THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

For preparation of reply.

F.D.R.

 DMH-54
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Rome
Dated August 15, 1944
Rec'd 12:55 p.m., 16th

Secretary of State
Washington

185, August 15, noon

In forwarding Bonomi's letter on publication of armistice terms (my 166, August 11, 4 p.m.) to SAC, Stone commented as follows:

Situation is now altered by present Italian initiative. Both Secretary General of Foreign Office and Bonomi himself have stated that main reason for this initiative is expectation that war against Germany may end shortly and conviction that publication of Italian and German armistice terms more or less simultaneously would have a deplorable effect in Italy as it would emphasize past association with Germany at very moment it is trying to turn back to older and better ways. While this argument has substance as concerns stability, and local prestige of present government it is obvious from Bonomi's letter that they also hope Allies intend to sugar pill by making some simultaneous concession to Italians such as granting Lend Lease aid. The fact that
time has passed since our June inquiry and terms remain unpublished may have led Italians to conclude that Allies for reasons of their own interests may be reluctant to publish and this may be basis for hope that pressure for publication now might incline Allies all the more to some simultaneous concession.

While recognizing this possible element of maneuver Kirk, Charles and I feel it will be difficult to refuse Italian request for publication except for countervailing and compelling military considerations.

I shall appreciate earliest possible instruction as to reply I should send Bonomi. I have merely acknowledged letter and impressed upon him importance that no publicity be given Italian initiative. In event of publication Italian Government would wish if possible to coordinate date and terms of announcement with Allies before made either in Rome or Allied capitals. End paraphrase.

As it does not (repeat not) now appear that matter will come before the Advisory Council (Department's 51, August 11, 1 p.m.) I assume that position of the United States will be transmitted to AFHQ through combined chiefs of staff so that a prompt decision along those lines may be made.
My dear Mr. President:

I thank you for your letter of July 2, 1944, written after the inauguration of the new government. I followed with keen interest the political developments in Italy immediately after the liberation of Rome. It was a source of satisfaction to the people of this country and to me personally to observe free men taking an active part again in the direction of Italian affairs and solving problems of government in the true democratic spirit. I congratulate you and your colleagues for the fine contribution you are making, under difficult circumstances, to the political life of Italy.

Your observations on the various problems confronting your country and the exhaustive document accompanying your letter have been referred to the Secretary of State for study. I believe that Mr. Hull has recently communicated with you through Mr. Kirk regarding various aspects of Italian political and economic life. Thus you will already have at hand, when this reaches you, an expression of this Government’s views on the several questions which you have raised and to which it is giving active and sympathetic consideration.

Thank you for your good wishes for the success of the Allied landings and battle in northern Europe. This operation is now being supported by a second successful invasion of France, from the south. We can have good hope that total victory over our common enemy in Europe will now not be long delayed.

Sincerely yours

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Ivano Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Rome.
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States
1944 Vol. III The British Commonwealth Europe
Pages 1139 - 1140
Il Presidente  
del Consiglio dei Ministri

Salerno, 2 July 1944

Mr. President,

Ever since the very first days of my advent to the government it has been my intention to contact you directly, to express, above all, the vivid and profound sense of solidarity and admiration with which Italian democracy, living once again today after so many years of silence, follows your activity and your work.

If I do so at this time, though a few weeks have elapsed since the formation of the new government, I am hoping that you will be so kind as to attribute it both to my reluctance to deprive you of some of your time, more precious now than ever, and to my desire to wait for a propitious occasion, which presents itself only today, permitting me to write directly to you in a more lengthy manner than could be accomplished by a mere telegram.

You know that today my government is composed exclusively of men absolutely free from any fascist contamination, of the most authorized and representative exponents of the six Italian political parties, that is, of men with deep conviction and profound sincerity, all of whom are capable of bringing Italy back to the road of her best liberal and democratic traditions, for which, in fact, they have lived and suffered for twenty years.

All these men are counting a great deal upon your support and assistance. They are all perfectly aware of the fact that no one can be more disinterestedly close to them in this, our effort of material and spiritual reconstruction and elevation of the country, than the President of the great and free North American Republic.

They turn, therefore, to you, with great faith and great hope.

I do not wish to tell you that the conditions given to Italy at the time of the Armistice were unjust. I simply want to mention to you that almost a year after the Armistice, and with an Italy so transformed, these still prevailing conditions are becoming progressively graver and therefore more unjust.

Why is it that, on the one hand, we are not allowed to participate with our own forces in the liberation of our national territory from German oppression as we would like to do, as we could do and as would be morally necessary for us to do; and why, on the other hand, is that free development...
development of our democratic life, the very condition of our salvation, denied us with excessive controls, excessive interference and excessive burden of occupation.

In these last few days, with the help of my old friend Marshal Badoglio, I have prepared a summary in the form of a document which I am forwarding to you by a personal and secret means. This document points out the greatest difficulties, the stumbling blocks and the gravest obstacles which we have found in our path during these eight months of co-belligerency. It is an elaborate document based upon data and material for the most part official but nevertheless unpublished.

I trust you will be able to peruse it and have it studied by your subordinates in a more thorough manner. Above all, I trust that you will be able to find in it, the incentive and the inspiration for a gesture and an initiative of human generosity which would give, to the new Italian democracy, the feeling that fascism is as dead internationally as it is dead in the hearts of the Italians, and which would finally allow us that determination and that impetus, devoid of humiliation and impotence, which we need so much in order to meet, with greater energy, the difficult tasks that await us.

The enthusiasm with which the North American troops have been received in Rome has certainly conveyed to you, more than any affirmation on my part, the spirit and fervor with which a people of 45 million souls looks to the United States and to its President. The Italian people have undergone indescribable sufferings and will continue to suffer. However, they are a sane, honest and solid people to whom credit can be given. Their activity and industriousness will be necessary to the reconstruction of Europe. Every aid and assistance which will be given them in this dark hour will certainly be a constructive deed towards the free world of tomorrow.

I repeat, Mr. President, that the free men who today govern Italy look to you with great faith and great hope.

In conclusion, it is superfluous for me to tell you with what admiration we follow, in these days, the gigantic effort directed by you which has brought North American troops to French soil and with what complete solidarity, Mr. President, we send you our most cordial and warm best wishes.

I beg you to believe in my sincerest sentiments.

/s/ Ivanoe Bonomi
MEMORANDUM ON ITALIAN PRO MEMORIA
OF JUNE 12, 1944.

This one hundred page document prepared by the Italian Government, probably the Foreign Office, recites the developments since the fall of Mussolini, including the Italian surrender, its declaration of war on Germany and the problems which have confronted it during its eight months of co-belligerency. Among the principal grievances for which I feel there is some basis for justification are:

1. The treatment of Italian prisoners of war and their present use in the Allied war effort contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention. General Eisenhower informed the Italian people on July 30, 1943 that all Italian prisoners captured in Tunisia and Sicily would be released and restored to their families if the Italians would release and deliver Allied prisoners in their hands. It is a matter of record that almost all, if not all, Allied prisoners of war in Italy were released by the Italian authorities on September 8, 1943, thus fulfilling their part of the bargain to the extent possible. It is also a matter of record, I believe, that Allied prisoners of war have almost invariably received aid and comfort from the Italian population since that date in hiding from the Germans and neo-Fascists and when possible, making their way across the lines to liberated Italy.

2. Forcing the Italians to sign the "long terms of surrender" twenty-six days after they had signed the original surrender terms and at the time we persuaded them to declare war on Germany and become "co-belligerents".

3. Exchange rate between the lire and the pound and the dollar, which many of our people, including Henry Grady, consider fixed the value of the lire too low and has been a factor in Italian inflation. At the present rate the French franc is worth two lire which is the reverse of the situation before the war.

4. Permission for the Italian armed forces to participate more directly and to a larger extent in the war against Germany and the liberation of their country.

Other Grievances listed are the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge in Quebec that the clauses of the short Armistice terms will be modified in Italy depending upon the aid given by the Italian Government and people in the war against Germany; the revision of the Cunningham agreement in November regulating the use of the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine; General Eisenhower's letter of September 29 stating that many of the terms of the long Armistice were already obsolete and saying that recommendations for their modification would be made from time to time depending upon Italian assistance in the war effort; undue interference by the Allied Control Commission in all aspects of
of Italian life; refusal to permit the reestablishment of Italian commercial aviation; continuation on the proclaimed list of Italian firms; failure to repatriate Italian diplomats captured in North Africa and interned there; refusal to permit the Italian Government to participate in the Advisory Council for Italy; the indiscriminate requisitioning of homes, buildings and industrial plants by Allied forces; failure to reemploy and rehabilitate Italian industry in the liberated areas; lack of consultation by the Allied authorities with the Italian Government regarding appointments, removals and promotions of Italian civil servants in liberated Italy; control of Italian radio by Psychological warfare branch; inhumane treatment of Italian prisoners of war in French hands; failure of the Allied Governments to permit the Italian Government to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and postponement of the Italian request to resume membership in the International Labor Organization.

Certain of the Italian complaints which may be disputed are:

1. That Badoglio was not informed until a few hours before of the announcement of the Italian Armistice. It is our understanding that he was informed several days before and at the last minute tried to have the announcement postponed.

2. That ACC is only interfering and a hindrance to Italian cooperation and recovery. The ACC has, generally speaking, done an excellent job and has in many cases taken the Italian point of view vis-a-vis the Allied military authorities whose principal interest has been operational.

3. That the Allies have "insisted" on paying for Italian missions in neutral countries when these could be supported by the Italian Government if its foreign assets were unblocked. Immediately after the Italian capitulation we were unable to find any Italian Government assets abroad. Only recently have Italian foreign exchange accruals begun to amount to a sizeable figure and we and the British have now agreed that the time has come for the Italians to begin financing their missions out of these reserves.

4. That we have used Italian merchant ships in Portuguese waters contrary to the Cunningham Agreement. No mention, however, is made of Allied advances during the past eight months to maintain Italian vessels and crews in Spanish waters and our successful negotiations with the Spanish authorities to eventually release these vessels.

5. That we refused to let an Italian Ambassador go to Argentina. This was, of course, in line with United Nations policy toward the present Argentine regime with which it is reasonable to expect the Italians to conform.

6. That
6. That the military authorities have refused to turn back to Italian administration Italy's transportation and communication facilities. This attitude is, of course, based on military necessity as long as the military campaign in Italy is going on.

7. That there is complete control of the Italian press by the Allied authorities (FRA). This situation has been greatly improved and the control of the Italian press has been returned to the Italian Government in territory under its control. There is no political censorship of internal Italian newspapers. It is reported that there are eleven daily newspapers in Rome alone.

It should, furthermore, be remembered that the Allied Governments have restored to Italian administration, under the Royal Italian Government, most of the territory liberated by its forces. The relaxation of domestic controls over Italians as enemy aliens in October 1942 is another indication of United States sympathy and understanding of the position of the Italian people in the present conflict. If it is decided to transfer to the Italian Government the dollar equivalent of American troop pay spent in Italy by American armed forces, this will be a gesture of great significance which will not only prove to be of real support to the present liberal government but also have the effect of redeeming some of the Allied military currency which has been issued by the occupying forces in Italy.
Signor Presidente,

Desideravo sin dai primi giorni del mio avvento al potere, premi in diretto contatto con Lei per dirLe soprattutto: il vivo e profondo senso di solidarietà e di ammirazione con cui la democrazia Italiana, che oggi risveglie dopo tanti anni di silenzio, segue la Sua attività e la Sua opera.

Se lo faccio soltanto ora, a distanza di qualche settimana dalla formazione del nuovo Governo, Ella voglia, La prego, attrbuirlo sia alla mia riluttanza a portarLe via anche brevi momenti del Suo tempo oggi più che mai prezioso, sia al desiderio di attendere una occasione propizia, che oggi infatti mi si presenta, che mi consentisse di scrivereLe direttamente in termini meno rissuntivi che non in un semplice telegramma.

Ella sa che il mio Governo e' oggi composto esclusivamente di uomini assolutamente puri da ogni contaminazione fascista, degli esponenti più autorizzati e rappresentativi dei sei partiti politici italiani, di uomini cioè che intendono tutti, con profonda convinzione e profonda sincerità, riportare l'Italia sul la via maestra delle sue migliori tradizioni liberali e democritiche e per tutto ciò hanno infatti per vent'anni vissuto e sofferto.

a Sua Eccellenza
Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America

Washington, D.C.
Tutti questi uomini contano molto sul vostro appoggio e sulla vostra assistenza. Essi si rendono tutti perfettamente conto che nessuno piu' e meglio del Presidente della grande e libera Repubblica Nordamericana puo' essere loro piu' disinteressatamente vicino in questo nostri sforzo di elevazione e di ricostruzione materiale e spirituale del Paese.

Essi si rivolgono dunque a Lei con molta fede e molta speranza.

Io non voglio dirLe che le condizioni fatte all'Italia al momento dell'Armistizio sono state ingiuste. Voglio dirLe semplicemente che, a quasi un anno di distanza dall'Armistizio e con una Italia così trasformata, queste condizioni tuttora permanenti ed anzi progressivamente piu' gravi, stanno diventando ingiuste.

Perche' da una parte ci impediscono di concorrere con le nostre forze, come vorremmo e come potremmo e come sarebbe per noi moralmente necessario, alla liberazione del territorio nazionale dall'oppressione tedesca; perche' ci vietano dall'altra, con gli eccessivi controlli, le eccessive interferenze, l'eccessivo peso dell'occupazione, quel libero sviluppo della nostra vita democratica che e' la condizione stessa della nostra salvezza.

Ho fatto in questi giorni preparare, anche con l'aiuto del mio vecchio amico Maresciallo Badoglio, un documento riassuntivo che Le accluso in via personale e segreta, dal quale risultano le nostre maggiori difficoltà e gli inciampi e gli ostacoli piu' gravi che abbiamo trovato sul nostro cammino in questi ottimo mesi di obbigheranza. E' un documento elaborato su dati e documenti in gran parte ufficiali e comunque non pubblici. Da cio' la necessita' della sua riservatezza.
Confido che Ella possa scorrerlo rapidamente e farlo esami-
nare dai suoi uffici in modo più approfondito. Confido soprattut-
to che Ella possa trovarvi lo spunto e l’ispirazione per un gesto
che sia un’iniziativa di umana generosità che dia alla nuova democra-
tia italiana la sensazione che il fascismo e anche internazio-
metalmente morto come morto nel cuore degli Italiani e ci consen-
ta finalmente quella spinta e quell’avvio, fuori dall’umiliazione e
dall’impotenza, di cui abbiamo bisogno per affrontare con maggior
energia i duri compiti che ci attendono.

L’entusiasmo con cui le truppe Nordamericane sono state accolte
a Roma, Le hanno certamente detto più di ogni altra mia affermazione
con quale animo e con quale fervore un popolo di 45 milioni di
uomini guarda verso gli Stati Uniti ed il suo Presidente. Il popolo
italiano ha indubbiamente sofferto e soffrirà ancora, ma è un
popolo sano, onesto e solido, cui si può far credito. La sua atti-
vità ed operosità saranno necessarie alla ricostruzione europea.
Ogni aiuto ed assistenza che gli saranno dati in questa griglia
sono certamente un atto distruttivo verso il libero mondo di doma-
ni.

Io Le ripeto, Signor Presidente, che gli uomini liberi che sono
oggi al Governo d’Italia, guardano verso di Lei con molta fede e
molta speranza.

Ed è, concludendo, superfluo io Le dica con quanta ammirazione
noi seguiamo in questi giorni il gigantesco sforzo da Lei diretto
che ha portato le truppe Nordamericane sul territorio francese e
con quale completa solidarieta' Le inviamo, Signor Presidente,
i nostri piu' cordiali e caldi voti augurali.
La prego di credere ai miei sentimenti migliori.

[Signature]
A Sua Eccellenza

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America

Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:

There is attached a draft reply to Prime Minister Bonomi’s letter of July 2 which has been prepared for your signature, if you approve, in accordance with your memorandum of August 14, 1944.

There are also attached a translation of the Prime Minister’s letter and a memorandum concerning the Pro Memoria submitted with his letter. The original letter and Pro Memoria are being returned herewith.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. Draft reply to Prime Minister Bonomi.
2. Translation of Prime Minister’s letter.
4. Letter from Prime Minister Bonomi.
5. Pro Memoria.

The President,

The White House.
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

I would appreciate it very much if you would hand the attached memorandum to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director.
10 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Transmitted herewith is a letter addressed to you by Ivanoe Bonomi, Prime Minister of Italy, dated 2 July 1944, which was brought to this country at his request by a member of this organization.

I am also enclosing a document entitled "Developments Dating from Armistice Negotiations" which was prepared for you by the Italian Government and the following booklets:

Barbagallo, *Napoli contro il Terrore Nazista*

Capozzi, *Venti Giorni di Terrore*

Matrone, *La Cacciata dei Tedeschi da Scafati*.

Respectfully

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

REGRARED UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON:

The President sent word to General O'Dwyer through Mr. Myron Taylor that he would like to see him. If he comes here on Friday, the President will see him then. If not, he will see him up above.

G.G.T.
FMH-200
Vatican City
Dated September 1, 1944
Rec'd 8:32 a.m., 2nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

September 1, 5 p.m.

THIS MESSAGE IS URGENT AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

It is extremely important before your reported conference with the Prime Minister that you have a frank talk with General O'Dwyer regarding Italy, its relief needs, and plans to meet the situation. To accomplish this will you request Secretary Hull or Leo Crowley to telegraph O'Dwyer personally to report to Washington for consultation without delay.

TAYLOR

BB
Vatican City

Dated September 11, 1944
Rec'd 8:06 a.m., 12th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT
313, September 11, 1 p.m.
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

My greatest present concern is that with the completion of Italian National Committee for the Distribution of Italian Relief the material accumulated in America will not be available in Italy through failure to ship according to schedule. First shipment should now have arrived. If not delivered reaction damaging to prestige we have built up will be very unfortunate. Reported statements from America indicate intention of substantial and adequate relief for Italy is the policy of our government. While we in America understand the shipping difficulties, the people in distress do not. Would it be possible to allocate one or two
one or two ships for strictly relief voyages with standard cargoes of staples and essentials and keep them constantly en route bringing relief to stricken populations? It seems to me with such vessels loaded at a given port in America and destined for convenient ports in Italy, a minimum of time would be lost in loading and unloading and the delays and complications resulting from mixed cargoes, munitions and other vital products would be avoided. A simple plan of this character would seem deserving of careful study.

TAYLOR

JT
MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Are you finished with this now that you have given out the statement on Italy?

G.G.T.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I showed the attached papers to Jerry Land and in regard to the one from Mr. Myron Taylor, he says if you want him to send the two ships he can do it, but of course he will have to take them away from the military. However, he says this can be done without great sacrifice and they do it all the time.

In regard to the memorandum from the State Department, Jerry says there is plenty of foodstuff in the Near East that could be sent to Italy but the difficulty is they have not the trucks to distribute them after they arrive at the port. This is entirely up to the Army. If General Mark Clark is willing to supply the trucks then of course they could distribute the food to the various places. Jerry suggests that this State Department memorandum be taken up with General Marshall or General Somerville.

Do you want him to supply the two ships?

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

I have had several talks with General O'Dwyer, Crowley and the State Department relative to the Italian business. The attached memo supplements the statement which you have with you on Italy.

It seems to me that there are great advantages to be accrued to us if you can take the initiative and get Churchill's approval to a course of action which you would announce publicly.

The machinery for getting quick action relative to immediate relief and the purchase of material for economic rehabilitation is available. The Italians can pay for all of the goods to be bought in this country, other than emergency relief supplies, out of funds which would accrue to them from our soldiers' pay.

The Prisoner of War business, I think, should be cleared up just as soon as possible and, of equal importance, is the obvious necessity of amending the Armistice terms.

H.L.H.

encl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of FEB 10 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS, THE WHITE HOUSE

I refer to Mr. Jones' conversation with you Monday morning, September 11.

American policy toward Italy is based upon our desire to see that nation return to political and economic independence and stability as quickly as possible. We do not believe that Italy will contribute to an orderly and peaceful Europe if it is subject to any one of its more powerful neighbors. This Government has specifically assured the Italian people the right to choose the form of government they may desire when they are in a position to exercise that right. Political independence for Italy, free from foreign domination, would seem to be implicit in this pledge.

The economic well-being of a country is the prime factor in its internal stability and its peaceful relations with other states. The economic dependence of one state upon another is not conducive to such well-being and may ultimately have undesirable political implications. Furthermore, since the United States is bearing the major share of the civilian supply quota for Italy, it is sound American policy to help Italy again become self-supporting and to regain a measure of economic independence at an early date.

In the immediate future increased civilian supplies, principally foodstuffs, are essential to prevent further deterioration in Italian public health and morale in the ever-increasing portions of liberated Italy. The three principal problems to be solved are:

(1) Available
(1) Available shipping to carry supplies from this country.

(2) Internal transportation to distribute it to the various populated centers.

(3) Method of payment.

A specific and sufficient allocation of shipping for civilian supplies should be obtained from the War Department or other United States agency.

Two thousand trucks are needed for the distribution of supplies for civilians in the present liberated area. Army trucks within the theater should be made available to the extent possible (not convenient) by the Supreme Allied Command. Once hostilities have ceased, a sufficient number of United States Army trucks and tractors in the theater could be made available for this purpose until the internal transportation system can be rehabilitated at least in a basic sense.

When the dollar equivalent of American troop pay spent in Italy, plus immigrant remittances and Italian exports to this country, is made available to the Italian Government, almost all the foreign exchange required for the purchase of civilian supplies in this country will be provided. (It is believed that this proposal is at present on the President’s desk, having received British concurrence, and could be put into effect immediately if approved.) Limited UNRRA participation in the medical field and in assistance to displaced persons of Italian nationality up to $50,000,000 is essential to supplement the civilian supply program mentioned above. Every effort therefore should be made to assure that agreement to this proposal is given at the UNRRA conference in Montreal this month.

As to the second phase of Italy’s economic problems, we should now make possible the primary rehabilitation of its agriculture and essential industries in order that the Italian nation can begin to be self-supporting again. Hence the Italian supply program should not be limited, as it has been so far, to consumer’s goods but should make available fertilizer, seeds, spare parts and essential raw
raw materials to permit the resumption of Italian production for the nation's basic consumers' needs. This will require not only a sufficient shipping allocation but sufficient funds to finance such a program even on a limited scale. The United States' funds to be made available to the Italian Government from troop pay, immigration remittances, et cetera, will probably not cover such an undertaking in addition to the consumers' goods which must be purchased over the next year for immediate consumption by the population. The following additional methods of financing might prove feasible.

(1) The War Department could continue its present practice of certifying Lend-Lease funds, on the basis of military necessity, to finance a civilian supply program of minimum subsistence. This would provide for the principal portion of the importation of consumers' goods, and the foreign exchange available to the Italian Government from troop pay, et cetera, would then be sufficient to finance a basic rehabilitation program for Italian agriculture and industry.

(2) Private Italian assets in this country, estimated roughly at $74,000,000, could be taken over by the Italian Government and used as security for an Italian Government loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purchase of basic rehabilitation supplies.

On the political side it is desirable to clarify our relations with Italy, which has been a co-belligerent with the United Nations in the war against Germany for almost a year. During that time the Italian Government--Armed Forces and people--have cooperated sincerely and to the best of their limited resources in the common fight. They have "worked their passage" to a considerable extent. The United States and Great Britain could revise Italian Armistice terms which have been rendered largely obsolete by the course of events, or we could conclude a preliminary peace treaty with Italy, terminating the state of war existing between it and the United Nations, postponing for future settlement the more complicated issues of territorial dispositions and reparations.
Specific steps should meanwhile be undertaken immediately to support the representative and liberal Italian Government and to encourage the various democratic groups in Italy who are working for the regeneration of their country. These might include:

(1) The removal from prisoner-of-war status of Italian soldiers in the British Empire, North Africa, Italy and this country and their return to regular military status under Italian Command with ultimate authority for their disposition and use resting in the Allied Theater Commander or respective British and American military authorities. It is an anomalous situation, to say the least, that while Italian divisions are fighting with the United Nations on the Italian front and Italian resources are being employed to the fullest extent in the common struggle against Germany, we continue to hold Italian prisoners of war not only abroad but in Italy itself. The non-combat services which they are now performing in these areas could be performed as effectively if they had the status of Italian soldiers under Italian command. A solution of this problem would be a concrete and important gesture of support to the present Italian Government.

(2) The acceptance of Italian technical representatives by the various United Nations to handle financial and economic problems and to resume the protection of Italian interests in the various United Nations which is still being performed by third powers.

(3) Italian participation in the various international organizations, such as the ILO, UNRRA, Food and Agricultural Organization, Financial and Monetary Conference, et cetera. Italy also desires to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, this without reference to membership in the United Nations.

(4) Resumption of United States' participation in the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome until such time as it is superseded or absorbed by the proposed Food and Agricultural Organization.

A copy of a memorandum which was prepared in this office for the President's use in Quebec is attached for your information.

Enclosure:
Memorandum.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I showed the attached papers to Jerry Land and in regard to the one from Mr. Myron Taylor, he says if you want him to send the two ships he can do it, but of course he will have to take them away from the military. However, he says this can be done without great sacrifice and they do it all the time.

In regard to the memorandum from the State Department, Jerry says there is plenty of foodstuffs in the Near East that could be sent to Italy but the difficulty is they have not the trucks to distribute them after they arrive at the port. This is entirely up to the Army. If General Mark Clark is willing to supply the trucks then of course they could distribute the food to the various places. Jerry suggests that this State Department memorandum be taken up with General Marshall or General Somervelle.

Do you want him to supply the two ships?

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HARRY HOPKINS:

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY
FILES.

F.D.R.

[Handwritten note]

Italy scan 1-44

[Handwritten note]

Grace

[Handwritten note]

Have noted

Henry
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESS

September 15, 1944.

I have been concerned over the problem of relief to Italy during the coming Winter and have discussed the whole matter with Prime Minister Churchill and by telephone with Chairman Lehman of UNRRA.

It is our thought that more food and clothing must be got to Italy as soon as it can be shipped. It will be remembered, of course, that the northern half of Italy is occupied by the Germans. The southern half, occupied by British and American forces, is being handled by the Army in relief matters. We are asking UNRRA to appropriate fifty million dollars to supplement the food already allocated to Italian relief by the Army.

Finally, I am asking Mayor LaGuardia of New York to proceed at once to Italy to make a quick survey of the relief situation in the area south of the combat line.

The people of Italy can be assured of food this Winter and other matters, such as standards of pay, will shortly be straightened out. In addition, the Government of Italy will be invited to take on gradually increasing duties so that the people of Italy can look forward to increasing self government.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thought you would like to know that General O'Dwyer has arranged for a national broadcast on Columbus Day, the central feature of which will be a short wave broadcast from Rome by Bonomi. O'Dwyer will see to it on his return that Bonomi strikes the proper note of gratitude and friendliness.

Lauchlin Currie
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Secret telegram to the Secretary of State, (State Dept. Dispatch No. 329) from Kirk, Rome, Sept. 9, 1944, with attached dispatch No. 330 from Kirk, embodying text of message which Count Sforza wanted to be sent to the President in re Communists in Italy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

Dear Grace:

    I have read this. It does not require an answer by the President and can be filed.

    The real headache here is lack of shipping.

H.B.H.

encl.
Letter and file re UNRRA Mission to Italy
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY AND
THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Herbert H. Lehman, Director
General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration, 1344 Connecticut Ave., 10/5/44,
to the President, enclosing copy of a cable that
UNRRA has received from Hon. Myron Taylor, 9/27/44,
in re relief for Italy, copy of letter which Mr. Lehman has addressed to the Asst. Secy.
of War, John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Combined
Civil Affairs Committee, together with copies of the enclosures referred to therein. Mr.
Lehman states that as soon as action is taken by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as
requested, an UNRRA Mission can immediately leave for Italy to negotiate detailed arrangements

(over)
along the lines outlined in the communication to Mr. McCloy. Mr. Lehman has asked the Chief of this Mission, Mr. Sam Keany, to confer with Ambassador Taylor promptly on his arrival in Italy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY AND
THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.
My dear Mr. President:

I send you herewith copy of a cable that UNRRA has received from Ambassador Taylor which he asked me to bring to your attention. I am also enclosing a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, together with copies of the enclosures referred to therein.

As soon as action is taken by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as requested, an UNRRA Mission can immediately leave for Italy to negotiate detailed arrangements along the lines outlined in my communication to Mr. McCloy. I have asked the Chief of this Mission, Mr. Sam Keeny, to confer with Ambassador Taylor promptly on his arrival in Italy.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Herbert H. Lehman

The President,

The White House.
FROM: Sans Origine (From Myron Taylor)  
NUMBER: Unnumbered  
DATED: September 27, 1944

It has pleased me very much to note the action of the UNRRA conference at Montreal in making available some 50 million dollars for certain categories of relief in Italy. If you will request State Department they will provide you with the statute press release by Prime Minister of Italy and the letters which passed between him and myself on September 18 my telegram of September 18 to State Department which relate to the organization on an Italian National basis of National Agency for distribution of relief in Italy which is intended to cooperate and correlate all distribution of donated materials and supplies in Italy. These donations will in part be made by the Italian Government, the Vatican, other Governments, organizations and individuals, and a reorganized Italian Red Cross Administration of relief by the National Agency provides for free transportation free services and volunteer workers in all necessary fields. It is intended to be entirely Italian in character in order to help Italy to help herself. As advisors and consultants we have arranged for representatives of the American Red Cross American Relief for Italy Inc and representatives of the Allied Military authorities and their subsidiaries in Italy. Many of the supplies under contemplation by UNRRA have also been in part provided by American Relief for Italy and are awaiting shipment which have unhappily been delayed by the Allied Agencies in Washington or London or elsewhere. Your representative Sorier in Rome has conferred with the above advisory representatives on the basis of coordinated activities of UNRRA with those of the National Agency. It is our opinion that UNRRA representative supervising in cooperation with the above named groups can perform a more efficient economical and timely accomplishment of their purpose than by attempting separate action. We believe the field of refugees of course is in many respects a separate one though relief in providing essential clothing and maintenance for all who are in distress in the released Italian areas will naturally be part of the plan for general relief. The government has already a cabinet representative for refugees as has the Vatican and it would seem that a similar representative of UNRRA working in the field of returning refugees to their homes or to a place of permanent settlement would be best handled by a separate committee aided by the War Refugee Board in America and the Intergovernmental
Committee for refugees. This preliminary outline is intended to give you an impression of the situation as it now exists and which is much more promising than any that has previously existed both in the field of relief in terms of current maintenance and in terms of refugee objectives.

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Kuo
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McGeachy
Sawyer

*Responsibility for initiating appropriate reply.
29 September 1944

Honorable John J. McCloy
Chairman, Combined Civil Affairs Committee
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

As you undoubtedly know, at its Second Session in Montreal just closed, the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration adopted a resolution establishing the scale and nature of relief and rehabilitation operations to be undertaken in Italy. In addition, the Council adopted another resolution authorizing operations in enemy and ex-enemy territories directed to the care and repatriation of displaced persons of United Nations nationality and to the control of epidemics. I am enclosing copies of these resolutions.

The resolution concerning Italy confines our operations to three types of assistance: the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies; assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons; and care of, and welfare services for, children and nursing and expectant mothers. The resolution also limits our expenditures of foreign exchange for these purposes to $50,000,000. The resolution concerning assistance to displaced persons of United Nations nationality and epidemic control work imposed no budgetary limitations.

I

UNRRA Programs for Italy

Our programs for Italy, pursuant to these resolutions, are briefly summarized below. It must be understood, of course, that this statement is quite tentative and is subject to modification as a result of further study of the Italian situation and as a result of negotiations with the appropriate authorities.

1. Assistance to Children and Mothers

Our efforts under the first resolution mentioned above will be chiefly directed to providing care of, and welfare services for,
children of school and pre-school age, and nursing and expectant mothers. The major part of the expenditures for this purpose will be for supplies to supplement the provision already being made for these classes of the population. Because of the limitations of our budget, we expect to confine this assistance to approximately 1,700,000 children and 300,000 mothers. This means that only one out of every five children of the ages included will receive this assistance. The recipients will be those children who are suffering from the more serious cases of undernourishment and malnutrition. The program will furnish each recipient, on the average, additional food up to the value of 750 calories daily. It is understood that such food will be in addition to the basic rations provided by other authorities.

Our operations in this respect will be centered largely in the bigger cities. We are not planning to furnish such supplies in the country or in the smaller communities, except in those which are not agriculturally self-supporting. So long as military operations in Italy continue, we shall, of course, also limit our operations to those areas which may be regarded as in repose.

Our present estimates indicate that the children and mothers program will require approximately 15,000 tons of supply per month, the major commodities being:

- Dry skimmed milk: 3,100 tons
- Sugar: 860 tons
- Fats: 820 tons
- Flour: 5,000 tons
- Pulses: 2,150 tons
- Farina: 315 tons
- Fish: 1,500 tons
- Miscellaneous: 1,255 tons

The ultimate distribution of these supplies to the recipients will in all likelihood be handled primarily by two Italian organizations, Opera Nazionale per la Protezione della Maternita e dell' Infanzia (ONMI) and the Italian Ministry of Education. The ONMI will be expected to conduct the distribution of supplies to the children of pre-school age and the nursing and expectant mothers. The exact method of distributing food, whether by issue for consumption at home or by other means, will be determined by agreement in the field to meet local conditions. The supplies for children of school age will be distributed by the Ministry of Education, the food being distributed most probably through school lunches.

2. Medical and Sanitary Aid and Supplies

Our assistance along these lines will consist of the dispatch of medical personnel whose primary function will be the rendering of advice in the restoration of the Italian Public Health Services, and the furnishing of up to $8,000,000 worth of medical and sanitary supplies, particularly of commodities not now included in the military supply program, over the period
of a year, to supplement the supplies now being furnished to Italy. With the medical supplies which are being imported into Italy at the rate for all of Italy of approximately $1,000,000 worth a month, this will provide a total of up to $20,000,000 worth for the whole country over a period of one year, an amount which appears extremely modest for a population of 45,000,000.

Included in the items to be furnished will be raw material from which certain medical supplies may be manufactured in Italy.

Our plan for distribution of medical supplies in Italy is to follow the system being used by A.C.C.

3. Displaced Persons of Italian Nationality

We are not at present prepared to set forth a program of assistance for displaced persons of Italian nationality, because we do not intend to undertake any work along this line which the Italian government can itself perform. An equitable division of responsibility between ourselves and the Italian government can only be reached after further study. Most expenditures, in any event, will be in local currency, and only a small amount of import tonnage will be involved.

4. Displaced Persons of United Nations Nationality

At the request of the Military, we shall be willing to assume responsibility for the camps in Italy which are already caring for several thousand refugees of United Nations nationality. We are also prepared to expand this program, if necessary.

5. Epidemic Control

We have not yet formulated any program under this heading. Before taking any definite action, we will consult with A.C.C. and its advisers regarding the nature and scope of our activities in this field.

6. Budget

On the basis of the foregoing, we have made the following tentative budget allocation for one year of activities in Italy under the first three programs described above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Care and Mothers</td>
<td>$36,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Aid and Supplies</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated Reserve</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The budgets for displaced United Nations nationals and for epidemic control will be in addition to the $50,000,000.
II

Administration

As indicated above in connection with the programs for assistance to children and mothers and for the furnishing of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, we intend to place the responsibility for distribution upon the Italian government or upon Italian organizations. Consequently, for these purposes, a relatively small staff will suffice. This will probably consist of a small group of executives and a number of technicians, for example, the medical personnel referred to in Section I (2) above. Our operations will undoubtedly start with a small number to which we will add from time to time, as need develops but, at the maximum, we do not expect our mission to exceed 75 professional personnel and 20-30 clerical. Other personnel, as needed, will be recruited in Italy.

This statement does not include personnel who may be needed for work in connection with displaced persons of United Nations nationality and epidemic control.

III

Relations with the Military Program

As indicated in several places above, the assistance which UNRRA is planning to give pursuant to the resolution authorizing operations in Italy is intended to be additional to, and not in substitution for, assistance which is now being given or which will be given as a basic measure for the benefit of Italy generally. The UNRRA Council authorized these operations on the understanding that the scale of supply by the Military or other authorities will be maintained or increased without deduction for the assistance which UNRRA is to afford.

IV

Relationship with Military Authorities

In our operations in Italy, we shall, of course, be guided by general policies laid down by the appropriate military authorities. Subject to such general policies, we should wish to operate as an autonomous organization, with complete control over our personnel and our programs. In dealing with the Italian government we would, of course, clear in advance all questions of general policy with the appropriate military authorities and would keep them informed of our arrangements.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 10 1972
By J. Schauble Date
In delivering supplies to Italian governmental or charitable organizations, however, we should expect to be free to establish the prices at which we make the transfer and the conditions of the distribution of the supplies by the organizations, including the classes of persons to whom the distribution is to be made and the prices at which the supplies are to be sold (unless given away). The prices for sale to the ultimate consumers, however, would not be higher than the prices fixed by the appropriate price control authorities.

V

Assistance from the Military

In carrying out these programs, we are completely dependent upon the military authorities in view of their control over supply, shipping, and internal transport, and over many phases of government and economic life within the country. I am writing to ask you, therefore, if you will obtain for us the issuance of directives to the appropriate authorities to facilitate the proposed operations and, in particular, to accomplish the following arrangements:

1. Transportation

(a) Beginning with October 1944, it is essential to have an allocation by the theater commander of 15,000 tons of shipping monthly from east coast U.S. ports to appropriate ports in Italy, over and above existing shipping allocations.

(b) As a beginning supply, we need the transfer, from military stocks in Italy or afloat, of 20,000 tons of the foods listed in Section I (1) or of appropriate substitutes. UNRRA is agreeable to reimbursing the military for these supplies promptly in cash or in kind.

(c) Supplies beyond the 20,000-ton beginning stock can be provided by UNRRA through its own efforts, so long as shipping space is allocated as indicated under (a) above; but if the military authorities prefer, UNRRA would accept an arrangement under which the military procured and shipped all or any part of the needed supplies for delivery to UNRRA in Italy against reimbursement by UNRRA in the United States in cash or in kind.

(d) To the extent that we ship in our own supplies, we should wish to be able to avoid delays in deliveries and unnecessary long and cross-hauls, by making arrangements in the theater (subject to military operational requirements) for deliveries from military stocks against replacement at later dates or other points.

(e) Our operations will require the use not only of ocean

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972
transportation facilities, but also of storage warehouses and facilities for local transportation in Italy. We would, of course, be prepared to pay appropriate charges for the service of transportation, handling and warehousing, in foreign exchange where incurred outside Italy, and in lire where incurred locally.

We understand that the most serious possible obstacle to this proposal is the existing shortage of local transport. UNRRA cannot discharge its obligations unless it has an adequate and unbroken supply line. Of necessity, we will require the same transport priorities as are accorded to A.C.C.

2. Assistance to UNRRA Personnel

We should like very much to have the cooperation of the appropriate military authorities in securing for our personnel assigned to the Italian program (subject of course to the limitations imposed by military necessity) necessary transportation, shelter, food, clothing, medical aid, communication facilities, and the use of Post Exchange or EFI facilities. This cooperation is essential to our effective operation, in view of the disorganization and inflationary conditions now existing in Italy. Of course, payment would be made for all supplies and services so furnished. As in other theaters under military control, we should also like to have for our personnel certificates of identity, entitling them to be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention, if captured.

I appreciate that most of the details of the arrangements referred to above cannot be settled in Washington but must be taken up with the military authorities in the theater, and in some cases, with the Italian government. Within this limitation, I respectfully request that the appropriate directives be procured from the Combined Chiefs of Staff so as to enable UNRRA to launch its programs at the earliest possible moment. Should the necessary assistance be forthcoming, we would be prepared to commence operations on a limited scale on November 1, 1944.

Representatives of the Administration are waiting to leave for Italy to attempt to negotiate detailed arrangements along these lines, and it would therefore be appreciated if we could have your reply at your earliest convenience.

Cordially,

Herbert H. Lehman
Director General
RESOLUTION UNDER ITEM 8B ON THE COUNCIL AGENDA — AS ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON POLICY, 22 Sept. 1944

A Resolution Relating to Operations of the Administration in Italy.

WHEREAS

Resolution 1 provides that, as to proposed operations of the Administration in enemy or ex-enemy areas, the Council shall approve the scale and nature of the operations it is proposed to undertake and the standard of provision; and,

WHEREAS

Resolution A. authorizes the Administration without the necessity of obtaining prior approval by the Council to carry out operations in enemy or ex-enemy areas for the care and repatriation or return of displaced persons as contemplated by Resolution 10 or for the control of epidemics for the purpose of preventing the spread of such epidemics to United Nations' areas or to displaced persons of United Nations' nationality found in the particular enemy or ex-enemy areas; and,

WHEREAS

A substantial portion of Italy is now under the control of the United Nations, and the Italian people are sacrificing life and property side by side with the forces of the United Nations in driving the Germans from Italian soil; and it is desirable that the Administration should be authorized to undertake certain specific and limited responsibilities for relief of victims of war in areas in Italy under the control of United Nations additional to those authorized under Resolution A; it is therefore

RESOLVED

That to the scale and nature of the operations that it is proposed the Administration should undertake and the standard of provision in Italy, the Council approves the following program:

Resolution A refers to Council II Document No. 32
1. The operations of the Administration in Italy (in addition to such operations as it may undertake under the authority given by Resolution A) shall be confined to (a) the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies; (b) assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons; (c) care of, and welfare services for, children and nursing and expectant mothers.

2. All operations of the Administration in Italy shall be agreed upon between the military command or the appropriate authority in Italy on the one hand and the Administration on the other, and such operations shall be subject to such control as the military command or the appropriate authority may find necessary.

3. With regard to payment for such operations the Administration shall

   (a) Make arrangements with the military command or the appropriate authority for the provision of local currency in the manner contemplated in Sections 19 and 20 of Resolution 14;

   (b) be authorized to charge against its general resources such expenses as cannot be met in Italian currency and fall to be met in foreign exchange, provided that the Director General consult from time to time with the Committee established under Resolution 23 as to the financial commitments incurred by the Administration in carrying out the operations set out in paragraph 1 hereof and as to the ability of Italy to pay.

4. The total net expenditure in foreign exchange which, under paragraph 3(b) above, the Administration is authorized to charge against its general resources in respect of operations additional to those authorized under Resolution A shall not exceed the equivalent of $50 million without further specific authorization from the Council.

5. The Council recommends that, to the extent consistent with military considerations, the Director General shall be kept informed of all relief and rehabilitation requirements for Italy for the purposes set forth in Resolution 17.

6. The operations in Italy shall not constitute a precedent for operations in other enemy or ex-enemy territory.

(The above text is the latest form received here, and is subject to typographical correction).
RESOLUTION UNDER ITEM 8A ON THE COUNCIL AGENDA

A RESOLUTION RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN ENEMY AND EX-ENEMY AREAS WITH RESPECT TO DISPLACED PERSONS AND EPIDEMIC CONTROL AS ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON POLICY, 22 SEPTEMBER 1944.

WHEREAS
In the course of the activities of the Administration in collaboration with the military authorities and the governments concerned with respect to the care and repatriation or return of the classes of displaced persons referred to in Resolution 10, found in enemy or ex-enemy areas and in controlling epidemics, it will be necessary that the Administration have latitude in its authority to provide the assistance which may be required of it and be enabled to take measures for the care or repatriation of such persons without delay; it is therefore

RESOLVED
1. That, notwithstanding the provisions of Resolution 1 Part 1, the Administration shall be authorized without the necessity of obtaining prior approval by the Council, to carry out operations in enemy or ex-enemy areas for the care and repatriation or return of displaced persons as contemplated by Resolution 10, and in agreement with the government of the country of which they are nationals, or other persons who have been obliged to leave their country or place of origin or former residence or who have been deported therefrom, by action of the enemy because of race, religion or activities in favor of the United Nations, or for the control of epidemics for the purpose of preventing the spread of such epidemics to United Nations areas or to displaced persons of United Nations nationality found in the particular enemy or ex-enemy area. In carrying out the purposes of this Resolution the Administration will do so only from such a time and for such purposes as may be agreed upon between the military command, the established control authority or duly recognized administration of the area on the one hand and the Administration on the other and subject to such control as the military command or the established control authority may find necessary.

2. With regard to payment for such operations the administration shall

(a) make arrangements with the military command or the appropriate authority for the provision of local currency in the manner contemplated in Sections 19 and 20 of Resolution 14;

(b) be authorized to charge against its general resources such expenses as cannot be met in local currency and fail to be met in foreign exchange, provided that the Director General consult from time to time with a committee established under Resolution 23 as to the financial commitments incurred by the Administration in carrying out the operations set out in paragraph 1 hereof and as to the ability of the countries involved to pay.

(The above text is the latest form received here, and is subject to typographical correction).
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

[Handwritten note: Noted H.L.H.]
VIA COURIER AIR MAIL

To: Generoso Pope, Publisher
    11 Progresso Italo-Americano
    42 Elk Street
    New York 7, New York

From: Gene Pope, APO 512
      Detachment A,
      AAFHQ - Pro
      c/o Postmaster, New York

THIS IS A PERSONAL REPORT:

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

When I left New York, some four weeks ago, I had no idea of the
magnitude of the work that had to be performed here in Italy. I eagerly looked
forward to doing some good for the Italo-Americans, for the newspaper, and for
America. I had decided then that I would work night and day to get the best possi-
able stories.

I arrived in Rome and immediately got to work. It took a few days
to get familiar with the proper authorities in the Allied Control Commission,
Allied Military Government, and with members of the Italian government.

It is needless for me to say that here days and time matter very little.
For me there are seven days a week of work, there are no hours, and every day is
exactly the same as the one previous to it, or the one following it. I can truth-
fully say that I've undertaken to perform the work requiring a whole staff. I am
happy to say that I feel I have accomplished a great deal in the time that I have
been here. I can further say that the days that are ahead will present even
greater problems, for shortly I intend to visit the South and to make a full re-
port on the people and the conditions there.

In the articles I have written and sent by cable or courier service, I
have presented the basic truth. But, actually, no words can describe the real
condition of Italy. It is pathetic for me to speak with people day after day
and to be able to do nothing. Probably more than anyone else, I feel that America
and England are losing Italy, and losing it so fast that they are not aware of the real trend.

I feel myself morally obligated to make this report to you, Mr. Pope, for I hope that in some way you may be able to awaken the dormant attitude of far too many people back in the United States. Being a good American, like you, I feel that America must now, and without any further loss of time, do something concrete.

I have spoken with scores of government officials who have opened up their hearts to me in a manner that they have not done with any other correspondent. Some of the things they have told me I have been able to send over to the newspaper. Many other things cannot be published now. But, believe me when I say that these unpublished items form a veritable black splotch in the record of the United States and England.

Italy is in fact, if not on paper, being trampled upon. I say this as a considered opinion, and one that can be verified at any time if any government official in England and the United States will take the trouble of going out of his office and doing some real investigative work. There is no doubt that a great many things have been accomplished. But all of these things have been purely MILITARY.

As I have repeatedly said in my stories, no one talks about the Armistice Terms. Yet, those Armistice terms are so evident to the open-eyed individual that they do not need to be published. Italy is being run on a purely military basis, without the benefits of military help for the masses. Yes, some help has been given. But that help is like a bucket of water thrown into the Atlantic Ocean.

England and the United States have made many pretty promises to the people of Italy. Not one of those promises has been fulfilled. The Italian
government exists in name only. Its power is absolutely nil. It has authority but it hasn't the means of carrying out that power.

There may be some controversy when I say that the things accomplished here are PURELY MILITARY. A lot of figures will be exhibited. On paper these figures look great. Yes, they give one the impression that things are going along fairly well here in Italy. But, in the name of everything that is decent, in the name of honesty itself, let us look ourselves in the eyes and say - is it actually so?

One doesn't have to rattle off a lot of statistics to see that conditions are not getting along fairly well. Just one simple statement will knock all the figures, all the thousands and thousands of pages issued by the ONI, PWB, FEA, and the other agencies, into a cock-eyed spin - the people of Italy are today getting less than 1,000 calories of food to eat a day. If the things were going along all right, then why, in the name of God, aren't these people getting the minimum food requirements!

Oh, those who say that things are going along all right will bring out figures, which, superficially would knock you off your feet: bridges have been repaired, farms are producing again, the fishing fleet is going out to sea again, the People's Granaries are acquiring surplus stocks. Ridiculous! What are the people actually getting - that is the question! They can't answer that. No, because the people aren't getting the food; aren't getting the clothing; aren't getting jobs; aren't able to return to their homes.

This report does not intend to paint a rosy picture. I would be betraying my profession. But, more important than that, I would be betraying America if I were to say that things looked bright.

Yes, even the Roosevelt-Churchill declarations have fallen flat here.

They looked good for the first few days. But they're now considered as "another
Oh, if America could just wake up! If America could just realize what is
going on here! If America could make up its mind once and for all and decide whether
they wanted Italy to be a friend of the United States, or to be the avenue of the
onrushing Communists!

Never in the history of the Italian people have the Italians had a real
chance to actually see for themselves what America can do. Today that chance is
here. Never have the Italian people felt far away from America. Never in the history
of the two countries have the Italians had anything but love, admiration, respect
for America. But today, with American armies on Italian soil, with American gov-
ernment officials sitting in places of command and guidance, the Italian people are
witnessing what America can or cannot do. The Italians, thus, are forming a personal
opinion of American democracy.

If I were to say that their opinion favored American democracy today, I
would be telling a terrible lie. Nor, could I say absolutely that the Italians have
lost all faith in America. But, today they are in the so-called middle of the path.
They can swing from America, and God knows it they do that America will lose one of
its dearest friends.

There may be some cynics in America who'll say that Italy means absolutely
nothing, to the United States. They'll say that the Italians aren't worth saving or
helping. Well, they are so wrong, so terribly wrong. The Italians did not have their
hearts in this war. You can see and feel that wherever you go. But the Italians
can fight. They can fight ferociously. They can see their colleagues slaughtered
one by one, and still they'll fight. However, they'll fight only for an ideal, as
they fought during the Risorgimento, as they fought in the First World War, as
their sons fought in America, as Italo-Americans are now fighting for the armed
forces of the United States. I mention this because Italy's geographical position
is of paramount importance in the Mediterranean world. Italy can either be the
wall stemming the onrushing tide of the Russian march to the East, that is, to-
wards the Atlantic. Or Italy can be the broad avenue of complete Russian domina-
tion of all of Europe. Perhaps there are those who would like to see the Slavic and
Russian entry in the center of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. But these people
will one day realize that such a false step today will lead to another war. And
that war may very well come before this generation is gone.

Today Italy is having its first full contact with America. Today
America has the opportunity of proving that it is, as it always has been, the
friend of Italy. But, in order to do so, it must forthwith tear asunder the
red-tape, the "doppiogiouco". There are some American officials here in Italy
who are nothing but politicians in every sense of the word. They are playing
politics for their own end. This political game is find in America. It is dan-
gerous in Italy. These Americans are playing into the hands of the big indu-
trialists, the big business men, and the "filthy" rich who did excellently under
Fascism and expect to do the same with any kind of government that may be set up
in Italy. These Americans are not taking the interest of the Italian people at
heart. I believe they are absolutely blind to the facts, to the real conditions
now existing in Italy.

The Italian government, as I have said, is an impotent body of men.
America and England are still undecided as to whether to give it any REAL power.
As of this date the Allied Control Commission is still the Allied Control Com-
mission, although Roosevelt and Churchill said that it was to be only an advisory group of individuals called the Allied Commission. No one in A.C.C. knows what his real job is, except that he must carry out the terms of the Armistice. And that is the only CONCRETE thing they are doing.

Today in Italy everything that is not being done has an excuse: "military expediency". And there isn't a single member of the Italian government, or any Italian for that matter, who will stand in the way of military victory. But, that excuse given by those who should be doing active work for the restoration of the national economy, is a feeble one. It is an excuse that has done irreparable harm for the friendly relationship between the Italian and American people.

What harm would an idle factory now do if it were to be restored to complete usage? The Italians are willing to work 24 hours a day to keep that factory going. They are willing to let the majority of its product go into the Allied war effort - but, at least they'll have employment for the people working in that factory. And they will have a partial product for their own use. Yet, factories that can be repaired are allowed to stand idle - the excuse being that a few mechanical parts that are needed to get it going are essential to the war effort. How absurd! That factory, were it to function, could turn out war goods that have to be transported thousands of miles across the Atlantic - tons of goods! Whereas a ton, two tons, or even a hundred tons of mechanical equipment could turn out thousands of tons of goods right here in Italy and thus save much needed shipping space and also give the Italians a chance to work.

In twelve months time the Allies could have set dozens, if not hundreds of these factories going. They could have provided work for thousands, and perhaps tens of thousands of persons who are now roaming the streets unable to find any kind of work. Is that helping the war effort?
In twelve months time the Allies could have brought in tractors and transport vehicles to make possible the planting and the harvesting of additional terrain. Had they done that they would have saved America the necessity of having to transport 150,000 tons of grain for the Italians. Was the military expediency helped by telling the Italian government and the people that they could not have the additional tractors and trucks? Sure, they say that 34,000,000 quintals of wheat will be harvested and amassed in the people's granaries this year. That's a very big figure. But, do the people realize that this figure is not enough to give the people in the liberated areas ALONE less than a single, small roll - the same kind of roll that is used to put frankfurters in. That's a statement made by an Allied Control Commission executive.

In twelve months time the Italians have increased their refugee displacement, with the result that today about 1,000,000 Italians are homeless, the great majority of them hundreds of miles away from their homes. The Allied Commission cannot find the transportation to bring these people - most of whom worked on the soil - back to their homes. Yet, in order to help feed these people, thousands of trucks are needed. And, also, thousands of tons of food must be imported to feed them. Yet, had the Allied Control Commissioners been able to return these people, those thousands of trucks would not have been necessary; those thousands of tons of food would not be taking up valuable cargo space. The problem would not, naturally, be completely solved, but a great part of it would. And, was this too in the interest of military expediency.

What about the Black Market? Does the fact that it flourishes help the war effort? Yet, where do the Black Marketeers get their food, cloth and other items to sell?

They don't get it from Italy, for Italy absolutely hasn't got it!
Everything they sell - or practically everything - goes through, if it is not actually part of, Allied hands. Somewhere along the line there must be dishonesty. Is it the fault of the Italian government or is it the fault of the Allies? To give just one example - you can get all the American cigarettes you want on the Black Market for 80 cents a pack! The Italian government certainly does not import American cigarettes. Yet, the Black Market cannot be stopped.

The picture of Italy today is the picture of a nation in chaos. I might say it is the picture of a nation on the verge of revolution. The rubber-band has been pulled far enough. It is now snapping.

It is with the hope that you may do something therefore that I make this report to you. It is not a complete report. But it gives you a general over-all picture. You are already acquainted with the horrible economic and financial condition of the people, with the tragic health situation.

I know that you as an American will want to do something to bring Italy to America.

As a fellow American, and as a son of your great newspaper family, I implore you in the name of God, to do whatever you can to bring about this aid to Italy.

Aid cannot wait for next Spring. Next Spring will be too late.

Please take all stories of conditions improving here with a grain, a double grain of salt. I am sure that America does not want to lose Italy. I am sure that the thousands of American boys did not die in vain - did not die to see Italy given to Communism or another form of totalitarian government.

I cannot plead too strongly, Mr. Pope, for this aid to the people of Italy. I cannot repeat it too often.

I feel that you can do a great deal. As your representative over here in Italy, I assure you that your good name has been spread to every individual I
I have spoken. The cause of aid to Italy is not an Italian problem at all. It is an international problem that must be solved immediately. I am not speaking as an Italian when I plead for aid to them. I am speaking as a loyal American, the father of a family - yes, the father of a family that doesn't want to see his son, or the husbands of his daughters, take up arms again to fight in another World War. And, in speaking this way, I feel that I am speaking for every American father.

Many of the officials, many of the Italians I have spoken with, are cognizant of the work you are performing. I have even spoken to His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, about your work. I can say that you have a warm spot in their hearts.

I say to you, keep up the good work, fight harder and harder, for yours is a just cause, a cause for the truth.

I say to you, Mr. Pope, that the faith you have placed in me and my work shall never be dimmed. I have a tremendous job to do. I am doing it, and will continue to do it with complete honesty, without fear, and with malice towards none.

As I said, I came to Italy confused about the entire situation. Today that confusion has solidified into concrete knowledge of the actual conditions.

I implore you again, and again, and again and again and again! Through III Progresso, through every means at your disposal, fight this thing to victory! For through that victory peace will come - a peace that will stick in the hearts of men, a peace of friendship and everlasting love. You must not lose this fight. Our beloved America will suffer in the years to come if this fight is lost.
In the name of the innocent children of Italy; in the name of the helpless mothers; in the name of the hundreds of thousands that are now wandering Nomads in the countryside; in the name of God and justice, let this help to Italy come soon - very soon. Give to Italy a chance to breathe. Give to the innocent a shining light. Give to the sick world the medicine it so urgently needs to get back on its feet!

I dread to think of the many more tragedies I am about to see as I head South. With faith in God, I hope that as I go among these people, the word will flash back: "Help is coming!"

And so, I close this personal report to you. May God give you the strength to carry on this gigantic task. May the friends of Italy, who are indeed the patriotic, loyal Americans, see the light. It is so much needed here.

Gene Rea
October 7th, 1944
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Copy of letter from Gene Rea Pope, 10/7/44 to Generoso Pope, reporting on conditions in Italy.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

You may be interested in the attached release on Italy.

Oscar lot
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

This report, prepared by the Office of War Information, is designed to meet the various needs of editors, writers, commentators, broadcasters, photographers, and others concerned with presenting the news. It may be reproduced in its entirety, excerpted, condensed or used as background and reference material.

ADVANCE RELEASE: For Friday Afternoon Papers, October 27, 1944.

A report on the present economic condition of Italy, including a summary of Allied contribution to its rehabilitation and to the relief of its people, was issued today by the Office of War Information, on the basis of data supplied by the War Department, the Department of State, the Allied Commission, the Foreign Economic Administration and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The report follows:

The Allies moved into a country whose economy had progressively deteriorated under Fascist mismanagement, Nazi oppression, and as a result of military operations to drive the Nazis from Italy. Under Fascist control a large part of Italy's resources and productive capacity was devoted to preparing for and engaging in war rather than producing useful supplies and services for the people of Italy. Cumulatively, this put Italy—a country always economically insufficient and depending on large imports—in a bad shape. Nazi oppression and plundering accentuated this situation. Bombing, artillery fire and other military operations to drive the German forces out of Italy caused even further devastation and deterioration of Italy's economic, agricultural, and industrial systems. This was the chaotic and critical situation which the Allies faced and have begun to correct in those parts of Italy which have been liberated.

The Allies' prime contribution was military: the liberation of most of Italy from the control of the Fascists and the Germans. In the face of the shattered economy and administration of Italy, the Allies have in addition, done these things:

1. Assisted the Italians in reforming and reorganizing the administrative machinery of the nation and provinces so as to facilitate the country's rehabilitation. The United States Government has lifted the ban on commercial communications with Italy and has eliminated all other economic warfare restrictions against liberated Italian territory.

2. Repaired and reconstructed shattered vital lines of transport, including highways, bridges, railways, and the docks and facilities of many ports.

3. Restored, repaired, and rebuilt essential public utilities — such as waterworks, electrical systems, gasworks and sewers — to the extent necessary for military usage and for essential civilian economy in many cities, including Rome, Naples, and the devastated areas of Sicily.

4. Supplied basic foodstuffs to the people through importations from official American and British sources which will have totaled 1,107,000 tons to the end of this year; plus 1,193,000 tons of other civilian supplies, making an aggregate of 2,300,000 tons of civilian supplies; ironed out inequalities in rationing and reordered it on a fair basis; straightened out the internal collection and distribution of domestic crops, including the successful amassing of the wheat crop of 1944.
5. Rehabilitated key industries, wrecked by bombing and German demolition, in order to process foodstuffs, manufacture textiles, mine essential minerals and to process them, both for military and essential civilian use, thus providing jobs as well. With Italian industry dependent 90 per cent on hydro-electric energy, which has been shattered, ACC predicts 60 per cent normal industrial production for the country one year after hostilities, which is considerably more than is likely to be the case with war-torn Allied countries such as Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, Holland and England. Planning for the rehabilitation of the following industries is well under way: soap, paper, textiles, tobacco and matches (important for government revenue as a monopoly) and fertilizers.

6. Supported banks after the crisis of liberation and permitted their rapid reopening on a sound basis, as indicated by the fact that deposits increased. The United States government has made available to the Italian government in U. S. dollars, the equivalent of the pay of U. S. troops in Italy in local currency; the dollar proceeds of remittances to Italy, and the dollar proceeds of Italian exports to the United States. The dollars from all these sources will be available for the Italian government to buy other essential supplies.

7. Set up price controls for 21 major necessities, and is curbing black market operations. This has been especially successful where it has been possible to increase rations.

8. Organized and is conducting a swift census of the people, of industry and agriculture to obtain a clearer picture of the nation's needs and potentialities for rehabilitation, and has drawn a plan for use of the Italian government in reestablishing the industrial and transportation economy.

9. Made a complete study of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and has indicated the supplies and financing needed for restoration.

10. Assisted labor, after the abolition of Fascist syndicates, to set up its own organizations, and mediated and advised in settling all disputes. No major strikes have occurred and work stoppages were prevented without the use of compulsion.

11. Upon the request of the Allies the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has undertaken to make an allocation of $50,000,000 for supplemental relief within Italy, and UNRRA plans, as part of this expenditure, to deliver 15,000 tons of extra foods monthly, to care for approximately, 1,700,000 children and expectant or nursing mothers. In addition, professional personnel would assist Italian health authorities and UNRRA would supply about $8,000,000 worth of supplemental medical supplies over a period of a year. Spurgeon M. Reeny, director of the mission, already is on his way to Italy.

12. Arranged for shipments of the supplies of American Relief for Italy, Inc. Eight hundred fifty thousand tons of clothing, vitamins and medical supplies already have been shipped and 500 tons a month additional have been scheduled. U. S. representatives in Italy have helped create the Italian National Agency for distribution of relief supplies. The United States government arranged to facilitate shipments of private donations from the 21 American republics, and has just completed plans to transmit Christmas parcels to Italy from private donors in the United States.

13. Arranged for resumption of postal services from the rest of the world for most parts of liberated Italy.

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A breakdown of total shipments of U.S. procured commodities, other than
petroleum products, to Italy, Sicily and Sardinia for purely civilian purposes
from July 1, 1943, through September 10, 1944, follows (these supplies are in
addition to those provided by the British and by private sources):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>TOTAL SHIPPED TO 10 SEPTEMBER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foodstuff</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>231,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>284,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans/Peas</td>
<td>60,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soup</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meat/Cheese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>726,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medical, Sanitary &amp; Veterinary Supplies</strong></td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soap</strong></td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coal</strong></td>
<td>290,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autos for AMF</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Utility Repairs</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing &amp; Textiles</td>
<td>7,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural Supplies &amp; Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>28,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>1,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misc. Supplies</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,500</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial Repairs &amp; Supplies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Industry</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining Industry</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous Items</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Matches</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newsprint</td>
<td>6,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Misc. Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cigarette Mfg. Supplies</td>
<td>800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Printing Ink</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>1,077,722</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE (1)**. Prices are estimated cost not including overseas shipping cost, or,
in most instances, domestic transportation costs beyond first inland depot.
In some instances exact net quantities are not yet known and costs have been
estimated by conversion from gross quantities.

(over)
A summary of the major accomplishments and problems of the Allied Commission, formerly known as the Allied Control Council, in its work for the Italian populace, follows:

FOOD

Food supply to the civilian population of Italy has been the paramount problem of the Allied Control Commission (now Allied Commission). The problem is still far from solved, but in the southern portion of liberated Italy, food conditions in rural districts are now relatively easy. The cities, always major points of crisis, have an improved supply. Conditions remain only fair in such cities as Florence, close behind the battle lines, and Rome, with its population of a million and a half. However, there also, the situation has improved.

During the winter and spring of 1943-44, a total of 84 per cent of the population of liberated Italy received more than half its daily allotments of food from ACC imports. This called for shipments into the country of more than 700,000 tons of foodstuffs, chiefly wheat and flour, during the year, July, 1943, to July, 1944. As the battle lines move northward, these shipments will have to be increased and arrangements for such an increase have been made.

Increased estimates of supplies needed for next year envisage the necessity of feeding the peoples of Northern Italy, now occupied by the Germans who still hold the Po Valley.

The basis for these estimates of needed food supplies is not lavish, but is calculated to allow 200-300 grams of bread a day for 75 per cent of the population south of the Pisa-Rimini line, and for some 80 per cent of the population north of that line. (This estimate is based on the fact that it was necessary to provide imported food for 84 per cent of the population of southern Italy.) The calculation takes into account also the wheat harvest this year in liberated Italy of 2,034,000 metric tons, and the portion of the harvest which can be held over through rigid rationing.

All of the work of collecting and distributing domestically produced food within Italy was in the hands of the Italian government. During the period immediately preceding Allied liberation, this system broke down completely. It has been necessary for the ACC to institute a complete reorganization of this machinery, and this has been successfully accomplished. Collection and amassing of the wheat harvest this year was successful with few exceptions, and quotas were fulfilled in accordance with plan -- and in the big grain centers of Foggia and Matera were exceeded. The 300-gram ration of bread issued in southern Italy, which had the effect of sharply curbing the black market, helped in this work.

Transportation shortages still constitute a major problem of food supply, as they do for all other operations of the Italian economy, because of the primacy of military operations in Italy, France and the Balkans. Highways have been repaired, and the northward movement of the battlefronts has released additional railway tonnage in the south for civilian use. The critical shortage of trucks continues, and military emergency on occasion inevitably has had to cause disruption of the supply pattern overnight, as when ports were closed to civilian supply ships, or rail traffic was preempted for military use.

(more)
Nevertheless, in Southern Italy it has been possible to increase the normal ration of bread to 300 grams a day; in the northern districts, including Rome, the ration remains at 200 grams. The initial goal of the ACC, it is stated, was to provide 1,000 calories a day from imported supplies for those to whom ration cards were issued, in order to supplement domestic food supplies and thus to bring Italian consumption near, or about, subsistence levels. It has not always been possible to achieve the latter objective, because of the difficulties of getting domestic food supplies to urban centers. Nevertheless, marked progress has been made in curtailing of the black market, and in the elimination of fraudulent or illegal ration cards -- the issue was reduced by 700,000 through a close survey.

Such labor difficulties as have arisen came out of the straitened food situation, chiefly among "white collar" workers. In addition to the normal ration, two classes of workers receive supplemental rations: those hired directly by the military for heavy work, and those who work on civilian projects, such as utility maintenance, which have an indirect military importance. The former class receives "Scale A" rations, which include a midwork meal comprising 150 grams of bread, six ounces of vegetables and 0.8 ounce of dried soup. In the north, these workers also receive the normal 200 gram bread ration daily, plus a weekly issue of 700 grams of pasta. In the south, where the daily ration is 300 grams of bread, they receive 150 grams of pasta a week and 200 grams of dried soup.

Workers of the second group receive "Scale B" ration, which includes the midwork meal, but no supplemental weekly issue of pasta and soup.

Through all these achievements, the improvement of imports, the increased transport facilities, better regulated rationing and the reformation of the administrative machinery of food distribution and collecting -- and as a result of the northward movement of battle lines -- a considerable success has been scored. Food quantities still continue to be below the standards originally set up as goals, and the balance obtained still depends on continuation of large imports. In a completely disrupted economy, amid devastations of war, the emergencies of army supply for all fighting fronts, and the competing demands of other liberated countries, ACC operations constitute a real achievement.

ROME

Rome escaped virtually unscathed from bombing and the German demolition squads. Nevertheless, the water supply was wrecked. Prompt action restored adequate quantities quickly, but only recently has the full supply been restored. Pumping facilities remain inadequate and large buildings and higher sections of the city lack good water facilities. The city, which formerly required 110,000 kilowatts for electrical supply, now must be content with 30,000 kw. Gas was restored on a partial basis in September. All these were consequences of the destruction and demolition of war, and are the lot not only of recently liberated cities, such as those of France, but also of many English cities and towns.

Rome's food problem springs from those same causes, and from the utter wrecking of transportation facilities, from the devastation of food supply areas, from the shipping bottleneck and the city's isolation from the rich Po Valley and Marche area. Nevertheless, 30,000 metric tons of food, of which 13,000 were Allied imports, were delivered to the city during August, and September schedules called for 50,000 tons -- enough to provide 2 1/2 pounds daily for each of the 1,500,000 ration card holders in the city.

(over)
Summarizing the food situation within the city, Allied officials say, "The situation is fair. It has improved. No one is starving, even in Rome. One hundred eighteen thousand kitchen meals are distributed daily, available to those who need them. Everything possible is being done to increase the supply of food in the city, and will continue to be done."

Rome probably is typical of the problems that will be faced with Turin and Milan when the northern part of Italy is liberated. Genoa's problem is only slightly helped by the fact that it is a port, rather than an inland city. For this reason, the feeding of Rome is analyzed in detail.

The feeding of the million and half persons in Rome is called the most difficult supply problem in Italy. Rome is an inland city and, under peacetime conditions, draws all sorts of foodstuffs from distant areas, rather than depending on nearby districts. Grain comes from Umbria; beef cattle from Marche, Umbria and Sardinia; milk from Lombardy; cheese from Puglia, Calabria and Abruzzi in the south; lamb from Marche and Sardinia; poultry from northern Italy and Marche. Production of fruits and vegetables in the Rome area is good, but artichokes and tomatoes come from Sardinia and Campania, and citrus fruits from Sicily.

In recent years, the expansion of Rome has crowded out many nearby agricultural areas which produced vegetables and fruit and eggs, so that these supplies must now come from the Naples plains.

The food supply of Rome, therefore, depended on the operation of three railways, the Rome-Naples, the Rome-Ancona, and the Rome Civitavecchia. The line to Naples, when opened, had to be devoted almost entirely to military supplies. The Ancona line, which tapped the Marche area on which Rome depended so heavily for food, was wrecked so utterly that no attempt could be made to put it back into operation.

Conditions in Rome deteriorated steadily long before the Allies moved into Italy. At the beginning of the war, the bread ration under the Fascists was 200 grams, and this was reduced to 150 grams in March, 1942. War-time drains of manpower and the military needs for food cut into agricultural supplies. Fascist inefficiency further complicated the picture.

In the middle of July, 1943, when the Allies moved into Sicily, food supplies from the south began to fail. The transport line, barely adequate under normal situations, was bombed, and preempted for German and Italian military use. The first two Allied bombings of the city during July and August forced freight cars to unload far from the normal centers, and put a strain upon the truck supply, already in bad shape. Refugees flooded the city, and the scope of the black market increased sharply under this augmented demand sending prices rapidly upward.

When the Germans moved into Rome at the time of the armistice in September, they stopped all rail and automobile traffic with northern and central Italy. This, with the disorganization of food control administration, made affairs worse. A period of slight improvement followed, but the black market, free of all controls at this time, continued to expand, and prices further increased. By the middle of January, Rome was virtually cut off from almost all railway supply, and food came in only in civil automobiles and trucks which the owners had succeeded in saving from the requisitions of authorities and the Germans.

The landing at Anzio, in January, sent another horde of refugees into Rome and the flooding of the Pontine marshes by the Germans cut off another source of food. The Italian authorities appealed to the producers to bring in all their supplies and lifted controls on import of foodstuffs. The Germans stopped those who obeyed the summons and confiscated their supplies. After this, the provisioning of the city became wholly dependent upon black market supplies.
On March 25, 1944, the bread ration was cut to 100 grams a day, and the city lived on this impossibly low ration until the liberation of Rome on June 4. In May, the monthly ration of food was 3,000 grams of bread, 500 grams of rice, 50 grams of butter, 100 grams of sheep or goat meat, 150 grams of cheese. No olive oil, beans, or sugar was available, except to sick persons and children. As a gauge, 3,000 grams of bread, the monthly allotment, totaled about 6 3/5 pounds -- equivalent to about a loaf and a half of our American bread for each person to last a week.

When the Allies moved into Rome, they found the Nazis had removed all but a small part of the city's food supplies. Nevertheless, the Allies were able to maintain the 100 gram bread ration until June 21, when it was increased to 150 grams. Four days later, it was possible to raise this to 200 grams, which entailed shipments into Rome of 300 tons of flour a day. On June 18, other imported foodstuffs began to arrive, and during that month, 7,000 tons of food were brought in and distributed.

During July, the situation continued to improve, and 8,000 tons of imported food were supplied. The monthly ration at that time comprised: bread, 6,200 grams; dried vegetables, 167 grams; sugar, 160 grams; canned meat, 186 grams; fish, 100 grams; rice, 42 grams; oil, 50 grams; cheese, 12 grams. This ration provided about 660 calories per day. In this month, fresh produce began to flow in increased quantities, and the supply jumped from 500 tons daily to 450 tons. Transport continued to be the big obstacle to better food supplies, but in the last two weeks of August it was possible to issue an extra ration of 550 grams of pasta. According to a study by the Public Health Subcommission of the ACC, the daily ration in Rome had been only 305 calories a day for nine months before the Allies entered the city. In August, under the Allies, the ration was 800 calories.

When the Allies scheduled 50,000 tons of food for Rome in September, it was necessary to plan to bring fish from as far away as the islands of Pantelleria and Sicily, potatoes from around Naples, wine from Puglia, the "heel" of Italy.

All this was achieved during a time when Allied military authorities in the Mediterranean were straining every resource and facility to conduct military operations in Central and Northern Italy, Southern France and the Balkans.

Every effort is being made to increase the flour ration in Rome, but the food supplies from the north are blocked out by disrupted transport, and the exigencies of war impede all shipments from the south. The Allies have improved the food situation in Rome steadily.

Prices for unrationed articles in Rome are higher than in any other city of Italy, due to the high costs of transportation. Rome is dependent largely upon motor transport from the Naples plain, and prices vary. The control price upon potatoes runs from 12 to 15 lire per kilo in Naples as contrasted with 25 lire in Rome. During June, July and August, however, prices were stabilized within a narrow range in Rome, partly due to seasonal availability of fresh fruits and vegetables. Continued stabilization will be dependent upon a high level of imported supplies, and continued improvement of transportation.

(The food situation in Naples, and also its rehabilitation from extensive German demolition, was discussed fully in OMI report, NB-2737, released on September 3, 1944.)
Price policy in Italy under Allied control has consisted mainly of attempts to salvage remnants of a broken-down system of controls developed by the Fascist government before and during the war. Under that system, the basic necessities of life were rationed. These included not only the principal foodstuffs but also manufactured goods, such as shoes and clothing. Wages and salaries were supposedly frozen. In order to prevent the basic necessity of life, namely bread, from increasing in price, the necessary increases in the price of wheat were largely covered by government subsidies.

Price controls under the Fascists were characterized by intrigue and corruption and were administered, or supposedly administered, by a multitude of semi-official trade associations.

Government salaries increased through supplementary payments, but the basic rate of pay remained unchanged. Prices to farmers increased to meet increased costs of production and, despite attempts at control, legal rates of payment for agricultural workers were largely disregarded.

At the invasion of Sicily, Allied authorities froze wages at the then prevailing level. Upon occupation, the breakdown of controls became almost complete. Bread in the larger centers jumped from 2.40 lire per kilo to 50-100 lire per kilo. Black market prices soared. Wages and salaries jumped. AMO authorized an increase in salaries and wages in Sicily in November, 1943, amounting to 75 per cent of the first 1,000 lire per month and tapering off in higher brackets.

This was the equivalent of a 60 per cent boost in all wages and salaries. Similar increases were later authorized on the mainland. By March, 1944, control over prices and wages had almost completely broken down. Such wage controls as existed were continued mostly in the government, public utilities and banks. The comparatively lower scale of wages paid by these industries made it difficult for AMO to recruit experienced workers who were badly needed.

The control of prices was confined largely to wheat and olive oil and to imported foodstuffs. Public utility rates, railroad rates and fares also remained under control. Rates were frozen.

The Allied control board fixed prices on March 8, 1944, on the following articles: soap, tomatoes, leathers, matches, cement, electric rates, water rates, gas rates, wheat, barley, dehydrated soups, wool, pulse, olive oil, sulphur, twine and rope, bread, postal and telegraph rates, bran.

On July 17, 1944, in Rome, the fixed price of bread was five lire per kilo, but bread in the black market cost 100-130 lire per kilo. Fixed price for oil was 37 lire per liter and, in the black market, 550 lire per liter.

Wheat prices were fixed in March at 1,000 lire per quintal on hard wheat and at 900 lire per quintal on soft wheat. The Italian government favored a higher price. Wages of agricultural workers were described as "uncontrolled and uncontrollable."

As the Allied armies advanced northward, the psychological warfare units broadcast to farmers in occupied areas to hold their wheat for the higher prices being paid by AMO. In some areas, AMO fixed prices on articles other than those listed by AMO.
The principal means of control decided upon were as follows:

For agricultural products: (1) compulsory marketing of the principal crops through officially controlled channels, including "massing"; (2) control of animal slaughtering, funneling all animals through communal slaughtering plants; (3) control of supply through allocation of fertilizers, bran for dairy cows, and other producer goods, in proportion to deliveries of the product to authorized marketing agencies.

For industrial products: larger producers -- control through inspection of books; smaller producers -- control through allocation of key raw materials, particularly imported materials and fuels.

For control of distribution to consumers: rationing, the point system, and development of consumer cooperatives. A consumers' committee was recommended in every center to investigate and advise on the operation of such controls.

TRANSPORTATION

Many of the more acute railroad transportation problems in the area south of Rome have now been solved. Railroad lines, although many of them are now single tracked because equipment had to be cannibalized from double-track roads because of war destruction--are now operating on regular schedules. The south Italian railroad situation can be described as "fair." But compared with what it was when Allied troops arrived in Sicily, Sardinia and the mainland, a minor miracle has been performed in a few short months.

Today, in this area, food and fuel for cooking can be sent from coastal cities into the interior and materials from the interior can be sent to coastal cities. Manufacture, however, is practically at a standstill. The restoration of Italy's economy must wait upon resumption of adequate transportation. In a coal-poor nation, the use of hydro-electric energy is important and this, too, is being restored.

The highway situation in this area is definitely poor. Reasons: Lack of trucks. The roads and bridges have been repaired. Further improvement in rail facilities is needed and will help relieve the acute truck shortage.

Coastal shipping transportation was a disappointment. The Allies found available fewer than 600 schooners with a total tonnage between 50,000 and 60,000.

All in all, there has been a vast improvement during the past few months. Conditions at the time of our arrival upon the mainland were chaotic. Fortunately of southern Italy's 7.5 million inhabitants, 5.5 millions lived in coastal areas. The two million who lived inland were for many months cut off from transportation. An Army report of the time said of the inland area that it was "made up of a number of isolated towns and cities trading as in medieval days by animal-drawn carts." Hi-jacking and highway robbery were almost commonplace. Transportation authorities asked for armed guards, pointing out at one time that the payment of protective money was another alternative.

The destruction of railroads, bridges, rolling stock and equipment by the Germans was enormous. Temporary bridges have been erected and are still being built. By making single-track lines out of double-track routes, the army has been able to get material for railroads leading into the fighting areas.

Coal is still in short supply. Italy is now getting 125,000 tons per month. In May and June, 1944, conditions in one area were so bad that food was carried by a chain of human porters from Foggia to Naples. The price of a 10-ton truck was $70,000 or, in Italian currency, 7 million lire.
The problems and objectives of transportation in southern Italy can be summarized as follows:

1. The release of more railway tonnage by military authorities for civilian purposes;

2. The restoration of basic transportation facilities for imported fuel, maintenance equipment, tires and animals;

3. The repair of bridges, roads and roadbeds—a problem of internal administration, held back partly because of the lack of machinery.

Trucks are scheduled to carry 50,000 tons of food and cooking charcoal into Rome each month, which is one-sixth of the total tonnage of civilian goods being carried on the railroads of the liberated portions of Italy.

Through cooperation of the Italian government, conflicting and parallel public works agencies in the government had been streamlined and consolidated into a more efficient organization to work with the Allied Commission's Public Works and Utilities subcommission.

Highways and bridges essential to military and civilian economy have been placed in adequate repair throughout the southern part of Italy and up to Rome. North of the city, roads were even more thoroughly wrecked by the German retreat and by bombing; but these, too, have been brought into usable condition by the combination of the Allied engineers and the subsequent augmented and continuing repair by the ACC sub-commission. A total of over $6,280,000 has been spent in making such repairs, and 22,500 civilian workers have been employed in making these repairs.

The number of bridges on main routes which were destroyed up to the Pisa-Rimini line (the so-called Gothic defense line of the Germans) totaled nearly 800. There were also hundreds of bridges destroyed on secondary roads. Of the bridges destroyed on the main highways, 250 have been completely reconstructed or are being rebuilt. Other bridges are not to be rebuilt now either because semi-permanent structures were put up by the armies, or adequate all-weather detours were constructed, or because the structures are very large and adequate re-routing can by-pass them.

As of the first of September, the ACC subcommission had under its care for maintenance, heavy repairs or reconstruction 2,950 miles of military highways and 882 additional miles important to civilians, plus several thousand miles of secondary roads.

Priorities for railroad transportation are as follows: Military shipments, purely ACC shipments, civilian shipments sponsored by ACC, ordinary freight on a commercial basis.

North of Rome and in the battle areas, railroad conditions are still in need of great improvement. Lines running to the battlefronts, devoted exclusively to the carrying of military supplies, are obviously being adequately maintained.

There is a serious shortage of trucks in the area below the Pisa-Rimini line. In northern Italy, of a total population of 13.6 million, 10 million live inland—and will need to be supplied by truck during the first months after liberation. With a shortage of trucks already evident immediately below that area, the sudden liberation of northern cities would pose great problems for transportation and supply.

The Italian state railways were badly mauled by the Nazis. The privately-owned railways did not fare quite so badly. But these, too, need coal and equipment—although some lines did have material reserves for restoration. It was necessary to watch the privately-owned lines, before they were stopped for lack of fuel, to see that the merchandise they carried was not diverted into black market channels.
FINANCE

The achievements of the Allied Military Financial Agency in Italy, through AMG and ACC have been notable. Banks have seldom remained closed for more than a fortnight after invasion.

Allied Military (AM) currency has been prepared and forces of the United States, England, France, Poland and Brazil are paid in this fashion. Four branch offices of the Allied Financial Agency, each with currency vaults, have been established. A fifth branch office is a mobile "Forward Area Branch" for Florence. The preparation, transportation and safeguarding of AM currency was completed.

Forgery of AM money was quickly ended and a gang of counterfeiters arrested. Procedures for the cremation of mutilated AM currency have been developed and applied. "Spearhead" currency—British and American money—was used when a plane laden with AM currency crashed and burst into flames off Miami. This "spearhead" money was recalled after new AM currency arrived.

The Allied Financial Agency has made possible emergency payments to needy U.S. and British nationals in Italy.

The financial crises in Italy were quickly eliminated after the landings and the restoration of bookkeeping systems. Bank deposits in liberated Italy increased 60 per cent or 12 billion lire in six months from September, 1943 to April, 1944 and are growing at the rate of 5 billion lire a month now. Beginning in June, 1944 there was a net inflow also into postal savings accounts.

Because of their separation from Rome, branches of Banca d'Italia had become little central banks, a great advantage to the Allies.

Prior to the Allied occupation of Southern Italy, the short-term debt of the Fascist government was coming due and was not being renewed. In July, 1943, the net outflow of approximately 1 billion lire was noted—this being the amount the government had to pay in excess of funds received from the sale of treasury bills.

With Allied occupation, the trend was reversed and in the year ended June 30, 1944, the government had net receipts of 2.5 billion lire. In August, Rome noted a 2 billion lire increase in net receipts.

The Italian government is now preparing its first issue of long-term bonds and the government is preparing to reduce the interest rate (5 per cent) by ½ per cent steps. AFA has denied financial facilities and access to safe deposit boxes to enemy governments, agents, Fascist individuals and organizations and persons located in enemy-occupied territory.

AFA discovered three huge financial corporations in Rome—IRI (Industrial Holding Company); Istocambi (Foreign Exchange Control); and IMI (Industrial Finance). IRI owns the three biggest commercial banks in the country and the largest part of the key heavy and armament industries of Italy.

Other advances made by AFA comprise recommendations for the reformation of the Italian taxation system. Current assessment procedures are slow and inaccurate.

(over)
Here is an abridged summary of state revenue collections for 27 liberated Italian provinces, in millions of lire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total 11 months to May 31, 1943</th>
<th>Total 11 months to May 31, 1944</th>
<th>Percent of 1943/44 to 1942/43</th>
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<tr>
<td>Direct taxes</td>
<td>1,087.0</td>
<td>1,183.4</td>
<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indirect taxes</td>
<td>1,153.7</td>
<td>1,052.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing taxes</td>
<td>271.1</td>
<td>167.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotteries</td>
<td>154.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>2,665.3</td>
<td>2,458.3</td>
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<td>Monopolies</td>
<td>1,702.8</td>
<td>1,165.2</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>284.7</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,653.8</td>
<td>3,723.7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In considering new sources of revenue, it was decided to increase by 100 per cent the retail price of tobacco (a state monopoly), granting also a small increase in price to growers of tobacco leaf. Increased retail prices for salt were also granted. Lottery drawings, an Italian institution, were revived in liberated areas.

The deficit for all Italy for the year ended June 30, 1944 was 180 billion lire.

The excess of disbursements over income was over 200 billion lire for the year or approximately 2 1/2 times the government deficit for the preceding fiscal year. The floating debt rose from 170 billion lire on June 30, 1943 to 350 billion lire on June 30, 1944.

AFA sponsored the creation of a budget for the Italian government and for areas under AMG. Commercial insurance is to be revived and strengthened and all financial and other means to bring about the "defascistization" of Italy are to be sponsored.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Industrial and commercial problems in liberated Italy are enormous. Major problems in industrial rehabilitation include the following: war damages, communications, raw materials and supplies, dispersion of labor, and psychological.

The destruction of hydro-electric installations, upon which 90 per cent of Italian industry and a large part of her communications depend, has been tremendous. Demolitions varied from scientific to the sheerly wanton. The Nazis sabotaged identical parts in a number of similar machines to prevent "cannibalization" by the Allies. Examples of wanton damage are numerous--typical case being that of the destruction of 300 looms at Ponte Felcino. The Nazis have also booby-trapped non-military machinery.

Officers comprising the Industry Sub-Commission have made reports on all important plants in cement, fertilizer, iron and steel, chemical, textile and industrial gases industries in liberated Italy.

The hemp industry, important to Italy and to Allied forces, presented some typical problems. Practically no factories were working because of short power supply and lack of raw material. Labor wages in the industry were shocking. There was no means of getting labor to factories and no possibilities of night work because of curfew and fear of women to go out at night. There was lack of sufficient food to do a full day's work and to walk several miles to and from the factory; lack of essential supplies, coal, oil, soap, lubricants, and industrial gases.

(more)
ACC met problems in the hemp industry by drawing on supplies from military and naval stores. A production incentive bonus helped to raise wages. No hemp was sold to factories, but factories were kept supplied with raw material which was strictly accounted for.

Currently, factories are working to capacity of one shift a day, but difficulties of replacement of worn parts are arising, despite the arrival of spare parts from England as a result of requisitions made in anticipation of this contingency. Transportation of raw and finished products is difficult.

There are only two major textile producing units in hitherto liberated Italy, namely, the Manifatture Cotoneiere Meridionali, Naples, and the C.I.S.A. Viacosa, Rome. The latter has only been liberated recently. ACC's problems concerning textiles and clothing are great and will be intensified when the major producing areas of the north are liberated.

Leather and footwear deficiencies constitute unquestionably the greatest problem in essential consumer goods. The situation was aggravated by factors due to the war; wholesale slaughtering and requisitions by the enemy both of cattle and hides; the collapse of legal control, and black market activities; looting of transmission belting, and local shortage of tannin, (as most producers are located in northern Italy).

ACC is repairing discarded army shoes at the rate of 5,000 pairs per week, and these are being sold at a nominal price to high priority civilians.

Work possibilities for 10 fertilizer plants in liberated Italy have been surveyed and full requisitions for phosphate rock, nitric acid, or sodium nitrate, pyrites and paper sacks have been submitted.

In addition to these major industries of liberated Italy, ACC has taken steps to rehabilitate and directly control various minor industries whose production is essential to the national economy. These include:

1. Paper production.
2. Soap manufacture for all Central and Meridional Italy.
3. Sulphuric acid.
4. Production of edible olive oil, and the use of its derivatives.
5. Assistance to the armed forces in the production of industrial gases.
6. Leather transmission belting, and,
7. Sewing thread and similar manufactures.

There is a probable future production potential in Italy of 60 per cent of pre-war capacity within one year after the cessation of hostilities. To achieve this objective, it is assumed that adequate power and raw materials will be available, and in making this prediction, account has been taken of the use of all probable local resources, whether by way of restoration, absorption or cannibalization.

ACC's studies of Italian industry have made possible this conclusion about the national economy under Fascism:

"Fascism was not creative; it was essentially elaborative; without hope of completion, it began grandiose schemes, covering up the lack of reality with political camouflage, employing many, paying little, doing less."

"The industrial consequences were inevitable—dishonesty, evasions, bribery and corruption, bureaucracy run mad until it became an integral part of the national economy."

(over)
"And this tendency is found, even after defascistation, to persist in the form of individual selfishness, mis-statements with an ulterior motive, and flagrant aversion to discipline. This attitude must be taken into account; though it may be ameliorated, it will not entirely be rooted out in a generation."

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, FISHERIES

The basic economic policy of the Allies is to revive economic life and stimulate production in order to reduce to a minimum the needs of Italy from the Allies and to develop Italy as a source of supply for further operations.

The question as to what is best for Italian agriculture from a long-term policy viewpoint is not a strong factor under war conditions when shipments of civilian supplies must be justified in detail in terms of developing self-sufficiency in food and livestock.

An established policy is that emergency rehabilitation measures may be undertaken only if they will lighten the relief-import burden during the emergency period.

The over-all criterion of essentiality in emergency rehabilitation is that of saving shipping space and conserving essential Allied supplies. If the import of a few tons of parts of drainage or irrigation machinery would result in the production of large quantities of essential foods that would otherwise have to be imported during 1945, there is reason for a specific request accompanied by a well-considered statement of justification.

The Allied Commission is using 1936 data in planning for the 1944-45 program. There was an abnormal increase in the Italian wheat area after 1935 inspired by a desire for self-sufficiency. There are grave shortages of fertilizer which can cause a reduction of 5 million quintals of wheat if nitrogenous fertilizer is absent; a reduction of 5 million quintals if phosphates are also absent.

Basic farm machinery is urgently needed because of the almost complete stoppage of purchases in recent years and because of the antiquity of much existing equipment. Prior to 1935, Italiens purchased 600 tractors annually from the United States; 350 from Germany. Local manufacturers made 350 per year. Spare parts for agricultural implements are badly needed also.

Forestry

Timberland in Italy is scarce, totalling only 5.8 million hectares. Despite this shortage there has been much over-cutting during the war. It is necessary to re-establish the forest crops, wood-using industries, the charcoal industry, sawmills and woodmen's supplies.

Fisheries

Sardinia and Sicily have just ended their best season in five years. Next year Sicily alone should pack 50,000 cases of tuna and 20 percent of the catch will be available as fresh fish. The industry needs supplies in nearly every category of fishermen's equipment. Needed also are standardized marketing procedures and the proper financing of fishermen and of markets.

Mining

Many mines have been restored to operation under administration of the Allied Commission's subsection charged with that responsibility. Mining in Italy hit an all time low in November of 1943 when employment had been reduced by about a third, and many mines had ceased operation altogether.

Mining supplies have been requested to restore facilities and to operate mines, and deliveries are being received. The force of 12 Allied experts, operating for the ACC, has inspected 131 mines and put many back in operation.

(more)
As a result of their activity, mines in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia now employ 22,000 men. Typically, coal production in the Sardinian mines increased from 7,500 tons in November, 1943, to 45,250 tons in January, 1944, and now stands at 35,000 tons monthly, where it was frozen on military orders because of lack of transport facilities. Sulfur production in Sicily increased from zero tonnage in November, 1943, to 2,200 tons in July, 1944, and thus provides employment for 1,800 persons.

Mining in Italy formerly (1938) employed about 38,000 persons, but in November, 1943, jobs had fallen to a little more than 26,000. The peaks were obtained through Italy's drive for self-sufficiency under the Fascists, and were accomplished by means of pegged prices and various government subsidies. At one time, for instance, lead was pegged by the Italian government at twice the value of the same material in London markets.

It is estimated that continued restoration of mines, plus rehabilitation of transportation, will permit an employment of about 28,000 persons during 1945, and permit good production for the nation's economy and for Allied needs. However, Italy normally produces only about one fiftieth of the oil, a tenth of the coal, and a quarter of the iron ore which she requires.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

Electricity. Hydroelectric power, to which Italy's entire domestic and industrial economy is geared, is being restored as rapidly as possible to the extent necessary for military usage and essential civilian economy.

A big program for rehabilitation and repair of generating plants and switching stations destroyed by bombs and by German demolition, is under way in Central Italy.

Sardinia escaped almost unscathed. In Sicily, the enemy had small time for sabotage, so quickly were the Germans driven out. Nevertheless, transmission lines were severely damaged. Repairs extended over a period of nine to ten months, and power for essential civilian activity and military usage was provided. Restoration of one major transmission line was accomplished by recovering and salvaging almost the whole of the overhead trolley wires of the city of Messina.

The Germans' destruction of hydroelectric installations was deliberate and thorough where the enemy had time to work. Complete restoration of the destroyed plants and lines will require years, estimates of engineers say, and cannot be undertaken until after the war. Meanwhile, even minor repairs are hampered by lack of transportation, and by the military exigencies of supply.

In Southern Italy, the enemy was hurried and major installations escaped with slight damage. Transmission lines suffered greater destruction, but were restored within a few months.

Waterworks, gasworks, sewers, etc. Damage to waterworks was severe almost everywhere. Gasworks were destroyed in such cities as Naples, Catania and Messina. Damage to sewer systems was less important, since few of the cities were dependent on pumping systems for operation. Waterworks have been restored in most cities, except some of those south of Rome where they were completely wrecked, and in Rome itself, where the damage was severe, and is still undergoing repairs. Gasworks are hampered chiefly in their operation now by the fact that coal to manufacture the fuel must come from the United Kingdom, and shipping and transportation, within the country remain at a premium. Naples and Palermo have partial supplies of gas, and Rome's system began to operate in September...

(over)
Conditions in Italy for working men, as revised and set up by cooperation between the Italian government and the Allied Control Commission, are summarized in the following statement of accomplishments as of September, 1944:

1. Fascist control over labor, and Fascist labor syndicates, have been abolished, and the rights of the workers to organize, hold meetings and select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining have been established.

2. All disputes have been settled by arbitration or conciliation, without the use of military or other compulsion, and without one serious strike.

3. Collective labor contracts and labor and wage laws and regulations, which were generally ignored and violated, have been re-established and enforced.

4. Regional and provincial offices have been set up to provide an employment service and to serve as field offices for the central Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor in handling relations, assembling statistics and performing other necessary administrative functions.

5. Fascist officials, operating Italy's social security agencies, have been replaced; the offices themselves, their function and procedures reformed and coordinated with the labor offices. The system is now re-established, and the Italian government has appointed a committee to prepare a reform.

6. Inflationary prices, resulting from the disrupted economy of the nation, have been curbed as effectively as possible in view of the intense commodity shortages, and wages were increased to an average of 50 per cent in an effort to balance the working man's budget. After that single increase, a "hold the line" policy has been enforced. Supplementary rations of food for heavy workers were provided. (See section on Food.)

The Italian Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor was finally stabilized after the capture of Rome, transferred to that city on July 15, 1944, and a Directorate of Labor established with responsibility for organizing and developing a labor program. The reforms, instituted by the Allied Control Commission and the Italian Government, operate at present on the basis of military orders in Commission territory, and by agreement in Italian controlled territory. Legislation is being prepared for enactment.

A General Confederation of Italian Labor has been organized in Rome by three political parties who previously had formed unions and confederations: The Communist, Socialist, and Democratic-Christian. Some new and independent unions were formed. In other cases, the members of the dissolved syndicates elected new leaders, changed the name of the organization and now function as representative of the workers' rights. Another leading labor confederation is designated as the Party For Action, and this group, together with all others, has been invited by the three organizing parties to join the General Confederation of Italian Labor.

UNRRA

Supplemental food supplies for 1,700,000 children and 300,000 mothers will be supplied by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration operations in Italy, Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of UNRRA, announces. Spurgeon M. Keeny, chief of the UNRRA mission to administer this limited relief program in Italy, already has left for that country.
Relief for Italy will come under a $50,000,000 allocation voted unanimously by the UNRRA Council at its Montreal meeting in September. Help is limited to three types of assistance for Italians: (1) the care of, and welfare services for children and nursing and expectant mothers; (2) the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies; and (3) the care and return to their homes of persons displaced by the war.

UNRRA's plans, Mr. Lehman said, are subject to modification as a result of further study on the scene. The maximum size of the mission was placed at 75 professional and 20 to 50 clerical workers, he stated, adding that the Italian government and Italian organizations will take the responsibility of distributing aid and supplies.

Mothers and children who are suffering from more serious cases of undernourishment and malnutrition will be those aided, and plans call for distribution to them of approximately 750 calories a day, over and above their basic rations.

The budgets for displaced United Nations nationals and for epidemic control would be over and above the $50,000,000 allocation.

UNRRA assistance in medical and sanitary aid and supplies will consist of the dispatch of medical personnel whose primary function will be the rendering of advise in the restoration of the Italian Public Health Services, and the furnishing of up to $8,000,000 worth of medical and sanitary supplies, particularly of commodities not now included in the military supply program, over a period of a year. Medical supplies now are being imported into Italy, for civilians, at a rate of approximately $1,000,000 a month. The UNRRA contribution would supplement this.

End of ADVANCE RELEASE: For FRIDAY AFTERNOON Papers, October 27, 1944.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1944.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

You asked me, when Judge Felix Forte, Superior Court of Massachusetts, had his conference with you, to look up the case of Ubaldo Guidi-Butrini and see if he could be released under the sponsorship of some responsible person like the Judge himself.

Mr. DuBois, Enemy Alien Control Unit in Justice, states as follows:

"Ubaldo Guidi-Butrini is one of about 10 Italians still interned. These 10 were pro-Fascist leaders here before the war. Guidi-Butrini was the worst of the lot, being a 'Mussolini fire-eater'. All these men were leaders on the wrong side and it is felt that perhaps we should not be too speedy in letting them out -- especially considering what effect it might have on the Italian community here. The Attorney General has once reconsidered their cases and was not willing to parole any of the group."

In view of the nature of this report I shall do nothing further unless you think I should follow it through with the Attorney General.

E.M.W.
<table>
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<th>TO</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BUILDING, ROOM NUMBER, ETC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Miss Elizabeth B. Drewry,</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hyde Park, New York</td>
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☐ PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF...
☐ ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE BEFORE...

FROM
Patricia G. Dowling, MND
10-25-66

REMARKS
As requested in your letter of Oct. 14, 1966. Copy was also sent to Miss Whiteman, Dept. of State.

R.G. 59
State Dept. Decimal File 1940-44
AMT-748

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (secret)

Vatican City
Dated November 3, 1944
Rec'd 5:23 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

MOST URGENT
363, November 3, 6 p.m.
FOR PRESIDENT ONLY
Department's 57, November 1.

Following is text in translation of secret message received by me for you today from Mayor of Rome, Prince Filippo Doria Pamphilj, dated November 3:

"To His Excellence Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.

On the anniversary (November 4, 1918) of the victory of our democracies united against two feudalistic and militaristic empires, remembering that Rome conferred its honorary citizenship upon President Woodrow Wilson, whom you loved and admired as we did, and interpreting the thought of the Eternal City and of all of Italy I hereby confer also upon you in absentia the honorary citizenship"
-2- #363, November 3, 6 p.m., from Vatican City.

citizenship of Rome as our supreme mark of respect and honor.

The American people will see in this exceptional decision the proof of our gratitude for the fact that you have always made the most profound distinction between the criminals who threw us into war and the Italian people who, even when shackled, not only remained at heart always a faithful friend of the great nations attacked by Fascism but boycotted the war with every means at their disposal. Signed Filippo Doriapamphili, Mayor of Rome."

Will you please acknowledge receipt by cable to me embodying your official message of acceptance for delivery to Mayor of Rome in order that above message and your reply can be made public in Rome and the United States not later than Sunday November 5 or Monday November 6, noon Rome time? I am assured that pending your reply with your official acceptance this matter will be held in strict secrecy here. My cable address is AMVAT Rome.

TAYLOR

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Rome

Dated December 14, 1944
Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

967, December 14, 3 p.m.

Chief Commissioner of AC has reported to AP Haw the following discussions and views with respect to the bread rationing program for Italy in the light of CCS telegram F/AN 465 (see my 928, December 9, 10 p.m. and previous).

One. At a meeting to consider Italy's overall food situation called by Stone upon receipt of the above cited telegram and attended by the AC Vice Presidents, the Russian and French officers of AC and representative G-5 AP Haw, it was unanimous decision that the recommendations made since May of this year that the basis for feeding the Italian population be a bread ration of 300 grams cannot be receded from by AC, as that ration constitutes the minimum for preventing disease and unrest and was recommended as such by the President to the War Department. In Italy the President's recommendation is looked upon as a promise.

Two. This
Two. This position was warmly supported at the meeting by the French Representative who, supported by his Russian colleague, urged the taking of every measure to increase shipping and suggested the use of neutral and even Italian war ships for transporting the food required. The persons attending the meeting felt that resentment against the Allies cannot possibly be avoided when, as will inevitably happen, the Italian Government and people learn of the difference in treatment accorded them in comparison with that provided for in other countries, such as approximately 400 grams in Greece for 85% of the population; 350 grams in France, which may be increased to four hundred; and approximately 300 grams in the remainder of Northwestern Europe.

Three. The urgent necessity was also stressed by Stone's advisors that parity be established throughout presently liberated Italy, as serious effects in Rome and LMG territory are resulting from the disparity now existing. The establishment in Central Italy of a 300 gram ration is, to repeat, looked upon as a promise made by the Allied Nations and certain to be carried out by them. The meeting was in agreement that...
December 14, 3 p.m. from Rome.

to program the feeding of 25 million people now and 45 million subsequently on a basis barely avoiding starvation is impossible under a plan which as shown by experience may from week to week be upset by shipping cuts; ENDSTONE VIEWS.

Four. At the same time a message has been received at AFHQ from the headquarters of the Fifth Army containing the following views:

Five. Virtually no improvement has occurred in the Fifth Army area with regard to the civilian food situation since previous exchange of telegrams on the subject, the daily bread ration being still 200 grams, which is supplemented by a monthly ration of flour for spaghetti of 600 grams or the equivalent thereof.

Restricted to cities having a minimum population of 50 thousand, AMG has been distributing, besides the foregoing, dehydrated soup and dried peas on the basis of twentieth grade and 400 grams respectively per month; but in a telegram dated November 23 the order was received that except occasionally in villages newly occupied no distribution of these latter items be made during December.

Six. This
Six. This quantity of food is inadequate and a normal individual cannot be supported by it. It is well known to the public that a minimum of 300 grams daily per person is being distributed in southern Italy, and recent demonstrations demanding a like minimum have occurred in the Fifth Army area where unrest is being created by under nourishment. A Washington despatch of December 3 has been widely quoted in the Italian press to the effect that instructions had been given by President Roosevelt that at least 300 grams of bread daily per person be received by the Italians throughout liberated Italy. Information is received that militarily serious unrest particularly as the weather becomes increasingly colder is likely to be caused by the continued failure to provide sufficient food. The grave shortage of transportation greatly aggravates the whole situation. End Fifth Army views.

I understand that a final recommendation will be sent from AFRQ on the question of the bread ration in Italy and in view of the necessity for the establishment of a 300 gram ration on the basis of parity throughout
-5-967, December 14, 3 p.m. from Rome.

throughout liberated Italy and the grave repercussions which must inevitably follow both in Italy and elsewhere if the impression conveyed by recent statements of the President and the Prime Minister are not implemented I urge that the observations as stated above together with previous data on this matter be laid before the President for consideration in connection with the above mentioned message from the SAC which is expected to be forthcoming shortly.

KIRK

CAD
Dear Secretary Stettinius,

In spite of the unanimous wish of my former colleagues in the Cabinet I have most reluctantly declined the offer of the embassy to the United States. The reasons are stated in a letter I have addressed to Prime Minister Bonomi; of which a copy is joined.

I do not need to assure you that no other appointment might have been more agreeable to me; in declining it I have been moved only by my devotion and my gratitude to your country. I may even say that it was impossible for me to offer a stronger proof of these feelings of mine towards a country which to me is the very embodiment of loyalty and generosity.

May I ask you to submit this letter with my deepest personal and political wishes for him and his work.

Believe me, dear Secretary Stettinius
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

December 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR  

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS  

TO READ AND RETURN FOR  

MY FILES.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Italian Supply Question

You will be interested in the enclosed telegram from Kirk transmitting indications of civilian dissatisfaction with the supply problem in areas near the Italian front.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 1001 from Rome,
December 18, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaubic Date FEB 10 1972
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Rome
Dated December 18, 1944
Rec'd 4:11 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
1001, December 18, 6 p.m.

Stone has received a report from General Hume of Fifth Army AMG that signs have appeared today in Florence reading "Roosevelt, where is that bread you promised us? Did you mean what you said? We are hungry - when do we eat?"

See my 967, December 14, 3 p.m., and my 978, December 15, 5 p.m. first paragraph.

KIRK

WTD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Deteriorating Economic Situation in Italy

I am becoming increasingly alarmed about the plight of Italians in liberated Italy during the next several months. I have seen Marshal Alexander's very sobering telegram of December 21 (NAF 830) containing a final urgent request for a decision on the bread ration for the Italian people. I asked Admiral Leahy yesterday to send you a copy of NAF 830 if you had not already seen it.

Reports from Myron Taylor and Alexander Kirk during the past several weeks and months have reflected the increasing gravity of the food situation particularly north of the Garigliano River. It is generally conceded that a ration of at least three hundred grams per day of bread and "pasta" is required to maintain the populace on any kind of a standard approaching normal subsistence. Thus far the Allied authorities have not been able to achieve this ration north of the Garigliano.

To implement your instructions of October 31 to the War Department to increase the bread ration to three hundred grams throughout all of liberated Italy I am informed that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCS) is working on a directive to Marshal Alexander. I believe there is considerable reluctance on the British side to concur in a directive to Alexander to use food reserves for north Italy to relieve the present acute situation in liberated Italy. There is of course complete unanimity on the American side in its desire to carry out the spirit and letter of your request of October 31.
This difficult problem can be solved eventually only by an increase in the shipping allocation to the Mediterranean theater. I hope that this situation will be kept under constant review for the purpose of increasing the Mediterranean shipping allocation at the expense of any less urgent demands, other than operational, on world shipping.
December 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you be good enough to let me see proposed reply to NAF 830?

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

The President:

The attached note from the State Department (Mr. Bohlen), together with NAF 330 referred to therein, is forwarded for your information.

NAF 330 is now under study by the American and British Chiefs of Staff as a matter of priority.

They have not yet been able to agree on a reply.

[Signature]

December 23, 1944

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEARY

Ambassador Kirk has telegraphed from Rome urging that the text of Marshal Alexander's most recent telegram to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff on the bread ration in Italy be placed before the President. The reference to this telegram is NAF 830. This is a military telegram and we do not have a copy. If the President has not already seen this message perhaps you could send him a copy by the next pouch.

Charles P. Bohlen
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
   CG United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
   Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Nr: FX 72384 NAF 830 21 December 1944

FX 72384 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to Central District, United Kingdom Base Section, London, for British Chiefs of Staff rptd SHAEF for information signed Alexander cite FHCOS. This is NAF 830.

1. This is an earnest and urgent request to you for a firm statement of the policy of our two Governments on the provision of bread for the population of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, together with a request that steps may be taken to provide means to implement that policy. This request has the complete support of my economic and political advisers.

2. The past policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is understood to have been to allot sufficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in Italy a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognized as desirable if disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in France and Greece. It is lower than that in northwest Europe as a whole.

The matter is therefore not one of preferential treat-
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Date: 21 December 1944

1. The distribution of bread is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in Italy necessary for the continuance of military operations.

2. As you have been advised it has been our constant endeavor to reach the target figure of 300 grams by making full use of the local resources of Italy. We have proved that there is always a discrepancy between what it is theoretically possible to amass for controlled distribution and what is in fact amassed and available for this purpose.

This is no new problem and is always most acute in peasant-populated countries with weak local administration. We can not hope within measurable time to correct it. It is therefore unprofitable to discuss further the use of grain which for controlled distribution is non-existent. Nor is it more useful to pass the responsibility to the Italian Government for a problem which they can not solve.

4. Hitherto we have been able to establish a ration of 300 grams south of the Garigliano. It has not been possible to do so north of this line where a 200-gram bread
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Casserta, Italy

Nr: FX 72394  NAF 830  21 December 1944

ration obtains. Here the combination of under-nourishment and winter and operational conditions is causing great distress and resentment which have already led to disorders.

My Army commanders have again made forcible representations to me on the matter. The necessity for preventing militarily serious disorders in and near the combat line is patent.

5. There is no doubt that the Italian people regard the statements made by the President and the Prime Minister as constituting a pledge which will not be broken and in this connection I wish to quote the following statements on which they base their hopes:

A. "The first objective in improving the lot of the Italian people is to furnish relief from hunger and sickness and famine." (Joint statement by the President and Prime Minister, 26th September 1944).

B. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in Italy where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency." (The President on 29th October 1944).
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 72384  NAF 830  21 December 1944

O. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of Italy that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks in whatever number is required to provide minimum transport system to get the food to the people." (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31st October 1944).

6. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to implement these promises. Moreover, of late weeks, the cuts which have been imposed make it impossible for me to plan consistently for any uniform ration. It will be superfluous for me to emphasize the administrative and political objections to an unstable ration scale for such a basic foodstuff as bread.

It has, for example, been brought to my notice that some 77,000 tons only are expected to arrive in this country in January as against previously planned and advised shipments of 95,000 tons of wheat equivalent. It is impossible to plan the feeding of the population of 25,000,000 people, (and later 45,000,000) with a plan which from past experience has shown may be upset from week to week.

I would also draw your attention to the fact that

CM-IN-20991 (22 Dec 44)

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS 29-71

SECRET
By Date FEB 7 1972

COPY NO. 32

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 72384 NAF 830 21 December 1944

whatever difficulties confront us now, they may be counted as small compared with those which we march to meet in the densely populated areas of north Italy.

7. To assure a ration of 300 grams of bread in all Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, we estimate that it will be necessary for you to ship so as to arrive in Italy during the period January through June 1945, a total of 1,021,000 tons of wheat.

The manner in which shipments should be phased and an estimate of the shipping involved are being submitted to you separately in my LAC 911.

8. A careful examination has been made to see whether we can offer some reduction in shipping allotted for operational maintenance. As regards United States tonnages there have been as you know, considerable reductions already. Authorized stock levels have been reduced but additional commitments have arisen and any further cut in imports will cause reductions below authorized stock levels.

As regards British tonnages, cuts have also recently been imposed. A back-log has already accumulated. Authorized stock levels have been reduced but even the reduced

CM-IN-20991 (22 Dec 44)
levels are not being maintained in certain items. The effect of further reductions in British tonnages would be to prejudice firstly maintenance of stock levels, particularly of supplies (rations) and secondly, current operational demands for items such as bridging vehicles etc.

To summarize United States and British positions we will continue to scrutinize our demands most carefully to ensure that we ask only for what is absolutely necessary. If you can find it impossible when you make your monthly allocations of shipping to meet the request put forward herein for additional wheat without some contribution from or deferment of operational maintenance, we will undertake to make the necessary contribution at the expense of military requirements if operationally possible to do so. We can only do this period by period after receiving from you the firm allocation for military imports during the period involved.

9. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many theaters of war. It is my duty, however, to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot administer those parts of Italy under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians unless I am regularly provided with the means to do so. The alternative is

CM-IN-20991 (22 Dec 44)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Casserta, Italy
Nr: FX 72384 NAF 830 21 December 1944

an Italy embittered by unfulfilled promises by hunger and distress. This, I believe, would be a grave handicap to our immediate war effort and a lamentable example to other nations of the justice of Allied dealing.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy CG AAF OPD Gen Bissell CAD Adm King Log

CM-IN-20991 (22 Dec 44) 0225Z bjm
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 5, 1945

Subject: Letter from Count Sforza.

You will be interested in the attached letter which I have just received from Count Sforza and in the copy of his letter to Premier Bonomi explaining his reasons for withdrawing as Italian Ambassador to the United States.

Enclosure:

From Count Sforza,
December 21, 1944.
Rome, December 20, 1944

Dear Bonomi:

Because of your insistence and that of my friend, de Gasperi, my first impulse was to accept the mission to the United States because the moving recollection of the three years that I spent there in the service of Italian liberty gave me the certainty that I could be useful to our country.

But I should be very sorry if, upon my arrival, I should become, against my will, the cause of new discussions. Sure as I am of the absolute clarity of my political and moral line of action, I want not only to be but to appear to all what I have been ever since the time when it cost me dear to be so: the exponent of a fruitful accord between Italy and the two great English-speaking democracies, an accord which is necessary to the latter also, if it is desired to establish tomorrow not a second armistice but a true peace.

It is solely for this reason that, with deep gratitude, I must now decline your offer.

Affectionately yours,

(S) SFORZA
Roma, 20 dicembre 1944

Caro Bonomi,

Grato per le insistenze tue e dell’amico de Gasperi, il mio primo impulso fu di accettare la missione agli Stati Uniti perché il comasco ricordo dei tre anni che vi ho passato al servizio della libertà italiana mi dava certezza di poter essere utile alla nostra patria.

Ma mi spiacerebbe troppo se col mio arrivo divenissi, mio malgrado, causa di nuove discussioni. Sicuro come sono della più assoluta coerenza della mia linea politica e morale, io voglio non solo essere ma apparire a tutti ciò che fui fin da quando costava caro di esserlo: – assertore di una feconda intesa fra l’Italia e le due grandi democrazie di lingua inglese, intesa che è necessaria anche ad esse se si vuol domani creare non un secondo armistizio ma la vera pace.

E’ solo per ciò che con profondo rincrescimento debo per ora declinare la vostra offerta.

Tuo aff.mo

SFORZA
Memorandum for Miss Audrey Turner:

Subject: Asinari Correspondence.

I return to you herewith the Asinari correspondence which you were kind enough to let us have on December 20 together with a copy of Mr. Dunn's reply to Ambassador Kirk. We have taken the liberty of making copies for our files of the Asinari correspondence.

I very much appreciate your cooperation in this.

Hathaway Watson
Assistant
President,

in my own name and in the name of my family, which is related to You by family ties, allow me to thank You and your valorous army because, together with the victory of Rome, You have given back to Italy the joy if its liberty; (my own name has appeared in an official republican fascist list amongst those condemned to death).

Mr. President, now that the Stars and Stripes are flying over Rome, my brothers, who have survived the war, and I are ready for the work of reconstruction, eager to co-operate heartily and effectively.

Mr. President, in this hour of rejoicing, which is also a grave hour for us, allow us to ask that Your Excellency extend your good-will towards us by recommending us to those financial-industrial organisations that will be established in Italy, so that some use may be made of our abilities, which my brothers and I offer in a spirit of zealous, lasting and loyal collaboration.

If it would be useful, I beg to inform You that, after long years of residence in Africa, we are thoroughly acquainted with that part of the world from the point of view of its markets, products, ways of living etc. During my stay in Ethiopia, I met with American commissions in these regions in 1929-1932-1933.

The collaboration of my family could be useful also in the field of politics, and we are ready to be at your disposal for political action.

Mr. President, we are confident that our desires will be duly appreciated by making use of me and my
brothers in the future.

I beg You to receive, Mr. President, for yourself and your family, our respectful greetings and thanks.

Roberto Asinari di San Marzano

mutilated during The War 1915-18

Roberto Asinari di San Marzano

Via Vincenzo Bellini 14 - Tel. 865186

Roma

P.S.

My own family is composed of:

- my wife (now deceased) Elsa Salom (Sant'Angelo 3887 - Palazzo Spinelli, Venezia) and my daughter Gabriella.
- my brothers: Alessandro, father of five sons, mutilated during the war 1915-18, actually a prisoner in Kenya.
- Carlo, father of one son, also mutilated during the other war, formerly prisoner in Kenya.
- my cousins: Giorgio and Filippo Antonio, nephew of Elisabeth Forbes, sister of Paul, who married Dora Delano, etc.
Mr. President,

following up the letter which I had the honour to write to Your Excellency in the month of August, and which was forwarded to you through the high mediation of H.R.H. the Prince of Piemont, true to sentiments of sympathy and devotion which binds me to you and your family in the bonds of relationship and true to my spirit of cooperation towards your nation already manifested in my first letter, I take the liberty to ask your high patronage in order to see realised my following plan which not only will allow financial and industrial relations between Italy and the United States to be exploited in a better way, but will also help to bind the peoples of our two Nations ever more closely by material and moral ties.

I beg to call your attention, Mr. President, to the fact that it would be opportune that a single, reliable industrial organisation should unite and have control over the various services of transportation, existing for the benefit of the public in Italy, and now belonging to private companies; and this unification should be worked out according to a new plan, studied by an expert in this line; a plan which would improve technical and administrative efficiency.

Here is in question a complex system of services, the principal characteristics of which are clearly and fully stated in the bold and detailed clever plan referred to above. I shall hold this plan at the disposal of those organisation which may be appointed by you, Mr. President, and which as I think will be glad to make use of my proposal and put it into practice, in this way securing
to the invested capital not only a good return but also absolute priority in the further developments of the new organisation, both in the proper field of transportation and in the allied industrial and economic fields.

From the synthetic table of the summary data, both of which are herewith enclosed you will be able, Mr. President, to grasp how clever indeed, the proposed plan really is, and how useful and advantageous it would be to put it into effect.

I beg, Mr. President, to accept my sincere thanks and my greetings for yourself and your family.

Roberto Asinari di San Hayano.
To his Excellency

The President of The United States
President,

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S/ Roberto di San Marsano
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Here is in question a complex system of services, the principal characteristics of which are clearly and fully stated in the bold and detailed clever plan referred to above. I shall hold this plan at the disposal of those organisation which may be appointed by you, Mr. President, and which as I think will be glad to make use of my proposal and put it into practice, in this way securing to the invested capital not only a good return but also absolute priority in the further developments of the new organisation, both in the proper field of transportation and in the allied industrial and economic fields.

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I beg, Mr. President, to accept my sincere thanks and my greetings for yourself and your family.

s/ Roberto Asinari di San Marsano.
In reply refer to
SE 811.001 Roosevelt, F. D.

Dear Alexander,

Colonel Rosenblatt on September 13, 1944 transmitted to the
President two letters from Count Roberto Asinari di San Marsano,
Via Vincenzo Bellini 14, Rome, copies of which are enclosed.
The first of these letters, dated July 15, requests that the
President recommend Count Asinari and his brothers to the financial
and industrial organizations that may be set up in Italy. The
second, dated September 4, requests the President’s assistance in
a plan for a consolidated public transportation organization in
Italy.

Would you be good enough to communicate with Count Asinari,
who claims relationship to the President, and inform him that his
letters have been received but that it is, of course, impossible
for the President to support any commercial or industrial venture
in Italy.

Sincerely yours,

James Clement Dunn
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:
Copies of letters from
Count Asinari.

The Honorable
Alexander C. Kirk,
American Ambassador,
Rome, Italy.

SE:EH:HEA 12/28/44
December 20, 1944.

NOTE FOR FILES:

At the request of Mr. Watson of the State Department, the enclosures from Asinari was sent to him to aid in taking care of this through Ambassador Kirk.

Audrey Turner
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Rosenblatt - Asinari Correspondence

I have considered Colonel Rosenblatt's letter of September 13 to you and the enclosures from an Italian (Asinari) requesting your assistance in some commercial transportation venture in Italy. I think the best thing to do in this case would be to let me communicate with Kirk in Rome. We would request Kirk to tell Asinari that the letters were received but that of course it would be impossible for you to support any individual commercial venture in Italy. If you wish this done, I shall be very happy to take care of it for you.

I am returning the letters herewith.

[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1944
Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

This past week I spent about two hours with Prince Umberto who asked me to convey to you his kindest personal respects and best wishes. My visit was completely unofficial and was not arranged through the Embassy. We have a number of mutual friends and the discussion was principally concerning them.

The Prince requested me to forward to you two letters which I am enclosing herewith and to advise you in forwarding them that he had the highest regard for the writers of subject letters who are well and favorably known to him.

This may be breaking the diplomatic channel, but since I have never stood much on ceremony I thought the best thing to do was to just send them along so that you could have one of your staff acknowledge and otherwise attend to the contents of subject letters.

Under orders, I am on my way to the Far East and leave Naples within the next day or so. I send Mrs. Roosevelt and yourself my own best wishes and felicitations.

With very kindest personal regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Sol A. Rosenblatt
Colonel, Air Corps.
Secretary of State
Washington

109, Thirteenth, 7 p.m.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested that the following message from the Italian Central Committee of National Liberation be forwarded to the President.

"The Central Committee of National Liberation of Italy has the honor to inform you of the desire which it has expressed to the Italian Government for a larger participation of our country in the war against Nazi oppression.

"The Italian people welcome with heart-felt gratitude the sacrifice of blood of the glorious Allied Armies and bows in admiration before the example of heroism displayed by the soldiers of the United Nations on every war front. In view of these great sacrifices the Italian people feel that the heroic action of the Patriots the admirable contribution of the Navy and the efforts of army and air force units can and should be rounded
rounded out by a larger participation of soldiers on the front of liberated Italy.

Interpreting the sentiment and desire of the people the Central Committee of National Liberation assures the heads of the United Nations that in accordance with the renewed national conscience and in contrast to the aims and methods which brought about the military and moral collapse of so large a part of the Italian Army Italy's war effort could be reinforced through the creation of a strong national army capable of entering the lines alongside the glorious Allied Armies. This must be the way by which Italy arises again morally revindicating its good name stained by Fascist dishonor and satisfying its urge to contribute more effectively towards regaining its national independence and to the victory of liberty for the people. Every Italian citizen is aware that the surest deliverance will result from action: action which linking in the heroic war effort Italian formations with those of the United Nations will bring about the destruction of Hitlerite and Fascist savagery and the triumph of democracy.

The Central Committee of National Liberation trusts that the great heads of the United Nations will not wish
-3-#109, Thirteenth, 7 p.m. from Rome

wish to deny to the Italian people the right to fulfill their duty."

In his note transmitting the above message the Minister adds that: "the continued enlargement and development of Italian military participation also is one of the fundamental desires of the government which consequently participates in and fully supports the proposals and sentiments expressed by the Central Committee of National Liberation."

KIRK

RB
Secretary of State,

Washington,

584, Second, 6 p.m.

Today's press gives great prominence to full summary of President's address. Headlines generally emphasize organization for peace with American collaboration and in a number of papers despatches are carried under headings such as "The End of American Isolation".

In its leading editorial IL POPOLO refers particularly to President's statements on American cooperation for peace, demilitarization of Germany and Japan and world cooperation without spheres of influence or alliances. Calling the President "the most farsighted statesman of our time" it says "the serene words of the President of the United States, inspired by the high moral dignity and by understanding of the rights of all, constitute the best guarantee of an international justice, as well as *** for a peace founded on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter, on the concept of the dignity of man, on the guarantee of tolerance and of freedom of worship".

ITALIA
ITALIA NOUVA also praises address and while expressing reservations regarding Polish settlement, says that address meets exigencies of present world situation and gives grounds for reasonable optimism regarding future peace and prosperity of the world. Pointing to President's remarks on American collaboration in peace, ITALIA NOUVA says it is impossible to foresee full consequences of this new American policy but that it will certainly prove invaluable to Europe and the rest of the world.

KIRK

MRM