My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of March 23, I am enclosing herewith a suggested draft reply to be sent by you in reply to the message which the Prime Minister of New Zealand addressed to you on March 19 through the Minister of New Zealand.

In your memorandum to me you stated that you wished to hand this reply to Mr. Nash when he calls upon you tomorrow, March 24.

I am informed by the War and Navy Departments that they are drafting messages for you to send to the Prime Minister of Australia and of New Zealand. Since I am not informed of the nature of these messages, I assume that you will wish your present message, in reply to Mr. Fraser's message to you, to be brief and in general terms and I have drafted it consequently accordingly.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Encs.

The President,

The White House.
March 19, 1942.

Sir,

Mr. Churchill has advised me of the offer which you have been so good as to make through him to despatch to New Zealand a Division of the United States Army in order to enable us to retain in the Middle East the New Zealand Forces which are at present engaged there.

I have informed Mr. Churchill that we warmly welcome and at once accept this offer and I wish to extend to you personally an expression of our deep gratitude and appreciation.

In our opinion, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance in the war against Japan of New Zealand and Fiji as essential stepping stones on the route of aerial reinforcements from the United States, or of New Zealand itself as one, with Australia, of only two possible strong points in this part of the world which can and must be held during the defensive period until the time for offensive arrives, when they become vital and essential as the only possible bases from which that offensive can spring. These facts seem to us to be so patent that they will be apparent to Japanese who may well act accordingly. Substantial Japanese Forces are obviously now free for further adventures, and it seems to us, therefore, that time is of the very essence of the matter if a Japanese attack in this direction is certainly to be repulsed, and we are not without the gravest

The President of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

[Stamp: DECLASSIFIED: By Authority of JCS memo]

10 Feb 1975

By EAT Date MAR 27 1975
apprehension lest the help that you are sending to us may arrive too late.

If, therefore, in addition to the naval forces which we have been so happy to welcome in the South Western Pacific (whose recent activities have been such a splendid encouragement and inspiration to us) there is any possibility of expediting and, if possible, indeed increasing the help in men, and no less important in equipment, which the United States is now so generously extending to us, believe me Mr. President this would not only be a matter of the greatest satisfaction to us but we think a very substantial contribution to our combined war effort in the Pacific.

Prime Minister

New Zealand.
TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND

March 24, 1942

Your message of March 19 has been received through Mr. Nash. I am glad to learn that the arrangement which we proposed meets with your warm approval.

I am in complete agreement with your statements in regard to the importance in the war against Japan of New Zealand and the Fiji Islands which, together with Australia, can and must be held and used as bases for an offensive against Japan.

I want you to know, Mr. Prime Minister, that we are straining every effort to send the forces to which you refer at the earliest possible moment. We shall also do what we can toward increasing the help in men and in equipment. Everything that it is possible for us to do in this regard as a contribution to our combined war effort will be done.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Please prepare reply and
I will hand it to him when he
comes in tomorrow.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from
the Prime Minister of New Zealand
in re Division of U. S. Army going
to New Zealand.
My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a letter from the Minister of New Zealand enclosing a message addressed to you by the Prime Minister of that Dominion.

I am enclosing copies of both of these communications for your information.

Will you let me know of the reply which you desire made and also whether you wish me to arrange with your office for an appointment with you for the Minister of New Zealand during the first days of next week.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. H.

For your information and the necessary action.

F. D. R.

[Handwritten note: Share copy of this. This can be filed.]

[Handwritten initials: H.L.H.]
March 26th, 1942.

Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

The attached appreciation relative to requirements for Land and Air Defence of New Zealand is supplied in response to your desire to read it— as expressed during my interview with you on Tuesday last.

The statement does not cover Naval requirements which I would however be pleased to provide on request.

May I thank you sincerely for the close personal interest which you have shown, and are showing, in the defence of my country.

The enclosure covers the Defence requirements only without restating the extended reasons for their supply which I gave to you orally and a copy of which I have given to Mr. Harry Hopkins with whom I discussed the subject, at your request, on the evening of the same day on which I saw you.

Yours sincerely,

Encl.
Some three weeks ago, I cabled my Government enquiring for a brief appreciation of the land and air defence problems of New Zealand with estimate of land and air forces - facilities and equipment required to meet the new situation, together with a statement of facilities and equipment of land and air forces at present available and what steps were being taken to increase security by raising and equipping new formations and increasing weapon production.

The enquiry assumed that Naval Defence problems were being carried out in cooperation with the United States Navy which had already taken steps to put its policy into effect.

The first point in the reply emphasized that (1) the most effective insurance against the invasion of New Zealand is that given by Naval Forces which should, with adequate air support, intercept any enemy expedition before it reaches New Zealand - and that (2) with adequate air cover, Naval Forces must be the mainstay of the offensive for which we should start to prepare now.

Preparation of Naval bases for the United States Pacific Fleet is assumed in the following appreciation to receive very high priority. The full details of all naval requirements in New Zealand and adjacent islands associated with its defence are contained in other appreciations. This report which mentions Naval Defence in Section 1 covers Air and Land Defence requirements only in Sections 2 and 3.
SECTION 1.

2. It is noted in your telegram no request is made for unilateral appreciation Naval defence problems and it is assumed this omission is due to fact that Naval defence to a large extent is now the responsibility of the United States Navy, yet it must be emphasised however that most effective insurance against invasion is that given by Naval Forces which should with adequate air support intercept any enemy expedition before it reaches New Zealand. Moreover, with adequate air cover, Naval Forces must be the mainstay of our subsequent offensive for which we should start to prepare now. Preparation of Naval bases for United States Pacific Fleet must, therefore, receive very high priority.
3. The scale of enemy attack estimated by the Chief of the General Staff is two divisions. There can be no certainty it will not be exceeded in view of the fact that a greater proportion of 29 Japanese divisions or more in South West Pacific area may, having now completed their first task, be diverted for attack on this area. The problem must, therefore, be approached from point of view of doing maximum possible to secure both Fiji and New Zealand as bases for a future offensive. The most convenient way of answering questions on land and air offence which you ask in your telegram is to consider Army and Air problems separately. Section 2 of this message will therefore deal with Army side and Section 3 with Air. There is an added section for giving a brief appreciation of man power situation.

SECTION 2. ARMY FORCES REQUIRED.

4. The strength of the Army required to provide security for New Zealand is much influenced by Naval situation and by strength of New Zealand Air Forces. The Naval situation, even if in our favour, is liable to be seriously upset by defeat and cannot at present be regarded as in any way a substitution for local defences. Air defence depends upon quality and number of aircraft, efficiency of air units, and capacity of aerodromes and does not appear likely to afford an optimum deterrent against heavy scale of attack for a long time. Land forces are therefore of prime importance meanwhile until Naval and Air situations develop materially in our favour.
5. Factors of importance in land defence of New Zealand are:

(1) Isolation of New Zealand from other lands which virtually prevent enemy using shore based aircraft during approach and enhances value both strong New Zealand air forces and of strong land forces to prevent enemy from securing a footing anywhere in New Zealand.

(2) Elongated shape of its lengthy coast line.
- Present incomplete warning system.
- Prevalence harbours and landing beaches.
- Great distances between vulnerable points.
- Existence of Cook Straits.
- Limited capacity main roads.
- Three foot six inch gauge railways.

These factors require strong mobile forces in at least seven widely separated areas and local garrisons for secondary ports and sheltered waters in addition to fortress areas. Aerodrome protection is difficult as many are close to coast and there is much flat land in sparsely populated areas. Thus forces required in each island must be considerably superior to likely enemy forces to ensure speedy and effective opposition by at least equal forces and rapid concentration superior force.


6. Divisions complete, including:
   - anti-aircraft artillery
   - anti-tank
   - field
   - and other arms and services wide British War Establishment.

13 Battalions

10 Aerodrome Defence Battalions
9 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiments
5 Army Tank Battalions
Survey Regiments

Medium Artillery
4 9.2 inch Coast Defence Batteries
20 6 inch " " "
8 5 inch or 4 inch Coast Defence Batteries
3 Regiments Medium Artillery in semi Coast Defence Role
9 Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiments to man 238 Heavy AA guns
9 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments to man 318 Light AA guns
13 Anti-aircraft Searchlight Batteries to man 306 AA Searchlights
8 Anti-Motor Torpedo Boat fire units (of 2 guns each).

- For Fiji (for Viti Levu except where Vanua Levu stated).

1 Division complete (as for New Zealand)
2 Brigade Groups (one for Vanua Levu)

5 Battalions (two for Vanua Levu)
1 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiment
2 Squadron Army or Cruiser Tanks
1 Regiment Medium Artillery
1 Battery Medium Artillery (for Vanua Levu)
8 6 inch Coast Defence Batteries (four for Vanua Levu)
1 4.7 inch Coast Defence Battery
2 Anti-Motor Torpedo Boat fire units
2 Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiments
2 Light Anti-aircraft Regiments (two troops for Vanua Levu)
3 Anti-aircraft Searchlight Batteries.

7. AT PRESENT AVAILABLE:-

(1) In New Zealand.

Headquarters and normal services for 3 Divisions consisting of:

7 Brigade Groups comprising:

18 Battalions
4 Field Regiments
3 Field Batteries

and proportion of other arms

4 Garrison Battalions

9 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiments employed as infantry temporarily only till tanks arrive

1 Army Tank Brigade providing 1 Battalion of thirty Valentine Tanks and 2 Battalions infantry till further tanks arrive

9 6 inch Coast Defence Batteries of 19 guns (8/2 & 1/3)

5 4 inch " " " 10 " (2 each)

7 Anti-Motor Torpedo Boat fire units of 8 - 12 prs. and 6 - 6 prs. All the A.M.T.B. guns are obsolete.

2 Medium Batteries comprising 12 - 6" howitzers and 4 - 60 prs. mainly employed on Coast Defence role.

4 Anti-Tank Guns, 2 pr, at Artillery School.

Personnel for 19 and 10 Battalions are in process of being called up.

(2) In Fiji

Divisional Headquarters and normal services for:

2 Infantry Brigade Groups comprising:

6 New Zealand Battalions

2 Field Batteries with 4.25 prs.; 8-10 prs;
12 - 4.5 Howitzers; 4 - 3.7 Howitzers; total 28 guns;
and proportion of other arms, one medium
Battery of 2 - 60 pdr, 2 - 6" howitzers in
Coast Defence role,

2 (Fiji defence force) Battalions
2 - 2 gun 6" Coast Defence Batteries
1 - 2 gun 4.7 inch Coast Defence Battery
4 - 3 inch and 4 Bofors Anti-aircraft guns,
6 Anti-aircraft Searchlights
6 Thirty-seven millimetre anti-tank guns (United
States)

8. STEPS BEING TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN DEFENCE, IN NEW ZEALAND:

Increasing existing companies to battalions and calling up
personnel to form additional battalions.

Raising Maori battalion.

Training and throwing off cadres to man additional coast, medium,
field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery due to arrive.

Training home guard instructors and personnel to man various
anti-aircraft equipment and Coast Defence Artillery equipment.

Training in Army approximately six thousand air force recruits
for aerodrome battalions until required in Air Force.

Increasing production three inch Light Trench Mortars and ammunition
to provide up to sixteen mortars for each of at least fifty home guard battalions.

Production two inch mortars planned with a view to full issue to
Field Force and Home Guard.

Expediting production R.D.F. equipment.

Local production of Bren Carriers, - Beaverettes.

Grenades.

Page 7.
SAA .303 calibre.
Portable W/T Sets.
Uniforms.
Blankets.
Boots.
Mess tins.
Water bottles and miscellaneous.
Barbing of imported plain wire.
Building bodies on imported Motor Vehicles.
Experiments proceeding for local production anti-tank mines, W.T. exploders.

9. ESTIMATED STATES OF READINESS AT FUTURE DATES:
(1) By June 30th, 1942, two-thirds of force complete minimum six months continuous training, balance three months. On present evidence we will then be short of 9.2 inch Coast Defence guns,
anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns,
anti-(air)craft Searchlights,
tanks for 9 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiments,
anti-tank mines and possibly rifles for 100,000 Home Guards.

Apart from these shortages, the Forces should be well able to undertake by that date active operations. Entrenchments, obstacles and improvements to road and bridges should be well advanced.

(2) By December 31st, 1942, Forces should be thoroughly fit for any operations if the necessary equipment has arrived.
10. (1) Reinforcements required in order of priority, (all troops should have camp equipment including tents and at least first, second and third line ammunition. Any available war reserves of ammunition should accompany all weapons sent.

For Fiji - Viti Levu:

2 Brigade Groups
1 Battalion
2 Squadrons Army or Cruiser Tanks
2 Heavy A.A. Regiments
2 Light A.A. Regiments,
3 Anti-Aircraft Search Light Batteries.
1 Regiment Medium Artillery.
2 Anti-Motor Torpedo Boat fire units.
1 Armoured Fighting Vehicle or armoured car regiment.

For New Zealand:

9 Heavy AA Regiments
9 Light AA Regiments
13 Anti-Aircraft Searchlight Batteries
2 9.2 inch Coast Defence Batteries
8 Anti-Motor Torpedo Boat units.
Two Regiments Medium Artillery.

TWO DIVISIONS COMPLETE
One Army Tank Battalion.
One Regiment Medium Artillery.
One Army Reserve Battalion.
For Fiji - Vanua Levu:

1 Infantry Brigade Group complete with field Artillery, anti-tank Artillery,
Light A.A. Artillery,
and proportion of other arms,
2 Battalions,
1 Battery Medium Artillery,
4 6 inch Coast Defence Batteries,
2 troops Light AA Artillery,
all same priority.

For New Zealand:

1 Division complete
1 Regiment Medium Artillery

For Tonga:

As required in accordance with United States of America development intentions. Water development essential.

For Western Samoa:

As required according to effect on defence American Samoa.

(2) EQUIPMENT:

A.A. Searchlights, Anti Tank guns
Tanks for Armoured Fighting Vehicle Regiments
Rifles and L.M.G.S.
EQUIPMENT (Continued)

9.2 inch Coast Defence guns and equipment,
Medium and Field Artillery
Anti-Motor Torpedo Boat guns,
6 inch or similar Coast Defence guns,
Army or Cruiser Tanks,
.30 (United States of America) S.A.A.

3. AIR

It is not possible to make a satisfactory statement of immediate and ultimate air requirements for defence of New Zealand and Fiji. These must be related to a central strategic plan. We cannot intelligently state requirements without knowing strategic intentions. So far we have been requested to prepare for reception in New Zealand of two hundred heavy bombers and invited to consider preparing for nearly four hundred naval aircraft. These proposals are evidently part of a plan related to South West Pacific, a plan on such a scale is considered essential and within that plan we estimate very large air forces would be based in New Zealand and Fiji.

12. The following roles fall to air forces countering enemy invasion:
   (a) Reconnaissance sea areas of approaches for which we will be responsible to locate enemy carriers, warships and transports.
   (b) To strike at enemy transports during their approach.
   (c) To destroy enemy aircraft carriers and otherwise to obtain air ascendancy over enemy carrier borne aircraft in operations area.
(d) To give bomber and reconnaissance support to Army.
(e) To provide fighter protection over important targets main waters and aerodromes.

13. The following secondary roles fall to air force in protection of New Zealand and Fiji against raids.
   (a) Reconnaissance sea areas other than invasion approach areas.
   (b) Escort shipping convoys.

14. The air forces required for all purposes are in excess of available aerodrome accommodation. Numerous excellent aerodromes exist in New Zealand but these mostly require extension and concreting and preparation of protected disposal positions.

15. As regards land aircraft, the first essential is to supply large quantities of aerodrome construction machinery. We have sent very large proportion of our construction machinery to Middle East, Far East and Fiji and there is now an acute shortage of machinery in New Zealand.

16. If Fiji and New Zealand are to be held and are to become important base areas in future offensive operations we estimate we require following as soon as possible:

   6 Squadrons long-range flying boats
   6 Squadrons torpedo bombers
   8 Squadrons dive bombers
   8 Squadrons long-range bombers
   6 Squadrons long-range fighters
   9 Squadrons interceptor fighters
   4 Squadrons Army Co-operation reconnaissance
   3 Squadrons heavy transport and paratroop Headquarters, maintenance depots, operational training units.
Bombing, gunnery, navigation, operational, gas and other flying training schools.
Aircraft assembly plants.
28 Air warning sets for high and low approach.
Rocket defence apparatus for 20 aerodromes.

17. Not knowing what might be made available we cannot state our preference for priority. We desire to be informed of Combined Chiefs of Staffs intentions and requirements as regards New Zealand and Fiji and we will immediately recommend what we can undertake and what we require to give effect to these intentions and requirements.

18. At present time we are prepared to receive and operate in New Zealand and Fiji any number of Squadrons which can conceivably be sent here within the next three months. We are prepared to disrupt our Empire training organisation to any extent required for purpose of accomodating operational squadrons while new aerodromes are being prepared.

19. In default of complete units or aircraft with trained crews we are prepared to accept and operate any numbers of aircraft and equipment not exceeding the following figures within the next three months:

- 6 Flying boats
- 60 Hudsons
- 75 Kittyhawks
- 25 Aerocobras
- 25 Long-range fighters
- 50 Vultees dive bombers
- 18 Radio location sets
- Rocket defence apparatus for
- 20 aerodromes.
Of the above we have been promised and expect to receive within the next three months 40 Hudsons, 52 Kittyhawks, 6 Beau fighters, 10 Radio location sets.

20. We possess at present time in New Zealand and Fiji 30 Hudsons, 24 Aerocobras. Otherwise we have no aircraft although we can and would put into air 4 Squadrons VINCENTS, 7 Squadrons OXFORDS, HARVARDS and NOLHS armed to bomb and fight. But recent experience has shown that obsolete aircraft can achieve very little result in presence of strong enemy air forces. We have 8 air-warning sets, 4 of which are unsuitable for detecting approach of low flying aircraft.

21. We recognize that our future success in the Pacific must depend upon regaining control of sea communications and that when this has been achieved the danger to New Zealand will recede and its importance as a base for offensive operations will increase. In present and in future circumstances we must be powerfully equipped with air forces but planning of those air forces must be left to the Combined Chiefs of Staffs and to a Supreme Commander.

22. All Service squadrons in New Zealand and Fiji are in constant readiness. All auxiliary squadrons are available at a few hours' notice.

23. All squadrons stated as requirements in paragraph 16 with exception of 3 Squadrons long-range bombers reconnaissance and one or possibly two squadrons interceptor fighters which are required as reinforcements should be complete with all equipment: Headquarters, maintenance, Services and tents. Alternatively the aircraft and equipment listed in paragraph 19 together with full scales of spares and tools can be regarded as being supplied in part substitution for reinforcements.
24. Hitherto the New Zealand Air Force has been primarily concerned producing partly trained air crews for Empire Air Training Scheme. This has been reduced to 3 elementary flying training schools, two service flying training schools, one instructor's school, miscellaneous ground training schools, and we have formed one bomber Operational Training Unit, one fighter Operational Training Unit and one General Reconnaissance School.

25. There is no aircraft industry in New Zealand except for the manufacture of a small number of MOTHS. The existing maintenance organisation is sufficient to maintain New Zealand Air Force as at present arrangements are being made to increase maintenance facilities by commandeering available workshop machinery and garage crews.

26. No technical equipment for Air Force is manufactured in New Zealand except wireless equipment on a small scale and spare parts ad hoc for aircraft and engines.

27. The maintenance and manning problems connected with new squadrons might be greatly eased if it were decided to transfer major part of air training now done in New Zealand to Canada.

This would have the further effect of economising on shipping space and tankers now required for maintaining training scheme in New Zealand.

MAN POWER. 28. The following is a brief statement of man-power position:

The population of New Zealand is 1,612,000.

The following is a brief statement of the position:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Sent Overseas</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>52,712</td>
<td>6,582</td>
<td>61,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In New Zealand,</td>
<td>3,001</td>
<td>52,983</td>
<td>11,280</td>
<td>67,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>128,632</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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This represents 7.6 per cent of the total population.
A further 26,500 men to complete the establishment of the territorial force has been ballotted and is in process of joining units.

The remaining men available will be ballotted almost immediately.

After the above 26,500 men have all joined, the total mobilised will be 155,132, or nearly 10 per cent of the entire population.

The bulk of the balance of men liable for service will not be available either on account of unfitness or the requirements of industry.

In addition to the above numbers, there is a Home Guard composed of men between the ages of 16 and 60 with a strength of 100,000. These will be mobilised in case of an attack.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from Brigadier General Patrick Hurley, dated May 20, 1942, Wellington, New Zealand, with clippings from various newspapers.
June 5, 1942

Dear Pat:

I have received and read with interest your letter of May 20 in which you emphasize the wholehearted effort which the Governments of Australia and New Zealand are making in the common war effort.

Any impression that we are in any way unfriendly toward the existing governments in these countries and are not appreciative of their war efforts is, of course, wholly erroneous. As you say, it would not be appropriate for us to make any suggestions regarding the domestic political situation in a country with which we are now so closely associated. Nevertheless, the information contained in your letter is very helpful to us in the conduct of our relations with these countries.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
Patrick J. Hurley,
American Minister,
Wellington.
My dear Mr. President:

In response to your memorandum of May 30, 1942, I enclose for your consideration a draft letter for your signature to the Honorable Patrick J. Hurley, Minister to New Zealand, in reply to his letter of May 20.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
Draft letter.

The President,
The White House.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF
COORDINATION AND REVIEW

June 10, 1942

Miss Brady,
The White House:

It is regretted that this original letter from the American Minister to New Zealand was omitted from the Department's letter of June 4 to the President transmitting a draft reply.
My dear Mr. President:

Having completed my military mission, I have now settled down as a diplomat. I wish to express to you my appreciation of the opportunity you have given me to serve.

I have reported all my official business to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of State.

There is, however, a matter of political importance that I would like to bring directly and privately, but nevertheless officially, to your attention.

As you well know, both Australia and New Zealand have at the present time Labor Governments. In the Cabinets of both are men who were pacifists during the last war. Indeed, some of these members of the Cabinets were incarcerated for subversive conduct. Whatever may be said of the former conduct of the members of the two present Governments, I can state to you from experience and knowledge that all of them are now cooperating sincerely, enthusiastically and efficiently in the war effort. The Opposition to the present Labor Governments in both Australia and New Zealand is, generally speaking, what we refer to in the United States as the vested interests. At least, those who make up the Opposition are well-to-do and wealthy or rich. There is in progress at the present time a deliberate attempt to oust the Governments in both Australia and New Zealand. The Opposition to the existing Governments leave the impression that neither Mr. Churchill nor yourself are favorable to the present Governments. This is especially true of the Australian Government.

Personally, I am convinced that it is a blessing to have these Labor Governments at this time. You will fully understand that a
great
great majority in both the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand are spiritually and on a basis of the principles involved, intensely active in the war effort. But the political issue, as usual, has a more materialistic basis. The well-to-do, the wealthy or the rich have no choice from a materialistic standpoint, except to go forward with the war effort. If the war is lost they will lose everything. The property of the well-to-do is their material stake in the success of the United Nations in the war. On the other hand, the supporters of the Labor Government are the people who claim that they have not had equality of opportunity; that they have not had their equitable share in the country's income. If their Government is ousted they will not have as great a stake or as great incentive to win the war as they have now. The Labor people have come around to the position that the responsibility of winning this war is their responsibility. The working people of both New Zealand and Australia, the men who have always been the most drastic critics of the economic system and the Government are now vigorously supporting the Labor Governments and the war effort. I need draw no diagram to indicate to you how fortunate it is to have this support for the war effort at these places at this time.

Before leaving Australia, I outlined this situation in detail to General MacArthur. It would, of course, be improper for any of us to make any public suggestion regarding the domestic political situation.

I have understood that you are being approached or will be approached in the near future by representatives of the Opposition to the present Governments. I felt that I owed it to you to give you my opinion on the subject. That opinion is that the best results for the war effort can be obtained by sustaining the present Labor Governments both in New Zealand and Australia.

Representation in the War Cabinets of both New Zealand and Australia have been and will be further diversified so as to give all elements a voice in the war effort.

With best wishes for your health and the success of the great cause which you are leading, I am,

Respectfully and faithfully,

Patrick Hurley,
American Minister.

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House, Washington, D.C.
A HEARTENING MESSAGE AND ROUSING APPEAL

In his first public speech since his arrival to take up his duties as United States Minister to New Zealand, delivered at the State luncheon given by the Government yesterday, Brigadier-General Hurley conveyed to the people of this Dominion a most heartening message from his own country. It breathed a spirit of determination and purpose in the struggle now raging in the Pacific and throughout the world that spoke eloquently of the feeling animating the war effort of the great Republic of free men and free institutions he has the honour to represent as its first Minister to this young nation.

The speech was a model of conciseness, precision, and telling emphasis. It is difficult, indeed, to recall an official deliverance in which so much was conveyed in so few words. Not only was it a message of hope and encouragement to a little country faced with a terrible menace, but it was also a fighting speech, a call for action, unsparing sacrifice, and unstinted effort by every citizen throughout this land. One ringing passage deserves special emphasis for the moral to be drawn from it by the New Zealand people:

This challenge (declared his Excellency) cannot be met by words. We must attack, defeat, and destroy the autocracy of Japan in battle upon the land, upon the sea, under the sea, and in the air. In the face of this it seems futile for us to continue to debate our social, political, economic, and diplomatic objectives—all of these objectives will be lost if we lose the war.

These are words to stir our hearts and energies, fire the imagination, and impel a new spirit in the councils of our public institutions from Parliament down throughout the great mass of the people.

The United States Minister has pledged to us the friendship, sympathy, and assistance of 130,000,000 American people in the common cause of liberty and the destruction of aggression and tyranny. This splendid gesture should be heavily upon our conscience as a nation and a people, for it implies a whole-hearted measure of reciprocity in productive effort as well as in military preparations by which the earnestness and sincerity of our war effort will be judged. The standard of measurement is best expressed by his Excellency's own words, in which he laid down the principle of action that must be the animating force of the total war effort of the United Nations if victory is to be won:

It is necessary (he emphasized) for us to mobilize the productive strength of the free peoples at home behind the soldier who fights. The leader of industry, manager of production, worker in the factory, in the field, or unloading a ship—in fact, every leader, manager, and worker is fighting, and if they shirk they are breaking faith with the soldier who dies in battle.

The New Zealand people will feel deeply grateful for these inspiring words. Coming from the distinguished representative of a mighty nation allied with them in defence of everything held dear by their citizens—rights, and privileges, and free institutions achieved by the blood and tears of past generations of the English-speaking peoples—they should mark a turning point in the war effort of this Dominion, a mark from which a new goal of achievement will be set, with a new and inspired effort to reach it.
"ATTACK, DEFEAT, AND DESTROY"

With a simple directness, which made his words all the more effective, the United States Minister to New Zealand, Brigadier-General Hurley, yesterday gave a stirring call to action which cannot fail to find an immediate and enthusiastic response in the minds of New Zealanders. Brigadier-General Hurley, after a distinguished career in the service of his country in many fields, comes to New Zealand at a critical time in the history of the Pacific nations, and the public will join wholeheartedly with the Prime Minister in the welcome extended to him both personally and as a representative of the United States, which is now playing such a vital part in the Pacific theatre of war. There will be gratitude and approval, too, for the stirring manner in which the Minister summed up the task which confronts the peoples of this part of the world.

"The Japanese," he said, "have challenged the freedom of the Pacific Ocean and the liberty and way of life of all peaceful nations. This challenge cannot be met by words. We must attack, defeat, and destroy the autocracy of Japan in battle upon the land, upon the sea, and in the air." In these three sentences, Brigadier-General Hurley, with welcome realism, gave eloquent expression to the true offensive spirit which wins battles and ultimately wins war. The thrilling raid on the Philippines from Australian bases, reported today, is evidence that that spirit really lives.

In his approach to other problems facing the United Nations Brigadier-General Hurley was equally realistic. Again in simple but effective language, the Minister made clear the duty which rests on all at a time when everything that democratic peoples hold dear is at stake. Not only must we be determined to strike heavy blows at the enemy with the full strength of our armed forces, but we must be prepared to make every sacrifice on the home front to ensure that our soldiers, sailors, and airmen are able to do their job unhampered in any way. Emphasizing the futility of mere words in the face of aggression, Brigadier-General Hurley said:

In the face of this fact it seems futile for us to continue to debate social, political, economic, and diplomatic objectives, because all of these objectives will be lost if we lose the war. Our rights and privileges are hard-won and they are dear to us, and we intend to perpetuate them. In order to do this, it is necessary for us to mobilize the productive strength of the free peoples at home behind the soldier. The leader of industry, manager of commerce, worker in the factory, in the field, or unloading a ship—in fact, every leader, manager, and worker is fighting, and if they shrink they are breaking faith with the soldier who dies in battle.

These are plain words, but they convey a message which no people fighting for their existence against powerful and ruthless enemies can afford to ignore. Total war has been forced upon us; our answer must be total war.

In the final passage of his speech Brigadier-General Hurley gave this message to the people of New Zealand:

New Zealand is engaged in this war for its survival and for its principles and for its way of life. I come to you today from your kinsmen across the mighty Pacific, from the greatest republic on earth, from the Land of Liberty, to say to you that your principles are our principles and your cause is our cause, and as a token of our faith in the victory of that cause to pledge to you the resources, the lives, the honour, and the power of one hundred and thirty million Americans.

What more inspiring and heartening message could the Minister of a great and powerful nation bring to an ally? In a few sentences Brigadier-General Hurley, speaking as the direct representative of President Roosevelt, placed his country alongside New Zealand without limitation of any kind. But such a pledge carries with it great responsibilities for the recipient as well as the giver. Such a pledge, indeed, cannot be accepted unless we, too, pledge ourselves without reserve to fight and work as we have never fought and worked before. We cannot, in honour, take the pledge as an excuse for relaxing our own efforts. We must resist sternly any inclination to say: "America will look after us, so we can take up again our political or industrial quarrels, and we need not interrupt our social programmes." America is taking great burdens, and preparing to take more. Our recognition and gratitude must be expressed, not by leaning, but by standing erect, small though our stature may be, beside the great republic. America is not suspending her economic and social advance so that we may indulge in effort-wasting, futile strife, but to attack, defeat, and destroy Japanese autocracy. The pledge of all aid to us is the most direct call to us to unite, end all domestic dissension and sectional quarrelling, and keep faith with America's soldiers and our own.
My dear Mr. President:

I am writing you officially today, but I wanted to drop this note to you personally to express the appreciation of all of the Americans here as well as the New Zealanders for the fact that you have sent Admiral Richard E. Byrd out here on a mission. The fact that he is here has not been publicised. It is a military secret, but you know how effectively "grape vine" information travels.

No other American is as personally well-known or as genuinely loved by New Zealanders as Dick Byrd. Every place I go I find that New Zealanders are measuring all Americans by Byrd. You can well understand what a great asset that is to all of us.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.
3-13-42

Respectfully referred to the President.

MHM
August 13, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCINTYRE:

Minister Hurley in a personal telegram to the Secretary, which has been received from the American Consul at Noumea, states that Prime Minister Fraser after a conference has returned to New Zealand, since the present situation in that area requires certain matters to be settled by the Prime Minister. The date of departure from New Zealand has been tentatively set for August 21.

George T. Summerlin
My dear Mr. President,

I cannot leave Washington without expressing to you my very warm appreciation of the kindness and hospitality that have been extended to me and to the members of my party by all with whom we have come into contact in the United States.

I count it a very special privilege that I have had the opportunity of discussing with you personally our common problems in this war and, in particular, the situation in the Pacific. I shall carry back to my own country the conviction that the position of the Pacific is appreciated and is receiving full consideration in light of the responsibilities undertaken and the pledges given in respect of other theatres of war.

I attach much importance to personal visits such as this and I sincerely trust that you will find it possible at no distant period to enable us to welcome in our part of the world a responsible representative of the United States.

Again thanking you and assuring you of my very warmest appreciation of my reception here,

I remain, Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

The President,

United States of America,

WASHINGTON. D.C.
March 18, 1943.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am sending this message by Walter Nash, and I hope that you will let Mr. Nash come back to Washington again as soon as you can. He has been a splendid representative of our sister democracy of New Zealand.

May I also take this opportunity of expressing my congratulations to the people of New Zealand on their splendid part in the war?

And may I also thank all of them for their cordial hospitality to our American soldiers, sailors and marines? The result is already the basis of a greater friendship and understanding in the future than we have ever had before.

With my sincere regards,

Mr. Peter Fraser,
Prime Minister of New Zealand,
Wellington,
New Zealand.
My dear Mr. President:

I am writing to thank you for the very kind message you sent to me by Mr. Nash and I would like to tell you how very much my colleagues and I value your appreciative remarks about Mr. Nash's work in Washington. I hope it will be possible for us to let him return to a post of such preeminent importance to our country.

I can assure you that New Zealand greatly values its association with the United States of America and our people are deeply appreciative of the assistance rendered to them by the United States in so many fields and in so many ways.

I speak for all sections when I say that the bonds of friendship between the two peoples are daily becoming stronger under the influence of personal contacts and assistance mutually rendered.

I trust that you are maintaining your health and strength despite the enormous burden of responsibilities upon your shoulders.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt Esq.,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Published in the Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45. (The War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand, 1951) Vol. 11, p. 220.
June 9, 1943.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Just before Winston Churchill left here, he told me that your Parliament had agreed that the Second N.Z. Expeditionary Force should be kept in the Mediterranean. Congratulations and thanks!

I hope much that the next Mediterranean operations will be so speedy and so successful that your troops can get home to rest a bit and be ready for the operations against Japan.

I do hope that Mrs. Roosevelt can visit you. We are all doing much talking about it -- but don't say anything yet! Give my regards to Walter Nash.

With every good wish,

As ever yours,

Right Honorable Peter Fraser,
Prime Minister of New Zealand,
Wellington,
New Zealand.
THE PRESIDENT.

2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

The Prime Minister instructs me to send you the attached paraphrase of a telegram he has just received from Mr. Fraser, and to add the following from himself:

"You will see they have played up very well. I am sending Fraser a message of thanks, and I am sure he would greatly appreciate one from you."

T. L. Rowan.
23.5.43
Paraphrased version published in the Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45. (The War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand, 1951) Vol. 11, pages 211-212
PARLIMENT today agreed that the 2nd N.Z. Expeditionary Force should be kept in the Mediterranean. Members had the full facts before them and paid great heed to the opinions expressed by President Roosevelt and yourself, and by General Freyberg and Mr. Jones, Minister of Defence, in support of retaining the Division for use in Europe. On the other hand, there was the known viewpoint of Australia, and Members realized keenly that the Government and people of the Commonwealth would regard such action by New Zealand as showing reluctance to assist to her full capacity in meeting joint dangers in the Pacific and to take her share of the grim and heavy toll which tropical disease levies on those serving in forward areas in this theatre. The choice was difficult and made after anxious and serious thought. But only a few dissented from the final decision.

In view of our increasing manpower difficulties, Parliament agreed with the view you yourself expressed, that, as and when it becomes necessary, the establishment should be
reduced. The further use of the 2nd N.Z. Expeditionary Force will depend, of course, on the time taken to absorb the relief force, and also the 4th Armoured Brigade which you state will not be battle-worthy till October. The New Zealand Government naturally wish that this Brigade be re-absorbed as soon as possible into the Division.

22nd May, 1943.
New Zealand Legation
Washington, D. C.
August 4, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to forward to you a letter which has arrived today by diplomatic mail from New Zealand.

Yours sincerely,

G. S. Ck.
Charge d'Affaires.

President F.D. Roosevelt,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dear President Roosevelt,

I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your very kind personal letter of June 9, in which you refer to the decision of Parliament that the 2nd New Zealand Division should remain in the Mediterranean Theatre.

This decision was arrived at only after long and anxious consideration of the rival claims of the two regions - Pacific and European - and of the advice and opinions of those concerned, including Mr. Churchill and yourself and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and of the growing manpower difficulties under which we are now labouring in the fourth year of war.

Having decided the matter, it is our intention to continue to maintain the 2nd Division for future operations in the European Theatre as long as our resources and the needs of the situation permit. It is also our intention to maintain the 3rd Division in the Pacific as a two brigade force for immediate service with Admiral Halsey's forces up till such time as our remaining manpower resources will not permit of its reinforcement.

Our Pacific air and naval commitments will, of course, have first priority, and we will continue to devote our full productive effort towards the sustenance of your forces and our own in the South Pacific Area.

I was delighted to learn that you were hoping that Mrs. Roosevelt could visit this part of the world and I can assure you we join with you in that regard and would assure her of a most enthusiastic and warm-hearted welcome.

I regret that it will not be possible for Mr. Nash to return to Washington before our General Election is held. This should take place, I anticipate, in the latter half of September, and naturally Mr. Nash's future movements will depend upon its outcome.

Kind regards,

Franklin D. Roosevelt Esq.,
President of the United States

Yours sincerely,

Prime Minister's Office,
Wellington.
14th July, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to your memorandum of 25 January relative to a letter from Mr. Nash which outlines the manpower situation in New Zealand, we feel that this is a matter for study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to arrive at a sound decision. The military implications of this subject involve:

(a) Shipping requirements.

(b) The relative importance to the war effort of the New Zealand military and food production programs.

(c) The effect of a reduction in Mediterranean forces on OVERLORD and ANVIL.

(d) The concentration of the New Zealand effort closer to the homeland.

(e) A possible precedent for other of the United Nations with forces overseas to press for the release of these forces at times which might prove inopportune.

We also feel that the proposal that this be studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should come from the British rather than the United States.

We therefore recommend that you inform Mr. Nash that you believe this matter requires study and recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and suggest that he so advise Mr. Churchill.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to your memorandum of 25 January relative to a letter from Mr. Nash which outlines the manpower situation in New Zealand, we feel that this is a matter for study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to arrive at a sound decision. The military implications of this subject involve:

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Copy to accompany original
MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland

It is desired that the attached memorandum from the President, dated January 25, 1944, regarding the question of maintenance of New Zealand Army Divisions, be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible and a reply be made to the President.

The return of all papers, with the reply to the President, is desired.

William Deady

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973
Published in the Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45. (The War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand, 1951) Vol. 11, P. 336.

CLS 6/30/59
February 1, 1944

My dear Mr. Nash:

I have received from the American Joint Chiefs of Staff comment on your letter of January 24th regarding the employment of New Zealand manpower to the best advantage in our common war effort.

The Chiefs of Staff advise me that the military implications involved are as follows:

(a) Shipping requirements.

(b) The relative importance to the war effort of the New Zealand military and food production programs.

(c) The effect of a reduction in the Mediterranean forces on operations planned for the near future.

(d) The concentration of the New Zealand effort closer to the homeland.

(e) The possible precedent for others of the United Nations with forces overseas to press for the release of these forces at times that might prove inopportune.

The American Chiefs of Staff, believing this matter of concern to both Great Britain and the United States, recommend that it be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and that the question should be referred to the Combined Staff by the British Government.

I therefore suggest that you consider referring the entire matter to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Most sincerely,

President

His Excellency,
Mr. Walter Nash
New Zealand Legation
Washington, D.C.
My dear President,

This letter will serve to acknowledge the one which you wrote to me on the 1st instant conveying the comments of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff on the contents of my letter to you of January 24th last.

I am hoping to proceed to London tomorrow, Saturday, and will then discuss the subject with the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

I much appreciate your courtesy.

With every good wish,

I am,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Please take up with the Joint Staff the following question and let me have an informal report.

The New Zealand Minister, Mr. Nash, came to me the other day and said that it is impossible for New Zealand to maintain two full divisions, one in Italy and the other in the Solomons. I gather it is a question of replacements.

My first thought is that the request for the elimination of one division should be acceded to, and my second thought is that it should be the division in Italy because the maintenance of that division from a base in New Zealand means a tremendous amount of transportation in both directions. It might be possible to keep the Italian Division in Italy certainly until Rome is in our hands -- say April first -- but this is a matter which concerns the Combined Staffs.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

I should like to have a slant on it which I shall communicate to Mr. Churchill.

There are a number of other questions which the Joint Staff or the Combined Staffs here could let me have a thought on.

F. D. R.

P.S. Please return Mr. Nash's letter with your reply.
Published in the *Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45.* (The War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand, 1951) Vol. 11, PP. 331-334.
My dear Mr. President,

May I first thank you for your courtesy in arranging at such short notice to discuss the problem stated by me to you in connection with manpower in New Zealand.

My delay in making the case in writing has been due to my desire to obtain Mr. Fraser's latest views on the situation. He has now advised me that Mr. Churchill would be glad to see me in London as soon as possible.

The position in New Zealand requires some clarification in order to determine the most effective method by which we can use our manpower to help the war effort.

Our position at the time of the most recent full analysis was as follows:-

Total number of males between the ages of 14 - 64  
600,000

Of this total those engaged either full time with war and defence forces - in munition and war equipment manufacture - essential work or minor less essential work numbered  
560,000

Total number of males between Service ages (18 - 40)  
330,000

Of this total, at middle of last year those serving full time in Army, Navy or Air services (exclusive of casualties) numbered  
149,000

Of this 149,000, the forces overseas totalled  
70,000

The large proportion engaged in full-time war services is causing a reduction in our production of primary products.
When I left New Zealand for instance in December last it was not possible to obtain full production in our meat freezing works (corresponding to your Meat Packing houses) owing to shortage of manpower. Our butter, cheese and meat production from the farms is also declining owing to shortage of manpower (and of fertiliser, which is in very short supply).

We are anxious to use our full resources to finish the war at the earliest possible date and also to meet all our commitments overseas, but we have to determine now where our manpower can best be used.

Where is the need greatest?

(a) Is it in providing airmen for Europe, India and the Pacific,

(b) Is it to meet Naval requirements in the Pacific and other areas,

(c) Or in maintaining a Division in the Mediterranean Zone,

(d) Or in maintaining two brigades in the South Pacific Area.

On present evidence we have decided to endeavour to maintain our air strength, which on October 31st last totalled 40,547 men - and to provide for expansion already planned; this means that the airmen required will absorb most of the young men reaching service age (18 years for service in New Zealand, 21 years for service overseas).

It is proposed to maintain the Navy at its present strength - 8,356.

The Army strength at October 31st was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In New Zealand</td>
<td>31,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the South Pacific War Zone</td>
<td>21,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Europe</td>
<td>33,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor additions</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This gave a total of 87,016.

If the Air Force is to be fully provided for and the Navy strength maintained there are no resources from
which we can send reinforcements to either the European or Pacific Armies.

When the question as to the place where New Zealand's manpower could best be used was raised early last year, the advice given by yourself and Mr. Churchill was to keep the land forces in the field in both the European and Pacific Areas - even though it was not possible to send men to replace casualties, etc. It is thought that on present evidence it would be unwise to pursue this policy to its limit.

It is not possible with our existing resources of men and women to maintain the strength of our present forces.

The problem therefore resolves itself into requiring the answer to the question: How can New Zealand best serve?

(a) By maintaining and expanding its Air Forces?
(b) By maintaining its present Naval strength?
(c) By maintaining its Division in Europe?
(d) By maintaining its Forces in the Pacific Zone?
(e) By maintaining and if possible expanding its production of food supplies, particularly butter, cheese and meat?

Presuming that it is decided that the wisest course would be to maintain a force in one Zone only - European or Pacific - in which place could New Zealand best serve the war effort?

A further question which immediately arises is -

If any changes of the present programme are to be made when would be the best time for them to take place.

If you so desired I could set out the reasons for and against utilising our forces in the Pacific or European Zones, but they are so well-known to you that I have presumed it not necessary to do so. This of course would include the timing of changes and the other factors associated with the fluid nature of the war in Europe and the Pacific.

The New Zealand Government would be helped by your advice as to what you consider is the best course to follow under present circumstances.
My present plans are being made on the assumption that (weather permitting) I will leave for London to obtain Mr. Churchill's advice not later than the end of next week. If I could obtain your opinion and advice prior to my leaving it would help me to prepare my report from London to Mr. Fraser for submission to the New Zealand War Cabinet, with whom the final decision will rest.

Again thanking you for your help and advice, and with every good wish

I am,
Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I asked Summerville to present a memorandum giving all the expected visits and the status at present. I thought this would be of interest to you.

Regarding the visit of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Summerville's memorandum was sent prior to my telling him that the President would probably be away from Washington at that time. Summerville will arrange for suitable accommodations for the Prime Minister and his party and Mr. Hull will receive him. I explained that whether the President sees Mr. Fraser will depend upon circumstances at the time.

E.M.W.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

The latest information available on pending visits of distinguished foreigners is as follows:

CANADA - His Excellency The Governor General of Canada and Her Royal Highness The Princess Alice

The Governor General and HRH The Princess Alice are expected to arrive in Washington by plane on Monday, April 17 at 12:30 P.M. It is understood that they will stay at the White House and leave Washington on Thursday, April 20 at 11 A.M. by air for New York. (See Ray Atherton's letter attached).

The party will comprise the Governor General and HRH The Princess Alice; Miss Vera Grenfell, Lady-in-Waiting; Sir Shuldham Redfern, Secretary to the Governor General; one Aide-de-Camp; a maid and a valet.

AUSTRALIA - The Right Honorable John Curtin
Prime Minister of Australia

The Department has been notified of no change in the Prime Minister's schedule to arrive in Washington on Wednesday, April 19, although the Australian Legation states that there may be some delay, owing to the PM's reluctance to fly the Pacific. According to the Legation, if he comes by boat, he could not arrive in Washington before April 25. The Legation has cabled again today to Canberra for the PM's plans.

NEW ZEALAND - The Right Honorable Peter Fraser
Prime Minister of New Zealand

The New Zealand Legation at Washington has informed the Department that the Prime Minister, accompanied by Mrs. Fraser.
Fraser, Mr. McIntosh, Secretary for External Affairs, and four others, expects to arrive in Washington "about the middle of the month (of April)" en route to London for the opening of the Conference of Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth on May 1.

COSTA RICA - His Excellency Tedoro Picado
President-elect of Costa Rica

President-elect Picado has been told that if he wishes to visit the United States, he should not arrive until after the visit of the Prime Minister of Australia. This was done pursuant to your instruction.

S/ G.T. SUMMERLIN

George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosure:
From Ray Atherton,
March 20, 1944
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, March 20, 1944

My dear Jack:

I had a talk with the Secretary to the Governor General, Sir Shuldham Redfern, on Saturday, who advised me that, subsequent to an invitation from the President, His Excellency The Governor General and Her Royal Highness, The Princess Alice will visit Washington (The White House).

The party will consist of the Governor General and the Princess Alice, Miss Vera Grenfell, Lady-in-Waiting, Sir Shuldham Redfern, Secretary to the Governor General, one Aide-de-Camp, a maid and a valet. The dates and itinerary are as follows:

Monday, April 17
9:00 a.m. Depart Ottawa (Rockcliffe) by air
12:30 p.m. Arrive Washington.

Thursday, April 20
11:00 a.m. Depart Washington (by air)
12:00 noon Arrive New York (La Guardia Field)
3:30 p.m. Depart New York (by air)
5:45 p.m. Arrive Ottawa (Rockcliffe)

Sir Shuldham Redfern informed me this is the first visit that their Excellencies had ever made to Washington and that, being very fond of sightseeing, they would first of all welcome an occasion to visit The National Gallery and also, if possible, Mount Vernon and some of the sights about Washington. Furthermore, although they are entirely at the disposal of the President as to their plans, they would be agreeable, if the opportunity permitted, to accept an invitation from the Canadian Ambassador at the Canadian Embassy and

John D. Hickerson, Esquire,
Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs,
Office of European Affairs,
Washington, D. C.,
U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaeble Date FEB 10 1972
from the British Ambassador at the British Embassy.

We will advise you shortly prior to their arrival as to any pending matters of interest as useful background to any conversations.

Yours sincerely,

RAY ATHERTON
TELEGRAM  From THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1944.

MRS. ROOSEVELT

I do hope you can arrange to be here when Lord Athlone
and Princess Alice are here. They get here the seventeenth
and stay until the nineteenth. It is not necessary to be
here with Curtin though he may be here at the same time.

F. D. R.
TELEGRAM From THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

March 17, 1944.

MRS. ROOSEVELT

Lord Athlone, Governor General of Canada, and his wife want to stay with us at the White House April 17th to 19th. Prime Minister Curtin is expected to arrive about April 18th or 19th. I hope much that you can be in Washington at that time. Will you let me know? Love

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ambassador McCarthy informed me that the Governor General and his wife, the Princess Alice, want to avail themselves of the President's repeated invitation to visit him. They suggested they might arrive April 17th and stay until April 19th. May I call the President's attention to the fact that Prime Minister Curtin, of Australia, is expected to arrive about April 18th or 19th.

Ambassador McCarthy says he will this afternoon submit the formal notification and request through the Division of Protocol of the State Department. They should arrive tomorrow.

E. M. W.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

We have just received the following message from Mrs. Roosevelt at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone, for delivery to the President:

"Can be home 18th and 19th. Am trying to cancel engagement for 17th but it may not be possible. Hope your cold is not serious. All well. Much love, signed E. R."

B. W. DAVENPORT,
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE:

Reminder to ask the President if Mrs. Roosevelt should give a signed photograph in frame to Mrs. Fraser.

djb

yes

Mrs. Janet Fraser