January 9, 1943.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss: That was about as good a speech as could have been made to Congress. Congratulations. I am glad that you took the

offensive and told them where you stood. Picking your own ground

for a fight is understood over here. What you did backs us up

a lot. They hang on every report that Congress is going back on

you, but they understand what you said in your message intimating

that, if there was to be a battle you had the issue already picked

and were smiling.

Evidence continues to accumulate that Eleanor's job in England

was a hundred per cent a success without a single sour note. I am

as well pleased with myself as they are with her. It is quite natural

that now I can borrow him and keep him on hand.

Word comes to me that Mr. Francis P. Matthews, head of the Knight

of Columba, is coming here (and is probably now in London.) I have

a hunch that this is the answer to my letter to Cardinal McNulty

though I may be wrong. The Papal Nuncio had me to lunch today very

intimately and told me that he had had advice from Monsignor

Harrington provincial for the Franciscans in New York to the effect

that Matthews was coming over to see about the welfare of

Catholic Americans in England and Northern Ireland. This means

that Harrington told him a lot more (presumably what well

wrote me). The Nuncio has opened up a lot the last few weeks.

Whether it is Rome or North Africa I don't know but today he

assented to my statement that there was only one issue from Ireland.

the issue which all parties asserted noisily was not an issue,

that is neutrality.
I told him that if he agreed with me that Partition was the question that had to be settled to ensure Irish peace he would agree with me that Dev'lera had damned little time to go into reverse and get on the bang wagon, that unless he took some position that would warrant our good offices in ending Partition and would conciliate British and Northern Ireland sentiment he was assuming the responsibility of blocking a settlement for a generation. The old Gentleman agreed. He was extraordinarily out-spoken in condemning the present policy which he has always before upheld. As I wrote you in my last I am considering a way to discuss the present situation with Dev' and tell him that the last call for dinner in the dining car has sounded. I want to put it all in the letter asking him for an appointment to discuss the matter because carefully I am very bad in verbal debate unless I have it all written out for the record. If I can provoke him and keep my own temper I find out things, otherwise he has it over me like a tent. It will probably take me a fortnight to work out this magnum opus but I know it is timely. I will send you a copy of it as soon as I get it done. We are looking forward to accepting your invitation to come back for a consultation and a bit of holiday this spring, probably early in May as soon as the direct North Atlantic route is open. Ask Sumner Welles when you next see him to ask Erhardt to hurry over the relief for my first secretary who has gone to Ankara. I must get the new man broken in before I go back to Ankara. I find I am neglecting my main job doing or I won't be able to go. I find I am neglecting my main job doing secretary's work at present. Maude sends her best. Aff
Jan 21, 1943

Dear Franklin:

I think their message to Congress is the greatest paper yet! It's a keen point for the

Heisen for 100 years, I think if the significance is firmly

Approved. Come here and I'll write you some lines this

Course and closed the business. The new author of

does so at his pen.

I was one of them and be patient about waiting

for some strength to come back. I'm just feeling no

a second of their infections that time by the area

of the 8. I know how it takes you, even though I

haven't been too sick to do my work in it.

So very for Mr. Davis.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose Mr. David Gray's undated letter transmitting the October 1942 issue of The Ulster Protestant together with his letter of January 4 to Sir John Maffey commenting on this matter. Mr. Gray suggests that these materials be forwarded to you for your information.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
1. Letter from Mr. Gray;
2. Letter to Sir John Maffey;
3. October 1942 issue of The Ulster Protestant.

The President,
The White House.
Personalty Typed.

LEGATION OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Mr. Welles: I am enclosing a copy of the Ulster Protestant anti-riot and co-optation letter which I have written to Sir John Maffey about it. I had been asked to embody this in a despatch without the President's approval, but I also wanted to emphasize this point and, I have left it to your judgment as a private citizen to decide whether this is the way to deal with the situation.

This matter came up in October, 1932, and I immediately called Maffey's attention to it. I also wrote Winant, enclosing a copy of the sheet, and took it up personally with Johnny Andrews the Northern Premier when I went up to see Mrs. Roosevelt in November. It is a question of how measures, had been taken to prevent recurrent outbreaks. Maffey tells me that the Home Office feels that it cannot interfere, and the Northern Ireland Government takes the line that it must preserve freedom of speech and avoid a severe censorship. Maffey is disturbed by this attitude and sees eye to eye with me and would have me write him as I did. Of course, technically this is beyond my bailiwick, and in my letter I have spoken from the American angle as if I were American Ambassador to St. James and without reference to Eire. But the repercussions here are direct and important. As I have taken issue with the Cardinal I cannot sleep on the Ulster Protestant matter which if exploited here would have bad consequences. Fortunately they are so used to this kind of thing that they have not exploited it here, but it is not safe to assume that it will not be exploited.

Winant has been most friendly and cooperative and I would not
assume to encourage him to preserve without his permission but
since whatever representation he may have made have been unsuc-
ful I feel my first duty is to the President and to the Depart-
ment. Dear Mr. Welles: I am enclosing a copy of the letter
that have consulted the Papal Nuncio and the Archbishop of Dublin
as to Mr. Francis Matthews. The Nuncio-think-it would help his
position if I had him stop at the Legation for a day or two at
least-I told him that my inclination was to advise him not to
see any political people, but only churchmen. I think the "absent

I thought that Mr. DeValera and
Mr. Cosgrave would be offended irishodiac-he called on them. I said
in effect what "friend" and laughed. We shall see what happens.
I think I shall take him up myself to call on the Cardinal at
the Armagh. I like an old and venerable face Christian and signed him
"Sir." Your devoted friend Mr. Matthews has not turned up yet so
it will be impossible for him to get back by January 15th. As soon
as he arrives I will arrange to have him return via me and go there
for an interview with Mr. DeValera. Soon to discuss the properties
of his departure from neutrality or at least modifying it, now that
it would be safe to do so. I think if he remains what might
be, call voluntarily neutral "the is a different bracket from a
 neutrality by fear."

I am assuming that you will take the other Protestant matter
up with the White House. I sent the President a pleasant number
and visitation
over a year ago with a leading article headed "Papist Arabs
arate 41 headquarters and base of been on ena
Traitors."

With all best wishes and many thanks for your constant help.

Mr. Know I had to say goodbye and Jan. Know, sincerely,

[Signature]
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 1-23-43

ADDRESS TO

The President,

The White House.
Dear Sir John,

Your reply to my recent inquiry regarding the "Ulster Protestant" makes me realize that I must have failed to make clear the dangerous possibilities inherent in this situation, trivial as it may appear. As the matter stands, the October issue of this newspaper with its leading article headlined "Why Aren't Convents Inspected? - The Priests' Brothel - Amazing Convent Revelations - The Murder of Infants," was lawfully printed in Northern Ireland and lawfully offered for sale on newsstands, where it was accessible to thousands of American Catholic soldiers stationed in that country and to their Catholic American chaplains. If we imagine our reaction to similar charges against our Protestant religion, we can estimate the effect on American Catholic soldiers informed that they were protecting the country which permitted this libelous affront to their faith. Furthermore, this newspaper might

Sir John Maffey, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., etc., etc., etc.,
United Kingdom Representative,
Dublin.
might readily be taken to America and circulated by enemies of England among our Catholic population with the truthful statement that it had been lawfully printed and sold in Northern Ireland without Government protest or apology. That it has not been so circulated is a piece of luck which we had better not count on being repeated. I can assure you that if this issue came into the hands of certain persons in America, a major incident might easily be precipitated.

As you know, Catholic Irish influences have been important factors in Anglo-American relations and such a wanton affront to Catholic sensibilities as this newspaper supplies is to say the least dangerous.

As you also know, the American Catholics have rallied superbly to their country's war effort and in doing so have apparently agreed to waive or forget the traditional issues which in the past have incited anti-British sentiment in the United States. Nothing could be more unfortunate than that Northern Ireland, which in a peculiar sense is beneficiary of this attitude, should show lack of appreciation.

The person chiefly responsible for winning the support of the Catholic Hierarchy in America is the President, who, by his unremitting efforts to promote Christian good-will and equal treatment for all religions,
religions, has merited the confidence of all religions. As his representative here, I assure you that, in the event of this matter being publicized in the anti-British section of the American Press, he would be seriously embarrassed.

Your suggestion that the Government of Northern Ireland, while deprecating this publication, feels that it is unable to suppress it through a censorship, appears to me to be beside the mark. Surely a police court prosecution for violation of public decency and good morals should suffice, but if not, it would seem that the war powers of a sovereign State should be able to protect its interests from a not insignificant danger.

I think it wiser to be "alarmist" about this matter than to say too late "I didn't foresee trouble."

Yours sincerely,

David Gray
CHEAP OFFER

Eleven Books
By A. J. Ferris, B.A.
Post Free 10/6 or 1/2 Each, Post Free.

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1. Great Britain and the U.S.A.
2. Armageddon at the Door.
3. The Truce of David.
4. The Great Triangle.
5. The Secret Activists
7. When Russia Invaded Palatinate.
8. When Russia Bowed Germany.

ORDER TO-DAY.

"THE ULSTER PROTESTANT.
Central Agency, 70 Royal Avenue, BELFAST.

BE A PROTESTANT ACTIONIST.

Here's One Way to Work for the Cause,
And Help Win the War!

Our readers will know by this time from recent statements in the Daily Press as well as through the B.B.C. of the latest "news" in the supply of transport to newspapers and magazines.

At this present time, it is very difficult for even the strongest to sustain any serious war. We suggest you take up the challenge of victory. We urge you to be a Protestant Actionist.

WHY AREN'T CONVENTS INSPECTED?

THE PRIESTS' BROTHEL

Amazing Convent Revelations

The Murder of Infants.

A nun who escaped from her convent-brothel in Canada, told her story and let a flood of light on the methods of those criminal places. The story went back to her childhood.

"A girl, thirteen years old, told me of the exploit of a 'priest' with her at an inn. A man of unbridled depravity, he seduced her into his bed and caused her to bear a son. When she refused to give the child to him, he threatened to kill her and said she must do what he wanted.

"She was frightened and obeyed him. The 'priest' took the child and sold it to another man, who gave it to his wife. The woman had a baby boy, but it died soon after birth. The 'priest' had the boy buried in the convent grounds.

"When the nun discovered what had happened, she was horror-stricken, but she was too afraid to speak about it. She was afraid of being sent to an orphanage or a workhouse. She knew that the convent would never have given her a chance to escape.

"She finally decided to escape and make her way to Canada, where she could be safe. She managed to reach the border without being caught and reached Canada by boat. When she arrived in Canada, she was picked up by the police and brought to the convent in Canada.

"There, she was questioned and forced to sign a confession admitting to her crimes. She was then sent to a correctional institution, where she remained for several months. She finally escaped and went to the United States, where she lived in hiding for several years.

"When she heard that the convent was being investigated, she decided to come forward and tell her story. She was then given a new identity and placed in a safe house.

"The convent was eventually closed down and the nuns were all sent to a reformatory. The 'priest' who had caused all this was arrested and charged with rape.

"The trial was a long and drawn-out affair, but the 'priest' was eventually found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.

"The nun was given a new name and a new life, and she lived in peace for the rest of her days.
THE ULSTER PROTESTANT JOURNAL

The “NATION.”
NEW ZEALAND’S NATIONAL PROTESTANT JOURNAL
Published by the New Zealand Protestants and Empire Loyally.

COMING NEXT MONTH: EXPOSURE OF JESUITISM.
PRIEST CHARGED IN ENGLAND.

Alleged Assault on Seven-Year-Old Girl.

After themagistrate at a special sitting at Prentice, North Yorkshire, heard the evidence of a seven-year-old girl, a 34-year-old priest was committed for trial.

The "girl," a 9-year-old girl, alleged that the Rev. Father, 89-year-old priest, had assaulted her. The girl was in the care of the girl's mother when the assault took place.

THE IRISH AND EXECUTIONS.

The Crooked Minds of Papists.

In the distorted perspective of the Papist mind, those who ask for justice are asking for rebellion. The government cannot tolerate any such threats to its authority.

ANNUAL MEETING OF I.C.M.

The presence of speakers from various countries at the annual meeting of the Irish Church Missionary Society, held at Oxford, was a significant event.

ENGLISH VICAR HEADING FOR ROME.

Saved by British-Italian-Isreal.

There was a time, only a few years ago, when the English Church was a powerful force in the world. But today, it seems as if the English Church is losing its influence.

IRISH PAPISTS HAVE NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO IRELAND.

Some Plain Facts.

Irish papists do not, and never had, any right or exclusive right to Irish territory. They are not more Irish than any other group of people.

PURGATORY AND THE MARD.

POPE'S PROFITABLE PUPILS.

Transcendentalism and papists, the two most profitable doctrines of the present day, are based on the teaching of the Church. They are taught in schools and universities throughout the country.

PROTESTANT PROPAGANDA.

Splendid Storehouse of Valuable Information.

Propaganda is a powerful weapon, used by Catholics to spread their doctrine. It is a tool that can be used to influence people and shape their beliefs.
DASTARDLY PLANS FRUSTRATED.

I.R.A.'s Declared Object.

Following their return from the front of one of the recent Troubles, the I.R.A. has been engaged in a series of terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. These activities have taken various forms, including bombings, shootings, and grenade attacks. The I.R.A. has called for a cease-fire and has demanded the withdrawal of British forces from Northern Ireland.

Regarding the recent Troubles, the British government has steadfastly refused to withdraw its forces from Northern Ireland, and has instead increased its military presence in the region. The Northern Ireland government, under the leadership of the Ulster Unionists, has also opposed any significant reduction in the British military presence.

The I.R.A. has been criticized for its use of violence and terrorism, and has been accused of targeting civilians in its attacks. The British government has vowed to continue its counter-terrorism efforts, and has promised to continue its military presence in Northern Ireland until the region is deemed safe.

The Troubles have continued for over three decades, and have resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries. The conflict has been fueled by a variety of factors, including political, religious, and economic grievances.

INTERNATIONAL PAPISTS.

PASCAL LEADERS ALL ROMANISTS.

It is a significant fact that all the leaders of these movements, whether in the West, in Central Europe, or on the East, are all Romanists, or at least claim to be Romanists. They all deny the sovereignty of the Pope, and all claim to be free of his jurisdiction.

As regards Monsey, the leader of this movement in Belgium, he is in close alliance with the dictators of the Papacy, and is considered a true representative of the Papal States.

That's all for this week. See you next time.
A WARIEME NEECESSITY

Results in Increased Cost of "U.P.*

Need for Readers’ Loyalty Support.

While newspapers and magazines have found it necessary to increase their price, the "ULSTER PROTESTANT," during the past three years, despite greatly increased war costs, has not only refrained from increasing the price of the "U.P.*" to its readers, but a few months after war broke out actually increased its issue.

However, as the shipping position becomes worse, and newspaper printers’ costs, etc., increased to an alarming extent, it has become absolutely necessary to ask our readers to give an extra 4d per week for their copy of the "ULSTER PROTESTANT." That is, for the duration of the war the price of the "U.P.*" will be 3d monthly—commencing with the November issue.

Considering the increased size of the new issue, the new price compares very favourably with the increased price which other publications have been forced to charge. Our readers will appreciate that it is impossible for any length of time to continue publishing the "ULSTER PROTESTANT" at the old low price of 2d while the price of everything connected with the publication of the paper had increased by leaps and bounds.

We are confident that our readers...
Spain and Roman Catholicism

Opening a Jesuit Mission Exhibition in Madrid, Father described: "The Spanish state, a war against the Roman Church, has been a powerful factor in the expansion of the religious world. From Spain and papal "civilization"

THE "TOPPERS" (PART 2).

Their Identity Told by the "Boys."

The question is: "Who's been the "tippo?" across the U.S.A.?" According to historians, and maps of learning.

Now, Jesus was the first "boy."

But after his captivity,

For witnesses were scattered,

Then Simon's name was given.

Through much tribulation they came here

To those false tales of the West;

They told tales of a people,

So named at Jerusalem:

The "tippo'" provide you with accuracy,

But one thing you lack is this knowledge

The bull unites in John's seat,

The former was in Simeon's lap.

She is the Lord of the Loom.

The "Rabbi's" friend, "A Philosopher's" vine you'd find.

The lot of Mattathias assigned.

Of olives loving, arrows, arrows,

Together with those 13 letters.

Reynes side, a Pythagorean's layer's,

Manna: He promises our understanding;

"Boys," they mocked, "you'll find no food here.

Firstly, "a Philosopher's vinegar.

The U.S.A. must be Mattathias.

The first "a Philosopher" did say.

At Jerusalem, in the temple's way.

To witness this event's first pass.

The U.S.A. must be Mattathias.

The "a Philosopher" did say.

At Jerusalem, in the temple's way.

To witness this event's first pass.

Arms symbols of Israel, I真理,

To wear the Philosopher's ring,

"Boys," are a great people, now.

"Be strong," then, "of good courage,

With Jesus's faith in Jehovah.

No, I'm not a Philosopher's vine.

90, Bafford Road, Longport.

With war costs rising at an alarming rate, the Protestant in Ulster needs to rally support to the "U.P."

BE A "PROTESTANT ACTIONIST" - HELP INCREASE "U.P." CIRCULATION.

Guarded by His mighty arm,

We rest, no fear from harm.

Peaceful arms, the dread of foes.

"He is our leader and our guide.

Throughout each dark and cloudy day,

He has been our strength and stay.

And�our help is in the name of the Lord, who takes up our cause.

A. BEGG.

PROTESTANTS MARCH TO R.C. CHURCH.

On a recent Sunday morning a parade of "Boys" took place in front of the Roman Catholic Church of Holy Cross in Ulster. The march was led by the "Protestant Actionists." About 200 people took part in the march. The marchers carried banners and placards with slogans such as "We dare not be silent." The purpose of the march was to protest against the Catholic Church's role in society.

PAPAVER PEACE.

A grave mistake would be made by anyone who should regard the Papal influence as insignificant and malicious. Says Mr. J. W. Poynter in the London Weekly: "It is a diabolical, political weapon, and a weapon that has been used against Ireland for years."

POPE'S TRIPLE CROWN.

The first pope to wear a crown was Pope Constantine (708-17). This was, however, to no avail, as the crown was worn only twice, once in 1000 and again in 1003. The second was added to the crown of Pope Nicholas II in 1059 and the third crown was first worn by Pope Alexander III in 1143.

PAPIST "VOLTA.""

"The (Roman) Catholic Church believes in the Holy Ghost, and in the Holy Scriptures as the principal source of its authority, and recognizes the Pope as the supreme head of the Church."

Many who know the grim history of the Roman Catholic Church are surprised to learn that it has been known for its freedom such as the one quoted above, and its eye-witness account is as follows:

ROMAN CATHOLIC V. SOCIALISM.

That papistry is going to be made to test its claims is evident from such statements as this one: "The Roman Catholic Church Table: There is a growing realization that all forms of socialism are potentially or actually hostile to liberty." That's good, coming from the greatest opponent of liberty, this earth ever cursed with.

TO OUR READERS.

You will be "doing your bit" to keep "Protestant Actionists" on the "U.P." and making a contribution to the welfare of the poor. This is our column, for you are worthy of your support.

Your Subscription to "The U.P." for a further 12 Months becomes due on the 1st of January. Complete the Form below and forward with P.O. for.

RECEIPT.

Thank you for your Subscription to "The U.P." (Receipt will be acknowledged in our next issue.)

To keep Ulster Protestant, buy the "U.P." weekly or monthly. If you have not done so already, please complete the Form below and forward with P.O. for.

Director of Protestant express, Maguire's Office, Belfast.


The "U.P."

76, Royal Avenue.

Belfast.

Please forward the "ULSTER PROTESTANT" to the following address for 12 months with which I enclose 4s. One.

Name...
Address...

Your Subscription to "The U.P." for a further 12 Months begins on the 1st of January. Please complete the Form below and forward with P.O. for.

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Looked to the interests of those who believe in safeguarding their Protestant Faith, British Constitution, and advocate a non-sectarian School System. Telephone: Childwell 5310.

SPARKS FROM OUR ANVIL.
By the Editor of the “Protestant Times.”

Holy Matrimony.

Some years ago a Protestant father consulted me regarding the proposed marriage of his daughter, a girl of sixteen, who had become infatuated with a youth two years older than herself who had served in India for shop-breaking and other crimes. The youth, though somewhat of a criminal, was a “good sort.” Catholic, he insisted that they should be allowed to marry in church.” Owing to the fact that she was under age it was impossible to stop this marriage by my appointing the registrar of the district. However, the couple decided to ask the magistrates to give them consent, and the Roman Catholic Police Missionary (who had some experience of young criminals) visited them on behalf of the young man. I have no wish to represent the girl’s father and mother, though there was a long police record against the young man, this could not be produced in court, though I succeeded in getting the magistrate knew what a bad lot he was. Accordingly, they refused to give their consent. The R.C. police officer told me how sorry he was. A few months later another priest married them. The girl found that she was going to be married, and what was worse, was that she and her child were infected with an unspeakable disease by the young villains of a husband. We have in all that the eyes of the Church, they had entered into the sanctity of Holy Matrimony because they were permitted by a priest.

The story is complete.

Not Wanted Here.

Ezra Pound Is Told by American Loyalties.

Thirty-three years ago Ezra Pound, the American poet, went to Italy, thinking that it was going to stay there forever. Apparently, whether he wanted to or not, Pound is staying there anyway. If any of our readers have seen E. A. Poem 1 is not going to stay there forever. Apparently, the man was not getting any respect, though they were

Warning.

Canadian soldiers from Quebec married in England at the Registry Office to 300 of this province by the British military according to the provincial government of that priest-controlled province.

The story of the Canadian Government has put its finger on this black mark.

It is perfectly true.

Papists in Quebec do not recognize British law in marriage, only recognize the marriage of a Canadian soldier and a Canadian soldier. He says, “I do not know whether I would be a good Protestant.”

Monthly Two Pence.

DOMINION M.P. THROWS LIGHT ON CANADA’S BAD PATCH.

Is There a Fifth Columnist in Quebec?

Three of us who have relatives in Canada feel a kind of ‘family pride’ when we see the fine Canadian soldier on the street. Tall, upstanding, fearless bluejacket, there is something of the freedom of the provinces in his gait. We are proud of the Generals from the great Dominion. We know nothing could be wrong in the provinces of Quebec. We know that there is no need for this foolishness in Quebec. We know that the Quebec of Canada, the homeland of the French Canadians, is not in danger. But now the Quebec of Canada, the province of Quebec, is health, freedom, and liberty to the whole world.

We are going to give this matter a chance. We are going to give this matter a chance. We are going to give this matter a chance. We are going to give this matter a chance. We are going to give this matter a chance.

French Protestants.

Resist Papist Hitler.

Article in Secret Paper.

One of the leading French Jewish organizations in this country has decided to publish a secret paper under the name of “The Frenchman.” This paper will be published in the French language and will be distributed among the French-speaking population. The following article, from a clandestine source in France, is a typical example of the type of writing that will appear in this paper:

FRENCH PROTESTANTS.

Resist Papist Hitler.

An article in the French language, in the name of the Frenchman, says: "We, the French Protestants, call upon all true Frenchmen to resist the Papist Hitler. We demand freedom for all Frenchmen, both Catholic and Protestant. We demand the cancellation of all agreements with the Papal States. We demand the recognition of the rights of all Frenchmen, both Catholic and Protestant."
THIEBERW, in 1893, $2000 Washington Avenue, Bronx New York State, Americans, just a few doors from the Police Station, are the members of the Bronx Athletic Club. The Club has the headquarters in a two-story brick building. The officers of the Club are as follows: Ennholch, President; J. W. W. Slade, Vice-President; J. W. W. Slade, Secretary; J. W. W. Slade, Treasurer; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Secretary; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Treasurer; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Secretary. The Club's history is full of memorable events, and its members have always been proud of their affiliation with the Club.

**BRONX ATHLETIC CLUB.**

At 889 Washington Avenue, Bronx New York State, Americans just a few doors from the Police Station, are the members of the Bronx Athletic Club. The Club has the headquarters in a two-story brick building. The officers of the Club are as follows: Ennholch, President; J. W. W. Slade, Vice-President; J. W. W. Slade, Secretary; J. W. W. Slade, Treasurer; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Secretary; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Treasurer; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Secretary. The Club's history is full of memorable events, and its members have always been proud of their affiliation with the Club.

**BROOKLYN ATHLETIC CLUB.**

At 889 Washington Avenue, Brooklyn New York State, Americans just a few doors from the Police Station, are the members of the Brooklyn Athletic Club. The Club has the headquarters in a two-story brick building. The officers of the Club are as follows: Ennholch, President; J. W. W. Slade, Vice-President; J. W. W. Slade, Secretary; J. W. W. Slade, Treasurer; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Secretary; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Treasurer; J. W. W. Slade, Assistant Secretary. The Club's history is full of memorable events, and its members have always been proud of their affiliation with the Club.

**THE PROTESTANT BRITON AND THE PRIEST.**

A Fable.

**THE PROTESTANT BRITON AND THE PRIEST.**

A fable.

Mr. Briton was walking in the country one day, enjoying the sunshine, the birds, the flowers, and all the activities of nature. He was walking down the road, when he came upon a little priest.

The priest greeted him and asked, "May I ask, young man, where are you going?"

"I am just going for a walk, Father," replied Mr. Briton.

"Very well," said the priest, "but I must also ask you, why are you walking?"

"I am walking to enjoy the beauty of nature," answered Mr. Briton.

"Ah," said the priest, "and why do you enjoy the beauty of nature?"

"Because it is God's creation," replied Mr. Briton.

"And why do you believe that it is God's creation?"

"Because the Bible says so," answered Mr. Briton.

"And you believe the Bible because it is the word of God," said the priest.

Mr. Briton nodded in agreement.

"And why do you believe that the Bible is the word of God?"

"Because my church teaches me that it is," said Mr. Briton.

"And why do you believe your church?"

"Because it is the church of God," answered Mr. Briton.

"And what makes you believe that it is the church of God?"

"Because it is the church that was established by Jesus Christ," replied Mr. Briton.

"And why do you believe that it was established by Jesus Christ?"

"Because the Bible says so," answered Mr. Briton.

"And why do you believe the Bible?"

"Because I am a Protestant," said Mr. Briton.

The priest looked at Mr. Briton thoughtfully and said, "Young man, you believe in many things because your church says so. But what about the things that your church does not say?"

Mr. Briton was taken aback. "What do you mean?"

"I mean," said the priest, "that you believe in many things simply because they are taught by your church, but you do not think about them. You do not question them. But what about the things that you believe that are not taught by your church? Do you question those things too?"

Mr. Briton thought about this for a moment and then replied, "I guess I don't."

The priest smiled. "And why not?"

"Because I don't want to," said Mr. Briton.

"And why not?"

"Because it is easier," answered Mr. Briton.

"And what is easier?"

"Believing in things that are taught by my church," said Mr. Briton.

"And what is the problem with that?"

"Nothing," said Mr. Briton. "It is just easier."
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss: Congratulations on your safe return from Africa, also on the results obtained there, including the capture alive of General de Gaulle. The picture of him shaking hands with Giraud, the title should be gives the show away, however, a sucker being trimmed by confidence men. Churchill has the decency to register shame, he bows his head away from the camera. You however are disclosed laughing brazenly.

Maffy the British representative here is again discussing with his government the question of the ports in the light of the new U-Boat menace. He is going to London shortly to find out what is going on behind the scenes and how likely they think the need of Irish facilities to become imperative. His ideas of procedure follow the line of my letters to you, that is a request for facilities in the name of the United Nations with you as spokesman. The request would make it plain that if refused, full publicity would be accorded the note. In the case that the request were acceded to, adequate armament for protection of Irish cities against bombing would be forthcoming. If refused, such action to be taken as seems needful, presumably occupation of the areas of land and water required but with a minimum of interference with Irish Government.

The Canadian High Commissioner has now joined us in feeling that conditions have changed to such an extent that it would be difficult for Mr. DeValera to refuse such a request for facilities without submitting it to the people. Maffy and I however believe that he would refuse.
If this were the end of the matter it would at least put him on record for the purposes of postwar adjustments and would prevent him from saying that he had been with us all along which is probably what he will say if he is not put on record.

If action were to be taken, Maffy. Kearny and I would agree that after the publicized request had been made, in view of the tide the war has taken and the corresponding orientation of Irish opinion toward the band wagon it would almost impossible for De Valera to order his troops to fire on naval forces occupying the areas in question. It would be a very lucky solution for him of a situation which he cannot like but does not know how to get out of. He would of course prefer a German attack.

I have written about this to Sumner Welles and sent him the brief of the Canadian High Commissioners report to his Government. I have heard some talk in military circles as to the need of Queenstown, Bantry, Shannon mouth and Swilly as ports of rendezvous for convoys in the event of an invasion of Europe. Whether Maffy's interest in this matter now when both he and I had assumed that all question of intervention had been abandoned is due to this possibility, I do not know.

I went all out to give Francis P. Matthews, supreme Knight of Columbus a good time when he was here. I had the Nuncio and the Archbishop of Dublin to lunch with him (separately) - you can't have them together - I motored him up to lunch with the Cardinal and did what I could. I liked Frank very much. He is devoted to you.
I am going to ask the department to order me home on leave and for consultation as soon as the direct North Atlantic route is open, say early in May. Our new secretary, Aaron Row has just arrived. I think he is going to be really good. He was four years in Mr. Hull's office. Maude is doing a great job with these young secretaries. Our best to you all including Grace Tully.

Aff

The line I have been taking here with political friends is this:

We can understand your neutrality as long as you believed that Germany was going to win. You obeyed the dictates of prudence. Now however, your neutrality is voluntary and gratuitous and if it means that you see no difference in the two causes, that you are as friendly to Germany as to us, American opinion is certain to resent it. Furthermore you deny all moral obligation for your supply and security without which there would be hunger and freezing in Dublin and a breakdown of Irish economy.

I am enclosing an extract from a letter from Tim McInerny, former editor of the Boston Post. He is a Major in the Intelligence in Northern Ireland and very able when he puts his mind to it. There might well be something in this as it is a new and face saving approach. Tim is a great supporter of John MacCormack.
More than ever your remark on "Ireland can write her own ticket if she offers Britain security" has been ringing in my head. I could really do quite an editorial on the subject, as you hit the nail on the head succinctly.

It would strike me that if Ireland, like any sensible nation, would call a military and naval conference of her own officers, those of the United States and Britain, right now, to determine a permanent policy for the security of the Atlantic, then something might well come out of it.

I don't think that the Irish people would resent such a conference if the U.S. is in on it, and the British could not very well object to our sitting in at this time. After all, Ireland is the guardian of the eastern approach to the Atlantic as well as the western approach to England. Perhaps an Allied security force could be devised under the supervision of an Allied commission, comprising Irish, American and British soldiers, airmen and sailors. All three nations achieve a sort of comradeship in this war and there is no reason why all three could not cooperate.

It is much more vital than, say, the International Ice Patrol which operates with the cooperation of Canada, Britain and the U.S.A. Such an agreement for joint defense should very well obtain construction of naval bases, patrol bases, storage places for oil and, what might be more important, adequate air fields.

Ireland would get a trained force, fully equipped, furnished her free of charge and should not object to
having her men submerged in the general scheme of an Allied force because England and the U.S. would be doing the same thing. Assuming, as most of us are now beginning to assume, that Russia may possibly emerge from this show as the dominant power in Europe, with the greatest Army and with unimaginable possibilities for sea and air strength, then the three Atlantic democracies, and we might well add Canada, face another enemy. We cannot kid ourselves that Russian communism will not be stimulated into world dreams of grandeur if it succeeds in smashing Germany.

It ought to make some good jobs for Irishmen, should help her out economically because she would have to supply food for the force, and might well prove the final solution of the partition problem. Of course, the die-hards in Ulster will never submit to Dublin domination, but there is one chink in their armor. They are ferociously greedy up here for money. If joint defense was established in the south, and the south benefited economically, then half the opposition in the north would disappear. Let the Allied defense force establish, let us say, a shipyard or two in Waterford or Cork, to build submarine chasers, etc., and let the farmers in the south of Ireland get money for their products, then the Ulster group would look invidiously and expertly upon the set-up and to hell with the border.

I would like to see you put over something like this.
I find that in Ireland everyone is affected by a constriction of vision, because of the overwhelming impact of local politics. Perhaps this vision may obscure such a constructive move as offering Britain security. I do not think that any such scheme as this will have any value after the war. The Irish will say "The war's over" with a finality which brooks of no compromise and with the optimism that the lightning will never strike again.

But I think that the whole solution is embodied in your security belief. I am in full agreement with you. In times of peace when the security force is operating on a peacetime basis, a stimulus to realization of Ireland’s dream of a maritime industry might be brought about. And the possibilities of air travel will add even to this.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I think I would telegraph
Gray that he and Spellman should
work this out together and that
doubtless Spellman will be in
London before he goes to Ireland.

F. D. R.
March 9, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Will you let me know if you wish me to send any word to David Gray in response to the message contained in his telegram of March 8 which I enclose herewith.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enclosure:
Telegram 33
from Dublin

The President,

The White House.
Dublin
Dated March 8, 1943

Secretary of State
Washington

33, March 8, 3 p.m.

Please inform the President that after getting press report that Archbishop Spellman might return to America via Dublin I telegraphed Matthews requesting him to offer Spellman, if and when he arrived in London, the hospitality of this Legation. It is known here that Spellman has obtained Eire visa while in Rome and great interest is evident in church and political circles. I learn that the Archbishop of Dublin is inviting him to stop with him. The President may consider it wiser for Archbishop Spellman not to stop here.

GRAY
Dear Boss: One must make the most of small pleasures these earnest days. I enclose one such in the form of a map issued by the King's stationer to make Britain "United States Conscious". It contains however only forty seven states, Delaware and the District of Columbia not appearing.

I got a very nice letter from Spellman the other day written from New York before he left. I have written him to London explaining the situation here and telling him that after consultation with the Nuncio [who offers to lend me an altar or to let the Archbishop say mass every morning at his chapel I am proposing that Archbishop Spellman stop at the Legation the first night and the second (if there is one) with the Archbishop of Dublin. Mr. DeValera is living in his dream Ireland and shutting out the rest of the world. On St. Patricks day he delivered the most fantastic appeal for the preservation of the Irish language as the most important issue with which the nation is faced. It is more difficult than Greek yet teachers who know it badly instruct young children who do not know it at all in arithmetic. A revolt is boiling up in educational circles but the patriots quell it by shouting "traitors"

Dev. has served notice that he will not form a national government if returned to power nor enter a national coalition government if defeated. He knows that in Opposition he can turn any coalition out in a few months.
April 5, 1943.
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss: Our Archbishop Spellman has come and made us happier if not better for his coming. He is a knockout and made them 100% mild and light wherever he went. Following my dinner, Mr. DeValera had him to dine, then lunch with the Nuncio on Thursday, followed by dinner at the Archbishops. From what he told me of his talk with DeValera he took the line of saying that what De Valera did was his own responsibility entirely but that thus and so was the policy of America and that he Spellman was a hundred percent behind it. I imagine he took the same line with the Archbishop of Dublin. At one of these parties I had a talk with the Archbishop of Dublin and told him that unless Ireland made some gesture alligning her self in principle with us it would be difficult to find grounds for offering good offices in the matter of ending Partition. To my surprise he assented to this. He has always refused to discuss politics. I asked him if he would talk this matter over with me, that is give me his views about the possible ways of ending Partition and he said he would. I shall write him soon and go to see him. He is the only man in Ireland who might influence De Valera but I think it most unlikely that anything will influence him. It is becoming clearer to me that he has blundered into a position where he has to choose between the Northern Nationalist extremists who refuse to recognize the Northern Government yet complain because they get no government jobs and taking a position in sympathy with the United Nations. I think his choice will be
to stick to his extremists. Whether or not he believes that bomb outrages and disturbance will force the British Government to hand over 800,000 protestant loyalists to his custody against their will, this is the line he believes was successful in 1916 to 1921 and the line he will stick to. I am afraid that he will never look ahead but always backward. I have never seen him so sour and depressed as he was during the XXX meals that I took in his company last week. The only comment he ever made on Spellman was that his ancestors were Irish. I think he is undergoing great inward suffering and if our Archbishop could have said to him what he recently said to DeGaulle, to purge his soul of vanity it might help. In his addresses at mass our Archbishop slipped in the American viewpoint continuously but of course the Government through its press has soft pedalled all this and claims the visit as a compliment paid by America to Ireland. I think your absent treatment which was entirely your own invention is the sound line. Keep everybody of importance away from now on much as it makes life dull for this legation. Hold up American supplies unless we can get something that we need in exchange. I am making recommendation in that sense to the Board of Economic Warfare which submits Irish applications for export licenses for out endorsement. The protected manufacturers thus far have all been shouting for neutrality and isolation. Exemplification of their own policy of parochial selfishness will be beneficial. Sir John Wafy tells me that the British Government feels that the crisis for which they had to
prepare has passed and that from now on supplies to Ireland will
be allotted strictly on a quid pro quo basis. Irish food is of
course desirable but hardly necessary. In peace time only about a
twentieth of Britain's food came from Ireland and that was chiefly
butter, luxury beef, eggs, mmm butter and bacon. Now there is no more
butter or bacon and diminished exports of eggs. Moreover there is
the surplus of 300,000 tons of corn to be disposed of. My view has had that going
only to buy cattle and sheep. The Irish can't eat them or
hold them over.

I am very grateful to Archbishop Spellman for staying here all during
his visit. It was his own decision. It has of course-materially
strengthened your legation here. They can hardly shoot old
Uncle Grey when His Grace stopped with him. Of course ev. knows
that we put this over on him and that is one thing that makes him
so sour. He considers the support of American Catholics for his
Nationalistic policies his RIGHT. I motored him up to the Cardinal's
at Armagh Friday morning, having first arranged with the Governor
or General that the Archbishop call on him on his way to U.S. Army Hq.
Then I went home and slept the clock around in two installments.
It was wise stopping only one day in Northern Ireland. As it was
the Nationalists addressed a political telegram to him demanding
that he end Partition. He ignored it. A copy of it came to me
with the request that I acknowledge receipt of it. This I did as
per enclosure.

Maude sends love. Take care of yourself.

(Enc.)

I am taking a leaf out of the Archbishop's notebook and am going to
myself.
impossible any grateful to the part of the

impossible any grateful to the part of the
To the Most Rev. Dr. Spellman,
Archbishop of New York,
American Legation,
Dublin.

May it please your Grace,

The undersigned elected representatives of the Catholics
of North-East Ulster regret the circumstances of your hurried
visit do not permit of a personal interview.

We would have wished to respectfully submit to your
Grace the conditions under which we live.

The Partition of Ireland is the greatest crime ever
perpetrated on our people. It is not, as Britain would
have the world believe, a domestic issue. It is a crime
perpetrated by one Nation against another; by a big power-
ful Empire in the interests of a few of its colonists
against the native inhabitants of an old and cultured race.

We cannot believe Americans will continue to stand for
the dismemberment of our Country, remembering as we do that
your great Nation under Abraham Lincoln fought a civil war
rather than allow the Southern States to secede from the
Union. We look when this war is over and has ended in
victory for the allied nations, that the justice it is pro-
posed to secure for Poland, Czecho Slovakia and the other
small Nations shall also be meted out to us, and Ireland
returned to her original dignity as a self-governing unit
among the peoples of the world.

The restoration of her territorial integrity and the
withdrawal of foreign armies of occupation will be the real
test of international good faith.

(Signed) G. Healy, M.P.  Fermanagh
A. Hulvey, M.P.  Tyrone.
P. Cunningham, M.P.  Tyrone.
Alex. Donnelly, M.P.  Belfast.
Senator Maguire  Belfast.
Senator Lynch  Belfast.
P. Maxwell, M.P.  Derry City.
Senator McLaughlin  Armagh.
Dear Mr. Donnelly,

I have received your letter of April 1, 1943, enclosing a copy of a telegram sent by your Committee to His Grace The Archbishop of New York.

It should be borne in mind that His Grace's visit to Eire was entirely without political significance. As you know, he is the Archbishop of New York and as such he visited old friends in Dublin. He is also Vicar General to Roman Catholic members of the Armed Forces of the United States and in this capacity he visited Northern Ireland, paying his respects to the Cardinal Primate at Armagh and to the Governor General at Hillsborough on his way to United States Army Headquarters.

I appreciate your courtesy in sending me a copy of the telegram in my capacity as host to His Grace, but it would of course be improper for me to comment upon it, as I am the Representative of the United States accredited to Eire.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) David Gray

Eamon Donnelly, Esq.,
Hon. Sec., Green Cross Fund,
72 Castle Street,
Belfast, Northern Ireland.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. CORDELL HULL:

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dublin

Dated April 19, 1943

Rec'd 10:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

P.S., April 19, 5 p.m.

Please inform the President that on Saturday, April 17, about noon a Flying Fortress B-17F (repeat B-17F) serial no. 229755, First Lieutenant Cecil Walters, pilot, bound from Africa to Britain crossed the Dublin area and was fired on by Irish anti-aircraft batteries. Pilot made a forced landing safely at Collinstown airfield just north of Dublin. Release was secured for plane and personnel also fuel and it took off for northern Ireland at 6 p.m.

The crew had not been briefed to claim non-operational status. As you know, reference my nos. 239, December 1, 241, December 5, 243, December 7 and 253, December 12 of 1942 and nos. 21, February 8 and 26, February 10, of 1943, I have made repeated and urgent representations that United States air commands brief their personnel to claim non-operational missions (repeat non) if forced to land on Eire territory. My understanding is that

General
-2- #52, April 19, 5 p.m. from Dublin.

General Eaker's command is cooperating, but of the six planes for which we have secured release the personnel of only one have claimed non-operational status. This obviously cannot continue without internment. If $350,000 aircraft are seized by Irish Government and trained personnel sent to the coop the responsibility rests on the Air Command and not on this Legation.

London Embassy informed.

GRAY

MCR
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

Please read enclosed from David Gray, our Minister to Ireland, and let me have it back for my files.

F. D. R.

Letter dated April 10th re release of six American military planes which came down in Eire.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972
May 27, 1943.

Dearest Maude:

I am enclosing copy of a letter, in the utmost privacy, which you can show to David when he is feeling low. I heartily subscribe to "thim sentiments".

Affectionately,

Mrs. David Gray,
American Legation,
Dublin, Ireland.

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 25, 1943

As of interest I enclose herewith copies of self-explanatory documents relating to the high esteem in which Minister Gray is held in Ireland.

[Signature]

C. H.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22nd May, 1943.

Dear Mr. Hull,

I send you the extract from the letter written by Sir John Maffey, High Commissioner in Eire, to the Permanent Head of the Dominions Office on the 28th February 1943. You thought it might interest the President to see what Sir John Maffey had said about Mr. Gray.

It is good evidence of the appreciation of our people of what Mr. Gray has done.

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

The Honourable Cordell Hull
SECRETARY OF STATE.
If in the course of this war the importance of American influence on the development of Irish policy has been revealed with startling clearness and in new and unforeseen ways, it would be ungracious on our part not to recognise how great a debt we owe to Mr. David Gray, the American Minister in Dublin. He came to Dublin in April, 1940, and was there during the dark weeks when France fell, when we stood alone and when Dublin opinion formed a very low estimate of our chances of survival. Although America was still neutral (and it was Mr. de Valera's declared belief that this neutrality was unshakeable) Mr. David Gray was outspoken in his condemnation of the Axis aggressors, in his support of Britain's determined stand for liberty and in his criticism of the unhelpful attitude of the de Valera Government towards our cause. The American representative in Dublin has a unique importance and a prestige deriving its high lights from many eventful chapters of history very different from the pages of the Anglo-Irish struggle. Practically every Irish family has relations in America. It is a constant surprise to me to find how many of the ordinary people in Eire have spent some time in America. For these very reasons the American Minister is expected to say comfortable things. Mr. Gray did not. It was not that he did not have a great sympathy with Ireland. He had lived over here for a year some ten years ago and had planned and largely written a book on Ireland which, he tells me, would not have been wholly pleasing to an English reader. I would not say that his views in this respect have greatly changed. He would say that now he sees in a new light the difficulties we had to face in trying to hold Ireland, and he would relate the dark chapters to contemporary dark chapters elsewhere in the world. Perhaps he would support the dictum which I employ in discussion with Irishmen: "England may have failed here, but she probably did as well as or better than anybody else would have done." Certainly he would say that our past, whatever view is taken of it, is now fully expiated.

He recognised the need of extreme patience on our side of the table and continued to say exactly what he thought in the ideal setting of the American Legation where, with Mrs. Gray, he extended to a wide circle a generous hospitality and friendliness. It would be difficult
difficult to estimate the importance of the help which the Legation gave to the British cause here during those difficult days. His association with me was overt and significant. It had a profound effect on Irish opinion at a critical stage of the war. Though it may escape the notice of the historian, Mr. David Gray's arrival in Dublin was a milestone in Irish history, and Irish history means a great deal more than the history of Ireland. An American Minister had the temerity to make it plain to Irish Nationalists that they were no longer the darling Playboy of the Western World, and to point out that the audience were bored. This rang down a curtain and raised a new one. We have been able to coordinate our policies with Mr. Gray in every way. Our association has shown us both that if this coordination of American and British policy in Eire is raised to the highest plane it cannot fail to have decisive consequences in laying the Anglo-Irish spectre.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have read David Gray's outline of view on American policy toward Ireland. What do you think we should do in regard to action?

In the matter of asking for the use of ports, I think we might consider asking for a lease of the ports in a manner similar to the lease of the eight bases from Great Britain in 1940. However, the period could well be cut from ninety-nine years to the duration of the war.

I think Mr. Gray is right in his desire to put de Valera on record. We shall undoubtedly be turned down. I think the strongest fact is that we are losing many American and British lives and many ships in carrying various supplies to Ireland without receiving anything in return, and without so much as "Thank you".

F. D. R.
June 11, 1943

MEMO FOR GRACE

Please give to me at lunchtime so I can talk to David Gray about.

F. D. R.
June 3, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum dated May 14, 1943 from Mr. David Gray in Dublin outlining his views on American policy toward Ireland. You will note that Mr. Gray recommends the adoption of a joint Anglo-American economic policy toward Eire shaped with reference to political considerations. Since Mr. Gray is arriving in Washington shortly and will undoubtedly wish to discuss some of these matters with you, it is believed that you will wish to have a copy of his memorandum at hand.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Memorandum from Mr. David Gray, May 14, 1943.

The President,

The White House.
DUBLIN, May 14, 1943.

No. 625

SUBJECT: Memorandum on American Policy Toward Eire.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward herewith a strictly confidential Memorandum on the situation in Eire and on the question of whether a joint policy toward Eire framed and executed by the United Nations to the end of securing political and military advantages is desirable.

As may be inferred from the Memorandum, although the suggestion that the Eire Government should be invited to clarify their position originated with the British and Canadian Representatives, it was a suggestion with which I agreed in principle and was prepared to recommend to you, if and when approved by the British and Canadian Governments. It appears, as set forth in the Memorandum, that these Governments did not approve the recommendations of their Representatives. Although this circumstance would obviously make it improper for this Mission to make similar recommendations, it does not, in my opinion, alter the situation which impelled the British and Canadian Representatives to make such recommendations nor necessarily indicate that the recommendations were unwise or untimely.

My hope is that the Memorandum will portray the situation to the Secretary of State in such a way that he will be enabled to form his own judgment and to frame his Irish policy on profitable lines.

Respectfully yours,

David Gray

Enclosure:
Memorandum dated May 14, 1943.
MEMORANDUM.

On recommendations for the adoption of a joint Anglo-American Economic Policy toward Eire shaped with reference to political considerations.

Introductory.

Early in February 1943, the British Representative to Eire, Sir John Maffey, informed me that he and the Canadian High Commissioner, the Honorable John Kearney, were exchanging personal views as to the desirability of recommending to their respective Governments some action designed to improve the position of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and if possible of the United Nations also as regards Eire. It was felt that, in the first place, some practical benefits for the Allied war effort might be obtained and, in the second place, that if military advantages were not forthcoming, it was desirable, in order to clarify Eire's position in the post-war period, that her Government be invited to make that position clear without undue delay.

It was suggested that a request be made for what are called "the ports." If the request were acceded to, we should have the much needed facilities. If not, Eire would be definitely on record as having refused a specific request made now for the first time. Otherwise, she might say with truth, "You never asked us for the ports." It was felt that if the record was not made
made clear, Eire would be in a better position later on to claim benefits to which she was not entitled on the basis of her attitude during the war, especially in view of the contingent of Eire volunteers in the British Army, published reference to whom is now prohibited by Government censorship. It is obvious that, although these volunteers are now regarded as renegades and traitors by the extreme nationalist group, they would probably be claimed as an asset by the Irish Government to obtain post-war advantages unless the position of Eire was more definitely established than it has been.

About the same time, the Canadian High Commissioner gave me the substance of a memorandum which he had addressed to his Government outlining the situation as he saw it, and making certain practical suggestions for a plan of procedure which involved joint action with the United Nations -- a plan in which it was thought desirable that the United States Government should act as spokesman -- with a general proposal for a joint policy and for some action which would clarify Mr. de Valera's position. My personal view was in agreement with the proposal for some such line of action as was suggested, and I expressed myself in favor of recommending to my own Government that, in view of the peculiar and complex nature of the Irish situation, a joint plan and such joint action as might be feasible was desirable.

During the first week in January 1943, Sir John returned from London and told me that the Dominions Office was in accord with the general proposal for a joint
joint Anglo-American policy toward Eire, but had not considered the idea of closely correlating the economic aspects of such a policy with political considerations. He had gained the impression that the military services for the time being at least were resigned to doing without the ports and that it was thought unwise to stir this matter up at the present time inasmuch as Anglo-Irish relations were on the whole as satisfactory as could be expected in view of Irish neutrality. The Canadian Representative gained a similar impression of his Government's attitude.

Examination of Existing Situation.

During the time which has since elapsed there has been no change in Eire policy which would indicate that the Eire Government were taking a more realistic view of the situation or intended to pursue a policy actively helpful to the cause of the United Nations, in spite of the evidently minimized risk of such a course. This is significant because a neutrality which might have been dictated by prudence in 1939 and 1940 had become an entirely voluntary and gratuitous neutrality in 1943 and can only be interpreted as a neutrality for material profit or a neutrality insensible to the moral issues of the war.

It seems therefore desirable to review the existing military, political and economic situation in Eire for your consideration to the end that you may have a basis for independent judgment as to whether existing policy
policy toward Eire should be continued or made more
drastic in conjunction with Britain and Canada for
the attainment of specified ends. It should be
clearly understood that your Minister would not recom-
mand any course of action to which the British Govern-
ment took exception, inasmuch as that Government can-
not escape a primary responsibility for the conse-
quences of any joint policy which might prove un-
profitable. It should also be understood that your
Minister appreciates the political situation in the
United States which makes an openly proclaimed Anglo-
American joint policy toward Eire of doubtful usefulness.
Your Minister's memorandum is, as far as
practicable, factual and intended to serve the policy
making officers of the Government. At the same time,
he wishes to point out the dangers of inaction. It
is his belief that, generally speaking, a positive
policy is to be preferred when dealing with Mr. de
Valera. Though there has been no avowed change in
Mr. de Valera's policy, the pressure of events has
undoubtedly affected him. He has come to believe
in an Allied victory, which he doubted as late as our
expedition to North Africa and perhaps later. He has
evidently considered the disadvantages of not being
one of the United Nations, for he has stated privately
that, even if he wanted to, he could not come in now
when it was safe, because he would be "mocked at."
In his keynote speech on May 8th opening the campaign
preliminary
preliminary to the elections to be held in June, he laid stress on the need for good relations with Britain. But he also laid stress on the issue of Partition and warned that it was the one difference which prevented cooperation with Britain. By curious coincidence, on the following day Mr. Churchill's letter to Mr. Andrews, the retiring Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, was published, in which he expressed the gratitude of Britain to Northern Ireland for the facilities which made the survival of Britain possible during 1940 and 1941, and assured Northern Ireland that its bond with Britain was unbreakable. This was again followed by a proclamation of the new Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir Basil Brooke, making it clear that union with Britain rather than with Eire was the keystone of Northern Ireland policy and warning Eire that if she wished to maintain happy relations with the North, she must refrain from interfering in Northern affairs. Mr. de Valera at present writing has made no reply, but it has become increasingly clear during the past months that he and his group rely upon the issue of Partition for post-war purposes. For this it prefers the grievance rather than the solution. Nearly a year ago Mr. de Valera stated to an American newspaper man, who asked him if he were not anxious as to Eire's position in the post-war period, that he was not anxious; that he relied on the inevitable falling out of Great Britain and the United States, as a consequence of which he would
secure the support of the United States. It has become increasingly apparent that he intends to use the alleged wrong of partition to open this rift and to enlist the sympathies and support of the Irish-American groups to this end.

Recently Mr. Robert Stewart has forwarded to me a copy of an able and pertinent memorandum prepared by him for the Department, in the course of which he cites what might be regarded as the opening gun of such a campaign -- a resolution from The Federation of American Societies for Irish Independence asking that our Congress should insure the independence and unity of Ireland; that is, secure the merger of the Government of Northern Ireland into that of Eire, during the negotiations for peace. The Irish Minister to the United States in a recent article in The New York Times entitled "The Case for Ireland's Neutrality" stresses the same note.

The question that now poses itself is whether it is advisable to take any measures to forestall this strategy and at the same time attain or endeavor to attain other desirable ends, and, if it is advisable, to decide what those measures should be and how they should be taken. It would seem that the obvious means of putting pressure upon Eire and discrediting the leadership of the de Valera group, from which trouble is to be expected in the post-war period, is by withholding supplies. The United Nations control the supplies and without injustice have the moral as well as legal right to withhold them in their own interest from separatist nations who refuse to take responsibility
responsibility for the common survival. More than that, if the association of United Nations has reality, it constitutes a trusteeship of all supply with the obligation to allot it or withhold it for the advancement of United Nations interests. The decision to give or withhold is essentially a joint one.

If we examine the facts as to Eire’s claims to self-sufficiency put forward by the de Valera group and the figures showing Eire imports since the outbreak of the war, we obtain a picture of the situation and of the thus far benevolent attitude of the British Government. Eire produces a surplus of food animals, and coarse wools. She has her own fisheries. She now produces about two-thirds of her required wheat, her oats and barley, her own dairy products, her fruits and vegetables, peat for domestic fuel and an insignificant amount of anthracite coal. She has abundance of limestone for cement manufacture. There is also a small amount of native timber for manufacture and fuel. Everything else, which is practically everything, she imports either as consumers goods or raw materials.

British economic policy toward Eire since the outbreak of war is revealed by the figures for Irish imports from 1938 onward, inasmuch as Britain under normal condition is the main source of Irish supply and, with the advent of war conditions, almost the sole source of essential materials. Irish statistics give £41,414,051 of imports for 1938, £43,415,139 for 1939, £46,790,207 for 1940, £29,530,215 in 1941, and £34,663,729 in 1942.
Imports from the United States for 1941 amounted to £2,294,958; in 1942 £3,050,841, and for the first quarter of 1943 £688,908. These figures indicate that United States exports comprised about one-tenth of the total in 1941 and about one-eleventh in 1942. For the same two years there was a total of goods sent to Eire from the United States amounting to £5,345,799 and a total of £1,001,748 received from Eire. These figures make it clear that, in spite of increasingly real and economically planned scarcity in Britain, very generous allotments have been made to Eire. During the last two years of scarcity she has been deprived of only about a fourth of normal requirements.

The Irish Minister for Finance, in presenting his Budget before the Irish Parliament on May 5, 1943, is quoted as saying "visible imports since the beginning of the war had up to March 31 last exceeded visible exports by seventeen and three-tenths million (pounds) in value. This is an achievement on which the trading interests concerned, as well as the State Departments, deserve recognition."

When it is realized that a large percentage of these visible imports were brought to Britain in British ships at a very considerable cost of British lives and thereafter allotted to Eire who made no contribution to the safety of the supply line, the nature of the transaction becomes clear.

This British policy appears to have been inaugurated at the outset of the war in the somewhat optimistic spirit of Chamberlain conciliation, and was probably continued...
continued after the fall of France by reason of well-grounded anxieties as to the position of the Eire Government in the case of German invasion. It was then imperative to appease even at the cost of sacrifice. There was also the possibility that action with regard to naval and air facilities in Eire would become imperative by reason of military necessity and if such action had to be taken, it was desirable that the Irish people should be without economic grievance.

Since the military position has so greatly improved, these reasons for supplying Ireland have lost cogency, but it has been deemed unwise by the British Government to make any sharp break in the existing policy that might give grounds for the charge of punitive coercion. Allotments of coal and petroleum products have been materially reduced, but are still sufficient to maintain the essential transportation services. It has been considered desirable to keep the railways operating in order that Irish live stock and other food exports may be moved to export ports.

Although Eire has no other market for her surplus food products than Britain, it has appeared desirable to allot manufactured goods and certain raw materials in sufficient quantities to maintain a fairly balanced trade. It is probably also true that trade interests in Irish customers on the part of British firms have been influential in procuring liberal allotments for Eire in the absence of any clearly defined governmental policy of withholding supply. It should be noted that under normal conditions Britain obtains only
between five and seven per cent. of her food from Eire by value consisting mostly of fresh meat and other foods that are first restricted in times of war stringency. Therefore, Britain in a pinch can do without Irish food, whereas the whole economic system of Eire depends upon imports from Britain. During the recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Eire, cattle exports were suspended for nine months without noticeable effect on the British food situation.

Of late, economic conditions in Britain, Chiefly due to the need of tonnage for war purposes, have begun to bring into force toward Eire a more realistic policy based on the thesis that it was unnecessary, as well as unjust, that Irish standards of living and supply should be maintained at a higher level than that prevailing in Britain and that some adequate return should be obtained for what was given. It should be noted that this new phase of British policy is not in conflict with the conception of a United Nations trusteeship of all supply for the advancement of United Nations interests.

For the first three months of 1943, allotments of coal have been reduced, as compared with the first quarter of 1942, from about 300,000 tons to 250,000, and allotments of petrol from 4,500,000 gallons to 1,750,000. Textiles chiefly for Irish manufacture have been reduced by about two-thirds. It should be noted at this point that Eire cotton mills have been and are sustained principally by importation of American
American cotton yarns. With the ominously increasing needs for both coal and petroleum products in Britain, it is possible that this new attitude toward Irish supply might result in the not distant future of a total withholding of both coal and oil. The effect of this on Irish economy and especially on Eire's industry, transportation, and distribution systems is not wholly clear, but it would inevitably be serious. The rural population comprising about three-quarters of the whole would be incomed, but would suffer no serious hardship or serious impairment of its living standards. Eire produces adequate food supplies for its population, though certain articles to which the Irish people are accustomed are in short supply. However, the problem of feeding Dublin's population of five hundred thousand would tax Irish administration severely. Nevertheless, it is a problem which by improvising elementary railway and motor truck services with wood, turf (peat), and anthracite coal as fuel should not prove insoluble. The possibility of such a situation has recently been discussed by Ministers of State in public addresses and not in a spirit of despair. The sharply diminished imports from Britain during the first quarter of the present year have thus far evoked no publicized resentment against Britain or charge of economic pressure. It is probable that the Irish conscience is uneasy on this point. It serves Britain's book that this should be so. But it is not apparent that the previous generous measure of British supply has had
had any effect in fostering a favorable view of the cause of the United Nations. It is certain that it has not in any way modified the policy of the Eire Government in a practical manner more favorable to Britain or the Allied cause. Supply seems to be taken as a matter of course — something arranged by an astute Government who have cleverly succeeded in getting things for the Irish people without contributing to the safety of the communications on which the supply depends.

The group which has benefited most from Irish neutrality are the tariff-protected manufacturers who, in spite of difficulties, have generally been able to continue operations on a profitable basis. Presumably, a large percentage of political campaign funds is subscribed to the de Valera Party by this group and its influence in support of the neutrality policy is considerable. The question therefore poses itself whether, if the raw materials needful in Irish manufactures were progressively restricted to the vanishing point, the industrialist group would demand a change of policy. Although the war will be won regardless of any action Eire may or may not take, there are at least three points on which United States and British interests are gravely prejudiced by the policy of the Irish Government, to wit:

1. The withholding of facilities for the protection of sea communications between America and Britain.

2. The maintenance of Axis Missions which are inevitably
inevitably espionage centers on the borders of Britain, the European bridgehead of the United Nations.

3. The claim on the part of the Irish Prime Minister to de jure sovereignty over Northern Ireland, which it is now apparent that he plans to use to the end of creating post-war disagreement between Britain and the United States, if not to foment trouble in Northern Ireland to the detriment of the common war effort.

It is unlikely, in the view of the British Representative and myself, that economic pressure on the industrialist group in itself would result (1) in the Irish Government's ceding air and port facilities to the United Nations or (2) in breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers, but such action might very well prepare the way to these ends by impressing upon both the Irish Government and the Irish people a more realistic sense of their dependence upon and indebtedness to the United Nations for political independence, for economic supply, and for military security. At present there is no general appreciation of these facts. Such a realization must precede any radical change in State policy.

As to the third point, the de Valera claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland is a matter for concern to those charged with the maintenance of cooperation and good-will between the United States and the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Not only has the protest of the Bire Government against the use of bases in Northern Ireland by American troops, followed
followed by the Eire Government-approved statement of the Cardinal Primate that "British and American troops overrun our country against the will of the Nation" tended to incite anti-American and anti-British feeling, both in Northern Ireland and in Eire, and to encourage I.R.A. outrages, but, as Mr. Robert Stewart points out, there is evidence that the anti-British campaign has already again been carried to the United States by Mr. de Valera's agents.

Possible Courses of Action.

If Anglo-American solidarity is to be preserved, both during the war and afterwards, this situation should be met by joint counsel and joint action without undue delay. Measures that would be politically impossible after the war appear now to be possible and, if properly executed, would force the issue and discredit the isolationist non-cooperative group of extreme nationalists in Eire whose political existence constitutes the chief obstacle to a happy and prosperous Ireland enjoying mutually advantageous relations with the British Commonwealth of Nations. It seems desirable that without undue delay the challenge of this group be accepted. It is obviously wiser to accept it on grounds chosen by ourselves and at a moment of our own choosing, than to wait for the Irish Prime Minister to develop his skillful and mischievous intrigue. Whatever the rights and wrongs of partition, it should be clearly understood that a solution on any basis of reason and compromise is not the primary object.
object of the de Valera leadership at this time. The grievance is politically of more importance than the solution. I have recently received direct evidence of this from persons close to the Prime Minister. It is probable that if Eire had joined the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in prosecuting the war, the influence of the British Government would have been exerted to end Partition and unite Ulster with the Twenty-six Counties. Inasmuch, however, as the de Valera policy has been not only to remain neutral but progressively to establish Eire as an independent foreign nation, disclaiming association with the neighboring Island, it is obvious that the British Government must and will support the political views of the majority in Northern Ireland. Mr. de Valera has definitely put an end to any hope of solving this problem in any predictable future, unless he should reverse his whole political philosophy. The Manchester Guardian, the organ of British Liberal opinion and traditional supporter of Irish Home Rule, observes in its issue of April 30, 1943, "One thing the war has done and that is to confirm Partition. So much Eire's neutrality has secured. Ulster needs no longer to base her politics on negations; no section of British (or American) opinion will wish to coerce her to satisfy Mr. de Valera's aspirations."

After enjoying the use of bases in Northern Ireland denied to us by Eire, it is unlikely that American opinion would support the coercion of Ulster. But, if Mr. de Valera has lost his chance to end Partition, he has not lost his power to foment trouble in Northern Ireland.
Ireland among the four hundred thousand Catholic population whom he claims as fellow nationalists, and there is reason to fear that he will continue to exert it unless he is made to realize that to do so will invite economic consequences disadvantageous to his authority and aspirations.

There seem to be several tactical approaches to meeting and forcing the issue before it develops further to our disadvantage. By this is meant action which conveys a sobering warning to Mr. de Valera and provides an educational experience for the Irish people as to their essential dependence on the United Nations. I enumerate four of them as follows:

1. A demand in the name of the United Nations for the lease of air and port facilities for the protection of the Western approaches, on the ground that Eire’s supply depends upon United Nations sea-borne transport.

2. A demand that Axis Missions be removed, on the ground that their presence is a menace to United Nations vital interests.

3. A demand that Eire clarify her position toward the British Commonwealth of Nations. Is she in or out?

An unsatisfactory reply to any of these demands would result in the progressive shutting off of raw materials for Irish industries, on the ground that if Eire chooses to exercise her right to an isolationist position, she must assume responsibility for her own supply.

4. Perhaps the most effective manner of meeting the issue from the American political viewpoint would be the enforcement of conscription in Northern Ireland.
There is little doubt that American opinion would support a measure which put an end to the escape of Northern Ireland slackers from duties imposed upon American youth. But it must be recognized that there is likelihood of bloodshed in Northern Ireland if conscription should be enforced and the political consequences should be carefully weighed before a decision were taken. It could, however, be truthfully said that new bloodshed could hardly increase the political capital manufactured out of the executions of 1916.

There are difficulties and dangers in all these suggested courses, but they may well be inconsiderable in comparison with those resulting from inaction and postponement to a less favorable time and less auspicious conditions. The important thing from the viewpoint of Anglo-American cooperation is to bring to the notice of the American people the unfair and destructive policy of the de Valera politicians at the time when British and American interests are essentially the same and to obtain a verdict of American disapproval which will remove the pressure of the Irish question from Anglo-American relations. Joint Anglo-American understanding is obviously desirable in the adoption of any of these policies and at least a degree of joint action in the execution.

It appears that a liaison committee representing the British Ministry of Economic Warfare sits with the American Board of Economic Warfare and considers jointly with the American Board the requests made by would-be Irish purchasers for export licenses for the commodities which
which they desire to purchase. The Ministry of Economic Warfare is therefore cognizant of American licensed exports to Eire. These two agencies for economic warfare acting jointly would seem to constitute the adequate machinery for such correlated economic action as might be approved. It would only remain for the policy-making agencies of the respective Governments to decide on the line to be pursued and delegate the implementing of the decision to the existing Boards of Economic Warfare. It should be made clear that your Minister is not assuming to advise the British Government, but only to suggest to his own Government various procedures by which we might properly assist the British Government in forestalling Irish menace to our mutually friendly and cooperative relations, which are of basic importance if our hope for the future is to be realized.

No important trade interests, either British or American, would be jeopardized by such proposed economic action if indeed it were planned and executed in a spirit of cooperative understanding, for Eire is and must remain primarily a customer of Britain. There is no market for Irish agricultural products, except in Britain, and so Eire must hold that market by buying British. The United States in peace-time finds Eire a logical customer for feeding grains and some manufactured specialties and is a purchaser of Irish specialties such as whiskey, luxury bacon, handmade tweeds, Irish poplins and carpet wool. But it seems desirable that during the war neither Britain nor America should undertake to supplant each other's legitimate
legitimate trade by supplying to Irish buyers what the other is unable or unwilling to supply, regardless of political considerations. This desirable end a joint trade policy toward Eire would incidentally assure.

It is difficult to frame an objective and dispassionate appraisal of current events at close range and it is possible that the facts set forth above should be otherwise interpreted as pointing to other courses of action. It may be wiser to take no action at all but leave to time and imponderable forces the working out of the problems presented by the Irish situation. But, however attractive the policy of doing nothing may appear, there is an inescapable decision which the United Nations must presently face, to wit: Can Eire as a geographical strategic keystone in the common defence of the British Isles and as the controlling area for the protection of Anglo-American communications again be permitted the right to refuse cooperation in time of crisis and endanger our existence? If it cannot, the choice of the United Nations is between making their decision now while the realistic pressures of war continue, and postponement to the period of post-war loosening of the bonds of common interests.

D.G.

Dublin, May 14, 1943.
Ireland is in a state of ferment at the moment. The elections are on and with them plenty of excitement at the hustings. But the Nazi group who are in the saddle there will not let anything out so I would be very sceptical as to what to believe from the stories that come out of there. David Gray is now in Washington and he will tell you most of what you might want to know about the Ould Sod. Apparently there is no need for me to bother with the Irish situation any more.

From a political standpoint, however, I would be reluctant, were I in the hierarchy of the Democratic party in the USA, to pass over Ireland as a potential political issue in the hustings of 1944. Let me put it this way. I would be most careful that a sentimental issue is not given rebirth. That Irish issue killed Woodrow Wilson's dream and elected people like Henry Cabot Lodge the First. You know what an implacable foe he was of participation in international settlements. But no matter how implacable he might have been, he would have been powerless unless he had behind him that restless, daring and resourceful Irish-American minority in a dozen States which had no hesitancy in assaulting the highest citadels at a time when the attack did the most harm.

I cannot see where there is any indication at present in the States of anything other than a complete overturn in government. This is June 1943. The minds of half the voters over there will be firmly made up within six months. Within a year the campaign will be at its hottest. Thus time is very short and as far as I can judge, the drift of popular feeling is away from the entire present setup. Perhaps I am too far away to judge correctly and I am making allowances for it. I cannot see how the recently established trends in national dissatisfaction can be otherwise expressed but in a protest vote.

The Irish in the saddle over here cannot exist without the support and good-will of the Irish at home. They will bend every effort to create an issue, to help themselves serve their parochial political interests. With unerring political prescience they will create the issue when America is disturbed politically and will hope to capitalize upon it. In more than a year of intensive observation, on the ground and not from a distance, I cannot see where we have made one good effort to sell America's part in the war to the Irish people, where we have made one effort to tell them the real mission of Roosevelt in the world scheme. Yes, it is a little nation, half-formed and still reined and checked by the
the tentacles of the past, but potentially it has an impact upon a body of American sentiment far beyond its size. That impact may well affect the coming national decisions by election. It did so in 1916, in 1918 and 1920 and there is nothing to stop it from being done again.

I pick up my paper at random and I see Brennan, the Irish Minister, pictured on Page One with the Cardinal, after having delivered as swift and sure a slap in the face at America as I have ever seen in print in a country at war. Brennan says that Ireland was not attacked like America, thus she has no reason to join the United Nations. He infers a preferred position for the Irish government, in that they carefully nurtured good-feeling for the Nazis they protect. But he does not say that a nation whose existence was guaranteed by America now makes our ships sail 500 miles further through submarine-infested seas, thus condemning our ships to the fate which often befalls them and the lives of our fellow Americans to Davy Jones.

Two weeks ago Sunday, as he left mass at a little town in County Monaghan, James Dillon, Deputy in the Dail Eireann, and only Irishman with enough patriotism to advocate aid to America in her battle with Hitler, was stoned by Irish gangsters. His crime has been that he has consistently said that Ireland has violated her birth-right. It is likely that Dillon will be defeated in the polls next week. They have six candidates in the field. He is the son and the grandson of great Irish nationalist leaders. They stone him because he dares to speak of the real Ireland of Pearse and O'Connell and Parnell, rather than the false Ireland of Frank Aiken and the Irish Nazi group.

I have read your letters of several months past very thoughtfully and I see in them a hint that the President may well retire if he believes that his mission is accomplished. From where I stand, his mission will not be accomplished during his lifetime or ours, but enough of it can be done to ensure the success of the remainder. I will have to cut this short as some work has just come in, but will write again soon. I have had several fine letters from Joe K. lately, and he appears to be very well. His observations on the home scene are certainly poignant. My best regards to you and I hope the weather is not too hot in Washington.

(Above excerpts from letter written by Tim McInerny to John McCormick, dated June 19, 1943.)
June 30, 1943

My dear Admiral Leahy:

You are doubtless familiar with the controversy over the Irish naval bases which, you will recall, were relinquished to the Irish Government by the British Government in 1938. Suggestions have been made since the outbreak of war in September 1939 that Ireland make these bases available to the British armed forces for the prosecution of the war. Prime Minister de Valera has repeatedly declared, however, that "there can be no question of leasing these ports or of handing them over on any condition whatsoever."

Since the entry of the United States into the war, there have been suggestions from time to time that the Government of the United States undertake to make an approach on this subject to the Irish Government. The Irish and the British have fought one another for seven hundred years. They suspect and distrust one another. It has been suggested that in the circumstances Ireland might be disposed to lease air and naval facilities to the United States for the duration because they know that we would turn back the facilities to Ireland at the end of the war. We do not know, of course, whether this is true.

Any approach to the Irish Government on this matter involves important military and political considerations. I look to our Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice and guidance on the purely military considerations involved in this question. In the light of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the purely military side of this matter, it will then be for me to decide, in association with the Secretary of State, the broader political question of whether to undertake such an approach.

I should, therefore, be grateful if you would send me a statement on the purely military aspects of the usefulness to our war effort of air and naval port facilities in Ireland.

Specifically,

Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N.,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
The White House.
Specifically, is it the view of our Joint Chiefs of Staff that such facilities would be useful to our war effort, and, if so, to what extent? Furthermore, would the leasing and developing of such facilities by the United States, in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff, result in the saving of American lives and the lives of the nationals of those countries associated with us in the war? I hope that the Chiefs of Staff will give me their answers to these questions from the purely military standpoint just as if there were no political considerations involved.

This whole question is under consideration by the Secretary of State. Will you, therefore, be good enough to send direct to the Secretary of State a copy of your reply to this letter.

If the Chiefs of Staff believe that the above-mentioned facilities would be useful to our war effort, I suggest that, in sending their reply, they designate an officer, or officers, to discuss the matter in detail with the State Department.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
June 29, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have given careful consideration to your memorandum of June 15, 1943 commenting on and requesting my views on Mr. David Gray's memorandum on Ireland.

It appears to me that without question air and naval facilities in Ireland would be of considerable usefulness to the United Nations war effort. The Department has been informally advised by a high officer of the War Department that these facilities would be enormously useful from a military standpoint. As you know, however, Prime Minister de Valera has repeatedly declared the determination of the Irish Government to remain neutral and has stated that "there can be no question of leasing these ports" or "of handing them over on any condition whatsoever." He has also stated that any attempt by any of the belligerents to bring pressure to bear on the Irish Government to turn over these ports "could only lead to bloodshed." In making these statements, Mr. de Valera has no doubt had principally in mind possible approaches from the British Government. Since our entry into the war, however, suggestions have been made that Ireland might be disposed to lease naval and air facilities to the United States.

There is much merit in the following statement in Mr. Gray's memorandum; indeed this statement is almost unanswerable:

"If the request were acceded to we should have the much needed facilities. If not, Eire would be definitely on record as having refused a specific request made now for the first time. Otherwise, she might say with truth, 'you never asked us for the ports'".

The President,

The White House.
The Irish and the British have fought one another for seven hundred years. They suspect and distrust one another. Each tries on suitable occasions to obtain the support of the American people and Government against the other. We must be careful, therefore, to be sure that any action which we take in this regard has a sound military basis in the opinion of our own Chiefs of Staff. It seems to me that this is of fundamental importance to make it impossible for anyone to maintain that we took sides with the British against the Irish and "pulled British chestnuts out of the fire."

Ireland is at the back door of the United Kingdom. Happenings inside Ireland are therefore of more immediate and more direct interest to the United Kingdom than to the United States. Therefore, if it should be decided that the American Government undertake a direct approach to the Irish Government concerning the ports, the matter should be discussed with the British Government in advance and the approval of the British Government should be obtained before any action is taken vis-a-vis the Irish.

I enclose a draft letter for your signature to Admiral Leahy requesting the views of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military aspects of this question. It seems preferable that I defer further recommendations in regard to this matter until we have Admiral Leahy's reply.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Draft letter to Admiral Leahy.
The President.
29 Washington Square West.
New York City.

July 16th, 1943.

Dear Boss: Thanks for so much kindness in Washington and Hyde Park. I got back here last night from my one night stands in Buffalo, Detroit and Chicago. Before I left I saw Bishop O'Hara in New York and Bishop Hurley of Florida is looking with me today. I'll be back to report as soon as I get back from Boston where I am going on Monday.

Irish Mooney seems to feel that the situation as regards the Peace and post war cooperations is even more dangerous than I imagined it. He was very cooperative as also was Archbishop Stritch. The question is what is the wise and right thing to do.

Aff

[Signature]
The attached was sent to the President from David Gray.
Dear Archbishop:

I should have written long ago to thank you for your kindness in receiving me as you did when I was in Detroit last month, but I have been a bit overcome by the heat and it took me longer than I had anticipated to reach a conviction as to what should be done and what, if anything, I should try to do about it.

After seeing you, I went on to Buffalo where I was unable to see Bishop Duffy. I fear he was not well and his Chancery were reluctant to make it clear that I could not see him. But this is only surmise. I had an interesting evening with Paul Fitzpatrick, the Democratic leader in Eire County. I talked to him not in his political capacity but as an American Catholic of Irish descent who is concerned with the apprehensions which I discussed with you. He felt as you did, that the situation was charged with danger for that postwar collaboration on the lines of enlightened self-interest and Christian principle on which the future of western civilization seems to depend. He felt that the less intelligent groups of Irish descended Americans in western New York were perplexed over the attitude of the DeValera Government toward our war effort, were not satisfied with it, but were, as always, deeply suspicious of England. He felt that a campaign of education should be carried out among them, but could suggest no one to conduct it nor any method which might not do more harm than good.

I came to New York and had a two hour talk with Bishop Hurley who doubtless, when he went to Detroit July 25, told you

The Most Reverend
Edward Mooney,
Archbishop of Detroit,
1900 Wellsley Drive,
Detroit, Michigan.
you of our meeting. He showed great kindness and good will and I talked to him with the same frankness as to you. I shall always think of him as I think of you as a friend and one of the best Americans I have known. I went on to Boston but the Cardinal was on vacation. I had a long and friendly talk with Joe Kennedy, however. He, too, felt the dynamite in the situation but had no solution. I went on to Portland, Maine, and found Bishop McCarthy most friendly and well disposed, but not confronted with the problem that confronts you and those in responsible authority in large cosmopolitan cities. Coming back to New York I had another talk with Bishop O'Hara who I like very much, and then later in Washington with Monsignor Ready. All are sympathetic but no one has any concrete, constructive policy to propose. All hope that American and Irish interests may not come into conflict, all see the need for wise forbearance as well as the danger that Mr. DeValera will toss the Partition issue into our lap as soon as the war ceases. It is probably inevitable that this should be so since no one but the American Government can take the responsibility for whatever policy is to be adopted. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that my recommendations to the Secretary of State must be in conformity with my own judgment and conscience and on my own responsibility.

As I made it clear to you I am concerned not only as regards the effect of injecting the Irish Partition issue into American politics but as to the effects of raising that issue on the fortunes and welfare of the new Irish State in which I am personally interested. If, as Mr. DeValera hinted to me was a possibility, he should offer as a solution an exchange of populations, that is, of forcibly deporting 800,000 Protestants from Northern Ireland, a religious issue is at once precipitated which would have tragic repercussions here as well as in England. At all costs this possibility, I believe, should be headed off, if possible. I know you agree in this and I believe it is the last thing the British Catholics would wish. It might easily lead to the economic isolation of Eire by the British Commonwealth of Nations, to the destruction of Eire's economy. It must always be remembered that Eire's only market for livestock is Britain and that her economy depends on that. The recent Economic War cost the Irish farmer the full price of the annuities and almost ruined him.

The only chance I can see of furthering a settlement of Partition in a reasonable future is for Eire to take part in the War and be entitled to make claims on Ulster for a United

Ireland.
Ireland. A victorious Britain will neither be intimidated by the DeValera Government nor coerce Northern Ireland which gave her essential bases in the moment of crisis. I recognize that Mr. DeValera could not only reverse himself to the extent of now forming an alliance with Britain but he might reasonably accept from us a share of the American victory that is now assured. The Axis has consistently plotted against him as he knows, has murdered his nationals, sunk his ships and committed repeated acts of war against the Irish people. I feel, therefore, that the only recommendation possible on my part is that the American Government should make him this offer in genuine friendliness. If he accepted, this would mean a place at the Peace Table, the close ties of companionship in arms at a time when the issue is not in doubt but nevertheless at a time when Irish facilities for the protection of the Western Approaches would mean the shortening of the war and the saving of many American lives, thus bringing into being an honest basis for mutual friendship and gratitude. I see no course short of this which may be expected to provide a solution. If he should accept it, we should know that God's blessing had been upon our offer. If he should decline as I fear is more likely, we shall have done our best to help this little nation which has so many roots in American soil and so many claims upon my affections. The responsibility will be fixed where it belongs.

Recommendations in this sense I am now preparing for submission to the Secretary and his advisers. They are entirely on my own personal responsibility as was my journey through the Middle West with the purpose of seeing you and others who with wisdom and good will are concerned with this question. If you come to Ireland when I am there, the Legation will be welcoming you. In any case I am sure that we shall meet again for I feel strongly drawn to you.

Yours faithfully,

P.S. I feel sure you will not object to my sending a copy of this letter to Bishop Hurley.

Would you be willing to discuss India with some friend of mine in the Department?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dear Miss Green, I have
in ten copies a draft
which the President wants
to have very early here.
You may show it to

August 16, 1943

[signature]
In Your Excellency's speech at Cork on December 14, 1941, you expressed a special sympathy for the people of the United States on the occasion of their entry into the war and made acknowledgment of American assistance in the establishment of the free Irish nation. In this statement you reaffirmed your policy of neutrality with the added qualification that toward the United States it would be a friendly one. Excerpts of this speech were transmitted through your Minister to this Government and were duly acknowledged by the President. In his note of appreciation he pointed out the danger threatening all free nations if they hesitated to unite in common defense of their liberties, trusting to fortune and the efforts of others for escape from the fate of those small states which elected the separatist policy.

Since December 1941 the military situation has changed so fundamentally that it appears profitable to reexamine our respective policies in the light of our common interests. The obvious approach is now less from the viewpoint of war and more from the viewpoint of the peace that must follow. You have spoken of the ties of blood and sympathy that unite
unite our two nations. It should be clear to you and to
the Irish people that these considerations have continuously
and notably shaped the policy of this Government toward
Eire in spite of the exacting pressures of the war.

In 1940 after the fall of France when the British
Commonwealth of Nations was in desperate need of arms of
every nature, when the American Government was anxiously
preparing for the attack which reasonable foresight warned
us would not be long delayed, we allotted you twenty
thousand rifles which could ill be spared.

Although Eire with reason blocks the export of
Irish funds to the United States and requisitions the
property in the United States of Naturalized American
citizens resident in Eire, who under your laws may also be
regarded as Irish nationals, we have never interrupted
the flow of American remittances to Ireland.

At a time when every ship was of vital importance
we permitted you to charter two serviceable cargo vessels
to assist you in importing your essential supplies. Both
these vessels sailing under neutral markings and defense-
less have been sunk by the Axis.

The American Red Cross is now in process of forwarding
to you upwards of a half million dollars worth of medical
medical supplies so that you may be prepared against attack either by the Axis Powers or by epidemic disease.

As long as possible we permitted the unregulated purchase and export of the things which your national economy required, though you very properly by executive order have conserved for your own people the things of which you had no surplus.

Requests for certain amounts of steel, copper and aluminum by the Irish Sugar Company for maintaining your nationally owned plants have been disallowed by the agencies charged with the allocation of strategic materials for our war effort. We have recently been informed that without these materials the 1944 crop of beet cannot be processed, thus leaving the Irish people without sugar. By direction of the President the request will now be approved.

It is believed that the Irish people should be informed that this is not an authorization for the sale of surplus commodities but the allocation of strategic materials in short supply for their special benefit. Though the amounts are small in relation to American production, the steel that will help to produce Irish sugar would
would have made either a certain number of tanks, 
the copper so many shell cases, the aluminum so many 
airplane parts or would have satisfied civilian needs 
which now will not be satisfied. It is as if you sent 
us foods which you need for your own people.

In accordance with this policy of special considera-
tion for the Irish people, we have approved the realloca-
tion to Eire by our Allies, the British Commonwealth of 
Nations, of various materials in short supply originating 
in the United States. In reduced quantity but neverthe-
less sufficient to maintain your national economy you 
have been supplied with American petroleum products 
allocated to you by Britain. This has enabled you to 
transport by motor truck practically the entire required 
supply of domestic heating fuel from your peat bogs to 
your towns and cities. In 1942 this amounted to about a 
half million tons of turf (peat) for the city of Dublin 
alone, involving a truck mileage of between fifteen and 
twenty million miles. It may here be observed that 
American city dwellers denied the use of their motor cars 
for escape to sea and countryside, do not enjoy the thought
of the representatives of Japan, Germany and Italy
driving their automobiles about Ireland with American
gasoline.

Though coal is temporarily in short supply in the
United States, we permit your ships to refuel at our ports
on equal terms with our combatant allies. By our contribu-
tion of American coal wherever practicable to the
common war effort, Britain has been able to supply you
with a coal ration, reduced to a third of your normal con-
sumption, but still sufficient to operate your railways
and permit a limited public gas service. Since 80 per
cent of the people of Dublin cook by gas some four hundred
thousand persons have thus been preserved from serious
hardship.

Enough steel has been furnished you for horseshoes
and agricultural tools manufactured in Eire, enough woollen
and cotton yarn to keep Irish mills operating. Irish
manufacturers as a rule have profited financially by
neutrality during this period.

In spite of great efforts on the part of the Irish
farmer Eire, after the 1942 crop, was still in need of a
considerable
considerable percentage of her wheat requirements. The United Nations without question granted export licenses for the amounts required.

For the year 1939-1940 during which war prevailed for six months, Irish imports appear to have been normal. For the following full year of war they rose by value, a half million pounds. For the following year they declined about one third. In the spring of this present year the Irish Minister for Finance, presenting his budget to the Irish Dail pointed with pride to the fact that since the outbreak of the war Eire had imported goods to the value of seventeen million pounds in excess of what she had exported.

Irish exports, chiefly livestock, have found a ready market in Britain. Britain has been fortunate in having them available at her door and Irish farmers have been fortunate in finding the only market open to them glad to receive all offerings.

Thanks to this policy of friendship and supply, normal standards of living have been less impaired in Eire
as the result of war than in any country in Europe.

It has not always been easy in view of American opinion to maintain this policy. Friendship is not a one-way street and it cannot be denied that Americans were mystified and saddened by Your Excellency's public protest against the use of bases in Northern Ireland by American forces sent there specifically to forestall Axis attack. Following this protest came the statement of the Cardinal Primate that "British and United States troops are overrunning our country against the will of the Nation". The official censorship approved the publication of this statement together with the publication of resolutions applauding it, adopted by the Corporation of the City of Cork, though suppressing that portion of a pastoral of the Bishop of Achonry which condemned the bombing of Irish Nationals by the Germans.

While this government accepts the suggestion that Your Excellency's protest was not made in an unfriendly spirit but to assert a claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland, it is unfortunate that your Government made no protest against the German bombing of the cities of Northern Ireland, with the attendant murder of Northern Irish people.
people. Moreover, since the Irish Republican Army has issued a manifesto declaring war on the United States and is now presumably at war with us in conjunction with their Axis allies, Americans could only feel that pronouncements exciting antagonism against our troops in Northern Ireland constituted encouragement to this subversive organization and endangered the lives of American soldiers.

Many Americans understand and sympathize with the reasons which prompted Irish neutrality; how at the outbreak of the war Eire should wish to exercise her new sovereignty by declining to be involved in a conflict which at the time may have seemed not to involve her survival as a free nation and later after the fall of France when the victory of the Axis appeared inevitable, how prudence and self-interest dictated the continuance of that policy.

Your friendly promise that your neutrality should be benevolent toward the United States was duly appreciated by the American people, but unfortunately by reason of your geographical position it has operated in favor of the Axis Powers and against
against the United Nations. This has become increasingly apparent since the loss of the French channel ports.

Every ship and airplane assigned to the defense of the Western approaches and the southern supply lines from the American continent would have its operating radius increased by two hundred miles were they based on Southwestern Eire rather than on Northern Ireland. Whether this unfavorable differential
be measured in terms of increased fuel costs, diminished operating efficiency or in losses of ships and seamen who might otherwise have been saved is a problem for the military statisticians when the data are available. But the handicap is heavy and real and American opinion feels a sense of grievance that you make no contribution to the safety and maintenance of a supply line by which in so important measure your national economy is maintained.

The presence in Eire of representatives of Germany, Italy and Japan, the powers which treacherously attacked us, still further weighs down the balance of Irish neutrality in favor of our enemies. For on the territory of Eire they are in a favorable position to spy on us while we are not in a favorable position to spy on them. We recognize the good faith of the Irish Government in attempting to prevent and suppress the activities of enemy agents, but it is naive to believe that they are preventable as long as enemy missions enjoy diplomatic immunity to come and go, and to negotiate for espionage under the cover of correct social relations. The danger is the greater because of the number of misguided but reputable Irish
Irish nationals who oppose your Government and look to the Axis Powers as the hope of Irish liberty.

It is naive also to believe that the regime which prepared and precipitated the downfall of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, Greece and Yugoslavia by fifth column organization has not also laid the groundwork for an inside job on Eire, the key position for a major attack upon Britain. The recrudescence and mysterious financing of the banned I.R.A. in 1938, the capture of parachutists and sea borne agents in Eire possessing large sums of money, the strange escape from prison and long time harboring of a convicted German spy by respected Irish citizens point to such a conclusion. They raise the question also how many agents are now undetected and at large. We know that you have interned and jailed hundreds of members of these subversive groups, but their friends and sympathizers are free and constitute a depot of potential enemy agents. Since they work with honest convictions as well as for pay, they are faithful to their employers and often above suspicion.

The operation of these spy agencies is facilitated by
the ease with which the border between Eire and Northern Ireland may be crossed. It is in fact like crossing from Connecticut to Massachusetts. North of the Border the military installations of the United States are readily studied and estimated. Between Northern Ireland and Britain there is no political barrier and the agent returning with reports of United Nations military dispositions has no difficulty in re-entering Eire. Once there the coastline with its hundreds of fishing craft plying the coastal waters offers exceptional opportunity for rendezvous with enemy submarines. How disastrous has been the information as to United Nations shipping thus conveyed we do not know, but it is reasonable, knowing the efficiency of the German spy system, to believe that it has been costly to the people of the United States.

Despite these circumstances which have made Irish neutrality gravely disadvantageous to the American people, their Government, as you know, has scrupulously respected it and has never questioned your right as a free nation to maintain it. While the Irish nation was defenceless and while the American Government lacked the means to equip your army and
and assist adequately in the defense of your cities, they
have never felt justified in suggesting the reorientation of
your policy. Now, however, the outcome of the war is no longer
in doubt. Our victory is assured though it is not yet won,
and it appears to the American Government to be a friendly
act to offer the Irish people a share in that victory as we
have given them a share of our supply.

Since in view of the military situation, such an offer
cannot be construed as a plea for aid or as an effort to
purchase cooperation, it does not appear that your past
policy should be a bar to the acceptance of it. While it
is true that regardless of your decision we shall win the war,
it is also true that Eire can play a notable and honorable
part in contributing to the shortening of its duration by
leasing us bases for the protection of the Atlantic supply
lines and by the elimination of Axis spy centers on Eire
territory.

Your Excellency's statement, made on leaving the United
States in 1923, to the effect that if America ever needed
Irish help it would not be lacking, makes it clear that
your
your personal inclination must now be to join us and hasten the retribution due the totalitarian powers which have plotted against you as against us and have murdered your people and destroyed your property. It was recently stated in your Dail that the Irish taxpayers had been mulcted a million dollars to pay for damages resulting from the German bombing of your lighted cities and the killing of seventy-eight Irish citizens. It has been announced that the Axis by submarine and air attack had sunk a dozen of your small fleet of ships. For these acts of war you now have the opportunity to exact satisfaction.

But in the American view, even more important than retribution is your place beside us in the post war future. The American people want your close friendship and the binding tie of common effort in the crushing of totalitarian lawlessness, and the reestablishment of international law. The American people wish to be able to share their supplies with you in the difficult years ahead when the needs of allies and enslaved peoples must be the first charge upon our resources. We believe that your interests both spiritual and material are bound up with ours and that if you fail
to recognize the fact our traditional friendship must inevitably be weakened. We believe that we have done our part to maintain this friendship. It is for you to do yours.

The American Government trusts that Your Excellency will favor them with a reply at your early convenience and will understand that the American Government’s obligation to the American people will require the publication of this note and your reply thereto.
August 26, 1943

My dear Boss: We are off Saturday morning early unless there should be some further postponement of the flight. You have given us a wonderful time and I go back with a new appreciation of the load you are carrying. The Secretary of State was so busy that I could not see him again after he had read the draft for an Irish note. I left copies of a worked over version with him also the brief report that serves as the supporting paper for the suggested draft. If it is decided to act on the suggested lines I hope to get some notice so that I can prepare the ground a little.

to Archbishop Mooney

I destroyed the letter, a draft for which I gave you, and wrote another one which was less commitatal. I enclose copy.

Last Saturday night we dined with Archbishop Spellman and had a very jolly time, old Chateau Yquem, Napoleon brandy and that sort of thing. He was very dear. I showed him the draft of the Irish paper as you suggested. He returned it next day with a note of thanks for letting him see it. I think this is a green light. If not he will drop you some hint. He is ready to go on and report to you on his trip whenever you are ready to receive him. He ought to have two or three days notice though I am sure he would cancel any engagement if he received your telegram. I think it very important to keep a very friendly ending to the Irish communication if adopted.

I questioned the P.M.'s objection to saying that if you still go your separatist way we wish you well. Sam read it
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

as I wanted to get his reaction from the New York political angle
and saw no trouble in it. I could get very fond of Sam.

I get the impression that the Quebec-Ottawa show was well received
here although there is some disappointment that there were no
firesworks. My personal hunch is that the P.M. has done as much
for you here as the traffic will bear at the moment. An open 

disagreement on

some unimportant matter at some time in the not distant future
might be profitable in. I feel that it is nearly time to weigh
realistically upon the difficulties of cooperation and bring the
sources of friction out into the open while the war is on. But your
sense about this is so much better than mine that it may be
silly to suggest it.

Malvina tells me that Pearson has not acknowledged Eleanor's
letter. I don't know whether Eleanor left instructions as to
running it in My Day as she talked of doing to me. Perhaps it is
better to let the matter drop. I don't know. I'd like to ask Sam.

This State Department situation gives me heartache. I am so
sorry for everyone concerned, especially you and myself who found
Welles very helpful.

God Bless you and thanks again for so much and so great
and continuous kindness.

Aff
To the Most Reverend Edward Mooney
Archbishop of Detroit
1880 Wellsley Drive
Detroit, Michigan.

My dear Archbishop:—I should have written long ago to thank you for your kindness to me in Detroit but the heat got me down and I have been overlong digesting what I have seen and heard and trying to decide what if anything I should try to do about it.

After seeing you I went on to Buffalo but was unable to get an appointment with Bishop Duffy. However I had an interesting evening with Paul Fitzpatrick, the Democratic leader of Erie Co. I talked with him not as a political leader but as an American Catholic of Irish descent. He felt as you did that the situation was charged with danger for post-war collaboration on the lines of enlightened self-interest and Christian principle and that the less intelligent groups of Irish descent might very possibly throw in with the isolationists if the anti-British issue were injected into the situation. He said these groups were not satisfied with the policy of the Irish Government but that they were always suspicious of Britain and knew very little of what was really taking place in Ireland.

I then came to New York and had a two hour talk with Bishop Hurley who doubtless told you about it when he went on to Detroit just a month ago. He showed me great kindness and goodwill and I talked to him with the same frankness that I talked with you. He is a grand man. I went on to Boston but the Cardinal was on vacation. However I had an interesting and friendly talk with Joe Kennedy whom I like very much. I then went on to Maine and found Bishop McCarthy very kind and well disposed but not confronted with the problem that leaders like yourself have to meet in the metropolitan areas. Coming back to New York I had a good talk with Bishop O'Hara and then later in Washington another talk with Monsignor Ready. All are sympathetic but no one has any concrete, constructive solution of Partition to propose. All hope that American and Irish interests will not come into acute conflict; all see the need for wisdom and forbearance but they also see the danger that Mr. DeValera will toss the issue of Partition into our lap as soon as the war ends.

As I tried to make it clear to you I am concerned not only with the effect of injecting the Irish Partition issue into our American political situation but I am also concerned for its effects on the new Irish state in whose welfare I am deeply interested. If as Mr. DeValera suggested to me was a possibility he should offer an exchange of populations as a solution, that is of deporting the 800,000 Protestants from Northern Ireland and importing an equal number of Catholic Irish from England a religious issue of first importance is at once set up. This could have tragic repercussions both here and in England. If it got going it would certainly be a very bad thing for Ireland.

The bringing together of North and South has got to be by
conciliation and arrangement and the only chance I see of bringing this about in any appreciable future is for Eire to make some definite approach, such as taking a limited part in the war on our side and entering into a relation with Northern Ireland as would promote solidarity.

It would of course be difficult if not impossible for Mr. DeValera to reverse his policy to the extent of making an alliance with England but must reasonable enough to make an alliance with us which would ensure him a place at the Peace Table. After all, the Axis have bombed his cities and sunk his ships and committed repeated acts of war against the Irish people. Leadership on this line would I believe get ninety per cent of the Irish people behind him, the military situation being what it is.

However, whatever might be attempted must be attempted in a spirit of real kindness and not resentment.

You and Bishop Hurley probably know more about India than any two responsible Americans interested in world solutions. I am writing to the President to this effect and I hope that if he should call on you for advice and information on this subject you would be willing to help. He is very understanding of your difficult problems in Detroit and I am sure that if you should need his help he would not fail you. He knows about your wise and skilful handling of the Polish problems in your Archdiocese.

I am off any time now. These air lines are very mysterious about giving you more than twelve hours notice of departure.

I felt closely drawn to you in our one meeting and hope that you will count on me as a friend to give you any assistance in my power. Life is too short and events too pressing and of too grave import for people who are on the side of Principle to stand on formalities with each other.

Faithfully Yours

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bishop Hurley as it explains the situation and I have no stenographer here that I would trust with intimate matters.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

How about the Irish message?

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of State.
John Maffey, British representative informed me shortly after my return that his government required his presence in London to confer and advise regarding a proposed American note to Ireland. I told him that I assumed this to be the proposal and draft which I reported to you before leaving Washington. I made it clear both verbally and in writing that this was no more than a recommendation on which as far as I knew you had not taken action. I said that I therefore felt at liberty to discuss the matter with him and would appreciate his counsel and advice. He suggested that I also consult Kearney, the Canadian High Commissioner, in whom I have confidence. This I have done.

Both these believe that there is more than a reasonable chance of De Valera accepting the offer in question not because he wishes to but because he could not afford
not afford to refuse it. I hope this may be so but I cannot subscribe to it as a probability.

I explained that the object of my recommendation was to prevent the Irish partition issue being injected into post-war American politics by De Valera and exploited by the subversive elements in America which tried block preparedness and Lend-Lease in order to oppose your plans for cooperation with the British Commonwealth and other nations. We know these forces are still active and organized. I said that it seemed wiser to spread the facts and our point of view on the record before the attack came and while war conditions existed. Maffey asked me if we wanted a refusal rather than acceptance of the offer if it should be made. I said while I had no authority to speak for you or the President I believed the last thing you wished would be a quarrel; that in long view it was obviously best that Eire should join us on a friendly basis and De Valera be placed in a position where he would be controlled by conference conditions. But I said that I could not believe that there was much chance that he would accept the offer and that it was most desirable that note should be drawn to make the record
the record for the American public. I further said that as he knew De Valera responded to none of the courtesies of diplomatic usage nor to the usual methods of persuasion but that a blunt and just statement of facts even though reciting unpleasant things carried most weight with him. Maffey agreed that this was so.

What will carry most weight with De Valera is that he will understand at once the strategy of the note and that it will forestall a successful appeal to American sympathy.

Maffey pointed out that if the note were sent De Valera would probably reply by saying that as long as the crime of partition lasted he could not be expected to cooperate with the British Commonwealth except on his own terms. This, of course, would be his probable line. It therefore seemed wise in order to forestall the necessity of a reply to his reply to state the American position as to the status of Northern Ireland at the outset and further to make it clear that any change in that status was a matter concerning the parties' interest and not the American Government.

I have therefore amended my recommended draft in this respect.
-4- #117, September 13, 8 p.m., from Dublin

respect:

I am sending you by the first air courier this revised draft containing this and a few immaterial recommendations.

GRAY

JHL
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

September 24, 1943.  

PERSONAL  
MEMORANDUM FOR HON. CORDELL HULL:  

I think you will like to read this confidential letter to me from David Gray. Please let me have it back.  

F.D.R.  

Letter from Hon. David Gray, 9/17/43, to the President, regarding Ireland.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

You might read this over and let me know just what is the status of the suggested message to DeValera.

Please return David Gray's letter for my files.

F. D. R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I enclose herewith a detailed memorandum prepared by the Department on the status of the suggested message to de Valera.

It points out that we are awaiting the British reaction to the proposed limited approach note agreed upon in September. It has been discussed in one War Cabinet meeting after the Prime Minister's return and we are informed that it should be discussed again during the week.

As requested, I return David Gray's letter to you.

Enclosures:
Memorandum.
From David Gray, undated.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Status of Proposed Approach to Ireland

You will recall that in your memorandum of June 16 you asked the Department's view on Mr. Gray's memorandum of May 14 proposing an approach to the Irish Government in regard to Irish bases. Later Mr. Gray prepared a draft note on a broader basis asking Ireland to make its contribution to the war. The Department replied June 29 that it believed Irish bases would be of considerable usefulness in the war effort but that any approach on the subject should be made only on two conditions:

1. It should be based on sound military grounds approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff; and,

2. It should be approved by the British Government.

You concurred in this view, and asked the Chiefs of Staff for a statement of their opinion on the purely military aspects of the usefulness to the war effort of air and naval facilities in Ireland.

The Chiefs of Staff gave their views in a memorandum addressed to you on August 7 recommending "that negotiations be conducted without committing the United States at this time..."
time to a definite program for the establishment of air or naval bases in southern Ireland.

Subsequently discussions were held between representatives of the State Department and of the Chiefs of Staff with a view to agreeing on an approach. On the basis of their memorandum of August 7, the Chiefs of Staff representatives took the position that a more limited approach than that contemplated in Mr. Gray's draft note was desirable in view of their military estimate and of their desire to make no commitments of any kind at this time.

A draft prepared on this basis, and agreed to by the State Department and the Chiefs of Staff representatives, was submitted to you with the Department's letter of September 13. After receiving your approval, the Department telegraphed this draft note to Ambassador Winant on September 18, instructing him to obtain the views of the British Government.

Mr. Winant replied the following day that he had discussed the matter with Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden felt that the message was "perfectly drafted", but explained that there was a "real division in the Cabinet on this issue", and that a reply would be delayed until Prime Minister Churchill could discuss the matter with the Cabinet.

On October 4, the Department instructed Mr. Winant to inquire when we might expect to receive the British Government's
Government's views. We added: "As you know, the President is personally interested in this matter".

Ambassador Winant replied October 8 that the matter had been raised in a War Cabinet meeting shortly after the Prime Minister returned, but that no decision was reached. He understood that the matter would be discussed again during the week.

We have kept Mr. Gray fully informed of all developments. I attach a copy of his telegram dated October 8 in which he expresses his complete agreement with the proposed approach to Ireland.

Enclosure:

Telegram from Dublin,
October 8, 1943.

October 11, 1943
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted October 11, '43

Addressed to

The President
September 17th, 1943.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss: Here we are back. Secretary Hull sent me a very kind telegram but stated that "The War and Navy Departments have their own ideas" as to the approach to be made to Ireland if any. He said that he would keep me advised.

Last Week Sir John Maffey told me that his government had sent for him to go to London to advise on an American proposal for a note to Ireland and I talked the matter over with him. He had personally been in favor of this in the Spring but had been called off by the Dominion Office as I told you, on the general ground of letting a sleeping dog lie. He will be back tomorrow and I will keep you posted as to the British reaction to the idea. I polished the draft up and inserted a paragraph about recognizing the status of Northern Ireland as defined by the treaty of 1921 to which the then Irish Government had been a party adding that any change in that status must obviously be a matter for the governments concerned and not the American Government. I sent a copy of this amended draft to the Secretary last week. Until I know what the army and Navy have in mind it would be foolish to express an opinion but if it is objection to supplying the needed defense of Dublin and Cork I should take exception to their position. Unless the English object to the move in principle I think they would dig up the balloons and antiaircraft guns and together we could put a few squadrons of spiffy fighters on the Dublin airdromes protection. Of course there would also have
have to be the radar installation which would also help the radar service in Northern Ireland. This is on the assumption of Dev's acceptance which I do not think likely though of course possible.

I find on coming back that the Government admits that the last harvest of wheat was a third short of requirements. It was really more than that. This year they already admit a falling off of from thirty to sixty thousands of acres of wheat since last year which would mean perhaps forty thousand tons less than last year if the crop is harvested. But if it has rained almost continuously during the harvest and a very considerable portion of the wheat is already spoiling either as it stands or in the stocks. An eighteen hours rain yesterday and showers today have against postponed any hope of getting things dried out. All in all it is very possible that Eire will be short half its requirements or more. Half is 180,000 tons and they now have only one ship of four or five thousand tons the others being little coastwise steamers of fifteen hundred to two thousand and not for the North Atlantic in winter. I don't have to tell you what will start in Irish-American circles when Eire really begins to feel the pinch and if you don't nail Dev's hide on the fence NOW, you will be in a bad way, unless you want to give in to him and supply him without even getting a thank you.

I found that the Archbishop of Dublin's secretary had written to our Press Attachée (Dan Terrel O.W.I.) after the bombing of Rome saying that he was tired of being told this was a Christian war and wished to have the American news bulletin discontinued
The Archbishop is very close to Dev. This undercurrent of antagonism to us crops out continually. The morning that the Germans claimed to have driven us off the Salerno beaches Dev' newspaper the Irish Press had big headlines stating that the Americans had been thrown back although the two other morning papers said only that the situation was critical and obscure. I can't very well complain of these pinpricks but they show definite unfriendliness at a time when they are dependent on the United Nations for everything. It doesn't seem right.

I shall write you again as soon as I see affey. I have Will Rogers jr. stopping with me. He will take this to Foynes to catch the Courier tomorrow night.

Thanks for your little note.

If you haven't fired that fellow Hopkins yet give him my love. Haude sends her best.

Yr.

[Signature]
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated: October 8, 1943
Rec'd: 6 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

128 October 8, 7 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Appreciated reply your clarifying exposition of the Irish note question in your number 110, October 5, 9 p.m. I realize the force of the objection of the military to accepting a commitment to protect Irish cities when they may not need Irish facilities. I am convinced that there is no chance of De Valera saying yes but, of course, you and the service chiefs would be responsible, not I in the case I were wrong. I am sure you and the President are right not to assume that responsibility.

Your suggestion that an evasive reply by De Valera would be regarded as a refusal for the record and that the note in question might be considered as an opening move in the development of a line of action designed to inform the American people of the unfriendly attitude of the
-2- 128, October 8, 7 p.m., from Dublin

of the Irish Government with a view to forestalling anti-British agitation on the partition question answers our criticism of the military approach note. I am now entirely in agreement with you that it is the best line to take.

Sir John Maffey says he has not been consulted with regard to the military approach version. The Canadian High Commissioner strongly approves of this latter version and prefers it to the former. He will see Cranborne in London shortly.

I am sending Winant a copy of this telegram.

GRAY

KLP
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Winant has talked with the Prime Minister about the proposed note to Ireland relative to naval and air facilities. He promised to mention to his Cabinet that we had again raised this question but he wishes to defer formal discussion of it until Eden's return.
November 4th 1943.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss:

Why the British have held up action on your Irish note all this time I have not been able to find out. Sir John Maffey says he does not know and I think if he did he would give me a hint at least. He has at last gone over for consultation on this matter and will be back the night of November 6th. I shall see him on the 7th but before that Winant will probably advised you of the situation. I have advised cutting out of the note all that part that I had supplied which cited the benefits we had conferred on Eire and holding it for further use. I think it would be a logical development for the record when and if Dev turn down the request for the ports to follow with a request that he at the least get the Axis spy missions out of the country. I hear we shall be having over a hundred thousand troops in Northern Ireland presently and for observation purposes they might as well be in Vichy France.

I went to the North last week, spent the night with General Hill and General Eaker to discuss the secret liaison with the Irish Chief of Staff General McKenna. Hill of course cannot command the American area but Eaker seemed very understanding and cooperative and said that he would do what he could to keep him in command of the airforces stationed in N.I. and so make him available for continuing the liaison he has so successfully conducted. It is important for several reasons the most immediate and practical being the aid McKenna gives us in releasing our
grounded aircraft and crews.

Your friend Mr. DeValera is continuing his efforts to preserve those little events of history which in spite of him keep occurring. He is in fact too busy attending meetings celebrating the revival of the Gaelic language to give his attention to such matters. It is fifty years since Douglas Hyde, the Protestant Anglo-Irish squires from the west founded the Gaelic League. He has his reward in being the paralysed President of an Eire which would have seen Britain overrun by Hitler with a degree of satisfaction and without lifting a finger to prevent it.

Meanwhile the Censor is loose again. The American flag was recently cut out of the title to a film called "Good Luck Mr. Yates," although this has never happened before. Previously your picture AND the flag were both flashed on the title. The Censor decreed that one of you had to go. I don't know yet which one went. Meanwhile I am surrounded by mountains of turf, some two hundred and fifty thousand tons, all brought her from the interior with American gasoline. If I go nuts can you blame me?

The elections are not too cheering but I suppose the results were to be expected and here and there are bright spots. The main thing is what you have achieved with Uncle Joe. Maude is fine and sends her love.

Aff.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

You may be interested in reading the attached cable from Dublin. It confirms information from Winant that the question of the note to de Valera will probably not be considered by the British Cabinet until Eden's return. It also points out Gray's impression that except for Churchill and Morrison there is little understanding of the problem in the British Cabinet. It also mentions possible opposition in the United Kingdom from trade interests there. The concluding paragraph contains a summary of the Minister's analysis of the problem.

Enc.
Cable 136 from Dublin
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dublin
Dated November 1, 1943
Rec'd 8:48 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

136, November 1, 7 p.m.
PERSONAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.
Appreciate your 116, October 28. The British representative here received instructions last week to go to London early this week for discussion of the note in question. Yesterday, October 31, he received a telegram postponing indefinitely his mission. He believed they might be waiting for Eden's return.

I gain the impression that possibly no one in the British Cabinet except Churchill and Morrison appreciate clearly the desirability of placing De Valera on the record from the viewpoint of the American situation. There is little accurate knowledge of De Valera or of his political strategy in British Government circles, and as long as he is making no immediate trouble the "better not" school of thought in the Cabinet gains ground.

You must also
You must also keep in mind that there are powerful trade interests suspicious of American inroads on Eire trade, also the bureaucratic view which is reluctant to recognize Eire as not a dominion and under British tutelage.

From our viewpoint, this seems the time to prepare a case that will protect us against the pressure of subversive groups using the Irish cause for attacks on our Government's postwar policies. As previously reported (reference my telegram No.124, October 1, 8 p.m) De Valera asked and received, authorization from his recent party convention to communicate the program for agitation to compel Northern Ireland to join Eire to associations in America which support the Irish cause. Of course, no overt support of the American cause would be permitted in Eire. The crux of the matter as I see it is your appraisal of the embarrassment which these produce. If they are regarded as something likely to prove serious, I would recommend that for the furtherance of American and incidentally British interests also, the President's policy should prevail.

GRAY

MK
December 13, 1943.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss: While you have been away I have been trying to
dig out the British point of view which has held up action on the
Irish note we submitted to them months ago. I told Maffey I thought
his country was missing a boat that might never again touch British
shores in not seizing the opportunity of having an American
Government cooperate on Irish policy, that anything we did together
would have to be done NOW as neither American Party could go
into a Presidential election with an anti-Irish tag. He then
talked very frankly, and while I could not quote him I telegraphed
the gist of what he told me to the Secretary who all along has
been most understanding and helpful in this matter. This telegram
I was instructed to repeat to Winant. Following this up I asked
Maffey what he could and would recommend to his government and
as a consequence of the conference I am telegraphing the draft
of a note to the Secretary. Maffey feels and I agree with him
that the logical first step, whether or not there is a second, is
to ask for the abatement of the danger to our military interests
caused by the presence of the Axis legations here with their
opportunity of recruiting and efficient espionage organization
entirely from the ranks of the I.R.A. and their sympathizers.
The I.R.A. as I have reported has declared war on us. The British
having got along without the Irish thus far do not want to have
us put DeValera in the position of claiming post war consideration
by giving us facilities at this late date. As there is no reward
promised or implied in the recall of the Axis legations but only
the remedying of a long standing wrong the British see no
objection to asking for this. It implies no reward.

If, as is certain in my opinion, DeValera will refuse our request then I believe he would also certainly refuse such a request for the ports if needed as was made in the draft note now in British hands. Maffey would subscribe to this and I believe there would be no British opposition to such a demand which would be couched in the form of asking what his price would be for facilities.

I am anxious to get this refusal in a brief for defense against Irish pressure groups trying to involve us in the Partition issue. The most I can do here now it seems is to get the material in hand for such a defense in the case that it is needed. I have no influence on Dev. except when I can wield a club but then for that matter no one else has either.

I wanted you to know where I got my dope about British Government opinion and of course I want you to tell the Secretary, though I didn't care to put the source in a paper for record.

Faithfully Yours

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

December 27, 1943

The Irish Shipping Limited, an agency of the Irish Government, has been negotiating with the States Marine Corporation in New York for the purchase of the SS Wolverine, approximately eight thousand tons, which is under charter to the War Shipping Administration. Application was made to the Maritime Commission for approval of this sale and the Irish Legation, in a note of December 4, requested the Department to recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the application be approved. The Department has not taken any action to support this request and the Maritime Commission on December 7 denied the application for sale "as not being in the best interests of the United States."

I enclose a copy of the note from the Irish Legation, together with a draft reply to the Legation and also a note to Mr. de Valera personally, to be delivered by Mr. Gray in Dublin. I believe that we should use this occasion to remind Mr. de Valera that the American Government has previously chartered two merchant ships to Ireland and that the Irish Government has permitted these two ships to be sunk by Nazi submarines without offering the slightest word of protest to the German Government.

Please let me know whether these drafts meet with your approval.

Enclosures:

1. Note from the Irish Legation.
2. Draft note to the Irish Legation.
3. Draft telegram to Dublin.

CH

Copies of these papers returned to the Secy. State
Department of State

BUREAU | Eu
DIVISION

ENCLOSURE S
TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO

The President
The Minister of Ireland presents his compliments to the Honourable the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that Irish Shipping Limited of Dublin, are negotiating with States Marine Corporation, 90 Broad Street, New York, N. Y., for the purchase of the s/s "Wolverine", a vessel of 7997 d.w.t., owned by States Marine Corporation at present under requisition to the War Shipping Administration and chartered by them.

Application for the approval of the sale of this vessel to Irish Shipping Limited and for its transfer to Irish registry is being made to the United States Maritime Commission by States Marine Corporation, as required by Section 9 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.

As the Secretary is no doubt aware, Irish Shipping Limited was established by the Irish Government
Government with a view to providing shipping facilities for the importation to Ireland of commodities essential to the economic life of the Irish people, because of the impossibility of obtaining these supplies through shipping facilities used prior to the outbreak of the war, and the entire share capital of the Company is held by the Minister for Finance.

In this connection it will be recalled that on the generous initiative of the President, two American vessels - the "West Meris" and the "West Hematite" - were chartered by the United States Maritime Commission to Irish Shipping Limited.

Unfortunately, those two vessels, which were trading to United States and Canadian ports carrying cargoes of wheat to Ireland, were lost and it is in order to replace, to some extent, the vital tonnage so lost that Irish Shipping Limited are anxious to purchase the a/s "Wolverine", so that wheat and other essential supplies may continue to be brought to Ireland.

In view of these circumstances and of the
the urgent need of Irish Shipping Limited for cargo vessels, the Minister begs to request that the Secretary may be so good as to recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the application above referred to be granted.

December 4, 1943
My dear Mr. Minister:

Reference is made to your note dated December 4, 1943 stating that the Irish Shipping Limited, an agency of the Irish Government, has been negotiating with the States Marine Corporation for the purchase of the SS Wolverine and that application for approval of the proposed sale was being made to the United States Maritime Commission. Your note requested that the State Department recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the proposed sale be approved.

I have given this matter careful consideration and regret to inform you that for reasons which I am explaining to Mr. de Valera through the American Minister in Ireland I have not been able to make the recommendation which the Irish Government requested. This matter has been discussed with the President who concurs in this decision.

I

The Honorable

Robert Brennan,

Minister of Ireland.
I am informed that the United States Maritime Commission on December 7 denied the application as not being in the best interests of the United States.

Sincerely yours,
AMERICAN LEGATION,
DUBLIN.
FOR THE MINISTER

Reference Department's telegram no. 133, December 13 and your 169, December 18.

Please request an appointment with Mr. de Valera and hand him the following note:

QUOTE I have the honor to refer to recent efforts of the Irish Government, through its officials in Washington, to obtain additional merchant ships in the United States. Several weeks ago the Irish Shipping Limited, an agency of the Irish Government, entered into negotiations with the States Marine Corporation in New York for the purchase of the SS Wolverine, a vessel of approximately eight thousand tons under charter to the United States War Shipping Administration. Application was made to the Maritime Commission for approval of the proposed sale and the Irish Legation in Washington, in a note of December 4, requested the State Department to recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the application be approved.
QUOTE I am instructed to inform you that the State Department in consultation with the President has given this matter careful consideration and for the reasons set forth below has been unable to make the recommendation requested by the Irish Government. The United States Maritime Commission on December 7 denied the application for the proposed sale as not being in the interests of the United States.

QUOTE You will recall that in September 1941, in the face of a growing world shortage of shipping, the American Government made available to the Irish Government by charter two American merchant ships. These two ships have now both been destroyed by Axis submarines. The American Government understands that the Irish Pine (formerly the West Hematite) sailed from Ireland October 28, 1942 and failed to arrive at its destination and that the Irish Oak (formerly West Merie) was torpedoed on the morning of May 15, 1943 in open daylight and under conditions of good visibility. Although no definite information seems to be available regarding the precise manner of the sinking of the Irish Pine, the torpedoing of the Irish Oak appears to have been definitely established, as well as the fact that a German submarine was observed by the crew of
the *Irish Oak* some hours prior to the sinking. The sinking of the *Irish Oak*, and of other Irish ships, which you have rightly described as a *QUOTE* wanton and inexcusable act, *UNQUOTE* is clearly the work of Axis submarines in their campaign of indiscriminate warfare against all ships whether belligerent or neutral.

*QUOTE* In chartering the *Hematite (Irish Pine)* and the *Heris (Irish Oak)* to the Irish Government the American Government was motivated by the most friendly considerations and by the sole purpose of helping the Irish Government and the Irish people to carry to their shores foodstuffs and other supplies of critical necessity. This, of course, constitutes only a part of the efforts of the American Government since the outbreak of war to assist the Irish people in obtaining needed supplies. The chartering of these ships to the Irish Government represented a real sacrifice on the part of the United States at a time when shipping space was most badly needed. The Irish Government sailed these ships with distinct neutral markings and they carried supplies in no way connected with the war. The action of the Axis submarines in sinking these ships without warning
is, therefore, to repeat your own language, a QUOTE wanton and inexcusable act. UNQUOTE

QUOTE So far as the American Government is informed, the Irish Government has taken no steps against the Axis Governments and, thus far, has offered no word of protest to the Axis Governments against these wanton acts. These repeated attacks on Irish ships appear to be conclusive proof, if further proof were needed, that the Axis powers are in fact making war upon Ireland while at the same time using Ireland's friendship to the detriment of the United Nations war effort. The loss of the West Hematite (Irish Pine) and the West Meria (Irish Oak) has harmed not only Ireland but the United States, to whom those vessels belonged, and the whole United Nations war effort.

QUOTE The fact that ships sailing under the Irish flag bear distinct neutral markings and travel fully lighted at night should make them immune from belligerent attack but in reality serves only to make them easy targets for Nazi submarines. Any further ships transferred to the Irish flag would be subjected to these same hazards.

QUOTE In view of the foregoing circumstances, it is
regretted that the State Department cannot comply with your request that it recommend to the Maritime Commission the approval of the sale now in question. UNQUOTE

I am today addressing a note to the Irish Minister merely telling him that for reasons which I am explaining to Mr. de Valera through the American Minister in Ireland I have not been able to make the recommendation which the Irish Government requested. We agree with the view expressed in your no. 168 December 18 that the question of releasing the above note to the press should be held in abeyance until the other matter under consideration is definitely decided upon.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

February 15, 1944

Attached is the text of a message which I propose to send to Prime Minister de Valera requesting the Irish Government to take appropriate steps for the recall of German and Japanese representatives in Ireland. This request is based upon the fact that the presence of Axis diplomatic representatives in Ireland, with their opportunities for espionage under the cloak of diplomatic immunity, must inevitably be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of Allied military operations.

This draft message was prepared in the first instance by Mr. David Gray. After making certain changes the Department submitted the draft to the British Government for its views. Mr. Eden has now replied that the British Government concurs in this proposed draft and that a day or two after the delivery of our note, the British Government will send a separate note supporting our request.

I have also consulted Admiral Leahy who states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objections to the proposed message from a military point of view.

Please let me know whether this draft meets with your approval in order that I may instruct Mr. Gray immediately to deliver it to Mr. de Valera.

Enclosure:

Draft Message to Prime Minister de Valera.
DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER DE VALERA

Your Excellency will recall that in your speech at Cork delivered on the fourteenth of December, 1941 you expressed sentiments of special friendship for the American people on the occasion of their entry into the present war and closed by saying, "The policy of the state remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral." As you will also recall, extracts of this speech were transmitted to the President by your Minister in Washington. The President, while conveying his appreciation for this expression of friendship, stated his confidence that the Irish Government and the Irish people, whose freedom is at stake no less than ours, would know how to meet their responsibilities in this situation.

It has become increasingly apparent that despite the declared desire of the Irish Government that its neutrality should not operate in favor of either of the belligerents, it has in fact operated and continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers and against the United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend. One of the gravest and
most inequitable results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized espionage which the geographical position of Ireland affords the Axis and denies the United Nations. Situated as you are in close proximity to Britain, divided only by an intangible boundary from Northern Ireland, where are situated important American bases, with continuous traffic to and from both countries, Axis agents enjoy almost unrestricted opportunity for bringing military information of vital importance from Great Britain and Northern Ireland into Ireland and from there transmitting it by various routes and methods to Germany. No opportunity corresponding to this is open to the United Nations, for the Axis has no military dispositions which may be observed from Ireland.

We do not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Whether or to what extent it has succeeded in preventing acts of espionage against American shipping and American forces in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is, of course, impossible to determine with certainty. Nevertheless
it is a fact that German and Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives still continue to reside in Dublin and enjoy the special privileges and immunities customarily accorded to such officials. That Axis representatives in neutral countries use these special privileges and immunities as a cloak for espionage activities against the United Nations has been demonstrated over and over again. It would be naive to assume that Axis agencies have not exploited conditions to the full in Ireland as they have in other countries. It is our understanding that the German Legation in Dublin, until recently at least, has had in its possession a radio sending set. This is evidence of the intention of the German Government to use this means of communication. Supporting evidence is furnished by the two parachutists equipped with radio sending sets recently dropped on your territory by German planes.

As you know from common report, United Nations military operations are in preparation in both Britain and Northern Ireland. It is vital that information from which may be deduced their nature and direction should not reach the enemy. Not only the success of the operations but the lives of thousands of United Nations' soldiers are at stake.

We
We request therefore, that the Irish Government take appropriate steps for the recall of German and Japanese representatives in Ireland. We should be lacking in candor if we did not state our hope that this action will take the form of severance of all diplomatic relations between Ireland and these two countries. You will, of course, readily understand the compelling reasons why we ask as an absolute minimum the removal of these Axis representatives whose presence in Ireland must inevitably be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of Allied military operations.

It is hardly necessary to point out that time is of extreme importance and that we trust Your Excellency will favor us with your reply at your early convenience.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of February 17, 1944, I see no advantage to be gained by the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland visiting the United States at this time and it might easily cause embarrassment. I therefore suggest that you may wish to send Mr. Gray the following message:

"Secret from the President to David Gray:
Your letter of January 10. I do not believe it would be advisable for your friend to visit the United States at this time."

If this message meets with your approval, we shall telegraph it to Mr. Gray immediately.
January 10, 1944.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss: I hope you are getting your strength back. I have been dragging myself around for over two months as a result of this flu and am still not yet fit. Don't be discouraged if it is slow. Sunday I went to Belfast to lunch with General Collins and General Lee to discuss certain aspects of our relations with the Irish Army and while in the North met the Premier Sir Basil Brooke. He is as anxious over this Partition question, and what it may do in America, as I am and he asked me whether I thought it would be a good thing for him to go to Washington and other points in America while making a visit to Canada. He said he would make no suggestion through channels to the British Government until first getting your reaction to the idea and asked me if I would sound you out. I said that I would. I also suggested that if you approved, he avoid the Partition question unless he were publicly attacked on that score and announce his mission as one bringing the thanks of the people of Ulster to the United States for sending American troops and thus guaranteeing Ulster's security. He could also testify to the universal good behavior of the men, the sympathetic personality of the entire officer personnel and the success of the enterprise besides expressing the hope that close and happy relations would be perpetuated. Brooke is first class, very sensible and would go well on the Hill. If he were attacked he is prepared to defend religious tolerance and refute the charges of persecution alleged by the Eire Catholic leaders. He might take Professor
Savory with him, an Ulster Member of Parliament and a brilliant historical writer.

What Downing Street or the F.O. would think of this I do not know, but before I went North I told Sir John Maffey that Brooke had asked to meet me off the record and that I would only do so if he, Maffey, felt that it would not get me in wrong with his Government. He said that he thought it would be a useful thing to do as long as I were acting unofficially and out of the country to which I was accredited, and a thing the Foreign Office could not object to. Of course this advice of his was off the record too.

If you think well of this as I do, send me the following telegram in confidential code. Your friend would be welcome.

Take care of your self. I am sending the Secretary a copy of a letter which I wrote Winant last week on the Irish note question. The gist of it was that Eden's fear of being embarrassed by the Partition question was understandable but it was not understandable that he thought he could avoid the issue if DeValera chose to raise it. Our only choice in the matter is whether to let Dev choose the time and circumstance for his attack or choose a time to suit our own book. Moreover there would be no need for publishing this last note until we were attacked. You may be sure Dev. will not publish it.

Aff
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 1-10-44, from Hon. David Gray, re possibility of the Ulster Premier, Sir Basil Brooke visiting Washington and other points, while visiting Canada; also re Irish note question.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1944.

CABLE VIA STATE DEPARTMENT

HONORABLE DAVID GRAY,
AMERICAN LEGATION
DUBLIN

YOUR FRIEND WOULD BE VERY WELCOME

HOPKINS

(Mr. Stettinius was notified by telephone to disregard this latest cable to David Gray.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C O P Y

February 23, 1944.

CABLE VIA STATE DEPARTMENT

HONORABLE DAVID GRAY,
AMERICAN LEGATION
DUBLIN

YOUR FRIEND WOULD BE VERY WELCOME.

HOPKINS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

The enclosed letter from David Gray arrived for Mr. Hopkins this morning.

Can you tell me whether or not there is any reply that Mr. Hopkins should make? Or that I can make for him?

May I ask that you return the letter with your answer?

D.H.K.
Secy. to H.L.H.

encl. letter of Feb. 15th from David Gray, U.S. Legation, Dublin, Ireland.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

February 15th, 1944.

Personally Typed.

Dear Harry:

Some weeks ago I was approached by Sir Basil Brooke, Premier of the Northern Ireland Government who asked me if I would undertake to inquire of the President whether it would be agreeable to him to have Brooke visit Washington. The true purpose of his visit would be to thank the American Government for sending troops to Northern Ireland at a time when the safety of Ireland was in doubt. He would wish to express his appreciation also of the port and air base developments in Northern Ireland executed by the American Government and further to testify to the excellent behavior of the American troops and the bond of understanding and friendship which they have in large measure established with the people of Northern Ireland regardless of religious differences. If the President raised no objection to this, Brooke would undertake the usual inquiries through official channels to the end of finding out whether his visit would be agreeable to our government.

I wrote the President to this effect suggesting that if he approved the idea to have me telemaphone, "Your friend would be welcome". To date I have had no word and I feel that I ought to give Brooke some sort of answer. Will you take it up and communicate with me as soon as possible?

Since I wrote the President a very difficult situation arose in Belfast. A member of the Government half in joke spoke of having an Orange Hall which had been used to hold Mass for American Catholic soldiers "disinfected". It was at once seized on by the nationalist politicians. Fortunately the Minister made a full disavowal and a very satisfactory apology to the Bishop of Derry delegated by Archbishop Spellman to represent him as chaplain general in this area. The Bishop accepted the apology very generously and all is well. I have just seen the Bishop and he is lunching with me tomorrow. From what he tells me I think Brooke would be able to deplore religious intolerance and stand for equal rights and privileges for all religions. If he has a free hand to take this line in case Partition is raised I personally think a visit from him would help our cause as it would give Congress a chance to hear Northern Ireland's thanks for the presence of American troops which Mr. DeValera protested.

I have been warning Brooke against just such incidents as has occurred and I think they will be more careful not to walk into traps set by the boys down here. Please telegraph me whatever is the decision.

Yours, David Gray

Piened notation:
"I have given Archbishop Spellman a full account of the incident but of course no word about Basil Brooke's inquiry."
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

32, February 29, noon

Please thank the President for your number 25 February 25 and inform him that I concur entirely in his view.

GRAY

wSB
February 25, 1944

7 p.m.

AMERICAN LEGATION
DUBLIN
25

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO DAVID GRAY

Your letter of January 10. I do not believe it would be advisable for your friend to visit the United States at this time.

STETTINIUS
Acting
(JDH)

BC:RBS:MS
2-24-44

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter from Minister Gray.

I return herewith the letter which you received from Minister Gray in Dublin, which you forwarded to me on March 6.

Enclosure:

Letter from Minister Gray
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 8, 1944.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

TO READ AND RETURN.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972
Dear Boss: I think your Irish note is going very well although it is still uncertain whether De' alera will take the risk of publishing it and making political capital out of it by charging that it is not the reasonable request that it is but the first step in a conspiracy to crucify Eire with hostile propaganda as a prelude to armed invasion. He was sour but quite calm while I watched him read the document. He stopped at the phrase "as a minimum we hope" for the sending away of the Axis legations and asked me if this was an ultimatum. I assured him on that point. He then said "As long as I am here the answer will be no. We have done all that we can do. We neither can nor will do more". But there was no excitement. This began next day when Maffy handed him the brief British note endorsing ours. That was Tuesday afternoon Feb. 22. Wednesday morning he sent for the Canadian Minister John Kearney and charged that our note indicated a political conspiracy against him with intent to provoke a propaganda campaign and the seizure of the Irish bases. He told Kearney, "We will fight to the last man." Kearney told him he thought the request was a reasonable one. De' alera said that he would like the Canadian Government to request us and the British to withdraw the notes. Kearney telegraphed this to McKenzie King and as you probably know the Dominions office also telegraphed King asking him to back us up. This is where it stands now. Of course I have kept the Secretary fully informed. I am going fishing rather publicly over the weekend. It is a
good thing to let DeValera have time to cool out. I told Kearney today that I was sure my Government would authorize me to give assurances that there was nothing in the note but the request for the withdrawal of the Axis Legations and that there was no present intention to publish either the note or DeValera's answer but I did not think my Government would bind itself not to publish the note if it saw fit. I told Kearney that I would like to know before hand if DeValera decided to make a public political incident of the note as I should wish to give him a friendly personal warning of the probable effect on American opinion of such an action. In such a case I should probably take this line: If you read into a simple and reasonable request dictated by our responsibility to our military forces a conspiracy to exert pressure upon you why should we have supplied you with rifles, ships, supplies of every nature which it was possible to release? Why should we permit the free exit of remittances to Eire when Eire blocks remittances to U.S. Why should we permit American gasoline of which our people are in great need to transport hundreds of thousands of tons of turf from the bogs to Dublin to ensure fuel for the population? Why should we assist our ally Britain with coal supplies so that she is able to allot sufficient coal to Eire to enable four hundred thousand Subliners to cook with gas? Why should we be about to release strategic metals for the Irish Sugar Company so as to ensure the making of next years sugar crop for the
Irish people? And more to the same effect.
I should then warn him that the responsibility for the deterioration of Irish American relations and any other consequences was solely on his shoulders and point to the unhappy effect of his political treatment of his protest against our troops in Northern Ireland had upon American opinion.

Of course unless he is determined to sound off we hold all this up.

You seem to be having that life of calm restfulness and desuetude which characterized the last year T.R. was in office. I recall that as a result of his unpopularity with his Congress and politicians generally he controlled the convention in 1908, defeated the nomination of Foraker, nominated Taft and prevented his own renomination by acclamation.

Maude sends her love.

Aff

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1944.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

TO READ AND RETURN.
F.D.R.

Undated letter to the President from David Gray, re DeValera and the Irish situation.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 10 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 10, 1944

Attached is a copy of a note handed to me on March 7 by the Irish Minister giving Prime Minister de Valera's reply to our request for the removal of Axis diplomatic and consular representatives in Ireland. Mr. de Valera states that this request is one with which it is impossible for the Irish Government to comply.

Also attached are copies of telegrams No. 1797 and 1798, March 4 from Ambassador Winant in regard to this matter. Apparently there has been a leakage of information in Ireland as a result of certain actions taken by Mr. de Valera after receiving the British and American notes. Mr. David Gray reports from Dublin that following the delivery of our note Mr. de Valera called a meeting of his Cabinet and told them he had received an ultimatum; arms were issued to local defense forces which stood to all night all over Ireland; and rumors of every kind were circulated, including one that the American fleet was to seize Irish ports.

Following these leaks in London and Dublin, reports of some development in relation to Ireland have been appearing in American as well as British newspapers and the Department is receiving inquiries from the press. The March 13 issue of Newsweek states: "Last week a joint Anglo-American note was served on de Valera asking that relations with the Axis be cut." In view of these leaks I believe that our note delivered to Prime Minister de Valera on February 21 should be given to the press at once unless you feel that there are domestic considerations which make this inadvisable. In giving this note to the press, I believe we should also make public previous communications from the Department to the Irish Government and from yourself to Prime Minister de Valera in regard to Ireland's attitude in the present war.

Does this procedure in regard to publicity meet with your approval?

Enclosures:
Copy, American note, Feb. 21.
Copy, note from Irish Minister.
Copy, telegram No. 1797
Copy, telegram No. 1798
Note Delivered by the American Minister in Dublin to Prime Minister de Valera on February 21, 1944

Your Excellency will recall that in your speech at Cork delivered on the fourteenth of December, 1941, you expressed sentiments of special friendship for the American people on the occasion of their entry into the present war and closed by saying, "The policy of the state remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral." As you will also recall, extracts of this speech were transmitted to the President by your Minister in Washington. The President, while conveying his appreciation for this expression of friendship, stated his confidence that the Irish Government and the Irish people, whose freedom is at stake no less than ours, would know how to meet their responsibilities in this situation.

It has become increasingly apparent that despite the declared desire of the Irish Government that its neutrality should not operate in favor of either of the belligerents, it has in fact operated and continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers and against the United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend. One of the gravest and most
most inequitable results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized espionage which the geographical position of Ireland affords the Axis and denies the United Nations. Situated as you are in close proximity to Britain, divided only by an intangible boundary from Northern Ireland, where are situated important American bases, with continuous traffic to and from both countries, Axis agents enjoy almost unrestricted opportunity for bringing military information of vital importance from Great Britain and Northern Ireland into Ireland and from there transmitting it by various routes and methods to Germany. No opportunity corresponding to this is open to the United Nations, for the Axis has no military dispositions which may be observed from Ireland.

We do not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Whether or to what extent it has succeeded in preventing acts of espionage against American shipping and American forces in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is, of course, impossible to determine with certainty. Nevertheless
it is a fact that German and Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives still continue to reside in Dublin and enjoy the special privileges and immunities customarily accorded to such officials. That Axis representatives in neutral countries use these special privileges and immunities as a cloak for espionage activities against the United Nations has been demonstrated over and over again. It would be naive to assume that Axis agencies have not exploited conditions to the full in Ireland as they have in other countries. It is our understanding that the German Legation in Dublin, until recently at least, has had in its possession a radio sending set. This is evidence of the intention of the German Government to use this means of communication. Supporting evidence is furnished by the two parachutists equipped with radio sending sets recently dropped on your territory by German planes.

As you know from common report, United Nations military operations are in preparation in both Britain and Northern Ireland. It is vital that information from which may be deduced their nature and direction should not reach the enemy. Not only the success of the operations but the lives of thousands of United Nations' soldiers are at stake.
We request therefore, that the Irish Government take appropriate steps for the recall of German and Japanese representatives in Ireland. We should be lacking in candor if we did not state our hope that this action will take the form of severance of all diplomatic relations between Ireland and these two countries. You will, of course, readily understand the compelling reasons why we ask as an absolute minimum the removal of these Axis representatives whose presence in Ireland must inevitably be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of Allied military operations.

It is hardly necessary to point out that time is of extreme importance and that we trust Your Excellency will favor us with your reply at your early convenience.
COPY OF NOTE HANDED TO THE ACTING SECRETARY

MARCH 7, 1944 BY THE IRISH MINISTER IN

WASHINGTON.

The Minister of Ireland presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and referring to the note handed to Mr. de Valera by Mr. Gray on February 21st 1944 has the honour to submit the following reply from Mr. de Valera:

"The note of the American Government was handed to me by the American Minister on February 21st. I informed him at once that the request it contained was one with which it was impossible for the Irish Government to comply. The Irish Government have since given the matter careful consideration and I now confirm the reply which I then gave verbally.

"The Irish Government have also received the assurance of the American Government conveyed to the Irish Minister at Washington and later confirmed by the American Minister here in an interview with me on February 29th, to the effect that the American Government did not contemplate proceeding to military or other measures because of the reply which had been given. The American Minister quoted in particular the President's personal message to me of February 26th 1942, that 'there is not now nor was there then the slightest thought or intention of invading the territory of Ireland or of threatening the security of the Irish' and added that this attitude was unchanged.

"The Irish Government wish to express their appreciation of this assurance. They were indeed surprised that so grave a note as that of February 21st should have been addressed to them. The terms of the note seemed to them altogether out of harmony with the facts and with the traditional relations of friendship between the Irish and American peoples. They doubted that such a note could have been presented had the American Government been fully aware of the uniform friendly character of Irish neutrality in relation to the United States and of the
measures which had been taken by the Irish Government, within the limits of their power, to safeguard American interests. They felt moreover that the American Government should have realized that the removal of representatives of a foreign state on the demand of the Government to which they are accredited is universally recognized as the first step towards war, and that the Irish Government could not entertain the American proposal without a complete betrayal of their democratic trust. Irish neutrality represents the united will of the people and parliament. It is the logical consequence of Irish history and of the forced partition of national territory.

"Already before America's entry into the war, the policy of the Irish Government towards Britain, America's ally, had been directed toward carrying out the intentions indicated in a statement of policy made by me in Dail Eireann on May 29th 1935, namely that 'our territory would never be permitted to be used as a base for attack upon Britain.' That policy has during the war been faithfully pursued. From the beginning, by the establishment of strong observation and defence forces, by a wide and rigorous censorship of press and of communications, by an extensive anti-espionage organization and by every other means within our power, we have endeavoured to prevent the leakage through Ireland of any information which might in any way endanger British lives or the safety of Great Britain. Since the United States entered the war, the same spirit of scrupulous regard for American interests has been shown. American officials have had an opportunity of seeing the measures which have been taken -- they have indeed made favourable comments on their effectiveness -- and it is satisfactory to observe that in the note itself not a single instance of neglect is alleged and no proof of injury to American interests is adduced. Should American lives be lost it will not be through any indifference or neglect of its duty on the part of this State.

As was
"As was known to the American officials, it is true that the German Minister had a wireless transmitter, but he had been for a long time debarred from using it and it has been in the custody of the Irish Government for some months. As regards the two parachutists dropped in Ireland last December, they were apprehended within a few hours. Two other agents dropped here since the war began met with a similar fate. The fifth, who arrived during the first year of the war, remained at large until December 3rd 1941, but the police were aware of his presence have almost from the first moment of landing, and successful activities on his part were rendered impossible. The total number of persons, inclusive of these parachutists, suspected of intentions to engage in espionage, and now held in Irish prisons, is ten foreign and two Irish nationals. These are the facts, and it is doubtful if any other country can show such a record of care and successful vigilance.

"The British Government have informed the Irish Government that they welcome the initiative of the American Government in sending the note and that they attached the utmost importance to it. The Irish Government do not wish to comment on this, except to remark that it is perhaps not known to the American Government that the feelings of the Irish people towards Britain have during the war undergone a considerable change precisely because Britain has not attempted to violate our neutrality. The Irish Government feel sure that the American Government would agree that it would be regrettable if any incidents now should alter that happy result.

"The Irish Government are therefore safeguarding and will continue to safeguard, the interests of the United States, but they must in all the circumstances protect the neutrality of the Irish State and the democratic way of life of the Irish people. Their attitude will continue to be determined not by fear of any measures which could be employed against them but by good will and the fundamental friendship existing between the two peoples."
DAILY EXPRESS is only paper to publish following story today, back page under heading "Eire racked by invasion scare":

"A few wild shots fired ten days ago by a drink-befuddled Allied soldier who crossed the border from Ulster into Eire - this was an official explanation of the worst attack of invasion jitters Eire has known. A mystery remains. Dublin's censorship clamped on news of the alarm, which is just easing, but travellers tell of these high spots: De Valera's army was on a 'stand to' alert. It manned the forts, mined bridges, set up machinery posts at vulnerable points and called out the local defence volunteers. Army officers were given a few hours leave only if they could be reached by telephone. The rushing rumors which led to the stand to gathered force from it. Late on Friday, a week ago, Mr. de Valera sent for
for General Mulcahy and Dr. O'Higgins, leader and deputy leader of the chief opposition party in the Dail, both on the Defence Council. Both men refused to speak when they came out of the Prime Minister's room. Dublin heard of this on Saturday and stories became still more fantastic 'the Allies have presented an ultimatum', 'the Allies want ports and other facilities', 'Mulcahy has been arrested and deputy Dillon shot'. On Sunday Mr. de Valera made a speech at Cavan. He condemned rumors and said there was no justification for public uneasiness. A tense Dail met on Tuesday. Rumors said that Mr. de Valera had flown to London after speaking on the transatlantic phone. But he slipped into his seat and answered a few questions. On Wednesday he hit out in the Dail at rumor mongers and appealed to deputies not to ask questions that could not be answered without embarrassing neutrality. Responsible opinion holds that something serious did happen over the weekend and that Eire survived a dangerous crisis by someone climbing down. One belief is that de Valera was asked to make a demarche to the German Minister to Eire on the grounds that he had certain information which the Nazis should disprove by inviting an investigation.
investigation of the Legation. A second belief is that the Allies stressed to de Valera Eire's responsibility in preventing any leakage of second-front information through Dublin. To this Mr. de Valera is believed to have given an assurance that every possible precaution would be taken.\n
WINANT

IMS
ACK-364
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
1798, March 4, 9 p.m.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY
This noon Cranborne telephoned me that there had been a considerable seepage of information into Great Britain from Ireland as a result of certain actions taken by De Valera after receiving the recent notes directed to him. I had already read a book page item in the DAILY EXPRESS which I am cabling in as my No. 1797. It is my hope that no further publication will occur in London papers, but we both felt that we should have statements ready in case news broke before De Valera's reply and also a prepared statement if it broke after his reply. We were thinking particularly of the possibility of misrepresentation by the Germans, perhaps charging pressure against a small nation, if they picked up the story.

Cranborne
-2- 1798, March 4, 9 p.m., from London

Cranborne told me he would send in a British statement this afternoon which I might forward to you but has just decided that since we took the initiative in this matter it might be better if you forwarded a statement here which you would put out if necessary and the British would follow up with a separate statement in line with ours. Since we haven't got De Valera's reply it is difficult now to write the second statement. This could be forwarded later. The British went to keep in step with us.

WINANT

EJH
March 24, 1944

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Boss: As far as I can see the Irish note has been a success and in a long range view of things I do not think that de Valera will have much chance of making us trouble over partition. It has been a great shock to people here to find out that the American Irish were behind you. None of the powerful American Catholic bishops has come to your aid. The reactions of the American press have depressed them. On receipt of the note Dev's instinct was to secure his political front so he ordered mobilisation and the second line troops were issued rifles and ball cartridges and stood to for a night. The story of the note I believe broke here. It was told by one of the Opposition leaders to a newspaper man. He got it substantially straight two or three days after the note was delivered and I at once put the fact into the record with Dev. After the notes were printed Dev took the line that the note meant 1. affront to Irish sovereignty, 2. affront to Irish neutrality which is the same as independence; 3. that breaking relations meant war. The censorship has been active in representing that the people as a unit were shocked and indignant with us for making the request. Correspondents who made surveys of Dublin opinion the day after the note appeared, found that people were startled but very rarely resentful. Fully fifty per cent said, if keeping these bastards is going to make us go without coal, petroleum and manufactured products why not throw them out. But no one dared say so and the Censor would not pass such surveys. He frankly told one correspondent that it was the Government's view that the Irish people were indignant and the correspondents must bloody well find that that was so.

The Irish government owned Irish Press has featured Brennan charges that our action was taken on inaccurate information supplied by me and they have tried to get me in various ways. A very nice Associated Press man to whom I had talked off the record let me down and we have had a tempest over that. But I came out all right for the editorial attacking me for not having denied the story was written after my denial had been received over the telephone. I refused to say anything further than that I had given out no statements or interview. Now the Opposition has a chance without wheeler dealing to attack Dev in the Dail for affronting the representative of an friendly power and has taken it in a big way. The way to handle this ugly group of bad hats is to tell them to go sit on a tack. I have given up appeasing which gets one no where. At the same time in looking ahead we must not allow any food shortages though we must make them sit up and ask. They were short about half the amount of wheat they need for making flour some 180,000 tons. Brennan talked of twenty thousand but the bigger figure I got from de Valera himself and always before they have understated their shortages. They are entirely without gratitude and what we give must be used primarily for the play of our own hands in U.S.A. I have asked the Secretary to get through for me the
materials of which I spoke to you last summer for the Irish sugar co. Otherwise no Irish sugar next year. He has promised to recommend the release if I feel it essential. I do feel it essential but I also feel it should be used for political effect by you or John MacCormack. The Secretary seemed not to approve the MacCormack idea. If and when the metals are cleared I think you ought to be given credit for doing it entirely with reference to Irish opinion in U.S.A. If you were to be attacked for doing this all the better. Don't let this slip Boss. Maffey is anxious lest Churchill jump the reservation and gum things up. I telegraphed suggesting that you ask him to let you play the hand from the U.S. viewpoint which is how it should be played. We have had a chance to find out who our friends were but nothing actively disagreeable has happened. I refused an escort car on the ground that it would create a scandal in America if an American Minister to Eire were not safe there. I told the Minister for Justice that I would not be responsible for the newspaper stories. They fell for this. The idea of course was to represent the people as so worked up over our outrage upon them that my life was not safe. They hadn't thought of the other angle. It has brought Maudie and me to understand a little what you have had to go through with for so many years. It has been a valuable experience for me because I have always been oversensitive to attacks. I suddenly find now that I don't give a dam and can go on doing what I think is right and fair. Maudie has been the greatest help possible full of fight as well as charm. After all if you don't get into a fight in Ireland you never know anything about the Irish. Fred Astaire's brother-in-law Charlie Cavendish has just died and we are meeting Adele tonight at the boat and taking her down to Lismore tomorrow morning.

Don't worry about us and the Irish. When they are angry as they are now they don't think straight and they walk into trouble.

When I say the Irish I mean the little group of political racketeers who have captured the country. Did you see that De Valera in a prepared speech the other day had spoken of English as a badge of servitude and a language they must get rid of. The censor I believe would not pass this out though it was printed in all the papers. I am storing it up as "an insult to Thirty and Thirty million Americans." These things come in handy some times. I have a boy as a secretary, Aaron Brown whom you will hear of some day. He has the wisest head and the nicest nature I have come across in a whole life time. In this recent episode he has been wonderful. He was in Mr. Hull's office for four years.

Maudie sends her love.

Aff

Dear Franklin, Irish peace here to have a cocktail with us or a smorgastub. Much, much love, Maudie.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In my memorandum of March 10 I transmitted to you Prime Minister de Valera's reply stating that it is impossible for the Irish Government to comply with our request for the removal of Axis representatives in Ireland.

I now enclose a copy of a note which I propose to send to Prime Minister de Valera through Mr. David Gray commenting on certain points in Mr. de Valera's note and making clear that the continued presence of Axis representatives in Ireland must be regarded as a danger to American lives and military operations for which the Irish Government cannot escape responsibility. Before transmitting this note, we would clear it with the British.

The Irish have made an effort, in their note and in their publicity since to show (a) that the American Government has been misinformed and (b) that it is a question of Ireland's right to remain neutral. I believe it is important to set de Valera right on both these points and also that our own people should see the issues clearly. I propose therefore, as soon as the note is delivered to Mr. de Valera, to give it to the press.

Please let me know whether you approve this note and this procedure in regard to publicity.

Enclosure:
To Prime Minister de Valera.
The British Embassy has given us a copy of a message from the Prime Minister to the President regarding further measures contemplated by the British Government in relation to Ireland. This is presumably in reply to the Department's inquiry in telegram 1916, March 15.

We now propose to send a further note to Prime Minister de Valera which we wish you to show to the appropriate British authorities at once and telegraph any comments they may have. We plan to give this note to the press immediately after its delivery. The text of our proposed message is as follows:

(BEGIN BROWN CODE) QUOTE On February 21, 1944 the American Government through its Minister in Dublin presented a request to the Irish Government for the removal of Axis consular and diplomatic representatives whose presence in Ireland must be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of the Allied
military operations. The Irish Minister in Washington on March 7, 1944 handed to the Acting Secretary of State your reply stating that it is impossible for the Irish Government to comply with this request.

QUOTE Since the compelling circumstances giving rise to the American Government's request were clearly set forth in its note of February 21, they need not be repeated here. 

QUOTE Your reply states that the Irish Government was indeed surprised that so grave a note as that of February 21st should have been addressed to them. The terms of the note seemed to them altogether out of harmony with the facts and with the traditional relations of friendship between the Irish and the American peoples. END SINGLE QUOTE

It seems hardly necessary to say that any situation in which the lives of thousands of American men are at stake is to the American Government a grave situation and one which requires its utmost endeavors to remedy.

QUOTE The Irish Government has not denied that the German Legation in Dublin until recently had in its possession a radio-sending set. Nor has the Irish Government denied that Axis agents, equipped with radio-sending sets, have been dropped on Irish territory by German planes. The
fact that five parachutists are known to have landed in Ireland does not preclude the possibility, indeed it adds to the likelihood, that others have landed and have not been discovered by the Irish authorities. The American Government understands that one of the five parachutists mentioned in your note remained at large for eighteen months and that twenty thousand dollars in American bills were found in the room which he occupied in the house of his German confederate in Dublin. The American Government understands that another of the German parachute spies who was apprehended shortly after landing and sentenced to imprisonment later mysteriously escaped from prison and remained at large for six weeks. It is evident that Axis spies could not remain at large in Ireland for such long periods without assistance from some quarter. The German Government apparently considers it possible for German agents in Ireland to operate radio-sending sets without detection; otherwise, they would not have equipped their spies as well as their Legation with radio-sending apparatus.

QUOTE The American Government's request, far from being out of harmony with the traditional relations of friendship between the Irish and American peoples, would
seem entirely in accord with such friendly relations and
one to which the Irish Government might be expected to make
a favorable response. As you stated in your speech of
December 14, 1941, there is scarcely a family in Ireland that
does not have a member or a near relative in the United
States. These Americans of Irish blood and background are
loyal American citizens and are making their full contribution
to the war in every way. At home they are supporting the
war effort as loyally as any section of the American population.
They are contributing their full share of fighting men for
duty in the armed forces overseas. Fighting with these
American soldiers of Irish blood are many tens of thousands
of other Irishmen from Great Britain and other countries of
the British Commonwealth and including Ireland itself. Any
steps to help safeguard the lives of these men and of all
those fighting with them must surely strike a sympathetic
chord in the hearts of the people of Ireland and indeed of
all Irishmen everywhere. In making this request, however,
the American Government is not asking a special favor of
Ireland on the basis of Irish-American friendship. It is
merely asking that steps be taken to insure that Irish
neutrality shall not be used by the Axis powers to harm the United States and the United Nations.

QUOTE Your note states that the American Government should have realized that the removal of representatives of a foreign state on the demand of the government to which they are accredited is universally recognized as the first step toward war, and that the Irish Government could not entertain the American proposal without a complete betrayal of their democratic trust. END SINGLE QUOTE

In this connection it may be noted that a number of other friendly nations have found it in their own interest to break diplomatic relations with the Axis nations, a step going beyond that requested of the Irish Government, without participating in the war or assuming the status of belligerents.

QUOTE The removal of Axis representatives, moreover, could scarcely be regarded as the SINGLE QUOTE first step toward war END SINGLE QUOTE in the same sense as the hostile acts already committed against Ireland by Germany. German planes have bombed Irish cities and destroyed Irish lives and property with impunity. A German plane has sunk a ship carrying a cargo of American wheat to Ireland, and Axis
submarines have sunk still other ships carrying supplies to Ireland. The German Government by the very act of dropping parachutists with radio equipment on Irish soil surely shows little respect for Ireland's neutrality or Ireland's desire that the United Nations be given no ground for complaint against Ireland.

QUOTE The American Government finds it difficult to understand how the removal of Axis representatives from Ireland—could possibly be considered a SINGLE QUOTE betrayal END SINGLE QUOTE of Ireland's SINGLE QUOTE democratic trust. END SINGLE QUOTE Surely the people of Ireland are not unaware that their country and their democratic way of life have been spared only because powerful armed resistance has stood in the Nazi conqueror's path. As the President emphasized in his message of December 22, 1941 to you, Ireland's freedom is at stake no less than our own. Although Irish neutrality may, as you say, represent the united will of the Irish people and Parliament, the American Government cannot believe that the Irish people or their elected representatives desire that Irish soil be used by the Axis powers in ways which endanger United States forces and their operations.
QUOTE Irish neutrality is not the issue. The American Government has at no time questioned Ireland's right to remain neutral—although it has doubted the wisdom of such a policy from the viewpoint of Ireland's own best interests. Nor is it a question of Ireland's maintaining diplomatic relations with the Axis countries, although the American Government would naturally like to see such relations severed completely. If the Irish Government considers its relations with Germany and Japan of such importance that diplomatic relations with these countries must be continued, maintenance of such relations through Irish representatives stationed in those countries would at least not constitute a direct danger to the lives of members of the American Armed Forces.

QUOTE Your reply, after reciting the various measures taken by the Irish Government to suppress Axis espionage, concludes: SINGLEQUOTE Should American lives be lost, it will not be through any indifference or neglect of its duty on the part of this State. END SINGLEQUOTE The American Government has already stated that it does not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its
efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Unhappily, friendly intentions alone are not enough when so much is at stake. Despite all the precautions on the part of the Irish Government, the continued presence of Axis diplomatic and consular representatives in Ireland, operating under their special privileges and immunities, must be regarded as a danger to American lives and military operations for which the Irish Government cannot escape responsibility. The United States Government therefore hopes that further consideration of this matter will convince the Government of Ireland that its own interests as well as those of the United Nations require the removal of Axis representatives from Ireland at the earliest possible date. UNQUOTE
Department of State

BUREAU BC
DIVISION

ENCLOSURE TO

Letter drafted 3-23-44

ADDRESS TO

The President
Dear Boss: Maude and I are both very grateful for the support which you and the Department have given us during this last Irish interlude. I have advised against another note answering DeValera's reply, though I think the points should be made for our own people in a statement preferably by some minor official. It is getting about that he made a monkey of his army with his ultimatum talk. The army chiefs are sore. Listen to this one, which is absolutely OFF the record. While the Defense Council was in session [the night we delivered the note] making plans to repel the Anglo-American invasion and sending out orders, the telephone rang and it proved to be the British Military Attache who had not been told of the note, inquiring where the Irish Army would take delivery of five hundred motorbicycles which he had procured for them. It naturally rocked the meeting. The Opposition while standing by neutrality are getting ready to attack this misrepresentation of our request and the gratuitous hostility which DeValera stirred up against us. It was a fatal move on his part and if we just let him alone for a bit, meanwhile keeping the petrol we need for Americans in America also the cotton yarns, he will have his work cut out for him. His next move will be to try to represent us as accepting a substitute for the removal of the Axis missions, if he can lure us into a position accepting responsibility for counter espionage. I have just warned the Secretary about that. As long as we keep him hooked on his record of refusing our request he cannot
do us any great harm either now or in the post war period but he is very apt to catch us napping and wriggle off. He will probably try to start a political underground movement against you. The time may come when it would be advisable for you to characterize as an insult to the American people that any foreigner should attempt to inject himself into American politics with racial pressure group methods. This war should have put an end to hyphens.

Another note to him we think would build him up again with his own people. There will be no hope for constructive sane cooperation with anybody while he is master of the Twenty Six Counties but only his own people can deflate him. We should do nothing to prevent that by making a martyr out of him or by giving him more opportunity to defy us. Your idea of the absent treatment is the key idea. I hand it to you for passing it on to me. I never would have thought of it.

The Secretary's broadcast was a great paper. It has made a great impression in England. I am printing the official text in our little C.W.I. "Letter from America". It will go to about one hundred thousand readers. We hope you have had a bit of a rest. I am off for a few days salmon fishing next week but unless we get rain there will be no fish. Maude sends her love.

Aff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 10, 1944

Yesterday you spoke to the Under Secretary of State about the possibility of making available two ships to the Irish Government in view of the acute need in Ireland for certain products which have to be transported from this Hemisphere.

You may recall that we chartered two American ships to the Irish Government some months ago and that both of these ships have been lost. One of them disappeared at sea without leaving a trace, presumably the victim of a German submarine. The other one was definitely torpedoed by a submarine. In the latter case Mr. de Valera described the torpedoing of this vessel as "a wanton act" but he did not say that it was done by the Germans nor did he in either case make a protest to the German Government. Last December the Irish Government applied to the War Shipping Administration for another ship and asked the Secretary of State to support their request. With your approval, I declined to do so and sent a memorandum to the Irish Government explaining why I could not do so. It has since been made public in connection with the exchange of communications with Ireland. A copy of it is attached for ready reference.

In February, you will recall, we asked the Irish Government to expel the Axis representatives. We did not ask Ireland to go to war or even to break diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan. On grounds of military security we asked them to expel a German Minister and his staff and a Japanese Consul General and his staff, pointing out that it would be naive to assume that these officials were not doing everything in their power to send out military information which might seriously affect the success of Allied military plans and cost American and Allied lives. The Irish Government adamantly refused to do this. We know for a fact, although for security grounds we cannot disclose...
disclose this, that the German Minister has continued to try to send out to Germany military information.

We believe that our request of the Irish Government that they expel the Axis representatives was a reasonable one with which they should have complied. We believe that public opinion in this country supported this request and in fact would be disposed to support pressure to cause Ireland to comply. The editorial reaction to this throughout the country was favorable. We believe that public opinion would find it difficult to understand our now making available two ships to get supplies to Ireland in view of the attitude which Ireland has taken toward us and the war.

To make ships available to Ireland in the present circumstances might well retard the progress which we have made in putting pressure on other neutral countries to reduce trade with Germany. Indeed such action might undermine the very foundations on which our program in this regard has been so carefully built up and ironically enough at the very time when we are beginning to get results.

In these circumstances I recommend that you take the position that we cannot now even consider making ships available to Ireland. The Irish Government, of course, knows how to change our attitude and how to get our support in obtaining two fine new Liberty ships.

S/ C.H.

Enclosure:
Memorandum to Irish Government.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 17, 1944

In my memorandum of March 24, I transmitted for your approval a copy of a further note which I proposed to send to Prime Minister de Valera in regard to the continued presence of Axis representatives in Ireland. Following your approval, we submitted the text of this proposed note to Mr. David Gray for his opinion and to Ambassador Winant for his opinion and for the views of the British Government.

Both Mr. Gray and Mr. Winant have recommended that a further note should not be sent. Mr. Winant has also reported that he has discussed this matter with Prime Minister Churchill and with Lord Cranborne, who was acting as Foreign Secretary during Eden's absence. Cranborne opposed sending a second note and is supported in this view by British security officials. Prime Minister Churchill has told Mr. Winant that he thinks our first note has done great good and has prompted the Irish authorities to strengthen security measures, but he felt that a second note was not necessary and that it would be best to leave well enough alone.

In view of the attitude of the British Government and of the recommendations of Mr. Gray and Mr. Winant, the Department has decided that it would not be advisable to proceed with the further note. You will also have noted the recent announcement of Mr. de Valera's decision to call a general election on May 30. This development, even
even aside from other considerations, would appear to make the sending of a further note definitely undesirable. I propose, therefore, to let this matter rest, at least for the time being. Meanwhile, however, we are following all aspects of the Irish situation, particularly as it relates to the security of our military operations.

CH
June 2, 1944.

Dear Boss: Many thanks for your intervention with regard to Professor Myles Dillon. He has landed a job, I hear, with O.W.I. where he should be useful.

Your opposite number in Eire has got a clear majority in his Dail which I think is a good thing. He is in now for five more years and if his mistakes are what we think they are, he will have to liquidate them. There was danger that he would duck responsibility for a while and let the Opposition pay the bills and clean the slate and then come back when they bungled. No engagement or refusal to enter into an engagement without his sanction, in the post war period would be worth the paper it was written on.

We have both been anxious about your health and apprehensive as to the prospect ahead for you. When a fighter pilot makes a certain number of operational missions they ground him if he hasn't already been killed. This apparently doesn't go for C.impg.Cs.

God Bless you

Aff
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. CORDELL HULL:

In view of the news this morning from Germany, I am inclined, after carefully reading the memorandum on relations with Ireland, to suggest that we hold up the whole thing until later. On my return, if the subject again becomes of more interest we can work out some method of making it public at that time.

F.D.R.

Carbon of memo of 7/20/44 to the President from Sec. Hull returned 7/22/44.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Relations with Ireland

I have received a large number of letters in recent months commenting on American policy toward Ireland. An overwhelming majority of these letters have expressed full approval of our policy, and, in particular, our request for the removal of Axis representatives from Ireland. Many of our citizens believe that this Government should go even further and take whatever steps may be necessary to obtain their removal.

Among the many letters received some show a lack of understanding of our request to the Irish Government. In addition, resolutions have been adopted by certain groups of citizens asking that this Government petition Great Britain to remove the boundary between Northern Ireland and southern Ireland. A resolution was also introduced in Congress on June 15, 1944 by the Honorable James M. Curley, requesting the President to use his good offices with the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the end that Great Britain "shall immediately grant, in conformity with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, full and complete independence to the Irish Free State."

In view of the apparent misunderstanding on these matters, and in order that you may have the fullest information available as occasion arises, I am submitting herewith a brief memorandum, together with relevant documents, on our relations with Ireland since the outbreak of war in Europe. While I see no particular reason to make the memorandum public at this time, it has been prepared with a view to its being made public either at the White House or at this Department at any time developments make such a course appear desirable in your opinion.

Enclosure:
Memorandum, with attachments.
Department of State

Bureau Division BC

Enclosure

To

Letter drafted

Addressed to

The President
Memorandum on Relations with Ireland

In the summer of 1940, after the fall of France had placed the whole British Isles in imminent danger, the American Government made available 20,000 American rifles to the Irish Army. After Pearl Harbor, in view of Ireland's continued policy of neutrality, this Government was forced to take the position that all available arms and war supplies must be given to our own armed forces or be provided to the armed forces of our Allies actively engaged in fighting the enemy. In other words, we have followed the common sense policy of putting arms into hands that are willing to use them. The wisdom of this policy is now amply evident on the many battlefronts of the war.

Although unable for the above reasons to provide Ireland with arms, we have done what we could to prevent hardship and suffering by the Irish people. We have made available to Ireland essential supplies of various kinds. These have included petroleum and petroleum products, machinery and auto parts, and chemicals and medical products. Spare parts and motor fuel have been provided for Irish trucks which haul peat, the essential fuel for heating Irish houses. The American Red Cross has allotted to Ireland supplies to the amount of $500,000 for use in the event of emergency. A large portion of these supplies, to the amount of $165,000 as of June 30, 1944, have already been shipped.

At the present time we are shipping to Canada about 1,000 tons of bunkering coal monthly to replace coal for Irish vessels carrying grain from Canada to Ireland.

In September 1941, despite the growing shortage of shipping, the American Government made available two merchant ships to help the Irish people carry to their shores foodstuffs and other supplies of critical necessity. Both of these ships have been sunk, presumably by Axis submarines. An Axis submarine was sighted by the crew of one of these ships about fifteen hours before it was sunk. In December 1943 the Irish Government again approached the American Government desiring to purchase additional ships. The State Department declined to support this request and the Maritime Commission denied the
the application for ships as not being in the interests of the United States.

On October 15, 1941 and November 6, 1941 the Irish Government addressed notes to the American Government, referring to reported activities of American technicians in Northern Ireland and asking "to be informed officially of the purpose of these activities and of the intentions of the American Government." The American Government replied on November 18, 1941, citing the President's statement to the press some weeks previously in regard to reports that the United States was constructing a naval air base in Northern Ireland. The President had stated that whatever had been done in this respect had been done either under Lend-Lease or as straight purchase by the British Government. He added that while American workmen were no doubt working on such bases, they were being paid by the British Government. The American Government's reply of November 18, 1941 suggested, therefore, that in as much as the Irish Government's inquiry related to territory recognized by the United States as part of the United Kingdom and in as much as the matter of the inquiry concerned the United Kingdom and its defense measures, the Irish Government should address its inquiry to the Government of the United Kingdom.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor Prime Minister de Valera made a speech referring to the long and close friendship between Ireland and America but stating that Ireland could only be a friendly neutral. The President on December 22, 1941 sent a message to Mr. de Valera telling him that Ireland's freedom was at stake as well as our own and expressing the hope that the Irish people, who love liberty and freedom as dearly as we, would know how to meet their responsibilities in the situation then existing.

In January 1942 American troops were sent to Northern Ireland. Prime Minister de Valera made a public speech protesting against this action and stating that this was a threat to Irish security. Again the President sent a personal
personal message to Mr. de Valera on February 26, 1942, assuring him that there was not the slightest thought or intention of invading Irish territory or threatening Irish security, and that the presence of these troops in Northern Ireland could only contribute to the security of Ireland. The President added that he wanted to make it plain to Ireland that when the time came to gather about the peace table Ireland in its own best interests should not stand alone but should be associated with its traditional friends, including the United States.

At various times since Pearl Harbor the War Department has expressed concern about Axis espionage in Ireland. In February 1944, following consultations between the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President this Government sent a note to the Irish Government requesting the removal of Axis Consular and Diplomatic representatives whose presence in Ireland must be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and the success of Allied military operations. Prime Minister de Valera replied that it was impossible for Ireland to comply with this request.

Attached are copies of the following documents:

(1) Text of American Government's note of November 18, 1941 to the Irish Government in regard to reported activities of American technicians in Northern Ireland.

(2) Text of message of December 22, 1941 from the President to Prime Minister de Valera in regard to Ireland's attitude toward the war.

(3) Text of message of February 26, 1942 from the President to Prime Minister de Valera regarding the presence of American troops in Northern Ireland.

(4) Text of Aide-Memoire of November 16, 1942 regarding Axis espionage in Ireland.

(5) Text of note delivered to Prime Minister de Valera on January 6, 1944, explaining why the State Department was unable
unable to recommend the sale of additional ships to Ireland.

(6) Text of note delivered to Prime Minister de Valera on February 21, 1944, requesting the removal of Axis representatives in Ireland.

(7) Memorandum of comment by the Secretary of State on Memorial printed in the Congressional Record, May 8, 1944.

(8) Letter of June 7, 1944 from the Acting Secretary of State to the Honorable John A. Danaher.

Documents numbers (3), (5) and (6) have already been given to the press as State Department press releases No. 79, March 11, 1944; No. 78, March 11, 1944, and No. 73, March 10, 1944, respectively.
I have taken up with the President your aide-mémoire of October 15, 1941 and your note of November 6, 1941 in which you refer to reported activities of American technicians in Northern Ireland and ask "to be informed officially of the purpose of these activities and of the intentions of the American Government." I am authorized to make the following reply.

You may recall that at the President's press conference some weeks ago reference was made to reports that the United States was constructing a naval air base in Northern Ireland. The President commented that whatever has been done in this respect has been done either under the Lend-Lease Act or by reason of straight purchase by the British Government. He stated that American steel, for example, has perhaps gone into British bases in the United Kingdom, in Canada and elsewhere. He added that American workmen were no doubt working on such bases and that they were being paid for this work by the British Government.

In as much as the inquiry contained in your communication under acknowledgment relates to territory recognized by the Government of the United States as part of the United Kingdom, and in as much as it will be clear from the statements I have above made that the matter of this inquiry is a question which concerns the United Kingdom and its defense measures, I am obliged to suggest that the inquiry in question should be addressed by the Irish Government to the Government of the United Kingdom.
"Sir:

"I have received your communication dated December 16, 1941 transmitting extracts from a speech delivered by Prime Minister de Valera at Cork on December 14. Your communication was immediately forwarded to the White House where it has been considered by the President. The President now requests that the following message, with which I also desire to associate myself, be cabled, as a personal message, to Mr. de Valera:

"I have received, through Mr. Brennan, the Irish Minister in Washington, certain extracts from your speech delivered at Cork on December 14.

"I note with particular interest your reference to the long association of friendship and regard between our two countries, your expressions of sympathy with the people of the United States in the present conflict and your declaration of friendly neutrality on the part of the Irish Government.

"I fully understand the strong desire of Ireland, and the desire of every nation not at war, to avoid active participation in the present struggle. Unfortunately, as the experience of so many nations, including our own, has so clearly demonstrated, the desire to avoid the wave of conquest provides little guarantee of national safety. On the contrary it merely gives to the aggressor the opportunity to choose the moment and manner of attack, sometimes carried out most treacherously.

"I cannot let this opportunity pass without repeating what has now become the obvious, namely, that Axis aggression is now being waged on a world-wide scale, that until this aggression has been stopped by force of arms there is no security of any nation, great or small.

"These
"These are stern facts which the Irish people may well ponder today, and I feel that the American Government would be failing in its duty of deep friendship if it did not, with the wisdom of its recent experience, underline their vital significance to the Irish Government.

"We do not minimize the task before us but I need scarcely tell you of the absolute confidence of the American Government and the American people in the final triumph of the cause for which we are now fighting and our determination to carry the fight through to complete victory. Happily the vast majority of mankind and the preponderance of resources are on our side. The assistance which any nation or any people may give in this struggle merely speeds the day of victory and peace and security for all nations.

"Your expressions of gratitude for the long interest of the United States in Irish freedom are appreciated. The policy of the American Government now as in the past contemplates the hope that all the free institutions, liberties and independence which the Irish people now enjoy may be preserved for the full enjoyment of the future. If freedom and liberty are to be preserved, they must now be defended by the human and material resources of all free nations. Your freedom too is at stake. No longer can it be doubted that the policy of Hitler and his Axis associates is the conquest of the entire world and the enslavement of all mankind.

"I have every confidence that the Irish Government and the Irish people, who love liberty and freedom as dearly as we, will know how to meet their responsibilities in the present situation.'

"Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."
TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER DE VALERA TRANSMITTED TO THE IRISH MINISTER IN WASHINGTON ON FEBRUARY 26, 1942 BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

"I have received, through Mr. Brennan, Irish Minister in Washington, the text of your statement on January 27, last, following the arrival of American troops in the British Isles.

"The decision to dispatch troops to the British Isles was reached in close consultation with the British Government as part of our strategic plan to defeat the Axis aggressors. There was not, and is not now, the slightest thought or intention of invading Irish territory or threatening Irish security. Far from constituting a threat to Ireland, the presence of these troops in neighboring territory can only contribute to the security of Ireland and of the whole British Isles, as well as furthering our total war effort.

"I have noted in your previous statements expressions of gratitude for the long interest of the United States in Irish freedom. The special ties of blood and friendship between our two countries are recognized here no less than in Ireland and have never left us unconcerned with the problems and fate of Ireland.

"At some future date when Axis aggression has been crushed by the military might of free peoples, the nations of the earth must gather about a peace table to plan the future world on foundations of liberty and justice everywhere. I think it only right that I make plain at this time that when that time comes the Irish Government in its own best interest should not stand alone but should be associated with its traditional friends, and, among them, the United States of America."
On October 29 the Minister of Ireland handed to the Under Secretary of State a memorandum relative to a Pocket Guide to Northern Ireland published by the War and Navy Departments for distribution to the American forces. The Minister referred orally to certain passages in the Pocket Guide to which the Irish Government takes exception. Reference was made in particular to the statement that, "Eire's neutrality is a real danger to the Allied cause. There, just across the Irish Channel from embattled England, and not too far from your own billets in Ulster, the Axis nations maintain large legations and staffs. These Axis agents send out weather reports, find out by espionage what is going on in Ulster."

In view of the representations made by the Minister of Ireland a copy of his memorandum was referred to the War Department for comment. The War Department has now replied that information in its files fully substantiates the statement made in the Pocket Guide to Northern Ireland to which objection was made by the Irish Minister.

Department of State,
Washington, November 16, 1942.
"I have the honor to refer to recent efforts of the Irish Government, through its officials in Washington, to obtain additional merchant ships in the United States. Several weeks ago the Irish Shipping Limited, an agency of the Irish Government, entered into negotiations with the States Marine Corporation in New York for the purchase of the SS Wolverine, a vessel of approximately eight thousand tons under charter to the United States War Shipping Administration. Application was made to the Maritime Commission for approval of the proposed sale and the Irish Legation in Washington, in a note of December 4, requested the State Department to recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the application be approved.

"I am instructed to inform you that the State Department in consultation with the President has given this matter careful consideration and for the reasons set forth below has been unable to make the recommendation requested by the Irish Government. The United States Maritime Commission on December 7 denied the application for the proposed sale as not being in the interests of the United States.

"You will recall that in September 1941, in the face of a growing world shortage of shipping, the American Government made available to the Irish Government by charter two American merchant ships. These two ships have now both been destroyed and, in view of all the circumstances, we must assume they were destroyed by Axis submarines. The American Government understands that the Irish Pine (formerly the West Hematite) sailed from Ireland October 23, 1942 and failed to arrive at its destination and that the Irish Oak (formerly West Neria) was torpedoed on the morning of May 15, 1943 in open daylight and under conditions of good visibility. Although no definite information seems to be available regarding the precise manner of the sinking of the Irish Pine, the torpedoing of the Irish Oak appears to have been definitely established, as well as the fact that a German submarine was observed by the crew of the Irish Oak some hours prior to the sinking. The sinking of the Irish Oak, which you have rightly described as a 'wanton and inexcusable act,' and of other Irish ships must be presumed in the absence of
of evidence to the contrary to be the work of Axis submarines in their campaign of indiscriminate warfare against all ships whether belligerent or neutral.

"In chartering the West Hematite (Irish Pine) and the West Neris (Irish Oak) to the Irish Government the American Government was motivated by the most friendly considerations and by the sole purpose of helping the Irish Government and the Irish people to carry to their shores foodstuffs and other supplies of critical necessity. This, of course, constitutes only a part of the efforts of the American Government since the outbreak of the war to assist the Irish people in obtaining needed supplies. The chartering of these ships to the Irish Government represented a real sacrifice on the part of the United States at a time when shipping space was most badly needed. The Irish Government sailed these ships with distinct neutral markings and they carried supplies in no way connected with the war. The action of the Axis submarines in sinking these ships without warning is, therefore, to repeat your own language, a 'wanton and inexcusable act.'

"So far as the American Government is informed, the Irish Government has taken no steps against the Axis Governments and, thus far, has offered no word of protest to the Axis Governments against these wanton acts. These repeated attacks on Irish ships appear to be conclusive proof, if further proof were needed, that the Axis powers are in fact making war upon Ireland while at the same time using Ireland's friendship to the detriment of the United Nations war effort. The loss of the West Hematite (Irish Pine) and the West Neris (Irish Oak) has harmed not only Ireland but the United States, to whom those vessels belonged, and the whole United Nations war effort.

"The fact that ships sailing under the Irish flag bear distinct neutral markings and travel fully lighted at night should make them immune from belligerent attack but in reality serves only to make them easy targets for Nazi submarines. Any further ships transferred to the Irish flag would be subjected to these same hazards.

"In view of the foregoing circumstances, it is regretted that the State Department cannot comply with your request that it recommend to the Maritime Commission the approval of the sale now in question."
TEXT OF NOTE DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER DE VALERA ON FEBRUARY 21, 1944, BY THE AMERICAN MINISTER IN DUBLIN ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"Your Excellency will recall that in your speech at Cork delivered on the fourteenth of December 1941 you expressed sentiments of special friendship for the American people on the occasion of their entry into the present war and closed by saying, 'The policy of the state remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral.' As you will also recall, extracts of this speech were transmitted to the President by your Minister in Washington. The President, while conveying his appreciation for this expression of friendship, stated his confidence that the Irish Government and the Irish people, whose freedom is at stake no less than ours, would know how to meet their responsibilities in this situation.

"It has become increasingly apparent that despite the declared desire of the Irish Government that its neutrality should not operate in favor of either of the belligerents, it has in fact operated and continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers and against the United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend. One of the gravest and most inequitable results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized espionage which the geographical position of Ireland affords the Axis and denies the United Nations. Situated as you are in close proximity to Britain, divided only by an intangible boundary from Northern Ireland, where are situated important American bases, with continuous traffic to and from both countries, Axis agents enjoy almost unrestricted opportunity for bringing military information of vital importance from Great Britain and Northern Ireland into Ireland and from there transmitting it by various routes and methods to Germany. No opportunity corresponding to this is open to the United Nations, for the Axis has no military dispositions which may be observed from Ireland.

"We do not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage. Whether or to what extent it has succeeded in preventing acts of espionage against American shipping and American forces in Great Britain and Northern Ireland is, of course, impossible to determine with certainty. Nevertheless it is a fact that German and Japanese diplomatic
and consular representatives still continue to reside in Dublin and enjoy the special privileges and immunities customarily accorded to such officials. That Axis representatives in neutral countries use these special privileges and immunities as a cloak for espionage activities against the United Nations has been demonstrated over and over again. It would be naive to assume that Axis agencies have not exploited conditions to the full in Ireland as they have in other countries. It is our understanding that the German Legation in Dublin, until recently at least, has had in its possession a radio sending set. This is evidence of the intention of the German Government to use this means of communication. Supporting evidence is furnished by the two parachutists equipped with radio sending sets recently dropped on your territory by German planes.

"As you know from common report, United Nations military operations are in preparation in both Britain and Northern Ireland. It is vital that information from which may be deduced their nature and direction should not reach the enemy. Not only the success of the operations but the lives of thousands of United Nations' soldiers are at stake.

"We request therefore, that the Irish Government take appropriate steps for the recall of German and Japanese representatives in Ireland. We should be lacking in candor if we did not state our hope that this action will take the form of severance of all diplomatic relations between Ireland and these two countries. You will, of course, readily understand the compelling reasons why we ask as an absolute minimum the removal of these Axis representatives whose presence in Ireland must inevitably be regarded as constituting a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of Allied military operations.

"It is hardly necessary to point out that time is of extreme importance and that we trust Your Excellency will favor us with your reply at your early convenience."
Memorandum of Comment by Secretary of State on Memorial Printed in Congressional Record, May 8, 1944

On May 8, 1944 the Honorable David I. Walsh presented to the Senate several memorials from his constituents in Massachusetts, "remonstrating against the policy of the State Department in regard to the neutrality of Eire". The text of one of the memorials in question was printed in the Congressional Record of May 8, as follows:

"The undersigned American citizens, many of whom have immediate relatives in the armed services, respectfully disagree with the policy of our State Department in its effort to force the people of Eire to abandon their neutrality for these reasons:

"1. The peoples of the United States of America and of Ireland have maintained a strong and unbroken friendship over our history, and the Irish people still cherish that friendship.

"2. Responsible British officials have repeatedly expressed a desire to repose Ireland, and are not unwilling to use any State Department, ours included, to accomplish that purpose.

"3. There is little opportunity for espionage afforded six Nazi-Nipponese representatives in Eire who must be under the constant surveillance of American, Irish, and British secret-service men.

"4. In the First World War, Ireland accepted the promises of world leaders, and volunteered an army of 350,000 men -- one-tenth of her population -- while England was conscripting her army. The Irish dead numbered twice the Belgian dead, yet all promises to small nations were repudiated in Ireland's case.

"5. To bring a neutral nation into military association by force of one kind or another is to emulate the Nazi philosophy and bring our war purposes and ideals into disrepute.

"We
"We respectfully suggest the immediate application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to Ireland. This can be done without awaiting final victory or without disturbing our war effort."

I do not think this memorial should stand on the record unanswered.

This memorial, I assume, refers to the request made by the American Government to the Irish Government on February 21, 1944 for the removal of Axis consular and diplomatic representatives in Ireland whose presence there has constituted a danger to the lives of American soldiers and to the success of Allied military operations.

I am happy to believe that the overwhelming majority of American citizens, including American citizens of Irish birth or Irish extraction, have appreciated the circumstances giving rise to this request and have fully supported the action taken by this Government. Hundreds of persons from all parts of the country have written me expressing their approval, and many have urged that the American Government take whatever steps might be necessary to compel Ireland to remove Axis representatives who are in a position to spy against American forces and American military operations.

Apparently the persons who have signed their names to the memorials in question do not fully understand the American request or the reasons for it.

The compelling circumstances giving rise to the request for the removal of Axis representatives in Ireland were clearly set forth in the American Government's note of February 21, 1944 to the Irish Government.

The memorial quoted above refers to the "strong and unbroken friendship" between the people of the United States and the people of Ireland. These special ties of blood and friendship have always been recognized by the American Government and, in fact, encouraged us to hope that the Irish Government might take the steps requested by the American Government for the protection of American lives and military operations. The Irish Government, nevertheless, declined to comply with our request.
As Prime Minister de Valera stated in his speech of December 14, 1941 there is scarcely a family in Ireland that does not have a member or near relative in the United States. These Americans of Irish blood and background are loyal American citizens and are making their full contribution to the war in every way. They are contributing their full share of fighting men for duty in the armed forces overseas. Fighting with these American soldiers of Irish blood are many tens of thousands of other Irishmen from Great Britain and other countries of the British Commonwealth, and including Ireland itself. Any steps to help safeguard the lives of these men and of all those fighting with them must surely strike a sympathetic chord in the hearts of Irishmen everywhere. In making the request of the Irish Government, however, the American Government was not asking a special favor on the basis of Irish-American friendship. It was merely asking that steps be taken to ensure that Irish neutrality shall not be used by the Axis powers to harm the United States and the United Nations.

The statement in the memorial that British officials "are not unwilling to use any State Department" is an obvious suggestion that the American Government was influenced by the British Government to make this request of the Irish Government. Such an implication is utterly untrue and without any foundation whatsoever. The American Government made this approach to the Irish Government entirely on its own initiative and in view of its obvious duty of taking every possible precaution to safeguard the lives of many hundreds of thousands of American soldiers in the British Isles who were about to embark upon hazardous military operations and who are at this moment engaged in these operations. The fact that military operations have now been launched against the Continent of Europe does not remove the dangers resulting from the presence of Axis representatives in Ireland.

The memorial states: "There is little opportunity for espionage" by Axis representatives in Ireland. I might point out that the Irish Government has not denied that the German Legation in Dublin until recently has had in its possession a radio sending set; nor has the Irish Government denied that Axis agents, equipped with radio sending sets, have been dropped on Irish territory by German planes. The fact that five parachutists are known
to have landed in Ireland and to have been captured by the Irish Government cannot preclude the possibility, indeed it adds to the likelihood, that others have landed and have not been apprehended by the Irish authorities. I understand that one parachutist, for example, remained at large in Ireland for eighteen months and that $20,000 in American bills were found in the room which he occupied in Dublin. I understand that another of the German parachutist fliers, who was apprehended shortly after landing and sentenced to imprisonment, later mysteriously escaped and remained at large for six weeks. It is evident that Axis spies could not remain at large in Ireland for such long periods without assistance from some quarter. The German Government evidently considers it possible for German agents in Ireland to send information to Germany by radio, otherwise they would not have equipped their spies as well as their Legation with radio sending apparatus.

The memorial refers to the use of force "to bring a neutral nation into military association". I should like to emphasize that no force whatsoever has been exercised by us against Ireland. Indeed the Irish Government was given specific assurances that the use of military force against Ireland was not contemplated. Nor has there been any question of asking Ireland to come into military association with us or even abandoning her neutrality. It may be noted that a number of other friendly nations have found it in their own interest to break diplomatic relations with the Axis nations, a step going beyond that requested of the Irish Government, without participating in the war or assuming the status of belligerents.

The American Government has at no time questioned Ireland's right to remain neutral, although it has doubted the wisdom of such a policy from the viewpoint of Ireland's own best interests. Nor has the American Government even asked Ireland to break diplomatic relations with the Axis countries. Although the American Government would naturally like to see such relations severed completely. If the Irish Government considers its relations with Germany and Japan of such importance that diplomatic relations with those countries must be continued, maintenance of such relations through Irish representatives stationed in those countries would at least not constitute a direct danger to the lives of members of the American armed forces.
The memorial, finally, suggests "the immediate application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to Ireland". The memorial does not specify the respects in which the principles of the Atlantic Charter are believed to be applicable to Ireland. However, I would like to call attention to a statement which I made in a speech of July 23, 1942 in which I emphasized the obligations which the Atlantic Charter imposes upon each nation as well as the assurances which it pledges. In this speech I stated, in part, as follows:

"The pledge of the Atlantic Charter is of a system which will give every nation, large or small, a greater assurance of stable peace, greater opportunity for the realization of its aspirations to freedom, and greater facilities for material advancement. But that pledge implies an obligation for each nation to demonstrate its capacity for stable and progressive government, to fulfill scrupulously its established duties to other nations, to settle its international differences and disputes by none but peaceful methods, and to make its full contribution to the maintenance of enduring peace."

I have commented at length on the above memorial because I believe it important that this matter be clearly understood.
United States Senate

John A. Bennett

The Honorable

Frederick

I send

de the stated reasons and the fact that the people of Frederick, as Prime Minister of the government, have a longstanding tradition of honoring the American people in this regard.

Accordingly, I urge the American government to take no other course.

and earnestly would permit no other course.

In the same way, I have been advised that the American government could only take the course of the statute and the stated reasons as of course a matter.

For the proper authorization within the British Commonwealth, the American government must take the course I have described.

You will appreciate that you are now in possession of the statute, the reasons, and the request of the President, President Franklin D.

That we request our President, Franklin D.

Those reasons which read:

Dear Senator Bennett,

I have received your letter of May 24, 1944, which

June 7, 1944
Ireland which does not have a member or near relative in the United States. These ties of blood and friendship have given Ireland a special place in the hearts of the American people. During the course of years the Irish have made many appeals across the seas - appeals which have never failed to be received with the greatest sympathy and friendship by their American cousins, and to which their American cousins have invariably replied with their wholehearted consideration and support.

For the first time in history the American Government recently made a request of the Irish - a request that they close existing centers of espionage and thus help safeguard the lives of American boys fighting a mortal enemy. We did not ask them to go to war, nor to abandon their neutrality, nor to break relations with the Axis powers - although many other countries have found it in their own interest to sever relations without, however, participating in the war or assuming the status of belligerents. We merely asked them to take steps to insure that Irish neutrality would not be used by the Axis powers to harm the cause of the United States and the United Nations - for which cause a great many Irish boys are also fighting.

We believed that our request was a reasonable one, and would strike a sympathetic chord in the hearts of Irishmen everywhere. We believed, too, that such action would be in the best interests of the Irish people. But, as you know, our request was denied.

The Ancient Order of Hibernians in the preamble to the resolution they are asking you to sponsor, pledge their loyalty, fidelity and continued support to the American Government in its "all-out endeavor of winning the war on every battle front". It was to this same end that our request was addressed to the Irish Government.

The enclosures to your letter are returned to you in accordance with your wishes.

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.

Acting Secretary
October 2, 1944.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Franklin: Things are going on pretty well here. I think our tough attitude has increased respect for us. The Irish despise soft headed "mugs". The Secretary very kindly sent me a copy of his report to you on Irish relations and the supporting papers. I thought it very good. I also thought there was no point in releasing it at the present. As I have told you before, I think our Irish policy should be conducted primarily with reference to political conditions in America and to the end of protecting the Administration from pressure group attacks on our foreign policy. This you have done and we are in a much better position if there has to be a showdown than we were.

On September 22 I made a formal oral request to Mr. De Valera for assurances regarding Axis War criminals. As I reported he was very sour about it. It put him on the same spot as our note about Axis missions. I told him that it was not an ultimatum and that there was no threat in the background. He of course knew that I was referring to his misrepresentation of the note to his own people. On September 27 External affairs called me up about another matter and I asked Joe Walsh when he was going to give us an answer to the request of September 22. He appeared depressed but said "In a couple of days." Five days have passed and no answer. It is hard to believe that he will say "No" but I think he will hedge his reply so that it will strengthen our hand against pressure group action. If he should say "No," as he would like, that would be best.

He is getting his people whom I continue to like and believe in into a very bad position in every way. I hope that we have nipped off an attempt by some self seeking doctors and by the Irish Government.
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to equip or partially equip an Irish hospital unit for De Gaulle with American Red Cross supplies now in Ireland for the security of the Irish people. I recommended to the Department that until the Eire Government assured us that the emergency was at an end we could not contemplate releasing supplies that had been placed in Ireland for the protection of the Irish people. If assurances were given the question of what was surplus would be examined, but the allocation of this surplus would have to be by the American Red Cross. De Valera has never broken with Vichy. When Vichy disappeared the Irish minister went to Paris. Now he wants to get solid with De Gaulle because he knows De Gaulle is out to make trouble, and in a general way to obtain credit for humanitarian action. It's in line with his sending 100,000 to the Mayor of Calcutta for the famine sufferers. It got there too late to be used for food but was accepted for buying clothes. The Red Cross in Washington sent telegrams which did not discourage this proposal as I think it should have been discouraged, but I think I have made the situation clear. If a flu epidemic should sweep Europe and Ireland should be without American Red Cross stores it would be inexcusable on our part. My belief is that when the war is over you should give what has not been expended to the Irish people. It has never been generally understood that the Irish Red Cross had not had title to the supplies but has only been trustee.

We enjoyed your speech at the Teamsters. God help you.

Aff

[Signature]
November 18, 1944.

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Personally typed

Dear Boss:

The Department, I think, has handled this War Criminals versus Eire situation extraordinarily well. I detect your fine Italian hand in letting DeValer's reply speak for itself, leaving the matter to the journalistic wolves. I fear we can't get the American comment printed here honestly, but if they select pieces from the Father Coughlin Press I will, off the record, tell DeValera that he is being foolish as it will all come out some day.

I expect shortly to write the Secretary a report on what we believe to be a crystallization of British Post war policy toward Eire. They obviously have the choice of saying, are you out or in? I think they will do neither but trust to time and appeasement to bring the lost sheep back. No clear headed Englishman should want Eire back on any basis savoring of the old regime. It is to England's advantage to have Eire self governing as New York is self governing. For the benefit of each, there should be a federal bond. Each needs federated security and federated freedom of trade. How to bring this about is a British problem and Irish too, though I don't realize it. Appeasement and "Wait and See" is to my mind the worst way of going about this. But it is none of our business how the British settle their problem as long as they do not brutalize Ireland and lose the support of American liberal Irish opinion and strengthen nationalist sentiment in America which is now at a low ebb, thank God. There is reason to believe that serious trouble will break out in Northern Ireland fomented by
DeValera and Cardinal McCrory when some thirty thousand workers from Eire are dismissed on the return of discharged soldiers and told to go back to the south. The line taken is that they are being expelled from their own country. This will touch the I.R.A. off again I fear. It will have to be carefully and courageously handled.

What a wonderful campaign you made! I shall be resigning shortly but as long as you find me useful I'm on the job.

Aff

[Signature]
March 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Air Agreement With Ireland

In accordance with your request I attach

a draft reply to the Prime Minister's message

number 904.

S/ Joseph B. Grew
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft reply
to Prime
Minister.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date FEB 10 1972

Returned to Mr. Bohlen, 3/10/45, to give to Mr. Stettinius
to see. (The attached not sent as of 3/10/45.)
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

I am surprised at your 904. There must have been some misunderstanding of my position. Furthermore, the circumstances of the agreement with Ireland were fully explained to your people, Cadogan in particular, at Yalta.

During the latter days of the Chicago Conference when it became increasingly doubtful that full agreement on aviation would be reached on a multilateral basis we held preliminary discussions looking toward bilateral agreements, as Berle publicly stated, with a number of countries represented there. Ireland was naturally one of these in view of its obvious geographic importance to American air routes. The agreement followed the standard form drawn up with the assistance of your people at Chicago and in no way prejudices your right to make similar arrangements. In the circumstances we saw no need to do more than advise your people, which we authorized Gray to do, before signature. One hour before the scheduled time of signature a copy of your 897 was brought to the attention of Acting Secretary Grew. He advised me that in view of your message he was postponing signature until February 3 to give me time to comment but that, the negotiations having been satisfactorily concluded, we could not in good faith refuse to sign nor could we risk the damage to Anglo-American relations which
which would result should it become known that your
Government had objected to our concluding this agreement
with Ireland. I saw no reason to instruct the State
Department not to sign on February 3 and I fully approve
of its action. There can of course be no question
of annulling the agreement. I am sorry but there it
is.

I fully realize your concern on political grounds
and your opinion, which I share, of Ireland's role during
the war. We instructed Gray to make clear to the Irish
that signature of the agreement indicated no change what-so-
ever in our attitude toward Ireland any more than our
signature of a similar agreement with Spain indicated any
change in our attitude toward Franco.

This agreement is however a post war matter. You
will recall how earnestly I endeavored to secure your
cooperation on the future of aviation during the Chicago
Conference. These bilateral aviation agreements were
made necessary by the failure of that conference to reach
a multilateral agreement permitting the natural development
of aviation. While I fully understand your own position,
I think it only fair to tell you that aviation circles
in this country are becoming increasingly suspicious that
certain elements in England intend to try to block the
development of international flying in general until the
British aviation industry is further developed. Of course
any feeling of complacency, even though wholly unwarranted at any time, on the part of the Irish has now been somewhat deflated by their being left out of the San Francisco Conference.