

● PSF

Poland

1940-42

CONTINUED

COPY

(Longhand notation--"File personal and confidential-have sent books over to house" M.A.LeH)

PSF: Poland

~~France~~

EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Angers, France, April 24, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

As of possible interest to you, I am forwarding you herewith a copy of the Polish "Black Book" (in French), which has just been issued by the Polish Government. The photographs contained give a striking portrayal of the tragic results of the German attack on Poland. (As soon as this book appears in the English language, I shall send you a copy).

At the same time, I am forwarding a copy of the Polish "White Book" containing official documents concerning the Polish-German and Polish Soviet relations from 1933-1939.

In reviewing this book, I find that the reports and observations contained in my own extensive report on the "Polish-German Conflict" which I forwarded to you accompanied by a letter under date of February 3, 1940, supplement and in some cases amplify this official publication of the Polish Government as concerns the period from mid-October 1938 to the close of the Polish-German conflict.

Since this is the case, I thought you might wish to keep these three documents: the "White Book", the "Black Book" and my report, together in your library as representing a fairly complete record of events from all angles.

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I am moreover marking for you in the "White Book" certain documents which to my mind have a vital bearing upon Poland's relations with Germany and I am at the same time attaching to the front cover, a memorandum containing my personal observations on the book.

Faithfully yours,

Tony Biddle, Jr.

Attached to this letter was long carbon copy of T.B's personal observations.

COPY

Embassy of the United States
of America

Paris, February 2, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a record bearing on various aspects of the Polish-German conflict.

As we burned our cable records before leaving Warsaw, I have had to depend for a number of the dates of events, upon personal notes which I took with me.

As this record is necessarily lengthy, I take occasion to draw your attention to the following parts, which I believe may engage your special interest.

1. "Factors contributing to Poland's defeat".
2. "Polish-German conflict and the Embassy's activities".
3. "Military aspects of the Polish-German conflict and lessons to be learned therefrom".
4. "Russian aspect".

With every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully

(Tony Biddle, Jr.)

(Original of this letter put with record.)

*File
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PSE Poland

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direct to house
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In Library

Angers, France, April 24, 1940

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The President

The White House

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Faithfully yours,

Tony Bissac, jr

PSF Poland

[4-24-40]

MEMORANDUM

The following are my personal observations on various aspects of the Polish White Book on Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations from 1933-1939, issued about March 10, 1940.

The diplomatic reports and official documents, contained in this book numerous instances of Herr Hitler and Comrade Stalin's duplicity and bad faith, as well as the insidious methods of Nazi and Comintern diplomacy.

As I have personally covered numerous phases of Poland's relations both with Germany and Russia from about October 16, 1938, to the close of the Polish-German conflict, in my extensive report entitled: "The Polish-German Conflict", forwarded to you in a letter dated February 3, and as the reports and observations contained therein supplement and in some cases amplify the Polish White Book, I feel that reference thereto would be helpful.

Since the Danzig question for so many years constituted a potential powder barrel in Polish-German relations, and since an examination of the documents contained in the Polish White Book reveal that during the months leading up to the outbreak of war, the German Government strove to make a case of Danzig as well as the question of a Highway across Pomorze, I take occasion in the following observations to draw your attention to certain documents both in the Polish White Book, and in my own aforementioned report, which might serve to clarify the record in connection with these particular questions. As regards Poland's attitude concerning its rights in Danzig, a study of the documents

contained

contained in the White Book discloses that Poland had persistently made its position clear to the German Government ever since 1933. In fact, Poland let it be known that she considered Germany's recognition of its rights in Danzig as the test point in Polish-German relations. (See document No. 1 of the Polish White Book).

As long as Herr Hitler was preoccupied with the carrying out of other steps in his program vis-a-vis Central and Eastern Europe, he seemed to admit the Polish point of view. Towards the close of 1937, and in the early part of 1938, Herr Hitler even went so far as to give formal assurances on this subject in his talks with Polish Ambassador to Germany, Lipski, and with Minister Beck, as well as in an address to the Reichstag on February 20, 1938. (See documents 34, 36, 37 - Polish White Book).

Characteristic of the history of German dealings with other countries over the past number of years, Herr Hitler apparently felt that his agreement with Poland had ceased to serve German interests, and, on October 24, several weeks after "Munich", Herr von Ribbentrop raised the question of Danzig's incorporation in the Reich, and of an extra-territorial Highway across Pomerze.

In response, Polish Ambassador Lipski immediately stated that he saw no possibility of agreement as regards the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich (See document No. 44 - Polish White Book).

Discussion

Discussion regarding this point was resumed between Herr von Ribbentrop and Ambassador Lipski on November 19, 1939. By this time, Ambassador Lipski had received instructions from his Government. Accordingly the Ambassador stated that any attempt on Germany's part to incorporate Danzig would inevitably give rise to a conflict between Poland and Germany. Herr von Ribbentrop thereupon led the Ambassador to understand that the foregoing proposals entailed only his personal views. Moreover, he declared himself prepared to re-examine the matter together with Herr Hitler, in the light of Poland's negative attitude. (See document No. 48 - Polish White Book).

Later, Minister Beck visited Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden. (See documents Nos 48 and 49 - Polish White Book, each covering minutes of Minister Beck's conversation with Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop respectively). In the conversation which ensued, Herr Hitler voiced his suggestions in respect to Danzig and a Highway across Pomerze. In response Minister Beck, without however entering deeply into this matter, cautioned Herr Hitler against any delusions he might have entertained as regards the likelihood of accepting his demands. The Minister drew Herr Hitler's attention to the fact that the problem of Danzig was most delicate, that Herr Hitler was in fact making unilateral demands and that Polish public opinion as a whole was profoundly sensitive on this subject.

Following the above conversation with Herr Hitler in
Berchtesgaden

Berchtesgaden, Minister Beck dined with Herr von Ribbentrop in Munich. Taking advantage of this occasion Minister Beck conveyed to Herr von Ribbentrop a precise reply to Herr Hitler's suggestions in regard to Danzig and a Highway across Pomerze. Minister Beck requested Herr von Ribbentrop moreover to repeat to Herr Hitler that he could see no possible chance of agreement on the basis of the German demands, particularly as regards Danzig. (Of further bearing on the above occasion see my report, "Polish-German Conflict", January 5, 1939, pages 1-3 inclusive).

The question of Danzig and a Highway across Pomerze was reopened in late January 1939 on the occasion of Herr von Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw. Minister Beck reiterated in effect what he had told Herr von Ribbentrop in Munich, that is to say, that Poland could not agree to the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich, nor could Poland accept the principle of extra-territoriality for a Highway across Pomerze. (See document No. 53 - Polish White Book).

Again, during the month of March 1939, after having accomplished the partial encirclement of Poland through the seizure of Memel, Bohemia and Slovakia, the German Government pressed the above matter.

Herr von Ribbentrop again raised the question of Danzig's incorporation in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Lipski on March 21. (See document No. 61

Polish

Polish White Book, and for further clarification, see my report "Polish-German Conflict" - "March events and Observations", pages 1 to 4 inclusive to the end of paragraph 11).

In response to the substance of Herr von Ribbentrop's March 21 conversation, the Polish reply contained in document No. 62 of the Polish White Book, was delivered on March 26, in the form of an Aide Memoire, which the Polish Ambassador handed to Herr von Ribbentrop. Therein the Polish Government reaffirmed its negative attitude towards the German suggestion as regards Danzig's incorporation and proposed the opening of negotiations to safeguard Polish German interests.

On April 26, Herr Hitler delivered an address to the Reichstag, wherein he declared that he had made certain proposals to the Polish Government. (See my report on the "Polish-German Conflict" - "April events and Observations", page 1 to page 9, through paragraph 25).

On May 5, Minister Beck delivered an address before the Polish Parliament, elaborating Poland's case in reply to Herr Hitler's address of April 26 to the Reichstag. (See my report on the "Polish-German Conflict" - "May events and Observations", page 1 to page 8 inclusive).

Examination of the aforesaid documents discloses the continuity of the Polish point of view in respect to Poland's vital interests in Danzig. These documents moreover reveal the efforts of the Polish statesmen to leave no doubts in the minds of the German statesmen,

regarding

regarding Poland's point of view.

The following references both in the White Book and in my report on the "Polish-German Conflict" shed light on the question as to whether from Germany's standpoint the issues of Danzig and a Highway across Pomerze constituted the fundamental problem in Polish-German relations. (See my report "Polish-German Conflict" - "May events and Observations", page 5, paragraph 16, to page 8, through paragraph 22).

In connection with these references, I beg to draw attention particularly to paragraphs 16 and 17, wherein respectively Minister Reel told me in effect that he felt Germany's demands for an extra-territorial autostada and railway, had been prompted not by the communications needs of the German citizens, so much as by Berlin's desire to disorganize Poland and other countries neighboring on Germany. The Minister believed moreover, that Herr Hitler's envisaged plan vis-a-vis Poland was far more extensive than his stated claims in respect to Danzig. Indeed, strategic and "lebensraum" considerations had played a larger rôle than racial considerations in Herr Hitler's desire for Danzig's annexation to the Reich. The Minister went on to say that just as the cession of the Sudan area to Germany served to remove the keystone of the dam in Czechoslovakia, so the cession of Danzig and an extra-territorial passageway across Pomerze to a Germany, whose Fuhrer envisaged himself as the sovereign of a pan-Germanic Europe

Europe, would prove, as Herr Hitler obviously intended, the barring of Poland from the Baltic, and Poland's consequent economic suffocation, leading eventually to Poland's undoing as an independent state and throwing her at the mercy of Germany. For Poland, it was not a question of prestige but of keeping open the national economic windpipe.

Further light was shed upon the German attitude vis-a-vis Poland by the remarks of a leading official of the Danzig Senate to me, on the occasion of my early August visit to the Free City. (See my report the "Polish-German Conflict" - "August, final steps of the crisis; a prelude to the German onslaught", page 1, paragraph 4, wherein the Danzig Senate official said in effect that Danzig and the Corridor represented only a part of the whole question in Germany's mind vis-a-vis Poland - there was Upper Silesia as well and even the matter of Poznań. He personally liked some of the Poles he knew and he realized that they regarded the question in the light of Poland's interests, however, the question at issue was a matter of German policy and it would therefore have to be settled on German terms. This statement revealed to my mind the rapidly growing imperialistic attitude on the part of Danzig statesmen, in turn reflecting no doubt, the attitude in Berlin.

FSE
Poland
✓

Youngstown, Ohio
October 22nd, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

Margaret and I are just in the midst of an intensely interesting and enjoyable speaking tour. We have already spoken in 18 cities, in 9 different states. We have studied and tried to appraise the political trend as we have gone along. I can honestly tell you that we are full of confidence.

During our travels in the Middlewestern States we discerned traces of resistance among the farming element and especially among the dairy farming group of Northern Wisconsin. Since our return East we were happy to find that Secretary Wallace is scheduled to devote the greater part of his speaking tour to that section of the country for while we were out there we formed the opinion that a useful counterforce to these symptoms of resistance would be for him to remain in that area until Election. I crossed his trail in several Middlewestern States and was gratified to learn that he was making a splendid impression.

Your speech delivered in Dayton on Columbus Day was simply wonderful. I was in Milwaukee at the time, about to address a meeting of more than three thousand. Previous to my address the meeting listened in to your broadcast and I saw what an instantaneously stimulating effect it had on the crowd. I can assure you that your words went a long way towards countering propaganda which deliberately aims at disgruntling the mothers of the boys called up by the Selective Service Law. The boys themselves during the past two weeks have come to understand more clearly the reason for the law, and the necessity of the training. Consequently the majority of them are joining up with an enlightened frame of mind and a sense of patriotism.

The President

The White House

So - now, it is only the mothers who do the "squawking", and it is in "exploiting this squawk", that the Fifth Column agents as well as the Republican campaigners are vigorously and subtly engaged. As I say, however, your Dayton speech went far towards overcoming these efforts, and I merely mention the foregoing in the thought, that should an opportunity arise again in the future to smoothe down the remaining ruffled hairs of the "squawking mothers", it might be very helpful to reemphasize the point you so masterfully made in your speech.

It may be a source of satisfaction to you to know that there was a Polish-American meeting on the 20th in Wilkesbarre to pay tribute to the memory of Pulaski - hence "non-political" - over 10,000 people attended, and when I mentioned your name, in telling that it was immediately upon the reformation of the new Polish Government on French soil, that you had instructed me to continue as Ambassador - I thought the house would come down !

I am so happy to learn of your decision to speak in Philadelphia on the twenty-third. I want you to know how disappointed I am not to be there. My speaking schedule calls me to Ohio for an address in Bridgeport. However, I am very happy and proud that you will be speaking in my native city, and I shall endeavor to listen in.

With every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Bidderly

THE WHITE HOUSE

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November 13, 1940

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My dear Mr. President:

As I telegraphed you from Chicago, your glorious victory is a source of such deep gratification and satisfaction for Margaret and me that I cannot find words which would fully express our feelings. It is really wonderful - and we are happier than we can describe over the outcome.

I want you to know that your having appointed me to welcome Ignace Paderewski in your behalf, upon his recent arrival, not only touched me deeply but was also a source of profound gratification for all American citizens of Polish extraction throughout this country. Mr. Paderewski asked me to convey to you his gratitude for the honor you thus paid him. At the same time he asked me to thank you from the bottom of his heart for your solicitous inquiries concerning his welfare during his difficult experience in Spain. He says that these inquiries on your part were entirely responsible for his regaining the right to safe conduct to the Port of Lisbon. What is more, this is known to the vast throng of Americans of Polish extraction and I assure you that they share his gratitude.

Having delivered your message of welcome to Mr. Paderewski, Margaret and I took the noon day plane to Chicago, where I delivered a welcoming address to Mr. Paderewski before an audience of 5,000 Polish-Americans at the Chicago Auditorium. In my address I laid great emphasis upon the necessity of unity of thought, aim and action - and I was very pleased when the chairman of the meeting, Dr. Switlik, Dean of the Marquette University, Madison, Wiscon, and head of the Polish-National Council, told me that he was instructing all Polish organizations in the United States to send you telegrams pledging their absolute support in the critical years ahead. I was particularly pleased over his statement since, as Head of the Polish National Council, he is in position to influence every Polish organization in the country.

Margaret

The President

The White House


Margaret and I covered about 45 cities in some 15 states in our speaking tour during the pre-election campaign, and the cross-section of opinion we thus derived, gave us real confidence in your then coming victory. What is more, I am happy to tell you that the great Polish-American community voted for you practically as a solid block. They love you, respect and admire, and are deeply grateful for your continued recognition of the Polish Government, thus bearing out your refusal to recognize territorial gains by force.

I cannot tell you how happy we were to have played some part in the campaign leading up to this grand victory, and I want you to know how proud we are of you and how deeply we value your friendship.

With every good wish for your continued happiness and success, I am

Yours faithfully

Tony Biddegr



The President

Special Delivery - Air Mail

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

Personal: from A.J.D. Biddle

PSF Poland
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter dated September 29, 1941 which I received this morning from the Polish Ambassador relating to the formation of Polish Army units in the Soviet Union and to the extent to which the Soviet Government is granting cultural freedom and freedom of worship to Poles in the Soviet Union.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From Polish Ambassador,
September 29, 1941.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Poland

September 29th, 1941.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I know how interested you are in the development of the efforts of the Polish Government relating to the formation of the Polish Army units in Soviet Russia, as well as in that of Polish-Soviet relations in general on the basis of the agreement signed in London on July 30, 1941, between Poland and the U. S. S. R. by virtue of which normal relations have been renewed between the two countries.

I am very glad to be able to tell you on the basis of information I just received from London that the enthusiasm of the Poles in Russia actively to resume the fight against Hitlerite Germany is so great, that the Polish Army in Russia will be virtually an army of volunteers. Great numbers of Poles of military age apply daily demanding to be enrolled immediately in the Polish Forces, thus swelling the ranks of units which

The Honorable

are

Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State.

are being formed from our regular soldiers who had been interned in Russia.

The Polish Government is confident that it will be able to put in the field very shortly an army of well over 100,000 men, provided they can be supplied with the necessary material and equipment from Great Britain and the United States. I hear that two divisions are already formed and the third is nearing completion.

What will interest you especially, I am sure, is that the U. S. S. R. has granted to our Armed Forces full rights of an independent National Polish Army, giving it likewise the right of opening its own schools, full cultural freedom and freedom of worship for both Christians and Jews. We have already got our own Catholic military chaplains.

Generally speaking, as matters now stand, the Soviet Government is loyally fulfilling all its engagements. The Polish deportees have now obtained their freedom and it is gratifying to note that of the estimated number of one million and a half of

Poles

Poles at present in Russia, those who are physically able and who are not of military age, are anxious to do their share in all kinds of war work in factories and on farms for the common effort. A special Polish Committee has been set up to enable them to do so.

Perhaps the most heartening fact is that a Polish Catholic church is about to be opened in Moscow, as well as a synagogue for Polish Jews, and that the Polish communities in Russia have been allowed by the Soviet Government to institute places of worship and have been given full freedom in this field.

One of the great difficulties is the lack of warm garments and warm underwear, footwear, as well as of medical supplies among the Poles in Russia. Men's clothing is most needed, there being a majority of men among the Polish deportees.

In view of the very kind interest which the President has so graciously shown in all matters relating to Poland and the Polish people, I should regard it as a great favor if you would kindly see
your

- 4 -

your way to convey this information to the President.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the expressions of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum dated December 27, 1941 from the Polish Ambassador, Mr. Ciechanowski, containing information regarding the formation of a Polish Armed Force in Russia and requesting under instructions of Prime Minister Sikorski that consideration be given to insuring Poland a place equal to that of Russia and China in any alignment of Allied or Associated Powers.

Mr. Ciechanowski has been informed that a copy of this memorandum has been brought to your attention as requested by him.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From Polish Ambassador,
December 27, 1941.

The President,
The White House.

MEMORANDUM

12-27-41

The Polish Ambassador has received through the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, a telegram from Prime Minister General Sikorski dated Teheran, December 19th. In this telegram General Sikorski informs the Polish Ambassador that:

Six divisions of Polish troops are being at present formed in Russia and will be transferred to Southern Turkestan. These troops should be reconditioned, trained and ready by June 1942. General Sikorski foresees that a great German offensive will be launched on the Eastern European Front about that time. The readiness of the above mentioned Polish forces will depend on their timely equipment and armament, the speeding up of which therefore is very urgent.

Apart from these six divisions, 25,000 Polish soldiers are being evacuated from Russia to the British Empire as well as a certain number of Polish airmen and sailors.

The

The Polish civilian population in Russia is likewise being concentrated in the South. One must reckon with famine in the Spring of 1942, - which however will not affect the Soviet Army or Administration who have food reserves prepared along the Trans-Siberian Railway Line. Famine will undoubtedly affect the civilian population and especially the Polish deportees. The Polish Government is faced by the urgent task of organizing relief for this population and counts on the support of Great Britain and of the United States.

In view of the Conference about to open in Washington, General Sikorski has likewise asked Prime Minister Churchill to take into consideration the position of Poland as an Ally of Great Britain, the part played by the Polish Nation through its indomitable resistance to the invader and its effective subversive warfare, the part which the Polish Armed Forces, the Polish Airforce and Navy are taking in the war for the common Allied cause, - and to insure for

Poland

Poland in the new alignment of Allied or Associated Powers with the United States, a place equal to that of Soviet Russia and China. General Sikorski stresses the fact that the latest agreement which he has brought about between Poland and the U. S. S. R. (Polish-Soviet Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed by Prime Minister General Sikorski and Prime Minister Stalin on December 4, 1941), appears to him fully to justify his request regarding Poland's position in the Association of Nations about to be concluded, considering that this Polish-Soviet agreement has eliminated many of the hitherto existing difficulties in the good relations between those two countries.

General Sikorski has instructed the Polish Ambassador in Washington to bring the above considerations to the knowledge of the Secretary of State and to request him to convey them to The President.

Washington, December 27th, 1941.

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 Vol. III Europe

Page 139

*(Welles letter printed.
Attachment not printed.)*

S.W. Poland - 1942
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April 14, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a memorandum handed me today by the Polish Ambassador in accordance with instructions he had received today from General Sikorski.

With regard to the request of General Sikorski set forth on page 6 of this memorandum, I stated to the Ambassador that, in my judgment, you had already made known to the British Government in the clearest terms the views of the Government of the United States in regard to this question, and that it seemed to me there was nothing you could add at this time to the views you had already expressed. I added, however, that if you desired me to communicate any further or additional message to General Sikorski with regard to this point, I would let the Ambassador know.

With regard to the last point mentioned in this memorandum, I have already sent a cable tonight to our Embassy in London suggesting to General Marshall that he have a conference with General Sikorski.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

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x48

MEMORANDUM

Prime Minister General Sikorski cabled the following information to the Polish Ambassador asking him to communicate it personally to Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles and to request him to bring it to the attention of The President:

I - General Sikorski communicates on April 13th that according to the latest reports received by him, the following number of Polish military and civilians have already been evacuated from Soviet Russia to Iran:

Military	30,030
Civilian population	12,619
Boy Scouts - about	100
Women incorporated in Women's Auxiliary Formation	1,150

The General has been informed by the Polish Ambassador in Russia that further evacuation and recruiting to the Polish Armed Forces in Soviet Russia has been suddenly stopped by the

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Soviet

Soviet authorities. Difficulty of transport was advanced as the pretext for this order. At the same time the Soviet authorities have alleged that the evacuated Poles have been guilty of anti-Soviet agitation and of depreciating Soviet currency through valuta transactions in Iran.

General Sikorski issued very stringent instructions to prevent any such acts. At the same time he expresses the opinion that the Soviet accusations are unfounded, since in all the reports in his possession the perfect discipline and excellent spirit of the evacuees is stressed. General Sikorski has instructed the Polish Foreign Office to hand a personal message from him to Premier Stalin through the Soviet Ambassador to Poland Bogomolow in this matter.

II - Secretary Eden informed Minister Raczynski that the British Government would start negotiations

with

with the Soviet Government on April 13th in view of reaching an agreement regarding Soviet demands. He promised to keep the Polish Government informed about the development of these negotiations.

According to Secretary Eden, these negotiations will not include the Polish territory, but they will tend to ensure the participation of Great Britain in eventual Polish-Soviet discussions at a later date. Secretary Eden said that he foresees that the present negotiations would last several weeks and that they will probably lead to an agreement which will be signed with Molotow in London.

Secretary Eden said that the U. S. Government was informed that the negotiations would take place and that, while not sharing the view of the British Government regarding the necessity of an agreement, the U. S. Government had raised no

objections

objections against such a decision being taken independently by Great Britain.

General Sikorski has protested to the British Government against these negotiations and the conclusion of any special agreement with Soviet Russia, and has sent a memorandum to Secretary Eden, the gist of which is as follows:

- 1) The Polish Prime Minister much regrets that, notwithstanding his conversations with Premier Churchill and members of the British Government before his journey to the U.S.A., and notwithstanding his arguments contained in the confidential Aide-Mémoire presented by the Polish Government to the British Government on March 27th, - the British Government has decided to undertake at this time negotiations with the Soviet Government concerning the organization of the European continent after the war;
- 2) The Polish Government is of the opinion that any agreement or understanding which might take place at present between Great Britain and Soviet Russia

on this subject could in no way contribute to the strengthening of the war effort of the United Nations. On the contrary, by undermining confidence in publicly declared principles, it would inevitably result in weakening the will to carry on the uncompromising fight so indispensable at this stage of this total war in the ranks of the armies of the United Nations and of the populations of the countries occupied and oppressed by the enemy;

- 3) The Polish Government reminds the British Government that it has repeatedly emphatically stated and lastly stressed in its Aide-Mémoire of March 27th that, apart from her territorial integrity, Poland has in Eastern Europe interests which have a vital bearing on her independent existence. Poland is thus directly interested in all matters pertaining to Bukowina and Lithuania. As regards the latter, Poland and Great Britain are bound by treaty obligations. Poland has defined its point of view on these two problems in its Aide-Mémoire of

March

March 27th, and now desires to stress once more that these matters cannot be settled without Polish participation and consent.

General Sikorski asked the Polish Ambassador confidentially to communicate the foregoing to Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles and to ask for the support of the U. S. Government in London of the views expressed by the Polish Government to the British Government on this subject, in accordance with the attitude of the U. S. Government communicated to General Sikorski by Acting Secretary Sumner Welles on March 25th in Washington.

III - General Sikorski has prepared a memorandum for Prime Minister Churchill on the necessity of opening another European front and of immediate preparations preliminary to offensive action. As a first step General Sikorski stresses in this memorandum the necessity of instituting a Joint Allied General Staff. General Sikorski inquires whether the

Secretary

Secretary would like to have a copy of this last mentioned memorandum.

At the same time General Sikorski is ready to discuss his views on operational matters with General Marshall in compliance with the wish expressed by The President. If this meets with the approval of The President, General Sikorski would be grateful if General Marshall could be informed accordingly.

Washington, D. C., April 13, 1942.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1942

My dear Mr. President;


I am enclosing for your information a memorandum left with me this morning by the Polish Ambassador.

I have made it clear to the Ambassador that this Government did not find it possible to go any further along the lines of the suggestion contained in point I of the memorandum.

The question to which reference is made in point IV of the memorandum is settled in principle and the arrangement will be concluded within the next few days.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:
Secret memorandum
from Polish Ambassador,
April 18, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

MEMORANDUM

I - The Polish Ambassador received cable information from Count Raczyński dated April 16th, to the effect that on April 15th Prime Minister General Sikorski and Count Raczyński had a detailed conversation with Foreign Secretary Eden and his collaborators at the British Foreign Office. It was learned from this conversation that a British proposal for a political pact between Great Britain and the USSR. had been presented in Moscow. This proposal suggests among other details a "recognition by Great Britain of the tendency on the part of Soviet Russia to regain her frontier of 1940". Apparently a special formula is to exclude from this pact the question of the frontiers of Poland.

In the frank discussion which followed, General Sikorski and Count Raczyński emphatically protested against the conclusion of any agreement at the cost of the independence of small and weak States, which, in the opinion of the Polish Government, would also be contrary to Allied interests.

The discussion unfortunately did not in any way help to convince Mr. Eden or make him change his opinion. The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is anxious that the matter should be regarded as confidential and that it should not be discussed while - as he said - "we (Great Britain) are negotiating with the Soviets prior to the access to such negotiations of the United States".

General Sikorski and Count Raczynski had the impression that at this stage of the proceedings Mr. Eden was most anxious to avoid anything which would bring about censure of, or dissociation from, an eventual British-Soviet agreement on the part of the United States.

In view of this attitude of the British Foreign Secretary General Sikorski believes that a renewed pressure could still be effectively brought to bear by the U. S. Government to prevent the conclusion of an agreement which would be so inopportune and which might seriously affect Allied unity.

It is expected in London that Messrs. Molotow and Pawlow will shortly arrive in the British Capital.

II. - General Sikorski informed the Polish Ambassador that he had had a conversation with General Marshall and also a detailed conversation with Mr. Harriman. The General handed to General Marshall his memorandum on the preparations for a future offensive, on the establishment of a second Allied front in Europe and on the necessity of setting up of a restricted Joint General Staff whose exclusive duty it would be to work out these problems.

III. - General Sikorski interprets the entry of Laval into the French Government as a proof of the final capitulation of Marshal Pétain and as the proof of the decision for full collaboration between the Vichy Government and the Germans. General Sikorski expressed the opinion that the early recall of the U. S. Ambassador from Vichy might make a strong impression in France and result in rallying a considerable number of patriotic Frenchmen against such collaboration. He thinks that the Laval Government will inevitably shortly be forced by German pressure to take the initiative in bringing about a rupture of relations between

France and the U. S. A.

IV. - Referring to his conversation with Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles on March 25th, General Sikorski requested the Polish Ambassador to ask the Secretary if he could see his way to hasten the payment of the sum of five million dollars on account of the credit granted to the Polish Government for special purposes of Poland's war effort. General Sikorski would be particularly grateful if this could be done in view of the fact that in the course of the last month the Polish Government has been forced to meet heavy expenditures connected with activities in Poland and with the evacuation of Polish military and civilians from Soviet Russia to Iran.

Washington, April 18th, 1942.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1942


Russia
Folder
file
Personal
Confidential

My dear Mr. President:

Sir Ronald Campbell came to see me this afternoon and, by instruction of his Government, asked that I send you the attached copy of a telegram received by the British Embassy from the British Foreign Office relating to the treaty recently signed by the British and Soviet Governments.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.

Substance of a telegram from the
Foreign Office to Lord Halifax dated May 29th.

It will be seen that it has been possible to avoid dealing in the Treaty with the whole subject of the Soviet claim to the Baltic States and their presumed designs in respect of Finland and Roumania. There is thus no question of the Treaty being in conflict with the Atlantic Charter. On the contrary, the preamble states the intention that post-war collaboration shall be on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, while the two principles enunciated in the Charter of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States are reaffirmed in Article 5 of the Treaty.

Collaboration with the United Nations is covered in paragraph 4 of the preamble, and in the second sentence of Article 5 of the Treaty.

As regards provisions for mutual assistance, these are confined to the case of renewed aggression by Germany and her associates. It is to be observed that the desire of the two parties to unite with other like minded States in adopting a post-war security system is covered in Article 3, and that the mutual assistance proposal lapses on the agreement of both parties that they are superseded by the adoption of such a system. It might conceivably be objected that

under/

under paragraph 2 of Article 4 the U.S.S.R. would be in a position to insist on the continuance of the mutual assistance provision after the general security system is agreed upon, by arguing that the latter does not supersede the former. The answer to this argument is that it is unlikely that any general security system in Europe would be of much practical value if the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom did not both participate and were not both satisfied that the system was adequate.

It may be argued that the words in Article 5 to the effect that the two parties will have "regard to the interests of the security" of each party could be used by the Soviet Government to reassert their claims to recover their 1941 frontiers and to control Finland and Roumania. It may be that the Soviet Government will in any case reassert their claims sooner or later, but it is important to note that these claims are not specified or recognised by implication in the present Treaty. The British Government are not pledged to do more than have regard to the Soviet Union's security interests in general if these are put forward by the Soviet Government after the re-establishment of peace; and even so, this pledge must be read in relation to the other undertakings assumed by both parties in Article 5.

In general, it can be claimed that this Treaty

(a) brings the U.S.S.R. closer to the United Kingdom in prosecuting the war in Europe up to the final victory,

(b)/

(b) provides for collaboration of the most effective kind to prevent a repetition of aggression by Germany and her associates in Europe pending the setting up of a more general security system. The Treaty thus provides for the establishment of the first condition on which the effective economic reconstruction of Europe after the war depends.

(c) brings Russia finally into the circle of the United Nations not only in regard to the organisation of security but also in respect of economic reconstruction, and

(d) by the second sentence of Article 5, the interests of other States are not only affected but actually safeguarded.

The British Government have tried in these negotiations to increase Soviet confidence in their sincerity and at the same time to dispel the suspicions of neutral and allied States in regard to their collaboration with the Soviet Union. If this aim is achieved, results which may be of importance not only during the war but in the post-war period should have been obtained.

Please take appropriate steps to bring the foregoing points to the notice of the President and the State Department.

.

Poland Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CORDELL HULL

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Letter to the Pres. from Prime Minister
Sikorski of Poland 6/22/42 re the new
wave of terrorism in Poland.

June 22nd, 1942.

Mr. President,

I have the honor to submit to you the following urgent matter.

A new wave of indescribable terrorism is spreading in German-occupied Poland regardless of all protests collectively voiced by the Governments of the occupied countries. This terrorism is manifested by mass arrests, mass executions like that which recently took place in Warsaw, and the compulsory recruiting of Poles for the German army and auxiliary military service, in flagrant violation of international law.

Undoubtedly such methods are part of Germany's war tactics. The Germans are out to break the spirit of resistance of the subjugated population and prove to them that further resistance to the German rule is useless. At the same time the German military authorities of occupation are desirous to create the illusion that some at least among the oppressed population are willing to serve under their colors.

The longer the war lasts, the greater Germany's difficulties, the more barbaric are the methods of extermination applied by Germany in Poland. The present system obviously aims at the extermination of the Polish nation.

In

The President,

The White House.

In view of this appalling situation and of the fact that the Hitler régime has always steadily disregarded international law, I venture to suggest that it is indeed urgent that in your conversations with Prime Minister Winston Churchill you would kindly consider means for the application of retaliatory measures.

May I suggest the following measures:

- 1) That the Inter-Allied Declaration of January 13, 1942, signed at St. James' Palace, London, by the Representatives of nine countries under Axis occupation, should be adopted by the United States and Great Britain;
- 2) that stringent measures be taken in regard to property of German nationals;
- 3) that drastic measures be applied to German citizens residing in the Allied countries, who, though considered enemy aliens, are enjoying full freedom and whose daily life in fact did not undergo any marked change since the beginning of the war;
- 4) that bombing on a large scale of non-military objectives in Germany, should be undertaken in retaliation for German savagery. This would undoubtedly restrain

the

the Germans from pursuing their present policy of terrorism.

Since all protests and threats of possible future retaliation have hitherto remained without effect upon the Germans, it seems that the point has been reached when the United Nations should show their determination to stop the German atrocities by every possible means at their disposal. Strict adherence by the United Nations to the rules of international law has unfortunately always been interpreted by the Germans as a sign of weakness. It appears to be indispensable that the United Nations, in their dealings with Germany should now show their solidarity in action and their firm determination to carry out their warnings of retaliation.

Signed:

GENERAL W. SIKORSKI

Prime Minister of Poland.

Signed original of this letter sent to
Hon. Sumner Wells for delivery
7/6/42
hm

PSF 4
Poland Folder

July 3, 1942

My dear General Sikorski:

I have received your letter of June 22, 1942 concerning the new wave of terrorism which has been let loose by the Germans over Poland. In this connection you suggest various measures in retaliation, as for example the adoption by the United States and Great Britain of the declaration condemning acts of violence committed in occupied countries, which was signed in London on January 13 of this year by representatives of nine countries under Axis occupation; stringent measures against the property of German nationals; and drastic measures against German citizens residing in territory under the control of the United Nations.

The terrible suffering to which the inhabitants of Axis-occupied countries are subjected is a matter of constant and extreme concern to us. The victims of the utterly heartless and barbaric acts of the Axis authorities can unfortunately, as you know, be entirely safe from these recurring cruelties only when the military might of the Axis powers has been thoroughly crushed. It is to the most effective prosecution of the war itself that our united efforts must primarily be devoted. That is the most effective way of bringing relief to these unfortunate people. I do, however, agree with you that meanwhile other measures should be used with a view to bringing home to the perpetrators of these shocking acts the enormity of their crimes. With this end in view I issued a statement, with which you are familiar, as early as October 25, 1941 condemning the practice of executing innocent hostages, and more recently, with special emphasis on the new wave of terrorism as

revealed

General Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.

revealed in the complete demolition of the village of Lidice, Mr. Hull issued a strongly-worded, condemnatory statement. A copy of this statement, which is dated June 12, 1942, is enclosed for your convenience.

Besides condemning the terroristic acts of the Axis powers publicly and forcefully whenever it appears that such action would be particularly effective, we are strictly applying our laws and regulations pertaining to enemy property and to enemy aliens. These laws and regulations as applied are, I believe, proving effective in depriving the enemy of the use of property which would be of great assistance to him in carrying on the war and effective in completely circumscribing potentially dangerous movements of enemy aliens.

Although the people of the United States are deeply incensed at the barbaric treatment which the Nazis are meting out, contrary to the tenets of international law and in violation of all the principles of humanity upon which our civilization has been based, to the inhabitants of territory over which they have gained control, I am nevertheless convinced that they are as yet not prepared to resort to such measures as the indiscriminate bombing of the civilian population of enemy countries or to the meting out of such treatment to innocent enemy aliens in the United States.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

✓ Enclosure!

Press release,
June 12, 1942.

PsF Poland

P
Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 12, 1942
No. 288

*File
Copy*

Reports that Hitler has demolished the village of Lidice, slaughtered every male inhabitant thereof, incarcerated every woman in a concentration camp, and sent the children to institutions, today called forth the following statement by the Secretary of State:

"This latest example of mass terrorization through wanton butchery of hostages and brutal torture of innocent women and children has shocked and outraged humanity. Savage tribes at times followed such vile practices, but quickly turned away from them as being so utterly inhuman and beastly as to be unworthy even of savages. I am not surprised that Hitler has revived this unspeakable relic of the darkest periods of history. His act is in thorough keeping with all that he represents."

* * *

AMBASADA
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ

PSF Poland

June 22nd, 1942.

Mr. President,

I have the honor to submit to you the following urgent matter.

A new wave of indescribable terrorism is spreading in German-occupied Poland regardless of all protests collectively voiced by the Governments of the occupied countries. This terrorism is manifested by mass arrests, mass executions like that which recently took place in Warsaw, and the compulsory recruiting of Poles for the German army and auxiliary military service, in flagrant violation of international law.

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In

The President,

The White House.

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Signed:

GENERAL W. SIKORSKI

Prime Minister of Poland.

PSF Poland


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 3. 1942

My dear Mr. President:

There is attached a draft reply to General Sikorski's letter of June 22nd. If you should approve the draft and have it returned to us we shall see that the letter is handed to General Sikorski by Ambassador Biddle.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. Draft letter to General Sikorski.
2. From General Sikorski June 22nd, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

PSF

Poland Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., Near
the Polish Government, London, 6/19/42, to the
President, enclosing letter addressed to the
President by General Sikorski, 6/17/42, with
attached 9 photographs received from General Anders
in Russia of Polish children mentioned in General
Sikorski's letter.

near the Polish Government.

LONDON, June 19, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

It would have done you good to have heard General Sikorski's account of the warm, friendly welcome which you accorded him on his visit to Washington, and his expression of admiration and appreciation of your deep understanding of world affairs and your unswerving determination to uphold the principles of justice. He was truly touched by your kind consideration of him. He had left here a depressed apprehensive man and came back with a fresh outlook and reinvigorated by his visit with you.

As you may imagine the Anglo-Russian Agreement in its concluded form is for him a source of relief and satisfaction.

I

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.

I have just forwarded a detailed report on the General's and his associates' reactions to various aspects of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.


I want you to know how profoundly I admire the magnificent way in which you handled and eventually brought about a satisfactory conclusion of Anglo-Russian negotiations. You have again made a vivid chapter in world history.

The General has just asked to forward you the attached letter and photographs; these, he said, he had just received from General Anders in Russia - they were taken of some of the Polish children which he mentions in his letter to you.

With warmest regards and every good wish, I am
Yours faithfully,

A.J.Drexel Biddle Jr.

AJDBJr:JS.



July 23, 1942

Dear Tony:

I appreciated very much receiving your letter of June 19 enclosing a letter to me from General Sikorski concerning his reactions to the Anglo-Soviet Agreement and his ideas as to how this Agreement might be implemented by the solution of certain Polish-Soviet problems. I read General Sikorski's letter with great interest and enclose herewith my reply for delivery to him.

I was particularly gratified to learn that General Sikorski was pleased with the results of his visit to the United States.

With every good wish, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
 Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
 American Ambassador to Poland,
 Care of American Embassy,
 London.

*Signed original of the letter with enclosed
 signed letter to Gen. Sikorski sent to
 Hon. Sumner Wells for delivery.
 hm*

July 23, 1942

My dear General Sikorski:

I have received your letter of June 17, 1942 expressing your approval of the British-Soviet Agreement and pointing out that in your opinion the letter and spirit of that Agreement might be implemented by the successful settlement of certain outstanding problems dealing with the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

I fully appreciate your desire, in the interests of the common war effort, to find a solution to these problems which will contribute to the attainment of ultimate victory and sincerely hope that the negotiations now being carried on between the representatives of the Polish and Soviet Governments will have constructive results.

I understand that Admiral Standley has on several occasions expressed to the Soviet authorities the hope that these negotiations may be successfully concluded to the mutual benefit of both countries, and it is my hope that as members of the United Nations the Soviet Union and Poland, both of which have already made such tremendous sacrifices in the interests of the common cause, will exert every effort to arrive at complete and satisfactory understanding with regard to these problems.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency
General Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.

PSF Poland

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


July 23. 1942

My dear Mr. President:

There are attached draft replies to Ambassador Biddle's letter of June 19 and General Sikorski's letter of June 17, 1942 which was forwarded under cover of the Ambassador's letter.

If you should approve these drafts and return them to us, we shall see that they are dispatched to the Ambassador and General Sikorski.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

Draft replies.

The President,
The White House.

2 signatures

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 7/14

ADDRESSED TO

THE PRESIDENT

USE AIRMAIL
POST OFFICE
DATE
RECEIVED BY
SUBJECT OF LETTER

URGENT

DELIVER BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Hermit - Rlt

RAF Poland
9/12/42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Yes -- and preferably in
the first half of December.

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary
of State, 10/10/42, to the President, advising
that he has informed the Polish Ambassador that
the President would be glad to receive
General Sikorski in Washington between January
5 and the end of that month. General Sikorski
feels it is highly important he should discuss
with the President certain matters in the
beginning of December. Copy of letter retained
for our files.

Poland folder 1942
1-42

file

October 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your instructions, I informed the Polish Ambassador that you would be glad to receive General Sikorski in Washington between January 5 and the end of that month. The Ambassador assured me that this would be entirely agreeable to his Prime Minister.

I have today received word from the Ambassador that General Sikorski feels that some of the matters connected with the phase which the war is now entering and which he feels it is highly important he should discuss with you would have to be discussed in the beginning of December because if their discussion "were to be put off until January, it would be too late for the preparation of certain operations".

Apparently Ambassador Biddle informed General Sikorski that you would be willing to receive him in December, after he had been notified that you could

The President,

The White House.

-2-

not receive him in October as he originally asked.

Will you let me know whether, in view of this message now received from General Sikorski, it would be possible for you to receive him in December instead of in January?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

[10-16 to 11-10-42] Poland folder
1-42

*file
personal*

PSF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPUBLIC OF POLAND
PRIME MINISTER

STRATTON HOUSE,
STRATTON STREET,
W. I.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION.

In spite of carefully prepared positions, the German and Italian resistance broke down under the attack of the VIII-th Army in Libya. The ultimate defeat of General Rommel's forces appears certain. Owing to the diminishing resisting power of the German armies this success will be repeated on other fronts wherever the spirit of initiative is supported by efficient leadership and the latest military weapons. Although Russia is persisting in her stubborn defence with such great determination, it is unlikely that similar success will be achieved there.

The most important factor rightly applied by the Americans and the British in North Africa on November 8th, was that of surprise. In planning the further course of the war this factor must play a great part. Hitler may attempt to annihilate the countries under his control before he himself is defeated. It will, therefore, become increasingly imperative in the future to co-ordinate efforts which must march hand in hand with speed and surprise, applied by the Allies with the same deadly logic as it is by the Germans.

The President
of the United States of America.

I. Results achieved by the Germans in 1942.

During 1942, the German campaign in the East no longer showed the same drive. Begun rather late, probably on account of transport difficulties, it was slowed down by the Russian counter-attack on Kharkov.

The sequence of German effort /first Kerch, then Sebastopol and, ultimately, the onslaught on Voronez, the Caucasus and Stalingrad/ as well as the restricted front of the attack indicate a drop in German offensive possibilities, as compared with last year's.

Had the German offensive followed, as previously, a lightning course, the Germans might have reached the Volga in the region of Stalingrad in order subsequently to attack Moscow from the rear or to capture the whole of the Caucasus. From the Caucasus they might have developed at a later time an offensive against the Middle East. The Germans failed to achieve these objectives.

Russia managed to save her armies but, by losing her most important industrial region on the Don, her most fertile agricultural areas in the Ukraine and Kuban, and by allowing her vital southern route of supplies for war material and petrol to be partially cut off, has distinctly lowered her war potential and weakened dangerously her national economy. She is now restricted to the output of her two remaining industrial bases: that of Moscow and of the Ural. The food situation has accordingly worsened. It is likely, however, that with material support of the Allies Russia will endure the coming winter and will be ready by the spring of 1943 to continue her defence. She may even manifest some activity during the winter months by taking advantage of being better prepared than the Germans for campaigning in the severe climate. The Germans are afraid of the Russian forces concentrated in the northern and central sectors of the front, which the Germans had not succeeded in drawing southwards while attacking Stalingrad.

In the second theatre of operations, i.e. in Lybia the superiority of the Axis is finished. The Germans have failed to shake the vital Allied centre, the Middle East - a result which might have been achieved by successful drives from the Suez and from the Caucasus.

The slowing up of the tempo and drive of German operations during the current year was accompanied by the weakening of their position in the air. The Allies profiting by this fact staged a series of large-scale raids, which lowered the war production of the Third Reich and shook the self-confidence of the German people, intoxicated by victories gained so far.

It should be remembered, however, that the Germans have maintained throughout the year a complete freedom of operations on their internal lines against any one adversary.

II. What are the further possibilities of German action.

It is unlikely that the Germans will develop extensive winter operations in Russia in the near future as this would involve too heavy losses. One should not, however, exclude the possibility of a number of surprise moves and attacks with limited objectives as their aim. It is difficult to take seriously Russian declarations concerning their counter-attack of a decisive importance.

On the Russian front, therefore, it may be expected that the Red Army will continue to bind the major part of the German forces. The transfer of these forces to the West and South can now be observed after the defeat of Rommel's army and the Allied attack on North Africa.

For the moment, the Germans have replied to this attack by occupying the so-called "free" part of France and her Mediterranean ports, sharing the booty with Italy. This should at last rouse the French people. The occupation of France might be a preliminary step to further operations. The Allies should therefore follow carefully developments in Spain, as an occupation of that country together with her ports, the Balearic Islands and her African possessions, would be of capital importance to Germany.

The second alternative would be an attack on Turkey in order to oust her from the Balkan Peninsula so as to deprive the Allies of their possible debouches to the Balkans.

Both actions, in Spain as well as in Turkey, would probably encounter armed resistance and would prove beyond Hitler's possibilities.

What will be the German operational plan for 1943.

1/ Germany on the offensive.

It is doubtful whether in the spring of 1943, the Germans will attempt for the third time an offensive operation against Russia, though limited in time and space, in order to force a decision in this theatre of war. Their aims in the East will remain the same, i.e. the occupation of Baku, the capture of Moscow, Leningrad and the cutting off of the northern supply route in the region of Vologda. Should they try to realize these aims, they would do so in succession. We may assume as certain that powerful German offensives, undertaken simultaneously in several operational directions, are a thing of the past. In addition each further move which draws the German armies further east, elongates their lines of communication which are an essential factor in Hitler's game, based on internal lines, in a manner increasingly dangerous to them.

After the German defeat in Lybia, it is unlikely that the Germans may present serious danger in the Middle East in 1943; an attack on Iran - Iraq, directed from the Caucasus alone would prove too risky considering that Russia remains undefeated.

An invasion of Great Britain appears improbable to-day, owing to the German loss of air supremacy and the great strength of British defences. Caution, however, dictates taking into account this eventuality.

2/ Germany on the defensive.

Should Hitler and his Staff reach the conclusion that a total German victory is definitely impossible and that it cannot be achieved by further offensive operations, he may decide to pass to the defensive on all fronts on the Continent, adapted for the purpose and adequately consolidated.

In passing to the defensive the Germans would endeavour to create such conditions as would convince the Allies that further bloodshed in a protracted war is useless. This would be used as an inducement to the Allies to suspend military operations and to seek a compromise peace based on international agreement.

German propaganda will then do its utmost to convince public opinion in the Allied countries that this solution only can save western civilization - presumably defended by the Germans. By using the bogey of a Bolshevized Europe the Germans will simultaneously attempt to find, at all costs, supporters of the "New Order" in the Pan-Europa under their rule.

What methods are the Germans likely to use
in order to achieve this aim.

1. Their first objective will be to prevent the Allies from attacking on two fronts. To-day this is no longer possible. This purpose may have been achieved on condition that the Allies were ousted from the Mediterranean and the Middle East and that Russia's military power was broken in 1943 - this now appears totally unlikely.
2. A switching over to the defensive, with a possible shortening of the eastern front, would allow the Germans to organize the exploitation of the captured "Lebensraum", which would cover all the requirements of a long war, by supplying them with Russian wheat, coal, iron and, partly, petrol. In this manner they intend to exploit the factor of time, which at present is working against the Axis.

The tremendous German investment in the territories captured from Russia, precludes any chances of a compromise peace between the Third Reich and Soviet Russia. Hitler cannot give up the raw materials and agricultural produce of the Ukraine already largely reorganized by the Germans - neither can Stalin cede these territories to Germany without condemning the people of Great Russia to a permanent famine.

The interruption of intensive offensive operations will reduce the losses and the wear and tear of war equipment; this would allow the Germans to master the approaching crisis in manpower in the German army and to improve German transport conditions.

3. By withdrawing from the eastern front considerable forces of first class fighting value /approximately 50 divisions/ and transferring them to the West and to the centre of the Reich, the Germans would be able to create good defensive conditions, especially in the West. This would be an important argument

demonstrating to the Allies the hopelessness of seeking a decision in this war by attacking Germany from the West. The Germans would endeavour to spread and deepen this feeling of despondency among the Allies by severe submarine warfare and the destruction of shipping.

4. In order to lower the hopes of the Allied nations in the efficacy of their air operations over Germany, the Germans may concentrate the Luftwaffe in mass attacks against Great Britain. In spite of extensive war weariness, one should reckon with serious German air attacks on Great Britain even during the approaching winter and this in spite of the extended range of the Luftwaffe's operations caused by the African offensive. If there are no decisive operational moves on the part of the Allies the Germans, by extending the war into one of mutual attrition, will do their utmost to achieve a so-called compromise peace.

Considerable assistance in achieving this aim would be provided if the attention of the U.S.A. could be distracted from Europe to the Pacific. Here Japan can play an important role and particularly as she is most successful in her own methods of warfare. In my opinion, Japan's aggression against Russia would not be justified from an operational point of view. It is more likely that her activities will be concentrated on containing the Allied forces in the Pacific which are already seriously engaged in this part of the world. Moreover, the maintenance of "neutral" relations with Russia may serve Japanese political interests in the future.

Finally it should be stated that the danger of a new campaign in Russia, the air-raids on German cities and the Allied offensives in North Africa favour the apparently increasing development of opposition not only within Germany but also fosters it in satellite countries such as Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and, above all in Italy. Information I am receiving from various quarters, and especially from Rome, indicates the acute internal crisis threatening Italy. One of the main tasks of the Allies in their struggle for victory is now to increase this state of mind and to exploit it methodically.

III. The Allied plan of action - Estimate of possibilities.

The thesis that a long protraction of the war will eventually lead to the exhaustion of German resources and that victory can be won without decisive and aggressive operations is not to be contemplated under any conditions. This thesis is rejected by the Allies and by statesmen who are responsible for conducting the war. To think otherwise would be to commit a capital blunder which would give us now, as it did in the last war, a half-hearted victory fruitless in its ultimate consequences. It should be borne in mind, therefore, that no air activity, conducted even on the largest scale, or any speculation as to the breakdown of the morale of the war-weary German people can deviate the Allies from an attack with all the forces at their disposal against the heart of Germany.

Mass air-raids on Germany and Italy bring about dire results for the Axis. They should be continued with utmost energy, but they should be regarded as a mere preparation for the actual decisive offensive. It is quite possible that the Germans will suddenly realize the danger of such an offensive, the results of which they will be unable to master, and may have recourse to some political subterfuge in order to find a way of escape.

Should they succeed in this the most terrible war in history would be lost and the boundless sacrifices of the nations which rose in arms against the Germans would be wasted. The peace following it would again be a mere armistice, possibly shorter than the last one.

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The Germans are doing their utmost to lower the resistance of the oppressed peoples by impressing on them the futility of the unending struggle. Highly significant moves of this kind may be observed even in Poland.

Judging the situation from this point of view, quickening up the tempo of the war should be regarded by the Allies as an imperative necessity.

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Where and when to attack.

There will be two main concentrations of the German armies - one in the east, the other in the west. To penetrate between them, separate them and defeat them separately, one after the other appears to be the right guiding principle, particularly if we consider the relative strength of the Allies and Germany in 1943. The opportunity to realize this will exist so long as there are two fronts, and for this reason the time when this attack takes place will be of particular importance for the outcome of these operations.

The separation of the German forces can be achieved from two directions:

- from the north: through the North Sea, via Hamburg, in the direction of Berlin,
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The northern direction may yield great results. It is directed at the very heart of Germany and it permits the Allies to avoid the two main defensive barriers offered by the Rhine and the Siegfried Line. At the same time it would provide a decisive blow against the whole German system of occupation.

There are two essential difficulties which render doubtful the practicability of this strategy. One of them is the large amount of shipping necessary to cover the considerable distance by sea, the other is the distance from air bases which renders difficult, or even impossible, the support of fighter aircraft, the range of which is so far inadequate. Both these difficulties are even more obvious when compared with the facility with which the Germans can concentrate their forces for battle in this direction, and in view of the fact that German A.A. defence in these regions is the strongest. The Allies would, therefore, be forced to engage considerable air and naval forces in order to obtain the necessary ascendancy.

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The first objective could be achieved by an attack on northern France and Belgium, the second objective - either by an earlier occupation of southern Norway, which might involve considerable losses, or by a combined naval and air operation directed against the German naval bases and aerodromes in Norway.

The southern direction via Italy, viewed as a road to Germany, is long and the terrain will remain difficult, for two barriers would have to be overcome, i.e. the sea and the debouches from northern Lombardy to central Europe.

The other road from the south leads through the Balkans. Operations organized here, and provided with well-developed bases in the Middle East, will bring the Allies to the Rumanian oil fields, which are vital to the German interests, and the capture of which would deprive the Germans of one of their main assets in their arguments concerning their alleged invincibility. Even comparatively small forces used in this route, which would pass through Allied countries, such as Greece and Yugoslavia, or through countries quarreling with each other such as Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, might penetrate fairly easily. An attack from the Balkans coinciding with an armed rising in Poland, and subsequently supported by Czechoslovakia, would completely separate the German forces and cut off from Germany the armies fighting in Russia. There can be no doubt about the huge operational advantages of an attack in this direction. The difficulties, however, should

not be underrated.

The massing of forces would be difficult. For this reason an indispensable condition for starting any operations from the south is the clearance of North Africa by gaining control over the Mediterranean. This necessity, as a matter of fact, comes to the fore as the initial stage in every plan of operations against Germany. The shortening of supply-lines will lead to an economy in shipping. Furthermore, the clearance of North Africa will greatly influence the situation in France and Italy. Under no circumstances should the initiative grasped by the Allies in North Africa be relinquished.

The difficulties of massing forces for an attack from the south could be overcome to a large extent in the event of Turkey joining the Allies. This eventuality cannot be ruled out, given favourable developments in the Mediterranean, and a careful political preparation undertaken in good time to which certain Allied Governments^{now} in exile might contribute. Russia could play the most important part here by guaranteeing Turkey's territorial integrity and giving up her claims to the Straits. An essential influence on Turkey's attitude will be exerted by Russia's being able to hold on to the Caucasus, the clearing of North Africa of Axis forces, and Turkey being invited to cooperate in post-war arrangements. Turkey's conciliatory attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is noticeable to-day.

The only problems left would be those of the transfer of troops from North Africa to the Balkans, and the problem of air support.

The easiest solution of the first problem leads undoubtedly through Turkey, the other through Italy via Yugoslavia, the third, presenting the greatest difficulties due to the terrain, straight through Greece.

The second problem, that of air support, is rendered more complicated because the main operational base of the air forces is Great Britain. It is on the Great Britain and U.S.A., or Canada, route that the air forces are now complemented. The regroupement of the air power in another region is, therefore, a much more difficult operation for Great Britain than it is for Germany. In order to achieve it, at a point where the operations require it - in this case in the south - it is desirable that the Great Britain - France - North Africa route should be created, i.e. that France should, once again, be brought into active co-operation. A successful landing, coincident with a rising in France would help to realize this plan.

The preparation for operations from the south requires obviously absolute security in the Middle East. The Suez and the Caucasus area must be covered. With regard to Suez, security is assured by the present victory in Lybia which, in conjunction with the occupation of North Africa, should lead to its complete clearance. With regard to the Caucasus direction, the defence of the southern Caucasus is the main issue. Any menace to northern Iraq /oil fields/ must be prevented. To that effect Russian, British and Polish forces should co-operate under a common unified command.

Should the Germans, for instance, succeed in the near future in penetrating southwards through the Caucasus, it might lead, in view of the lack of coordination, to a successive, instead of a simultaneous, engagement first of the Russian forces in the Caucasus and then of the Polish-British forces in N.W. Iran.

Conditions of attack in the West, on the Franco-Belgian front are most favourable from the point of view of air support and shipping. It is difficult to foretell what the result of such an operation is likely to be. This will contain the Germans in the West, giving the Allies the chance of intensifying the action of their own air forces with a simultaneous reduction of the danger of reprisals by the German air force against Great Britain.

The chances of exploiting this direction of attack in depth are very poor and for this reason this particular direction of attack is the least profitable. It is indispensable, however, and of a very great operational significance, were it only as a transitory phase, which might lead to incalculable advantages of a general nature.

T o s u m u p :

An attack from the south, through the Balkans, would be most profitable. It is difficult to assess its practicability without having an exact knowledge of the strength of the available forces, or of the conditions of their concentration.

The initial operation necessary for all the alternatives under discussion - must be the clearance of North Africa and the full re-establishment of communications across the Mediterranean. The time needed for this operation may take several months counting from the beginning of the offensive in Libya and from the moment of Allied landings in Algiers, Tunisia and Morocco.

The next stage should consist in containing the German forces in the West by striking at northern France. It should be carried out at a fairly early date, so as not to abandon the Russian armies to their difficulties, i.e. by the spring 1943 at the latest; at the time when activities are resumed in the east.

The third decisive stage of attack will depend first of all on the concentration of adequate forces and transport - this applies equally to invasion through the Balkans as to the invasion of Berlin via the North Sea. It would be most profitable for the outcome of the war if before the winter of 1943-1944, the German armies in Russia were faced with a disaster of a retreat, enforced by the threat of the severance of the communications with the Reich. To achieve this the attack from the south should materialize in the summer of 1943. The part played by the secret military organization in Poland, which is continuously carrying out important diversive action and which is already prepared to cut off completely, at the proper time, communications linking the eastern front with the Reich, has been fully recognized by the appropriate departments of the British Government which are collaborating with us.

IV. The role of the occupied countries.

There are four essential groups of occupied /Allied/ countries which are in a position to play an important role in the operations planned:

- the western group: France - Belgium - Holland,
- the Balkan group: Greece - Yugoslavia - Albania,
- the central group: Poland - Czechoslovakia,
- the fourth group: Scandinavia; the importance of the latter would come to the fore should the transport conditions by sea and air permit a deep out-flanking of the Germans from the north.

In every occupied country, though in varying degrees, there exists an indestructible power arising from the love of freedom. It is based on the desire for revenge and the right to exact justice for the infinite wrongs, atrocities and humiliations endured. It is so dynamic a power that it can replace that of regular armies incomparably better equipped and organized. It is imperative, for operational purposes, to prepare and plan the exploitation of the retaliation of the oppressed peoples.

Unco-ordinated, their reactions might undermine the confidence of the peoples in the Allies, and cause heavy and useless sacrifices.

There are two essential tasks connected with the expected operations on the Continent to be performed by the occupied countries:

- the first one is to start active warfare in the rear of the German armies closely co-ordinated with the operations of the Allied armies,
- the second one is to reconstruct, as quickly as possible, the national armed forces which will protect their respective lands.

Another service no less important than military operations, which can be rendered by the oppressed peoples is to prepare the ground for the collapse of German morale. For this purpose it is essential to make full use of the masses of alien workers -men and women- forcibly deported into Germany.

The moment when open warfare is undertaken will depend on the geographical position of the occupied countries in relation to the point from which the planned Allied operations will start.

The western and Balkan groups will co-operate in the first stage in the establishing of bridgeheads on the Continent.

The central group will take up the proper attack on the German rear at the moment when an armed rising of the population will have real chances of success. Until such a time, diversive operations of varying military importance may be organized there.

The armed rising of the occupied countries must be considered by the Allied High Command in relation to the air force, their most powerful fighting instrument. The air force is not only able to spread destruction inside Germany, but it can bring into action in the German rear whole tactical or even operational groups. Thanks to air-borne troops, it is possible at present to carry the battle far into enemy territory, this forming the highest achievement of modern methods of attack. The co-ordination of air operations with the armed risings of the conquered nations may yield very serious results which cannot be anticipated as yet.

The effort which must be made in this respect exceeds the present possibilities of Great Britain which is entirely engrossed in the production of air force equipment. It should be undertaken first of all by the U.S.A. It would seem right to think that the U.S.A. would find it more expedient to create several air-borne units, to send them into action on the Continent, and to develop air transport than to organize cumbersome, specialized land forces and ship them to Europe. The effect of operations carried out by air-borne troops in conjunction with the conflagration started within the German occupied territories might yield results out of all proportion with the initial investment.

Finally, I should like to stress that by changing radically their present tactics and passing over to the defensive, the Germans will have to face the disadvantages of this policy. It is true that they already try to explain to their people that the Blitzkrieg was abandoned merely because they wished to avoid further bloodshed. Nevertheless, they are fully aware of the fact that a war deprived of further political aims, a war which has led to no decision as yet and has placed them on top of a volcano, might easily prove disastrous. They will, therefore, do their utmost to undermine the mutual confidence of the Allies, and set the United Nations at variance. /Frederic the Great followed the same reasoning, when during the 7-years war he entrenched himself in Blausewitz until the Coalition against him fell apart/.

Our main task is to maintain and strengthen the morale and the political unity of the Allies, based on the mutual understanding of the common needs and the unconditional recognition of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the countries forming the Great Coalition. Every intentional misinterpretation of the Atlantic Charter, as well as any arguments in favour of the annexation by force of foreign territories on the plea that it is the alleged will of the population, must cease.

The other, very urgent task, is the maximum coordination of war production and the unification of strategy. This latter should be achieved by the organizing of a common command to direct the current and future war operations as a whole in conjunction with the co-operation which can be provided by the organized forces in the occupied countries. It cannot be denied that an absolutely uniform direction of operations on the Axis side has largely contributed to their success up till the present and it is a factor which should be eliminated as soon as possible.

After straightening these problems, we will be able to undertake a decisive counter-action on the Continent and thus quicken the harmonious rhythm of the war and defeat the enemy sooner than it recently may have appeared possible.-

Dickens
Prime Minister
and Commander-in-Chief

London, 16th October - 10th November, 1942.

40, Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.
November 18, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

General Sikorski came to see me today and told me how deeply touched he was by the very kind invitation to visit you at the White House. He is looking forward with the utmost pleasure and interest to meeting with you at that time.

1/ He, moreover, asked me to send you the enclosed letter and attached secret memorandum which he and his General Staff have, together, prepared, as their general estimate of the military situation, and opinion on its future possibilities. The General is submitting another copy of this memorandum to Mr. Churchill. Meanwhile, he is working out, in detail, the alternatives of offensive action set forth in the memorandum.

With warmest regards and my every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures;
two copies of memorandum
one letter

~~MOST SECRET~~

REPUBLIC OF POLAND
PRIME MINISTER

Stratton House,
Stratton Street,
W.1.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION.

In spite of carefully prepared positions, the German and Italian resistance broke down under the attack of the VIIIth Army in Libya. The ultimate defeat of General Rommel's forces appears certain. Owing to the diminishing resting power of the German armies this success will be repeated on other fronts wherever the spirit of initiative is supported by efficient leadership and the latest military weapons. Although Russia is persisting in her stubborn defence with such great determination, it is unlikely that similar success will be achieved there.

The most important factor rightly applied by the Americans and the British in North Africa on November 8th, was that of surprise. In planning the further course of the war this factor must play a great part. Hitler may attempt to annihilate the countries under his control before he himself is defeated. It will, therefore, become increasingly imperative in the future to co-ordinate efforts which must march hand in hand with speed and surprise, applied by the Allies with the same deadly logic as it is by the Germans.

The President
of the United States of America.

1. Results achieved by the Germans in 1942.

During 1942, the German campaign in the East no longer showed the same drive. Begun rather late, probably on account of transport difficulties, it was slowed down by the Russian counter-attack on Kharkov.

The sequence of German effort /first Kerch, then Sebastopol and, ultimately, the onslaught on Voronez, the Caucasus and Stalingrad/ as well as the restricted front of the attack indicate a drop in German offensive possibilities, as compared with last year's.

Had the German offensive followed, as previously, a lightning course, the Germans might have reached the Volga in the region of Stalingrad in order subsequently to attack Moscow from the rear or to capture the whole of the Caucasus. From the Caucasus they might have developed at a later time an offensive against the Middle East. The Germans failed to achieve these objectives.

Russia managed to save her armies, but, by losing her most important industrial region on the Don, her most fertile agricultural areas in the Ukraine and Kuban, and by allowing her vital southern route of supplies for war material and petrol to be partially cut off, has distinctly lowered her war potential and weakened dangerously her national economy. She is now restricted to the output of her two remaining industrial bases: that of Moscow and of the Ural. The food situation has accordingly worsened. It is likely, however, that with material support of the Allies Russia will endure the coming winter and will be ready by the spring of 1943 to continue her defence. She may even manifest some activity during the winter months by taking advantage of being better prepared than the Germans for campaigning in the severe climate. The Germans are afraid of the Russian forces concentrated in the northern and central sectors of the front, which the Germans had not succeeded in drawing southwards while attacking Stalingrad.

In the second theatre of operations, i.e. in Libya the superiority of the Axis is finished. The Germans have failed to shake the vital Allied centre, the Middle East - a result which **might** have been achieved by successful drives from the Suez and from the Caucasus.

The slowing up of the tempo and drive of German operations during the current year was accompanied by the weakening of their position in the air. The Allies profiting by this fact staged a series of large-scale raids, which lowered the war production of the Third Reich and shook the self-confidence of the German people, intoxicated by victories gained so far.

It should be remembered, however, that the Germans have maintained throughout the year a complete freedom of operations on their internal lines against any one adversary.

II. What are the further possibilities of German action.

It is unlikely that the Germans will develop extensive winter operations in Russia in the near future as this would involve too heavy losses. One should not, however, exclude the possibility of a number of surprise moves and attacks with limited objectives as their aim. It is difficult to take seriously Russian declarations concerning their counter-attack of a decisive importance.

On the Russian front, therefore, it may be expected that the Red Army will continue to bind the major part of the German forces. The transfer of these forces to the West and South can now be observed after the defeat of Rommel's army and the Allied attack on North Africa.

For the moment, the Germans have replied to this attack by occupying the so-called "free" part of France and her Mediterranean ports, sharing the booty with Italy. This should at last rouse the French people. The occupation of France might be a preliminary step to further operations. The Allies should therefore follow carefully developments in Spain, as an occupation of that country together with her ports, the Balearic Islands and her African possessions, would be of capital importance to Germany.

The second alternative would be an attack on Turkey in order to oust her from the Balkan Peninsula so as to deprive the Allies of their possible debouches to the Balkans.

Both actions, in Spain as well as in Turkey, would probably encounter armed resistance and would prove beyond Hitler's possibilities.

What will be the German operational plan for 1943.

1/ Germany on the offensive.

It is doubtful whether in the spring of 1943, the Germans will attempt for the third time an offensive operation against Russia, though limited in time and space, in order to force a decision in this theatre of war. Their aims in the East will remain the same, i.e. the occupation of Baku, the capture of **Mescow**, Leningrad and the cutting off of the northern supply route in the region of Vologda. Should they try to realize these aims, they would do so in succession. We may assume as certain that powerful German offensives, undertaken simultaneously in several operational directions, are a thing of the past. In addition each further move which draws the German armies further east, elongates their lines of communication which are an essential factor in Hitler's game, based on internal lines, in a manner increasingly dangerous to them.

After the German defeat in Litya, it is unlikely that the Germans may present serious danger in the Middle East in 1943; an attack on Iran - Iraq, directed from the Caucasus alone would prove too risky considering that Russia remains undefeated.

An invasion of Great Britain appears improbable today, owing to the German loss of air supremacy and the great strength of British defences. Caution, however, dictates taking into account this eventuality.

2/ Germany on the defensive.

Should Hitler and his Staff reach the conclusion that a total German victory is definitely impossible and that it cannot be achieved by further offensive operations, he may decide to pass to the defensive on all fronts on the Continent, adapted for the purpose and adequately consolidated.

In passing to the defensive the Germans would endeavour to create such conditions as would convince the Allies that further bloodshed in a protracted war is useless. This would be used as an inducement to the Allies to suspend military operations and to seek a compromise peace based on international agreement.

German propaganda will then do its utmost to convince public opinion in the Allied countries that this solution only can save western civilization - presumably defended by the Germans. By using the bogey of a Bolshevized Europe the Germans will simultaneously attempt to find, at all costs, supporters of the "New Order" in the Pan-Europa under their rule.

What methods are the Germans likely to use

in order to achieve this aim.

1. Their first objective will be to prevent the Allies from attacking on two fronts. To-day this is no longer possible. This purpose may have been achieved on condition that the Allies were ousted from the Mediterranean and the Middle East and that Russia's military power was broken in 1943 - this now appears totally unlikely.
2. A switching over to the defensive, with a possible shortening of the eastern front, would allow the Germans to organize the exploitation of the captured "Lebensraum", which would cover all the requirements of a long war, by supplying them with Russian wheat, coal, iron and, partly, petrol. In this manner they intend to exploit the factor of time, which at present is working against the Axis.

The tremendous German investment in the territories captured from Russia, precludes any chances of a compromise peace **between** the Third Reich and Soviet Russia. Hitler cannot give up the raw materials and agricultural produce of the Ukraine already largely reorganized by the Germans - neither can Stalin **cede** these territories **to** Germany without condemning the people of Great Russia to a permanent famine.

The interruption of intensive offensive operations will reduce the losses and the wear and tear of war equipment; this would allow the Germans to master the approaching crisis in manpower in the German army and to improve German transport conditions.

3. By withdrawing from the eastern front considerable forces of first class fighting value /approximately 50 divisions/ and transferring them to the West and to the centre of the Reich, the Germans would be able to create good defensive conditions, especially in the West. This would be an important

argument demonstrating to the Allies the hopelessness of seeking a decision in this war by attacking Germany from the West. The Germans would endeavour to spread and deepen this feeling of despondency among the Allies by severe submarine warfare and the destruction of shipping.

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Considerable assistance in achieving this aim would be provided if the attention of the U.S.A. could be distracted from Europe to the Pacific. Here Japan can play an important role and particularly as she is most successful in her own methods of warfare. In my opinion, Japan's aggression against Russia would not be justified from an operational point of view. It is more likely that her activities will be concentrated on containing the Allied forces in the Pacific which are already seriously engaged in this part of the world. Moreover, the maintenance of "neutral" relations with Russia may serve Japanese political interests in the future.

Finally it should be stated that the danger of a new campaign in Russia, the air-raids on German cities and the Allied offensives in North Africa favour the apparently increasing development of opposition not only within Germany but also fosters it in satellite countries such as Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and, above all, in Italy. Information I am receiving from various quarters, and especially from Rome, indicates the acute internal crisis threatening Italy. One of the main tasks of the Allies in their struggle for victory is now to increase this state of mind and to exploit it methodically.

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The first objective could be achieved by an attack on northern France and Belgium, the second objective - either by an earlier occupation of southern Norway, which might involve considerable losses, or by a combined naval and air operation directed against the German naval bases and aerodromes in Norway.

The southern direction via Italy, viewed as a road to Germany, is long and the terrain will remain difficult, for two barriers would have to be overcome, i.e. the sea and the debouches from northern Lombardy to central Europe.

The other road from the south leads through the Balkans. Operations organized here, and provided with well-developed bases in the Middle East, will bring the Allies to the Rumanian oil fields, which are vital to the German interests, and the capture of which would deprive the Germans of one of their main assets in their arguments concerning their alleged invincibility. Even comparatively small forces used in this route, which would pass through Allied countries, such as Greece and Yugoslavia, or through countries quarreling with each other such as Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, might penetrate fairly easily. An attack from the Balkans coinciding with an armed rising in Poland, and subsequently supported by Czechoslovakia, would completely separate the

German

German forces and cut off from Germany the armies fighting in Russia. There can be no doubt about the huge operational advantages of an attack in this direction. The difficulties, however, should not be underrated.

The massing of forces would be difficult. For this reason an indispensable condition for starting any operations from the south is the clearance of North Africa by gaining control over the Mediterranean. This necessity, as a matter of fact, comes to the fore as the initial stage in every plan of operations against Germany. The shortening of supply-lines will lead to an economy in shipping. Furthermore, the clearance of North Africa will greatly influence the situation in France and Italy. Under no circumstances should the initiative grasped by the Allies in North Africa be relinquished.

The difficulties of massing forces for an attack from the south could be overcome to a large extent in the event of Turkey joining the Allies. This eventuality cannot be ruled out, given favourable developments in the Mediterranean, and a careful political preparation undertaken in good time to which certain Allied Governments now in exile might contribute. Russia could play the most important part here by guaranteeing Turkey's territorial integrity and giving up her claims to the Straits. An essential influence on Turkey's attitude will be exerted by Russia's being able to hold on to the Caucasus, the clearing of North Africa of Axis forces, and Turkey being invited to cooperate in post-war arrangements. Turkey's conciliatory attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is noticeable today.

The only problems left would be those of the transfer of troops from North Africa to the Balkans, and the problem of air support.

The easiest solution of the first problem leads undoubtedly through Turkey, the other through Italy via Yugoslavia, the third, presenting the greatest difficulties due to the terrain, straight through Greece.

The second problem, that of air support, is rendered more complicated because the main operational base of the air forces is Great Britain. It is on the Great Britain and U.S.A., or Canada, route that the air forces are now complemented. The re-groupement of the air power in another region is, therefore, a much more difficult operation for Great Britain than it is for Germany. In order to achieve it, at a point where the operations require it - in this case in the south - it is desirable that the Great Britain - France - North Africa route should be created,

created, i.e. that France should, once again, be brought into active co-operation. A successful landing, coincident with a rising in France would help to realize this plan.

The preparation for operations from the south requires obviously absolute security in the Middle East. The Suez and the Caucasus area must be covered. With regard to Suez, security is assured by the present victory in Libya which, in conjunction with the occupation of North Africa, should lead to its complete clearance. With regard to the Caucasus direction, the defence of the southern Caucasus is the main issue. Any menace to northern Iraq /oil fields/ must be prevented. To that effect Russian, British and Polish forces should co-operate under a common unified command.

Should the Germans, for instance, succeed in the near future in penetrating southwards through the Caucasus, it might lead, in view of the lack of coordination, to a successive, instead of a simultaneous, engagement first of the Russian forces in the Caucasus and then of the Polish-British forces in N.W. Iran.

Conditions of attack in the West, on the Franco-Belgian front are most favourable from the point of view of air support and shipping. It is difficult to foretell what the result of such an operation is likely to be. This will contain the Germans in the West, giving the Allies the chance of intensifying the action of their own air forces with a simultaneous reduction of the danger of reprisals by the German air force against Great Britain.

The chances of exploiting this direction of attack in depth are very poor and for this reason this particular direction of attack is the least profitable. It is indispensable, however, and of a very great operational significance, were it only as a transitory phase, which might lead to incalculable advantages of a general nature.

To sum up:

An attack from the south, through the Balkans, would be most profitable. It is difficult to assess its practicability without having an exact knowledge of the strength of the available forces, or of the conditions of their concentration.

The initial

The initial operation necessary for all the alternatives under discussion - must be the clearance of North Africa and the full re-establishment of communications across the Mediterranean. The time needed for this operation may take several months counting from the beginning of the offensive in Libya and from the moment of Allied landings in Algiers, Tunisia and Morocco.

The next stage should consist in containing the German forces in the West by striking at northern France. It should be carried out at a fairly early date, so as not to abandon the Russian armies to their difficulties, i.e. by the spring 1943 at the latest; at the time when activities are resumed in the east.

The third decisive stage of attack will depend first of all on the concentration of adequate forces and transport - this applies equally to invasion through the Balkans as to the invasion of Berlin via the North Sea. It would be most profitable for the outcome of the war if before the winter of 1943-1944, the German Armies in Russia were faced with a disaster of a retreat, enforced by the threat of the severance of the communications with the Reich. To achieve this the attack from the south should materialize in the summer of 1943. The part played by the secret military organization in Poland, which is continuously carrying out important diversive action and which is already prepared to cut off completely, at the proper time, communications linking the eastern front with the Reich, has been fully recognized by the appropriate departments of the British Government which are collaborating with us.

IV. The role of the occupied countries.

There are four essential groups of occupied /Allied/ countries which are in a position to play an important role in the operations planned:

- the western group: France - Belgium - Holland
- the Balkan group: Greece - Yugoslavia - Albania,
- the central group: Poland - Czechoslovakia,
- the fourth group: Scandinavia; the importance of the latter would come to the fore should the transport conditions by sea and air permit a deep out-flanking of the Germans from the north.

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In every occupied country, though in varying degrees, there exists an indestructible power arising from the love of freedom. It is based on the desire for revenge and the right to exact justice for the infinite wrongs, atrocities and humiliations endured. It is so dynamic a power that it can replace that of regular armies incomparably better equipped and organized. It is imperative, for operational purposes, to prepare and plan the exploitation of the retaliation of the oppressed peoples. Unco-ordinated, their reactions might undermine the confidence of the peoples in the Allies, and cause heavy and useless sacrifices.

There are two essential tasks connected with the expected operations on the Continent to be performed by the occupied countries:

- the first one is to start active warfare in the rear of the German armies closely co-ordinated with the operations of the Allied armies,
- the second one is to reconstruct, as quickly as possible, the national armed forces which will protect their respective lands.

Another service no less important than military operations, which can be rendered by the oppressed peoples is to prepare the ground for the collapse of German morale. For this purpose it is essential to make full use of the masses of alien workers - men and women - forcibly deported into Germany.

The moment when open warfare is undertaken will depend on the geographical position of the occupied countries in relation to the point from which the planned Allied operations will start.

The western and Balkan groups will cooperate in the first stage in the establishing of bridgeheads on the Continent.

The central group will take up the proper attack on the German rear at the moment when an armed rising of the population will have real chances of success. Until such a time, diversive operations of varying military importance may be organized there.

The armed rising of the occupied countries must be considered by the Allied High Command in relation to the air force, their most powerful fighting instrument. The air force is not only able to spread destruction inside Germany, but it can bring into action in the German rear

whole

whole tactical or even operational groups. Thanks to air-borne troops, it is possible at present to carry the battle far into enemy territory, thus forming the highest achievement of modern methods of attack. The coordination of air operations with the armed risings of the conquered nations may yield very serious results which cannot be anticipated as yet.

The effort which must be made in this respect exceeds the present possibilities of Great Britain which is entirely engrossed in the production of air force equipment. It should be undertaken first of all by the U.S.A. It would seem right to think that the U.S.A. would find it more expedient to create several air-borne units, to send them into action on the Continent, and to develop air transport than to organize cumbersome, specialized land forces and ship them to Europe. The effect of operations carried out by air-borne troops in conjunction with the conflagration started within the German occupied territories might yield results out of all proportion with the initial investment.

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Finally, I should like to stress that by changing radically their present tactics and passing over to the defensive, the Germans will have to face the disadvantages of this policy. It is true that they already try to explain to their people that the Blitzkrieg was abandoned merely because they wished to avoid further bloodshed. Nevertheless, they are fully aware of the fact that a war deprived of further political aims, a war which has led to no decision as yet and has placed them on top of a volcano, might easily prove disastrous. They will, therefore, do their utmost to undermine the mutual confidence of the Allies, and set the United Nations at variance. /Frederic the Great followed the same reasoning, when during the 7-years war he entrenched himself in Blausewitz until the Coalition against him fell apart/.

Our main task is to maintain and strengthen the morale and the political unity of the Allies, based on the mutual understanding of the common needs and the unconditional recognition of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the countries forming the Great Coalition. Every intentional misinterpretation of the Atlantic Charter, as well as any arguments in favour to the annexation by force of foreign territories on the plea that it is the alleged will of the population, must case.

The other

The other very urgent task is the maximum coordination of war production and the unification of strategy. This latter should be achieved by the organizing of a common command to direct the current and future war operations as a whole in conjunction with the co-operation which can be provided by the organized forces in the occupied countries. It cannot be denied that an absolutely uniform direction of operations on the Axis side has largely contributed to their success up till the present and it is a factor which should be eliminated as soon as possible.

After straightening these problems, we will be able to undertake a decisive counter-action on the Continent and thus quicken the harmonious rhythm of the war and defeat the enemy sooner than it recently may have appeared possible.

(Signed) Vladimir Sikorski
Prime Minister and
Commander-in-Chief

London, 16th October - 10th November, 1942

REGISTRY DELIVERY BILL

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT FOREIGN MAIL ROOM

ARMY COURIER SECTION

DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1942

TO: THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Division - Bureau - Agency

Env., Pkg., Letter, :	:	:	:
Pouch No. & etc. :	Registry Number :	Point of Origin :	Addressee

ENV LO 08210

WDFMR 2379

HQ ETO USA

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Receipt Acknowledged: Jimm Vicker

Date 11-25-42

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Number Pieces ONE (1)

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1942

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personal
PSK
Poland folder
1-42


My dear Mr. President:

The Polish Ambassador, by instruction of his Prime Minister, left with me this morning a memorandum, of which I am transmitting a copy for your information.

I told the Ambassador that I would be very glad to transmit to you this expression of thanks addressed to you by General Sikorski for your effective help in obtaining a solution of the controversy which had arisen between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government regarding Polish officials in Soviet Russia.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.

Polish-Soviet Relations

The Ambassador expressed great pleasure in being able to communicate to the Under Secretary of State that he had been informed on the 23rd of October by Count Raczyński that, undoubtedly owing to the interventions authorized by the President and carried out by the United States Embassy in Moscow, and lastly by the Honorable Wendell L. Willkie, as personal emissary of the President, - the Soviet authorities had informed the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, Minister Sokolnicki, that the investigation conducted against the arrested officials and delegates for relief work of the Polish Embassy in Russia had now been concluded and that as a result of this investigation fifteen of the arrested persons had been found innocent and their release ordered; seventy-eight persons were regarded as allegedly guilty of anti-USSR. activities and were to be expelled from Russia. As regards the remaining sixteen officials, proceedings would be instituted as the Soviet authorities alleged that they had proof of activities of a serious nature against them.

The newly appointed Polish Ambassador, Mr. Tadeusz Romer, who has just arrived in Soviet Russia, is of the opinion that this step on the part of the Soviet authorities

is a proof that there is a tendency to carry out the promise recently made to Mr. Willkie of trying to clarify and improve Polish-Soviet relations and this is a signal proof that the American intervention with Premier Stalin has proved effective. Ambassador Romer thinks that he may succeed in obtaining a change of attitude regarding the above mentioned sixteen officials against whom proceedings are to be instituted and obtaining their release.

The Polish Ambassador would like to take this earliest opportunity of expressing to the United States Government the warmest and most sincere thanks on behalf of the Polish Government for the invaluable help given to Poland in this matter, and also would be most grateful if, pending the arrival of Prime Minister General Sikorski, the thanks of Prime Minister General Sikorski could likewise be conveyed to the President.

REPUBLIC OF POLAND

PRIME MINISTER

November 17th, 1942.

Mr. President,

I have the honour to send you a general estimate of the military situation and my opinion on its future possibilities. Another copy of this Memorandum I am submitting to Mr. Churchill. I am working out now in detail the alternatives of offensive actions set forth in the Memorandum, and look forward to the time I shall have the opportunity of discussing it with you and your Staff in Washington.

On the margin of this Memorandum, I would like to attract your attention to the Balkans. Even in the case the Germans would desist, in the coming year, from offensive action on other fronts and turned to defensive tactics, they may try to strike out from the Balkan area in the direction of Turkey and Persia in the pursuit of oil. In any case, I think it reasonable to take into consideration the possibility of the occupation by them of Thrace which would aim at obstructing the eventual invasion of the Continent by the Allies across the Straits.

I take also this occasion to renew my sincere thanks for your kind invitation and for facilities extended for my journey.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

Stankiewicz

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington.

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. H. L. HOPKINS.

I thought you might be interested in the attached on what has gone to Russia--ships sailed, ships lost, cargo lifted. The brief summary on the second page will perhaps save your time in reading.

I am passing it on to the President also. ✓

L. W. Douglas,
Deputy Administrator.



November 17, 1942.

*Russia folder
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confidential 1-42*

MEMORANDUM ON SHIPMENTS TO RUSSIA

Since January 1, 1942, 249 U.S. controlled vessels, aggregating 2,362,398 deadweight tons, have departed from U.S. ports with full or part cargoes for Russia. They lifted 1,359,825 long tons of cargo. Fifty-five of these vessels with a total deadweight tonnage of 524,605 were lost while in services on Russian account. During the same period 33 other United Nations vessels having a deadweight tonnage of 275,316 and carrying 126,704 long tons of cargo for Russian account cleared U.S. ports for North Russia and the Persian Gulf and 113 Russian vessels of 689,796 deadweight tons sailed from U.S. Pacific ports with 474,612 tons of cargo. Five vessels under other United Nations control having a deadweight of 38,827 were lost.

The service from the U.S. to North Russia, over which the largest amount of cargo has been moved, has been carried on almost exclusively with U.S. controlled tonnage since January. A total of 169 ships of 1,501,707 deadweight with 455,741 long tons of cargo departed from U.S. ports in this service since January 1. Five of these were tankers which carried 42,582 tons of cargo. Forty-three ships of 388,387 deadweight tons constituting 25.9 per cent of all that sailed for North Russia, have been lost. Thirty-five of these with 218,023 tons of cargo on board were lost while outbound.

This involved the loss of 22.8 per cent of the cargo shipped to North Russia.

The second largest service has been that to the Persian Gulf. One hundred thirteen ships carrying full or part cargoes of Russian cargo sailed for this destination with 530,788 long tons of cargo on board. Six of these were tankers which carried altogether only 807 tons of Russian bombers as deck loads. Losses in this service amounted to 16 ships of 166,067 deadweight, or 14.6 per cent of the total that departed.

The following table gives a summary of the number and deadweight tonnage of ships that have departed from the U.S. in the three services to Russia together with the cargo lifted from U.S. ports and the number and deadweight tonnage of vessels lost.

SHIPS SAILED AND LOST AND CARGO LIFTED

January through October 1942
(Dry Cargo Ships & Tankers)

	<u>Ships Departed</u>		<u>Ships Lost*</u>			<u>Cargo Lifted</u>
	<u>No.</u>	<u>DWT</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>DWT</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Long Tons</u>
North Russia						
U.S.	147	1,330,092	40	368,638		842,124
Other	22	171,615	3	19,749		113,617
Total	169	1,501,707	43	388,387	25.9	955,741
Persian Gulf						
U.S.	102	1,032,306	15	155,967		517,701
Other	11	103,701	1	10,100		13,087
Total	113	1,136,007	16	166,067	14.6	530,788
Trans Pacific	113	689,796	1	8,978		474,612
All Services						
U.S.	249	2,362,398	55	524,605	22.4	1,359,825
Other	146	965,112	5	38,827	3.9	601,316
Total	395	3,327,510	60	563,432	16.9	1,961,141

* Includes only losses reported through November 10.

Reed

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For preparation of reply
for my signature.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Letter from Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime
Minister of Poland, NYC, 12/16/42, in
re importance of democratic educational
reconstruction throughout Europe after
the defeat of Germany.

Poland folder
1-43

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1943


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Personnel*

My dear Mr. President;

The Polish Prime Minister gave me this afternoon
a letter addressed to you which I am enclosing herewith.
I have had a copy made for the files of the Department.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure;
From General Wladyslaw
Sikorski, January 4, 1943.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Poland

Washington, D. C.
January 4th, 1943

REPUBLIC OF POLAND
PRIME MINISTER

Mr. President,

I take the liberty to revert to our conversation, in which I had the honour of exchanging with you my ideas on international and Polish post-war economic problems, and to put before you, in short, an outline of my views.

All nations should endeavour to improve their standards of living through closer international co-operation and intensified trading, and not through autarchy which leads to pauperisation and conflicts.

International collaboration would not only necessarily involve the support of the poorer countries by the wealthier, during the transitory post-war period; it would also require the establishment of organised and permanent assistance in the general system guaranteeing freedom and durable peace.

The protection of all citizens against want will increasingly become the duty of the State. Conscious of this responsibility, and taking into consideration the economic structure of Poland, the Polish Government are studying the problem of creating conditions for affording to every citizen adequate nutriment and sustenance which the Country provides in plenty.

Social legislation, which determines the length of work per week in connection with the social standards and requirements of public health, should also establish age limits for labour, in order to furnish the opportunity of work to the growing generations.

In order to settle the housing problem, social insurance legislation should afford to every working man the possibility of acquiring a house or lodging.

The

The agricultural structure of Poland, where arable land is insufficient, should be based on prosperous, medium-sized selfsupporting farms which, in respect of the progress and improvement of their production and output, would be sustained by selective larger estates and cooperative associations.

The Polish Government intend to carry out the industrialisation of the Country, in accordance with a general economic program, through private enterprise, both domestic and foreign, with the exception of certain domains which would be retained for the public administration. Foreign investments in Poland will be favoured.

The cooperation of foreign capital in the development of communications, electrification of the Country, and public utility works of national or international importance will be readily afforded.

Poland will endeavour to extend commercial intercourse not only to those States with which she may be federated and to her neighbours, but also to all the friendly nations overseas. A wide access to the sea will facilitate to Poland this international collaboration. In article 7 of the Atlantic Charter the principle of the freedom of the seas has been clearly stated. This principle must find its application to the Baltic, which in the future must become an open sea, in the fullest sense of the word, in the interests of security and unobstructed trade.

I take the liberty, Mr. President, to propose bringing before you these ideas in fuller detail, after having discussed them with the members of my Cabinet.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

Dimitry.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.