PSF Italy
1943- June 1944
The President and the Prime Minister have agreed that the Italian people in their revolt against the Nazi invaders of their country demonstrated their intention to join with those nations who are determined to destroy the philosophy of world domination promulgated by the barbarous rulers of Germany and to give such assistance as is possible to the nations who are fighting to preserve the future peace of the world.

It is therefore the intention of Great Britain and America to give to the government and to the people of Italy every assistance that is within their resources to make effective Italian military effort against Germany and the German domination of Europe.

As a measure of military expediency it is the intention of America and Great Britain to at once provide the distressed people of Italy with the food, clothing, medicines and military equipment necessary to bring their efforts to a point of efficiency, to facilitate their shipping and their overseas trade with the Allies and the neutral nations; to assist in the reconstruction of their power systems, dams, industries, railroads and other communications that are essential to efficiency of the Italian forces against the enemy—to do this at the earliest practicable date, and to turn over to the Italian people complete control of their government as quickly as such action is permitted by military exigencies.

It is the firm intention of America and Great Britain to do all
of these things with the least possible delay, and to welcome Italy into the community of peace-loving civilized nations.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY RADIO FROM LONDON.

"BERLIN RADIO HAS MADE ITS FIRST COMMENT UPON THE RESIGNATION OF MUSSOLINI. ALMOST FIVE HOURS AFTER IT WAS FIRST ANNOUNCED BY ROME, THE NAZI BROADCAST QUOTES AN ITALIAN NEWS AGENCY: 'THE CHANGE IN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WAS BELIEVED TO BE DUE TO IL DUCE'S HEALTH.' RADIO BERLIN SAYS THAT MUSSOLINI HAS BEEN IN ILL HEALTH FOR SOME TIME."

VERY RESPECTFULLY,

[Signature]

LT. COL. CHESTER HAMMOND
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

NEWS BROADCAST STATES THAT BBC HAS PICKED UP THE FOLLOWING REPORTS FROM RADIO ROME.

A. THAT MUSSOLINI HAS RESIGNED

B. THAT MUSSOLINI WAS DISMISSED BY THE KING AND REPLACED BY MARSHAL BADOLIO.

THE MAP ROOM IS ENDEAVORING TO VERIFY
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

I talked to Bill Donovan of the OSS about the State Department's proposals and he agreed that it would be wise to make the money available at once. He said he would work closely with the State Department to make certain that the money was used for good purposes.

I also consulted Edgar Hoover about the Italian Embassy in the Argentine. Hoover got a pretty bad report on that one and I told Matthews to be pretty careful about giving money to any of our enemies down there. Matthews assured me that the money would be used only on behalf of those Italians who were really cooperating with us.

I think the probability of this enterprise being successful is very good. I have told Mr. Matthews, therefore, that the advances would be authorized.

[Signature]

re Acting Secy. A.A. Berle, Jr. letter of Sept. 29th to the President re providing money for Italian diplomatic missions in neutral countries.
My dear Mr. President:

You will note from the attached copy of an aide memoir from the British Embassy that consideration is being given to the question of providing money for Italian diplomatic missions in various neutral countries which might find themselves in financial straits. You will further note that the British Government is endeavoring to ascertain whether the Badoglio Government is still able to supply funds for the upkeep of loyal missions abroad, and that if the Italian Government is not in a position immediately to provide needed funds, it is proposed that we share the responsibility on a fifty-fifty basis to furnish funds for the upkeep of these missions at least until such time as other arrangements can be made.

According to a telegram received from our mission in Madrid, the Italian representative in that city has already brought up the question of receiving financial assistance.

Since in the neutral countries involved (Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Turkey, and

The President

The White House
and Afghanistan), there are also German missions which undoubtedly will endeavor, by offering financial assistance, to win over to the side of the puppet Italian Government the Italian missions in these posts, it is felt that as an emergency matter we should be in a position to advance funds on short notice in the event the Badoglio Government, itself, is not able immediately to make provisions for its loyal representatives abroad.

Efforts are being made to ascertain the availability of official Italian funds in this country which might be used to repay any advances made to the Badoglio Government. If official Italian funds are not available in this country for this purpose, it is hoped that the Badoglio Government eventually can complete arrangements to cover these expenses from official Italian funds on deposit in one or more of the neutral countries involved.

In order that we may be in a position to act expeditiously in this matter in the event that it proves necessary for us to assist Italian missions to meet legitimate expenses until other arrangements can be made, it is suggested, if you agree to the proposal in principle, that you authorize an allocation from your Emergency Fund of various sums as needed, not to exceed $1,000,000, however, for this purpose, on the understanding reimbursement will eventually be sought through diplomatic channels.

If
If you concur with the British proposal, we feel that the Soviet Government should be informed of our contemplated action in order that they may be in a position to offer suggestions and give their approval to the plan.

Faithfully yours,

A. A. Berle, Jr.

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of aide memoire from the British Embassy dated 25th September, 1943.
The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

Dear Cordell:

I refer to a letter from the Acting Secretary of State dated September 29, 1943 in regard to a proposal from the British Government that the United States and the British Governments share the financial responsibility, on a fifty-fifty basis, of making certain emergency advances to Italian diplomatic representatives abroad who are cooperating with our two Governments.

I approve our Government's joining with the British Government in this undertaking as set forth in Mr. Berle's letter and the British aide-mémoire which is enclosed. I also approve the allocation of funds from the President's Emergency Fund, not to exceed one million dollars, to cover the United States' share of the financing of such advances. I have noted your statement that the repayment of these advances will be sought through diplomatic channels as soon as conditions permit.

I look to you to see to it that arrangements are made which will insure that no part of these funds is used.
used to benefit any Italian officials about whose loyalty and devotion to the principles for which we are fighting there is any question. I suggest that no advance be made to Italian diplomatic representatives in any country unless the American and the British Chiefs of Mission in the country concerned both approve such advance and that they both certify that the official in question is wholeheartedly cooperating with the American and the British Governments in the conduct of the war.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Director of the Budget for his guidance in working out the necessary financial arrangements with officials of the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1943

The Honorable
Harold D. Smith,
Director of the Budget.

Dear Harold:

I enclose for your information and guidance a copy of a self-explanatory letter which I have sent to the Secretary of State.

You will note that I have approved the allocation from the President's Emergency Fund, of not to exceed one million dollars, for the purposes set forth in this letter.

I have suggested to the Secretary of State that officials of the Department of State get in touch with you in regard to the details of this allocation.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to Secretary of State.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

October 21, 1943  

My dear Mr. Secretary:  

By virtue of the authority vested in me by law, I hereby allocate from the appropriation entitled "Emergency Fund for the President, National Defense, 1942-1944,"  

To  
Department of State  

Amount  
$1,000,000  

to be expended by the Department of State in connection with emergencies affecting the national security and defense.  

The funds hereby allocated shall be available for objects of a confidential nature and shall be charged against the limitation for such purposes under said appropriation, and shall be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Secretary of State.  

Please arrange for the necessary transfer of funds and advise the Department of State accordingly.  

Sincerely yours,  

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT  

The Honorable  

The Secretary of the Treasury  

Copy For White House Files
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached allocation of $1,000,000 is to provide funds to continue the operation of certain Italian missions in accordance with the letter of September 29, 1943, from the Acting Secretary of State A. A. Berle, Jr., and your memorandum of October 15, 1943.

Attachment
HERB MILLER:

To see and return to me for my files.

Audrey Turner

[Handwritten signature]

CHARLES P. MILLER
The Honorable
Harold D. Smith,
Director of the Budget.
My dear Mr. President:

You will note from the attached copy of an aide memoire from the British Embassy that consideration is being given to the question of providing money for Italian diplomatic missions in various neutral countries which might find themselves in financial straits. You will further note that the British Government is endeavoring to ascertain whether the Badoglio Government is still able to supply funds for the upkeep of loyal missions abroad, and that if the Italian Government is not in a position immediately to provide needed funds, it is proposed that we share the responsibility on a fifty-fifty basis to furnish funds for the upkeep of these missions at least until such time as other arrangements can be made.

According to a telegram received from our mission in Madrid, the Italian representative in that city has already brought up the question of receiving financial assistance.

Since

The President

The White House
Since in the neutral countries involved (Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Turkey, and Afghanistan), there are also German missions which undoubtedly will endeavor, by offering financial assistance, to win over to the side of the puppet Italian Government the Italian missions in these posts, it is felt that as an emergency matter we should be in a position to advance funds on short notice in the event the Badoglio Government, itself, is not able immediately to make provisions for its loyal representatives abroad.

Efforts are being made to ascertain the availability of official Italian funds in this country which might be used to repay any advances made to the Badoglio Government. If official Italian funds are not available in this country for this purpose, it is hoped that the Badoglio Government eventually can complete arrangements to cover these expenses from official Italian funds on deposit in one or more of the neutral countries involved.

In order that we may be in a position to act expeditiously in this matter in the event that it proves necessary for us to assist Italian missions to meet legitimate expenses until other arrangements can be made, it is suggested, if you agree to the proposal in principle, that you authorize an allocation from your Emergency Fund of various sums as needed, not to exceed $1,000,000.
$1,000,000, however, for this purpose, on the understanding reimbursement will eventually be sought through diplomatic channels.

If you concur with the British proposal, we feel that the Soviet Government should be informed of our contemplated action in order that they may be in a position to offer suggestions and give their approval to the plan.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of aide memoire from the British Embassy dated 25th September, 1943.

But I am telling the boys to exhaust all possibility of using Italian blocked funds first. There may be some.
The question of providing money for Italian Diplomatic Missions is likely to arise in several countries. His Majesty's Government are trying to ascertain whether the Badoglio Government can still provide funds for their upkeep, but it must be recognised that in the present circumstances they will probably be unable to do so.

2. It could, of course, be maintained that this was a matter which does not concern His Majesty's Government or the United States Government, and that if the Italian Government cannot support their missions abroad these must be withdrawn to Italy. There would, however, be advantage in maintaining Italian missions in neutral countries provided they support the King and the Badoglio Government, since their withdrawal might give an opportunity to the puppet Fascist Government to secure representation in neutral countries. His Majesty's Government therefore feel that arrangements must be made, if necessary, for their upkeep from Allied funds. No funds should be advanced to missions suspected of supporting Mussolini's regime.

3. His Majesty's Government feel that this responsibility should be shared between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government on a 50-50 basis. They would naturally wish expenditure to be kept to the minimum, and British and United States representatives in the countries concerned could advise whether the Italian diplomatic or consular staffs there could be reduced by the repatriation of
of unnecessary personnel to Italy. We should also secure
the removal of any Italians suspected of Fascist sympathies.

BRITISH EMBASSY

25th September, 1943.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 13th
1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
MISS GRACE TULLY

These letters concern the same matter as the memo I sent you dated Oct. 11th. I recommend that the President sign them.

H.L.H.

encl.
Letter to Harold D. Smith, Dir. of the Budget
Letter to Secy. Cordell Hull for the President's signature, re advances to Italian diplomatic representatives.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

In the use of funds to keep Italian diplomatic missions going, I think:

(a) We should be 100% sure that the personnel involved is completely loyal to the Badoglio Government.

(b) That only the absolutely essential personnel is covered by the appropriation.

(c) That the money will be repaid by the Badoglio Government or at least that Italy will be so obligated that any successor Government will honor the bill.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. A. A. BERLE, JR.

Does this need an answer
from me or will you do it?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Count Sforza has sent me a letter, a copy of which is attached, through Bob Murphy, to whom he stated that he hoped his letter would be submitted to you. The issues and observations he makes seem to have been dealt with already by your recent message to the Prime Minister in connection with the Italian Government.

Enclosure:
Copy of letter from
Count Sforza, December 17, 1943

Adolf A. Bérle, Jr.
Dear Mr. Berle:

You may be sure that - as you cabled me on or about November 23 - I did my best "to be responsive to the popular will, while supporting fully the Italian military effort and Marshal Badoglio as its responsible head." I knew the heavy mistakes of Badoglio in the fateful months of August and September, after Mussolini's fall, but I knew also (a) that the responsibility of these tragic errors rested with the King, whom I had, with the whole Italian nation, openly rejected, as I told Mr. Hull and you and - even more forcefully - to Mr. Churchill since he had the most wrong information about the King's position; (b) that just because we had to eliminate a traitor king it was advisable not to increase the list of eliminations and ostracisms. Badoglio had been a gallant leader in the past and I hoped that I might help him, since he was "in power", to become the creator of an immediate Italian military effort.

You know that trying to keep alive the principle of a liberal monarchy I suggested the abdication of the King and proclamation of his innocent grandson as King with Badoglio as Regent or - if the King liked it better - with a decent non-Fascist prince. Badoglio entered enthusiastically into my views. He told me that the King hated him just as he despised the republicans, accepted my scheme as a compromise in order to go on, now, only with the war. But suddenly - I do not know why - Badoglio changed and began saying the contrary of what he had confided to me and my friends. I'll tell you later the psychological explanation his Under-Secretaries (he has been unable to find Ministers) give of Badoglio's transformation. Now about the "military effort".

This is our supreme duty as Italians. But the main fault of Badoglio is that he failed: after four months he has put in line 4000 men; while in Southern Italy there are very many thousands of men, disbanding in September, who might become again an army - but they want colonels and generals who are not pro-German as these proved to be when they betrayed our soldiers and Italy last September.
But these generals are the King's men; therefore they are tabu. There is more: a most conservative Italian, Senator Croce (the philosopher and historian) had promoted a body of volunteers; I had supported him on my arrival; we might have now a splendid little army of "partisans" like Tito's in Croatia; these men might still be created; they might be precious to the Allies, on our mountains, to harass the Germans on their flanks. But the traitor king imposed Badoglio to have our volunteers suppressed.

I must tell you the bitter truth: Badoglio, whom I liked in the past, is UNABLE TO CREATE AN ARMY. Here is the explanation his Under-Secretaries murmur; that he has become at once a tired discouraged man without any moral force left in him.

Who supports him? An old old old tale: that his adversaries are red. This is at the basis of the many tragicomic mistakes, I am afraid, of the Brindisi diplomats. Do you imagine Croce or me reds while we are the only ones who try to keep alive the principle of the representative monarchy.

As for Marshal Messe, he does not command general confidence; many are afraid that he might evolve into a South American "hero".

As for the King, he is preparing a dreadful neo-fascism; Badoglio deprecates it but does nothing; he allows all the Fascists to become a body of new official recruits of a new fascist regular army (to kill Italians, not Germans); just the contrary of what Croce and I wanted. May I speak with a sincerity which has its roots in my deep and grateful respect for America? If things go on that way, it will be said some day that the Allies made it impossible for Italy to come again into life, TO TAKE HER SHARE IN THE STRUGGLE, TO SPARE AMERICAN LIVES - AND TO SPARE TIME.

As you saw so well when you cabled me, Italian affairs are "in rapid political evolution". Badoglio - I am sorry to say - is no more Badoglio; (any objective inquest will prove it to you); I cannot in conscience assume the power with the King or his son, because they are the symbol and the alibi of all the Fascists and because I want present and future true order in Italy,
not a Franco order and future disorders. If Badoglio falls I'll be glad to help anybody who may create a real military effort; but, be sure, this effort may only be the result of a destruction of Fascism - which the presence of the King makes impossible.

I'll be glad to discuss any point with your representatives; I might even come to the United States for a short visit, if assured to come back at once to do here my duty; my most ardent wish is the closest cooperation with Washington.

Believe me

Most sincerely yours,

SPORZA
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

There is no need for you to answer Count Sforza unless you wish. He has been advised, through our representatives in Italy, that we are in general agreement with his estimate of the situation and that we propose to support policies looking toward the abdication of the King and the Crown Prince.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

What do I do about this letter from Badoglio? I am stumped.

F. D. R.
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.  

My dear Miss Tully:  

General Donovan, who is still abroad, has forwarded to us by safe hand the inclosed unopened communication for the President.  

I would appreciate it if you will see that the communication is delivered.  

Sincerely yours,  

G. Edward Buxton  
Acting Director
Excerpt from Count Sforza's letter of February 14, 1944.

The Allies have realized late, very late, that the Badoglio government, consciously or unconsciously, betrays them. They begin to realize that a revival of moral and military Italian forces may be precious, given the situation around Rome; they are bound to realize that only those who have always been against fascism may do the miracle -- humbly, reluctantly, because who may wish to become Prime Minister of a country fallen so low?) I must admit that the immense majority of the Italians is behind me. It is therefore possible that the Allies create the situation and elimination which will make it necessary for me and my friends to form a government.

But in order to give new life to Italy, to make of her a valuable ally to you, to create social freedom and sound revolution, I need among other things the actual sympathy of the U.S. On the other side I could do something which may be useful to the President and I would do it with joy: if I become Prime Minister I might make a most rapid flying visit to the U.S. and not only take all possible and even vague agreements with the State Department but make two or three great speeches in N.Y., Chicago etc., stating to the Italian masses how generous, loyal, far-seeing is the policy of the Administration (which it certainly is, if this happens, after some applicable early hesitation my intervention might mean the modification of five million voters. But you understand how hopeful it would be for me to make an offer of this kind, directly or to any other person who is not you.
February 22, 1944

Respectfully referred to
the Under Secretary of State for
transmittal.

M. C. LATTA
Executive Clerk

Transmitting signed original of the President's letter
of 2/21/44 to Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian
Government.
February 21, 1944

My dear Marshal Badoglio:

General Donovan has handed me your letter of January 27, which will have my most earnest attention.

I thank you for expressing in this forthright way, as a soldier and patriot, your desire to give the greatest possible effectiveness to the effort the Italian armed forces are making to drive the Germans from their country, and to find every means to unite, to strengthen, and to sustain the Italian people in this task.

I appreciate the candor of your letter. You will understand if I am equally frank. I do not underestimate the difficulties under which you and your countrymen have had to work in rendering that effective assistance so necessary to an early expulsion of the enemy. At the same time I feel that events since October 13 have made it evident that until the Government of Italy can also include the articulate political groups of anti-Fascist, liberal elements within its composition it will not be possible for any Head of Government to organize the conduct of the war on such a broad national scale as the status of an ally would require. There is, I understand, a plan for the reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis as soon as the present critical military situation will permit and not later than the liberation of Rome.
With all these considerations in mind I feel that it would be better to hold in abeyance any major changes in our present relationship.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency

Marshal Pietro Badoglio,

Head of the Italian Government.
27 January 36

My dear President,

general Donovan has promised
to represent to you my ideas
on the present situation. I am
very grateful to him for this, and
will be grateful to you if you
will give my ideas your kind
consideration.

I only wish to confirm to you
my dear President, that I, as an
old soldier, have only one aim
in my actions, and only one
guiding thought in mind: to
help with all our forces the
Allies to drive the Germans out
of Italy—and other question
can be of only secondary importance.

But in order to be able to inspire and galvanize the country, I must receive assistance from you, because if I am always and only considered as the representative of a country that has been conquered and has asked for an armistice, I cannot have the prestige to be able to give my people powerful leadership in the war of liberation.

An act of generosity on your part would increase my strength in the greatest measure.
and enable me to furnish the contribution that the allies are expecting from us.

My dear President, if Italy who is now fighting the same common enemy could be declared an ally, you would have the eternal gratitude of the Italians living in Italy and in the United States. You will forgive me if I have approached the question in such a frank way—because I am a soldier and not a diplomat.

With the expression of my highest consideration
I am sincerely yours,

[Signature]

How Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United
States of America
Her Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am returning Marshal Badoglio's letter to which we have given careful thought here. I interpret his request for recognition of Italy now as a full ally not only as a device to stimulate the Italians to greater war effort but also to give his Government much needed support.

I do not, of course, believe that this is the time to accept the Italians as full allies.

I am enclosing a draft reply for your signature if you approve.

Enclosures:

Draft letter to Marshal Badoglio.
Letter from Marshal Badoglio returned.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 17, 1944

Subject: Attitude of the Italian masses today according to an observer at Rome.

There is attached a summary of a telegram, dated April 3, 1944, received in the Department on April 15 via Bern from Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, American Chargé d'Affaires at the Vatican, giving the views of an Italian friend of his on the attitude of the Italian masses today. Mr. Tittmann states that his friend is a keen observer and that he has confidence in his judgment.

Enclosure:

1. Summary of telegram,
   April 3, 1944.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO

Memorandum for the

President
Subject: Attitude of Italian people today.

The Italian people are in the throes of despondency and bitterly opposed to those who are responsible for their adversities. While they detest Fascism, the Republican Fascists and the Germans, they have no love for the King and Marshal Badoglio. On the other hand there has been widespread sympathy for the Allies among the common people, but unfortunately the terrible destruction caused by the Allied air bombardments has gradually embittered and disaffected large masses of the population. When to the loss of so many homes, especially of the poor, are added extremely difficult living conditions, the scarcity of food, lack of medicine, the continued rise in the cost of living, the growing depreciation of the currency, one can understand why the Italian masses have lost all confidence in their governing authorities and why, impelled by clever Bolshevik agitators, they are turning more and more toward Communism.

Today even in public the "man in the street" is often heard to remark that the communists are the most humane because they refrain from bombing the dwellings of the poor, and that in addition to being the bravest, the communists are also the most generous because Russia showed herself willing to treat at length with Finland over the Armistice, offering conditions which were not too severe, although Finland "as the facts have demonstrated" did not have the same
same firm intention of withdrawing from the war as Italy
did in August 1943.

This wide diffusion of anarchy and communism in Italy
is causing considerable anxiety to the religious authori-
ties and to all those who are interested in the maintenance
of order and the national tradition, who perhaps still have
the majority of the people with them. But it is necessary
to support them if the people are not to fall into a danger-
ous state.

Mr. Tittmann's friend states that according to his
information for the reasons set forth above there exists a
similar trend toward Communism on the part of the masses in
other enemy countries as well, especially in Germany, and
that in his opinion the development of this phenomenon
should be very carefully watched by the Allies.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 16, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR The President
FROM Jonathan Daniels

Colonel G. Edward Buxton, Acting Director of Office of Strategic Services has sent me a letter for you from Marshall Badoglio. This letter was delivered to Major Ricca, OSS Liaison with Badoglio, for delivery to you in all haste. Major Ricca has just arrived with this communication and it is transmitted to you unopened with the original seal unbroken.
Memo for: Judge Latte.

This letter was signed on April 30, 1944.

I presume you want it to be delivered through State Department channels.

I have made a complete copy for the President's map room files.

Respectfully,

W. N. Rigdon.
Published in

*Foreign Relations of the United States*

1944 Vol. III The British Commonwealth Europe

Page 1106
April 30, 1944

My dear Marshal Badoglio:

Your letter of April 3, 1944, informing me that a new government would shortly be formed, reached me just as the first announcement came that a new cabinet comprising representatives of the leading Italian parties had, in fact, been constituted. This is indeed welcome news to the Government and the people of the United States, who earnestly hope that this step will serve to unite the spiritual and physical forces of the nation in the struggle against our common enemy.

You ask that this event be accompanied by a reexamination of the armistice terms. Any revision of the terms, of course, could come about only after consultation with the military authorities and as a result of concerted action among the Allied Governments. The matter is, however, receiving my full consideration. The American people are not insensitive to the peculiar moral tragedy of Italy's situation, nor am I insensitive to the grave difficulties which beset the Italian Government.

May I meanwhile speak again with that frankness which my countrymen and yours prefer? Now that Italy has moved in the direction of truly democratic government, public opinion in the United States is watching earnestly for clear evidence that the Italian people are sincerely and passionately resolved to drive the invader from their
sell and contribute to that common victory which Italy's defection under Fascism rendered so much costlier. I know that all Italian patriots share the feeling of the peoples of the United Nations that it is for the Italians themselves to prove that they do not seek spurious rehabilitation through external acts but Italy's national and international regeneration through their own courageous efforts. Every sign that Italy has truly shouldered the burden of her responsibilities and has aligned herself in deed and spirit with those who fight for the triumph of humanity will, I am sure, be received with genuine sympathy by the peoples of all the United Nations.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Exellency
Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Head of the Italian Government.
(TRANSLATION)

Salerno, April 3, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I wish indeed to thank you for your letter of February 21. I am particularly grateful to you for the frankness with which you expressed yourself. In the very difficult and very grave hours through which Italy is passing, your word serves me as consolation and at the same time as a spur.

You write me that until such time as the Italian Government includes also the representatives of the leading anti-fascist political groups, it is not possible for a Head of Government to organize the conduct of the war on such a broad national scale as the status of an ally would require.

Now Italy is on the eve of such an event. I hope, that is, within a very short time to present to the country, after the many recent vicissitudes, a truly national government which will include within its composition the representatives of all the leading parties, organized and finally and solely directed toward the war against the Germans. And I wish to notify you thereof before anyone else, since to you more than to anyone else I feel bound by friendship and gratitude for the great deal you have already done for my country and for that which - I firmly hope - you will continue to do to restore it to that honorable place in the world of which you spoke in the unforgettable and dark hours of the armistice.

Fully aware of the importance of your precious time and the great burden of work that weighs upon your shoulders, I wish merely to tell you how wise and humane it would be if the advent of the new democratic Italian Government were accompanied by full reexamination of the very harsh terms made to us six months ago: that is, briefly, Italy's transition from cobelligerency to alliance.

No occasion could be more propitious, no occasion more favorable. You yourself, moreover, refer to it explicitly in your letter. And no living man could better than yourself, Mr. President, perform this task of synchronizing the imminent advent of the new democratic Italy with her definitive alignment among the Allied nations.

The
The United States would in this way assume in Italy and the Mediterranean a leading part vis-à-vis all the other Powers; she would assure for herself a decided and decisive influence on Italy and Italian affairs; would neutralize any action and influence from the East; would thaw the rigid, intransigent British policy, impelling it toward more constructive goals and tasks. Moreover, she would galvanize the whole nation, both in the south and the north, for the final struggle against the Germans and for the work of rebuilding the country on those liberal and democratic bases which are your and our common ideal.

Italy has, as you know, passed through the sorriest phase of her history; other hard phases await her. Her cities are semi-destroyed; three-fourths of her people groan beneath the German heel; suffering is the lot of each and all.

It is not vain and empty rhetoric to tell you, Mr. President, that all Italy is at this moment looking to you, and these, I believe, are rare moments in the lives of men and peoples.

It is certain that a word and a move from you in this direction could do more than anything else for Italy's revival and regeneration, which are and must be spiritual above all.

Please accept the assurance, Mr. President, of my loyal and cordial friendship.

(s) Badoglio
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum of April 21, there are attached a translation of Marshal Badoglio's communication of April 3, 1944 and a reply to that communication which has been drafted for your signature, if you approve.

In this communication the Marshal refers to your letter of February 21, 1944 (a copy of which is also attached), announces the imminent formation of a broadly based government, and suggests a full reexamination of the terms of the armistice looking toward a new status for Italy as an ally rather than a belligerent.

This matter is being brought to the attention of the United States representatives in Italy.

Enclosures:
1. From Marshal Badoglio, April 3, 1944.
2. From Marshal Badoglio, April 3, 1944 (translation).
3. Draft reply to Marshal Badoglio.
4. To Marshal Badoglio, February 21, 1944.
My dear Marshal Badoglio:

General Donovan has handed me your letter of January 27, which will have my most earnest attention.

I thank you for expressing in this forthright way, as a soldier and patriot, your desire to give the greatest possible effectiveness to the effort the Italian armed forces are making to drive the Germans from their country, and to find every means to unite, to strengthen, and to sustain the Italian people in this task.

I appreciate the candor of your letter. You will understand if I am equally frank. I do not underestimate the difficulties under which you and your countrymen have had to work in rendering that effective assistance so necessary to an early expulsion of the enemy. At the same time I feel that events since October 13 have made it evident that until the Government of Italy can also include the articulate political groups of anti-Fascist, liberal elements within its composition it will not be possible for any Head of Government to organize the conduct of the war on such a broad national scale as the status of an ally would require. There is, I understand, a plan for the reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis as soon as the present critical military situation will permit and not later than the liberation of Rome.

With all these considerations in mind I feel that it would be better to hold in abeyance any major changes in our present relationship.

Very sincerely yours,

(s) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Head of the Italian Government.
Salerno, 3 Aprile, 1944.

Mio caro Signor Presidente,

tengo molte a ringraziarLa della sua lettera del 21 febbraio. Le sono soprattutto riconoscenti della leale franchezza con cui Ella ha voluto esprimersi. Nelle ore molto dure e molte gravi che l'Italia attraversa, la Sua parola e' per me di conforto, e, insieme, di incitamento.

Ella mi scrive che sino a quando il Governo italiano non includerà anche i rappresentanti dei grandi gruppi politici antifascisti, non e' per un Capo di Governo possibile organizzare la condotta della guerra su quel largo piano nazionale che le status di alleato richiederebbe.

Ora l'Italia e' alla vigilia di un avvenimento siffatto. Spero c'è, fra brevissimo, di presentare al Paese, dopo le molte vicende recenti, un Governo veramente nazionale, che includa nella sua compagine i rappresentanti di tutti i grandi Partiti organizzati e finalmente ed unicamente orientati verso la guerra contro i tedeschi. E di ciò' voglio dare l'annunzio a Lei prima che ad ogni altro, perché' a Lei, prima che ad ogni altro, io mi sento legato di amicizia e di gratitudine per quel molte che ha gia' fatto per il mio Paese e per quello che - ne ho la ferma speranza - verrà' continuare a fare per riporarlo a quel posto onorevole nel mondo, di cui Ella parle' nelle indimendicabili ed oscure ore dell'armistizio.
Pienamente consapevole dell'importanza del suo tempo prezioso e del grande fardello di lavoro che incombe sulle sue spalle, voglio soltanto dirLe quanto e come sarebbe saggio ed umano se all'avvento del nuovo governo democratico italiano corrispondesse il riesame integrale della durissima situazione fattaci or sono sei mesi e cioc', in poche parole, il passaggio dell'Italia dalla co-belligeranza all'alleanza.

Nessuna occasione potrebbe essere più propizia, nessuna occasione più favorevole. Ella stessa vi accenna del resto, esplicitamente, nella Sua lettera. E nessun uomo vivente potrebbe meglio di Lei svolgere, Signor Presidente, questo compito di sincronizzare il prossimo avvento della nuova Italia democratica col suo definitivo schieramento in seno alle Nazioni Alleate.

Gli Stati Uniti assumerebbero in questo modo in Italia e nel Mediterraneo un ruolo dirigente nei confronti di tutte le altre Potenze; si assicurerebbero una decisa e decisiva influenza sull'Italia e sulle cose italiane; neutralizzerebbero una qualunque azione ed influenza dell'Est; scongelerebbero la rigida e intran-sigente politica britannica, trascinandola verso mete e compiti più costruttivi. E galvanizzerebbero poi la Nazione intera, sia al sud che al nord, per la lotta finale contro i tedeschi e per il compito di ricostruire il Paese su quelle basi liberali e democratiche che sono il vostro e il nostro ideale comune.

L'Italia ha, come Lei sa, attraversato la più triste fase della sua storia; altre dure fasi la attendono; le sue città sono semidistrutte; tre quarti del suo popolo gemono sotto il tal-
lone tedesco; le sofferenze sono di ciascuno e di tutti.

Non è vano e sterile dire, Signor Presidente, che tutta l'Italia guarda in questo momento verso di Lei e sono questi, crede, momenti rari nella vita degli uomini e dei popoli.

Certo c'è che una Sua parola e una sua iniziativa in questo senso potrebbero contribuire meglio e più di qualunque cosa, al risollevamento e alla rigenerazione dell'Italia, che sono e debbono essere soprattutto spirituali.

Voglia, Signor Presidente, credere alla mia leale e cordiale amicizia.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 1, 1944

Subject: Count Dino Grandi's letter to the Secretary of War

Mr. Stimson has written to me enclosing a copy of the letter he received from Count Dino Grandi under cover of a note from our Military Attaché in Lisbon. I attach copies of this correspondence.

Mr. Stimson expresses his very high regard for Grandi, whom he has known for some years, and speaks of the enlightened foreign policy he always followed. He suggests that in view of Grandi's potentialities as a great Italian leader something be done to rescue him from his present peril. The Military Attaché writes in similar vein.

Grandi describes his long struggle to keep Italy from Fascism and in the family of democratic nations. He tells how he consistently opposed Mussolini and his rapprochement with the Germans, and laid the plans and took the leading part in the Grand Council meeting of July 1943 that resulted in Mussolini's overthrow.

Grandi is reported to be living in exile near Lisbon with constant police protection. He is under the death penalty imposed by Mussolini on the eighteen members of the Grand Council. Five have already been executed.

I am forwarding these documents for your information. I have no recommendations to make at this time regarding our possible use for Grandi.

Enclosures:
1. From Count Dino Grandi, March 1, 1944.
2. From Military Attaché, Lisbon, April 8, 1944.
3. From Secretary of War, April 22, 1944.
Hon. Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I send you copy of a letter that I have received from former Foreign Minister Dino Grandi of Italy, together with the copy of a letter from our Military Attache through whom Grandi made this approach to me.

I think this is a most important letter and I believe that it is substantially accurate in its statement of facts. I know Grandi very well. I met him first at the London Naval Conference where he was chairman of the Italian delegation. He had first been appointed Foreign Minister and was a young man inexperienced in diplomatic relations. Nevertheless he made a most favorable impression upon us all. The frankness with which he labored for a reconciliation with France which would permit France and Italy to join the Naval Treaty impressed me at the time as in strong contrast with the defeatism and insincerity of the French delegates, Tardieu and Briand.

I met him again in the summer of 1931 when I visited Rome and he entertained me at Nettuno, the site of the present beachhead. I had several frank personal talks with him then in which he frankly expressed his attitude towards Fascism. He told me he had been driven into it by the excesses of the Communists in Bologna, the town where he lived and was practicing law. Several attempts had been made on his life and the only protection he could obtain was by joining the Fascist post in that city. He likened Fascism to a gigantic vigilance committee which would pass away when it had performed its duty of restoring law and order in Italy, and he in 1932 prophesied to me that Fascism would be terminated and Democracy restored the following year.

When I met him again the following year, 1931, he had evidently made his attempt on Mussolini and had been rebuffed and the story was going round that he would soon be relieved from the post of Foreign Minister and sent to some embassy
embassy. This actually happened and he was sent to London. Owing to the briefness of my visit to Geneva in 1932, I had no opportunity to talk with him personally at length. He had visited America in the autumn of 1931 (between my two visits to Europe of July 1931 and the spring of 1932), had stayed at my house at Woodley, and again made a very favorable impression upon us all by his sincerity and directness.

From all these personal contacts with him I have derived the strong impression that he is an honest man who got caught up in the web of Fascism as a matter of personal safety in the way I have described and who did his best on the inside to curb Mussolini, terminate Fascism, and restore Democracy. I think that in this time when it is so difficult to find men of youth, vigor, and common sense to take the leadership of the Italians, he has the make-up of great possible usefulness.

I should be much obliged to you if you would get this picture of him and my own confidence in him to the President. He evidently made the same impression upon our Military Attache who has seen him lately in Lisbon as he did upon me. He is evidently in personal peril at Lisbon as pointed out by our Attache, and I think something should be done to rescue a man whom I deem to be so potentially valuable.

Faithfully yours,

(s) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.
SUBJECT: Count Dino Grandi.

TO: Major General Clayton E. Bissell,
    AC of S G-2, War Dept, Washington, DC.

1. Forwarded herewith are a personal signed letter from Count Grandi to the Honorable the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson and a letter to me asking that I transmit same. I request, if it is found proper, that the letter to Mr. Stimson be transmitted to him through channels.

2. The undersigned has had several conversations with Dino Grandi, who leads here a secluded life with his wife and two children in restrained financial circumstances. He is in constant bodily danger and under police protection provided by the Portuguese Government.

3. From these interviews, opinion is gained that Grandi is a man of action, young, virile and possessing a large fund of political experience. It is suggested that in view of the penury of Italian leaders of statesmanlike stature the War Department might find it advisable to look into Grandi's case with more than passing interest.

4. The undersigned has caused an interview to take place between Ambassador Norweb and Count Grandi and the letter to Secretary Stimson is being forwarded with the Ambassador's knowledge. Initial contact with Grandi was reported in cable despatch No. 1006 of 5 November 1943.

ROBT. A. SOLBORG,
Colonel, GSC,
Air.

2 Incl:
Letters.
Dear Mr. Stimson:

I trust that all what has happened during these fateful years has not made you forget the good friendship existing between us. As to myself, I shall always cherish the recollection of old times, when we used to meet and work closely together with the British statesmen in London, Geneva, Washington, Paris, Rome, in the interest of our countries and of general peace and cooperation among the nations of the world. My wife and I will always remember the friendly welcome and hospitality of Mrs. Stimson—and yourself in Washington during our happy and unforgettable staying in the United States before the general disarmament Conference in November 1931.

Many events took place since then. The last one concerning me is that, as you will perhaps know, on January 10th I have been condemned to death by Mussolini's expressed will, together with the 18 members of the Italian Grand Council who in the night of July 24th, 1943, brought about Mussolini's fall and therefore laid the necessary premise for the armistice with the Allies. Five of the 18 have already been executed. The sentence has been pronounced by an extra-ordinary court, created for the purpose, acting without any Judicial guaranty and in open violation of the law. It has simply been a sinister and premeditated murder, and with it Mussolini has wanted to satisfy his personal vengeance against those who, acting within the frame of our constitution, were instrumental in freeing Italy from fascist dictatorship and the German alliance.

You will understand why I feel that I must let you know a few things about events in Italy both before and after July 25th and the part I played in them, as inaccurate reports have been circulating on the subject.
I take the whole responsibility for what happened on July 24–25th. I personally took the initiative of the action for Mussolini's overthrow and persuaded the members of the Grand Council, through an eleven-hour dramatic debate against Mussolini and his supporters, to approve a motion which I had prepared long before and which meant a full condemnation of Mussolini's home and foreign policy and strongly urged the king to act accordingly, as the constitution required him to do and as many times we had in the previous years asked him to do.

The events of July 25th which brought about the fall of Mussolini and fascism were no improvisation, nor were they influenced by any popular movement or intervention of the anti-fascist parties which were to appear on the political scene only after July 25th. Our action, long meditated and prepared, was the consequence of an attitude maintained for twenty years in front of Mussolini and his supporters.

As you perhaps remember, I was dismissed on July 1932 as Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately after the speech I made at Geneva, when, unhesitatingly and alone among all foreign representatives at the Disarmament Conference, I accepted fully and unconditionally for Italy and on my personal responsibility, the plan proposed by the President of the United States for disarmament and peace. I thought in fact that that was the last chance offered by the United States to the Nations of the world to join willingly their forces and put into operation those high principles of international peace and cooperation which could have spared to the world the danger of a war. A few months before (January 1932) I had succeeded in opposing a meeting between the Italian Prime Minister and Herr Hitler, head of the new and already strong Nazi movement.
The swift rise of the Nazi movement in Germany made Mussolini think that the time was ripe for getting rid of me and with me of the policy he had tolerated but never shared. So my dismissal came at the very moment when I was reaching with M. Herriot (head of the newly-formed radical-socialist Government in France) the full understanding for which I had worked so hard and which was to remove once and for all the age-old difficulties between France and Italy. Mussolini disavowed the action taken by me at Geneva and sent me as ambassador to London, resuming himself full control of the Italian foreign policy. The cooperation with other fellow-members of the League of Nations was practically interrupted at that time, the anti-Geneva attitude reasserted itself once more and the Italian policy followed more and more the German pattern.

During my seven years in London as Italian ambassador, whenever official duties compelled me to act according to dis-tasteful instructions, I always did my best to follow them in such a way not to endanger the policy of close collaboration and friendship with Great Britain and full independence of Germany. Very often, however, I had to run counter those instructions. During the Abyssinian war I made every effort in order to avoid a final split between Great Britain and Italy and afterwards to reach (April 1938) that gentlemen's agreement which should have meant a new start in the Italian foreign policy. It gratifies me to remember that the British Prime Minister gave me credit in the House of Commons for all the work done in order to reach the agreement and to assure the restoration of the old relations between Great Britain and Italy.

But suddenly, in May 1939, Mussolini concluded a military alliance with Germany and a few days afterwards, following bitter attacks against my activities as ambassador to London
and upon German request, I was recalled and appointed, without my previous knowledge, Minister for Justice and President of the Chamber of Deputies, both offices being considered as having no influence on the Government policy.

In the event, those offices proved to be of no little importance, as they gave me the opportunity of renewing once again from the juridical and the legal aspect my efforts in the defense of the Constitution, which fascist dictatorship had in the meantime violated but not yet altogether obliterated. During my tenure of office (Mussolini got rid of me again in February 1943) I availed myself many times, much to the irritation of the fascist "revolutionaries" and Mussolini himself, of the privilege of the Justice Minister to refuse to validate with the seal of the State laws and decrees deemed inconsistent with the Constitution. The defense of the latter was in fact an essential premise for slowly preparing the ground for the restauration of our parliamentary system and the overthrow of the ill-fated dictatorship, which had taken our country's political life in its iron grip and made prisoners of the whole Italian people. From that moment (June 1939) I slowly resumed the direction of the Democratic group which Mussolini and his gang had tried to disperse during the previous years.

When in August 1939 Germany invaded Poland, my political friends and I did all in our power to prevent Italy's entry in the war on Germany's side, as was Mussolini's intention. At the cabinet meeting which approved Italy's non-belligerency, I demanded a public denunciation of our military alliance with Germany and a declaration of full neutrality. Mussolini refused and asked me not to interfere any longer with the Italian foreign policy. Nevertheless, during the nine months of our non-belligerency, I did all I could to keep Italy out of the war. The
British statesmen with whom I was in touch encouraged me in my efforts; but in June 1940 Mussolini declared war without even informing the cabinet, whose members, with the only exception of the Foreign Minister Ciano, learned it from the radio. He intended in that way to administer a final blow to our constitutional machinery. By means of the war Mussolini planned to get rid of Monarchy and Constitution, installing in its place a permanent "de jure" dictatorship on the lines of German Nazism, as he is doing in North Italy, now that he is free at last of his internal opposition.

We were convinced that war meant ruin for our country both in the national and international fields. Not having been successful in preventing it, we believed that no means should be ignored in order to shorten it and thus free Italy from the German alliance, taking advantage of any favourable opportunity. In the days preceding the 25th of July there were no signs of any popular or political rising in Italy. It was a misfortune that the decisive action could only take place much too late for our country to benefit from it without passing through today's tremendous experience. We had twice arranged the action which finally took place in July 1943: In May 1941, immediately following the criminal Greek campaign, and again in Autumn 1942, at the time of the Allied disembarkation in North Africa. The obstacles we had to overcome compelled us to desist both times. We were Mussolini's prisoners just as the anti-fascists he confined on the islands.

What we had tried at first was to foster an active movement in parliament in order to bring about a constitutional crisis which would have put the King in the necessity of taking action. But we came to the realization that it was impossible to act through such large bodies as the Chamber and the Senate. The
Grand Council was the only possible body, created as it had been by a law introduced by Mussolini with the aim of limiting the influence of Parliament. But the law required that the meeting should be called by the Head of the Government, who, conscious as he was of our opposition (Mussolini's and Hitler's recent speeches bear the full evidence of this fact) had always refused to let it meet. When he finally called a meeting for July 24th he did so only to challenge us and free himself once and for all of those who were an obstinate obstacle to his policy.

Many stories have circulated about that meeting in the night of July 24th, but they are full of inexactitude and fantasy. I led the attack in a pure parliamentary way and finally succeeded in bringing the Grand Council to approve a motion which meant the end of dictatorship and asked the king to avail himself of all powers conferred upon him by the Constitution. My friends and I risked our lives (at the beginning of the meeting our chances of success were scanty indeed) in this last attempt.

On the same morning of July 25th, immediately after the meeting and before knowing what the decision of the king would be, I stressed the urgency of asking an armistice to the Allies, offering myself to go to Madrid or Lisbon in order to approach the Allies. I was convinced that not a single minute should be lost, so that Germany could have no time to take strong military measures. German troops were comparatively few at the time; it was essential to take advantage of the surprise factor and of the confusion brought into the German plans by Mussolini's overthrow. It is to be regretted that this course was not followed. Precious time was lost and only after two weeks I was entrusted with the task of approaching the Allies in Spain. The necessity of eluding the German surveillance (the Germans were after me since July 25th) accounts for further delay, so that when I arrived in Spain and
Portugal official contacts between Allied and Italian military authorities had already been established. There was nothing I could do but to remain here, ready to do whatever might be required from me in the service of my country and of the common cause at long last uniting Italy to the Allies against Germany.

In my conscience I feel I have done all in my power to be of some service to my country, to save it from anarchy and the total disaster connected with a military collapse and to resume, some day in the future and within the reality of a defeat, the position of a respectable member of the community of countries which will arise from this war. Someone has said that I struck too late and someone else that I struck too soon. The fact is that I struck when I could. How great the difficulties were that I had to dispose of has been proved by the course events have subsequently taken. But events have also shown that opposition to fascist dictatorship from without was powerless. I chose to work from within, keeping alive there an opposition which proved to be at last successful. My policy involved difficulties, risks, setbacks, even mistakes and temporary compromises. But I still believe that that was the only way to a final success.

It was clear that, even had we not acted on July 25th, Mussolini's regime would have been destroyed by the armed forces of the United Nations. Everyone realized that. But the problem was to shorten a war which the Italian people had not wanted, to weaken German military strength by withdrawing its ally, to bring the Italians themselves to regain their constitutional liberties and, as the Allies had always asked us to do, to oust Mussolini breaking the chains holding us, so that the co-operation of the great majority of the Italian people might be willing and confidently assured to the cause of Democracy.

I feel sure you will forgive me for going into the story of Italian events and the part I played in them. I truly think it
is difficult to understand Italian events if some light is not thrown on what appears to be only a personal case, but is rather the case of many Italians whose ideas my friends and I tried to interpret and represent. Mussolini wants to-day, through terror, assassinations and falsehood, to create his historical alibi and vainly to strengthen in North Italy a position which is obviously doomed. Falsifying facts and documents he tries to prove that the military defeat that the fascist dictatorship has met is nothing but the result of military plots which supposedly have found a complacent instrument in the Grand Council. Nothing could be more false. My hope is that some day the entire truth will be told, if in the meantime the Gestapo agents will not have succeeded in suppressing one of the few witnesses of events as they did really happen.

Many times, during these last unhappy months, I have thought of writing to you. No one better than yourself witnessed my work in the international field and the difficulties I had to overcome at home to assure the loyal and active contribution of Italy to a policy of peace and international co-operation. I indeed am greatly indebted to you and to your invaluable assistance and personal encouragement if for many years my foreign policy prevailed in Italy. The principles in which I always believed were stressed by me to the American public opinion in the speeches made in Washington, New York and Philadelphia. In these principles I put my faith to-day more firmly than ever. In doing what I have done to save Italy from the total disaster where Mussolini was driving it, I was not trying to build up a new political platform whatsoever. As I said to the king the very day of July 25th, I had meant only to accomplish the last duty of my active political life and to serve those which had been my ideals through all my life. Nonetheless, arriving in Portugal some months ago I
cherished the hope that, even being out of the political field, my familiarity with Italian affairs could still be of some assistance both to my unhappy country and to the cause of the Allies, which is now the cause of Italy.

Certainly, the fall of dictatorship has not led where I hoped it would. Italy is divided, partly still under enemy occupation, pillaged, destroyed. The population of the North is scared into submission to the Germans and to a thin but unscrupulous gang. In the South, some small political committees do not make easier the difficult task of the Government in organizing the country for the fight. I had dreamt of an Italy aligned with all her national forces against her traditional enemy and reconquering her lost liberties. This was what I thought on July 25th and this was what Mussolini's fall meant to the millions of Italians who were overpowered by their enthusiasm that day. The unfulfillment of these hopes fills of sorrow my present life, which is hard indeed.

You will forgive me, dear Mr. Stimson, if as man to man I have talked so openly and confidently to you, telling you what I feel in my heart. I am sure that in you I shall find that friendly understanding, which on your part never failed to me in the old days, and which means everything to me.

My wife asks to be remembered with all her kind thoughts to Mrs. Stimson, to whom I beg you to present my best regards.

Believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Dino Grandi
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If you determine to speak on the Italian campaign, the attached memorandum, hastily prepared to outline generally what has been done to aid the Italian population, might be turned over to someone to develop for you.

[Handwritten Signature]

JAMES F. BYRNES
CIVILIAN SUPPLIES FOR ITALY

The extent to which the United States and the United Kingdom have been furnishing Italy with food and other essential supplies is revealed in a recent memorandum of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum is classified as secret and the figures cannot be released without clearance from the Army.

Total Dollar Value of Supplies

According to the memorandum, United States and British aid to the civilians of Italy by June 30, 1944, will total $103,000,000, over the entire period from the date of the invasion. This figure includes all types of supplies furnished except coal and petroleum. Of the above figure $81,000,000 was supplied by the United States, and $22,000,000 by the United Kingdom.

Foodstuffs

Foodstuffs comprise the bulk of the articles furnished. Wheat and flour account for $41,000,000 and other foodstuffs amounted to $45,000,000.

The other foodstuffs consisted of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dried Soup</td>
<td>$12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Vegetables</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canned &amp; Dried Milk</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese &amp; Canned Meat</td>
<td>21,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other Supplies

The other supplies furnished were as follows:

Medical Supplies ........................................ $2,500,000

Agricultural Supplies .................................. 3,000,000
  Seed potatoes ........................................ $2,000,000
  Fertilizer, etc. ..................................... 1,000,000

Clothing .................................................. 8,000,000

Soap ...................................................... 1,600,000

Miscellaneous
  (including sacks, bags, roofing, etc.) ........... 1,900,000

FEA Procurement

Of the United States share, the Army has supplied $71,000,000, and the
Foreign Economic Administration has procured for the Army $10,000,000. The
FEA has procured the clothing, fertilizer, and miscellaneous supplies, and
the Army has supplied all the rest.

Tonnage

Civilian supplies to Italy by June 30, 1944 will total 795,000 long tons.
The bulk of this is wheat and flour, 587,000 tons, and subsistence of other
kinds 140,000 tons.

Most of this amount has been shipped since December. The months
September to December, inclusive, account for a total of 93,000 tons. In
the month of January alone over 98,000 tons were provided. The figure rose
to 130,000 tons in February, and 167,000 tons in March. In April 137,000 tons
were provided. The very heavy shipments during these months were occasioned
by the need of emergency food supplies to meet the local food shortage. In
May the total amount declined to 130,000 tons, and in June it is expected to be in the neighborhood of 54,000 to 55,000 tons. Large shipments of flour and other foodstuffs have been discontinued in anticipation of the Italian harvest which will begin to come in this month.

The tonnage of coal and petroleum is considerable, but these commodities are shipped without distinction as to whether the ultimate use is to be military or civilian, and therefore figures cannot be given.

**Area and Population Supplied**

The figures given above are the totals for Sicily, Sardinia, and the portion of the Italian peninsula liberated from the Germans. During most of the period, that is from the end of September to the middle of May, the population supplied has been in the neighborhood of 16\(\frac{1}{2}\) million persons. The capture of Rome will increase this number to 18,000,000, and as our armies move north the requirements will necessarily increase.

The food supplies have been used for the most part in the cities and major towns where because of a poor harvest in 1943 and the disruption of transportation and distribution, severe shortages in local food supplies were encountered in the winter months. Italy is an agricultural country but the southern part has never been wholly self-sustaining in food.

**Basis of the Figures**

The figures given above are for civilian supplies requisitioned and scheduled in the months listed. This does not mean that the amounts listed were actually distributed to the Italian population in those months. Time must be allowed for transocean shipment and distribution of supplies to the local population.

The dollar values do not include handling charges or shipping costs beyond inland depots in this country.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I gather from the attached photostatic letter of April 24 from Marshal Badoglio that Professor Pazzi carried it personally here and the Marshal asked if you would be good enough to see him.

Adolph Berle's memorandum said that Pazzi was returning the end of last week unless he had instructions to the contrary. I presume from this that we have not received the original and Prof. Pazzi still has it.

G.G.T.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

After Cabinet yesterday, I referred to a letter said to have been written to you by Marshal Badoglio. There is attached a photostat of that letter, with a memorandum giving the present status and presumed future departure of its bearer. Does this need your views?

C. H.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum, dated May 29, 1944.
2. From Marshal Badoglio, dated April 24, 1944.
S - Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a photostat copy of a letter which we understand Marshal Badoglio has written to the President of the United States and which we likewise understand he wishes to have delivered by Professor Guido Pazzi.

Pazzi is here to give information to the OSS under the assumed name of Michael Rossi, but he has not presented his letter.

Unless some instruction is received to the contrary, Pazzi (Rossi) will have completed giving his information to the OSS by the end of this week and will then return to Italy without having presented his letter.

This superheated tuber landed on the desk of Mr. Earl Brennan of OSS, who, I think, deserves a good mark for handling it with extreme care.

Accompaniment:

Photostat.

DECLASSIFIED
A. A. B., Jr.
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-39
FEB 10 1972
By J. Schaubie Date
Salerno, April 24th, 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

On April 2nd I wrote to say that I confidently hoped to be able in a very short while to form a truly national Government, including all the major organized Parties. What was then my hope, has to-day materialized. Without any exception, all the parties which, since the fall of fascism, have taken up again their free activity, are cooperating to-day, with their best men, in a new Government representing the largest possible concentration of democratic forces, and which is exclusively bent on galvanizing the Country in its fight against Germany and on bringing it resolutely on the road of its material and moral rebirth.

Men such as Benedetto Croce and Count Sforza, notwithstanding any past vicissitude, are to-day, unrestrainedly sharing with me this great national task.

Prof. Pazzi is leaving within the next few days...
for the United States, on an unofficial and secret mission, the practical execution of which has only been made possible through the generous understanding of North-American channels, to whom I am most indebted therefor.

I am, therefore, entrusting this letter of mine to Professor Pazzi who, if, as I hope, you shall see fit to consent it—will be in a position to explain in person what is actually our present situation, through what developments the formation of the present Government has been reached, what are in fact the purport and the significance of this event.

Prof. Pazzi will, above all, be in a position to explain that the rebirth of a democratic and liberal Italy is, beyond any doubt, already under way; and how and why, in order to give to the Country the moral strength and impetus which alone can enable it to proceed with ever greater resolution along the road on which it has started, it is today absolutely necessary, and at the same time invaluable to the common aims, that the internal regeneration of the Country, of which the new Government is the expression, should be accompanied by a parallel and synchronous revision and revaluation of its international situation.

You are well aware, Mr. President, which is this international situation to-day. A continued imprisonment...
within a humiliating and demoralizing armistice; a minute and daily control, which allows of no breathing space and no initiative; an atmosphere of diffidence and suspicion which stifles and stultifies every possibility of a durable recovery; Italian military participation measured out and contained within the narrowest possible limits, etc.

This iron ring, in which we are constricted for the last eight months, can only be broken by a generous word on your part, by a human gesture which, implementing the assurances given to us at Quebec, may serve at last, through an Alliance, to bring back a free Italy amongst the family of free Nations.

This is, today, I would like to repeat, the most favourable occasion and the most timely contingency for such a word and such a gesture; and this is why I take it upon me to write to you once more on the subject, and, notwithstanding your present grave tasks, to ask you to give your favourable attention to what the bearer of this letter will have the opportunity to explain to you more fully and in detail.

I would like to add (though it is a detail of too personal a character for which you will forgive me) that I am writing under the stress of what is for me a particularly painful moment. I have just learned, in fact, that my only remaining boy, who was waiting for me in Rome, was trailed and arrested by the German police the day before yesterday. I have
no news as to his fate. You will understand what this means.

I venture to mention to you this circumstance merely because I am confident that it may serve, better than any other argument, to explain to you that I am alone supported by the hope of being able to bring back my Country – in the powers of recuperation and recovery of which I have unflinching trust, provided your generous help will not fail – on the side, above all, of the United States, whose friendship is for us essential.

Believe me, Mr. President, with heartfelt and devoted friendship,
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: GENERAL SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON
DATE: 4 JUNE 1944

WE ARE ALL THRILLED BY THE SPLENDID SUCCESS IN ITALY. MY VERY
WARM CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU.

ROOSEVELT
PARAPHRASE

From: General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
To: The President
Date: 5 June 1944

I greatly appreciate and want to thank you for your message.

Our success during the last few months is due to the fine fighting qualities of the Allied troops, the constant harassing operations of the Allied Air Forces and the support received from the Allied Navies. The 85th and 88th United States Divisions showed dash and fighting spirit in this their first battle, and I should like to record my admiration of these fine troops.
FROM: GENERAL SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO.: 55134, 5 JUNE 1944

Thank you for your message which I appreciate greatly.

Success has been due to the fine fighting qualities of the Allied troops also to the unremitting harassing operations of the Allied Air Forces and the assistance received from the Allied Navies during the last few months.

I would like to record my admiration of the dash and fighting spirit shown by the 85th and 88th United States Divisions in this their first battle.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: GENERAL SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER
DATE: 4 JUNE 1944

I AM VERY HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO SEND TO MY OLD FRIEND UNSTINTED PRAISE AND CONGRATULATIONS ON THE FALL OF ROME. GRAND JOB.

ROOSEVELT
From: General Sir Harold Alexander

To: The President

Date: 5 June 1944

Your kind message of congratulations is greatly appreciated.

The United States Fifth Army played a magnificent part in this victory. I am immensely proud of it.
FROM: GENERAL SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : 1325, 5 JUNE 1944

I greatly appreciate your kind message of congratulations. I am immensely proud of your 5th Army which has played such a magnificent part in this victory.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK CLARK
DATE: 4 JUNE 1944

YOU HAVE MADE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE VERY HAPPY. IT IS A GRAND JOB.
WELL DONE. CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND THE MEN OF THE FIFTH ARMY.

ROOSEVELT
PARAPHRASE

From: Lieutenant General Mark Clark
To: The President
Date: 6 June 1944

All members of the Fifth Army are inspired by your deeply appreciated message of congratulations, and we reaffirm our pledge to deliver unrelenting blows until the enemy is finally defeated.
FROM: LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK CLARK
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : 3366, 6 JUNE 1944

Your deeply appreciated message of congratulations is an inspiration to all members of the Fifth Army.

We reaffirm our pledge of unrelenting blows against the enemy until his final defeat.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: ADMIRAL SIR JOHN H. D. CUNNINGHAM

DATE: 4 JUNE 1944

To: The President

Date: 4 June 1944

MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN UNDER YOUR COMMAND. THE NAVIES OF BRITAIN AND THE U.S. HAVE LIVED UP TO THEIR REPUTATIONS. WELL DONE.

ROOSEVELT
PARAPHRASE

From: Admiral Sir John Cunningham
To: The President
Date: 5 June 1944

I wish to thank you for your message on behalf of the officers and men of the Allied Navies. All of us appreciate it very much.
FROM: ADMIRAL SIR JOHN H. D. CUNNINGHAM
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 051902B, 5 JUNE 1944

On behalf of the officers and men of the Allied Navies I thank you for your message which is very much appreciated by all of us.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR OLIVER LESEE
DATE: 4 JUNE 1944

MY VERY WARM CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND THE MEN OF THE EIGHTH ARMY.

ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

EIGHTH ARMY 05/1015z

THE PRESIDENT.

I thank you, Mister President, on behalf of all ranks of the Eighth Army, for your most kind congratulations which we value greatly. It has been an inspiration to fight alongside the Fifth Army. With all my respects and grateful thanks to yourself.

OLIVER LESEE.

8:35 a.m.
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Dated June 6, 1944
Rec'd 2:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1733, June 6, 5 p.m.

The Italian Charge, who came this morning to offer his congratulations on the entry into Rome, told me that he had heard many expressions of spontaneous gratification among the Italians here at the tone and substance of the President's radio address. He said he was giving it the widest circulation among his colony.

NORWEB

RB
REP
Secretary of State,

Washington.

133, June 6, 7 p.m.

FROM KIRK.

Would be grateful if the following message could be transmitted to the President.

"Dear Mr. President, deeply grateful with all Italian democrats for your far-seeing generous words about Italy. Sforza".

BRANDT

EDA
EMB
FROM: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
TO: MARSHAL BADOGLIO
DATE: 7 JUNE 1944

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF JUNE 6. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOUND IT OF GOOD AUGURY TO THAT CAUSE OF WORLD FREEDOM AND PROGRESS FOR WHICH THEY ARE FIGHTING THAT THE FIRST CAPITAL OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT TO EMERGE FROM THE BLACK SHADOW OF TYRANNY SHOULD BE ROME, WITH ALL ITS UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE. ITS LIBERATION WAS A FITTING PRELUDE TO THAT MIGHTY INVASION LAUNCHED FROM THE NORTH.

JUST AS ROME AND THE OTHER HISTORIC CITIES OF ITALY ARE FELT TO BE THE INHERITANCE OF ALL THE CIVILIZED WORLD, SO, I AM SURE, THE ITALIAN PEOPLE HAVE NEVER BEEN MORE KEENLY AWARE THAN TODAY THAT THE CAUSE OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD IS THEIR CAUSE AND DEMANDS THE COMPLETE DEDICATION OF THEIR POWERS OF MIND AND HEART.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: MARSHAL BADOGLIO
TO: THE PRESIDENT.
NO: 55575, 6 JUNE 1944

To Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States of America.

On the day when the victorious troops pursuing the enemy in flight, are restoring Rome to the new Italy, I send to you, Mister President, to the great and free North American people, and to your gallant troops, the expression of my gratitude and my ardent wishes for the future. The first capital of the European continent to be liberated from the German yoke, Rome once more occupies, today, her place in the world of liberty and justice. The sacrifice of American soldiers for the liberation of Rome is the surest guarantee of the renewed and lasting friendship between Italy and the U.S.A.

BADOGLIO
From: CG Allied Force Headquarters Algiers Algeria
To: War Department
Nr: F 55575 6 June 1944

F 55575 to AGWAR signed Wilson cite FRGEG.

Following message from Marshal Badoglio to President received here:

"To Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States of America. On the day when the victorious troops pursuing the enemy in flight, are restoring Rome to the new Italy, I send to you Mister President, to the great and free North American people, and to your gallant troops, the expression of my gratitude and my ardent wishes for the future. The first capital of the European continent to be liberated from the German yoke, Rome once more occupies, today, her place in the world of liberty and justice. The sacrifice of American soldiers for the liberation of Rome is the surest guarantee of the renewed and lasting friendship between Italy and the USA. Signed Badoglio."

Request above be transmitted to the President.

End

ACTION: White House

CM-IN-4649 (6 Jun 44) 1610Z bjm

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
June 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY THE
FIRST THING TOMORROW MORNING.

F.D.R.

Pink despatch from Badoglio to Pres. June 6
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum of June 6, 1944, there is attached for your signature, if you approve, a draft reply to Marshal Badoglio's message of that same date.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to Marshal Badoglio.
DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL BADOGLIO.

I thank you for your message of June 5. The American people found it of good augury to that cause of world freedom and progress for which they are fighting that the first capital of the European continent to emerge from the black shadow of tyranny should be Rome, with all its universal significance. Its liberation was a fitting prelude to that mighty invasion launched from the north upon which the fate of Italy and all free nations depends.

Just as Rome and the other historic cities of Italy are felt to be the inheritance of all the civilized world, so, I am sure, the Italian people have never been more keenly aware than today that the cause of the civilized world is their cause and demands the complete dedication of their powers of mind and heart.

-SECRET-

SE:EH:DLP
6-7-44

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972
June 7, 1944

THE HONORABLE

JOSE ALBERTAZZI AVERDANO,

PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS,

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA.

Please convey to the Costa Rican Congress my thanks for its message of encouragement and support sent in connection with the initiation of military operations for the liberation of Europe. Though the campaign may be difficult I have faith in the victory of the United Nations.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE

June 7, 1944

HIS EXCELLENCY

TIBURCIO CARIAS A.,

PRESIDENT OF HONDURAS,

TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS.

I am happy to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram expressing the fervent hopes and prayers of the Honduran nation that victory will crown the attack of the United Nations upon the fortress of Europe. The battle will be hard but I am confident the outcome will be a triumph for the forces of liberation.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
PCN-26

Monrovia

Dated June 7, 1944

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

125, June 7, 11 a.m.

I have been requested by the Liberian Government to inform my Government of its gratification over the occupation of Rome and the invasion of Europe, through Northern France by the Allied Armies of the United Nations; and also of its reaffirmation of the pledge hitherto made with respect to the Liberian Nation and people wholeheartedly to support the fight for world freedom.

WALTON

RB
RR
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you talk this over with the Joint Staff and prepare a reply to the enclosed?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 10, 1944

Subject: Publication of the terms of surrender of Italy.

Concerning the publication of the terms of surrender of Italy, you may wish to consider the following points:

1. The British Government has for some time, for political and internal reasons, desired to publish the secret terms of the Italian Armistice. Because of recommendations from the Theater Commander, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department have consistently refused, to date, to concur in the British proposal to publish the surrender terms. In view of British recognition that the publication of these terms involves joint responsibility of the two Governments, I should like first to inform the British Ambassador if the terms are now to be published.

2. A new Italian Government is being formed in Rome under a new Premier. We do not yet know if the new government has accepted the old government's obligations and undertakings, including the long terms of surrender. The severity of the terms which have been superseded to a degree by events in our relations with Italy are almost certain to create an unfortunate impression among the Italian people when known to them and complicate the task of the new Premier in forming a government.

3. The publication of the Italian terms of surrender may affect directly or indirectly the military campaign in Italy. Therefore, you may wish to consider the desirability of ascertaining the views of the Supreme Allied Commander at Algiers before the terms are given to the press.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

To prepare a very nice reply
for my signature -- My dear John Curtin.

F.D.R.

Message from Prime Minister Curtin to the President,
6/12/44, in re liberation of Rome. There is a
notation to the effect that the same message has
been sent to the Prime Minister of England.
This message is typed on a plain sheet of paper
in blue type.
FROM: PRIME MINISTER CURTIN, AUSTRALIA

TO: THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 4 JUNE 1944

Joyfully Australia tenders its congratulations on the Allied liberation of Rome and pays deep tribute to the gallant forces of the United Nations whose devotion has evoked this marked advance towards the final victory which will free all the world from despotism and tyranny. My deepest personal regards.
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

258, June 22, 3 p.m.

TO THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WAR, NAVY AND BISHOP SHERILL:

"Cooperating with General Johnson, American Military Governor of Rome, have arranged to have Episcopal chaplain temporarily detached from Army to open American church and community house in Rome at once for services and social privileges of armed forces and others. Temporary arrangement to be concluded upon arrival clergyman selected by American church authorities with your approval.

Visited American Academy Rome, all in good order and to be used by Monuments and Fine Arts sub-Commission in Italy."

BRANDT

WMB RR