DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Mr. Foster

For your file.

Curtis
Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 14 PAGES 12:27-12:30

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 520-522.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a redraft of your proposed message to the Emperor of Japan.

In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory conversations with us, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister is, at his request, coming to call again this afternoon for a further extended discussion, (b) the message received by Ambassador Grew from Prince Konoye (through Prince Konoye's private secretary) (reported in Mr. Grew's telegram 1646, October 17, 11 a.m.) that the new Japanese cabinet would be one sincerely desirous of improving relations with the United States and of continuing the exploratory conversations, and (c) the word we have that General Tojo, a Konoye adherent and a "moderate",...
"moderate", has been designated by the Emperor to form a new cabinet, we incline to the view that it would be premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor pending further clarification of the situation in Japan and of the probable attitude of the new government.

Enclosure:
Redraft of proposed message.
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty on matters of state. I feel I should again address Your Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency which appears to be in the process of formation. As Your Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the great purpose of Your Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against the Soviet Union or against British or Dutch or independent territory...
territory in the south, the obvious result would, of
necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European
and Near Eastern theaters of war to the whole of the
Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve
American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest.
It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It
would like to see freedom of the seas maintained and
trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join
with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be
only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with
the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep
at home for our own defense and that of all of the
Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new mili-
tary operations, the United States, in accordance with
her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned
and would have to seek, by taking any and all steps
which it might deem necessary, to prevent any extension of
such condition of war.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you read the enclosed from Joe Grew and let me have a suggested reply?

F. D. R.

Letter from Ambassador Grew to the President, dated Sept. 22, 1941, enclosing copy of a letter from the Ambassador to a Japanese friend.
carbon copy of this letter
Published in
Pearl Harbor Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4212
Published, also, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, page 560.
October 30, 1941

Dear Joe:

I am much interested in the comments contained in your letter of September 22, 1941 in regard to Prince Konoye. It seems a pity that during the time that he was Premier there could not have been rallied in Japan a wider and stronger support for a moderate and peaceful policy.

I also have read with interest the copy, which you enclosed, of a letter addressed by you to a Japanese friend who had asked for American sympathy and cooperation in the pursuit by Japan of "her legitimate interests and aspirations". It seems to me that in your letter you covered admirably and comprehensively the subject of American attitude toward relations with Japan. I appreciate your having sent me a copy of the letter.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.
The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.
Published in Pearl Harbor Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4211-4212
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum of October 29, 1941 transmitting a letter of September 22 addressed to you by Ambassador Grew at Tokyo, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft reply to Mr. Grew.

Ambassador Grew's letter and its enclosure are returned herewith.

Enclosures:
1. To the Honorable Joseph C. Grew.
2. From the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, September 22, with enclosure.

C H
October 30, 1941

Dear Jose:

I am much interested in the comments contained in your letter of September 22, 1941 in regard to Prince Konoye. It seems a pity that during the time that he was Premier there could not have been rallied in Japan a wider and stronger support for a moderate and peaceful policy.

I also have read with interest the copy, which you enclosed, of a letter addressed by you to a Japanese friend who had asked for American sympathy and cooperation in the pursuit by Japan of "her legitimate interests and aspirations." It seems to me that in your letter you covered admirably and comprehensively the subject of American attitude toward relations with Japan. I appreciate your having sent me a copy of the letter.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Joseph C. Grew,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.
There are important indications that Japan is about to attack Thailand and that this attack will include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra isthmus.

We have plans for the rapid movement of a force from Malaya to hold a line across the Kra isthmus in the neighbourhood of Singapore. 

Time is the essence of this plan, particularly at this season of the year when the Kra isthmus is water logged. Consequently great tactical advantage lies with the side which gets there first.

R.A.F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tostta Bharu for three days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days. 

Commander in Chief, Far East, has asked for permission to move into Kra isthmus, if air reconnaissance establishes the fact that escorted Japanese ships are approaching the coast of Thailand, and he asks for an immediate decision on this point.

To allow the Japanese to establish themselves so near the Malay frontier would be an obvious threat to Singapore even though at the present season it might not develop at once. We have also to bear in mind the encouragement which the Japanese success would give to their extremists. 

Demands of appetite would grow and other Far East peoples would be correspondingly depressed. It looks therefore as though, to ensure the defence of Singapore and for wider reasons, we might have to take the proposed action to forestall the Japanese.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the call which Mr. Kurusu is to make upon you in company with the Japanese Ambassador on November 17, Mr. Kurusu may regard this first call as purely ceremonial and may not wish to initiate any discussion. Should the occasion appear opportune, however, you may wish to offer comments along lines as follows:

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(1) We cannot afford to make light of the tremendous seriousness of the present world situation confronting us. I want to repeat and to emphasize what I said to Admiral Nomura on November 10. The entire world has been placed in a precarious position as a result of the havoc which has been wrought by the forces of aggression. Our common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world come back to ways of peace. It is the purpose of this Government to do its best in the spirit of fair play to contribute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and order in the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these objectives it is essential that emphasis be laid upon giving practical effect to a sound philosophy of human welfare.
welfare. We have often and quite recently made clear publicly what we have in mind in this regard.

(2) We are fully aware that it may require time for Japan to turn to courses of peace. The American people and Government, especially the President and the Secretary of State, have been very patient. We are ready and willing to continue to be patient, to endeavor to work out a broad-gauge peaceful settlement, and to afford every practicable opportunity to Japan to turn to courses of peace.

(3) It is tremendously important that no statesman and no country miscalculate the attitude and the position of the American people and Government. The American people and Government are fully alive to the sinister menace which all peace-loving countries are facing from Hitlerism and courses of aggression. This country has been slow in arousing itself to the dangers of Hitlerism. Today we are fully aware of those dangers and are thoroughly aroused. Our national effort is primarily and in ever-increasing measure being devoted toward defeat of Hitlerism. We are determined to protect and preserve our national security against Hitlerism.

(4) A victorious Hitler would constitute a menace to all other nations, including Japan. Our opposition to courses of aggression and to the program of Hitlerism stands firm. We are entirely convinced that Hitlerism will
will be defeated.

(5) We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek.

In view of the general character of these suggested comments no need is perceived of giving the Ambassador a written record of what you say to him.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 15, 1941

SUBJECT: United States-Japanese Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary of State Hull
                The Japanese Ambassador, Kaname
                The Japanese Minister, Mr. Nakanishi
                Mr. Ballantine

COPIES TO:

The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment made at
his request at the Secretary's apartment. The Secretary
referred to the Japanese proposal in regard to com-
cmercial policy which the Ambassador had presented on
November 7 and November 10 and offered oral comment along
the line of the oral statement which, together with the
draft of a joint United States-Japanese declaration on
economic policy, he then handed to the Ambassador. The
Secretary emphasized the advantageous and worthwhile
character to Japan of participation by Japan in a program
such as that envisions in the draft. The Japanese Ambassa-
dor said that he could not comment upon that matter but
that he would refer it to his Government. The Japanese
Minister
Minister asked whether this proposal constituted our answer to the Japanese Government on the question of non-discrimination in international commercial relations which had been outstanding in our conversations. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. The Japanese Minister then said that the Japanese Government desired our reply on the two other outstanding questions, namely, the question of Japan's relations with the Tripartite Pact and the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador then stated that he also wanted to bring up the point that the Japanese Government considered that we were now engaged in actual negotiations and not in merely exploratory conversations as the American Government had contended. The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. He said also that it would be impossible for him to collaborate with those other countries until we had got
got things on a satisfactory basis; that otherwise they 
might read in the newspapers that he was negotiating with 
Japan on matters affecting them without their being con-
sulted. The Ambassador made no comment.

The Secretary went on to point out that notwithstanding 
the fact that the conversations between the Secretary 
and the Ambassador had related to a settlement covering 
the entire Pacific area and our draft of June 21 had made 
this clear, the Japanese proposals of September 25 
narrowed the application of non-discrimination and of 
peace to the southwestern Pacific area. The Ambassador 
replied that the question of peace in the entire Pacific 
area was covered in the preamble of their draft, but the 
Secretary pointed out that what was said in the body of 
the document rather than in the preamble governed. The 
Secretary added that he would like to know the attitude 
of the Japanese Government on this point.

The Secretary then said that the Japanese Foreign 
Minister in his conversation with Ambassador Crew on 
November 10 had indicated that the Japanese Government 
desired to conclude an agreement with the British 
simultaneously with concluding an agreement with this 
country, and yet the Japanese Government expected us to 
answer at once the Japanese Government's proposals. He 
suggested that there was some inconsistency between the 
instructions
instructions which the Japanese Ambassador was being asked to carry out here and what the Foreign Minister had in mind in regard to the British. The Secretary then commented that the Ambassador said that Japan wants an answer now, but that the Secretary felt that the Japanese Government ought to come and tell us whether it intends to adopt peaceful courses. The Ambassador said that there was no doubt about the desire of the Japanese Government to have peace in the Pacific and that Japan had freedom of decision and would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the alliance.

The Secretary asked whether if the Japanese Government should enter into agreement with us the alliance would be automatically abandoned. Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether we were asking that the Tripartite Pact be denounced. The Ambassador said that he understood what the Secretary had said to mean abandoned in the sense of becoming a dead letter. The Secretary rejoined that, just as the Ambassador had suggested, could we assume that if the Japanese Government entered into an agreement with us the Tripartite Pact would automatically become a dead letter, for supposing that he went to the British and the Dutch and said that Japan was willing to enter on a peaceful program but at the same time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany, what would the British and Dutch say? He asked how he could make the
the British believe in Japan's peaceful intentions while Japan was proclaiming its adherence intact to a military alliance with Germany. He pointed out that it would be very difficult for him to make the people of this country and the people of all peaceful nations believe that Japan was pursuing a peaceful course so long as Japan was tied in an alliance with the most flagrant aggressor who has appeared on this planet in the last 2,000 years. The Ambassador commented that the public had so much confidence in the Secretary that they would accept the agreement with us if the Secretary recommended it. The Secretary replied that if we went into an agreement with Japan while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call upon Japan to go to war with us this would cause so much turmoil in the country that he might well be lynched. The Secretary pointed out that, notwithstanding the existence of a neutrality pact between Japan and Russia, large Japanese armies in Manchuria were facing Russian armies in Siberia. The Secretary said that what we had in mind was an agreement which would promote mutual trust and enable us to get away from the expansion of military preparations, and what he desired was a clear-cut unequivocal agreement which would remove the doubts that Japan was trying to face two ways in order that we could remove distrust between
between nations in the Pacific area. The Secretary said that, so long as Japan insisted that it would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in the event that the United States through self-defense was obliged to take up arms against Germany, it would be very difficult for the world to see that Japan's clear intention was to adopt peaceful courses. The Secretary said he would like to know whether, when an agreement is reached with us, Japan's connection with the Tripartite Pact would automatically disappear.

The Japanese Minister asked the Secretary whether what he had said was the answer of this Government on the question of Japan's relations with the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary replied that when we got an answer from the Japanese Government in regard to its attitude on the point that he had raised about the Tripartite Pact becoming automatically a dead letter in case we entered into an agreement with Japan we would be better able to make reply. The Japanese Ambassador said that he was afraid that the American Government did not trust the Japanese Government whereas there was no material difference between the policies of the present Japanese Government and the previous Japanese Government, notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister was a military man. The Secretary
Secretary replied that the new Government in Japan seems to take the attitude that we must reply at once to their points, but that we do not feel that we should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese Government under circumstances where the United States has been pursuing peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government is the one which has been violating law and order. The Secretary said, in conclusion, that when we hear from the Japanese Government concerning its position on the points we had raised with them two days ago on their peaceful intentions and when we could clear up the question of non-discrimination, as suggested in our proposal of today, and also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that we could sit down like brothers and reach some solution of the question of stationing Japanese troops in China. The Secretary emphasized at the same time that we did not desire any delay and that we were working as hard as we could to bring about a wholly satisfactory and broad settlement.
Foreign Relations of the US
Japan, 1931-41
VOL. II PAGE 740

State Dept. copy
Published in
Foreign Relations of the US
Japan, 1931-41
VOL. II PAGE 740

Vol. II  Page 744
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching copies of memoranda of the conversation which you had with the Japanese Ambassadors on November seventeenth and my protracted conversation with them on yesterday.
I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President.

Following several minutes of an exchange of courtesies and formalities, the President brought up the more serious side by referring to the misunderstandings and matters of difference between our countries and made clear the desire of this country, and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that it was the desire of Japan equally, to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis so far as the Pacific area was concerned.

Ambassador Kurusu
Ambassador Kurusu proceeded with one line of remarks that he kept up during the conversation and that was that we must find ways to work out an agreement to avoid trouble between our two countries. He said that all the way across the Pacific it was like a powder keg, and again he repeated that some way must be found to adjust the situation.

Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for
for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject -- I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country's relations with Japan.

The President remarked that some time ago he proclaimed a zone around this hemisphere, 300 miles out in the
the sea in some places and 1,100 miles in others. The President added that this was self-defense.

I then said that Ambassador Nomura and I have been proceeding on the view that the people of the United States and Japan alike are a proud and great people and there is no occasion for either to attempt to bluff the other and we would not consider that bluffing enters into our conversations, which are of genuine friendliness.

The President brought out a number of illustrations of our situation and the Japanese situation as it relates to Germany and our self-defense which serve to emphasize our position and to expose the sophistry of the Japanese position.

Ambassador Kurusu said that Germany had not up to this time requested Japan to fight; that she was serving a desirable purpose without doing so, - this must have meant that she was keeping the American and British Navies, aircraft, et cetera, diverted.

The further question of whether the United States is on the defensive in the present Pacific situation came up by some general discussion in reference to that situation by Ambassador Kurusu, and the President and I made it
Ambassador Murray

Patrol question having already been determined.

proceed with the remaining or detained for necessaries, the
introduce Japan and China to each other and tell them to
be state if we know that Japan does not wish us
to interfere or the matters involved and that at a suit.
ratify any consideration of the circumstances and role
that this question ought to be worked out in a
peace among the Japanese on the defensives, the President
read their plan of not bringing the troops out of China.

There was some effort by Ambassador Murray to do

the repair made no party order now.

Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese in China.

the money of very extraordinary military rule just as the
the question and would place every other country at
that this would introduce the high seas, the submarines and
and otherwise by military force all of the party agree
dominate military, politically, economically, socially
Greater East Asia is but another name for a program to
country is that the Japanese form the new order in

At another point I said that the better in this

but that Japan was the aggressor.

It clear that we were not the aggressors in the patrol
Ambassador Kurusu strongly stated that it would be most difficult to bring all the troops out of China at once.

Ambassador Kurusu said that we, of course, desired to bring up both sides of matters existing between our two countries and he said that we would recall that when the Japanese went into Shantung during the World War, this Government insisted that she get out. I replied that my own country opposed a policy of this seizure of new territory by any country to the fullest extent of its ability to do so; that it declined to take a dollar of compensation or a foot of territory for itself; that it insisted that the world must turn over a new leaf in this respect or nations would be fighting always for territory and under modern methods of war would soon destroy and utterly impoverish each other; that in any event his country fared well in this respect.

The question of our recent proposal on commercial policy was brought up by us and Ambassador Kurusu said he had not examined it and that he had forgotten much of the technical side of commercial policy since he was in the Foreign Office. The President made very pertinent and timely reference to the destructive nature of armaments.
armaments and the still more destructive effects of a permanent policy of armaments which always means war, devastation and destruction. He emphasized the point that there is from the long-term point of view no difference of interest between our two countries and no occasion, therefore, for serious differences.

All in all, there was nothing new brought out by the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu. Ambassador Kurusu constantly made the plea that there was no reason why there should be serious differences between the two countries and that ways must be found to solve the present situation. He referred to Prime Minister Tojo as being very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man. The President expressed his interest and satisfaction to hear this. The President frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and also of Ambassador Kurusu, especially in regard to the three main points of difference between our two countries. There was no effort to solve these questions at the conference. The meeting broke up with the understanding that I would meet the Japanese representative tomorrow morning.

C.H.

S CH:MA
The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called on the Secretary, by appointment made at their request, at the Department.

After some preliminary remarks the Secretary took up the question of Japan's relations with the Axis. He pointed out that the public would place their own interpretation upon the implications of a situation wherein on the one hand Japan had an agreement with us and on the other was in an alliance with the Axis powers. He said that our people do not trust Hitler and furthermore we feel that it would be inevitable that Hitler would eventually, if he was successful, get around to the Far East and double-cross Japan. The Secretary cited the instance
instance when Germany, after having concluded an anti-
Comintern pact with Japan had surprised Japan later on
by entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia and
finally went back on the non-aggression pact by attacking
Russia. The Secretary said that he presumed Japan did
not know in advance what Germany's intentions were any
more than we did. The Secretary expressed great doubt
that any agreement into which we entered with Japan while
Japan at the same time had an alliance with Hitler would
carry the confidence of our people and he emphasized that
we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making self-
evident our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would
be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their
armaments. He pointed out that we are coming out of the
Philippines in 1946 and that we are now bringing our
marines out of China and in this way we are trying to make
a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world
based on law and order. He said that this is what we
want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer
in the way of bargaining except our friendship. Our com-
mercial program was one, he said, calling for a maximum/
distribution of goods. The Secretary pointed out also
that we are even now engaged in efforts to induce the
British Empire to reduce its Empire preferences. He said
that
that what we desire is to put our people back to work
in a way that can never be accomplished through permitting
armies to overrun countries. The Secretary observed
that many Japanese spokesmen had spoken of Japan's desire
to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia, but the
only kind of controlling influence which was worth anything
was one that could not be achieved or maintained by the
sword. He dwelt briefly upon what we have accomplished
in South America through our peaceful policies and through
renouncing the employment of gunboats and armed forces.
The Secretary made it clear that we recognized that under
present emergency conditions we cannot carry out to
perfection our commercial policy which must be modified
to meet war conditions, but we can at least establish
the principles. The Secretary said, going back to the
situation with regard to Japan's relations with the Axis,
that a difficult situation was created thereby as far as
our public was concerned--as, for example, when telegrams
of congratulations were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders
when he commits some atrocity.

The Japanese Ambassador observed that the United
States and Russia were not pursuing parallel courses and
yet we are aligned with Russia at the present time. He
also said he appreciated very well the relations we had
developed
developed with South America but that, although Japan would like to imitate us, Japan was not in a position to be so magnanimous—as, for example, in the matter of extending substantial lend-lease aid to other countries. The Secretary replied that it is true that we have contempt for communism and are not in sympathy with Soviet ideologies, but the whole question depends upon how anxious one is to defeat Hitler for we need not be too anxious whose support we enlist to help us to do the job. The Secretary then added that he frankly did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences. The Ambassador then said that Japan is now hard-pressed and that the Secretary was well aware of how desirous Japan was to reach some agreement with the United States.

Mr. Kurusu said that he had served five years as Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office and that he was familiar with the developments in Japan's commercial policy. He said that the situation with respect to the Empire preferences was one of the factors which had influenced Japan to go into the Axis camp. He said that the United States was an economically powerful country and that the United States
United States was, therefore, in a much better position than was Japan to enter into commercial bargaining. Furthermore, Japan was much more dependent than was the United States upon foreign trade. He felt that what the two Governments should now do would be to achieve something to tide over the present abnormal situation. He referred, for example, to the exchange control situation which had been developed in Japanese-occupied China and expressed the view that that situation could not be done away with in a short time. He said that perhaps after the war was over it might be possible to adopt a more liberal policy but that he was unable to promise anything on the part of his Government. The Secretary asked whether Japan could not now agree in principle on commercial policy. Mr. Kurusu made no direct reply but went on to say that in the early years of American intercourse in the Far East, our main interest was in commerce and not religious and cultural activities; that we had pursued a course of idealism, but with American occupation of the Philippines the situation changed somewhat and the United States tied itself in with the European concert of nations, a way which would be convincing to the American people. Turning to the question of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that he could not say that Japan would abrogate...
the Tripartite Pact but that Japan might do something
which would "outshine" the Tripartite Pact.

The Secretary pointed out that unless peaceably
minded nations now start their program of reconstruction
it will be impossible to get such a program started later
on because the selfish elements would get control of the
situation and prevent the materialization of a liberal
policy. Therefore, he said it was necessary to get the
fundamental principles established so that we might
begin to enable the peaceful forces, which were now
demoralized, to assert a leadership. Unless we pursue
such a course, the Secretary noted, we shall not be
able to obtain the confidence of peaceably minded
people when the time for putting into effect a reconstruc-
tion program arrives. Mr. Kurasu asked whether the Sec-
retary had a concrete formula for dealing with Japan's
relations with the Axis alliance. The Secretary made
it clear that this was a matter for Japan to work out.
He said that if we could get a peaceful program firmly
established, Hitler ought to be asked not to embarrass
us too much. He asked whether Japan could not work it
out in some way which would be convincing to the American
people. He said that if it goes the wrong way every
peaceful nation will redouble its defensive efforts.

The
The Secretary emphasized again that the public would be confused in regard to a survival of a relationship between Japan and the Axis while Japan had an agreement with the United States.

The Ambassador asked whether it was not important now to make some understanding to save the situation. The Secretary said he agreed but that he felt that the Tripartite Pact was inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding.

Mr. Kurusu asked what could the Secretary suggest. The Secretary said that if we mix the Tripartite Pact with an agreement with the United States it will not be possible to get many people to follow us. The Secretary said that the question arises whether Japanese statesmen desire to follow entirely peaceful courses with China or whether they desire to face two ways. The Secretary went on to say that if the Japanese should back away from adopting a clear-cut position with regard to commercial policy, with regard to a course in China consistent with peaceful principles and with regard to Japanese relations to the European war this would leave us in an indefensible position in regard to the proposed agreement. We would have to say that the Japanese Government is unable...
The Ambassador repeated that the situation in Japan was very pressing and that it was important to arrest a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. He suggested that if this situation could now be checked an atmosphere would develop when it would be possible to move in the direction of the course which this Government advocated. He pointed out that big ships cannot turn around too quickly, that they have to be eased.

The Secretary replied that if we should sit down and write an agreement permitted with the doctrine of force it would be found that each country would be pulling up to its own islands as fast as possible. An agreement of this nature would produce no solution.

Mr. Kurusu pointed out that a comprehensive solution could not be worked out immediately, that he could make no promises. He said that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and he felt that Japan had to fight while it still could. If we could come to some settlement now, he said, it would promote an atmosphere which would be conducive to disarming fundamentals. The Secretary asked if he did not think that something could be worked out on the Tripartite Pact. The Ambassador said that he desired to emphasize that Japan would not be a sat's.
It is clear also to Mr. Furusui, that whereas the Japanese Government desired to consider our talk negotiations in regard to the Chinese situation and whether the Japanese stood for no armaments, no indemnities, respect for China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of equality, the Ambassador replied in the affirmative.

The Secretary then said that while he had made the point already clear to the Ambassador, he wished to make clear that he had not disinterested. In but the Secretary said that he had not disinterested in any way would be just an assumption on his part.
his part. Mr. Kurusu then said that under such circumstances United States-Japanese relations would be at the mercy of Great Britain and China. The Secretary replied that he believed that we must have something substantial in the way of a basis for an agreement to take to these governments for otherwise there would be no point in talking to them. Mr. Kurusu said that the situation was so depressing that it might get beyond our control. The Secretary agreed that that was true but he pointed out that the fact that Japan's leaders keep announcing programs based upon force adds to our difficulties. He said he would like to leave the Hitler situation to the Japanese Government for consideration.

Turning to the China situation the Secretary asked how many soldiers the Japanese wanted to retain in China. The Ambassador replied that possibly 90 percent would be withdrawn. The Secretary asked how long the Japanese intended to keep that remaining 10 percent in China. The Ambassador did not reply directly to this but he invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area. The Secretary pointed out that the question of the troops was one in which there were many elements of trouble. American interests even had suffered severely from the actions of the Japanese forces and we had a long list of such instances. The Secretary made mention of the great
great patience this Government had exercised in the presence of this situation. He said the situation was one in which the extremists seemed to be looking for trouble and he said that it was up to the Japanese Government to make an extra effort to take the situation by the collar. He said also that the United States and Japan had trusted each other in the past, that the present situation was one of Japan's own making and it was up to the Japanese Government to find some way of getting itself out of the difficulty in which it had placed itself. The Secretary went on to say that the situation was now exceptionally advantageous for Japan to put her factories to work in producing goods which are needed by peaceful countries if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind. The Ambassador said that our conversations had been protracted and if the American Government could only give the Japanese some hope with regard to the situation it might be helpful. He added that our country was great and strong. The Secretary replied that our Government has not made any threats and he has exercised his influence throughout to depurate bellicose utterances in this country. He added that the Japanese armed forces in China do not appear to realize whose territory they are in and that the people in this country say that Hitler proposes to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan proposes to take charge of the other half and if they should succeed what
would there be left for the United States? Mr. Kurusu suggested that Japan would have to move gradually in China, that one step might lead to another and that what was important now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. The Secretary asked what was in Mr. Kurusu's mind. In reply to a suggestion that it was felt in Japanese circles that we have been responsible for delay, the Secretary pointed out that we could more rightly accuse the Japanese of delays, that he had met with the Japanese Ambassador promptly every time the latter had asked for a meeting and had discussed matters fully with him. The Secretary added that when Japan's movement into Indochina in July took place this had caused an interruption of our conversations and it was then that the Secretary could no longer defend the continued shipments of petroleum products to Japan, especially as for the past year he had been under severe criticism in this country for not having cut off those shipments. Mr. Kurusu asked whether we wanted the status quo ante to be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if the Japanese could not do anything now on those three points -- he could only leave to Japan what Japan could do. The Secretary said that it is our desire to see Japan help furnish a world leadership for a peaceful program and that he felt that Japan's long-swing interests were the same as our interests. The Ambassador said that he realized that
our Government was suspicious of the Japanese Government but he wished to assure us that Japan wanted to settle the China affair notwithstanding the fact that Japan desired to keep a few troops in China for the time being. The Secretary then asked again what the Japanese had in mind. Mr. Kurusu said that it was Japan's intention to withdraw Japanese troops from French Indochina as soon as a just Pacific settlement should be reached and he pointed out that the Japanese Government took the Burma Road situation very seriously. The Secretary asked, if there should be a relaxation of freezing, to what extent would that enable Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence. The Ambassador said that our position was unyielding and that it was Japan's unyielding attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek which had stiffened Chinese resistance against Japan. He asked whether there was any hope of a solution — some small beginning toward the realization of our high ideals. The Secretary replied that if we do not work out an agreement that the public trusts the arming of nations will go on; that the Japanese Government has a responsibility in the matter as it has created the conditions we are trying to deal with. The Ambassador then suggested the possibility of going back to the
to the status which existed before the date when following
the Japanese move into southern French Indochina, our
freezing measures were put into effect. The Secretary
said that if we should make some modifications in our
embargo on the strength of a step by Japan such as the
Ambassador had mentioned we do not know whether the troops
which have been withdrawn from French Indochina will be
diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere.
The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply
some move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our
relations. The Secretary said that it would be difficult
for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing
the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan
was definitely started on a peaceful course and had
renounced purposes of conquest. The Ambassador said that
the Japanese were tired of fighting China and that Japan
would go as far as it could along a first step. The
Secretary said that he would consult with the British and
the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the
suggestion offered by the Japanese Ambassador. In reply
to a question by the Secretary the Ambassador replied that
the Japanese Government was still studying the questions
of commercial policy involved in our proposal of November 15.
He said he assumed that what we had in mind was a program
for dealing with the situation after the war. The Secretary
replied in the affirmative.
When asked by the Secretary as to when the Ambassador would like to confer with us again the Ambassador said that he would get in touch with his Government and would communicate to the Secretary through Mr. Ballantine.
The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Secretary's apartment. After about fifteen minutes of general conversation the Ambassador said that he and Mr. Kurusu had reported to their Government their conversation of yesterday with the Secretary and were momentarily expecting instructions, and that in fact a telegram had already come in but it had not yet been decoded. They said that they would wish to confer with the Secretary perhaps tomorrow, but would at least expect to communicate with him tomorrow in regard to a further appointment. They expressed satisfaction with what the Secretary had said to the press in regard to yesterday's conversation and the Secretary remarked that the press seemed to be satisfied.
The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador felt yesterday about the possibilities. The Ambassador said that he had made the suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed before the Japanese move into south Indochina in the latter part of July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if something could be done on his suggestion, it would serve to relieve that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some time.

The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had so far diverged. The Ambassador agreed.
agreed. He observed, however, that the views of the Japanese Government with regard to the Tripartite Pact had been fully expressed by the Japanese Government; that is to say, that their intentions to maintain peace in the Pacific were already made clear in their draft statement of September 25, but that they could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and were bound to carry out their obligations. The Secretary suggested that one way in which the Japanese could be helpful would be to let the Russian forces in the Far East and the British forces at Singapore go back to Europe. The Secretary said that his suggestion was by way of illustration how much Japan was hindering us. The Secretary added that if Hitler were helping the world the situation would be different, but the fact was that he was injuring all of us.

The conversation then turned for a few minutes to the situation in Russia and Germany's prospects. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu expressed the view that there seemed to be no likelihood of an early Russian defeat or of a collapse of Stalin's regime. The Ambassador said that he had been much surprised at the strength Stalin had shown in holding his government together and he also spoke with admiration of the stubbornness of Russian defense. The Ambassador also expressed the view that he saw no prospect of Germany's being able in the future to launch a successful invasion of England. The Secretary asked, what, if Germany could not conquer
conquer Stalin, could not invade England, and was faced with the hostility of the many millions in Europe which were being held in subjection by Germany, would be the outcome for Germany. The Ambassador expressed no clear-cut views on this point. The Secretary suggested that if the Japanese Government could prevail over the views of the Japanese war party it should be possible to work out something with us. The Ambassador made a further reference to Japan's being bound by the Tripartite Pact, whereupon the Secretary asked whether Japan was not equally bound by the neutrality pact with Russia. The Ambassador replied that if Japan was faithful to the Tripartite Pact it must be equally faithful to the neutrality pact as they were both equally binding. The Ambassador dwelt at some length upon the point that Japan was getting nothing out of the Tripartite Pact except American resentment. Mr. Kurusu then expressed the view that although he did not see any prospect of another Brest-Litovsk in the Russo-German situation, Japan would be very apprehensive of such a development as it would mean a combined Russo-German advance on the Far East.

The Secretary referred to the need of looking forward to the time for rebuilding the world and said that, if the Japanese militant leaders keep control of Japanese policy, they
they would deprive us of a chance of stabilizing the world
and laying down a progressive program. The Ambassador said
that the United States was likely at the end of the war to
be in a position of overwhelming strength, but he intimated
that we might impair our strength if we sent forces to
Africa. There then ensued some discussion of Hitler's
efforts to gain control of the seas and the Secretary em-
phasized that this country is determined to keep Hitler
from getting control of the seas no matter how long it took
us. He expressed the view that if Hitler had striven only
for limited objectives he might have had a better chance
for success than he now has because of his unlimited pro-
gram of conquest. The Secretary said that if the Japanese
could tell Hitler to be reasonable — Mr. Kurusu interrupted
at this point and said that he thought that Hitler would be
willing to enter into peace negotiations. The Secretary
replied that he was speaking figuratively; that what he
meant was abandonment entirely by Hitler of his program of
conquest. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then rose to take
leave and as they did so the Secretary emphasized again
that all we can do is to stand firm on our basic principles.
The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that they had referred to their Government the suggestion which the Ambassador had made at a previous meeting in regard to a return to the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into south Indochina last July, and said that they had anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal on that basis. He said, however, that the proposal represented an amplification of the
the Ambassador's suggestion. He then read the proposal to
the Secretary which was as follows:

"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the
United States undertake not to make any armed advance-
ment into any of the regions in the South-
eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area
excepting the part of French Indo-China where the
Japanese troops are stationed at present.

"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to
withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-
China upon either the restoration of peace between
Japan and China or the establishment of an
equitable peace in the Pacific area.

"In the meantime the Government of Japan
declares that it is prepared to remove its troops
now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part of the said territory
upon the conclusion of the present arrangement
which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United
States shall cooperate with a view to securing the
acquisition of those goods and commodities which
the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United
States mutually undertake to restore their com-
mercial relations to those prevailing prior to the
freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall
supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

"5. The Government of the United States under-
takes to refrain from such measures and actions as
will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the
restoration of general peace between Japan and China."

The Secretary said that he would give sympathetic
study to the proposal and that the comments which he was
about to make were not directed specifically to the

proposal
proposal but to the general situation. The Secretary said that Japan had it in its power at any moment to put an end to the present situation by deciding upon an all-out peaceful course; that at any moment Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call encirclement. He said that we want to have Japan develop public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. Mr. Kurusu said that if we could alleviate the situation by adopting a proposal such as the Japanese Government had just made it would help develop public opinion. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Thailand which adoption of the proposal would accomplish.

The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought would be the public reaction in this country if we were to announce tomorrow that we had decided to discontinue aid to Great Britain. He said that in the minds of the American people the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as the purposes underlying aid to Great Britain; that the American people believed that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan of the other half; and that the fact of the Tripartite Alliance
Alliance and the continual harping by Japanese leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type such as "new order in East Asia" and "co-prosperity sphere" served to strengthen the public in their belief. What was therefore needed, the Secretary pointed out, was the manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses.

The Ambassador replied that there was no doubt of Japan's desire for peace, as this was clear from the eagerness of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement of the China affair -- and indeed adoption of the Japanese Government's proposal that he had just presented was designed to bring about speedy settlement of the China affair. He said that the Japanese people after four years of fighting were jaded and that the slogans to which the Secretary had made reference were intended to encourage the Japanese people to push on to victory.

The Secretary said that we of course are anxious to help work this matter out for if we should get into trouble everybody was likely to get hurt.

Mr. Kurusu said that if we could go ahead with the present proposal the Japanese idea would be that we could go on working at fundamentals. He said that Japan has never pledged itself to a policy of expansion. The Secretary observed that the Chinese might have an answer to that
that point. The Secretary said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in east Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people did not welcome the idea of a new order under military control. He said also that the public in this country thinks that Japan is chained to Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked how Japan could eradicate such a belief as Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary said that he did not want to be disagreeable, but he felt he must observe that Japan did not talk that way about the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Kurusu said something about the Nine Power Treaty being twenty years old and being outmoded. The Secretary said that of course he did not wish to argue the matter. He said that when the Japanese complained about our helping China the public in this country wonders what is underneath the Comintern Pact. He emphasized that Japan is doing this country tremendous injury in the Pacific; that Japanese statesmen ought to understand that we are helping China for the same reason that we are helping Britain; that we are afraid of the military elements led by Hitler. He added that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China were not unlike Hitler's methods. The Ambassador asked how we could save the situation at this juncture. The Secretary replied that he agreed upon the urgent importance of saving it, but he asked whether the Ambassador
Ambassador thought that the Japanese statesmen could tone down the situation in Japan. Mr. Kurusu said, with reference to the fifth point in the Japanese proposal, that he did not know whether his Government would agree but he thought that that point might be interpreted to mean that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that negotiations were started. The Secretary made no comment on that point but noted that in the last few days there had been marked subsidence in warlike utterances emanating from Tokyo, and he felt that it was indeed a great tribute to the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that so much had been accomplished in this direction within a short space of two days as he felt sure that it was their efforts which had brought this about. He said that if so much had been accomplished within the course of two days, much more could be accomplished in the course of a longer period.

No time was set for the next meeting.
President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, undated, entitled "6 months."

Basis of possible agreement with Japan embodied in 4 points.

[Notation attached to the original: "Pencilled memorandum given by the President to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written shortly after November 20, 1941)"]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

There are several
for prints within
I am having some
there –
THC aECIUTA,_Y OF TH E TIICAaU .. Y
WA8H I HOTON
November 18, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith for your perusal a memorandum on the Japanese situation which was submitted to me by one of my assistants.

I realize that I do not know the details or character of the current negotiations with the Japanese Government and therefore do not know whether or not the financial proposals, which are a vital part of the program sketched in this memorandum, will fit into your plans. Nevertheless, I am taking the liberty of sending it along on the chance that you may find the suggestions helpful.

I am also sending a copy of this letter and memorandum to Secretary Hull.

Faithfully,

The President,
The White House.

Enclosure
AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ELIMINATING
TENSION WITH JAPAN AND HELPING DEFEAT OF GERMANY

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I. Foreword

It is becoming increasingly evident that "all out" diplomatic preparedness is as important an instrument of defense as is adequate military preparedness. Military activity may win battles, diplomatic activity can make the fighting of these battles unnecessary; military victories can gain raw material and equipment and can weaken the enemy, diplomatic victories can achieve similar gains. Without major diplomatic victories Germany could not have attained her spectacular success. Had they not suffered major diplomatic defeats neither England nor France would be in their present predicaments.

An "all out" effort involves in diplomacy as in military strategy the fullest use of every economic and political advantage. Just as our military forces in preparation for an "all out" defense or in actual warfare must make intelligent use of our geographical position, our rich resources, our vast labor power, technical equipment and democratic traditions, so must diplomacy utilize those advantages to the full if it is to have any chance of success.

We are rich -- we should use more of our wealth in the interests of peace and victory. We are powerful -- we should be willing to use our power before our backs are to the wall. We need no nation's lands -- we should make full use of that fact. We keep our national pledges -- now is the time that record of integrity should stand us in good
stead. We are protected by two oceans -- let us exploit that protection while distance is still a potent barrier. We are a democracy -- let us take full advantage of the strength of just covenants openly arrived at.

If ever there was a time when diplomacy could secure its most brilliant victories for the United States, now is that time! The longer we wait the less chance will we have to use diplomacy as an aid to our defense. The patterns of relationship jell; plans become irrevocable; opportunities lost are gone forever. A nation committed irrevocably to a course of action loses the power to exercise choice, to accept offers and make conditions.

If the President were to propose something like the appended agreement and the Japanese accept, the whole world would be electrified by the successful transformation of a threatening and belligerent powerful enemy into a peaceful and prosperous neighbor. The prestige and the leadership of the President both at home and abroad would skyrocket by so brilliant and momentous a diplomatic victory -- a victory that requires no vanquished, a victory that immediately would bring peace, happiness and prosperity to hundreds of millions of Eastern peoples, and assure the subsequent defeat of Germany.

The proposal is workable and could be spectacularly successful, if Japan could be induced to accept the arrangement, and the great advantages it offers to Japan, and the fact that the likely alternative is war might induce Japan to accept the arrangement.
The proposal is given below only in bare outline and in only enough detail to indicate the essential points. What is most needed at this moment is not a carefully worked out program, but rather a decision to employ an all-out diplomatic approach in the current discussions with the Japanese.
II. Self-Evident Propositions Concerning United States and Japan

1. War between the United States and Japan would cost thousands of lives, billions of dollars; would leave the vanquished country bitter and desirous of revenge; would foster social disruption, and would not insure peace during our children's lives, nor permanently solve troublesome problems now standing between the two countries.

2. The United States prefers a just and peaceful settlement to war as a means of settling international difficulties, and is willing to go more than half way to settle peaceably the issues that stand in the way of more friendly intercourse between the two countries.

3. The United States recognizes that Japan, because of the special nature of its economy, is greatly in need of opportunities for increased foreign trade, and in need of capital to repair the ravages of four years of warfare, and in need of assured sources of basic raw materials.

4. The United States recognizes that our immigration laws have in fact unjustly discriminated against the Japanese people.

5. The United States believes that in the long run the interests of both the Japanese people and the American people can best be served by establishing fair and peaceful conditions under which Japan and her neighbors can prosper.
6. The United States is rich enough in funds, raw material, equipment, and technical skill to build, if necessary, and maintain a Navy and air force ten times as strong as that which Japan can build, and the United States is, because of numerous circumstances, powerful enough to destroy Japan should the United States be forced against her will to take up arms against Japan.

7. Should Japan force the United States to fight, Japan would have actively arrayed against her not only the United States but the British Empire, Netherlands East Indies, China, and probably Russia. In addition, the peoples of Indo China, Thailand, Manchuria and Korea would become much more difficult for Japan to control. In such a war victory for Japan would be impossible.

8. Defeat of Japan would bring bankruptcy, revolution and chaos in Japan. It would cost Japan her empire and her navy, and leave her a fourth-rate power with little chance of regaining her present world position for decades to come.

9. The United States wishes so much to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and destruction and to attain friendship between the Japanese and the American people, that it will pay well to help Japan's economy back to a peaceful and healthy basis.
10. The United States believes there is no basic obstacle to permanent and more friendly relations between the United States and Japan and believes that the Japanese people will welcome an opportunity to restore peace, to reconstruct Japan's industry and trade, and to promote friendly relations with her neighbors on a basis fair both to Japan's needs and the needs of her neighbors.

11. The United States wishes to help China maintain her independence and attain peace so that she may go forward in her political and economic development, so unfortunately interrupted a few years ago.

And finally -- and of most immediate importance --

12. The United States wishes to concentrate as soon as possible her naval force in the Atlantic so as to be prepared for any emergency against a potential enemy with whom there is no current basis for friendship.
III. Proposed Agreement

Because of the foregoing facts, the United States proposes to enter into an Agreement with Japan at once under which the United States and Japan will agree to do certain things, as follows:

A. On her part, the United States Government proposes to do the following:

1. To withdraw the bulk of the American Naval forces from the Pacific.
2. To sign a 20-year non-aggression pact with Japan.
3. To promote a final settlement of the Manchurian question.
4. To actively advocate the placing of Indo-China under the Government of a joint British, French, Japanese, Chinese and American Commission, which will insure most-favored-nation treatment for those five countries until the European War is ended, and which will govern the country primarily in the interests of the Indo-Chinese people.
5. To give up all extra-territorial rights in China, and to obtain England's agreement to give up her extra-territorial rights in China, and give Hong Kong back to China.
6. To present to Congress and push for enactment a bill to repeal the Immigration Act of 1917 which prohibits immigration into the United States of Japanese, and place the Japanese and the Chinese on the same basis as other peoples.
7. To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giving her (a) most-favored-nation treatment and (b) such concessions
on imports as can be mutually satisfactorily arranged, including an agreement to keep raw silk on the free list for 20 years.

8. To extend a $2 billion 20-year credit at 2 per cent interest, to be drawn upon at the rate not to exceed $200 million a year except with approval of the President of the United States.

9. To set up a $500 million stabilization fund half supplied by Japan and half by the United States, to be used for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

10. To remove the restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.

11. To use its influence to the full to attempt to eliminate sources of potential friction between Japan and her neighbors, and to assure Japan access to the raw materials of the world on the same basis as now enjoyed by United States and Great Britain.

B. On its part, the Japanese Government proposes to do the following:

1. Withdraw all military, naval, air police forces from China (boundaries as of 1931) from Indo-China and from Thailand.

2. Withdraw all support -- military, political, or economic -- from any government in China other than that of the national government.

3. Replace with yen currency at a rate agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, England and United States all military scrip, yen and puppet notes circulating in China.
4. Give up all extra-territorial rights in China.

5. Extend to China a billion yen loan at 2 per cent to aid in reconstructing China (at rate of 100 million yen a year).

6. Withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided U.S.S.R. withdraws all her troops from the Far Eastern front except for an equivalent remainder.

7. Sell to the United States up to three-fourths of her current output of war material -- including naval, air, ordnance and commercial ships on a cost-plus 20 per cent basis as the United States may select.

8. Expel all German technical men, military officials and propagandists.


10. Negotiate a 10-year non-aggression pact with United States, China, British Empire, Dutch Indies (and Philippines).

C. Inasmuch as the United States cannot permit the present uncertain status between the United States and Japan to continue in view of world developments, and feels that decisive action is called for now, the United States should extend the above offer of a generous and peaceful solution of the difficulties between the two countries for only a limited time. If the Japanese Government does not indicate its acceptance in principle at least of the proffered terms
before the expiration of that time, it can mean only that the present Japanese Government prefers other and less peaceful ways of solving those difficulties, and is awaiting the propitious moment to attempt to carry out further a plan of conquest.
IV.
Adantages to Japan and United States of Such an Agreement

The advantages accruing to each government are listed below:

A. To the United States
   1. In the event that Japan elected to reject the offer of peaceful solution under terms herein indicated, the United States would have a clearer idea of what to expect and would therefore know better how to shape her own policy.
   
   2. Our naval power will be greatly increased at once by the freeing of our Pacific fleet for duty elsewhere.
   
   3. We would be able to send more of our equipment to England and Russia without increasing our vulnerability to an attack from the East.
   
   4. We will have stopped the war in China and have regained for her her freedom.
   
   5. We will have paved the way for a substantial increase in post-war trade.
   
   6. We would greatly strengthen the Allied position vis-a-vis Germany.
   
   7. We will have saved ourselves from a war with Japan.
   
   8. The money it would cost us would be a very small part of what we would save by not having to fight Japan, or by not having to be prepared for a two-ocean war.
   
   9. A prosperous Japan and China can greatly help to restore our normal trade, and thus make easier our own transition to a peace time economy.
10. Insure for ourselves an increased supply of tin, antimony and wood oil and rubber from the Far East.

11. Handicap Germany in its present military campaign and at the same time give great moral encouragement to the British and Russian people.

12. Finally, military and naval experts who now fear a "two front" naval threat will be more enthusiastic about all out help to England and Russia. There will be much less cause to oppose the administration's foreign policy.

B. To Japan

1. Instead of being confronted with prospect of a more serious war and certain defeat in the end, she can have peace at once.

2. She can proceed at once to shift from a war economy to peace economy and at the same time experience prosperity rather than a serious depression.

3. She can withdraw from the China incident without loss of "face".

4. She can strengthen her currency and reduce her public debt.

5. Her foreign trade will greatly increase.

6. She can devote her energies and capital to reconstructing Japan, building up Manchuria, and developing new trade possibilities at a time when other countries are engaged in war or preparation for war.

7. She will at one stroke have solved some of her thorniest problems in her international relations.

8. She will avoid the social disruption that is bound to take place in Japan after an expanded and prolonged war effort.
The one danger inherent in the proposed concessions is that if accepted by Japan it would provide her with a breathing space during which she could greatly strengthen her military and economic potential. She might then be a greater threat to us a year or two hence than she is now.

Against that possibility are the following factors:

1. Owing to the scarcity of many raw materials she will not be able to expand her navy and air force during the next year nearly as much as we can -- particularly in view of the provision in the agreement that we can buy 30 percent of her current output of armaments.

2. The next two years are crucial for us. If we can obtain the release of the Russian, British and American forces now being tied up in the Far East by Japan's threatening, we will have done more to strengthen United Kingdom and Russia vis-a-vis Germany than we could with a whole year's output of planes and tanks and ships.

3. The Japanese people would be so relieved by the settlement of the China "incident", and the end of the threat of war with major powers, and would be so happy at the cessation of economic strangulation and the emergence of real prosperity, that it is hardly likely that any military clique could stir up significant trouble for years to come.

Altogether, the likelihood of Japan's strengthening her position and re-entering the world scene as a belligerent aggressor in the next few years seems very slim -- provided Germany is defeated.
It would, of course, be necessary to obtain Congressional approval before making definite offers, but through preliminary confidential conferences with leaders of both parties and with appropriate committees, the ground could be quickly prepared so that negotiations could go forward.

A completed document could in a week or two be offered to the Japanese Government. The world, including the Japanese people, would know the motives and the contents of our offer. If the Japanese Government would not accept, it would have at least the great advantages of (1) clarifying our own policy and rallying support behind the President, (2) create serious division in Japan.

If the Japanese Government were to indicate its tentative acceptance in principle, the President could at once call a conference in Washington to be attended by Chinese, British, Russian, and possibly Dutch East Indian and Philippine representatives. Inasmuch as all the important concessions are to be made by United States and Japan, the participation of other governments in the conference need not complicate negotiations.

The above proposed program of mutual concessions can be successful only if certain vital concessions are not left out. If adopted with those concessions peace in the Pacific would be gained, whereas if adopted without them "appeasement" would be the result, the threat of war would not be averted, and an exceptional opportunity to settle the issue on terms favorable to defeat of Germany would be lost.
Minimum concessions to be obtained from Japan should be withdrawal of troops from the mainland of Asia and sale to us of the bulk of her current production of armaments. If we do not achieve this, we shall not obtain any significant relief to allied military forces in the east while we would be making it possible for Japan to strengthen herself for possible later aggression when the situation is more propitious for aggressive acts on her part. The minimum objectives must be to free the American, British and Russian forces from the Pacific.
The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurosu called at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the request of the Ambassador. The Secretary said that he had called in the representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Pacific area and that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things could be developed in such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing. The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be settled if the Japanese could give us some evidences that their intentions were peaceful.

The
The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal civilian consumption.

The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese statesmen are talking about a peaceful course, whereas in the American press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked why was there not some Japanese statesman backing the two by ambassadors/preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there would be no question
question about Japan obtaining all the materials she desired.

The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would be glad to help Japan out on oil for civilian requirements as soon as the Japanese Government could assert control of the situation in Japan. He said that if the Ambassador could give him anything further in regard to Japan's peaceful intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with Senators and other persons in this country.

Mr. Kurusu said it was unfortunate that there had been a special session of the Diet at this time, as the efforts of the Government to obtain public support had brought out in sharp relief the abnormal state of the present temper of the Japanese people who had been affected by four years of war and by our freezing measures.

The Secretary asked to what extent in the Ambassador's opinion did the firebrand attitude prevail in the Japanese army. Mr. Kurusu said that it took a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to their suggestion in regard to offering to withdraw the Japanese troops from southern
southern Indochina. He said he thought this was an encouraging sign, but that nevertheless the situation was approaching an explosive point.

The Secretary asked whether it was not possible for a Japanese statesman now to come out and say that Japan wanted peace; that while there was much confusion in the world because of the war situation Japan would like to have a peace which she did not have to fight for to obtain and maintain; that the United States says it stands for such ideas; and that Japan might well ask the United States for a showdown on this question.

The Ambassador said he did not have the slightest doubt that Japan desired peace. He then cited the popular agitation in Japan following the conclusion of the peace settlement with Russia in 1905, as pointing to a difficulty in the way of publicly backing a conciliatory course.

The Secretary asked whether there was any way to get Japanese statesmen to approach the question before us with real appreciation of the situation with which we are dealing including the question of finding a way to encourage the governments of other powers concerned in the Pacific area to reach some trade arrangement with Japan. He pointed out that Japan's Indochina move, if repeated, would further give a spurt
a spurt to arming and thus undo all the work that he and the Ambassador had done. He suggested that if the United States and the other countries should supply Japan with goods in moderate amounts at the beginning, those countries would be inclined to satisfy Japan more fully later on if and as Japan found ways of demonstrating its peaceful intentions. He said that one move on Japan's part might kill dead our peace effort, whereas it would be easy to persuade the other countries to relax their export restrictions if Japan would be satisfied with gradual relaxation.

Mr. Kurusu said that at best it would take some time to get trade moving. The Secretary replied that he understood this but that it would be difficult to get other countries to understand until Japan could convince those countries that it was committed to peaceful ways. Mr. Kurusu said that some immediate relief was necessary and that if the patient needed a thousand dollars to effect a cure an offer of three hundred dollars would not accomplish the purpose. The Secretary commented that if the Japanese Government was as weak as to need all that had been asked for nothing was likely to save it.

Mr. Kurusu said that Japan's offer to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina would set a reverse movement in motion.

The Secretary
The Secretary said that the Japanese were not helping as they should help in the present situation in which they had got themselves but were expecting us to do the whole thing.

Mr. Kurusu asked what was the idea of the American Government.

The Secretary replied that although the Japanese proposal was addressed to the American Government he thought it advisable to see whether the other countries would contribute and he found that they would like to move gradually. The effect of an arrangement between these countries and Japan would be electrifying by showing that Japan had committed herself to go along a peaceful course.

Mr. Kurusu asked what Japan could do. The Secretary replied that if, for example, he should say that he agreed to enter into a peaceful settlement provided that there should be occasional exceptions and qualifications he could not expect to find peace-minded nations interested.

The Secretary then asked whether his understanding was correct that the Japanese proposal was intended as a temporary step to help organize public opinion in Japan and that it was intended to continue the conversations looking to the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Mr. Kurusu said yes.

Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had any further suggestions. The Secretary replied that he did not have in mind...
The Secretary reminded the Secretary General that Japan had expressed concern about a possible settlement that France wanted to impose on Indochina. "The Chinese were determined to prevent the troops out of China east of Indochina from returning to Indochina," he said. "The Chinese expected to have troops on what would be the northern coast of Indochina, 300 miles south of the present boundary." He said that the French feared that they would have to move troops to this area to prevent a settlement from being imposed on them.

The French, for example, would not be able to move one of their divisions, the 1st Division, from Indochina to France. If Japan were to move forces from Indochina to France, it would be difficult for the French to move forces to Japan. Therefore, the situation was very critical. He said that Japan had made the situation very critical by demanding any suggestion that the French could dispose of troops to re-
the fact that in July the Japanese had gone into Indochina. He added that the United States had remained from the first in the middle of the road, that it was the Japanese who had strayed away and that they should not have to be paid to come back.

Mr. Kurusu said that this country's denunciation of the commercial treaty had caused Japan to be placed in a tight corner.

The Secretary observed that Japan had cornered herself; that we had been preaching for the last nine years that militarism was sapping everybody and that if the world were to be plunged into another war there would not be much left of the people anywhere. He said that in 1934 he had told Ambassador Saito where Japan was headed with its ideas of overlordship in East Asia. The Secretary added that he had tried to persuade Hitler that participation by him in a peaceful course would assure him of what he needed. The Secretary said it was a pity that Japan could not do just a few small things to help tide over the situation.

Mr. Kurusu asked what the Secretary meant. The Secretary replied that the major portion of our fleet was being kept in the Pacific and yet Japan asked us not to help China. He said it was little enough that we were actually doing to help China. The Ambassador commented that
that our moral influence was enabling Chiang to hold out.

The Secretary said that a peaceful movement could be started in thirty or forty days by moving gradually, and yet Japan pushed everything it wanted into its proposal. The Ambassador explained that Japan needed a quick settlement and that its psychological value would be great.

The Secretary said that he was discouraged, that he felt that he had rendered a real contribution when he had called in the representatives of the other countries, but that he could only go a certain distance. He said he thought nevertheless that if this matter should move in the right way peace would become infectious. He pointed also to the danger arising from blocking progress by injecting the China matter in the proposal, as the carrying out of such a point in the Japanese proposal would effectually prevent the United States from ever successfully extending its good offices in a peace settlement between Japan and China.

There then ensued some further but inconclusive discussion of the troop situation in Indochina, after which the Ambassador reverted to the desire of the Japanese Government to reach a quick settlement and asked whether we could not say what points in the Japanese proposal we would accept and what points we desired to have modified.

The Secretary
The Secretary emphasized that there was no way in which he could carry the whole burden and suggested that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could spend a little time preaching peace. He said that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking.

The Ambassador disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard for an answer, agreed that the Secretary had always been most considerate in meeting with the Ambassador whenever an appointment had been requested, and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to wait until Monday.

The Secretary said he had in mind taking up with the Ambassador sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence.

FE:Ballantine:NHS-MHP
The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister and the Netherlands Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during that time and need not be repeated here.

I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a _modus vivendi_. I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal. There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute was
was more desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese. Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision in our proposed modus vivendi which would block a Japanese attack on China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations looking toward a general agreement on the basic questions.

C.H.

S:ICH:AR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 24, 1941

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message to the British Prime Minister containing a description of a proposal for a *modus vivendi* made by the Japanese Government to this Government and of a suggested alternate *modus vivendi* which this Government proposes to offer to the Japanese Government.

If you approve of the draft telegram, I shall arrange to have it forwarded.

Enclosure: Draft telegram.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of [Signature]
Letter 8/14/69

[Initials]

OK

Mr. Secretary

[Initials]
AMERICAN EMBASSY,

LONDON (ENGLAND).

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a *modus vivendi*. He has represented that the conclusion of such a *modus vivendi* might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that the domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal. The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of general peace in the Pacific area when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to supply Japan a required quantity of petroleum products and to refrain from measures prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China and mutual commitments to make no armed advancement in the southeastern Asiatic and southern Pacific areas (the formula offered would apparently not exclude advancement into China from Indochina), to cooperate.

REGRAD

UNCLASSIFIED
toward obtaining goods required by either in the Netherlands East Indies and to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the adoption of freezing measures.

This Government proposes to inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. It is also proposed to offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposal for a *modus vivendi* which will contain mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number shall not be subject to replacement and shall not in any case exceed 25,000 and not to send additional forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to $600,000 monthly, petroleum on a monthly
basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports 

general

in/ely provided that raw silk constitute at least two-thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures. Provision is made that the modua xivandi shall remain in force for three months with the understanding that at the instance of either party the two parties shall confer to determine whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area warrant extension of the modua xivandi.
Add at close:
This occurs to me as a fair-proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful that and we must all be prepared for that trouble, possibly soon.

Roosevelt
State Dept. copy
Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

Part 14 Pages 1143-1146

State Dept. copy published also in Foreign Relations... 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, pp. 646-647
Department of State

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 24, 1941

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MODUS VIVENDI FOR SUBMISSION TO JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL; THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX; THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIH; THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER, RICHARD G. CASEY; AND THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER, DR. A. LOUDON

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador, the Chinese Ambassador, the Australian Minister and the Netherlands Minister called at my request. I handed each of them a copy of the proposed modus vivendi prepared by us for submission to the Japanese Ambassador. They spent an hour reading it and taking notes to send back to their Governments.

The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000 Japanese troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General Marshall had a few minutes before expressed to me his opinion that 25,000 troops would be no menace and that, while this Government did not
not recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur — any day after this week — unless a temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general agreement.

The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course for three months and set forth the advantages
advantages to each of having additional time in which to make further preparations, et cetera, et cetera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their Governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his Government and that it would support the
the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record.

C.H.
The Chinese Ambassador called at his request. He sought to make profuse preliminary explanations, stating among other things that the Foreign Minister of China understood very well the broad international aspects of the Japanese situation as it relates to several countries, including China and the United States, but that the Generalissimo was not so well acquainted with the situation, and hence his reported opposition to our *modus vivendi*. He then handed me a telegram, dated November 24, 1941, from his Foreign Minister, a copy of which is here-to attached.

I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until
until they have had an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on conversations and making some progress thus far; and the Japanese are urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the proposed *modus vivendi* is really a part and parcel of the efforts to carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador and to others.

I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation.
situation which we have taken care of for him and inveigh
loudly about another matter relating to the release of
certain commodities to Japan corresponding to the progress
made with our conversations concerning a general peace
agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal
would relieve the menace of Japan in Indochina to the
whole South Pacific area, including Singapore, the Nether-
lands East Indies, Australia and also the United States,
with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes.
All of this relief from menace to each of the countries
would continue for ninety days. One of our leading
admirals stated to me recently that the limited amount
of more or less inferior oil products that we might let
Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable
extent increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I
said that, of course, we can cancel this proposal but it
must be with the understanding that we are not to be
charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near
Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan
makes a military drive southward.

The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that
he would send back to his Government a fuller explanation
which he hoped might relieve the situation more or less.
Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly spirit.

G.H.

SINGH: NA:AR
TELEGRAM FROM MINISTER QUO TAI-CHI
TO AMBASSADOR HU SHIH
CHUNGKING, NOVEMBER 24, 1941.

Reference is made to your telegram of November 22.

After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction. He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese question in its conversation with Japan instead of seeking a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China. I have explained to him that the Secretary of State has always had the greatest respect for the fundamental principles, and that I believe he has made no concession to Japan. The fact that he inquires of the possibility of a modus vivendi shows that he has not yet revealed anything to the Japanese. We are, however, firmly opposed to any measure which may have the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China.

Please inform the Secretary of State.
Published in Pearl Harbor Hearings

PART 14 PAGES 1162-1166

State Dept. copy published also, in Foreign Relations... 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, pp. 654-656.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 26, 1941

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MÓDUS VIVENDI

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me a memorandum, a copy of which is hereto attached. I commented briefly on the impossibility of not letting the Japanese have some oil for strictly civilian use, if we, in turn, are to secure the tremendously valuable commitment by the Japanese not to move on any aggressive course outside of China proper during the next three months. I pointed out to the Ambassador the advantages to China with respect to the Burma Road and its possible destruction and the removal of any menace to the South Sea area which would be of great interest and advantage to Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States as well.

I
I emphasized that this proposed *modus vivendi* was really a part of what the Japanese claimed to be a continuation of the same conversations held heretofore relative to a permanent agreement on a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area. I also pointed out the utter impracticability of requesting a suspension of further military advances in China in addition to the preceding assurances.

The Ambassador referred to the provision in the proposed draft of a *modus vivendi* limiting the Japanese troops in Indochina to 25,000 and urged that that number be reduced in our draft. I said that we would do the best we could in the matter, that our Army and Navy experts feel that 25,000 in North Indochina would not be a menace to the Burma Road, and that even double that number would not be a serious menace.

G.H.
Japanese proposal is clearly unacceptable and the only question appears to be whether:

(a) To reject it and (while making it clear that a limited agreement is not ruled out) to leave it to the Japanese to produce a better offer, or

(b) To make a counter proposal.

We have complete confidence in Mr. Hull's handling of these negotiations and he is in the best position to judge which of these two courses is the better tactics. We feel sure that he fully understands that the Japanese will try to force a hurried decision by magnifying the dangers of delay. If having taken this into account he feels it best to put forward a counter proposal we will support this course.

The Japanese proposal should, we feel, be regarded as the opening movement in a process of bargaining. It puts their own desiderata at a maximum and the price at a minimum. If a counter proposal is to be made we suggest that this process should be reversed and that our demands should be pitched high and our price low.

The removal of merely "the bulk" of Japanese troops from Indo China would allow too wide a loophole. It is doubtful whether we should be justified in accepting this as satisfactory and still less in suggesting it. Apart from the desirability of pitching a counter proposal higher than we may obtain, it seems advisable from the Chinese angle so to frame it as to frustrate the possibility of any attack on Kunming during the currency of an interim agreement.

On this basis we would suggest for the consideration of the United States Government that any counter proposal should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo China not merely of the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval military and air forces with their equipment and for the suspension of further military advances in China in addition to satisfactory assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Southern Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no shortage.
shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course only become effective as and when with-
drawal of Japanese armed forces took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar nature from Japan if we required them.

Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned.

The above represents our immediate reaction, sent without consultation with the Dominion Governments who as in the case of the Netherlands and the Chinese Governments may have other suggestions.

There remains the question raised as to the degree of authority to be delegated to the representatives of the powers concerned in Washington. We are of course anxious to facilitate Mr. Hull's difficult task in all possible ways. But our economic structure is so com-
plicated (in particular by the necessity of consultation with other parts of the Empire) that we do not think it practicable at this stage to give carte blanche to dip-
ломatic representatives. If the United States Government favour the suggestion which we made above, it will be necessary to define more closely the distinction between goods of importance to the welfare of the Japanese civilian population and those of direct importance to Japan's war potential, and to consider whether relaxation of economic pressure should be operated by financial control or by barter. After this stage we would be prepared to consider the question of discretion afresh.
The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, [Washington,]
November 26, 1941.

Proposes that he call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand them a proposal for a general peaceful settlement and withhold the modus vivendi proposal.


[This message was delivered orally by Hull and agreed to by FDR]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 26, 1941

SUBJECT: Japanese-American relations

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary of State Hull
Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador
Mr. Kurusu
Mr. Ballantine

COPIES TO:

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called by appointment at the Department. The Secretary handed each of the Japanese copies of an outline of a proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement.

After the Japanese had read the documents, Mr. Kurusu asked whether this was our reply to their proposal for a modus vivendi. The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United States we have a political situation to deal with just as does the Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a natural reaction among
among the public in this country. He said that our proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation, which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding. He also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador of the ambition that had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the proposed agreement. He noted that in our statement of principles there was a reiteration of the Stimson doctrine. He objected to the proposal for multilateral non-aggression pacts and referred to Japan's bitter experience of international organizations, citing the case of the award against Japan by the Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter. He went on to say that the Washington Conference Treaties had given a wrong idea to China, that China had taken advantage of them to flaunt Japan's rights. He said he did not see how his Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4) of the proposed agreement and that if the United States should expect that Japan was to take off its hat to Chiang Kai-shek and propose to recognize him Japan could not agree. He said that if this
this was the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible.

The Secretary asked whether this matter could not be worked out.

Mr. Kurusu said that when they reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands. He noted that this was a tentative proposal without commitment, and suggested that it might be better if they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally here.

The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a result of being harangued. He explained that in the light of all that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we could go at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a document which would present a complete picture of our position by making provision for each essential point involved.

The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public feeling was so acute on that question that he might
he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina affects our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu reverted to the difficulty of Japan's renouncing its support of Wang Ching-wei. The Secretary pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek had made an outstanding contribution in bringing out national spirit in China and expressed the view that the Nanking regime had not asserted itself in a way that would impress the world. Mr. Kurusu agreed with what the Secretary had said about Chiang, but observed that the question of the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion. His arguments on this as well as on various other points were specious, and unconvincing.

The Ambassador took the occasion to observe that sometimes statesmen of firm conviction fail to get sympathizers among the public; that only wise men could see far ahead and sometimes suffered martyrdom; but that life's span was short
short and one could only do his duty. The Ambassador then asked whether there was no other possibility and whether they could not see the President.

The Secretary replied that he had no doubt that the President would be glad to see them at any time.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi.

The Secretary replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it was because the other powers would not agree, but the Secretary replied simply that he had done his best.

The Ambassador when rising to go raised the question of publicity. The Secretary replied that he had it in mind to give the press something of the situation tomorrow, and asked what the Ambassador thought. The Ambassador said that they did not wish to question the Secretary's right to give out what he desired in regard to the American proposal. The Ambassador said he would like to have Mr. Wakasugi call on Mr. Ballantine on Thursday to discuss further details.

FE: Ballantine: MHP
November 26, 1941

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which
which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador
Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains
contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 664-665.
OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I
Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(November 26, 1941)
(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and
and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, economically -- any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government
Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
The Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Roosevelt (undated).

Memorandum containing suggestions for the proposed message to Congress on the subject of relations with Japan.


[Notations on original: "About Nov. 27, 1941." : "Draft received by the Secretary of State from the Secretary of War for possible inclusion in the proposed message to the Congress on the subject of relations with Japan.
]
State Dept. copy
published in
Foreign Relations
of the U.S.
Japan, 1931-1941
VOL. II PAGES 770-772
The two Japanese Ambassadors called at their request. The President opened the conversation with some reference to German international psychology. Ambassador Nomura then said that they were disappointed about the failure of any agreement regarding a modus vivendi. The President proceeded to express the grateful appreciation of himself and of this Government to the peace element in Japan which had worked hard in support of the movement to establish a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. He made it clear that we were not overlooking for a moment what that element has done and is ready still to do. The President added that in the United States most people want a peaceful solution of all matters in the Pacific.
Pacific area. He said that he does not give up yet although the situation is serious and that fact should be recognized. He then referred to the conversations since April which have been carried on here with the Japanese Ambassador in an attempt to deal with the difficulties. The President added that some of these difficulties at times have the effect of a cold bath on the United States Government and people, such as the recent occupation of Indochina by the Japanese and recent movements and utterances of the Japanese slanting wholly in the direction of conquest by force and ignoring the whole question of a peaceful settlement and the principles underlying it. The President then made the following points:

(1) We have been very much disappointed that during the course of these very important conversations Japanese leaders have continued to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the central spirit of the conversations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japanese leaders has naturally created an atmosphere both in this country and abroad which has added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.
(2) We have been very patient in our dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan's courses of action permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. We still have hope that there may be worked out a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area of the character we have been discussing. The temper of public opinion in this country has become of such a character and the big issues at stake in the world today have become so sharply outlined that this country cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.

(3) We remain convinced that Japan's own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan's own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.

The
The

Get out. I give up the property they took from other people and
and added that they had no right over there and another
cassinations had done in the south after the Civil War
people's rights and properties and the peace of those who had
forced them away and said that they had settled other
200,000 casserions that had gone into north China for-
anything so. For the President to do so, I referred to the
Board to bring up the matter but we were anxious, without
strong when neither side desired to request the mediation
an illustration or any desire with some strike conduct.
President's request, President's request, President's request, the
President to introduce these two Governments. The
Japan and China, Korea asked to know who would request

A recent remark of the President about introducing
Furthermore so much as with their application, referring
to a personal arrangement. That the trouble was not with the
hope for ten days in an endeavor to discuss and develop
Ambassador then proceeded to say that he had been
that war does not help us nor would it help Japan.
Your years the Japanese people need to have a peace treaty
persuasion here. He said that having been in that con-
and attempted the whole movement involved in the con-
the President expressed that the leaders in Japan
The President, referring to the efforts of Japan to colonize countries that they conquer, said that Germany would completely fail because she did not have enough top people to govern the fifteen or more conquered countries in Europe and that this would cause Germany to fail in her present movements; that second class people cannot run fifteen captured countries.

The President further referred to the matter of encirclement that Japan has been alleging. He pointed out that the Philippines were being encircled by Japan so far as that is concerned.

I made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and talk and move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would get anywhere as has been so clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in certain areas, are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military agencies of the political, economic, social and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as
as the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be any real progress made on a peaceful course.

C.H.
Published in Pearl Harbor Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4477-4478

State Dept copy published, also, in Foreign Relations ..., 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East, pp. 670-671.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the call which Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu are to make on you this afternoon at 2:30, it is suggested that you may care to include in your comments mention of the following points:

(1) We have been very much disappointed that during the course of these very important conversations Japanese leaders have continued to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the central spirit of the conversations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japanese leaders has naturally created an atmosphere both in this country and abroad which has added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.

(2) We have been very patient in our dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan's course of
of action permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. We still have hope that there may be worked out a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area of the character we have been discussing. The temper of public opinion in this country has become of such a character and the big issues at stake in the world today have become so sharply outlined that this country cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.

(3) We remain convinced that Japan's own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan's own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.
The President requested this copy for his private confidential files.

JCS

Jack Beck
MEMORANDUM

Directive dated 30 November 1941
from Foreign Minister Togo to
Ambassador General Oshima in Berlin.

The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured -- broken. I am sending you an outline of developments separately.

In the fact of this our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

SECRET

(Please note that the rest of the pages are not provided in the image.)
(Page 2 of this report could not be obtained)
If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

This directive is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please forward this directive to Rome, together with the separate one following.
Informatory instruction
from Foreign Minister Togo to
Ambassador General Oshima in Berlin,
dated 30 November 1941

...Japan-American negotiations were commenced the
middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year
they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial
Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as
the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the
vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjust-
ment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United
States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of re-
straining the United States from participating in the war,
she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these
negotiations.

Therefore, the present cabinet, with the view
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just
and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried
out in the past. However, their views and ours on the question
of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested,
were completely in opposition to each other. They demanded
the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-
China.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that
have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the
United States, in keeping with its traditional idealogical
tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized
her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the
conversations carried on between the United States and Eng-
land in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States
in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in
Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the
Tri-Partite Pact. As long as the Empire of Japan was in
alliance with Germany and Italy there could be no maintenance
of friendly relations between Japan and the United States,
was the stand they took. From this point of view, they be-
gan to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the
Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was
brought out at the negotiations of the last few days that it
has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial
Government could no longer continue negotiations with the
United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of
the negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

The proposal presented by the United States on the
26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it

(Page 4 of 5)
there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China - they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: December 1, 1941.

SUBJECT: United States-Japanese Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Hull
The Japanese Ambassador
Mr. Saburo Kurusu
Mr. Bellantine

COPIES TO:

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at
their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that
he noted that the President was returning to Washington
in advance of his schedule and inquired what the reason
for this was. The Secretary replied that one of the
factors in the present situation was the loud talk of
the Japanese Prime Minister. The Secretary added that the
Prime Minister seemed to be in need of advice which would
deter him from indulging in such talk at a time when the
Ambassador was here talking about good relations. The
Secretary then asked the Japanese how they felt about the
general trend in the world situation, especially the situa-
tion in Libya and Russia. The Japanese Ambassador replied
to the
to the effect that their attention had been largely engrossed in the situation as between the United States and Japan. The Secretary observed that from our point of view we felt very much encouraged about the news from Libya and Russia and it looked as if we might be turning the corner into a more favorable situation.

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu endeavored to convince the Secretary that in this country we seem to take a more serious view of the Japanese Prime Minister's utterances than was warranted. Mr. Kurusu said that what the Prime Minister had done was nothing more than a ten-minute broadcast. The Secretary pointed out that a broadcast was all the more effective. Mr. Kurusu said that the Prime Minister had been misquoted and asked whether we had heard anything from Ambassador Creg. The Secretary replied that we had heard nothing from Ambassador Creg and that we felt that the Associated Press was reliable and that we should give credence to its reports of what the Prime Minister said. Mr. Kurusu said that Japanese news services did not always correctly translate statements into English.

The Secretary said that he had been talking peace for nine months with the Japanese Ambassador, both of them acting in entire good faith. He said that during all the time that
Matsuoka was holding forth on the Tripartite Alliance and engaging in general bluster, the Secretary had ignored all of that. Then while the talks were in progress last July the Japanese moved suddenly into Indochina without any advance notice to this Government, and possibly the Ambassador was not informed of the Japanese Government's intention in advance. Then, too, the Secretary said, the Japanese press had been conducting a blustering campaign against the United States. The Secretary said that this Government had no idea of trying to bluff Japan and he saw no occasion for Japan's trying to bluff us, and he emphasized that there is a limit beyond which we cannot go further and that one of these days we may reach a point when we cannot keep on as we are.

Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government had been very much surprised at the reaction in this country to the Prime Minister's statements and he would see to it that the Secretary was given a correct translation of the Prime Minister's statements. He said he hoped we would get something from Ambassador Grew. He then said that he was pleased to inform the Secretary that the document we had given them on November 26 had been communicated to the Japanese Government, that the Japanese Government is giving the case study, and that within a few
few days the Japanese Government's observation thereon would be communicated to us. He then said that the Japanese Government believed that the proposal which they submitted to us on November 20 was equitable and that full consideration had been given therein to the points of view taken by both sides in the conversations; that the Japanese Government finds it difficult to understand the position taken by the Government of the United States; and that the proposal which we had communicated to them seemed to fail to take cognizance of the actual conditions in the Far East. He said that his Government directed him to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to request this Government to make "deep reflection of this matter". Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese offer to withdraw its troops from southern Indochina still stands; that Japan has shown its extreme desire to promote a peaceful settlement.

The Secretary replied that we had to take into account the bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo and that never would there be possible any peaceful arrangements if such arrangements have to be based upon principles of force. He pointed out that the methods the Japanese are using in China are similar to those which are being adopted by Hitler to subjugate Europe. The Secretary said
said that he had called attention to that during the progress of our conversations and that we cannot lose sight of the movement by Hitler to seize one-half of the world. He said that we believe that the Japanese militarists are moving in the same direction and that this Government cannot yield to anything of that kind. He explained that this is why we desire to work things out in a way that would promote peace, stability and prosperity and that this is why he has made no complaint, notwithstanding the fact that the Japanese press has heaped filthy abuse on this country.

The Ambassador expressed the view that as a matter of fact there is not much difference between Japan's idea of a co-prosperity sphere and Pan-Americanism, except that Japanese methods may be more primitive. He denied that it was Japan's purpose to use force. The Secretary asked whether, when the Japanese Government was moving on inch by inch by force, the Ambassador thought that this was a part of our policy. The Ambassador replied that Japan was motivated by self-defense in the same way as Britain had been motivated in her acts, for example, in Syria; that Japan needed rice and other materials at a time when she was being shut off by the United States and other countries and she had no alternative but to endeavor to obtain access to these materials.

The
The Secretary observed that the Japanese are saying that the United States has no right to interfere with what Japan is doing in eastern Asia; that when the Japanese keep their troops in Indochina this constitutes a menace to the South Seas area, irrespective of where in Indochina the troops are stationed; that the stationing of these troops in Indochina is making it necessary for the United States and its friends to keep large numbers of armed forces immobilized in east Asia, and in this way Japan's acts were having the effect of aiding Hitler. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that he had made it clear to the Ambassador that we could not sit still while such developments were taking place.

The Ambassador commented that today war is being conducted through the agency of economic weapons, that Japan was being squeezed, and that Japan must expand to obtain raw materials. The Secretary pointed out that we were selling Japan oil until Japan suddenly moved into Indochina; that he could not defend such a situation indefinitely; and that the United States would give Japan all she wanted in the way of materials if Japan's military leaders would only show that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course. The Secretary emphasized that we do not propose to go into partnership with Japan's military leaders; that he has not heard one whisper of peace from the Japanese military, only
only bluster and blood-curdling threats. The Secretary added that he had been subjected to very severe criticism for his policy of patience but that he would not mind if only the Japanese Government could back him up.

The Secretary went on to enumerate various points in the Japanese proposal of November 20. He reminded the Ambassador that on November 22 he had promptly told the Ambassador that we could not sell oil to the Japanese Navy, although we might be prepared to consider the re-release of oil for civilian purposes. He made it clear that this Government was anxious to help settle the China affair if the Japanese could reach a settlement in accordance with the basic principles which we had discussed in our conversations, and that under such circumstances we would be glad to offer our good offices. The Secretary went on to say that under existing circumstances, when Japan was tied in with the Tripartite Pact, Japan might just as well ask us to cease aiding Britain as to cease aiding China. He emphasized again that we can't overlook Japan's digging herself into Indochina, the effect of which is to create an increasing menace to America's friends; that we can't continue to take chances on the situation; and that we will not allow ourselves to be kicked out of the Pacific. The Secretary called attention to reports
to reports that we have received from press and other sources of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and again stressed the point that, when a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia. He pointed out that we cannot be sure what the Japanese military leaders are likely to do, that we do not know where the Japanese Army intends to land its forces, and that for this reason we cannot sit still but will have to puzzle these things out in some way. The Secretary explained that this situation had been very painful to him and he did not know whether the Ambassador could do anything in the matter of influencing the Japanese Government. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt it was a shame that nothing should come out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals seem to carry the two sides further away than before.

The Secretary pointed out that every time we get started in the direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn us. The Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in view of all
the threats that had been made. He pointed out that the acts of the Japanese militarists had effectively tied the hands of the Ambassadors and he did not know whether the Ambassadors could succeed in having anything accomplished toward untying their hands. Mr. Kurusu brought up again his contention made on previous occasions that China had taken advantage of the Washington Conference treaties to flatter Japan, and commented that if we don't look out China will sell both the United States and Japan down the river. The Secretary observed that he has been plowing through various contradictions in Japanese acts and utterances. He pointed out that the Japanese had been telling us that if something quick is not done something awful was about to happen; that they kept urging upon the Secretary the danger of delay, and kept pressing the Secretary to do something. He said that in view of all the confusion, threats and pressure, he had been brought to the stage where he felt that something must be done to clear the foggy atmosphere; that his conclusion was that he must bring us back to fundamentals; and that these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal which we had offered the Japanese on November 26. He said that we have stood from the first on the points involved in this proposal. He pointed out that everything that Japan was doing
doing was in precisely the opposite direction from the course we have been talking about in our conversations.

Mr. Kurasu endeavored to make some lame apology for the direct military mind of the Japanese Army and commented that General Tojo was in position to control the situation. The Secretary asked what possibility there was of peace-minded people coming out in Japan and expressing themselves. He expressed doubt whether anybody in Japan would be free to speak unless he preached conquest. The Ambassador commented that the Japanese people are not talking about conquest. The Secretary pointed out that we all understand what are the implications of such terms as "controlling influence", "new order in east Asia", and "co-prosperity sphere". The Secretary observed that Hitler was using similar terms as synonyms for purposes of conquest. The Secretary went on to say that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and Japan, that there was no real clash of interests. He added that Japan does not have to use a sword to gain for herself a seat at the head of the table. He pointed out that equality of opportunity is in our opinion the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations.

Mr. Kurasu disclaimed on the part of Japan any similarity between Japan's purposes and Hitler's purposes.
The Ambassador pointed out that wars never settle anything and that war in the Pacific would be a tragedy, but he added that the Japanese people believe that the United States wants to keep Japan fighting with China and to keep Japan strangled. He said that the Japanese people feel that they are faced with the alternative of surrendering to the United States or of fighting. The Ambassador said that he was still trying to save the situation. The Secretary said that he has practically exhausted himself here, that the American people are going to assume that there is real danger to this country in the situation, and that there is nothing he can do to prevent it.

The Ambassadors said that they understood the Secretary's position in the light of his explanation and they would report the matter to the Japanese Government with a view to seeing what could be done.
December 1, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indo-China. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indo-China.

It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement -- and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement -- between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indo-China was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.

The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand.

Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE.

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December 1, 1941

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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F. D. R.
The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. The Ambassador handed to the Secretary a paper which he said was the Japanese Government's reply to the President's inquiry in regard to Japanese troops in French Indo-China. The paper reads as follows:

"Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Under instructions from Tokyo, I wish to inform you as follows:

"As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-China. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern
southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France."

The Secretary read the paper and asked whether the Japanese considered that the Chinese were liable to attack them in Indochina. He said that he had heard that the Chinese are contending that their massing troops in Yunnan was in answer to Japan's massing troops in Indochina.

Mr. Kurosu said that that is all that they have received from their Government in regard to this matter. The Ambassador said that as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road he felt that the possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of preventing Japan's attacking the Burma Road from Indochina could not be excluded.

The Secretary said that he had been under the impression that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese are alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers.
ABCD powers in the southwest Pacific area, and that an airplane of one of those countries had recently flown over Formosa. He said that our military men are very alert and enterprising and are known to believe in the principle that offense is the best defense. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador's observations applied to defensive measures we are taking against Hitler. The Ambassador replied that he did not say that, but that it was because of Japan's apprehensions in regard to the situation that they had made their November 20 proposal.

The Secretary asked whether, if the Chinese are about to attack Japan in Indochina, this would not constitute an additional reason for Japan to withdraw her armed forces from Indochina. The Secretary said that he would be glad to get anything further which it might occur to the Japanese Government to say to us on this matter.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach an agreement with this Government and Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government felt that we ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initiated. The Secretary pointed out that when the Japanese bring that matter up it brings up the matter of the aid Japan is giving to Hitler. He said that he did not see how
how Japan could demand that we cease giving aid to China while Japan was going on aiding Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked in what way was Japan aiding Hitler. The Secretary replied that, as he had already made clear to the Japanese Ambassador, Japan was aiding Hitler by keeping large forces of this country and other countries immobilized in the Pacific area. (At this point the Ambassador uttered *sotto voce* an expression in Japanese which in the present context means "This isn't getting us anywhere".) The Secretary reminded the Ambassador of what the Secretary had said to the Ambassador on this point on November 22 as well as on our unwillingness to supply oil to Japan for the Japanese Navy which would enable Japan to operate against us in the southern Pacific and also on our attitude toward continuing aid to China. The Ambassador said that he recalled that the Secretary had said that he would almost incur the danger of being lynched if he permitted oil to go to Japan. The Ambassador said that he believed that if the Secretary would explain that giving of oil to Japan had been prompted by the desirability of reaching a peaceful agreement such explanation would be accepted. The Secretary replied that senators and others are not even now desisting from criticizing the Secretary for the course that he had hitherto taken.
The Ambassador said that this Government blames Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina was controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan. The Secretary replied that as the Ambassador was aware we could solve matters without delay if only the Japanese Government would renounce courses of force and aggression. The Secretary added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that if we could only come to an agreement on temporary measures we could then proceed with our exploration of fundamental solutions. He said that such a fundamental agreement would necessarily take time and that what was needed now was a temporary expedient. The Secretary replied that the Japanese were keeping the situation confused by a malignant campaign conducted through the officially controlled and inspired press which created an atmosphere not conducive to peace. The Secretary said that we knew the Japanese Government could control the press and that therefore we did not understand what the motives are of the higher officials of the Japanese Government in promoting such a campaign.

Mr. Kurusu said that on the American side we were not free from injurious newspaper propaganda. He said that for example
example there was the case of a newspaper report of the Secretary's interview with the press which created an unfortunate impression in Japan. The Secretary replied that he had been seeing for months and months that Japanese officials and the Japanese press had been proclaiming slogans of a bellicose character and that while all this was going on he had kept silent. He pointed out/now he was being jumped on if he said a single word in regard to the situation. Mr. Kurusu then referred to a press report casting aspersions on Kurusu to the effect that he had been sent here to check on the Ambassador, et cetera, et cetera. The Secretary replied that he had heard only good reports in regard to Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador. At this point the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu took their leave after making the usual apologies for taking so much of the Secretary's time when he was busy.
Published in Pearl Harbor Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4525-4527
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Returned with many thanks.

[Signature: CH]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Telephone message from Secretary Morgenthau to the President re closing of Bank of Japan in New York.
Dec. 3, 1941.

Memo for The President:

By telephone from Secretary Morgenthau:

"At five forty-five this evening I received word that the representative of the Bank of Japan in New York is closing their office tomorrow under instructions from Japan. The representative will leave New York on December tenth for Japan."

* * *

h.m.jr/mc
7:10 P.M.
TOKYO—JAPAN INDICATED THROUGH OFFICIAL SOURCES TODAY A DESIRE TO 
PROLONG PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND SUGGESTED THAT THE 
"UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE" POSITION TAKEN BY WASHINGTON WAS DUE TO A 
BIG MISUNDERSTANDING.

MANY POINTS OF DIFFERENCE REMAIN BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN, THE 
SPOKESMAN SAID, BUT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AT WASHINGTON IN CLARIFYING 
VARIOUS POINTS AND IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN CONTINUE 
TOWARD SEEKING A "COMMON FORMULA" FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PACIFIC 
CRISIS.

TOMOKAZU HORI, THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN, TOOK A MUCH MORE HOPESFUL 
ATTITUDE TOWARD CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN HAD BEEN 
SUGGESTED IN THE LAST FEW DAYS.

"ASSUMING THAT PRESS REPORTS ARE CORRECT REGARDING SECRETARY OF 
STATE CORDELL HULL'S STATEMENT (DENOUNCING JAPANESE RULE BY FORCE) WE 
ARE AMAIZED TO FIND SUCH A BIG MISUNDERSTANDING BY THE UNITED STATES," 
HORI SAID.

"THE HULL STATEMENT SEEMS TO ALLEGED THAT WE ARE FOLLOWING A POLICY 
OF FORCE AND CONQUEST AND ESTABLISHING A MILITARY DESPOTISM.

JAPAN WILL FOLLOW THE POLICY LAID DOWN BY FORMER PREMIE-PRINCE 
FUMIMARO KONOYE, WHO FOUR YEARS AGO ISSUED A DECLARATION THAT JAPAN 
HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN CHINA. THE SPOKESMAN CONTINUED, THE 
KONOYE STATEMENT DISCLAIMED ANY JAPANESE INTENTION OF DemANDING 
INDENITY FROM CHINA.

HORI SUGGESTED THAT THE CHINA SITUATION WAS THE REAL DIFFICULTY IN 
THE WASHINGTON NEGOTIATIONS.

"IN SHANGHAI A JAPANESE MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY THAT THE 
JAPANESE ARMY IS NOW SO STRONG THAT IT IS ABLE TO LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN 
IN ANY DIRECTION WITHOUT WITHDRAWING FORCES FROM THE CHINA FRONT. I 
BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR BRITISH AND AMERICAN MECHANIZED UNITS 
TO OPERATE IN CHINA."

HORI SAID THE JAPANESE TROOPS IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA DO NOT EXCEED 
TREATY LIMITS.

"DISPATCHES FROM VICHY REPORTED THAT JAPANESE TROOPS IN FRENCH 
INDO-CHINA TOTALLED ABOUT 40,000 AND DID NOT EXCEED TREATY LIMITS. VICHY 
REPORTED THAT FRENCH AUTHORITIES IN INDO-CHINA HAD INSISTED ON KEEPING 
JAPANESE FORCES IN INDO-CHINA WITHIN TREATY BOUNDS."

THE NEWSPAPER ASAHI, IN A DISPATCH FROM LONDON, ASSERTED BRITAIN WAS 
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE WASHINGTON NEGOTIATIONS TO RUSH WAR 
PREPARATIONS AGAINST JAPAN. BRITAIN ALSO WAS ACCUSED OF Cooper 
WITH THE U.S. IN PREPARATIONS TO INVADE THAILAND.

ASAHI SAID BRITAIN HAD INFORMED THE U.S. THAT "IN CASE 
EMERGENCY" SHE WOULD "TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION WITHOUT WAITING A 
STATES ACTION."

DOMEI REPORTED FROM BANGKOK THAT BRITISH VESSELS HAD BEEN IN 
TO ENTER THE PORT OF BANGKOK.

DOMEI REPORTED ALSO THAT THAILAND WAS TRAINING SOME 2,000,000 
VOLUNTEERS TO COPE WITH ANY EMERGENCY SITUATION.

NICHI NICHI SAID THE U.S. WAS SEEKING DOMINATION OF EAST AS 
THAT JAPAN DESIRED ONLY PEACE.

ACCORDINGLY IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THEIR BASIC PRINCIPLES ARE 
OPPOSED," THE NEWSPAPER SAID.

IT WAS UNDESIRES THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO ALLOW THE 
INTRODUCTION OF QUESTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC ISSUES AT A THREE-DAY 
MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COOPERATIVE COUNCIL, OPENING MONDAY.
The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, [Washington,]
December 6, 1941.

Transmits a draft of a message from the President to
the Emperor of Japan

SEE: FDRL Master Speech File for original of this draft.
SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pp. 721-723, 726.

[This message was not sent to Japan but was superseded by one
drafted in the White House]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the substance of the "stand-still" arrangement which you contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your message.

Enclosure:
Draft message to the Emperor of Japan.
I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our two countries for almost a century. Those developments are suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be overlooked which might serve
serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses — thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.
In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or material to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the amount
amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan's leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.
1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Cordell,

About the 7s & 8s—Head this to Tras—
I think can go in grey work—Don't turn—
I don't mind if it gets picked up.

Yours,

JFK.
TRIPLE PRIORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Please communicate at the earliest possible moment in such manner as you deem most appropriate a message to the Emperor from the President, reading as follows:

QUOTE His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan: (Telegraph Section: Insert here the text of the attached message beginning with the words SUBQUOTE Almost a century ago: END SUBQUOTE to the end of page five including the President's name) UNQUOTE.

The press here is being informed simply that the President is sending a message to the Emperor.
December 6, 1941.

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.
The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted...
further Japanese military forces, avowedly for the same reason -- Indochina for the common defense of French Indochina, protection against Chinese attack on Indo-China from the north. I think I am correct in saying that no Chinese attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated by the Chinese Government.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that very large numbers of Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China to places so far removed from the defense area of Northern Indo-China as to constitute a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Southern Indo-China is neither defensive in its character, nor directed against China at all.

Because these continuing concentrations in Southern Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.
further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indochina for the common defense of French Indochina. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.
I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese
forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

***************

Franklin D. Roosevelt
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page three of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on the telephone.

If you approve the draft as it now stands, we shall see that it gets off to Grew at once.

C H

Enclosure:
Message to Emperor of Japan.

Done

AF—send the
Amended p. 3 to The
British Ambassador
and copy to me

FR
In reply refer to
FC 740.0011 Pacific War/656

AUG 1 1942

My dear Mr. Berge:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 20, 1942, by reference from the White House, concerning your request for a certified copy of the message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, which was dispatched on December 6, 1941.

In accordance with your request, there is attached herewith a certified copy of the proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, together with a certified copy of the telegram of transmittal.

Sincerely yours,

George A. Gordon
Acting Chief, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation

Enclosures:

Certified copy of telegram and message from President, to Emperor of Japan.

The Honorable
Wendell Berge,
Assistant Attorney General.
FROM: COM. MARINES
       NORTH CHINA

TO: CINCAF

INFO: C N O

Following demands by Imperial Japanese Army
North China delivered to me this morning.

1. Immediate and voluntary disarming all Marine
   Force, North China.

2. Turn in all arms and ammunition.

3. Assemble command await further directions Imperial
   Army Headquarters.

Written reply accepting their demands and
complying at 1200 today.
From: Com Marins
North China
To: CinC AF
Info: CNO

Following demands by Imperial Japanese
Army, North China delivered to me this
morning.

1. Immediate and voluntary disarming all
Marine Force, North China.
2. Turn in all arms and ammunition.
3. Assemble Command await further direc-
tions. Imperial Army
Headquarters.

Written reply accepting their demands and complying at 1200 today.
MEMORANDUM:

On finding through Mr. Belin that I knew Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese Special Envoy, who was an old friend, Colonel Donovan asked me to come to Washington to get into contact with him. Colonel Donovan spoke to the Secretary of State and obtained his approval.

I called at the Japanese Embassy at eleven o'clock the morning of December 6th. Mr. Kurusu, whom I have not seen for eleven years, was very cordial and we resumed our old friendship at once.

After a few personal inquiries and some reminiscences of our days together in Peru, Mr. Kurusu launched forth into a lengthy conversation regarding his mission here, seeming to be extremely anxious to talk about it with an old friend and with someone in whom he had entire confidence. Constantly, throughout the whole hour-and-a-half conversation, Mr. Kurusu seemed very apprehensive of being overheard by members of the Embassy staff, repeatedly turning his head to see if anyone were approaching.
Mr. Kurusu said right off: "Fred, we are in an awful mess. In the first place, I was delayed two months in coming on this mission, through an attack of conjunctivitis when I could neither read nor write. This complicated the situation because time was running out, from the point of view of restraining the military element, and it had been planned that I should have left for the United States in August or September. This had an immediate bearing on my negotiations with the Secretary of State because I found, just prior to my departure, that the Civil Government was up against it to know how to assuage the military effervescence so that it would do the least harm to American and English relations; that the Civil Government had decided that the least harmful alternative was to allow the military to move into Indo-China since that neither directly threatened Siberia and the United States nor Singapore and Britain."

Nevertheless, Kurusu recognized that any troop movement would be regarded with great suspicion in the United States and would, inevitably, jeopardize the success of his mission. The best he could do, however, was to be allowed three weeks' time for his negotiations to bring some concrete result with which the Civil Government would feel able to hold off the military. With this background, Kurusu said, he had had to initiate his discussions with the
Secretary of State. In the first place, he could not explain this to the Secretary, who seemed to feel suspicious at once, not only at the troop movement but of the evident desire of Kurusu to arrive at results speedily. In fact, Kurusu said that the Secretary had queried several times why he was in such a rush to get something concrete effected.

Kurusu said that he would appreciate it greatly if I, as his old friend, would explain this to the Secretary, which I, of course, promised to do.

Turning then to the general problem, Kurusu said that he felt the principal difficulties could be said, in a nut-shell, to be the State Department and the national sentimentality with regard to China on the one hand and a "lack of humor" on the part of the Japanese militarists on the other hand. The real problem, however, was "how to get the Japanese out of China!" Kurusu was extremely frank on this subject on which he dealt and to which he returned most of the time. He stated that the show was up in China, that the militarists knew this as well, or perhaps better, than anyone else and that they were all looking for a way out to save their faces.

To illustrate the present situation, Kurusu said that it was similar to that existing at the end of the Russo-Japanese War when the Japanese won the great victory of Mukden; namely, that while Japan was the
victor, she was exhausted and could not have gone on. This, he said, was the situation attained today; only in the present case they arrive at no victory, just the occupation of certain hotly contested localities in China. "So", he kept repeating and repeating, "we must find a way out and we believe that President Roosevelt as arbiter between ourselves and the Chinese is the best move from our point of view, as well as everyone else's."

I repeatedly asked Kurusu if he was absolutely sure of his ground in these statements, with particular reference to the remarks on the part of the militarists that the show was up in China and the conditions were extremely bad. Kurusu said he was absolutely certain of it, not only by his own observations but from conversations he had had with important military authorities just prior to his departure from Tokyo a few weeks ago. He added that the country was absolutely war-weary, had no enthusiasm for this or any other conflict, but must be restored to peaceful conditions where normal trade could be resumed.

I got the distinct impression that the whole situation was especially bad. Commenting further on this particular subject, Kurusu said that, naturally, the militarists continued to bluster and roar, but that this was merely normal face-saving, particularly in the Army and in no way contradicted the things he had just stated, which, in brief, was that the militarists' power in Japan had definitely passed.
its high point and was definitely on the down-grade.

Likewise, Kurusu said, it was his definite opinion that pro-Axis sentiment was now on the down-grade. He, himself, and the thinking people of the country had always realized that a German victory in the West would be perhaps more dangerous for them in the East than for the United States; that Germany had no intention of assisting or even permitting Japan to retain any benefits that she might derive from her Axis victory. Furthermore, the increased number of German officers in Tokyo and the large German refugee colony had soured the situation greatly, the Japanese resenting German arrogance and manners, and were increasingly saying: "Is this the people to whom we have allied ourselves and for whom we expected to go to war with the United States and Britain!"

At this point I said that, while I had not been in touch with the State Department for at least a year and had no knowledge of what was in their minds, I felt that the best way to approach better relations between Japan and the United States was through a definite demonstration by Japan of her change of heart with regard to the Axis and a throwing-in of her lot with the British and the Americans.
Kurusu heartily agreed, but reminded me of the Anti-Comintern agreement and the military alliance which he, himself, had signed as Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. Kurusu said this most ruefully, adding, however, that he had resigned as Ambassador to Germany the next day.

We then discussed for sometime ways and means whereby Japan could show her change of heart with regard to the Axis and yet not have to break her treaties, which, Kurusu humourously said, would offend our Government's great interest in the maintenance and sanctity of treaties!

Among the expedients suggested by Kurusu was the use to which industry could be put to aid in supplying Britain and ourselves with war materiel which would help Japan to restore her own apparently desperate economic and industrial condition. I countered this with the thought that unless something of a strikingly pro-anti-Axis and pro-American and -British character were done, we would consider this manufacturing expedient, for which we would forego our present embargo, only a ruse on the part of Japan.

This brought up the question of Confidence, which, I said quite bluntly, was perhaps the crux of the whole matter, that there was no trust in Japan here, quite understandable from our point of view, that quite possibly the Japanese might feel the same way about us, and that
the important thing to work for, therefore, was a restoration of confidence between the two countries on which the future could be built. Kurusu was emphatically in agreement with this idea. He said he had been working along exactly the same line, that he had been most disappointed at the failure of the effort to have the President and Prince Konoye meet, as such a spectacular example of Japanese change of heart, and that he was still seeking some means of effecting a meeting.

Returning again to the question of how the Japanese could withdraw from China, he mentioned the time element which would require a certain "garrisoning" of Japanese troops in China for a period of years. Apparently, Government officials had viewed this with much disfavor which he said he, of course, understood because it looked suspicious, but the United States, itself, had taken considerable time to withdraw from Nicaragua, Haiti and Cuba. These things could not be done over-night, much as it might be desired.

Speaking again of the question of confidence, I reminded him that unquestionably he labored under the same difficulty in which I remember Debuchi was in the early days of the Manchurian affair when he was making statements in the morning to the Secretary of State which the militarists would repudiate in the afternoon, that, naturally, there could be no trust or confidence in such a situation
which, unfortunately, still attended. Kurusu appeared only too tragically aware of this truth, but asserted with considerable confidence that he believed the militarists were so much on the run and in such a difficult situation that, unless hot-heads among them upset the applecart — which might be done at any time — he felt that the better element in Japan was really on its way to control the situation.

At the end of our long conversation, I asked Kurusu to come and dine with Mr. Belin and myself that night at Mr. Belin's house. He said he would be only too delighted to do so, that he had not been out of the Embassy, practically since his arrival, and that he would be so happy to have this opportunity.

As agreed, Mr. Kurusu came to dinner at eight o'clock and we were just sitting down at the table when the telephone rang and he was called to it. He came back and immediately told us that the State Department had announced that President Roosevelt had sent a personal message to Emperor Hirohito, hoping that a peaceful solution could be found. Kurusu stated that he thought this was a very clever move on the part of the Government; that he could hardly say "no", nor could he say "yes", and that this would cause many headaches in Tokyo and give much food for thought.
During the course of the evening, he reiterated in the presence of Mr. Belin - whom he had never met before and who was a complete stranger to him - practically everything he had told me in the morning. He spoke with a frankness, which astonished Mr. Belin beyond measure, but with evident sincerity.

Mr. Belin, carrying the ball, followed the line taken in the morning's conversation with regard to the question of confidence and especially Kurusu's firm opinion that the flag was up in China, the military position extremely bad, and the militarists' influence, itself, on the wane. Mr. Belin stated that, in his opinion, the one step which would completely reverse things in the United States and restore confidence between the two countries would be a renouncement by Japan of the pro-Axis pact. This, Kurusu seemed to find a difficult procedure although agreeing entirely in principle.

Kurusu expressed the opinion at this juncture that he and others in Japan realized perfectly that Germany was trying to make of Japan an Italy in the Pacific, and that he hoped and prayed that they would not be successful. He had no illusions that, in the event of a German victory, the Germans would take the Netherlands East Indies for themselves and give nothing to Japan. He also repeated to Mr. Belin his Mushkden analogy to describe the present exhausted military state of Japan.
Mr. Kurusu stayed for four hours although he had ordered his car for ten o'clock and the chauffeur sent word in that he was expected back at the Embassy.

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Inspite of what happened on Sunday, Mr. Belin and I are of the firm conviction that Kurusu knew nothing of the events which were going to take place the next day.

This feeling was confirmed by a telephone conversation which I had with Kurusu Sunday evening at the suggestion of Colonel Donovan, who believed it would be advantageous for me to try to have a talk with Kurusu. When I called Kurusu on the telephone to say that I would be glad to see him if he cared to see me, his voice sounded like that of a broken man. Calling me by my first name and expressing his deep appreciation for my having telephoned, he said that he would hate to inconvenience me because there was a big crowd in front of the Embassy and many policemen. I gave him my telephone number and said that, if at any time he wished to talk with me, he could call me as I might be here several days.

Kurusu seemed quite overwhelmed and in the deepest sort of despair, both by the tone of his voice and his expressions of keenest disappointment.

Naturally, this conversation had to be guarded as he was speaking from the Japanese Embassy.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Tokyo
Dated December 8, 1941
Rec'd 6:23 a.m., 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1910, December 8, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Embassy's 1906 December 8, 1 a.m.

One. The Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock this morning asked me to call on him at his official residence.

Two. He handed me a 13 page Memorandum, dated today, which he said had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present to you this morning (evening of December 7th Washington time). He said that he had already been in touch with the Emperor who desired that the aforesaid Memorandum be regarded as his reply to the President's message.

Three. The Foreign Minister thereupon made to me the following oral statement:

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President. He has graciously let known his wishes..."
-2- #1910, December 8, 1 p.m., from Tokyo

wishes to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter's message:

Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawing of Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore, desired that the President will kindly refer to this reply.

Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact.

GREW

HPD