

● PSF

Japan

Jan. - Sept. 1941

PSF Japan

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4257-
4258

[1-11-41]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


January 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached despatch from our Naval
Attache at Tokyo is forwarded as being of
possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

Japan
THE WHITE HOUSE
JAN 13 9 04 AM '41
RECEIVED

*Send to Pres
for info.*

NPM 1836 Z MOTH 060930 MUSK Q DART F5Q PLUG D GR 48

FROM: ADUSNA TOKYO
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI- CINCAF- COM 16

ROUTINE/S

COMMENTS ON PRESIDENTS FIRESIDE CHAT WHICH NOT FULLY REPORTED IN
ENGLISH LANGUAGE OR VERNACULAR PAPERS INDICATE ATTEMPT MINIMIZE
IMPORTANCE MAKE JAPANESE PEOPLE BELIEVE PRESIDENT EXPRESSING
OWN OPINIONS NOT VIEWS AMERICAN PEOPLE X PRESIDENT ACCUSED MAKING
IRRESPONSIBLE REMARKS PRESUMPTIONS PREDICTIONS DISREGARDING ACTUAL
FACTS AND OF DRIVING AMERICA INTO WAR

1937 BMMX10JAN41

1-1-41
13 ACTION

10 11 12 16 28 39 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
17 0100

~~7~~ Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

1/13/41

PART 20 PAGES 4259

Hes 1106
L 091 1107
brip 1109
bod all dig
1109 1109

For Pres.
info.

Japan

NPM 2333

Z MOTH 110250 MUSK Q DART F5Q PLUG D GR 58

FROM: ALUSNA TOKYO.

ACTION: OPNAV.

INFO: ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI --GINCAF--COMSIXTEEN.

NITE/JA

REPORTS CHANGES U S FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDERS CARRIED
LARGE HEADLINES ALL VERNACULAR PAPERS X TYPICAL COMMENT THAT U S
PREPARING FOR WAR IN BOTH OCEANS BY ORGANIZING TWO OCEAN FLEET
AND REPLACING ~~MMMMMM~~ OLDER LESS ENERGETIC OFFICERS X YOMIURI
REMARKS THAT ADMIRAL RICHARDSON WHO ADVOCATED CAUTIONS POLICY
TOWARD JAPAN REPLACED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL WHO ADVOCATED STRONG
AGGRESSIVE POLICY

13 ACTION

0917AHMX13JAN

JA JA J2

10/11 12 16 35 NAVY FILE



Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4261 - 4273

Also in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,
Vol. IV, The Far East, pp. 6-8.

Original sent to State for delivery by
pouch 1/21/41
hmw Japan PSE
State 1941

January 21, 1941

Dear Joe: x204

I have given careful consideration to your
letter of December 14. x3575

First, I want to say how helpful it is to have
your over-all estimates and reflections--based as
they are upon a rare combination of first-hand
observation, long experience with our Japanese rela-
tions, and masterly judgment. I find myself in
decided agreement with your conclusions.

I also want you to know how much I appreciate
your kind words of congratulation on my re-election
and your expression of confidence in my conduct of
our foreign affairs.

As to your very natural request for an indication
of my views as to certain aspects of our future atti-
tude toward developments in the Far East, I believe
that the fundamental proposition is that we must recog-
nize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in
Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We
must, consequently, recognize that our interests are
menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. We are
engaged in the task of defending our way of life and
our vital national interests wherever they are seriously
endangered. Our strategy of self-defense must be a
global strategy which takes account of every front and
takes advantage of every opportunity to contribute to
our total security.

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the
problem of our attitude toward Japan the question
whether our getting into war with Japan would so handi-
cap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the differ-
ence to Britain between victory and defeat. In this
connection it seems to me that we must consider whether,
if Japan should gain possession of the region of the
Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the

x197
x197-A
x463-6
x6 F State-European War
x48

the chances of England's winning in her struggle with Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those Isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by importing goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire. The British need assistance along the lines of our generally established policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the Far East is certainly well within the realm of "possibility" so far as the capacity of the United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving them assistance toward ensuring our own security must envisage both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British and be added to the assets of the other side.

You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the questions whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war. As I have indicated above, the conflict is world-wide, not merely a European war. I firmly believe, as I have recently declared publicly, that the British, with our help, will be victorious in this conflict. The conflict may well be long and we must bear in mind that when England is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed to bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the western and southern Pacific as might occur

during the course of the conflict if Japan is not kept within bounds. I judge from the remarks which appear at the bottom of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of your letter that you, too, attach due importance to this aspect of the problem.

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we can not lay down hard and fast plans. As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.

With warmest regards,

As ever
(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Department of State

BUREAU | PA/H
DIVISION |

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

.....
The President
.....

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 21, 1941

Memorandum for the President

In response to your memorandum of January 3, 1941, ^{ml} there is attached hereto a draft of a letter for your signature to Mr. Grew in reply to Mr. Grew's letter to you of December 14, 1940. Mr. Grew's letter is returned herewith.

C.H.

x20

Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States,
1940, Vol. IV, p. 469.

AS 11/14/56

Japan film - 1941

January 21, 1941

Dear Joe:

I appreciate and I thank you for your thoughtful courtesy in sending me enclosed with your letter of December 14 four new Japanese stamps, including two commemorating the 2600th anniversary. I am, of course, delighted to have these stamps. Among other things, I have not failed to note the Imperial crest which appears on each of them.

xpp737-9

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew, ^{xpp7164}
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Original sent to State for delivery by pouch
1/21/41
hm

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 21. 1941


My dear Mr. President:

I have before me, by reference from you of January 3, Mr. Grew's letter to you of December 14, 1940.

I find attached to Mr. Grew's letter an envelope which is inscribed "New stamps". In order to avoid chance of that envelope and its contents being lost, I return the said envelope to you herewith, together with a draft of a letter in acknowledgment thereof.

I am sending to you separately a draft of a possible reply to Mr. Grew's letter under reference.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. Envelope containing four Japanese stamps.
2. Draft of letter to Mr. Grew.

The President,

The White House.

Japan folder - 1941

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
TOKYO

December 14, 1940.

Dear Frank:

*added
11/21/41*

I would give a great deal to know your mind about Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown someday, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be:

- (1) whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;
- (2) whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat; and
- (3) to what extent our own policy in the Far

The President,
The White House.

East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.

Those are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from

pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always swinging between extremist and moderate policies, but as things stand today we believe that the pendulum is more likely to swing still further toward extremes than to reverse its direction. Konoye, and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but under present circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive.

Our own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination in meeting every Japanese step with some step of our own has been eminently wise, and that policy has sunk deep into Japanese conscious-

ness. But while important elements among the Japanese people deplore the course which their leaders are taking, those elements are nevertheless inarticulate and powerless and are likely to remain so. Meanwhile the Germans here are working overtime to push Japan into war with us. I have told Matsuoka point blank that his country is heading for disaster. He has at least seen that his efforts to intimidate us have fallen flat and have had an effect precisely the reverse of that intended.

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

A progressively firm policy on our part will entail inevitable risks - especially risks of sudden uncalculated strokes such as the sinking of the PANAY which might enflame the

American people - but in my opinion those risks are less in degree than the far greater future dangers which we would face if we were to follow a policy of laissez-faire.

In other words, the risks of not taking positive measures to maintain our future security are likely to be much greater than the risks of taking positive measures as the southward advance proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great majority of the American people are in a mood for vigorous action. The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program, but when.

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures "short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to

do so will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war, - the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting of Japan's present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of normal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem.


In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have ^{seen} some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "New Structure" is in an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within

the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

If you are willing to give me even a cue to your thoughts, either in a personal ultra-confidential letter or orally by some trustworthy person coming out here, it will be of tremendous help.

I cabled you my enthusiastic and affectionate congratulations on your re-election. You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and I am profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived of your clear vision, determination and splendid courage in piloting the old ship of state.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Joseph E. Fraw". The signature is written in dark ink and extends across the width of the page, ending in a long, sweeping tail that curves downwards and to the right.

Copy from file of
Capt. E. M. Zacharias (U.S. Navy)

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 18 PAGES 3258 - 3262

COPY

PSE Japan folder
X Navy

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

Mare Island, California
February 9, 1941

My dear Admiral:

I think that you will be interested in a conversation which I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and favorably over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly. I decided to arrange for such a conversation in order to determine if possible the purpose for which he was sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversation I have formed the following impressions:

(1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Axis and is greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nomura was sent here to determine the best bargain to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be coming to "Rock us to sleep" while Japan proceeded to the Southward, has been eliminated definitely).

(2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.

(3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot "conquer" China or exert sufficient control while Chiang Kai-shek maintains his present position and strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be attempted first by trying to dissuade us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the Wang Chin-wei group to gain control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible he will then explore the other possible means of bringing about peace in China.

(4) That hostilities between Japan and the U. S. can be avoided if he is given sufficient basis for an approach to the Leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him that an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan would have to be forthcoming if our Government opened such an approach. When he asked "What for example" I replied "If I were asked, I would say 'Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China'". He made no comment on this.

In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements:

(1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the U. S. in settling present disagreements.

(2) That Japan has completely changed her views with regard to China, and that peace is essential to both countries.

(3) That if the U. S. is patient until Europe is settled then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore I resisted an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of force by us in the Far East). My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted the question from him "Do you think it will be a long war?" My answer was negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they finally hear of US aid to Britain.

(4) That the signing of the Axis pact was done only after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight balance of influence in its favor. Now, the mistake is realized but as it is a "Fait accompli" nothing can be done towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading Japanese business representative in San Francisco referred to the signing of the pact by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have brought this about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished by bribery of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.

Details of Conversation

After the usual exchange of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he expected to handle it. He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in settling the difficulties existing between our two countries. I replied, "Of course you know that at least 65% of the American people are reconciled to any action as far as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would be a disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U.S. We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed. We saved her in 1904, you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to save her again because the very same reasons exist today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a strong China means the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war if our Commerce was blacked off, because that has been the cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all Foreign trade in Manchuria. What would happen in the rest of Asia," At this he apologized for their extremists and I reminded him that they are the ones who bring on wars. I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people cant reconcile is why Japan, a country which has called continually for 'Equal Opportunity' could sign a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was sharp division of opinion in

Japan as to the advisability of signing the pact and that only a very slight balance of influence made it possible. Now they realize the mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it. Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

"Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a man like Wang Chin-wei, set him up and count upon him working for Japan?"

He replied that Wang was for peace in China and that this was very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism which has spread Russian influence as far South as Peiping. "In this case", I said, "it seems to me that you want a man like Chiang Kai Shek to combat it, as he has done so successfully for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agreement if you really want the peace of Asia, and here is where the U.S. might act as mediator and again save Japan. With communications as now exist in China you will never be able to conquer or control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all three of our countries. Your objective of markets and raw materials will be realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and there remains only the problem of taking care of Japan's expanding population. Let's explore the realms of possibility. Do you think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to cede Manchuria to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the Japanese people and say 'Japan has at last reached her original objective, we can now stop the war in China and settle down to prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?" This question was evidently unexpected for after much hesitation the Admiral laughing and then seriously said, "It would have to be handled very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in such matters and the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of 1932. "That of course would clear up the rest of China for a resumption of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long desired development would eventuate. The fears of Japan about a strong Russia in Asia or an over strong China would disappear." The Admiral again indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan at this time, but I said that the more difficult they were the more important they became. And I added, "Of course, you understand that if Japan really wants the U.S. to assist in solving this serious situation without resort to force, which you say is your mission, then there would have to be an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan." He then asked, "What for example?" I replied, "If I were asked, I would say Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China." He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an appreciable interval.

COPY

-4-

During this conversation I made two references to my watch and the fact that he must have many callers, in order to give him the opportunity to indicate a desire to break off, but each time he stressed that he had no engagements and wanted to continue talking.

Other parts of the conversation were devoted to the general cause of ill feeling between the two countries which I indicated has been due solely to the vilification of the U.S. by the controlled press of Japan. Starting with the unjustified raging over the Portsmouth Treaty after the U. S. had saved Japan from defeat, it continued with every incident. Typical was that after the immigration bill, a purely economic expedient occasioned by the failure of immigrant farmers to adhere to the existing standards thereby endangering the California farmers. Japan does not admit farmers.

I indicated that the Public is now well aware of the vast difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Also that the public does understand Japans needs and the difficult situations with which she has been confronted in the past, however they do not understand and will not tolerate either in Europe or Asia any impositions on our commerce which restricts their freedom to go where and when they will.

In conclusion I told the Admiral that he had been quoted in the Press as having accepted this mission on the condition that while he was here the Japanese Government would not take any steps in the Far East which might embarass him. He neither confirmed nor denied this. I then said that I hoped that it was true because it had put him in a very favorable light with the American public and they would wish him every success as I do.

Admiral Nonura is accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, as advisor. Wakasugi was formerly Consul-General at San Francisco, and was not looked upon as a good mixer. Having had some occasion to observe him in 1931 I was not impressed with his ability. For a diplomat he was usually unapproachable, which gave the impression of assumed reticence to hide inferior qualities. It is believed that he will be only a general guide for Admiral Nonura, whose activities or conclusions will not be influenced by Mr. Wakasugi.

Admiral Nonura was very appreciative of the attentions which he received from Admiral Richardson while in Honolulu, and I am sure these will have a profound effect in Japan, in raising his prestige.

002A
COPY

#5-

Admiral Richardson, who knew of my proposed conversation with Admiral Nonura, had expressed a desire to have any details I could give him on it. I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Kimmel.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

(signed) E. M. ZACHARIAS

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4293-4296

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

*File
Confidential*

February 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
PRESIDENT

There is attached a memorandum containing suggestions of statements which might be made orally to the Japanese Ambassador when he calls on you.

Attachment:
Memorandum.

CH

PSF Japan Folder

SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW WITH
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

There is offered for consideration the suggestion that in the initial conversation with Admiral Nomura following presentation of his credentials the issues between the United States and Japan be not discussed in such a way as to cause Admiral Nomura to feel that this Government is closing the door to any diplomatic efforts which he may make as Ambassador. Reference might, however, be made to the assumption that he, as a seafaring man, would welcome frank speaking, and the following points might then be touched upon:

1. There is no disguising the fact that relations between the United States and Japan are not good. These relations have deteriorated for the reason, as we see it, that Japan has embarked upon a course of expansion by force. There is no need at this time to dwell upon the fact that Japan's course has been attended by more than 250 instances of the bombing by Japanese planes of American mission and other properties in China, by the sinking of the Panay and the burning or sinking of three other American vessels with loss of American life, and by the disruption of the normal and legitimate activities of thousands of Americans.

2. With reference to the alliance entered into by Japan with Germany and Italy, some Japanese statesmen

say

say that Japan has retained freedom of action. Japan is aware of our policy of assisting those countries which are resisting aggression. In these circumstances, the question naturally arises whether Japan's actions will demonstrate that Japan in fact retains liberty of action or that Japan has pledged itself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things which this country is committed to support, things which it always has supported and which it forever will support.

3. The Government of the United States has noted repeated statements by Japanese leaders to the effect that the United States is moving toward involvement in the European war and that such involvement would constitute a world calamity. Do not these statements, in view of happenings in the Far East, give rise to the warrantable and corollary question whether Japan itself, through its military activities toward the south and through its commitments to Germany and Italy, is not drifting toward involvement in the European war and whether such involvement would not be, in the words of Japan's leaders, a "world calamity"? There comes to mind in connection with this question Japan's military occupation of or military activities in north China, central China, south China, the Hainan Island, the Spratly Islands, and, thus far, parts of French Indochina. It appears to those on
this

this side of the Pacific that there is in the public utterances of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press undue emphasis upon the asserted responsibility of other nations and not sufficient consideration of the possible consequences of Japan's own presentation of constantly expanding aims at the expense of other countries.

4. Our two countries have drifted apart from that friendly and reciprocally advantageous attitude which in general had previously characterized their relations with one another. Some very acute questions are now presented to each country. Without going into these at the moment, it is suggested that, if Japan has a desire to examine the points of divergence with a view to talking over the situation fully and frankly, the time has arisen when that should be done. If the Japanese Ambassador feels that he would like to discuss such questions, the appropriate officers of this Government are of course available for such discussion. This does not mean a negotiation; it means a discussion of attitudes, policies, objectives.

5. These are some of the thoughts which honesty and candor require to be frankly expressed. In expressing them, we are not unmindful of the circumstances attending the appointment of Admiral Nomura as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. The press has reported that he repeatedly declined this assignment. The fact that Admiral Nomura,

with

with his high character, his statesmanship, and his well-known friendship for the United States, finally accepted the responsibilities of the position of Japanese Ambassador to the United States, indicates to us that there is still desire on the part of Japan that progress toward improving relations between the United States and Japan may be made.

Note: With reference to the question of "tone" in the opening stages of our contacts with the new Japanese Ambassador, it is believed that it may be advisable -- in the light of indications from the Far East -- to "speak softly" (carefully avoiding any word that might to a wishful thinker imply that we would consider offers of "compromise"), while simultaneously giving by our acts in the Pacific new glimpses of diplomatic, economic, and naval "big sticks".

State Dept. copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

"Japan, 1931-1941"

VOL. II PAGES 387-389

*late
confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

February 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached as of possible interest a copy of the memorandum of your conversation with the Japanese Ambassador yesterday.

CH

Japan Files

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: **FEBRUARY 14, 1941**

SUBJECT: **UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS**

PARTICIPANTS: **THE PRESIDENT AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, KICHISABURO NOMURA**

COPIES TO:

* * * 1-1403

I accompanied the new Japanese Ambassador to the President's office and sat through the conference between the President and the Ambassador. The President received the Ambassador in a marked spirit of cordiality and personal friendliness. He referred in pleasing language to their association some twenty-odd years ago, and remarked that he proposed to call him Admiral and consider him as Admiral, rather than as Ambassador. He said that they were friends and they could at all times talk candidly as friends about the relations and related affairs of the two countries.

The President then said that of course it is manifest that the present relations between the two
countries

countries are not good; that they are in fact getting worse, or to use a well-known expression, they are "deteriorating"; that the press of Japan - and he said the press of our country might not be an exception - expresses views and circulates reports which are calculated to arouse feeling in this country of 130,000,000 population; that some of the Japanese statesmen talk along similar lines, and that altogether the American people are quite seriously concerned about the Japanese situation. The President affirmed two or three times the view that the American people, while not bitter as yet, are thoroughly and seriously concerned and to a more or less increasing extent, at the course of Japan.

He then referred to the movements of Japan southward down to Indochina and the Spratley Islands and other localities in that area, as having given this country very serious concern. He said that the entry of Japan into the Tripartite agreement is likewise giving this country the same serious concern, especially from the viewpoint that Japan is supposed to have divested herself of her sovereign authority to deal with the question of peace and war and to leave it to the Tripartite signatories led by Germany. The President went over this the second time with increased emphasis as to the heavy signs of concern it had created among the American people.

people. He then said that while the American people are peace-minded and peace-loving and peace-observing, and are not unduly wrought up at present, it would be extremely easy for some incident like the sinking of the Maine or the destruction and sinking of the Panay to cause an overnight uprising, in a more or less explosive sense, of American sentiment against the authors, regardless of the exact facts or details as to the cause, adding that if he, the President, and I, the Secretary of State, had not almost instantly played down the Panay incident, there would in all probability have been a terrific inflammation of public sentiment in this country.

The President more than once referred with gratification to the fact that the present Ambassador is here and that the two of them could in the friendliest and frankest manner talk out to the best advantage of both countries ways and means of dealing with such inflammable circumstances and with methods to avoid them. He then said that in view of all these serious conditions which are becoming increasingly worse and which seriously call for attention, it occurred to him that the Japanese Ambassador might find it advisable and agreeable as he, the President, does, to sit down with the Secretary of State and other State Department officials and review
and

and reexamine the important phases of the relations between the two countries, at least during the past four or five years, and frankly discuss all of their phases and ascertain just when and how points of divergence developed and their effects, and bring the whole situation in these respects up to date in order to see if our relations could not be improved. The President said there is plenty of room in the Pacific area for everybody, and he repeated this statement with emphasis. The Ambassador showed no signs of dissent, but somewhat to the contrary. The President elaborated a little in order to emphasize this suggestion. The Ambassador bowed and indicated his assent, just as he bowed in an apparently wholehearted and agreeable manner when the President referred to the dangerous situation between the two countries - the Panay incident and the Tripartite agreement. One would have thought from his demeanor and manifestations that the Ambassador was in entire harmony with each point the President brought out, including the reexamination of the record of relations between the two countries.

The President finally said it would not do this country any good nor Japan any good, but both of them harm, to get into a war. The Ambassador gave his prompt assent to this.

The

The Ambassador, having passed in his formal address and the President having laid his reply and address aside, proceeded to speak with every appearance of earnestness about preserving peaceful relations between the two countries. He referred to the military group in control as "Chauvinistic" and he used another similar word to characterize this element without mentioning it by name, but referring to it as presenting the chief difficulty and chief obstacle to the pursuit of the course which the Ambassador and those of his views would be disposed to follow, which course was presumably one that would be acceptable to this country. The Ambassador said that every part of his being would be behind his best possible efforts to promote and preserve peaceful and agreeable relations and a better understanding between the two countries. He left the impression that his Government was in harmony with this purpose thus so earnestly expressed. He made no reference to the points the President brought out, but spoke briefly in a general way about the existence of unsatisfactory relations; the need for their improvement and his every disposition to say and do anything possible to that end.

G.H.

S:CH:WH:AR

The Postmaster General (Walker) to President Roosevelt, [Washington] February 28, 1941. States that a representative of the Japanese Government is in Washington to negotiate terms for a settlement of Far Eastern questions.

Major General Edwin M. Watson wrote to FDR, February 28, 1941 that Frank Walker had brought in this memorandum and wished FDR to see it.

see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 54.

[Document bears the State Dept file number 711.94/1973 2/3]

5th March 1949

JAPAN: NAVAL

1. Destroyer H.I.J.M.S. TANIKASE, launched recently at Fujinagata Shipyards, Osaka, is same type and sister ship of H.I.J.M.S. HAGIKASE, 2,000 tons; 361 feet long; 36 knots speed, 6 5-inch guns; 2 MG., and 8 21-inch torpedo tubes.
2. The following was observed from the harbour in Kobe:

(a) At Kawasaki Dockyards:

5 submarines launched and fitting out on south side.

1 destroyer, H.I.J.M.S. 01, undergoing repairs on the south side.

1 minesweeper on the south side.

1 aircraft carrier, fitting out on the north side. This is H.I.J.M.S. MITUZURU being rushed to completion. She has three funnels and is similar in appearance to the U.S.S. RANGER, Her Flight Deck is overall.

Note:

The five submarines seem to be of the "I" type, - first class seagoing vessels, all over 1,500 tons.

On the slips under construction on the south

side are three submarines, and on the east side one minesweeper.

Several other keels have been laid but they are all merchantmen. On the main slip is the giant N.Y.K. liner under construction.

b. At Mitsubishi Shipyards:

5 submarines, also apparently of the "I" type, similar to those at Kawasaki, launched and fitting out at the east end of the yard.

2 submarines building on the No 3 slip on the west side.

1 submarine building on No.1 slip on the west side.

This vessel is painted grey and bears a No. 18 on her stern.

3. The Japanese Navy is constructing very secretly, under orders issued November 1st, 1940, warships of over 50,000 tons in Naval Shipyards. One has been launched in Nagasaki and one is under construction in Yokosuka.
4. The Japanese Navy, believing that they cannot avoid war with the U.S.A. in the near future, are laying mines around Northern Chishima and in the waters off Southern Hainan Island.
5. It was officially announced by the Japanese Navy on November 15th 1940, that they have

opened two new air bases at:

Tsuchiura, Ami-mura, Inashiki-gun,
Ibaragi Prefecture, and

Hakata, Shigashima-mura, Nakao-gun,
Fukuoka Prefecture.

6. It was officially announced that a destroyer, unnamed, was launched on November 29th, at the Tama Shipyards, Okayama Prefecture.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL

1. The secret battleship launched at the Mitsubishi Yard at Nagasaki on November 1st, 1940, is one of four which the Japanese Navy decided to build out of the 1937 replenishment estimates. She is in excess of 50,000 tons; speed 33 knots; 9 16-inch guns.
2. Aircraft carrier R.I.J.M.S. MITUZURU. Tonnage 37,000 tons; speed 33 knots. Aircraft hangars double from end to end. Ninety aircraft of all types carried. Two lifts, - one at stern and one at bow.
3. No new ships under construction at Osaka Iron Works at present. H.I.J.M.S. RIUMA is undergoing repairs. She is a sister ship of H.I.J.M.S.01, also undergoing repairs at the Kawasaki Yards in Kobe. H.I.J.M.S. UJI, a gun-boat, is fitting out at the Osaka Iron Works.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL

On SHINNAN QUNTO (spelling given by Japanese) of the SPRATLEY ISLAND group, the Japanese have built a wharf to accomodate ships up to five thousand tons.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL

It is reported that three aircraft carriers, sister ships, are being built, - one at Kobe; the second at Kure, and the third at Nagasaki.

Informant saw one of them in Kobe, and another (possibly the same one) on a trial run near Kagoshima, He stated that in his 34 years at sea he had never seen any warship as big or comparably so.

He described her bridge and funnel arrangements as being similar to those of H.M.S. HERMES.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL

1. The Japanese Navy launched seven first-class destroyers in 1939. One each was launched at

Kawasaki Dockyard Co., Kobe
Fujinagata Dock Co., Osaka, and
Maidzuru Navy Yard;

and two each at

Sasebo Navy Yard, and
Uruga Dockyards, Uruga, Kanagawa
Prefecture.

Specifications are standard as given in Jane's Fighting Ships.

2. The Japanese Navy began in December 1939, the construction of a Naval Arsenal in Toyokawa, Aichi Prefecture, to produce guns, armour plating, etc. The Arsenal is to be completed and in operation this year.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL

Submarines Launched November 1938 to June 1940

Mitsubishi Jukogyo K.K. - Kobe Yards:

1. 1 19 - 1650 tons; length 320 feet; beam 26 feet; draught 16 feet; speed 19 knots on surface; mounting one 4.5 inch gun; 8 torpedo tubes.

Launched: September 16th 1939.

2. 1 20 ; specifications almost the same as above.

Launched: January 25th 1939.

This ship has since been commissioned.

Kawasaki Jukogyo K.K. - Kobe Yards:

1. 1 22 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: December 23rd 1938, and since placed in commission.

2. 1 10 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: September 29th 1939.

Kure Naval Dockyard:

1. 1 9 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: May 20th 1939.

2. 1 16 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: July 28th 1938, and since placed in commission.

Sasebo Naval Dockyard:

1. 1 18 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: November 11th 1938, and since placed in commission.

2. 1 24 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: November 12th 1939.

3. 1 29 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: June 6th 1940.

Yokosuka Laval Dockyard:

1. 1 15 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: March 3rd 1939, and since placed in commission.

2. 1 17 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched: July 19th 1939.

3. 1 23 - same specifications as for 1 19.

Launched November 24th 1939.

NOTE: It is probable that all ships launched in the first nine months of 1939 are now completed and in service. Labour conditions, however, held up all work at private yards throughout 1940, and there will probably be some delay in getting those ships ready.

Tentative List of Submarines on the Way

Mitsubishi Jukogyo K.K. - Kobe Yards:

2 of the 1 type: both ships were laid down in 1939.

Kawasaki Jukogyo K.K. - Kobe Yards:

1 of 1 type; launched in late summer of 1940.

1 of 1 type, laid down in late 1939.

Kure Naval Dockyard:

1 of 1 type; laid down in 1939, and probably launched in July 1940.

1 of 1 type; laid down end of 1939.

Sasebo Naval Dockyard:

1 of 1 type laid down early in 1939, and probably launched in July 1940.

1 of 1 type, laid down at beginning of 1940.

Yokosuka Naval Dockyard:

2 of 1 type laid down late in 1939.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: Naval.

Agent reports as follows from observation at Mitsubishi and Kawasaki docks.

A. At Kawasaki the line IZUMAYU (?) IZAMARU, is in an advanced stage, and appears to be undergoing deck modification to fit her as an auxiliary cruiser.

B. On the North side of main slip, a cruiser (name unknown) is being built. The hull is complete.

C. The aircraft carrier MITUZURO is being equipped at the same dockyard.

D. Three submarines are being built on the North side of the main slip. Seven submarines are being refitted, five on the South side, and two on the East side. All are of the "ocean going" type.

E. One old destroyer is being refitted on the South side of the yard.

F. At the Mitsubishi yards, six submarines of the same type as para (d), are being fitted. (Source is not clear whether these are new craft, or old ones being refitted.)

At the same place two new submarines are being built.

G. The "Hashidate" which was launched on Dec. 23rd 1939, at Osaka Iron Works. Dimensions are as follows:

252 X 38 X 7.5 feet.

Speed: 17 knots.

Guns: Two 12 cm. at bows.

" Two 12 cm. at stern.

"²¹
Two/cm (tubes?) at bows.

" Two 21 cm at stern.

" Two 7.7 at bows.

Two 7.7 " "

(all high angle guns).

(NOTE: Agent does not mention type of ship or tonnage).

A sister ship is being built at the same yard.

(h) At the Kure Naval base a battleship of 45,000 tons is being built, but no details are known regarding her, or state of construction.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL.

1. At Puginigata shipyard, Osaka, the destroyer "Tanikase" is to be launched on Nov.1. She will be of the same class and type as the "Hazikase".
2. The gunboat "Uji" launched at Osaka Iron Works, 900 tons displacement, 252 x 36 x 7½'; 4 12 cm guns AA; 4 21 cm MG; 16 knots. Launched on 28.9.40; same type as Hashidate, launched on 23.12.39.
3. On Sept.17th. at Naizuru arsenal, destroyer "NOWAKE" was launched. Same class as "Hazikase"; 2000 tons; 361' 36 knots; 6. 5" guns; 2 MG; 8 21" TT.
4. On Oct.1, Navy announced establishment of new arsenal at Mitsu-machi, Kunage-gun, Yamagachi prefecture. Rear Admiral Tomonosuke Sewo appointed director. Main manufacture: naval guns and ammunition.
5. On Oct. 15, at Mitsubishi yard, Yokohama, warship Kashii was launched; no details known.

5th March 1941

JAPAN; NAVAL

German raiders - SS REGENSBURG and ELBE - have both been refitted in Yokohama with fuel and/or water tanks, S.S.ELBE was fully stored and on the point of sailing late in November. SS REGENSBURG was seen to sail with a draught of about 26 feet, and return to port with a draught of about 16 feet. It was reported that she was escorted by Japanese Armed Merchant Cruisers.

Every possible merchant ship is being pressed into Japanese naval service. Of recent months, many of the newer types on regular runs have been missed, and it is understood that they are being refitted. Demand for personnel is so great that men are being virtually press-ganged into naval service.

Informant states, on the basis of his many years' knowledge of ships, that although modern merchant shipping is largely built in Japan for conversion to naval uses, workmanship and materials are so poor that no ship would stand more than a few rounds being fired, without rivets and plates being sprung. Constant refits have been required with the later ships in order to keep them in condition for their normal work alone.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL

TRIALS OF NEW JAPANESE SUBMARINES.

Information was received from a passenger off a boat recently arrived from Japan to the effect that some two months ago trials were run for one of the new 2,000 ton submarines, constructed to run on diesel power both on the surface and submerged. Trials proved a failure, most of the crew being hospitalised with severe burns on hands from fire or explosion, which occurred when the ships were running submerged. Whilst running on the surface the diesels use fuel oil and a gas is extracted from the motor exhaust and stored. This gas (in Japanese "Suiso") provides the fuel which is used when submerged. Such was the intent in the design of the craft at any rate, but it is generally understood to have failed.

The idea of installing diesels is to save the 500 tons which would be taken up by electric motors and batteries.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL

Attached hereto is silhouette of SS "YAWATA MARU" of N.Y.K. There are two sister-ships, the "NITTA MARU" and the "KASUGA MARU", - the "NITTA MARU" being completed, and the "KASUGA MARU" to be completed this spring.

Details are as follows:-

Decks: Top or sun. Boat deck. Promenade deck.

Two lower decks.

Foremast: Higher than mainmast.

Ventilators are well hidden by superstructure, and one pair only, immediately to rear of stack, are visible from a distance. They are fitted with the English type of cowl, and would likely appear quite high, if and when superstructure is removed for war purposes.

Derricks: Two pairs fore and after, - very noticeable from a distance.

Keel laid December 14th 1938. Completed October 1939. First run to Vancouver in September 1940.

Built by the Mitsubishi Company at Nagasaki. She is said to be fitted for conversion to cruiser.

DimensionsL Gross tonnage 17,200; length 180 metres; beam 22.5 metres; draught 12.4 metres.

Engines: Two sets Mitsubishi-Zoelly impulse high pressure turbines with double reduction gears.

Shaft horse power: 21,000; speed 22.5 knots; boilers, four sets, three drum water tube, high pressure.

Cargo capacity: 11,800 tons. Passengers about 280.

Her sister ships are said to be identical.

All three are built for easy conversion.

5th March 1941

JAPAN: NAVAL.

An informant, who is believed reliable, reports that the new ship S.S. "Kasuga Maru" sister ship to "Nitta" and "Yawata", 17,200 tons, launched September 7th 1940, at Nagasaki Dockyard of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, is expected to be completed and in commission in April 1941. He states that the "Kasuga Maru" would not be turned over to N.Y.K., but will be used for naval duties.

The S.S. "Kasuga Maru" has length 180 metres, beam 22.5 metres, depth 12.4 metres. Speed - 22 knots; cargo capacity - 10,000 tons.

State Dept. copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US
Japan, 1931-1941
VOL. II PAGES 389-396

Japan folder

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: MARCH 8, 1941

SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE JAPANESE
AMBASSADOR, KICHISABURO NOMURA

COPIES TO:

Revised
CH

*** 1-1403

The Japanese Ambassador called at my apartment at the Carlton Hotel by an indirect arrangement based on the equal and joint initiative of himself and myself growing out of his talk with the President in my presence some days ago. I expressed my satisfaction and interest at his coming and he said that he had been watching for an opportunity to talk with me. The idea evidently was that he was seeking to do this without appearing to take the initiative in the conference.

I then said that I was not absolutely certain whether he would come; that at all times most countries have some responsible,

responsible, fine and capable citizens who are seeking earnestly and patriotically to make their respective contributions to better understanding and other desirable relations between their own and other governments; that in the instant situation I deeply appreciate their purposes and their efforts and have sent word to them to that effect. I have also made it clear that on all official questions and problems between our Governments I can only deal with and through him, the duly authorized Ambassador of Japan, and that much as I appreciate their efforts, this must be the course and attitude of my Government. I made this very definite so that the Ambassador could not misunderstand me. I also said to the Ambassador that I had likewise sent word to these good people from his country that I could not confer with them individually relative to these matters pending between our two Governments unless the Ambassador assumed the responsibility and the initiative to that end; that, in other words, everything must come and go through him, the Ambassador of Japan. He merely bowed each time I referred to the matter without saying anything.

Some casual remark then offered the occasion for me to refer to our program of liberal commercial policy and trade agreements and the extreme need for its adoption by all important nations. I reviewed in some detail the

course

course of extreme nationalism during the post-war period and how each nation had sought to live unto itself, blocking the maximum of imports by arbitrary methods of every kind with the result that the sum total of international trade was far below what the annual increase during the past twenty years should have made it; that the processes of distribution and consumption were hopelessly hobbled and handicapped; that as a result world consumption fell at least twenty billions below what it should have legitimately been; that unemployment correspondingly spread in almost every part of the world, with resultant privations, distress and hunger, so that peoples in many countries became a prey to agitators and those seeking dictatorships while the peaceful nations were stagnant and cursed with large dammed up surpluses of their own with nowhere to sell them. I said it was against this movement of what would ultimately be utter disaster that I and others strove for many years in an effort to prevail on important nations to join in a liberal commercial program for vastly increased production and healthy trade in all parts of the world; but that the movement had been just a little too late for us to prevail, especially on Europe, to get in and actively aid in advancing this movement of economic restoration on a sound healthy basis. I said that we

were

were struggling to get forty nations actively and earnestly behind this movement based on equality of treatment and equality of access to raw materials, so that we could then turn to countries like Germany and Italy and let the forty nations assure them that they would be welcome into this program of trade opportunity and trade equality.

I said that, unfortunately, this sound healthy movement was interrupted by military movements and plans and undertakings; that conquest by force accompanied by virtual military rule of conquered peoples, with all of its elements of semi-barbarism, seemed to effectively block for the time being the movement for peaceful commerce and increased consumption and employment throughout most of the world. I said this policy and this movement of my Government are, of course, well known to every government and every statesman in the world; that in our efforts to ward off any pretext for military adventures for purposes of conquest and arbitrary domination of other nations economically, politically or militarily, we for years strove to the utmost not only to advance and secure the acceptance generally of a sound liberal commercial policy and ever-increasing international trade, but along with it the other fundamentals which underlie all other
important

important relations among civilized nations and with which everyone is familiar; that that was our objective and our effort; that these efforts conducted vigorously for many years under this Administration were well known to everybody.

I then said that it would be impossible to describe our surprise and deep disappointment to see a number of nations abandon this peaceful course of understanding and adjustment in accordance with basic rules and laws and policies and move straight in the direction of fastening on the world the opposite and opposing policy of military conquest by force, and threat of force, and the adoption of methods of government of the conquered peoples that are a reversion to those extremely and unspeakably vicious methods of arbitrary rulers and despots of many centuries ago.

I said, therefore, that I am glad to have the Ambassador come in in the hope that he may have something definite and systematic in mind that would offer a practical approach to and consideration of the course and attitude of his Government with respect to its present course.

The Ambassador expressed much interest in what I said about attempts to organize the world on a liberal commercial basis and indicated his whole-hearted approval.

He

He said that his Government, like others at times, may have made some mistakes, and he added that all of the people in Japan with very few exceptions, which included extremists, were very much averse to getting into war with the United States; that he had talked with them generally and this included most of the military officials, but not all of them; that Prime Minister Konoye is not one of the latter type, and is not desirous of moving on such a course as I had mentioned and criticized, namely a course of military expansion; that Matsuoka is a politician and the Ambassador smiled and said that he sometimes uses big words. The Ambassador said that the talk of Matsuoka and other statesmen in Japan along the lines I complained of was really for home consumption. The Ambassador then said that his Government would be very glad to effect peace arrangements with China and hoped that at no distant date such terms might be developed as would give consideration to their puppet government, and would move Chiang-Kai-shek to come into the picture and participate in general peaceful arrangements with China, which the Ambassador emphasized as his country's desire, and which should be on the basis of equality to all nations. In response to inquiries as to further details of the proposed Chinese-Japanese peace or the methods of bringing it about, the Ambassador was silent

for

for the present, but indicated that his adviser, Colonel Iwakuro, is on his way here and that he had intimate details of the whole Chinese-Japanese situation.

The Ambassador then said that it would be well-nigh unthinkable for our two countries to fight each other on account of the destructive effects that would inevitably result in any event. I here spoke and said that my country entertained the same idea about the destructive effects of a military clash between our two countries. I then inquired of the Ambassador whether the military groups in control of his Government could possibly expect important nations like the United States to sit absolutely quiet while two or three nations before our very eyes organized naval and military forces and went out and conquered the balance of the earth, including the seven seas and all trade routes and the other four continents. Could they expect countries like mine to continue to remain complacent as that movement is going on? I inquired further what countries like mine would have to gain by remaining complacent in the face of a movement to substitute force and conquest for law and justice and order and fair dealing and equality. The Ambassador sought to play down the view that such military conquest was really in the mind of his Government and he then said that embargoes by this country were, of course, of increasing concern, and that

he

he did not believe there would be any further military movements unless the policy of increasing embargoes by this country should force his Government, in the minds of those in control, to take further military steps. To this I replied that this is a matter entirely in the hands of his Government for the reason that his Government took the initiative in military expansion and seizures of territory of other countries, thereby creating an increasingly deep concern on the part of my own and other countries as to the full extent of Japanese conquest by force which was contemplated; that my country has not been at fault and none of the nations engaged in conquest have pretended seriously to charge it with any action of omission or commission in relation to the present movement of world conquest by force on the part of some three nations, including Japan. The Ambassador sought here to minimize and mildly to controvert the idea that Japan is engaged in broad unqualified military conquest. I then repeated the terms of the Tripartite Agreement and the public declarations of Hitler and Matsuoka and other high authorities in Japan to the effect that their countries under the Tripartite arrangement were out by military force to establish a new order not for Asia alone, not for Europe alone, but for the world, and a new order under their control. I said that whatever interpretation

interpretation the Ambassador might give these utterances and military activities in harmony with them thus far, the American people who were long complacent with respect to dangerous international developments have of late become very thoroughly aroused and awakened to what they regard as a matter of most serious concern in relation to movements by Japan and Germany, presumably to take charge of the seas and the other continents for their own personal arbitrary control and pecuniary profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the peoples, who are victims of such a course and of peaceful nations in general. I said, of course, these apprehensions and this tremendous concern will remain and continue so long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and so long as the Japanese Army and Navy increase their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, with no apparent occasion to do so other than that of capture and exclusive use of the territory and other interests of other countries. The Ambassador again sought to allay the idea of military conquest on the part of his country, and I again replied with emphasis that as long as Japanese forces were all over China and Japanese troops and airplanes and naval vessels were as far south as Thailand and Indochina and Saigon, accompanied by such threatening declarations

as Japanese statemen are making week after week, there can only be increasing concern by nations who are vitally interested in international affairs both on land and sea as they are also vitally interested in the halt of world conquest by force and barbaric methods of government.

The Ambassador came back again to the desire of his country for peace with China based on equality to all and the hope that it might combine something of their puppet government with Chiang-kai-Shek's government. I pressed the Ambassador to indicate some further definite ideas he might have in mind about the proper steps to take to approach the whole situation. He did not disagree with me when I spoke of the necessity for acts and utterances by Japan, making it clear that in good faith she was not pursuing or intending to pursue a course of expansion and conquest by force such as had been referred to.

I said that I came from the President who sent his regards and said that he would be only too glad at any time to talk further with the Ambassador just as two old friends would talk, and do so officially and unofficially, or individually at times, if desired by either. I pointed out that such a meeting could be arranged unobtrusively and without publicity, and in a manner permitting the initiative to be shared on a 50-50 basis between him and the President. The Ambassador said he might call on the
President

President the next time; that he would hope to continue these conversations. On two or three occasions I inquired of him whether it was still agreeable to pursue the President's suggestion of talking over and discussing the past relations between our two Governments and the questions that have arisen which call for settlement by mutual agreement. He indicated his favorable disposition in regard to the matter, but not in any specific way as to time or as to officials with whom he might talk.

I referred on one or two occasions to the statement reported to have been made to Mr. Churchill by the Japanese Ambassador in London some days ago to the effect that his Government would not attack Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies, and inquired point-blank what the Ambassador's idea as to this was. In reply to the first inquiry, he was not exceedingly strong in his statement but he did make it fairly definite that he did not believe there would be an attack but added, as heretofore indicated, that if our American embargoes continued to press his Government and the military group in control, they may feel forced to proceed further in a naval or military way. I again said to him that this latter question would not with any consistency or reason arise, in my judgment, because, as already stated to him, the whole responsibility and initiative with respect to military conquest and the
departure

departure from laws and treaties and other basic rules of friendly relationship by the Japanese Government rests entirely on that Government.

I again inquired of the Ambassador if he had any further ideas or suggestions which would constitute any plans or purposes for peaceful readjustment additional to that which he had already mentioned in relation to China. The Ambassador did not offer any comment on this except to attempt to convey the impression that later he would give consideration to these further phases.

At an appropriate stage in the conversation I said that the conquest of the world by his country and Germany with the methods of government which were being applied to conquered peoples, all bankrupt, would mean to set not only the world but these very conquering countries back to impossible levels of existence; that the conquering countries themselves would be the losers to an unthinkable extent.

In the course of the conversation I had occasion to remind the Ambassador that few nations were ever on more mutually profitable and genuine friendly relations than our two countries for two generations lasting until about the time of the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. I said that, speaking in great confidence, when I came to the State Department, one of my greatest ambitions was to
work

work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement with respect to the Quota Limitation Act of 1924, enacted by our Congress, so as to place the whole matter of immigration on an equal or reciprocal basis, which, of course, would have meant that the number of immigrants both ways would be limited, but this basis of equality would settle the feeling that has existed since 1924. He expressed his gratification at this.

I then added that we would get nowhere if the military group should say that they were not expanding in a military way, as they have often said in China, and at the same time go forward with their expansion plans and activities.

The Ambassador also brought up the question about how the doors of trade had been closed against Japan by other countries, including Indochina, and hence the necessity for some steps looking to the comfortable existence of her people. To this I replied by reminding the Ambassador of what I had said at the outset to the effect that during the twenty years of the post-war period under the reign of extreme nationalism in every country alike, all nations had shut their doors to a large extent against each other, that most nations shut their doors against my country as a part of this universal movement of trade and commercial suicide; that, therefore, Japan is not an
exception.

exception. I then added that it would be an amazing thing to abandon the whole program of economic rehabilitation on peaceful lines and under the principle of equality, to which I have been referring, and turn away to military force and conquest as a substitute.

I inquired whether Matsuoka was going to Berlin and the Ambassador said he did not believe he would go, that he had been invited there at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

I proceeded to comment on Japan's line of activities and utterances by saying that this country and most other countries only proclaim and practice policies of peaceful international relationships, political, economic, social and cultural. Sometimes the policy to promote these mutually beneficial relationships is proclaimed, such as our good neighbor policy with special reference to Pan America. And yet all of our acts and programs and policies adopted by the twenty-one American nations in their conferences from time to time are made universal in their application, so that Japan and all other nations receive the same equal opportunities for trade and commerce generally throughout the Americas that each of the American nations receives itself. In striking contrast the new order in greater Eastern Asia is unequivocally believed to be purely a program of military aggression

and

and conquest with entirely arbitrary policies of political, economic and military domination. The Ambassador made no definite promise as to what his Government would do in respect to halting its aggression for purpose of discussions. He did not intimate that it could not and would not do this, no more than he intimated or indicated just what its attitude would be towards the Tripartite Agreement in the future when I definitely brought that phase to his attention in connection with the present and prospective course of the Japanese Government.

During our conversation, I emphasized to the Ambassador that it is the opinion of the President and others of the Administration that the British will beyond any reasonable doubt be able successfully to resist Hitler.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

3/7/41

PART 20 PAGES 4296-
4298

131 Japan folder
Filed 2-11-41
Personal
Confidential

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1941.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached is a brief of Admiral
Pratt's interview with Ambassador Nomura.

I thought the President would be
interested.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

Memo-----March-7-41

Interview with Nomura on March-4

At his own request ,I met The Ambassador on March-4--He gave me a lunch at the Plaza, and we had a three hours conversation alone in his private quarters--I am returning the compliment by giving him a small dinner at the St.Regis tonight March 7

My remarks followed ,without my knowing it at the time, almost exactly the line indicated in the confidential report of the American Advisor for the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Moore.

I told the Ambassador that Japans best promise for the future lay along economic lines, and not through military conquest.

That Japan being an island State, like Britain, her real interests, lay along the path of sea power, and not military power, and that her best promise for the future lay in connection with Britain and the United States, and not with the Axis. That sea power was not destructive as military power was--Sea power kept the trade lanes open--was liberal--and to succeed must be conciliatory and not aggressive. Military power was destructive--antagonized those it overran--was non productive--did not open trade lanes, but closed them--and ultimately defeated its own purpose.

I told him that joining the Axis was what turned American sentiment so definitely against Japan. I cited our Constitution, which puts no bars on naval strength, but definitely limits moneys to the Army for two years. This in itself showed the feeling at the time, that too great military strength was a menace, and that fear of too great military power in unscrupulous hands had become an enduring part of American life and thought.

I told him that we did not wish to see Japan destroyed--that her influence properly used could always be a strength in the Orient--that Russia is and always would be the main threat to Japan, as long as the present Communist influence lasted.

I told him we were definitely out to see Britain win, and would go the limit if necessary, because it was essential in an economic sense, and for the purposes of an enduring peace, that sea power prevail over aggressive military power.

That 6 or 7 years ago, when visited by members of the Japanese General Naval Staff, in Los Angeles, and asked for an opinion, I had told them then that the military domination of China would be a failure.

I told him that even if Japan won the first naval victory--we had the power to build and she had not--that she would be so weakened, that ultimately she would lose her influence in the Orient and be supplanted by Russia, and that her ideologies and not those of Japan would influence the Orient.

That the best way to combat communism in China, their great fear, was along the economic road, and not along the aggressive military path--that given the chance to live, and become stabilized along economic and peaceful lines, there was no fear of China becoming communist in the sense Russia is today--that China's natural socialism centered around the family and the guild--as far apart from the Russian brand as the two poles, and if given the chance to work out her own salvation, Japan need never fear the Russian brand fully penetrating China. That military domination in China would never put down the brand of communism Japan feared, but on the contrary would drive China closer to Russia.

I told him frankly that if a new war started in the Orient, it would be it would be Japan's making--not ours--that the decision depended largely on the future course they adopted.

I advised him to exercise the Oriental talent for patience, and see if in the end the military conquests of Hitler in Europe, would not run the same course there that Japan's military venture in China did. That in effect it would be a failure.

Nomura was more than frank, and agreed thoroughly with all I said.

He told me of his interviews with Lord Halifax and The President--I gathered that my views were in entire accord with those of the President.

I gathered that Japan does not wish war with us, and Britain, and that a southern drive against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, will not be undertaken, certainly not for the present, if wiser counsels can prevail--that the leading military and naval men were against it--that the economic path was the one they wished to pursue--that the Elder Statesmen had strongly advised against the China invasion, but had been overthrown by the military clique, but that the failure of the China venture, had converted many of the leading military men

That since the China invasion had been such a failure, leading naval and military thought had swung around, and was much more liberal now than it was then.

He said Japan was full of German military men, and Gestapo agents, trying to induce Japan to act in conjunction with the Axis, but that after all Japan had a mind of her own, and the decision was hers and not Germany's--that there were few or no Nazi naval men in Japan.

His own personal secretary has just come from England, and has had considerable experience there--His naval and military attaches have much influence in the War office, and I gathered they were mostly in accord with his views.

He admits he has a hard task, and only accepted the post from a sense of duty. He is extremely liberal--his views on the liberal influence of sea power vs aggressive military influence, coincide with mine--and I judge he is infinitely more sympathetic to the liberal policies of Britain and the United States, than he is to those of the Nazis.

I gathered that if Japan were given a little chance to save face, so important to the Oriental, in Indo China, along the economic path, it would do much to offset the smart of the China failure, and strengthen liberal influence in Japan itself, which though under a cloud was still fairly strong, and if I inferred correctly, was more apt to grow than to weaken.

I gathered that the main fear of military men was the spread of Communism in China--that they frankly admitted that military domination would not solve the problem--and that they didn't know how to solve it--Hence I made the remarks I

~~I gathered that the main fear of military men was the spread of communism in China--~~

did ,as what appeared to me to be the only way out for a solution.

This covers the main points.and I trust I said nothing counter to the general trend of our own policies--all I said was in the spirit of friendliness to Japan,and in the hope that she would nothing rash which could only lead to her own ultimate defeat,which I did not wish.I wanted Japan to be strong,but a liberal generous Japan,not a militaristic Japan.In passing,I might add,that in the course of the years I have had many contacts with the Japanese,and contrary to the general opinion,I have never had one of the samuri class,deliberately lie to me.

W.V.Pratt

BSF:JAPAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~


March 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I thought the President would be interested in the attached copy of a report made by Rear Admiral Turner, re his conversation with Ambassador Nomura.

As the President will recall, Admiral (then Captain) Turner was the skipper of the U.S.S. ASTORIA which, in April '39, carried to Japan the remains of the Japanese Ambassador who died in Washington. Admiral Turner is very well known to, and very well liked by the Japanese.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

DECLASSIFIED

GOD DIR. 2209 (9/27/88)

Op-12-CTB

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1941.

From: Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U.S.N.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Report of Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.

1. On March 12th I met the Japanese Ambassador at a cocktail party given in his honor by the Japanese Naval Attache. In the course of a five minute chat he said he would like to converse with me at greater length. On March 12th he telephoned me to ask me to see him at 5 p.m., that day, either at the Embassy or at my home. I arranged to call at the Embassy at that hour. I shall hereafter refer to him as "Nomura." The words of the conversation are my own; I merely try to give the gist and impressions of the talk.

2. After an exchange of pleasantries, Nomura stated that his mission here was to prevent war between Japan and the United States, that he had undertaken the mission with a realization of the possibility of failure, and that he was even less hopeful of success after arrival here, but that he had undertaken the mission as a matter of duty to his government, and because of his conviction that the best interests of the two countries were to maintain peace. He referred to his friendship with Admiral Pratt and other United States naval officers, and stated that he was exploring the ground, as best he could, in order to find a basis on which the two nations could agree. He said that he would value receiving my views as to the future.

3. I replied that naturally, as the War Plans Officer of the Navy, I could express no opinions as to military matters, and since military officers were not authorized to express the political views of the government, I could say nothing on that score. Therefore, I would confine my statements to the expression of my concept of the general attitude of the American people toward Japan, so far as I could determine it.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIEDE.O. 12958-2
DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

I had been to Japan four times, and had known Japanese there, in China, in Hawaii, and in California. I felt that I understood the Japanese better than the average American, and I admired their many excellent qualities. I would speak frankly, and he must assume that what I said was in no way to be construed as a criticism of the Japanese. Different peoples had different viewpoints; all have good qualities, and also have qualities that are not so good; and it is these inferior qualities, and the differences in culture, that often give rise to misunderstandings.

4. I stated I believed that, underneath, the Japanese and the American people liked and respected each other. Minor differences and disagreements had naturally appeared, but I believed the events of the past ten years were more ominous, and that they were deeply disturbing to Americans.

5. Nomura agreed that the feeling was worse than it had been in past years, but stated that the "New Order" in the Far East originally had not been intended as a military adventure, but was designed to be purely economic and cultural. Unfortunately, radicals had obtained a strong influence, and the execution of the New Order had been initiated by the force of arms. He was impressed by the views that he had received in this country, and he agreed with them, that the victor and the defeated in a war received almost equal losses, and that both suffered severely. He gave France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as examples.

6. He stated that he had talked, at various times, with high ranking Japanese army and naval officers as to whether Japan would be benefited by the war in China. Practically all of them were convinced that this adventure was a mistake. Certainly it had proved a terrible drain, and the task of controlling such a great territory by force seemed almost impossible to accomplish. When the project first came up, the high ranking army officers had opposed it, but the younger, radical element had been so strong that the older men had acquiesced. He believed now, on the contrary, that though the younger element was still in favor of strong measures, the older army officers in command would not give in to them. The Navy, on the contrary, had been and still are in favor of peace with the United States.

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

7. I replied that it was this use of force that had disturbed the United States. All thinking men recognized the necessity for outlets by an industrial country such as Japan had become, and recognized her need for sources of raw materials. Nevertheless, forceful expansion, such as Japan had undertaken, cuts across established national and personal interests, and naturally arouses antagonisms. The United States has difficulty in accommodating itself to the variations in Japanese policy which result in the shifts of power among the three quite different and antagonistic elements of Japanese political life. The question now was as to how much further Japanese Far Eastern conquests would extend. Japan never has had reason to fear a military expansion of the United States into the Far East; when Commodore Perry in 1856 recommended that the United States should seize the Bonin and the Loo Choo Islands, the American people had rejected the idea. They accepted the temporary care of the Philippines reluctantly. In my opinion, they have no wish to extend permanent military power into the Far East. They wish to remain at home and at peace. They believe that gradual changes of status, and not sudden changes accompanied by force, will in the long run prove the best. The deterioration of American and Japanese relations, I believed, was chiefly due to the use of forceful measures by Japan, and in particular to the Japanese adherence to the Axis. This had come as a disappointment and a shock to Americans, who believed it a weapon aimed at themselves and the British. Nomura's appointment as Ambassador had slightly relieved this feeling, as it was construed as a desire on the part of Japan for improved relations. Nomura is respected by Americans, and is known for his desire to maintain peace with the United States. However, since the beginning of the affair in Indo-China, I felt that opinion here had become worse than before.

8. Nomura recognized the value of a peaceful conquest. Relations of the United States with Mexico and Central America now under the Good Neighbor Policy were far better than when he was here in 1921, and the peaceful policy appeared very effective. Japan has not now, and never has had, any desire to extend control over the Philippines. With regard to adherence to the Axis, it was his opinion that Matsuoka, whom he knew well, had been sincere in his opinion that this action actually would be conducive to peace in the Pacific.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Nomura had not agreed to this, but Matsuoka had been much surprised by the severe reaction of the United States. As to the Indo-China affair: Japan is in need of rice and other supplies; Indo-China had been even more uncooperative than had the Netherlands East Indies; furthermore, Thailand is a friend. These influences had determined Japan's course.

9. I stated that, of course, different peoples had difficulty in understanding the point of view of others. Their culture, habits of thought, and customs are different, and they fail to allow for inevitable mistakes. That is doubtless one of the reasons that the United States and Japan began to fall apart. It is necessary to understand a people's background before its point of view can be appreciated. From my reading of translations from Japanese newspapers, and talking to Japanese, I feared that they might fail to appreciate the extremely close cultural and political relationship that exists between Great Britain and the United States. We both have the same origins, our economy is closely tied together, and though we have fought two wars and have had many quarrels, it should be understood that the United States would not stand aside and see Great Britain fall. The United States had intervened in her favor in the last war, and it must be clearly apparent that the American people are now determined to do all that lies within their power to save Great Britain now. This principle of common interest applies to British holdings in the Far East as well as in the Atlantic. I wished there were a way to make the Japanese understand this important relationship.

10.. Nomura said all Japanese naval officers understood this thoroughly, but, unfortunately, Japanese army officers did not. He had tried to explain this to them, but they would not believe him. He emphasized this point by several repetitions.

11. Nomura was convinced that the American people were slow to make up their minds, but thereafter were very determined to carry out their decision to the full. He believed that they would help the British to the best of their ability, with material alone, if possible; but that when the very severe German submarine and air attacks would nullify this help, the United States would enter the war against Germany. He did not believe German invasion plans were certain to succeed, but he believed it possible that in a few months the British people might be starving because of air and submarine action against the convoys.

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

~~SECRET~~

12. Nomura is no longer active in the Navy, but, in his opinion, the presence of the United States Fleet in Hawaii, particularly in combination with the British, forms a stabilizing influence for affairs in the Pacific. This fleet would be less potent if many of the American destroyers and other light forces should move to the Atlantic to help the British. Battleships might be left in the Pacific, but their influence alone would not be great without other forces of adequate strength. (This was the only time he seemed to want to "pump" me).

13. I agreed that the submarine and air menace placed Great Britain in a very bad position. Their danger is grave. We can not be sure how the matter will end. I intimated, however, that ways are available for defeating the German submarines and aircraft which have not been fully exploited. I had no idea whether the American people would make war in the Atlantic, the Pacific, or remain neutral. I pointed out that American warships are now being turned out rapidly, and that many of these would be available for the Atlantic without reducing our strength in the Pacific. In any case, it was my opinion that if war occurred in the Pacific, it would be because of events in the Far East, and not because of any decision by the United States to attack Japan, even though many persons were now advocating this step, and Gallup polls indicated strong support for such a move.

14. Nomura was very cordial. I believe he is fully sincere, and that he will use his influence against further aggressive moves by the military forces of Japan. He seemed desirous for support of the more liberal Japanese elements.

R. K. Turner.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4301-4303

Japan folder
1-41
CABLE ADDRESS "DAVJON"

LAW OFFICES
DAVIES, RICHBERG, BEEBE, BUSICK & RICHARDSON
BOWEN BUILDING
815 FIFTEENTH STREET

JOSEPH E. DAVIES
FRANKLIN D. JONES (928)
DONALD R. RICHBERG
RAYMOND W. BEEBE
ADRIEN F. BUSICK
SETH W. RICHARDSON
ALFONS B. LANDA
RAYMOND C. CUSHWA
MAURICE H. JANBY

file
Confidential

WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 13, 1941

Dear Steve:

Here is the memorandum which I left with Sumner.
I am quite sure that it gives in short compass a background
that would be valuable to "The Boss".

Hastily,
Joe

Mr. Stephen T. Early,
The White House.

Enc.

*The President:- I ask
for this copy of
Joe's report to the
State Dept. JE*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM BY JOSEPH E. DAVIES FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEBRUARY 18, 1941.

For the information of the Department, and for such value as it may have, I submit the following:

Last week, at my law office, I was offered a retainer by a group representing Japanese interests who desired advice and counsel, in connection with the betterment of relations between the United States and Japan. They submitted responsible references as to their reliability.

I told them that if they wished to tell me about their problem, with the understanding that I incurred no fiduciary or other obligations by listening to them, that I would consider the facts and advise them as to my attitude thereafter. To this they agreed.

They stated that they represented certain big business groups in Japan, who were in close relationship with practically all of the Japanese Cabinet, except Matsuoka, the leaders of the Navy and many of the leaders of the Army. They also stated that the internal, political and economic situation in Japan had deteriorated so rapidly in the past four or five months, that the group which they represented had become convinced that there was no escape from complete internal disaster, communism, and confiscation of all property rights, except thru ending the Sino-Japanese war, and by coming to a complete agreement with the United States.

They confidently asserted that, if the President and Secretary of State would "take hold of" this situation vigorously, a rapprochement between the two countries could be effected in which the United States could "write its own ticket".

This they recognized involved a complete "volte face" on the part of the Japanese Government. In the face of that fact, they nevertheless confidently maintained that if negotiations were had, the following could be effected:

- (a) That Japan would get out of the Rome-Berlin axis.
- (b) That Japan would withdraw from China upon terms which the United States would determine.
- (c) That Japan would modify its policy with reference to the Orient; and would return to the "status quo ante" in accord with the concepts of the United States Government as to what constituted fairness in the Pacific and the Orient.
- (d) That even as to Manchukuo a settlement could be had satisfactory to the United States.

The foregoing contained only one qualification and that was that it was expected that the United States, while insisting upon the foregoing results, would exercise amelioration in the manner of doing the job; so that the Japanese government responsible for the new policy could measurably "save face" before its own people.

The specific proposal suggested was; that the President and Secretary of State should send to Japan, by air and immediately, someone who could verify their representations by direct contact with their principals, and report the facts to the President. They suggested that if the Under Secretary of State or Mr. Hopkins were to go to Japan; they could and would place themselves at their disposal to have them meet, unofficially, the leaders of these various groups, and see for themselves that their representations as to what could be done were well founded.

They stated that they made this suggestion because they could secure greater frankness thru unofficial contacts which they could arrange, rather than thru official contacts made thru the American Embassy; and that in this suggestion there was no reflection upon the ability or effectiveness of Ambassador Grew.

My reply to these gentlemen was that neither I nor my firm would accept any retainer or employment in this situation. I stated, however, that if they could make these representations with sufficient weight behind them to the Department of State; and could make good on their representations, that they would be rendering a great service not only to the Japanese interests they serve but to the cause of peace in the world.

In connection with their suggestion that in my private capacity I go to Japan to verify their representations, I replied positively and unequivocally that under no circumstances would I do so.

The foregoing is reported to the Department in the belief that it might be of some value in connection with the situation.

My own judgment, from what I gathered in these discussions, is that there is a "possibility" that it might be well worth the Department's while to explore and consider the matter. There might be just a chance that this might be "the moment" for the "break" in the war situation, which the defection of Japan from the axis would undoubtedly afford. If there is nothing to it, still a valuable side light might be afforded in the situation and nothing would be lost.

Joseph E. Davies


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3-14-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This letter is from the Captain of the U.S.S. Salt Lake City, an American who was formerly a Japanese language officer in Japan.

Admiral Stark said this was a very interesting letter and wanted you to read it.


E.M.W.

*File personal +
Confidential -
original returned
to Admiral Stark
2/17/41 in
sealed envelope*

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 18 PAGES 3258-
3262

COPY

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY

Mare Island, California
February 9, 1941

My dear Admiral:

I think that you will be interested in a conversation which I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and favorably over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly. I decided to arrange for such a conversation in order to determine if possible the purpose for which he was sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversation I have formed the following impressions:

(1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Axis and is greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nomura was sent here to determine the best bargain to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be coming to "Rock us to sleep" while Japan proceeded to the Southward, has been eliminated definitely).

(2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.

(3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot "conquer" China or exert sufficient control while Chiang Kai-shek maintains his present position and strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be attempted first by trying to dissuade us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the Wang Chin-wei group to gain control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible he will then explore the other possible means of bringing about peace in China.

(4) That hostilities between Japan and the U. S. can be avoided if he is given sufficient basis for an approach to the Leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him that an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan would have to be forthcoming if our Government opened such an approach. When he asked "What for example" I replied "If I were asked, I would say 'Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China'". He made no comment on this.

In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements:

(1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the U. S. in settling present disagreements.

(2) That Japan has completely changed her views with regard to China, and that peace is essential to both countries.

(3) That if the U. S. is patient until Europe is settled then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore I resisted an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of force by us in the Far East). My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted the question from him "Do you think it will be a long war?" My answer was negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they finally hear of US aid to Britain.

(4) That the signing of the Axis pact was done only after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight balance of influence in its favor. Now, the mistake is realized but as it is a "Fait accompli" nothing can be done towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading Japanese business representative in San Francisco referred to the signing of the pact by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have brought this about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished by bribery of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.)

Details of Conversation

After the usual exchange of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he expected to handle it. He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in settling the difficulties existing between our two countries. I replied, "Of course you know that at least 65% of the American people are reconciled to any action as far as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would be disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U.S. We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed. We saved her in 1904, you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to save her again because the very same reasons exist today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a strong China means the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war if our Commerce was blocked off, because that has been the cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all Foreign trade in Manchuria. What would happen in the rest of Asia," At this he apologized for their extremists and I reminded him that they are the ones who bring on wars. I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people cant reconcile is why Japan, a country which has called continually for 'Equal Opportunity' could sign a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was sharp division of opinion in

Japan as to the advisability of signing the pact and that only a very slight balance of influence made it possible. Now they realize the mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it. Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

"Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a man like Wang Chin-wei, set him up and count upon him working for Japan?"

He replied that Wang was for peace in China and that this was very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism which has spread Russian influence as far South as Peiping. "In this case", I said, "it seems to me that you want a man like Chiang Kai Shek to combat it, as he has done so successfully for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agreement if you really want the peace of Asia, and here is where the U.S. might act as mediator and again save Japan. With communications as now exist in China you will never be able to conquer or control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all three of our countries. Your objective of markets and raw materials will be realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and there remains only the problem of taking care of Japan's expanding population. Let's explore the realms of possibility. Do you think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to cede Manchuria to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the Japanese people and say 'Japan has at last reached her original objective, we can now stop the war in China and settle down to prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?" This question was evidently unexpected for after much hesitation the Admiral laughing and then seriously said, "It would have to be handled very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in such matters and the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of 1932. "That of course would clear up the rest of China for a resumption of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long desired development would eventuate. The fears of Japan about a strong Russia in Asia or an over strong China would disappear." The Admiral again indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan at this time, but I said that the more difficult they were the more important they became. And I added, "Of course, you understand that if Japan really wants the U.S. to assist in solving this serious situation without resort to force, which you say is your mission, then there would have to be an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan." He then asked, "What for example?" I replied, "If I were asked, I would say immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China." He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an appreciable interval.

During this conversation I made two references to my watch and the fact that he must have many callers, in order to give him the opportunity to indicate a desire to break off, but each time he stressed that he had no engagements and wanted to continue talking.

Other parts of the conversation were devoted to the general cause of ill feeling between the two countries which I indicated has been due solely to the vilification of the U.S. by the controlled press of Japan. Starting with the unjustified raging over the Portsmouth Treaty after the U. S. had saved Japan from defeat, it continued with every incident. Typical was that after the immigration bill, a purely economic expedient occasioned by the failure of immigrant farmers to adhere to the existing standards thereby endangering the California farmers. Japan does not admit farmers.

I indicated that the Public is now well aware of the vast difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Also that the public does understand Japans needs and the difficult situations with which she has been confronted in the past, however they do not understand and will not tolerate either in Europe or Asia any impositions on our commerce which restricts their freedom to go where and when they will.

In conclusion I told the Admiral that he had been quoted in the Press as having accepted this mission on the condition that while he was here the Japanese Government would not take any steps in the Far East which might embarass him. He neither confirmed nor denied this. I then said that I hoped that it was true because it had put him in a very favorable light with the American public and they would wish him every success as I do.

Admiral Nonura is accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, as advisor. Wakasugi was formerly Consul-General at San Francisco, and was not looked upon as a good mixer. Having had some occasion to observe him in 1931 I was not impressed with his ability. For a diplomat he was usually unapproachable, which gave the impression of assumed reticence to hide inferior qualities. It is believed that he will be only a general guide for Admiral Nonura, whose activities or conclusions will not be influenced by Mr. Wakasugi.

Admiral Nonura was very appreciative of the attentions which he received from Admiral Richardson while in Honolulu, and I am sure these will have a profound effect in Japan, in raising his prestige.

COPY

#5-

Admiral Richardson, who knew of my proposed conversation with Admiral Nonura, had expressed a desire to have any details I could give him on it. I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Kimmel.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

(signed) E. M. ZACHARIAS

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4305-4307

also published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,
Vol. IV, the Far East, pages 75-76.

Japan folder
1-41 S

March 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the call which the Japanese Ambassador is to make on you this afternoon, suggestions are offered as follows:

One. Should the Ambassador bring up the question of Mr. Matsuoka's visiting the United States, you might comment to this effect: We of course welcome visits to this country by persons occupying responsible positions in other countries. Visits at the present time by any such persons may be especially informative both to them and to us, in view of the current complexity of problems of international relations and of the tremendous changes which have occurred in the United States during recent months. If Mr. Matsuoka chooses to visit this country while proceeding from Europe to Japan, he will of course be welcomed.

Two. Should the Ambassador mention his compatriots who are here and who apparently desire to have this Government enter into discussions with them on the question
of

of improving relations between Japan and the United States, you may care to say -- as I did to the Ambassador on March 8 -- that you very much appreciate the purpose of the Ambassador's compatriots and that of course officials of this Government charged with the conduct of foreign relations could not confer with them individually in regard to matters pending between our two Governments unless the Japanese Ambassador should assume the responsibility and the initiative to that end.

Three. Occasion or opportunity may develop, in the course of the conversation, of which you might care to take advantage for the offering of observations on lines as follows:

In view of Japan's membership in the tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy, there arises question whether Japan has retained freedom of action and whether her actions will so demonstrate, or whether Japan has committed herself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things -- principles, policies and objectives -- to the support of which this country is habituated and is committed. Can the military groups in control of the Japanese Government expect important countries like the United States to maintain silence and remain inactive while two or three nations engage in tremendous programs
of

of military and naval expansion and move toward conquest of the rest of the earth? As long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and as long as the Japanese army and navy extend their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, the apprehensions and the concern of this country will be very real and our reactions be increasingly realistic. This country is proceeding with a program of rearmament with ever increasing speed and effectiveness, and our national effort, directed in no way toward any program of aggression, is more and more being concentrated upon the problem of perfecting our defense and supporting the resistance of other nations to movements of conquest. We wish to be friends, we are ready to be friends, with every nation in the world -- but in our concept real friendship and real cooperation can prevail only between and among nations each and all of which want peace and security for all.

Justice

CH

FE:MMH:HES

FE

PA/H

PA/H:SKH

state Dept. copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

Japan, 1931-1941

Vol. II pages 396-398

Published also in Foreign Relations ... 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, pages 77-79.

3/19/41
Hull Memo
of Convers.

*Japan Folder
1-41
personal
confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: **MARCH 14, 1941**

SUBJECT: **UNITED STATES--JAPANESE RELATIONS**

PARTICIPANTS: **THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE JAPANESE
AMBASSADOR, ADMIRAL KICHISABURO NOMURA**

COPIES TO:

*** 1-1403

The Ambassador of Japan called at the White House at his request. The President and I were present at the meeting.

The Ambassador proceeded to say that none of his people, with few exceptions, desired war between our two countries; that Matsuoka talks loudly for home consumption because he is ambitious politically, but Japan herself cannot maintain such ambitious plans. He said that Japan desired especially three things in the Chinese situation; the first was good will; the second was economic cooperation; and the third was Comintern defense. He then said that Japan wants raw materials from neighboring countries, and that the "New Order" which contemplates equality

equality of economic opportunity and cooperative prosperity should be given a flexible interpretation. He continued by saying something about the increasingly disastrous situation in Europe, and added that Japan and the United States should cooperate for peace.

The President then emphasized very strongly the deep-seated effect on public opinion in this country arising from the Tripartite Agreement, and he proceeded to emphasize vigorously the dangerous effects of this agreement and the utter lack of any sound reason for Japan to enter into it from every standpoint of her welfare. The Ambassador rather lamely remarked that this country was pressing Japan with embargoes and trade restrictions, and they were in a way forced into this Tripartite arrangement. The President controverted this and again said that from every viewpoint this action was contrary to the interest of Japan; that Hitler would rule over every country if once given the opportunity, just as he is today ruling over Italy and the other countries which had trusted him. The Ambassador did not discuss this phase further.

Then the question arose regarding the threatening nature of Matsuoka's acts and utterances, and the Ambassador said that Matsuoka's trip to Berlin was a mere compliment to the German Government, such as is customary in the existing circumstances for countries like Japan.

The

The President then proceeded to set forth the sound rules and policies of international trade based on the rule of equality of treatment and elaborated at length with illustrations of the situation facing different countries in various parts of the world. He said that the task would be left to a few important nations like this country and Great Britain, and also Japan if she should be so disposed to reorganize international trade on a sound liberal basis, to cooperate with countries that were weak, or at a disadvantage, to enable them to enjoy all the benefits of economic progress. He said that the United States, for example, desires to aid Brazil to develop her most important lines of production to fit it into the international economic trade situation, and that this country likewise desires to cooperate with Argentina for a like purpose, especially as it relates to Argentine beef and other surplus products.

The President then referred to the fact that the South American countries are forty and fifty years behind us and behind Japan, especially from a political and economic angle, and that he hoped all the South American countries would continue to improve their political situation and to enjoy all of the principles of equality, international law, moral concepts and freedom
from

from any interference with their sovereignty or territorial integrity. He then stressed the close ties existing between Thailand and Japan, adding that the former was more closely related to Japan in many ways than the Argentine was related to the United States. The President said that the suggestion had been made now and then that the United States take over the West Indies, but that the attitude of this Government unreservedly has been to see each country preserve its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and equality of opportunity, and that all the nations of the world can on the same basis come and trade with the nations of this hemisphere. The Ambassador admitted that we had been treating Central and South America extremely well, and that we had developed greatly the good neighbor relationships.

The President again returned to the Tripartite Agreement and said that it had upset the American people because they think that a concerted effort is being made by Germany and Italy to reach the Suez Canal and by Japan on the other hand to approach Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Indian Ocean. The Japanese Ambassador spoke more strongly than he had in his earlier talk with me, expressing his belief that his country would not go South.

The

The President came back to the matter of the great work the United States has been doing for economic equality of opportunity, and said that if Great Britain wins, she must be willing for Germany to have equal access to all raw materials and equal trade opportunities. He then remarked that the United States and Japan do not produce rubber and tin and numerous other commodities produced in the British Empire, and that by international arrangements, access to each and all of these must be equal to each country alike. The President illustrated the necessity for this broader course by citing the fact that private efforts had been made to control rubber production and had failed; that control of coffee production had been attempted and had failed.

The President finally remarked that, as the Ambassador indicated, matters between our two countries could undoubtedly be worked out without a military clash, emphasizing that the first step in this direction would be the removal of suspicion and fear regarding Japan's intentions. I here remarked that, of course, with Matsuoka astride the Axis on his way to Berlin and talking loudly as he goes, and Japanese naval and air forces in the vicinity of Indochina, Thailand and Saigon, with no explanation but with serious inferences, the Ambassador must realize how acute feeling and opinion in this
country

country have become.

The Ambassador said that Japan had no idea of controlling China and again referred to the communistic situation there. The President replied by saying that the people of China were constituted very differently from those of Russia; that in particular the people of China have a philosophy that stabilizes them and guides them along much broader lines than the Russians, who have no philosophy. He continued by saying that China was not really communistic in the same sense as Russia and that Japan has an undue fear of communism in China. The Ambassador joined with the President a number of times in expressing the view that differences between the countries could and should be worked out. The Ambassador did not, however, respond to requests for any additional methods of approach beyond the Chinese-Japanese question. He did not say so, but I inferred that he would probably be returning in due time for another conference. I made it clear that Japan, having departed from the course that both countries have been pursuing, the initiative and the responsibility are hers to suggest what, how and when, she is willing, as a preliminary step, to undertake serious discussions, and that above all she must make it clear by words and acts of her serious intentions in this direction.

S:CH:MA:AR

C.H.

[3-15-41]

The Postmaster General (Walker) to the Secretary of State (undated) [o/a Mar. 15, 1941]. Discusses arrangements being made Mr. Wikawa, a representative of Japan, for negotiations with high Japanese officials.

This memorandum was transmitted to Mr. Walker for the Secy. of State and President Roosevelt.

See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pp. 69-70.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4310

4-3-41

*Japan Folder
1-41*

*file
confidential*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

..... April 3, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR the Director

16-12936 GPO

Subject: Japanese Government and its obligation
to the Axis.

The DIO 3ND reported today that the Mitsui Bank
of New York has been instructed by its London
office to conduct business on the premise
that the Japanese Government is not going to
fulfill its obligations to the Axis Powers.
Source of this information is of doubtful
reliability, he stated.

*This from
McFall*

B-7-J

WSD

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4320

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

HONORABLE CORDELL HULL
ADMIRAL EMORY S. LAND
HONORABLE HARRY HOPKINS

May I advise, as a matter of information, that Frank Kluckhohn of the New York Times Washington Staff, gives me the following statement:

"The Domei official Japanese correspondent tells me that the Japanese intend to halt and delay for a month American merchant ships on their way to the Red Sea."


S.T.E.

*Japan folder
file 1-4
Confidential
4-15-41*

State Dept copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

Japan 1931-1941

Vol. II pp. 402-406

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4242

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

April 16, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you may be interested in reading the attached copy of my conversation with Admiral Nomura on April fourteenth.

CH

*file
personal*

Japan Folder
1-41

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: APRIL 14, 1941

SUBJECT: U.S. - JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE JAPANESE
AMBASSADOR, KICHISABURO NOMURA

COPIES TO:

1-1403

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel at my request. I stated that as the Ambassador would recall, both the President and I suggested during our conversations with him that he might care in discussions with me to explore the question of improving relations between the United States and Japan; that such a procedure might involve a review of relations during recent years in an attempt to ascertain where and in what respects the courses of the two countries had diverged; and that this would be done with a view to ascertaining whether something practicable might be done toward restoring the relations of our two

two

two countries to that harmonious state which existed for so many decades. I said that I referred to this again at this time because of the reports which have been coming to me that certain of the Ambassador's compatriots have been working on formulation of proposals and plans for improving relations between the United States and Japan. I had been told that the Ambassador's compatriots have been in touch with the Ambassador in connection with their proposals and that the Ambassador has participated in and associated himself with these plans. I added that I did, of course, not know whether these reports are entirely accurate and, as mentioned previously to him, we can deal only with the Ambassador in addressing ourselves to consideration of problems outstanding between our two Governments.

I then emphasized the point that I had sent for the Ambassador primarily to clear up the matter of the extent of his knowledge of the latest document handed to my associates in the State Department by those Americans and Japanese who are collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort of contribution to better relations between the two countries, and as to whether it was his desire to present that officially as a first step in negotiations between the two Governments. I

again

again cited these phrases previously referred to, which called for preliminary conversation on certain subjects before a stage of negotiations could be reached, and which discouraged the immediate presentation of the document by the Ambassador in an official way. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did know all about this document and that he had collaborated more or less with the individual Japanese and Americans referred to, and that he would be disposed to present it as a basis for negotiations. He proceeded to refer to his great desire to preserve peace between the two countries and therefore to do anything within his power to that end. He emphasized the utter disaster it would be to both countries to go to war, which would last perhaps for many years with the complete exhaustion of all concerned. He spoke strongly expressing the view that his Government did not intend to invade the South Sea area.

We then exchanged some remarks about the general international situation, in which I referred to the fact that it would matter little who wins wars these days unless there is to be a restoration of the principles of justice, order under law, et cetera, which underlie orderly and peaceful international relations, such, for example,

example, as this Government has applied in the upbuilding of the whole fabric of Pan American relations during the past eight years. I elaborated to some extent on the far-reaching improvement in and betterment of all relations between the twenty-one American republics and their respective populations, and concluded by remarking that these same principles could far better be applied in every part of the world, including the Orient than any other doctrines or policies, especially those based on force as an instrument of foreign policy and the intervention in the domestic and internal affairs of one nation or nations by another, and emphasized the view that Japan could well consider the course we had followed instead of the opposite course of force and conquest and arbitrary domination for national aggrandizement. The Ambassador mistook what I said and undertook to go back of the past eight-year period and referred to our difficulties with certain Latin American countries, including Mexico. I soon corrected him and said that this Government had turned over a new leaf, so to speak, especially in 1933 and the following years, in its relations with all nations, including South America. The Ambassador seemed to understand and to get the point. I said that in the present state of world conditions, it was manifest that

that this war would be followed more or less by chaos and anarchy in international affairs and bankruptcy generally, with the result that new wars would be recurring with increasing frequency in the future. This would be the case unless law-abiding countries should exert every possible effort to prevent wild and reckless groups in every country from dragging the world over the precipice, as was done in many vital respects following the World War when the ablest statesmen in Great Britain, for example, were carrying on a nation-wide campaign on the sole issue of hanging the Kaiser and collecting one hundred billion dollars, or some other fabulous amount, from Germany. I said I desired to repeat that it would not make much difference which way the war goes if such unthinkable conditions of utter destruction are to follow, as is sure to happen, unless safeguarded against by every possible means. The Ambassador commented entirely favorably on this view and emphasized his approval of it.

I then said that today it was reported that Hitler is obliged to keep six or eight hundred thousand troops in Poland in order to hold the population in subjugation in every way, which includes semi-slavery in numerous respects; that the same unquenchable love of liberty that existed

existed in conquered nations throughout Europe still exists; that ninety-nine percent of the people of France, whose liberties have been snuffed out and who have been subjected to every privation and many kinds of ill treatment, are strongly sympathetic with the British cause and its support by the United States as far as is practicable; that all of these conquered peoples are but awaiting the slightest opportunity to throw off the shackles of semi-slavery and destitution, and they can be depended upon to do so, if and when Hitler has some serious reverse or reverses. The Ambassador expressed his acquiescence in this last view without the use of words.

I then said that I had observed every phase of Hitler's conduct and utterances from 1933, each year, each week and each day, and that I, in common with many others, have absolutely no faith in any statement or promise that he makes, but any world, subjected to his methods and his philosophies, which are rooted largely in barbarism, would be an unthinkable world in which to live; that he has no real friends anywhere and that he is not a real friend to anyone; that he would abandon over-night the most solemn obligation taken the day

before,

before, if it suited his purpose in the least. I then added that this Government cannot conscientiously sit still and see this unthinkable brand of government fastened on the world; that it wants nothing whatever from anybody, anywhere, but only seeks to aid in preserving an orderly world based on the principles which I have so often recited. The Ambassador did not take issue with this although he did not in any way indicate his approval.

Near the close of the conversation I suggested that, having cleared up these preliminary phases for which I sent for him, we could, if desired on his part, proceed at any time with certain preliminary discussions with a view to ascertaining whether there is a basis for negotiations; that for the purpose of this preliminary discussion there would really be no occasion for either side to present officially any completed documents. The Ambassador raised some question as to why such documents might not be presented in the next conversation, and I replied that there were certain points that my Government would desire to raise prior to negotiations, such as questions pertaining to the integrity and sovereignty of China to the principle of equality of opportunity in
China,

China, et cetera; that he could then communicate with his Government and ascertain whether it agrees that there is a basis for negotiations. The Ambassador readily agreed to this view. He emphasized that he had not yet presented this document to his Government or consulted it concerning concrete terms of settlement, but stated that, in his opinion, his Government would be favorably disposed along such lines as might be made the basis of an agreement.

I said, in conclusion, that I would communicate with the Ambassador later today with a view to agreeing on a time and place for the next conference, adding that it could be at my office or at the White House or in my apartment, although the President was planning on leaving for Warm Springs within a day or two. The Ambassador referred to the interruptions of the press and suggested that he come to my apartment, which he would be ready to do any day from this day on, and he again emphasized the urgency of the situation, saying that events were moving rapidly and that my country is likewise moving rapidly with the result that clashes would become more easily possible from week to week.

G.H.

state Dept. copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

"Japan, 1931-1941"

VOL. II PAGES 406-410

ВНЕШНИЕ СВОДЕ
1941 г. № 101-102
Москва, 18 апреля 1941 г.
Внештатный сотрудник

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

*file
confidential*

April 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a copy of a memorandum of my conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, about which I spoke with you this morning.

CH

PST Japan Fukuda
1-41

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: APRIL 16, 1941

SUBJECT: U.S. - JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE JAPANESE
AMBASSADOR, KICHISABURO NOMURA

COPIES TO:

*** 1-1403

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment in accordance with a previous mutual understanding.

I asked him what news he had and he proceeded to say that from all he could see and learn, the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, announced two days ago, was not really undertaken because of Germany or for Germany's benefit. I remarked that I had not become unduly concerned about the matter because for some time I have acted on the view that the Soviet policy was not to have war with any country unless in actual self-defense, and that, on the other hand, I did not see wherein Japan could

could have a policy based on the disposition to attack the Soviet Union. It was one of those circumstances in which I felt that the written document merely reduced to writing the relationships and policies already existing between the two Governments.

I then said that I would speak off the record of the fact that, according to official information of today, the British believe that they will safely hold the Egyptian-North African area from German attack. Another item of information coming to me today was that the people, that is the public, in Denmark, are unanimously in favor and support of the action of this Government and their Minister with respect to Greenland.

With reference to the question of gradually developing a settlement in the Orient, I said that I had been told that the document on which the Ambassador and the private group of individual Americans and Japanese were collaborating contained numerous proposals with which my Government could readily agree; on the other hand, however, there were others that would require modification, expansion, or entire elimination, and, in addition, there would naturally be some new and separate suggestions by this Government for consideration. I then remarked that the one paramount preliminary question
about

about which my Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan along the lines of the document we have referred to and the points brought up in our conversation in relation to the problems of a settlement; to abandon its present doctrine of military conquest by force and the taking of title to all property and territories seized, together with the use of force as an instrument of policy; and to adopt the principles which this Government has been proclaiming and practicing as embodying the foundation on which all relations between nations should properly rest.

I said:

"I will, therefore, hand to you as the basis for my preliminary question, the following four points on a blank piece of paper:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"You can answer the questions or submit them to your Government for its answer through you, as you prefer. You understand that we both agree that

we

we have in no sense reached the stage of negotiations; that we are only exploring in a purely preliminary and unofficial way what action might pave the way for negotiations later. You tell me that you have not submitted the document in question to your Government, but that you desire to do so. Naturally, you are at the fullest liberty to do this, but, of course, this does not imply any commitment whatever on the part of this Government with respect to the provisions of the document in case it should be approved by your Government. I do, of course, recognize individually that, as stated, if the Japanese Government should approve this document and instruct the Ambassador here to propose it to the United States Government, it would afford a basis for the institution of negotiations, with the result that this Government would offer any counter-proposals desired and any independent proposals desired; which, in conjunction with the Japanese proposal, would be fully discussed and talked out to a conclusion in one way or the other in the spirit that unquestionably should and would characterize the conversations."

The Ambassador studied for a few minutes the four points which I handed to him. He then suggested that the principle of equality might well be discussed in connection with the negotiations. I replied promptly that this would be impossible since we could not think of entering into negotiations if his Government should even hesitate in agreeing to this point; that no country in the world would get more from the doctrine of equality, politically, economically, socially and worthwhile, than Japan; that the Ambassador knows how successfully this doctrine has operated between the United States and the

South

South American countries, and how successfully this hemisphere has greatly improved the relations between the American republics and improved the conditions of their respective peoples by observing the eight-point program adopted at the Lima Conference, the development of the program having been initiated at Montevideo.

I thereupon handed to the Ambassador a copy of the eight-point program adopted by the Lima Conference and said that this Government, of course, stands for these principles for the betterment of international relations and is opposed to the doctrine of conquest by force and the seizure and the taking of title by the conqueror which results in the exclusion of all other parts of the world from the conquered areas except by the giving of a preference to Japanese citizens wherever preference would be of any use. I said that throughout any preliminary conversations we have, it must be understood that the foregoing is the well-defined attitude of the United States Government.

The Ambassador remarked that this country has special relations with South America which Japan in a similar way would not be permitted to have in the Orient. I replied that there was a great misapprehension and misunderstanding about this phase. I said that the truth is that

the

the chief South American countries produce large surpluses of wheat and corn and meat, such as we produce, with the result that we have never had a real trade relationship except to a limited extent; that the total commerce of this hemisphere until lately has only been the rise of twenty percent of the world commerce between nations; that eight years ago when I went to Montevideo I sought to institute a system of closer relations between our countries, politically, economically, socially and culturally and otherwise, for all worthwhile purposes, but that the largest single one of these related to the defense of the hemisphere and especially of the Panama Canal; that without a cultivation of closer relations in lieu of the embittered relations that existed prior to 1933, there would probably be several Hitler puppet governments established in Central and South American countries and this would lead to concessions of naval and airplane bases and other acts in accordance with Hitler's instructions and desires; that it is a tremendous undertaking to protect the Canal, especially from the air both below and above its location, and that the Ambassador must see the supreme importance of our cultivating South American people to the extent that we
would

would not have their ill will and Hitler their good will due to German propoganda, when such a crisis and such danger arises to the Canal as exists now. I said the same was true to the north of us from Canada to Greenland so far as guarding against danger is concerned. Then I added that Japan could carry on any and all social, educational, economic and political relations with nations in the Pacific with a view to cultivating them, but that it would get nowhere if she should undertake to segregate and surround herself and them by preferences or assert zones of special controlling influence or movements such as are not dreamed of in this country or this hemisphere and which are utterly inimical to the eight principles which were adopted at the Lima Conference.

The Ambassador then remarked that the status quo point No. 4 would interfere with the Manchurian situation. I replied that the question of non-recognition of Manchuria would be discussed in connection with the negotiations and dealt with at that stage, and that this status quo point would not, therefore, affect Manchukuo, but was intended to apply to the future from the time of the adoption of the treaty of general settlement.

The

The Ambassador then inquired about the immigration provision. I replied that immigration is considered more of a domestic question in this country; that he would recall my former statement to him to the effect that one of my ambitions when I came to the State Department was to confer with the people of California in particular and undertake to bring about a situation which would make possible the establishment of a reciprocal immigration arrangement with Japan that would be reasonably acceptable to both countries, and that, therefore, Japan would have to accept our good faith in this respect rather than to attempt to make it a part of the proposed negotiations.

I was not sure whether the Ambassador fully understood each statement I made in regard to the four points laid before him, and I sought to illustrate by saying to him that the principles underlying a good portion of the proposals in his doctrine were similar to the principles contained in the four points I had handed to him, and that they were an essential part of the eight-point program, which we had recently emphasized in our South American conferences. I added that, if his Government should make up its mind to abandon its present policies

of

of force and invasion, et cetera, and to adopt a peaceful course with worthwhile international relationships, it could find no objection to these four points reasonably applied, nor to the eight points contained in the Lima resolutions, and that, therefore, he could judge the United States attitude toward a Far Eastern settlement in the light of these practices and principles.

The Ambassador desired me to indicate whether I would to a fairly full extent approve the proposals contained in his document, and I again replied that there would be ready approval of several of them while others would have to be modified or eliminated and this Government would offer some independent proposals, but that if his Government is in real earnest about changing its course, I could see no good reason why ways could not be found to reach a fairly mutually satisfactory settlement of all of the essential questions and problems presented. I illustrated what I meant by the modification of some of the proposals in the document by referring to the fact that the navies of the two countries would not menace each other and adding that the proposal should be broadened to the effect that no navies of any countries
should

should menace each other in the Pacific or anywhere else, but in this particular instance especially in the Pacific. I said that the doctrine of equality should be very easily agreed upon and inserted in the proposals regarding China, as contained in his document. I referred to the clause in regard to the economic cooperation between Japan and China and said that to avoid the possibility of special preferential arrangements between the two countries, the doctrine of equality should be inserted in that connection. I referred to another proposal in which the two countries would assure each other of supplying such commodities as are available, and added that during the war period this country would be obliged to embargo many commodities from export to any country, but that it would expect to supply the pre-war volume in any event.

I said that in connection with the proposal referring to Singapore and Hong Kong, there should be a broader provision to the effect that no nation should construct or operate any agency for the purpose of conquest and aggression.

These were illustrations of our wholly informal conversation, in which I sought to get the Ambassador

to

to see what I meant by the statement that some of his other proposals in his document could be accepted, some modified, some rejected, while some new and independent proposals would be made by this Government. The Ambassador seemed not to understand why I could not now agree to some of these proposals in his document. I sought repeatedly to make clear to him, in the first place, that we have not reached the stage of negotiations, he himself agreeing that he thus far has no authority from his Government to negotiate; and in the second place, that if I should thus out of turn agree to a number of important proposals in the document and these proposals should be sent to Japan and the military or extremist groups should ignore them, I and my Government would be very much embarrassed. The Ambassador finally said he fully understood the situation and made clear, I thought, that he would proceed in his own way to consult his Government regarding the four points in the form of a question which I laid before him inferentially with respect to the approval by the Government of his document, by which is meant the document prepared by the group of Americans and Japanese here with the admitted knowledge and more or less cooperation of
the

the Ambassador himself.

The Ambassador then arose to leave and I said that if and when he heard from his Government and should then desire a conference, I would be glad for him to advise me at any time.

C.H.

— Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

5/8/41

PART 19 PAGES 3460-
3461

Published, also, in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, pp. 183-184.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

My Dear Mr. President: I am
attaching herewith
a formal reply to from
the Defence Committee of
the British Cabinet to
the query we put to
Adm. Danksbury on transfer
of part of the Pacific fleet
to the Atlantic.

Yours sincerely

J.K.

[Japan]

REPLY TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

~~SECRET~~

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Inform U.S. authorities that the issues raised by this proposal have been considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and that as such a move vitally affects Australia and New Zealand we have obtained their opinions.

2. Our opinion which is concurred in in general by both Australia and New Zealand is that any marked advance by the U.S. Navy in or into the Atlantic would be on the whole more likely to deter Japan from going to war than the maintenance of the present very large U.S. Fleet at Hawaii, and further that it might exercise a profound influence on the present critical situation in Spain, Turkey and Vichy France. You should therefore strongly encourage American action in this sense.

3. The problem for the U.S. authorities is so nicely to judge the degree of the transfer that while still retaining the deterrent effect of a strong U.S. Fleet in the Pacific, there will also be the deterrent effect of an increased U.S. Fleet in the Atlantic.

4. It is not only the strength but also the composition of the Fleet in the Pacific which will act as a deterrent, and in our view the necessary effect will not remain unless the Fleet in the Pacific consisted of not less than 6 capital ships and 2 aircraft carriers. Inclusion of the latter is considered of the greatest importance.

8th May, 1941.

M. P. Churchill
Rear Admiral.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt, Washington, May 22, 1941. Quotes excerpts from the diary of Ambassador Joseph C. Grew regarding Japan's position in the Far East and the possibility of an attack on Singapore.

See: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 208.

7-2-41

Telegram Received by Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, Chungking, July 2, 1941. (Signed by "Segac").

Telegram states that Generalissimo has received reliable information that Japan will abrogate the Soviet-Japan Neutrality Pact and declare war on Russia.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 289.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),
Washington, July 4, 1941. (Approved by President Roosevelt on
July 3, 1941)

Delivers a message from the Secretary of State for the
Prime Minister of Japan indicating alarm concerning reports
that Japan plans to attack the Soviet Union and requesting an
assurance from the Prime Minister that such is not the case.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 994-995.

7-11-41

Representative John M. Vorys, of Ohio, to President Roosevelt, Washington, July 11, 1941, enclosing a memorandum by Dr. E. Stanley Jones entitled "Memorandum of Conversations Regarding Possible Peace Between Japan and China (undated).

Mr. Vorys sent to the President the memorandum of the conversations which Dr. Jones had with Dr. Miao, Secretary of the National Christian Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, well-known author of Japan regarding a basis of peace between China and Japan.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 306-310.

also see: O. F. 197-A, FDR to Vorys, July 14, 1941.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

7/15/41

PART 20 PAGES 4363

~~SECRET~~

750 Japan

Boyd.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM for The President:

A long "magic" has just been decoded but has not yet been put in shape for distribution. It covers the following:

Japan, through Vichy, is issuing an ultimatum to Indo-China for the occupation of eight air bases and two naval ports (Cameron and Sigon) for the avowed reason of preventing further encirclement by Britain and the United States. No time limit is stated.


The Chief of Naval Operations in Japan to the Naval Attache in Washington states that on account of the shortage of ship tonnage in the Sea of Japan, the requirements by the Army, the inability to charter ships at the present time, and the fact that many foreign ships no longer make Japan a port of call, the following re-scheduling of shipping will be effected:

Japanese ships will be removed from the run between the Philippines and the east United States coast.

The run to the east coast of South America will be continued through August but it will be impossible after September 1st. However, nine ships will serve the east coast of South America via Cape Horn. (This may signify their anticipation of inability to use the Panama Canal.)

Their shipping will continue to the west coast of South America.

A full copy of this "magic" will be sent you as soon as it can be prepared.


Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~

The Chief of Naval Operations (Stark) to the Secretary of State, Washington, July 22, 1941, enclosing The Chief of Naval Operations (Stark) to President Roosevelt, [Washington,] July 21, 1941, and The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department (Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark), Washington, July 19, 1941.

Discusses his talks with Admiral Nomura and the possibility of embargoes on trade with Japan. Encloses Turner's report to him (Stark) on the effect of an embargo on trade with Japan.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 835-840.

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt,
Washington, July 22, 1941.

Forwards to the President a memorandum from General Marshall
stating that the War Department has no objection to the
imposition of restrictions upon the importation of silk into
this country.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, page 834.

State Dept. Copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US
Japan 1931-1941
VOL. II PAGES 522-526

Confidential

*Japan Files
-48 E*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:
July 24, 1941

SUBJECT: Occupation of Indochina

PARTICIPANTS: Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, A-B, PA/H, FE

*** 1-7400

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

Admiral Nomura commenced the conversation by saying that as soon as he had received from Mr. Wakasugi the report of his conversation with me two days ago, he had immediately returned to Washington in order to speak with me personally.

The Ambassador then commenced his exposition, which I did not interrupt until he had concluded.

The Ambassador said that he had now received from press reports, but not as yet officially, information that the Japanese Government had concluded with the Vichy

Government an agreement whereunder the Japanese Government would send military forces to occupy certain portions of southern Indochina. The Ambassador said that he understood this agreement entailed no violation of the inherent sovereignty of French Indochina. He stated that I was well aware of the critical economic situation of Japan and of the great difficulty which Japan had in procuring raw materials, particularly food supplies, from abroad. He stressed the question of lack of fertilizer which Japan had been accustomed to importing from Germany and said that consequently additional rice must be imported from abroad. He stated that Japan was now importing a million tons of rice a year from Indochina. He went on to say that one of the two reasons for the step taken was to assure to Japan an uninterrupted source of supply of rice and other food stuffs, which Indochina afforded, as well as an uninterrupted supply of other raw materials which they required from that region. He stated that Japan believed that de Gaullist French agents were stirring up trouble in southern Indochina and that of course there were many Chinese agitators in that region and the Japanese Government feared that at some time in the near future a situation might develop which would cut off Japan's supplies from those territories.

The Ambassador then said that the second reason for the

occupation undertaken was the need for military security. He stated that Japan believed that certain foreign powers were bent upon a policy of encirclement of Japan and that the step taken was purely a precautionary measure in the nature of a safeguard.

The two situations which the Ambassador had set forth above, he stated, had occasioned great "uneasiness" to Japan.

The Ambassador then said that from the tone of the press in this country and from observations which had been made to him by various Americans in whom he placed reliance, these recent developments were creating a condition of great excitement and perturbation in the United States. He said that of course the question of the measures which the United States might take was something which the United States alone could determine, but he urged most urgently that this Government should not "reach hasty conclusions" and should permit a little time to elapse in the hope that a friendly adjustment between Japan and the United States might be found. He said that any measures restricting oil exports to Japan would undoubtedly inflame Japanese public opinion exceedingly and he hoped, in view of his own belief that friendly relations could be maintained between the two countries, that full consideration might be given

to his views in this connection.

The Ambassador concluded his exposition by saying that one of the first messages he had received from the new Cabinet was an urgent instruction to him to press for an understanding with the United States along the lines he had been discussing with Secretary Hull. These instructions, he said, were not as yet given to him in full detail but made it completely clear that the new Government fully supported the policies which he had been representing throughout the course of the conversations.

He said that I would of course realize that "third powers" were doing everything within their power to prevent the reaching of an agreement with the United States. He expressed the hope that this Government would bear this fact fully in mind in reaching any decisions it might contemplate.

I replied to the Ambassador that in view of his statement to me that Mr. Wakasugi had fully reported his conversation with me to the Ambassador, I felt I need not cover the same ground again in my conversation with the Ambassador this afternoon. I said that I had made it clear to Mr. Wakasugi that if the Japanese Government was now determined to pursue a policy diametrically opposed to the policy laid down by the Japanese Ambassador in his conversation with

Secretary Hull as the policy which would result from the reaching of an agreement with the United States, this Government must reconsider its own position in the matter.

I said it was very clear to this Government that any agreement which Japan might have reached with the Vichy Government could only have been reached as a result of pressure brought to bear upon the Vichy Government by Berlin. Since that was the case in our judgment, the reaching of this agreement by Japan could only be regarded as offering assistance to Hitler in his obvious policy of world conquest and of world domination, which, I emphasized, in the opinion of the United States, would, if successful, prove equally deleterious to Japan and to the United States.

The Ambassador had referred to the desire of Japan, by occupying Indochina, to assure itself of supplies of food and raw materials from that territory. I said that if the agreement which Secretary Hull and the Ambassador had been discussing were concluded, the Ambassador must fully realize that a far greater measure of economic security would be afforded Japan since the whole agreement was predicated upon equal economic opportunity and equal economic security for all of the nations directly concerned in the Pacific region. With regard to the

statement made by the Ambassador that the measure taken was in the nature of a military precaution, I inquired as to what possible justification there could be for such a step on the part of Japan when the Japanese Government had been fully informed, through the Ambassador by Secretary Hull, of the policy of this Government in the Pacific, which was a policy of the maintenance of peace, of non-aggression and of the refusal to carry out any policy of conquest or of physical force. I said the policy of this Government was the reverse of a policy of encirclement or of a policy which would constitute any threat to Japan. Furthermore, I said, this Government was equally confident that the policy of Great Britain constituted no menace to Japan and that if an agreement of the kind which had been under discussion were concluded, the United States would have been joined, together with Japan, in support of the underlying principles for which this Government stood, by the Governments of Great Britain, of the Dominions, of the Netherlands, and, I was confident, by the Government of China as well.

I said the Ambassador could hardly expect me to take seriously the Ambassador's statement that Japan was concerned by the activities of Chinese agitators or de Gaulist sympathizers in southern Indochina. I said I

believed we could both agree to pass that by without further reference.

I said I thought the time had now come to speak with the complete frankness which the Ambassador would expect from a member of his own naval profession and I would consequently take the liberty of doing so. I said that the movement now undertaken by Japan could only be regarded by the United States as having two probable purposes, neither of which purpose this Government could ignore.

First, the United States could only assume that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume that the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that region.

This Government could not see that there was any fact or factual theory upon which Japan could possibly fill Indochina with Japanese military and other forces for purposes of defending Japan. The only consequent alter-

native was to regard the occupation of Indochina by Japan as being undertaken because of the Japanese realization of its value to Japan for purposes of offense against the South Sea area.

I said that in view of all of these considerations, which I believed I had set forth very clearly to the Ambassador, I was now in a position where I must tell him, at the request of Secretary Hull, that the latter could not see that there was any basis now offered for the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been engaged. This Government, in the opinion of Secretary Hull, had made it thoroughly clear to the Government of Japan that it was entirely ready to go forward with Japan on the basis of peaceful adjustment of the relations between the two countries in accordance with the principles and policies set forth in the agreement which it had been proposed should be concluded. This Government had already shown the utmost measure of patience in its dealings with Japan -- and at this stage the Ambassador emphatically nodded his head -- and had been prepared, as I had emphasized to Mr. Wakasugi, to continue to be patient in the event that the Government of Japan had required time in order to deal with its own public opinion but had at the same time refrained from embarking upon

measures which were fundamentally opposed to the principles which both parties here in Washington had been endeavoring to establish. I repeated again that in the judgment of the United States if such an agreement had been reached, the Government of Japan would have obtained an infinitely greater amount of security, both military and economic, than it could obtain through its embarkation upon a policy of conquest by force.

The Ambassador then said that he fully realized that this Government had been exceedingly patient. He urged that it continue, at least for a short time, to be patient and he said most emphatically that he was willing to assure me that if the agreement which had been under discussion had been concluded, the present steps would not have been taken by the present Government of Japan. He said he felt that the procrastination which had taken place -- and for this he did not attempt to place the blame -- had been responsible for the creation of conditions with which the new Government was confronted when it took office and from which it could not immediately free itself.

The Ambassador concluded by saying that he would report to Tokyo what I had said.

I concluded the interview by saying that I was happy to say that Secretary Hull was now almost completely restored to health and that he hoped he would be able to return to Washington in the near future and in such event I was sure that he himself would wish to talk again with the Ambassador.

The Ambassador gave me the impression of being greatly disturbed and sincerely concerned by the possibility that a situation might now develop which would make utterly impossible any understanding between the two countries. His manner was exceedingly conciliatory throughout the interview and when he spoke about his hope that the United States would not reach "hasty conclusions", he said three or four times that, of course, he had no right to interfere or to give the impression that he was intervening in the decisions which might be made by this country, but that he made the remark solely because of his belief that a friendly adjustment could still be found.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4387-4388

PSF Japan
Luck *bx*

TK
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC).

Tokyo

Dated July 30, 1941

Rec'd 7:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1131, July 30, 10 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Your 436, July 29, 3 p.m., is greatly appreciated.

The eventual way out of the present situation would appear to lie in the third provision of the Franco-Japanese protocol of July 29 to the effect that the validity of the stipulations of the agreement shall cease when the situation motivating their adoption no longer exists. The President's proposal, if accepted and carried through, would effectively remove the alleged threat to the security of Indochina set forth in the preamble of the protocol as the fundamental purpose of the agreement. If Japan should reject the proposal or should avoid giving positive authorization to the President to proceed to carry out the proposal, Japan's good faith would be brought into question, the honesty of her announced purpose and incentives would come before the tribunal of public opinion,

-2- #1131, July 30, 10 p.m., from Tokyo.

opinion, and her position before the world and in the light of history would become doubly unenviable.

This, of course, assumes that the President's proposal will eventually and inevitably be made known to the public, a point which might discreetly but helpfully be conveyed to Admiral Nomura in case the reply of the Japanese Government should be unduly delayed or should prove to be of a negative or evasive character. No progress can be made toward the adjustment of international relations without mutual confidence, and were the Japanese Government to withhold confidence in the helpful efforts of the President to find a way out of the impasse and in such eventual international assurances with regard to the security of Indochina as the President might be in a position to present, such an attitude on the part of Japan would oblige the United States completely to discount any expressed desire on the part of Japan for a restoration of good relations with the United States.

I know of no other way of possibly preventing the Japanese forces from "digging in" in Indochina than to bring the foregoing thoughts through Admiral Nomura squarely to the attention of the Japanese Government.

KLP

GREW

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt,
Washington, July 31, 1941.

Discusses licensing of exports to Japan and imports from
Japan. Submits to FDR a suggested statement of policy on
categories of exports and imports.

[Pres. Roosevelt approved the recommendations with the
notation, "SW OK. FDR."]

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 346-348.

copy of State Dept. document
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

"Japan, 1931-41"

VOL. II PAGE 549

PSF Japan

*File back copy
This is reply to
my proposal*

Copy of a document handed
by the Japanese Ambassador
to the Secretary on
August 6, 1941

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

8-6-41

PROPOSAL BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

I. The Japanese Government undertakes:

(A) that, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of a military character to the United States, it will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas except French Indo-China and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indo-China will be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident, and

(B) that, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of political and military character to the Philippine Islands, the Japanese Government will guarantee the neutrality of the islands at an opportune time on the condition that Japan and the Japanese subjects will not be placed in any discriminatory positions as compared with other countries and their nationals including the United States and its nationals, and

(C) that, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for the instability of the economic

economic relations between Japan and the United States, the Japanese Government will cooperate with the Government of the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as are required by the United States.

II. The Government of the United States undertakes:

(A) that, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a direct menace of military character to Japan or to her international communications, the Government of the United States will suspend its military measures in the Southwestern Pacific areas, and also that, upon a successful conclusion of the present conversations, it will advise the Governments of Great Britain and of the Netherlands to take similar steps, and

(B) that, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for military, political and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Government of the United States will cooperate with the Japanese Government in the production and procurement of natural resources as are required by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific areas, especially in the Netherlands East Indies,

and

(C) that, in conjunction with the measures as set forth in (B) above, the Government of the United States will take steps necessary for restoring the normal relations of trade and commerce which have hitherto existed between Japan and the United States, and

(D) that, in view of the undertaking by the Japanese Government as set forth in I. (A) above, the Government of the United States will use its good offices for the initiation of direct negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chiang Kai-shek régime for the purpose of a speedy settlement of the China Incident, and that the Government of the United States will recognise a special status of Japan in French Indo-China even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from that area.

August 6, 1941

Copy of a document handed
by the Japanese Ambassador
to the Secretary on
August 6, 1941

ORAL

The purport and nature of the measures taken by the Japanese Government in effecting a joint defense of French Indo-China has already been explained by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the United States Ambassador in Tokio as well as by myself to the President and the Acting Secretary of State. To summarise, the measures are of entirely peaceful character and for self-defense, and an intervention by any third Power would be wholly unwarranted. They were absolutely necessary in order to prevent from getting beyond control the Japanese public opinion which had been dangerously aroused because of the successive measures taken by the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands East Indies against Japan, and consequently in order to preserve peace in the Pacific.

As the United States Government has nevertheless manifested certain anxiety over the situation in regard to French Indo-China, the Japanese Government, with a view to dispelling any such misgiving, has instructed me to transmit a proposal and to enter into negotiations in strict confidence and on an "off record" basis. The

proposal

proposal is intended to serve as a reply in a way to the suggestion made by the President on July 24 during his conversation with me, and to provide a fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding on which informal conversations have been carried on during the past months. I have to add that any accord of views which may result from the present negotiations is to be incorporated in the general formula for the adjustment of the relations between our two countries.

At all events, the Japanese Government is convinced that it is more than ever necessary to examine calmly and with a spirit of understanding toward the standpoint of each other the diverse causes which have been responsible for the strained relations between Japan and the United States, and to endeavor for the removal and alleviation of such causes and conditions as will upset the military, political and economic equilibrium that should normally exist between the two countries. The Japanese Government believes that its views in this respect are fully shared by the Government of the United States.

August 6, 1941

RF - Japan

August 16, 1941

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Secretary:

The present Japanese Foreign Minister is evidently of the impression, which earlier Japanese reports from Washington undertook to give, that the initiative in regard to conversations came from the American Government.

Apparently the Japanese Foreign Minister has been holding back as regards new conversations while awaiting (since August 7) a report by Nomura on the subject of "rumors of Hull's resignation and of the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan".

In the Imperial conference of July 2, the Japanese Government apparently decided to adhere to its "new order" policy "regardless of how the world situation may change"; to "take measures with a view to advancing southward"; to increase its pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek "from various points in the south"; to continue diplomatic negotiations; to carry out previous decisions regarding French Indochina and Thailand; to use "every means available" in order "to prevent the United States from joining the war"; to act in accordance with the Three Power Pact, but deciding for itself "when and how force will be employed".

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bof

THE SECRETARY

August 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a memo of
your conversation with the
Japanese Ambassador.

C.H.

THE SECY
DEPARTMENT OF

State Dept. copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

Japan 1931-41

VOL. II PAGES 554-555

PSF Japan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: AUGUST 17, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, ADMIRAL KICHISABURO NOMURA

COPIES TO:

*** 2-1000

The Ambassador of Japan called to see the President at the latter's request. Following some few exchanges of preliminary remarks, the President then became serious and proceeded to refer to the strained relations between our two countries. He referred to the Ambassador's visit to me and the latter's request for a reopening of the conversations between our two Governments. The President commented briefly on the policies and principles that this Government has been standing for in its relations with Japan, and he made some contrast to Japan's opposite course of conquest by force, et cetera. He concluded by saying that our attitude of opposition to Japan's course

has

BY PUBLICITY: JUNE 1
SUBJECT: UNITED STATES

has been made well known, and that the next move is now up to Japan. The President inquired of the Ambassador if he had anything in mind to say in connection with the situation. Thereupon the Ambassador drew out of his pocket an instruction which he said was from his Government, in which the Japanese Government set forth some generalities and asserted very earnestly that it desired to see peaceful relations preserved between our two countries; that Prince Konoze feels so seriously and so earnestly about preserving such relations that he would be disposed to meet the President midway, geographically speaking, between our two countries and sit down together and talk the matter out in a peaceful spirit.

The President thereupon said that this Government should really bring the matters between the two Governments literally up to date and that he would, therefore, offer certain observations about the position of this Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so doing but that he had no other recourse. The President said he had dictated what he was about to say and that he would read it to the Ambassador and then hand him the written instrument containing the oral conversation. This the President proceeded to do as follows:

"During

-3-

"During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pursuit by either Government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

"On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indochina and that they would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indochina should be available to all Powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the Powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the Government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indochina.

"Notwithstanding these efforts, the Government of Japan has continued its military activities and its disposals of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has occupied Indochina with its military, air and naval forces.

"The Government of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for amicable and mutually profitable relations between our two countries. This Government's

patience

patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent months. This Government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications which come to it from many sources, will at this moment tend to further the objectives sought.

"Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States."

The President, after some little delay in the conversation so as to set apart the first statement which he read to the Ambassador, then proceeded to turn to the Ambassador's request to the Secretary of State and to himself for a resumption of the conversations. The President made further references to Japan's opposing course of conquest by force and bitter denunciation of this country by the Japanese Government-controlled press and then coming to the request for a reopening of the conversations he repeated our former statements to the

Japanese

Japanese Government that, of course, we could not think of reopening the conversations if the Japanese Government is to continue its present movement of force and conquest supported by its bitter press campaign against this country.

Thereupon the President proceeded to read to the Ambassador the following statement, which is self-explanatory:

"Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on August 8 during a conversation with the Secretary of State whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoze and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

"Reference is made also to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on August 16 that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two Governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

"When the Japanese Ambassador brought up these suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the Government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow a course of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course

this

this Government had received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

"On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indochina. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indochina and pointed out that the Government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indochina or the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

"The Government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the

Japanese

Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

"Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this Government and this Government would cooperate with other nations in

extending

extending assistance to any country threatened.

"Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the Government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

"If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

"In case the Japanese Government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. The Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement that has

yet

yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans."

The Ambassador received each paper in writing and said he would communicate both to his Government. He reiterated from time to time that his Government was very desirous of preserving peaceful relations between the two countries and he took no issue with the President relative to the reasons set forth by this Government for discontinuing conversations with Japan.

C.H.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Boyd

August 28, 1941.

Memorandum for the President

I herewith enclose statement of my conversation at my apartment last evening with the Japanese Ambassador, which I think covers the main points I had in mind to discuss with you today.

If in addition you desire me to come over at 1:40, I shall of course be delighted to do so.

CH

State Dept. copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the U.S.

Japan 1931-41

VOL. II PAGE 576-579

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Ps F Japan
DATE: August 28, 1941

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador
The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull
Mr. Ballantine

COPIES TO:

*** 1-1699

The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment made at his request at the Secretary's apartment. He expressed his appreciation for the Secretary's having arranged to have the Ambassador see the President that morning. The Ambassador said that he felt much encouraged from his interview with the President/^{to hope}for a successful outcome of our common effort to bring about an improvement in the relations between the two countries, and he added that he has telegraphed a full account of that interview to his Government.

The Ambassador said that it was his personal opinion that the suggestion of the President that the meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister be held at Juneau would be agreeable to his Government and that the Prime Minister would probably proceed thither

by a

by a Japanese warship, making the journey in about ten days. The Ambassador thought that the Prime Minister would be assisted by a staff of about twenty persons, of whom five each would be from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy and the Japanese Embassy at Washington. The Ambassador thought that the inclusion of army and navy representatives in the delegation would be especially beneficial in view of the responsibility which they would share for the settlement reached. He said his Government was very anxious that the meeting be held at the earliest possible moment in view of the efforts of a third country and fifth columnists in Japan, who are now behind a press campaign against the United States, to disturb Japanese-American relations. He suggested the period between September 21 and 25 as suitable. He said that the question of publicity was something which the two Governments should agree upon, and that involved in the question of timing of any announcement was the fact that the Prime Minister would necessarily have to leave Tokyo about five days before the President left Washington.

The Secretary said that he would refer these points to the President for his consideration.

The Secretary then pointed out to the Ambassador the desirability

desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed meeting an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations. He dwelt upon the serious consequences from the point of view of both Governments which would ensue if the meeting failed to result in an agreement as a consequence of issues arising which could not be resolved, and he expressed the view that the meeting should therefore have as its purpose the ratification of essential points already agreed to in principle. The Secretary pointed out that in the conversations which had taken place last spring difficulties had been encountered in regard to certain fundamental points which had caused delays which finally culminated in Japan's taking action contrary to the spirit which had animated both the Ambassador and himself in those conversations. The Secretary also pointed out that it would be unfortunate if now, while one half of the Japanese Government was disposed to go along a course of peace the other half should be pulling in the opposite direction.

The Ambassador reviewed the points in regard to which difficulties had been encountered in the conversations, namely: (1) Japan's relations to the Axis, (2) the question of the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, and (3) the question of the
application

application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. He noted that only in regard to the question of the retention of Japanese troops in North China, concerning which he had no information that his Government had modified its attitude, did he anticipate real difficulty. He observed that with regard to Japan's relations with the Axis there should be no difficulties, as the Japanese people regarded their adherence to the Axis as merely nominal and as he could not conceive of his people being prepared to go to war with the United States for the sake of Germany. He said he thought our attitude in regard to self-protection was entirely reasonable. The only difficulty that he saw was that to ask that Japan give a blank check for action that the United States might take against Germany in the name of self-defense was equivalent to asking for a nullification of the Tripartite Pact.

The Secretary commented that the Japanese Government had entered into the Tripartite Pact at a most critical moment in our efforts to extend aid to England, and Japan's action therefore was given particular emphasis in this country. In addition, Mr. Matsuoka kept re-asserting gratuitously Japan's alignment with the Axis.

The

The Secretary said he felt that unless something was done to counteract the effect upon the American people, it might prove a source of serious embarrassment to the President upon his return from the proposed meeting. The Secretary went on to refer to the actual situation in our relations with Germany, to the fact that although no shooting is taking place we are maintaining patrols all the way to Iceland.

The Japanese Ambassador said that with regard to the China question it was the idea of the Japanese Government that we exercise our good offices in bringing the Chinese and Japanese together leaving China and Japan to reach a direct settlement among themselves whereas the United States Government desired to discuss with Japan the basic terms on which peace was to be concluded.

The Secretary said that we were involved in this matter through Japan's requesting this Government to exercise its good offices. In order to exercise such good offices it was necessary for us to have the confidence and friendship of the Chinese Government before and after exercising those good offices. We could not, he said, propose that the Chinese negotiate with Japan until we knew what the basic terms were which Japan intended to propose and it can be imagined what a difficult situation

situation would be created if, after a meeting between Prince Konoye and the President, an explosion should take place in China as a result of dissatisfaction with the results of that meeting. The Secretary explained further that we could not now afford to have the Chinese think that we were ignoring their interests in going ahead with any arrangements and that it was our idea to help the Japanese achieve the purpose of establishing friendship with China on a solid basis. In this way the Secretary said we could work together, Japan and the United States, in order to make the most of the potentialities of the 500,000,000 people of China as a trading nation.

The Ambassador commented that of course the China question was a very important matter but in view of the wide-spread press comments to the effect that the situation had now come to a show-down between Japan and the United States were there not other questions pending between the United States and Japan even apart from the China question which could be disposed of at the meeting with a view to tidying over a critical situation.

The Secretary replied that it was quite true that there were these other questions but that the China question was one of the pivotal questions underlying relations between the United States and Japan and if this question remained unsettled to the satisfaction of all
there

there would remain the roots of future instability and trouble. The Ambassador said that he recognized the soundness of what the Secretary said especially in view of the French Indochina situation. Mr. Ballantine said he assumed that what the Ambassador had reference to was the Japanese assurance that they would withdraw their troops from French Indochina as soon as the China affair was settled.

The Ambassador then recapitulated briefly what the Secretary had said, namely, that the Secretary considers that there should be an agreement in principle on the outstanding questions of importance prior to the holding of the meeting, that the meeting would serve the purpose of ratifying agreement in principle already reached, that the Secretary considered that the Chinese question was one of the pivotal subjects calling for settlement, and that this Government in exercising its good offices between China and Japan would have to consider the basic terms on which Japan proposed to negotiate. The Secretary said that this represented his views. The Ambassador said that he recognized that what the Secretary said was quite reasonable. The Ambassador had misgivings as to how far the Japanese Government could go on account of the internal political difficulties in Japan. He said, however, that Prince Konoye was a man of great courage and

was

was prepared to assume great risks in bringing to a successful conclusion an effort to improve relations.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4406-4410

August 28, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
S
Mr. Secretary:

In connection with your proposed call upon the President to discuss with him the proposal of the Japanese Government which the Japanese Ambassador desires to present to him on August 28 in regard to a meeting of the heads of the American and Japanese Governments for the purpose of endeavoring to reach a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area, observations are offered as follows:

It seems apparent from the character of the document which the Japanese Ambassador proposes to hand to the President, a copy of which he handed you last night, and various other indications that the Japanese Government will adopt a strategy designed to put through an agreement couched in general terms which will leave the application of those terms wide open. The Japanese will probably argue that the situation calls for speedy action on the ground that only in this way can there be averted the danger of control of the Japanese Government passing into the hands of the extremists, which would result in the opportunity being lost for a peaceful adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan. (Our Embassy has reported that the internal situation in Japan is serious and there may

may be a sound basis for this argument.) The Japanese will probably also argue that for this reason it is essential that points of agreement be confined to broad questions leaving specific details to be dealt with subsequently.

It will be recalled that these are the very tactics which the Japanese Government has employed in connection with the proposals for an understanding which were presented to our Government last spring. It will be recalled too that our deliberate careful study of their proposals revealed inconsistencies between their professions of acceptance of the principles of respect for China's territorial integrity and of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations on the one hand and their reluctance on the other hand to agree to withdrawing troops from north China and Inner Mongolia and to relinquish in practice special economic principles which they have asserted in China.

Should we accede to Japan's desire to conclude an agreement first covering only broad principles, there is a danger that we shall not have in fact reached a meeting of minds on what is implied in the actual application of those principles to concrete cases.

We have consistently informed the Japanese that, in

the

the light of the many evidences which have come to our attention that the Japanese Government is pursuing courses diametrically opposed to the spirit underlying the conversations which you have held with the Japanese Ambassador, we must await some clear indication of the Japanese Government's intention to pursue peaceful courses before we could profitably continue to pursue our conversations. It is thought that the President may wish to reemphasize to the Japanese Ambassador that our views in this respect remain unchanged. He may wish to recall to the Ambassador that in addition we found during the course of our conversations difficulties arising from (1) the disposition of the Japanese Government to stress its alignment with the Axis; (2) the intention of the Japanese Government to retain troops in Chinese territory for defense against communistic activities; and (3) lack of adequate clarification of the application to Japan's proposed program of economic cooperation with China of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. The President may wish to suggest that these points would need to be satisfactorily disposed of as a condition precedent to a general peaceful settlement.

The President might then go on to offer the suggestion that in the light of all developments which have taken place,

place, it would be helpful at this time if the Japanese Government could give some practical evidence of its intention to readjust its position and to pursue courses of peace; the giving of such practical evidence would not only contribute toward convincing the American people and the world at large of the earnestness of the Japanese Government's^{declared} intentions, but would also serve, it is believed, to make easier the task of bringing about reconciliation between Japan and China, in accordance with Japan's earnestly professed desire. He might say that as the Japanese Government is in a far better position to know than is the Government of the United States what Japan is prepared to do by way of giving practical evidence of its intentions, this Government hesitates to suggest concrete measures which the Japanese Government might take.

The President might then in conclusion say that he is glad to learn from the Ambassador of the Japanese Government's desire to pursue peaceful courses; that he will be glad to give careful study to the paper which the Japanese Ambassador has given him; and that with regard to the Japanese Government's proposal for a meeting between himself and Prince Konoe, while the President will be glad to try

to try and arrange such a meeting, he feels that precedent to the taking place of such a meeting there should be a meeting of minds between the two Governments on fundamental principles, as it would be most unfortunate from the point of view of both Governments if when such a meeting takes place there should ensue a failure to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement.

SMS New
FE:Ballentine:MHP

State Dept copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

Japan, 1931-41

VOL. II PAGES 572-575

PSF Japan

~~SECRET~~

TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM
THE PRINCE PREMIER OF JAPAN

I deeply appreciate the courtesy of Your Excellency in delivering personally to Ambassador Nomura the reply of the United States Government to the proposal of the Japanese Government regarding a meeting between Your Excellency and myself.

In the face of universal warlike turmoil Japan and the United States are the last two major Powers who hold the key to international peace. That the two nations should fall in the worst of relations at this time would mean not only a disaster in itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations.

The present deterioration of the Japanese-American relations is largely due, I feel, to a lack of understanding which has led to mutual suspicions and misapprehensions, and also encouraged the machinations and maneuvers of Third Powers.

Without first eliminating such causes, it is impossible to expect adjustment of Japanese-American

relations. This is why I wish to meet Your Excellency personally for a frank exchange of views.

The preliminary informal conversations, disrupted July last, were quite appropriate both in spirit and content. But the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Government does not meet the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies.

I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary, be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting.

Such is my aim in making the present proposal. I sincerely hope my views in this regard are fully understood and reciprocated by Your Excellency.

Because of the nature of the meeting as stated above, I would prefer that it will take place as soon as possible.

August 27, 1941.

Strictly Confidential

The Japanese Government has received the communication conveyed by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941. The Japanese Government desires to state its views as follows:

The Japanese Government profoundly regrets that despite the pledge it has given heretofore as well as its repeated explanations concerning Japan's actions and measures in the foreign field, the United States Government continues to entertain misgivings.

The United States Government mentions certain situations and measures which it regards as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international confusion, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain when an event is a cause and when it is a consequence.

When a nation is obstructed in the path of natural and peaceful development or when the means of its existence is threatened, not only is it imperative that that nation should take defensive measures, but it is also required to do so for the maintenance of a just peace. This was the motivating policy of the Japanese Government.

Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain

measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with the then current amicable conversations.

The United States Government certainly regards some of its actions as merely counter-measures against Japan's policy and procedures which were considered as conflicting with American interests and principles. On the other hand, to the Japanese Government those procedures were determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements or removing environmental and political obstacles against national security.

With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed frequently unaware that its words and policies are automatically weighted with the immense power of America's accomplished facts, natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the ways of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nations, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

Yet, as long as there is lacking the assuagement of that possible threat, there will be some less favorably endowed (especially in essential resources) who will

feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the Government of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices.

Japan's measure in Indo-China was intended to accelerate the settlement of the China Incident; and at the same time it was calculated to remove all menace to the peace of the Pacific and to secure to Japan an equitable supply of essential materials. It was a measure of self-defense the Japanese Government felt obliged to take. But the Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories. The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intentions toward Thailand.

As regards Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchoukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty. On the other hand, the Japanese Government sincerely hopes that the United States Government will avoid any action that might give rise to a fear of menace to Japan through collaboration with the Soviet Union.

In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.

Quite properly, discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining if there existed a basis for negotiations for a peaceful settlement covering the entire

situation,— such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.

It is also stated by the United States Government that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as these might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The fundamental national policy long cherished by the Japanese Government is again in full agreement on that point.

Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself.

The Japanese Government now confidently hopes that from the larger viewpoint of a constructive world peace,

and in the light of the current international situation, past differences may be merged in an agreement of principles and a cooperative effort based on order and justice. The meeting of the responsible heads of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be instituted by that meeting.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
—
THE SECRETARY

Box.

September 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may wish to read the attached memoranda before our meeting with the Japanese Ambassador at five o'clock.

CH

DEBYLWEI
State Dept copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the US

Japan 1931-41

VOL . II PAGE 589-592

PSF Japan

bit

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: SEPTEMBER 3, 1941

SUBJECT: U.S. - JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, ADMIRAL KICHI SABURO NOMURA

COPIES TO:

1-1453

At the request of the President, the Japanese Ambassador called at the White House this afternoon. The President proceeded at once to read the written oral statement (copy attached) which had been prepared in reply to the communication recently sent to the President by the Japanese Prime Minister. He emphasized certain points as he read. He particularly emphasized the fact that he appreciated the difficulties of Prince Konoye in connection with the Japanese internal situation, but he added that he has difficulties here which he hopes that Prince Konoye and his Government would appreciate. The President referred to his recent

recent conversations with Prime Minister Churchill, especially that portion relating to plebiscites at the end of the war as the best means of settling many differences and as the soundest policy of dealing with conditions existing between different races. He cited several instances existing at the end of the World War, which were effectively dealt with by plebiscites.

The President then proceeded to read his letter to Prime Minister Konoye, a copy of which is hereto attached. The Ambassador inquired if the President was still favorable to a conference and the President replied that he was, but that it was very important to settle a number of these questions beforehand, if the success of the conference was to be safeguarded to the extent warranted by the holding of such a meeting. It was also emphasized that if and when we had secured sufficient assurances from the Japanese Government that it stands earnestly for all of the principles which this Government has been proclaiming as applicable to the Pacific area, it would be necessary for us to discuss the matter fully with the British, the Chinese and the Dutch, since there is no other way to effect a suitable peaceful settlement for the Pacific area;

that

that any settlement must be on a basis that will restore confidence and friendliness among the nations concerned; in no other way can a suitable economic structure be rebuilt for that area. The Ambassador seemed to appreciate this viewpoint. Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his Government to clarify its position on the question of abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three fundamental questions concerning which difficulties had been encountered in our discussion of the Japanese proposal of May twelfth and the discussion of which we had not pursued after the Japanese went into Indochina. The Ambassador said that Prince Konoye, while preferring to go to Hawaii, would be disposed to go to any place in the Pacific where there was suitable anchorage.

The Ambassador then proceeded to say that he had a despatch from Tokyo referring to the fact that certain elements of opposition to the proposals of the Prime Minister existed and were active in their opposition. He said that the Government, however, is determined to overcome such opposition. He stated that a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister would enable Japan to overcome these disagreements at

home

home and that the opposition would gradually get in line with the Government. He said that Konoyo thinks that he and the President can discuss the three questions which were left untouched when the Japanese went into Indochina in July, mainly the question relating to the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from China, the question of non-discrimination in commerce, et cetera, et cetera, and the Tripartite Pact.

It was made clear to the Ambassador that several days should be consumed by his Government both in clarifying and stating strongly its position on the principles already referred to and their application so far as China is concerned, and also that their Government should by word and act in every way possible devote some time at once to the education and organization of public opinion in support of the proposals for a peaceful settlement, as already set forth.

C.H.

S CH:MA

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN, FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.

I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.

I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly-moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.

In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that

"such

"such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself".

I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance
of

of peace which are mentioned with more of specification
in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that
you will look favorably upon this suggestion.

ORAL STATEMENT

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows:

On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the

Secretary

Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest.

These four fundamental principles are as follows:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which

which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages or preferences by force.

The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of Japan and of the United States might make to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial and Without Commitment"

which

which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were ^{certain} ~~three~~ fundamental questions with respect to ~~this redraft on~~ which there were divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The Government of the United States ^{desires to} ~~although it~~ ^{facilitate progress toward a conclusive discussion, but} ~~has no wish to cause any delay but believing~~ that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the three points above-mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. ^{It therefore} seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the ~~three~~ fundamental questions under reference.

It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people -- in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force -- believe.

The

The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth.

ORAL STATEMENTSTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows:

On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of

the

the Government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages or preferences by force.

The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of Japan and of the United States might make to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial and Without Commitment" which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The Government of the United States desires to facilitate progress

toward

toward a conclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference.

It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people -- in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force -- believe.

The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN, FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.

I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.

I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly-moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.

In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself".

I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief

that

that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more of specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 44/2

~~SECRET~~
Memo for The President:

[Sept. 1941?]

The Commanding Officer of the 4th Regiment of U.S. Marines believes that Japan will soon act toward the removal of French and British forces from Shanghai basing their action on an enforcement of neutrality. They are planning on seizing the French and British areas and specifically plan to prevent any extension of our sector.

The CinCAF suggests that a complete revision of the Settlement defense plan is necessary between the Japanese and Americans and possibly the Italians. He does not believe that we can entrust the safety of our Nationals, in the present British and French concessions to the Japanese protection, for several reasons: i.e.

- (1) the Japanese Commander at Shanghai has submitted a comprehensive plan to Tokyo for entering the French and British Settlements, taking over the defense areas by the Japanese Army and Navy and disarming the French and British troops, if not evacuated.
- (2) A similar plan has been proposed for the French Settlement at Hankow.
- (3) These Japanese plans are to be executed under the guise of neutrality enforcement and the Japanese then plan on proposing a revised defense plan.
- (4) The Japanese are engaged in extensive hostilities on two fronts which might require the withdrawal of their forces at any time; thereby leaving the Settlements unprotected.

In view of these reasons and to effect true neutrality the CinCAF intends to propose that the United States take over the defense of all evacuated sectors, with possibly a certain amount of small adjustments on departures from the proposed. The CinCAF has talked this matter over with the American Consul General.

This information is highly secret.

W. R. Smedberg
W. R. SMEDBERG, 6rd
By direction.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4413-4416

Boyd

PSF Japan

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
Dated September 4, 1941
Rec'd 12:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1384, September 4, 9 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER-SECRETARY ONLY.

One. The Foreign Minister asked me to call this
afternoon and in a long conversation he emphasized
the desire of the Prime Minister and himself to make
every effort to bring about the proposed early meeting
between the representative heads of the two governments
and to make that meeting successful because if it
should fail in achieving its fundamental object he
feared that further efforts would be futile. With
these ends in view the Japanese Government is prepared
to place its cards face up on the table and provisionally
to enter into certain commitments as well as provision-
ally to specify certain reciprocal commitments which
it would expect on the part of the United States, these
points to serve as a basis for the proposed discussions
between

-2- 1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE), from Tokyo.

between the President and the Prime Minister. The Minister said that he had cabled these points this afternoon to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington but he asked me also to cable them to my Government because he feared the risk of inaccurate reporting through possible misunderstandings in the English language.

Two. The Minister pointed out the readiness of the Japanese Government to concur in the points already tentatively.

GREW.

ALC

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC).

Tokyo.

Dated September 4, 1941

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1324, September 4, 9 p.m., (SECTION TWO).

agreed upon in the preliminary informal conversations which have taken place in Washington and furthermore that points C, D, and E. below provide solution for three of the principal matters left unsolved in those conversations. He particularly emphasized the importance of point C because it envisages an interpretation of article three of the Tri-Partite Pact other than the interpretation placed upon that article by Mr. Matsuoka. Admiral Toyoda spoke of this point several times in our conversation indicating the importance that he attaches to it.

Three. While the Minister gave me the Japanese points in writing he urged me to cable them in our most secret code and I have therefore paraphrased them without altering the sense, as follows.

Four. The Japanese Government undertakes the
following

-2- 1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Tokyo.

following provisional commitments:

(A) Readiness to express concurrence in such matters as were already tentatively agreed upon in the informal preliminary conversations in Washington;) no (repeat no) military advance will be made by Japan from French Indochina against any areas adjoining Indochina and no military action will be undertaken by Japan against any regions lying north of Japan without justifiable reasons.

GREW.

RR

PSF Japan

NWN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

Dated September 4, 1941

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

C. The attitude of both the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe will be determined by concepts of self-defense and protection and in the event that the United States should come to participate in that war, Japan will independently (repeat independently) determine the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and its implementation of the pact by virtue of that independent interpretation.

D. It will be Japan's endeavor to bring Sino-Japanese relations to a normal and general rehabilitation, and once this rehabilitation is realized, Japan is prepared to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with such agreements as may be reached between China and Japan.

E. So long as the economic activities of the United States in China are carried out on an equitable

-2- 1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Tokyo.

an equitable basis, such activities will not be restricted.

F. Activities by Japan in the region of the Southwestern Pacific will be pursued only by peaceful means and the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce will be reserved; furthermore the production and procurement by the United States of such natural resources as it may need in that region will be accorded Japanese cooperation;

GREW

LMS

PM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

Dated September 4, 1941.

Rec'd 10:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

(G) Measures will be taken by Japan such as may become necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and Japan, and on the basis of reciprocity Japan is prepared, as soon as a settlement is reached, to discontinue immediately application to the United States of the regulations applying to the control of transactions by foreigners.

The American Government provisionally undertakes that:

(A) In response to Japan's commitment set forth in point (D) above, no actions or measures will be taken by the United States which would prejudice Japan's efforts to settle the China affair; (the Minister said that this point referred to American aid to Chiang Kai-Shek);

(B) Japan's commitment set forth in point (F) above will be reciprocated by the United States;

(C) Any

-2- No. 1384, September 4, 1941, 9 p.m. (Sec. 4)
from Tokyo.

(C) Any military measures by the United States in the area of the southwestern Pacific or the Far East will be suspended ;

(D) As soon as a settlement is reached between the two countries, Japan's commitment set forth in point (D) above will immediately be reciprocated by the United States both by discontinuing application to Japan of the so-called freezing order and by withdrawing the prohibition against the use of the Panama Canal by Japanese ships.

GREW.

KLP

PSF Japan

PM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

Dated September 4, 1941.

Rec'd 9:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

Five. After examining briefly the foregoing points, I expressed to the Minister the personal opinion that some of the points as set forth would appear to be open to very wide interpretation, to which he replied that the proposed commitments would of course be subject to discussion at the forthcoming conference. I gather that they have been put forward by the Japanese Government at this time chiefly as a gauge of Japan's good faith in seeking a general settlement. The Minister suggested that the reciprocal commitments as finally adopted should be formulated in a secret agreement and that after the meeting of the representative heads of the two governments, a press release couched in general terms should be issued after mutual agreement. I pointed out the difficulty if not the impossibility under our democratic system of withholding from the
American

-2- No. 1384, September 4, 1941, 9 p.m. (Sec. 5)
from Tokyo.

American public such concrete results as the proposed conference might achieve but the subject was not pursued.

Six. In this connection, it seems to me that the specifications and stipulations which must be agreed upon with regard to each one of the points making up the provisional agreement put forward by the Japanese Government before any report of a concrete character could be laid before the American public could not be formulated in detail within the necessarily brief time available for the proposed conference of heads of governments. It occurs to me

GREW.

HTM

PM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

Dated September 4, 1941.

Rec'd 10:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

That the problem of publicity might be met for the time being, at the termination of the conference, by an announcement that the Japanese Government had expressed concurrence with the principles of policy governing relations between nations which have been enunciated by the Secretary of State and that a broad plan of adjustment of Pacific problems which would give effect to those principles of policy, was in process of formulation. The suggested announcement might further refer to the efforts of both Governments to contribute toward the establishment of a world of freedom (as put forward by the President) and conclude with an expression of gratification that progress toward such an end had been achieved without sacrifice by either nation of its just and legitimate aims and aspirations.

SEVEN. The Minister said he understood that

Admiral

-2- No. 1384, September 4, 1941, 9 p.m. (Sec. 6)
from Tokyo.

Admiral Nomura had seen the President again yesterday but that the Ambassador's report of the conversation had not yet been received. I replied that I also was without information of that conversation.

Eight. The difference in the tone and substance of the Foreign Minister's statement to me as conveyed by Mr. Terasaki on August 29, as reported in my 1347, August 29, 9 p.m., and his statement today, is manifest and is significant of the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to reach a general settlement with our country. (END OF MESSAGE).

GREW.

KLP

9-11-41

The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division (Miles), to the Chief of Staff (Marshall), [Washington,] September 11, 1941.

Brigadier General Sherman Miles quotes a United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated Sept. 11, 1941 on the subject of political developments in Japan and suggests that Japan may find a peaceful way out of the crisis.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 443-444.

(copy of this letter transmitted by the War Department to President Roosevelt)

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 22, 1941. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary.

Steinhardt reports on his discussion with the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow regarding those matters which are the subject of negotiation between Japan and the Soviet Union.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 1019.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

9-22-41

PART 20 PAGES 4214-4232

Grew's letter to FDR published also, in Foreign Relations of
U.S., 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, pages 468-469.

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

TOKYO

September 22, 1941

Dear Frank:

I have not bothered you with personal letters for some time for the good reason that letters are now subject to long delays owing to the infrequent sailings of ships carrying our diplomatic pouches, and because developments in American-Japanese relations are moving so comparatively rapidly that my comments would generally be too much out of date to be helpful when they reached you. But I have tried and am constantly trying in my telegrams to the Secretary of State to paint an accurate picture of the moving scene from day to day. I hope that you see them regularly.

As you know from my telegrams, I am in close touch with Prince Konoye who in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he


The President,
The White House,
Washington.

now means business and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than has been the case in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased probability of war, ~~war~~ -- Facilis descensus Averno est -- and while we would undoubtedly win in the end, I question whether it is in our own interest to see an impoverished Japan reduced to the position of a third-rate Power. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree, the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to implement those terms.

I venture to enclose a copy of a letter which I recently wrote to a Japanese friend who had expressed the hope that the United States would ultimately come to sympathize and to cooperate with Japan in pursuing her "legitimate interests and aspiration". The letter was sent by my friend, on his own initiative, to Prince Konoye.

My admiration of the masterly way in which you have led and are leading our country in the present turmoil in world affairs steadily increases.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure.

Copy of a letter from the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to a Japanese friend who wrote expressing the hope that the American Government would ultimately come to sympathize and, if possible, to cooperate with Japan in pursuing her "legitimate interests and aspirations".

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, September 1, 1941

My dear

I well know how deeply the present situation in international affairs is paining you, just as it is paining me. It is a dark and critical period that we are passing through, but during the past nine years I have seen our two countries pass through several crises and surmount them, and I firmly believe that we shall eventually surmount the present one. I cannot visualize the utter stupidity of war ensuing between Japan and the United States, and if ever a break should occur I feel convinced that it will not come as a result of any deliberated act on the part of either of our Governments but rather through some unfortunate act brought about by extremist elements. I know very well that Prince Konoye and Admiral Toyoda, and the President and Mr. Hull, are

doing their utmost to avoid war and are dealing with the situation with the highest statesmanship, courage and far-sighted vision. Pray God that they may be allowed to achieve success and that their enlightened efforts will not be wrecked by short-sighted and intransigent elements in either country.

But many things have been done over the past several years and are being done today which are not permitted to come to the knowledge of the public in Japan, and therefore it is very difficult, I should say impossible, for the Japanese people to view the situation objectively and to weigh all the factors which have led to the present unhappy pass in our relations. Merely as an illustration, I doubt if many Japanese know of the serious incidents which occurred only recently, when Japanese aviators attacked our Embassy and our navy ship the TUTUILA, sister ship of the ill-fated PANAY, in Chungking on several occasions; our Embassy was damaged, fortunately without loss of American lives, and a bomb missed the TUTUILA by only a few yards, but damaged her. Our Embassy and our ship are in a safety zone, recognized by the Japanese Government, and no military objectives are near them. Three American officers who witnessed the attack on the TUTUILA from a near-by hill have officially expressed their opinion

that the attack was deliberate or, at the very least, due to criminal negligence. The Japanese planes came over in perfectly clear weather; one plane left the others and took a course directly over the TUTUILA, dropping its bomb as it passed over the ship and missing her only by a split-second of time. If the ship had been sunk, or if our Ambassador had been killed, as might easily have occurred, I do not think that the present status of our relations could have stood the strain because the entire American people would have become enflamed. I said this to Mr. Matsuoka early in June after the first attack on our Embassy, when the buildings had been actually hit; I said that never during my nine years in Japan had I been more anxious over any situation than these obviously deliberate attacks on our Embassy and ship, and that of all the difficult problems with which the Minister was faced, I felt certain that he was confronted with no more serious problem than this one. Mr. Matsuoka replied "I agree with you", yet the attacks continued, three or four of them within a few weeks. By such hair-breadth escapes are America and Japan still hoping and working to avoid a break.

You write of the desirability of our recognizing Japan's legitimate interests and aspirations. Indeed our Government has time and time again, and only recently, expressed its full appreciation of Japan's

legitimate interests and aspirations, realizing that Japan, restricted as she is in her islands, must have access to raw materials, markets for the products of her industries and a free flow of trade and commerce. Nevertheless, unless Japan is willing to abandon aggression by force there can be no hope for an improvement in our relations. We know by sad and bitter practical experience that Japan's so-called "New Order in East Asia" and "Co-Prosperity Sphere" visualize no neighborly relations on the basis of reciprocity and a free give-and-take but rather an order in which Japanese

interests, or what she conceives to be her interests, are to be predominant and to be exercised to the exclusion of the legitimate interests of other countries. We have watched the gradual but inexorable elimination of our own legitimate interests over these past several years, our long-standing and patiently-established business, commercial, industrial, banking and cultural interests, all legitimate and cooperative activities, progressively ousted first from Manchuria, and then, in turn, from North China, the ports, the Yangtze, and now they are in process of being excluded from Indochina, in spite of the most categorical assurances and promises that the Open Door and equal opportunity would be scrupulously observed everywhere. Every Foreign Minister -- especially Hirota, Arita, Nomura -- have given us such promises but not one of those promises has been carried out. Why? Those promises were unquestionably given in good faith. But the military would not permit their implementation. Japanese armed force has prevented their implementation. Is it surprising that when Admiral Toyoda assures me of Japan's peaceful intentions, I am obliged to recount to him those past bitter experiences? How, in the light of those experiences, can my Government believe any such promise or assurance given us by any Japanese Government?

Highly placed Japanese are constantly talking and writing about Anglo-American imperialism in East Asia,

about Anglo-American encirclement. Please look at the record. So far as the United States is concerned, we have always wished Japan well, have proved our friendship by concrete acts. In the old days we protected Japan from unequal treaties which other nations attempted to foist upon her. We counseled and actively helped Japan in her splendid efforts to become a great modern Power. At the time of the Great Earthquake we did everything in our power, spiritually and materially, to show our friendship for Japan and to support and aid her in her hour of trial. Up until the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 we were negotiating with China for the abrogation of the unequal treaties, ready and willing to abandon our extraterritorial rights, including our extraterritorial judicial, commercial and customs rights, and this would unquestionably have come to pass if Japan had not set out on her long course of aggression and the use of armed force as an instrument of national policy. The Exclusion Clause of our Immigration Act of 1924 cast a dark shadow on our relations, but do you know that prior to 1931 our Government had been steadily working to have that clause cancelled? In a few months that obnoxious clause, which naturally wounded your proud and sensitive people (even though it was a domestic measure, taken for the same economic protection that Japan has been continually invoking and acting upon during

recent years), would almost certainly have been withdrawn. But then came Japan's invasion of Manchuria, and we then knew that further efforts at that time to withdraw the exclusion clause were hopeless.

I do not believe that you, my dear friend, or many of your friends, have any detailed knowledge of the patience and forbearance exercised by the American Government and people in the face of the truly outrageous treatment of our own legitimate interests at the hands of Japanese authorities, both military and civil, during these past years. Our missions throughout China, including churches, hospitals, universities and schools, have been ruthlessly bombed and wrecked and American missionaries and their families have been killed or injured in spite of the fact that such buildings were clearly marked by American flags both flying and painted on the roofs and their precise location marked on maps submitted to the Japanese military authorities, showing that they were seldom if ever in the neighborhood of any military objectives. There can be no shadow of doubt that these cruel and brutal attacks were planned and executed with careful intention. Accidents can happen, but not two or three hundred accidents of the same kind. It is a saying among the Chinese that when a Chinese city or town is bombed by Japanese aviators, the most dangerous spot and the one to get far away from is the

American mission. It is perfectly clear that the Japanese bombers were following a concerted plan to drive American missionary, educational, medical and cultural activities out of China permanently. We might have broken relations with Japan on this issue alone, but we didn't; we remained patient and, permit me to say, long-suffering. Yet you write: "Even an incident one-tenth as bad as that of the bombing of Iran will never take place in this our part of the world."

and in Japan

The same concerted drive against our business firms, banks, industrial interests, commercial and shipping activities, has steadily and inexorably progressed, first in Manchuria, then in North China, the ports, the Yangtze valley, and now in Indochina where American-owned cargoes have been ruthlessly seized and shipped away. Is this the Open Door and equal opportunity, of the scrupulous safeguarding of which I so often received the most categorical assurances from successive Japanese governments?

Meanwhile the southward advance progressed step by step, one step at a time, first occupation, then consolidation, a pause to watch its result, and then another forward step. All this time many of your leading men, Admirals, Generals, retired Ambassadors, prominent writers, publicists and politicians, were contributing articles to

the daily press and magazines advocating the rapid pushing of the southward advance and the elimination of the Americans and Europeans and all of their interests and activities from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas". And this advance was to be pursued first by high-pressure diplomacy and then, if necessary, by force. Can you possibly believe that if France had not been powerless she would have allowed the occupation of bases, both naval and aviation, in Indochina? Or can you possibly believe that Great Britain, completely occupied as she is with the war in Europe, where her own national life and the safety of the British Isles are at stake, would or could start a program of unprovoked aggression and invasion against Indochina or Thailand, or that the United States or the Netherlands would ever even consider such aggression? The fallacy of the alleged ABCD "encirclement" is too patent to fool even a school boy -- if he knows the facts. But in the light of Japan's recent actions and the clear intentions of so many of Japan's prominent men as expressed by them in their articles in the daily newspapers and magazines, is it surprising that the ABCD powers realize beyond a shadow of a doubt that it is they who are being "encircled" and that Malaya, Burma, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines themselves are in direct line for future aggressive moves

by Japan in establishing and consolidating the so-called "New Order in Greater East Asia including the South Seas" and that defensive measures had therefore to be taken? From all that has passed and from all that is being said and written and done, the evidence is clear for all to see that what is euphemistically called the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" means eventual Japanese hegemony over all the areas therein contained. From all the evidence, is it not abundantly clear that we in the United States must now and in future be guided alone by facts and actions and that we can no longer rely on words or assurances of peaceful intentions? I have stated this fact categorically to Admiral Toyoda, after recounting to him our past bitter experiences when we did rely on such assurances.

To turn to the China Affair. Few people know, but I know, that about ten days or a fortnight after the outbreak of hostilities in July, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek sent a message through the British Embassy here to the Japanese Government, offering an immediate armistice and the withdrawal of all Chinese troops if the Japanese troops would likewise withdraw to a given line pending negotiations. Mr. Dodds was then the British Chargé d'Affaires, and when he received that message from the British Ambassador in Nanking he came to ask my advice

as to whether he ought to deliver it to the Japanese Government without instructions from London because his own Government might regard the step as in the nature of offering mediation, yet the message was too urgent for him to wait for instructions. I told him that he could not possibly take the responsibility of not delivering the message immediately, so he did so and later London approved. The message was delivered to Mr. Horinouchi who was then Vice Foreign Minister. But it died, alas, and nothing came of it. History will most certainly take full cognizance of that effort of Chiang Kai-shek for peace. The Japanese forces didn't want an armistice. They have now had war for over four long years with no end in sight. Chiang Kai-shek, a brave and far-sighted man, is still the legitimate head of the Chinese Government, is still fighting against ruthless aggression against his country, and Wang Ching-wei could not live a day if Japan's bayonets were withdrawn. How can he therefore be regarded as representative of China or, in fact, anything more than a puppet? I know well Japan's former troubles in China and with China, but those troubles could have been smoothed out eventually by peaceful negotiation. They have not and never will be smoothed out by war which, unless terminated on terms acceptable to the Chinese -- also a proud and sensitive people -- will

make real friendship between Japan and the Chinese impossible for generations to come.

Another and essential aspect of the situation is this. We believe, with abundant reason, that Germany, as controlled by the Nazis, seeks world domination by force and that once in control of Europe and the British Isles it would be only a question of time before the Western Hemisphere was attacked. Hitler has said as much in published statements. We believe that the Nazis seek to control and to alter our whole way of life. Therefore, as a reasonable and sensible measure of self-defense, we determined to help Great Britain to avoid defeat. When Japan allied herself with Germany we inevitably came to associate Japan with the same general program, so far as the Far East is concerned, and we thereupon determined to assist not only Great Britain but all other victims of aggression, including China. In pursuing that policy we feel that it would be utterly short-sighted to pour supplies into Great Britain across the Atlantic while complacently watching the potential cutting-off of Great Britain's other great life-line to the East which would be accomplished by the fall of Singapore to any Axis Power. Therefore, whatever threatens Singapore, directly concerns the United States. The occupation of bases in Indochina definitely does threaten Singapore. The occupation of bases in Thailand would

constitute a still more serious threat. Therefore, if Japanese forces should now undertake a further move on the line of the southward advance (and many Japanese openly advocate such a move), I question whether our relations could stand the strain involved.

Incidentally, you mention Iran. The British began to fight this war as amateurs perhaps, but at least like gentlemen. They trusted like gentlemen to Germany's pledged word. But gradually they saw what they were encountering, an enemy whose pledged word counted for nothing. In spite of non-aggression pacts and the most solemn assurances given on the very eve of aggression they saw one country after another fall to the absolutely ruthless invader and to the work of fifth columnists within those countries -- Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and now Soviet Russia -- as Churchill has so aptly said, "one by one". Do you remember what Hitler said after the seizure of Austria, and after Munich, and after the seizure of Czechoslovakia: "I am now completely satisfied. This is the last territorial readjustment I will seek."! In every case Great Britain was too slow and too late. At **last** she has wisely learned by bitter experience, and it is that experience

which prompted her very wise occupation of Syria and Iran -- before Hitler could get there and could threaten the Suez Canal and the whole Mediterranean area. But note the difference: Hitler aims to control all of Europe and has so stated; Great Britain has pledged herself, and the world by experience can rely on her pledges, to withdraw from Iran and to restore her complete sovereignty the moment the necessity for these measures of self-defense has passed. I applaud her action. I cannot admire the action of Japan's allies.

Incidentally we now learn that the bombing of Iranian cities by either the British or Soviet forces has been officially denied. I am inclined to believe that the bombing report was merely Nazi propaganda.

International relations, if they are to be stable and secure, must be based upon the scrupulous observance of international commitments. Breaking of the pledged word between nations can lead only to international anarchy. Was it not the breaking of the Nine Power Treaty that constituted the first step in this long line of breaches of international commitments by certain nations? It is maintained in Japan that Japan did not break the Nine Power Treaty. Yet look at the text and the facts, which speak for themselves. It is held in Japan that under changed conditions that treaty had become obsolete. Very well, our Government has stated in

categorical terms that it is ready at all times to consider the effect of changed conditions upon international commitments and to modify or modernize those commitments by peaceful negotiations. We do not regard and never have, as charged, regarded the status quo as permanently unalterable. Our negotiations with China for abandoning our extraterritorial rights proves the point, just as does our willingness to surrender our permanent leases in Japan and many other legitimate but outmoded rights. But once Japan resorted to force as an instrument of national policy in breaching an important international treaty, from which Japan had gained much when it was concluded because it was a carefully balanced undertaking, entered into by Japan freely and, at that time, gladly, a precedent was set and an example was created which were soon followed by other nations, beginning, as you will remember, by Italy's action in Ethiopia. This was the beginning of international chaos of which we see the sad result today.

Through the process of publicity and propaganda in Japan, largely stimulated from Axis sources, the Japanese people are today told that the Anglo-Saxon countries propose to "encircle" Japan by their imperialistic ambitions, to obtain complete hegemony in East Asia, to control commerce and trade and sources of raw materials, and to drive Japan to the wall. How untrue is this pic-

ture you, my dear friend, know only too well, yet how can we hope to improve our relations so long as the Japanese people are made to believe these preposterous charges? My Government believes, and I believe, that Japan's legitimate interests and aspirations should be given the fullest recognition.

As you know, I am no defeatist. I believe that in spite of present difficulties we can still guide our ^{relations} ~~respective countries~~ into healthy channels, and for that high purpose I am constantly thinking and working. Below are four points which my Government regards as essential for our future good relations. We confidently believe that Japan would achieve the greatest happiness, security, prosperity and contentment by following a policy of peaceful and productive expansion based on the principle of free and equal treatment for all nations, a policy which would have the full support of the United States, while we believe that the continued use of armed force will lead eventually to social, economic and financial disaster. These are the points:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

On such a basis and, I fear, only on such a basis will the United States "ultimately come to sympathize with us in our efforts and, if possible, cooperate with us".

If Japan will mould her policy and actions on the basis of the foregoing four points and will abandon aggression, I see a happy outlook for the development of a new era in Japanese-American relations, contributing to Japan's future prosperity and welfare through a free flow of trade and commerce, access to the needed raw materials and a successful continuation of industrial development, resulting in a progressive raising of the standard of living of her people and a return to the old cultural values of life which have so brilliantly illuminated her background and history.

We should at all times be aware that the facts of geography are immutable. For better or for worse Divine Providence has placed our respective nations on either side of the Pacific; we are neighbors for all time to come; and nothing that anyone can do can alter that fact. Since the beginning of relations between our two countries -- almost ninety years ago -- we have maintained peace between ourselves, and with the exception of the past ten

years, our relations have been marked by friendship, good will, and respect, the one for the other. The tradition of good neighborly relations must be restored, for if we fail in that task, there will be introduced into the Pacific the tradition of war which has cursed Europe since the beginning of history. We who are charged with the accomplishment of this task, who are working for the welfare not only of this generation but of those yet unborn, need your help and the help of all other men of good will.

With expressions of warm friendship, I am as always,
my dear

Cordially yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4423-4427

Published, also, in Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941,
Vol. IV, the Far East, page 483.

9-28-41

Japan Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hyde Park, N. Y.,
September 28, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I wholly agree with your pencilled note -- to recite the more liberal original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My suggestion
on Jap. situation -
for you to read later.
CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

When the Japanese Prime Minister requested a meeting with you he indicated a fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as getting troops out of China, Tripartite pact, non-discrimination in trade in Pacific.

We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested

2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

first an agreement in principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success of the Conference.

Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Jurean.

My suggestion is to recall their more liberal attitude when they first sought the

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3

meeting with you, with their
much narrowed position now,
and earnestly ask if they can-
not go back to their orig-
inal liberal attitude.
So we can start discussions
again on agreement in
principle before the meeting,
and ~~the~~ emphasizing your
desire for a meeting.