

PALESTINE

PALESTINE

PSF: Palestine  
Box 16

ROBERT L. RAMSAY  
1ST DIST. WEST VIRGINIA

PSF PALESTINE

COMMITTEE  
JUDICIARY

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

Wellsburg, W. Va.,  
October 12, 1938.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
OCT 15 8 59 AM '38  
RECEIVED

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I urge you to use your fine powers of persuasion to have the Imperial Powers of Great Britian renounce or modify the Balfour declaration relative to the Palestine situation. Mr. Balfour's position seems to me to be freighted with tragedy and unfairness, and is a repudication of the acknowledged rights of the Jews in Palestine.

Very sincerely yours,

*Robert L. Ramsay*

RLR:K

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In re Balfour Declaration and requesting that President  
request Great Britain to refrain from limitation of Jewish  
immigration into Palestine:

Telegram from Cong. R. M. Simpson, Huntingdon, Pa., 10/14/38.

Telegram from Sen. Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Seattle, Wash., 10/14/38.

Letter signed by Sen. Millard E. Tydings and George L. Radcliffe,  
10/14/38.

Letter from Cong. Robert L. Ramsey, Wellburg, W.Va., 10/12/38.

PSF Palestine

Hyde Park, New York,  
October 19, 1938.

My dear Mr. Ramsay:

I fully appreciate the concern expressed by you in your letter of October 12, 1938, regarding the Palestine situation. I have on numerous occasions, as you know, expressed my sympathy in the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine and, despite the set-backs caused by the disorders there during the last few years, I have been heartened by the progress which has been made and by the remarkable accomplishments of the Jewish settlers in that country.

As I have had occasion to inform a number of Members of Congress within the past few days, we have kept constantly before the British Government, through our Ambassador in London, the interest which the American people have in Palestine and I have every reason to believe that that Government is fully cognizant of public opinion on the matter in this country. We were assured, in the discussions which took place in London a little more than a year ago, that the British Government would keep us fully informed of any proposals which it might make to the Council of the League of Nations for the modification of the Palestine Mandate. We expect, therefore, to have the opportunity afforded us of communicating to the British Government our views with respect to any changes in the Mandate which may be proposed as a result of the forthcoming report of the Palestine Partition Commission. I understand, however, that under the terms of our

The Honorable  
Robert L. Ramsay,  
House of Representatives.

convention with Great Britain regarding the Palestine Mandate we are unable to prevent modifications in the Mandate. The most we can do is to decline to accept as applicable to American interests any modifications affecting such interests unless we have given our assent to them.

You may be sure that we shall continue to follow the situation with the closest attention.

Sincerely yours,

File  
Journal

PSF: Palestine

Supreme Court of the United States

Washington, D. C.

Dec 28/39

Dear Mr. President:

Re memo of 27<sup>th</sup>.

My thanks for letting me see the papers  
returned herewith.

The British attitude is deplorable.

But ultimately — if we insist — fully  
will yield to reason and the right.

Enclosed from Blackwood's will  
interest you.

As best wishes for 1939.

Cordially

Vacant

President Roosevelt.

PALESTINE PARADOX.

"BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE" (London) for November had an article under the above title by Captain J.G.E. Hickson, who described his experiences with the British troops in the campaign against the Arab terrorists. He was stationed in <sup>the</sup> Tul-Karem area and gives a friendly account of the Jewish settlers. He writes:

"Every day half a platoon would set out in a bus, visiting as many of the neighbouring Jewish settlements as it could in the time. It was on these patrols that I learnt the true meaning of Palestine as a National Home for the Jews. A group of immigrants forms, buys a piece of land varying in size according to available capital, augmented if necessary by the Jewish National Agency, and in an incredibly short space of a time a flourishing young colony arises, housed at first in wooden huts of the army variety. Later, these are replaced by the oddly pill-box like concrete houses favoured by the Jews, probably for obvious reasons. Square and squat, with perhaps three rooms, and sometimes only two, whitewashed, or yellow, the little houses are typical of the colonies throughout Palestine, and are doubtless all that is required by the hardy agriculturalists those amazing people quickly become, whatever their former profession. They work in the fields from dawn till dusk, and it is small wonder that the whole plain from Haifa to Gaza is already an almost continuous line of these colonies, with orange groves at every stage of growth, and many other side-lines. Run entirely by themselves, sometimes as independent communities, sometimes on communal lines with all the funds in a common pool, the colonies are undoubtedly efficient and paying concerns.

"And the people who are proving themselves such expert colonists are not the hook-nosed Shylock type of Jew so dear to fiction, but, in most cases, a stalwart type of man and woman, fair of face and ruddy of countenance, with blue eyes and bodies of the physical fitness one expects from such a life."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1938


My dear Mr. President:

The British Chargé d'Affaires called to see me this morning and said that from what Sir Ronald Lindsay had told him, and from what Mr. Eden had said to him about the latter's conversation with you, he believed you would be interested in some notes which he had received from his Government with regard to the possibility of moving the Arab population from Palestine to adjacent portions of Arabia.

I am transmitting herewith the memorandum which Mr. Mallet left with me. Some of the facts mentioned will, I know, be of considerable interest to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure.

The President,  
The White House.

MEMORANDUM

The latest available evidence does not, unfortunately, bear out the belief that any considerable quantity of water could be obtained in the countries across the Jordan at shallow levels by boring wells. On page 66 of its report the Woodhead Commission gives details regarding nine wells which have been sunk in various parts of the Transjordan plateau. In almost every case, either no water at all was found, or else too small a yield to be of value. The Commission stated that the results had been uniformly disappointing and that there appeared to be little likelihood of the extension of cultivation by irrigation. The Commission did not, of course, suggest that Transjordan could not carry a larger agricultural population than it does but the Commission was convinced that the possible increase was small. For convenience of reference the relevant paragraphs from the Woodhead Report are annexed.

Suggestions have also been made that if the free offer of cultivable land in Transjordan did not suffice to attract the Arabs from Palestine, they might be compelled to emigrate from it, with the object of vacating land in Palestine for settlement by Jews. The difficulty which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom see as regards this suggestion appears to them very great. It is not merely that the action proposed would be beyond their powers, but that the morality of attempting to take such measures of coercion against the Arab inhabitants of Palestine would surely

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be called in question in wide-spread circles in the United Kingdom, in India and throughout the Moslem world, where His Majesty's Government would be powerfully assailed for unjustly trying to force a long-established community to leave its country in order to make room for immigrants of a race which has, in great part, not lived in Palestine for many centuries.

It is still assumed in some quarters that the Palestine problem is susceptible of financial treatment, and that provided that sufficient funds are available the redistribution of the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine and across the Jordan is purely a matter of adequate financing. Such an assumption His Majesty's Government sincerely believe to be mistaken. The problem of Palestine has become one of political interest and national sentiment for the whole Arab world and, in the present state of feeling in the Middle East, His Majesty's Government are convinced that neither they nor anyone else could promote a settlement primarily by economic sops or financial help however generous; although after a political settlement and when feeling has cooled down economic help may be able to play its part.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

December 20th, 1938.

COPY

137. The following wells have been sunk in the Trans-Jordan plateau; they are shown on map 6--

	Depth Drilled in Metres.	Depth to Water in Metres.	Remarks.
1. Irbid	175	-	No water found.
2. Remtha	182	-	Ditto
3. Um Kundur	60		Ditto. Abandoned owing to difficulties in boring.
4. Zubayer Adwan	175	168	Small yield, less than 2 cubic metres per hour.
5. Teneib	162	152	Ditto
6. Qatrane	136	114	Small yield; $2\frac{1}{2}$ cubic metres per hour.
7. Black Rock	67	-	No water found; drilling abandoned owing to boring difficulties.
8. Ma'an	180	12	Drilled to a depth of 180 metres; drilling will be continued somewhat further; the prospects of a useful yield of water are very small.
9. Mafraq	242	195	Drilled by the "Iraq Petroleum Co.; tested at 64 cubic metres per day.

The results have been uniformly disappointing and there appears to be little likelihood of an extension of cultivation by irrigation. And in this connection it should again be remembered that it is not economic to grow ordinary cereal crops on land irrigated by water which has to be pumped: special crops must be grown on

such/

such land, such as vegetables and fruit, and special crops require an assured market.

Funds have been provided for the sinking of some bores in the Shera country where there are prospects of finding water. These bores have not been sunk as yet because it was thought advisable to take up the Shera tests after work had been completed in the Jordan Valley. But it is unlikely, even if water should be found at reasonable depths, that this area will be capable of agricultural development. The topography of the country does not lend itself to irrigation from wells, and, although it may be possible to cultivate part of it, the main benefit accruing from the discovery of additional water sources will be an increase in the number of animals which can be supported on the grazing grounds.

138. In our opinion, Trans-Jordan offers small scope for intensive settlement on the land. We do not suggest that it cannot carry a larger agricultural population than it does, but we are convinced that the additional agricultural population which the land can support is small.

139. Apart from the prospects of irrigation schemes in Beersheba and the Jordan valley, and of development in Trans-Jordan, there is also the possibility of settlement in other parts of Palestine to be considered, namely the hill country and the Gaza sub-district, that is, the maritime plain south of the proposed Jewish State.

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1939 Vol. 1V      The Far East, The Near  
East, Africa.

Page 696

Note: The published letter is a draft prepared by Sumner Welles. The letter sent to Abdul Aziz ibn Saud has a minor change in the first line.

PLS  
7-11-66

**Your Majesty:**

I have received the letter of Your Majesty of November 29, 1936, which was delivered by the Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo on December 6 to the American Chargé d'Affaires there, with regard to the Arab cause in Palestine.

As Your Majesty is no doubt aware, the Palestine situation is one which has engaged for long the attention of the American people. It is therefore with particular interest that I have read Your letter devoted to that subject.

The interest of the American people in Palestine is based on a number of considerations. They include both those of a spiritual character as well as those flowing from the rights derived by the United States in Palestine through the American-British Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924.

The position of the United States with respect to Palestine has been set forth in a public statement issued by the Department of State on October 4, 1936, of which it gives me pleasure to transmit to Your Majesty a copy. I may add that this Government has never taken any position different from that which it has maintained from the beginning toward this question.

**Your Good Friend,**

His Majesty  
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud,  
King of Saudi Arabia.

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The Near East  
Africa

Pages 694-696

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I transmit the original of a communication addressed to you by His Majesty Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, regarding the Palestine situation and the attitude of this Government with respect thereto. The original letter, of which a translation prepared by the American Legation in Cairo is also enclosed, was handed to the American Chargé d'Affaires in that city by the Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires there, and transmitted by the former to the Department.

With regard to King ibn Saud's remarks concerning the position of President Wilson in respect of self-determination and the sending of a "Commission of Investigation" to the Near East in 1919, it may be helpful, for convenient reference, to set forth briefly the chronology of events. It will be recalled that President Wilson, in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, urged that "the other nationalities which are now under Turkish

The President,  
The White House.

Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development". In line with the foregoing principle Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations accorded provisional recognition as independent nations to certain communities in the former Ottoman Empire, and stipulated that in selecting mandatories for such nations the "wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration".

With a view to carrying out that stipulation it was agreed at Paris that commissions should be sent to the Near East to inquire into the situation and to submit a report thereon. It will be recalled that the other governments concerned refrained from sending such commissions but an American section, headed by Mr. Charles R. Crane and Dr. Henry Churchill King, did visit the Near East during the summer of 1919 and submitted a report, dated August 28, 1919. It is to this report that King ibn Saud refers in the fourth from the last paragraph of his letter. For convenience of reference I quote those of the Commission's recommendations regarding Palestine which King ibn Saud apparently had in mind:

"If that principle (self-determination) is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine - nearly nine-tenths of the whole - are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no

one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the form of law."

The conclusions of the Commission on the question of Palestine read as follows:

"In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish Commonwealth should be given up."


Although we have had numerous communications from Arab notables and organizations protesting that the attitude of this Government favored the Zionist cause and was consequently anti-Arab, this is the first letter which we have had from an Arab Chief of State. As you are aware, the special position of the Arab States neighboring Palestine with reference to that country has been recognized by the British Government on several occasions, the most recent of which was in connection with the forthcoming London Conference called by the British Government to effect a settlement of the Palestine question, to which the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, Egypt and Yemen have been invited to send official delegates. In view of the special position of the Arab States in respect of the Palestine question, and

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in view of the position of King ibn Saud as the outstanding Arab ruler and as the person most qualified to speak on behalf of the Arab people, it would seem that something more than a perfunctory acknowledgment should be made of his present communication.

I enclose for your consideration and your signature, if you approve, a reply to His Majesty which has been drafted with the foregoing considerations in mind. If you have some particular views which you desire to have incorporated in this communication, I shall be grateful if you will indicate their nature.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. H. H. H.', written in a cursive style.

Enclosures:

1. From King ibn Saud,  
with translation thereof.
2. Letter to King ibn Saud.

من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل ملك المملكة العربية السعودية  
الى صاحب الفخامة الرئيس فرانكلن روزفلت رئيس جمهورية الولايات المتحدة الاميركية

يا صاحب الفخامة

لقد اطالعنا على ما اذيع عن موقف حكومة الولايات المتحدة الاميركية  
في مناصرة اليهود في فلسطين وبالنظر لماننا من الثقة في محبتكم للعدل والانصاف  
وفي تمسك الامة الاميركية الحرة بأعرق التقاليد الديموقراطية الموسومة  
على تأييد الحق والعدل ونصرة الأئمة المغلوبه ، ونظرا للصلات الودية  
التي بين مملكتنا وحكومة الولايات المتحدة فقد اردنا ان نلفت نظركم  
فخامتكم الى قضية العرب في فلسطين وبيان حقهم المشروع فيها ولنا ملء  
الثقة ان بياننا هذا يوضح لكم وللشعب الاميركي قضية العرب العادله  
في تلك البلاد المقدسة ،

لقد ظهر لنا من البيان الذي نشر عن موقف امريكا ان قضية فلسطين  
قد نظر اليها من وجهة نظر واحدة هي وجهة نظر اليهود والصهيونيه  
واهملت وجهات نظر العرب وقد رأينا من آثار الدعايات اليهوديه الواسعة  
النطاق ان الشعب الاميركي الديموقراطي قد ضلّ تضليلا عظيما ادى الى اعتبار  
مناصرة اليهود على سحق العرب في فلسطين عملا انسانيا في حين ان مثل ذلك  
ظلم فاضح وجه على شعب آمن مستوطن في بلاده كان ولا يزال يثق بعدالة  
الرأى العام الديموقراطي في العالم عامة وفي امريكا خاصة وانا على ثقة  
بأنه اذا اتضح لفخامتكم وللشعب الاميركي حق العرب في فلسطين فأنكم  
ستقومون بنصرتهم حق القيام ،

ان الحجة التي يستند اليها اليهود في ادعائهم بفلسطين هي  
انهم استوطنوها حقبة من الزمن القديم وانهم مشتقون في بلاد العالم  
وانهم يريدون ايجاد مجتمع لهم يعيشون فيه احرارا في فلسطين ويستتدون  
في عملهم على وعد تلقوه من الحكومة البريطانية سمي بوعد بلفور ،  
اما دعوى اليهود التاريخية فأنه لا يوجد ما يبررها في حين ان فلسطين  
كانت ولا تزال مشغولة بالعرب في جميع ادوار التاريخ المتقدمه

وكان السلطان فيها لهم ، وازا استتبنا الفترة التي اتاها اليهود فيها والسدة الثانية التي سيطرت فيها الامبراطورية الرومانية عليها فان سلطان العرب كان منذ الزمن الاقدم على فلسطين الى زماننا هذا وقد كان العرب في سائر اوار حياتهم محافظين على الاماكن المقدسة معظمين لمقامها محترمين لقدسيتها فاقنعين بشؤونها بكل امانة واخلاص ، ولما امتد الحكم العثماني على فلسطين كان النفوذ العربي هو المسيطر ولم يكن العربي يشعرون بان الترك دولة مستعمرة لبلادهم وذلك ،

١- لوحدة الجامعة الدينية

٢- لشعور العرب انهم شركاء الترك في الحكم

٣- لكون الازارة المحلية للحكم بيد ابناء البلاد انفسهم

فما ذكر اعلاه يرى ان دعوى اليهود بحقهم في فلسطين استنادا على التاريخ لا حقيقة له فان كان اليهود قد استوطنوا فلسطين مدة معينة بصورة استيلاء فان العرب قد استوطنوها مدة اطول بكثير من ذلك ولا يمكن ان يعتبر احتلال امه لبك من البلدان حقا طبيعيا يبرر مطالبتها ولو اعتبر هذا المبدأ في العصر الحاضر لحق لكل امه ان تطالب بالبلدان التي سبق لها اشغالها بالقوة حقيقة من الزمن وتسبب عن ذلك تغير خريطة المسالم بشكل من امجيب الاشكال مما لا يتلائم مع العدل ولا مع الحق والانصاف اما دعوى اليهود التي يستترون بها عطف العالم انهم مشتتون في البلاد ومضطهدون فيها وانهم يريدون ايجاد مكان ياون فيه لياخذوا على انفسهم من العدوان السندي يتح عليهم في كثير من المسالك ،

فالهم في هذه القضية هو التفريق بين قضية اليهودية المالبييه

او الالاساميه وبين قضية الصهيونية السياسية فان كان المقصود هو المعطوف على اليهود المعتنين فان فلسطين الحقيقة قد استوعبت منهم الآن مقدارا عظيما لا يوجد ما يماثله في اى بلد من بلدان العالم وذلك بالنسبة لضيقة ارض فلسطين وبالنسبة لاراضي العالم التي يقم اليهود فيها وليس باستقامة رقعة ضيقة ك فلسطين ان تتح لجميع يهود العالم حتى ولو نرض انها اخلت من سكانها العرب ( كما قال المستر ملكوم ماكد ونلد في خطاب القاه في مجلس النواب البريطاني مؤخرًا ) فاذا قيل مبدأ يقاه اليهود الموجودين في فلسطين بالوقت الحاضر فنكون هذه البلاد الصغيرة قد قامت بأعظم قسط انساني لم يقم بعثه غيرها ويرى نخاسة الرئيس انسه ليس من العدل ان تمد حكومات العالم - وفي جعلتها الولايات المتحدة -

ابوابها بوجه مهاجري اليهود وتكلف فلسطين البلد العربي الصغير  
لتحملهم ،

وأما اذا نظرنا الى القضية من وجهة الصهيونية السياسية  
فإن هذه الوجهة تمثل ناحية ظالمة غاشمة سداها القضاء على شعب  
آمن مطمأن وطرد من بلاده بشتى الوسائل. ولحمتها النهم السياسي  
والطمع الشخصي لبعض افراد الصهيونية وأما استناد اليهود على تصريح  
بلفور فإن التصريح بحد ذاته جاء جورا وظلما على بلاد آمنة مطمئنة  
وقد اعطى من قبل حكومة لم تكن تملك يوم اعطائه حق فرضه على فلسطين  
كما ان عرب فلسطين لم يؤخذ رأيهم فيه ولا في نظام الانتخاب الذى  
فرض عليهم كما صرح بذلك ملكوم ماكد ونلد وزير المستعمرات البريطانية  
ايضا وذلك برفض الوعود التي بذلها الحلفاء وبينهم امريكا لهم بحق  
تقرير المصير ومن المهم ان نذكر ان وعد بلفور كان مسبقا بوعد آخر  
من الحكومة البريطانية بمعرفة الحلفاء بحق العرب في فلسطين وفي  
غيرها من بلاد العرب ،

ومن هذا يتبين لفخامتكم ان حجة اليهود التاريخية باطلية ولا يمكن  
اعتبارها وحجتهم من الوجهة الانسانية قد قامت فيها فلسطين بعالم يقم  
به بلد آخر ووعد بلفور الذى يستندون اليه مخالف للحق والعدل  
ومخالف لمبدأ تقرير المصير ، والمطامع الصهيونية تجعل العرب في  
جميع الأقطار يوجسون منها خيفة وتدعوهم لمقاومتها ،

أما حقوق العرب في فلسطين فأنها لا تقبل المجادلة لأن فلسطين  
بلادهم منذ اقدم الأزمنة وهم لم يخرجوا منها كما ان غيرهم لم يخرجهم  
منها وقد كانت من الأماكن التي ازدهرت فيها المدنية العربية ازدهارا  
يدعو الى الإعجاب ولذلك فهي عربية عرقا ولسانا وموتعا وثقافة وليس  
في ذلك اى شبهة او موهى وتاريخ العرب بتلك البلاد مملوء بأحكام العدل  
والاعمال النافعة ،

ولما جاءت الحرب العامة انضمت العرب الى صف الحلفاء املا في الحصول  
على استقلالهم وقد كانوا على ثقة تامة من انهم سينالسونه بعد الحرب العامة  
للاسباب الآتية -

- ١- لأنهم اشتركوا بالفعل في الحرب وضحوا فيها بأموالهم وانفسهم ،
- ٢- لأنهم وعدوا بذلك من قبل الحكومة البريطانية في المراسلات التي

دارت بين مثلها السير هنري مكماهون وبين الشريف حسين ،  
٣- لأن سلفكم العظيم الرئيس ولسن تردد دخول الولايات المتحدة  
الأمريكية في الحرب الى جانب الحلفاء نصره للمبادئ الإنسانية  
السامية التي كان من أهمها حق تقرير المصير ،  
٤- لأن الحلفاء صرحوا في نوفمبر سنة ١٩١٨ عقب احتلالهم البلاد  
انهم انما دخلوها لتحريرها واعطاها اهلها حريتهم واستقلالهم  
وانا رجعتم فخاضتكم الى التقرير الذي قدمته لجنة التحقيق التي ارسلها  
سلفكم الرئيس ولسن عام ١٩١٩ الى الشرق الأدنى نسي لعلمتم المطالب التي طلبها  
العرب في فلسطين وفي سوريا حينئذ سئلوا عن المصير الذي يطلبون لانفسهم  
ولكن العرب لسوا الحظ وجدوا انفسهم بعد الحرب انهم قد خذلوا  
وان الأمانسي التي وعدوا بها لم تحقق وقد جزئت بلادهم وقسمت تقسيما جائرا  
ووجدت لهذه الأقسام حدود مصنعة لا تيررها عوامل جغرافية ولا جنسية  
ولادينية وعلاوة على ذلك وجدوا انفسهم امام خطر اعظم هو خطر غزو الصهيونية  
لهم واستلاكها لبقعة من اهم بقاعهم ،  
لقد احتج العرب بشدة عند ما علموا بتصريح بلفور واحتجوا على نظام  
الانتداب واعلنوا رفضهم له وعدم قبولهم به منذ اليوم الأول وقد كان تدفق  
مهاجري اليهود من الاتاق المختلفة الى فلسطين مدعاة لتخوف العرب على  
مصيرهم وعلى حياتهم فحدثت في فلسطين ثورات وقتل متعددة سنة ١٩٢٠ و١٩٢١ و  
١٩٢٩ وكان اهم تلك الثورات ثورة عام ١٩٣٦ التي لاتزال نارها مستعرة حتى  
هذه الساعة ،

ان عرب فلسطين يافخامة الرئيس ومن ورائهم سائر العرب بل وسائر العالم  
الإسلامي يطالبون بحقوقهم ويدافعون عن بلادهم ضد دخلاء عنهم وعنهم  
ومن المستحيل اقرار السلام في فلسطين اذالم ينزل العرب حقوقهم ويتأكدوا  
ان بلادهم لن تعطى الى شعب غريب افاق تختلف مبادئه واغراضه واخلاقه  
عنهم كل الاختلاف ولذلك فأنا نهيب بغضبتكم ونناشدكم بأسم العدل والحرية  
ونصرة الشعوب الضعيفة التي اشتهرت بها الأمة الأمريكية النبيلة ان تتكروا  
بالنظر في قضية عرب فلسطين وان تكونوا نصرا للآمن العظماء الهادي المعتدى  
عليه من قبل تلك الجماعات المشرقة من سائر انحاء العالم لأنه ليس من العدل  
أن يطرد اليهود من جميع انحاء العالم المتمدن وان تتحمل فلسطين الضعيفة  
المغلوبة على امرها هذا الشعب برمه ولا تشك بأن العبادي السامية التي  
يتحلى بها الشعب الأمريكي ستجعله يذعن للحق ويقدم لنصرة العدل

والانصاف ،

حررني قصرنا بالرياض في اليوم السابع من شهر شوال سنة  
سبعة وخمسين بعد الثلاثمائة والالف هجره الموافق تسعة  
وعشرين نوفمبر سنة ثمان وثلاثين بعد التسعمائة والالف ميلاديه <sup>عند الزوال</sup> <sub>الشمس</sub>

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1474 of December 17,  
1938, from the American Legation at Cairo.

Translation

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE

From: Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdur Rahman El Faisal, King of the  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

To : President Franklin Roosevelt of the Republic of the  
United States of America.

Mr. President:

We have been informed of what has been published regarding the position of the Government of the United States of America concerning support of the Jews in Palestine. In view of our confidence in your love of right and justice, and the attachment of the free American People to the fundamental democratic traditions based upon the maintenance of right and justice and succor for defeated peoples, and in view of the friendly relations existing between our Kingdom and the Government of the United States, we wish to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the cause of the Arabs in Palestine and their legitimate rights, and we have full confidence that our statement will make clear to you and the American People the just cause of the Arabs in those Holy Lands.

It has appeared to us from the account which has been published of the American position that the case of Palestine has been considered from a single point of view: the point of view of the Zionist Jews; and the Arab points of view have been neglected. We have observed as one of the effects of the widespread Jewish propaganda that the democratic American People has been grossly misled, and it has resulted in considering support for the Jews in crushing the Arabs in Palestine a human act, while such an act is a flagrant injustice directed against a peaceful people in its own country that has not ceased to have confidence in the fairness of general democratic opinion in the world at large and in America particularly. I am confident that if the rights of the Arabs in Palestine were made clear to you, Mr. President, and to the American People, you would give them full support.

The argument on which the Jews depend in their claims regarding Palestine is that they settled there for a time in the olden days and that they have wandered in various countries of the world, and that they wish to create a gathering-place for themselves in Palestine where they may live freely. And for their action they rely upon a promise they received from the British Government, namely: the Balfour Declaration.

As for the historical claim of the Jews, there is nothing to justify it, because Palestine was and has not

ceased

ceased to be occupied by the Arabs through all the periods and progression of history, and its sovereign was their sovereign. If we except the interval when the Jews were established there, and a second period when the Roman Empire ruled there, the sovereignty of the Arabs has been theirs in Palestine from the oldest times to our own day. The Arabs, through the entire course of their existence, have been the keepers of the Holy Places, the magnifiers of their situation, the respecters of their sanctity, maintaining their affairs with all faithfulness and devotion. When the Otoman Government extended over Palestine, Arab influence was dominant, and the Arabs never felt that the Turks were a colonizing power in their country, owing to:

1. The oneness of the religious bond;
2. The feeling of the Arabs that they were partners of the Turks in government;
3. The local administration of government being in the hands of the sons of the land itself.

From the foregoing it is seen that the Jewish claim of rights in Palestine in so far as it rests upon history has no reality, for if the Jews dwelt in Palestine for a certain period as possessors, surely the Arabs have dwelt there for a far longer time, and it is impossible to consider the occupation of a country by a people as a natural right justifying their claim thereto. If this principle be now held in esteem, then it is the right of every people to reclaim the country it formerly occupied by force for a certain time. This would bring about astonishing changes in the map of the world, and would be irreconcilable with right, with justice, or with equity.

Now regarding the other claim of the Jews, whereby they take unto themselves the sympathy of the world only because they are scattered and persecuted in various countries, and they would like to find a place in which to take shelter in order to be safe from the injustice they encounter in many countries, the important thing in this matter is to discriminate between the causes of Judaism or anti-Semitism in the world and the cause of political Zionism. If the intent was sympathy for scattered Jews, Palestine is a small country. It has already received such a great number of them as to exceed comparison with any country in the world, taking account of the limited area of Palestine as compared with the lands of the earth where the Jews dwell. A country with narrow limits such as Palestine cannot make room for all the Jews of the world, even supposing it were emptied of its inhabitants, the Arabs (as Mr. Malcolm MacDonald said in a speech which he delivered recently in the British House of Commons). If the principle be accepted that the Jews now in Palestine are to remain there, then that little country has already performed a greater human justice than any other. You will see, Mr. President, that it is not just that the governments of the world -- including the United States -- have closed their doors against the immigration of the Jews and impose on Palestine, a small Arab country, the task of sustaining them.

But

But if we look at the matter from the standpoint of political Zionism, this point of view represents a wrong and unjust way. Its aim is to ruin a peaceable and tranquil people and to drive them from their country by various means, and to feed the political greed and personal ambition of a few Zionists. As to the reliance of the Jews upon the Balfour Declaration, surely that Declaration has brought the limit of oppression and iniquity to a peaceful and tranquil country. It was given by a government which at the time of the gift did not possess the right to impose it upon Palestine. Similarly, the opinion of the Arabs of Palestine was not taken in this regard nor with regard to the arrangement of the Mandate which was imposed upon them, as has been made clear also by Malcolm MacDonald, British Minister of Colonies, and this in spite of promises given by the Allies, including America, that they would have the right of self-determination. It is important for us to mention that Balfour's promise was preceded by another promise from the British Government with the knowledge of the Allies regarding the rights of the Arabs in Palestine and in other Arab countries.

From this it will be clear to you, Mr. President, that the historical pretext of the Jews is unjust and it is impossible to consider it. Their plea from the standpoint of humanity has been fulfilled more by Palestine than any other country, and Balfour's promise on which they depend is contrary to right and justice and inconsistent with the principle of self-determination. The ambition of the Zionists renders the Arabs in all countries apprehensive, and causes them to resist it.

The rights of the Arabs in Palestine do not admit of discussion because Palestine has been their country since the oldest times, and they did not leave it nor did others drive them out of it. Places flourished there, Arab in civilization, to an extent calling for admiration, for the reason that they were Arab in origin, in language, in situation, in culture; and of this there is no uncertainty or doubt. The history of the Arabs is full of just laws and useful works.

When the World War broke out, the Arabs sided with the Allies hoping to obtain their independence, and they were wholly confident that they would achieve it after the World War for the following reasons:

1. Because they participated in the War by action, and sacrificed their lives and their property;
2. Because it was promised them by the British Government through notes exchanged between its representative at the time, Sir Henry MacMahon, and the Sherif Hussein;
3. Because of your predecessor, the Great President Wilson who decided upon the participation of the United States of America in the War on the side of the

Allies in support of high human principles, of which the most important was the right of self-determination;

4. Because the Allies declared in November 1918, following their occupation of the countries, that they entered them in order to free them and to give the people their liberty and independence.

Mr. President, if you will refer to the report submitted by the Commission of Investigation which your predecessor, President Wilson, sent to the Near East in 1919, you will find the demands which the Arabs in Palestine and Syria made when they were questioned as to what future they asked for themselves.

But unfortunately the Arabs found after the War that they were abandoned, and the assurances given did not materialize. Their lands have been divided and distributed unjustly. Artificial frontiers resulted from these divisions which are not justified by the facts of geography, nationality, or religion. In addition to this, they found themselves facing a very great danger: the incursion upon them of the Zionists, who became the possessors of their best lands.

The Arabs protested strongly when they learned of the Balfour Declaration, and they protested against the organization of the Mandate. They announced their rejection and their non-acceptance thereof from the first day. The stream of Jewish immigration from various countries to Palestine has caused the Arabs to fear for their lives and their destiny; consequently numerous outbreaks and disturbances in Palestine took place in 1920, 1921, and 1929, but the most important outbreak was that of 1936, and its fire has not ceased to blaze to this hour.

Mr. President, the Arabs of Palestine and behind them the rest of the Arabs -- or rather, the rest of the Islamic World -- demand their rights, and they defend their lands against those who intrude upon them and their territories. It is impossible to establish peace in Palestine unless the Arabs obtain their rights, and unless they are sure that their countries will not be given to an alien people whose principles, aims and customs differ from theirs in every way. Therefore we beseech and adjure you, Mr. President, in the name of Justice and Freedom and help for weak peoples for which the noble American People is celebrated, to have the goodness to consider the cause of the Arabs of Palestine, and to support those who live in peace and quiet despite attack from these homeless groups from all parts of the world. For it is not just that the Jews be sent away from all the various countries of the world and that weak, conquered Palestine should, against its will, suffer this whole people. We do not doubt that the high principles to which the American People adhere, will cause them to yield to right and grant support for justice and fair play.

Written

Written in our Palace at Ar Riad on the seventh day  
of the month of Shawal, in the year 1357 of the Hejira,  
corresponding to November 29, 1938, A. D.

(Signed) Abdul Aziz Es Saud

Translation: GPM/MN/SS  
Copied by: icg

PSF: Palastine

7  
Personal



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram which was sent yesterday to Mr. Myron Taylor and Mr. George Rublee *from Hull* with regard to the program of emigration which the German Government has indicated its willingness to carry out.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram sent  
to Mr. Taylor and Mr. Rublee,  
February 8, 1939.

The President,

The White House.

REB

TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

February 8, 1939

4 p. m.

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

104

FOR MYRON TAYLOR AND RUBLEE.

Your 167, February 6, 4 p. m.

Before commenting specifically upon Rublee's memorandum to Wohlthat, we wish to emphasize certain general considerations.

One. The program outlined relates exclusively to Jews. You should emphasize to the Committee that its task also covers the emigration and resettlement of Catholics, Protestants and others. As a practical matter, however, there appears to be no objection to admitting frankly that Jewish emigration and resettlement constitutes by far the greatest and most difficult part of the Committee's task.

Two. The condition that the program will be put into effect only when Germany "is satisfied that the countries of immigration are disposed to receive

currently

REB

2-#104, To London, Feb.8,4p.m.

currently Jews from Germany in conformity with this program" is a serious one. It gives Germany the final say as to what must be done or what assurances must be given by other governments before the program will be put into effect and would permit Germany to drop or change the program at any time on the excuse that other governments were not acting in accordance with it.

Three. We feel strongly that the program outlined must be carried out unilaterally by the German Government. We agree that the program represents the maximum obtainable from the German Government at this time, that it represents a new and more favorable attitude toward the problem of Jewish emigration, and that it will, if carried out, provide a notable improvement over present conditions in Germany. On the other hand, even this maximum contains objectionable features which this Government would not wish to condone by participating in an agreement between the Committee and <sup>the</sup> German Government or by an active acceptance. In this connection the German position that they are acting independently on their own initiative is helpful. As a unilateral program it  
presumably

REB

3-#104, To London, Feb.8, 4p.m.

presumably represents the best that could be expected. As a basis for an agreement it would be definitely unacceptable.

Four. We consider that the program outlined would, if carried out, represent a sufficient improvement over present conditions (aside from the repercussions in Germany which could be expected if the Committee did not take cognizance of the program) to warrant the Committee taking cognizance of it. We do not, however, favor a reply by the Committee to the Germans which could be construed either as an acceptance or as initiating a negotiation between the Committee and the German Government which would saddle the former with responsibility. The distinction between raising no objection to, and actively accepting, a project may seem a fine one, but it is none the less real. The Committee, having taken cognizance of what Germany is prepared to do, should make clear that it is disposed, also unilaterally, to deal to the fullest extent of its ability and within the limits of the immigration laws and practices of its member Governments with the problem of developing opportunities for settlement.

• The

REB

4-#104, To London, Feb. 8, 4p.m.

The following are more specific considerations:

(1) In so far as our immigration laws are concerned, it is unthinkable that we could admit the right of another government to say whom we should or should not admit and there is, of course, no way in which preference can be granted to persons in the wage-earning category as such as far as we are concerned. The only way in which the percentage of persons of that category coming to this country could be increased would be by the purely voluntary action of persons in other categories giving up their places when their turn is reached under the quota. Obviously no assurances of any kind could be given in this connection and no pressure could be exerted by us.

(2) The emigration of 150,000 persons of the wage-earning category from Germany over a period of five years should not, however, be impossible or even excessively difficult without departure from existing immigration laws and practices. If our estimate that refugees are currently being admitted into other countries at a rate of 80,000 a year is correct, and we are confident that it is conservative, and if the German estimate that three-

eighths

REB

5-#104, To London, Feb.8,4p.m.

eighths of the persons to be emigrated are wage-earners, it seems probable that wage-earners are already emigrating at a rate approximating 30,000 a year. On the one hand, current emigration includes a certain percentage, perhaps ten to fifteen per cent, of non-Jews and a further percentage of Jews over 45; on the other, the current estimated rate of emigration takes no account of mass settlement possibilities. It would not seem improbable that a five year period would be sufficient not only for the emigration of 150,000 wage-earners but for the emigration of most of their dependents as well.

(3) There will presumably be a considerable residue of wage-earners who for one reason or another will not be admissible into any country in the normal course of events and these must be provided for in mass settlement projects. This will not be easy as mass settlement under pioneering conditions will require a particularly capable type of emigrant, but it is believed that large scale mass settlement should be able to provide for this residue as well.

(4) The provisions for organizing emigration within  
Germany

REB

6-#104, To London, Feb. 8, 4p.m.

Germany, with foreign participation, should have distinct value. It must be borne in mind, however, that our immigration laws would not permit the intervention of any agency between applicant and consul.

(5) The release of all, or nearly all, Jews from concentration camps would be a considerable achievement.

(6) The arrangements for the care of persons who are not to be emigrated are not definite and far short of what might be desired but are definitely better than present conditions.

(7) The setting up of a trust fund from existing Jewish property in Germany is something which, as indicated in our 802, December 21, 6 p. m., would be most difficult for us to recognize in view of the implied sanction of the principle of confiscation. This difficulty might be overcome, however, if the individual were to retain title to the amount he had contributed to the fund, such title to cover his pro-rata share in such amounts as may eventually be transferred, if any are. The limitations on the use of the trust fund do not appear objectionable.

(8) We assume that the words "traditional sphere" of the Haavarah system refers solely to Palestine.

(9) The

REB

7-#104, To London, Feb.8,4p.m.

(9) The permission for emigrants to leave without payment of their flight or personal effects taxes would be a further worthwhile achievement.

(10) The relationship of the Committee to the proposed outside purchasing agency, which may be very useful, will have to be worked out in London, but care should be taken in this connection to avoid active acceptance of the German program.

(11) The appointment of the third trustee would also involve active acceptance. We should not desire to see an American serve in this capacity even if individual contributors to the trust fund are permitted to retain title.

Rublee appears to have accomplished more in Berlin than we had reason to expect, and we wish to congratulate him and to express appreciation for the energy and determination with which he carried out his mission in Berlin.

HULL  
(SW)

Eu:TCA:EMC VD EA A-M A-S Treasury U

Copy of letter from Myron C. Taylor  
left with Bill Bullitt  
For rest of memo not dealing with  
the Committee-See: Taylor Gen corres-Drawer 2-1939

PSF: Palestine  
1

Paris Mar 11, 1939

The Intergovernmental meeting concluded its sessions on February 13, 1939. Thereafter I brought to the attention of the Jewish societies and to a group of leaders, including Anthony Rothchild, Lord Bearstead and others, the importance of promptly acting, first, on the suggestion of the third trustee for the internal German Trust, and second, the formation of a plan to create an outside corporation or foundation to carry out in both instances the terms of the German unilateral proposals first proposed by Schacht, later modified by Wohlthat. I believe it best for many reasons to characterize as German proposals the memorandum which, while it contains many of the points that the committee had evolved at and since Evian, is not of course, an Inter-Governmental Committee proposal. Embarrassment might ultimately flow from it if it were so styled.

On arrival in Paris on February 16th, I conferred with Ambassador Bullitt and gave him in detail all events and memoranda affecting refugees, so that he would be able intelligently to discuss the matter when and as occasion required. I then left for Florence.

From Florence I telephoned Ambassador Phillips that I would come to Rome Thursday, February 23rd, to discuss the refugee situation with him, and suggested that if he thought well of it, it might be advisable first to visit Mussolini together and to acquaint him with preliminaries of the present German situation, and, if the opportunity occurred, to express to him the hope that in view of the progress made with Germany, he might find it possible to postpone the date of exodus in Italy from March 12th for a period of six months or a year, giving those affected a better opportunity to locate elsewhere and the avoiding of a revival of a general world discussion on the subject, with its possible injurious effect on the German refugee situation, which, in its present early stages under the memorandum, might be seriously impaired if the subject were renewed in a world-wide sense.

For his further information, I submitted to him, first, a copy of Sir Andrew MacFadden's report on the Italian situation; second, a copy of a memorandum which had been prepared by the Jewish leaders in London and Paris; third, a copy of Sir Herbert Emerson's memorandum regarding settlement projects; and fourth, minutes of the Inter-Governmental Committee which contained the German memorandum, of which memorandum he kept a copy. This will be helpful to

him in the discussions which may take place with Italian officials.

Mussolini was not in Rome when I was there, but was understood to be in the Italian Alps on vacation. Ciano left Rome about the time I arrived. The Ambassador had inquired if I should be received by Mussolini a week later when he returned. The answer was, I believe, that it was not then convenient. My Italian friends in London and Paris had suggested contact with Mussolini and not Ciano, who reported as violently anti-Jewish and not fully friendly toward America. I suggested to the Ambassador that I should not create an issue over the question of a visit to Mussolini.

I returned to Florence the following day, February 24th. The Ambassador to Rome, has, I believe, asked your instructions whether he should proceed through the usual channel, Ciano, to discuss the subject along the lines indicated. I am not aware of your reply.

I left Florence for Monte Carlo on Saturday last, to visit a few friends who were there ill. It is likely that Mr. Bullitt will in another telegram recite other incidents which may be of interest.

*file private*

*PSF: Palestine*


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

It is not often that I send you a copy of a personal letter as long as the enclosed letter from Mr. Pell to Pierrepont Moffat. This letter, however, gives so vivid a picture of the difficulties under which the Intergovernmental Committee is working and of the uncooperative attitude of several countries, - despite their protestations of interest, - that I feel you would be interested in reading it.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Copy of letter from  
Mr. Robert Pell.

The President,  
The White House.

(COPY EU:CMS)  
(COMP. 4/10)

*Pierpont*

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE

1, Central Buildings,  
Westminster,  
London, S.W.1.

March 8, 1939

Dear Pierpont:

I enclose a copy of a confidential memorandum of my conversation with Wohlthat in Berlin. I think that it gives you the full picture. My impression is that Goering wishes to go ahead with his program, but desires ammunition with which to justify his activities to Hitler. This ammunition in the first instance is to take the form of the memorandum on settlement projects which I am to take back to Berlin in a fortnight's time. Goering's other preoccupation is that the financing machinery on the inside of Germany and on the outside shall come into being simultaneously, that is, that the private corporation shall be set up at the same time. In studying the situation it seems to me that the clue to the timing lies with the appointment of the third or foreign trustee. When he has been approved by both sides, his appointment can be held off until both corporation and trust can be announced to the public. It is my impression that Wohlthat is in agreement with this way of proceeding.

As I indicate in my memorandum, I had a long secret conference with the Jewish leaders in Berlin. They are, of course, very nervous and jumpy, and inclined to discount much of what we are doing. At the same time, they are ready to acknowledge that there has been an easing of the situation, and that it is all to the good that Goering is centralizing the administration of the emigration. They were quite frank about the ship loads of their co-religionists which they are heading in various directions such as Shanghai, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. They said that they had to get their people out, whether there was an easing of the tension or not. At any moment an incident might occur which would endanger the very lives of their people. They could not afford to take chances, with the consequence that they were very ready to yield to the pressure of the secret police and the enticement of the shipping companies and to emigrate their people without papers and without a fixed destination. They said that no opportunities for infiltration existed any

longer, with the exception of the American quota and the refuge opportunities offered in England. The rest of the world had dried up. They had, therefore, to fall back upon force majeure, and reveal to the world in this dramatic fashion what was their plight. I pleaded with them that they were doing more harm than good by this way of proceeding, that they were defeating our efforts to open up places in Latin America, but they laughed in my face. After six years of dealing with this problem they are very hard. They do not believe in promises. Too many promises have been broken. They want action and are in a state of mind where they will force action.

Following my return from Berlin, I conferred at length with Lord Winterton and Sir Herbert Emerson, also Monicy of the French Embassy. It was agreed that I should make a draft memorandum which would then be submitted to the American, British and French Governments in the first instance, and by way of courtesy to the other officers of the Committee. When the text had been approved I would be authorized to take it back to Berlin. As a first setback in the preparation of this draft, the Foreign Office informed me this morning that I could say nothing about Palestine. They also warned me that I would have to be most cautious in my references to British Guiana and to Northern Rhodesia. Just by way of further encouragement, the Dominican Charge d'Affaires, for whom I gave a luncheon yesterday, said that the statement with regard to his country would have to be most general.

With regard to Northern Rhodesia, a terrific row has been going on here throughout the last two weeks. The basis was that the Rothschild emigration committee was authorized by the Government to assemble a Commission which would be sent to Rhodesia for the purpose of surveying possibilities of "small scale settlement". The Rothschilds replied that they could not send out a mission at great expense unless its terms of reference were agreed upon with the Government in advance. They also asked that an official of the Government should be assigned to accompany the mission. The Government, in answer, said that no official either from this end or from the local government in Rhodesia could have any connection with the mission. They then produced terms of reference which were so poor that Lord Hailey, the Chairman of the Co-Ordinating Committee, threatened to resign. Sir Herbert Emerson, who is magnificent, rushed into the breach and saved the situation temporarily. The Colonial Office is now reconsidering terms of reference, but so far has not given any indication that they will be very satisfactory. The battle continues.

Sir Herbert returned from his visit of inspection in France, Belgium and Holland about the same time that I got back from Berlin. He has given me a very confidential indication of what he discovered in these countries. The conditions in France are appalling. The government is doing little or nothing to cope with the situation, and is treating the people who have escaped across the borders as criminals, housing them in abandoned jails, depriving them of proper medical attention, and generally behaving badly. Sir Herbert was given very little cooperation by the French in his investigation; in fact it might be said that they did everything to hamper his efforts. In Belgium he found that there were between 8,000 and 9,000 adult refugees, and about 500 children. The number of adults is continually increasing, since although the Belgian Government has formally closed the frontier, no serious attempt is being made to carry out the closure, and both private organizations and government services told him that it was in fact impracticable to close the frontiers. While, therefore, the Government is still at liberty to expel those who have entered the country illegally, there is no immediate prospect of it exercising that right, although it might be compelled to do so if the numbers continue to increase at the present rate. The rate of irregular entry into Belgium is about 400 a week, and there is at present little evidence that the rate is declining. The excess of entries over departures constitutes the main problem in Belgium, both for the Government and the private organizations which are hard put financially. There is practically no anti-semitic feeling in the country at present, although there is some evidence that there is a trend in this direction. Private organizations have been very generous in supplying funds, but they are rapidly reaching the point where they cannot afford to make further large contributions, so that without external support the situation may very quickly get out of hand. Most of the refugees at present are being supported in Brussels or in Antwerp. The cost of board and lodging of a refugee is approximately 8 Belgian francs a day and this is very near the subsistence limit and cannot be cut down any further. It allows a man to live but little more. Other refugees are in a camp, or rather settlement, at Merxplas, about 45 miles from Brussels. This village is the headquarters of the State Workhouse for Vagrants, and the Government has placed at the disposal of the private associations some of the buildings. There are facilities for sports and there are work shops with adequate rooms for training purposes. Between 600 and 1,000 refugees are in this settlement. Most of them are between eighteen and thirty-five and belong to the shop-keeper, salesman, clerk

and petty merchant class. There are virtually no skilled mechanics or agriculturalists. The Superintendent is a refugee doctor and he is assisted by two Government officials. The conduct of the persons in the camp is excellent and the morale is high. The Belgian Government is now planning to set up a second camp at Marneffe, about 60 miles from Brussels. There is a large government building there which was originally a castle, later a Jesuit College and was recently used for the accommodation of Spanish children. It has large out-buildings which might easily be converted into excellent work shops. The surroundings are beautiful and healthy and there are about 100 acres of land available for agricultural training. At least 1,000 refugees can be accommodated there. The Government is prepared to stand the expense of conditioning this settlement if its maintenance will be taken over by the private organizations. Special facilities are being organized for children. The Germans have recently adopted the practice of placing children from three to ten years old on trains with a tag pinned on their chest stating "I am so and so, going to join my mother in Brussels". Of course, there is no mother at Brussels, and the children have to be taken care of upon arrival by the Red Cross and other agencies. Many of these children are so young that they only know their first names. They carry no papers or other indications of who they are or where they have come from. These children are coming across the frontier at such a rate that Belgium will soon have well over 1,000 children on its hands. On the Belgian side they are being very well and efficiently treated, and are being placed in private homes as soon as this can be arranged. Facilities are rapidly being exhausted, however, and the Belgians will soon be in need of outside help.

In Holland Sir Herbert found that there were approximately 22,000 refugees. The great majority of these are old or middle-aged persons, some sufficiently financed to carry them along for a short time. Many of these are living outside Government control, but are obliged to report at regular intervals to the authorities. The Dutch Government is using military forces to seal the frontier, and there are few irregular entries into the country at this time. Briefly, the Government's policy appears to be to allow the earlier legal entries to melt into the population, but to make things very difficult for the recent illegal entries. Sir Herbert was not

permitted to visit the camp where illegal entrants are maintained, but he understands that these places are more in the nature of concentration camps than settlements. Camps are under the command of officers of the Army Reserve who, he is informed, are very sympathetic towards the refugees. The food is said to be good and there are certain facilities for outdoor exercise. A certain amount of teaching in English and other languages is being given and a small beginning is being made in instructing these people in the crafts. Generally speaking, facilities for retraining are very meagre. Most of the refugees are said to be too pleased to be out of Germany to worry about their present disabilities. The Government is said to have plans now for setting up one central camp where from three to four thousand refugees will be housed, where there will be facilities for retraining and recreation and where less rigorous methods will be adopted than are now the rule. The Government will pay a part of the cost which is estimated to be around £125,000. The private organizations will have to defer the remainder of the expenses. There are approximately 1,500 refugee children in Holland and in accordance with its general policy, the Government does not allow these children to be placed with private families. They are accommodated in homes, and Sir Herbert found that the administration of the homes was efficient and the character of the children excellent. Unfortunately, the Government is not prepared at present to allow the children to attend ordinary schools, and the associations are finding it difficult to make arrangements to teach children of varying ages. The cost of living in Holland is high. There is very little, if any, anti-semitic feeling in the country. At the same time, unemployment is high, and if refugees were seriously to compete with domestic labor, public opinion might rapidly change. Private charity has been very generous and the resources of private organizations for this purpose do not seem to be exhausted.

Of course, all these Governments, together with the British Government, are insistent that the refugees should be moved on to places of final settlement within a year, and both Sir Herbert and I are very much worried about the situation on the settlement side. It is quite clear, no matter what may be said, that Latin America is sealed at the present time. The two projects in the British Empire, that is British Guiana and Northern Rhodesia, are of a long range nature, with the accent on the "long".

The British are not even sure they will be permitting anybody to go to Rhodesia. What does this leave? The Dominican Republic and the Philippines for settlement and the United States for infiltration, with 3,000 a year to Australia. It is understood, however, that this 3,000 will be drawn from the refugees now in England.

Sir Herbert and I had a confidential talk with Home Office experts here this week, and we asked them frankly how many people they were prepared to retain permanently after the end of this year. They said that they could not permit more than 3,000 to remain in England. Outlets would have to be found for the others. The people while here are not allowed to work. They have to be supported by private charity, and conditions are not made easy for them. The condition, in almost every case, for temporary entry into England has been evidence that these people were included on the American quota. Now that the British have discovered that application for the quota does not necessarily mean that the applicant could obtain a visa, entry of persons on a temporary basis here has virtually been stopped. So we are pretty close to rock bottom.

The Godman affair is boiling briskly. (1) Godman's solicitors have notified us that he is suing the Committee and/or its responsible representative to collect the sum of £2,500 for services rendered. (2) The legal advisers of the British Government have decided (a) that Lord Winterton is Chairman of the British Delegation and, as such, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee without executive authority or responsibility; (b) that Sir Herbert Emerson as an official of the League of Nations, enjoys under the covenant of the League, full diplomatic immunity and cannot be sued in the British Courts; (c) that other officials of the Committee (meaning me) who are not at the same time officials of the League of Nations, do not enjoy diplomatic or any other immunity or any special status, and are regarded as private citizens, subject to be sued and taxed. Parenthetically, this is flatly contrary to what I have been given to understand from the outset of our establishment here. I have been repeatedly told, although I can find no record in writing, that the Director and the Assistant or Vice-Director of the Intergovernmental Committee should have the same status as officials of the League of Nations on duty in London. The Foreign Office now says that there is no precedent for this and that it cannot be granted.

-7-

This, I believe, covers the week's developments.

With best regards to you and to Ted Achilles,

Yours ever,

R.T.P.

Pierrepont Moffat, Esq.,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D.C.

9-2  
PSF: Palestine

March 23, 1939.

My dear Mr. Justice:-

All I have been able to do so far has been to postpone any British announcement until next week. I am trying to put it off still further. Apparently the British are very much worried by the German and Italian incursions into the whole Mohammedan area.

As ever yours,

Honorable Louis D. Brandeis,  
2205 California Street,  
Washington, D. C.

Washington, D. C.,  
March 16, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

You will recall the letter of March 6 from Ambassador Lindsay, which I showed you, in which the Ambassador indicated that he had been instructed to assure me that His Majesty's Government "are very mindful of their obligations with regard to the Jewish National Home under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate".

Today word comes to me of decisive import showing clearly a contemplated course of British action which is wholly inconsistent with the Balfour Declaration and Mandate. In order to save your time I am writing you instead of troubling you with a visit.


These are the essentials of the contemplated British action:

1. An independent state, after an interim of probably not more than ten years, which would practically crystallise the present minority status of the Jews in Palestine.
2. Restriction of immigration during the next five years to 10,000 a year, with no assurance of further immigration without Arab consent.
3. Restriction of land purchases so as practically to make land acquisitions by Jews largely impossible.

In a private talk with Mr. Chamberlain he admitted to Dr. Weizmann that he did not blame Dr. Weizmann for refusing to cooperate on the basis of the British proposals. Mr. Chamberlain added that his personal feeling is friendly towards the Jews, but that he is not free to disregard the recommendations of his advisors.

As the formal action of the British Government is not to be announced until early next week, I am wondering whether you would not feel that a word from you now to London may yet be in time to avert the folly and injustice of the British proposals.

Yours sincerely,



The President

The White House

PSF: Palestine  
9.

file  
personal

2205 California Street  
Washington, D. C.

April 17, 1939

Dear W. President:

The American Jewish Organization  
has just received from London the  
Enclosed Cable. Our friends deem  
it very important that no announcement  
be made in the near future.

I hope that you may be able, by your  
wise counsel, to prevent the making  
of an announcement now.

Cordially

Lois A. Frank

President Roosevelt.

PSF: Palestine

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P  
Y

April 16, 1939

TELEGRAM FROM JEWISH AGENCY, LONDON, TO AMERICAN ZIONISTS:

(HEBREW TRANSLATION FOLLOWS)

Dr. Weizman reports that his interview with the Government leaders in Egypt was cordial. They appreciate the importance of America in the situation. Are interested in peaceful relations with us. They would agree to a postponement of the solution were it not for the Palestinian Arabs. Weizman's impression is that were it not for the underground machinations of anti-zionists in the British Legation in Cairo it would be possible to create favorable relations with Egypt and to have them exert an influence for good in Palestine. The Egyptians invited him for a second visit. Weizman asked us to apprise you of this and to urge you to do everything to ward off the Government's decision. There is reason to fear that it will be even worse as a result of the new conversations that are being conducted in secret.

We requested today from the Colonial office explanations about the statements in the papers regarding new British proposals to the Arabs. The Colonial Office denied that there were any proposals. They admitted that the Arab countries proposed changes in the Government's proposal which would likely induce the Arabs to become reconciled to the Government's proposal. The Secretary gave them a non-committal reply and as a result of that the Egyptian Minister flew to Cairo and there began conversations among the Arabs. We requested to be advised immediately what changes are being considered because it is clear that they are to our hurt. They replied that they would submit our request to the Secretary who is

returning Tuesday.

According to reliable reports the Government's declaration will be published on the twenty fourth of this month. Parliament convenes the eighteenth. Try to secure once more White House assistance to avert hasty and premature decision. Please advise.

RECEIVED AT

No. 8 Dupont Circle  
BRANCH  
Telephone Natl. 6600  
Br. 39

STANDARD TIME  
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# Postal Telegraph

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This is a full rate Telegram, Cablegram or Radiogram unless otherwise indicated by signal in the check or in the address.

DL	DAY LETTER
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NM	NIGHT MESSAGE
LCO	DEFERRED CABLE
NLT	NIGHT CABLE LETTER
	RADIOGRAM

Form 101

WA96 160=BY NEWYORK NY 8 305P

JUSTICE BRANDEIS=

FLORENCE COURT APTS=

PSF: Palestine  
1939 MAY 8 PM 4 06

FOLLOWING CODE MESSAGE RECEIVED FOR YOU: WOULD REQUEST BRANDEIS TRANSIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MYSELF TO PRESIDENT QUOTE UNDERSTAND BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL NEXT MONDAY PUBLISH STATEMENT POLICY EMBODYING LIQUIDATION POLICY JEWISH NATIONAL HOME INAUGURATED BY BALFOUR DECLARATION ISSUED BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT DURING LATE WAR WITH ACTIVE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT WILSON STOP JEWS OF PALESTINE. HOLD THIS BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL TRUST DEPRIVES GOVERNMENT EVERY BASIS LEGALITY AND REDUCES IT TO PURELY COERCIVE AGENCY WHICH TYPE BOUND RESIST WITH EVERY RESOURCE AT THEIR DISPOSAL STOP IN THE INTEREST OF THE PEACE OF HOLY LAND AND THE SALVATION OF A HOMELESS PEOPLE REDUCED BY ANTISEMITIC PERSECUTION TO DESPERATE PLIGHT APPEAL TO YOU AS SUCCESSOR OF PRESIDENT JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE WITH LORD BALFOUR ADOPTION OF NATIONAL HOME POLICY TO USE YOUR GOOD OFFICES WITH BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ABSTAIN FROM BREACH OF SOLEMN TRUST WHICH BOUND PRODUCE CATASTROPHE PALESTINE AND COMPLETELY UNDERMINE ALL CONFIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL PLEDGES GIVEN MALL NATIONS CHAIM WEIZMANN PRESIDENT JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE=

HENRY MONTOR.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*BSF: Palestine*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 12, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS

I am dictating this just before leaving to go down the river. I hear from London that Halifax says they are now contemplating delaying the Palestine statement. Kennedy is to see them about it again tomorrow.

F. D. R.

(Montar)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1939


My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of May 10 and the letter sent to you by Justice Brandeis under date of May 9, enclosed therewith, we have received this morning a telegram from Ambassador Kennedy which contains this statement: "Halifax says they are now contemplating delaying the Palestine statement scheduled for Monday and I will see MacDonald on this later tonight."

In view of the information conveyed to us by Ambassador Kennedy, I would suggest that you merely let Justice Brandeis know that we have had this information and assure him that our point of view is placed before the British on every possible occasion by Ambassador Kennedy in accordance with the standing instructions you have given him.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



The President,  
The White House.

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated May 10, 1939

Rec'd 3:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

658, May 10, 7 p. m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have seen Halifax and Cadogan. They think the Prime Minister's statement on Russia this afternoon will clear up the feeling about the Russian negotiations.

They are a bit concerned about the Danzig situation because unquestionably the Germans have the same group there they had in the Sudeten when the trouble started in November and Cadogan feels they are in there for no good. Halifax believes, however, that if the Germans think the British will fight, they will not mix up in the Danzig affair, but the Germans are constantly being advised that the British will not fight over Danzig. That is the great danger as he sees it. They do not regard the situation as dangerous, but extremely ticklish at the moment. They are attempting to bring pressure on Sweden to maintain strict neutrality in the event of trouble and not to sell any raw materials to either side. Halifax

believes

REB

2-#658, From London, May 10, 7p.m.

believes there is a possibility they may succeed in doing this.

Stanley, President of International Nickel, came in to see me last night and told me very confidentially that the Russians canceled 26,000 tons of nickel which they had on order for delivery over the balance of the year and he understands they are canceling other metals with other producers. He is completely at a loss to explain it.

Halifax says they are now contemplating delaying the Palestine statement scheduled for Monday and I will see MacDonald on this later tonight.

Cadogan told me that all nations particularly Poland and Rumania whom, after all, they are most anxious to help, are bitterly set against making any deal with the Russians and he said that practically all the nations have expressed some opinion to them that they hoped the tie up will not be too strong; that is of course all nations who are not lined up with the Rome-Berlin Axis. Even the Japanese have urged them not to do it.

KENNEDY

NPL



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

I still believe that any announcement about Palestine at this time by the British Government is a mistake, and I think we should tell them that.

What can I say to Justice Brandeis?

F. D. R.

RECEIVED

OFFICE OF THE  
UNITED STATES  
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

2205 California Street  
Washington, D. C.

May 9, 1939

Dear Mr. President:

Herewith, I enclose Dr. Wiggmann's  
Cable to you of the 8<sup>th</sup>.

Cordially,  
Valent Wiggmann

President Roosevelt >

Two British statements  
attached on the Jewish-  
Palestine situation.  
May 15, 1939

45 *clm*

P.S.F. Palestine

Extracts from a White Paper  
on Palestine.

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It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered the prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth.

His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view which was expressed by the Royal Commission that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of that Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922 (cmd. 1700) which reads as follows:

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English'. His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and

Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine."

But this statement has not removed doubts and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past that the Arab population of Palestine should be made subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

The nature of the Jewish national home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows:

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its

business/

business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection."

His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in

Palestine./

It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the fact that since the statement of 1922 was published more than three hundred thousand Jews have immigrated to Palestine and the population of the national home has risen to some four hundred and fifty thousand, or approaches a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish national home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkably constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be in particular a source of pride to the Jewish people.

In recent discussions the Arab Delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir H. McMahon on behalf of the British Government in October, 1915 undertook to recognise and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir H. McMahon and the Shereef of Mecca was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their report which has been published states that both the Arab and British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation  
of/

of the correspondence. There is no need to summarize here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere for the reasons given by their representatives in the report to the view that the whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

His Majesty's Government are charged as a mandatory power "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of the neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take but their objective is self-government and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in Government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

The establishment of an independent state and the complete relinquishment of mandatory control

in Palestine would require such relations between Arabs and Jews as would make a good Government possible. Moreover the growth of self-governing institutions in Palestine as in other countries must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved throughout which the ultimate responsibility for the government of the country will be retained by His Majesty's Government as the mandatory authority while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the government and understanding and cooperation amongst them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future Government of Palestine.

Constitution.

(1) The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestinian State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of an independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in the Government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each

community/



community are safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the government of the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity of participation in the machinery of government and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine, steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the departments of government with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain departments with British advisers. Palestinian heads of departments will sit on the Executive Council which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of departments are Palestinians exercising administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed/

performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of Palestinian heads of departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless, they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order an appropriate body of representatives of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestinian State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated in sub-paragraph (1) or in the Constitution contemplated in sub-paragraph (5) adequate provision has been made for:

(A) The security and freedom of access to the Holy Places and the protection of the interests and property of various religious bodies. (B) The protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position/

position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

(C) Such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of circumstances then existing.

His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine for the preservation of which they are at present responsible are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create the conditions which will enable the independent Palestinian State to come into being within 10 years. If at the end of 10 years it appears to His Majesty's Government that contrary to their hopes circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State they will consult the representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable they will invite the cooperation of these parties in framing a plan for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible moment.

During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

Under Article 6 of the Mandate the Administration of Palestine "while insuring that the rights and position of the other sections of the population are not prejudiced" is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions"./

conditions". Beyond this the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate. In Command Paper of 1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish national home it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.

In practice from that date onward until recent times the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor and in the letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister sent to Dr. Weizman in February, 1931, it was laid down as a matter of policy that the economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the statement of policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to the consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent statements of policy to support the view that the  
establishment/

establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effective unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country it should clearly be restricted; and equally if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored. Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious set back to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country regardless of all other considerations a fatal enmity between the two peoples/

people will be perpetuated and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction among all the peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate or considerations of common sense and justice require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing an immigration policy.

In the view of the Royal Commission the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied a belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognising the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (1) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country or (2) to promote the further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover the relations/

relations between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself requires this. Therefore His Majesty's Government after earnest consideration and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second alternative referred to above. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover in the view of His Majesty's Government abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But above all His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances they believe that they will be acting consistently with the Mandate obligations to both Arabs and Jews and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration.

(1) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which if economic absorptive capacity permits will bring the Jewish population

up to approximately one third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country this would allow of admission as from the beginning of April this year of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would be, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, admitted as follows:

(A) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to quotas for subsequent years within the five years period if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(B) In addition as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is insured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependents.

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining the economic absorptive capacity will be retained and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

(3) After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration and further preventive

measures/

measures are being adopted. The number of any Jewish illegal immigrants who despite these measures may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the years' quotas.

His Majesty's Government are satisfied that when immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place they will not be justified in facilitating nor will they be under any obligation to foster the establishment of the Jewish National Home by further immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

The High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will come into force from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of land and the improvement where possible of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of transfer of land.

State Dept. copy published in

Foreign Relations of the U.S.  
1939, Vol. IV The Far East,  
the Near East, and Africa

pages 757-758.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 17, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have read with interest and a good deal of dismay the decisions of the British Government regarding its Palestine policy.

I wish you would let me have a copy of the original Palestine Mandate. Frankly, I do not believe that the British are wholly correct in saying that the framers of the Palestine Mandate "could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country".

My recollection is that this way of putting it is deceptive for the reason that while the Palestine Mandate undoubtedly did not intend to take away the right of citizenship and of taking part in the Government on the part of the Arab population, it nevertheless did intend to convert Palestine into a Jewish Home which might very possibly become preponderantly Jewish within a comparatively short time. Certainly that was the impression that was given to the whole world at the time of the Mandate.

The statement on your Page #6, paragraph #2, quoting the White Paper of 1933, bears out my contention.

This new White Paper admits that the British Mandate is "to secure the development of self-governing institutions". Frankly, I do not see how the British Government reads into the original Mandate or into the White Paper of 1933 any policy that would limit Jewish immigration.

My offhand thought is that while there are some good ideas in regard to actual administration of government in this new White Paper, it is something that we cannot give approval to by the United States.

My snap judgment is that the British plan for administration can well be the basis of an administration to be set up and to carry on during the next five years; that during the

next five years the 75,000 additional Jews should be allowed to go into Palestine and settle; and at the end of five years the whole problem could be resurveyed and at that time either continued on a temporary basis for another five years or permanently settled if that is then possible. I believe that the Arabs could be brought to accept this because it seems clear that 75,000 additional immigrants can be successfully settled on the land and because also the Arab immigration into Palestine since 1921 has vastly exceeded the total Jewish immigration during this whole period.

Before we do anything formal about this please talk with me.

F. D. R.

P.S.F. Palestine

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

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THE SECRETARY

May 16, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I send herewith two British statements on the Jewish-Palestine situation, accompanied by an analysis of their proposals. These are to be made public on tomorrow.

Truce

State Dept. copy published in  
Foreign Relations of the United States,  
1939, Vol. IV, The Far East, the Near  
East, and Africa, pp. 751-757.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 15, 1939.

S - Mr. Secretary:

We have received today, in strict confidence, the final decisions of the British Government regarding its Palestine policy, which are expected to be published in the form of a White Paper in London on Wednesday, May 17.

The principal points of difference between the present decisions and the final proposals as made by the British to the London Conference on Palestine held in February and March are as follows:

(1) The term of the transitional period pending the establishment of an independent Palestine state is definitely fixed as "within ten years". However, if at the end of that time circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent state the British Government will consult representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League and neighboring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If the British Government concludes that postponement is unavoidable it will invite the cooperation of these parties in framing a plan for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible moment.

(2) Under the former proposals the regulation of Jewish immigration after five years would be subject to Arab consent

and

and the establishment of an independent Palestine upon Jewish consent. The present final decisions make the continuance of Jewish immigration after five years subject to Arab consent but a Jewish veto upon the setting up of an independent Palestine is not stipulated. Instead the final decisions provide that:

"At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order an appropriate body of representatives of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestinian state."

(3) While the final decisions do not expressly contemplate settlement of the Palestine problem on a federal basis, as envisaged in the final proposals and as stated to be "most favored by the Jewish leaders", the British Government has informed us, in the aide-mémoire accompanying pertinent extracts from the decisions, that in the Parliamentary discussion of Palestine the Colonial Secretary will make it clear "that such a solution is not excluded and will be for consideration in due course". It is presumed that by federal basis is meant a solution along lines of cantonal administration which would give the Jews full local autonomy in Jewish areas.

(4) The final proposals made no provision for the establishment of an elective legislature during the transitional period but instead foresaw the possibility of holding elections within

within two years for a Legislative Council to take the place of the present Advisory Council. The final decisions, however, envisage the possibility of an elective legislature and differ besides from the final proposals in that the process of permitting both sections of the population to participate in the machinery of government "will be carried on whether or not both avail themselves of it". This intention is obviously framed in order to avoid possible efforts by the Jews or Arabs to block the introduction of self-governing institutions by a refusal to participate in them.

In brief, the final British decisions provide for "the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestinian state in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future". "As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine", Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of departments, with the assistance of British advisers, approximately in proportion to their respective populations (the present proportions are: Arabs 71 percent, Jews 28 percent, others 1 percent). The number of Palestinians in charge of departments will be increased "as circumstances permit" until all heads of departments are Palestinians and, in the meanwhile, such Palestinian heads of departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner.

Commissioner. Eventually the Executive Council may be converted into a Council of Ministers. The British Government will require to be satisfied that, in the treaty and constitution contemplated, adequate provision has been made (1) in respect of the Holy Places and (2) for the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with British obligations to both Arabs and Jews and "for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home".

Concerning immigration, the final British decisions envisage, as did the final British proposals, the entry during the next five years, subject to the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, of sufficient Jews to bring the proportion of the Jewish population of Palestine from its present ratio of twenty-eight percent to thirty-three and one-third percent. This would involve, according to British calculations, an addition of some 75,000 to the present population, which would be distributed at the rate of 10,000 per annum, plus 25,000 Jewish refugees, who will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is insured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependents. After five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted "unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it". Immigration at this rate during the next five years would represent a slight increase over the present

present rate.

Concerning land transfers, the High Commissioner will be given, as was envisaged in the final British proposals, general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. In the aide-mémoire accompanying the communication of the final British decisions, it is stated that in respect of such regulation of land transfers the High Commissioner will do his utmost to follow as closely as possible the recommendations of the recent Peel and Woodhead Commissions (Palestine Royal Commission and Palestine Partition Commission). It may be expected, therefore, that in the light of those reports the acquisition of land by Jews will be unrestricted in the predominantly Jewish areas, prohibited in predominantly Arab areas and restricted in such mixed areas as Galilee in northern Palestine and the Negev in southern Palestine.

In explanation of its decisions, the British Government contends that the framers of the Palestine Mandate "could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country". Reference is made in that connection to the statement of the British Government made in a White Paper of 1922 that "His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view". In order to remove any possible ambiguity attaching to the position of the British Government in the matter, the statement

is now made that His Majesty's Government:

"would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, hence to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past that the Arab population of Palestine should be made subjects of a Jewish state against their will".

The proposed British White Paper refers also to the statement in the White Paper of 1922 that for Jewish free development and to provide:

"a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection".

It is added that "His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917".

Concerning the McMahon correspondence, it is remarked that the British Government cannot agree that such correspondence "forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab state".

The proposed White Paper continues by pointing out that the British Government is charged as a mandatory power "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine and it is added that that Government would regard it "as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate System that the population of Palestine should remain forever under mandatory tutelage". Although the British Government is

unable

unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, the desire is expressed to see established ultimately an independent Palestine, in which the "two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in governing in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured".

As has been pointed out in previous memoranda of this Division, the crux of British difficulties in Palestine hitherto have been their inability to reconcile the dual obligations imposed under the Mandate to secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home and to develop, at the same time, self-governing institutions. This dual obligation is found in Article 2 of the Mandate, which reads as follows:

"The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the Preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion".

The securing of the establishment of a Jewish National Home has made impossible, so long as the Arabs were in the majority, the granting to Palestine of self-governing institutions as such institutions would have enabled the Arabs to nullify the establishment of such a home. The one obligation, accordingly, has made impossible the fulfillment

of

of the other.

Concerning this, in connection particularly with the problem of immigration, the proposed British White Paper remarks

"In the view of the Royal Commission the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate System implied a belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (1) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country or (2) to promote the further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate."\*

In the aide-mémoire accompanying the British final decisions, it is remarked that "His Majesty's Government

trusts

\*Article 22 of the Covenant of the League reads in part as follows: "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the lending of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." The Preamble to the Palestine Mandate recites that "The Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire."

trusts that the United States authorities will appreciate the peculiar difficulties with which they have to contend in Palestine". An allusion to these "peculiar difficulties" is made in the text of the proposed British White Paper, in which it is stated that if immigration is continued in Palestine regardless of all other considerations" a fatal enmity between the two peoples (Arabs and Jews) will be perpetuated and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction among all the peoples of the Near and Middle East". The importance to Great Britain of avoiding such friction among the Arab people populating one of the lifelines of the British Empire - that passing through the eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf - needs no elaboration.

The aide-mémoire also notes that:

"It is understood that the President has frequently shown an interest in the possibility of some development and settlement either of Arabs from Palestine or else of Jews in Trans-Jordan. His Majesty's Government share the President's desire for such a development though expert investigations have indicated that the possibilities are somewhat limited. While the situation in Palestine has been tense and the Arab fear of domination by a Jewish minority continued, it was politically impossible for the Trans-Jordan authorities, however willing they might be, to consent to any such Jewish settlement. His Majesty's Government hope that their policy in Palestine will enable peace and confidence to be restored there in the near future and that in due course, therefore, it will be possible, if the Jews handle the matter tactfully, for them to induce the Arabs to agree to a development in Trans-Jordan on the lines which the President has advocated."

It

It may be finally remarked that the proposed British White Paper provides that before the establishment of an independent Palestine state:

"His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine for the preservation of which they are at present responsible are adequately safeguarded."

This obviously refers to the United States and to the responsibility assumed by Great Britain in the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924, in respect of American rights in Palestine.

Taking all things into consideration and, having in view particularly, British strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the necessity for Great Britain in the present uncertain state of international affairs of cementing its position in the Near East, it is our opinion that the final British decisions represent perhaps as reasonable a compromise between Jewish and Arab aspirations as it is practicable to attempt to effect at this time.

No present action on the part of this Government is called for by the final British decisions as they do not affect our Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924 with the British Government concerning Palestine and will not affect that convention until the possible termination of the Mandate which is now envisaged as a contingency some ten years hence.

*JRC*  
NE J.R.Childs/EG

*W.M.*  
Wallace Murray

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and Africa

VOL. IV PAGES 750-751

1939

PSF Palestine

AIDE MÉMOIRE

[5-15-39]

His Majesty's Embassy has been instructed to inform the State Department in the strictest confidence of the final decisions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regarding their Palestine policy as explained in the accompanying extensive extracts from the White Paper which, according to present arrangements, it is intended to issue in London on the evening of May 17th.

His Majesty's Government trust that the United States authorities will appreciate the peculiar difficulties with which they have to contend in Palestine and that it will be understood that the policy upon which His Majesty's Government have decided - which it is feared will unfortunately be disappointing to both Jews and Arabs - represents a sincere effort to fulfil the obligations which His Majesty's Government have undertaken to the two people and to act justly between their interests.

The Constitutional provisions in the policy envisaged by His Majesty's Government do not preclude an ultimate settlement of the Palestine problem on the lines most favoured by the Jewish leaders - i.e. a Federal basis. This possibility will not be specifically mentioned in the White Paper but the Secretary of State for the Colonies will make it clear during the Parliamentary discussion of the matter that such a solution is not excluded

it is still too early to envisage what may be the ultimate Constitutional evolution in Palestine His Majesty's Government believe that a Federal solution, if it be practicable, may well be best.

With regard to immigration His Majesty's Government have resisted very strong pressure from many quarters in favour of the immediate and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration.

It is understood that the President has frequently shown an interest in the possibility of some development and settlement either of Arabs from Palestine or else of Jews in Trans-Jordan. His Majesty's Government share the President's desire for such a development though expert investigations have indicated that the possibilities are somewhat limited. While the situation in Palestine has been tense and the Arab fear of domination by a Jewish minority continued, it was politically impossible for the Trans-Jordan authorities however willing they might be, to consent to any such Jewish settlement. His Majesty's Government hope that their policy in Palestine will enable peace and confidence to be restored there in the near future and that in due course therefore it will be possible, if the Jews handle the matter tactfully, for them to induce the Arabs to agree to a development in Trans-Jordan on the lines which the President has advocated.



-3-

As regards the regulation of land sales the High Commissioner will do his utmost to follow as closely as possible the recommendations of the recent Commissions of Enquiry.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

May 15th, 1939.

PSF Palestine  
March 7, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I do not agree with the memorandum from the Division of European Affairs. The American position from the very beginning has been far broader than a mere negotiation relating to German pressure on the Jews or the problem of political refugees. Nor can I agree with the statement that "When the war broke the principal justification for the continued existence of this consultative body ceased".

It is true, as the Division states, that the British and French showed scant sympathy toward our viewpoint that no matter how the war resulted there would be a vast refugee problem. I cannot see why we would be "placed in a position where we would have either to subscribe to or oppose the Anglo-French position".

This government is genuinely interested in the solution of the refugee problem in its broadest sense, i. e., not merely those unfortunate people who are forced by government action to leave their homes and their countries, but also all those who, at the end of this war, will for a thousand other reasons find it desirable voluntarily to seek new homes in new lands.

Even if this proposed meeting only "makes pretty speeches" it is worthwhile keeping this Committee very definitely alive. The Division, I fear, is thinking in terms of the immediate needs of a definite number of German, Spanish, Polish, Czech-Slovak individuals and families and fails to appreciate the enormous importance of the long-range view which will take into consideration new home seekers from France, Great Britain and even the United States. It will be time enough later on to consider the question of transferring certain activities from Mr. Taylor's committee to Governor Winant's committee, but, in the meantime, I am not yet ready to "put the Intergovernmental Committee quietly to sleep".

F. D. R.

PSF Palestine



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a telegram from the American Embassy at London concerning a proposal of Lord Winterton, the Chairman, for a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees at Paris in the late spring, and a telegram from Mr. Myron Taylor concurring in principle in the proposal that a meeting be held and suggesting Monte Carlo as an alternative to Paris as the place of meeting.

I enclose also a draft telegram in reply to Mr. Taylor expressing the view that it would be inadvisable for this Government to participate in a meeting of the Committee while the present unsettled international situation continues. I should be grateful to be informed whether this telegram meets with your approval and attach for your consideration in this connection a brief memorandum analyzing the present position of the Committee.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. From London
2. From Mr. Taylor
3. Memorandum
4. Draft telegram

The President,

The White House.

**THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON**

May 19, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:

The President asked me to give you these papers and to ask you to start a temporary Palestine file for him.

P. L. S.



*File  
Journal of Confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
Palestine  
1

June 28, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

After my last talk with you on the refugee question, I communicated to Myron Taylor the wishes you had expressed to me and in particular the expression of your desire that a meeting be held here in Washington next September under your personal direction of the representatives of the present Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, namely, representatives of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Brazil, Argentina, and this Government. I indicated to Mr. Taylor that it was my thought that this invitation from you might most appropriately be made known by him at the next meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee which will be held in London on July 18 next. I asked Mr. Taylor if he would send me his reaction to the general plan which I indicated to him.

The President,


The White House.

I have this morning received a letter from him in reply to my letter and I am enclosing a copy of his letter for your information.

At your convenience may I have an opportunity of talking with you again about this subject? Mr. Taylor is planning to sail on July 12 and before he leaves he should have final and definite instructions from you in this regard.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "R. Kelly". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed phrase "Faithfully yours,".

Enclosure.  
From Mr. Myron Taylor,  
June 25, 1939.

COPY

KILLINGWORTH  
LOCUST VALLEY  
LONG ISLAND

June 25, 1939

The Honorable  
Sumner Welles,  
Under Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Welles:

I am very happy to have your letter of June 22d, and to be able to say that I am at home and making daily improvement toward restoration to full vigor. I am pleased to have put behind me an unpleasant experience and glad to have removed an uncertainty that might some day have caused real difficulty--more real, in fact, than I had imagined. I have greatly appreciated the friendly interest and expressions of yourself and your associates in the Government.

In response to your letter I am glad to say that we are in accord upon the general interpretation of the situation in the realistic sense, and that our procedures thus far taken have proved constructive and sufficiently cautious to be safe, the attitude of our Government and those of us who have been working in its behalf considered.

I am planning to sail on the 12th of July. In the meantime I hope to have at least one thorough discussion with you, so that some of the minor questions can be determined definitely. I think it will not be possible for me to come to Washington until just prior to my departure. Perhaps in the interim you may find occasion to visit New York, in which case we could meet here.

Relative to the proposed September meeting of the executive officers of the Intergovernmental Committee, I am not quite clear as to the precise objective toward which its deliberations would be directed. I am wondering also if you have considered whether in all likelihood it would be imposing a new obligation on our Government in a field which, to say the least, is difficult. One of the chief difficulties in the present situation, as you know, so far as Jewish refugees are concerned, is three-fold:

First, it is not clear that there is available a suitable area for mass colonization that would be permanently acceptable to the Jewish refugees. (Their real objective

is to get into settled countries where they can set up their lives in existing communities and in professional, commercial and industrial activities).

Secondly, do the Jewish people really want a new "Palestine" in another part of the world sufficiently to contribute to and permanently develop and support in a large way such activity? (If so, the situs of such development should be easily accessible; it should have a climate, soil and general characteristics that would justify it as the basis for its permanent and costly development.)

Thirdly, is our own Government prepared to contribute or invest perhaps one hundred million dollars to such a development? (If so, would it be willing to use such a sum in development of a scheme in foreign lands; e.g., British Guiana?) We must bear in mind that certainly thus far on the question of finance the British and French Jewish committees have shown no disposition to finance large settlement projects. This has also been the attitude of the British and French governments. The suggestion has been bluntly made that American Jewry and the American Government should do it all.

It seems advisable to consider these questions before the final objective of the proposed September meeting is adopted.

In a day or two I hope to talk with you on the telephone on the whole matter, before you have taken the next step in formulating plans.

With kind regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

MYRON C. TAYLOR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7/5/39

I have a file something  
about Jewish refugees. Put this  
with it.

FDR

*Palestine*



*file  
Confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*P20  
Palestine*

August 5, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

Myron Taylor has sent under date of July 28 a memorandum of a conversation which he had in London with Herr Wohlthat who was sent to London ostensibly as German delegate to the Whaling Conference. I believe you will be interested in this memorandum.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:  
Memorandum of  
conversation.

The President,  
The White House.

Paris, July 28, 1939.

Memorandum of a conversation of the Honorable Myron C. Taylor with Mr. Wohltat, London, July 21, 1939. Mr. Pell was present.

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The meeting, which was requested by Mr. Taylor, took place in Mr. Wohltat's apartment at the Hotel Victoria. Mr. Wohltat had originally agreed to come to Mr. Taylor's rooms, but in view of the fact that appointments had been arranged for him with Sir Horace Wilson and other British officials, he asked Mr. Taylor to do him the kindness of coming to him.

Mr. Taylor, after the customary courtesies, said that he felt it to be a duty to say to Mr. Wohltat at the outset what an unfortunate impression had been created in the United States by the reception accorded by Chancellor Hitler to President Roosevelt's letter during the March crisis. The tendency to scoff at this letter had alienated many Americans who had a feeling of sympathy for the German people, and the insult to the Presidential office had done great harm. Mr. Taylor felt that it should be appreciated in Germany that American patience was running short. Untold danger would be done by a repetition of the insulting tactics of February.

Mr. Wohltat said that he was in thorough agreement with Mr. Taylor's views.

Mr. Taylor continued that in the present state of world economy every nation was faced with approximately the.....

the same problem and no nation and no leader would be able to survive a general collapse. Without a doubt this collapse would come if expenditure continued at the present pace. A time must come when further expenditure on war preparations would not be possible. The adjustment of national economies which would ensue would raise many problems, not the least of which would be the problem of progressive unemployment. Of course, if war came, it would mean ruin for all Europe, including Germany.

Mr. Wohltat said he agreed with Mr. Taylor, but observed that the beginning of a solution lay in a political and economic agreement of Germany with England.

Mr. Taylor then spoke of Marshal Goering; said that he was sorry that he had missed meeting him on the Riviera last winter, and observed that the Marshal was more respected in America than any other member of the National Socialist Party.

Mr. Wohltat said that he was pleased to hear this.

Mr. Taylor next mentioned the persecution of the Jews in Germany. He said that the despoliation of these people had filled the Western World with horror and had created difficulties for other countries which were almost insurmountable at a time when unemployment and anti-Semitism were rising. It was a breach of courtesy on the part of a nation to try to throw its undesirables on its neighbors after depriving them of their fortunes and their property. The remedy was to work with the Intergovernmental Committee in introducing orderly emigration and meanwhile to treat those who were obliged to remain behind humanely. Time would bring a cure. To impose pressure would be

to.....

to assure failure.

Mr. Wohltat's comment was that he was working out the details of the arrangement with Sir Herbert Emerson and he was hopeful that the plans inside and outside Germany would mature in the immediate future.

RTP/FP

*Palentine*  
1


In re-conversation which Myron Taylor had with  
Mr. Wohltat in London on July 21, 1939 and during  
which Mr. Taylor mentioned the persecution of the Jews  
in Germany etc.

See: Myron Taylor-Gen corres-Drawer 2-1939--(July 28, 1939)




PSF: *Palestine*

# THE DISTRIBUTION OF WHITES IN AFRICA.



8




- 250 Whites
- 500 Whites

Cities with more than 10,000 Whites are represented by circles whose diameter is based on the total number of Whites.

Total number of Whites in Africa  
4.77 millions according to census  
of 1931.

Of these:

- 1.8 Mill. in Union of South Africa
- 1.3 " in French North Africa
- 0.8 " in Port. and Span. Is.
- 0.2 " in Egypt



1935 publication - K. L. ...

PSF  
Palestine  
1

December 4, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. van Zeeland's plan is on the whole good but I think misses the psychology which is necessary to success.

No. 5, for instance, suggests that a large number of relatively small settlement projects will be organized separately.

No. 6 suggests the same thing -- that the privileged companies will each organize small communities -- some agricultural, some semi-urban.

In other words the outline does not stimulate my imagination or that of the average individual in the civilized world to picture the huge rounded out project which could affect many millions of our fellow beings. Most people would regard it as a large series of small individual projects and would mentally miss out on the conception of the whole. For example, nothing is said about the possibility of one or two very large areas which would take hundreds of thousands of people through a course of years and develop a wholly new rounded civilization.

This is not the time, for example, to speak of small settlements organized on an agricultural or subsistence basis and other small settlements on a semi-urban industrial basis. The picture should be in terms of a million square miles occupied by a coordinated self-sustaining civilization -- some people on individual farms, others near them in small villages, still others devoting themselves to public works, still others in small manufacturing communities, but all of them an essential part of a complete coordinated picture. I could raise money on that far quicker than if I talked in terms of individual communities. In other words, over-all planning on an enormous scale is essential.

In items 7, 8, 9 and 10 too much emphasis is placed on strictly business basis for financing. Resettlement of large numbers of people cannot be put solely on a business basis. It is my judgment that 50% of the cost can properly be financed on a business basis but that the other 50% would have to be given -- not loaned -- in the form of gifts from governments and individuals.

Taking Mr. Van Zeeland's figure of \$100,000,000, I would, as he does, make the first "tranche" \$20,000,000-- of which \$10,000,000 would be given outright and the other \$10,000,000 subscribed by the capitalist group.

Somebody has to breathe heart and ideals on a large scale into this whole subject if it is to be put into effect on a world-wide basis.

F. D. R.

NOV 21 1939  
RECEIVED  
STATE DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

December 1 1939

My dear Mr. President:

Following the recent meeting of the officers of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, I have had one long conversation and exchanged correspondence with M. van Zeeland, who, as you know, is the leading spirit in the refugee work at the present time in his capacity as President of the Coordinating Foundation. M. van Zeeland has elaborated a careful plan, has had numerous conferences at New York with persons who might wish to participate in assistance to refugees and is now leaving for Europe where he will confer with the leading personalities.

Before taking further steps or making definite commitments, M. van Zeeland is most anxious that I should obtain from you an indication that his plans meet with your general approval. He is most anxious to accord his plans with your views and intends, when the work is more advanced, to ask you to make a public statement in support of the Foundation's approach to the solution of the refugee problem.

M. van Zeeland's plan may be summarized in the following points:

- (1) The problem should be approached on a non-sectarian, non-racial and non-discriminatory basis

The President,  
The White House.

basis and the solution should benefit all refugees, irrespective of the cause of their migration.

(2) Infiltration, that is individual immigration, should be stimulated but it must be supplemented by large-scale settlement.

(3) Without detriment to what has already been accomplished in the way of exploring places of settlement, a fresh effort should be made to survey the existing undeveloped portions of the world with a view to their use for resettlement.

(4) The existing administrative facilities of the private organizations should be continued but brought under the general aegis of the Foundation which shall serve as the management in matters of settlement.

(5) When places have been adjudged feasible for settlement, the projects shall be organized in the form of privileged international companies.

(6) Under the privileged companies, settlement should be organized in part on agricultural, or subsistence, basis and in part on a semi-urban industrial basis.

(7) Financing should be done in the first instance by a central financial corporation which will have subsidiaries in the form of the various chartered companies.

(8) Financing should be done on a strictly business basis, that is, subscribers to the various projects should enter the field as investors not as dispensers of charity.

(9) All formulae to be adopted for raising  
money

money should be based upon the investment idea.

(10) For purposes of financing a sum of \$100,000,000 should ultimately be subscribed. A first tranche should be subscribed by the capitalist group and should amount to approximately \$20,000,000. When this amount has been subscribed, the President of the Foundation will be in a position to approach governments with regard to settlement projects. When agreement has been reached with governments regarding settlement projects the time will have come to appeal to the general public to complete the \$100,000,000.

These are the broad lines of M. van Zeeland's plan. I shall not bother you with the subordinate details which have been worked out, particularly those of a financial nature, with great care, and discussed with leading financial personalities, both Jewish and non-Jewish, in New York and have met, I understand, with general approval in the financial community.

If you are in agreement that M. van Zeeland is working in the right direction I shall, if you concur, write him in general terms to that effect. He is of the opinion--and I am sure that it is the right one--that you should not be brought into the matter in any direct way whatsoever until the \$20,000,000 has been subscribed by the capitalist group. When the stage has been reached where an appeal to the general public might be useful, M. van Zeeland will doubtless wish to have some public expression of support.

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Under Secretary

PSF: Palestine

*4-43*

*Miss Tully file.*



*file  
Brennan*

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

After hearing you make the statement at Cabinet that there were reports that Dr. Weizmann had tried to bribe King Ibn Saud, you may remember that I asked you whether anybody here had tried to get Dr. Weizmann's side of the story and you said you thought not.

As a matter of fairness to Dr. Weizmann and the Zionist Movement, plus the important fact that you may have an opportunity to do something constructive for the Jews in Palestine, I asked friends of Dr. Weizmann in this country to tell me what they could that would bear on this report. I am enclosing herewith a memorandum from Meyer W. Weisgal, which gives in detail just what has happened since 1940 to the best of his knowledge.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry M. Nathan*

The President

The White House

FOR DEFENSE



MEMORANDUM

from Meyer W. Weisgal

November 11, 1943

Without checking directly with Dr. Weizmann, it is, of course, impossible to make a conclusive reply to the statement which you were good enough to convey to us this morning. However, to confirm our own knowledge of the situation, we checked with Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the political representative of the Jewish Agency in this country, who is closely identified with our affairs, and with Dr. Weizmann. He, as we did this morning, corroborated the essential facts as we know them. They are as follows:

In 1940, prior to Dr. Weizmann's departure for the United States, he met with Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill, whose interest in Zionism has been continuous since the Balfour Declaration, told Dr. Weizmann that in his opinion the solution of our Palestine problem rested, to a large extent, on securing the goodwill of King Ibn Saud. As far as I can recall, Mr. Churchill said: "I will make Ibn Saud the boss of the bosses of the Arab world, and, as a condition, Palestine must become in fact, as in promise, the Jewish National Homeland. Of course, it will involve large sums of money."

To this Dr. Weizmann replied: "If it is a question of a million pounds, it is too cheap; if it is a hundred million pounds, we cannot tackle it; if it is twenty or twenty-five million pounds, I have not got the money, but you may rest assured, Mr. Prime Minister, that the Jewish people will be ready to pay the sum."

(These quotations are from memory and may not be the exact words used. The sense, however, is accurate.)

The underlying idea, as reported to us confidentially by Dr.

-Weizmann-

Weizmann, was that this money should be given as a long-term loan to Saudi Arabia for the development of that country and other parts of the Arab world, and as an indication of Jewish interest in the economic development of the Near East.

Shortly after Dr. Weizmann's conversation with Mr. Churchill, John Philby, a British traveler and explorer, known for his anti-Zionist attitude, came to Dr. Weizmann of his own accord to discuss the problem of Zionism. Philby had been in Saudi Arabia for many years, had become a Moslem, and was very close to Ibn Saud. In this conversation, Mr. Philby suggested that he might be ready to approach Ibn Saud with a view to winning his support for the Zionist cause. He indicated that the Jews would be expected to advance a substantial sum as a loan to Saudi Arabia. A second condition which Mr. Philby made was that if Ibn Saud agreed that Palestine should be ceded to the Jews, all the other Arab countries would have to become completely independent after the war, with Ibn Saud as their overlord.

Dr. Weizmann discussed the advisability of Mr. Philby's approaching Ibn Saud, with some British officials, but, for various reasons, it was considered inadvisable to entrust Mr. Philby with this mission.

Dr. Weizmann reported all this to Mr. Sumner Welles, who agreed that Ibn Saud might become the Arab leader through whose intervention the Palestine problem might be solved.

When Dr. Weizmann saw the President, accompanied by Mr. Welles, there was some discussion on the same question. The President, too, indicated his interest in the economic development of Saudi Arabia, and the possibility that Jewish and governmental assistance might be extended.


A few weeks later when Dr. Wise met with the President, the

same matter was touched upon, and the President again indicated his readiness to help Saudi Arabia and his hope that Ibn Saud might take a reasonable attitude with regard to Palestine.

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Since 1940, as far as we know, Dr. Weizmann had no discussion with any individual, British or otherwise, regarding this matter, except those alluded to above. But it is possible that Mr. Philby may have discussed the whole matter with the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in London, who is at present accompanying the Saudian Arabian Princes on their trip here. Certainly no one could have gone to Saudi Arabia during the war, without the full knowledge, consent and facilities of the British government.


Washington, D. C.

<b>CROSS-REFERENCE</b> (Name, number, or subject under which this form is filed)		
		PSF: Palestine

<b>IDENTIFICATION OF RECORD</b>	<b>DATE</b>	December 21, 1943
	<b>TO</b>	
	<b>FROM</b>	Charles W. Taussig
	<b>BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONTENTS</b>	Conversation with Secretary Hull - 4:30 p.m. Participants: J. S. Macpherson, Hull, Taussig. Discussion of Palestine problem.

<b>FILED</b> (Name, number, or subject under which the document itself is filed)	Papers of Charles W. Taussig, Box 33, Caribbean Commission, British Section, General
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*Trip file*  
*file confidential*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Lowdermilk Project  
for Palestine.

Information has reached us that the Zionists intend to ask you to endorse the so-called Lowdermilk project for the development of Palestine. This project, which is described in a recent book entitled Palestine, Land of Promise by Dr. Walter Clay Lowdermilk of the United States Department of Agriculture, proposes the establishment of a Jordan Valley Authority on the model of the TVA, with the object of making it possible for Palestine to absorb at least four million Jewish refugees. The author, who is Assistant Chief of the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture, has made it plain that his plan represents his own personal views and does not have the backing of the Government. The project has, however, been heartily endorsed by the Zionists, who have not failed to stress the fact that the author is prominent in our own Government's reclamation work.

Quite apart from the foreign policy implications, we have some interesting comments regarding the Lowdermilk project, based on the view of scientists resident in Palestine, from one of our officers in the field, showing that from a purely technical standpoint there are serious obstacles to the plan. I thought that you would want to know this.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date FEB 14 1972

*Palestine folder 1-43*

*Imp file*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*file confidential*

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By *JS* Date FEB 14 1972

January 12, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reaction in Iraq to  
Congressional Resolutions  
Regarding Palestine.

I think you will want to note these two airgrams from our Minister at Baghdad, the first of which outlines the reaction in Iraq to the revival of the Palestine resolutions in Congress, while the second gives the text of a note from the Iraqi Foreign Office to our Minister summarizing the position of Iraq and the other Arab countries in this regard.

These airgrams show quite clearly that the Arabs regard, and will continue to regard, the Palestine question with the utmost concern. Zionist activities in this country will remain the gravest threat to friendly relations between the United States and the countries of the Near East until a solution to the problem is reached.

We are sending copies of the Iraqi note to Tom Connally and Sol Bloom.

*Joseph P. Gurnea*  
Acting Secretary

- Enclosures:
1. Airgram no. A-75,  
December 19, 6 p.m.  
1944, from Baghdad.
  2. Airgram no. A-77,  
December 21, 9 p.m.,  
from Baghdad.

Department of State

NE

BUREAU |

DIVISION |

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted .....

ADDRESSED TO

**The President,  
The White House.**

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By js Date FEB 14 1972 RGL:ad

From: Baghdad  
Date: December 19, 1944  
Rec'd: January 3, 1945  
3 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

A-75, December 19, 6 p.m.

1. Several weeks ago the Foreign Office asked me informally if I possessed any details regarding the resolutions relating to Palestine which had been presented to the appropriate committees in Congress. I replied in the negative and was informed that the Iraqi Legation in Washington had reported that the House Committee had already approved the resolution which had been placed before it. The Foreign Minister informed me several days later that the resolutions had been discussed at a Cabinet meeting; that the Government was extremely disturbed at what the effect in Iraq would be if the resolutions would be passed; and that it had decided to send a friendly note on the subject to the American Government. Judge Lloyd, who still acts occasionally in a drafting capacity for the Prime Minister, and Janali, the Director General of the Foreign Office, told me subsequently that they were working on the draft of such a note. At various times members of the Government and other prominent Iraqis mentioned to me their concern lest these resolutions should be passed and their passage should become known to the Iraqi public. No mention of the resolutions, however, was permitted to appear in the Iraqi press.

2. On the morning of December 12 Janali informed me by telephone that the Foreign Office had received a message from Washington to the effect that the Secretary of State had advised the Senate Committee that, in the opinion of the Department, it would be unwise at the present time for the resolutions to be passed, and asked me to let him know in case I should receive any confirmation of this report. Several hours later I was able to give to the Foreign Office the contents of the Department's telegram No. 263 of December 11. On the evening of the same day the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a special point of telling me how deeply the Iraqi Government appreciated the action of the Secretary of State. He said his Government regarded this action as convincing evidence that the United States really had an interest in maintaining good relations with the Arab world.

3. Following a dinner given by the Prime Minister on December 14, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Finance Minister called me to one side in order again to express the appreciation of the Iraqi Government of the action of the Secretary of State. They said that they hoped that the statement of the Secretary would definitely put to an end attempts of the Zionists to achieve their ends

by

by resorting to internal political pressure in the United States; that the American Government would be free in the future to consider the problem of Palestine purely upon its merits and would be able to apply to the solution of that problem the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and in the Declaration of the United Nations. They said that it was extremely important to Iraq and to other Arab countries that future relations between the United States and the Arab world be close and friendly and that they were relieved that a threat to these relations had been removed, at least for the time being.

4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me several days ago that the Cabinet had decided, despite the Secretary's statement to the Senate Committee, to send a note to the American Government on the subject of the passage of resolutions in Congress relating to Zionism. He said that his Government felt that it was its duty to have a formal expression of its feelings on the subject on record in the Department of State. It is probable that such a note will be handed to me in a few days.

5. No mention other than that referred to in paragraph number six below has appeared in the Baghdad press of the Secretary's statement to the Senate Committee and the fact that he has made such a statement is thus far known to relatively few people. The Foreign Minister informs me that since the Iraqi press was not permitted to publish announcements with regard to the resolutions, it considered it inadvisable to give to the press at present the contents of the Secretary's statement on that subject.

6. The only reference to the resolutions which has appeared in the Iraqi press was a story published in al-Ba'th, a conservative Shia newspaper, of December 13, and repeated with several variations in al-Mida of December 19. Both of these papers are in opposition to the present Government. This story pointed out that following a visit of the Secretary of State upon the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, it had been announced that the discussion of the resolution would be postponed to an indefinite date. The article added that it had been learned that the White House was opposed to the passage of the resolution just now and that the White House opposition arose from the possible effect of its passage upon "American-Saudi Arabian economic and political relations". The Director General of the Foreign Office informs me that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has complained because the Iraqi censor permitted this article to be published. He says that it was apparently based on stories coming out of Egypt and that the reference to Saudi Arabia was included in it in order to make it appear that the present Iraqi Government had been inactive in the matter.

BERNARDSON

AIRGRAM

FROM:

Baghdad

Date: December 21, 1944

Rec'd: January 3, 1945

3 p.m.

The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

A-77, December 21, 9 p.m., 1944.

Reference is made to my airgram A-75 of December 19, referring to a note which I was expecting from the Iraqi Foreign Office relating to Congressional Resolutions on the subject of Palestine.

The note in question bearing today's date was received this afternoon. The English translation of this note made in the Legation reads as follows:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Legation in Baghdad and has the honor to state that, being motivated by a feeling of sincere friendship toward the Government of the United States of America, the Iraqi Government wishes to draw the American Government's attention to the difficult situation in which it finds itself. This situation is created by the deep feeling of the Iraqi people for the Arabs of Palestine and by their anxiety over the future of their brethren in that country, an anxiety which is heightened whenever the Foreign Affairs Committee in each of the two Houses of Congress are presented resolutions recommending the taking of decisions favoring the unrestricted opening of the doors of Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state therein.

"Iraq and the other Arab countries consider Palestine to be an Arab country not dissimilar in any way from the other Arab Wilayets (provinces) which were attached to the Ottoman Empire and which have all now become independent Arab States.

"The Palestinian incidents which took place on several past occasions have had direct effects on Iraq. It has, therefore, become incumbent upon the Iraqi Government to be constantly vigilant. These circumstances have impelled it to explain the situation to the friendly Government of the United States. The Iraqi Government is

exceedingly

exceedingly anxious that American-Iraqi relations shall be developed in an atmosphere fraught with sincere friendship and mutual confidence, and it is feared that such resolutions and events might affect the situation and disturb the calm, all of which is not desirable to anyone.

"The Ministry wishes to state that it may be remembered that there are still many people in the world who are interested in creating difficulties and disturbances among the members of the United Nations and that the propaganda of the Axis powers is persisting in a fiendish effort to affect the unity of the United Nations by taking advantage of the Palestine question; this behooves us to avoid giving such opportunities to the enemy.

"The position of the Iraqi Government is rendered more difficult when the committees of such important institutions as Congress make such recommendations. The Iraqi Government cannot remain as a spectator of the tragedy which the Zionists wish to enact on the stage of the world.

"The resolution for the adoption of such a decision is directly opposed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and violates all the lofty principles of humanity. It undoubtedly arises from the effect of Zionist propaganda on the statesmen in America which leaves no scope for any of them to study, to investigate the justice of the case, and freely to hear the opposite point of view. The principle of interference in the destiny of the countries of others is an extremely dangerous one. This war is raging to exterminate that principle and to bring about justice among the peace-loving nations. It is not reasonable for a power permeated with the spirit of justice to give Arab Palestine away to the Jews in contravention of these lofty principles. This reassures us that the Palestine cause would inevitably and ultimately be solved in the interest of its Arab inhabitants.

"All the Arabs are completely confident of the justice of their cause in Palestine and of the transgression resulting from Zionist interference therein. Nothing shall, therefore, prevent them from fighting in defense of their legitimate right in Palestine regardless of costs. The Arabs appeal to the leaders of America to weigh the Zionist cause and the benefits which may result from supporting it against the sacrifices and efforts which America has made in the Arab and Islamic countries and the firm traditional friendship and material and moral interests which these sacrifices and efforts have created now and will create in the future in the Arab countries, and also against America's reputation for upholding justice and right. Only then will appear the wide difference between the profit and loss which American will experience in the event she supports the unjust Zionist policy.

"The Iraqi Government is fully cognizant of the fact that the Constitution of the United States of America imposes the principle of the division of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches. It, therefore, hopes that the American Government will, in its Executive capacity, make the viewpoint of the Iraqi Government known to the Legislative authority. It must be stated in this connection that the statement which Mr. Stettinius has recently sent to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has more or less alleviated the crisis which has arisen in the hearts of the Iraqi people. But we wish to be reassured that the American Government will not be affected by Zionist attempts which are undoubtedly contrary to the principles of right and justice. We likewise wish to reiterate here that the continued application by the Zionists of their plans for the realization of their unlimited ambitions will inevitably lead to the occurrence of unrest and disturbances and the shedding of blood in this part of the world. We do not believe that this will gain the support of the American nation which is famed for its adherence to the principles of justice and peace.

"The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and respect."

HENDERSON

LHM:gmjr.

ROBERT F. WAGNER  
NEW YORK

PSF: Palestine folder 1-45

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Imp file  
file confidential*

January 15, 1945

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am grateful for the opportunity I had last Wednesday to discuss with you briefly the Palestine question. It was good to hear you express again your determination to do everything in your power to help bring about the early realization of the Zionist objectives set forth in your historic message of October 15th, which I was privileged to read to the last convention of the Zionist Organization of America. That the overwhelming majority of the American people -- Jews and Christians alike -- give their support to these aims admits of no doubt.

Your forthcoming discussions abroad may be of fateful significance for the Palestine issue and the future of the Jews as a people. I am writing these few paragraphs in the hope that you may find them of use in your consideration of this historic and far-reaching problem.

1. The Jews of Europe cannot remain where they are without inviting a perpetuation of the problem so fearfully dramatized by the Nazi massacres. There must be a place to which any Jew who so wishes shall be entitled to go as of right. You yourself were responsible for two Conferences, at Evian and Bermuda, which scoured the world for places of refuge, and produced nothing. Only Palestine, to which the Jews have clung through the centuries with an almost unbelievable tenacity, is finally and irrevocably bound up with the fate of the Jewish people.

2. The vision and statesmanship which at the end of the last war recognized the historic right of the Jewish people to Palestine and envisaged the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth, was not implemented in practice in a manner designed to achieve that result. The original conception was whittled down until finally all that remained was a White Paper which prohibits Jews from entering their own national home. Despite all obstacles however, the Jews have achieved in Palestine a miracle of modern colonization which has greatly benefited both the Jews and the Arabs. The idea of their restoration to nationhood in their old homeland after 2,000 years of dispersion has unleashed forces which in the end no discouragement has been able to check.

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

The President . . .

page 2

January 15, 1945.

3. In the meantime for millions of Jews, Europe has become a charnel house. Civilization cannot in conscience refuse to the survivors the right to re-establish themselves amongst their own people. They, together with the Jews already in Palestine and such others as wish to go there, must be enabled to establish themselves as a majority in Palestine and set up a self-governing Jewish Commonwealth. In that Commonwealth all the inhabitants, while retaining the right to the maintenance of their own culture, language and religion, shall have equality before the law. It must be an undiminished and undivided Palestine. For apart from other consideration any partition which would exclude the Jews from access either to the water resources of the North or the undeveloped land areas of the South, would disrupt the country's economic frame and wreck the chances of large scale development.

4. The main obstacle is Arab opposition. Let it be said at once that if Arab consent is to be a prerequisite of any political settlement, there can be no hope of justice to the Jewish people. The Arab program necessarily denies to the Jews a place among the nations. It calls for a permanent Jewish minority in an Arab Palestine State which shall be one amongst many Arab states. To the Jews, Palestine would be the one place on earth in which they would be entitled to settle and to work out their own salvation by large scale settlement and the achievement of full nationhood.

5. The decisive element in the Palestine situation is that of time. The Arabs today accept as an accomplished fact the 550,000 Jews now in Palestine as against the 80,000 in 1920, even though they resisted, on occasion with violence, the increase to the present numbers. If the proposal for the establishment of a Jewish State were carried through with determination and speed, the Arabs would in the end likewise accept the accomplished fact of the existence of such a state. But it is vital to this end that the Jewish population in Palestine be increased by mass immigration from abroad within the briefest possible time. A long transition period would be disastrous.

6. This transfer must be initiated and as far as possible carried through in the coming months while the power and prestige of the United Nations are at their height and when the situation still permits of the execution of major changes which later may prove far more difficult. Nor can the broken Jews of Europe wait for some indefinite future for their salvation? Their very survival is dependent on their speedy resettlement in Palestine. At the same

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

The President ...

page 3

January 15, 1945

time adequate funds and technical facilities must be provided for this purpose by our own and other governments, just as such aid will in appropriate cases be extended to other peoples.

7. The Arab countries of the Middle East are for the most part sparsely populated and greatly underdeveloped. Their governments are unstable and the masses of their population live in backwardness and poverty. Within the framework of a general settlement at the end of this war it would be possible for the United States, working in conjunction with Great Britain, to make provision on broad and generous lines for the political and economic future of the Arab countries. The Jews in Palestine can serve as a creative and civilizing influence for the whole of that region. Any solution however can be premised only on a strong firmly rooted Jewish national entity in Palestine.

You once said in speaking of the post war world that we are now getting a second bite at the cherry. That bite must put an end once and for all to the homelessness of the Jewish people. To that end you and I and the great mass of our fellow Americans are pledged.

I'm just one of 130 million that are praying that your health will remain fine as it is now and that you will be very successful in your many arduous undertakings.

Very sincerely yours,

*Bob*

*Drop file*  
*file confidential* PSF: Palestine folder  
1-45-

January 16, 1945.

Dear Manny:-

I have not had a chance to thank you for yours of December fifteenth before this. Give me an opportunity to talk with Stalin and Churchill. There are all kinds of schemes -- crackpot and otherwise -- being advanced. Perhaps some solution will come out of this whole matter. Naturally I do not want to see a war between a million or two million people in Palestine against the whole Moslem world in that area -- seventy million strong.

As ever yours,

Honorable Emanuel Celler,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D. C.

EMANUEL CELLER  
10TH DISTRICT NEW YORK

MEMBER OF  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON SECRETARIES:  
BESSIE EFFRAT MARGARET BROOKS

NEW YORK OFFICE:  
1450 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK CITY

1324 NEW HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

NEW YORK SECRETARIES:  
JACOB GRALLA MARY DOUGHERTY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
DEC 16 8 59 AM '44  
RECEIVED

ABSOLUTELY PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

December 15, 1944

Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Franklin,

Prior to election, I wrote you anent the Wright-Compton Palestine Resolution and what your support thereof would mean in furthering your chances for re-election, especially in Brooklyn, my balliwick.

Your eloquent recognition of the yearning of the Jew for Palestine and his nostalgia for the Holy Land as his homeland, your support of the Palestine plank in the Democratic Platform (which plank as member of the Platform and Resolutions Committee of the Convention I helped frame) bore rich fruitage. See the official returns, e.g. from my Congressional District and how the vote in some precincts ran 1200 for Roosevelt and 20 for Dewey.

My section has a preponderately Jewish voting population. These people voted for you as though you were a modern Moses. I recall to you empty streets in the Italian and Irish sections when in the torrential downpour on that eventful Saturday you went through Brooklyn, and in contrast, the crowds, five and six deep, on the sidewalks of Brownsville-East New York streets (my district), where children and old men and women waited in the pelting rain for hours to catch a glimpse of you. They prayed for you in the synagogues that morning. You cannot forget their sincerity and the enthusiasm of their greeting.

The recent scuttling of the Palestine resolution in the House and Senate after 399 Senators and members of the House had expressed approval is a dreadful letdown to them. I am perplexed. They are bewildered. I do not know how adequately to answer their anxious inquiries.

Shall I tell them a platform is not something to stand upon, but something to get in on?

What could have occurred since your recent refreshing statement on Palestine that impelled you and the Secretary of State to ask that consideration of the resolution be deferred? Secretary Stimson had said that military considerations are now outweighed by political factors.

The inescapable conclusion is there must be some restraint from Britain.

But with her it is ever delay and more delay until we are confronted with a fait accompli - a British-Arab State with a Jewish Ghetto - contrary to the Balfour Declaration, the terms of the Palestine Mandate, the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924 and the Concurrent Resolution of 1922.

It is with sorrow I write. Is there an acceptable explanation for your retreat?

Sincerely,

*Manne*  
EMANUEL ZELLER

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PSF: Palestine folder  
1-43  
DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DSH-417  
No paraphrase necessary.  
(~~SECRET~~)

*file*  
Baghdad via Army  
Dated March 10, 1945  
Rec'd 1:55 p.m., 11th

Secretary of State

Washington

98, March 10, 11 p.m.

One. The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs told me a week ago in confidence that the Regent of Iraq had recently received a communication from Ibn Saud enclosing a draft of a letter which Ibn Saud proposed to send to the President on the subject of Palestine and suggesting that the various Arab kings address similar letters to the President simultaneously. The Minister said that the Regent had agreed to Ibn Saud's suggestion and that it had been arranged for the letters to be delivered to the appropriate representatives of the American Government on March 10.

Two. The Regent today has caused to be delivered to me a sealed envelope addressed to the President. He also sent for the files of the Legation a document which he said was an English translation of the Arabic text of a letter from himself to the President. The

Regent's letter,

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date FEB 14 1972

-2-, #98, March 10, 11 p.m., from Baghdad via Army.

Regent's letter, after setting forth a number of arguments against Zionism, concludes as follows: "The Arabs believe at present that the Jews want to have Palestine only as a means for their future domination of the whole Arab world economically as well as politically. Their future aim is no less than the colonization of all adjacent Arab countries. The Arabs naturally are opposed to such designs.

The Arabs maintain that they cannot unite unless Palestine is one of their constituent members. The geographical position of Palestine will obstruct Arab unity should it be in the hands of non Arabs whose interests conflict with those of the Arabs. The Arabs who regarded their unity as of prime importance can never agree to leave out Palestine. The Arabs individually and collectively regard the future of Palestine as a matter of life and death for them.

Excellency, these are only some of the most important reasons which induced the Arabs to defend their natural rights in Palestine. Such rights are undoubtedly supported by all humanitarian principles. It is the encroachment on such principles which is the main cause of all the wars and the troubles of the world. The

world indeed

-3-, #98, March 10, 11 p.m., from Baghdad via Army.

world indeed needs the maintenance of peace and justice in order to achieve security and cooperation among the nations. Nothing that tends to promote discord should be tolerated.

As Your Excellency is one of the responsible men in high office who is endeavoring to realize such ideals and to share the world of tomorrow we appeal to you to support the natural rights of the Arabs in Palestine. In doing so you will eliminate one of the important factors which disturb peace and security not only in the Middle East but also throughout the entire world.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my hearty greetings and highest esteem".

Three. The envelope will go forward by next pouch.

Four. A similar communication was handed today to the British Embassy for Churchill.

HENDERSON

MJF

4240

*Palestine folder 1-45*

Carbon initialed "OK F.D.R." and returned to Acting Secretary Grew 3/24/45,  
elb

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By JS Date FEB 14 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


March 22, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Iraqi Premier's Inquiry  
Regarding Your Attitude  
on Palestine.

I am attaching a copy of a telegram from Baghdad stating that the Prime Minister of Iraq had asked for confirmation of a Reuter's report to the effect that you had reaffirmed to Rabbi Wise your promises of last October to the Zionists. The telegram adds that the Prime Minister requested our Charge d'Affaires to convey to this Government the keen disappointment of the Iraqi Government if the report should prove to be true.

There is also attached for your approval a proposed telegraphic reply to Baghdad.



Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Copy of telegram from Baghdad dated March 18, 1945.
2. Proposed telegraphic reply to Baghdad.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By JS Date FEB 14 1972

AMLEGATION,  
BAGHDAD.

In reply to the inquiry of the Prime Minister contained in your 110, March 18, noon, you may state that the Reuter's report in question is substantially correct and undoubtedly refers to a statement issued by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise following a conference with the President on March 16. No (repeat no) statement was issued by the President in this connection. In discussing this matter with local officials you should point out that the Rabbi's statement refers to possible action at some future time. In this same connection, it will be recalled that the President's letter of October 15, 1944, to Senator Wagner regarding the Palestine plank adopted by the Democratic Party stated QUOTE efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable UNQUOTE. You may state that the President is, of course, keeping in mind the assurances which were communicated on a number of occasions to the Governments of certain Near Eastern countries, including Iraq, to the effect that in the view of this Government no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. You may renew these

- 2 -

assurances to the Government of Iraq.

Sent to Baghdad, repeated to London and to Cairo,  
to be repeated by Cairo to Beirut, Jerusalem, Damascus  
and Jidda.

Acting

Code Room:

Please repeat to London as Department's \_\_\_\_\_.

Repeat to Cairo as Department's \_\_\_\_\_.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By JS Date FEB 14 1972

NE:ENW:HW

3/22/45

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

MES-649  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. [REDACTED]

Baghdad via Army

Dated March 18, 1945

Rec'd. 8:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

110, March 18, noon

The Prime Minister has informed me that a Reuter's  
despatch reports the President as having "reaffirmed his  
promises of last October to Rabbi Wise". The Prime  
Minister expressed the hope that this report is not true  
but if it is true he asks me to convey to the US  
Government the keen disappointment of the Iraqi  
Government.

MORELAND

RB

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-73

By JS Date FEB 14 1972