not to be engulfed one by one as has already happened to a large number of countries in Europe. In recognition of these truths, the Government and people of the United States of America, as is well known, are not only building up the defenses of this country with all possible speed, but they have also entered upon a very extensive program of material assistance to those countries which are actively engaged in resisting German ambition for world domination.

Your Imperial Majesty's Minister at Washington is fully informed of this Government's views on the international situation, and of the great effort on which this country is engaged, and I am certain that he has transmitted this information, based on his discussions here, to Your Majesty's Government.

My Government has noted the statements to the Iranian Government.
His Imperial Majesty, Reza Pahlavi, Shahinshah of Iran, Tehran.

Government by the British and Soviet Governments that they have no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran. In view of the long-standing friendship between our two countries, my Government has already sought information from the British and Soviet Governments as to their immediate as well as long-range plans and intentions in Iran, and has suggested to them the advisability of a public statement to all free peoples of the world reiterating the assurances already given to Your Majesty's Government.

I desire to assure Your Imperial Majesty of my good-will and to renew to you the assurances of my sincere friendship.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Department of State

ENCLOSURE TO
Letter drafted 9/12/41
ADDRESS TO
The President
My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your memorandum of August 30, 1941, transmitting for reply a telegram from His Imperial Majesty Reza Pahlevi, Shahinshah of Iran, requesting your intervention with respect to the entry of British and Soviet armed forces into Iran. The original of this telegram is enclosed in order that it may be included in the files of the White House. There is also enclosed a copy of your reply to the Shahinshah dated September 2, 1941.

In a telegram dated September 7, 8 a.m., Mr. Dreyfus, the American Minister at Tehran, stated that on the previous evening he was received in special audience by the Shahinshah, who requested him to convey to

The President,

The White House.
to you his thanks for your friendly telegram. Specifically the Shahinshah requested Mr. Dreyfus to thank you for your declaration of friendship and good will, to express his appreciation of your statement that you are following the course of events in Iran, and to make known to you his satisfaction in knowing that the Government of the United States has taken note of the statements of the British and Russian governments to the effect that they have no designs upon the territorial integrity or the independence of Iran.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

- Original of telegram from His Imperial Majesty Reza Pahlevi.
- Copy of reply to Reza Pahlevi.
November 30, 1943.

Memorandum for the President:

The Shah may mention a treaty pending, which will soon be signed by him and by the United States. This treaty is negotiated by the State Department. The treaty recognizes the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Iran.

(Dictated by General Hurley)

This note received just before receiving the Shah at my quarters - Teheran.
Dear Mr. President,

Your Minister duly delivered the framed photograph which Your Excellency was good enough to present to me, just before your departure, as a souvenir of your memorable visit to Tehran.

This handsome gift, a very good likeness, stands in a prominent place in my study and will always remind me of your great personality and the interesting conversation we had together on November 30th.

Your Excellency's kind letter of December 1st has also been gratefully received. The cordial sentiments therein expressed are entirely reciprocated, and I look forward to an ever-increasing cooperation between our two countries in the arts of peace to our mutual advantage.

Let me assure Your Excellency that the friendship of the American People is very precious to us; my constant desire will be to foster closer ties between Iran and the United States of America which have already been brought so near to one another in the common struggle for freedom.

It is indeed a matter for gratification that the momentous Tehran Conference was a success. We have to be particularly grateful to Your Excellency for your share in obtaining
obtaining approval of the satisfactory communiqué issued yesterday regarding Iran, in the drafting of which Mr. Dreyfus, Your able and distinguished representative, has taken an outstanding part.

The kind invitation to visit Washington, extended by Your Excellency, is much appreciated and I hope to be able to avail myself of it and to have the pleasure of seeing You again as soon as circumstances permit.

With the assurance of my friendship and highest consideration, I remain dear Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi

To

His Excellency,
The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
His Excellency,
The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America

WASHINGTON
Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On your departure from Tehran you outlined to me, during our conversation at the airport, a tentative basis for American policy in Iran which might be used as a pattern for our relations with all less favored associate nations. In response to your suggestion and the directive which I received from the Secretary of State, I wish to submit the following for your consideration.

PART I

It is the purpose of the United States to sustain Iran as a free, independent nation and to afford the Iranian people an opportunity to enjoy the rights of man as set forth in the Constitution of the United States and to participate in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The policy of the United States toward Iran, therefore, is to assist in the creation in Iran of a government based upon the consent of the governed and of a system of free enter-
prise which will enable that nation to develop its resources primarily for the benefit of its own people. Iranian resources are adequate to sustain a program to help Iran to help herself. By this program of self-government and well directed self-help Iran can achieve for herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom from want, equality of opportunity, and to a degree freedom from fear.

To accomplish the above, the United States will furnish, upon invitation of the Iranian Government, expert advisors in any or all of the fields of government. All experts and advisors furnished to Iran by the United States will be paid by the Iranian Government and implemented in their operations by authority of Iranian law, and will not be a financial responsibility of the American taxpayer. The United States will not ask or receive any special privileges for these services.

American advisors will be fully indoctrinated in the policy of our own government toward Iran and shall make regular progress reports to our State Department. This indoctrination and requirement of reporting will provide a vital element of coordination which is essential to direction of our policy and protection of our interests.

Modern history of this country shows it to have been dominated by a powerful and greedy minority. The people have also been subjected to foreign exploitation and monopoly. In extending American assistance to the building of an improved society in
Iran there must be imposed a sufficient degree of supervision and control over free enterprise and personal aggression to protect the unorganized and inarticulate majority from foreign and domestic monopoly and oppression.

Inauguration in Iran of the American pattern of self-government and free enterprise will be an assurance that proceeds from development of Iranian resources will be directed substantially to the building of schools, hospitals, sanitary systems, transportation and communication systems, irrigation systems and improvement of all facilities contributing to the health, happiness and general welfare of the Iranian people.

This plan of nation building may be improved through our experience in Iran and may become the criterion for the relations of the United States toward all the nations which are now suffering from the evils of greedy minorities, monopolies, aggression and imperialism.

The American people, single-mindedly devoted to independence and liberty, are fighting today not to save the imperialisms of other nations nor to create an imperialism of our own but rather to bestow upon the world the benevolent principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.

PART II

The foregoing is a rather simple plan designed to promote the building of free nations. The job that confronts us is not an easy one. The success of the recent conferences in Moscow, Cairo and Tehran indicates that the major powers can cooperate in the prosecution of the war. The reaffirmation of the Atlantic
Charter indicates that there is a basis for post-war cooperation. Notwithstanding these evidences of good will I think that now is the time for us to attempt to analyse the opposition that the building of free nations will be likely to encounter.

Without any opposition from other nations and with the cooperation and support of the intelligent and patriotic leaders of Iran it will take generations to achieve in Iran free enterprise and a government based on the consent of the governed. The population of Iran is approximately 90% illiterate and it is composed, to a large extent, of disorganized and separated tribes. The intelligence and vigilance which will support liberty of the masses must be created. The education of the tribesmen and the establishment of a unity of purpose will require time, patience, diligence, efficiency, and a crusading spirit on the part of our advisors. Above all, the advisors must have the continuous support of the American people which in itself may be difficult to assure.

In addition to the obstacles within Iran, the principles of the above formula are in conflict with the principles of imperialism. Free enterprise may also come in conflict with any forced expansion of communism. Advocates of both of these doctrines may resist the proposed spreading of democracy.

In all the nations I have visited, I have been told, usually by British and Americans, that the principles of imperialism already have succumbed to the principles of democracy. From my own observations, however, I must say that if imperialism is dead, it seems very reluctant to lie down.
The imperialisms of Germany, Japan, Italy, France, Belgium, Portugal, and The Netherlands will, we hope, end or be radically revised by this war. British imperialism seems to have acquired a new life. This appearance, however, is illusory. What appears to be a new life of British imperialism is the result of the infusion, into its emaciated form, of the blood of productivity and liberty from a free nation through lend-lease. British imperialism is also being defended today by the blood of the soldiers of the most democratic nation on earth.

The names of the imperialistic nations are sufficient to indicate that a large part of the world's population is still committed to the principles of imperialism. These names also indicate the opposition that will be encountered by any effort that has for its purpose the establishment of democracy in nations that are now subjected to the rule of imperialistic nations. We are approaching the irrepressible conflict between world-wide imperialism and world-wide democracy. It is depressing to note how many of our real friends in the world seem to be irrevocably committed to the old order of imperialism.

Woodrow Wilson's policy for America in the first world war was designed "To make the world safe for democracy" and to sustain Britain as a first class world power. Sustaining Britain as a first class power has for many years been the cornerstone of America's foreign policy. Personally I have supported that policy. I have long believed and have many times stated publicly that the ultimate destiny of the English speaking peoples is a single destiny.
We did sustain Britain in the first world war as a first class power but we did not succeed in making the world "safe for democracy". Instead, when we backed away from the League of Nations and failed to make the peace terms an instrument of democracy, we made the world safe for imperialism. In the quarter of a century which has intervened the processes of both eastern and western imperialism set the stage for this new world war.

An effort to establish true freedom among the less favored nations, so many of which are under the present shadow of imperialism, will almost inevitably run counter to the policy of sustaining Britain as a first class world power. This leads us to the conclusion that Britain today is confronted by the same condition that confronted our nation when Lincoln at Gettysburg said "That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom". Britain can be sustained as a first class power but to warrant this support from the American people she must accept the principles of liberty and democracy and discard the principles of oppressive imperialism.

Soviet Russia has earned for herself an assured place as a first class world power. Friendship and cooperation between the United States and the U. S. S. R. are essential to peace and harmony in the post-war world. There must, therefore, be a mutual understanding and acceptance of the post-war patterns for freedom which the great powers among the United Nations are to offer to their less powerful associates. Without such agreement there would be jealousy, suspicion and conflict.
PART III

In considering the present status of relations between Iran and the United States it must be remembered that although American troops have been here more than a year their presence has not yet been officially recognized by the Iranian Government. Many Iranian officials believe that American troops are in Iran on the invitation and for the purpose of serving as an instrumentality of Britain. For a year or more we have had under negotiation with Iran a treaty wherein Iran would recognize the presence of American troops as an American operation. The ineffective presentation of the treaty has not been helpful to American prestige with the Iranians.

It is the responsibility of the State Department to effect the consummation of the treaty. The necessity for promptness in the negotiation of this agreement was pointed out by me in my report to you of May 13, 1943. I have not personally participated in any of the treaty conferences with the Iranians.

I think it important that we understand that since our troops entered Iran on the invitation of the British, without advance notice to the Government of Iran, it was natural for the Iranians to look upon us as a British instrumentality. In addition to this the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation which was first engaged in preclusive purchasing in Iran has since been selling American lend lease supplies to civilians and to the Government of Iran. Largely through our lend lease supplies, paid for by the American taxpayer, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation has been attempting and, to a considerable degree, succeeding in establishing a complete trade monopoly in Iran. The United Kingdom Commercial

DECLASSIFIED

- 7 - By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972
Corporation achieved this position by virtue of being on the scene when American lend lease supplies began entering Iran. United States representatives in Iran engaged the British Corporation, government owned but profit making, to serve as handling agent and middleman for the American goods. This arrangement, which evidently had the approval of the Lend Lease Administration and the State Department, has been profitable to the British Corporation.

There has been a United States Commercial Corporation, government owned, with offices in Tehran. When I was here a year ago, Mr. Philip Kidd was in charge of the corporation. Later Mr. Erik Eriksson was in charge. If we were going to enter the commercial field with lend lease goods, I do not know why we did not use our own corporation instead of the British Corporation. I refer again to my report to you on Iran dated at Cairo, May 13, 1943 and my report on lend lease in the Middle East dated at Delhi, November 7, 1943. Your Minister, Mr. Landis, has made great improvement in the administration of lend lease in the Middle East. Notwithstanding this I am still of the opinion that the present debate between the Americans and British on lend lease will be ended only when America has taken complete control of the distribution of our own lend lease supplies in this area.

The Iranians believe that the post-war monopoly plans of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation now have the support of the United States Government.

In addition to all this there have been conflicts between the British and American Ministries that have been evident to the Iranians. This situation has been damaging to both American and
British prestige. To offset this impression the Iranians have witnessed the efficiency of the American operations of railroad and road transportation in passing war supplies to Russia. Finally they have been deeply impressed by your masterful handling of the three-power conference and especially by your skill in procuring from the conference the declaration of policy of the United Nations toward Iran.

Meanwhile, Soviet prestige has benefited from their own well ordered conduct and by their direct and positive relations with the Iranians.

PART IV

In a conversation with his Majesty, the Shah and certain of his ministers a few days ago, I was informed that from one source or another the tribesmen in the outlying provinces of Iran have acquired at least 50,000 rifles and ammunition. This the Shah thought made it imperative that our advisors to the Iranian Army and to the Iranian Police Force hasten the organization of the forces for security against internal disorder. He stated that certain foreign influences are being brought to bear on the tribesmen to cause internal disorder in Iran. While on this subject I informed His Majesty that I had heard that Russia had agreed to furnish the Iranian Army with a number of tanks, rifles and airplanes. The Shah admitted that there was such an offer but how much equipment Russia would give he was unable to say. I remarked that we were furnishing Russia equipment under lend lease because Russia did not have enough equipment for her own war necessities.
His Majesty said that he understood that fact but that Russia had offered to give his government this much needed equipment. He said he had hoped to acquire the equipment from the United States but had been unable to obtain satisfactory action. In my opinion Iran is able to pay for the equipment which she needs for both her Army and her Police Force.

It is a fact, however, that Britain is furnishing lend lease material to other nations at a time when she is being sustained in her war effort by American lend lease. Now Russia seems to be about to embark on a similar program. Britain has been giving and now Russia is about to give our lend lease supplies, or supplies that have been replaced or released by our lend lease supplies, to other nations in return for concessions or to strengthen their own ideologies in the countries to which the supplies are given. The least we should demand is that we be permitted to do our own giving.

PART V

Iranian officials have expressed a desire to establish a closer commercial relationship with the United States.

Under conditions now prevailing there will no doubt be a great rush on the part of American businessmen to get oil, mineral and other concessions in Iran. I suggest that the State Department, with the assistance of the other agencies of our government, should be prepared to advise the Government of Iran definitely concerning the character and other qualifications of every applicant for a concession.
PART VI

In proposing to commit you to a world wide plan of building associated free nations, I am not unmindful of the problems that confront you on the home front.

We should, of course, consider the effect of the present and future high taxes and of the expenditure of great amounts of our economic reserve. Our greatest danger, however, lies in the creation of a stupendous bonded indebtedness. If the war and our post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation commitments continue for a long period this indebtedness may become so overwhelming that it will create hopelessness, lethargy and despondency on the part of the world's freest and most resourceful people. We may again have soldiers being mustered out to disillusionment and unemployment. We may again have people shouting that "We can't eat the Constitution". They may even add to the non-edibles the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. This might lead to panic, bankruptcy and revolution. It is needless to add that if anything of this nature occurred at home, all our plans for the future of the world would be futile. Tyranny and oppressive imperialism would again be dominant.

I think the broader aspects of your world diplomacy are now in excellent form. But we can damage that position if we fail to be realistic in whipping the details into conformity with your general plan.

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK C. HURLEY
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Tehran, Iran.
21 December 1943.

Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have written a letter to the President dated at Tehran, December 21, 1943, copy of which I am enclosing to you herewith. This letter is written in response to a suggestion made by the President to me and the directive which I received from you under date of November 19, 1943.

While in Iran I worked with the President and the officials accompanying him and with your legation on the preparation of the draft of the three power declaration pertaining to Iran which was adopted by the conference. I have conferred with Iranian, British and Soviet officials, the heads of our various agencies in Iran, and the Commanding General of our troops in Iran and many of his officers. I believe I have eliminated some discords. The report I am submitting is not intended to detail all issues here but is intended to be helpful to you in formulating a general policy.

Respectfully,

Patrick J. Hurley,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On your departure from Tehran you outlined to me, during our conversation at the airport, a tentative basis for American policy in Iran which might be used as a pattern for our relations with all less favored associate nations. In response to your suggestion and the directive which I received from the Secretary of State, I wish to submit the following for your consideration.

PART 1

It is the purpose of the United States to sustain Iran as a free, independent nation and to afford the Iranian people an opportunity to enjoy the rights of man as set forth in the Constitution of the United States and to participate in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The policy of the United States toward Iran, therefore, is to assist in the creation in Iran of a government based upon the consent of the governed and of a system of free enter-

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972
prise which will enable that nation to develop its resources primarily for the benefit of its own people. Iranian resources are adequate to sustain a program to help Iran to help herself. By this program of self-government and well directed self-help Iran can achieve for herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom from want, equality of opportunity, and to a degree freedom from fear.

To accomplish the above, the United States will furnish, upon invitation of the Iranian Government, expert advisors in any or all of the fields of government. All experts and advisors furnished to Iran by the United States will be paid by the Iranian Government and implemented in their operations by authority of Iranian law, and will not be a financial responsibility of the American taxpayer. The United States will not ask or receive any special privileges for these services.

American advisors will be fully indoctrinated in the policy of our own government toward Iran and shall make regular progress reports to our State Department. This indoctrination and requirement of reporting will provide a vital element of coordination which is essential to direction of our policy and protection of our interests.

Modern history of this country shows it to have been dominated by a powerful and greedy minority. The people have also been subjected to foreign exploitation and monopoly. In extending American assistance to the building of an improved society in
Iran there must be imposed a sufficient degree of supervision and control over free enterprise and personal aggression to protect the unorganized and inarticulate majority from foreign and domestic monopoly and oppression.

Inauguration in Iran of the American pattern of self-government and free enterprise will be an assurance that proceeds from development of Iranian resources will be directed substantially to the building of schools, hospitals, sanitary systems, transportation and communication systems, irrigation systems and improvement of all facilities contributing to the health, happiness and general welfare of the Iranian people.

This plan of nation building may be improved through our experience in Iran and may become the criterion for the relations of the United States toward all the nations which are now suffering from the evils of greedy minorities, monopolies, aggression and imperialism.

The American people, single-mindedly devoted to independence and liberty, are fighting today not to save the imperialisms of other nations nor to create an imperialism of our own but rather to bestow upon the world the benevolent principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.

**PART II**

The foregoing is a rather simple plan designed to promote the building of free nations. The job that confronts us is not an easy one. The success of the recent conferences in Moscow, Cairo and Tehran indicates that the major powers can cooperate in the prosecution of the war. The reaffirmation of the Atlantic

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By W. J. Stewart Date **FEB 10 1972**
Charter indicates that there is a basis for post-war cooperation. Notwithstanding these evidences of good will I think that now is the time for us to attempt to analyse the opposition that the building of free nations will be likely to encounter.

Without any opposition from other nations and with the cooperation and support of the intelligent and patriotic leaders of Iran it will take generations to achieve in Iran free enterprise and a government based on the consent of the governed. The population of Iran is approximately 90% illiterate and it is composed, to a large extent, of disorganized and separated tribes. The intelligence and vigilance which will support liberty of the masses must be created. The education of the tribesmen and the establishment of a unity of purpose will require time, patience, diligence, efficiency, and a crusading spirit on the part of our advisors. Above all, the advisors must have the continuous support of the American people which in itself may be difficult to assure.

In addition to the obstacles within Iran, the principles of the above formula are in conflict with the principles of imperialism. Free enterprise may also come in conflict with any forced expansion of communism. Advocates of both of these doctrines may resist the proposed spreading of democracy.

In all the nations I have visited, I have been told, usually by British and Americans, that the principles of imperialism already have succumbed to the principles of democracy. From my own observations, however, I must say that if imperialism is dead, it seems very reluctant to lie down.
The imperialisms of Germany, Japan, Italy, France, Belgium, Portugal, and The Netherlands will, we hope, end or be radically revised by this war. British imperialism seems to have acquired a new life. This appearance, however, is illusory. What appears to be a new life of British imperialism is the result of the infusion, into its emaciated form, of the blood of productivity and liberty from a free nation through lend lease. British imperialism is also being defended today by the blood of the soldiers of the most democratic nation on earth.

The names of the imperialistic nations are sufficient to indicate that a large part of the world's population is still committed to the principles of imperialism. These names also indicate the opposition that will be encountered by any effort that has for its purpose the establishment of democracy in nations that are now subjected to the rule of imperialistic nations. We are approaching the irrepressible conflict between world-wide imperialism and world-wide democracy. It is depressing to note how many of our real friends in the world seem to be irrevocably committed to the old order of imperialism.

Woodrow Wilson's policy for America in the first world war was designed "To make the world safe for democracy" and to sustain Britain as a first class world power. Sustaining Britain as a first class power has for many years been the cornerstone of America's foreign policy. Personally I have supported that policy. I have long believed and have many times stated publicly that the ultimate destiny of the English speaking peoples is a single destiny.
We did sustain Britain in the first world war as a first class power but we did not succeed in making the world "safe for democracy". Instead, when we backed away from the League of Nations and failed to make the peace terms an instrument of democracy, we made the world safe for imperialism. In the quarter of a century which has intervened the processes of both eastern and western imperialism set the stage for this new world war.

An effort to establish true freedom among the less favored nations, so many of which are under the present shadow of imperialism, will almost inevitably run counter to the policy of sustaining Britain as a first class world power. This leads us to the conclusion that Britain today is confronted by the same condition that confronted our nation when Lincoln at Gettysburg said "That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom". Britain can be sustained as a first class power but to warrant this support from the American people she must accept the principles of liberty and democracy and discard the principles of oppressive imperialism.

Soviet Russia has earned for herself an assured place as a first class world power. Friendship and cooperation between the United States and the U. S. S. R. are essential to peace and harmony in the post-war world. There must, therefore, be a mutual understanding and acceptance of the post-war patterns for freedom which the great powers among the United Nations are to offer to their less powerful associates. Without such agreement there would be jealousy, suspicion and conflict.

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By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972
PART III

In considering the present status of relations between Iran and the United States it must be remembered that although American troops have been here more than a year their presence has not yet been officially recognized by the Iranian Government. Many Iranian officials believe that American troops are in Iran on the invitation and for the purpose of serving as an instrumentality of Britain. For a year or more we have had under negotiation with Iran a treaty wherein Iran would recognize the presence of American troops as an American operation. The ineffective presentation of the treaty has not been helpful to American prestige with the Iranians.

It is the responsibility of the State Department to effect the consummation of the treaty. The necessity for promptness in the negotiation of this agreement was pointed out by me in my report to you of May 13, 1945. I have not personally participated in any of the treaty conferences with the Iranians.

I think it important that we understand that since our troops entered Iran on the invitation of the British, without advance notice to the Government of Iran, it was natural for the Iranians to look upon us as a British instrumentality. In addition to this the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation which was first engaged in preclusive purchasing in Iran has since been selling American lend lease supplies to civilians and to the Government of Iran. Largely through our lend lease supplies, paid for by the American taxpayer, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation has been attempting and, to a considerable degree, succeeding in establishing a complete trade monopoly in Iran. The United Kingdom Commercial...
Corporation achieved this position by virtue of being on the scene when American lend lease supplies began entering Iran. United States representatives in Iran engaged the British Corporation, government owned but profit making, to serve as handling agent and middleman for the American goods. This arrangement, which evidently had the approval of the Lend Lease Administration and the State Department, has been profitable to the British Corporation.

There has been a United States Commercial Corporation, government owned, with offices in Tehran. When I was here a year ago, Mr. Philip Kidd was in charge of the corporation. Later Mr. Erik Eriksen was in charge. If we were going to enter the commercial field with lend lease goods, I do not know why we did not use our own corporation instead of the British Corporation. I refer again to my report to you on Iran dated at Cairo, May 13, 1943 and my report on lend lease in the Middle East dated at Delhi, November 7, 1943. Your Minister, Mr. Landis, has made great improvement in the administration of lend lease in the Middle East. Notwithstanding this I am still of the opinion that the present debate between the Americans and British on lend lease will be ended only when America has taken complete control of the distribution of our own lend lease supplies in this area.

The Iranians believe that the post-war monopoly plans of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation now have the support of the United States Government.

In addition to all this there have been conflicts between the British and American Ministries that have been evident to the Iranians. This situation has been damaging to both American and
British prestige. To offset this impression the Iranians have witnessed the efficiency of the American operations of railroad and road transportation in passing war supplies to Russia. Finally they have been deeply impressed by your masterful handling of the three-power conference and especially by your skill in procuring from the conference the declaration of policy of the United Nations toward Iran.

Meanwhile, Soviet prestige has benefited from their own well ordered conduct and by their direct and positive relations with the Iranians.

PART IV

In a conversation with his Majesty, the Shah and certain of his ministers a few days ago, I was informed that from one source or another the tribesmen in the outlying provinces of Iran have acquired at least 50,000 rifles and ammunition. This the Shah thought made it imperative that our advisors to the Iranian Army and to the Iranian Police Force hasten the organization of the forces for security against internal disorder. He stated that certain foreign influences are being brought to bear on the tribesmen to cause internal disorder in Iran. While on this subject I informed His Majesty that I had heard that Russia had agreed to furnish the Iranian Army with a number of tanks, rifles and airplanes. The Shah admitted that there was such an offer but how much equipment Russia would give he was unable to say. I remarked that we were furnishing Russia equipment under lend lease because Russia did not have enough equipment for her own war necessities.

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By W. J. Stewart Date: FEB 10 1972
His Majesty said that he understood that fact but that Russia had offered to give his government this much needed equipment. He said he had hoped to acquire the equipment from the United States but had been unable to obtain satisfactory action. In my opinion Iran is able to pay for the equipment which she needs for both her Army and her Police Force.

It is a fact, however, that Britain is furnishing lend lease material to other nations at a time when she is being sustained in her war effort by American lend lease. Now Russia seems to be about to embark on a similar program. Britain has been giving and now Russia is about to give our lend lease supplies, or supplies that have been replaced or released by our lend lease supplies, to other nations in return for concessions or to strengthen their own ideologies in the countries to which the supplies are given. The least we should demand is that we be permitted to do our own giving.

PART V

Iranian officials have expressed a desire to establish a closer commercial relationship with the United States.

Under conditions now prevailing there will no doubt be a great rush on the part of American businessmen to get oil, mineral and other concessions in Iran. I suggest that the State Department, with the assistance of the other agencies of our government, should be prepared to advise the Government of Iran definitely concerning the character and other qualifications of every applicant for a concession.
PART VI

In proposing to commit you to a world wide plan of building associated free nations, I am not unmindful of the problems that confront you on the home front.

We should, of course, consider the effect of the present and future high taxes and of the expenditure of great amounts of our economic reserve. Our greatest danger, however, lies in the creation of a stupendous bonded indebtedness. If the war and our post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation commitments continue for a long period this indebtedness may become so overwhelming that it will create hopelessness, lethargy and despondency on the part of the world's freest and most resourceful people. We may again have soldiers being mustered out to disillusionment and unemployment. We may again have people shouting that "We can't eat the Constitution". They may even add to the non-edibles the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. This might lead to panic, bankruptcy and revolution. It is needless to add that if anything of this nature occurred at home, all our plans for the future of the world would be futile. Tyranny and oppressive imperialism would again be dominant.

I think the broader aspects of your world diplomacy are now in excellent form. But we can damage that position if we fail to be realistic in whipping the details into conformity with your general plan.

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK J. HURLEY,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In his report to you of May 13, 1943, General Hurley recommended that our Legation at Tehran be raised to the status of an Embassy. He also recommended that we assure Iran that the principles of the Atlantic Charter apply to that country, and that Iran be permitted to join the United Nations in a declaration of war against the Axis.

Since that time Iran, of her own volition, has declared war against Germany and Japan, and adhered to the United Nations Declaration. The recent Three-Power-Declaration at Tehran definitely assures Iran's future in accordance with Atlantic Charter principles.

The elevation of our Legation at Tehran to an Embassy, at this time, would constitute recognition of these facts, and of the difficulties and suffering which Iran has experienced in making available her transport system, by means of which huge quantities of military supplies have been and are being moved to Russia.

A certain
A certain precedent for the action suggested lies in the fact that about a year ago, the Shah appointed a distinguished elder statesman to Washington and asked that he be received with the rank of Ambassador. This request was referred to you and received your approval. Unfortunately Mr. Foroughi, the statesman in question, died before he could leave Iran.

A further precedent exists in the fact that General Hurley recently received a temporary appointment to Tehran with the rank of Ambassador.

As you know, Soviet Russia already has an Embassy in Iran. If it is decided to raise our Legation to the status of an Embassy it would seem desirable to inform the British of our plan in order that they may consider taking similar action at approximately the same time.

I should be glad to know whether, in view of the considerations above-mentioned, you concur in the suggestion of raising our Legation at Tehran to the rank of Embassy.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
December 23, 1943

I feel confident that you would wish to be advised of the following.

The Iranian Minister, under instructions from his Government, has informed me that while deeply grateful for the tripartite declaration on Iran made during the Tehran conference, the Shah and the Iranian Government were bitterly disappointed and even felt humiliated that you were unable to make a return call upon the Shah and receive the hospitality and the honor which he was eager to accord to you. The chagrin of the Iranians is all the more poignant because Marshal Stalin took special pains to call upon the Shah with whom he remained in conference for nearly two hours.

The Iranians, who are an almost morbidly sensitive people on the matter of courtesies and protocol, felt, furthermore, mortified over the report that there had been a plot against the lives of the three distinguished statesmen meeting in Tehran. They feel that this, in some manner, implied that the Iranians themselves might have had such designs.

The Iranian Minister has pled with me to urge you to include in your radio address on Friday evening some particularly friendly references to the courtesy and hospitality of the Shah and the Iranian people during your visit to Tehran, and of the great admiration which you and the American people have for the Shah and his people. I earnestly hope that you can meet the wishes of the Iranians in this matter since I believe it is of particular importance in our relations with that country at the present time.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

I am enclosing herewith a sealed letter addressed to the President by the Shahinshah of Iran, which was left with me by our Minister to Iran, Mr. Dreyfus.

George T. Summerlin

Enclosure:
Sealed letter.

(Sealed letter did not come to file)
January 10, 1944.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Pat:

I am given to understand by the State Department that the Foreign Minister of Iran is very much perturbed about the stories the American press and radio have carried about a reported plot to assassinate the various Heads of State during the conferences at Teheran in December.

I wish you would explain to the Foreign Minister that there was never any question of suspicion about any Iranian, but that the report of threatened violence involved German agents who were believed to have entered Iran without authority. As you know, my move from the American Legation was made primarily in order not to expose any of the conferees to the risk of attack by Axis agents while coming to visit me. I hope that you can put at rest any misunderstanding about the incident. I do not wish to make any further statement to the American press about it as such action would only increase general attention to the matter.

I hope that you may be making fine progress in your work.

With all good wishes,

Always sincerely,

s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Major General Patrick J. Hurley
(via State Dept. pouch)
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

I have blocked out the attached proposed letter to General Hurley as a reminder for the President. When he sends a letter to General Hurley I suggest that it would be well to send a copy to the State Department, if the President wishes it done.

WILSON BROWN.
Personal and 

Dear Pat;

I am given to understand by the State Department that the Foreign Minister of Iran is very much perturbed about the stories the American press and radio have carried about a reported plot to assassinate the various Heads of State during the conferences at Teheran in December. I wish you would explain to the Foreign Minister that there was never any question of suspicion about any Iranian, but that the report of threatened violence involved German agents who were believed to have entered Iran without authority. As you know, my move from the American Legation was made primarily in order not to expose any of the conferees to the risk of attack by Axis agents while coming to visit me. I hope that you can put at rest any misunderstanding about the incident. I do not wish to make any further statement to the American press about it as such action would only increase general attention to the matter.

I hope that you may be making fine progress in your work.

With all good wishes,

Cordially yours,

Major General Patrick J. Hurley, U.S.N.

(Via State Department)
Ask the President if it is OK to send copy of this to the State Dept. as suggested by Adm. Brown.

OK 7/17
January 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

"F.D.R."

Transmitting a copy of the President letter of 1/10/44 addressed to Major General Patrick J. Hurley, in re stories carried by the American press and radio about a reported plot to assassinate the various Heads of State during the conferences at Teheran in December.
Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

ME

ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO

The President
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Enclosed is a very interesting letter from Pat Hurley. It is in general along the lines of my talk with him.

Iran is definitely a very, very backward nation. It consists really of a series of tribes and 99% of the population is, in effect, in bondage to the other 1%. The 99% do not own their land and cannot keep their own production or convert it into money or property.

I was rather thrilled with the idea of using Iran as an example of what we could do by an unselfish American policy. We could not take on a more difficult nation than Iran. I would like, however, to have a try at it. The real difficulty is to get the right kind of American experts who would be loyal to their ideals, not fight among themselves and be absolutely honest financially.

If we could get this policy started, it would become permanent if it succeeded as we hope during the first five or ten years. And incidentally, the whole experiment need cost the taxpayers of the United States very little money.

Would you let me know what you think I should reply to Hurley? He is right that the whole Lend-Lease Administration should take complete control of the distribution of our own Lend-Lease supplies in the Middle East.

F.D.R.
Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On your departure from Tehran you outlined to me, during our conversation at the airport, a tentative basis for American policy in Iran which might be used as a pattern for our relations with all less favored associate nations. In response to your suggestion and the directive which I received from the Secretary of State, I wish to submit the following for your consideration.

PART I

It is the purpose of the United States to sustain Iran as a free, independent nation and to afford the Iranian people an opportunity to enjoy the rights of man as set forth in the Constitution of the United States and to participate in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

The policy of the United States toward Iran, therefore, is to assist in the creation in Iran of a government based upon the consent of the governed and of a system of free enterprise which will enable that nation to develop its resources primarily for the benefit of its own people. Iranian resources are adequate to sustain a program to help Iran to help herself. By this program of self-government and well directed self-help Iran can achieve for herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom from want, equality of opportunity, and to a degree freedom from fear.

To accomplish the above, the United States will furnish, upon invitation of the Iranian Government, expert advisors in any or all of the fields of government. All experts and advisors furnished to Iran by the United States will be paid by the Iranian Government and implemented in their operations by authority of Iranian law, and will not be a financial responsibility of the American taxpayer. The United States will not ask or receive any special privileges for these services.

American advisors will be fully indoctrinated in the policy of our own government toward Iran and shall make regular progress reports to our State Department. This indoctrination and requirement
requirement of reporting will provide a vital element of coordination which is essential to direction of our policy and protection of our interests.

Modern history of this country shows it to have been dominated by a powerful and greedy minority. The people have also been subjected to foreign exploitation and monopoly. In extending American assistance to the building of an improved society in Iran there must be imposed a sufficient degree of supervision and control over free enterprise and personal aggression to protect the unorganized and inarticulate majority from foreign and domestic monopoly and oppression.

Inauguration in Iran of the American pattern of self-government and free enterprise will be an assurance that proceeds from development of Iranian resources will be directed substantially to the building of schools, hospitals, sanitary systems, transportation and communication systems, irrigation systems and improvement of all facilities contributing to the health, happiness and general welfare of the Iranian people.

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The American people, single-mindedly devoted to independence and liberty, are fighting today not to save the imperialisms of other nations nor to create an imperialism of our own but rather to bestow upon the world the benevolent principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.

PART II

The foregoing is a rather simple plan designed to promote the building of free nations. The job that confronts us is not an easy one. The success of the recent conferences in Moscow, Cairo and Tehran indicates that the major powers can cooperate in the prosecution of the war. The reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter indicates that there is a basis for postwar cooperation. Notwithstanding these evidences of good will I think that now is the time for us to attempt to analyze the opposition that the building of free nations will be likely to encounter.

Without any opposition from other nations and with the cooperation and support of the intelligent and patriotic leaders of Iran it will take generations to achieve in Iran free enterprise and a government based on the consent of the governed.

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The population of Iran is approximately 90% illiterate and it is composed, to a large extent, of disorganized and separated tribes. The intelligence and vigilance which will support liberty of the masses must be created. The education of the tribesmen and the establishment of a unity of purpose will require time, patience, diligence, efficiency, and a crusading spirit on the part of our advisors. Above all, the advisors must have the continuous support of the American people which in itself may be difficult to assure.

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An effort to establish true freedom among the less favored nations, so many of which are under the present shadow of imperialism, will almost inevitably run counter to the policy of sustaining Britain as a first-class world power. This leads us to the conclusion that Britain today is confronted by the same condition that confronted our nation when Lincoln at Gettysburg said "That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom". Britain can be sustained as a first-class power but to warrant this support from the American people she must accept the principles of liberty and democracy and discard the principles of oppressive imperialism.

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The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation achieved this position by virtue of being on the scene when American lend-lease supplies began entering Iran. United States representatives in Iran engaged the British Corporation, government-owned but profit-making, to serve as handling agent and middleman for the American goods. This arrangement, which evidently had the approval of the Lend-Lease Administration and the State Department, has been profitable to the British Corporation.

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Under conditions now prevailing there will no doubt be a great rush on the part of American businessmen to get oil, mineral and other concessions in Iran. I suggest that the State Department, with the assistance of the other agencies of our government, should be prepared to advise the Government of Iran definitely concerning the character and other qualifications of every applicant for a concession.

PART VI

In proposing to commit you to a world-wide plan of building associated free nations, I am not unmindful of the problems that confront you on the home front.

We should, of course, consider the effect of the present and future high taxes and of the expenditure of great amounts of our economic reserve. Our greatest danger, however, lies in the creation of a stupendous bonded indebtedness. If the war and our postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation commitments continue for a long period this indebtedness may become so overwhelming that it will create hopelessness, lethargy and despondency on the part of the world's freest and most resourceful people. We may again have soldiers being mustered out to disillusionment and unemployment. We may again have people shouting that "We can't eat the Constitution." They may even add to the non-edibles the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. This might lead to panic, bankruptcy and revolution. It is needless to add that if anything of this nature occurred at home, all our plans for the future of the world would be futile. Tyranny and oppressive imperialism would again be dominant.

I think the broader aspects of your world diplomacy are now in excellent form. But we can damage that position if we fail to be realistic in whipping the details into conformity with your general plan.

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK J. HURLEY
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Secret from Hurley to the President
Feb. 9 Number AMSME 1368 N re conferences
with both Christian and Mohammedan Arabs.
February 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I refer to my memorandum of October 29, 1943, which met with your approval, recommending that General Patrick Hurley be sent to Tehran for a short period on a special mission, with the personal rank of Ambassador.

The Department indicated to General Hurley, when informing him of his designation in this capacity, that he would be expected to reside in Tehran during the absence from Iran of Mr. Dreyfus, and that he would be expected to leave Tehran prior to the Minister's return.

General Hurley, presumably believing that he has accomplished the purposes of his special mission to Iran, has left that country, and is understood to be at present in Palestine or Transjordan.

General Hurley's activities in Tehran, according to the reports we have received, have been of very considerable assistance to our Legation there. I believe, however, that there is no further occasion to require his continued services in this connection, and suggest that he be appropriately informed that his special mission has terminated. This would also terminate, of course, the personal rank of Ambassador which was accorded him for the purposes of the mission.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

February 18, 1944

Your views concerning the policy we should follow in Iran, expressed in your memorandum of January 12, 1944, have proved most helpful to the Department in its efforts to develop an American advisory program in that country which can serve as a model.

General Hurley's report to you of December 21, 1943, which was the occasion of your memorandum, contains many useful suggestions which we have discussed with General Hurley briefly since his return to Washington, and hope to have an opportunity to discuss further with him.

Your memorandum requested suggestions regarding the reply you might make to General Hurley. A few days after your memorandum reached the Department we received word that the General had left Tehran, presumably en route to Washington. We have expressed to him our full appreciation for the services he rendered in Tehran and have told him of your favorable reaction to his report, which has been most gratifying to him. Should you have further occasion to comment to him on his report, you may wish to assure him that his report is serving as a basis for active measures already under way with regard to Iran.

General Connolly's directives have recently been broadened by the War Department to enable our armed forces in Iran to assist, in such ways as may be feasible, in carrying out our policy of aid to Iran, and he has already taken an important step by making available personnel to the American supervisor of Iranian transport facilities. Other measures are being taken as rapidly as personnel can be found to implement your policy.

General Hurley's report is returned herewith, a copy having been made for the Department's files.

Enclosure:
Report

Report did not come in file - 2/22/44
March 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Appointment of American Ambassador to Iran

It does not seem to me that it would be feasible, in view of the announcement already made of the appointment of Mr. Morris to Tehran and of Mr. Dreyfus to Reykjavik, to attempt to do anything about the Iranian request. We have told the Iranian Minister that while we appreciate deeply the generous references to Mr. Dreyfus, appointments already made could not be revoked. I do not believe any further action necessary.

Enclosures:

1. Original memorandum from Mr. Berle, March 9, 1944, with enclosure.
2. Copy of memorandum for the Secretary of State, March 14, 1944.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

March 14, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do we do about this?

F.D.R.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 9, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Appointment of American Ambassador to Iran

Attached, memorandum of conversation with the Minister of Iran, in which he transmits a request from the Iranian Government for reconsideration of the recall of Dreyfus, and expresses his Government's hope that Dreyfus will be appointed Ambassador to Iran. The Iranian Government asks that this message be conveyed to the White House and states that if it will assist in the matter the Shah will be prepared to communicate personally with President Roosevelt. The Shah has nothing against Leland Morris and is glad to agree to his appointment, realizing that representation is in the hands of the President; but feels that, since they have a man who understands them, they would like to hang on to him.

The Iranian Government directed that this representation be made to Mr. Hull personally; in his absence, to me personally.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation, dated March 9, 1944.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 9, 1944

SUBJECT: Appointment of American Ambassador to Iran

PARTICIPANTS: Minister of Iran, Mr. Mohammed Shayesteh;
Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr.

COPIES TO: The President, S, U, NE, ME

The Minister of Iran came in to see me at his request.

He wished to renew a request made earlier that our Government reconsider the recall of Mr. Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., and to express the hope that we would appoint him as our Ambassador to Iran.

He recited at considerable length the very great personal esteem in which Dreyfus and his wife were held in Iran; the fact that the Shah had given the agrément to Mr. Leland B. Morris' appointment, but coupled it with the request that Mr. Dreyfus might be considered for the ambassadorial post. Recognizing that representation was a matter for the President, and that there was nothing personal against Leland Morris, the Iranian Government and the Shah nevertheless ventured the hope that even at this late date the matter might be reconsidered.

The Minister added that if it would assist matters the Shah would communicate directly and personally with President Roosevelt.

The
The Minister gave at some length the reasons for this, including the fact that for two years Dreyfus had upheld the interests of Iran and of the United States at a time when the Middle East supply center was falling down badly on supplies, and so forth.

He said that these representations had been made by him pursuant to a cable dated February 26 and another one dated February 28; that the latter had directed him to take up the matter with Secretary Hull personally, but that Secretary Hull was out of town; he had subsequently received a cable from his Foreign Office directing him to take it up personally with me.

I said I was gratified to know of the success which had attended Mr. Dreyfus, who was a personal friend of mine; that, as the Minister had stated, representation was, of course, a matter for the President; but that I would be glad to bring his representations to the attention of the appropriate authorities and he could be assured that they would be given every consideration. I said that we were appreciative that the Shah had taken a personal interest in the matter.

A. A. B., Jr.
March 25, 1944

Dear Pat:

Your letter of December 21, 1943 concerning Iran contains suggestions of very great interest: I am thrilled with the idea of using our efforts in Iran as an example of what can be done by an unselfish American policy. If we can get the right kind of American experts who will remain loyal to their ideals I feel certain that our policy of aiding Iran will succeed.

You are right that the distribution of Lend-Lease supplies throughout the Middle East should be taken over by our own people and I have let the Secretary of State know my views in this regard.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Major General Patrick J. Hurley,
Shoreham Building,
Washington, D. C.
January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Enclosed is a very interesting letter from Pat Hurley. It is in general along the lines of my talk with him.

Iran is definitely a very, very backward nation. It consists really of a series of tribes and 99% of the population is, in effect, in bondage to the other 1%. The 99% do not own their land and cannot keep their own production or convert it into money or property.

I was rather thrilled with the idea of using Iran as an example of what we could do by an unselfish American policy. We could not take on a more difficult nation than Iran. I would like, however, to have a try at it. The real difficulty is to get the right kind of American experts who would be loyal to their ideals, not fight among themselves and be absolutely honest financially.

If we could get this policy started, it would become permanent if it succeeded as we hope during the first five or ten years. And incidentally, the whole experiment need cost the taxpayers of the United States very little money.

Would you let me know what you think I should reply to Hurley? He is right that the whole Lend-Lease Administration should take complete control of the distribution of our own Lend-Lease supplies in the Middle East.

F.D.R.

Secret letter to the President, 12-21-43, from Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Tehran, Iran, re American policy in Iran.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Acknowledgment of General Hurley's Report

General Hurley has informed us that he would appreciate very much receiving a written acknowledgment from you to his report on Iran dated December 21, 1943. You may recall that when you received this report you asked the Department for suggestions regarding the reply you might make to General Hurley. (A copy of the report and of your memorandum are attached.) Since General Hurley left Iran en route to Washington soon after his report was received, the Department suggested, in a memorandum to you of February 18, a reply which you might make orally to the General.

In view of General Hurley's wish for a written acknowledgment, I attach a letter to him for your signature, if you concur.

Enclosures:
1. From General Hurley, December 21, 1943.
2. To the Secretary of State, January 12, 1944.
3. To General Hurley.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to the raising of the diplomatic missions of Iran and the United States to the rank of Embassies, a note has been received from the Minister of Iran in Washington, in which he states that the Government of Iran desires to appoint Mr. Nasrollah Entezam as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Washington, and has requested an agreement for him.

Mr. Entezam was born in 1900 in Tehran where he attended the Faculty of Law, Political and Economic Sciences. He became Secretary, Foreign Office, 1918-20, and has since served at the Foreign Office and in the Iranian missions at Paris, Warsaw and Berne (where he was Chargé d'Affaires). He has also been Secretary of the Iranian Delegation to the League of Nations, 1928-30; and represented the Iranian Association for the League at the Nineteenth International Congress of Associations for the League at Brussels in 1935 and at the Twentieth Congress at Glasgow in 1936; and as Substitute Delegate to the League, May 9, 1938. Mr. Entezam

is

The President,

The White House.

(Copy of original of this letter are in files downstairs
with notation of Pres' approval)
is not at present in Government service but in the last two years has held various portfolios in Iranian cabinets. He is not married. He speaks some English and very fluent French.

There would seem to be no reason why the appointment of Mr. Entezam would not be most desirable, and if you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Iranian Government of your approval.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

GORDON H. MILLER
September 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SUMMERLIN:

The President has signed the draft of letter to His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, submitted with your memorandum of August thirty-first to Miss Tully. I am returning it herewith for forwarding to the American Embassy at Tehran for appropriate delivery as you suggest.

I am also enclosing another letter addressed to His Imperial Majesty by the President.

M. C. LATTA
Executive Clerk
September 2, 1944

My dear Shah Mohammad Reza:

Of course, I do not pretend to know Iran well on account of the shortness of my visit, but may I write you about one of the impressions which I received on my air trip to Teheran?

It relates to the lack of trees on the mountain slopes and the general aridity of the country which lies above the plains.

All my life I have been very much interested in reforestation and the increase of the water supply which goes with it.

May I express a hope that your Government will set aside a small amount for a few years to test out the possibility of growing trees or even shrubs on a few selected areas to test out the possibility of trees which would hold the soil with their roots and, at the same time, hold back floods? We are doing something along this line in our western dry areas and, though it is a new experiment, it seems to be going well.

It is my thought that if your Government would try similar small experiments along this line it would be worthwhile for the future of Iran.

I do not need to tell you how much interested I am in that future, and the future of the people of Iran.

With my warm regards,

Cordially yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Imperial Majesty,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,
Shah of Iran.
My dear Shah Mohammad Reza:

I was pleased and touched to receive, on my return to Washington, your friendly communication of June 17, 1944.

It is unfortunate that I was prevented by pressing matters, including my extended visit to the Pacific Coast and Hawaii, from receiving your communication directly from the hands of Mr. Ebtchadj. I should have been glad to learn from him at first-hand of your health and of developments in Your Majesty's intention to endeavor to intensify the cooperation already existing between Iran and the United States, both now and after the war.

Although the pressures under which I have labored during the past year have not always made it possible for me to demonstrate, in ways I should have liked, my special interest in and personal regard for Iran, I know I can rely on Your Majesty's deep understanding of the exigencies which have demanded my attention during these past months. Iran and America have every reason to be close friends. Patience and understanding on both our parts are needed. If matters of irritation arise, I hope you will let me know your views in the spirit of frankness and cordiality which I hope will always characterize our relations. General Hurley has spoken to me often of Your Majesty and has assured me that you would understand and reciprocate my sentiments.

With the warmest personal regards and wishes for Your Majesty's health and the welfare of your people, I am

Cordially yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Imperial Majesty
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,
Shah of Iran.
In reply refer to
PR 891.001 Pahlavi,
Reza Mohammad/8-1544

August 31, 1944

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a note dated August 15, 1944 from the Minister of Iran at Washington transmitting for the President a communication from His Imperial Majesty the Shah, which was brought to Washington by Mr. Abol-Hassan Ebtehadj, Chairman of the Iranian Delegation to the Monetary Conference.

There is also enclosed herewith a draft of a suggested reply which the President may care to send to His Majesty. If you will return the letter to me when signed, I shall be glad to see that it is forwarded to the American Embassy at Tehran for appropriate delivery.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:

1. From the Minister of Iran, August 15, 1944, with enclosure.
2. Draft letter.

Miss Grace G. Tully,
The White House.
Legation Imperiale de l'Iran

August 15th, 1944
Washington, D.C.
No. 1185

Mr. Secretary:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a message from His Imperial Majesty the Shah, my August Sovereign, addressed to the President of the United States.

Mr. A. Ebtehaj, Chairman of the Iranian Delegation to the Monetary Conference, brought this message with him, but he did not have the privilege of delivering it to its high destination. I would appreciate it, therefore, if Your Excellency would remit His Majesty's message to the President on his return to Washington.

Please accept, Sir, the expression of my highest consideration.

M. SHAYESTEH

The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
The Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
Saad-Abad,
June 17th, 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

I was distressed to hear, by your letter of February 10th., that you had been laid up for some time with an attack of the "flu" and hope you are now enjoying the best of health and strength.

You will need all your accustomed vigour and energy to bring to final accomplishment the colossal and unprecedented efforts your country is making, under your brilliant leadership, for the early termination of the war and the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

It was indeed a source of regret to me that circumstances, over which I had no control, deprived me of the pleasure of seeing more of you in Tehran and extending to Your Excellency the warm hospitality which my people and I like to show to illustrious friends of Iran.

It is, I assure you, more than ever the firm intention and earnest desire of my government and myself to intensify the cooperation of the United States

His Excellency,
The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington D.C.
States of America with Iran, now and after the war. The confidence happily existing between our two nations should create an atmosphere of more comprehensive understanding and mutual aid.

Mr. Abol-Hassan Ebtehadj, Governor of our National Bank, the bearer of this letter, who is our delegate to the Monetary Conference to be held shortly in your country, will be able to furnish all necessary details on this and other subjects. A frank exchange of views between him and members of Your Excellency's Government will, no doubt, be extremely useful.

With all good wishes for the continued success of your arms and assurances of my highest esteem, I am, my dear Mr. President, always your's sincerely,

[Signature]
Department of State

BUREAU | PR
DIVISION | ENCLOSURE
to

Letter drafted 8-29-44

ADDRESSED TO

Miss Grace G. Tully

891.001 Pahlavi,
Reza Mohammad/8-1544
HIS EXCELLENCY
THE HONORABLE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON D.C.
My dear President,

I have received from the hands of Your Ambassador, Leland B. Morris, who has made a very good impression upon me, the two letters which Your Excellency was good enough to write me on September 2nd.

The friendly interest which You take in the welfare of my country has touched me deeply. Please believe that I fully reciprocate your sentiments and share the view that the United States and Iran have every reason to be close friends and everything to gain by intimate, confident relations.

If we cooperate wholeheartedly and unswervingly abide by the principles for which you entered the War and which you have advocated in the Atlantic Charter, the progress and prosperity of Iran as well as the maintenance of peace and security in this part of the World will no doubt be assured to our mutual advantage.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
No misunderstanding or temporary friction must ever be allowed to affect in any way the cordiality and sincerity of our relations.

Your suggestion regarding the reforestation of our arid mountain slopes is very valuable, coming as it does from one who is an expert in the matter and who has done so much on the same lines for his own country. I am drawing the attention of my Ministry of Agriculture to the necessity of testing out in certain areas the possibility of growing trees.

In conjunction with reforestation and afforestation, which will in themselves increase the supply of water, there is the very important, I might say, vital problem of irrigation. The soil of Iran is extremely fertile if we can only get water to it. There are immense desert regions which could be made to blossom into fair fields of corn and wheat etc. We are beginning to tackle this problem, and here again the vast experience and technical and material assistance of America will be most useful and welcome to us.

I can quite realise how busy you must be in these days of preparation for the Presidential Elections.

With
With warmest wishes and kindest regards, I am, my dear President,

Your's cordially

Muhammad Reza Pahlavi
His Excellency

The HONORABLE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA.
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tehran, Iran, October 12, 1944

No. 73
UNRESTRICTED

Subject: Transmitting letter from His Imperial Majesty
Mohamad Reza Pahlavi to President Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to instruction no. 483 of September 6,
1944, I have the honor to enclose herewith the reply of
His Imperial Majesty Mohamad Reza Pahlavi to the President.

Respectfully yours,

LELAND MORRIS

Enclosure:

Letter from His Imperial
Majesty, the Shah of Iran.
My dear Miss Tully:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a despatch from the American Legation at Tehran dated October 12, 1944 forwarding an unsealed communication addressed to the President by His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, in reply to two communications from the President of September 2.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

From Legation, Tehran, no. 73, October 12, 1944, with enclosure.

Miss Grace G. Tully,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Please speak to me about this.

F.D.R.

(Original of attached memorandum sent.)
January 11, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Iranian Free Port and Railway Trusteeship

When the Secretary discussed the above subject on December 30, you requested a memorandum of the Department's views.

The proposal offers several excellent advantages. Many Soviet officials undoubtedly believe that Russia must have an assured outlet to the Persian Gulf, to be obtained by forceful means if necessary, in the interests of Soviet security. An international trusteeship to operate the trans-Iranian railway and a free port on the Gulf might render less likely a more exigent demand by Russia.

The trusteeship would assure to Russia an unhampered trade outlet to the Persian Gulf and would at the same time assist Iran economically by developing an important transit trade through the country and by improving Iranian transport facilities for its internal trade.

Perhaps more important than any of the above, the trusteeship proposal would be in the direction of British-Soviet-American cooperation rather than rivalry in Iran.

In spite of the advantages of the proposal, certain difficulties are foreseen which, in the Department's view, make it unlikely that the proposal would be acceptable either to Iran, Russia, or Great Britain.

No matter
No matter how drawn up or proposed, the plan would appear to Iran, and doubtless to the world, as a thinly disguised cover for power politics and old-world-imperialism. Iranians are highly suspicious of foreign influence in the country and would unquestionably resent any extension of foreign control there. The railway, built by their own strenuous efforts at a cost of some $150,000,000, without foreign borrowing, is a source of especial and intense patriotic pride. The Department's judgment is that the trusteeship could only be imposed on Iran, a sovereign, allied nation, by force of arms.

There is little reason to believe that Soviet Russia would be interested, at least for the present, in participating in an international trusteeship in Iran in the genuine manner contemplated, particularly if it included an element of non-Russian control in northern Iran.

The British, we feel, would almost certainly raise equally strenuous objections. British policy for more than a hundred years has been pointed toward preventing any other great power, and especially Russia, from gaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf. There is no indication that this policy has been altered. If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interest of the United States, it might be considered wise, in protection of vital British communications in this important area, to discourage such a trusteeship. The British also will probably continue to endeavor to keep the Russians away from the vital South Iranian oil fields.

The laudable ends contemplated by the proposal might be accomplished in some measure through the employment by Iran of foreign technicians to assist them in operating the railway and port. The Iranians would prefer to employ Americans or the nationals of small European countries (Sweden or Switzerland) for this purpose, if they should agree to the idea.

(Signed) JOSEPH C. BRENN

Acting Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

TO SPEAK TO ME ABOUT.

F.D.R.

Top Secret report to the Pres. from Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Chungking, China, 9-17-44, re America's position in Iran. Attached are copy of Iran Declaration and copy of ltr. 3-2-44 from Edw. R. Stettinius, Acting Sec. of State. Copies of all above correspondence also attached.