Warsaw, April 7, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest to you, I am forwarding you hereto attached memoranda: No. 1 dealing with certain important political factors, and No. 2 dealing with certain observations on the possible bearing of Hitler's iron ore and petroleum requirements upon his potential forward-looking program of expansion.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:
Memoranda Nos. 1 and 2.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM NO. 1

I believe that the following among other factors call for consideration in gauging developments in the making.

1. The fact that Hitler did not instantly strike out against Poland on the heels of Chamberlain's declaration. This suggests, to my mind, that Hitler may conceivably have adopted alternative tactics aimed at inspiring relaxation amongst the political circles throughout Europe, in which case he might await the psychological moment to strike at whatever opening presents itself.

2. In this connection, reports of Hitler's decision to proceed direct from his "Strength Through Joy" cruise in the Baltic to Berchtesgaden, to remain there until his birthday on April 20th, are already discernibly and reportedly contributing to a certain amount of relaxation in European political quarters. In my opinion, these reports, together with what I interpret as deliberately inspired rumors that Hitler may be expected to devote himself for the next two weeks exclusively to birthday ceremonial plans, are too numerous not to be obvious. Indeed, I feel they are inspired for the tactical purpose of anesthetizing the European political arena into a state of repose.

3. Personally, I believe that Europe is now at the threshold of a period which will require more caution, more vigilance and a greater effort at preparedness than ever before. Moreover, I feel that the
the only means of preventing a conflagration between now and November, is (a) unprecedented speed and efficiency in the rearmament programs of Britain, France, Poland and other potential participants of the proposed anti-aggression front; (b) firmness and solidarity among participants of the proposed anti-aggression front, not necessarily, however, through declarations of a provocative nature; (c) emergency accommodation in terms of equipment and/or financial credits by the big Powers, to make up existent deficiencies in the equipment of the smaller Powers which might be deemed worthy thereof.

4. If these measures are adopted without delay, they may be expected to have a deterrent effect upon the minds of the German General Staff.

As I view the picture between now and November, the closer Europe approaches that month, the greater degree of balance in armament will have been achieved by the potential anti-aggression front as against Germany - and accordingly, the more likely that the current grave European situation might be liquidated through statesmanship and diplomacy rather than through war.

The French General Staff have, according to the French Ambassador, secretly ascertained that the German General Staff had recently come to accept the theory that a war today would be one of long duration. One should not, however, lose sight of Hitler's own potential attitude - should not overlook the report (which persistently reaches here) that Hitler discounts his General Staff's counsel and is deaf to their opinion that
that Germany cannot defeat the European democracies in a campaign of lightning destruction. If this is actually so, then a power-drunk Hitler, petulant and enraged over Poland's and Chamberlain's having thrown a "wrench" (in form of the proposed anti-aggression policy) into the machinery of Hitler's "house-breaking" schedule, might conceivably strike out suddenly in either direction - West or East.

5. Indeed, Hitler's and his associates' threatening utterances and their deliberate and petulant refusal to admit that Chamberlain's proposed anti-aggression front is strictly a policy of defense, are significant of Hitler's mood. It is becoming increasingly clear that Hitler is enraged by Poland's demonstrated will to resist and by Britain's intervention, in that together they have put a "crimp" in the schedule of Hitler's "gangster diplomacy". Accordingly, his obvious eagerness to interpret and play up Chamberlain's proposed anti-aggression front as a policy of encirclement, indicates to my mind Hitler is building up his case (a) for further adventures, and (b) possibly to rally again to his support the German people amongst whom there has reportedly been a rapidly spreading reaction to the effect that while Hitler, until recently had been serving the political purpose of the German people without encountering war, now, having consolidated a large part of the world against Germany, he represented a menace to the welfare and lives of the German population. To my mind, indeed, Hitler may now be dramatizing himself as the potential victim of "collective prejudice
prejudice, lack of understanding, and unreasonableness". Hence, if faced with the possibility of "slipping" in terms of his own political position in Germany, and if faced with the realization that a war either at his West or his East, could not be localized, Hitler, like a cornered gangster, might conceivably try to "shoot his way out".

6. Of pertinent bearing it is reasonable to suppose that Hitler's current enraged and petulant mood is importantly attributable to the poor judgment of German diplomacy and Intelligence Service, characterized by Ribbentrop's and the latter's miscalculations of public and official opinion in London and Paris as well as Warsaw.

7. I am inclined to look for the period between now and at least the end of May to represent one of rapidly increasing tension in all directions throughout Europe. Meanwhile, Hitler will either break out in fresh adventures, or wage an insidious campaign (a) towards divorcing the East from the West of Europe, and (b) towards fomenting revolutions within Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia, as well as Russia.

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AJDB/emq
MEMORANDUM NO. 2

While stationed in Oslo, I collaborated with Mr. C. W. Wright, of the United States Bureau of Mines, in assembling a report of mining resources and operations in Norway. This research led to my study of available figures on Germany's iron ore and petroleum requirements and sources of supply. I consequently formed the opinion that as well as petroleum, iron ore might be expected to play a major role in Hitler's politico-economic plans, and thus have an important bearing upon the direction of his expansion program.

Now that the question as to Hitler's next move again arises in the mind of interested statesmen and diplomatists today, there is much speculation abroad. Personally, I believe as previously reported, that in terms of near future calculations, Hitler may be considered somewhat in nature of a football quarterback who picks his openings as he discerns them anywhere along the line.

As to Hitler's main-line objective, however, it is important to bear in mind that according to the French Ambassador here, the French General Staff has secretly ascertained that the German General Staff has definitely ceased to visualize a swift destructive war of short duration, and has come to accept the theory that any war will be one of long duration. Provided Hitler concurs with his General Staff, then this would suggest
West of East, his main-line aim would likely be access to even more abundant sources of petroleum and iron ore to meet his potential requirement in event he envisaged coming to grips with the West.

This suggestion, in turn, prompts me to look for him to cast an even more than hitherto covetous eye on the Ukraine. Accordingly, I should look for him to approach his Ukraine objective either (a) through weakening not only Russia, but also the intervening states such as Poland and Rumania, through fomentation of revolutions, or (b) through negotiation with Russia and these states, based either on force or through tempting, fantastic but eventually empty promises. (In this connection I have for some time had reason to suspect that Hitler aims to take advantage of what he reportedly foresaw as an industrial breakdown in Russia within the next year, to supply Russia with machinery replacements.)

In my opinion, (a) represents the preferred course and the one which is more than likely under immediate consideration, for in the case of (b), Stalin, if he were in his right senses would be reluctant to engage in any rapprochement with Berlin for fear it might eventually prove his own undoing; besides, it would be only reasonable to expect that Hitler's adoption of tactics described in (b) would arouse the West's suspicion and provoke counter maneuvers. Moreover, in the case of (c), Hitler would now have to be prepared for a western attack on his back, provided the proposed anti-aggression
In considering the foregoing I have in mind that, in terms of the broad outline, the past six months have witnessed what might be characterized as an attempt by the West of Europe to divert the Nazi cyclone eastward. Then came Chamberlain's declaration of March 29, signaling a major effort to form an anti-aggression front with Poland as an eastern European basis. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that if Russia can be enlisted as a participant in such a front, either on a bilateral or unilateral basis, this will have served to notify Hitler that the West had experienced a change of heart and would no longer tolerate a German aggression against Russia. Indeed, in such case, Hitler would have to decide, should he still contemplate further adventures, whether to strike out first against the East or the West and/or whether he would be prepared to stand off an attack on his back while he was engaged on the other side.

Of further pertinent bearing, it is interesting that competent and experienced observers of eastern and central European affairs agree in most cases that what Hitler has already gained economically in his expansion drive east and southeast of Berlin would probably suffice merely in peace time but not in war time. Accordingly, they point out that, even if Hitler were able to acquire Rumania's entire
oil production of about 7,000,000 tons per annum, this would be far from sufficient to supply Germany's requirements in addition to what otherwise would be available during a war period. Hence, in terms of oil, Rumania may be marked down rather as a "service station" on Hitler's envisaged route to Baku.

Moreover, in terms of his iron ore requirements, the following brief summary of observations may possibly prove of interest.

Previous to the Great War Britain and Germany were approximately in a similar position as regards their respective sources of supply of iron ore. In other words, each produced about 50 per cent and imported about 50 per cent of their respective requirements. In those days, Germany obtained from what was then German Lorraine about 25,000,000 tons per annum, which represented between 80 to 85 per cent of Germany's then current need. Hence, loss of Lorraine as result of the War meant that Germany had to resort to home production which amounted to about 10 per cent of her requirements. This home production was subsequently increased to about 16 per cent by Goering's having re-opened old mines. According to informed observers, this could be raised probably to about 20 per cent in time of war which would mean that Germany would be forced to import about 80 per cent of her requirements.

During the Great War, Germany's steel and iron production amounted to about 19,000,000 tons per annum, which would
would seem to indicate that her war requirements would be at the rate of 20,000,000 tons a year. This would call for iron ore to the amount of anywhere from between 45,000,000 to 60,000,000 tons - 45,000,000 tons in the case of Swedish high grade ore, 60,000,000 tons in the case of former German Lorraine low grade ore.

The question then arises as to what source Germany could rely upon in the event of war. Sweden, which during the War was forced by the British to reduce its maximum shipments of iron ore, between 7,000,000-8,000,000 tons, to 3,500,000 tons to Germany, is now shipping at the rate of about 8,000,000 tons. According to competent observers here, the Swedes are apprehensive lest Germany press them to extend their present rate of iron ore exports to Germany to about 12,000,000 tons.

Moreover, Germany is now, according to available figures, importing about 40 per cent of Spain's iron ore production, or about 1,000,000 tons. It would be reasonable to suppose, however, that in time of war, even though these shipments were made to Genoa via Barcelona (provided Italy remained an Axis partner in event of war), only about 50 per cent of these shipments would arrive at the point of destination.

In view of the foregoing and on the basis of a rough calculation that (a) Germany might be able to effect a home production of about 10,000,000 tons of iron ore, which would mean about 3,500,000 tons of steel, and (b) an importation of
of, say, 8,000,000 tons of Swedish ore (unless the British and/or the Russians put a stop to all Swedish exports to Germany), which would mean about 4,000,000 tons of steel; this would equal about 7,500,000 tons of steel or something less than about 40 per cent of Germany's war time requirements of about 20,000,000 tons.

I cannot help but feel that the question of covering the difference of 60 per cent will have an important bearing upon Hitler's forward-looking program of expansion, in the event that he concurs with his General Staff that a war with the western powers, and whatever powers in eastern and central Europe become participants in the proposed anti-aggression pact, would be one of long duration. Accordingly, I should look for Hitler to turn his attention with renewed interest to the Ukraine with a view to the iron ore deposits in the Doniec area, as well as the petroleum of the Baku region. Indeed, experienced observers here point out that Berlin's agents are busy with propaganda amongst (a) "White Russians" in the area between Leningrad and the Ukraine, (b) the Cossacks of the Don and Kuban areas, and (c) in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.

It is pertinent to report that official circles here are aware of official Swedish apprehension lest in the not distant future Stockholm receive what might virtually amount to an ultimatum from Germany to turn over to her 80-85 per cent
cent of the total Swedish iron ore production. (In this connection, it is interesting that official circles believe that the prevailing pro-German feeling throughout the Swedish army would be counter-balanced by the independent spirit of the Swedish Government and dissipated by the appearance of the first German soldier on Swedish soil.)
Warsaw, April 22, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest, a friend of Margaret's and mine, who owns an extensive property near Memel, has just informed us that on the day of the German march into Memel, the tank units had to traverse about 60 kilometers of passable roads. Our informant's brother, a man of military experience, having witnessed the performance of these tanks, characterized this particular operation as a "break-down" in that numerous tanks were left by the side of the road, having encountered difficulties with their engines and their tractors. He ascribed most of the trouble mainly to the inefficacy of artificial lubricants.

Moreover, in finding a number of motor lorries also drawn up at the side of the road, he concluded that their

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.
their troubles were due not only to artificial lubricants, but to tire trouble as well, resultant from the use of synthetic rubber.

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bidelle
Warsaw, April 18, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest, I am forwarding you, hereto attached, a memorandum covering confidential disclosures made to me recently by an experienced and objective observer who, under the guise of London Times' "Special Correspondent", accompanied Mr. Robert Hudson, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Trade, to Warsaw and Moscow. His command of the Russian as well as German and French languages, facilitated the underlying purpose of his trip, which, he informed me, entailed an "independent", realistic appraisal of Russia's potential military, air, and naval strength.

Upon my informant's return from Moscow, he stopped off here several days, before proceeding to London. His findings and observations which he confidentially disclosed to me at that time I have summarized in the attached memorandum.

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.
memorandum.

The substance of his report, to my mind, is particularly interesting in that his observations are based not only upon his "on the spot" inspection, but also upon the observations of German diplomatic, as well as other informed quarters of Moscow.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bidle

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum.
Ground forces. Approximately 1,800,000 troops now mobilized. About 1,000,000 of these garrisoned along the western frontier, and about 800,000 in eastern Russia. Moreover, the presumably mobilized force of 1,800,000 forms framework for an additional 3,200,000 callable in quiet order.

Fortifications: supplies and communications. Along the western frontier and at a distance of about 25 miles therefrom, runs a line of fortifications consisting chiefly of concrete block-houses. Behind these, at appropriate points is a system of abundantly stocked food and petrol supply depots. The main troop concentration centers are at Polotsk, Minsk, Kiev, and Balta. Although the roads connecting troop and supply centers along the west front are secondary in character, they are sufficiently serviceable for transport purposes. (As a matter of fact, only within a radius of about 125 miles of Moscow, are the main roads metalled).

Planes. While German military observers estimate a total of 9,000 planes, my informant judging from inquiries in all quarters, believes there is a total of about 7,000 "which could be used one way or other." He moreover estimates that of these, there are about 4,500 to 5000 "first line" planes about two-thirds of which are in the region of the western frontier, and one-third in east Russia. Of those in the west, about 700 are potentially
potentially "useful" bombers. My informant believes, however, the Russians are low on "first-class" bombers.

Abundance of light and heavy tanks in west. The "lights" more numerous and in good shape - the "heavies" potentially "useful" but not up to "top" standard.

Of the total naval tonnage, the most potentially effective factor consists of about 100 "modern type" submarines in the Baltic, as well as a sizeable fleet of fast torpedo-equipped motor boats, (similar to the boat of this description several years ago adopted by the Italians). Moreover, there are about 68 submarines, "modern type" in the Black Sea. The officers commanding these submarines have had little more than about four years training, and in terms of experience, would justify the equivalent rank of Lieutenant in the American, British or French navies.

In summing up Russia's potential capacity, in the light of foregoing disclosures, my informant believes that notwithstanding the Russian General Staff's contention that their western force is geared up to an offensive standard, the Russian military structure as a whole should be considered more as a potential means of "taking the weight off" Britain in the Baltic and Britain and France in the Mediterranean and the Far East, then as an effective striking force. The main potential value of the Russian forces, in event Russia could be brought to throw her weight on the side of the anti-aggression front, should according
according to my informant's opinion, be considered in the foregoing light.

In discussing other aspects, my informant felt that while the flying radius of the Russian planes was sufficient to permit a direct attack on East Prussia, they would require a landing and re-fuelling base in Poland in order to wage attacks on Berlin and other points in Greater Germany.

**SUPPLEMENTARY OBSERVATIONS**

My informant then went on to say that in discussing Japan's position, Russian authorities gave him the impression they considered the "Japs were cooked", in fact to the extent that Moscow was considering reducing the Russian garrisons in the East. Moreover, his Russian informants had, with an air of apparent confidence, pointed to the recent settlement of the Fisheries dispute as an indication of Japan's unwillingness to provoke Russian ire at this time.

While reports reaching here through various channels indicate the Jap's have their "hands full" with their job in China, I do not exclude the possibility that the foregoing statements represented either (a) a Russian attempt to "pad" the price for collaboration with the British and French, or (b) Moscow's having "fallen for" a possible Jap tactical effort to anesthetize Moscow into repose.

Moreover,
Moreover, as I see it, while London, acting as the bilateral pivot in an envisaged anti-aggression front, desires to enlist Russia's collaboration (a) to take the weight off Britain's potential naval and military efforts at various points, (b) to preclude a Berlin-Moscow deal, London wishes to limit the scope and character of Britain's pledges to Russia. (Moscow might possibly press for mutual pledges to the extent of a British guarantee for Eastern Russia against a potential Japanese attack).

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AJDB/emq
In reply refer to Eu

May 2, 1939

My dear General Watson:

I am enclosing copies of the following strictly confidential despatches from Ambassador Biddle which have been marked for the President:

No. 1026, dated April 4, 1939 concerning Nazi propaganda in Belgian frontier areas;

No. 1027, dated April 4, 1939 concerning Nazi propaganda in Poland.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

Copies of two despatches as listed.

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House
No. 1026
Warsaw, April 4, 1939.

Subject: Belgian Minister's disclosures regarding disturbing Nazi-inspired propaganda in Belgian frontier areas.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Belgian Minister here, pursuant instructions from Brussels is now engaged in detailed study of vigorous measures which Polish Government was forced to adopt towards arresting Berlin-inspired propaganda aimed at spreading confusion and weakening Poland internally.

In this connection, the Belgian Minister imparted that
that his Government had become greatly exercised over a similar Nazi-inspired campaign of subversive propaganda in Belgium's frontier areas.

In concurring with my impression that the Polish Government's aforementioned measures were timely and appropriate under the grave circumstances, the Minister stated that if the current wave of Nazi confusion-inspiring propaganda continued in Belgium, his Government would be forced to effect similar measures.

Respectfully yours,

A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

710
AJDB/emq
(In quintuplicate)

Copies sent to Embassies at:
London
Paris
No. 1027
Warsaw, April 4, 1939.

Subject: Supplementing my Despatch No. 1026, April 4, 1939, and referring my Despatch No. 996, March 10, 1939, and my cable No. 58, March 31, 1 P.M.; observations on (a) Nazi-inspired campaign of destructive propaganda in Poland, (b) Berlin's and German minority's attitude, (c) Police police precautions to protect German minority.

SUBJECTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to supplement my despatch No. 1026, April 4, 1939, and to refer to my despatch No. 996, March 10, 1939, and to report that as previously cabled (see my cable no. 58, March 31, 1 P.M.), German machinations within Poland aimed at spreading confusion and weakening the
internal political-economic structure of the state, assumed a grave aspect last week.

In part, Berlin's campaign consisted (a) of inspired tendentious rumors regarding an acute conflict of opinions in Government circles, and (b) false telephone messages to the various Foreign missions, including our own. For example, one German-inspired report which gained swift and wide-spread circulation amongst the Polish population of Warsaw, as well as diplomatic circles, was to the effect that due to disagreement in policy, Marshal Smigly-Rydz had shot Foreign Minister Beck. On another occasion, our Embassy was telephoned at 9 P.M., Friday, March 24th, that pursuant to a German ultimatum, Beck had refused to agree with his associates that Poland surrender Bogunin to the Germans, and that Beck was consequently resigning within two hours of the time of the telephone call.

Though I placed little if any credence in the substance of this telephone message, I went immediately to the Foreign Office for the purpose of making discreet observations for myself. As I expected, I found Beck and his Cabinet members together with General Staff representatives, informally gathered, discussing various aspects of the "black out", which at that time was in progress. Upon their invitation, I "sat in" the conference for several hours, and having assured myself that all was in order, and that the telephone message was only another mendacious effort to create confusion, I returned home.
On a subsequent occasion, the telephone operator at our chancery, telephoned me at 8:40, on the morning of March 27, stating that some one purporting to represent the Foreign Office, had telephoned to announce that Polish troops had entered Danzig at 8:30 a.m. I immediately suspected a trick, characteristic of Nazi technic, and requested our operator to check back on the Foreign Office to verify the source and substance of the message. I was therefore not surprised when our operator telephoned me five minutes later to say that having conformed with my request, he ascertained that the Foreign Office knew nothing of the aforementioned message. Major Colber, our Military Attaché thereupon immediately notified the Second Bureau of the General Staff, while I apprised Minister Beck, the Vice Premier, the Governor of Warsaw, and the Chief of Police, suggesting that some appropriate measures be adopted swiftly to curb what we considered a campaign deliberately aimed at causing confusion and general disturbance. That same day, the Government adopted emergency precautions aimed at arresting this wave of harmful propaganda.

As regards continued reports emanating from the Berlin broadcast stations and the German press, accusing Poland of maltreating the German minority, I am aware that in anticipation of Polish mass anti-German feeling and in a determined effort to prevent acts which might provoke Germany, the Polish Government issued strict orders to the local police authorities throughout Poland to adopt strict measures to protect the German
German minority. However, before these measures came into effect, there had taken place, according to my information from usually reliable sources, a few cases of "rough housing", mainly on part of exuberant Polish youths, expressing their feelings against the Germans, who, particularly in Bydgoszcz, had become overbearing and provocative in their attitude towards the local Poles.

As an illustration of the extent of aforementioned police precaution, the Belgian Minister informed me that in the area industrialized by Belgian invested capital, the Polish police authorities had forbidden the German employees to leave the town without police visas. Moreover, the police were careful to point out that since they were responsible for the welfare and protection of each German in that area, the police could not afford to allow the Germans to "go wandering out of sight".

My further examination of subsequently reported incidents gives me more than an impression that the German minority has been deliberately attempting to provoke incidents. For example, a report came to my notice this morning to the effect that at Chorzów, a town of about 125,000 inhabitants, and a nitrate industrial center in Upper Silesia, the Polish police apprehended a number of young German students deliberately in the act of smashing the windows of the German high school of which they were students. Under subsequent police examination the boys confessed their fathers had instructed them to commit these disorders.

The
The apparent determination both of Berlin and the German minority in Poland to keep Polish German minority differences an almost daily "headline" issue, suggests that they aim to keep this an open question whereon to build a case for potential forceful intervention.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

710
AJDB/emq

(In quintuplicate)


A TRUE COPY
OF THE SIGNED
ORIGINAL
Warsaw, May 4, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest, I am forwarding you hereto attached a memorandum covering my recent tour d'horizon with Beck and several of his more informed associates regarding the positions of neighboring states.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Biddle, Jr.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
In tour d'horizon with Beck and his associates, following came to light:

Hungary

(a) Warsaw's disappointment in Budapest's current subjective position* in light of impression here that Budapest in desire for Hungarian incorporation of Slovakia was tending to play further into Berlin's arms. Only hopeful signs: Budapest now re-examining its position in light of Germany's altered strategic position resultant from increasing scope and vigor of anti-aggression front which Budapest now believes would spell Germany's eventual defeat. Hence, Budapest would seek Berlin's assent to remain neutral;

Yugoslavia

(b) While Yugoslavia's current geo-political position was extremely delicate, there was still room for hope that Yugoslavia would eventually throw her weight on side of anti-aggression forces after outbreak of war, though she would endeavor to maintain neutral position at outset of hostilities, hoping thereby to escape brunt in early phase thereof. Meanwhile, Belgrade remained the Axis bone of contention, and in such light, the weak point in the Axis structure.

Moreover,

* See attached memorandum B for background.
Moreover, Yugoslav Minister here confidentially imparted to me his Government's opinion that Rome now went so far as to envisage Yugoslavia as Italy's potential front line defense against a possible German threat to Italy. Moreover, while Berlin constantly reassured Rome that it considered Yugoslavia Italy's "lebensraum", Berlin was simultaneously whispering threats to Belgrade that if latter did not play ball with Berlin, Berlin would stir up irredentist revolt amongst Croats.

The Minister added that while the increasing threat of the Axis in general and Germany in particular had contributed towards a renewed tendency on part of the Croats and Serbes to consolidate and while the Prime Minister, Dragisza Cvetkovicz, and the leader of the Croats, Dr. Vladko Maczek had both shown a disposition to find a common ground of understanding, negotiations along these lines were having their ups and downs, - not to any small degree due to the subversive machinations of outside forces.

In my opinion, Yugoslavia is now entering a period which will call for Belgrade's utmost vigilance against an attempt by Rome and chiefly Berlin to lull Belgrade into a state of repose, whereby Berlin might hope to catch Belgrade unawares, and present it with an ultimatum. In line with this thought, reports reaching Warsaw indicate
indicate Berlin has instructed Budapest to better its relations with Belgrade. On the other hand, it is conceivable that while patting Belgrade on the back, Berlin will in near future propose an extension of Yugoslavia's trade with Germany. These among other factors, could be marked down to part of the technique of a boa-constrictor policy.

(c) It was vitally important to Poland's strategic position that Lithuania be kept from falling completely into Berlin's clutches. In event of war Lithuania would offer Poland best military approach vis-à-vis East Prussia. The deep banks and broad bed of the River Niemen offered potentially effective defense line. Moreover, military history showed that the Masurian Lakes of East Prussia had more than once proved a stumbling block to military tacticians. Hence, Lithuania's collaboration with Poland in the event of war was matter of vital strategic importance. General Rasztikis' forthcoming visit here, upon invitation from Marshal Smigly-Rydz, will therefore have important bearing upon future developments. Meanwhile, official circles here are perceptibly concerned over report that Kaunas received a multi-point "proposal" from Berlin, requiring among other items (a) that Lithuania turn over to Germany 80% of her annual production, (b) that in this connection Lithuania abrogate her trade agreements with Britain, Sweden and Russia, (c) that
Memel become exclusive port for shipment of these goods, and (d) that Memel be developed as the main industrial center of Lithuania. The Polish Government, in examining these reported proposals, are inclined to feel hopeful that, since Poland has little if any market to absorb additional Lithuanian production because of its similar character to that of Poland, between the three other consumers' markets they might be able to make arrangements which would prevent Lithuania's coming completely under German economic domination.

(d) Slovakia's position was increasingly uncertain. Warsaw was concerned over disturbing outcome of recent efforts to bring about a Polish-Slovak trade understanding. A Slovak official confidentially admitted/a Polish official that in view of the uncertainty of Slovakia's political and economic position it did not seem practicable to engage in trade negotiations at this time. Moreover, the Yugoslav Minister here imparted to me his Government's opinion that Germany intended to use Slovakia as an instrument of its brutal policy of imperialism. In other words, if it served that policy to use Slovakia, or any part thereof, to "sweeten" a deal either with Hungary or Poland or both, Berlin would not hesitate to stoop to these tactics.

Moreover, as pointed out in my previous writings, Berlin's position in relation to Slovakia was far from consistent.
consistent in that while Berlin exercised a protectorate over Slovakia, Berlin had also promised Rome not to prevent potential Hungarian efforts to incorporate Slovakia within the Hungarian state.

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In my dispatch No. 721 of October 10, 1930, Polish foreign policy envisaged a common frontier with Hungary, first through an envisaged autonomous Slovakian leaning politically and culturally towards Poland and economically towards Hungary; later, through Hungary's incorporation of Ruthenia. I also pointed out that ever mindful of the late Marshal Pilsudski's 1924 forecast that Germany would one day attempt to gain domination over the whole of Czechoslovakia, the Polish Government preferred, in terms of the long-range outlook, that Ruthenia, (a potential spring board for anti-Polish activities amongst Poland's Ukrainian minority) be included in framework of a friendly Hungary, rather than within framework of a then suspected Czechoslovakia, which might conceivably become eventual victim of Berlin's expansion program.

It is interesting to note, moreover, that directly responsible for Poland's坚持不懈 desire for closer relations with Hungary, is the fact that Colonel Beck, and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Szoembeck, as well as a number of influential high ranking Polish military officers, were attached at one time or
MEMORANDUM B

[5-4-39]

Background for Warsaw's disappointment in Budapest's current position.

As frequently pointed out in my cables and despatches, as far back as November 1937, and again in my despatch No. 731 of October 15, 1938, Polish foreign policy envisaged a common frontier with Hungary, first through an envisaged autonomous Slovakia leaning politically and culturally towards Poland and economically towards Hungary; later, through Hungary's incorporation of Ruthenia. I also pointed out that even mindful of the late Marshal Piłsudski's 1924 forecast that Germany would some day attempt to gain domination over the whole of Czechoslovakia, the Polish Government preferred, in terms of the long-range outlook, that Ruthenia, (a potential spring board for anti-Polish activities amongst Poland's Ukrainian minority) be included in framework of a friendly Hungary, rather to rest within framework of a then suspected Czechoslovakia, which might conceivably become eventual victim of Berlin's expansion program.

It is interesting to note, moreover, that largely responsible for Poland's hitherto persistent desire for closer relations with Hungary, is the fact that Colonel Beck, and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Szembek, as well as a number of influential high ranking Polish military officers, were attached at one time or other
other to Hungarian military units. Accordingly, I am aware that the deep attachment which they formed for the Hungarians at that time endured through intervening years. I am aware, moreover, that Beck's persistent efforts to do something to "brace up" Budapest, in an endeavor to prevent Hungary's falling completely a victim of German domination, have been motivated not only by sentimental but also, and importantly, by strategic considerations.

AJDB
My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest, in that it represents a side-light on past and current play of forces in Berlin diplomatic circles, I take occasion to forward you, hereto attached, a Memorandum for your private, confidential information. With every good wish,

Yours faithfully,

Tony Ridde q

May 6th, 1939
Warsaw.
MEMORANDUM

SPECIAL CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT

Competent individuals in official and diplomatic circles here lament the wave of distorted and insidious propaganda which has been emanating from the "propaganda factories" in Berlin for the past six weeks. Moreover, the impression has gained ground here that a number of foreign diplomatic missions, as well as numerous press correspondents accredited to Berlin had fallen under the spell of the Wilhelmstrasse's obvious efforts to spread fear, confusion and defeatism, in all quarters abroad, and to inspire distrust and loss of confidence among states forming the anti-aggression front.

One objective and experienced diplomat here went so far as to remark confidentially that judging from the tone and substance of reports from his country's mission in Berlin, he suspected the mission either had been unduly impressed by local atmosphere and become victims of "spoon-feeding", or were suffering from an acute case of combined jitters and dwindling perspective - unfortunately a vicious circle. My informant felt that at any rate, when transmitting to one's government at times like these, substance of conversations with leading officials, wherein one could discern traces of technique of power politics and of threats to the international code of law and order, the reporter, should include his own interpretations and observations.
observations.

Of pertinent bearing it is significant that a well informed and usually reliable British press correspondent imparted to me in strict confidence that during his course of conversation with Sir Neville Henderson, (British Ambassador in Berlin) last autumn, just previous to the Czech crisis, Henderson had remarked in effect that the sooner the Czech state were broken up and divided, the better for the peace of Europe. How could Britain be interested in participating in any stand which interfered with the right of self-determination among so conglamorate a mass of people such as those within the framework of the Czech state? Besides, how could Britain consider defending "a little shyster lawyer like Beneš?"

My informant in disclosing the above said he wondered whether Henderson would adopt a like attitude vis-à-vis Poland's position.

I am passing on the foregoing as an interesting side-light on the influences at play during these trying times.

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AJDB/emq
Warsaw, May 6, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my cable No. 100, May 5, 5 P.M., paragraph 2, sub-section d, covering Beck's May 5th address and to that part in which he referred to "various other allusions reaching far wider and further than the subjects now under discussion", I take this occasion to attach hereto for your interest and further clarification on these allusions, a memorandum covering the story behind them.

With every good wish, I am,

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bedder

The President

The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM

May 6, 1939

It may be recalled that I reported in my telegram No. 4, January 11, 5 p.m., paragraph 5, that the Beck-Hitler conference at Berchtesgaden consisted mainly of a dramatic tour d'horizon wherein Hitler "thought out loud" for some three hours. I later found that when Hitler perceived that the following proposals fell on deaf ears (Colonel Beck's and Count Zubieski's) Hitler and Ribbentrop realized they would have to adopt alternative methods if they were to carry out Hitler's Ludendorff-conceived scheme, entailing neutralization of Eastern Europe during a potential German campaign against Britain and France.

Accordingly, Hitler's proposals were: (a) Poland to share in Germany's colonial spoils in return for Poland's neutrality during an envisagedly victorious German attack on Britain and France; and (b) a Polish-German military partnership in an envisaged crusade against Russia.

Hence, aware of his failure to tempt Beck by the foregoing proposals, and encouraged by Ribbentrop to believe Poland, like Czecho-Slovakia, would not resist German demands, Hitler decided to adopt strong-arm measures. Accordingly, he believed that an acceptance by the Polish Government of his subsequent demands for incorporation of Danzig and an extra-territorial passageway across Pomorze would
would serve (a) to alienate and discredit Poland as a potential eastern European partner in the eyes of London and Paris by making Poland appear to be in the German camp; and (b) to discredit Polish Government in eyes of Polish people, thus bringing about internal demoralization. If this plan had worked, Poland would have been isolated and abandoned by potential outside assistance and at the same time would have become so weakened from within that she would have become an easy prey to Germany's expansion program.

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AJDB/emq
Warsaw, May 20, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest, I am forwarding you hereto attached a memorandum covering my conversation with Minister Beck regarding Tokyo's having reportedly offered Japan's good services as mediator in a settlement of Polish-German differences.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House,

Washington.
MEMORANDUM

May 18, 1939

In response to my question as to whether there was foundation for the report that Japan had offered to mediate in the matter of Polish-German differences, Beck replied as follows: As he had previously told me, about five months ago, the Japanese Ambassador here had suggested to Beck that, should Poland desire Japan's good offices in a mediation of Polish-German differences, Tokyo might conceivably consent to act in such capacity. At that time Beck had expressed his Government's appreciation and pointed out that Poland had no need of Tokyo's good offices in the matter.

Recently the Polish Ambassador in Tokyo had been informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the Cabinet had informally and realistically discussed at several meetings various aspects of Polish-German differences. Indeed, they had pondered the question of offering Japan's good offices as mediator. In this connection, moreover, the Cabinet as a whole had openly evinced a clear comprehension of Poland's position. Finally, after careful consideration of all points appertinent to the issues at stake, as well as Tokyo's own position vis-à-vis both Warsaw and Berlin, the Cabinet
Cabinet decided (a) to refrain from possibly embarrassing Poland's position by a formal offer of mediation; and (b) that Tokyo's relations with Berlin were already too complicated to facilitate an effectual sounding in that capital.

I gained the impression, during my discussion with Beck on the foregoing, that in spite of the negative character of the Japanese Foreign Minister's remarks to the Polish Ambassador, the former had left the door open a "crack" for Warsaw's further consideration, should Warsaw eventually come to desire Japanese mediation.

In conclusion, Beck assured me that Tokyo had made no démarche, either through the Polish Ambassador in Tokyo or here, nor had Tokyo in any way whatsoever brought pressure on Warsaw to settle its differences with Berlin.

AJDB/emq

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Warsaw, May 20, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I take occasion to forward you hereto attached a memorandum covering my recent conversation with official circles here wherein they disclosed the substance of Berlin's reported plan to force the surrender of Danzig within the next six weeks, and my informant's observations thereon.

With every good wish, I am,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM
May 20, 1939

Today's conversations with official circles here reveal they are aware of the following report: Berlin plans stirring up trouble in Upper Silesia over a period of the next six weeks. This is to serve partly as a diversion activity and partly as a smoke screen for further machinations vis-à-vis Danzig, which are to be brought to a head at the end of the six-weeks period. At that time, Berlin plans a bold stroke involving Gdynia as well as Danzig. The German fleet is to take station at a point vis-à-vis the two ports, and within gun range thereof, while East Prussian troops are to enter the city by the bridge at Marienburg and by the canal leading into the city from the Vistula (This canal was deepened about one and a half years ago with the idea of affording access to light draught boats). Leading up to this point, a gradual accumulation of German East Prussian troops will have taken place in the city - under the guise, perhaps, of tourists. Already some twenty truck loads of ammunition have been smuggled into Danzig with a view to German occupation of some central point within the confines of the city. (Polish authorities are now in process of verifying this report and in ascertaining the point whereat this ammunition is now allegedly stored.) The plan, moreover, envisages an ultimatum stating that, if the Poles did not surrender Danzig intact, the German fleet
fleet would lay the port of Gdynia in ashes and the
German troops (then envisagedly in the city) would
synchronize their action with that of the fleet.

This plan has evidently been conceived as a means
of circumventing the Polish plan to take over the city,
in the event of a German threat thereto, before the East
Prussian troops might have had time to cross the Vistula
into Danzig. In this connection, it is well to bear in
mind that there is but one bridge across the Vistula
from East Prussia; while the Poles are afforded a compara-
tively speedy approach through a number of highways
and several railways leading into Danzig. Moreover, the
Polish batteries at Hel command the city. Furthermore,
I am aware that the military authorities here, typifying
the feelings of the Government and public opinion, would
sooner lay Danzig in ashes than to permit its seizure and
militarization by Germany. As several of the Polish High
Command remarked to me: To lay Danzig in ashes would be
exceedingly painful for the Poles but, after all, every
Pole realizes that German militarization thereof would
spell the eventual end of Poland's access to the Baltic.
German artillery mounted in Danzig would be within easy
range of Gdynia and would serve the Nazi agents as a threat
to Polish interests and as a constant instrument of pressure
on Polish shippers and shipping interests.

In discussing the aforementioned report of Berlin's
plan to force the surrender of Danzig, I am aware that,
while
while my informants are disinclined to attach a too great importance thereto, they are aware that such reports call for added calm consideration and vigilance. In fact, they are inclined to put these reports down to a Berlin-inspired "open secret", characteristic of Berlin's jitters-inspiring technique, and such might be aimed not only at racking Polish nerves but also at causing sufficient anxiety in foreign quarters as to draw further offers of mediation. Moreover, one official, at the conclusion of reading aloud to me the details of the envisaged plan as reported by a Polish Intelligence officer, calmly remarked, "So what?" He then went on to say that this scheme should not be considered in the light of action which could be localized, for a military conflict which would ensue from such action would rapidly spread to the proportions of a general conflagration. Berlin knew this only too well and realized that the putting into operation of such a scheme would spell nothing short of a European war. Of course, if Hitler wanted war, that was one thing; but my informant did not think Hitler was willing actually to risk war over Danzig within the next six weeks.

AJDB/emq

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Warsaw, May 20, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest, I am attaching here to for your information a memorandum covering last night's conversation with Minister Beck and Under Secretary of State, Count Szembek, who just returned from the Vatican where he had served as Poland's special Ambassador to the Pope's coronation.

With every good wish, I am,

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
May 20, 1939

MEMORANDUM

Count Szembek, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and closely connected with Vatican circles, imparted to me last night that his confidential reports from Rome indicate a rapid spread of dissatisfaction amongst the Italian people as a whole with the position in which Italy now finds itself as a result of its Axis collaboration. Those sections of public opinion covered by Count Szembek's report are now alarmed lest Italy's continuance to serve as an instrument of Hitler's policy might land Italy in a war. I am aware that Count Szembek's reports do not cover reaction amongst inner and the more enthusiastic Fascist circles - but rather Court and Vatican circles and sections of public opinion with whom these circles come in contact.

Of pertinent bearing, my interest was further engaged by Minister Beck's confidentially expressed opinion, that Italy would prove no match for France in the event of armed conflict. Italy was now in the process of reorganizing its army, and out of some 52 divisions, the Italian High Command would have succeeded in reorganizing only about 15 divisions this year. He believed that at heart, the High Command was fully aware of the French army's superiority.
Warsaw, May 25, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

With further reference to the last paragraph of my memorandum attached to my letter to you of May 20, I take occasion to report that Minister Beck just imparted to me that his confidential reports from Polish military experts indicate that Italy would not be ready for a war until the spring of 1940.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bidwell

The President

The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Warsaw, May 27, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

I take occasion to forward you hereto attached a memorandum setting forth the substance of a report which recently came to the attention of official circles here.

I am aware my informants have already traced the "rumor" to Nazi circles in Berlin. While my informants greet this, among other obviously inspired rumors calmly and are inclined to mark it down to a Berlin-directed "open secrets" campaign aimed at inciting "jitters" in Poland and elsewhere, I am aware they recognize the situation calls for utmost vigilance and no let-up in preparedness against a potential attempt to grab Danzig.

It may be noted that while differing in detail, the report covered in the attached memorandum is similar in substance to that described in the memorandum attached to my letter to you as of May 20.

Of pertinent interest, League High Commissioner, Burckhardt arrived in Warsaw yesterday, dined with Beck last night, is conferring with Beck again this morning, and expects to leave for Danzig tonight. I am interested to find that Beck and associates gained a more favorable impression of Burckhardt's general attitude and frame of mind than that which they had, just previous to his departure for Geneva some time ago. At that time, they felt events had brought him to a state of mind conducive to blurred perspective and incapacity to make strong decisions. Now however, they are pleased to note "an improvement in his general attitude."

In

The President

The White House.
In this connection, I am aware that since Burckhardt was last in Danzig, he became concerned lest rumors and press reports emanating from Berlin, and indicating Berlin's friendly feelings and high regard for him, might spell for him the "kiss of political death". Indeed, an important section both of the Swiss and French press seized on these reports and played them up subsequently causing Swiss political circles to criticize him rather harshly. This experience may conceivably serve to make him careful not to give an impression of anything smacking of Berlin leanings. Moreover, he has recently had the benefit of frank conversations with the British, French, and Swedish representatives of the "Committee of Three" (on Danzig affairs). It is reasonable to suppose he was thus enabled to gain a clearer perspective than hitherto as regards London's, Paris' and Stockholm's policy vis-à-vis Danzig developments.

Burckhardt plans to leave for Danzig tonight, and the length of his stay there will depend largely upon the outcome of his this morning's conversation with Beck.

Meanwhile, the Danzig press, referring to a report suggesting that Burckhardt's return might spell an attempt at mediation of Polish-German differences, states with emphasis that no "Runciman" is desired in this case.

With every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidde
Warsaw, May 27, 1939

MEMORANDUM

Supplementing my memorandum covering events in Danzig, attached to my letters to the President and to the Secretary of May 20, the following rumor, evidently inspired by Berlin, has just come to the attention of official circles here:

At a time when a large number of East Prussian troops may have entered Danzig as tourists, the Danzig Senate would extend a formal invitation to Admiral Raeder (presently occupied in fleet maneuvers off the Lithuanian coast) to accept honorary citizenship of Danzig. It would be natural that, under the circumstances, he arrive with his fleet off the harbor of Danzig to receive the honor in person. Synchronized with his arrival, the Danzig Senate would make a declaration expressing a desire that Danzig be incorporated in the Reich. It would then be pointed out to Warsaw that both Gdynia and the batteries of Hel were under the range not only of the fleet's guns but also of the heavy railway artillery on the German side of Poland's northwest frontier.

While my informants are inclined to mark the foregoing rumor down to further Nazi fear-inspiring technique, they do not overlook the potential danger involved in ideas of the political dreamers and war lords of Berlin. Accordingly, whereas my informants do not look for Hitler to let Danzig become the cause of a war in the immediate
May 31, 1939

Dear Tony:

Thank you for your letter of May thirteenth enclosing memoranda covering recent confidential conversations you have had.

I found them very interesting.

With my kind personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

F. D. R.

Honorable Anthony J. D. Biddle, Jr.
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Warsaw
Poland
Warsaw, May 13, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest to you, I am forwarding hereto attached a memorandum covering my recent conversation with Polish Ambassador to Germany, Lipski, wherein he confidentially disclosed his observations upon the change in course of Hitler's politics at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.

In that Lipski possesses in my opinion a unique understanding of the mentality of the Germans in general and of Hitler in particular, I consider his remarks of special interest.

With every good wish, I am,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
Warsaw, May 12, 1939.

MEMORANDUM

In conversation with Polish Ambassador to Germany Lipski who in my opinion possesses a unique understanding of the German mentality, he disclosed the following:

Before the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, Hitler had looked upon Britain as the power with whom Germany wanted to avoid a conflict. Even at that time Hitler envisaged Britain as Europe's No. 1 at sea and Germany as Europe's No. 1 on land. In other words, Hitler had a wholesome respect for the mood and capacity of Britain to act forcefully in defense not only of its own interest but also of principles.

Accordingly, Hitler told Lipski that he felt confident Britain would never permit Italy to take Ethiopia. Later came Britain's backdown on Ethiopia. Hitler was astonished, taken aback and, according to my informant, admittedly in a quandary.

From that date forward, however, Hitler pressed by Ribbentrop's advice, began to realize that there were many prizes awaiting his taking without fear of British interference. Hence, Britain's reaction to the Ethiopian affair had importantly contributed towards changing the course of Hitler's politics abroad.

Later when Mr. Chamberlain flew from London to Godesburg, Hitler and his associates marked it down to a distinct sign of weakness. They failed to understand
understand the British point of view.

Now therefore, it is difficult for Hitler to understand an "about face" on the part of a man whose actions of not so long ago, were interpreted as a sign of weakness.

These observations are interesting, in that they go to show that Hitler is lacking in an understanding of British mentality; at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, Hitler, surprised that Britain took no action, thereafter miscalculated Britain's long-range policy and capacity to about face, and appraised Britain as a negative quantity. Now Hitler is again surprised at Britain's strong positive stand.

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AJDB
Warsaw, May 13, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest to you in the light of its potential bearing on the political as well as economic aspect of the situation in Germany, I am forwarding hereto attached a memorandum wherein I have taken occasion to outline the course of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht's position in relation to the German Government since the time when he assumed a leading rôle in the management of the finances of the Reich up to the time of his comparatively recent resignation.

In drawing up this outline, I have had the benefit of confidentially imparted information on part of Polish Ambassador to Germany Lipski, who has known Dr. Schacht well for many years.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Memorandum.

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM

May 12, 1939

In my opinion, an examination of the ups and downs of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht's position in connection with inner Nazi circles brings to light a fairly clear picture of the course of the political-economic development within the Reich.

In brief outline, Schacht utilized Germany's position as recipient of investment funds, up to 1939, from the United States, Britain and elsewhere as means of internal rehabilitation. Thereafter he constructed an iron band around Germany in terms of exchange for purpose of consolidating to Germany's advantage, the benefits of these investments without endangering the mark by the play of forces outside the Reich. This in effect created, comparatively speaking, an internal boom. Through the creation of this so-called "iron band" around the mark, Schacht importantly contributed to the success of Hitler's program, in that he thus kept the German mark and share market comparatively free of effect of depressions from abroad growing out of such moves as the Rhineland occupation, etc.

At this point, however, Schacht and Hitler disagreed, for in the back of Schacht's mind he had been entertaining since, say 1925, a scheme whereby, if Germany could profit by the American, British and other investments, Schacht might eventually reach a position whereby he might come
to some sort of an agreement along rational lines with the creditor nations - an agreement along such lines as would permit Germany to rejoin the family of liberal trading nations. By this time, however, Hitler and Company realized that in order to secure their political control it would be necessary to control the internal economic structure as well.

According to one of Schacht's closest friends, Schacht balked at this idea, for he was utterly opposed at that time to Hitler's theory of self-sufficiency. Moreover, this theory conflicted with the ultimate purpose Schacht had had in the back of his mind since the first day he embarked upon his scheme of consolidating Germany's position at the expense of foreign investments.

Later, according to Polish Ambassador to Germany Lipski, who had known Schacht well for a long time, Schacht had often emphasized that Germany should acquire no greater an armament than she could afford to pay for and support. Accordingly, Schacht's and Hitler's ideas further clashed when Hitler insisted upon an increase in arms disproportionate to the means at Germany's disposal. Finally, according to Ambassador Lipski, Schacht could stand unorthodox financial practices no longer; he discerned the signs of ultimate collapse of the financial-economic structure of the country under the continued strain placed thereon by Hitler and his extremist advisers. Moreover, Schacht warned that if this Nazi policy were to continue, Germany would end up in a war. Subsequently he asked to be relieved of his post.

Lipski
Lipski believes Schacht is now simply biding his time until his services will again be required to pull the country out of a financial mire.

AJDB/emq

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Warsaw, May 13, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest to you, I am forwarding hereto attached a memorandum covering my conversation with Ambassador Lipaki, wherein he confidentially imparted his observations on the occasion of the Wilhelmstrasse's closing its doors to the Chiefs of Foreign Missions during a limited period when the German Army was actually marching into Czechoslovakia.

With every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Enclosure:
Memorandum.

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM

May 12, 1939.

Polish Ambassador to Germany Lipski imparted to me that during a three-day period, wherein German troops were actually marching into Czechoslovakia, the German Foreign Office had in effect been closed to the Chiefs of Foreign Missions. Lipski considered that this had proven a great error in Nezidom's politics, for after all the Chief of Mission enjoyed the privilege of access to officialdom and they were thus prevented from conferring with the proper officials during a crucial moment. The only comfort Lipski had derived from the situation was the fact that even the Italian Ambassador had been thus prevented from consulting German officials.

In analyzing what had motivated this action on part of the German Government, Lipski stated that just previous to the September crisis certain of the German officials had tipped off some of the Chiefs of Foreign Missions to expect a German adventure, in an effort to elicit the intervention of their respective Governments. This had led to advance notice abroad of Germany's intention vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia and eventually to Munich.

Later Ribbentrop had convinced Hitler that he could have gone to war with Czechoslovakia without British and/or French intervention, which might have resulted in a victory which in turn might have served to put an end to an existent
existent pacifism and defeatism of a certain section of the German population.

Hence, with the foregoing experience in mind, Ribbentrop had decided to prevent a repetition thereof at the time Hitler had decided to occupy Czechoslovakia. Therefore, by absenting himself from Berlin and making unavailable for consultation other officers of the Foreign Office, Ribbentrop had felt that he was precluding any chance of advance notice abroad.

AJDB/emq
My dear General Watson:

I am enclosing a copy of Ambassador Biddle's confidential despatch no. 1058 of May 12, 1939 concerning the recent visit in Warsaw of Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The despatch was marked for the President.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch no. 1058, May 12, from Warsaw.

 Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson,
 Secretary to the President,
 The White House.
ENCLOSURE

to

6-3-39

Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson

Watson
No. 1058

Warsaw, May 12, 1939

Subject: Referring to my cable No. 107, May 10, 2 p.m.; Potemkin’s conversation with Beck in Warsaw; further observations thereon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to my cable No. 107 of May 10, 2 p.m., I have the honor to report that, after a lengthy talk with Beck and just before his departure from Warsaw, Potemkin imparted the following to the Turkish Ambassador:

He was highly satisfied with his talk with Beck. Beck had been very friendly and had manifested marked comprehension in connection with all aspects covered in the discussion.

While
While maintaining the characteristic Polish reserve in respect to a potential alliance with Russia, Beck had stressed Poland's desire for a mutual re-invigoration of all aspects of the Non-Aggression Agreement and emphasized Poland's desire for a broadening of the scope of the Commercial Agreement between Warsaw and Moscow. Moreover, Beck had assured Potemkin of the Polish Government's desire for friendly Polish-Russian relations.

Potemkin had assured Beck in turn that Moscow reciprocated Warsaw's desires on all points mentioned. Moreover, Potemkin explained to my informant that he clearly understood Poland's position vis-à-vis a potential alliance with Russia as characterized by Beck's reserve on the subject. Furthermore, Potemkin had assured Beck that Litvinov's replacement by Molotov did not entail a change in Moscow's foreign policy.

Judging from the above disclosures and from Beck's remarks subsequent to his conversation with Potemkin, the substance of which I reported in my cable under reference, I am inclined to believe that for Poland's part Poland desires: (a) mutual re-invigoration of Non-Aggression Agreement; (b) friendly relations along commercial but not political lines; (c) broadening of scope of existent Commercial Agreement to meet 1/ Poland's requirements of war matériel and supplies, and 2/ to provide Russian outlets for coal and industrial production of the Teschen district; (d) to avoid committing herself to an alliance with
with Russia whereby Poland, due to her strict principle of refusing to accept unilateral guarantees, might in turn find it necessary to guarantee the territorial integrity of Russia.

For Russia's part, Russia (a) desires to meet Poland's wishes regarding a non-aggression agreement, (b) understands and is willing to meet Poland's desires for friendly relations along commercial but not political lines, (c) is apparently willing to 1/ meet Poland's desire to broaden the scope of the existent Commercial Agreement to meet Poland's requirements of war materiel and supplies, and 2/ meet within reason Poland's requirement for a Russian outlet for coal and industrial production of the Teschen district.

Moreover, I perceive that Moscow not only understands Poland's position regarding a potential alliance with Russia, but perhaps welcomes thus avoiding a closer tie-in to potential conflict whereby Russian troops might be involved beyond the Russian frontier.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
Warsaw, June 10, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I am attaching hereto for your confidential information memorandums covering substance of two conversations with the Japanese Ambassador here in connection with Tokyo's reported willingness to render its good offices towards a mediation of outstanding Polish-German differences in event of the expressed willingness of both parties concerned (It may be recalled that I reported in the memorandum accompanying my letter of May 20, 1939 Polish officialdom's observations on Tokyo's then currently reported mediation efforts).

In brief, on May 25 Japanese Ambassador Sakoh confidentially imparted that both he and

The President,

The White House,

Washington.
the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin had been making soundings respectively in Warsaw and Berlin as to the attitude of both capitals towards a re-opening of negotiations and/or mediation by a third party. During the course of our conversation, I gave the Ambassador, in response to his inquiry, my opinion on certain aspects of Polish attitude (see attached memorandum for details).

On June 3 when Sakoh and I again met at his request, he imparted to me in strictest confidence that German Ambassador to Poland, von Moltke, had had on the previous day a three-hours' conversation with Polish Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Arciszewski. Sakoh informed me he was cognizant of the substance of their discussion, and he wanted me to know I had been correct in my estimate of the situation; in other words, while Warsaw would welcome an opportunity to re-open an exchange of ideas with Berlin regarding the questions of Danzig and a passageway across.
across Pomorze, Warsaw felt it would be extremely difficult to conduct negotiations in an atmosphere so highly charged as that of today. Moltke had admitted that he understood Warsaw views on this score. Sakoh, moreover, stated that in our previous conversation I had "put my finger" on one of the main difficulties in connection with any potential negotiations: the fact that Czecho-Slovakia's and Memel's occupation, together with Berlin's declared demands and unilateral revocation of the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact, had served to shake Poland's confidence in Berlin. He agreed, furthermore, that this was a factor which had to be taken into serious consideration when contemplating a settlement of outstanding differences between Berlin and Warsaw.

I am aware that the Japanese Ambassador, together with his colleague in Berlin, intends to pursue the matter further. As the former promised to keep me posted
MEMORANDUM

May 26, 1939

In an after-dinner conversation with Japanese
Ambassador Sakoh, May 25, he said he had been waiting
for an opportunity to talk privately and confidentially
to me about Polish-German differences. He felt that he
and I had gained a clear perspective of the Polish view-
point, as well as the Polish mood and capacity for res-
sistance. Hence, he had waited to question me as to
whether I believed there were grounds for hope of a
settlement of Polish-German differences, urging me to
answer with utmost frankness.

In response, I admitted having given great thought
and careful and objective consideration to all aspects of
the problem. My conclusions of today coincided with my
preliminary observations (see my cables No. 55 of March 29,
2 p.m., paragraph 2, subsection (c) and No. 57 of March 30,
6 p.m.). In brief, there was little hope of attaining
a settlement based on justice and equality of rights in
so highly charged an atmosphere as existed today. Even
though the statesmen appointed to conduct negotiations
between the two countries might mutually agree on what
they considered an equitable solution, it should be borne
in mind that behind each negotiator would be standing the
public opinion of his respective state, alert to discern
any
any move which it might interpret as a concession possibly unacceptable from their standpoint - yet which, under more tranquil conditions, that same public opinion might be willing to accept as a reasonable basis of settlement. Besides, the two armies would be standing by and, as in the case of the two public opinions, would be, so to speak, glaring at each other across the fence. One should not overlook the fact that in the armies, as well as the political circles of both countries, there were "hot heads" and extremists who had to be taken into consideration in the light of their potential capacity to whip up a desire to "go places".

In view of these considerations, I felt that a constructive move at present would be an effort to reach a preliminary and informal mutual understanding to leave the questions in abeyance until after the "shooting season", say November 15. Moreover, it might prove mutually agreeable to confine these informal efforts to confidential diplomatic channels. By autumn public opinion in both countries would have had more to think about than the specific character of demands made by Ribbentrop and subsequently declared in Hitler's speech of April 28. In other words, time might possibly serve to make mass opinion in both countries more receptive to a potential compromise. Indeed, I felt it was conceivable that if Herr Hitler were sincere in his expressed desire for peace and his reported wish for good neighborly relations with Poland, Herr Hitler himself might conceivably see his way to
to revise his stated demands on Poland.*

I added my belief that Hitler, and Hitler alone, could change his mind if afforded a face-saving formula.

At this point Ambassador Sakoh evinced a spontaneous expression of enthusiasm; slapping me on the back, he said we were in accord. His colleague, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, had just informed him that Hitler had emphasized in a recent conversation his desire for good relations with Poland and his regrets that outstanding differences between the two countries had led to such a lamentable atmosphere.

Sakoh

* In this connection, I do not overlook the fact that Ribbentrop had miscalculated Poland's potential resistance and had thus contributed importantly towards Hitler's psychological mistake in making his one-sided demands on Warsaw. Moreover, Ribbentrop had committed a serious error, in my view, by having abandoned diplomatic channels for a continued exchange of views between Berlin and Warsaw immediately subsequent to the announcement of the Anglo-Polish Pact. He had thus brought what might have been otherwise confined to confidential bilateral diplomatic discussion into the open for world-wide attention. Having thus permitted his Chief of State to declare Germany's demands openly, constituted, to my mind, risky tactics in that he had permitted his Chief of State to crawl far out on the limb. On the other hand, these tactics had opened the way for Beck to state Poland's case at a moment when the whole world had focussed its attention on what Beck had to say. Were Herr Hitler to have become enlightened in the meantime on the various aspects of what I considered to be a serious diplomatic blunder, he might conceivably have come to reconsider the position. Such enlightenment might conceivably give rise to Herr Hitler's taking matters into his own hands, adopting a more reasonable attitude in connection with his demands on Poland, and save his face by pointing out that the forceful character of his demands had been the result of misinformation and/or misunderstanding on part of his advisers.
Sakoh then significantly asked me whether I thought the Polish Government and the Polish people would be receptive to a proposal from Hitler along lines (a) for a joint guarantee of an independent Danzig, (b) for construction of a passageway, under Polish sovereignty, across Pomorze to facilitate German communication, and (c) a long-term German guarantee of Poland's frontiers. Having in mind that such a proposal represented in effect Warsaw's counter proposals - in fact the line of Poland's reasoning during past exchanges of views between the two capitals, I replied that I thought the Polish Government would greet such a proposal as a reasonable basis for negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement. Moreover, I felt that all sections of public opinion here might "stomach" a settlement along such lines when the atmosphere might have become less charged.

It seemed to me that if the Fuehrer would favorably consider ideas along this line, it might be possible to re-open a discreet bilateral exchange of views through diplomatic channels, I did not believe, however, that Polish officialdom would deem it wise to re-open formal negotiations until the fall, after the "shooting season" would have passed. If during an exchange of ideas (as above suggested) Warsaw clearly understood Berlin's willingness to deal on a basis such as suggested by Sakoh,
Sakoh, it should thereupon become the duty of the Governments of both states to educate their respective public opinions to an eventual acceptance of terms found mutually agreeable during aforementioned exchange of ideas.

At this point I observed that there was a factor which had to be taken into serious consideration when contemplating negotiations between Poland and Germany, and that was the existent lack of confidence in Hitler's word on part both of official and mass opinion here. One had to take this into account when contemplating negotiations of any character. As a matter of fact, my observations prompted me to feel that the same consideration applied in the cases of other states in this area of Europe.

He again slapped me on the back and said that he was delighted that we shared views on this problem, and significantly added that he concurred with my belief that Hitler alone was capable of changing his mind to the above extent and that he felt it was within the realm of possibility that Hitler might actually come around to making a revised proposal along the lines Sakoh mentioned.

I have the distinct impression that Sakoh was sincere in his desire to discuss the foregoing with me, in that he is aware that I have studied the reactions of all sections of public opinion here to events in the foreign as well as the internal political arena. I am, moreover, aware that Sakoh, together with his colleague, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin,
Berlin, has been conducting discreet soundings in both capitals towards ascertaining receptivity of both parties to an offer by Tokyo of its good offices in capacity of mediator. On the other hand, they have been in search of some common ground whereon Warsaw and Berlin might find it possible to re-open negotiations. I consider his remarks were significant in that he is not given to exaggeration, nor is he carried away by his imagination.

At conclusion of our conversation, he earnestly urged me to be prepared further to discuss discreetly with him various aspects of the problem.

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AJDB/Is
MEMORANDUM II

June 3, 1939.

Japanese Ambassador imparted in strictest confidence that, after a three-hour conversation between Ambassador Moltke and Vice Minister Arciszewski, it was found that I had been correct in my estimate of the situation; that was to say that, while Poland would welcome an opportunity to re-open an exchange of ideas with Berlin regarding Danzig and a passageway across Pomorze, Warsaw did not consider it possible to conduct renewed negotiations in a highly charged atmosphere such as existed today. In fact, it would be difficult to re-open discussions until the autumn. Warsaw had to take into consideration public opinion and the state of mind among the military "hotheads", while Berlin had its public opinion and "extremist" element to consider. The Ambassador then remarked that I had also been correct in my observation that Poland’s shaken confidence in Berlin would form an important obstacle to a Polish-German agreement, even perhaps on terms based upon Poland’s counter proposals. The Ambassador remarked that an offer to guarantee Polish frontiers would offer little temptation to Polish official as well as public opinion, in their present state of mind. This lack of confidence, then, was a factor which had to be taken into serious consideration when contemplating a renewal of negotiations between the two capitals.
The Ambassador then questioned what interpretation might be placed on Hitler's statement regarding the incorporation of Danzig as a Free City. Did he mean no remilitarization? Moltke, in response to this question, had stated that Hitler might possibly refrain from fortifying Danzig, but he doubted whether Hitler would guarantee not to garrison the city with troops.

The Ambassador also stated that military circles here had a fixed idea that Danzig's incorporation would spell a prelude to a German attempt to annex the Corridor all the way down to Upper Silesia.

Ambassador Sakoh would pursue the matter further and would keep me posted.
Warsaw, June 17, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I beg to refer to my letter of June 10, 1939 and memorandum thereto attached, covering substance of my conversations with the Japanese Ambassador regarding Polish-German differences, and to report my following additional observations.

I am aware that while Japanese Ambassador Sakoh's recent energetic efforts to bring about informal as well as formal discussions between German Ambassador Moltke and Polish officials have met with some measure of success, the results of the conversations which have thus far taken place have been negative in character, insofar as concerns the "Danzig problem."

While Moltke's recent official call upon Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Szembek occasioned

The President,

The White House.
occasioned much attention and speculation in that it represented Moltke's first official call at the Foreign Office since March, I am authoritatively informed Moltke touched on matters only of comparatively minor importance: (a) question of soft-pedaling Polish and German press campaigns; and (b) question of ameliorating conditions for their respective minorities (which are bearing a large share of the brunt of current tension). In other words, Moltke's much publicized visit, in my opinion, may be marked down (a) to a search for a modus vivendi in relation to comparatively minor matters, and (b) to a tactical gesture to impress London and Paris with Berlin's "forbearance" in connection with what Berlin now propagandizes as Warsaw's "cautious and militant spirit."

Meanwhile I am disinclined to feel that Japanese Ambassador Sakoh's energetic interest in a potential settlement of Polish-German differences is entirely altruistic in character. In view (a) of current trend of developments in Europe
Europe and the Far East, and (b) of Tokyo's, as well as Berlin's and Rome's, efforts to prevent conclusion of an Anglo-Russian pact; I do not overlook the possibility that in their joint efforts to bring about a Warsaw-Berlin settlement the Japanese Ambassadors in Warsaw and Berlin might be serving as instruments of Berlin's policy to "crack up" the anti-aggression front.

Moreover, I am mindful that Tokyo's policy would be better served by a condition whereby Russia were worried by the potential implications (vis-à-vis Russia) of friendly Polish-German relations than by the current condition whereby Russia can look with a sense of comfort upon a resistant, "anti-aggression" Poland as a buffer between herself and Germany.

With every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

As of pertinent bearing I take occasion to attach hereto a confidential memorandum supplementing my cables 122 of June 16 and 127 of June 19, and covering the result of my discreet inquiries among high Catholic circles here in Government and military as well as representative circles outside officialdom, as to whether their allegiance to the Church outweighed their allegiance to the State.

I conducted my inquiries in such manner as to acquire a cross-section of opinion and, in view of recent and current diplomatic soundings by the Vatican, I consider the disclosures of my informants enlightening.

Moreover,

The President,

The White House.
Moreover, my inquiries brought to light the fact that the Polish clergy is markedly nationalistic and that during the course of the Papal Nuncio's soundings amongst them as to their attitude towards the Vatican's envisaged diplomatic move towards summoning a peace conference, they frankly cautioned the Nuncio against the Vatican's intervention in Polish-German differences, stating bluntly that in their opinion such intervention at this time would prove a detriment to the position of the Catholic Church in Poland. They moreover took this occasion to express their apprehension lest the Vatican exercise influences abroad which might tend to disarm public opinion, stating that any such influences would tend towards creating weakness in the camp of the anti-aggression front which the Axis powers would be only too quick to discern and take advantage of. Indeed, they felt the only way to hold Hitler in check was to maintain this front in vigor.

With every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidder Jr

Enclosure:
Memorandum.
MEMORANDUM

June 20, 1939

Supplementing my cables Nos. 122 of June 16 and 127 of June 19, I take occasion to report that my discreet inquiries amongst high Catholic circles here, in Government and military as well as representative circles outside officialdom, bring to light on all sides the voluntary contention that the people of this country are "first Poles, secondly Catholics."

In this connection, a high ranking official of the Polish Government, and an individual who enjoys a high standing in the Church, confidentially imparted to me he was confident he was expressing the reactions of his Government and of Polish mass opinion by characterizing the policy of the Vatican over the post-War period as one of "sauve qui peut." (He thereupon cited as examples Austria and Czechoslovakia.) He went on to say that the Polish Government had in the past frequently experienced Vatican pressure through various means to bring Warsaw in line with Vatican policy. Towards this end, the Vatican had usually resorted to playing the Uniat against the Latin Rite of the Church in Poland. While the Government was not resentful of this, still its experience on this score had served to open its eyes.

He then pointed out that an impression was gaining ground here to effect that the Vatican's paramount concern
of the moment was the fate of the approximately 40,000,000 Catholics presently contained in the Greater Reich. This impression in turn was leading my informant and his associates to be wary lest, in order to improve the position of the Catholics in Germany, the Vatican might conceivably consciously or unconsciously bring about circumstances whereby Poland might be expected to foot the cost for this envisaged improvement in Germany. Furthermore, in view of (a) this impression, (b) reports that the Pope was deeply concerned over mounting recalcitrance of a large section of Italian public opinion vis-à-vis the Italian Government as result of Germany's wholesale penetration of Italy*, and (c) other reports that His Holiness was aware of Mussolini's fear that Italy was unprepared for a major conflict, Warsaw had been prompted to feel that Pius XII was acting more as an Italian than the Holy See in initiating diplomatic soundings for a peace conference under circumstances currently existing throughout the European political arena.

Another high ranking Polish official of high standing in the Catholic Church (he points with pride to the fact there have been 38 bishops in his family) made the following observations: Warsaw had long been aware of

Piùs

* Referring to the anti-Polish tone which the Italian press has recently adopted, my informant stated Warsaw considered the Italian press had become the instrument of German policy and that belief was fast gaining ground here that Italy was little short of a German protectorate and "Mussolini its Gauleiter."
Pius XII's Berlin leanings which found their roots in the days when he was accredited to that capital as Nuncio. Moreover, while the attitude of Pius XII as former Secretary of State for the Vatican had at all times been correct vis-à-vis Warsaw, the Vatican machinations during that period had not escaped Warsaw's discreet notice. Indeed, it was during His Holiness' secretaryship that the Vatican had frequently played the Uniat against the Latin Rite in Poland as means of pressure on Warsaw. In fact, Warsaw had long been inclined to feel that Secretary of State Pacelli lacked, comparatively speaking, a genuinely warm heart for and clear understanding of Poland.

My informant went on to say that the present Pope, typifying the mentality of his closest associates, still hankered after the old affluent and politically powerful "Centrum Party"* of Germany. Its elimination upon Hitler's advent to power represented a big gap in the Catholic structure.

* Former Chancellor and subsequently Minister of the Interior of Germany, Joseph Wirth, was virtually leader of the Centrum at the time of Hitler's advent to power. Hitler sent Wirth to stay with Dollfus to negotiate an anschluss. During their negotiations Hitler's mounting annoyance over the power of Wirth's influence in German Catholic circles, and his suspicion that Wirth and Dollfus might connive to draw Austria and Bavaria into closer relationship led Hitler to order Wirth's arrest. At this point the Vatican, pursuant its reaction of "After Hitler what?" urged Wirth to leave Germany and hold himself in readiness to serve the Church in Germany in case Hitler's regime met with failure. Hence, since the first year of Hitler's regime Wirth has been living and working outside Germany, serving as a confidential liaison between the Vatican and the Church in the field. Moreover, he is a close friend of Pius XII.
structure. Its elimination, moreover, had inclined the Vatican to turn with more active interest to the Catholic community in the United States. Even the Vatican had its "pocket nerve" and its heart was not above throbbing at the jingle of "filthy lucre" which, after all, was necessary to carrying out the wide scope of the Vatican's policy. Hence, it was reasonable to suppose that, in absence of the German Centrum Party, the Catholic community of the United States would play a more important than hitherto role in the eyes of the Vatican.

Of pertinent bearing, my informant went on to say that two years ago Warsaw had learned that Pope Pius XI considered Naziism and Fascism composed a greater threat to the Church than Communism and that in this reaction the Pope enjoyed the support both of Jesuit and Dominican circles. Moreover, at that time Pius XI's main-line objective envisaged the Catholic Church's penetration of Russia. Hence, the Vatican under his regime had exerted strenuous efforts to build up the Uniat Rite in Poland, constantly endeavoring to Russify it, for Pius XI had looked to this Rite as the potential advance guard of an envisaged Catholic "march" into Russia.

Warsaw now learned, however, that the present Pope regarded Communism as a greater menace to the Church than either or both Fascism or Naziism. Moreover, Warsaw now had the impression that the present Pope's main-line policy envisaged a deal with Berlin whereby the Vatican
might regain a foothold in Germany and thus, in the course of time, resurrect or replace the "Centrum" which had previously constituted the Vatican's greatest source of revenue in Europe and provided the Vatican with the means of political influence throughout Germany.

My informant added that, as regards the present situation wherein the Vatican's attention was focused upon Polish-German as well as Italo-French differences, the Vatican's attitude might be characterized by taking for granted the position of the "good sheep", meanwhile concentrating its efforts on the "stray sheep" - perhaps even going so far as to press for an improvement of the condition of the "stray sheep" at the cost of the "good sheep."

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AJDB/emq/is
Warsaw, June 24, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

In the thought that you may be interested in the subject matter, I am forwarding you hereto attached, a memorandum covering a recent conversation with Minister Beck's Cabinet Chief, Count Žubienski.

With every good wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Tony Bidwell

The President

The White House

Washington.
MEMORANDUM

Minister Beck's Cabinet Chief confidentially imparted to me that Minister Beck and he were interested to learn that French Ambassador to Berlin, Coulandreau, had recently cabled his Government that in his opinion war would be prevented only (a) if Poland showed not the slightest tendency to retreat from her firm stand; and (b) if Britain and France gave no sign which Berlin could interpret as a disinclination to stand by Poland. Coulandreau had added that, facing bare facts, France could not expect (a) to stand aside during a Polish-German conflict, which could not be localized, or (b) formidable military collaboration on part of states east of the Axis without Poland. Coulandreau had, moreover, informed his Government that when questioned by Berlin officials as to whether France would actively support Poland in an armed conflict over Danzig, he usually replied to the effect that he believed Poland would fight to resist a German attempt to annex Danzig and if Poland found herself at war with Germany, she would find France fighting on her side.

The substance of this message had proven a source of gratification to Beck and his associates.

*****

AJDB/emq/is
Warsaw, June 24, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

As of pertinent bearing upon the trend of current developments I feel that the following will prove of interest to you.

An outstandingly well-informed and leading Norwegian industrialist who has just spent several days with me here, confidentially stated in effect that, in recent discussions with leading bankers of London City, several of whom were closely connected with the Bank of England, he gained the distinct impression they envisaged the eventual replacement of the Third by the Fourth Reich, rather than a war, as the best solution for the present politico-economic dilemma throughout Europe.

Moreover, the course this element envisaged, as a means of marking time in the interval, apparently entailed a series of resistance periods interspersed with

The President,

The White House.
with occasional "Munichs" whenever the crisis atmosphere made them a necessary alternative to war.

My informant who is primarily business-minded admitted that even his "cold, unsentimental mentality" had received a shock from this disclosure, and he expressed apprehension lest, if the attitude and influence of this element predominated, London might countenance one Munich after another as a means of gaining time until Hitler and his crowd might have been shaken loose from power in Germany. He felt that this might presage a grim picture for Europe in the not distant future in that during the interval Germany might readily have secured domination over the greater part of the European continent. As a Norwegian, and as one who looked to London in a business and cultural sense, he was exercised over his findings along the aforementioned lines and hoped that the future trend of developments in Europe would not be influenced by such an attitude.

Yours faithfully,

Tony Ridder
In reply refer to Eu

June 24, 1939

My dear General Watson:

I am enclosing copies of the following strictly confidential despatches from Ambassador Biddle which have been marked for the President:

No. 1069, dated June 1, 1939 concerning the possible reopening of negotiations affecting Danzig and the Corridor;

No. 1072, dated June 3, 1939 reporting the substance of a conversation with the Polish Ambassador to Great Britain on Anglo-German differences;

No. 1074, dated June 3, 1939 concerning status of Polish attempts to obtain British financial assistance;

No. 1075, dated June 3, 1939 concerning reaction in official Polish circles to Molotov's address of May 31, 1939.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

Copies of four despatches, as listed.

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
No. 1069 Warsaw, June 1, 1939

Subject: Possible re-opening of negotiations regarding Danzig and Corridor passage-way; Commissioner Burckhardt's proposed visit to Ribbentrop.

SECRETARY CONFIDENTIAL
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to supplement my letters to the President and to the Secretary as of May 27, and to report that Dr. Burckhardt, League High Commissioner for Danzig, previous to his departure from Warsaw for Danzig at midnight May 27, disclosed the following:

He had gained an impression during his conversations with Beck and his associates that they were willing, when times
times were quieter to re-open an exchange of views with Berlin looking to an equitable settlement of the problems of Danzig and a passageway across Pomorze.

Bürckhardt would now remain for only a limited period in Danzig, proceeding at an early date to Basel to receive a degree of Doctor of Laws (honoris causa). He would use this trip to Basel as an excuse to drop in on Ribbentrop, with a view to sounding him out on Berlin's current fundamental attitude towards a re-opening of talks with Warsaw.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

710
AJDB/emq/18
(In quintuplicate)
Subject: Substance of my conversation with Polish Ambassador to London; his observations (a) on Chamberlain's attitude during Foreign Affairs debate of May 18, (b) on continuation of certain elements in London to cling to appeasement policy and other elements which envisaged economic conference as solution of Anglo-German differences.

SYMMETRY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that in conversation with Polish Ambassador to London, Count Raczyński, during his recent consultations with his Government here, he touched upon Premier Chamberlain's utterances during the foreign affairs debate in Parliament as of about May 18. The Ambassador interpreted Chamberlain's remarks on that occasion to mean (a) a gesture to assure that element in London which continues to cling to the hope that appeasement may prove the solution for Europe's political ills, that
he was still willing to give Hitler a chance to play ball; and (b) a warning to Hitler that he had one more chance to play ball with London before Chamberlain might be forced to change his attitude once and for all - in other words, it was like the interval before the auctioneer brought his hammer down for the last rap. Chamberlain probably had in mind that during this interval, London would enter what circumstance then presaged as the last stage of negotiations with Moscow. Moreover, he probably did not overlook the possibility that Russia might prove an obstacle to a policy of appeasement.

The Ambassador then remarked his opinion that Chamberlain had allowed himself to be forced into making an alliance with Russia. Thus he might be expected to gain eventually the maximum support of British public opinion behind whatever deal he might finally have made with Moscow.

Reverting to that element in London which continued to cling to an appeasement policy, and commenting upon reports which continued to reach Warsaw regarding the efforts of this element, the Ambassador made the following remarks:

Flirtations amongst certain banking and industrial as well as political elements in London with the idea of an economic conference were traceable to conversations between representatives of the Federation of British Industries, and their opposite numbers in Germany, about March 20th. These conversations had assumed
assumed the line of considering cartels and market divisions and in such light had gone quite far. As a matter of fact the reported progress of these talks had given rise in London banking and industrial circles to no little encouragement that Germany might thus be drawn into a more liberal form of trade. At about that juncture, it was decided in London that the Secretary of Overseas Trade, Robert Hudson, should proceed to Germany to take part in the more advanced stages of these conferences. Although his then contemplated tour was to include Warsaw, Moscow, and Stockholm, as well as Berlin, Ambassador Raczyński had gained the impression that Hudson's real interest was focused on his then prospective conversations in Berlin.

Just previous to his departure, however, and on the heels of a public utterance by Mr. Chamberlain, indicating in effect his confidence that Germany would refrain from further adventures, Nazi troops occupied Czechoslovakia. Hudson had thereupon canceled his stop-off in Berlin and proceeded straight to Warsaw. (See my telegram No. 39, March 22, 12 noon).

The Ambassador then stated that it was in the encouragement received by the Federation of British Industries' representatives from their conversations in Germany that hopes on part of certain London circles for an economic conference might conceivably have found their roots.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
No. 1074

Quadruplicat

Warsaw, June 3, 1939

Subject: Confidential observations of Economic
Counselor of the Foreign Office (on
return from negotiations in London)
regarding: (a) status of Poland's
negotiations for British financial
accommodation; (b) Poland's current
economic-financial condition; (c)
financial condition of Britain.

Secretely Confidential

For the President and the Secretary

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to supplement my despatch No. 1073
of June 3, 1939 with memorandum attached thereto, and to
report that the Economic Counselor of the Polish Foreign
Office, Mr. Jan Wazelaki, just returned from London where
he represented his Government in Anglo-Polish financial-
economic conversations, confidentially imparted to me in
effect the following:

He
He was frank to state that the greater part of the conversations had been devoted to the question of London's extending Warsaw financial accommodation in connection with Poland's mobilization and rearmament.

While in this connection there was no lack of good will on London's part, the negotiations thus initiated were not going, from Warsaw's standpoint, as fast as Warsaw would like. Negotiations had met with several "obstacles of general character." He believed and sincerely hoped that these obstacles might be cleared up within two or three weeks. In brief, the talks were still in a preliminary stage.

Commenting upon the impression he had gained in London, Mr. Wazelaki stated that London was commencing to feel the financial strain caused by armaments expenditure. However, the British Government was trying to pursue two courses, the one inconsistent with the other: (a) to arm Britain and other states of the anti-aggression front, and (b) to maintain a normal, comfortable, living standard. Moreover, too much gold was leaving Britain for the United States and the equalization fund was experiencing a strain.

Moreover, there were two elements which loomed from time to time into the foreground as factors of interference of current Government policy: (a) an important element in the "City" which continued to consider world affairs in terms of the pre-war period. It appeared that this element believed that, as no major incident had occurred since the Italian
Italian occupation of Albania, no further threats to international order might be expected, and accordingly one could afford to relax; and (b) a large section of youth aged about 20 which, if anything, was pacifist in trend of thought. This element was not as effective, however, as the former, in that it controlled neither the money bags nor politics.

Wazelski then went on to say that mobilization was costing Poland at the rate of between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 złotys per day. Moreover, the subscriptions to the Defense Loan, together with a tendency to hoard cash, were contributing towards a scarcity of currency. As a matter of fact, it was now difficult to secure short-term credits and even difficult to change a 500 złoty note in Warsaw. This condition was contributing towards and indicative of a slowing up of business. Of course, the subscriptions to the Defense Loan, which amounted to about 400,000,000, or about one fifth of the total currency circulation, would start coming back into circulation again in about three months time, although about one fourth of it would have to be expended abroad for raw materials such as aluminum, et cetera, for the construction of aeroplanes. If the people of Poland knew that financial relief was in sight there would be an immediate alleviation of the current financial tension.

When Beck went to London the British Government officially asked him whether Poland was in need of financial aid. He stated that he preferred not to discuss matters of that character at that time (for sake of pride and in order
not to appear to be placing a price upon Poland's willingness to join an alliance with Britain - besides, Marshal Piłsudski had "led down the law" that no Polish Foreign Minister transacting a treaty with a foreign country should permit himself to engage in financial conversations), but that this matter might be taken up at a later date. Accordingly, conversations entailing Poland's request for financial accommodation subsequently took place in London, culminating in a formal proposal by Poland which was met by a counter proposal by Britain stating certain obstacles of "general character" to the acceptance of Poland's former proposal. Poland had thereupon sent a note stating that Britain's counter proposals were unsatisfactory, and requesting that Britain reconsider the substance of Poland's original proposal. Wazelaki stated this described the current status of the negotiations referred to in the early part of this despatch.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

951
AJTB/exg/is
(In quintuplicate)
TRIPLICATE

No. 1075

Warsaw, June 3, 1939.

Subject: Reaction of Polish official circles to Molotov's address of May 31, 1939.

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that my conversations with informed Polish officials regarding Molotov's address of May 31, revealed they greeted with a sense of satisfaction, his references to Poland. They were gratified (a) by his observations on Polish-Russian relations, and (b) that Molotov had not mentioned Poland in connection with Anglo-Russian negotiations. They felt Molotov had thus
thus manifested an understanding of Polish foreign policy.

As regards the general tone and other aspects of the speech, my informants characterized it more as a criticism of the current status of negotiations, than as a rejection thereof. The speech did not announce any new difficulties; existing differences of opinion appeared to concern matters of detail more than of principle.

Reports from London and Paris provided sufficient ground upon which to base an expectancy that the Pact would be signed in the near future.* My informants, moreover, considered the speech as a whole, represented a tactical move, and as such, destined for internal as well as external consumption. In fact, they did not exclude the possibility that Molotov, a nationalist, whose perspective should be judged in terms principally

* In conversation with Beck about a month ago, I gained the impression he did not then expect a prompt settlement of Anglo-Russian negotiations. He was inclined to feel Russia would prefer not to become involved actively in the early stage of a potential European conflict, only during a second stage thereof. Russia envisaged such a conflict as one of long duration. Moreover, Russia foresaw that by entering the fray in a later phase, she might conceivably "swing the balance" and thus gain the position to dictate the terms of peace when other participants were tired out.

Both the Japanese and German Ambassadors here, who (partly due to "wish-thinking") have from the outset been skeptical as to an early settlement of Anglo-Russian negotiations, again imparted as recently as yesterday, June 2, they did not look for a prompt conclusion. Moreover, the Japanese Ambassador held that the Russians were not only trying to prolong negotiations, but even trying to side-step the proposed pact altogether. This desire had motivated Moscow's suggesting conditions in its counter proposals which Moscow hoped Britain would refuse to accept. Fundamentally, Moscow preferred that Russia at least ostensibly maintain a neutral position.
principally of internal affairs, had directed his words mainly for internal consumption.

My informants considered, moreover, that by putting into relief Russia's importance in Europe, Molotoff aimed to bargain for the maximum price obtainable for Russia's participation in the anti-aggression front. Moscow preferred freedom of action rather than too strict a tie-in to automatic obligations. Moreover, Moscow was breathing more easily now that Poland had joined the anti-aggression forces, for a Poland aligned on the side of Germany would have represented a serious threat to Russia. However, Moscow now perceived an opportunity to come back as an important factor in European politics - an opportunity to assume once again a dominant role in Europe, such as in the time of Nicholas I, when during the period 1815 - 1855, Russia had served as the arbiter of European disputes.

Molotoff's reiteration of Moscow's disgust with "Munich" and the results thereof, engaged my informants' interest in that his remarks on this score more or less characterized their own reactions.

Commenting, moreover, upon Molotoff's remarks to effect that Russia did not chose to play the role of pulling others' chestnuts out of the fire, my informants said that Russia, since the time of Peter the Great, suspected Britain of aiming to get others to do her fighting for her. Molotoff's remarks indicated Moscow continued to be wary on this score.

With reference to further aspects of the speech, my informants
informants pointed out that Moscow was obviously anxious to engage Britain directly in the defense of the Baltic states. Accordingly, the speech was a tactical move to exercise pressure on Britain in this regard.

It was now clear that Moscow considered the Baltic states Russia's potential weak point. Moscow was convinced Poland would resist aggression, and thus serve as a buffer force between a potential German advance and Russia's western frontier. However, Moscow doubted seriously whether, in event of a German march, the Baltics would or could resist.

With reference to Molotoff's remarks about Russian-German and Russian-Italian trade, my informants were inclined to interpret this as Moscow's desire to minimize the possibly offensive character of the Anglo-Russian negotiations - in other words, a corrective. In fact, my informants' reports led them to believe that at the moment there were no grounds for suspicion that Moscow was contemplating a political deal with Berlin.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

* Of pertinent bearing, Estonian Minister to Poland, Markus imparted with an air of unfeigned concern that, while Britain implied she would keep Baltic interests in mind in her negotiations with Russia, Tallinn was worried lest these negotiations create an opening for eventual Russian domination in the Baltic area. Though it was a choice between two evils, this risk was preferable to a return to Rapallo.
In reply refer to Eu

June 27, 1939

My dear General Watson:

I am enclosing a copy of Ambassador Biddle's strictly confidential despatch no. 1073 of June 3, 1939 which was marked for the President. The despatch contains observations of the Ambassador on recent talks between the General Staffs of Poland and France, and of Poland and Great Britain.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

From Embassy, Warsaw, no. 1073, June 3, 1939.

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Inclosure to 6/26/39 letter drafted

Add• to

Brigadier General

Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President.
Waraw, Jutne 3, 1939

Subject: Attached Memorandum covering (a) Observations on Polish-French and Polish-British General Staff conversations; (b) Polish official circles' reactions to British Mission's favorable impression; (c) Personal observations on Warsaw's desire to avoid becoming exclusively dependent on Russia for military supplies.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward hereto attached a memorandum covering (a) certain aspects of the Polish Minister of War's recent conversation in Paris with the French General Staff, (b) of the British military mission's recent Staff conversations here, (c) Polish official circles' reactions to preliminary results of aforementioned conversations, and (d) my observations on reactions of official
official circles, particularly as regards Warsaw's
desire to avoid becoming exclusively dependent upon
Russia for assistance in terms of armaments.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

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AJDB/enq/is
(In quintuplicate)
MEMORANDUM

May 29, 1939.

General Musse, Military Attaché of the French Embassy here, who accompanied Minister of War Kasprzycki recently to Paris and attended all conferences between the latter, General Gemelin and other French General Staff officers, stated these conversations were conducted in an atmosphere of exceptional frankness and good will on both sides. Both Gemelin and Kasprzycki shared the view that, in order to prevent war, today's anti-aggression policy of the "Halt-Hitler forces" must, to the maximum degree, be implemented by a demonstration of armed and equipped strength by all participating states. This would seem to indicate that some tangible form of French assistance in terms of equipment and financial accommodation may possibly grow out of military and political agreements between Poland and France.

The British Military Mission, moreover, which recently came to Warsaw for Staff conversations, has been engaged in an examination of all departments of Poland's military establishment. The Chief of the Mission imparted he was so impressed with what he had thus far seen that he was returning instantly to London to report in person upon his findings. Not that he did not recognize an existence of shortages in certain lines, such as planes, anti-aircraft equipment...
equipment and heavy artillery — and not that he did not
realize that a certain amount of replacement was necessary
in the stocks of small arms for reserve divisions — but
what he had seen, in terms of both the quality of existing
equipment and efficiency of operation thereof, had greatly
impressed him. He had, moreover, gained an exceptionally
high regard for the standard of efficiency and morale among
the officers and troops.

Leading Polish officials, cognizant of the British
Commission’s foregoing impression, are discernibly grati-
fied and believe that the decision of the Mission Chief
to report favorably at an early date upon his findings
here gives ground for hope that a military and political
agreement, giving effect to the Anglo-Polish Pact in its
present form, may result in Britain’s contribution to
Poland’s military position in form of financial accommoda-
tion as well as military supplies. One high-ranking Polish
official remarked that the impression gained by the British
Commission as reflected in the aforementioned remarks of
the Chief of the British Military Mission was a source of
satisfaction to the Polish Government in more ways than
one, in that Government opposition circles in London had
manifested a lack of knowledge of specific facts in having,
during the past month, unduly emphasized the potential de-
pendence of the Polish military structure upon Russian
assistance in event of Polish-German hostilities. Poland
had an adequate number of trained troops and reservists.

It
It was mainly (a) a question either of replacement or supply of part of the equipment for the reserve divisions (our Military Attaché estimates that the artillery is sufficient for only about 15 out of the 30 reserve divisions); and (b) increase in the number of planes and anti-aircraft equipment. Moreover, it was important to bear in mind that, while Poland could now receive equipment from the west, commencement of hostilities would immediately render difficult, if not impossible, western shipments to Poland. Hence, besides the question of acquiring made-up equipment at this stage, it was necessary for Poland to consider the matter of financial accommodation to permit the continued purchase of raw materials for the manufacture of planes, arms and ammunition, after the commencement of hostilities.

Moreover, Poland had to be careful not to allow itself to be placed in a position whereby she might become exclusively dependent upon Russia for assistance in military supplies, for fear that Russia might use this dependency as an instrument of pressure on Poland.

As one official remarked, complete dependence upon Russia might conceivably afford Moscow an opportunity to offer aid on conditions which might spell the difference between poison and the sword.

It is well to bear in mind that, as I pointed out in my cable No. 116, May 25, 11 a.m., Beck had made it clear during his London conversation that Poland had to consider an anti-aggression policy not only in terms of a possible war with Germany, but also in connection with the maintenance of
of peace on a basis of a balance of power in which Poland might find itself associated with Russia. Moreover, reports continue to reach the Government here that (a) amongst a certain element in the British Cabinet there is still alive some leaning towards an appeasement policy, and (b) that an important element in the "City" consisting of bankers and industrialists are pressing for an economic formula as a solution for Anglo-German differences.

In view of these reports, I am aware that the Polish Government believes it must take into consideration Poland's potential geo-political position in case Britain came to terms with Germany.

In connection with the foregoing, I am aware, as previously reported, that Beck's attitude towards the Anglo-Russian negotiations is characterized by his remark that London had been keeping Warsaw satisfactorily informed of the various stages of negotiations which neither affected Polish interests nor imposed new obligations on Poland. Moreover, Poland settled her political relations with Russia directly on the basis of the Polish-Russian Non-Aggression Pact and the two countries conducted their commercial relations within the scope of the Polish-Russian Trade Agreement.