

● PSF: Ireland

Jan. - April 1942

Ireland Folder
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE:

See No. 2 - Jan. 18th - 11 A.M.
from Minister Gray in Dublin.

What do you think we ought to
do in regard to his last paragraph relating
to high class Irish American agents?

F.D.R.



file

Ireland Folder

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum requesting my opinion concerning the suggestion contained in the last paragraph of Minister David Gray's telegram No. 2 of January 18, 1942 from Dublin.

The Navy Department feels that this is now a matter of primary interest to it and has requested a paraphrase of Minister Gray's message for appropriate action.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

The President,
The White House.

file

Ireland Folder

Dublin, February 2, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

On the occasion of the 82nd birthday of President Hyde, I transmitted your congratulations and good wishes and have received from him a very cordial acknowledgment of your congratulations.

On the occasion of your 60th birthday, Mr. Cosgrave, Leader of the Opposition, communicated to me for transmission to you his heartfelt congratulations and good wishes.

The Belgian Minister also communicated his congratulations.

Yours respectfully,

David Gray

The President,
The White House.

RECEIVED BY THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT



The President,

The White House,

Washington.

Ireland Folder

file personal

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1942

My dear Mr. President:


Secretary Hull has transmitted your memorandum of February 4 and Mr. Gray's letter of January 1 to me, and, in accordance with your request, I am returning Mr. Gray's letter herewith for your files.

General Marshall has read this letter.

The request made by Mr. Gray for courier service between Dublin and London or Belfast is now being attended to.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.

AIR MAIL

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Dublin, January 1, 1942.

My dear Franklin -

Well, here we are in it up to the neck. If any one ever tried for peace, it has been you, but thank God, you were not blind to realities and so we are on the way to a measure of preparedness which would have been two years further off if Ham Fish, Nye, Wheeler and Co. had had their way.

Your note to Mr. de Valera in answer to his speech declaring Ireland's "benevolent neutrality" was perfect, but entirely lost on the man to whom it was addressed. And no one else will see it until it appears in a White Book which will never be read in Eire. His answer to it was the fatuous broadcast which he made to America on Christmas Eve. It was such an abvious anti-climax to Churchill's utterances that only the paper he owns featured it on the front page. Under his leadership the Irish people have no realization of their friendless position in the world. However, I know that you understand the situation and when you think it profitable, you will turn on the publicity.

The situation as regards Ireland in this present phase (as I see it) is this: Conditions are going to make it impossible for America and Britain to spare anything for Ireland without sacrificing American and British interests. There is no reason why American and British interests should be sacrificed for a government which refuses all help. However, it is desirable that the Irish people and the Irish Army should be favorably disposed to us. They both are at present, and their sympathy should not be lost. It will be a definite advantage in either of two situations which may arise:

1. That we have to take strong action and must try to divide the country against its government.
2. That we have to wait passively for a German attack with our defenses concentrated in Ulster.

LIAM SIA

Your representative here therefore should do his best to cultivate friendly relations all along the line. The disbanding of the Friends of Irish Neutrality and similar pressure-grouping organizations has changed the set-up for me. While this thing went on I could only warn the Irish Government unofficially of its danger to Ireland and personally refuse to recommend arms. Now I can recede from this position logically, especially since the Prime Minister's declaration of "benevolent neutrality" which is something in the nature of a pledge that Ireland will not go Axis.

I am therefore now telling the Army and the Government whom we meet that I am willing to recommend arms, though of course they must realize that conditions make it unlikely that even if my recommendations were favorably considered no large quantity of arms could be spared. The token allotment which the British recently allowed the forces in Ulster to hand over to the Irish Staff here are being received and are making a very good impression. Something similar from us would, I think, be profitable, especially in view of the economic troubles that are daily getting worse and nearer. The severer these pressures, the better, as it is the only way in which the Irish people can be made to realize the fatuity of their Government's program. But the severer they are, the more need for expressions of goodwill and token offerings similar in spirit to the sterile friendliness of Mr. de Valera. The Cosgravites, except Dillon, have been as strong for neutrality as de Valera. But it may dawn on them sooner than on him that in this world we get what we give and that a policy which leaves Ireland without a friend is unprofitable.

This is of course only as I see it at close range and not in the large perspective that you have. Tip me off if I am on the wrong track.

There is only one thing more that is of first importance - that is that the defense set-up of Eire is totally inadequate even to delay a formidable German attack. A few hours of dive bombing and it would dissipate. The British and ourselves have got to assure the defense of the Island as a whole. From the best advices that I can get, the defense provisions now in Ulster are very inadequate even for the defense of the northern bridgehead. Once the enemy establishes air bases in the south, the show is pretty well over. Britain is too far away for defense planes to operate profitably. There should be such a preponderance of

tank units in the Six Counties as to be able to deal with any landing by sea or air almost instantly and without question. As you know, if the Germans take Eire, which is defenseless, the battle of the Atlantic is pretty well lost.

I can get no satisfactory answer to the following question which I have put to both British and American staff officers: What is your idea of an adequate preponderance of men and matériel for the defense of the Island? The English say, "We're doing the best we can. There is nothing to worry about." The Americans shake their heads, but won't commit themselves. I think there is everything to worry about. Thus far, it has always been "too little and too late", very possibly because nothing more and sooner was possible. But keep your eye on this place, particularly if you take over the Londonderry base and have eggs in the Irish basket. It might easily be another and more calamitous Crete.

I called on Mr. de Valera this morning. His confidential secretary, Miss Kathleen O'Connell, who knows his inmost secrets, said to me, "Who would have thought a year ago that America would be in the war!" I said, "That is what Mr. de Valera, Mr. Walshe, and all Government people have thought. Where did they get the information that made them take that view," She wouldn't tell me. I said, "For a year and a half I've been telling you that we couldn't keep out and you have all laughed at me. On whom have you been relying?" No answer. It is significant of the whole twisted and blinded viewpoint here that the Irish mind wishfully refused to accept the fact that American interests were bound up with British survival. Perhaps economic pressure will make them realize at long last that their survival is bound up with that of Britain.

I have been asking for more help here. We are not doing a good job. We ought to have a courier service either to London or Belfast. I can't take the responsibility of putting confidential communications in the pouch which lies over night in the Irish Post Office which must be sown with German agents or of filing our confidential telegrams in offices which presumably turn copies over to the Germans. We know definitely that Germany has immediate wireless communication with their Legation here. It is a bad situation.

I think the Department will give us what we need. John Erhardt is a grand fellow. I am sending this letter to London in the bag of the British naval courier. You may not know it, but a package containing secret army code strips arrived here with the seals broken. It came in a bag which presumably was opened some where en route. I find it lay nearly twenty-four hours in the post office here. *Was of course*
Reported it and the Department is investigating.

Take care of yourself and God bless you

W. D. D.

February 9, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

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Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

C.H.

You might read this as it asks for some more State Department help. Also you might show it to General Marshall.

Please return for my files.

F.D.R.

Adkins

005187

AIR MAIL

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Dublin, January 1, 1942.

My dear Franklin -

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Your

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Take care of yourself and God bless you.

DAVID

David Gray
American minister
in Dublin, Ireland.

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an 281 Ireland ①
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Sailey - Motion picture.
send 1 to G H P -

THE WHITE HOUSE *also to Hasty*
WASHINGTON *27*
152

February 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

This is a personal letter to me from the American Minister in Dublin -- David Gray -- who happens to be my wife's uncle-in-law. He has done exceedingly well there and I think you and possibly the Combined Staffs may care to consider this.

F.D.R.

WPD and G.H.P.
ge. M.

Ireland Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

Please read this personal and confidential note from David Gray. What do you think of the suggestion:

- (a) To embargo oil products
- (b) To keep unarmed neutral ships out of American convoys ?

What do you think I should tell him in regard to the American commanding officer?

F.D.R.

Ireland Folder

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942

*file
personal*

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith David Gray's letter to you of January 27.

In reply to the specific inquiries contained in your memorandum:

(a) To embargo oil products to countries not receiving lease-lend aid would prevent oil shipments reaching Spain and Portugal, which would be contrary to our present policy--a policy regarding which the British are particularly insistent and which I believe to be wise under present conditions.

I think it would be unwise to place any specific embargo on oil products to Ireland.

(b) We have previously stated that we would do what we could to assist Ireland in obtaining food-stuffs. If we insist that unarmed neutral ships--namely, Irish ships--must be kept outside of American convoys, it would probably defeat our own purpose as above stated.


The President

The White House.

I have informed General Marshall of Mr. Gray's suggestion in regard to liaison between the American and British forces on the one hand, and Irish forces on the other. You may wish to send specific instructions, through him, to the American commanding officer. I think it would be helpful.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "D. M. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

Enc.

January 27 ,142.

My dear Mr. President :

Sir John Maffy yesterday apprised Mr. De-Valera of the imminent arrival of American troops in Northern Ireland. He of course expected this, but was none the less resentful of the fact. I think there are two reasons for his refusal to hail our installations there as insurance against Hitler. One, the claim of sovereignty over the whole Island, two the resentment among the Left Wingers growing out of our entry into the war. It is becoming clear that Irish policy has been based upon the conviction that under no circumstances would we be drawn into hostilities. Aiken on his return reassured the government on this point. As you know I made myself unpopular warning any one who would listen that this was a dangerous course to follow. Now the Neutrals are out on a limb, **ALONE**

Maffy tells me that he had never seen DeValera so depressed. ~~XXXXXX~~ DeValera said that he had been thinking a great deal over the situation but could get no light. Maffy told him that his way would be clear if he applied for membership in the club to which he naturally belonged and to Maffy's surprise did not fly into a rage. He said that if only Ireland were attacked by Germany it would simplify things. It is something that this has occurred to him at long last. **HOWEVER**, I am not an optimist about the Prime Minister. I think he needs demonstration that he is on the skids to change his point of view. I think the best thing we can do is to let him severely

alone if it be possible and let him work out ^{his} national existence on an isolationist basis without co-operation, without giving or asking for friendship. I have two suggestions of which you may ~~be~~ approve or disapprove. The first is declare an embargo on petroleum products to all eastern hemisphere countries not on a "Lend Lease basis"; the second is to issue an order that unarmed ^{neutral} ships may not travel in American convoys. A month or six weeks after the petroleum order, let a certain amount of gasolene come ^{earmarked} through ^{for} the Irish army, but no ker/osine or diesel oil ^{used in tractors}. I suspect the British are preparing the situation for an embargo on coal. If these two things can be done without appearing to be coercive measures I would anticipate swift results. Ireland forbids the export of butter, eggs, bacon, everything that she needs for Irish people who are not ^{strictly} rationed. I think the British are boobs not to adopt the same policy. Why should coal be rationed in Britain ~~not~~ exported to Eire, or why should gasoline that we need be sent to Eire? It is not coercion; it is simple justice. One of the meanest and most irritating tactics of this Irish Government is to conceal from the people that their ships travel in British convoys (the crews will not travel otherwise), nor will they allow their ships to be armed. They depend entirely upon British and now American protection but will not say "thank you"

Here is a matter which I think you will want to have taken care of: As I have explained to you and the Department the British military authorities in Ulster have established a secret but very cordial entente with the General Staff in Eire. It really amounts to staff talks and a plan of liason. Now if we get a commanding

officer in Northern Ireland who wants to brush this all aside

3.

it will be a great pity. It should be developed as far beyond where it is now as is possible. There should be a service of resident liason officers, one for every ~~big~~ ^{rather} town and country in southern Ireland who in case of a German invasion will be on hand to help arrange billets, give information and introductions to the local authorities. I put up a row with Maffey insisting on something of this sort in case we sent troops to Ulster but how far the plan was worked out I have never found out. If it is possible it seems that the liason staff of British officers ought to be transferred to American Headquarters and carry on. If we get a non-cooperating American General in command it may make a lot of trouble as the situation as you know is very delicate. We might as well face the fact that the chance of American troops getting into trouble with the Irish civilian population is much greater than that of British troops for the Irish are used to British troops and get on with them. Therefore I think you will want me to be notified as soon as possible before our taking over of the Northern Command so that first I can make a courtesy announcement of the fact to DeValera and second so that we can lay the foundation for keeping on and improving the secret liason between the two commands. I have already instructed ~~the~~ ^{our} Military attaché to do the spade work ~~for~~ preparatory to a close liason. He is Lieut. Col. John Reynolds, Harvard 97, a very intelligent and nice fellow. He promises to do a good job.

Meantime I am trying to keep everything as pleasant and jolly as possible though pointing out the probability of embargoes on most commodities for countries not on the Lend Lease priority list.

Take care of Yourself,

W. J.

D. J.

Ireland Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

This is a personal letter to me from the American Minister in Dublin -- David Gray -- who happens to be my wife's uncle-in-law. He has done exceedingly well there and I think you and possibly the Combined Staffs may care to consider this.

F.D.R.

Letter from David Gray to FDR 2/16/42
re troops in Ireland and need for more.

*File
Personal.*

Ireland Folder

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1942

My dear Mr. President:


I have taken up with General Marshall the suggestion made by David Gray as to the establishment of a close liaison between the United States Commander in Northern Ireland and the Commanding Officer in Eire.

I have received today a letter from General Marshall dated February 27 of which I enclose a copy for your information.

From what General Marshall writes I believe that the arrangement suggested by David Gray will now be completed in a satisfactory way.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.

COPY

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

FEB 27 1942

The Honorable

The Under Secretary of State.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your note of the 23d with its inclosure from the American Minister in Ireland.

The intent of the Minister's proposal is not entirely clear, due perhaps to his use of the term "American High Command" which, in the British Isles, is located in London. I am of the opinion, however, that the Minister's proposal involves a British liaison group at the Headquarters of the United States Army Commander in North Ireland with American Liaison officers in Dublin. Assuming that the Minister's suggestion involves only practicable methods for maintaining liaison between the U.S. Commanding General in North Ireland and the Government in Eire, I should think that the problem would not prove too difficult of solution.

I shall communicate at once with General Chaney, in London, to prepare for the establishment of necessary liaison between the United States Commander in North Ireland and the Commanding Officer of the Irish Army in Eire, consulting with the American Minister as to desirable methods.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-18-70

Signature- JVD

Ireland Goldie

file
personal

Dublin, March 24, 1942.

Dear Bob:—

I am asking Mr. Welles to call your attention to a report that I am sending in this mail on "The Invasion and Defence of Ireland."

I am pretty sure that you already entertain, "in principle" at least, the views set forth in it, and that Ireland is at present defenceless, not because you do not realize that it is defenceless, but because you haven't the stuff at present to put in here. However, we are taking a dangerous chance, considering the probable consequences of successful German occupation of the island and I should deserve to be shot if I didn't do my best to emphasize it. We don't want American troops involved in any Dunkirk or Singapore episode. If you don't get time yourself to read the report, the main points are these:

1. An adequate air-borne German invasion of Eire might reasonably be expected to occupy Southern Ireland in two or three days without serious opposition.

2.

2. It is admitted by the British Admiralty that a surprise, sea-borne expeditionary force of from three to five divisions with a lucky break of weather might reasonably be expected to make successful landings.

3. Once established with Irish air bases, air umbrella protection could be given to convoys of supplies and reinforcements.

4. Conceding these assumptions, Northern Ireland becomes untenable with the forces at present stationed there.

5. With enemy occupation of the whole island, the blockade of Britain becomes effective and Britain is eliminated. Various facts to be borne in mind are:

(a) The Irish Army lacks tanks, artillery, air force, and so has no protection against air attack and dive-bombing;

(b) The south of Ireland is beyond the effective range of short-range fighters based on Northern Ireland or on Britain;

(c) It is estimated that it will take armored units based in Northern Ireland three days to get into action in the Foynes and Cork areas, where initial German efforts would probably be made;

(d) It is estimated that armored reinforcements from Britain, if they could be spared, would require three weeks before getting into action in southern Ireland.

This is the perfect set-up for disaster. The British military mind has assumed that if Hitler attacks, the main effort will be made against Britain. The attack on
Ireland

Ireland will be only a diversion. This is crazy. If the diversion succeeds there need be no main attack. Britain is kaput. The stake which Hitler stands to lose is a few thousand airplanes and two or three hundred thousand men. If he has enough airplanes this time he can put it over with things as they are here. The English tell me that if he had thrown in only three or four hundred more bombers into the Battle of Britain, he would have won, because the R.A.F. fighters were done in with fatigue. You know better than I do, of course, how much the Russian mauling is taking out of the German air force, but it is unlikely that they could not accumulate adequate reserves for an adventure that promises such conclusive results.

If you read the report you will see that it was written not only for you, but for Irish consumption. I put the objections, technical and political, to arming Eire as bluntly as I could and read it to the Minister of Defence and his Chief of Staff asking for "constructive suggestions." They asked to keep it over night, as I hoped they would, and showed it to de Valera. They brought it back with protestations of gratitude. This must mean that they are getting worried. I had expected a good deal of indignation. I think more than ever that we ought to let them shift for themselves economically, though whether the British will

will consent to that is doubtful. The English never stick to any Irish policy. Somebody wants to sell something and policy goes out the window. James Dillon said exactly this to me yesterday. He said, "let the English choose. Let them give us 95% of everything they have and deny themselves to 5%, or let them keep what they need and make us find out what the facts of neutrality and self-sufficiency really are. Either policy might work, but half of one and half of the other is idiocy."

By the way, his outspoken advocacy of war and an American alliance a few weeks ago and the acceptance of his resignation by Cosgrave from the Party, instead of killing him as the de Valera people predicted, is making him. His own constituents have endorsed him a hundred per cent in a county meeting last Sunday. Two days before, he had a tremendous success speaking at a big meeting of a students' debating society of the National University. A clique started out to boo him and he got them all eating out of his hand. He says the madness of de Valera is beginning to be found out, though most people want to stay out if they can and are terrified of being bombed.

The reply I would like to my request for "token arms" for the Irish Army would be four or five fighter planes, preferably transferred by our forces in the

North

North as soon as possible and such odds and ends as might be spared. Accompanying this gesture, I would like to be instructed to inform the Irish Government that the situation was regarded as so serious that from a military point of view it was impossible to share responsibility for Irish defence with a State that would make no cooperative engagements; that in view of the pressing need for arms by combatant units, it was undesirable to freeze any armament of importance where it could be used against the enemy only under certain circumstances and conditions.

I think if you gave them some "good-will" arms you could take back the two ships which you let them charter under plea of emergency needs and gain by it. But whether you can give me "token arms" or not, please direct that I get some answer within a reasonable time. I can make use of any answer.

Mr. J.S.

Ireland Folder

April 9, 1942.

Dear David:

Those are real contributions and I hope you will continue. It is really amazing about Mrs. Fletcher. I knew and liked the old Senator but, frankly, I cannot remember ever having met Mrs. Fletcher.

I rather like your thought of treating these communications as advice from friends who are still here.

Love to you and Maude.

Affectionately,

Honorable David Gray,
American Legation,
Dublin, Ireland.

fdr/gst/
dj

file
personal

February 15, 1942.

My dear Franklin : When we first came to Ireland and settled ourselves among the Somervilles we met a Miss Geraldine Cummins. One of her brothers was a leading surgeon in Cork, a sister was a prominent woman's doctor and another sister a chemist. She herself had played hockey for the All Ireland woman's team . At the time we came to Ireland she had become one of the two most noted writing mediums in Europe. Over a million words had come through her supernormally which subsequently were published in a series of books purporting to describe the life and ministry of St. Paul to the time of his death. It made very good reading, had style and to say the least might very easily have been the report of a contemporary. It was transmitted sometimes at the rate of twelve or fifteen hundred words an hour and the subject was one in which Miss Cummins had no interest and of which she had no knowledge. When we were spending a week end with the Somervilles over a year ago we met Miss Cummins again and I had a private sitting with her at which some very interesting things developed. Subsequently she has been twice in Dublin and we have had sittings at the last two of which her Guide Astor wrote that there was some one ~~named~~ who ~~at first~~ would not give her ^{her} name, who wished to speak to me. She was an old lady who said that her son was the most important man in the world. This was just after your mothers death. I am copying out of the record the passages that relate to the two messages purporting to come from

Mer . There also came a communication purporting to be from T.R. which I am also sending on . There has been quite a good deal purporting to be from Arthur Balfour giving advice about Ireland ^{a)} most of it seems pretty sound. He says he is no prophet but in his last message several months ago, some time before the Russians began their winter offensive spoke of the possibility of their reacting and thrusting the Germans back. But he says he is no ~~graph~~ prophet and proffers his advice only for what it may be worth adding that whatever is given freely is apt not to be worth much. There is a curious change in handwriting each time a new communicator comes in . The T.R. one is quite suggestive of his writing and so is my father's . I know you have an open mind in regard to conditions after death and as regards communication just as I have so I am sending you these excerpts . How evidential your mother's answer to my question may be is open to question but it certainly has some weight as I knew nothing about that episode. One curious thing turned up; Balfour said that there was beside the I.R.A. an organization of Irish Quisling intellectuals opposed to the Government and ready to take over from the Germans with a Quisling Government. I had never heard anything like this mentioned but I told Cosgrave one night when I sat next him at the Nuncio's at dinner that I had been tipped off about it and he said that this bore out his secret information and he mentioned the two names that Balfour mentioned. Later I checked it in the same way with the vice Premier O'Kelly and got the same answer. ^{though no names were mentioned} This is hard to account for except as a supernormal phenomimon. Well here they are for what they are worth someday I'll show you the Mss. and the whole file. Aff

Smith

November 7, 1941. U.S. Legation Dublin
Present , Geraldine C. and D.G.

The writing reads:

Astor is here. Your people are crowding round and I am trying to sort them. It seems that your own father and mother are here, a young woman and an old rather positive lady, Sarah R. - she wont give me her surname because we haven't been introduced. She wants to speak of her son to you. She is worrying about his health and she says this son is the most important man in the world today. Now read- but A. B. will want to write a postscript.

Sara -- Oh David this is fine. I have been waiting round for weeks to speak to you about my boy. I won't give my name as this lady must not know. But he is working far too hard at present. Can any one induce him to lay off- relax? I don't want the other people to know he is under strain but if you can do something in the matter I shall be obliged. I always went straight to my point when I was with friends. My boy will have to make an important decision in the next two months(This was Nov. 7-D.G.) I want him to throw down the gauntlet. You can say an old woman like me should not speak about such things but what I do see is difficulties in labour world in our country so my boy must let no one know before hand and spring his surprise on the world. I made

Now you might like to know how I am getting on since my curtsy to death. It's been good to get a rest. I was lifted without pain right out of my old body and I floated away like a soap bubble. I saw my boy sad about me and I was furious with him for it and yet I loved him for it but if he will believe I can post him posthumous letters. Do tell him I am so happy and at home over here I wouldn't go back to that paaguey incinerator of a world for ~~with~~ youth, love or anything else. I want my boy to be cheerful about me, think of me at the brightest time of my whole life and that wouldn't tell him a quarter of my happiness. Now the old lady won't go on boring you but let me come again. Yours always Sarah R. once D.

November 8. 1941 U.S. Legation Dublin.
Present G.C. and D.G.

Astor comes. Your father is anxious you should speak to A.B. but ~~ix~~ the two ladies who were here yesterday (the second was Titine Hitchcock who was lost in the Mohawk.) say they had other things to say and they weren't permitted because I hurried them away. Shall I let Sara say a few words and then call A.B.

D.G. Please do. D.G. then asked her if she could give evidence of identity.

Sara R.-- Yes David I hear you faintly from the distance. My old mind has many memories but they are rather like an untidy skein of wool, knotted and tangled at present. Let me see. Yes , this I don't think would be known to you. It is rather intimate and is of importance. F.D.R. gave me a very bad time at the beginning of 1882, the worst he ever gave me and I said to James as I called him then I shall never have another. I couldn't go through with it again so F.D. will have to be very remarkable to make up for the others.

Then again there was a really bad time for me of mental anxiety when F.D.R. was so bad after the last war. It was in '21 when he was struck down-- so ill

and I thought all my hopes for the most wonderful man in the world are going to come to nothing. That time came second for me in my life as a real night mare. Oh I know I did not seem as concerned as all that but it was F.D.R. that had such a grand spirit and lifted me out of myself with the courage he showed. Oh by the way do tell him not to neglect his exercises. It is very important and now I am being hustled. Please give this one message to F.D.R.. He will understand it even if you don't. Say "I keep looking forward". Come and if he asks "Whither Bound"? Say, "I have gone on to search for a ~~xxxx~~ place to make a home for the Happy Warrior when his work and his life is ended. Assure him that he will be the Happy Warrior for he will have pulled off the impossible with his own faith and courage. He will have the victory over all the backbiters and rascals and then he will come home to me. That is all. Thank you David, from Sarah R. nee D.

There followed this from "A.B."

Good evening Gray. If I may call you David I shall be pleased. I was listening to your talk with that young Irishman just now (I presume this refers to Dillon who lunched with us) He's a clever fellow. You can trust him but there are others you must not trust. I saw a man here, dark with a strong face in the last six months. Some name like Walsh. Is there a Joe Walsh? (Joe Walshe is the permanent secretary of External Affairs.) He from what I can see is hand and glove with the German Minister. He and his Colleague Dr. Murphy. (This might be Sean Murphy Irish Minister to France. He avoided me rather pointedly when he was here on vacation in the summer.) If you meet those two again lay false tracks for them. Never let them know the slightest inkling of your real intentions. The organization of the Fifth Columnists in this country is now complete. Walsh is a leading Quisling. There are two divisions in this column the I.R.A. who are not in the inner council but who stand aside waiting ~~for the~~ ~~time~~ to be used by Hitler when the time comes to strike. Second division, the Intellectuals co-ordinated with the people of German nationality scattered through the country, some holding key positions. Of this group the authorities know practically nothing. But from ~~among~~ among them come the men who will make a Hitler's Quisling cabinet if there is ever one.

Now as to the signs of the times. Well, my mother used to say, "Time means the reversal of all judgment. The invasion of Ireland was timed for last September but Russia stopped that. It is now timed for the spring. That is the plan I see that was hatched at Bereschgarten. I am no prophet. I merely can see into the minds of certain leaders. I presume you cannot change the attitude of the U.S.A. government. If only your people would occupy the island before the blow falls- ruin, death and disaster of a very horrible kind would be averted. I don't say it will fall for circumstances may yet save this poor ignorant people. But H.Q. have planned the coup for next spring. I believe DeValera will go down on his knees and thank God if U.S.A. takes forcible possession of this country. There will be no resistance only welcome and it will be a sound strategic stroke in the war. Are the allies always going to be late in moving. That is what you have got to ask Washington.

I doubt the wisdom of this letter.
D.S.

3.

December 2, 1941

Is Theodore there?

Astor "Yes."

Theodore R. This is a new game to me. Driving a pen. Say David I have often seen you at what was my official house and now you are sitting in a key position on the borders of Europe. I want to tell you that I think Franklin will hold the Japs for a while; at anyrate from our country's point of view. I see no immediate Armageddon for young America, possibly not at all. But what is clear is America will be thinking of another movement in Europe. You be ready or getting ready for that. It seems as if Russia gets her toes in and Hitler may turn like a rat in a trap and start biting in the West. So we see it. I mean the seed of a western offensive in his mind. Go ahead then, build up confidence with the ^{presumably F.A.R.} fire authroities. But keep back your shot for the President alone. Any offers made now should be privately to him. For there is leakage in his government. There is indeed at least one if not two ^{steering} huckstering friends of the German minister U.S.A. They might easily spill the beans too early about any renewed offer on our part. But DeValera is ~~im~~ likely to keep his own counsel. He is in his heart anxious to keep in with the allies so be friendly to his cabinet but keep the essential moves concentrated on DeValera.

And now sir, the ladies.

Theodore

It would seem that the huckstering friends of the German Minister U.S.A. must be in your government. Four days after this communication the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor. They had T.R. fooled. I suspect that if these communications come through pretty much as given our friends on the other side don't know very much more than they did on this side.

DS

2.

March 16th , 1942.

My dear Franklin : Miss Geraldine Cummins was in Dublin the other day. Maude asked her out to tea and we had a sitting. At last something really evidential happened . Astor the control said that among others who wised to speak was an old lady , recently dead who said her name was Fletcher from Florida. She gave her name as Anna Louise or Louisa Fletcher, ~~xxxxxxx~~ and mentioned "Jackson ville-town." I said can she identify herself? Then followed this: " I hear her say that her family were well known. Her husband was a mayor and senator, Mayor of Jacksonville in Florida, she says. She adds, that she believed in communion between the two worlds and that since she recently passed she wants to get through to prove she is alive. She knows your people by sight, your wife. She says/ that her husband the senator was for a long time in politics and she asks you to remember she was more than eighty when she died but was put down as eighty by her relations as she was in the habit of subtracting from her age."

Of course Geraldine Cummins never heard of the Fletchers or even of Jacksonville,FLA. I never knew them nor did Maude. I never knew Fletcher had been Mayor of Jacksonville. I probably did know that he was dead but not that his wife was. I did not even know that he was married. Who's Who gives her name correctly as Anna Louise (Paine of Jacksonville) . It says she was married in 1883. If she was twenty then and has just died she would have

have been seventy nine and not over eighty but if she had been more than twenty one when she was married she would have been over eighty. I shall write one of her sisters and find out when she was born, or possibly Jacksonvilles might have kept vital statistics as far back as that. Anyway this personality intrudes and gives correctly her maiden name and other data which I could not possibly have ^{been} known by the psychic and which I did not know. This is hard to laugh off. I enclose a transcript of the writing for what it is worth. I get a few bouquets which might ^{have} originated in my own subconscious but the speculation suggested by A.B. and T. R. as to the views of the German High Command about DeValera and Eire was a surprise to me. You will know whether Dev ever asked my recall or not. I know of course that he wanted to but whether he did or not I do not know.

Assuming these comments do come from friends who have passed on I think they should be treated exactly as advice from friends who are still here.

Maude sends her best. Take care of yourself.

Aff

Omig.

That was a dear little letter you sent us a few weeks ago. It bucked us both up no end. I am having Frank Aiken and Sean T. O'Kelley with other government people to meet Harold Nicholson at dinner tonight. I hope we can bait Aiken on the censorship and get some action.

Astor comes-- There is a crowd here today. It is as if they had been waiting. Besides, David your father and Guthrie, there is A.B. and also two who died recently, your friend Cameron and an old lady who says you are from my state, Florida. She gives name of Fletcher, Anna Louisa and Jackson town ville. But Cameron and the others seem to be stronger. I can also see Theodore who talks of Eleanor. Whom of all these shall I call?

Q. Ask Mrs. Fletcher if she can identify herself.

I hear her say that her family were well known. Her husband was a mayor and a senator, Mayor of Jacksonville in Florida. She says. She adds that she believes in communion between the two worlds and that since she recently passed she wants to get through to ~~you~~ prove she is alive. She knows your people by sight, your wife she says; That her husband the senator was for a long time in politics and she asks you to remember she was more than eighty when she died but was put down as eighty by her relations as she was in the habit of subtracting from her age.

Cameron ----- My dear David: May I seize the opportunity to give you my good news. Out of great unhappiness of mind I passed into perfect peace and happiness. Tell Maude that I am at home in another Drishane over here and that I look forward to a distant time when we shall have walks together again. I am relieved in mind now that I see Desmond is managing for Edith. You see when I knew that I was going I was very unhappy about her future but now I know all is well. Boyle and Aylmer are with me. I won't keep you now. Boyle says, God Speed you in your exasperating work. He feels that you will get through with colours flying. But I am resting and out of touch with world affairs. Love to Maude and to you. -- Cameron.

Q Ask A.B. and Theodore if they have any advice or comment.

Astor. I shall call A.B.

A.B. My dear Compatriot: We, Theodore and I feel that you should continue on the same lines. You have to wait for a little but I have one rather interesting piece of information. Though we are no prophets we can see into certain of the minds of men. The German spies in this country have conveyed to the German authorities the information that some little time ago Fianna Fail party officials in the inner circle urged an agreement with the U.S.A. the handing over of our bases in June and it is held in German H.Q. that there have been negotiations to this effect and that on conditions of delivery of supplies DeValera will come in with U.S.A. or is inclined to do so. The German minister has therefore been directed to put on the psychological screw and threaten again. It seems therefore that at the moment DeValera's mind is ~~it~~ like a see-saw, up and down. One moment he is prepared to throw his weight once more into the neutrality side and another he is ready to go ahead and do the only wise and honourable thing for his country, accept U.S.A. You have been very useful because you were so blunt in the past. You have now merely to be as helpful and suave when approached as possible. The fact that DeValera asked some time ago for your removal from Eire was the highest compliment any American diplomat in this country has ever been paid. There is undoubtedly going to be trouble among the civilian population soon in this country. There are signs of unrest in the collective mind. What we counsel therefore is a friendly attitude but firmness all the time when there is any discussion. Sudden developments may lead to a crisis. For there is one school of German thought still favouring a western offensive but the issue is not yet quite decided owing to the to the other school holding that Russia requires all the offensive strength of the Reich. We can see no more at present except that if America does come here this summer or make the attempt later in the year the Germans will make at least a thrust in the air beforehand. They are almost too well informed. They believe that DeValera is now beginning to double cross them. I do not wish to prevent your father from speaking so I shall close at once. A.B

Ireland Folder

*file
personal*


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 10. 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information copies of certain confidential despatches from Minister David Gray relating to the subjects of Invasion and Defence of Ireland, Anglo-American Economic Policy Toward Ireland, and Secret Liaison Between British and Irish Armies. I have also sent copies to Admiral King and General Marshall.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

Despatches from Dublin,
no. 317, with enclosures;
no. 319, with enclosure;
and no. 320.

The President,
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU }
DIVISION }

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ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 4-8-42

ADDRESSED TO

The President

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 317

Dublin, March 21, 1942.

SUBJECT: Invasion and Defence of Ireland.

[REDACTED]

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to forward herewith my memorandum
on the invasion and defence of Ireland, together with
2/ the report on this subject prepared at my request by
our Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel John Reynolds,
3-5/ and other papers relative thereto. Lieutenant-Colonel
Reynolds has forwarded copies of his report to the
Chief, Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
Washington, and to Major General Chaney at London.

Perhaps the most disquieting feature of the exist-
ing situation is the circumstance that those of us who
are here on the ground have been so slow in appreciating
the gravity of the menace. Possibly this is in part due
to the fact that British opinion, entirely without warrant,
has assumed that if Hitler attempted an invasion of
Britain, there would be a feint attack on Ireland, which
could be repelled in our own time and at our own convenience.

Since

RECORDED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-42
By J. Schaubic Date FEB 10 1972

Since analogous assumptions have already cost Britain much of her colonial empire, it should not be relied upon.

As regards a policy in anticipation of attack, there seems to me to be a choice between two courses:

1. To obtain possession of all desirable strategic points in Eire at the earliest possible moment by the most practicable means;
2. To make the best of an admittedly unfavorable situation by making such concessions of armament to the Irish Army as may increase its morale and good-will, without materially increasing its effectiveness in the event that it were to be used against us.

The small amounts of matériel which the British Army have recently transferred to the Irish Army have produced favorable results beyond reasonable expectation. A definitely friendly attitude between the High Commands of Northern Ireland and Eire has been established. It would be desirable on our part, with as little delay as possible, to arrange the transfer of some items, however insignificant. It should be clearly understood that this recommendation does not contemplate any measure of reduction of responsibility for the defence of Ireland by Britain and ourselves. It is purely a political gesture for political ends. In the light of recent events, it is obvious that, without an air force superior to that which the invading force could employ, a defence of Ireland by Irish military power is unthinkable.

I call attention to the communication addressed to me by Lieutenant General McKenna, Chief of Staff of the Irish Army, attached hereto. In the conversation with him and the Minister for Defence, at the time he delivered the communication to me, I made it plain that his suggestion that "Partition" be considered as a factor in the Irish case could not be entertained. I pointed out that the attitude of his Government toward the landing of American troops in Northern Ireland had cost the Irish Government whatever sympathy American majority opinion may have cherished for the Irish viewpoint and that the sooner that aspect of the situation was suppressed, the better for Irish security.

Respectfully yours,

DAVID GRAY

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum entitled "Invasion and Defence of Ireland".
2. Report by Lt. Col. Reynolds, Military Attaché.
3. Copy of communication from Irish Chief of Staff, dated March 19, 1942.
4. Copy of letter from Lt. Col. Reynolds, March 9, 1942.
5. Copy of letter to Lt. Col. Reynolds, March 11, 1942.

820/824/710

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 317, dated March 21, 1942,
From American Legation, Dublin, Ireland.

MEMORANDUM

INVASION AND DEFENCE OF IRELAND

1. CONSEQUENCES OF GERMAN OCCUPATION OF IRELAND.

It can hardly be disputed that if the Axis should seize and hold Ireland, the blockade of Great Britain will become effective and Britain will be forced to capitulate:

- (a) By reason of the closing of the Irish channel;
- (b) By reason of the enemy use of Irish bases for air attack on the western approaches;
- (c) By reason of the use of Irish harbors on the south and west coast as submarine bases.

To defeat Britain, therefore, it is unnecessary for Germany to invade Britain, but only to occupy Ireland.

2. EIRE DEFENCELESS

Eire, comprising three-fourths of the territory of Ireland, is in effect defenceless. The Eire Government has only about 40,000 first line troops. It has practically no tanks, no armored cars, no aircraft. It has inadequate artillery and transport, inadequate supplies of motor fuel and ammunition. The defence of the Island, from our viewpoint, must therefore be assumed by the United Nations operating from Northern Ireland.

3. PROBABILITY OF GERMAN ATTACK

The above facts are undoubtedly as well known to the German High Command as to us. Whatever the outcome,
therefore,

therefore, of the Russian campaign, it is probable that Germany is preparing the matériel and personnel for an invasion of Ireland. It is obviously her best chance to defeat Britain. And it is reasonable to expect it at the earliest date at which it can be prepared, in view of the growing assistance being sent by America.

4. ESTIMATED POWER AND NATURE OF GERMAN ATTACK

Opinions confidentially expressed to me by British Air Intelligence officers indicate that Germany is accumulating formidable reserves of transport planes and gliders; that it is possible that an air-borne force of not less than 200,000 picked men might be landed in Eire in a few days together with air-borne light tanks, light artillery and adequate munitions. Inasmuch as there are cattle and potato stocks on every Irish farm, this considerable force might count on living on the country for several weeks.

I am informed confidentially that the British Admiralty concedes the possibility that with a lucky break of weather the landing in the Cork - Wexford area of an Axis sea-borne expeditionary force of from three to five divisions and armed transport is entirely possible.

The recent strategy and tactics employed by the Japanese in their invasion of the Philippines, Malaya, Java and Burma indicate the possibility of protecting convoys by land-based planes. The distance between Cherbourg and Cork is only 316 miles. Short range fighters

fighters based on Brest and in southern Ireland, each patrolling half the intervening area, might reasonably be counted upon to establish a protective umbrella throughout the whole voyage. The German fleet is available for convoy protection, setting out either from France or from Norway. It would be rash to assume that if the occupation of Ireland is undertaken, the Germans will not employ the French fleet also.

Landings by air could be made at almost any point in southern and southwestern Ireland without serious opposition. The Rynanna aerodrome near Foynes would at once give the enemy a large and well-equipped air base in the southwest. Every race-course and golf course, as well as many large pastures, provide emergency landing fields. Conceding to the Irish Army a loyal resolution to oppose invasion from any quarter, it is undeniable that it lacks the armament for effective resistance.

It must be assumed that all the Irish centers of population and communication - Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Mullinger, Galway - as well as the defensive areas in Northern Ireland, would be subjected at the outset to demoralizing bombing. It must be assumed also that Britain would be simultaneously threatened and British forces tied up for home defence.

A force of from a few hundred to a few thousand specially trained German air-borne troops, striking at vulnerable centers of communication and establishing themselves in stone-built villages and towns would be impossible speedily to dislodge by any means available to the Irish Army. There must also be anticipated the
now

now well-known strategy of making a large number of separate landings, thus confusing the defence command and dividing defence forces and reinforcing and exploiting those nuclei which have been successful in consolidating their positions.

5. DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS

It requires no special military knowledge to recognize that conditions such as are set forth above can successfully be met only by opposing the invader at all points with a PREPONDERANCE of air power and armored land power. This defence must be essentially offensive in character, each enemy nucleus must be not only encircled and contained, but obliterated in the shortest possible time. To attempt merely to hold Northern Ireland or Northern Ireland and a portion of southern Ireland, as has been suggested, thus permitting the Axis to establish air, sea, and land bases in Eire, would be suicidal.

PREPONDERANCE of offensive armored forces and time are the obvious essentials of the defence. The Irish military experts are of the opinion that, under the most favorable conditions, motorized forces in the north could hardly operate in the Cork or Foynes areas under three days. Moreover, conditions doubtless would not be favorable, as roads and bridges would be bombed. So few stone bridges in Ireland will carry more than six tons that tank forces must rely on engineers and pontoon service. If the Irish time figures are accurate, and I have no reason to doubt them, the defending forces operating offensively must be proportionately greater,

greater, in order to cope with an enemy who has had several days in which to establish himself.

Emphasis has been placed on tanks and motorized infantry and artillery as essential means of defence, for the reason that, without the pre-arranged cooperation of Eire in a combined defence, the defending air power must inevitably operate at great disadvantage. The southern areas most available for German attack and landings are beyond the radius of short range fighter planes based either in the Six Counties or in Britain. They are even beyond the effective range of such craft based in the Dublin area, assuming that in the first twenty-four hours the Dublin air facilities might be defended from the Germans and made available to air forces coming down from the Six Counties. To operate successfully against the areas in question and to protect bombers attacking the invader in the areas in question, emergency landing fields would be necessary within 50 or 60 miles of Cork and Foynes. Assuming the possibility of providing such fields, the problem of preventing the Germans from seizing them and holding them does not appear possible of solution with the means at present available to the Irish Army.

It would seem that no fewer than five tank divisions and five motorized divisions with their full complements of artillery would be the minimum force that could be expected to meet such an attack as has been envisaged and that to insure a certain preponderance of force, half again as much should be provided. It is of course understood that air force commensurate with the above ground forces would be indispensable.

While

While recognizing the physical problem of housing and supplying a force of such size in Northern Ireland, it would be dangerous to rely on despatch of adequate reinforcements from Britain, having regard to the time factor, even if such forces were available. It is estimated that it would require three weeks for effective forces based on Britain to take the field in Ireland.

6. ATTACK ON IRELAND AS DIVERSION TO INVASION OF ENGLAND.

If factors not taken into account in the foregoing paragraphs should determine the German High Command to launch their major attack upon England, the weakness of Irish defences and the difficulties of island defence inherent upon defence based primarily on the Six Counties would continue to invite attack as a feint or diversion to be developed or not according to circumstances. The view generally held in England is to the effect that if Britain be invaded, such a diversion would in fact be directed against Eire, but it is assumed that it would be a minor operation to be dealt with more or less at the convenience of the Irish and British military commands. In as much as this view appears not to recognize that the consequences of a successful minor operation undertaken as a feint and subsequently developed into a major operation are the same as if the operation had been planned as a major one, it would seem to be a dangerous view for the American High Command to accept. Consequently, the requirements for island defence are the same whether a diversion or a major attack is to be expected.

7. ARMING

7. ARMING EIRE

The foregoing analysis of defence conditions in Ireland has been based on the assumption that the present policy of the Irish Government continues unchanged. Changes in that policy would immediately alter the whole problem of Irish defence:

(a) If the Irish Government became an ally, disposition of armored forces and air power would naturally be made at strategic points. Self-interest would dictate that every sacrifice be made to arm and equip Irish military man-power, to provide anti-aircraft defence without delay, as well as to deliver all essential supplies for the home front.

(b) If the Irish Government, while continuing their policy of neutrality, negotiated a defensive alliance with the United Nations to come into effect upon being attacked, to a lesser extent than in the event of an alliance, but nevertheless to a considerable extent, it would be to the self-interest of the United Nations to supply and equip the Irish Army and to perfect carefully coordinated plans for common defence. There is, however, no reason to anticipate any change in Irish policy. The Irish Government are supported in the policy of neutrality by a very large majority of the Irish people, who naturally wish to keep out of the war. The view is prevalent that, even with the assistance of the United States, the United Nations will be unable to defeat the Axis Powers, a view not at all unreasonable in

the

the light of the existing military situation and without understanding of the military potentialities of the United States. As a consequence, the Irish people dread taking any action which might offend German sensibilities and provoke retaliatory bombing and a harsher fate in the case of a German victory. It is unlikely that even the limited measure of cooperation set out above would receive popular support.

It should be understood that the Irish Government believe honestly that the policy which they are now pursuing offers the best chance of escaping the horrors of war and that they are prepared to accept responsibility to the Irish people for this policy, entailing as it does, in the case invasion is attempted, the throwing into battle of Irish manpower without adequate equipment or matériel, and the inevitable selection of Irish terrain as the main battlefield by the German High Command.

If the possibility of a change in Irish policy be ruled out, it remains only to examine the possibility of arming the Irish Army without any cooperative undertaking on the part of the Irish Government. Spokesmen for the Irish Government point out the following advantages which would accrue to the United Nations if the Irish Army were adequately equipped:

- (a) The Irish Army may be relied upon to defend Irish soil from any invader;
- (b) Irish manpower is famous soldier material;
- (c) An Irish Army knows its own terrain;

(d) An

(d) An adequate Irish Army would be disposed with reference to areas first liable to attack, thus eliminating the existing adverse time factor confronting forces operating from the Six Counties;

(e) The effect of an adequately armed Irish Army would be to add to the forces of the United Nations in the event of Axis invasion from forty to two hundred thousand effectives maintained at the expense of the Irish Government and in areas not congested by the billeting of United Nations' forces.

Both technical and political objections undoubtedly exist to such a program and in as much as I propose to recommend such measure of armament for the Irish forces as may be practicable and in American interest, it is better at the outset to consider the strongest case that can be made against such a policy. I recognize, therefore, that the following technical difficulties and perhaps others would have to be considered by our General Staff:

(a) Whether it is possible to plan a workable and dependable scheme of cooperative defensive action with a Government whose policy forbids the open interchange of those understandings and undertakings which are usual between governments undertaking defensive operations in common. This is a decision which only the High Command of the United States can make.

(b) Whether, with the existing urgent need for arms and equipment outrunning the available supply, American or Allied units ready for combatant service

should

should be passed over and priority extended to forces dedicated to Irish defence alone, over which the sources of supply exercise no control.

(c) Assuming that adequate matériel should become available, to what extent could its issue to the Irish Army be expected to make that organization capable of successful defence of its own territory and in what period of time? The Irish Prime Minister frequently refers to the quarter of a million of Irishmen capable of bearing arms. This would not be an excessive figure if the volunteer enlistments in the British Army have not materially encroached upon the traditional ten percent of total population available for military service. Estimates of this enlistment run from fifty to a hundred and fifty thousand. The higher figure is undoubtedly excessive, but the number may well be in excess of fifty thousand.

If a program of matériel sufficient for arming eight to ten divisions were available, the manpower would presumably also be available. This would imply adequate artillery, mechanized transport, armored units, supply services and adequate air force. What assurances could be given to our High Command that a trained personnel of technicians could be provided to serve the necessary equipment? The maintenance of tanks and motorized transport on a large scale demands large staffs of highly skilled mechanics. How long would it take to produce such a force? How quickly could a requisite force of competent gunners be trained? Even more difficult is the problem of pilots and technicians for
the

the air force commensurate to such an army.

(d) There remain now to be considered the political difficulties which the American Government would encounter if it undertook the arming of Eire without satisfactory agreements as to cooperation. My impression of American sentiment, gained from the American press, radio comment, and private letters is that it is beginning to adopt the formula "Our friends are those who are with us." It is true that the "Friends of Irish Neutrality" disbanded upon America's entry in the war, but this act is interpreted as tacit admission that the organization was not primarily interested in Irish neutrality but in sabotaging our government's aid-for-Britain policy. The effect of such activities has undoubtedly been to represent Ireland and its Government as opposed to Britain rather than concerned with its own neutrality. This I know not to be the case as regards Ireland and its Government, but the impression made upon American public opinion remains as a political factor. I.R.A. activities, the public utterances of the Cardinal Primate and, finally, the protest of the Irish Prime Minister against American troops landing in Northern Ireland all tend to strengthen this view.

Furthermore, the American press has made it clear that the main currents of American opinion regard the assistance of Irish manpower as of secondary importance, compared with the use of Irish strategic bases for the prosecution of the Battle of the Atlantic. The recent Gallup poll expresses the crystallization of this opinion and indicates that opinion among the Irish-born Americans and the first American-born generation

has

has changed radically since America entered the war. It must therefore be recognized that American majority opinion in general regards the unwillingness of Eire to contribute to the safety of sea-borne transport, by which she has received and still receives her supplies, as justification for making no sacrifices for the safety and comfort of Eire. It may well be that this is the policy of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face, but I recognize that the popular opinion which advocates it is just as much a political fact in America as the undoubted allegiance of the Irish people to the principle of neutrality is a cogent political fact in Ireland.

Obviously it is beyond my province to shape American policy, but, in spite of the political objections to arming Eire above considered, I recommend urgently examination of the following considerations of American self-interest which I believe should dictate our attitude in the present situation:

(a) In general, it is desirable that, even without cooperative arrangement between our two governments, the morale of the Irish Army should be maintained at as high a level as possible in view of German invasion. The concession of such armament to the Irish Army as may be available is the most practicable way of attaining this end.

(b) It is also desirable that the traditional Irish-American friendship be maintained, in spite of radical divergence of national policy and nothing in the present crisis is better calculated to produce Irish good-will toward America than the

concession

concession of available armament.

(c) In particular, in view of prospective use of Irish air ports by American commercial transport lines, it is in American interest that adequate protection be assured in the Foynes-Rynanna area.

(d) It is also definitely to the interest of American and British forces in Northern Ireland which are assuming ultimate responsibility for island defence that suitable emergency landing and refuelling fields be established, maintained, and defended by the Irish Defence Ministry, with a view to making them available for United Nations' fighter planes in the Cork and Foynes regions in the event of Axis invasion. An approach to attaining these ends, both general and particular, could most practicably be made, I believe, by allotting to the Irish Government as quickly as possible sufficient anti-aircraft artillery for the defence of the areas in question and also such a force of first line fighter aircraft as existing personnel of the Irish air force could man and service.

As a factor in maintaining morale, the Irish Government are especially interested in obtaining rifles, even though they may not be of the latest pattern. Any allotments of old Springfields that could be spared would be gratefully received and would make for good-will.

On Wednesday, March 18th, at 4 p.m., I called upon the Irish Minister for Defence and the Chief of Staff,

Lt. General

Lt. General D. McKenna, and read the foregoing memorandum to them. I also left them a copy for more careful consideration, requesting at the same time such suggestions and recommendations as might prove constructively helpful. At 12 noon, on March 20th, the Minister and Chief of Staff returned my call. The Minister stated that he had taken the liberty of showing the memorandum to Mr. de Valera. The Chief of Staff presented me with a communication signed by him, a copy of which is hereto attached, in which, among other things, he sets forth the kind and quantity of equipment for which the Irish Army at present has trained personnel available.

I hereby suggest that if my recommendation for arms for the Irish Army be approved, this list be considered as authoritatively setting forth the needs and desires of the Irish Defence Ministry.

D. G.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 317 dated March 21, 1942
From American Legation, Dublin, Ireland.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By 847 NARS Date JAN 24 1973

THE GERMAN THREAT TO IRELAND

AND

THE STRENGTH NECESSARY TO MEET IT

In this estimate I have tried to consider whether under certain conditions a successful invasion of Ireland is within German capabilities, whether the rewards of a successful invasion by Germany would be such as to justify her in running the risks of such a venture, the general form which an attack on Ireland might take, and the strength the Allies should hold in Ireland to insure the defeat of the invaders. This is not an attempt to forecast German strategy.

I

COULD GERMANY INVADE IRELAND WITH REASONABLE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS?

There are several factors to be considered with regard to this point. In the first place, what sort of resistance would she meet in Ireland?

1. The Army of Eire.

Due to Eire's policy of neutrality to which she rigidly adheres, the entire defense of the twenty six Southern Counties is entrusted to the Army of Eire. This consists of about 45,000 regulars and a Local Defense Force which is optimistically estimated at about 100,000. The regulars are a fine body of men. They are organized in two Infantry Divisions, each of nine battalions of infantry, one battalion of light artillery, and one company each of signal troops, engineers, supply and transport, medical, and military police. There are some ten additional battalions of infantry which have not been assigned, a few extra field guns, and miscellaneous unassigned troops. There are seven motorized squadrons of cavalry, each consisting of an armored troop and three motor troops. There are also two armored squadrons. The motor squadrons and armored squadrons together have 25 old type English tanks and 22 "home made" tanks based on Ford chassis. There is practically no coast defense except a few old guns left by the British. The anti-aircraft artillery is merely a token force. The air corps consists of 67 officers of whom 54 are pilots and 672 enlisted men. It is equipped with 54 airplanes, most of which are trainers, all of which (except for possibly two or three that crashed in Ireland and were impounded) were acquired before 1936, and less than half of which are fit for use at any one time.

The Local Defense Force is very raw and relatively much more poorly equipped than the Regular Army.

The

The only ammunition manufactured in Eire is for shot guns. They also made a few land mines.

The General Staff has worked out what it calls a "spider web" defense for Eire, involving small mobile columns which will hit and run and hit again and a fairly complete system of demolitions. Owing to the lack of explosives, many of the planned demolitions could not be effected. Due to the acute shortage of petrol and motor transport (as well as tires) it will probably be impossible to move the mobile columns in accordance with the plans. Bravely as it would resist, the Eire Army would be brushed aside by the sort of invasion that fell on Crete.

2. The B.T.N.I. (British Troops in Northern Ireland) and American Troops.

Due to Eire's neutrality, these troops are sequestered in the Six Northern Counties, and are billeted over an extensive area. It is conceivable that they might not be concentrated until the German invasion was under way. Even assuming that the columns were formed with the leading vehicles on the Border headed South at the moment of alarm, Newry is 65 1/2 miles from Dublin, and Dublin is 159 miles from Cork. The distances to be traversed by columns moving over the Central and Western roads would be much greater.

I have heard it estimated that the head of the Eastern Column of the B.T.N.I. could be in the Dublin area in two hours and a half after receiving movement orders. I fear that on the night selected for the invasion, the Dublin - Belfast road and the bridges at Newry, Dundalk, and Drogheda would be considerably impaired by the Luftwaffe and the I.R.A., and the towns through which it passes would be in much confusion. It is reasonable to anticipate similar conditions on all the main roads leading to the South, which would greatly retard the movement.

It is unnecessary to particularize in this estimate as to the strength and composition of the troops in the North as they are a matter of record. Handicapped as they are by the ground rules which keep them North of the Border until the Germans have landed, seized the necessary airdromes and ports, and got themselves organized, I believe they are in insufficient force and that they lack the necessary planes, armored vehicles, and motor transport to enable them to knock out a powerful invading force before it gathers momentum. This is the opinion of every British officer with whom I have discussed the subject.

3. Does Ireland's Location Render an Invasion Impossible.

Germany transported from 17,000 - 18,000 troops from Athens to Crete by air, defeated a defending force of some 37,500 men and captured the island. It is 170 miles from Athens to Crete. No German war ships were present, except a few motor torpedo boats and mine sweepers; the Italian navy, if present was not effective; and the British Mediterranean fleet had complete control of the Aegean Sea.

The distance from Queenstown to Cherbourg is 316 miles, and some of the strategic points for which parachutists would make are 120 miles further. The German troop transport planes Ju. 89 and 90 can carry forty soldiers, at a maximum speed of 217 miles per hour. There are four other types of German military transport planes, including the Ju. 52 which carries fifteen men, and was the transport plane used in Crete. We know that the German Navy has some large Dornier and Blohm and Voss flying-boat transports. It is fair to suppose that the air-minded Germans, encouraged by the success of their Cretan venture, have greatly increased their troop transport planes, and could land a substantial force in Ireland. Against the Waalhaven airdrome in Holland they used one battalion of parachute troops. At Crete they used a division of three regiments. In Ireland they might use three divisions.

This does not take into account the gliders which Germany is reported to be building at a great rate. In Crete some fifty were used, each carrying ten men. How many gliders were towed by one plane does not appear but we believe they travelled at about 105 miles per hour and we know that they were towed for at least 170 miles. There would seem to be no inherent reason why gliders could not be used in an invasion of Ireland.

While Ireland is too far from the German air bases to enable their fighters to be effective there if based on France, the German parachutists and air-borne infantry should have no difficulty in seizing air fields in Ireland from which the fighting planes could operate. As for the German bombers, they have already been to BELFAST.

To be effective, the air-borne troops would probably have to be closely followed and reenforced by tanks, artillery, and motorized troops. This would involve ocean transports and probably using the unloading facilities of one or two ports, and with the British Navy in control of its home waters, would be very hazardous.

Any invasion of Ireland, however, would probably be coupled with a demonstration in force against England, as well as timed to take place when the British and American navies were occupied in other quarters. Under certain conditions the British naval superiority as regards the defense of Ireland, might be less than it was in the Aegean Sea during the Crete affair. Before it could be determined that the attack in force on England was not the main blow, and a powerful force of planes and ships diverted to Ireland, German air-borne infantry might be in possession of Cork, the Shannon estuary, the southern beaches, the principal landing fields of Eire, and the transports and their naval escorts well on their way from France or Spain.

The difficulty of supplying an expeditionary force after it had landed in Ireland is the strongest reason for doubting that the Germans will invade. But the problems of supply in Norway, North Africa and Russia have not been simple, and the Germans have shown extraordinary

ability

ability in solving them. Much was done by the Italians in the way of delivering supplies by air in Ethiopia. A German commercial submarine crossed to America with a considerable cargo prior to the last war. It would be rash to assume that the difficulties of supplying a German force in Ireland were insoluble.

Recent far flung Japanese operations in the Pacific, the successful transit of the English Channel by a considerable German flotilla under aircraft protection, and the inability of Great Britain with complete naval control of the Aegean Sea to prevent the invasion and capture of the 160 mile long island of Crete, may cause revision of thought on the part of the Germans as to the conclusiveness of predominant sea power.

On the whole, it would seem over-confident to believe that Germany was incapable of launching an invasion of Ireland with any chance of success, if the possible gains justified taking the undoubted risks.

II

WHAT HAS GERMANY TO GAIN BY THE CONQUEST OF IRELAND?

1. Ireland would afford another invaluable base for an ultimate invasion of England. Kingston (Dun Laoghaire) is only 56 miles from Holyhead, Belfast is 140 miles from Liverpool and 112 from Glasgow. Torr Head in Ireland is only 12 1/2 miles from Kintyre in Scotland.

2. Ireland in German hands would almost complete the encirclement of the United Kingdom, close the Western ports of England and Scotland, and render the German blockade almost wholly effective.

3. Ireland would be a useful base from which to attack convoys in the North Atlantic in transit to the United Kingdom or to Russia.

4. Ireland would be a valuable base for German operations against Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland and the North American Continent.

5. By the occupation of Ireland, Germany could deny its use to America as the base for an expeditionary force to be launched at a favorable time on the Continent of Europe.

6. In the event of the invasion of Ireland, Germany could count on help from the I.R.A. and other disaffected elements. While they represent a small part of the population, the method by which they have always conducted their activities has familiarized them with every road and trail in the country and all the tricks of sabotage. As a fifth Column they would be very useful. Furthermore, there is an increasingly large and influential group in Eire, who, while preferring the English to the Germans, are coming to believe that Germany is going to win the war. If Germany invaded, they might be inclined to accept what

they

they believe to be the inevitable with very little resistance. The Irish are extremely allergic to being bombed, which I believe to be the basis of their policy of neutrality.

7. Of late, Germany has not kept up its pace of conquest. Hitler might well decide that Ireland offered a favorable opportunity of showing his people that Japan had no monopoly of the conquest of important islands.

The conquest of Ireland would involve such rich rewards that the Germans might well gamble on their audacity and ingenuity to overcome the very real hazards of the venture.

III.

WHAT FORM MIGHT THE INVASION BE EXPECTED TO TAKE?

If it followed the pattern of Crete, the German attack would probably open by the intensive bombardment of the principal cities and military establishments of both North and South Ireland, especially the Northern airdromes, on the night prior to the invasion. Towards dawn this bombardment would be concentrated on the airdromes to be seized. Parachutists would then descend and capture and clear the air fields preparatory to the landing of the air-borne infantry. The necessary ports and beaches would be captured and made ready for the ocean transports which carry the armored and motorized elements and the motor transport and supplies. Coincident with all this, all roads, defiles, bridges, and railroads from the North would be bombed and advancing columns of the defending forces would be strafed from the air. The lack of artillery weapons heavier than 81-mm mortars and 75-mm mountain and infantry howitzers would be compensated by the Luftwaffe, which at Crete, in addition to driving the British fleet from the Aegean Sea, was able to put down fire on the Maleme airdrome described as exceeding in severity the heaviest artillery preparation of the World War.

1. The Strength and Composition of the Invading Force.

Before examining in detail the kind of attack the defenders of Ireland might be called upon to meet, let us consider the question of the probable strength and composition of the invading force. Again it is helpful to compare the conditions in Crete with those of Ireland. The data with regard to the Battle of Crete has been obtained from Special Bulletin No. 35, G-2 2657-231.

Crete is a mountainous island 160 miles long, whose breadth varies from 7 1/2 to 35 miles. It was 170 miles from the base from which German re-enforcements were drawn. The surrounding sea was dominated by the British Navy, but Germany had overwhelming superiority in the air. Part of the invading force was sent by sea but it never reached Crete. With the exception of a small Italian

force

force which landed from boats after the conquest of the island was completed, all the invading troops were air-borne.

The reduction of Crete commenced by several days' heavy preparatory air bombardment. The first landing was at 8 a.m. May 20, 1941, and by the 27th the fate of Crete was settled. The British had evacuated the island by June 1, 1941. The total strength of the Allied troops in Crete was 37,500 but it is said that only 12,000 of them were combat troops, the balance being odds and ends of service units that had escaped from Greece.

To conquer Crete the Germans created a task force under General Loehr of the Air Force, consisting of strong units of the Luftwaffe and the Army. The Air force was organized as the VIII Air Corps and was composed as follows:

Heavy bombers and dive-bombers	360
Two engined fighters	150
Single engine fighters	315
Transports	650
Total	<u>1,475</u>

The Army consisted of one skeleton division of parachute troops and two skeleton divisions of land forces, under the command of General Student who had been in charge of the parachutists at Rotterdam, and was composed as follows:

Parachute Division - three regiments	4,950
22nd Air Infantry Division - part only	5,600
5th Mountain Division - two regiments only	5,000
Total	<u>15,550</u>

In addition there are known to have been at least one motorcycle company, considerable antiaircraft units, and adequate supporting weapons -- 37-mm antitank guns, 88-mm mortars, and 75-mm mountain and infantry howitzers. The presence of heavier artillery weapons and light tanks has not been verified.

Now let us turn to Ireland and speculate upon the strength and composition of a force necessary to effectuate its conquest under the special conditions there existing.

The area of Ireland is 20,367,735 acres of which 17,024,485 are in Eire and 3,352,250 in the Six Counties. The total population is 4,248,165 of which 2,968,420 live in Eire and 1,279,745 inhabit the Six Counties of the North.

The length of the island from North East to South West is about 330 miles. It's width varies from about 100 to 170 miles. While there are no high mountains

there

there are many hills. Rivers and lakes abound. Woods, affording concealment for bivouacs and assembly areas, are almost non-existent. The country is interspersed with stone houses and many of the villages, houses and fields are surrounded by stone walls rendering them readily convertible into effective centers of resistance. The road net is fairly extensive but many of the roads are only fit for one-way traffic and many that appear on the map are mere tracks. There is a good deal of bog-land which is impassible to tanks or vehicles.

Ireland possesses a number of air fields or terrain which could readily be adapted to that purpose. Owing to the weakness of the Eire Army and the restrictions imposed on the Allied troops in the North, it will be a simple matter for well trained and equipped troops to capture many of these fields. A list of airdromes, air fields, and terrain suitable for landing planes is annexed to this estimate and marked "Appendix A".

The coast line of Ireland on the West is deeply indented, with many headlands and islands. It is something like Maine except that the shore is more precipitous. It is open to the Atlantic ground swell which raises a heavy surf and except in the deep bays, renders landing from ordinary boats difficult.

The East coast is lacking in harbors, and although some of the shore is quite mountainous, the water is much smoother.

The North and South coasts resemble the West.

The tide approaches Ireland from the South West first striking Dursey Head, whence the South undulation reaches Tuskar Rock in 1 3/4 hours and the West reaches Tory Island 1 3/4 hours later. Along the South and West coast the rise of the Spring tide is from 10 - 13 feet. On the North coast at Carnlough, Co. Antrim, and on the East coast at Cahore Point, Co. Wicklow, the Spring tide rises from 3 - 5 feet. At Dundalk, on the East coast, due to the proximity of England and the meeting of the two undulations, the Spring tide rise is 15 feet.

Prevailing winds are from the South West and West. Fogs are rare on the Irish coast but there is a lot of thick weather.

A list of the seaports of Ireland, with certain data concerning them, is hereto annexed and marked "Appendix B". It is apparent that a sea-borne expedition, if it could reach Ireland, would be able to effect a landing at a number of different places.

The extensive area of Ireland, the number of key points which, if seized and held would facilitate the invasion, the necessity for crushing local resistance before reenforcements could arrive from England, all call for the use by Germany of a very strong, quick striking force.

The composition and strength of a task force for the rapid reduction of Ireland might be something like this:

<u>Troops</u>	<u>Approximate Strength</u>
Three Parachute Divisions - three regiments each	15,000
Eight Infantry Divisions - air-borne	80,000
Two Armored Divisions - sea-borne	16,000
Six Infantry Divisions - sea-borne	90,000
Appropriate Corps and Army Troops	<u>15,000</u>
Total	216,000
 <u>Air Force</u>	
Heavy bombers and dive bombers	500
Fighters	800
Transports	<u>2,000</u>
Total	3,300

Assuming that the first echelon of transport planes was 800, they should be able to drop the 15,000 parachutists at their assigned positions at 4 a.m. on the day selected for the attack and be back in France by 9 a.m. Even if they lost 100 planes, 700 planes of the first echelon could make a second trip and carry 21,000 infantry and land them in Ireland by 3 p.m.

Meanwhile, the second echelon of 1200 transports, carrying 30,000 troops and weapons could land on captured Irish fields at 7 a.m. and return to France by 12 noon. Assuming it lost 400 planes, the 800 remaining could land 24,000 additional infantry by 7 p.m. making a total of 90,000 men in fifteen hours. The process could continue during the night and it might be possible to substitute air-transport for some of the infantry it had been planned to move by sea.

No gliders have been taken into account in this movement and their use would either relieve the transport planes or enable more supplies to be carried over.

An air officer could probably detect a great many flaws in this plan. I have had no experience along this line and have not the necessary texts to work out the logistics. But even if the operation envisaged greatly exceeds the actual possibilities, judging by past operations it would seem that the Germans could launch a very formidable air-borne attack on Ireland.

2. The German Plan of Attack.

Any plan the Germans formulate is sure to be a dangerous one. While it might take any one of a number of variations it would probably involve three main elements:

(1) The protection of the invading force by creating the maximum confusion in the North of Ireland by bombing congested civilian areas and military cantonments, destruction of aircraft in airdromes and the unrelenting attack on columns moving to repel the invasion.

(2) The seizure of all available landing fields in order to expedite the unloading of air-borne troops, provide bases for fighter planes, and deny the use of the Southern landing fields as bases for the fighter planes of the defenders.

(3) The capture and occupation of certain ports and beaches for use of the sea-borne troops and the unloading of heavy equipment.

The plans would certainly include the capture of Cork which has an excellent harbor and port facilities and probably contains considerable stores of food. Limerick, while in many ways not so good as Cork, might also be used as a debarkation port because it would allow an invading force to march to the North up the corridor of the Shannon River with good left flank protection.

The seizure of Dublin and the general line to the West along the Royal Canal to Mullingar might seem to involve initial operations too far to the North. But the capture of Dublin would demoralize the government of Eire and upset plans for the defense of Ireland. It would enable the Germans to obtain valuable stores before they could be destroyed. The initial landing of an invading force on the excellent landing fields of Dublin would put the defenders of Ireland at a disadvantage at the outset, and would seem a proper risk to take. The invaders would have to trust to air superiority to hold off the troops approaching from the North until their position could be consolidated. In the absence of motor transport the invaders would have to take Dublin from the air, if it was to be done quickly.

Bearing in mind the essential elements of the German plan of invasion, and assuming that Sunday, May 3rd, was the date selected, the German operations might take a form something like this:

(1) At 2:00 a.m. the simultaneous bombardment of the cities of Cork, Dublin, Limerick, Belfast, Londonderry, Mullingar, the military flying fields and cantonments of the North and South, and the roads and railroads leading from the North into Eire, accompanied by Fifth Column sabotage.

(2) At 3:00 a.m. the intensive bombardment of the defences of the landing fields the Germans intended to use.

(3) At 4:00 a.m. landing parachute troops and the removal of the obstacles from the following landing fields:

(a) Dublin Area: Collinstown, Baldonnell, Gormanstown, Phoenix Park, Castle Knock, Kildonan, Leopardstown, Dublin Bay Beach, and Portmarnock Strand.

(b)

(b) Cork Area: Fermoy, Ballincollig 1, Ballincollig 2, Belvelly Bridge, Saleen, Cloyne, Skibbereen.

(c) Limerick Area: Rineanna, Foynes, Kilconry, Adare, Limerick 1, Limerick 2, Newcastle West.

(d) Curragh Area: Curragh Camp, Leixlip, Athy, Bishops-court House.

(e) Waterford Area: Tramore.

(f) Wexford Area: Ferns, Johnstown Castle, North Slob, Newtonbarry House, Rosegarland.

(4) At 7:00 a.m. the landing of the first wave of air-borne infantry and fighter planes, capture of Dublin, Cork and Limerick, and preparation of the ports for the use of the ships.

(5) The arrival of transports at Cork and Limerick, and the development of the German plan of campaign.

Throughout all the above stages German bombers and fighters ceaselessly attack the defending troops and assist their infantry in the reduction of centers of resistance. The troops which landed at the various fields are concentrated. The maximum advantage is taken of the I.R.A. and other Fifth Column elements.

3. The Timing of the Invasion.

All that can be said on this point is that it is safe to assume that if an attack is planned, it will fall before America attains her maximum military strength, at a season when the nights are long enough to permit the completion of the initial stages of the invasion under cover of darkness and the days are not too short for the exploiting of the advantages gained by surprise, and when storms at sea are infrequent. The Japanese, who have had much experience in landing operations, usually make their landings just before dawn, on a day when the tide is high just after dawn.

IV

THE STRENGTH OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE FORCE.

The conclusion presented as to an adequate defense force represents the strength believed sufficient to ensure the holding of Ireland against any troops it might reasonably be anticipated that the Germans could use.

There are four main factors which would seem to enter into determining the strength of an Allied force sufficient to defeat a German invasion.

1. Reliance to be Placed on Eire Army.

The Eire Regular Army is composed of excellent material. Since commencing this estimate I have had the

opportunity of meeting Major General Costello, in command of the 1st Division, Colonel Fox, the Chief of Staff, Commandant Emphy, G-3, and some others. I witnessed a tactical exercise and attended an Officers' Refresher Course. I formed a very favorable impression of the character and ability of the officers and the excellent discipline and quality of the troops. In case of a German invasion I am convinced that the Eire Army would fight bravely and that its high command would welcome the assistance of the Allies and would cooperate loyally with them.

But, as already pointed out, the Eire Army is destitute of all equipment necessary to an efficient modern fighting force. I believe it would be incapable of offering more than a spirited but brief resistance to a German invasion and in calculating the strength of the force which the Allies should provide to insure Ireland against conquest by Germany, it has seemed best to disregard it.

2. Strength of Subversive Elements in Ireland.

Irish officers have told me that the strength of the I.R.A. and other subversive elements which might be expected to help Germany in the event of an invasion is not over five per cent. Taking the population of Eire at 2,968,420, this would give us 148,421 disaffected individuals, without considering the 1,279,745 people who live in the Six Counties of the North where conditions are not harmonious. Discounting the women in the disaffected families (some of whom are undoubtedly dangerous) the number of persons who might be counted as a Fifth Column is quite formidable.

Ireland is very poor. Many of its people have been cold and hungry all winter. Since this estimate was commenced, bread allowance has been reduced. Coal is practically unobtainable by the poor and the supply of turf has proved unsatisfactory. On March 3rd the consumption of gas, with which most of the cooking is done in the cities, was drastically curtailed, and further reduction is anticipated which will oblige some of the large industrial employers of labor to go out of business. With bread short, and fuel for cooking other foods equally so, the Irish people must look forward to real privation.

Under such conditions, the ranks of the disaffected will swell and become receptive to the sort of propaganda spread by German agents. This fact bears on the strength of a defense force which may encounter attack and obstruction from the Irish as well as the Germans.

3. Limitations Imposed by the Neutrality of Eire.

Not only is Eire unable to repel an invasion in force by Germany, but the policy of neutrality to which she adheres imposes grave handicaps on the Allies in coming to her assistance. Instead of being able to defend the

ports and airfields of Eire by sufficient guns and fighter planes based on Southern Airdromes, and by concentrations of highly mobile, hard-hitting troops placed in critical areas, who can crush air-borne invaders before they organize, the Allies are compelled to keep their troops North of the Border, dispersed through the Six Counties. Their first warning of an invasion might conceivably be the German bombs. By the time the Allies could put into effect their plans of defence, the air-fields, ports and beaches and the key positions in Eire might be in German hands. Their columns moving South will be attacked by German bombers and hampered by Fifth Column sabotage, through ruined towns filled with panic-stricken people. As they get further South they will lose the protection of their fighter planes for lack of fields upon which to base them. They will have been forced to spot Germany the precious hours of time and initiative which have made Japan so dangerous.

4. Factors of Time and Space Work for the Invader.

Before the Allied ground troops based on the North could strike an invader, they would be obliged to travel considerable distances. It is impossible to translate such distances into terms of time because there is no means of determining the extent to which marching columns would be delayed. But if we assume that because of the "ground rules" imposed by Eire's policy of neutrality the Allied columns would start from the general East-West line Newry - Armagh - Enniskillen (few troops could be quartered South of that line), we find the following road distances to localities which the Germans are likely to try to seize:

Newry to Dublin Area	65 1/2 miles
" " Curragh "	92 3/4 "
" " Cork "	225 1/2 "
" " Limerick ", via Dublin	187 1/2 "
" " " " Mullingar-	
Tullamore-Nenagh	164 "
" to Wexford Area	158 3/4 "
" " Waterford "	179 3/4 "
Armagh to Dublin Area via	
Carrickmacross-Navan	91 "
Armagh to Curragh Area via	
Carrickmacross-Navan	106 "
Armagh to Mullingar Area, via	
Castleblaney-Oldcastle	77 "
Armagh to Cork Area	222 1/2 "
Armagh to Limerick Area, via	
Mullingar	173 1/2 "
Armagh to Wexford Area, via Navan-	
Naas-Carlow	178 "
Armagh to Waterford Area, via	
Navan-Naas-Carlow	182 1/2 "
Enniskillen to Dublin Area via	
Cavan-Kells	103 "
Enniskillen to Curragh Area via	
Cavan-Mullingar	114 "

Enniskillen

Enniskillen to Mullingar Area	72	miles
" " Athlone Area via Longford	79	"
Enniskillen to Cork Area via Rosscree-Thurles	212	"
Enniskillen to Limerick Area via Athlone-Rosscree	163	"
Enniskillen to Wexford Area via Tullamore-Kilkenny	202	"
Enniskillen to Waterford Area	181	"

It is apparent that before an invading force at any of the above localities could be attacked by the Allied ground troops, much valuable time would have elapsed and the enemy would be in a position to offer effective organized resistance.

5. Conclusion:

Taking the above factors into consideration, as well as the fact that the loss of Ireland might be almost as disastrous as the conquest of the United Kingdom, to which it might actually lead, it would seem that to enable the Allies to be reasonably certain of holding Ireland against a determined German invasion, their forces should approximate the following strength:

<u>Troops</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Eight Infantry Divisions	600 Heavy Bombers and Dive Bombers
Three Motorized Infantry Divisions	1000 Fighters
Two Armored Divisions	
Six Regiments Anti-Aircraft Artillery	
Corps and Army Troops	

I have not the Tables of Organization available to determine the numerical strength of the above force and it would be affected by whether square or triangular divisions were employed. I believe the troops should be somewhere in the neighborhood of 300,000 men.

JOHN REYNOLDS

Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.
Military Attaché, Dublin

March 9, 1942.

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 317, dated March 21, 1942.
From American Legation, Dublin, Ireland.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

Parkgate, Dublin.

19th March, 1942.

My dear Minister,

I have read with deep interest the memorandum you were good enough to give me last evening. I am availing of the opportunity to make a few observations on it from the military point of view.

May I at the outset say that I feel that in the first and last sentences of paragraph 2, as well as in some other parts of the memorandum, you have painted the picture rather blacker than it in effect is. This might have unfortunate repercussions in as much as it might defeat the primary object of the memorandum by conveying the impression that our defence position is so weak that your country would not be justified in releasing equipment to us on the grounds that the provision of such equipment would not materially improve our present position. In making this comment I realize that you are the best judge of the effect this picture may have on your people. You are, of course, aware that even though we are inadequately equipped the overrunning of Denmark will not be repeated here. Furthermore, we are satisfied that given the necessary material we will stop the invader.

In paragraph 4 the figures 200,000 representing 20 light Airborne Divisions appears to me to be an over-estimate. This apart from fighter craft would require some 12,000 transport planes and gliders. So far, we have no information that a force of this magnitude could be made available. I cannot agree that air landings could be made at almost any point in Southern and South Western Ireland without serious opposition, nor do I agree that suitable emergency landing fields are as plentiful as you suggest. You may be thinking of glider, parachutists and crash landings which could, of course, be made at almost any point. Should the Germans succeed in securing operational landing fields then I agree that a much lesser number of aircraft could, over a comparatively short period, build up a large airborne force.

It

It might be inferred from your statement that Fineanna Aerodrome is not defended. This is definitely not the case. In fact our plans provide for making a maximum effort in the defence of our harbours and aerodromes. A denial of these facilities would render a successful German invasion of this country practically impossible. As our equipment position improves so also will our ability to deny these facilities.

In paragraph 7 you refer to our shortage of technicians. This is largely true since we are not an industrial country. Despite this, however, our small air and armoured forces are capable of considerable expansion.

On page 11, sub-paragraph (e)* you have omitted a factor which I think is of importance and that is - it would further greatly decrease the danger of a German attempt to defeat Great Britain by striking at her through Ireland.

Might I suggest that instead of the recommendation contained in the last 5 lines on page 16**you would strongly urge that we be immediately supplied with the following items which would not require much shipping space:

- (a) 150 - 37 m.m. anti-tank guns M.3. complete with spare parts and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun.
- (b) 48 - 75 m.m. guns complete with instruments and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun.
- (c) 150 - 81 m.m. Mortars complete with instruments and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun.
- (d) 400 - 60 m.m. Mortars complete with instruments and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun.
- (e) 100 - 37 m.m. Anti-Aircraft Mobile Guns complete with instruments, spare parts and 5,000 rounds of ammunition per gun.
- (f) 2000 Thompson sub-machine guns and 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition.
- (g) 30,000 rifles with 25,000,000 rounds .300 ammunition.

Apart

Apart from its effect on morale this material which we are at present capable of handling, would considerably strengthen our defence position. I am not including light automatics for the reason that we have a number of Bren guns in service and to introduce an automatic of another calibre would complicate ammunition supply. Besides we have a large number on order with the British War Office which we hope will be released.

Whilst not desiring to make any comment on the political aspects of your memorandum, I do feel that on page 14***where certain political factors are referred to, the fundamental factor underlying the political situation in this country, that is partition, might be mentioned.

I cannot say how much I appreciate your personal interest in the Army and its problems. No less do I appreciate the privilege of seeing your memorandum. If I can be of any assistance to you in your efforts on our behalf kindly let me know. I take this opportunity of assuring you that the equipment which I am asking to have released immediately can be manned on delivery by existing Units.

I remain,

My dear Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgnd) D. McKENNA

His Excellency,
Mr. David Gray,
United States Legation,
Phoenix Park,
Dublin.

*See page 9 (e) of Enclosure No. 1, which is revision of Memorandum handed to Lt. Gen. McKenna.
** " page 13, last full paragraph.
*** " page 11, 12, etc.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 317, dated March 21, 1942,
From American Legation, Dublin, Ireland.

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
DUBLIN, IRELAND.

March 9, 1942.

The Honorable David Gray,
American Minister,
Dublin.

Sir:

Pursuant to your request I enclose an estimate I have prepared on the German threat to Ireland and the strength necessary to meet it. As I told you, the estimate is purely my own opinion and in no sense represents the views of the War Department. I should not have ventured upon such a subject except for the fact that I am your only available military adviser, and I felt you were entitled to my opinion, for what it may be worth.

Respectfully yours,
(Sgnd) JOHN REYNOLDS
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C.
Military Attache.

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 317, dated March 21, 1942,
From American Legation, Dublin, Ireland.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dublin, March 11, 1942.

My dear Colonel Reynolds,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 9, 1942, and the text of your paper entitled "The German threat to Ireland and the strength necessary to meet it" which you have very kindly prepared at my request.

I have read this paper very carefully and wish officially to congratulate you on the broad and imaginative comprehension with which you have envisaged the situation and the painstaking competence with which you have worked out so much valuable detail.

I am in entire accord with your conclusions. If a fortunate trend of events averts from this country the threat which we both believe to be menacing it, we shall have taken only the course that reasonable prudence dictates. If, on the other hand, our apprehensions are borne out by subsequent events, we shall have done our duty in endeavoring to forecast a most dangerous situation and calling it to the attention of our superiors.

I intend at an early date to forward your report to the Secretary of State and request you to forward a copy of it to the Secretary of War with a copy of this letter.

Yours sincerely,

(S_gnd) DAVID GRAY

Lt. Col. John Reynolds,
Military Attache,
American Legation,
Dublin, Ireland.

APPENDIX A

List of:

1. Airdromes.
2. Seaplane Stations and Landing Grounds.
3. Sites Reported Suitable for Aircraft.

(Unless otherwise stated, map references are to Ordnance Survey Map, 1/2 inch equals 1 mile.)

County CORK

FERMOY

Position:- 52° 09' 00" North 68° 17' 00" West,
Location:- One mile North West of FERMOY,
Runways:- North to South 700 Yards,
East to West 800 Yards,
Surface is of grazed grass.
Hangers:- There are three hangers, but it is not known whether they are in use. Each would house three Ansons or similar aircraft and are of a type used by the R.A.F. as semi-portable.
Obstruction:- A barbed wire fence runs across the aerodrome, separating the golf links to the South and the part restricted to the use of the Air Corps to the North,
Nearest Roads:- Main road from FERMOY to MITCHELSTOWN runs along the East side of landing area, a minor road, branching North West from the above mentioned road, runs along North East side of landing area,
Nearest Railway:- FERMOY railway station is 300 yards South. Branch line from FERMOY to MITCHELSTOWN runs along West side of Landing area,
Nearest Town:- FERMOY, one mile South East MITCHELSTOWN, eight miles North.
Remarks:- We have two plans of this aerodrome. This is an Air Corps Aerodrome.

County DUBLIN

BALDONNEL

Position:- 53° 18' North 06° 27' West,
Location:- Immediately South West of BALDONNEL,
2 miles South West of CLONDALKIN,
8 miles West South West of DUBLIN,
Runways:- None. The General dimensions are:- North to South 1,050 yards, North East to South West 1,090 yards, East to West 850 yards, South East to North West 775 yards.
Lighting:-

Lighting:- Includes flood lighting, obstruction Lights and flares.
Refuelling:- Petrol 77,000 gals. Oil 1,500 gals. Also 8,000 gals. stored in 10 gal. drums.
Hangers:- There are two 204ft. by 170ft. by 25ft. high and one 102ft. by 170 ft. by 25 ft. high.
Radio:- W/T, R/T and Civil D.F. 1 Military T77 ground station and two aircraft sets standing by.
Obstruction:- There are no obstructions,
Defence:- Two 40-mm. Bofors guns, two Rolls Royce armoured cars and several M.G. Posts, Ferro concrete blockhouses (x) number unknown, under construction.
Nearest Roads:- Adjoins through road which connects with main road between NAAS and DUBLIN, and with main road running South from LUCAN. Numerous road junctions within one mile of aerodrome.
Nearest Railway:- Main line railway, South West from DUBLIN to WATERFORD, LIMERICK, ATHLONE, etc., Nearest station is LUCAN, 2 miles North by West.
Nearest town:- DUBLIN, 8 miles East North East.
Remarks:- This aerodrome belongs to the Air Corps. Plans of this aerodrome are held at H.2, B.T.N.I.

CASTLE KNOCK.

Position:- 53° 22-1/2' North. 6° 23' West,
Location:- Five miles West North West of DUBLIN. Immediately East of the grounds of Biswellstown House.
Runways:- No laid-out runways. Maximum run East to West 850 yards. All directions 550 yards.
Hangers:- Three. One to take D.H.Moth unfolded. One about 70 ft. span. One about 80 ft. span.
Refuelling:- 1,000 gall. tank, at present empty; pump dismantled.
Nearest roads:- Secondary road from Phoenix Park to CLONSILLA runs close to South side of aerodrome. A minor road runs North and South along the East side.
Nearest railway:- DUBLIN, 5 miles. BLANCHARDSTOWN, 1-1/2 miles. CLONSILLA, 2-1/4 miles. Stations on main line DUBLIN - NAVAN.
Nearest town:- DUBLIN, 5 miles East South East.

Private aerodrome owned by Hon. A.E. Guinness.

COLLINSTOWN.

COLLINSTOWN.

Position:- 53° 25' 4" North. 6° 15' West.
Location:- The aerodrome is 5 3/4 miles North of DUBLIN on the West side of the main DUBLIN-SWORDS road.
Runways:- North to South 1,400 yards. East to West 1,400 yards. North East to South West 1,760 yards. North West to South East 1,00 yards.
Lighting:- Lighting includes four flood-lights, boundary lights, obstruction lights, ill wind 'T', and line of contact lights. Beacon installed.
Hangars:- One 300 ft. by 180 ft. by 35 ft. high. One 155 ft. by 120 ft. by 30 ft. high.
Radio:- W/T, R/T, adcock D. F. and Lorenz blind landing system. Transmitter at DUBLIN.
Fuel:- Petrol 9,000 galls. Oil 900 galls.
Obstruction:- It is reported that the aerodrome has been obstructed except for the prevailing wind runway. The method of obstruction is probably spikes driven into the ground, with wagons available to obstruct the remainder if an attack is impending.
Defence:- Two Rolls-Royce armoured cars. Also five ferro-concrete block-houses (x) one of which contains one 12 pdr.
Nearest roads:- This aerodrome is bounded by roughly a rectangle of roads, on the West side of the main DUBLIN - SWORDS road which forms the East boundary.
Nearest railways:- Main line North from DUBLIN to DROGHEDA, 3 miles East of aerodrome. Nearest station is MALAHIDE, 3 1/2 miles East by North.
Nearest town:- DUBLIN, 5 3/4 miles South. SWORDS 1 3/4 miles North East.

This is a civil aerodrome.

KILDONAN.

Position:- 53° 24' North 06° 19' West.
Location:- 4 1/2 miles West North West of DUBLIN. 1 1/2 miles West North West of FINGLAS.

Runways:-

Runways:- None. The general dimensions are:- North to South 500 yards. North East to South West 475 yards. East to West 350 yards. South East to North West 400 yards.

Hangars:- There used to be one hangar 50 ft. by 100 ft. by 48 ft. high.

Obstruction:- The ground is obstructed by stakes.

Nearest roads:- Farm road (1/2 mile long) leading to main road to DUBLIN.

Nearest Railways:- Main line railway, West from DUBLIN to MULLINGAR, ATHLONE, etc. 2 miles South of aerodrome. Nearest station is ASHTOWN, 2 miles South by West.

Nearest town:- DUBLIN, 4 1/2 miles South South East.

This is a disused civil aerodrome.

County LIMERICK

RINEANNA.

Position:- 52° 41' North 08° 55' West.

Location:- 14 1/2 miles West by North of LIMERICK on the headland known as KNOCKBEAGH POINT.

Runways:- Four grass runways thus: One - 1,750 yards by 200 yards. One - 1,717 yards by 400 yards. One - 1,760 yards by 200 yards. One - 1,783 yards by 200 yards. Concrete runway under construction 25th September, 1940.

Fuel:- Petrol 36,000 galls. Oil not known.

Obstruction:- Two thirds obstructed by stakes. The remaining one-third by G.S. wagons and timber.

Defence:- Ground defence by Air Corps personnel with machine guns and two Rolls-Royce armoured cars, seven ferro-concrete blockhouses (x), one 12 pdr in two of them. Reinforcements by mobile columns in LIMERICK area.

Hangars:- One 200 ft. by 150 ft. by 40 ft. high.

Radio:- W/T, R/T, D/F stations are at BALLYGIREEN and URLANMORE.

Nearest roads:- Special road connecting aerodrome with main road to LIMERICK.

Nearest railway:- Railway line from LIMERICK to ENNIS etc. 6 miles East of aerodrome. Nearest station is CRATHLOW, 6 miles East.

Nearest

Nearest towns:- LIMERICK, 12 miles East by
South ENNIS 11 miles North
by West.

County MEATH

GORMANSTON

Position:- 53° 38' 20" North 6° 12'
50" West.
Location:- 1 mile North of GORMANSTON.
The aerodrome is in the area
covered by the word IRISHTOWN
at O 1768 (O.S. 1/2 inch). It
is bounded on the North by
road crossing on railway, on
South by "White" road going
under railway, and on West by
a road.
Runways:- North to South 780 yards. East
to West 1,100 yards. North
East to South West 960 yards.
South East to North West 1,000
yards.
Fuel:- Petrol 29,000 galls.
Obstruction:- The landing ground is fully
staked. The staking appears
neither strong nor adequate.
Hangars:- Four hangars all in very bad
state of repair. Floors bad,
roofs unsafe, and doors unusable.
They cannot be regarded as of
use for air stores. Three 200
ft. by 170 ft. One 100 ft. by
170 ft. Doors 100 ft. by 25 ft.
Lay-out:- Similar to BALDONNEL.
Nearest roads:- Main BALBRIGGAN-DROGHEDA road,
one mile West of landing ground.
Traffic from the aerodrome
appears to use the road running
to IRISHTOWN from cross-roads
at O 166671 (O.S.- 1/2 inch)
Nearest railway:- Main line East from DUBLIN to
DROGHEDA. Nearest station is
GORMANSTON.
Nearest town:- BALBRIGGAN, 4 miles South East.
DROGHEDA, 4 miles North West.

This is an Air Corps landing
ground.

SEAPLANE STATIONS AND LANDING GROUNDS

County GALWAY

LOUGH CORRIB
(Seaplane Alighting
Area)

Position:-

Position:- 53° 31' 30" North 09° 17' West.
Location:- At North end of Lough adjacent
to village of CONG.
Runways:- North to South 1500 yards. East
to West 1000 yards.
Facilities:- Flying boat slipway 6 ft. wide,
suitable for A.C. of very large
span, equipped with block and
tackle for hauling up; no cradle.
A marked passage leads into a
sheltered harbour 800 yards by
300 yards providing a good
anchorage in all weathers.
Nearest roads:- Good roads from CONG to slipway
and quays. Two third class
roads lead to BALLINROBE and
HEADFORD on main GALWAY-CASTLEBAR
road.
Nearest railway:- Nearest station at BALLINROBE
6 miles North North East, terminus
of single track branch line to
CLAREMORRIS.
Nearest towns:- CASTLEBAR--21 miles.
BALLINROBE--6 miles.
HEADFORD--9 miles.
GALWAY--23 miles.

KILLARY BAY
(Seaplane Alighting
Area)

Position:- 53° 38' North 10° 00' West.
Location:- Inlet between County MAYO and
County GALWAY.
Runways:- There is a stretch a few miles
long at the landward end of the
bay suitable for all marine
aircraft. It is very sheltered
and affords good anchorage and
landing in all weathers.
Facilities:- No details available.
Nearest roads:- At LEENANE. These are fair
roads but there are many narrow
bridges on them. No railway.
Nearest town:- LEENANE which is on the bay
itself.

BALLYNAKILL HARBOUR
(Seaplane alighting
area)

Position:- 53° 34' North 09° 58' 30" West.
Nearest town:- CLIFDEN, 6 miles.
Surface:- Water.
Communications:- Road.
Dimensions:- Not known.
Remarks:- There is a good alighting area
and anchorage in this inlet
3/4-mile West of the mouth of
the DAWROS River in position
L 687595 (O.S. 1/2-inch).

County

County KILDARE

CURRAGH CAMP
(Landing Ground.)

Position:- 53° 09' North 06° 51' West.
Location:- Bounded on South by the Military Camp, on North by undulating grass land reaching to racecourse 1,000 yards distant: on East by tarred road running roughly North and South from centre of Camp buildings.

Runways:- No laid out runways. Dimensions of landing area: East to West 550 yards (capable of extension to 800 yards). North to South 400 yards. South West to North East 550 yards. South East to North West 550 yards. Used by Lysander aircraft.

Refuelling:- Two mobile pumps on road on East side of landing ground.

Defence:- Two 12-pdr. guns.

Nearest roads:- Arterial road between KILDARE and NEWBRIDGE runs along North side of landing area. All roads adjacent to Camp are tarmac and in good condition. Suitable for all traffic.

Nearest railway:- Main DUBLIN-CORK line runs 2 miles North of Camp. Nearest station KILDARE 3 1/2 miles West.

Nearest town:- NEWBRIDGE, 3 miles North East. KILDARE, 3 1/2 miles West.

Remarks:- The racecourse has great possibilities for development, with runs up to 600 yards. Camouflage of aircraft would be assisted by the numerous clumps of gorse bushes scattered all over the course. Plan of this aerodrome in possession of B.T.N.I. (British Troops in Northern Ireland).

LEIXLIP
(Landing Ground)

Position:- 53° 21' North 06° 29 1/2' West.
Location:- 1 mile South of LEIXLIP in Westonpark, between the CELBRIDGE-LUCAN road and the R. LIFFEY.

Runways:- Maximum runs:- North to South 700 yards. North East to South West 500 yards. Bounded on East by main road and surrounded by trees. Hardly large enough for service types in view of trees and would be difficult to extend.

Facilities:- Facilities, details not available. In readiness for use as satellite aerodrome to BALDONNEL.

Nearest

Nearest roads:- Adjoins main road CELBRIDGE-DUBLIN.
Nearest railway:- LEIXLIP station 3 1/4 miles by road. Main Great Southern Railway line DUBLIN-MULLINGAR-ATHLONE.
Nearest town:- LEIXLIP, 2 miles North.
LUCAN, 1 1/2 miles East.
CELBRIDGE, 2 1/2 miles South West.

County LIMERICK

FOYNES
(Seaplane Station)

Position:- 52° 37' North 09° 06' West.
Location:- In estuary of R. SHANNON, North East of FOYNES ISLAND and FOYNES.
Runways:- Runs of 2 miles in all directions available in SHANNON estuary.
Fuel:- Three large petroleum storage tanks near jetty.
Moorings:- Two for large flying boats.
Landing pier:- At FOYNES.
Radio:- W/T, R/T and D/F.
Nearest roads:- Main roads from FOYNES to LIMERICK, TRALEE, CORK, etc.
Nearest railway:- Railway lines from FOYNES to LIMERICK, TRALEE, CORK, etc.
Nearest town:- LIMERICK, 16 miles East by West.

KILCONRY
(Seaplane Alighting Area)

Position:- 52° 43' North 08° 59' West.
Location:- In estuary of rivers FERGUS and SHANNON.
Runways:- Runs of 2 miles in all directions available in FERGUS and SHANNON estuaries.
Facilities:- No details available.
Nearest Roads:- Special road joining RINEANNA land aerodrome adjoining with main road to LIMERICK. Other roads connecting with roads to LIMERICK at BALLYCARRY, CLENAGH, etc.
Nearest railway:- Railway line from LIMERICK to ENNIS etc. 8 miles East to 4 miles of FERGUS estuary. Nearest stations are at GRATLOE, 8 miles East; SIXMILEBRIDGE, 8 miles East by North; QUIN, 6 miles North East; and CLARE CASTLE, 6 miles North.
Nearest town:- ENNIS, 9 miles North. LIMERICK, 14 miles East by South.

This is a civil seaplane alighting area.

RINEANNA

RINEANNA

(Seaplane Station)

Position:- 52° 42' North 08° 55' West.
Location:- In estuary of R. SHANNON adjacent to RINEANNA aerodrome and immediately West of KNOCKBEAGH POINT.
Hangars:- Contracts for construction of hangars, slipway, etc. were to have been placed in May, 1940.
Runways:- Runs of 2 miles in all directions available in SHANNON and FERGUS estuaries.
Radio:- W/T, R/T and D/F.
Nearest roads:- Special road joining SHANNON (RINEANNA) land aerodrome with main road to LIMERICK. Many quays with local roads connected to LIMERICK on South side of R. SHANNON.
Nearest Railway:- Railway line, from LIMERICK to ENNIS etc., 6 miles East of seaplane station. Nearest station is CRATLOE, 6 miles East.
Nearest towns:- LIMERICK, 12 miles East by South. ENNIS, 11 miles North by West.

SITES REPORTED SUITABLE FOR USE BY AIRCRAFT

County CLARE

ENNIS

Position:- 52° 49 1/2' North 08° 56 1/2' West.
Nearest town:- CLARECASTLE, 3/4 miles. ENNIS, 2 miles.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- 400 yards in three directions.
Remarks:- A triangular field 2 miles South East of town giving 400 yards in three directions. Boundaries are stone walls 4-6 ft. high. Extensions might be possible.

County CORK

BALLINCOLLIG 1

Position:- 51° 53' North 08° 35' West.
Nearest town:- CORK.
Surfaces:- Grazed grassland.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North to South 300 yards. East to West 800 yards. North East to South West 400 yards. North West to South East 400 yards. Capable of extension to give 1,000 yards run East to West.
Obstruction:- Shallow and ineffective ditches.
Remarks:- A one-way site only.

BALLINCOLLIG 2

BALLINCOLLIG 2

Position:- 51° 52' 30" North 08° 35' West.
 Nearest town:- CORK.
 Surface:- Grass.
 Communications:- Road and Rail.
 Dimensions:- East to West 800-1,000 yards.
 North to South 300 yards.
 Remarks:- Situated 5 miles West of CORK, 3/4 mile South of BALLINCOLLIG "a" and just South of the railway. The site is on a long ridge with the ground sloping away in the North and South sides, and is open and unobstructed. The prevailing wind blows from West to East.

BELVELLY BRIDGE

Position:- 51° 53' North 08° 18' West.
 Nearest town:- COBH (QUEENSTOWN).
 Surface:- Grass.
 Communications:- Road and Rail.
 Dimensions:- Runs: East to West 700 yards.
 North to South 300 yards.
 Obstruction:- Extensively staked.
 Remarks:- Has been used as landing ground by Cobham's Circus.

SALEEN

Position:- 51° 52' North 08° 10' West.
 Nearest town:- KILKENNY, 2 1/2 miles.
 Surface:- Grass.
 Communications:- Road and Rail.
 Dimensions:- North to South 400 yards,
 East to West 700 yards.
 Remarks:- A field on high ground 1 1/2 miles West of CLOYNE. There is a runway of about 400 yards from North East to South West with a considerable slope at either end. There is a stone wall cattle enclosure within the field and odd boulders are strewn about. Now staked all over with 6 ft. posts.

CLOYNE

Position:- 51° 51' 45" North 08° 05' West.
 Nearest town:- CLOYNE, 1 1/4 miles.
 Surface:- Grass, on light clay. Area slopes very slightly North.
 Communications:- Road only, nearest railway at MIDLETON, 6 miles North West.
 Dimensions:- North to South 1,100 yards,
 East to West 950 yards, North West to South East 1,350 yards,
 North East to South West 900 yards.

SKIBBEREEN

Position:- 51° 33' North 09° 14' West.
 Nearest town:- SKIBBEREEN.

Surface:-

Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North to South 500 yards.
Remarks:- Between road and railway,
just North of town. A long
and narrow field, running
North and South. Only fit
for use in that direction.
Has been used for Avro's.

WHITEGATE BAY

Position:- 51° 50' North 08° 14' West.
Nearest town:- CLOYNE.
Surface:- Sheltered water.
Communications:- Road.
Dimensions:- Small bay.
Remarks:- Enclosed bay approximately
3/4 mile across, affording
complete shelter. Eastern
side of CORK harbour. 6
miles South West of CLOYNE.

County DUBLIN

DUBLIN (LEOPARDSTOWN)

Position:- 53° 16' North 06° 11 1/2' West.
Nearest town:- KINGSTOWN, 3 miles.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Remarks:- (a) Racecourse. The ground
slopes away in all directions
from North West corner. Longest
run approximately 1,000 yards
North North West to South South
East on West side of course.
Ground on East side probably
soft and unserviceable in wet
weather. Removal of barriers,
hedges, trees etc., and ground
levelling necessary before site
could be used for modern aircraft.
(b) There is also a small field
adjoining the racecourse sloping
slightly towards the South East.
Maximum dimensions in a North
West - South East direction.
Surrounded by low hedges. This
has been used satisfactorily
by a D.H. "Rapide". (Dimensions:
North West - South East 400
yards. North East - South West
250 yards).

DUBLIN (PHOENIX PARK)

Position:- 53° 21 1/2' North 06° 20' West.
Nearest town:- DUBLIN.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Defence:- Two 12-pdr. guns.
Dimensions:- North East to South West,
1,500 yards. North West to
South East 700 yards.

Remarks:-

Remarks:- A ready made landing ground with ample room for further development. At present obstructed by stakes.

DUBLIN BAY

Position:- 53° 20' North 06° 12' West.
Nearest town:- DUBLIN.
Surface:- Sand.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North West to South East 3 miles.
Remarks:- Beach, situated just South of mouth of R. LIFFEY. Good hard sand at low water.

PORTMARNOCK STRAND

Position:- 53° 25' North 06° 07' West.
Nearest town:- DUBLIN.
Surface:- Sand.
Communications:- Road.
Remarks:- A fine stretch of sand on the coast 7 1/2 miles North East of DUBLIN and 3 miles North West of HOWTH. At present obstructed.

County GALWAY

BALLYNAKILL HARBOUR
(Seaplane alighting area)

Position:- 53° 34' North 09° 58' 30" West.
Nearest town:- CLIFDEN, 6 miles.
Surface:- Water.
Communications:- Road.
Dimensions:- Not known.
Remarks:- There is a good alighting area and anchorage in this inlet 3/4-mile West of the mouth of the DAWROS River in position L 687595 (O.S. 1/2-inch).

ORANMORE

Position:- 53° 17' North 08° 55' West.
Nearest town:- GALWAY.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North to South 300 yards. East to West 760 yards. North East to South West 800 yards. North West to South East 900 yards.
Obstructions:- At present obstructed by cratering.
Remarks:- Situated 6 miles East of GALWAY. 500 yards North East of ORANMORE Railway Station. Approaches fair, but telephone wires on West and South sides. No flying when wind is between North East and South East or North West and South West.

TUAM

Position:- 53° 29 1/2' North 08° 49' West.
Nearest town:- TUAM, 1 1/2 miles.

Surface:-

Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Remarks:- A racecourse 1 1/2 miles South East of the town. A large area suitable for development if the wooden racecourse buildings and barriers are removed.

County KERRY

INCH PENINSULA

Position:- 52° 08' North 09° 59' West.
Nearest town:- TRALEE.
Surface:- Sand.
Communications:- Road.
Dimensions:- North to South 2 - 3 miles.
Remarks:- Beach, situated on West coast of INCH PENINSULA, DINGLE BAY, stretch of good hard sand suitable for use within one hour either side of low water. Nearest station and towns:- TRALEE - 18 miles, KILLARNEY - 24 miles.

KILLARNEY 1

Position:- 52° 04' North 09° 34' West.
Nearest town:- KILLARNEY.
Surface:- Very rough grass.
Communications:- Main Road.
Dimensions:- North to South 400 yards.
North East to South West 650 yards. East to West 600 yards. South East to North West 650 yards.
Remarks:- Situated 3 miles West of town on lake side. Mainly on East to West site, surrounded by trees. Take off to North impossible. Only suitable for lightly loaded Dragon or similar types.

KILLARNEY 2

Position:- 52° 02 1/2' North 09° 28 1/2' West.
Nearest town:- KILLARNEY, 2 miles.
Surface:- Grass.
Dimensions:- 600 yards by 500 yards.
Remarks:- A good field 2 1/2 miles South East of the town. Has been used by D.H. "RAPIDE".

TRALEE

Position:- 52° 16' 30" North. 09° 41 West.
Nearest town:- TRALEE.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North East to South West 800 - 1,000 yards. North West to South East 500 yards.

Remarks:-

Remarks:- Racecourse, situated 2 miles North East of TRALEE in open country. Suitable for all types of aircraft. NOTE:- All the country in the neighborhood of TRALEE is open. There are many large fields of 20 - 30 acres with good grass surfaces. Field boundaries consist of stone walls.

VALENCIA

Position:- 51° 55' North 10° 18' West.
Nearest town:- CAHIRCLVEEN.
Communications:- Water to Knights Town, where there is rail and road.
Dimensions:- Maximum run 400 yards.
Remarks:- Landing ground on East side of island somewhere near KILBEG. Believed used by Western Airways. Surface, not known.

County KILDARE

ATHY

Position:- 52° 58' North 07° 00' West.
Nearest town:- ATHY.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North to South 350 yards.
North East to South West 450 yards. East to West 300 yards. South East to North West 450 yards.
Remarks:- 3 miles South West of town, on the main road. Surrounded by trees. Ground slopes slightly to North East and there are a few ridges. Suitable for light aircraft. There are other fields in the neighbourhood, but those on the North of town have telegraph wires along the Western side and would be dangerous.

BISHOPSCOURT HOUSE

Position:- 53° 16' North 06° 34' West.
Nearest town:- NAAS.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Main Road.
Dimensions:- Maximum run exceeds 500 yards.
Remarks:- 5 miles North East of NAAS, on North side of main NAAS - DUBLIN road. Very large field reported suitable for all types. At one time marked with a circle and name.

County KILKENNY

KILKENNY

Position:- 52° 41 1/2' North 07° 14 1/2' West.

Nearest

Nearest town:- KILKENNY, 2 1/2 miles.
 Surface:- Grass.
 Communications:- Road and Rail.
 Dimensions:- 450 yards by 450 yards.
 Remarks:- A good square field 2 1/2 miles North of town surrounded by low hedges. Suitable for extension.

County LEIX

MARYBOROUGH

Position:- 53° 03' North 07° 16 1/2' West.
 Nearest town:- MARYBOROUGH, 1 1/2 miles.
 Surface:- Grass.
 Communications:- Road and Rail.
 Dimensions:- 550 yards by 300 yards.
 Remarks:- A good field 1 1/2 miles North East of town. Close to a railway line. Maximum dimensions North-South. No obstructions on approaches from the North. Trees 80 ft. high 250 yards from North boundary.

County LIMERICK

ADARE

Position:- 52° 33' North 08° 50' West.
 Nearest town:- ADARE, 1 1/2 miles.
 Surface:- Flat grass fields on light loam soil.
 Communications:- Road.
 Remarks:- A number of fair sized fields 1 1/2 miles South West of ADARE, South of the road to RATHKEALE. At present divided by hedges and walls. Landing ground could be constructed giving 1,000 yards run in three directions without obstructions. Detailed information available.

LIMERICK 1 (Roche Castle)

Position:- 52° 37' 45" North 08° 39' 28" West.
 Nearest town:- LIMERICK, 2 1/2 miles.
 Surface:- Close cropped grass, sloping slightly South East.
 Communications:- Road and Rail.
 Dimensions:- North North West - South South East 400 yards. East North East - West South West 900 yards.
 Remarks:- Situated on the estate of ROCHE CASTLE 2 miles South West of LIMERICK. Ground slopes gently to South East. Suitable for extension to give a landing area 900 yards by 900 yards. Accommodation and garage available in neighbourhood. Detailed information and plan available.

LIMERICK 2

LIMERICK 2
(Annacotty)

Position:- 52° 39' 45" North 08° 33' 40" West.
Nearest town:- LIMERICK, 2 1/2 miles.
Surface:- Good grass, sloping slightly to South.
Communications:- Road.
Dimensions:- Runs:- North West - South East 700 yards by 200 yards. North East - South West 500 yards by 200 yards.
Remarks:- Golf course, formerly a race-course. Situated 2 1/2 miles East of LIMERICK, and South of main road to NEWPORT: bounded on East by minor road. The runs are fairways on the golf course. Suitable for LYSANDERS.

NEWCASTLE WEST

Position:- 52° 27' 30" North 09° 02' 30" West.
Nearest town:- NEWCASTLE WEST, 3/4 mile.
Surface:- Pasture.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North - South 600 yards.
Remarks:- A site formerly used by Cobham's Air Circus situated 3/4 mile North East of NEWCASTLE WEST. Suitable for extension to give runs of 800 yards in three directions. Approaches good. Detailed information and plan available.

County LOUTH

DROGHEDA

Position:- 53° 42' North 06° 17' 1/2' West.
Nearest town:- DROGHEDA, 2 1/2 miles.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- 450 yards by 450 yards.
Remarks:- A good square field 2 1/2 miles South East of the town, bounded by low hedges. Suitable for development.

DUNDALK

Position:- 54° 01' North 06° 22' West.
Nearest town:- DUNDALK.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North to South 450 yards, East to West 250 yards.
Remarks:- Racecourse. Has been used by light aircraft, but is not a good landing ground.

County MAYO

BALLINROBE

Position:- 53° 38' North 09° 13' West.
Nearest town:- BALLINROBE.
Surface:- Grass, uneven.
Hangars:- One, to take Moth unfolded.

Communications:-

Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- Runway exceeds 500 yards.
Remarks:- Racecourse. High trees at one end but ground probably suitable for light service types.

County MEATH

BALLYBOY HOUSE

Position:- 53° 38' North 06° 53' West.
Nearest town:- ATHBOY.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Main Road.
Dimensions:- Runway exceeds 500 yards.
Remarks:- 2 miles North East of ATHBOY. About five fields here, possible for use by light aircraft.

CLOONBARRY HOUSE

Position:- 53° 35' North 06° 54' West.
Nearest town:- ATHBOY.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road.
Dimensions:- Maximum runway 400 yards.
Remarks:- 1 mile West of main road ATHBOY to TRIM. 3 miles South of ATHBOY and 4 miles North West of TRIM. A training ground for racehorses. Possible for light aircraft.

NAVAN

Position:- 53° 42' North 06° 46' West.
Nearest town:- NAVAN.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- 550 yards by 560 yards.
Remarks:- There is a very good field on the main road between KELLS and NAVAN about half way between these two towns close to the road. Approx. 550 yards square and from the nature of the surrounding terrain it appears suitable for development.

County SLIGO

SLIGO

Position:- 54° 18' North 08° 29' West.
Nearest town:- SLIGO.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- 450 yards by 450 yards.
Remarks:- Good square field. 1 mile North West of the town of SLIGO, bounded by low hedges and suitable for extensions.

County TIPPERARY

LAKEFIELD HOUSE

Position:- 52° 26' 30" North 07° 41' West.
Nearest town:- FETHARD.
Surface:-

Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- Not known.
Remarks:- Approximately 2 miles South of town, big field sloping slightly. Very high trees at one end. Possible for use by light aircraft.

County WATERFORD

ARDMORE

Position:- 51° 58' North 07° 44' West.
Nearest town:- YOUGHAL.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Bye-road.
Dimensions:- Not known.
Remarks:- About 2 miles North of ARDMORE, and one mile West of CURRAGH. Landing ground is not good, but could be made suitable for light service types.

ARDMORE BAY

Position:- 51° 58' North 07° 43' West.
Nearest town:- YOUGHAL.
Surface:- Water.
Communications:- Not known.
Dimensions:- Not known.
Remarks:- Bay approximately 1 mile from CURRAGH POINT and ARDMORE HEAD. Sheltered from the North, South and West.

TRAMORE

Position:- 52° 10' North 07° 08' West.
Nearest town:- TRAMORE, 1 mile.
Surface:- Grass, sloping gradually East.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- North to South 900 yards maximum. East to West 1,500 yards.
Remarks:- Large field lying immediately East of the TRAMORE - WATERFORD Ry. and one mile East of the town. Approaches from the North and West over moderately high ground. Detailed information and plan available.

County WESTMEATH

ATHLONE 1

Position:- 53° 24 1/2 North 07° 56 1/2' West.
Nearest town:- ATHLONE, 1 1/2 miles.
Surface:- Grass.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- 600 yards by 400 yards.
Remarks:- A very excellent field 1 1/2 miles South of town on right bank of R. SHANNON. Open on all sides but owing to proximity to the river flooding might occur.

ATHLONE 2

ATHLONE 2

Position:- 53° 25' North 07° 54' West.
 Nearest town:- ATHLONE, 1 mile.
 Surface:- Grass.
 Communications:- Road and Rail.
 Dimensions:- Not known.
 Remarks:- Field used by Cobham Air Circus, 1 mile East of ATHLONE on North side of main road to MOATE. Suitable for Lysanders or similar aircraft only. Possibly soft ground in Winter. At present extensively staked.

County WEXFORD

FERNS

Position:- 52° 35' North 06° 32' 30" West.
 Nearest town:- FERNS. 2 miles.
 Surface:- Close cropped grass on light sandy soil.
 Communications:- Road.
 Dimensions:- Maximum run East to West 900 yards, by 500 yards (max).
 Remarks:- Several flat fields 2 miles West by South of FERNS lying South of secondary road to BALLYCARNEY. Removal of hedges would provide an area large enough for fighter aircraft. Local accommodation limited. Detailed information and plan available.

JOHNSTOWN CASTLE

Position:- 52° 17' North 06° 30' West.
 Nearest town:- WEXFORD, 3 1/2 miles.
 Surface:- Grass, undulating.
 Communications:- Road.
 Dimensions:- Not known.
 Remarks:- 3 1/2 miles South West of WEXFORD on South West side of road to MURNTOWN. A north-east - South West site. A wire fence lies across the runway. Approaches could be improved by removal of trees. At present completely staked. Has been used by a Monospar and would be suitable for a detached flight of Lysanders or similar aircraft, possibly for a squadron in emergency. Owner: Lady M. Fitzgerald. Telephone No. Wexford 28. Detailed information and plan available.

NORTH SLOB

Position:- 52° 22' North 06° 24' West.
 Nearest town:- WEXFORD, 4 miles.
 Surface:- Grass.
 Communications:- Cart track only.
 Remarks:- Reclaimed grass land area known as the SLOB immediately North of WEXFORD HARBOUR and surrounded by a creek. The land is divided

up by dykes. Some of the fields reputed large enough to operate fighter aircraft under summer conditions. After October the area becomes a quagmire.

NEWTONBARRY HOUSE

Position:- 52° 40' North 06° 40' West.
Nearest town:- NEWTONBARRY, 1/2 mile.
Surface:- Short cropped grass, light soil, sloping moderately North East.
Communications:- Road.
Dimensions:- Runs: North-South 1,000 by 100 yards. North East-South West 1,000 X 100 yards. North North West-South South East 1,000 yards X 100 yards. East-West 800 yards.
Remarks:- A park of about 113 acres 1/2 mile North West of NEWTONBARRY. The perimeter is wooded. Suitable for Lysanders; poor for fighters owing to slope. Ample local accommodation. Telephone: Newtonbarry 4. Detailed information and plan available.

ROSEGARLAND

Position:- 52° 17' North 06° 45' West.
Nearest town:- WELLINGTON BRIDGE. 1 1/2 miles.
Surface:- Grass. Light soil remaining hard during winter months.
Communications:- Rail: WELLINGTON BRIDGE station.
Road: 2nd and 3rd class roads to site.
Dimensions:- North to South 800 yards. East to West 400 yards (maximum).
Remarks:- Situated at a cross roads 1 mile North of WELLINGTON BRIDGE in the Estate of ROSEGARLAND HOUSE. A large field in South West sector of the cross roads, capable of extension. Has been used by a Monospar. Accommodation: adequate accommodation available in the neighbourhood. Telegraph and Telephone: At Wellington Bridge. Owner: F. Leigh, esq. Detailed information and plan available.

County WICKLOW

SHILLELAGH

Position:- 52° 45' North 06° 31 1/2' West.
Nearest town:- SHILLELAGH, 1/4 mile.
Surface:- Grass, possibly liable to flooding.
Communications:- Road and Rail.
Dimensions:- Not known.
Remarks:- A field in South East sector of "T" road junction 1/4 mile East

of SHILLELAGH; lies in a hollow bounded by high ground on North, East and West sides. Suitable for Lysanders; for fighters only with a South wind.

GREATER SALTEE ISLAND Position:-

52° 07 1/2' North 06° 36 1/2' West.

Nearest town:-

KILMORE QUAY on mainland.

Surface:-

Grass.

Communications:-

Nearest port KILMORE QUAY.

Nearest railway station

BRIDGETOWN G.S. & W. Railway, 4 miles.

Dimensions:-

North East-South West 500 yards.

Remarks:-

A field on the North side of the island. The longest diagonal run approximately 500 yards in a North East - South West direction. Low boundaries on all sides. Has been used by Air Speed Ferry and Avro Tutor.

A P P E N D I X "B"

THE SEAPORTS OF EIRE

BALTIMORE HARBOUR Lat. $51^{\circ} 27'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 16'$ W.

Shallow but affords secure anchorage for a large number of vessels under 10 feet draught and sufficient shelter just within the entrance for a few vessels drawing up to 24 feet. Depth at entrance 60 feet; at quays 6 feet at L.W. and about 18 feet at H.W.

Quays:- Old Pier about 230 feet long.
New Pier length unknown. Railway connected to discharging berth on latter.

Rise of Tide:- Springs 10 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

BANTRY BAY Lat. $51^{\circ} 40'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 45'$ W.

21 miles long by 4 to 6 miles wide. Easy of access. Depth at entrance 36 feet but exposed to westerly winds. Formerly used as a fleet anchorage, it affords security to the largest vessels. Landing difficult. Harbours include BANTRY, GLENGARIFF, BEREHAVEN, ADRIGOLE, and CASTLETOWN.

BANTRY HARBOUR

Secure and well sheltered for large ships. Depth at entrance 36 feet, at head of pier 26 feet and at berths 15 feet average S.T. It has two piers, one at the terminus of the railway.

Rise of Tide:- Springs 12 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

BEREHAVEN

Excellent harbour. Shelter for all classes of vessel against all weathers; spacious and easy of access. No railway within 30 miles.

Quays:- Negligible.

Rise of Tide:- Springs 10 feet.
Neap 8 feet.

BLACKSOD BAY Lat. $54^{\circ} 04'$ N. Long. $10^{\circ} 19'$ W.

Large bay, easy of access. Secure anchorage for a large number of vessels, but vessels of deep draught can lie only near ARDELLY POINT on the west coast of the north limb of the bay.

South end.

Difficult entry.
No quay facilities.
Railway terminus at ACHILL SOUND
VILLAGE nearby.

North

North end. BELMULLET.

Very difficult entry.

Quays:- 240 feet, for vessels up to 10 feet draught.

This area was regularly used by the fleet.

No railway for 40 miles.

BLACKSOD POINT.

Pier 225 feet x 36 feet. Depth alongside 10-12 feet at high water.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 10 feet.

Neap 7 feet.

BRANDON BAY Lat. 52° 15' N. Long. 10° 15' W.

Not safe in certain winds nor with any appearance of bad weather. Completely exposed to the N.W.

Small railway 6 miles away. A small pier with storm wall.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.

Neap 9 feet.

CAHIRCIVEEN Lat. 51° 58' N. Long. 10° 20' W.

One pier protected from the West by breakwater. Berths for three steamers of from 800 to 1,000 tons each and six sailing vessels of from 200 to 300 tons each. Approachable at all times of tide.

Depth 12 feet L.W. and 26 feet on bar at H.W. At quay about 6 feet at L.W. Railway communication.

CARLINGFORD LOUGH Lat. 54° 01' N. Long. 6° 05' W.

Secure anchorage for vessels up to 2,000 tons, drawing 24 feet. The entrance is dangerous, especially at L.W. and above KILLOWEN the Lough is very shallow. It is connected with LOUGH NEAGH by NEWRY CANAL.

Harbours include CARLINGFORD and GREENORE.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 15 feet.

Neap 12 feet.

CARLINGFORD Lat. 54° 03' N. Long. 6° 11' W.

A small tidal harbour enclosed by two piers, the new one sheltering from all winds. Depth 10-15 feet H.W.S.T. Dry at L.W.S.T. Depth at entrance H.W.S.T. 15 feet, the width being 600 feet. Depth along quay 15-11 feet. At new quay 18 feet. Vessels up to 650 tons use the port.

CASTLETOWN Lat. 51° 41' N. Long. 9° 54' W.

Anchorage and pier in BANTRY BAY, 16 feet at end of pier at H.W. Depth at entrance 15 feet. Vessels of 400 tons lie here. Depth alongside pier 13 feet H.W.S.T., 9 feet H.W.N.T. Pier accommodation inadequate.

CLEGGAN

CLEGGAN BAY Lat. 53° 34' N. Long. 10° 07' W.

Tolerable shelter for small vessels. Harbour where small craft might lie aground. Quay but no port facilities.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

CLEW BAY Lat. 53° 46' N. Long. 10° 00' W.

A spacious inlet with moderate depths and easy of access. The head of the bay is studded with a very large number of islets. Vessels up to 24 feet draught can anchor between INISHGORT and INISHGREE in a depth of 28 feet. Harbours include NEWPORT, WESTPORT and INISHGREE.

CLIFDEN BAY Lat. 53° 30' N. Long. 10° 11' W.

Difficult entrance over bar but affords good anchorage for small craft. Depth at H.W.S.T. 12 feet. H.W.N.T. 7 feet. Dry at low water.

One pier, depth alongside pier 10 feet M.W.S.T. Sometimes vessels of 100-200 tons load and discharge at pier. Vessels of 800 tons have discharged in bay. Virtually no port facilities but railway in town.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

CORK Lat. 51° 47' 33" N. Long. 8° 15' 14" W.

(Including QUEENSTOWN and PASSAGE)

Harbour provides ample anchorage for a great number of large vessels in all weathers and is easy of access day and night.

Depth at entrance 42 feet L.W. In river, Spring 29 feet, Neaps 26 feet at H.W. Alongside the wharves there are 20-30 feet at L.W. Vessels of 27 feet draught have discharged at the CORK deep-water quays, lying afloat at all states of the tide. Longest Trans-Atlantic liners can enter and leave at all states of the tide.

Depths at quays as follows:-

	<u>Length</u>	<u>Depth</u>
North Deep-Water and Penrose Quays	1,680'	24' L.S.W.
Andersons and North Custom's House Quays	1,270'	22'
South Deep-Water Quay	660'	26'
South Jetties	1,200'	30'
Albert Quay	990'	24'
South Custom's House and Lapp's Quays	970'	20'
Penrose and Patrick's Quays	1,680'	16'
Other Quays	5,300'	5-7'

Depths

Length Depth

Depths at QUEENSTOWN Quays:-

Deep-Water Quay at Railway Station	600'	24'
Ballast and Coal Quay	290'	17'

	<u>Length</u>	<u>Width</u>	<u>Depth of Sill</u>
Haulbowline Dock	608'	92 1/2'	32 1/2'
Rushbrooke Dock	580'	70'	29'
Victoria Docks, Passage West	370'	60'	16'
Albert Docks, Passage West	330'	55'	18'

The river here is navigable for ships of the largest class for about 2 1/2 miles above HAULBOWLINE to PASSAGE WEST, whence the river channel to CORK is 5 1/4 miles long by 360'-300' wide with 16 feet depth at L.W.S.T.

The port has sheer legs to lift 40 tons; hand cranes of 3 and 2 tons; two 1 1/2 ton cranes at HAULBOWLINE; electric transporters, 25 tons, 5 and 3 tons. Most of the docks at HAULBOWLINE are now out of commission.

Ample railway facilities, landing piers or quays for the use of passenger steamers and other small craft at BALLINACURRAN, EAST FERRY, AGHADA, CROSSHAVEN, RINGASKIDDY, MONKSTOWN and BLACKROCK; boat harbour at QUEENSTOWN with breakwater for shelter and accommodation for small boats.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 13 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

CROSSHAVEN Lat. 51° 30' N. Long. 9° 40' W.

A convenient place for vessels of less than 14 feet draught. Depth from 18-30 feet at L.W.S.T. in harbour, dry at L.T. at quays and berths.

Nearest railway 14 miles.

DROGHEDA Lat. 53° 43' N. Long. 6° 18' W.

Shallow and narrow entry up the RIVER BOYNE. Depth on bar 6 feet L.W.S.T. Vessels of 17 feet draught have entered the river and arrived in their berths in the harbour on the same tide.

Quayage:- 3,000 feet on North side and 1,100 feet on South side.

Depth at Quay:- Springs 21 feet, Neaps 14 feet, medium 16 feet. Good warehouse accommodation. Five steam cranes, three privately owned 5-ton electric cranes and two conveyors.

Railway.

Rise of Tide:- Springs 11 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

DUBLIN Lat. 53° 21' N. Long. 6° 16' W.

Entrance

Entrance to the harbour formed by the channel of the river LIPFEY is 1,000 feet wide. Depth on bar at L.W.S.T. about 20 feet. The river or harbour channel is about 7,635 yards long, varying in width from 334-80 yards. Vessels drawing 30 feet can enter at H.W. and vessels of 18 feet and under can enter at any state of the tide.

Depths at Quays as follows:-	Length	Depth
Alexandra Basin, South and West sides	2,682'	24-26' L.W.
Alexandra Basin, North Side	1,316'	32' L.W.
Alexandra Basin, North Side	100'	25' L.W.
Georges Dock, Inner	650'	16-17 1/2' L.W.
Georges Dock, Outer	320'	16-17 1/2' L.W.
(Width of entrance 31 1/2')		
Spencer Dock	about 1 mile	13 1/2-16 1/2' L.W.
Grand Canal Docks (There are two locks, one 150' x 35' for vessels not exceeding 148' in length, the other 120' x 25' for vessels not exceeding 108')	6,000	18' L.W.
Harbour Channel, North Side	7,464'	8-22' L.W.
Harbour Channel, South Side	5,728'	16-22' L.W.

Cranes:- Ten electric up to 4 tons in Alexandra Basin. On North side of Harbour Channel there is one electric crane of 100 tons and five up to 4 tons, also three steam cranes of 3 tons and eleven hydraulic cranes up to 20 tons. On South side there are hand cranes up to 4 tons and ten electric cranes up to 4 tons. Extensive sheds and tramways connecting with the railways. Graving docks available.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12-14 feet.
Neap 9-11 feet.

DUNDALK Lat. 55° 38' 40" N. Long. 6° 15' W.

Depth on bar 3-4 feet S.T. The largest vessel using the harbour is 1,100 tons but no vessels can enter at L.W.S.T. The channel at the town is about 300 feet wide and vessels lie alongside quays in 15 feet of water at S.T. Berths at L.W. dry. Length of channel in inner of harbour about 9,000 feet. Numerous quays on south side of channel, recently reconstructed with ferro-concrete from west end, for a distance extending 1,357 feet eastward. Patent slipway 400 feet long by 40 feet wide. Good warehouse accommodation and seven steam cranes up to 10 tons available.

Railway runs alongside vessel.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 15 feet.
Neap 11 feet.

DUNGARVAN Lat. 52° 4' 27" N. Long. 7° 35' W.

Depth

Depth at entrance 24 feet H.W.S.T. and 10 feet
L.W.S.T.

Depth at Quay 13 feet H.W.S.T. and 9 feet Neaps.

New channel is being formed south of old one. Wharf
900 feet long, dry at L.W. Railway in town.

DUNKERRON HARBOUR Lat. 51° 52' N. Long. 9° 29' W.

Well sheltered. Vessels up to 11 feet lie afloat
(up to 18 feet if they lie aground).

Landing possible at a pier at TEMPLENOE, dry at low
tide.

Off LACKEEN ROCK (between SHEEM and TEMPLENOE) room
for several large vessels and a considerable number of
small vessels with perfect security against all winds
and seas.

Large vessels bound for KENMARE town anchor south
of DUNKERRON ISLANDS and discharge part of their cargo
before proceeding up to Kenmare Pier, where they take
the ground at low water.

DUN LAOGHAIRE Lat. 53° 18' N. Long. 6° 08' W.
(Kingstown)

Large vessels can anchor but the area of good anchor-
age is restricted when easterly winds blow.

Depth at entrance 22-28 feet L.W.S.T. Quays about
3,000 feet as follows:-

Victoria Wharf	Depth 18-20 feet L.W.S.T.
Traders Wharf	10 feet L.W.S.T.
Mail Packet Pier (East side)	17-22 feet L.W.S.T.
Mail Packet Pier (West side)	15-20 feet L.W.S.T.

5-ton hand crane on Victoria Wharf and 2-ton hand
crane at Traders Wharf. Railway along Traders Wharf and
Pier.

Rise of Tide:- Springs 11 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

DUNMORE EAST Lat. 52° 9' N. Long. 6° 59' W.

West side of entrance to River SUIR, depth at en-
trance 13 feet, inside pier head 8-13 feet.

The pier 890 feet affords a secure anchorage from
westerly gales. Deep water quay 230 feet long, Depth
11 1/2 feet at L.W.S.T. Anchorage in the roadstead is
14 feet to 20 feet L.W.S.T. Secure from all but southerly
winds.

Quayage 820 feet of deep water quays and 300 feet of
quays, dry at L.W. No railway.

Rise of Tide:- Springs 12 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

FENIT

Difficult entry. Connected with the mainland by a
causeway 900 feet long, well sheltered from all winds.

Depth

Depth at entrance 16 feet L.W.S.T., at quays 22 feet. Pier 1,700 feet with railway on it and eight steam cranes, 2-10 tons. The largest vessel to use the port was of 6,000 tons.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 13 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

FOYNES Lat. $52^{\circ} 36'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 5'$ W.

800 feet quay, berths for five vessels. Deep water berths for vessels drawing 25 feet at L.W.S.T. The largest vessel to use the port was 8,000 tons. Good anchorage. Railway connects with all piers and there is one 5-ton travelling crane.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 15 feet.
Neap 11 feet.

GALWAY BAY. Lat. $53^{\circ} 18'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 5' 30''$ W.

The largest vessel can enter the roadstead and lie there at anchor in safety.

Depth in harbour S.T. 18 feet, N.T. 12-14 feet. One dock only available (Commercial Dock) maximum draft vessels 16 feet S.T. Dun Aingers Dock closed until improvement scheme completed. This includes deepening and widening of entrance and construction of new pier.

Railway and one 10-ton crane available.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 16 feet.
Neap 11 feet.

GLENGARIFF HARBOUR Lat. $51^{\circ} 45'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 34'$ W.

Harbour will accommodate vessels drawing up to 25 feet L.W.

Depth at quays 8 feet L.W.S.T. Inner anchorage 20 feet, outer 42-66 feet. No railway for 11 miles.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

GREENORE Lat. $54^{\circ} 1' 55''$ N. Long. $6^{\circ} 7' 52''$ W.

Depth at entrance 18 feet to 20 feet. Vessels drawing 14 feet can proceed two miles up the Lough.

Depths at quays 12-16 feet S.T. Has four 3-ton hydraulic cranes and one 30-cwt at coal quay.

Patent slip at WARRENPOINT.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 15 feet.
Neap 12 feet.

INISHLYRE Lat. $53^{\circ} 49'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 38'$ W.

A deep and spacious anchorage in WESTPORT HARBOUR. Depth 22 to 40 feet. Vessels are discharged afloat in 20-22 feet L.W. Largest vessel to anchor was 1,670 tons.

KENMARE Lat. $51^{\circ} 34'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 35'$ W.

Has a tidal pier, depth alongside about 13-14 feet.
Railway in town.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 11 feet.
Neap 8 feet.

KENMARE RIVER Lat. $51^{\circ} 49'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 49'$ W.

Above MacKeen Rocks there is room for several large vessels to moor in from 33-48 feet and for a considerable number of smaller vessels, with perfect security against all winds and sea. Large vessels bound for KENMARE TOWN anchor southward of DUNKERRON ISLANDS, and discharge part of their cargo before proceeding up to the pier.

Harbours include ARDMORE, BALLYCRONANE, BANNOW, KILLMAKILLOGE, KENMARE, ORMOND and DUNKERRON.

There are piers at KILLMAKILLOGE, BLACKWATER, TAHILLA and at GREENANE.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 10 feet.
Neap 7 feet.

KILLARY BAY Lat. $53^{\circ} 38'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 55'$ W.

Good anchorage for all classes of vessels at the entrance.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

KILLYBEGS Lat. $54^{\circ} 34' 8''$ N. Long. $8^{\circ} 27' 23''$ W.

Safe harbour and anchorage sheltered. Any vessel can enter at all times. Pier 300 feet long. Depth alongside 26 feet H.W.S.T. The largest vessel to use the port was of 1,200 tons.

Railway runs along the pier.

Rise of Tide:- Spring } 11 feet
Neap } average.

KILLMAKILLOGE Lat. $51^{\circ} 48'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 51'$ W.

Good anchorage in deep water. Depth at pier 16 feet H.W.S.T. No railway.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 10 feet.
Neap 7 feet.

KILRUSH Lat. $52^{\circ} 38'$ N. Long. $9^{\circ} 30'$ W.

Natural harbour and a quay with berths for eight vessels of 13 feet draught. Railway alongside quay. There is also a pier at CAPPAGH outside harbour.

KINSALE Lat. $51^{\circ} 36'$ N. Long. $8^{\circ} 31' 38''$ W.

Natural harbour improved by the construction of a pier and quay.

Depth

Depth at bar 13 feet at L.W. and inside harbour 48 feet. Pier 150 feet long, depth alongside 20 feet H.W.S.T. and 9 feet H.W.N.T. Quay 1/2 mile long, depth alongside 12-14 feet H.W.S.T., 9 1/2 feet H.W.N.T. Vessels lie aground at all berths at L.W. but can now get alongside quay at H.W. The largest vessel to use the port was of 1,000 tons.

Railway in town.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

LIMERICK Lat. 52° 40' N. Long. 8° 37' W.

Easy approach in 90-120 feet. Harbour is about 1,600 yards long and 150 yards wide. Depth on sill S.T. 22 feet, N.T. 16 1/2 feet.

Two miles of quays with a depth alongside of 14-18 feet. They are, however dry at L.W. Docks in which vessels can always float are as follows:-

Wet dock 1,385 feet long. Depth 22 feet H.W.S.T.
16 1/2 feet H.W.N.T.
Graving dock 428 feet long. Depth 17 feet H.W.S.T.

Good warehouse accommodation. Two hand cranes up to 5 tons. One 20-ton and one 5-ton electric crane for discharging coal.

Railway in town.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 22 feet.
Neap 18 1/2 feet.

LONG ISLAND SOUND Lat. 51° 29' N. Long. 9° 36' W.

Excellent shelter for a large number of vessels of light draught. Depth 18-48 feet.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 10 feet.
Neap 8 feet.

NEW ROSS Lat. 52° 23' N. Long. 6° 56' W.

Depth at entrance about 12 feet L.W., 19-24 feet H.W., and 20-30 feet H.W.S.T. alongside the discharging berths. Accommodation comprises New Quay, Custom House Quay, Charles Street Dock, Fish Dock and four private docks with average depth of 14 feet. Public quay about 250 yards long. One 3-ton crane. Warehouse accommodation available. Railway.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

ROSSLARE Lat. 52° 15' N. Long. 6° 56' W.

Harbour is well sheltered from the prevailing south and south-west winds. Depth at entrance 20 feet L.W.S.T. and 26 feet H.W.S.T.

Quayage:

Quayage: 1,040 feet with depth alongside of 17 1/2 feet L.W.S.T., and 490 feet with 14 1/2 feet. Cranes (electric). Three 1 1/2 tons, one 2 1/2-ton and one 5-ton. Railway and goods shed on breakwater.

RIVER SHANNON Lat. 52° 34' N. Long. 9° 56' W.

Spacious and secure anchorage for all classes of vessels. Easy access. Navigable for all classes up to within 15 miles of LIMERICK.

Suitable for a fleet anchorage, but poor port facilities.

SKULL Lat. 51° 31' N. Long. 9° 32' W.

A safe harbour sheltered from South West to South East. Good anchorage sheltered from all points, is from 8-21 feet in depth. Coal wharf 240 feet long with a depth of 6 feet alongside. Connected by light railway to SKIBBEREEN.

SLIGO Lat. 54° 16' N. Long. 8° 28' W.

Depth on bar at L.W. 12 1/2 feet. Good and safe channels up to quays. The ballast quay is about 2,000 feet long with a depth of water alongside of 7 feet at L.W.S.T. Deep water berths 800 feet with a depth of water of 18 feet. New concrete jetty 245 feet long. Depth up to upper quays at S.T. 17 feet and at N.T. 13 1/2 feet.

Hand cranes. Tramways to deep water berths connected with railway lines.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 11 feet.
Neap 8 feet from L.W.

LOUGH SWILLY Lat. 55° 15' N. Long. 7° 34' W.

Formerly a fleet anchorage. Accessible at all times. Very poor port facilities.

RATHMULLAN ROADS. Good shelter, bad communications.

BUNCRANA. Landing pier, but no other port facilities.

Rise of Tide: - Spring 13 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

TRALEE Lat. 52° 16' N. Long. 9° 43' W.

Depth at bar S.T. 11 1/2 feet, N.T. 9 1/2 feet, in basin 14 feet S.T., 10 feet N.T. There is good accommodation for shipping. TRALEE is at the head of a bay, the greater part of which dries at L.W. It is approached by a ship canal 13 1/2 miles long with a depth of 10 feet at S.T. and 6 1/2 feet at N.T. The basin at TRALEE has an area of about 60,000 feet with convenience for loading

and

and discharging. Patent slipway 330 feet long can accommodate vessels of 200 tons.

Seven cranes up to 50 tons. Railway. The largest vessel to use the port was 6,000 tons.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

VALENTIA Lat. 51° 56' N. Long. 10° 18' W.

A natural harbour with a pier. Depth at entrance 78 feet, at quay 13-15 feet at S.T. Railway. Largest vessel to use the port was 5,494 tons. There is a small hand crane of 2-3 ton lifting capacity.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 13 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

VENTRY HARBOUR Lat. 52° 07' N. Long. 10° 20' W.

Easy of access; space sufficient for several vessels of moderate draught to lie at anchor; subject to heavy squalls.

Quays for small vessels at:-

BALLYMORE On East side of bay; 4 miles from DINGLE where there is a light railway connecting with TRALEE (25 miles).

DINGLE HARBOUR Small vessels only. Vessels drawing up to 6 feet only.

CASTLEMAINE HARBOUR Difficult entry; small vessels only.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 14 feet.
Neap 8 feet.

DINGLE and VENTRY harbours have no lifting gear but have good sandy bottoms which could be used by punts or small boats for landing purposes.

WATERFORD Lat. 52° 7' 25" N. Long. 6° 55' 53" W.

Depth at bar at L.W.S.T. 14 feet, L.W.N.T. 17 feet. A natural harbour formed by the channel of the RIVER SUIR from the City of WATERFORD to its confluence with the BANNON and thence to the sea by the estuary of these two rivers, at a distance of 18 miles. Width of entrance 3 miles. The RIVER SUIR is navigable for vessels of 22 feet draught up to WATERFORD, where they lie afloat at the quays.

Quays:- 1 1/2 miles with a depth alongside 22 feet L.W.S.T. Quay has been mined. Two berths depth alongside 25 feet, above the bridge which has an opening 80 feet wide. Jetty 600 feet long, depth 16-18 feet.

Cranes:- One 20-ton electric on the new deep-water wharf. Three 5-ton and one 3-ton on the south side and ten small cranes on north side.

Railway

Railway is close to the quays on the south side, where most of the quays are. On the north side vessels up to 6,000 tons can lie alongside and discharge direct into trucks.

The largest vessel to use the port was 6,500 tons and the deepest draught 25 1/4 feet. Vessels windbound anchor off PASSAGE EAST.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 13 feet.
Neap 11 feet.

WESTPORT Lat. 53° 49' N. Long. 9° 30' W.

Depth at entrance 50 feet L.W.S.T. A very safe harbour. Vessels entering harbour at L.W. anchor at INISHLYRE or DORINCH and large ships bound for WESTPORT and having to discharge afloat always anchor at INISHLYRE. Quay 3,045 feet long and vessels of 15 feet draught can approach quay.

Warehouse and crane accommodation. Railway in town.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 13 feet.
Neap 9 feet.

WEXFORD Lat. 52° 20' N. Long. 6° 25' W.

Depth on bar 8 feet at L.W.S.T. Depth at entrance 12 1/2 feet S.T., 9 1/2 feet N.T. 4 miles from entrance to harbour. A natural harbour with 2,475 feet of quayage with 10-15 feet alongside at L.W. No vessels enter at L.W. The general depth of water in the harbour is from 6-13 feet. Two hand cranes and railway. Vessels up to 13 feet draught can enter at H.W.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 5 feet.
Neap 3 feet.

WICKLOW Lat. 52° 57' N. Long. 6° 0' 5" W.

Depth at entrance 10 feet to 14 feet. West pier, 1,200 feet long, with a depth alongside of 16 feet at H.W. East pier 650 feet long, with 15 feet at L.W. and 24 feet at H.W. Packet quay 300 feet long, with 9 feet at L.W. Also river quays with 10-12 feet at H.W. but dry at L.W.

One steam crane and railway. The largest vessel to use the port was 1,520 tons drawing 15 feet.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 9 feet.
Neap 6 feet.

YOUGHAL Lat. 51° 56' N. Long. 7° 50' W.

Well sheltered accommodation for a number of small vessels, except during gales from East, South-East, and South.

Depth on bar 4-5 feet at L.W.S.T. and 19 feet at H.W.S.T. Average depth in harbour 13 feet. Quays 2,000 feet long, all dry at L.W. Railway. The largest vessel using the port is 900 tons.

Rise of Tide:- Spring 12 feet.
Neap 10 feet.

LIST OF CHARTS AVAILABLE

North Coast

<u>No.</u>	<u>Subject.</u>
2752	HORN HEAD and BLOODY FORELAND.
2698	MULROY BAY and LOUGH.
2699	SHEEP HAVEN.
2697	LOUGH SWILLY.

East Coast

1772	Approaches to WEXFORD and ROSSLARE HARBOUR.
52	WICKLOW ROADSTEAD and HARBOUR.

South Coast

3725	BALTIMORE HARBOUR.
2092	CASTLE HAVEN and GLANDORE HARBOUR.
2080	CLONAKILTY BAY.
1765	CORK HARBOUR and Approaches
2081	COURTMACSHERRY BAY.
3444	CROOKHAVEN, BALLYDIVLIN and TOORMORE BAYS.
2053	KINSALE HARBOUR and OYSTER HAVEN
2129	LONG ISLAND and BALTIMORE BAY.
3348	QUEENSTOWN.
2424	VALENCIA to CORK.
2046	WATERFORD and NEW ROSS HARBOURS.
2071	YOUGHAL HARBOUR.

West Coast

3207	ACHILL SOUND, NORTHERN ENTRANCE.
954	ACHILL SOUND, SOUTHERN ENTRANCE to ACHILL BRIDGE.
1879	ARAN ISLAND to DAWROS BAY.
3165	BANTRY and GLENGARIFF HARBOURS.
1210	BEREHAVEN.
3275	BLACKSOD BAY.
2703	BROAD HAVEN BAY, and FRENCH PORT.
2844	DINGLE and VENTRY HARBOURS.
2792	DONEGAL, KILLYBEGS and TEELIN HARBOURS.
1584	RIVER FERGUS from ENNIS to the SHANNON.
1903	GALWAY HARBOUR.
2495	KENMARE RIVER.
2886	KILLARY BAY.
1918	PORT MAGEE.
2738	SALTEE ISLANDS and FENIT HARBOUR and Approaches.
1819	MOUTH OF THE SHANNON.
1547	RIVER SHANNON - CARRIGAHOLT to SCATBERY.
1538	" " FOYNES HARBOUR.
1549	" " FOYNES to MIDDLE GROUND.
1541	" " GLIN to FOYNES.
1539	" " MIDDLE GROUND to SCARLET REACH.
1540	" " SCARLET REACH to LIMERICK.
1548	" " SCATTERY to GLIN.
2852	SLIGO HARBOUR and Approaches.
2767	SLIGO and KILLALA BAYS.
2739	TRALEE and BRANDON BAY.
2030	VALENCIA HARBOUR.
2125	VALENCIA ISLAND.
1824b	WEST COAST of IRELAND.
2057	WESTPORT.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dublin, March 23, 1942.

No. 319

SUBJECT: Anglo-American Economic Policy Toward Eire.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report to you the letter referred to in my telegram No. 56 of March 20, 1942 hereto annexed which I wrote to the British Representative in Eire upon learning from Irish sources that the British Government had authorized a barter transaction of 30,000 tons of wheat now in England for Irish beer.

Respectfully yours,

DAVID GRAY

Enclosure:

As stated.

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972

Enclosure to Despatch No. 319, dated March 23, 1942.
From American Legation, Dublin, Ireland.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Dublin, March 16, 1942.

Dear Jack,

You and I have agreed that it was desirable that our respective countries and Canada should define a common Irish policy and carry it out in such a way as to prevent Mr. de Valera from playing one of us against the others. I have recently asked my government to explore this matter with your government primarily in regard to economic concessions and what might be called token grants of arms made with the intent of obtaining and holding the good-will of the Irish Army. My recommendations have been based on several considerations:

(a) The Irish government steadfastly refuses to recognize any obligation to take part in the struggle between predatory dictatorship and law-abiding Democracy.

(b) The economic policy of the Irish government is formulated strictly in the interest of the Irish people. The Irish government part with nothing which their people need or may need.

(c) The

Sir John Maffey, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.,
etc., etc., etc.,
British Representative,
Dublin.

(c) The Irish government during the year 1941 obtained about two-thirds of their normal imports, practically all from England and all by virtue of British convoys. The imports for the previous year were somewhat above normal.

(d) The Irish government occupies an undefended strategic position which jeopardizes the common security of both Britain and Ireland, a position important also in safeguarding the ocean lanes to America, yet they refuse to permit the use of these strategic bases as their contribution to the security of sea-borne imports. They are thus in a position of enjoying benefits for which they refuse to pay their just share in blood and danger.

(e) In the two years that we have been together in Dublin we have each of us become separately convinced that no generous gesture may be expected from Mr. de Valera and his associates nor any honest recognition of his position of indebtedness for security and supplies. Instead, everything they can get they use to gain credit for their Party and make political capital whenever they dare out of anti-British sentiment.

Two points have become clear. One, that the only thing we need from Eire is the strategic bases; the other is that we shall never get them by the good-will of the Irish Government. On occasions in the past, Mr. de Valera has yielded to pressure and it is possible that he might yield again. Therefore, there has been steadily growing

in my mind a conviction, in which I think you share, that the only chance of his reversing his policy is by making it patent to him and especially to his people that Eire cannot stand alone if the dry-nursing by Britain and America on which his economic existence depends be withdrawn. A designed coercion would be against our tradition and would probably defeat itself, but, since the Irish recognize the justice of Britain adopting the same policy as the Irish government, that is, making no sacrifices for others and keeping what they need for themselves, all that need be done is to cease re-exporting to Ireland what has been brought to Britain in much needed bottoms and that which originating in Britain is needed for English war effort. This should be done with the same expressions of benevolence as flow to us from Mr. de Valera, expressions which doubtless also flow from him to the Germans and Italians.

Derived from the above considerations, I communicated the following formula to my government as a recommendation based on justice and expediency: "No sacrifices for those who will make no sacrifices for us, but good-will token grants to the Irish people, so publicized that the Irish government will be unable to exploit them for political ends."

I also communicated the opinion that the recent reduction by Britain of supplies to Ireland seemed to indicate the adoption of the formula in question.

The early part of last week, Mr. Lemass, Irish Minister for Supplies, speaking in the Dail on the wheat position,

position, stated that "unless our plans work out there will be a wheat shortage of a hundred thousand tons". (This is quoted from memory.) I asked a member of the Opposition what plans Mr. Lemass had in mind. The answer was that the Irish government had negotiated a trade of thirty thousand tons of wheat for Irish beer. If this be a fact, it suspends the operation of augmenting economic pressures and postpones the only position which is favorable to our obtaining our greatest desideratum, "the ports". And that without any political gain; as you will agree that the Irish government will use the deal to strengthen their Party position.

When I report this beer-wheat trade to my government, I think it will be difficult for Washington to understand it. In the first place, at a time when every ship is so greatly needed, this transaction allots in effect thirty thousand tons to a country that is unwilling to contribute to the common effort. This is not what the American government is urging Americans to make sacrifices for. A further weakness in the American view is that it exchanges a vital necessity for what Americans regard at the best as a luxury and at the worst as a poison. If the American press gets hold of this item, there might be a bad reaction. I am anxious about it. I think that if the beer is essential, the wheat should have been given as a highly publicized humane gesture. Let us get at least some political benefit from so adverse an economic factor. I hear from some quarters that the British government would not dare publicize the transfer
of

of this amount of wheat to the Irish because of British indignation and political repercussions. This will be hard for Washington to believe or to understand as the gesture would have so obvious a purpose.

An aggravating circumstance attending the beer-wheat deal were the utterances of Mr. Corry, government member from Cork, made in the Dail during the session in which Mr. Lemass made his statement. He said in substance that in Cork the English were buying crows to feed their people. He hoped to God they would soon be eating rats. Of course there was protest by Alfie Byrne and later Sean T. O'Kelly, on the part of the government repudiated Corry's sentiments. But it is not an atmosphere that encourages one to make self-denying sacrifices.

Yours sincerely,

DAVID GRAY

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DUBLIN, March 23, 1942.

No. 320

SUBJECT: Secret Liaison Between British and
Irish Armies.

~~SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 27 of February 20, 1942, and to state that the detailed report referred to therein was held up for further information which I have only just secured.

In July, 1940, the Irish Army Command was notified by the Irish Government that a British invasion from the North was anticipated. It was the period following the breakdown of negotiations inaugurated by the late Neville Chamberlain. His aim was to secure the ports and Irish participation in the war at the most

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaeble Date FEB 10 1972

and at the least an Irish status of non-belligerency. The consideration offered was the promise of the British Government to use its best offices to end partition after the war.

Whether there was in fact any basis for the apprehensions of the Irish Government at this time I have never been able conclusively to determine. The Irish Permanent Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Walshe, told me that he had documentary proof substantiating this view. I asked him to let me see it. He said that he would "after the war." From a British Naval Intelligence officer I learned that there was a General Staff plan for the invasion of Ireland from the North, as there are plans for every military situation that might conceivably arise. However, assurances from Sir John Maffey that he knew of no intention on the part of his Government to take action against Eire have convinced me that no action was contemplated and that the alarm of the Irish Government was due either to the assumption that action would follow the refusal of the Chamberlain offer or to possibly forged evidence submitted by the Germans, who were doubtless aware of the negotiations. It is conceivable that, by German agency or other means, the Irish Government had a copy of the General Staff plan.

Whatever the motivating facts may have been, the Irish Government ordered the Army Command to prepare a defensive front along the northern border. The effect of this upon Irish Army personnel of all ranks was to excite acute anti-British feeling. Since no
attack

attack developed, the state of alarm gradually subsided, but it became apparent that, if the Irish army and country-side were to cooperate with British armed forces in the event of a German invasion, something would have to be done to effect a measure of better feeling. Sir John Maffey began tactfully to effect a relation between individuals of his Military Mission and individual officers of importance in the Irish Army. My impression is that once he launched the effort he withdrew from the picture, leaving the negotiation to military officers. The result was that an understanding was established beyond what Mr. de Valera would admit and very probably beyond his knowledge, and that the Chief of Staff, Lt. General McKenna obtained concessions of matériel which the Irish Government had been unable to obtain. It is interesting to note that the British Government similarly ignored the transaction, leaving the transfer of the arms to the Army Command in Northern Ireland.

Early in September 1941, it became clear that the Lend-Lease bases which our technicians were establishing in Northern Ireland might reasonably be expected to be taken over by us in the event of our entry into the war, a thing which had long appeared to me to be inevitable. I therefore approached Sir John Maffey and told him that, in the event of American participation in the defence of Northern Ireland, it would doubtless be desirable for a practicable liaison to be established between the Irish Army on one side and American and British forces on the other. He thereupon informed me as to what

what had already been accomplished. I then made, somewhat insistently, the suggestion that provision be made for the possibility that the Irish Army, in case of German attack, should either refuse immediate cooperation with us or cease resistance after perfunctory action, or in part assume a hostile attitude. In any of these events the individuals designated to receive and guide our forces at the border and facilitate relations with the inhabitants would be lacking. I expressed the view that we should have an adequate secret force of persons of unquestioned trustworthiness, who were resident and prominent in their various localities; in other words, an efficient fifth column of our own. In time and that Americans are generally

There appeared to be reluctance on the part of the British to consider this suggestion and I expressed myself somewhat forcibly to the effect that if American troops came into the picture, I was certain that provision would have to be made for the eventualities in question.

With the entry of American into the war, the British Military Mission have laid their cards on the table and I find that a mutual good feeling and confidence have been established between the Irish and British Military chiefs beyond what might reasonably have been believed possible. Unquestionably, the transfer of certain unimportant armament has been the prime factor in this success.

As my telegram No. 27 of February 20, 1942 states, I recommend, in the event of the assumption of the General Command of Northern Ireland by an American officer

officer, the retention of the individuals who have inaugurated and maintained the liaison and cooperative understandings between the British and Irish Armies, until such time as a satisfactory relation be established between the Irish and Americans.

Because British interests are so important in Eire, I recommend further that permanent British Military Missions be attached to our Military headquarters, the personnel of which should be chosen for their knowledge of Eire and their acquaintance in the Twenty-six Counties. There are a number of such officers now stationed in the North doing liaison work.

It appears to be an illusion that British subjects are suspect in Eire and that Americans are generally preferred to Englishmen.

The list of secret liaison agents which I suggested has been in fact compiled, but for obvious reasons cannot be disclosed.

Respectfully yours,

(Sgnd) DAVID GRAY

820

DG/HM

In triplicate

Original by Air Mail.

Triplicate by next pouch.

*file
personal*

Ireland Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I think that on the whole it is not necessary to reply to the last half of Mr. De Valera's letter -- that means not to reply at all.

If he would only come out of the clouds and quit talking about the quarter of a million Irishmen ready to fight if they had the weapons, we would all have higher regard for him. Personally I do not believe there are more than one thousand trained soldiers in the whole of the Free State. Even they are probably efficient only in the use of rifles and shotguns.

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


April 20, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our conversation on the telephone this afternoon, I am sending you herewith a copy of the note handed me this afternoon by the Irish Minister. This note contains the message addressed to you by Mr. De Valera.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'E. A. Tamm', written over the typed words 'Faithfully yours,'.

Enclosure:
From the Irish
Minister, April 20, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

April 20, 1942

Sir:

I desire to refer to your communication of February 26, 1942 in which you gave me the text of a personal message which the President requested be cabled to Mr. De Valera. The message was duly cabled, and Mr. De Valera has now requested me to ~~have~~ the following message transmitted to the President.

"Dear Mr. President:

I wish to thank you for your personal message sent through the Acting Secretary of State and duly conveyed to me by our Minister, Mr. Brennan. Your assurance that there was not, and is not now, the slightest thought or intention of invading Irish territory or threatening Irish security has relieved an anxiety which was unfortunately developing into tension. I thank you sincerely for that assurance which is so much in accord with the tradition of American principles and, indeed, your own enunciation of them.

"As you are aware, the partition of Ireland by Britain has for the past 20 years been the outstanding cause of difference between the two countries, and is now the one obstacle to that final reconciliation which well-wishers of both countries have so much desired and for which we ourselves have so long and earnestly striven. Britain's exercise of sovereignty over our six North-Eastern counties is repugnant to national sentiment here, and is deeply resented by the overwhelming majority of the Irish people. The American Government's seemingly unreserved recognition of that sovereignty, by sending its soldiers to the disputed territories without any reference to the Irish Government, appeared to be a taking of sides and a worsening of Ireland's position vis-a-vis Britain, which the Irish Government could not but deplore. In the interests of good relations between Ireland and America, which have been so uniformly cordial and happy, the Irish Government would have advised against the sending of the troops had they had an opportunity of expressing their views. Fear that the movement of American troops into the Six Counties might be a preliminary to an attack upon our position in this part of Ireland are happily dispelled by your explicit assurance to the contrary.

"One matter, however, continues to give us concern. The young men of Ireland will defend their country's liberty to the end if it be attacked. But modern equipment is required to preserve the high degree of confidence in their ability to do so effectively, which it is desirable to maintain. Since this war began, and even before that, as you know, we have endeavoured to secure this equipment from the United States, as well as from Britain. Unfortunately, except for the inadequate quantity recently received, our efforts have remained without success. As neither Britain nor the United States intend to attack us, it seems folly to leave in any way insecure so important a position as ours, when there are on the spot a quarter of a million men of the best fighting quality, ready and able to make it secure if proper weapons are put into their hands. I have repeatedly explained to your Minister here, and to the British representative, my views in this regard, and I trust you may be able to reconsider your decision and make the necessary equipment available for purchase without delay. The effect upon the spirit of our people would be incalculable as would be the resulting improvement in feeling towards Great Britain.

"May I express to you, Mr. President,
my most sincere good wishes and my sympathy
with you in the anxieties and burdens which
you are called upon to bear."

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.

(Signed) Robt. Brennan

Irish Minister

The Honorable

Sumner Welles,

Acting Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.