

● PSF Philippines 1941

2-5-41

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4284

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 5, 1941.<sup>4</sup>

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Please let me have your  
recommendation on this secret  
recommendation of the Secretaries  
of War and Navy.

F. D. R.

Letter dated Jan. 30, 1941 to the President from Secretaries Stimson and Knox in re request of President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth that funds not yet appropriated but already authorized to be paid the Commonwealth from sums derived from sugar excise taxes and currency devaluation be provided at this time in order to permit improvement of the defenses of the Islands. The sum in question amounts to \$52,000,000.

*Philippine  
Fishes*

CONFIRMATION OF CODED CABLEGRAM SENT FEB. 7

7  
Personal Philippines  
Confidential  
Folder  
1-49

PRESIDENT QUEZON  
MANILA

Personal - For your guidance have had some unofficial conversations here suggesting some concern official quarters our large sales copra and coconut oil to Russia apparently for Germany and iron ore shipments to Japan all of which has periodically reflected itself in the local press. Also it is not readily understood here why Philippine National Bank, Manila, making purchases of long-term drafts amounting to large sums from Japanese companies now considered beyond average risk. On account of unavailable information have been unable to make specific replies to justify our policy.

Believe general tension Europe and Asia increasing here daily will become more acute with passage Lend-Lease Bill which is assured. Confidential information conditions in Europe more precarious than publicly reflected making assistance by United States absolutely necessary at this point. Regards.

M I K E

CONFIRMATION OF CODED CABLEGRAM RECEIVED FEB. 18

COMMISSIONER ELIZALDE  
WASHINGTON DC

Refer to your telegram of 7th instant regarding copra and coconut oil shipments to Russia apparently for Germany am informed that these shipments are made to Shanghai and Vladivostock and are handled largely by American concerns. Likewise American concerns are principal exporters of iron ore to Japan.

Drafts bought by Philippine National Bank, Manila from Japanese companies are in the nature of ordinary commercial papers covering shipments of Philippine products consigned mostly to American concerns and sometimes even to United States Government agencies. This accommodation is known to United States High Commissioner and State Department.

You may assure officials concerned that Philippine Government will be glad to cooperate in any specific measures which the State Department may desire to suggest or recommend.

Q U E Z O N

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

2/10/41

PART 20 PAGES 4293

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Philippine*  
*Folders*  
*1-41*

February 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

Please talk this matter  
over and let me have final  
recommendation.

The whole matter should  
be treated as highly con-  
fidential.

F. D. R.

Letter of Feb. 7, 1941 from  
Acting Secretary Bell of the  
Treasury in re recommendation  
for the appropriation of certain  
moneys amounting to approximately  
\$52,000,000 to the Philippine  
Islands to be used for defense  
purposes.

2/11/41

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4242

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

February 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Admiral Stark asked me to forward this to the President since he considered the matter of some urgency.

Respectfully,

  
E. J. CALLAGHAN

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 16 PAGES 2150-2151

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

11 February 1941

①

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4 cruisers, a squadron (9) of destroyers and carriers and perhaps to permit a leak that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return, I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small hours because, as you know, I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.

You also called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously, if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any, bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back, we would then certainly look like turning tail and running if something happened and we did come back. I believe it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that even were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far East, we would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southward or into Dutch East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack.

As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is simply up against it for facilities to care for what he has, and only recently have we acquired a vessel, to make available to him later on, to help take care of his submarines which are in ~~urgent~~ urgent and immediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities. Sometime after July, I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March.

Specifically:-

Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be exposing our force without compensating results.

There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in, in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem.

The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is <sup>in</sup> its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It is true we only contemplate a visit ~~at~~ out there but we might find recall of this additional detachment

exceedingly embarrassing or difficult. (3)

If we are forced into the war, our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should, at least at first, remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to ~~support~~ spare forces for the Atlantic.

Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, and also we might very well compromise our own future operations.

I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.

I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. I do think the matter serious.

The establishment of Marine Defense Battalions at Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could, of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending we plant our mines in Manila, assume a full posture of defense in the Philippines and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii.

Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.

I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram ~~fr~~ of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

*H.R.S.*



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

In connection and to be considered with my separate memorandum of February 17, with reference to the secret recommendations of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, with regard to making available certain authorized appropriations for the improvement of the defenses of the Philippine Islands, I wish to make this additional comment. As you know, the relationship between the High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands and President Quezon is not friendly. It may very well be that, while it is in accordance with the law that these expenditures, if made, should be under the supervision and control of the High Commissioner, such an exercise of authority might lead to further friction. In view of these facts and of the relationship between these two officials already referred to, it would seem to me that the designation of a different High Commissioner might make for a more amicable relationship between this country and the Philippine Commonwealth.

Sincerely yours,

*Harold Z. Ickes*

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,  
The White House.

*File Personal Confidential*  
*Philippine Folder*  
*1-11*

PSF; Philippine folder  
1-41

File  
personal  
confidential

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


An officer from the Navy Department recently made a flying trip to the Far East and return. While there he conferred with Admiral Hart and the High Commissioner.

Among other things, the following bits of information came back:

(a) Admiral Hart thinks it a mistake that the Philippines were placed under the Department of the Interior - and wished the President to know his thought in this matter.

(b) The High Commissioner was greatly concerned because, no matter to whom he wrote in Washington concerning his problems, his views always leaked through to the Philippines and to Mr. Quezon.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART  
20

PAGE X  
4309

*Philippines*

*PSF; Philippine Islands  
1-44*

COPY

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1941.

The President

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Our Military Adviser to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, has recently recommended the strengthening of the seacoast defenses of the Philippines against possible invasion.

He has requested that seven 8-inch railway guns (old model) and twenty-four 155 mm guns, together with the necessary auxiliary equipment and ammunition, be placed at the disposal of the Philippine Government for this purpose.

Title to equipment made available under this proposed transfer would remain with the United States pending final adjudication of all accounts between the two governments prior to 1946 as specified in the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

The amount of equipment involved is relatively small. It does not affect our present commitments to the British Government and cannot materially affect future arrangements.

The War Department is of the opinion that the proposed transfer would both strengthen the defense of the Philippine Islands and improve the position of the United States in that area without impairment to more important defense objectives.

Your approve of this transfer is recommended.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

H. L. S.

O. K.

F. D. R.

~~SECRET~~

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4327

*Philippine Folder  
1-41*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

May 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you speak to me  
about this?

F. D. R.

Letter from The United  
States High Commissioner giving  
a report on the Philippines,  
dated April 23, 1941.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4416

PSF: Philippine Folder  
1-41

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following extract from a personal letter from General MacArthur to me may be of interest to you:


"The Philippine Army units that have been called are now (August 30) mobilizing in a most satisfactory manner and the whole program is progressing by leaps and bounds. President Roosevelt's proclamation had a most momentous effect throughout the Far East. Locally it changed a feeling of defeatism to the highest state of morale I have ever seen. It was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm by all classes. You, Secretary Stimson, and the President may congratulate yourselves on the excellent timing of the action.

"I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the formation of this command. With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid."

By commercial vessels from San Francisco on August 26th and September 8th, the following personnel and materiel have been shipped to Manila:

One antiaircraft regiment  
One tank battalion (less one company) with 50 tanks  
Fifty latest model P-forty pursuit planes, along  
with ammunition, and some other items of materiel.

The departure of the Flying Fortress squadron from Hawaii was delayed because of the run-way at Wake Island. It is now en route and arrived at New Britain this morning. It should be in Manila tomorrow, or the next day.

  
Chief of Staff.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4453-4454

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER  
MANILA

Philippine Files  
1-41

file

Via airmail

November 1, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of September twenty-sixth enclosing a copy of the letter you wrote to President Quezon. I am so glad you wrote to President Quezon as you did. It flattered him greatly to receive your warm expressions of goodwill and he was as pleased as a child with what you said. I know that your note served a genuinely useful purpose in deepening his sense of loyalty to the United States and to yourself.

Out here on the firing line I feel distressed that you are being so hamstrung and impeded by a divided Congress and by refractory labor groups. The Neutrality Law should have been repealed weeks and months ago and the United States should today be forging armaments at a pace which would make the outcome of the war clear to everyone. As long as Germany pursues her civilization-wrecking policy a fight to the death between her and the United States is as inevitable as the rising of the sun, for Americans will not take the defeat of their most precious heritages lying down. This being true, the sooner America can whole-heartedly devote one hundred percent of her energies to the supreme effort necessary to crush Nazism, the sooner the present wrecking of civilization can be stopped. The way you have led the American people step by step to understand and realize this fact has been one of the outstanding achievements of democracy during this time.

We feel much more reassured out here that Americans back home under your leadership have come to realize the importance of building up a strong Philippine defense. How greatly our defenses here have been strengthened Japan also knows; and that is the surest way of avoiding trouble in the Far East.

I have been building up a fine staff of workers in the High Commissioner's office. They are an outstanding group; and as the work has rapidly increased with export control functions, foreign funds control, priority problems and a

host

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

- 2 -

host of additional duties due to war conditions, they have jumped into the breach gallantly and have carried on with great ability and loyalty. I am hoping that my new Legal Adviser, Stewart McDonald, whom you appointed two weeks ago, will arrive by the end of this month.

Ever sincerely yours,

*Frank*



Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4457

*Philippine Folder*  
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF WAR:

For preparation of a personal  
reply to Francis Sayre for my signature.

F.D.R.

Note from Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Manila, 10/20/41, to the President, enclosing copies of his letter to Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, dated 9/30/41, with its enclosures (Marron reports), together with a copy of General MacArthur's reply to Mr. Sayre of 10/10/41, dealing with the organizing and stimulating of effective civilian defense preparation in the Philippines.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4456-4457

Published also in Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941,  
Vol. IV, the Four Fast, page 526.

*Philippine Folder*  
1-11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE:

To prepare a very nice personal  
letter for my signature.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, 10/18/41, to the  
President, a copy of which has been retained for our  
files. In re defense of the Philippines.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4458-4462

FDR letter to Quezon published, also, in Foreign Relations  
of US., 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, p. 598.

Quezon to FDR, 10/18/41 published on page 526.

*Sent by Regular Mail*

*Philippine Folder  
1-41*

November 15, 1941

My dear President Quezon:

It is with much pleasure and gratification that I have read your letter of October 18, 1941, assuring me of the wholehearted loyalty and support of the Philippine Government and people in whatever the immediate future may hold in store for the Philippines and the United States.

In times such as these it is particularly gratifying to learn of the cordial manner in which you, General MacArthur and Admiral Hart are collaborating in making preparations for the defense of the Philippines.

It is my earnest hope that the contingency for which preparations are being made will never arise. However, in the light of recent history

it would be worse than criminal not to be fully prepared for all eventualities, and I wish you to know that your expressions of loyalty and support and the manifestations of cooperation shown by your government and people are highly gratifying and helpful to me and to the American people in these times of uncertainty and danger.

Very sincerely yours,

*(Signed) Franklin D Roosevelt*

The Honorable  
Manuel L. Quezon,  
President of the Commonwealth  
of the Philippines,  
Manila, Philippine Islands.

UNCLASSIFIED BY SP4  
FO KNOX FPM/ LON  
DATE 08/10/01 BY  
IF MONTY DE AC/EE

PSF: Philippines

October 18, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Today's press reports seem to point strongly to the possibility of actual involvement of the United States in the war on account of the torpedoing of the destroyer "Kearny". On the other hand, the course of recent events in Japan is far from encouraging to those who would hope that there may not be armed conflict between the United States and Japan. Should this unfortunate situation arise, it is but natural to expect that the Philippines will be the scene of such a conflict. I am, therefore, hastening to reiterate to you what on former occasions I have asserted, namely, that our government and people are absolutely and wholeheartedly for you and your policies, and that we are casting our lot with America no matter what sacrifices such determination may entail.

Mr. President, since at a time such as this it is of the utmost importance that the Government of the Philippines should have complete understanding and cooperation with the military and naval authorities of the United States, I believe you will be pleased to know that General MacArthur and I are in perfect accord, and that the government and people of the Philippines are placing at his disposal everything that he needs to accomplish the great task of defending the Philippines. I could almost say as much regarding my relations with Admiral Hart, although, owing to the nature of the Navy's work, our connections are not so close and our contacts so frequent as those I have with General MacArthur.

Mr. President, it is, of course, a dreadful thing to contemplate the horrors of war, but there is this consideration in which I almost find cause for rejoicing that such an awful situation should arise before the severance of the political ties now existing between the United States and the Philippines; and that is, because the Filipino people are thereby afforded the opportunity to prove in supreme efforts and sacrifices not only our deep appreciation of the great things which America has contributed in the up-building of this new nation of ours, but also the fact that the democratic ideals of the United States have become our sacred heritage, and that to preserve such a precious gift we are willing to pay the price in blood and treasure.

- 2 -

With assurances of my deepest respect and  
highest regard, I beg to remain

Faithfully yours,

(SGD) MANUEL L. QUEZON

President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

MLQ/sc

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

*Philippine Is.  
Folder*

PART 20 PAGES 4453

October 31, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I was deeply moved by your letter of September 26, 1941, and all I can say is that, if elected, you can continue to depend upon my loyalty and support, both officially and personally.

Your information that there is a growing confidence that the Philippines can be adequately defended is particularly gratifying and encouraging. As I have assured you in my last letter, we, on our part, are doing everything within our resources to meet whatever situation may arise, especially after the news of the bombing of the "Kearny" and the fall of the Konohe Cabinet. From time to time, I shall take the liberty of writing you as to the progress that we are making here.

After that slight setback, I am regaining very rapidly my old health and strength.

Mrs. Quezon joins me in sending you and Mrs. Roosevelt highest regards and best wishes.

Devotedly yours,

(SGD) MANUEL L. QUEZON

President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

MLQ/sc

MALACAÑAN PALACE  
MANILA

THE WHITE HOUSE  
October 18, 1941  
Nov 6 9 06 AM '41

*ackd  
11/15/41*

My dear Mr. President:

RECEIVED

Today's press reports seem to point strongly to the possibility of actual involvement of the United States in the war on account of the torpedoing of the destroyer "Kearny". On the other hand, the course of recent events in Japan is far from encouraging to those who would hope that there may not be armed conflict between the United States and Japan. Should this unfortunate situation arise, it is but natural to expect that the Philippines will be the scene of such a conflict. I am, therefore, hastening to reiterate to you what on former occasions I have asserted, namely, that our government and people are absolutely and wholeheartedly for you and your policies, and that we are casting our lot with America no matter what sacrifices such determination may entail.

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Mr. President, it is, of course, a dreadful thing to contemplate the horrors of war, but there is this consideration in which I almost find cause for rejoicing that such an awful situation should arise before the severance of the political ties now existing between the United States and the Philippines; and that is, because the Filipino people are thereby afforded the opportunity to prove in supreme efforts and sacrifices not only our deep appreciation of the great things which America has contributed in the upbuilding of this new nation of ours, but also the fact that the democratic ideals of the United States have become our sacred heritage, and that to preserve such a precious gift we are willing to pay the price in blood and treasure.

- 2 -

With assurances of my deepest respect and  
highest regard, I beg to remain

Faithfully yours,

*Manuel L. Quezon*

President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with the request contained in the memorandum which you attached to the enclosed letter, dated October 18, 1941, from the Honorable Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines assuring you of the loyalty and support of the Commonwealth, I am enclosing a suggested reply to President Quezon.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. From the Honorable Manuel L. Quezon, October 18, 1941.
2. Suggested reply to President Quezon.

The President,

The White House.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGE 4479

[11-27<sup>?</sup>-41]

C.R. 0748.

~~SECRET~~

FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER SAYRE PERSONAL FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY  
APPRECIATED.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT QUEZON TO INFORM  
YOU THAT YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO THE LAST MAN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE  
FILIPINO PEOPLE, WILL STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA.

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: WHITE HOUSE....

SS FILE.....

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

*Returned  
Contracts noted  
HR*

TELEGRAM

Philippines

The White House  
NYA44 POKIG 544 CABLE  
Washington

F MANILA, NOVEMBER 30, 1941

THE PRESIDENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTINUATION OF MY TELEGRAM OF NOVEMBER TWENTY-NINE:  
BE ASSURED PHILIPPINE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY MEASURES BEEN  
MY CLOSE OBSERVATION FOR MORE THAN YEAR. THROUGH MY EFFORTS,  
WORKING WITH MILITARY AND NAVAL COMMANDERS, QUEZON WAS INDUCED  
CREATE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION, WHICH THOUGH BADLY  
HANDICAPPED BY FAILURE TO PROVIDE FUNDS, HAS SLOWLY ADVANCED  
PHILIPPINE CIVILIAN DEFENSE MEASURES. ALTHOUGH WITHOUT ANY  
JURISDICTION I WAS ABLE TO STIMULATE ITS ACTIVITIES DESPITE  
DIFFICULTIES DUE TO THE LOCAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY  
COMPLEXITIES. THREE MONTHS AGO I SENT MAJOR MARRON, MY  
LIAISON OFFICER, TO BRITISH MALAYA AND NETHERLANDS INDIES  
TO REPORT CIVILIAN DEFENSE PREPARATIONS THERE. HIS EXCELLENT  
CONSTRUCTIVE REPORTS INEVITABLY DISCLOSED GLARING DEFICIENCIES  
IN PHILIPPINE PREPARATIONS. SOME PROGRESS HAS RESULTED BUT  
I AM FAR FROM SATISFIED.

THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY QUEZON'S SPEECH WAS PLACEMENT OF  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT INADEQUACY OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE  
PREPARATIONS. QUEZON CONTENDS THAT EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY  
POWERS ACT WOULD HAVE ENABLED HIM TO TAKE CIVILIAN PROTECTION

DECLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

The White House  
2 - SAYRE - MANILA - NOVEMBER 30, 1941  
Washington

MEASURES BUT THAT DUE TO THE AMERICAN OPINION CREATED BY  
CAMPAIGN OF IGNORANCE AND BAD FAITH YOU STOPPED HIM FROM  
EXERCISING THOSE POWERS. DURING SEVEN MONTHS FOLLOWING  
HE CLAIMED HIS HANDS WERE TIED; THAT IT WAS THIS SEVEN  
MONTHS' PERIOD THAT HE NEEDED IN ORDER TO BE READY TODAY;  
AND THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS NEGLECT OF EMERGENCY  
MEASURES WAS NOT HIS. HE STATED IF WAR BREAKS OUT SOON  
AND PEOPLE DIE HERE UNPROTECTED, <sup>from bombs</sup> THOSE WHO HAVE STOPPED  
HIM FROM DOING WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE OUGHT TO BE HANGED,  
EVERY ONE OF THEM, ON LAMP-POST; THAT HAD THERE BEEN WAR  
TWO MONTHS AGO, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN STARVATION IN THE  
PHILIPPINES; IF WAR ARRIVED NOW IT WOULD FIND CIVILIAN  
POPULATION UNPREPARED AND UNPROTECTED; THAT DEATH AND  
DESTRUCTION MAY COME HERE BUT NOBODY IS GETTING READY FOR IT.

QUEZON'S SPEECH, WITH ITS PATENT ATTEMPT TO EVADE RESPON-  
SIBILITY FOR DEFICIENCIES IN EMERGENCY MEASURES, CAME WITHOUT  
WARNING. IT WAS DELIVERED DAY FOLLOWING CONFERENCE CALLED  
BY ME WITH HIM AND GENERAL MACARTHUR WHERE IT WAS AGREED THAT  
EACH SHOULD STATE IN WRITING, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, STATUS OF  
CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND OUTLINE FUTURE ACTIVITIES.

DURING THE PERIOD SINCE CREATION OF CIVILIAN EMERGENCY  
ADMINISTRATION, QUEZON HAS ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY OF

TELEGRAM

3 - SAYRE - MANILA - NOVEMBER 30, 1941  
The White House  
Washington

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE ON REPEATED OCCASIONS, PARTICULARLY IN ADDRESSING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON MAY FIFTH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE.

SEVEN MONTHS "HANDS TIED" PERIOD OBVIOUSLY REFERS TO TIME BETWEEN RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER SEVENTH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY AND DATE OF CREATION OF CEA, APRIL FIRST, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE. FACTS CONTRADICT HIS STATEMENTS CONCERNING THIS PERIOD. OPPORTUNITY WAS NOT OPEN TO HIM TO SECURE LEGISLATION DURING THIS PERIOD, BUT PRESUMABLY HE MIGHT HAVE PROCEEDED UNDER ORDINARY POLICE POWERS OF COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT. DURING THIS PERIOD GENERAL GRUNERT AND I DID EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO STIMULATE HIM TO ACT.

AM FORWARDING TOMORROW, AIR-MAIL, FULL REPORT PROVING CONCLUSIVELY QUEZON'S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHORTCOMINGS CIVILIAN DEFENSE CONTRARY TO FACT. OWING DELICATE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND FACT QUEZON'S ATTACK BASED UPON YOUR CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTION TO ME, IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS, I DO NOT FEEL FREE TO MAKE STATEMENT OF MY OWN, UNLESS SO DIRECTED BY YOU. I VENTURE TO SUGGEST HOW TO PROCEED THAT YOU MAY WISH TO STATE TO PRESS:

(1) THAT FAR FROM IMPEDING CIVILIAN DEFENSE MEASURES

TELEGRAM

The White House

4 - SAYRE - MANILA - NOVEMBER 30, 1941

Washington

AMERICAN AUTHORITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES HAVE LONG URGED AND STIMULATED COMMONWEALTH AUTHORITIES TO MAKE CIVILIAN DEFENSE PREPARATIONS;

(2) THAT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER PLACED OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION BY COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT OR USE OF EXISTING POLICE POWERS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE MEASURES AND;

(3) THAT IF PREPARATIONS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE IN THE PHILIPPINES ARE INADEQUATE, AS PRESIDENT QUEZON ALLEGES, THEY SHOULD BE MADE ADEQUATE FORTHWITH BY THE CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, WHO ENJOYS THE FULL COOPERATION OF AMERICAN AUTHORITIES.

SAYRE.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4491-4511

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER  
MANILA

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
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December 1, 1941.

Via airmail

*Phil  
Roosevelt*

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my telegrams to you of November 29 and November 30 concerning President Quezon's address before the Philippine University of November 28, (see Enclosure No. 1), the exaggerated allegations in his speech oblige me at this time to submit to you this report on civilian emergency defense measures in the Philippine Islands and recommendations as to your clarification of the problem of responsibility for the continuance of this work.

President Quezon's chief allegations in his speech were:

1. If war were to come, the civilian population of the Philippines would be unprotected;
2. The inadequacy of preparations was due to President Quezon's being blocked in his efforts to provide for civilian defense by the President of the United States stopping him from exercising powers under the Emergency Powers Act;
3. President Roosevelt's action was due to a campaign based on ignorance and bad faith indulged in by civil liberties unions, peace-at-any-price societies, theorists, writers, liberals and American imperialists in the Philippines.

The issue presented by President Quezon's speech was the placement of responsibility for the inadequacy today of civilian defense measures in the Philippines. President Quezon gave credit to his own vision and far-sightedness for getting the National Assembly to pass the Emergency Powers Act of August 19, 1940 and he asserted that when you stopped him from exercising those powers he suffered the greatest humiliation and defeat he had received in his public life.

He

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

He said the present unpreparedness was due to his enforced inactivity during a seven-months period when his hands were tied. This period can refer only to the time prior to April 1, 1941 when by executive order he set up the Civilian Emergency Administration. (See Enclosure No. 2). As I pointed out in my telegram of November 30, 1941, during this period it was always open to him to secure such legislation as might be necessary, and also he might have proceeded under the ordinary police powers of the Commonwealth Government.

During that period I made unceasing effort to initiate and stimulate activity in civilian defense work. On September 9, 1940 General Grunert, Commanding General of the Philippine Department, in my office and at my request explained in detail to President Quezon the urgent need for joint collaboration in preparing for civilian defense. President Quezon thereupon appointed a committee including General MacArthur, then his military adviser, to represent him in conferring with General Grunert. On September 16, General Grunert presented to the committee a detailed memorandum outlining the need for civilian defense planning. After a month's study, on October 15, the committee reported that protective measures should not be prematurely practiced here, that in anticipation of any emergency, the Emergency Powers Act gave to President Quezon complete control of civic functions, and that in time of emergency by converting land to food production the Philippines could be easily self-sustained. (See Enclosure No. 3). On October 16, President Quezon stated to the press that war was not imminent in the Orient and that he did not believe it was the duty of the Philippine Government to provide air-raid shelters but even if it were he was of the opinion they were not necessary.

On October 22, at my request, General Grunert submitted to me a plan for a General Planning Board; and on the next day President Quezon, General Grunert and Admiral Smeallie, then Commandant of the 16th Naval District, conferred with me and agreed to create such a Board to formulate concrete plans for civilian protection in the event of sudden emergency. On October 28, the Planning Board, with President Quezon himself in attendance, held its first meeting in my office under the chairmanship of my then liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Carswell, who is now in the United States. The Board made exhaustive surveys of resources and needs and submitted its report jointly to President Quezon and me on March 11, 1941. General Grunert stated the Board did an excellent job and that the future success or failure of this civil planning and its results appeared to depend upon what the Commonwealth government, particularly its President, could and would do in furtherance of the Board's recommendations.

President

President Quezon agreed that the responsibility was his and he would go forward and on March 20 he joined me in issuing a press release (see Enclosure No. 4) pointing out conditions to be remedied and stating that an organization would be set up to function directly under the President of the Philippines. In accordance with this assurance President Quezon then established on April 1, 1941 the Civilian Emergency Administration by an Executive Order under the Emergency Powers Act. (See Enclosure No. 2)

It seems clear, therefore, that during the seven-months' period prior to April 1, 1941, due to the initiative of the American authorities and with the knowledge and cooperation of President Quezon, the groundwork was in fact prepared for the Civilian Emergency Administration.

After the creation of the CEA on April 1, 1941, actual progress in civilian defense preparations has been slow but continuous. It has been handicapped, however, by weaknesses in organization and administration, inadequacy of funds, vacillation in objectives, difficulties in maintaining close coordination with the military and ordinary inertia. I have consistently endeavored to stimulate the CEA by placing at its disposal all the facilities of my office and sending to its meetings my military liaison officer. On September 7, 1941 I sent Major Marron, my military liaison officer, to British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies to report on civilian defense preparations there. His excellent reports, copies of which are in Washington, disclosed glaring deficiencies here by comparison and although they caused much press comment and official efforts towards self-justification, they resulted in the acceleration in civilian defense measures for which I have constantly striven. Observations on the CEA are contained in the monthly reports by Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury, my former adviser on political affairs, who is now on duty at the State Department, and are on file in Washington.

The responsibility for the adequacy or inadequacy of the work of the CEA rests squarely upon President Quezon. The Executive Order creating it states that the directing commission of the CEA shall, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions.

President Quezon, however, has not been always consistent in recognizing his responsibility. On May 5, 1941, in an address to the National Assembly, he stated that the duty of safeguarding inhabitants, both citizens and aliens, against hunger, pestilence, lawlessness and other dangers which the nature of modern warfare entails, rests mainly with the

government

government of the Commonwealth and that consequently he created the CEA to advise and assist the government in the adoption and execution of such measures as may be necessary to protect its civilian population in case of emergency. (See Enclosure No. 5).

In a letter to me dated April 3, 1941, he said:

"I desire to make it clear that, in my opinion, the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines is as much the primary responsibility of the Government of the United States as is the military defense of the Islands."

Four days later, he wrote to me:

"the obligation which the Government of the Commonwealth attempted to assume by the approval of the Emergency Powers Act - that of protecting the Filipino people from the ravages of war - was, after all, primarily the obligation of the United States and not of the Commonwealth."

Because of these fluctuations in his attitude and the dire need for effective civilian defense preparations, I recommend that you clarify the problem of responsibility for the continuance of this work. Responsibility might conceivably rest upon either (1) the High Commissioner's office, (2) the United States Army, or (3) the Commonwealth government. To this problem for over a year I have given intensive study.

My conclusions and recommendations follow:

It is clear that the High Commissioner's office as at present constituted lacks both the funds and the necessary personnel which would warrant its being designated to assume responsibility for civilian defense. It also lacks jurisdiction due to the domestic autonomy granted the Philippines by the Independence Act.

Throwing upon the United States military forces responsibility for the work of civilian defense is a possibility. This matter has already been brought to the attention of the Commanding General of the United States Army in the Far East and he has taken the position that civilian defense should lie with the Commonwealth. As late as November 27, 1941 when President Quezon and General MacArthur conferred with me at my request to consider the effects of

a letter dated October 7, 1941 addressed to me by Mr. LaGuardia as United States Director of Civilian Defense, appointing me Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands, it was again agreed by the three of us that the existing Civilian Emergency Administration should continue to operate under the direct control of the President of the Commonwealth, but of course with the constant observation and advice of the United States military authorities. (See Enclosures Nos. 6 and 7). I enclose herewith a copy of Mr. LaGuardia's letter to me and of my reply, explaining the reasons why I did not feel free to accept this appointment. (See Enclosures Nos. 8 and 9).

In view of the above it seems that responsibility for the work of civilian defense should rest squarely upon the Commonwealth Government. Two fundamental reasons form the basis for my opinion: first, the disturbance which I fear a shift at this time might cause and which might be construed both here and abroad as a disruption of Filipino-American relations; second, your announced policy, as given in your letter of March 1, 1937 to my predecessor, which I have continually borne in mind, not only to avoid unnecessary interference with the large measure of autonomy in the administration of domestic affairs entrusted to the Commonwealth Government, but also to give helpful encouragement to the new government.

Very sincerely yours,

*Francis B. Sayre*

Enclosures:

1. Speech of Pres. Quezon, Nov. 28, 1941;
2. Executive Order by Pres. Quezon, No. 335, April 1, 1941;
3. Letter from Sec. Vargas to Gen. Grunert, Oct. 15, 1940;
4. Joint press release by H.C. and Pres. Quezon, March 20, 1941;
5. Pres. Quezon's message to National Assembly, May 5, 1941;
6. Letter from H.C. to Gen. MacArthur, Nov. 27, 1941;
7. Letter from Gen. MacArthur to H.C., Nov. 28, 1941;
8. Letter from Mayor LaGuardia to H.C., Oct. 7, 1941;
9. Reply to Mayor LaGuardia by H.C., Dec. 1, 1941.

SPEECH OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRESIDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY  
OF THE PHILIPPINES ON THE OCCASION OF THE CELEBRATION  
OF NATIONAL HEROES DAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

President Gonzales, Members of the Faculty, Distinguished  
Guests, Students of the University of the Philippines, Ladies  
and Gentlemen:

Every time that I witness a parade of the ROTC, my heart  
beats fast for I am filled with almost unbounded pride and pleasure.  
Today, however, as I saw you pass before me, officers and men of  
the ROTC of the University of the Philippines, I felt that my heart  
was heavy and thoughts came to my mind that perhaps some of you may  
soon have to give your lives in defense of your country. Should  
such an occasion arise, I want you, young men, to remember that  
there is no death more glorious and more desirable than death in  
defense of the fatherland.

We are gathered here this afternoon to do honor, to pay hom-  
age, to the heroes of our race. You are celebrating National  
Heroes Day. Should you have to give your lives in defense of your  
country, those coming after you will revere you in their hearts  
just as we are revering today those who have gone before us. That  
should be the thought you must bear constantly in mind in these  
days that you may be ready to face any danger that may confront us.

A little while ago, at the Luneta, after that mammoth parade  
during the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the Common-  
wealth, I stated, with I think justifiable pride, that it was due  
to my vision, to my far-sightedness and to my determination that  
we have today a force capable of putting up a good fight should  
the occasion arise. In the course of my remarks, I stated that  
this achievement of my administration was accomplished despite the  
opposition of the so-called civil liberties unions, both here and  
in the United States, and the peace-at-any-price societies. I  
might have added that that was accomplished despite the opposition  
of liberty-loving theorists.

I come now to tell you of something of which I am not proud.  
I want to confess to you the greatest defeat and humiliation that  
I have received in my public life. And this defeat was caused by  
these theorists--these "defenders of liberty", these civil liber-  
ties unions here and in the United States.

Perhaps I might have gone to my grave without making a public  
statement of this secret. No one likes to speak of his defeat.  
But soon after I made that statement at the Luneta the so-called  
Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines gave out a statement  
denying that they have ever opposed the national defense program  
of my administration, but asserting with evident satisfaction that  
what they have opposed is the emergency powers act. And the evi-  
dence that our stand was justified is the fact that for seven  
months, the powers granted to the President in that act have not  
been exercised.

It

It is true--unfortunately true--and I hope it may not prove to be the most tragic truth in the history of the Philippines. Today if the war were to start and bombs fall on the University campus--don't laugh they may fall--thousands or hundreds of you will be killed for you have no air raid shelters here. If there was to be war our people may find themselves starving. Certainly, if there had been war two months ago, there would have been starvation in the Philippines.

If there was to be war now, we may find ourselves to be without fuel, without gasoline,--in one word, if there were to be war now, we would find ourselves unprepared. The civilian population of the Philippines unprotected. We are just beginning to practice blackouts--we are just starting to show our people how to evacuate crowded places.

And who is responsible for this neglect? Not the President of the Philippines, not the National Assembly--but the "liberty loving" people of the Philippines, the so-called "liberty loving" people of the Philippines.

No sooner did the war in Europe break and especially after the debacle of France, I asked the National Assembly to give the President emergency powers so that he might be able to take the measures necessary for the protection of our people. At that time nobody in the Philippines thought that war may ever come to our shores. These people who know so much, who are all the time telling us what to do--they never imagined, they could not imagine--a bunch of fools that they are--they could not imagine a war between Germany and England and France will ever reach our shores. But I did. I saw it coming. I saw it because I am spending my days and nights studying what is going on in the world, because it is my duty to you to be always alert so that I may be in a position to render to you the service that is my duty to render that you may be protected.

As soon as I sent that message to the National Assembly asking for these powers, all these young writers of the Philippines with the Civil Liberties Union and all these so-called liberals--who have never done anything in their lives to fight for freedom and liberty--all these come out and denounced me as a would-be dictator and attacked the National Assembly, denouncing its men as weak and incompetent for granting me those powers. Seven months, the Civil Liberties Union said, had to elapse before I made use of those powers. Precisely the seven months that I needed to be ready at this time. If I had been able to do what we had to do during those seven months, I would not be afraid now that something, some calamity may happen here in the University campus. I will be certain that these students of the University of the Philippines for whose care I am responsible--I assert that no matter what happens nothing would occur to you. But I am humiliated and grieved to say that I am in no position to give that assurance now.

How did this happen? Did these writers, these liberals, this Civil Liberties Union--did they ever succeed in stopping my hand? Never. Never by themselves alone. But at this time they found powerful allies--the American imperialists in the Philippines, as represented by the Bulletin. Now I am calling everything by its name. These imperialists who have never accepted defeat, who still believe that they can stop the Philippines from becoming independent, who all the time have been placing obstacles in our way in the hope that and perhaps in the belief that they may defeat our cause--these people have been all the time charging the Government of the Commonwealth of being incompetent or of being a dictatorship. They are the ones who started to oppose the national defense program. And they opposed the national defense program not because they did not believe that we could make a success out of it but because they wanted to make an argument when independence was to come, to say to the United States, "Are you going to let the Philippines alone when they are absolutely defenseless?" So when I was trying to arm the country they denounced me as a would-be military dictator with the idea of stopping that program. Fortunately I had occasion to go to the United States then and I fought them right before American public opinion and I had occasion to convince the President of the United States that what we are doing here was not only the right thing to do but the essential thing to do if we were going to become independent. And I defeated them, when, however, the fight against the Emergency Powers Act in the United States came, I was tied up in the Philippines. The war was going on; I could not leave the country for something might happen while I was away. It was my duty to be here. And so the cry that came to America coming from these American imperialists and these Filipinos (what shall I say about them?) made an impression in the United States. That had the effect of creating an opinion there unfavorable to the exercise of those powers by me. It was not strange. At that time nobody in America--no, I won't say nobody because President Roosevelt knew it--but very few in America knew that the war in Europe was going to affect them seriously. And these peace-at-any-price fellows--they could not understand why if America was not getting ready then--why should the Philippines get ready. Why? There is no doubt that this Quezon is getting to be a dictator. I had to fight both ignorance and bad faith. The campaign was so effective that I received a message from no less a personage than the President of the United States himself telling me that the enactment of this law had created great concern in the United States and asking me to give a public statement to the effect that I would not use those powers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, under the Tydings-MoDuffie law, the President of the United States has the right to intervene in the Philippines if in his judgment the government here established has ceased to be democratic. And the matter, as presented to the President, seems to prove this has ceased to be a democracy. It was impossible for me to argue with the President over the phone or through radio, I could not send him a telegram so I simply bowed my head in deep sorrow. I gave the President of the

United States

United States the assurance that I would not exercise these powers unless his representative in the Philippines himself asked me to do it. I was so certain that the day would come when I would be asked to exercise these powers that I preferred to bide my time. But seven months had gone by. During that time I had my hands tied. I don't know how, but the fact that the Philippines might be involved in war before I was ready to protect my people haunted me day and night, and for several months I could not go to sleep until finally I broke down with another attack of tuberculosis. I could not stand it anymore. Finally, the commanding general of the United States Army wrote me a letter asking what this government was doing for the protection of the civilian population. My answer was, "I don't know. You ask the High Commissioner." And finally I was asked by the High Commissioner himself to constitute the Civilian Emergency Administration, to which body I gave all the powers that the Emergency Powers Act gave me. This is the reason why for seven months the powers of that Act were not exercised, not because they were not necessary but because thanks to the wisdom of the far-sightedness of these liberty-loving Filipinos, in conjunction with the American imperialists, the President stopped me from exercising these powers.

I am going to say something terrible--but that is what I feel. If war breaks out soon and our people die here unprotected by the bombs, those men who have stopped me from doing what I should have done ought to be hanged--everyone of them on the lamp post. And now I am addressing you--the youth of the land--and with you I am addressing your rectors, and your professors--for you are not alone responsible; they are primarily responsible too for what you are doing or failing to do.

Under the Constitution of the Philippines, the Government of the Commonwealth has supervision and control over all schools and colleges and universities. Even before the Commonwealth was inaugurated, we had laws here that gave the government the effective control over our educational institutions.

I have been President of the Philippines for six years now. The worst criticism against me and my administration has come either from professors or from university students. If there is anybody here who dares say publicly--be he a professor, a president of a university, a rector or student--is there anyone here who dares say in my presence that because he has taken the liberty to criticize me, even in denouncing me falsely, that I have done anything against him?

Nobody can say that. And yet if we were to read what you are writing and saying almost every day in public speeches and newspapers, you seem to be living in a country where you cannot move without someone hitting you in the head; that you cannot speak your mind; that this is a dictatorship.

Fortunately

Fortunately the Filipino people do not agree with you for they have once more elected me to this high office with still greater majority than the first time I was elected. They know that I am not a dictator. They know it is beautiful oratory to accuse somebody of dictatorship. They know that it is easy for you to get applause from the public if you are brave and attack the present government from the President down to the policeman.

That is why every time you have an oratorical contest there the speeches are full of denunciation. My goodness, I don't know my own country. I don't know my own people when I read these speeches. I do not care what you say about that. It amuses me. I have no hesitancy in saying that since the first day that democracy has come to this earth there has never been a case of the chief of state whose position is elective, that he has been elected by his people without his asking for his election. I am the only one in history. And I want you to know that I did not want to be elected. I want you to know that the only thing that at last induced me to adopt a passive attitude about my reelection is that war in Europe, that I saw that the Philippines may sooner or later be involved.

And I saw that while the immense majority of our people were living in a fool's paradise, I was one of the few who was watching what was going on and knew what was coming. That was one of the reasons why I permitted myself to be reelected once more.

But I have no hesitancy in saying that that provision in the Constitution which limits my reelection to two more years has been my own work, for I did not want to go beyond that. Is that the dictator? I am resigning my position at my own volition. There is nobody in this country who could have defeated me if I had wanted to continue for another four years.

Now, I am speaking to you with my heart in my hand because of what I am going to tell you now. This is no time for us to be engaged in foolish debates. This is the time when your mind--the mind of everyone of you, men and women, old and young--should be devoted to but one problem: the problem that is confronting us and which may mean a terrible destruction and unbearable hardship. Talk of freedom and liberty. You have plenty of that. What you do not have enough of is duty. At least, you do not talk of duty. You need not learn from my lips. See what has happened to France. To France. Where is France today? At the feet of the conqueror, paying 8 million dollars--16 million pesos a day for the support of the German army, five billion and a half a year of pesos.

If France had spent that money in airplanes and tanks, France would not be giving that money now to her master. The Frenchman is working day and night, when he is told to work, with or without compensation. He is working for his master, Germany. He would not be doing that now if he had not been all the time wanting more

reading only of the death and destruction in Europe. You have been  
seen it in the movies. You do not realize yet that you may see  
hours

hours of rest, less hours of work and more salary and more good time. Strike upon strike. In every corner of the streets in Paris, you could hear nothing but freedom, liberty, while the Germans were getting ready to take that freedom and liberty from them.

I wonder. I wonder if my countrymen desire to have the same fate that befell France. That is the work of the Fronte Populaire of Blum; the work of so many parties of the opposition, that whenever they wanted to have a government they had to get together five or six opposition parties. They never had a majority party; they never had a policy, a constant policy of government that had a majority and the confidence of the people. That is the fruit of doing nothing but singing the song of liberty without remembering that liberty without order is chaos.

I think that our universities and colleges ought to, occasionally at least, tell their students that men do not live on liberty alone. There is also duty. And that the man who knows how to do his duty knows how to fight for his right. There is no man in this country--I challenge every Filipino of the 16 million Filipinos--there is no man in this country, not even a woman, there is no man in this country who loves liberty more than I do. I have fought for liberty since I was a boy, and now that I am an old man I am still fighting for the liberty of our country. No man who is willing to give his life for that liberty is going to deny that liberty.

I am an old man, even though I do not want to confess it, especially when there are girls around--but I am an old man. At least in the Philippines very few men live more than 70 years. In another six years or seven I will be 70, and before I am 70 I know I will be dead. Why should I who have been raised to the position I am occupying today by my people, only because I have been their servant in the fight for their liberty and freedom--now that I am old and about to die, deprive you of that freedom? Why should I deprive you, the men of tomorrow, of the opportunity to be free when my whole life has been dedicated to the cause of liberty so that you may live free. I am about to die but I want my country to live and I want my country to live eternally and to live with the blessings of liberty. But liberty can only be a blessing if it is accompanied with order. I am about to die but I am leaving children, children that are as young if not younger than you are. I could not face those pieces of my own soul and flesh if I were not devoting every day of my life for their happiness and freedom and security; and I cannot do that for them without doing it for you. They cannot be free if the rest of you are slaves.

My friends--for you are my friends regardless of whether you like me or not--please listen to me. I am talking to you on a very solemn occasion, on a very dangerous situation. You have been reading only of the death and destruction in Europe. You have seen it in the movies. You do not realize yet that you may see

it right here and you are not getting ready for it. Nobody is getting ready for it. I am not telling you that war will come. It may never come. I hope it will not come. But if it should come, it will be a good thing for all of us, for we will learn to suffer and we will learn to die. I know people are not worthy unless they know how to suffer and how to die. I wish these educators of ours here will start telling you to write poems or speeches speaking of your duty to lay down your lives, your duty to work and your duty to suffer. That is life.

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Enclosure No. 2

4-1-41

MALACAÑAN PALACE  
MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 335

CREATING A CIVILIAN EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND DUTIES AND PROVIDING FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CIVIL POPULATION IN EXTRAORDINARY AND EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

WHEREAS, the Civilian Emergency Planning Board has recommended immediate adoption of measures to control and coordinate civilian participation in meeting grave emergencies; and

WHEREAS, it appears necessary and desirable that comprehensive rules and regulations be issued to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants;

Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred, do hereby create and constitute a Civilian Emergency Administration, which shall function through and be administered by the following officials and organizations and those that may hereafter be designated;

1. The National Emergency Commission, composed of the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman and a representative of each Executive Department as members. This Commission shall, subject to the approval of the President, formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection and welfare of the civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions. It shall have general supervision and control over the officials and organizations as authorized herein, in so far as their duties pertain to said Administration, and shall function through (1) The

Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Director of Publicity and Propaganda; (3) a Food Administrator; (4) an Industrial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and Transportation Administrator; (6) a National Air Raid Warden; (7) a Director of Communications and such other officials as may be appointed by the President from time to time.

2. A Provincial Emergency Committee in each province, composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Fiscal, the District Engineer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Inspector of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, as members. This committee shall have general supervision and control over the Municipal Emergency Committees.

3. A Municipal Emergency Committee in each municipality or municipal district, composed of the Municipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal Treasurer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the Chief of Police, the Sanitary Officer, the Municipal Agricultural Inspector, and a representative of the Municipal Council, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for emergency purposes in accordance with and subject to the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the National Emergency Commission. Such local units shall consist of (1) a Volunteer Guard, (2) Air Raid Protection, (3) protection of utilities and industries, (4) food administration, (5) evacuation, (6) public welfare and morale, (7) transportation and fuel administration, (8) medical and sanitary, (9) publicity and propaganda and such other services as may be authorized from time to time.

4. A City Emergency Committee in each chartered city, composed of the City Mayor, as Chairman, and the City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the City Engineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the City Health Officer, the Chief of the Fire Department, and a representative of the Municipal Board, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for emergency purposes as prescribed for municipalities under paragraph (3) hereof.

5. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Order, the cooperation of all departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government is hereby enjoined and the whole-hearted support of the inhabitants of the Philippines earnestly requested.

Done at the City of Baguio, this 1st day of April, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the sixth.

(Sgd.) MANUEL L. QUEZON  
*President of the Philippines*

By the President:  
(Sgd.) JORGE B. VARGAS  
*Secretary to the President*

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE PHILIPPINESCONFIDENTIAL

Manila, October 15, 1940.

Dear General Grunert:

The Committee appointed by His Excellency, the President, has carefully considered the statements contained in your memorandum of September 16th, presented in our recent conference, and I beg to submit the following comment and information, reference being made seriatim to subheadings of paragraph 4 thereof:

## a. Additional soldiers.

The Philippine Army is prepared to mobilize immediately its twelve divisions of approximately 120,000 men. The Department Commander has complete data as to the location, equipment, and training of these troops. As for their replacement in civil pursuits, the unemployed in the islands, including those that would be thrown out of employment by the war processes, would fill the vacancies in productive fields resulting from a mobilization.

## b. Food supplies.

The Commonwealth at present imports a certain amount of its food requirement. In time of emergency, however, by converting to food production some portion of the agricultural land now devoted to cash exports it could easily be self-contained. The federal forces here, as you know, are supplied largely by imports; however, they could readily be supplied from local sources in time of war. The National Rice and Corn Corporation, a Commonwealth entity, imports those cereals and could, in emergency, increase its present supply. The continued importation of food supplies is an insignificant problem compared with the importation of military supplies. All ammunition, ordnance, gasoline, aviation supplies and what might be classed as munitions of war must be imported and the channels of communication constantly kept clear. This is a naval problem, not an interior one.

## c. Other essential military supplies - transportation, medical, construction materials, utilities.

All transportation in the islands would be available to the military on demand. The supply would be far in excess of military needs. Complete studies have been made as to such facilities. Repair and maintenance facilities and operating personnel are available. Such demands as the military might make could readily be accommodated by the civil population. Gasoline stocks are very limited and the supply depends upon the maintenance of sea communications.

Medical

Medical installations and facilities are limited and no funds are available to do more than is now being planned by the Commonwealth in its progressive program for improving conditions within its fiscal limitations.

Construction materials exist only in limited quantities. Timber and cement are available, but steel products and appurtenances are supplied from the United States or foreign countries, largely upon individual order. The road system hardly needs discussion, as it is shown on official road maps of the Bureau of Public Works.

Utilities, now adequately manned and administered, could be insured only by a proper military defense.

d. Communications.

All communications would naturally be at the disposal of the military. The present operating agencies could continue to function under such direction and supervision as the military might impose. No preparatory instructions are necessary to accomplish these ends.

e. Labor.

The demands of the military could be more than met by civil potentialities in this regard provided the United States Government pays the prevailing wage. The operation and administration of labor gangs engaged on military measures present problems that do not materially differ from similar operations in civil life.

f. Welfare.

This is a subject that receives the constant attention of Government. Its transition from a civil to a war-time basis will depend entirely upon the policies of the military as determined by the nature and course of military operations.

g. Publicity.

The dissemination of military propaganda is a problem that appertains not to the civil, but to the military headquarters. The usual publicity methods would continue subject to such restrictions as the military might impose. The application of such restrictions would be a simple matter in so far as civil authority is concerned.

h. Protection.

The protective features of municipalities and provinces would continue to function except as might be modified by military commanders. Any attempt to reorganize these civil agencies based not upon local civic needs but upon possible needs in time of war would be impracticable. The present organization represents a standard development which would have to await local necessity in order to be intelligently modified.

Anti-sabotage measures are already in operation.

Blackouts, gas proof shelters, and all the many ramifications of a nation at war are of doubtful application to the local situation until a much more critical phase of the international situation develops. Such steps cannot be imposed without causing the gravest anxiety and concern on the part of the populace and great expense and effort on the part of Government. Such steps are not as yet current in the United States itself, and it is not believed that they should be prematurely practiced here.

The present police control of aliens in so far as is known, has proven entirely satisfactory. The efficiency of the current system unquestionably compares favorably with that of other parts of the United States.

In anticipation of any emergency the Commonwealth Government has recently enacted Commonwealth Act No. 600 authorizing its President to take the most comprehensive action with reference to complete control of its civic functions. The comprehensiveness of this law which was enacted as a measure of preparedness, exceeds anything of the kind as yet provided by the United States Government or any of its other integral parts.

Most of the data on the subject you have outlined are available from published annual reports of the different offices of the Commonwealth Government. If any further data are desired along any special line, I shall be very glad indeed to furnish such information as soon as it can be made available.

With expressions of cordial regard, I am

Sincerely yours,

JORGE B. VARGAS  
Secretary to the President

Major General George Grunert  
Commanding General, U.S. Army,  
Philippine Department  
Manila.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER  
MANILAPRESS RELEASE

March 20, 1941

The report submitted to the United States High Commissioner and the President of the Philippines by the Civilian Emergency Planning Board on March 11th contains a resumé of conditions as they exist at this time, as determined by surveys conducted by the Committees on Supply, Transportation, Medicine, Communications, Welfare, and Personnel and Labor. In addition to setting forth conditions as they exist, the report of each Committee points out specific conditions that need to be remedied and contains the recommendations of the committees as to the action to be taken by the Commonwealth authorities to remedy such defective conditions. For instance, definite shortages are known to exist in certain articles of food and other supply items. The Committee on Supply has recommended that the Commonwealth authorities immediately develop and put into effect a plan to increase the production of essential foodstuffs throughout the Philippines, and that special attention be paid to the development of self-sufficiency of food supply in each locality. It also recommended that the growing of short-time crops, and the raising of livestock and poultry to meet the requirements for meat, dairy and poultry products, be encouraged in every practicable manner. The acquisition of suitable and adequate reserve stocks of all imported items considered as essential, including fuels and foodstuffs, by the Commonwealth Government itself, or by suppliers of such items under an agreement with the Commonwealth Government, was recommended.

Concerning transportation, certain recommendations were made for the control of the operation of motor vehicles during an emergency in order that existing supplies of gasoline, lubricating oil, tires and spare parts might be conserved.

Among other recommendations made by the Board were those concerned with the establishment of adequate stocks of surgical instruments, X-ray apparatus and supplies, biological serums and apparatus for blood transfusions; the expansion of existing telephone and telegraph lines to meet emergency conditions; and the control and use of radio stations during an emergency.

During any emergency many organizations will be active in behalf of the civil population. In order to avoid duplication of effort, prevent waste and reduce expense, the work of these organizations should be controlled and coordinated by a central organization. To secure such coordination and control the Board has recommended that a Civilian Emergency Administration be created by the President of the Philippines composed of

one representative of each of the following Departments of the Commonwealth Government:

Department of the Interior  
Department of Public Works and Communications  
Department of Agriculture and Commerce  
Department of Health and Public Welfare  
Department of Public Instruction  
Department of Finance  
Department of National Defense.

This organization would function directly under the President of the Philippines and be charged with the duty of formulating and executing policies and plans for the organization of certain units in all the provinces and chartered cities. Functioning directly under this national body would be the Philippine Red Cross, a Director of Publicity and Propaganda, a Fuel Administrator, a Food Administrator, a National Air Raid Warden, and a Director of Communications.

Among the units that would be organized and trained under the supervision of the National CEA if this plan is adopted are those belonging to the Air Raid Protective Service and Volunteer Guard Units.

The Board has prepared a complete and comprehensive Air Raid Protective Plan which contemplates the organization of:

A Warning Service  
An Air Raid Wardens Service  
Auxiliary Fire Fighting Units  
First-Aid Units  
Rescue Units  
Demolition and Repair Units  
Decontamination Units.

This plan contains the necessary information to be given to the public as to what to do before, during and after an air raid. It contains information regarding air raid shelters and several designs of inexpensive shelters for family use. It even contains directions for making a cheap improvised type of gas mask which would afford temporary protection from poison gas.

Manuel L. Quezon  
President of the Philippines

Francis B. Sayre  
United States High Commissioner  
to the  
Philippine Islands

MALACAÑAN PALACE  
MANILA

Baguio, May 5, 1941

Gentlemen of the National Assembly:

The trend of events seems to point strongly to the possibility of America's entry into the present world war. If such a situation should arise, it goes without saying that the Philippines would also be involved directly in the war.

While the protection of the Philippines against external aggression is primarily the responsibility of the United States, the duty of safeguarding the inhabitants of our country, both citizens and aliens, against hunger, pestilence, lawlessness and other dangers which the nature of modern warfare entails, rests mainly with the Government of the Commonwealth. Consequently, and by virtue of the powers vested in me by Commonwealth Act No. 600, I have constituted a Civilian Emergency Administration to advise and assist the government in the adoption and execution of such measures as may be necessary to protect our civilian population in case of an emergency. This Administration is functioning through the following organizations:

1. The National Emergency Commission, composed of the Honorable Teofilo Sison, Secretary of National Defense, as Chairman, and a representative of each Executive Department, as members. This Commission, subject to the approval of the President, formulates and executes plans for the protection and welfare of the civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions. It operates through (1) The Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Director of Publicity and Propaganda; (3) a Food Administrator; (4) an Industrial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and Transportation Administrator; (6) a National Air Raid Warden; and (7) a Director of Communications.

2. A Provincial Emergency Committee in each province, composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Fiscal, the District Engineer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Inspector

of

sent for the board  
The Clerk  
Comptroller of P

of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, as members. This Committee has general supervision and control over the municipal emergency committees.

3. A Municipal Emergency Committee in each municipality or municipal district, composed of the Municipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal Treasurer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the Chief of Police, the Sanitary Officer, the Municipal Agricultural Inspector, and a representative of the Municipal Council, as members. This Committee organizes local units for emergency purposes, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the National Emergency Commission.

4. A City Emergency Committee in each chartered city, composed of the City Mayor, as Chairman, and the City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the City Engineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the City Health Officer, the Chief of the Fire Department, and a representative of the Municipal Board, as members. This Committee organizes local units for emergency purposes, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the National Emergency Commission.

The Civilian Emergency Administration has been functioning for some time, and has already formulated comprehensive plans designed to effectuate the objectives of the Government in the event that our country is drawn into the conflict. Some of these plans are now in process of execution; others are being carefully studied by the Government with a view to final action.

In order to avert shortages in certain articles of food and other supply items, definite steps have been taken to increase the production of essential foodstuffs throughout the Philippines, particular attention being given to the development of self-sufficiency of food supply in each locality. The growing of short-term crops has been encouraged. Negotiations are under way for the acquisition of suitable and adequate reserve stocks of all imported items considered as essential -- including fuels, construction materials, and foodstuffs -- either by the Government itself or by the importers of such items under an agree-

ment

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510  
O'Connell

ment with the Government. In this connection, I have issued an executive order requiring all government entities to establish and maintain at least a four-month reserve supply of gasoline, lubricating oil, diesel oil, and other oil products. Public utility enterprises are being requested to take similar precautions.

To safeguard the health of the civilian population, negotiations are being made for the acquisition of an emergency reserve supply of medicines, and surgical instruments, including bacteriological serums and vaccines. These supplies will be distributed and stored throughout the country in eleven strategic locations. Artesian wells will be drilled in evacuation centers in order to insure adequate supply of drinking water.

The Civilian Emergency Administration has found that the construction of public air-raid shelters in Manila and in most other coastal cities and towns would be very expensive and impracticable on account of the low terrain. Furthermore, the supply of materials for the construction of suitable shelters is totally inadequate. For these reasons, the Commission has recommended the evacuation of children and unessential men and women from the danger areas in such cities and towns, as well as the transfer of some government offices from the City of Manila and surrounding municipalities to the provinces. There are, however, certain offices which, by the nature of their functions, must remain in Manila, and to afford protection, as far as possible, to the officers and employees whose duties require them to remain in such offices, air-raid shelters will be constructed in the buildings where those offices are located.

To enable private persons or entities to build their own air-raid shelters, plans for the construction of such shelters in privately owned concrete buildings will soon be ready for distribution. Because of the lack of sufficient supply in the local market, the National Coconut Corporation has been requested to have 1,000,000 sacks manufactured from coconut coir for use in building air-raid shelters.

Plans are being completed for the evacuation of such portions of the civilian population of Manila as may be found in danger areas which the proper authorities of the United States Army will specify in due time. These plans include the designation of places

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in Manila where people will be expected to gather for their transportation to the different evacuation centers. A survey has been made of nearby towns in the provinces of Rizal and Laguna to determine their availability as evacuation centers from the standpoint of food and water supply, sanitation, construction materials, etc. A similar survey is being made for the purpose of taking care of the populations of other danger areas outside of the City of Manila, such as the cities of Cavite, Cebu, and Iloilo, and the towns of Batangas, Lingayen, and others.

In case of an emergency, our electrical communications are inadequate. Therefore, plans have been adopted for their improvement and for supplementing the usual facilities with mobile and portable radio sets. To carry out these plans, the amount of ₱250,000 has for the present been allotted. The sum of ₱100,000 has also been made available for immediate use by the Bureau of Posts for the purpose of maintaining 24-hour telegraphic service in all provincial capitals, for the employment of the necessary additional personnel, the training of operators, and the purchase of additional equipment and supplies.

With a view to avoiding confusion resulting from lack of organization and to provide organized emergency groups ready to function at any moment for the purpose of ministering to the needs of the population, the organization of Volunteer Guard units in all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts, is being undertaken by the provincial governors under the direction of the Chief of Constabulary. Rules and regulations for the organization and training of the Volunteer Guards and for the establishment of an Air Raid Warden Service have been issued and sent to all officials concerned. These rules and regulations, including directions for air-raid precaution, have been printed in pamphlet form for general distribution.

During great emergencies, the matter of police protection for the civil population assumes a vital importance. It is the primary duty of the Government to provide adequate police protection in such cases. The present strength of the Philippine Constabulary, while adequate in normal times, is insufficient to meet

emergency



November 27, 1941.

My dear General MacArthur:

In accordance with our conversation of this morning, I am enclosing a copy of a letter of October 7, 1941 from Mayor LaGuardia, the United States Director of Civilian Defense, in which he says:

"Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint you Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands."

As I told you this morning, there must be some mistake, since I have had neither recent conversation nor correspondence with Mayor LaGuardia. It is apparent that he has not taken into consideration special circumstances obtaining in the Philippine Islands and the progress already achieved in emergency defense measures under the primary responsibility of the Commonwealth Government in conjunction with the advice and cooperation of the military authorities.

I shall appreciate having your views as to what reply should be made to Washington. So that Mayor LaGuardia and President Roosevelt may obtain a clear understanding of the situation here, I should appreciate your setting forth in  
your

Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur,  
Commanding U.S. Army Forces in the Far East,  
1 Calle Victoria,  
Manila.

- 2 -

your letter the present status of civilian defense and plans for future activities.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

CAS:

FBB:abn

Enclosure No. 7

[copy compared rap]

HEADQUARTERS  
United States Army Forces in the Far East  
Office of the Commanding General  
Manila, P. I.

November 28, 1941

Dear Mr. High Commissioner:

I have received your cordial note of November 27th and I concur fully with your thought that the communication from Mr. LaGuardia was sent through mistake. The executive power in the Philippine Islands for peacetime execution of measures involving extraordinary controls of the civil population are vested in the Commonwealth Government. With the Tydings-McDuffie Act as a basis it enacted emergency laws placing such authority in the hands of its Chief Executive. Accordingly local measures for civilian defense were initiated several months ago after coordinated discussion between the High Commissioner, the President of the Commonwealth, and the military authorities. A Civilian Emergency Administration for this purpose was constituted operating under the direct control of the President of the Commonwealth. This agency, while a responsibility of the Commonwealth Government, functions with the constant advice and observation of both the High Commissioner's office and the military authorities. It has operated successfully within the natural limitations imposed by local conditions. It would be most unfortunate if any attempt were made to change the present arrangement. The cooperation and complete understanding which now exists between all agencies involved should not be disturbed especially at this critical time.

Most sincerely,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

The United States High Commissioner  
to the Philippines,  
Manila, P. I.

[copy compared rap]

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE  
Washington, D. C.

October 7, 1941

Hon. Francis B. Sayre,  
United States High Commissioner,  
Manila, Philippine Islands.

My dear Commissioner:

Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint you Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands.

Instructional material has been sent to you, and you will receive from time to time such additional information as it becomes available. If there is any assistance this office can render you at any time, we will be only too glad to do so.

As Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands, it is understood that you will serve without remuneration.

Sincerely yours,

F. H. LaGuardia,  
U. S. Director of Civilian Defense.

[Coba cumberleg 1.5.41]

Enclosure No. 9

Via airmail

December 1, 1941.

My dear Mr. LaGuardia:

I have your letter of October 7, 1941, sent by ordinary mail and not received here until late in November, informing me that you have appointed me Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands. Inasmuch as I have had no previous conversations with you with regard to this matter as stated in your letter, I wonder whether the letter could have been sent possibly under some misapprehension. As you know, the executive power in the Philippine Islands with certain exceptions has been placed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act in the hands of the President of the Commonwealth Government. Acting in accordance with that power, nearly eight months ago he set up the Civilian Emergency Administration, of which he is the directing head. In view of the delicacy of the existing international situation and of the political and jurisdictional complexities of the local situation, the problem of civilian defense in the Philippines has now been referred to President Roosevelt and it would be most unfortunate at this time to disturb the present arrangement without his specific instructions. I therefore do not feel free to accept the appointment tendered in your letter unless directed otherwise by the President, to whom I am today sending a full report on the situation.

Sincerely yours,

Francis B. Sayre

The Honorable  
F. H. LaGuardia,  
United States Director of Civilian Defense,  
Washington, D. C.

FBS:abn

*Philippines Today*  
*from Manila*  
*Field*  
*12-7-41*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1941  
10.10 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

General Marshall just telephoned to say that he had just had the following radio from General MacArthur:

"All possible action taken here for security and defense. Interceptor pursuit now reported in attack with about 13 enemy planes north of Clark Field (Clark Field is near Camp Stotensberg in Central Luzon). Report received of bombing attack on Davao. Only damage thus far reported is hangar on civilian airport. Report just received of bombing attack on Camp John Hayes destroying several houses (John Hayes is at Baguio in the northern mountains of Luzon). The message was apparently sent about 9 o'clock our time, which would be ten o'clock tomorrow their time."

*War history*

*Philippines Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

12-8-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Marshall just dictated the following over the phone:

"MacArthur reported that there had been steady, light bomber attacks on the Philippines. The principal target was Clark Field (near Camp Stotsenburg). Fifty-odd two-engine bombers at high altitude bombed Clark Field in cooperation with about 40 dive bombers.

"They did considerable damage -- about 28 men killed and a number wounded. The losses in planes were heavy. The Japanese losses in planes were medium.

"MacArthur said he had available 17 Flying Fortresses, 40 T-40's, 15 T-35's, and the other types were not involved. I presume he was referring to the B-18 medium bombers, old type. The presumption would be that those were all intact. Just what he means by "available" in terms of subtracting that from the total number to determine his losses, I cannot tell. Undoubtedly some of the planes could be repaired."

E.M.W.

*War  
Historical*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File  
Confidential*

12-9-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Marshall just phoned the following report from General MacArthur:

3:24 am -

Only action since last report was one high altitude bombing attack on Nichols Field near Manila by 10 enemy planes at 0315 today, destroying one hangar by fire and damaging one B-18 and one O-52 (observation plane). In passing it dropped one bomb at McKinley damaging one truck. Manila had had a previous air raid warning.

Supplementing report of 8 heavy bombing attacks by same formations that attacked Clark Field, destroying installations there, including radio direction finder which was in temporary location. 3 officers, 19 soldiers killed; 16 officers, 21 enlisted men wounded.

Reference report casualties Clark Field about 55 killed, 110 wounded. Further information reference damage Clark Field required.

Cancelled proposed attack on Formosa. Reports do not yet indicate attempt at landing attack. Enemy airplanes have been handled with superior efficiency and there are some indications that his dive bombers are at least partially manned by white pilots. The general public has withstood the shock of initial attack with composure and there are no signs of hysteria and confusion.

7:01 am - No enemy action since last report.

E.M.W.

# TELEGRAM

FA112 WUC 32 USG VIAS RCA GHR ETAT 10:52AM  
*The White House*  
*Washington*

MANILA, DECEMBER 9, 1941 5:02PM

THE PRESIDENT.

WE ON FIRING LINE ARE BACK OF YOU TO A MAN. AM DEPENDING  
ON MILITARY TO GIVE YOU FULL ACCOUNT OF ALL MILITARY DEVELOP-  
MENTS HERE.

SAYRE.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**TELEGRAM**

December 10, 1941.

**MacARTHUR**  
**MANILA**  
**P.I.**

My personal and official con-  
gratulations on the fine<sup>d</sup> stand  
you are making. All of you  
are constantly in our thoughts.  
Keep up the good work. Warmest  
regards.

**ROOSEVELT**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM

December 10, 1941.

PRESIDENT QUEZON  
MANILA  
P. I.

The overwhelming majority of all the people in the world are watching the magnificent defense against wanton invasion which is being conducted by the government and people of the Philippine Islands. I know you will all continue your splendid work. May God be with you and I send you all my affectionate good wishes.

ROOSEVELT

*Philippine  
Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM

December 10, 1941.

SAYRE  
MANILA  
P. I.

Keep up the good work. The  
best of luck to you all. God  
bless you.

ROOSEVELT

S. C. Form No. 11

# Signal Corps, United States Army

*Philippine  
file folder*

Received at

War Department Message Center,  
Room 3441, Munitions Building,  
Washington, D. C.

P5 WTJ HC 32 WD PRTY 1 EX

MANILA PI 830P DEC 11 1941

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

WASHINGTON DC

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR VERY HEARTENING MESSAGE AND ALL I  
CAN SAY IS TO ONCE MORE REITERATE WHAT I HAVE  
HERETOFORE DECLARED DASH WE WILL DO OUR DUTY TO THE END

MANUEL L QUEZON

1105A/11

**PRIORITY**

AMERICAN RED CROSS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE

*file*

To The President: -

*I think you will be*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
DEC 15 12 53 PM '41  
*interested in the attached*  
RECEIVED  
*Cable from Manila.*

*The Red Cross is doing a  
great work there and  
also Hawaii -*

*WHD*

COPY OF INCOMING CABLEGRAM

*Philippine Folder*

AMERICAN RED CROSS  
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Date received: December 14, 1941

Cablegram received from: MANILA (P. I.)

FB60 VIA RCA - F MANILA 132 1/50 Dec 13 (PASS F)

NLT

AMERICAN RED CROSS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Our emergency services have stood the test. Our staff are showing discipline loyalty and courage. Evacuation of Manila and other areas is proceeding under our administration. Feeding and public health present a major problem. We cannot give an accurate statement but will do so in a few days. The forty-eight thousand cracked wheat are now unloaded and taken care of by Army. We are using our entire resources regardless of budgetary arrangements for relief and can carry on for a short time.

You should send us a substantial appropriation soon, and if possible, a unit of your best disaster personnel please. Cullens, Williams, Graybeal are giving themselves unstintingly.

Please notify my daughter we are all well.

Charles Forster, Philippine Red Cross

cc Regular Routing  
and  
Mr. Geo. Smith  
Mr. Bondy  
Mr. Don Smith - Mr. Dinsmore  
Miss Hardisty

*Philippine Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Please let me have a  
suggested reply as quickly  
as possible.

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Sayre  
to the effect that rumors are  
being circulated in Philippines  
that the U. S. is withholding  
further aid, etc.

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
TO THE PRESIDENT

*war file*

*file  
personal*

PO 35  
Filed 721p/18

CABLEGRAM

*Philippine Folder*  
COPY

0-4-C

~~SECRET~~

Received at War Department Message Center  
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, DC

Dec. 19, 1941.

5:44 a.m.

From MANILA

To GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

EIGHTEENTH PRESIDENT QUEZON HAS REQUESTED ME TO CONVEY  
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES quote  
I WISH TO EXPRESS MY PROFOUND APPRECIATION OF THIS PROMPT AND  
GENEROUS RESPONSE TO MY APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE DURING THIS EMERGENCY  
unquote REURAD SEVEN NINE SEVEN

MacARTHUR

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-12-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer.*

~~SECRET~~