PSF : Italy

Developments Dating from
Armistice Negotiations, 6-12-44

12 June 1944

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Italy

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## APPEALS BY ALLIED LEADERS

1. All democratic-minded persons and peoples in the world agree with the high and noble ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter. Undoubtedly one of its main purposes was that of inducing the people of those nations who were under the dictatorship of Nazi and Fascist power to rise up in rebellion.

Before the overthrow of Fascism in Italy on July 25, 1943 and long before the formulation of the Atlantic Charter there were numerous persons in and out of Italy who sought to bring an end to Fascist dictatorship. Many of them were executed, many sent to prison, many ruined in their life's career, many fled in exile even to the United States where they continued their battle against Fascism. Some of these famous exiles are now in the present Italian government and are working arduously for the reconstruction of Italy.

In addition to the Atlantic Charter, many later statements and proclamations were made by the leaders of the Allied Powers which encouraged the Italian people to believe they would be treated with honor if they would throw off the Fascist yoke. In his radio address of February 12, 1943 President Roosevelt stated:

> "In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders."

On July 17, 1943 during the invasion of Sicily a message was broadcast to the Italian people from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain in which it was stated:

> "The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations. ..... All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Nazi Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by destroying both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European nations. The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests, and your own desires for a restoration of national dignity, security, and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler - or live for Italy and for civilization."

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Responding to these appeals the Italian people overthrew Mussolini, placed him under arrest and formed a new government which today functions in a democratic manner and has extended its bases to include representatives of all the important anti-fascist political parties. This courageous action on the part of the Italian people received the hearty approval of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower, who on July 30, 1943, broadcast the following message:

> "We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor, who is still on Italian soil.... We are coming as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country. If you do this, we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. .... The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored."

It is a fact known to all that in Sicily no appreciable resistance to the Allied troops was offered by the Italian armed forces and the people of that ancient island welcomed the Allied troops as liberators from the Nazis. In speaking of this Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons on July 27, 1943:

> "When I took cognizance of all which has taken place in the streets of the beautiful city of Palermo upon the entry of American troops, when I reviewed all the detailed information I could obtain, I did not doubt that the principal and dominating desire of the Italian people is to free themselves of their German masters in order to avoid future and useless destruction and to revive the old parliamentary and democratic institutions."

Subsequent events have fulfilled the prophecy of the Prime Minister. The Italian people have given overwhelming proof of their determined intention to restore the Democratic institutions that existed before Fascism. They consider it a distinct honor to have been the first among the once-enslaved nations to openly defy German domination.

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OVERTHROW OF FASCISM AND ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

2. The first task of the new government constituted under the leadership of Marshal Badoglio after the fall of Fascism was to abolish and destroy the main Fascist structure in order to prevent its nefarious leaders from retaking control of the government by a coup or by force. Several plots backed by German authorities were discovered and immediately snuffed out. The new government issued decrees abolishing the Fascist Party, the Fascist Grand Council, the Fascist Chamber of the Fasci and Corporations and the Fascist Militia. It proceeded to arrest all the principal Fascist leaders and it removed from office fifty provincial prefects (head of provinces) and put in their places trusted officials. It also removed from office the Fascists who held the top positions in governmental and semi-governmental agencies.

The foremost desire of the new government was to bring about a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible moment. Emissaries were dispatched to Lisbon and Tangiers where on August 4th and 5th, 1943, they contacted Allied representatives. They pointed out the danger of a German occupation of Italy. They gave full and detailed information on the strength and disposition of German forces, and warned the Allies that these forces were constantly increasing. They stressed the fact that time was short and that this first contact should be considered by the Allies as an earnest and sincere endeavor to bring about as speedily as possible the conditions necessary for Italy's getting out of the war.

On August 13, 1943 our representative at Tangiers, Signor Berio, was given by the local British Consul General, Gascoigne, the following message:

> "The following message is sent by the governments of Great Britain and of the United States of America: It is necessary that Marshal Badoglio understand that we cannot negotiate but require unconditional surrender. This means that the Italian government must place itself at the disposal of the two Allied Governments which would later advise it of their terms. Call Signor Berio's attention to the fact that the two heads of the two Governments have already expressed their desire that Italy have a respected place in the new Europe as soon as the conflict is over and Gen. Eisenhower has already announced that the Italian prisoners in Tunisia and Sicily shall be released on condition

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> that the same thing will be done to all Allied prisoners."

Consequently General Castellano was sent to Lisbon to confer with the Allied Military Authorities arriving on August 16, 1943. In that interim as a result of the provisions taken by the new government (which had incurred the rabid hatred of Hitler) the Germans had been moving into Italy many divisions of troops. The new government could do practically nothing to counteract the German move for the reason that Mussolini as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Nation had dispersed almost all the Italian divisions outside of Italy, so that 36 divisions were beyond the territory of the Italian mainland and only 12 reduced and badly armed ones were in the Italian homeground.

On August 19 negotiations were started with General Castellano at great personal risks to all those involved. In negotiating for the armistice the Italian representatives offered not only a surrender of their country's armed forces, but asked that they be permitted to fight in coordination with the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland so that the German army could be driven out of Italy with the least possible delay. It was pointed out that unless this were done Italy would become a battleground and it would then be much more difficult to drive the Germans out of the country. Speaking about this to the House of Commons on September 21, 1943 Prime Minister Churchill said that General Castellano,

> "... did not oppose those (military) terms, drastic though they were, but he replied that the purpose of his visit was to discuss how Italy could join the United Nations in the war against Germany. He also asked how the terms could be executed in the face of German opposition. The British and American officers replied that they were empowered to discuss only unconditional surrender."

The Allied representatives were also informed that unless Marshal Badoglio were given a few days advance notice of the date of the publication of the Armistice he would not be able to give the proper and necessary orders to his armed forces to resist and even fight the German forces. The Marshal could not give orders too far in advance of such a date for fear of a leak that would give the Germans a pretext for seizing the country. Marshal Badoglio was not

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advised that the armistice was going to be announced to the world until a few hours before 6:30 p.m. o'clock on September 8, 1943, the time at which he was ordered by the Allied High Command to announce it to the Italian people. This, of course, did not give the Marshal time enough to issue the necessary orders to his troops and brought about the now well-known disastrous consequences to Italy and to its military forces located on other fronts. In speaking of this phase of the matter to the House of Commons on September 21, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill stated:

> "We did not doubt the sincerity of the envoy nor of his government, but we were not able to reveal our military plans for the invasion of Italy, or, as it had now become, the liberation of Italy. The real difficulty was that the Italians were powerless until we landed in strength, and we could not give them the date."

But in spite of all the difficulties that the time presented, a great deal was done to aid the Allied forces on their landings and subsequent battles to oust the Germans. Without regard to its own personal safety and though it meant the refusal of help probably decisive for the defense of Rome, the new government advised against the landing of an American division of parachute troops at Rome, as had been planned by the Allied Command, for the reason that the Germans had subsequently taken control of all airfields. The Italian authorities concentrated all available forces for the protection of Rome. As a result of the fighting done by these troops during several days after the proclamation of the Armistice the Germans were kept from occupying the city and were compelled to maintain outside its perimeter a large number of troops, including one armored and one parachute division, which otherwise could have been used to resist the Allied landings at Salerno. In his speech of September 21, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill said:

> "We would have done more had it been possible to help this unhappy Government who were beset on every side by insoluble problems and who have since acted towards us to the best of their ability with both courage and good faith."

The Italian government accepted the armistice terms although it knew full well it would mean the continuation of

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hostilities on Italian soil. This enormous obligation it was willing to assume because it desired above all to contribute to the destruction of German tyranny.

ITALY FIGHTS GERMANY

3. The armistice was signed and now the whole of Italy had become a battle-ground. Let us examine the obligations that Italy assumed by virtue of the armistice. According to its strict terms Italy was to surrender its armed forces on land, sea and air and to permit occupation of its territory for Allied military operations. All this it has done completely, fully and willingly. Although not required by the Armistice terms and although the Italian government had no means of communication with its troops scattered in Italy, Franco, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and other territories, nevertheless most of these troops spontaneously fought the Germans wherever and however they could. This was fully recognized by Prime Minister Churchill, speaking to the House of Commons on September 21, 1943:

> "... The Italian forces and population have everywhere shown themselves unfriendly or actively hostile to the Germans. They have everywhere shown themselves anxious to obey, as far as in their power, the orders of the King of Italy's new government. Every effort has been made, both by that Government and its forces to comply with the armistice conditions. Fighting has taken place at many points between the Italians and the German intruders. There is no doubt whatever on which side the sympathy, hopes and efforts of the Italian Nation now lie. In Sardinia, for instance, which a little while ago was considered a major price in itself, four Italian divisions have driven out the German garrison.... The French have landed in Corsica and aided by the Italian garrison and all true Frenchmen and Corsicans, are actively attacking the Germans... The fight in Bastia harbour was conducted by Italian destroyers and a British submarine, all of whom united in shelling the Germans and driving them out of the place."

But also on the Italian mainland the comparatively few Italian troops left there fought as long as they could against overwhelmingly stronger and better armed German forces. For instance:

1. At Gorizia the TORINO division under General

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Malagutti defended the city and the important bridges on the Isonzo river up to the end of September when it had to retreat to the mountains where it is still fighting. Before leaving the city General Malagutti distributed to the patriots what arms and ammunition his troops were not able to carry away.

2. At the Futa Pass on the Appennine mountains between Bologna and Florence a group of parachutists, infantrymen and artillerymen, under General Morigi, attacked the Germans killing several hundreds of them and closed this important highway. The German Command had to use armored forces (including 20 tanks of the "Tiger" class) to re-occupy the pass. These troops later withdrew to the mountains where they were joined by thousands of patriots of that region.

3. At Cuneo troops of the NIZZA cavalry Regiment and some Alpine soldiers passing through that city fought the Germans for several days until forced to retreat to the mountains where they were joined later by the patriots of that region.

4. At Savona the 15th autocar Regiment and an Anti-Aircraft Battery fought the Germans for several days until forced to surrender by lack of ammunition. Many were executed.

5. At Trieste Alpine troops kept the Germans away from the city for several days. Finally they withdrew to the mountains where many patriots soon joined them.

6. At Montecavallo and Piana di Consiglio, about 3000 men under General Caneva fought the Germans for twelve days.

7. In the region around La Spezia troops of the ALPI GRAIE division opposed for ten days the German advance. When forced to withdraw they fought their way to the Apuane Alps where many patriots joined them later.

8. At Ascoli Piceno, all troops available there under the leadership of Col. Santanche fought the Germans until Sept. 20, when surrounded by superior forces they partially succeeded in breaking the siege and reached the mountains where they are still fighting.

9. Italian troops for the defense of Rome kept the Germans away from the city for several days. Fighting was particularly hard in the Ostia and Moterosi zones and at Viterbo: Italian casualties were very high.

10. Many German forces were immobilized throughout Northern and Central Italy by the presence of Italian troops who threatened and disrupted their lines of communication, and by the open hostilities of the Italian populace.

11. Many naval bases and ports, Taranto, Brindisi, Bari, Manfredonia, and numerous airfields were turned over immediately to the Allies and were initially protected by Italian troops against the Germans. Two Italian divisions and minor contingents assisted in the Allied military operations in Puglia and contingents of the Italian Air Force aided in the fighting done there. All this facilitated the landing of more Allied troops and material at the time when it was so decisive.

12. In the Salento peninsula the PICENO and LEGNANO divisions vigorously fought from the very first moment, alongside Allied troops, participating with them in the first phase of advance toward the Ofanto line until ordered to cease fighting by the Allied High Command.



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This was already a substantial contribution to the Allied cause.

"The second important feature arising out of the Armistice with Italy" - declared Mr. Churchill - "is the situation in the Balkans." In this region 30 Italian divisions not only ceased to assist the German occupation troops but began to fight against them, for the purpose of defending important strategic positions along the Adriatic coast in the hope that Allied landings would be made there. By doing so,many divisions willingly lost the advantage of an early retreat to the mountains. Some of these troops succeeded even later in fighting their way through to the interior and are still fighting at this moment, although little or no aid can be sent to them by the Italian Government. For instance:

1. The PINEROLO division, over 10,000 men from the CASALE and FORLI' divisions, and minor contingents, including the AOSTA Cavalry Regiment, fought against the Germans in Greece and later joined the Greek partisans. Over 2000 Alpine troops, belonging to the MANFREDINI Group fought their way to the mountains of Epirus where they are still resisting the Germans.
2. The PERUGIA, FIRENZE and BRENNERO divisions fought against the Germans in Albania. Later the whole of the FIRENZE, part of the BRENNERO division and the MONFERRATO Cavalry Regiment withdrew to the mountains where they continued to fight.
3. The MARCHE, VENEZIA and TAURINENSE divisions and various minor contingents fought the Germans in Herzegovina and Montenegro. The whole of the VENEZIA and part of the TAURINENSE later fought their way to the mountains where they joined the partisan forces of Marshal Tito.
4. The ACQUI division defended Corfu' and Cefalonia for fifteen days against overwhelming forces. The Italian garrison did not receive any supplies and naval and air support, in spite of repeated demands by the Italian High Command to be permitted to send Italian ships and airplanes to help them. Only when it was already too late did the Allied Military Mission authorize the sending of a few Italian airplanes and torpedo-boats. The Italian garrison fought to the last. The few survivors, including the Commander, General Gandin, were all executed by the Germans.
5. The EMILIA division at Cattaro and the MARCHE at Spalato, though unsupported and not receiving any supplies, fought the Germans as long as they could and many officers were later executed. Part of these divisions and also of the BERGAMO and 2 CELERE divisions succeeded in reaching the mountains where they joined Tito's forces.

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6. The REGINA and CUNEO divisions put up a strong defense of the Aegean Islands in order to hold them for the benefit of Allied landings. When the Islands later fell to larger German forces in spite of Allied help numerous Italian prisoners were executed. As a result of his loyalty to the Italian Government Admiral Campioni, then Governor of the Aegean Islands, was later executed by the Fascists and Nazis at Rome.

After the fall of Samo, the greatest part of the CUNEO succeeded in disengaging themselves from the Germans and reaching the Turkish mainland. They are now in Palestine where they work for the Allies. If given the opportunity, as asked by the Italian Government, they would be only too glad to fight again in Italy and thus avenge their comrades treacherously executed by the Germans.

All of the foregoing fighting was done by the local commanders and their troops on their own initiative and responsibility. It shows beyond doubt that "the Italian people are sincerely and passionately resolved to drive the invaders from their soil."

Later the Allied Command ordered that all operational activities in the Italian peninsula by Italian troops were to cease until the issuance of new orders.

4. No less important is the part played by the civilian population of Italy in driving the Germans out of several cities in the South and in resisting them in the North, where for many weeks countless villages and even comparatively large cities like Como and Varese, just to name a few, kept the Germans away through the courageous efforts of their citizens.

The heroic fighting that was done by the civilian population of Naples and its environs will go down in history as one of the most glorious contributions made by the Italian people in their resolution "to drive the invader from their soil". One should bear in mind that these people had been subjected to about 120 air bombardments by the Allied Air Force, one of these taking place after the signing of the armistice. Nevertheless, in spite of all the suffering and terror that this population had undergone it rose as one man to drive the hated German from its soil when the moment of liberation was at hand. Let us not forget, also, that a civilian population under international law has no right to engage

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in combat with or against either side of the armed forces, and by doing so it took its life into its own hands.

The press of the whole world has already reported how the men, women and children of Naples fought the Nazis for five days, violently, and to the death, with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on in order to liberate their city. Such acts as blowing up German tanks by hand grenades and improvised explosives not only proves the undaunted heroism of these untrained civilians, but also caused such havoc and confusion among the German forces that they fled from the city. This precipitous flight prevented the Germans from carrying out their nefarious plans of wholesale destruction of the city to render it uninhabitable for the Allied troops. And they did such a thorough job of it that when the Allied troops entered Naples there was not a German soldier remaining in the city, and the Allied troops were greeted and welcomed at 11:00 a.m. on October 1, 1943 by two Italian patriots who had gone beyond the limits of the city to meet them.

Many of the citizens were killed and wounded in this struggle, the details of which are vividly and accurately told in two booklets which are enclosed, namely: "Napoli Contro il Terrore Nazista" by Corrado Barbagallo, one of Italy's outstanding historians, and "Venti Giorni di Terrore" by Dott. Gennaro Capazzi.

Enclosed also is a booklet entitled "La Cacciata dei Tedeschi da Scafati" by Francesco Matrone, an inhabitant of Scafati, which is a small industrial city on the river Sarno between Naples and Salerno. It describes in what manner a courageous band of citizens aided the Allied troops in preventing the Germans from blowing up an important highway bridge and in driving them out of their city. May we refer only to the written testimonial of a British officer which appears on page 26 of the booklet:

> "This note is to say that the following people assisted the British troops during the battle of Scafati, 28 September 1943. They were very helpful indeed in guiding the troops down side streets and alleyways under fire in the town which helped to outwit the Germans."

This spontaneous and valorous aid by the civilians of

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Scafati was rendered by them despite the fact that on the nights of September 13 and 15 this city was heavily bombed by the Allies, causing many victims among them. Although these raids occurred after the publication of the Armistice our populace was determined to oust the Germans.

Civilian resistance to German occupation was very courageous also in the North. Considering that they were fighting seasoned and superior armed troops, the success obtained in many encounters by these improvised bands of patriots is truly remarkable.

It must also be considered that fighting on such a large scale by civilians in large cities has not taken place so far in any part of Western Europe during the present war.

1. At Turin the civilian population and especially the industrial workers fired on German troops attacking the city and resisted their advance through sheer heroism, fighting from house to house. Casualties were very high on both sides.
2. In all Lombardia, but especially at Milano and Pavia, civilians fired on the advancing German troops and forced them to engage in combat before taking the city.
3. Throughout the Emilia region, civilians fired on German troops, with heavy casualties on both sides.
4. In Veneto, especially at Venice, Trieste and Gorizia the civilian population took arms from military deposits and opposed German occupation.
5. At Lanciano (in the Abruzzi region) the whole population fought the Germans. When reinforcements arrived the Germans stormed the town and in reprisal destroyed it completely with a heavy bombardment.
6. At Montefiorito (Abruzzi) a band of civilians who had attacked German troops were killed to the last man after prolonged combat.

These are only a few of the many episodes of civilian defiance and bravery which took place in the days immediately following the proclamation of the Armistice. Others will be known later when, after the liberation of Italy, people from the countless villages and towns who desperately resisted the Germans in those epic days and later joined the patriots' bands in the mountains will be able to give a full account of what actually took place.



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5. A very important contribution to the Allied cause was that made by the Italian Fleet, which not only faithfully executed the terms of the Armistice but went quite beyond them by becoming an active cobelligerent of the Allied Fleet. Practically the whole of the Italian Fleet followed the instructions of the Royal Government. From its first days it fought and is still fighting the Germans. Even the gunboat ERITREA which at the time of the publication of the Armistice was in a Japanese port, succeeded in escaping from the inland sea of Japan to Ceylon - an unprecedented feat which clearly showed an unflinching determination to fight the common enemy.

In his interview of September 13, 1943 Gen. Eisenhower stated:

> "If the conditions of the armistice gave to the Allies nothing more of an effective nature beyond the control of the Italian Fleet, this fact alone justifies it... Only light naval forces are now needed in the Mediterranean."

This was recognized frankly by Prime Minister Churchill (House of Commons, September 21, 1943):

> "Practically the whole of the Italian Navy and many many merchant ships and many submarines have under conditions of great risk strictly executed the conditions of the Armistice and made their way to Malta or other ports under British control. This event has decisively altered the naval balances of the world."

There was no obligation under the Armistice for our Navy to render combat or escort services to the Allies, but this was willingly and spontaneously done from the very first moment by the Italian Navy.

For instance:

1. There were encounters between the Italian Navy and the Germans in the Tyrrenean Sea in which the 35,000 ton battleship ROMA was lost. German losses were also very severe in these encounters.
2. Near Gorgona Island Italian patrol boats attacked a group of German torpedo-boats inflicting upon them severe losses and damage.
3. In the waters of Portoferraio the Italian corvettes FOLAGA, APE and CORMORANO attacked German units which were forced to escape.

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4. Near Ajaccio (Corsica) the Italian escort-boat ALISEO attacked a group of German torpedo-boats, sinking 9. Italian destroyers took part in the fight in Bastia harbour.
5. At Piombino a coastal defense Battery fired on German torpedo-boats and sank two.

On September 3, 1943 very few airplanes were still left to the Italian Air Force. These immediately took part in attacking German troops retreating from the Salento peninsula, and later on September 17, Italian bombers attacked German naval units at Bocche di Bonifacio.

From September 18 up to the fall of Corfu and Cefalonia the Italian air force made a gallant attempt to assist the Italian garrison there. Fighters and pursuit planes engaged in strafing andanti-personnel bombing actions. Three German planes were destroyed in combat and some Italian personnel killed during these actions.

AGGRAVATION OF ARMISTICE TERMS

6. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the time of the Quebec Conference in the document supplementary to the clauses of the short armistice of September 3, 1943 had stated that:

> "The conditions of the Armistice do not contemplate the active assistance by Italy in the fight against the Germans. Their modification in favour of Italy will depend upon the aid given by the government and people of Italy to the United Nations against Germany during the rest of the war."

The Italian Government had faith that the importance of the Italian contribution to the cause of freedom would be fully appreciated by Allied leaders. Not only had Prime Minister Churchill made open acknowledgment of it in his speech of September 21, 1943 quoted above, but Marshal Badoglio had received from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill the following letter dated September 11, 1943:

> "Marshal,
> It has fallen to you in the hour of your country's agony to take the first firm step to win peace and freedom for the Italian people and to win back for Italy an honourable place in the civilization of Europe....The German terror in Italy will not last long. They will be extirpated from your land and you, by helping in this great

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> surge of liberation, will place yourself once more among the important and long proved friends of your country from whom you have been so wrongfully estranged. Take every chance you can, strike hard and strike home. Have faith in your future. All will come well. March forward with your American and British friends in the great world movement towards freedom, justice and peace."

To this message Marshal Badoglio immediately answered:

> "All that which is possible is and shall be done with that same spirit and with that same tenacity that we displayed together on the fields of battle in Italy and France during the last great war..."

He also gave assurances that the Italian people

> "who long, at the price of whatever sacrifices, for the arrival of liberty and peace with justice, shall not fail to do their duty courageously - their fullest duty on this occasion. We shall not be lacking in faith and we shall march together with you, our American and British friends."

While not asking or expecting for the time being the fulfillment of the promises contained in the Quebec document as to the modification of the armistice terms in proportion to the aid already given by the Italian Government and people to the United Nations against Germany, on the other hand the Italian Government hoped there would not be an aggravation of the armistice terms.

On September 29 Marshal Badoglio went to Malta intending to submit to Gen. Eisenhower plans as to the best use to be made of Italian resources for the prosecution of the fight against Germany. He also expected to sign the political, economic and financial clauses of the armistice in pursuance to Article 12 of the Armistice of September 3 which provided:

"Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at a future date." At Malta Marshal Badoglio was presented instead with a wholly different supplemental document containing not only 'conditions of a political, economical and financial nature' but military conditions as well, many of them much harsher than those of the original military armistice of September 3rd. The reason he was given for the presentation of this new document was that "it is convenient that the terms of a military nature and the said other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature should... be comprised in one document' but this was

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stated to be 'without prejudice to the continued validity of the Armistice of September 3, 1943.'"

Not only this but the words "surrender" and "unconditionally" which did not appear in the armistice of September 3rd, were inserted in the new document.

Though Marshal Badoglio felt that he was not bound, in law or equity, by art. 12 of the Short Armistice of September 3rd to accept this aggravating supplemental document, still he consented to sign it in order to prove once more Italy's willingness to cooperate with Allied desires and to be ranked beyond shadow of doubt on their side. However he objected to the words "surrender" and "unconditionally" which he considered "needlessly injurious to the good name of the new Italy and prejudicial, in my opinion to the common cause which I most firmly intended and do intend to uphold with every means at my disposal". General Eisenhower undertook to represent to the Allies governments Marshal Badoglio's viewpoint.

When presenting the new aggravating Armistice terms to Marshal Badoglio at Malta, General Eisenhower also urged the Italian Government formally to declare war on Germany. As it has already been shown the Italian Armed Forces and civilian population had not waited for this suggestion to start fighting the Germans. However, the Italian Government felt that in view of its precarious situation and limited control over so small a portion of the national territory an early declaration of war was inopportune.

This, of course, was again asking the Italian Government to go beyond the strict terms of the Armistice and do a positive act against the German State. As a result of the Malta Conference the Italian Government declared war on Germany on October 13, 1943.

Following upon his remonstrances to General Eisenhower, on October 17, 1943 Marshal Badoglio was informed by General Taylor of the Allied Military Mission

> "that the American, British and Soviet Governments have approved the amendments to the Document containing the Long Armistice terms which you desired. A supplementary document in the form of a Protocol embodying these amendments is being forwarded to me by General Eisenhower and immediately upon receipt I will communicate it to Your Excellency for signature."

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On November 9, 1943 Marshal Badoglio was presented with this Protocol in which however only the title had been changed. The words "surrender" and "unconditionally", not included in the Armistice of September 3rd, still appeared in the new Protocol and had been merely put in a different order. Moreover the offer of the Protocol was made conditional upon the acceptance by Italy of a new naval supplemental agreement reconsidering matters previously settled and increasing the burdens and obligations already assumed by Italy on September 23, 1943 in the agreement between the Italian Navy Minister Admiral De Courten and the Navy Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Admiral Cunningham.

Marshal Badoglio once again consented to a further aggravation of the terms of the Armistice and the new naval supplemental agreement was signed by Admiral De Courten on November 17, 1943. At the same time Marshal Badoglio asked for re-examination of this amendment on the basis of a modification proposed by him, but no action has yet been taken on this.

On November 17, 1943 Marshal Badoglio wrote to President Roosevelt a letter in which he said:

> "...The Armistice signed by my order by General Castellano on the 3rd of September did not contain any clause that mentioned surrender on the part of Italy. As you know, the clauses were mainly military. I was told then that additional clauses, but only of non-military nature, would be presented to me later. The 29th of September, when we had already loyally carried out all the armistice conditions and when the phase of actual collaboration had already begun with the full approval of the Military Mission, I was obliged to sign at Malta the additional clauses which changed for the worse the conditions of the armistice signed on September 3rd and which carried the title 'Unconditional surrender by Italy.'
>
> Following my remonstrances, Gen. Eisenhower promised to represent to the Allied governments the reasons for my disagreement and to propose to them the deletion of various phrases needlessly injurious to the good name of the new Italy and prejudicial, in my opinion, to the common cause which I most firmly intended and do intend to uphold with every means at my disposal.
>
> Nevertheless, and in spite of the further development from co-operation to co-belligerency and the assurances given to me, the document was returned to me partly corrected, but still containing the word 'surrender' which did not exist in the first document. The same thing happened with the naval clauses. The 23rd of September this last question was discussed fully and at length between Admiral Cunningham and Admiral De Courten and a conclusion was mutually agreed upon.

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> Now, more than 40 days later, I have been presented with a new amendment in which the promised and announced deletion of the words which had brought about my remonstrances was at last granted, but, at the same time, the signature by the Allies has been subordinated to our acceptance of a further naval clause, which brings up once more a question which had already been discussed and agreed upon and makes Italy's position considerably worse.
>
> I have been obliged, I repeat, to sign this amendment, which I hope however, Mr. President, you will find a way of having re-examined on the basis of the modification I proposed.
>
> ....Mr. President, I am taking the liberty of writing to you directly, in the hope that you will take into account the many serious and grievous difficulties that the Italian nation is passing through, the very firm intention on my part and on the part of my Government to fight on your side against the common enemy, and to give to the country those free democratic institutions which constitute your strength, and in the hope that you will continue to base your action toward us on those principles of human justice of which you are certainly one of the greatest and most respected exponents in the world."

If the changes in the Armistice terms were meant to give to Italy and its new government the fullest opportunity for the marshalling of her forces and resources for the fight going on for the liberation of her land from the Germans, then the increased burdens she was asked to assume would have been not only justified but gladly undertaken. But the Armistice terms of September 29, and the subsequent supplements and protocol, especially considering that they were strictly interpreted and applied by the Allied Control Commission instead of aiding they impeded at every turn almost all her efforts of collaboration that the Italian government sought to bring to the aid of the Allies.

## FORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

7. On November 10, 1943, a few days after the Moscow Conference, a statement was issued by General Eisenhower announcing the formation of the Allied Control Commission (A.C.C.).

> "The Commission - stated Gen. Eisenhower - has control of the military and economic activities of Italy as envisaged in the terms of the armistice. Italy has a new role in the war. That role is to fight the common enemy - Germany. The Allied Control Commission will

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see that all of Italy's economic resources and man-power are utilized where they can do the most good in that fight..... The United Nations are converting Italy into an effective instrument of war against Germany. They look to the Italian Government to produce tangible results. By rallying the entire people to a vigorous resistance to the Germans, the Government of Italy may hasten the redemption of its country and prove its value to the United Nations."

Now Italy's new role in the war, i.e., to fight Germany, had not been assumed in pursuance of the armistice terms or as a result of the Moscow Conference or of other agreements with the Allied Powers, but was a unilateral decision of the Italian Government following the spontaneous rising of the people and armed forces of the country after the publication of the armistice on September 8, 1943.

So the Allied Control Commission, set up under the Armistice to supervise the execution of its terms, was now to become an agency to help Italy in her new role in the war, a role - let us stress it once more - that was not contemplated in the Armistice and could hardly be reconciled with the provisions of that document. In fact the supplemental Armistice terms had been devised as a method of paralyzing an enemy by depriving him of any possibility of harming the Allied Powers. However, now that Italy had become an active co-belligerent in the common fight against Germany, the Armistice and its supplements in the manner they were applied become a paralyzing and restrictive device, preventing Italy in a thousand ways from becoming "an effective instrument of war against Germany" and hampering the Italian Government, in spite of its efforts and good will, in its attempts "to produce tangible results" and "to prove its value to the United Nations".

Gen. Eisenhower had already stated in his letter to Marshal Badoglio of September 29, 1943: "It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these (Armistice) terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution..... It is understood that the terms both of this document (the Armistice of September 29) and of the Short Military Armistice of September 3rd may be modified from time to time if

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military necessity or the extent of co-operation by the Italian Government indicates this as desirable."

Instead of these modifications, which military necessity and the extent of Italian co-operation during the previous two months indicated as clearly advisable, the A.C.C. was set up. The name itself of the new agency was hardly a fortunate choice and did not tend to strengthen the Italian Government's prestige at home and abroad and to encourage the Italian people. (Up to this time there had been in Italy only an "Allied Military Mission".) In the Italian language, at any rate, the word "control" does not suggest guidance and co-operation toward a common goal, but rather diffidence, distrust and above all a limitation instead of encouragement to greater efforts.

As the A.C.C.'s authority is derived from the Armistice, the A.C.C. started to apply its terms in the strictest way. What was intended to be merely "a control of military and economic activities" soon became increasing interference in all details of Italian life, even in the political field. A Political Section of A.C.C. was immediately formed. The various sub-commissions of A.C.C. began not only to control but to do things of their own often at cross-purpose with each other. It is a well-known fact that bureaucratic agencies have a tendency to expand in order to justify their existence and importance. This coming on top of regulations made by military authorities, practically independent of A.C.C., and by A.M.G. officials, rendered impossible any initiative by the Italian government to marshal the economic forces of the nation to increase its war efforts against Germany. Even in the provinces under Italian administration any minor Allied official could block and offset measures adopted by the highest Italian authorities.

Though the best relationship and co-operation always existed between the Chief Commissioner (at first General Joyce and later Gen. MacFarlane) and Marshal Badoglio and though some of the A.C.C. personnel were efficient, able, approaching their unique task in the right spirit, others were inexperienced in and unacquainted with the nature of their job. Others found themselves

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suddenly given enormous authority over millions of people in a strange country in the midst of a complete disorganization of social and economic life. Whenever the hoped-for results were not reached by their decisions, made without appropriate knowledge of the conditions of a country and its people whose habits and traditions date back more than two thousand years and who moreover were just passing through one of the most difficult crises of their history, the tendency was to blame the Italian people as being lazy, incompetent and inefficient, while the whole world knows, as evidenced in the United States, that Italian ingenuity and industry have contributed everywhere to the enrichment of the human race.

The danger of all this and its disastrous consequences for Italy and for the Allied cause were clearly recognized by the Advisory Council for Italy which as early as last December recommended restitution to the Italian Government of the provinces under A.M.G. As a result of this recommendation, A.C.C. consented to narrow the zone of A.M.G. activity and on February 11, 1944 the Italian Government resumed authority over the liberated provinces, though not over Naples and the important region around it which is still under A.M.G.

Restoration of Italian authority over the "unoccupied territory" was however made subject to terms and conditions so restrictive in character that in actual practice the Italian Government was still deprived of any real authority. In addition to rights reserved on account of military exigencies, Allied authorities reserved, among others, the following rights which Marshal Badoglio was compelled to accept without any of the amendments he proposed having been accepted.

> "7. Any official in the 'Unoccupied Territory' previously appointed by the AMG may only be removed by the Italian Government with the consent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."
> "8. The right to requisition private and public property and services."
> "9. The right to reoccupy the whole or any part of the 'Unoccupied Territory' at any time or take such steps or exercise such other powers in any part of such territory as may from time to time be deemed necessary for the prosecution of the war."

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"10. The right to import and export and to control and supervise the distribution to the civilian population of such civilian supplies as the Allied Forces may determine...."

"11. The right to engage in such operations and import and export such military and other supplies or property of any nature as may be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war....."

It might be emphasized that the Allied authorities have the right to exercise any of these powers, and do exercise them without the approval or consent of or even without first consulting the Italian Government.

"14. All expenses and costs arising from the maintenance of Allied troops or other personnel within the 'Unoccupied Territory' will be chargeable to the Italian Government as a part of the costs of occupation."

In this connection it might be pointed out that while the Armistice terms do not provide that the costs of occupation and of military operations in Italy be charged to the Italian Government, there is a clause prescribing that Italy shall furnish to the United Nations all Italian currency they may request and that it shall redeem with Italian money all currency emitted in Italian territory by the United Nations during occupation. The whole situation, which so seriously hampers Italian efforts toward economic recovery and greater participation in the war, should be re-examined in the light of subsequent events and of Italian co-operation with the United Nations.

The Italian Government was also asked to pass and publish before the date of restoration of the occupied provinces, several decrees and proclamations the text of which was indicated by Allied authorities. They included:

a) "A Decree stabilizing wage rates, maximum prices and charges for services; maximum quantities of grain to be held by anyone, as existing at the date of restoration and pending the future policy being agreed upon between us."

b) "A Decree .... providing for the establishment of Allied Military Courts to try offenses entailing any hostile act against the Allied Forces and empowering any member of the Allied Forces to arrest any Italian person whom such member had reasonable

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grounds for believing is concerned in such act...."

These reservations were couched in such general terms and they were so loosely interpreted by Allied authorities that in reality restoration was little more than an empty word. Local A.C.C. officials extended their control over the smallest details, so that their activities should be construed as being direct management. There is also a definite tendency on their part to continue using the same powers as they previously enjoyed under AMG even after the "Unoccupied Territory" was returned to Italian administration and also to extend these powers to those four provinces which have always been under the unrestricted administration of the Italian Government, Bari, Lecce, Taranto and Brindisi.

In his announcement of February 10, 1944 at the moment of restoration the Commander-in-Chief, General Maitland Wilson, said: "According to the terms of the Armistice, the A.C.C. will continue to insure the effective use of Italian resources in the common war." Let us examine briefly what the A.C.C. has done to increase Italian war effort in the military, economic and political fields.

MOBILIZATION OF ITALIAN WAR EFFORT ABROAD

8. An extremely important factor in the Italian war effort against Germany would have been the contribution that the 10 millions of Italians who live abroad could give. From the very first moment the Italian government attempted to mobilize them against Germany and to off-set the effect of German and Fascist propaganda fed to them.

The Italian agency in charge of that problem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is above any suspicion of the Allied Authorities. From the first announcement of the Armistice all the Italian diplomats without exception in neutral countries and almost all those in German-occupied countries, excepting a few non-career functionaries appointed because of Fascist influence, declared themselves loyal to the New Italian Government. By taking this stand they not only exposed themselves to cruel treatment (especially the diplomats at Shanghai and in

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Japan who have been deprived of their diplomatic privileges and are now brutally mistreated by the Japanese), but they also exposed to danger and to reprisals their families who remained in Italy still in German hands. A decree issued on October 14, 1943 by the Fascist government and widely publicized, established severe measures to be taken against all officials loyal to the Royal Government and even against their families.

All the employees now in the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in liberated Italy escaped from Rome, crossing the battle lines at great risk to their lives, and compelled to leave behind their families about whom they have since received no information. One member of the diplomatic service escaped from France after having had many dangerous adventures, another escaped from Belgium, a third from Denmark - all eluding the German authorities who were in constant pursuit. Flights of this kind from German-occupied territories show clearly the anti-German feeling of the Italian people, in all its social classes including the Diplomatic Corps. Another diplomat, De Grenet, was executed at Rome by the Germans for participating in activities against them.

In spite of all these happenings the Italian Government was cut off from any communication with the outside world. Not only were its communications direct with its representatives abroad cut off, but the messages sent through the Allied authorities took weeks before they arrived at their destination and in many cases were arbitrarily held up or changed or even lost. Under these conditions the field was left wide open to Fascist propaganda especially in neutral countries like Argentina and Spain where our activities could have been of great help to the Allied cause in view of the presence there of large Italian colonies. The revival of the Stefani press agency, so indispensable to enlighten the Italian at home and especially abroad on what was happening was prohibited by P.W.B. in accord with the A.C.C. On the other hand the Fascist propaganda aided by Germany had been very active from the very first days after the armistice and took advantage of the slightest opportunity

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to belittle and disparage the Badoglio Government in all its activities and relations with the Allied authorities, accusing it of having betrayed Italy by signing the Armistice. Having been deprived of communication with the outside world the Italian Government could do nothing to present the truth to the Italian people abroad. Nevertheless the Italian foreign representatives on their own initiative and with fidelity to the common cause did their utmost to neutralize a large part of the Fascist activities but not as much as they could have otherwise done.

Not only the requests of the Italian government to establish direct contact with its own representatives have been refused, but when the Swiss Government, desirous of resuming radio communications with Italy, suggested last February the establishment of a regular service between Bern and Bari radio stations, the offer was turned down by A.C.C. on security grounds, though some reasonable and security-proof control could have been easily worked out.

Following a request by British representatives, on March 24, 1944 the Italian Ambassador in Spain was instructed by us to deliver to the Allies all wireless telegraph sets and radio-goniometers belonging to the Italian Embassy and Consulates in Spain. This apparatus had been previously sealed and entrusted to the Ambassador upon his personal responsibility and nothing had justified in the meantime doubts about his security. The same happened in Portugal and in other neutral countries. With the actual transfer of both codes and wireless sets the Italian Government went once more beyond the Armistice provisions. As it was pointed out at the time to the A.C.C., this continued feeling of distrust, six months after the Armistice, was truly discouraging.

It must be stressed in this connection that all information of a military nature in our hands both in Italy and abroad was freely put at the disposal of the Allies. At the risk of their lives and though subjected by the Germans to the most terrible reprisals on their families in Northern Italy, Italian intelligence officers in neutral countries rendered invaluable services to the Allies by giving them

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full details about the German espionage organizations which they knew so well. This was also going beyond the Armistice terms.

In spite of this unfailing cooperation the Italian Government would receive continuous requests for the removal of many of its officials in neutral countries according to the particular desire of the local Allied intelligence organization, though in many cases no evidence of wrong-doing was given and though it felt on the contrary that these people could be very useful to the common cause. However the Italian Government always complied willingly with these requests as evidence of its genuine desire to cooperate. Then repatriation of our officials abroad is delayed for many months and eventually when they are permitted to return to Italy they are routed to Algiers where they are detained indefinitely and submitted to humiliating interrogatories as if they were enemy suspects. The former Italian Vice Consul in Tangiers, a regular career diplomat, who had been recalled to Italy, went to Gibraltar on his way home at the end of April. He has not been heard of since, nor was the Italian Government advised of what had prompted Allied authorities to take this unprecedented step. It should be pointed out that he had a regular British visa and therefore was entitled to the same protection that even an enemy diplomat would enjoy in similar circumstances. These incidents become known in other countries and result in great harm to our interest and to the Allied cause since they induce undecided people to go to the side of the Fascists.

In this regard the transit of our officials to and from abroad becomes increasingly more difficult rather than more expeditious.

The Allied authorities insist on financing our Missions in neutral countries but in many cases financing could be arranged by ourselves if freezing of Italian assets in those countries were removed and the practice discontinued of requisitioning remittances by Italian emigrants, paying the amount in A.M.G. Liras and keeping the foreign currency. While taking advantage in every way of Italian assets abroad they have refused instead to advance

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sums for Italian diplomats interned in Japan, Germany and countries occupied by the enemy. These diplomats are in a very grave plight on account of their loyalty to the Royal Government and to the Allied cause, notwithstanding threats of all kinds by the Fascist and enemy authorities.

In spite of all our efforts it has not been possible so far to obtain the British guarantee asked by Turkey in order to grant a visa to Italian diplomatic and other officials in Rumania and Bulgaria who are in constant danger of being handed over to the Fascists and the Germans because of their loyalty to the Royal Government and to the Allies cause.

There is also a definite tendency to use the financing of Italian Missions abroad as a means of submitting them to the strictest control and interference not in the interest of the common cause.

A typical instance of the way in which undue pressure is brought to bear on our representatives abroad was the action of the British Embassy in Lisbon concerning some Italian merchant ships in Portuguese ports. The use of ships of the Italian Merchant Navy was regulated by the Agreement between Adm. De Courten and Adm. Cunningham, embodied in a British Memorandum of September 19, 1943. Contrary to the provisions of this agreement, the British Embassy in Lisbon prevailed upon our representatives in Portugal, to place British crews on board the Italian tankers Taigete and Arcola at Cabo Verde. This was accomplished by holding up and not delivering to our representatives our instructions against such substitution of crews. Our representative in Lisbon had loyally co-operated in overcoming the obstacles planted by the Portuguese Government who at first did not want to release those ships because of claims it said it had against Italy and we had to satisfy those claims before the Portuguese Government would release them to us. The fact that Italian merchant ships are taking part in the common fight with crews and under a flag other than Italian, contrary to the terms stated in the De Courten-Cunningham agreement is demoralizing to the morale of the Italian Merchant Navy, the crews of which are particularly idle today but

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want to play their full part in the efforts and sacrifices needed "to drive the invader from their soil", to share in Italian ships the same risks that other crews of the Merchant Fleets of the United Nations are running. But our repeated offers to use Italian crews for Allied purposes have not been always accepted so far.

We have made offers to resume activities of the LATI and ALA ITALIANA airlines between Southern Italy and Spain and Portugal. This would represent a valuable addition to the existing Allied air transport network in the Mediterranean. Allied control over these lines could have been easily arranged. By resuming operations valuable field rights, equipment and personnel both in Spain and Portugal, at present forced to be idle, would have been used to ease strained Allied air transport facilities in the Mediterranean. We could have made an important contribution to the common cause. In response to our continued offers, which were always turned down, we were recently told that this material should be put at the disposal of the Mediterranean Air Transport Service at Gibraltar. This we consented to do, though it meant making a most inadequate use of our possibilities as most of the equipment and the field rights cannot be transferred to Gibraltar. It is to be feared that the Germans, through their Fascist friends, will try to get control of and use these facilities. The best solution would have been to resume operations between Italy and the Spanish peninsula under Allied control. By facilitating more frequent contacts between our government and the Spanish peninsula would have enabled us to frustrate German efforts to utilize Italian economical resources in Spain.

It would have been to the advancement of the Allied cause to have enabled us quickly and under proper safeguards to have removed from the Allied black list those Italian citizens and firms that had no business relations with the enemy or with Northern Italy. It happens that by pursuing such a restrictive policy against us the Italian firms and the citizens remaining faithful to the Italian government have been boycotted by the Germans and the Fascists but not removed from the Allied black list. Thus they find themselves in a position much inferior to those who collaborate with the Germans in the commercial field.

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This is not only a moral injustice but it prevents our government from using a most potent weapon in combatting the economic penetration of the Germans in countries like Spain where our interests are considerable and could have been a means of our making an important contribution to the common cause.

For many months we have been asking permission to send a new Ambassador to Argentina where for a long time we have had only a Charge' d'Affaires. A new Ambassador could handle our affairs in a manner so much more favorable to the Allied cause in Argentina where there is a very large and powerful Italian colony but which now is divided and disunited because of lack of proper guidance.

After our repeated requests had elicited no answer for several months, in February last the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed by the A.C.C. that repatriation of all foreign service officials and employees captured or interned in the course of this war, would take place in the near future. Though we are in great need of such personnel, up to now not one such employee has been permitted to return to Italy.

9. Among those who have suffered from the consequences of Fascist errors are many Italians who at the beginning of the war were living in various Allied countries. Through no fault of their own, because of the mere fact that they were Italian citizens, though very often they lived abroad because they had opposed Fascism without however becoming politically prominent, they were interned. These measures were understandable during the first days but later the United States Government recognizing the virtue and loyalty of these Italian nationals restored them to full and equal rights with a few and very minor exceptions. This act of faith in our people was greatly appreciated in all of Italy. But in other countries things were much different. Not only are large numbers kept in internment camps but in Egypt, contrary to international law, properties of Italian internees have been confiscated or sold at auction. More than six months have elapsed

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since the Italian government first requested suspension of all auction sales and other confiscatory measures against Italian property in Egypt, but no answer has yet been received.

With over 6000 family wage-earners still interned and their properties sold at auction at ridiculous prices, what once was a prosperous and industrious colony of 65,000 Italians has now become impoverished and destitute. As a result misery and prostitution are widespread.

Attempts by the Italian government to obtain information through A.C.C. as to the number and condition of Italian civil internees in the British Empire and other countries have so far gone unheeded. Not even when, as in Australia, favorable measures were passed, was the Italian government informed about them in spite of its repeated inquiries. Nor is the Italian government in a position to furnish to their anxious families any information concerning the treatment accorded to their relatives, who for years now have been languishing in concentration camps. German and Fascist propaganda is exploiting the situation by spreading all kinds of reports which the Italian government cannot counteract by making known the real facts.

Among Italian internees there are also women, children, old people, invalids and even some missionaries. For several of these repatriation was pending at the time of the Armistice in pursuance of agreements reached under international law. As a result of the Armistice repatriation was suspended and they are still interned.

There are today sufficient facts on hand to warrant a thorough re-examination of the complex question of Italian civil internees in Allied countries. It would be desirable and advisable to have the internees assume their share in that total cooperation which the Italian people offer to the United Nations.

There are in the various concentration camps people who since the Armistice have been able to forward applications for voluntary enrollment to fight the common German enemy. There are

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officers and crews of Italian merchant ships interned in the United States and in other countries even before war was declared; these could be used to man Allied ships at a time when the United Nations are so short of such personnel. The excellence of Italian merchant marine personnel is recognized all over the world. There are officials of the State Railways and other semi-governmental agencies whose work would be particularly useful in this moment to increase Italian war effort. There are banking employees, professors and many technicians whose activity is also indispensable and would substantially aid the common cause.

The enthusiasm of all these people at the news of Italian declaration of war on Germany, gradually cooled down when nothing was done to employ them. The Italian government is anxious to cooperate to the fullest extent in finding a just solution to these problems and hopes that its pleas will not continue to fall on deaf ears.

## ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

10. Not only in its administrative functions is the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled and limited, but also Italian efforts to ameliorate the relations between the Italian government and the United Nations are not looked upon with favor by the A.C.C., even when the purpose was that of creating an atmosphere more helpful in the prosecution of the common cause.

On December 17, 1943 Marshal Badoglio wrote a letter to Gen. Joyce, then Deputy President of A.C.C., that the Council of Ministers had unanimously passed a resolution of adherence by Italy to the Atlantic Charter. Recognizing that the Atlantic Charter was not a treaty but a declaration of principles Marshal Badoglio desired to make known Italy's decision to the American and English governments and asked for instructions on the procedure his government would have to follow in order to declare its adherence to the principles so nobly expressed in the Charter. No answer has yet been received to that letter.

On the occasion of the first meeting in Italy of the

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"Advisory Council for Italy", set up as a result of the Moscow Conference, Marshal Badoglio in a letter of December 2, 1943 wrote to General Joyce: "It is therefore superfluous that I repeat again what an open and natural disillusion would be felt by Italian public opinion should it become aware that the committee expressly set up to examine Italian affairs would meet in the same city which is the seat of the Italian government and would begin its labours with our absolute exclusion from its membership. It is on this account, my dear General, that I say I would be more than grateful to you if you would use your good offices and your influence to permit the attendance under whatever title you would consider proper of an Italian member. Personally I believe that the capacity of 'observer' would be sufficient for the present time."

Having received no favorable reply Marshal Badoglio on February 26, 1943 wrote again to the Deputy President of A.C.C., now General MacFarlane, asking again that Italy be represented on the Advisory Council for Italy which, he said, "whatever its attributes, concerns itself exclusively with Italian affairs and as such would be strengthened by our participation, and if such participation would bring about some changes in the policies of the Council I hold that such changes would be only for the better in that they would enlarge its purposes and possibilities among them being our contribution towards the pacification of the Mediterranean peoples, and which would be to our common good."

Up until today no decision has been received on the question of permitting Italy to participate in some form on the "Advisory Council for Italy".

On February 2, 1944 the Italian government requested the American Representative of the Political Section of A.C.C. to transmit a letter addressed to Mr. Carter Goodrich, President of the International Labor Office and the U.S.A. representative of that organization, containing the official application by the Italian government to be readmitted in the I.L.O. of which Italy was one of the founders but which Fascism had caused it to abandon. No answer has been yet received.

If according to the declarations of the Moscow Conference it is desired to destroy the Fascist structure within the country, it is equally necessary to repair all the harm that the errors of Fascism have created in the international field. It is essential

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that Italy break the chains of isolation that had separated Italy from sister nations and take again her proper role in those international organizations which prepare the making of a better world in which shall triumph the "four freedoms".

The Italian people heartily share President Roosevelt's statement of January 1st, 1943 that: "In this as in no previous war men are conscious of the supreme necessity of planning what is to come after - and of carrying forward into peace the common effort which will have brought them victory in the war. They have come to see that the maintenance and safeguarding of peace is the most vital single necessity in the lives of each and all of us."

All these events and many more show how unsatisfactory have been the relations between the Italian government and the Allied government through the intermediary of the A.C.C. and how their common interests were not served.

Not only our requests for the re-establishment of direct relations, in whatever form, between the Italian government and the American and English governments were not granted, but when there was concluded between Italy and the U.S.S.R. an accord for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Marshal Badoglio received from Gen. MacFarlane the following Memorandum, dated March 25, 1944:

> "I have been instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander as President of the Allied Control Commission to inform you that the Italian Government is not entitled to enter into any arrangement with any foreign power, whether Allied or neutral, without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander, which should be sought through the Control Commission. Quite apart from any inherent rights established by the Armistice agreements with Italy, the Commander-in-Chief of occupying Forces enjoys a general right on grounds of military security to control relations between the Italian Government and all other countries."

This unprecedented statement, more than six months after the Armistice, instead of being that modification of the Armistice terms in proportion to the cooperation given by the Italian government so often repeated contained a wholly new demand, aggravating the Armistice terms, since for the first time there it mentioned "a general right on

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grounds of military security to control relations between the Italian Government and all other countries", not only neutral but even Allied.

To this blunt note Marshal Badoglio replies in a moderate tone, expressing the hope of overcoming all the difficulties and of bringing about at last a more trustful spirit of collaboration between Italy and the Allied Powers. Answering to Gen. MacFarlane on March 29, 1944 Marshal Badoglio wrote:

> "I do not believe at all, my dear General, that the conditions of the Armistice, hard as they may be, contain anything that precludes the making of an arrangement with neutral or Allied Powers. And neither do I believe that 'the general right of the Supreme Commander on grounds of military security' justifies any interference on your part unless such reasons of security are definite and indisputable facts.
>
> We are faced then, as always, by an ulterior and arbitrary aggravation of the conditions of the Armistice, or, in its most favorable aspect, with an interpretation always more restrictive and less liberal of its clauses. All this is not justified either by my own attitude nor by that of my government towards the Allied Powers, nor, in particular by the recent initiative of the Soviets which caused you to write your memorandum of March 25th. This is and remains an initiative of friendliness towards Italy which I could not, and if I could, should not have declined. Now I would like to tell you very sincerely that this system and these methods exactly are the equivalent to a slow and progressive process of asphyxiation. The Allied Administration does not in fact limit itself to the mere supervision of administrative and governmental activities, but interferes in the most minute particulars of the life of the country and makes decisions in the most categorical and mandatory manner. Thus it is that I and my Government are reduced simply to the level of mere instruments and executors of the Allied decisions, yet at the same time maintaining before the country all the responsibilities of acts and deeds in whose formulation we have had no part whatever.
>
> No government, no matter how formed, can maintain itself for long under these progressively humiliating and, above all, sterile limitations. And it perhaps would be a more sincere and above board position, I shall not say a better state of things, that the Allied Administration, if it really wants to govern the country, should decide to govern it directly and not through an intermediary.
>
> I do not believe - even though there are moments when I have my doubts - that this is what you really want. Thus, I would like to say to you, my dear General, with the greatest of loyalty and friendship, that, in order



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to avoid the arising of disturbing situations during this troublesome period, it would be human and wise that the Allies in the interest of the common cause initiate a policy that is really and finally reconstructive.

You know, for example, that the word 'co-belligerency' is today an empty word for it leans entirely on the armistice. You know that many of the clauses of the armistice of the 3rd and 29th of September should be considered void, whether because they have been fully executed or because they are materially impossible of execution, or substituted by other agreements etc.

Now I ask myself and I ask you if this would not be an opportune moment, as I firmly believe it is, for us and for all that these documents be substituted by a new one in which all the clauses which have become void were eliminated and which would define in a more precise manner our state of co-belligerency in the light of our most loyal collaboration for the past six months; in other words bring up to date the Italian international situation so that it conforms to the real facts of today.

I do not believe that I am asking for the impossible."

Among other things for many months now many of the countries of South America have expressed the desire that their relations with Italy would soon become normal, which would have helped in defining the position of Italian citizens there interned and subjected to all manner of restrictions since they are still considered enemy aliens. It has been impossible up to now to realize this goal on account of the restrictive attitude of the Allied Control Commission.

If it is desired to improve relations between Italy and the United Nations after more than eight months of co-belligerency it would seem necessary to permit her to re-establish such relations direct rather than through the channels of A.C.C., and by following the precept so realistically adopted by Russia, which act has won the sympathy of all of the Italian people, who are waiting anxiously for a similar gesture of good-will from the United States and the other United Nations.

## ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AS A MEANS OF INCREASING ITALIAN WAR EFFORT

One of the prerequisites of increasing the Italian war effort obviously consists in healing and re-organizing the economy of the country, which was upset by the war and by the events that have taken place since the Armistice. It is impossible to meet the necessities of war if the economic life of the nation is disorganized. Following are some of the consequences brought on by Allied occupation that have

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prevented Italy from making a larger contribution to the Allied war effort.

11. Currency and price level constitute for Italy the main and most acute problem in the financial and economic field. The two phenomena are linked together. The Italian government has repeatedly expressed to Allied authorities its opinion that the present exchange rate (1 U.S. Dollar = 100 Liras as against 1 U. S. Dollar = 19 Liras at the time the Armistice was signed) is one of the main factors of the dislocation of Italy's economic life and financial organization and more than anything else is responsible for having fostered inflation after the Armistice. A result that at the time had been correctly forecast by the British financial press (Financial Times and Financial News) which pointed out that the rate had been fixed on the basis of conditions prevailing on the black market. To apply the same evaluation of the black market (which in itself was very limited) to the whole economy of the country could only lead to the most disastrous consequences.

The Allied Forces are pouring enormous quantities of currency into circulation with an increasing flow and at the above rate of exchange, this inflow of currency expressed in Liras rises to figures of such magnitude as to have an overwhelming inflationary effect. Up to the end of March 1944 approximately 12 billion A.M.G. Liras have been put into circulation. Considering that both Italian and American experts now agree that the Italian currency in circulation in the liberated territory at the time of the Armistice amounted to about 13 to 14 billion Liras and that no new Italian currency has been issued since in liberated Italy because the currency printings works are all in the hands of the Germans, it is exclusively the inflow of A.M.G. Liras that has almost doubled the circulation in about 7 months.

The utmost care has been taken by the Italian government to withdraw from circulation as much currency as possible. By restoring the confidence of the public the following results have been obtained: the deposits with the "Banca d'Italia" show an increase

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of 4,210,429,000 Liras in only three months from January 1st to March 31st, 1944. During the same period the one-year Treasury Bonds sold exceeded by 1,616,000,000 Liras the total of reimbursements of the same class of Bonds. Deposits of Postal Savings, of Postal Current accounts and of Postal Savings Bonds show also an increase as compared to reimbursements. The most conservative economic policy has been enforced and through the "Banca d'Italia" private Banks are strictly controlled in order that they should not make available any finance whatsoever for operations of a speculative character or which might lead to hoarding. Every care and financial help is devoted exclusively to foster production.

All this goes to show that also in the financial field Italy "has truly shouldered the burden of her responsibility". But inflation, fostered by the present rate of exchange, is making the burden so increasingly heavier that Italian efforts are to a great extent nullified. At an early stage of the war the United States found out that inflation and unrestricted rises in price levels were a menace to the Nation's war effort. In his Budget message to Congress of January 6, 1943 President Roosevelt stated: "Economic stabilization for all groups - not for just the other fellow - is the only policy consistent with the requirements of total war..... Under war conditions a rise in profits, wages, and farm incomes unfortunately does not increase the supply of goodsfor civilians; it merely invites the bidding up of prices of scarce commodities". This is exactly what is taking place in Italy. Though the Italian Government has done all it could to prevent a rise in profits, wages and farm incomes, their efforts were of little or no avail in view of the present rate of exchange which gives to the purchasing power of the Allied Forces a monetary value which continually upsets the economy of the country.

Allied Forces are at present supplied with an excessive amount of Liras. In spending their money they pay it out on the basis of what one Dollar has meant to them all their life and not on the basis of what 100 Liras have meant to the Italians. In Naples, still under A.M.G. control, inflation is at its worst on account of the presence of so many Allied troops. If the rate of

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exchange were reduced in favour of the Lira this would not lessen the real purchasing power of Allied troops, but would simply lower the level of prices by taking away from Allied troops an almost unlimited capacity for "bidding up prices of scarce commodities". This has already happened in North Africa when the rate of exchange of the Franc was reduced. Soldiers became suddenly aware that they should not throw their money away and began to bargain. Hoarders became suddenly aware that the market could fluctuate both ways and were more ready to sell.

At present, however, the middle and lower classes of liberated Italy, except for the comparatively few individuals (mostly shopkeepers and restaurant owners) who dabble in black market and other dubious activities, "are getting it in the neck" - as was pointed out some time ago by an impartial witness to an American member of A.C.C. - "when they have been reduced to misery one shall have destroyed those intellectual and moral values that take much longer to rebuild than the industrial districts of the city and those other sections that have been singled out by the bombs. It is a very serious situation and some people with whom I talked, frankly admitted that it made them nearly regret the past with all its drawbacks: this is a dangerous state of mind that is apt to grow should not something be done to the contrary."

The situation is rendered even more difficult because the Allied authorities have blocked almost all the available merchandise. This makes impossible the exchange of consumers' goods which is so necessary in the re-establishment of the country's economy and for the best utilization of the existent resources, and this would make it less necessary to import goods across the seas. The blocking of merchandise prevents the stabilization of prices in relation to changed monetary conditions and facilitates in this way the expansion of the black market. Only by permitting a greater autonomy of action to the Italian government shall it be possible to ameliorate this dangerous state of affairs.

The situation is becoming such that on April 22, 1944 it was broadcasted by P.W.B. (the Allied agency managing all press, radio and other similar activities) that "the anti-fascist Committee of

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Sardinia advocates a separate monetary system for Sardinia." This is due to the fact that in Sardinia (notwithstanding the presence of about 200,000 Italian soldiers against a total population of about 1,000,000 inhabitants) prices are on the average one-third to one-half of what they are on the mainland. In Sardinia there are only about 10,000 Allied soldiers, all of the Air Force.

In view of the coming liberation of Rome and other parts of German-occupied Italy, where prices are still on the average one-half or less of what they are in liberated Italy, it is essential and urgent that the rate of exchange be fixed at 50 Liras = 1 U. S. Dollar.

On September 29, 1943 during the discussion of the additional Armistice conditions, Gen. B. Smith, Chief of Gen. Eisenhower's Staff, told Marshal Badoglio that after Italy would have declared war on Germany and would have thus become a co-belligerent, the rate of exchange between Lira, U. S. Dollar and British Pound would be revised. In his reply to the letter of September 23, 1943 in which the King of Italy had also asked for a revision of the exchange rate, President Roosevelt wrote: "Consideration is now being given in consultation with our Allies to the exchange rate for the Lira."

Though the present rate of exchange was severely criticized by financial experts both in the United States and Great Britain, no practical steps have been taken so far to implement Gen. Smith's assurances.

12. Nothing of what is said above is meant to underrate the importance of the other elements of the economic situation, especially the scarcity of food and essential commodities, lack and disruption of all transport, unrestricted requisitioning of industrial plants, homes, material and means of transportation.

The food problem is of primary importance also in regard to inflation. When the Italian population will be in a position actually to rely on a ration of essential foodstuffs sufficient to constitute a reasonable basis for livelihood and only when this ration can be obtained without recourse to the black market will the pressure relax that now is being exerted, especially by the population

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of the cities and towns, in a vain effort to secure essential foodstuffs such as bread, olive oil, fats, etc. thus inflating prices all around.

The provisions adopted by the Allied authorities to find solution of the food problem do not always produce the results desired. For example, it happened that contrary to all assurances the potatoes that were shipped for seeding were infected with a cancerous disease. In Sicily the planting of these potatoes resulted in a loss of 95 to 98% of the crop on account of the prevalence of this disease. Then to this direct loss of crop must be added the future losses brought about by the fact that for several years the infected ground cannot be used for potato planting. The seed potatoes to be shipped to Italy should be subjected to a rigorous pathological examination before shipping in accordance to the practice followed in the past in pursuance to international agreements which required the issuance of a certificate of immunity from infection by competent authorities.

The re-opening of commercial fishing which would powerfully contribute to ease the food problem, has been obstructed by the fact that the Allied authorities require the issuance of two certificates, one by the Naval Office for permission to enter the port and docking of the boat, the other by the local Allied authorities giving permission to do the fishing. To facilitate the business of fishing the second certificate should be abolished since the fishing licenses have always been issued by the Italian government through the Royal Port Authorities. Permission should also be granted to do night fishing with underwater illumination, within military limits of security, along the coasts of southern Italy, of Sicily and Sardinia. This type of fishing brings the biggest catches and would employ a large number of sailors. For this purpose it would be necessary for the Allied authorities to release a number of motor fishing boats which have been requisitioned by them. These, however, are only comparatively minor details. The situation as a whole is accurately described in the following letter by Mr. V. J. Wrigley which appeared in the May 13, 1944 issue of <u>The New Statesman and Nation</u>:

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"Sir, - Your readers might be interested in some account of the life of the people in this area of Italy at the present moment. The information was gathered in conversation with different people in one of the first areas to be liberated and where no fighting had taken place. The position differs slightly from area to area the only differences being that the country folk have more to eat, but the basic troubles are the same. The cutting off of South Italy from the source of supply of nearly all manufactured goods, coming on top of the blockade of the war years and in default of commodity rationing, means soaring prices quite out of reach of all but the very rich. Add to this the breakdown of communications, the needs of the war and a tendency to hoard against a still worse day, and one can see that there may be and often is a shortage of a food which is reasonably plentiful only a short distance from where it is produced. This is a fruitful cause of the black market. On top of this the Allied Armies have flowed into Italy armed with lire bought at 400 to the £, or 100 to the dollar - a very convenient figure, but one which bears no relation to the value of the lira at the time of our arrival.

A workman round here was earning 50 lire a day till recently; this has now been raised to 65 lire a day, but it is insufficient for the needs of the large Italian families. As to the soldiers, the newspapers have just announced an increase 'almost five-fold' in the basic pay of Italian privates to 5 lire a day!

At the present time there is no official ration of macaroni here, and there has not been for some months. There is a ration of bread or flour, which seems adequate, but because of the absence of other filling foods, is not. Meat for instance, is practically only available on the black market, and then not very much of it. Rationed flour costs less than 4 lire a kilo, but has usually to be supplemented with black market flour at 90-100 lire a Kilo. Even food which is fairly abundant is very dear; cauliflowers cost 25 lire, figs 50 lire a kilo, etc. Eggs in this part used to cost 50 centesimi before the war; at the time of the armistice 2 lire, and now 15-20 lire. The same story could be told of other things. Some prices may not have gone up officially, but an Italian here can hardly get a haircut for 2-3 lire as of old, for the barber prefers to serve the Allies who pay 10-20 lire, working out what they should pay on the basis of the present exchange rate.

When it comes to clothes the situation is even worse and much harder to remedy. A pair of cork-soled



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lady's shoes with no leather on them may cost 1000 lire. What clothing is left is quite beyond the reach of those who need it most. Even the means of mending clothes are hard to come by. The stories of women selling themselves for food are not exaggerated. Means have to be found of augmenting the family income if the family is to survive, and hence the terrific competition for our laundry and the queues of children for our scraps of food. All say that the black market is a necessity until the rations are increased.

Strong measures are necessary to improve the situation. Among the most urgent are: 1. Control of prices of necessities with an extension of the rationing system where necessary. 2. Improvement of transport for civilian purposes, and with this of the distribution of food. 3. Curtailment of Allied spending, whether official or unofficial, on necessities for the civil population, and a reduction in the exchange rate of the lira. 4. An increase of wages. 5. A new attack on food hoarding, which goes hand-in-hand with the black market.

Only when these measures have been taken can the black market be checked. Of course no one pretends that this is easy nor the Italian Government can do this without our help, but it is very necessary to do something and to do it soon. Not only is the situation serious for the Italians, but it is serious for our cause, if liberation is to mean the black market, inflation, and worse still, hunger."

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13. Requisitioning by Allied Military Authorities of living quarters, public buildings and industrial plants are very often carried out hastily, with disregard of individual situations and, what is more important, of the practical consequences for the common war effort. There are many instances in which furniture in private homes was completely broken up, simply in order to avoid the trouble of removing it; private belongings - particularly linen and tableware and even personal clothing - have been taken away without even giving a receipt to the rightful owner.

The Allied authorities often have refused to issue receipts for the property that was being requisitioned and on many occasions would become angry if the property owner would ask for one. These receipts are essential to the property owner when he eventually presents his claim for indemnity and payment for damages by the Italian government.

The Italian government has to face increasing requests by its ministries for office space and housing at Salerno, the seat of the Government. These offices are so necessary for the proper functioning of its public offices, without which it is impossible to organize the war program of the country. The Allied Control Commission has many times been asked to cease locating in Salerno of any more Allied offices or troops and to transfer elsewhere certain offices or headquarters in order to allow the Italian government the use of more sorely-needed office and housing space so that it might better organize the administration of its country's affairs. Not only have these requests gone unheeded but the Allied authorities have refused to turn over to the Soviet Diplomatic Representative the only villa available in Salerno suitable for that purpose. Even Marshal Badoglio, on May 8, 1944, personally wrote to Gen. MacFarlane in this regard and despite the good-will of the latter nothing was done about it.

The Italian government has many times asked that the office building of the Prefects be returned to it so that the Prefects and other major local officers could properly handle their public affairs in the capitals of the Provinces, but these requests have also been disregarded.

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The requisitioning of hotels assumes even larger proportions. These requisitions should be limited to cases of strictest necessity in order to give housing to the dislocated civilian population as much of which has nowhere to go.

A great number of the buildings, a large part of the teaching materials and apparatus of the Institutes of Technical and Professional Instruction, which are so greatly tied up with the industrial progress of the nation, have been destroyed or lost by the ravages of war and by act of requisition. In order to aid the re-building of the economic life of the nation it is necessary that the buildings of these Institutes be freed of requisition and that the materials used in the scientific studies be replenished.

In spite of instructions by the Allied High Command, damage, often unrepairable, has been done and still is being done by occupying troops and officers to Palaces and Monuments of high artistic value and to the precious objects herein contained, such as the Royal Palaces at Naples and at Caserta, the Academy of Fine Arts at Naples, just to name a few striking cases. The Italian people are rightly jealous of their artistic inheritance and damage done by Allied troops is very much resented especially when the people feel that with a little more good-will and attention many incidents could be avoided. It is absolutely necessary that these deplorable occurrences should not happen in Rome, Florence, Siena, Assisi, etc. lest not only Italy but the whole world become the poorer for it. Proposals were made by the Italian government to set up a mixed Committee to prevent these incidents, but nothing has been done so far and it is to be feared that troops will continue to behave as they have done so far.

14. To re-establish the economic life of the country it is indispensable that the systems of communication and transport be revived at least partially. The Allied Military Authorities merely for the housing of troops have taken over railway stations, postal and telegraphic buildings and other edifices in which are situated machines and equipment of great value. This has caused in various localities (Taranto, Naples, Palermo, Foggia, to cite some important

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ones) great disservice, and much irreparable damages and losses to the plant equipment. It is especially urgent to evacuate these public buildings and to place them instead at the disposal of the public, as military needs might be taken care in some less expensive manner by the use of a little cooperation. Then too, requisitioned Postal, telegraph and telephone plants are not being utilized to their greatest capacity to the injury of the common interests. For example the Cables Palermo-Napoli and Palermo-Cagliari are now being used by military Allied authorities on one Morse circuit only. If given permission to do so, the Italian Administration would long ago have utilized them like it always has done with its own personnel and its own equipment on the basis of four channels (with the quadruple Beudot) thus giving to the Allied double the number of circuits they now have and at the same time reserving for itself the use of the remaining two.

The Allied Military Authorities do not permit the Italian personnel specialized in Telegraph and Telephone work to come near the zone of operations or the plant equipment. It thus happens that this personnel remains idle and for that reason many lines and central telephone stations, like the one at Campobasso and Foggia, remain out of service for many months. With the use of proper controls and precautions it would be possible to employ this specialized personnel even in the zones of operations. This would make for a more advantageous use of the communication system even for war purposes.

The public complains about the postal and telegraphic service it gets and this too renders it more difficult to re-establish normalization of the economic life of the country. The greatest fault here seems to lie in the slowness of the Allied censorship office, which in certain Provinces seem to want to censure even the official correspondence of the Italian government and one can imagine the serious consequences of such delays.

The transportation situation is very serious in all of Italy and the Island. The means used, both railroad and highway, are very insufficient to meet the needs of the people. Such insufficiency impedes any attempt at re-establishing the economic system.

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There exists such a system of control and authorization exercised by an Allied Committee at Naples that in practice has proved to be so long and complicated that the result has been the paralysis of any kind of civilian railway traffic. The Italian government has asked but in vain that the administration of the railroads in liberated Italy be restored to its jurisdiction - all the railroads south of a line running between Foggia, Benevento, Caserta, Naples, entrusting to the Italian Administration the duty and the responsibility of satisfying the needs of the Allied Military Authorities and of assuring the continuity and regularity of a minimum service for passengers and merchandise trains for civilian use. For example the lack of salt on the market causes popular discontent. At Margherita di Savoia near Barletta there is available a deposit of 150,000 tons of salt which would be enough to supply the needs of the people of Southern Italy. To make available distribution of a sufficient quantity of this very important necessity a certain number of railroad cars should be placed at the disposal of the Italian Civil Authorities.

Equally urgent, to supplement railway transportation, is the release by Allied authorities of all transport means, taken by them, such as trucks, busses, motorcars, etc., the requisitioning of which should not be arbitrary as it too often has happened, but be subject to a stricter and planned discipline. The highly important transportation of food-stuffs has been seriously impeded in all the provinces by the scarcity of trucks. To avoid sending of too many motor trucks from the outside the Italian government has requested on many occasions the bringing in of tires and repair parts in order to put into service the many trucks that are idle for lack of repairs and parts. There should be released from requisition some garages so that Italian Authorities after having made a collection of all the motor trucks out of service could repair and put in service at least a large portion of them by using parts from others.

The Italian government has also repeatedly asked, but without success so far, for the re-establishment of regular sea communications between the Italian mainland and at least our two major islands, Sicily and Sardinia. These two islands, with a total population of over 5 million people, are at present completely cut off



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from the political and economic life of the country, impairing Italian war and reconstruction efforts. Italian economy is an integrated whole and the various regions are to a great extent complementary to each other. The Italian government, which is contributing so many ships to the common war effort, including those recently released by Spain and Portugal through the action by our representatives in those countries, has asked for four Italian ships of small or medium tonnage (so that loading and unloading operations could be carried out in small harbours in order not to interfere with military operations), but this request brought no results.

The transport situation would also be eased if coastal traffic were permitted to be resumed. Release of 18 Italian ships, all under 1500 tons, asked on December 3rd, 1943, was denied on January 29, 1944 by the Chief of Staff of Allied Force Headquarters after consultation with Allied Shipping Authorities. The Italian government vainly has asked that all the motor boats less than 100 tons be released for coastal traffic in order to transport the products most needed by the consuming public, such as, oil, wine, fire wood, charcoal, lemons and oranges, cheeses, etc. To relieve the situation it is also necessary to complete the construction of 64 motorboats and small motorships amounting in all to a gross tonnage of 10,000 tons, which are now being built in the docks. For this purpose a request was made for the assignment of 1200 tons of plates, 9000 cubic meters of oak wood, 6000 cubic meters of pine lumber, in addition to nails, tow, rope, chains and motors. These requests were very modest and could have been easily granted. The revival of coastal traffic would have enabled the hauling from Syracuse to Bari, Salerno and Naples of asphalt so sorely needed for resurfacing and repairing of the highways.

For the revival of coastal traffic it would be a better practice if the Allied authorities would not take any action involving the Navigation and Shipbuilding companies, which used to be subsidized by the government, without first coming to an agreement with the Ministry of the Navy, particularly companies controlled by the FINMARE.

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15. Allied Military Authorities generally requisition for exclusive use of troops entire industrial plants (cement factories, saw mills, mechanical workshop, etc.) of which they take full and exclusive possession also when the actual needs of the troops take up only a small percentage of the plant but destroy the entire usefulness. They also follow the constant practice of removing from undamaged or only partially damaged plants machinery or parts of machinery without the slightest consideration as to the consequences of such removal on the existing or easily obtainable efficiency of such plants.

Management by occupying officials, who in most cases hardly know the language, and who are unacquainted with that particular field and are not concerned about the upkeep or improvement of the plants, is bound not only to prevent economic recovery but to wreck eventually what industrial equipment was left by the Germans.

The occupancy by Allied Military Authorities of the industrial plants prevents their being put back to work. It is necessary that the requisitioning be first released, at least as to those whose owners can show that they can put them back in working order. In passing it might be pointed out that Allied P.W.B. authorities have partially requisitioned even the printing works of the world-famous editor, Laterza, thus stopping the reprinting of Benedetto Croce's works which should be put urgently in circulation in order to contribute to the formation of a democratic and liberal public opinion. It is especially important that those factories and firms be released that work for the railroads that are so in need of repairing their lines and stationary plants, to repair their rolling stock and put back into working order their yards which have been largely destroyed or are in process of deteriorating. It is also urgent to release the Naval Yards. Very often Allied troops do not even permit the officers of the company to have access to their offices when they come to get books and records they need for legal or fiscal matters of the firm.

Many metallurgical establishments and factories could begin working if they could count on the furnishing of coal, iron

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metal and wood. The reopening of these factories is very important, particularly to the railroads and naval yards.

By allocating monthly about 17,000 tons of coal there could be produced, for example, monthly 62,000 tons of cement, 23,000 tons of lime, and 120,000 square meters of window glass. There should certainly be no destruction of plants and equipment only in cases of absolute necessity and then only after consultation with the Italian authorities, and not as has been done without even informing them about it.

It is known also that the Allied troops cut trees in the forests and requisition charcoal without consulting the Italian Forest Authorities, and in that way many times doing irreparable injury to the forest resources of the country and to the production of charcoal. Allied soldiers very often make abusive use of firearms, placing in peril the life of the people and trespassing on private property. For example, in the territory of Vico del Gargano (Foggia) Allied soldiers go hunting deer, a hunt that is forbidden by Italian law, and shooting willy-nilly in the forests called "Umbra", putting in danger the people who are working there in the production of charcoal on behalf of the Allied authorities themselves. They do not even abstain from shooting at domestic animals nor in the vicinity of inhabited homes.

If we want to revive the economic life of the country and to contribute to the war effort it is necessary to cease the requisitioning of machinery and its removal from the plants, and the requisitioning of prime materials in the plants or of the products that had been partly finished. Many times these products are put to an uneconomic use by the Allied Military Authorities, are allowed to deteriorate or become destroyed - while the industries of liberated Italy have so much need of them. The Allied authorities have even requisitioned all the paper that was stored in the paper factory at Foggia (about 18,000 quintals). This paper had already been assigned to the Italian public administrations who are so greatly in need of it. For example, the Finance Administration has no paper on which to print the forms for the collection of the taxes and the Railroad Administration has not enough paper with

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which to print the railroad tickets.

The paralyzing effects of such practices and of the constant interference by occupying officials wholly stifle attempts by the Italian government to enforce any measure aimed at economic recovery. How can Italian war effort be increased as long as the whole economic life of the country is submitted to the most paralyzing and confusing interferences?

ITALIAN WAR PRODUCTION

16. It is apparent that the industrial war production of liberated Italy is limited by all the difficulties and deficiencies that have been discussed above. On account of the widespread destruction wrought by Allied bombardments and then by the Germans in their retreat and later by the paralyzing policies of the A.C.C., the Italian government has been able to do very little to revive and increase industrial war production in Southern Italy.

To bring about a revival of such industrial production it is first necessary to put at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of War, who has made repeated requests on this score but all in vain, the raw materials and the resources of parts and machinery exclusively of Italian ownership that are to be found scattered and unused in all of the various plants and factory buildings that are now used for the housing of Allied troops.

Even the industries that work for the Navy could be made to increase their production in a short time if the Allied authorities would give the permissions so often requested. The Italian Navy has a particular interest in the reopening of these industrial plants and of those that are under its direct management. As conditions are now it is impossible to provide for the normal repair and maintenance of the fleet. As a result there is a constant increase in the number of ships that have to remain idle on account of the length of wait for repairs.

For these purposes it is necessary that the naval arsenal at Taranto, the shipyards of Tosi in the same city and the factories of Brindisi were permitted to work at least at half their capacity for the repairing of Italian war ships. To meet



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the lack of materials and machinery the industrial establishments and factories should be re-opened, the piles of material now blocked should be unfrozen and scarce materials and precious machinery that have been ceded to the Allied, and by them to private citizens or that have even been stolen by other private individuals, should be immediately recovered.

It must be pointed out in this connection that the Italian Navy could give a greater contribution to the common war efforts if only it had means of preventing deterioration of machinery and plants, or better still if it were given the opportunity of putting in order docks and other port facilities, navy yards, repair workshops, deposits, warehouses, barracks, hospitals, etc. Allied authorities are constantly asking for greater facilities in this field.

It would also be necessary to salvage all units which have been sunk, to finish construction of the great drydock at Taranto, to put in working condition cement factories, to collect metal scrap, to furnish fuel and electricity enough to permit production of metal goods, importing all necessary machine tools, to make available means of transportation in order to carry timber from Calabria, to increase production of bituminous materials and to facilitate in all possible ways transfer of goods from one region to another.

At present there are several thousand sailors who cannot be employed because of lack of clothes and especially of shoes and the situation is becoming increasingly difficult. For this reason it has been necessary to stop temporarily normal enlistments and, as a result, even normal substitutions in personnel.

Such a situation is of course limiting the contribution of the Italian Navy to the common fight. In order to satisfy the most urgent needs it is indispensable:

- to release and to put in working conditions the textile mills of the "Manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali" at Naples. These mills not only would take care of all the requirements of the Navy but would provide work for about 3000 men who

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are now unemployed:

- to establish at Taranto a shoe factory for the Navy, importing the little machinery needed to this purpose.

By means of such measures and by the consignment of some Allied machinery and raw materials, liberated Italy could rapidly increase to a considerable extent its war production. In this way highly skilled man-power at present available in large numbers in Southern Italy could be properly used.

Greater possibilities for the development of war production exist in Central and Northern Italy. It is almost impossible to make at present any accurate estimate, as much will depend on destruction and robberies already done or to be carried out by the Germans. It will also obviously depend on the development of war operations.

However it is sure that, as far as skilled labor and the will of the whole nation to co-operate in the fight against Germany are concerned, Italy can become a great and industrious arsenal of war production.

If, after more than eight months of fighting against the common enemy, Italy were also admitted to benefit from the Lend-Lease program, the problem of Italian war production would rapidly reach a favorable solution.

## ADMINISTRATION

17. The minute control exercised by A.C.C. causes many inconveniences even in the administrative field. The situation is rendered much more difficult by the fact that while the greater part of the liberated territory is governed directly by the Italian government subject to interferences practiced by A.C.C., there are several very important regions like Naples which are governed directly by A.M.G. The A.M.G. Authorities on account of their unfamiliarity with Italian administrative organization on many occasions adopt methods and measures exactly contrary to those in vogue in the other provinces.

This disparity of administration and this disregard for the traditional Italian administrative practices gives rise to

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much confusion in a situation that even now is sufficiently confusing and creates a great deal of embarrassment to the Italian public. It might be more advantageous to substitute the A.M.G. in the zone immediately back of the combat area with a governmental agency composed of mixed Allied and Italian personnel so that Allied administrative ideas could be integrated into the Italian system without causing too much disorganization.

Many have been the inconveniences caused by the present system. Let us examine a few of the most important ones: The Allied authorities have suppressed in the territories under their control many agencies and institutions of fundamental importance to the Italian administrative system, such as the Provincial Economic Councils which are nothing but the old provincial Chambers of Commerce, and in their place have set up new offices, in Sicily for example, that find no counterpart in the administrative system in vogue in the other provinces of the nation.

It would have been a far better practice to have consulted with the Italian government before adopting an administrative policy that would collide with the settled administrative practice to the end that uniformity rather than confusion prevail.

In some Provinces like in Sicily, in Cosenza, Matera and Reggio Calabria the Allied authorities have removed from office many Prefects (Heads of Provinces) and put in their places local persons and functionaries of low grade and with very little administrative experience or capacity. It would be a better practice considering the importance of the office and the delicacy of the functions that the Allied authorities would first consult with the Ministry of the Interior before deciding on an appointment, discharge or transfers of any Prefect within the territory under their control. On the other hand the Italian government cannot remove any Prefect or other functionary in the "Unoccupied territory" without the consent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, a consent difficult to obtain and often long delayed.

The Allied authorities in territories by them controlled have made appointments to public offices and given promotions in the administration careers as well as discharges without regard

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to the civil service requirements. Now it happens that the Italian government finds it so difficult now to regularize these appointments and changes which have caused confusion in the classifications of services on the payrolls to the injury of the interests of many categories of employees. In this regard it has been intimated but with little success:

- that the Allied authorities make a request for the personnel they need in the territories by them controlled to the particular Ministry involved and who very often have a surplus of personnel.

- that in case of immediate necessity non-civil service personnel be employed on a temporary basis beginning with the lowest grade.

- that the Allied authorities refrain from giving promotions to State or administrative employees and only in very particular cases promote an employee only to the grade immediately superior to the one held.

- that the A.C.C. consult at least with the Ministry involved before making any changes in matters of personnel.

The personnel working for A.M.G. in territories directly under its jurisdiction very often receives wages higher than those employed by the Italian government. It thus happens that a great clamor is raised by these less favored employees who insist that their wages be raised to the higher level. It would be a better policy to have consultations on the pay state employees should receive even though they are working in territory administered by A.M.G.

The Allied Forces have absolute power to arrest Italian citizens without according them even the most rudimentary guaranties of personal rights. Many complaints have been received from Italian citizens who have been arrested and kept in jail for long periods sometimes running into months without any charge being brought against them. It would seem that the Allied authorities could at least in these matters of personal liberties adopt the procedure set up by the Italian government under the Law-Decree of January 31, 1944, the provisions of which are based on democratic

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principles that safeguard the citizens' personal liberties against arbitrary acts of the authorities.

It has also happened that Italian officers and soldiers have been arrested by the Allied Military Authorities and jailed in many cases for various months in concentration camps without any reason being given and without even informing the Italian Military Command. For example, General Bellomo was arrested at Bari on January 28, 1944 and has been detained until now without having had a trial. The same month Colonal Acampora was arrested in territory that has always been under Italian jurisdiction. Although it has been shown that Col. Acampora was not guilty and though the charges against him were later withdrawn, he is still detained in spite of the intervention on his behalf by the highest A.C.C. officials. As late as May 25, 1944 the A.C.C. used their exceptional powers in territory under the Italian government to set up in Lecce a special General Court, composed of three Allied judges and empowered to try and pass even sentences of death in the case of 35 Italians accused of "attempting to overthrow with violence the economic and social order of the Italian State and with associating and giving aid to the enemy." Though there is enough law in the Italian statute books to mete out in such cases the severest penalties, A.C.C. did not let the Italian Courts try these cases, in which only Italian citizens were involved who lived in territory restored to the Italian government. The Italian people, who remember only too well the Fascist Special Courts, are disturbed by such departures from ordinary procedure. The A.C.C. could later intervene if judgments were not satisfactory.

Another important field in which A.C.C. interference is preventing the betterment of conditions is in that of education. Because of the lack of teachers, books and even schoolhouses (many of which are requisitioned by Allied Military Authorities) it makes for further confusion when A.M.G. and A.C.C. authorities adopt decisions different from those of the Italian government concerning school hours, length of terms, textbooks, programs and examinations, and also aid in the form of hot lunches and clothing to the less fortunate students. This disparity of treatment causes dissatisfaction

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among teachers and scholars and is injurious to discipline.

It would be easy to add to the list of the many acts of interference indulged in by A.C.C. and A.M.G. that created confusion and did not make for good administration of public affairs but we believe that the matters related herein are sufficient to show changes should be made for the betterment of the administration of public affairs.

PRESS, RADIO, ETC.

18. It has already been indicated how difficult it was made for the Italian government to marshal its forces for the purpose of reordering its contribution to the war effort since September 8, 1943, particularly in its attempts to combat by means of the radio and press the propaganda emanated by the Fascists and Germans in occupied Italy and in neutral countries.

At the Malta Conference on September 29, 1943 Marshal Badoglio set forth the difficulties his government was facing in its efforts to clarify its position before the Italian people and how very necessary this had become. In particular Marshal Badoglio asked that the radio station at Bari be put at the disposal of the Italian Government. Gen. Eisenhower answered in these words:

> "In this matter my Staff will give you whatever aid may be needed."

Notwithstanding these assurances and the undoubted good will and understanding of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, things even in this field have been handled altogether differently. From the very first moment the Allied authorities of P.W.B. assumed complete and direct control of Radio Bari. All the programs of this station which theoretically should have been the mouthpiece of the Italian government were prepared by a group of writers who worked under the immediate direction of Major Greenlees of the British Army, head of the Radio Section of P.W.B. All of the official communications of the Italian government and the statements of its members were subjected to the scrutiny of the aforesaid Major who as was his wish either denied or delayed their broadcasting. A large part of the time of Radio Bari was used up by no less than

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seven re-broadcasts daily of Italian programs from Radio London or New York, even though for technical reasons these re-broadcasts were so disturbed as to have been inaudible.

The newscasts and above all the dialogues over Radio Bari were so poor in language and contents and showed such a lack of knowledge of Italian psychology as well as to what was the real situation in occupied Italy that we learned from various sources that the influence of Radio Bari in occupied Italy was of no consequence if not actually harmful.

While the control practiced by P.W.B. in the administration of the use of the radio did not improve the standard of its programs, its interference on the technical side brought about disastrous consequences. Instead of increasing the transmitting power of Radio Bari the persons in charge engaged in making innovations and experiments with the result that the operating efficiency of the station was lowered. Had they made liberal use of Italian technicians familiar with the technical peculiarities of the mechanism the situation would have improved a great deal. Consequently the voice of Radio Bari could be heard clearly only in a radius of 20 or 30 kilometers. This is what was happening to Radio Bari in territory administered by the Italian government, which radio was supposed to be the mouthpiece of the government. As regards Radio Palermo and Radio Naples no collaboration on the part of the Italian authorities was permitted and these stations do not even broadcast the official communiques of the Italian government.

One must not wonder, therefore, why it was impossible under these conditions for the Italian government to promulgate a program of propaganda so greatly needed by the population still in territory occupied by the Germans in order that they may have been able to make a greater contribution to the common cause.

No different was the situation in regard to the press. Even though in his circular of Oct. 29, 1943 Marshal Badoglio had re-established complete freedom of the press, P.W.B. at first and A.C.C. following through the personnel of P.W.B. exercised such a rigorous control over the press even in territory restored to the Italian government that it might just as well have managed it direct.

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Ignoring entirely the competent Italian press organs the Allied authorities have direct orders to the editors of the newspapers and going so far as entering the printing shop and changing small details in the laying-out of the pages. Even official communications of the Italian government and the statements of its officials were arbitrarily delayed and modified by P.W.B.

Among the secret instructions that were being applied at Bari by the head of the press section of P.W.B., Lt. Col. Munro, of the British Army, were the following:

a) "To ensure a post-war, not a present-day, assumption of Italian representative opinion.
b) To disallow any political party to state the conditions under which the Italian people should continue the war against Germany."

All these things are not consistent with the Moscow Declaration on Italy, with the practices of a free democratic country and also did not better the interests of the common fight against Germany. In addition to this Allied Military censorship is applied in such a way as to curtail freedom of political opinion.

Lt. Col. Munro, acting upon instructions, also forbade any attempt to re-establish the functioning of the semi-official press agency "Stefani". This caused incalculable harm in view of the fact that the Fascists aided by the Germans made use of the name "Stefani" in Italy and in neutral countries. The Italian government not being permitted to counteract it was forced to leave a free field to the Fascists who inflicted considerable harm by their unchecked propaganda in Italy but more so in those countries where large numbers of Italian immigrants are located.

The head of the cinema section of P.W.B. is a high ranking executive of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. From the first moment he began the requisitioning of the films not only of German but also of Italian production under the most disputable pretexts (for instance, that one or more of the cast were enemy or even neutral nationals, even though their role in the film was secondary). Motion picture equipment and material were requisitioned on a large scale. Movie houses everywhere and without regard to the necessities of the population are requisitioned. For instance

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in Salerno, the seat of the Italian government, where Allied Military Forces are not too numerous, out of 4 movie houses 3 have been requisitioned for the troops; the last one of the three being requisitioned only a few days ago.

Also most of the theatres are requisitioned by Allied Military Authorities and very often Italian political parties are denied the use of these theatres for holding their public meetings. It would be only fair to permit owners of theatres and cinemas to resume operations on their own, giving a limited number of free special daily shows reserved to Allied troops. With a little more good will and consideration for civilian needs these situations could be minimized. The cinema is an instrument that could be used so powerfully in the building up of the morale of our people and in making them feel that they can play a vital role in bringing about the defeat of the common enemy.

AN ALLIED SURVEY OF A.C.C. ACTIVITIES

18 bis. The spirit in which the A.C.C. is carrying out the job of governing Italy is evidenced by the following article contributed to the Italian magazine "Politica Estera" by the Director of Press Relations of A.C.C. and approved by the A.C.C. Authorities. In view of its authorship, this article can be considered as an official presentation of the A.C.C. case and as a survey of A.C.C. achievements:

> "The Allied Control Commission, which includes and controls Allied Military Government, was established on November 11, 1943. The task which it was designed to fulfill may be divided into three separate, but interdependent, categories, viz.:
>
> (1) To ensure that law and order prevail, and communications are kept clear and efficient, in the areas behind the advancing armies. This duty overrides all others.
>
> (2) To see that the terms of the Armistice, signed by Italy on September 29, are fully and faithfully observed.
>
> (3) To assist as far as possible in bringing about such stable conditions as may permit the return, without undue delay, of conquered and occupied territory in Italy to a democratic and popular Italian government.
>
> General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy, has referred to the Allied Control Commission as his 'Third Army'.
>
> In other words, as the Fifth and Eighth Armies move forward, the Allied Control Commission takes their place and organizes and controls their hinterland. This point must be strongly emphasized because it is not always realized that the A.C.C. is a part of the Allied Armies and that it is first and foremost a military organization.

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It must be remembered, therefore, that the Allied Control Commission's task of bringing peace, liberty, and as far as possible prosperity, to occupied territories must always be subservient to the task of ensuring that in Italy nothing obstructs, and everything sustains, the war effort. Thus, the shipment of food supplies must be subservient to the shipment of munitions; the freedom of labour to negotiate or strike must be subservient to the war needs of industry; the liberty of the press must be subservient to military security.

The President of the Allied Control Commission is, ex-officio and as long as the war lasts, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies. He it is who, as long as the war lasts in Italy, must have the decisive word on all policy. The Executive Head, or Chief Commissioner, of the A.C.C. is Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane who stands in the same relation to General Alexander as do the Commanders of the Fifth Army and the Eighth Army. Naturally, his responsibilities become ever greater as the armies move forward and more territory comes within the scope of the Allied Control Commission.

The Allied Control Commission falls naturally into three main sections, although these sections are by no means watertight compartments, the personnel being interchangeable and the whole controlled by General Mason MacFarlane. First is the 'spearhead' group of Allied Military Government, which follows closely on the heels of - sometimes with - the fighting troops, and whose main tasks are the speedy restoration of supplies, the establishment of local government, the immediate needs of refugees and the sick or wounded, and the temporary rehabilitation of shattered towns. Second, and merging into the first, is the direct rule of Allied Military Government, assisted by Italian local government, under more settled conditions, the executive power still being held by the Allies while every effort is made to pave the way for a transfer to Italian hands. Third and last, the 'advisory' stage at which territory has been handed over to the Italian Government, Allied Officers nevertheless remaining - though in very small numbers - to assist the Italian Government and to ensure adherence to the terms of the Armistice.

This grouping is of course dependent on the course of events. Whether more, or less, territory is handed over to the Italian Government, and whether direct Allied Military Government lasts for a long or a short time in any given area, must depend upon conditions in Italy itself, and upon the measure of support given by the Italian population in the prosecution of the war effort and the maintenance of law and order.

By the nature of its duties the Allied Control Commission must, obviously, cover the whole field of Government, whether in a direct or advisory capacity. For this purpose the Headquarters staff is grouped into 26 sub-commissions, covering such questions as Public Health, Public Safety, Law, Food, Transport, Labour, Finance, Education etc. For the purpose of control, Italy is divided into Regions; thus Sicily is Region I, Sardinia Region VI, Calabria Region VII, and so on. Each Region is supervised by a Commissioner responsible to General MacFarlane, and each Region carries a staff of expert advisers drawn from the Sub-Commissions at Headquarters.



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Apart from these 'experts' there are in each Region the Civil Affairs Officers, who may themselves be experts, since all staff is interchangeable as conditions dictate, but whose chief duty is the general supervision of local Government in towns or districts from the moment when they are cleared of the Germans until the day when they are handed back to Italian authorities.

Such is the framework of the Allied Control Commission and Allied Military Government. It represents and implements the control exercised by the United Nations over Italy, the degree and extent of such control depending on the necessities of the war.

What has the A.C.C. accomplished in Italy? It must be remembered that its organization and activity have been, and to some extent must be, empirical. The attempt to restore democracy and freedom to a conquered people while the war still continues in their country is a new experiment in history. At first it was considered that direct Allied Military Government would suffice for the duration of the war, and that policy governed the action taken in Sicily, Calabria and Campania up to October 13, 1943. On that date the Badoglio Government declared war on Germany and Italy was named a 'co-belligerent'. In the words of Churchill, Italy was to be given the opportunity, in spite of the fact that she had declared and waged war against the United Nations (and at a time when it was conceivable that she could have swung the balance towards their defeat) to 'work her passage home'.

The Allied Control Commission was established to make that opportunity possible. Part of its job, therefore, is to allow the freest play consistent with the war effort to public opinion in Italy - through the Press, through free assembly, through the formation of labour unions, and through the untrammelled evolution of an Italian Government based on the most representative elements of the population. The extent to which these first principles of democracy could and can be permitted was and is governed by the necessities of war. While the war rages in Italy, elections and strikes are out of the question. And it is clearly impossible to achieve any final solution of institutional problems until the voice of all Italy is free.

Nevertheless, even with such inevitable limitations, much has been achieved. Throughout Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, local government, the basis of all democracy, is getting into its stride. Labour unions, both industrial and agricultural, have been set up with power to hold meetings and conduct negotiations. Schools and Universities, cleared of fascist teachers and teachings, are beginning to function smoothly. The Italian Government has been broadened to include representatives of the six parties included in the Committee of Liberation. The political picture is therefore one of a people finding their way - and their own way - towards the freedom and democratic self-government which they lost 22 years ago.

The economic and humanitarian picture cannot, under war conditions, be altogether a happy one. Although the United Nations has brought no less than 100,000 tons of grain per month into Italy for Italian civilians alone - and Southern Italy should be self-sufficient in grain - the Black Market, fomented and encouraged by Italians themselves, has prevented full supplies from reaching the whole Italian people. Nevertheless there has been no starvation - and no conditions comparable with those of Greece or



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Norway - in Southern Italy, and the general high level of public health shows that food conditions are, if not luxurious, at least adequate. With the repression of the Black Market these conditions are improving and will improve. The inflation of the currency, an inevitable factor in the invasion of any country by large armed forces, has been followed by a corresponding increase in wages: and energetic steps have been taken to prevent further inflation. In the field of relief and welfare; over 50,000 Italian refugees, and nearly the same number of other nationalities have been cared for: among other things, 90,000 garments have been distributed, and epidemics have been successfully arrested or avoided by vaccination, inoculation and disinfestation. Sicily now presents a picture of life as nearly approaching normal conditions as war will permit, and Southern Italy is nearing the same standard.

The Allied Control Commission is not in Italy, however, for purely philanthropic ends: it is here because the United Nations are winning the war and because Italy declared war against them: it is here to see that justice is done and that those responsible for Fascism and war do not escape. It is here, too, to temper justice with mercy, because that is the intention and desire of the United Nations. In that task it associates itself with all those Italians who have refused to support Fascism and who are prepared to work for a world in which honesty, tolerance and justice shall prevail."

ITALIAN WAR PRISONERS

19. In his message of July 30, 1943 to the Italian people, Gen. Eisenhower stated:

> "Your men will return to their normal life and to their productive avocations, and, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us and not taken away to Germany, the hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them."

After the Armistice was signed, the Italian Government complied to the best of its abilities within limits established by the Allies, to the clause providing for the liberation of Allied prisoners of war. The Italian people, in spite of German and Fascist threats of shooting anyone doing so, gave unfailing assistance of shelter, food and clothing to Allied prisoners trying to escape to the South. In this way not only countless soldiers and junior officers were able to reach the Allied lines, but even the highest ranking officers, as Lt. Gen. O'Connor, Lt. Gen. Neame and Air Marshal Boyd, whose escape was only made possible through Italian assistance. Others have joined our armed bands in Northern Italy and to this

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and to this day are living in the mountains where food and equipment is provided them by the civilian population in spite of severe German reprisals.

On November 9, 1943, on the occasion of the signing of an agreement of mutual assistance among the United Nations, President Roosevelt declared among other things that "the United Nations have decided that preparations be made and agreements reached for the repatriation of war prisoners". The Italian government though taking account of the difficulties that stood in the realization of the promise of Gen. Eisenhower and the declaration of President Roosevelt, concerned itself from the very beginning with the task of bringing about a fruitful utilization of the Italian war prisoners in the common struggle against Germany. Italian prisoners in Allied hands totaled 26,500 officers and about 418,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

Proposals along these lines were formulated by the Italian government as early as October 3, 1943 to the Allied Military Mission. They were repeated on October 11 and October 26 by the Italian High Command. Since then they have been repeated on countless occasions, without any result. In addition discussions between Provost Marshal General White, General McNarny and General Gazzera, then a prisoner of war in the United States, were going on in Washington in November 1943 on the basis of which was being studied a project for the military organization of Italian P.O.W. either for their use in auxiliary services in the U.S. or for their preparation to do combat service on the Italian front. According to advices transmitted by General Gazzera, this project had received the approval in form of the American authorities but was to be extended into a general plan which was to be submitted for approval to the Italian government and the government of Great Britain so that the plan could be applied to the prisoners of war also in the hands not only of the U.S. but also the British Commonwealths.

However, in January 1944 the Allies presented a project of organization and employment of the prisoners of war totally different from the one discussed at Washington. The Allies for

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some technical and juridical reasons insisted in said proposal that the status of prisoners of war be maintained but yet required that the Italian government renounce its rights contained in the guarantees of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929 on prisoners of war. Article 1 of the Proposal provided that the Italian prisoners should, at the absolute discretion of the governments of the U. S., Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, be enrolled as volunteers to render service in units or formations organized on a military basis, or, on the other hand, be employed under the command not only of North America or Great Britain but under any other of the United Nations in whatever part of the world, in whatever capacity which would be considered in furtherance of the common cause by any of the aforesaid governments.

The Italian government on its own account was obliged to take into account the reaction of public opinion of the people of liberated Italy as well as of occupied Italy. The people in both these sections of Italy would have severely criticized the Italian government to the serious injury of the common cause had it agreed to such a proposal according to the terms of which Italian soldiers who would be required to work for the common cause even to the extent of fighting in the front lines would still be carrying the stigma of Prisoners of War. Certainly the Italian government could not conscientiously agree to such proposals notwithstanding its deep desire to make use of these prisoners at the earliest moment in the fight against Germany. In this regard the Italian government proposed that,

> "a small mixed Commission of Italian, English and American membership be immediately formed to study the question which appeared to be too complicated and which touched so heavily and directly all the Italian nation and which could not be resolved by a procedure of too great haste. Such commission should have the duty to continue discussions on the basis of the plans made at Washington between the American military authorities and General Gazzera with the object of arriving at an agreement as soon as possible."

These Italian proposals have not yet brought any concrete result and in the meantime various of the governments have utilized the Italian P.O.W. according to their own desires without even

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taking the pains of informing the Italian government through the channels of the A.C.C. For instance, the Italian government learned from the May 15, 1944 issue of Time magazine that "The U.S. War Department announced last week that Italian captives, of whom 50,136 are interned in the U.S., may volunteer in the U.S. Army. They will be used in Service units, both here and overseas, but not in actual combat...." Then, too, the General Headquarters at Delhi informed General Piacentini, then Italian P.O.W. in India, that an agreement on the use of Italian prisoners had been signed between the United Nations and the Italian government. It asked General Piacentini to make this fact known to the Italian P.O.W. and to make a propaganda tour for this purpose through the various prison camps in India. This General Piacentini did in good faith without knowledge that he had been ill-informed.

20. One of the aspects of the P.O.W. problem that has caused great concern to the Italian government is that which has to do with the Italian P.O.W. in French hands.

The Italian government was surprised to have discovered that Italian P.O.W. captured by American and British troops in North Africa had been turned over to the French authorities under the Committee of Liberation of Algiers. Such treatment - which had serious effects on the morale of these prisoners who instead of finding themselves freed discovered that they were transferred to another Power - finds no support in international law customs. The fact that French units were interspaced among the Anglo-American forces cannot be used as justification for the capturing nation has no right to transfer prisoners even to an Ally: The proof of this principle is found so well illustrated in the vigorous protest lodged on August 1943 by the British government regarding the alleged transfer of English prisoners in Italian hands to Germany which transfer the British government claimed was illegal.

Beyond that, the existence of an Armistice between Italy and the Allied Powers should have, in the light of Article 75 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, induced them to consult beforehand with the Italian Government, which would not have hesitated in presenting its position in view of the existence of a

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state of co-belligerency.

But, apart from the juridical consideration of the question, the treatment these prisoners received from the French raises serious problems. The Italian government continued to receive from various sources documental reports on the inhuman treatment accorded our prisoners in many instances.

These reports principally showed the following:

1) Corporal punishment
2) Insufficiency of dress and shoes
3) Insufficiency of food
4) Ill-treatment, morally as well as physically
5) Widespread illnesses and lack of medical care
6) Complete absence of organizations of assistance as required by the international conventions.

All these are infractions of the conventions of war on P.W.B. Here are a few typical instances taken at random from the thousands of cases registered in our files:

On June 24, 1943 in the French Camp of "La Cagna" (Tunisia) on account of the flight of an Italian prisoner during the night a group of 100 prisoners was punished. This group was compelled to sit under the sun from 8:30 until 7 P.M. and obligated to alternate a position of 40 minutes standing and 20 minutes sitting. Besides the whole group during the entire day was deprived of its meals. The tent mate of the escaped prisoner because he could not give the dog-tag number of the escaped prisoner was beaten with a raw-hide switch in the presence of the Commander of the Camp. On that day two of the group of 100 were felled by sun-stroke.

During the same month, June 1943, at the "L'Ariana" Camp (Tunisia) an Italian doctor was forced to perform a surgical operation by using a Gillette razor blade because the French would not allow the sick prisoner to go to a hospital.

During this early period the food was below elementary requirements. Just a little tea was given for breakfast and for the other two meals a few fava beans and some carrots. In some camps in Tunisia it became the meals amounted to giving one carrot a day to every three persons. Even spiritual assistance was hampered and the military chaplains were forbidden to explain the

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Gospel during the Sunday Mass.

But even later the situation did not improve. Let us quote once more at random from our files:

On March 17, 1944, near Cheregas, N. A. on the lands of a certain Mr. Vidal where 26 Italian P.O.W. were working, the leader of the group, Corporal Perricone, complained about the insufficiency of food: in response he was insulted and threatened so he and his companions returned to their living quarters and refused to work. At 2:30 P.M. on the same day there arrived the proprietor accompanied by a Master Sergeant with six French soldiers completely armed. The Sergeant to terrorize the prisoners first carried out a mock execution. Then he forced them to throw over their shoulders their field pack and march into the courtyard. During all this the French soldiers stole all the personal belongings from the prisoners (such as cigarettes, soap, etc. which they had been given by other prisoners still in American hands). In the courtyard they were tortured, insulted, beaten, spat upon and forced to march around on their knees with the field pack on their back. The one treated the worst was Corporal Perricone who after four days' rest was not yet able to do any work. The soldiers Cafiso and Buffa were injured with the bayonet.

Near El Biar on lands administered by a French Captain, Scotto, Italian P.O.W. work for more than ten months. At first they were 17 in number but now they are only 11 for 6 have escaped. This man Scotto subjected these prisoners to the most inhuman treatment. He forced them to work from sunrise to sunset and fed them below subsistence level. They would not be able to live were it not for the extra food given them by their countrymen who live nearby. To suppress acts in violation of his discipline - natural consequence of his inhumanity - Scotto placed them in a prison that consists of a large cement barrel having a small opening for air. To no one is any pay given. All the attempts made by these prisoners to confer with the French authorities have come to naught.

These and numerous other incidents in our files show that from the very first moment of their capture violations were committed of the Preamble of the Geneva Convention of July 29,

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1929 as well as the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6. And during their state of captivity no regard was given to the regulations set forth in Article 10 on housing, 11 on food, 12 on dress, 13 on hygiene, 16 on spiritual assistance, 23 on financial matters of prisoners, 27, 28, 29 and 30 on working conditions, 34 on salaries, 42 and 43 on complaints and representation of the P.O.W.

From information reaching us it appeared that the German P.O.W. were treated much better than the Italian. The Italian government vitally concerned about the situation used every means at its disposal to bring the question to the foregoing and expose the facts to the light of day. Among the many attempts made for that purpose were many requests made by General Castellano, Head of the Italian Military Mission at Algiers, for permission to visit the camps, but his requests were tardily answered on December 13, 1943. Then he was compelled to wait until January 18, 1944 for advice on the conditions of his visit which, he was told, could not take place until after February 1, 1944. Even the representatives of the Protecting Power of the Italian interests in North Africa complained that they too were not permitted to visit the camps of Italian P.O.W. in French hands.

21. From the foregoing it can be seen that although more than 8 months have elapsed from the signing of the Armistice the problem of Italian War Prisoners has not yet been solved nor even been given serious attention. Notwithstanding the promises made the prisoners that have been repatriated have amounted only to a few hundred. The Italian people find it hard to understand why the Allies went even as far as bringing back to liberated Italy to work for the common cause groups of Italian P.O.W. keeping them still in the condition of prisoners and maintaining in prison camps in Sicily those P.O.W. who come from the German occupied region but giving liberty on parole only to those who come from Sicily.

Not only is it necessary to arrive at an agreement between the Italian government and the Allied governments on the juridical status of the Italian P.O.W. and on the best use that could be made of them in the interest of the common cause, but

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it is absolutely necessary to repatriate a larger number of officers to complete the organization of Italian units to be used in combat service in Italy against the Germans. Among the Italian prisoners of war there is a large number of courageous fighters who have had many years of experience in combat warfare. If we were permitted to arm, equip and organize them as we asked as early as September 1943 many units could be formed and assigned to the front lines in Italy. This should be done immediately before the morale and spirit of these men become destroyed in these prison camps. Then, to keep 450,000 Italian soldiers in the status of P.O.W. deprives the Allies from using them most effectively in the war effort in view of the Geneva Convention. The Italian government has on many occasions stated its position to be that of wanting to utilize these prisoners at the earliest possible moment as free soldiers willing to fight for the triumph of the common cause, and in this it feels sure it is properly expressing the will of the Italian people.

MOSCOW DECLARATION ON ITALY

22. We shall discuss herein how Italy has complied with the terms of the Moscow Declaration on Italy. We shall consider the seven points of this declaration in their order.

> "1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism".

This has been accomplished to a point even beyond the expectations of the most hopeful persons in and out of Italy. In the present cabinet are represented all the recognized anti-fascist parties, Communist, Socialist, Demo-Christian (the old Partito Popolare of Don Luigi Sturzo), Partito Liberale of the great world-famous scholar, Benedetto Croce, Democrazia del Lavoro of Prime Minister Bonomi, and the Partito d'Azione that is an off-spring of the Comitati di Liberazione. Each party has several ministerial posts and also under-secretariats. In order to introduce into the councils of the Cabinet men of high calibre and international anti-Fascist standing five ministers without portfolio were appointed.

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such as Count Carlo Sforza, Benedetto Croce, Palmiro Togliatti (communist exile in Russia for the past twelve years and now head of the Communist Party in Italy), Giulio Rodino' (ex-deputy and Minister of War who opposed Fascism and is now leader of the Demo-Christian Party) and Piero Mancini, a leader of the revived Socialist Party. This widely representative government not only has received the full support of the people in liberated Italy but has also been given the full collaboration of the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as expressed in the following telegram lately arrived:

> "The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy has decided to give its full collaboration to the Italian Government. It requests that it be recognized as an agency of the Italian Government and that it be given sufficient arms to conduct the war on behalf of the common cause."

> "2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups."

In relation to this point we must refer to the later statement in this Declaration to the effect that "so long as military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff". However, much was done by the Italian government on its own initiative between July 25, 1943 and September 8, the date of the publication of the Armistice. It should be remembered that all of these personal liberties are provided for and protected in the Italian Constitution of 1848, and were respected by all the Italian governments until the Fascist regime destroyed them by passing laws that violated the Constitution. All these liberties are at present enjoyed by the people in liberated Italy except insofar as they have been abrogated, limited or controlled either directly by the Allied authorities or at their request in view of the continuance of military operations in Italy. On January 20, 1944 the Italian government passed a Decree-Law abolishing all Fascist racial laws

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and restoring to persons of the Jewish race all the rights and privileges enjoyed by all other Italian citizens whether living in Italy or abroad.

"3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed."

"4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from administration and from institutions and organizations of public character."

Immediately after assuming power the government of Marshal Badoglio abolished the Fascist Grand Council, the Fascist National Party, the House of the Fasci and Corporations (that had been substituted for the Chamber of Deputies) and the Fascist Militia.

On December 28, 1943 the Italian government passed a Decree-Law making all persons holding public or semi-public offices or positions in local or state or semi-governmental agencies or in any private agency vested with a public interest who had taken active part in the Fascist Party or having been a "squadrista, marcia su Roma, gerarca or sciarpa Littorio" subject to removal from his or her office or position. On April 12, 1944 a special commission was created to administer the above law of "defascistizzazione" of governmental agencies. On April 13, 1944 in pursuance to all the decree-laws that had been passed for the suppression of the Fascist organizations in the nation a "High Commissioner for the Suppression of Fascism from the National Life" was created and Tito Zaniboni was named as High Commissioner. Zaniboni attempted Mussolini's life and had spent eighteen years in prison for having tried but failed to assassinate him. But the most sweeping and rigorous decree-law has just recently been passed on May 26, 1944 providing for the punishment of Fascist crimes and illegal acts. Count Carlo Sforza, Minister without Portfolio, has been charged by the Cabinet with the responsibility of seeing that this law is properly and justly enforced. The principal and most noted persons that this law punishes are:

a) those who promoted or directed the insurrection known as the March on Rome of October 28, 1922 - Punishment: life imprisonment or death according to circumstances.

b) those who organized Fascist armed bands who promoted or directed the commission of grave acts of violence or injury to persons or organizations - Punishment: 5

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to 15 years imprisonment and deprivation of all political rights for life.

c) those who promoted or directed the effectuation of the coup d'etat of January 3, 1925 and those who later contributed by similar or like acts to the maintenance of Fascism in power. Punishment: 5 to 15 years imprisonment and the deprivation of all political rights for life.

A law that is not only severe as this but also retroactive in its application is indisputable proof that the Italian people are determined to eradicate from their national life the evils of twenty-two years of Fascism.

"5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty".

Upon assuming power on July 25, 1944 the Badoglio Government released many of these prisoners through the Ministry of Justice. Among them are men like Bruno Buozzi, leader of the Socialist Party but who now is presumably in Rome and Antonio Pesenti, a member of the Communist Party who holds the position of Undersecretary of Finance in the present government. Tito Zaniboni, above mentioned, now holds the position of Commissioner of Aid to Italian Refugees. There can be no doubt that upon getting full control of Italian territory the Italian government will immediately release all such prisoners and punish those who were responsible for their incarceration under the law explained supra.

"6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created."

Prior to Fascism all local communities enjoyed a large measure of local autonomous government. The Cities and Communes elected their own Mayors and Councils and the Provincial Councils were also elected by the people of the province. The major federal officer was the Provincial Prefect who was a career man and represented the interests of the central national government. Because it wanted to get absolute control of the local governments the Fascist regime abolished all this structure of local self-government by substituting the system of hierarchical appointments. At the present time while there is A.C.C. control no system of local elective self-government can be set up. There is no doubt

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but that a modernized system of local democratic government will be inaugurated as soon as the Italian government resumes complete control over the internal affairs of the country.

> "7. Fascist chiefs and Army Generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice."

Many of these will fall under the provisions of the recent law of May 26, 1944 referred above. Others will be punished under general Italian criminal and military law. When it is considered that the present government is composed of people who were ostracized, arrested and exiled by Fascist chiefs the world may rest assured that the Fascist criminals referred to in this paragraph will all be severely punished.

All of the major parties are in accord that at the conclusion of the war and after the full liberation of all of Italy the people should be given an opportunity to express themselves as to the form of government they want. There may be differences of opinion as to the method by which this shall be done, but that it should be done is admitted on all sides.

## CIVILIAN RESISTANCE IN GERMAN OCCUPIED ITALY

23. It has already been related elsewhere in this study how the civilian population of Italy rose up and assisted the Allied forces in driving the German troops out of their country during the first months after the publication of the Armistice. By the time the Allied forces came to a halt at the Cassino front the Italian Supreme Command began organizing contacts with voluntary patriotic bands that were being formed in the central and northern part of Italy. The purpose of these contacts was to give them directions and such aid as it could send by itself or in cooperation with the Allied authorities. From the very nature of the operations it is impossible to give an accurate figure on the total number of Italians that took part in the formation and activities of these various bands, but from information in our possession it can be estimated that for certain there are at least 100,000 men. The total number of men who in one form or another take part in patriot activities are estimated to run into several

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hundreds of thousands.

The following is a list of localities in which skirmishes have occurred between Italian patriot bands and Nazi-Fascist troops:

PIEMONTE - Valley Vermenagna and Valley Gesso - Boves-Valley Casotto, Corsaglia, Ellero and Pesio

Valdossola - Lake Maggiore - Biella - Aderno - Graglia

Valley Strono - Gozzano - Borgomanero Vergiato (Major Beltrami, Commander of this Band fell while fighting the Germans in the month of February)

LOMBARDY - Bergamasche Alps - Valley Trompia

VENETO - Mount Grappa (recently the band was attacked by a German force of 3500 men)

EMILIA - Modenese Appennines

MARCHE - Mount San Vicino - Cingoli - Camerino

TUSCANY - Mount Falterone

In all of Northern Italy there exist "Regional Commands" that are in touch with the Italian Supreme Command located in liberated Italy. In all the principal centers there are "Military Committees of Liberation". Although all possible aid is sent these resistance groups by the Allied authorities as well as by the Italian Command yet these fighting men are mainly supplied by the Italian patriotic population in that area. Then in addition to these small or large organized bands there are the millions of patriotic Italians who fight the NAZI-FASCIST enemy however and wherever they can.

We shall give an example of the fighting that was done by these bands in the area of the Province of Cuneo during the month of March during German mopping up operations against these groups:

During the months of January and February a strong force of German S.S. troops were sent in this area to clean out the bands that were doing a great amount of sabotage. The SS troops were not successful because the bands were clever enough to retire to and hide in the mountains. Towards the end of February the Germans undertook their task of mopping up with a much larger

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force consisting of about 2000 Nazi-Fascist troops and attacked the bands hiding in the zone of Boves. After five days of fighting the Italian patriots decided to retire to safety. About the middle of March the Germans launched an organized and coordinated campaign of mopping up these groups in the valleys south of the Cuneo-Mondovi zone. This time they employed about 10,000 men: During the course of the fighting that ensued the following events occurred:

1. March 15 - contemporaneous mopping-up operations in the valleys of Pesio, Ellero, Corsaglia and Casotto - the band of Valley Corsaglia after indecisive fighting withdrew.

March 16 - after indecisive fighting against greatly superior numbers the band of Valley Casotto withdrew also.

March 18 - the bands of these two Valleys (Corsaglia and Casotto) after the events of the preceding days united their forces and attacked the Germans in the high valley of Casotto and began driving them towards the town of Pamparato. In the meantime the Germans from the south occupy Ormea. The valleys of Ellero and Pesio are blocked while the Italian patriots momentarily await an enemy attack.

March 23 - The German Command promising liberty proposes conditions of surrender to the bands of the Ellero and Pesio valleys. The proposal is refused.

March 25 - The Germans make a second proposal of surrender and this is also refused by the patriots.

March 26 - The band of the Ellero valley is attacked, withstands the blow and withdraws safely. The band in the valley of Pesio is still blocked.

March 30 - The band of the Pesio valley organizes itself in the mountain, remains blocked but the enemy does not attack in force. In two patrol encounters 14 Nazis are wounded and only one patriot.

April 7 - Large German forces attack the Pesio valley.

These operations against the bands of the Cunese beginning in January 1944 necessitated on the part of the Germans the employment of a large volume of troops over a long period of time. Yet they produced no appreciable results for the Italian bands taking advantage of the terrain have known how to attack when suitable and to retreat and withdraw after having inflicted considerable losses. Thus after the cycle of operations by the Germans had spent

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itself these bands would reform and reorganize for performing work of sabotaging the German communication lines like, the destruction for example, of the bridge and other works between Robilante and Vernante on the important communication line of the Colle di Tenda.

Following are two messages we have recently received from the region of the Marche in connection with a vast and bloody mopping-up operation:

> "Everywhere there are going on bitter battles against superior German and Fascist forces. Our losses though large are less than the enemies. Just the same all the patriots of the Marches are waiting to renew the fight while mothers, wives and innocent children cry over their bodies of dear dead, shouting REVENGE.
> I have by miracle fled from the captivity of the Germans. These cursed people have instituted an inhuman terror. Only God can tell what they are doing."

Following is a translation of a document found on the person of a German prisoner, clearly indicating that there is no safety for the German forces anywhere in occupied Italy:

FIFTH MOUNTAIN DIVISION

From the Division Commandant
March 30, 1944

ACTIVITIES OF BADOGLIAN COMMUNISTS

1. On March 23 anti-German elements organized in the centre of Rome an ambuscade against a column of German police on the march. After having thrown three tubes of nitro-glycerine they opened fire with automatic pistols and machine guns from the roofs, the windows and the small windows of the canteens. During the fray 32 German police were killed and 38 others were wounded. In other parts of the city, particularly in the regions of the perifery, there were other isolated attacks made with hand grenades and portable arms against isolated German vehicles. In reprisal it has been ordered that for every German killed 10 Badoglian communists would be executed. Already 320 rebels have been executed.

2. It has been confirmed that lately there has been an increase in the activities of enemy bands. Originally their activities were limited to attacks against isolated German vehicles.

3. Partisan and sabotage activities are probably going on all over Italy.

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4. The formation of partisan groups must be impeded by maintaining continuous control over the Italian population. The behaviour of the civilian population, particularly in the zones of the highways to the rear, must be under the constant surveillance of the local military commands, of the section "B" and by all the divisional road blocks. Suspected formation of partisan groups and acts of insubordination on the part of the civilian population should be communicated by the most rapid means to the information section of that division. In such cases the division official will act with the greatest severity.

5. As a defense against probability of attack formations on march and the personnel of each vehicle must have their weapons always loaded and always manned. Drivers of isolated vehicles should carry along as many hand grenades as possible.

6. Attention is called again to the permanent order to the effect that soldiers who leave their barracks must go fully armed at all times.

7. The commanding officers of all ranks must constantly combat the typical blind faith of the German soldier in the civilian population of a foreign country. Into the mind of every man there must be implanted by constant repetition the idea that every civilian is a potential agent or saboteur who will take advantage of trustful nature of the German soldier to do him harm.

By order of the Division Commandant
Signed: Prohl

From other sources of information we know that the greatest part of the patriots refused the offer of amnesty that ended at midnight of the 24th day of May, that there are continued attacks against the buildings occupied by the Fascists and Nazis, the German Consulates have to be protected by armed guards, and that many of the Fascist hierarchs are being killed, among whom lately was the Fascist Minister of the Navy.

The organized and unorganized resistance and fighting that has been and is still being done by the Italian people in the German occupied part of Italy has by now received world-wide and even official military recognition. In his recent statement U.S. Senator Albert B. Thomas of Utah praised the acts of sabotage done

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by the Italian patriots as the result of which, he stated, the railroads in central and northern Italy are almost completely out of operation.

On May 27, 1944 Radio Naples broadcast instructions to the Italian patriots coming from the Headquarters of General Alexander.

On the same day the General Headquarters of General Alexander issued the following communique on the activities of the Italian patriots:

> "A battalion of Alpine troops of the JULIA Division has joined with a group of Austrian anti-Nazis and thus have formed a strong nucleus that harasses German traffic in the Vittorio Veneto region. Other groups of patriots control the zone between Lake Como and the Swiss border."

On May 23 the General Headquarters of General Alexander issued the following communique:

> "Patriots of the first and second brigades GARIBALDI control vast zones and many inhabited localities in Piedmont, in the Emilie, in Tuscany, and in the Marche."

In fact the Headquarters of General Alexander now issues regular bulletins on the activities of the Italian Front of Patriot Resistance.

The bulletin of May 20 stated that at least 6 German divisions were held in northern Italy by the activities of the patriots. "The danger of an eventual battle breaking out on the Italian Front of Liberation, which may happen at any moment, prevents the Germans from using these 6 Divisions against the Anglo-American Fifth and Eighth Armies."

The recent offensive for the taking of Rome has been a hard and bloody one. Who can say what the outcome would have been if these six German divisions had been hurled against the Allied Forces at a critical moment during the numerous attacks they made to stem the tide of Allied victory?

In addition to the constant warfare that the Italian people in northern Italy have waged against the German invader they have not hesitated to cripple the German and Fascist war power by the weapon of the STRIKE. Undaunted by all the threats

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of execution they have organized and carried out stoppages of work which no other German-occupied population in western Europe has dared. On this score let us quote from the Swiss newspaper "Libera Stampa" of Lugano on March 15, 1944:

"The general strike from March 1 to March 6 involved not only the industrial workers of the great cities of Milan, Turin, and Trieste, but also those in small factories in the provincial centers. When the sirens of Milan gave the signal at 10 A.M. on March 1, work ceased as if by magic. Operators stopped all machinery and transportation facilities, and office employees walked out. Technicians and managers cooperated. The workers then silently left the factories and, obeying the orders of the organizers, returned to their homes."

Commenting the Swiss paper "Dovero" of Bellinzona said:

"These strikes were a dress rehearsal and greatly alarmed the Fascists. The experiment proved formidable and since it succeeded, it means the workers are ready to obey any orders against their Fascist oppressors when the moment arrives."

In conclusion let us add that nowhere in Italy is the German soldier hated and detested like in Northern Italy. The Italian people in these parts cannot forget that periodically for centuries they have been invaded and their lands laid waste by these Teutonic hordes. In the last war part of Northern Italy was invaded and occupied by the German army. Many fathers and brothers still living bear the scars and wounds they received at the hands of the Germans in that war. This traditional hatred and the great love that the Northern Italian feels for his country drives him relentlessly on to whatever sacrifices may be needed in order to "drive the invader from his soil."

It must also be stressed that while armed resistance to the Germans and sabotage activities were so prominent in occupied Italy, in the liberated regions not a single sabotage attempt has occurred so far, though enormous amount of Allied material and equipment is left unguarded throughout Southern Italy.

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## ITALIAN AIR FORCE:

## WHAT IT HAS DONE

24. Shortly after the publication of the Armistice the Italian Air Force consisted of the following:

115 Pursuit and fighter planes
90 Transport and bomber planes
50 Hydroplanes
50 Planes of miscellaneous types

305 Total

The land organization and services were still in efficient working condition in the provinces of Puglie and the island of Sardinia, but in the other regions they had been destroyed. Almost all of the industrial plants are located in central and northern Italy (which has been) under German domination.

But with the meagre means at hand the Italian Air Force has performed the following services from September 8, 1943 to April 15, 1944 as its contribution in the war against Germany:

| | |
|---|---|
| Hours of flight | 12,500 |
| Number of missions | 9,000 |
| Bombs dropped, Kg. | 40,000 |
| Rounds fired | 100,000 |
| Supplies air-flown to fighting troops, Kg. | 150,000 |
| Shipwrecked and wounded picked up | 119 |
| Mail and material flown Kg. | 900,000 |
| Passengers transported | 9,500 |
| Miles of flights | 2,200,000 |

In the course of the foregoing activities, subject to strict control and limitations by the ACC, the Italian Air Forces have performed the following military operations:

1. Heavy and anti-personnel bombardments, machine gunning and reconnaissance in the Balkan peninsula (western zone). In Montenegro over 100 military vehicles were destroyed by the Air Force.

2. Anti-submarine escort and search of shipwrecked men in the Ionian and Adriatic seas.

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3. Transporting of men and supplies to the Italian and partisan troops fighting in Montenegro and for the maintenance of communications between the Italian mainland, the Islands and North Africa.

In these operations the air force sustained the following losses from September 8, 1943 to April 15, 1944:

Dead - 80 men
Lost - 46 men

The work of the Italian Air Force was praised highly by R.A.F. Air Commodore Foster, head of the Sub-commission of the Air Forces of the ACC, in a message issued by him when he left Italy in March 1944. The London Times of April 25, 1944 published an article describing and praising the results accomplished by the Italian Air Force against all odds and difficulties. In his speech to the House of Commons on May 24, 1944 Prime Minister said in this regard:

> "The Italian Air Force that remained faithful has fought so well that I am making particular efforts to furnish it with better planes of British construction."

It might be well to emphasize that in all of the foregoing work and services rendered, Italian equipment exclusively has been used.

WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE

25. The activities of the Italian Air Force have been limited and been strictly subject to the minute control of the ACC and of the Allied Air authorities. In particular, the ACC has limited to the Balkans the area over which the air force is permitted to function on military operations. All operations have had to be first submitted to the Head of the Sub-commission of Aeronautics of the ACC. Thus what was expected to be only a control

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became direct command by the ACC so that the Italian General Staff and the Air Unit Command were completely displaced in their authority over their own air forces located on the Italian mainland. The ACC has forbidden the use of Italian bombing planes on offensive bombing missions, and has forbidden up until a few days ago the use of radio communication between land stations or between land stations and planes in flight.

The planes that have been used in these operations are of an antiquated type and on account of lack of repairs and spare parts their efficiency is very doubtful. Since the 8th of September 1943 because of the lack of airplane factories in Southern Italy and as no material aid has been given us by the Allies these planes have been kept aloft by the patient and rational use of materials and parts recovered from Sicily, Sardinia and North Africa. But even these have now become exhausted so now it has become even more necessary that aid be received from Allied resources. The most pressing of needs are planes and new motors. The Italian Air Force has within its ranks a large mass of pilots and technicians of high professional abilities and would be very capable of using and maintaining at a high rate of efficiency Allied planes and equipment.

With the Italian air personnel actually available at this time (pilots, specialists, mechanics and supervisory) a total of 1,100 planes could be manned on the basis of 60% for pursuit, 30% for bombing, 10% for sea planes. If at least 500 aviation prisoners in Allied hands could be released and integrated in the present personnel an additional 500 planes could be kept aloft, thus making a total of 1,600 planes. The planes of the Italian Air Force that found safety in Southern Italy after the Armistice numbering 305 are now reduced to 250. The Italian aviators most of whom today are lying about idle ask for nothing more than that they be given a chance to fight and make their full contribution for the achievement of the common victory.

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ITALIAN NAVY: WHAT IT HAS DONE

26. The important contribution that the Italian Navy has made in the war against the common enemy has been so often recognized by the highest Allied authorities that it might seem superfluous to mention it here in detail. We refer to the speeches of Prime Minister Churchill on February 22, 1944 and on May 24, 1944, and to the statement of Admiral John Cunningham, Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Area, on May 28, 1944. Therefore we shall confine ourselves here to the principal items.

Immediately after the events that succeeded the publication of the Armistice the Italian Naval Forces stood as follows:

5 Battleships (one of which was damaged)
9 Cruisers
11 Destroyers
40 Torpedo boats and corvettes
37 Submarines
30 MAS and light torpedo boats
Auxiliary and small boats

All of these units had to be transferred, in pursuance to the terms of the Armistice, some (the large battle units) to Allied bases, some to the bases in Liberated Italy such as Taranto, Brindisi, La Maddalena and other ports that had been defended by Italian troops against the Germans. Then, too, the Italian Navy had under its control the important arsenal at Taranto, and one efficient territorial organization and many other services in Southern Italy and in Sardinia.

During the period commencing September 8, 1943 and ending April 30, 1944 the Italian Navy performed the following services on behalf of the Allies:

1. 356 war missions employing 432 units covering a total of 130,021 miles.

2. 542 transfer movements covering a total of 219,168 miles.

3. 108 units transported Italian troops and materiel, covering a total of 38,410 miles and transporting 114,512 men.

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4. 36 units of Cruisers and Torpedo boats were used for fast transportation of 13,607 Allied troops and covering 23,444 miles.

5. Escorted 65 Italian passenger ships covering a total of 21,009 miles.

6. The most important work done for the Allies consisted in escorting 308 Allied convoys comprising a total of 4,022 ships having a total tonnage of 32,595,000. For this purpose 862 escort units were used that traveled a total distance of 214,318 miles.

The total movements made by units of the Italian Navy from September 8, 1943 to April 30, 1944 amount to 1,889 in number, covering a total distance of 646,370 miles. In the course of all these activities the following military operations were performed:

1. Actions of shelling of the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

2. Patrolling along the whole of the Adriatic sea for the purpose of intercepting enemy traffic and protecting the landings in Dalmatia.

3. Rescue of Italian and Allied military personnel from Albania and Greece.

4. Numerous missions by submarines and small torpedo-boats for the transportation of Italian and Allied secret service and sabotage personnel in various localities. In the performance of these services several units were lost.

5. Trips by submarines and destroyers for the furnishing of supplies to troops on the Aegean Islands.

6. Actions by destroyers and torpedo-boats for searching out German naval forces and protecting Italian positions, particularly in the Ionian Islands, Sardinia and Corsica. In these actions several units were lost.

During the period beginning September 8, 1943 and ending April 30, 1944 in all its operations the Italian Navy has suffered the following losses:



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1 Battleship of 35,000 tons (Roma)
4 Destroyers
5 Torpedo-boats
1 Corvette
1 Submarine
3 Auxiliary Cruisers
14 Small Torpedo-boats

During the same period 733 men were killed, 6,369 men were lost, 748 men were wounded. The percentage of losses in proportion to the total personnel employed amounted to 20%.

Although for security reasons we do not have the figures of the total movements of the Allied Mediterranean fleet, yet we are in a position to say on belief that the operations of the Italian Navy represent a high proportion of the total of Allied fleet movements. This, of course, permitted the Allies to transfer a large number of their ships to services on the other high seas.

But even outside the Mediterranean the work of the Italian Navy has become important, as was recognized by Prime Minister Churchill in his speech of May 24th. These activities have consisted chiefly of doing scouting work by fast cruisers based at Freetown for the purpose of intercepting German corsairs loose on the high seas. A group of submarines is stationed at Bermuda and another group with its own auxiliary ship is located at Colombo, India.

The arsenals of the Italian Navy from September 8, 1943 to March 31, 1944 have performed 350 items of repairs to Allied ships having a total tonnage of 900,000 on 130 units put in dry-dock and employing 120,000 man days of labor. On these repairs were also engaged an additional 1,000 or more highly skilled workers.

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WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE

27. Although the facts given above are rather impressive, yet the Italian Navy could have made an even greater contribution to the common cause had it been permitted to do so. The two modern battleships are at anchor in an Egyptian port with a reduced personnel and with the firing apparatus removed from the cannons. The VITTORIO VENETO is in fair shape and ready. The ITALIA has a bulge in her deck caused by a German bomb on September 9, 1943. Unless repair work is started, so far the Allies have not permitted any, it will be more difficult and costly to put these ships in serviceable condition later on because of water corrosion and harm to the electrical system. The three battleships of 27,000 tons are at Malta with reduced personnel and with the firing apparata removed from the cannons. The DUILIO and the DORIA are ready for action as ships. The GIULIO CESARE requires some repairs. These five battleships are thus not actually utilized, their personnel is insufficient and the equipment gradually deteriorating. Later on it will be more difficult not only to put them in fighting condition materially but it will also take longer to re-train the personnel needed. So far the Allied authorities have given no heed to the numerous requests made by the Italian government to put all these ships in fighting shape and to man them with a full complement, so that Italy could make this additional contribution to the war effort against the common enemy.

The personnel of the Italian Navy has been reduced to 5,104 officers and 74,065 men. Of this number 29,000 are on board ships and 1,000 form a regiment that has been fighting on the Cassino front and has taken part in the offensive for the liberation of Rome. Because the requests of the Italian government have not been granted by the Allied authorities we have had to discharge an additional 500 officers and 10,000 men, all of whom are highly trained and anxious to fight against the

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common enemy. The men of the Italian Navy now available are among our very best trained sailors for at the time of the publication of the Armistice all of the ships and the Naval Academy succeeded in reaching the regions of Liberated Italy. In Southern Italy there was on hand a select land service personnel while many seamen who were caught in Northern Italy have come down into Southern Italy by crossing the lines at great personal risk. There are no insuperable difficulties against the full utilization of this highly trained group of men. If the battleships were put in serviceable readiness a large number of these men could keep themselves in training shape. They all are desirous of fighting the common enemy. It is up to the Allied authorities to permit them to do so.

## THE ITALIAN ARMY:

## WHAT IT HAS DONE

28. Immediately after the publication of the Armistice the status of the Italian Army on the mainland of Liberated Italy and the Islands was as follows:

- 9 Mobile divisions
- 12 Divisions for coastal protection
- A variety of minor units
- Services and supplies and military organization, still functioning efficiently in Puglie and Sardinia, seriously disorganized in Calabria, totally disappeared in Sicily and the Campania.
- The total in men of the above forces was 430,000, almost half of which was in Sardinia.

These units were in possession of a meagre amount of transportation facilities and were armed with equipment unsuitable for modern warfare. Notwithstanding such handicaps these troops, as has already been related elsewhere, attacked the German forces immediately and continued to fight alongside the Allied troops until the 20th of September 1943, at which time the Allied Military Mission issued an order coming from a superior command that the Italian troops were not to participate in any more fighting on the Italian mainland until further orders.

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Later on following repeated and insistent pleas by the Italian government permission was given for sending to the front lines a motorized force of 10,000 men (consisting of a regiment of infantry with several batteries of artillery). This force was permitted to enter the front lines during the first days of December 1943 alongside the American Fifth Army. Their courage and spirit in battle were of the highest order according to a message sent by General Mark Clark on December 20, 1943 to the Italian Command in which he said:

> "I want to congratulate the officers and men of your command on the success of their attack last night at Mount Lungo and on hill number 343. This action demonstrated the determination of the Italian soldier to free his country from German domination. The determined will of the Italian soldiers to liberate their native soil from the Nazi yoke until final victory by fighting over hard and difficult terrain can well be an example to all the other peoples of Europe who are fighting against German oppression."

However, all the requests of the Italian government (which we shall set forth later on in this study) for permission to make a larger contribution through its armed forces to the war effort went for the most part unheeded. In fact the ACC decided that the Italian troops to be sent to the front lines were never to exceed 14,100 men. This limited number has been strictly adhered to by the Allied authorities despite the repeated demands by the Italian government that it be increased.

But on account of the necessity of rotation of troops the actual number of the Italian Corps of Liberation now number about 21,000 (14,000 of the First Force and 7,000 of paratroops of the NEMBO division). This contingent of troops has had an active part in the late offensive for the taking of Rome but not to the extent that the Italian people would have wanted and that had been promised in the fall of 1943 by General Eisenhower. It has been armed and equipped exclusively from Italian materiel.

The ACC has asked that the Italian government furnish also:

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101,100 soldiers for home security
180,000 for employment by the Allies in various services
45,170 for central organization, territorial bodies and services.

The greatest part of this total of 340,470 men has already been furnished.

There are Italian soldiers working with Allied units in all sorts of services, from engineers to front-line food suppliers and groups of laborers. All these troops are rendering valuable services and a large part of them are located in the military operational zones directly behind the front lines (including the Anzio beach-head) where they have also given their contribution in numerous losses in lives. If these rear-line troops could be counted as belonging to the Italian Corps of Liberation, in the same manner that other military commands usually classify their rear and front-line troops, the actual number of combatant troops would be more than double the number that immediately belong to the Italian Corps of Liberation.

There are also 16,000 Italian soldiers who assist the Allied forces in manning of anti-aircraft batteries.

The Italian troops have rendered the following services of military value to the common cause, all of these services having been performed exclusively with Italian equipment notwithstanding the almost total lack of materials:

1. 700 KM of highways for motor traffic have been repaired and maintained.

2. About 30 KM of new highways constructed.

3. Repaired and put into operation the plant and equipment of the railroad stations at Foggia, Termoli and Taranto; of the roundhouse, of the station at S. Nicola and the naval workshops of Tosi at Taranto.

4. Repaired and put in working condition the railroad tracks and switching yards on the rail line Calabro-Lucana, the freight and passenger yards, of the line Catanzaro Marina and Catanzaro City, and the S. Eufemia-Lamezia line.

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5. 120 bridges rebuilt.

Important and useful for the Allied cause was the military information service that was set up almost from nothing by the Italian Command after the Armistice. A close net-work of secret information and counter-espionage service organized by the Italian government works in the closest collaboration with the Allied authorities who have often expressed their highest appreciation for this important Italian contribution. For instance:

1. Up to date 24 secret information missions have been sent into the German-occupied zone and 26 communication missions in the same zone to the bands of Italian patriots.

2. 63 air-drop supply fields have been organized in German-occupied territory where 91 supply drops were made having a total weight of 99 tons.

In German-occupied Italy this secret service organization has organized numerous cells for gathering information and performing sabotage work. Many persons belonging to the Italian Armed Forces have organized and directed the bands of Italian patriots.

The foregoing is only a brief resume of what contribution the Italian Army has been permitted to make to "drive the invader from its soil." That it wanted to and could have done more are matters that find ample proof in our records and files as will be shown in the following section 30.

## ITALIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE BALKANS

29. As has already been related, Italian troops in the Balkans fought the Germans immediately after the Armistice was published and later withdrew to the mountains. For several weeks the Germans were opposed by 9 Italian divisions almost all mobile but scattered over a vast territory, and not in communication with one another, nor to a large extent with the Italian government. There were also various minor autonomous groups. The supply services of these troops were completely gone and no

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supplies were sent to them by the Allies. Later on the Italian government was authorized to re-establish communications with these troops, but although regular contacts have been established with the GARIBALDI division that is fighting with the forces of TITO, great difficulties have been encountered in establishing contacts with the small groups that are still fighting in isolated points of the Balkans.

We shall relate here only facts supported by evidence that come from information which we know to be absolutely reliable. Certainly it can be inferred that this is only a very small part of the actual fighting that has gone on.

1. A large part of the PINEROLO division, the AOSTA cavalry regiment and elements from the CASALE and FORLI divisions, who had withdrawn to the mountains of Thessaly in Greece, fought the Germans until October 14, 1943 when the Communist organization ELAS treacherously disarmed them in spite of the protests from the British Military Mission. The Alpine group MANFREDINI of 2,000 men is still fighting in the mountains of Epirus.

2. In Albania remnants from the FIRENZE and BRENNERO divisions and from other minor units are still fighting the Germans in the mountains where they were joined by Albanian patriots.

3. The most important fighting by Italian troops in the Balkans has taken place in Jugo-Slavia. After many combats in which our troops fought the Germans alone or in cooperation with the partisans of TITO, the Italian forces were reorganized in December, 1943 into the new all-Italian GARIBALDI division which is a regular unit of TITO'S Army. The GARIBALDI division is still fighting in Montenegro and has repulsed the sixth German offensive. Clashes with German and "Chetnik" troops have been very

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numerous, among the most important being those of Priepolji, Plevia, Jabuka, Kamena, Gora, Odaac, Broadarevo, Berane, Murina, and Andrevica. TITO'S communiques have often praised the GARIBALDI.

4. In addition to this all-Italian division, minor Italian units, including the MATTEOTTI battalion, were incorporated into the partisan corps. According to a statement made by Marshal TITO in his interview with a "Reuter" correspondent early in May 1944, over 80,000 Italian soldiers are fighting at present in Jugo-Slavia on the side of the partisans. Italian losses have been very heavy in this region.

For the purpose of assisting the land operations and supplying the Italian and partisan troops, units of the Italian aviation have gone into action, engaging in bombing missions, strafing, anti-personnel bombing, reconnaissance, and carrying supplies by plane. Almost every day during the first months (less frequently during the winter months on account of bad weather) and now oftener with the coming of spring Italian planes of all types:

1. Raid the German air and naval bases in Jugo-Slavia and Albania, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and frequently engaging in aerial combats.

2. Ferry supplies of munitions, food and clothing, almost always alone, to the partisan groups, particularly in Montenegro, and ferrying back the wounded. This is being done under difficult landing conditions at the airport of Berane.

Units of the Italian fleet and submarines have done very important work in the Adriatic in support of TITO'S forces. Injured and other troops are brought to Italy for rest and in Italy

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they are welcomed and helped by the Italian authorities and people.

The courage and the fighting qualities of the Italian troops in Jugo-Slavia have been praised often by the Allied Military Authorities and by TITO himself. Almost every day since September 8, 1943 the Allied radio broadcast official communiques to that effect. For instance:

1. January 3, 1944 London BBC: "The Jugo-Slav radio has broadcast that during the fighting that took place in the sector of Novi Bazar, Italian groups incorporated in the Army of Liberation have given fine proof of their great valor in battle. Reference is made to the 3rd Brigade of the GARIBALDI division."

2. January 9, 1944 Moscow radio: "In Jugo-Slavia in the zone of Plevlja Italian troops in the past few days exterminated several hundreds of Germans and captured a large amount of booty."

3. March 23, 1944 London BBC: "According to information from German sources, in Bosnia Italian units have launched a violent attack against German positions 50 KM east of Serajevo. The battle continues."

4. March 25, 1944 London BBC: "Today's communique from the General Headquarters of the Jugo-Slavian Army of Liberation declares that fighting with the Jugo-Slav Army is a full Italian division and other smaller groups."

5. April 22, 1944: Marshal TITO sends a message of congratulations and thanks to the Italian division GARIBALDI for the heroic fighting done by it against the Germans.

6. May 8, 1944 London BBC: "The head of the Military Mission of Marshal Tito at London, General Wellebit, said that the Italian division GARIBALDI has reached a good state of training and constitutes a high-grade combatant force."

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THE ITALIAN ARMY:

WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE FOR THE COMMON CAUSE

30. The Italian troops that were located in Puglie at the date of the Armistice immediately joined with the Allied troops in the common fight to drive the Germans from Italian territory. During these first few days this voluntary aid was asked for and gladly accepted by the Allied Command. However, on September 21, 1943, General Macfarlane, head of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian government, verbally communicated an order that he had received from a superior authority that Italian troops were no longer to participate in front-line fighting until further orders. Immediately Marshal Badoglio protested against this decision and on September 22nd he sent a telegram to the Allied Commander-in-Chief declaring that the Italian troops wanted to continue fighting against the Germans. No response was ever received to this telegram.

On September 29 at the Malta Conference Marshal Badoglio spontaneously offered to utilize all the armed strength and resources of the Italian nation to fight alongside of the Allied forces against the Germans. He particularly offered the parachute division "Nembo" and two infantry divisions then located in Sardinia. But the offer, as shown by the proceedings of the Conference, was turned down by Gen. Alexander who remarked that "the plans for the campaign in Italy have already been minutely prepared in all their details and thus the participation of Italian troops cannot be considered." Although General Eisenhower stated at the time: "I am sure General Alexander can adjust the matter in such a way so that we can arrive at effective collaboration. I see no difficulty in permitting Italian troops to enter Rome with the first troops to arrive there." Italian participation in active fighting against the Germans was kept down to a minimum through no fault of our own and in spite of our continued and repeated offers, as will be shown later.

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To supplement this offer, on September 30, the day after the Conference, there was sent to Gen. Eisenhower and to his Chief of Staff Gen. B. Smith by the Italian High Command a memorandum, which Italian authorities were given no opportunity to present at Malta, containing the following proposals of military collaboration: the utilization in the immediate future of seven Italian divisions and of a motorized corps of about 10,000 men. Three more divisions could be ready in the near future. This would be done exclusively with Italian materiel, and the Allies were only asked to furnish the means of transporting to the Italian mainland the Italian troops in Sardinia and Corsica and to give their permission to recover arms and materiel from Sicily and Calabria. No direct answer was ever received.

On October 3, 1943 an offer was sent to the head of the Allied Military Mission to utilize the Italian Prisoners of War for the formation of several large fighting units. This offer was made again on October 11, and 26, 1943 by the Italian Supreme Command and has been repeated times without number since then but up to date no positive action has been taken.

A few days later on October 8, 1943 Marshal Badoglio saw General Alexander who, in principle, declared himself in favor of effective participation by Italian troops in military operations. No concrete steps were taken by the Allied authorities for the conditioning and use of the Italian troops in furtherance of this declaration.

On October 10, 1943 the Italian Supreme Command offered the First Assault Troop Battalion (Arditi), who are particularly trained in sabotage warfare, with the understanding that the Allies would provide the air transportation. The answer was in the negative.

On October 12, at the time of Italy's formal declaration of war on Germany, Marshal Badoglio again wrote to Gen. Eisenhower as follows:

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"Now that Italy has declared war on Germany, if it is desired that this be more than a mere platonic gesture it is necessary that you take into consideration our requests so that we may be placed in a position to render the greatest possible collaboration to the forces under your command. You have written me that the eventual betterment of the conditions of the armistice would depend upon the action taken by the Italian Government. But if you do not help me I shall be able to give nothing more than good-will."

In this regard Marshal Badoglio made the following offers:

1) Alpine troops (very useful on account of mountainous terrain and Grenadiers etc. - a total of four divisions, to be transported from Sardinia. The transporting would have to be done by the Allies since they have requisitioned all our ships.
2) Other divisions could be made ready if we could be given back our material located in Sicily and Tunisia.
3) With Italian prisoners and volunteers there could be organized large units willing to fight for the liberation of our country.

"It is a great honor" - concludes the Marshal - "to give our blood for the liberation of our country."

Again two days later, on October 14, writing to Gen. Eisenhower, Marshal Badoglio said:

"If you would help me as I have indicated in my letter of only a few days ago, you shall see that our efforts will multiply and be of great aid to our common cause."

However on October 17 Gen. Taylor informed the Italian Government:

"For the moment it is not our plan to use in military operations other Italian troops outside of the motorized corps.
It is planned to use 10 Italian divisions for the defense of lines of communication in the peninsula and the islands, some units for the anti-aircraft and coastal defenses and some units for engineering work. The Italian air-forces will be used only in the Balkans."

This answer to our communications was very discouraging. We replied, however, assuring the Allied Command of our fullest collaboration within the limits indicated by them and reiterating our desire to render greater aid, stressing the fact that in

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Sardinia there were four Italian divisions ready to be used against the Germans.

On October 22, 1943 the Italian High Command informed Gen. Eisenhower through the offices of the Italian Mission headed by Gen. Castellano at Algiers of the possibility and opportunity of using our Alpine units, more accustomed to mountain warfare than the Allied troops, in broken and mountainous terrain which does not lend itself to motorized troop movements.

On October 26, 1943 the Italian Supreme Command instructed the Italian Military Mission at Algiers to offer to the Allied authorities to transfer from Sardinia three divisions of Infantry, one division of Paratroops, 3 divisions of Coastal Defense, 1 Alpine corps group, Grenadiers, and other minor units - all of these troops to be used in the battle against the Germans. Again the answer was in the negative.

On October 30 Gen. Eisenhower authorized the readiness of an Italian division to fight alongside the Allied troops. The work of furnishing and preparing was immediately begun by the Italian Command, who informed the Allied authorities that the division selected was the LEGNANO. The readiness of this division had progressed almost to completion in the matter of training, armament and equipment from exclusive Italian resources. By a series of communications, some oral and some in writing, the utilization of this division was so obstructed by the Allied Military Authorities, even to the point of resorting to the requisitioning of its draft-animals, that in the end it could no longer be prepared for effective military service. A few days later General Alexander declared that the Italian participation would have to be limited to the motorized corps already prepared and to a corps of Alpine troops instead of a division. The Italian government immediately and again insisted that Gen. Eisenhower authorize a much larger participation.

On October 28 Gen. Eisenhower answered Badoglio's letter of October 12:

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"I am very sympathetic to the possibilities which you have enumerated.

.....Temporary limitations rule out, for some time at least, a number of your proposals which otherwise would be very desirable.

.....As we advance farther North in Italy the need for trained mountain troops will become more acute. The excellence of Italian mountain troops is well-known, and we hope to be able to take full advantage of their assistance when the time comes.

.....The occupation of Rome will undoubtedly necessitate the employment of certain Italian troops."

On November 29, 1943 the new Italian Chief of Staff, Marshal Messe, in explaining his program to the Allied Military Mission indicated the great possibilities of the Italian Army and its needs of personnel and material. No direct answer has ever been received to the proposals.

On January 1st, 1944 the Italian Command insisted again that the Paratroops of the NEMBO division be utilized in conjunction with the Corps that had entered the front lines just a few days before. It was not until the middle of May, 1944 that the NEMBO division was transferred by the Allied Military Authorities from Sardinia to the Italian mainland. It was assigned to the Italian Corps of Liberation merely for the purpose of allowing rotation of front-line troops, but with the definite order that at no time must the Corps exceed the maximum fighting strength of 14,100 men as was fixed by an order of the ACC on April 6, 1944.

From these repeated refusals the Italian government drew the unavoidable conclusion that while the Allied governments insisted on evidence of greater Italian participation in the war, the Allied Military Authorities were clearly against allowing the Italian armed forces to participate in military operations.

The Italian Army not only did not receive any aid in arms and material for the preparation of combat units but in many cases even the Italian arms which had been gotten together with great difficulty for the arming of its own units were taken away

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by order of Allied Military Authorities and sent to Yugoslavia and to other countries. Besides blocking the use of arms and Italian raw materials the Allied authorities have requisitioned large amounts of material, arms and munitions, among which were the following:

360 mortars of 81 and pieces of smaller calibre.

1,500 portable arms.

Over 2,000,000 rounds for portable arms.

A quantity of accessories for under-water arms.

Particularly crippling, since it made impossible the preparation of the projected large army units, was a request by the Allies for arms in December 1943 and one for mules in April, 1944. Moreover the Italian soldiers anxious to fight the Germans were humiliated not only by the taking of their arms away from them but by putting them to work in the rear as unloaders of ships and repairers of roads. For these jobs plenty of civilian man-power was available.

A typical case is that which happened in Corsica. The importance of the contribution made by the Italian troops in the liberation of Corsica can be demonstrated not only by the declarations of Prime Minister Churchill, already quoted, by accounts in the Corsican press, as the events were happening, by the various letters addressed by French generals to the Italian Generals commanding our troops in Corsica, by the evident numerical superiority of the Italian units and means used against the Germans in proportion to those employed at the same time in the operations by the Allies and the French, but above all by the number of Italian dead which in all reached a total beyond a thousand men.

As to the four Italian divisions, which fought for the Allied cause in Corsica, it was asked that upon their leaving for

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Italy they leave in the Island not only the small amount of French arms but also a large part of their (Italian) motorized equipment and artillery. In justification of this request it was said that this would avoid unnecessary transportation of material and obviate the sending of new equipment in Corsica. It was promised by General Theodore Roosevelt, Gen. Eisenhower's special envoy to Sardinia, that the material given up would be replaced with other equipment that would be issued them in Italy. This up to now has not been done. A large number of Italian troops varying from five to ten thousand men has nevertheless continued to render services in Corsica from last November until now on work of clearing the fields of mines, the rebuilding of roads and on other important war work.

The same thing happened to the Italian troops in the Aegean Islands. The CUNEO division and the remnants of the division REGINA and other minor units after having fought hard and well against the Germans were transferred to Palestine in November and December of 1943 by Allied order. General Soldarelli was ordered by the Italian Supreme Command to re-organize these troops into the one division CUNEO and in conversations had with General Wilson it was understood that they were to be used as a fighting unit. Instead an order was received from the ACC that this division was to be used for labor services. The Italian authorities protested and insisted that it be used for fighting purposes, but their requests were ignored.

The Allied authorities are constantly making demands upon the Italian Command for troops to perform auxiliary services, such as road repair, longshoremen, etc. These requests obstruct the army's plans of preparing the minimum quota of fighting troops allocated by the ACC and it cuts down the margins needed for the organization of other divisions. The work of road repair and ship unloading, etc. are undoubtedly of great value,

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but to soldiers who are willing and anxious to fight for the liberation of their soil these jobs are demoralizing to their fighting spirit. Civilian labor of which there is a great abundance could be utilized to greater advantage for this work and in that way much of the unemployment that exists could be eliminated.

The return of Italian volunteers from neutral countries is also obstructed by the Allied authorities despite the fact that they would have raised the morale and spirit of the people. In many cases they were persons who had fled from France and reached Spain after having skillfully evaded the German authorities.

The efforts of Colonel Panella commanding the GARIBALDI LEGION to bring it from Algiers to fight at the Italian front have so far come to naught. This legion is anti-Fascist and anti-German in character for it fought the German forces at Tours in 1940 and after the fall of France many of them reached North Africa. The GARIBALDI LEGION represents the finest traditions of the Risorgimento and would have constituted the best link between the past wars for the liberation of Italy and the present one. Colonel Panella's offer so far has not been accepted although these Italian soldiers, who were already fighting the Germans in 1940, were asking only for the chance to fight again on behalf of their country's freedom.

The Italian government has repeatedly asked that it be authorized to send a larger number of troops to participate in the offensive for the taking of Rome in pursuance to the promise made last fall by General Eisenhower. The answer of the ACC was that insofar as the Italian Army was concerned it would be allowed to send the fixed number of 14,100 of troops and not one more. The Italian Air Force had prepared a battalion of assault troops (Arditi) and offered it to the Allied authorities on May 11, 1944 but the answer was again in the negative. The

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Italian Supreme Command recently offered the CREMONA division but so far the responses have been evasive.

These are only a few of the countless similar offers made by the Italian government to the Allied Military Authorities and turned down by them. They all go to show that the Italian people "do not seek spurious rehabilitation through external acts but Italy's national and international regeneration through their own courageous efforts."

Had our repeated offers been accepted who can say how many lives of American boys would have been spared! The more so if one considers that by a skillful use of Italian Alpine troops (whose excellence was praised by General Eisenhower) the whole Italian campaign could have taken long ago a wholly different turn.

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