My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Prior to your departure from the United States I wish to express to Your Excellency my appreciation for your courtesy in affording me the opportunity of discussing again with you the many complex problems relating to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy. It has been a source of great satisfaction to me that we have been able to discuss with complete frankness and sincerity not only these problems, but also the equally vital questions which will arise following the achievement of victory. You have outlined to me in full detail the views of your Government concerning the organization of the future Polish state and its role in the European community of nations.

In an effort to build a solid foundation for a lasting peace in eastern Europe based upon careful considerations of political, ethnic, and economic factors, the United States Government desires to encourage the countries of Eastern Europe to continue to make careful studies of their mutual problems to determine points of agreement and disagreement in order that they may be in a position to present a plan under which lasting relationships would be assured. The United States Government would then be prepared to participate in efforts to reach a constructive and final solution of the Eastern European problem within the framework of a general world settlement.

I need hardly assure you of the determination of the United States Government that Poland be reestablished. This is implicit in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations. The views of this Government moreover reflect the warm sympathy which the American people have always felt toward

His Excellency
General Władysław Sikorski,
Prime Minister of Poland.
the people of Poland in their age-long struggle freely to organize their national life.

The magnificent and continuing resistance of the Polish armed forces and people to the German enemy in occupation of their country, and the Polish contribution to the prosecution of the war testify to the inextinguishable vitality of the Polish nation and constitute the best guarantee for the re-emergence of a strong and independent Poland.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

When the Prime Minister of Poland had lunch with you he asked that you let him have before he left the United States a letter from you indicating your desire that Poland be reconstituted. You said that you would give him such a letter.

I am submitting herewith a suggested letter from you to be given to General Sikorski. The Secretary of State has read and approves this letter but suggests that the letter should be regarded as confidential.

General Sikorski is planning to leave Washington on his way back to London Thursday night. If this letter is satisfactory to you, will you sign it and have it sent to me so that I may give it to General Sikorski before he leaves the city.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Letter.

The President,

The White House.
This document was originally declassified March 8, 1972 and has been stamped incorrectly.

EKD
4-13-73
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 8, 1943

My dear Winston:

Our good friend, General Sikorski, has been urging us to assign at least six B-24 aircraft for the maintenance of his liaison with Poland.

I have just written him that the United States cannot take action on his request without jeopardizing basic agreements in which the United States and Great Britain have each accepted definite responsibilities for the provision of aircraft within the various theaters of operations. In accordance with these agreements, Poland is within a British theater of operations and responsibility.

I feel, however, that his proposal has a great deal of merit, and I told him, therefore, that I would refer the matter to you, with the request that you give it all possible consideration. It was my thought (which I did not, however, convey to him) that you might perhaps be able to spare him six out of the total of 398 B-24's allocated from U.S. production under the recent Arnold-Evill-McCain-Patterson agreement.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Right Honorable Winston Churchill
Prime Minister

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
FEB 14 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date _____
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943

General Władysław Sikorski
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief
of Polish Armed Forces,
Polish Embassy
2633 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Sikorski:

I have given most careful consideration to your letter of December 22, 1942, regarding the assignment of B-24 aircraft required for the maintenance of your liaison with Poland. I regret very much that it is impossible for the United States to act favorably on this request.

As our Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out in their letter to you of December 6, 1942, we cannot take action on this matter without jeopardizing basic agreements in which the United States and Great Britain have each accepted definite responsibilities for the provision of aircraft within the various theaters of operations. In accordance with these agreements, Poland is within a British theater of operations and responsibility. In view of the many very heavy demands made upon us for aircraft of this type in our own theaters and areas of responsibility, we simply do not have any available for additional commitments.

I feel, however, that your proposal has so much merit that I am referring it personally to the British Prime Minister, with the request that he give it all possible consideration.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date Feb 14 1972
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Reply to General Sikorski's Request for B-24 Airplanes.

Enclosed herewith are two suggested letters for your signature in response to General Sikorski's request for an allotment of B-24 airplanes.

The reply to General Sikorski is in conformity with our agreements with Great Britain and the non-availability of further heavy aircraft commitments at the present time.

The letter to the Prime Minister is suggested with the thought that the British might possibly see their way clear to the diversion of certain aircraft to this project.

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a similar request from General Sikorski and replied in the negative, I am enclosing a copy for your information.

I believe that this proposed solution is the best that can be offered at this time.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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Chief of Staff.

Encs- JAN 16 1972
Signature-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

Will you be good enough
to prepare a memorandum of reply
for my signature to the enclosed
from General Sikorski?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Let to the President 12/22/42 Most
Secret and Confidential re the assign-
ment of B.24 Aircraft required for
the maintenance of liaison with Poland.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 14 1972
Washington, D.C.
December 22, 1942.

Mr. President,

In accordance with your recommendation during our talks on December 3rd, I discussed with Admiral Leahy and General Marshall the question of assignment of B.24 Aircraft required for the maintenance of our liaison with Poland. Although I have met with the full understanding of the importance of the question and much favourable consideration, I did not succeed in obtaining a favourable decision.

The difficulty, as it appears to me, lies in the formal conciliation of my request with existing obligations in respect to the British Government, and consequently the question has once again come to a standstill.

Meanwhile, the message which I have just received from my Chief of Staff, a copy of which I take the liberty to enclose, is conclusive of the opportunities which we are losing, not only with regard to the progress of our military organisation in Poland, but even to its very existence.

Even the most exalted spirit of those who are determined to overcome the greatest difficulties will be of no avail without the means required for the struggle, the necessary material assistance and above all that invaluable moral support which they draw from every flight to Poland, of aircraft bringing aid.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
In the fourth year of the war my Country still remains inflexibly loyal to our common cause, despite the unmerciful conditions of the struggle, for the preservation of its rights to life and freedom. I, therefore, believe that it is fully justified in demanding assistance indispensable to the upholding of its forces in a struggle which may go beyond even their limits of endurance.

Moreover, the conservation of that strength is not only connected with the apprehension for our own existence, but also with the solicitude for the reconstruction of Europe in which Poland constitutes one of the main factors.

I appeal to you once more Mr. President, in order that my Country might not be left to itself in this cruel fight which it is conducting with the relentlessness of all available means, and that it might be able to rely upon support for the continuation of their underground struggle.

It seems to me that the assignment of twelve or for the time being at least six liaison aircraft, which I so eagerly solicit, would be of disproportionate significance compared with its importance to the Country.

While fully confident that a favourable decision on your part, would overcome the technical difficulties, I would like to assure you that all the people of Poland, who are fighting for liberty would accept your generous help with deep gratitude.

Believe me

Very sincerely,

I. Wybyl

The President
White House
Washington, D.C.

1 Enclosure.
Cipher Cable from London
Received Dec. 21, 1942.

To General Sikorski
For Chief of General Staff:

In spite of the obligation undertaken by Sinclair, our three aircraft continue to be employed for other purposes. One of our crews has been lately lost over Malta (3 officers 4 N.C.O's). During the spring we also lost one of the crews over France. The Air Ministry have neutralised your endeavours in the U.S.A. during your former visit to Washington by declaring that six Halifax aircraft with Polish crews would be assigned for liaison and transfer of men, in the first place for operations over Poland. Unfortunately we do not even have priority in the employment of the three Halifaxes, which are at present supposed to be put to our disposal. Under these circumstances we are incapable of taking advantage even of the limited days of favourable atmospheric conditions during the winter months. The execution of our plan, which has thus far been conducted efficiently and with profit to the Allied war-effort, will have to be interrupted owing to the exhaustion in the Country of the funds and war-material and the shortage of forthcoming trained personnel which will bear unfavorably upon the diver- sive and sabotage activities during the period of transfer by the Germans of part of their forces to the Western Front. I beg you to intervene in the United States in the direction of obtaining the indispensable aircraft and air-base for the organisation of a Polish Flight for liaison with the Country. Experience has proved that only the establishment of a special flight exclusively for operations connected with Poland is capable of assuring the further conduct of our undertaking in connection with our secret Army in Poland.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington  

December 6, 1942.  

Colonel Wlodzimierz Onacewicz,  
Polish Military Attache  
Polish Embassy  
2633 Sixteenth Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.  

My dear Colonel:  

Your memorandum on behalf of the Polish General Staff  
requesting six B-24 "Liberator" aircraft for the purpose of  
maintaining liaison with the Polish secret military and political  
organization in Poland has received careful consideration by the  
Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.  

The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff cannot, however,  
take action on this request without jeopardizing basic agreements  
in which the United States and Great Britain have accepted definite  
responsibilities for the provision of aircraft within the various  
thearers of operations. In accordance with these agreements,  
Poland is within a British theater of operations and responsibility.  
In view of the unfulfilled demands in its own theaters and areas of  
responsibility, the United States has no Liberators available for  
additional commitments. Your request, therefore, has been referred  
to the British Chiefs of Staff for consideration in connection with  
possible allocation from British sources.  

Sincerely yours,  

For the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff:  

WILLIAM D. LEAHY  
Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.  

DECLASSIFIED  
\JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974
Discours
prononcé par le Général Sikorski, le 28 janvier 1943, à la réunion des Premiers
Ministres des Gouvernements alliés du Continent, en présence de M. le Premier
Ministre de Belgique, MM. les Presidents des Conseils de la Grèce, Norvège,
Tchécoslovaquie, Yougoslavie, les Ministres des Affaires Étrangères de la Bel-
gique, grèce, Luxembourg, Norvège, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie et
France Combattante, ainsi que des Ambassadeurs Sir Cecil Dormer, A.J. Drexel-
Biddle, A. E. Bogomolow.

Permettez-moi, d'abord, Messieurs, de partager avec vous quelques
impressions que je rapporte de mon récent séjour aux États-Unis. Je veux
en même temps vous exposer les résultats de mes conversations à la Maison-
Blanche et dans les milieux gouvernementaux de Washington au sujet de cer-
tains problèmes qui tiennent à cœur à nous tous.

Ma dernière visite à Washington - la troisième au cours de cette
guerre - est tombée sur un moment crucial du conflit mondial.

La guerre qui a éclaté, en 1939, à la suite de la décision de la
nation polonaise de s'opposer par les armes aux hordes de Hitler, soutenue
avec la plus ferme détermination par la Grande Bretagne après la défaite
française, s'est d'abord développée sur le continent européen d'une manière
aussi favorable pour les armées allemandes, est entrée actuellement dans
une nouvelle phase, grâce à l'heroïsme des armées soviétiques.

L'initiative à laquelle les pays de l'Axe devaient jusqu'ici leurs
succès passe progressivement, mais sûrement, aux mains des Alliés. C'est
vrai surtout en ce qui concerne l'adversaire principal - l'Allemagne. Il
en est ainsi sur le front oriental. Il en est ainsi en Afrique du Nord.
Dans un mémoire que j'avais préparé il y a deux mois, il était dit :

"... Lorsque Hitler et son État-Major auront acquis la conviction que
la victoire totale allemande est exclue et qu'il sera impossible de
l'atteindre par une action offensive ultérieure, ils se décideront à
adopter un programme défensif; ce programme sera exécuté sur tous les fronts du Continent européen adaptés à ce but, raccourcis et consolidés d'une façon appropriée. L'Allemagne, en passant à la défensive, s'efforcera, sans doute, de créer des conditions susceptibles de convaincre les Alliés que le sang versé dans une guerre d'usure, est versé sans espoir. Leur but serait ainsi d'inviter les Alliés à cesser les hostilités et accepter l'idée d'un compromis par la voie d'un arrangement international.

"Dans cette hypothèse, la propagande allemande - cela va de soi - ne menagera aucun effort pour arriver à faire croire aux pays alliés que seule cette solution est capable de sauver la civilisation occidentale dont l'Allemagne a ainsi la garde. En menaçant le monde d'une révolution générale en Europe, les Allemands tâcheront en même temps d'obtenir à tout prix des adherents à leur "Ordre nouveau" dans une "Faneurope allemande."

Aujourd'hui, où les lignes générales de cette hypothèse semblent se réaliser entièrement, il faut constater que l'Allemagne traverse sur son front Est une crise extrêmement profonde. Elle est plus grave que les duretés de l'hiver russe dont Hitler lui-même avait brossé un tableau si réaliste au peuple allemand. En conséquence, les possibilités allemandes, en ce qui concerne une action offensive de grande envergure en 1943, seront compromises.

Les distances infinies de la Russie absorbent des forces immenses et annulent les chances d'une décision. Les Allemands, pour autant qu'ils
pourront maîtriser la situation, auront plutôt la tendance d'user les forces soviétiques précisément par le programme défensif dont je viens de parler. Mais, étant donné que le raccourcissement du front est imposé par l'adversaire et qu'il vient trop tard, il ne saurait donner aux Allemands, déjà fortement affaiblis, l'économie des forces à laquelle ils aspirent avant tout. En d'autres termes, il ne servira point à leur permettre de reconstituer de puissantes réserves.

Bien que ce ne soit pas encore la défaite, il reste acquis: (1) que les résultats de la campagne militaire allemande de 1942 se ramènent presque à zéro;

(2) que les pertes allemandes en personnel et en matériel sont déjà extrêmement lourdes;

(3) que le plan allemand de défaire la Russie au moyen d'une action offensive fait faillite.

Il leur reste pour le moment la défense sur une ligne qui sera choisie ou imposée par l'Armée Rouge.

Il est vrai qu'en Afrique du Nord s'accomplit la jonction des forces de l'Axe jusqu'ici séparées, ce qui n'exclut pas la possibilité d'une initiative passagère dans ce secteur. Gardons, cependant, l'espoir que les Alliés réussiront à l'annihiler très rapidement et qu'ils regagneront ainsi la maîtrise complète de la Méditerranée.

Nous sommes en un mot les témoins du passage de l'initiative entière dans les mains des Alliés. Ceci présage leur action offensive qui devrait se déclencher dans un avenir prochain. La rencontre historique des chefs des deux démocraties occidentales l'annonce. Une nouvelle étape s'ouvre, en ce
qui concerne la coordination des opérations militaires de tous les Alliés au cours de cette guerre. L'action débute en Afrique du Nord, qu'il faudra nettoyer avant de procéder à l'invasion du continent.

Il serait, à mon avis, stérile de faire dures et déjà des spéculations quant à la date de la victoire, tout comme il le serait également de compter que l'Allemagne déposera bientôt les armes.

Tout en reconnaissant les forces gigantesques et la résistance indomptable de la Grande-Bretagne depuis le commencement de la guerre, couronnée par la victoire brillante de la VIIIe armée; tout en reconnaissant la ténacité et les grands mérites de l'aviation et de la marine des Alliés; tout en reconnaissant l'héroïsme et la vaillance des Armées et le patriotisme des peuples soviétiques; tout en reconnaissant l'élan inébranlable et les sacrifices des forces américaines et leurs combats héroïques dans l'Extrême Orient sur terre et spécialement dans l'air et sur la mer, en prenant en considération l'importance qu'a pour toute la conduite de la guerre la lutte acharnée et infatigable de la Chine; il faudra néanmoins faire face à de nouveaux efforts et de nouveaux sacrifices.

La puissance de l'Allemagne nous a fait, au cours de cette guerre, autant de surprises qu'elle a trouvées elle-même en face de la puissance soviétique. La capacité de l'Allemagne de puiser des forces, malgré la crise si sérieuse dont elle souffre, par rapport aux réserves d'hommes, est encore considérable; il est donc nécessaire de souligner sans répit que nous sommes non seulement prêts à faire des sacrifices sans fin, mais surtout que toutes les Nations-Unies sans exception, sont unies, dans la victoire.
Hitler voit seul son salut dans la réalisation de l'hypothèse de la destruction de la Grande Coalition. A défaut de cela, plus rien ne pourrait le sauver. Le Führer se leurrer de l'espoirance qu'il répétera l'exploit de Frédéric II de Prusse lors de la Guerre de Sept Ans, lorsque ce dernier s'entrancha à Buszelwitz en attendant la fin de la coalition anti-prussienne. Mais nous avons la foi que cela ne se répétera pas au cours de cette guerre.

Toutefois, il faut constater qu'à mesure de l'approche de la victoire, l'on rencontre souvent au sein de la Coalition (si nombreuse, puisqu'elle englobe à peu près trente pays) des divergences d'opinion au sujet des conditions d'armistice ou de la paix qui s'ensuivra; or, ces divergences peuvent inciter l'ennemi à tenir et à résister.

L'unité constitue non seulement la voie qui mène à la victoire, mais aussi à une victoire rapide. L'unité par rapport aux principes seuls ne suffit même pas; elle doit exister aussi en ce qui concerne concrètement les détails.

Nous avons été témoins du dommage qu'a fait une préparation non adéquate et une étude imparfaite de toutes les alternatives du problème français en Afrique du Nord. Il serait nécessaire d'empêcher que cela ne puisse se répéter en Europe. L'invasion du Continent doit être préparée non seulement au point de vue militaire, mais également politique.

A mon avis, cette préparation devrait aller dans deux directions. Les Gouvernements des Nations-Unies devraient se mettre d'accord sur les sujets primordiaux, par l'interprétation pratique et détaillée des principes de la Charte Atlantique. Il faut éliminer les divergences d'opinion qui subsistent et élaborer une base commune en vue de l'action qui se déclenchera au moment de la libération de nos territoires, lorsque l'Allemagne aura capitulé définitivement.
Jusqu'ici, les Alliés étaient en quelque sorte retranchés derrière les généralités; la difficulté de traduire ces généralités en langage pratique, en tenant compte du côté non seulement politique mais aussi social, économique et technique des problèmes, cette difficulté-la, Messieurs, s'est avérée assez considérable.


J'y ai tenu à développer ces divers points en toute sincérité, en concluant à la nécessité d'unifier aussi bien la stratégie que la politique des Alliés. Le mémoire déjà signalé, qui avait été remis auparavant au Gouvernement britannique, fut remis au Président Roosevelt ainsi qu'aux Chef's d'État-major (Combined Chiefs of Staff). L'idée directrice de mon exposé a été d'accélérer la conduite de la guerre, au moyen d'une coordination et d'une concentration plus effective des efforts offensifs de tous les Alliés, y compris bien entendu l'Armée polonaise de 100 mille hommes qui sera sous peu prête en Proche-Orient. Après avoir établi un contact plus étroit entre l'État-major polonais et l'État-major américain, j'ai tout lieu de croire que les conceptions exposées ont été soumises à l'étude des État-majors combinés.

La deuxième idée contenue dans mon exposé s'occupait du principe de concentration, au cours de l'année présente, de l'effort de guerre contre l'Allemagne qui est et restera l'Ennemi Numéro un. Or, il apparait possible sous certaines conditions, de battre l'Allemagne cette année. Quant aux
opérations en Extrême-Orient, elles pourraient, jusqu'à un moment donné revêtir le caractère d'une action à retardement.

J'ai également eu l'occasion d'exposer l'immensité des dommages non seulement économiques et démographiques, mais aussi des torts moraux qui ont frappé les territoires occupés comme conséquence des méthodes d'extermination allemandes. Ces méthodes risquent d'avoir pour résultat qu'à mesure que la guerre va se prolonger les changements introduits par l'envahisseur produiront des fissures si profondes que la reconstruction n'en sera que plus difficile et plus compliquée. Nous devons à tout prix empêcher l'ennemi de terminer son œuvre d'extermination.

Dans chacun des pays occupés il existe une puissance dynamique qui tire sa force de leur attachement aux libertés. Utiliser cette force d'une façon appropriée, en la jetant le moment venu dans la roue des événements est non seulement une nécessité pour les Alliés ; elle est encore un devoir. C'est pour cette raison que tout le problème de l'accélération de la guerre possède un autre aspect pour nous que pour les Grands Alliés. Leurs gouvernements ne sauraient donc s'étonner si, dans nos milieux, il y a insistance sur ce point. C'est la notre rôle et, il me semble notre devoir élémentaire vis-à-vis de nations qui souffrent et que nous avons le privilège de représenter ici.

Chez le President des Etats-Unis, ce grand homme qui réunit à la fois le patriotisme américain et des vues très larges et des sentiments de fraternité pour toute l'humanité, j'ai trouvé une pleine compréhension pour ces idées.
En outre, comme initiateur des conversations entre les présidents du Conseil ici présents, j'ai informé le Président-de l'état de coopération et de coordination accompli jusqu'ici dans les travaux entre ces gouvernements. J'ai combattu une idée que l'on rencontre si souvent dans de milieux américains, – à savoir que nombreux gouvernements ne s'entendent pas entre eux et sont incapables d'arriver à un point de vue unique dans des problèmes primordiaux qui, par la nature des choses, nous sont communs. Je l'ai informé de l'existence de certaines commissions interalliées qui fonctionnent déjà à Londres et s'occupent de la répression des crimes de guerre, des problèmes relatifs à l'Armistice ainsi que de la propagande des Allemands et de leurs satellites. Le volume de cette coopération va en s'agrandissant, étant donné que tous ces gouvernements se rendent compte de l'utilité et de la nécessité de cette coopération.

En effet, je viens de recevoir un rapport très intéressant de Monsieur Van Zeeland, lequel rapport a été préparé à la suite d'une décision commune des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères. Il s'agit, en l'espèce, d'une suggestion de créer une Commission pour l'étude de la reconstruction de l'Europe de demain. Pour ma part, j'appuierai chaudement ce projet, dès que certaines questions auront été préalablement élucidées.

Le président Roosevelt a pris connaissance, avec une visible satisfaction, des résultats déjà acquis dans ce domaine et m'a prié de vous communiquer qu'il nous encourage à aller plus en avant. Le Président attache la plus grande importance à ce que nous obtenions un maximum de vues uniformes en ce qui concerne les problèmes d'apres-guerre; à ce
que les problèmes qui nous séparent puissent être réglés entre nous et que pour le moins, ils puissent se réduire à de telles proportions ou à des formules suffisamment concrètes pour que les décisions internationales éventuelles en soient un jour facilitées.

Pour ma part, je dois avouer que mes conversations à Washington m'ont confirmé dans la conviction que la mise en accord de nos points de vue, la clarification ou l'élimination de nos difficultés réciproques contribuerait dans une très vaste mesure à augmenter l'importance de tous les gouvernements établis provisoirement à Londres. Cela préjugerait d'une façon positive la réorganisation de l'Europe, fondée sur la coopération mutuelle, sur l'ordre et sur la liberté. J'ai également l'impression nette que de cela dépendra dans une large mesure non seulement l'intérêt actif du Département d'État, mais aussi du peuple américain, pour les problèmes de la reconstruction européenne.

Permettez-moi maintenant de mentionner les problèmes concrets d'après-guerre dont j'ai eu l'occasion de discuter au nom du gouvernement polonais, parce qu'ils ont un caractère européen en général. Ces problèmes sont: le problème de la punition des coupables de guerre, les problèmes dits d'Armistice, le relief et la reconstruction et, enfin, la question de l'organisation de l'Europe Centre-Orientale.

A propos de tous ces problèmes je n'ai pas manqué de souligner la nécessité qu'il y a de s'en tenir aux principes déclarés par les Nations-Unies, en soulignant que toute brèche apportée dans ces idéaux-firait par être funeste pour la cause des Alliés pendant la guerre comme après la guerre.
Je vous exposerai maintenant les points saillants des trois conférences que j'ai eues avec le President Roosevelt, dans plusieurs entretiens avec M. Sumner Welles et dans une série de conversations avec d'autres représentants du gouvernement américain.

En ce qui concerne le problème de la rétribution, j'ai insisté sur la portée non seulement morale, mais aussi politique de l'exercice réel de la justice conformément aux principes adoptés par la Déclaration interalliée du 13 janvier 1942 de St. James's Palace. Seule une justice organisée et rigoureuse, applicable aux criminels de guerre, peu importe qu'ils aient agi comme instigateurs, auteurs ou complices de l'infraction ou qu'ils aient agi par ordre supérieur ou de leur propre initiative – pourra empêcher l'anarchie et la vindicte publique. Il ne semble pas y avoir d'autre méthode pour extirper l'hitlérisme. J'ai exprimé également l'avis que, le moment venu, l'obligation d'extrader, respectivement de livrer les criminels devrait non seulement être l'affaire des Nations-Unies et bien entendu, des États vaincus, mais aussi des pays neutres. En règle générale, il semble que c'est la compétence des juridictions des pays, sur les territoires desquels les crimes ont été commis, qui devrait être admise, étant donné que c'est là le moyen le plus naturel de donner une issue légale au terrible besoin de châtiment qui se fait jour.

Le President des États-Unis, dans sa réponse, a souligné que nous devons déraciner complètement l'hitlérisme et de commencer à échafauder la paix sur ses ruines. Sa réponse était nette et ne laissait subsister aucun doute.

En ce qui regarde les questions dites d'armistice, j'ai exprimé ma conviction
qu'il faudrait considérer l'Allemagne non pas comme un partenaire après la guerre, mais comme un criminel ayant mérité ce nom par toute son activité jusqu'ici. Donc, nécessité d'un désarmement radical de l'Allemagne, non seulement militaire, mais aussi économique ; ceci comprendrait la dés-industrialisation de certaines branches et la privation de l'Allemagne de certains moyens de transport ; nécessité d'une occupation militaire s'étendant sur une période de longues années ; ré-éducation de la jeunesse allemande ; enfin, nécessité d'établir un contrôle économique permanent de l'Allemagne par la voie d'organes alliés appropriés.

A cette occasion, j'ai tenu à souligner la différence qui existe entre l'occupation des territoires centraux de l'Allemagne et ses régions-frontières. J'ai insisté sur la nécessité d'organiser un système de réstitution intégrale des biens volés ou pillés, sous quelle forme que ce soit (sans excep­tion la méthode dite "économique") et, enfin, sur la réparation des dommages entraînés directement ou indirectement par la guerre et l'occupation, - ces réparations pouvant se concentrer sur une période brève et devant être autant que possible en nature.

En accord avec les opinions du Président Roosevelt il ressort clairement que les États-Unis n'ont pas l'intention de terminer cette guerre par un Armistice ou par un traité. L'Allemagne doit se rendre sans conditions quelconques. Ensuite, il sera nécessaire de l'occuper et lui appliquer une quarantaine, même la plus severe, durant-elle même trente ans. C'est
pendant une telle période qu'il serait possible d'éduquer une nouvelle génération allemande dans un esprit démocratique.

Nous apprenons d'autre part, que le Président Roosevelt a fait une déclaration dans ce sens dans l'entrevue de Casablanca qu'il a appelée un " unconditional surrender meeting ".

Il faut ajouter que les États-Unis se préparent solidement aux tâches qui se poseront devant eux au moment de l'occupation des territoires européens par les Allies.

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En ce qui concerne le relief et la reconstruction, j'ai insisté sur ce que le relief devrait englober non seulement les produits alimentaires, mais aussi les matières premières industrielles, et outils indispensables en vue de la mise en marche des entreprises et l'emploi de la main-d'œuvre. Le relief et la reconstruction devraient englober également l'éducation et l'enseignement et, en particulier, les installations des écoles supérieures. Revêtus d'un caractère productif, plutôt qu'humanitaire, le relief et la reconstruction devraient, à mon sens, être traités comme un tout – par rapport aux territoires occupés d'Europe et notamment de l'Europe Centre-Orientale, les principes de leur administration ne devraient pas être les mêmes pour l'Allemagne que pour les Nations-Unies.

L'organisation d'une assistance énergique en Europe est considérée aux États-Unis comme un devoir moral du peuple américain. Washington est d'avis qu'il faut commencer par nourrir normalement les peuples, libérés
du joug ennemi, les habiller et les soigner, après quoi on songera aux réformes indispensables. La reconstruction économique doit sauvegarder toutes les quatres libertés, contenues dans les nombreuses déclarations de M. Roosevelt, mais les Etats-Unis seraient désireux d'éviter à tout prix l'anarchie et les désordres sur le continent d'Europe. L'instrument principal permettant de maîtriser le chaos d'après-guerre est le relief et la reconstruction. Ils sont considérés non seulement comme action humanitaire et économique, mais aussi comme une arme de la démocratie, comme un atout important, politique et éducationnel, surtout dans les territoires des nations ennemies.

Le Gouverneur Lehman, un homme à vues larges, m'a déclaré que le relief et la reconstruction engloberont non seulement les articles d'alimentation et les matières de première nécessité, mais les matières premières industrielles, outils etc. M. Lehman a distingué trois périodes :

1) la période de secours et d'alimentation ;
2) la période de rehabilitation qui donnera aux populations les moyens d'établir leurs ateliers de travail, en leur permettant le retour à la vie normale,
3) la période de stabilisation ou période de paix, qui donnera la possibilité d'une prise en considération plus large des bases d'une coopération internationale, en vertu d'un accord nouveau. Le Bureau qu'il organise en ce moment, n'a rien de commun avec la mission Hoover, telle quelle existait après la dernière guerre ; il s'agit, en l'espèce, d'un office dans
le Département d'État. Son ambition est de préparer les produits alimentaires, le matériel, les transports par bateaux-de telle manière que les secours puissent arriver immédiatement.

Des conversations avec le sous-secrétaire d'État M. Adolf Berle, il résulte que les États-Unis se rendent bien compte des énormes implications économique-politiques que comporte un planning dans le domaine du relief et de la reconstruction.

Je crois que ces derniers peuvent servir de point de départ pour un programme nouveau de consolidation en Europe. Ils auront sans doute un caractère constructif et productif, ce qui veut dire que dès le début ils permettront de développer sur le continent les centres de production alimentaire et d'articles de première nécessité, afin que le besoin du transport par mer puisse être réduit au minimum.

A Washington, comme à Londres, on songe à considérer le système des communications des régions du relief comme un ensemble ; on songe également à éviter que le chaos dans les monnaies et les devises ne puisse gêner l'exécution du programme du relief. Les tarifs douaniers élevés par rapport aux articles du relief etc. ne devraient non plus devenir un obstacle.

En tout cas, l'on voit bien combien sont profondes les implications du programme du relief.

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J'ai déjà mentionné ma suggestion quant à englober la question de l'éducation et celle de la reconstruction de l'enseignement dans le cadre d'un programme de relief et de reconstruction. Or, sur l'initiative de l'Université de New-York, j'ai présenté à Mr. Roosevelt qui a chargé Mr. Lehman de le réaliser, un projet de création d'un Institut international d'Éducation dans lequel ne prendront part que les membres des Nations-Unies. Cet institut serait établi sur une base analogue comme p.ex. le Bureau International du Travail. Son but serait de préparer et d'exécuter un plan pour reconstruire l'enseignement et l'éducation morale en Europe, et pour y fortifier les idées démocratiques. J'ai également appuyé le projet de la création d'un fond de cent millions de dollars pour la couverture des frais de reconstruction des établissements d'enseignement et de rééducation de la jeunesse, que la démoralisation hitlérienne empoissonne aujourd'hui dans les pays occupés. Enfin, j'ai eu l'occasion de soumettre un projet de la création d'une École supérieure de Reconstruction pour l'Europe, où pourraient étudier des Polonais, Grecs, Tchécoslovaques, Yougoslaves etc., bref les ressortissants des nations opprimées par l'Allemagne et ses satellites. Cette école aurait pour but de préparer des experts en vue de l'administration et l'enseignement, tout en facilitant le rapprochement idéologique et culturel des pays situés dans une région où ils sont appelés à coopérer de la façon la plus étroite entre eux.

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Permettez-moi, Messieurs, de m'arrêter un instant aux problèmes de l'organisation de la paix en Europe Centrale et Orientale.

J'ai pu, à Londres, formuler à plus d'une reprise, le projet d'une fédération dans cette région de l'Europe, dont le point de départ a été : la Déclaration polono-tchécoslovaque du 11 novembre 1940. Plus tard, il y eut la Déclaration gréco-vousgoslave de janvier 1942. Auprès du Gouvernement Britannique ces projets ont trouvé un écho favorable et un appui. M. Eden y a donné publiquement expression plusieurs fois, et en particulier dans son discours de Leamington, du 26 septembre et celui du 2 décembre 1942 ; il a en même temps toujours souligné que la fédération demeure conforme aux principes de la Charte Atlantique, pourvu qu'elle n'ait un caractère exclusif. D'autres membres du Gouvernement Britannique, comme Sir Stafford Cripps ou Mr. Ernest Bevin ont, de leur côté, marqué, à plusieurs reprises, leur approbation de cette idée à laquelle l'opinion d'ici demeure favorable.

Pour ma part, j'attache la plus haute importance à cette attitude du Gouvernement Britannique, comme c'est la Grande Bretagne qui par la nature des choses sera appelée à collaborer d'une façon organique et permanente avec notre Continent.

Encouragé par cela, et étant sincèrement convaincu qu'il est nécessaire que l'Europe Centrale et Orientale s'organise dans cet esprit, j'ai exposé au President Roosevelt les principes généraux, sur lesquels à mon sens un schéma d'une fédération des nations habitant cette partie de l'Europe pourrait s'appuyer.
J'ai présenté le problème au Président par son coté négatif comme
par celui positif.

L'Europe Centrale-Orientale est sortie libre de la dernière guerre,
mais économiquement non organisée et disjoints. Elle est devenue de ce fait
rapidement la victime de la renaissance de l'expansion économique allemande.
Ce danger pourra se reproduire après cette guerre, si ce n'est tout de suite,
du moins plus tard.

Les nations qui habitent cette région ont leur vieille culture et
leurs traditions. Elles ont le droit naturel de vivre libres et d'organiser
librement leurs relations, - un droit reconnu par la Charte Atlantique.
Or, étant donné les conditions géographiques, économiques et ethniques de
cette partie du monde, ce droit peut être réalisé d'une manière plus affi-
cace, si cette région se trouve organisée pour ainsi dire, en tant qu'un
ensemble.

Plusieurs pays étant restés en arrière au point de vue économique,
il se pose pour eux le problème de l'industrialisation sur une vaste échel-
le et selon les principes d'un planning à longue échéance, ce qui voudrait
dire que cette action devrait être entreprise sans délai, lors du relief et
de la reconstruction. Une fédération ne devrait nullement avoir pour but
de créer une espèce de " cordon sanitaire " contre qui que ce soit, sinon
en face de l'Allemagne. Au contraire, l'un des buts d'une fédération de-
rait être une collaboration étroite avec l'U.S.S.R. qui, dès le début,
ne devrait pas rester étrangère aux entretiens dans ce domaine et devrait
r ester constamment informée de leur développement.

Je crois, en effet, qu'attirer la Russie à la cooperation européenne est un de ces principes devant trouver une application pratique continue dans l'organisation de l'Europe d'après-guerre.

Il n'est pas non plus, le but d'une telle fédération de sauver de la destruction des éléments fachistes ou pro-hitlériens, surtout en Hongrie et en Roumanie. Bien au contraire, l'une des principales conditions de la réussite et de la solidité d'un régime fédératif serait l'élimination de ces éléments. Le problème paysan dans ces régions est particulièrement enflammé et je m'imagine que sa solution au moyen d'une réforme agraire substantielle contribuerait sans doute à nettoyer l'atmosphère politique dans ces pays.

Une fédération ou une confédération n'est pas et ne peut pas être conçue, pour des raisons de principe et constitutionnelles, comme un instrument d'impérialisme ouvert ou caché. Un organisme, composé d'un grand nombre de groupements ethniques, en serait du reste organiquement incapable.

Nous nous réunirions ainsi, en réalisant une tâche que semble commander l'histoire, - d'égal à égal, et de libres à libres .... La renonciation à un fragment donné de la souveraineté nationale peut à cette occasion avoir lieu uniquement au profit d'une organisation supérieure commune, mais jamais au profit d'une puissance étrangère.

L'organisme fédératif serait avant tout conçu comme une entité de coopération économique, ayant pour but d'élever le bien-être et de sauvagar-
der la paix. Les mêmes idéals, et au possible une organisation analogue avec bien entendu toutes les modifications requises - qui ont inspiré le régime des États-Unis pourrait trouver ici leur application. Il faut tendre vers la communauté en matière de tarifs douaniers (mais en laissant les douanes à l'intérieur, pendant une période de transition et dans un cadre restreint), il faut tendre vers la communauté des devises, des chemins de fer, des postes. Il faut stimuler la libre migration des hommes et des capitaux. Il faut établir un plan commun d'investissements qui donneraient seulement au schéma fédéral un contenu vivant et reel.

A Washington, j'ai souligné que le principe fédéral pourrait utilement trouver en Europe une application non seulement dans la partie de l'Europe qui vient d'être mentionnée, mais aussi dans d'autres régions.

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Dans ces conversations de Washington j'ai rencontré un écho très vif, une compréhension et de la sympathie pour des conceptions de ce genre. On nous y encourage à chaque pas d'étudier ces problèmes et de formuler concrètement des plans (autant que possible après consultation avec d'autres gouvernements et, s'il devait être impossible d'arriver à un accord, d'en connaître au moins les points divergents). Il s'agit donc à la fois de fixer les points qui nous unissent en la matière et ceux qui nous separent, de telle manière qu'un plan puisse être présenté et conformément auquel nos nations verrai leurs relations mutuelles sauvegardées a l'avenir d'une façon permanente. J'ai lieu de croire que le Gouvernement des États-Unis serait alors
préfère prendre sa part dans les efforts d'obtenir une solution constructive du problème dans cette partie de l'Europe, dans le cadre d'un arrangement mondial général. Il semble du reste que cette façon de voir serait conforme aux opinions qui ont été mises en avant par les milieux officiels britanniques.

Puis-je enfin ajouter comme parenthèse que j'ai pu constater la forte impression qu'ont produit aux États-Unis la déclaration polono-tchécoslovaque du 11 septembre 1940 et gréco-yougoslave de janvier 1942 ; de même que les résolutions de la Conférence agraire des pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale. L'opinion publique des États-Unis y voit l'apport le plus constructif en matière des problèmes d'après-guerre.

Et maintenant, permettez-moi, Messieurs, de tirer de mes impressions aux États-Unis quelques conclusions d'ordre général : Tous les problèmes d'après-guerre sont envisagés aux États-Unis par leur côté économique. On y tend de résoudre les problèmes politiques avant tout par des moyens économiques. C'est ainsi que le désarmement et la pacification de l'Allemagne seraient accomplis dans une large mesure par le désarmement économique. La paix serait sauvegardée avant tout par l'élevation des standards de vie des masses des travailleurs et grâce à la coopération mutuelle économique entre nations. Les fédérations sont d'ores lors envisagées en Amérique avant tout comme des organismes servant à augmenter le bien-être général et à stimuler la collaboration économique. Le relief et la reconstruction sont fondés sur une conception économique et non seulement humanitaire.
L'idée en vertu de laquelle les terrains d'Europe fusionneraient pour ainsi dire dans un sens économique me semble faire de grands progrès de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique. On y attache la plus haute importance au problème de resserrer notre coopération et la coordination de nos intérêts, étant donné que c'est la meilleure garantie d'éviter en Europe d'après-guerre la règle de l'anarchie.

Les nations qui aiment et honorent la liberté non seulement collective mais aussi la liberté individuelle doivent se décider pour des idéals et intérêts supérieurs communs, afin que réellement puisse s'établir une sorte d'ordre international supérieur sur le Continent d'Europe que l'hitérisme a détruit. C'est là, semble-t-il, le plus puissant moyen pour nous préserver de la faiblesse et garantir aux peuples d'Europe un avenir meilleur.

En face du développement rapide des événements militaires il est nécessaire de quitter le terrain des généralités et passer aux détails, aux formules concrètes, surtout en matière économique.

Voici, Messieurs, dans leurs lignes générales, l'aspect européen de mes entretiens à Washington ; j'ai éliminé de mon exposé les questions strictement polonaises qui ont bien entendu absorbé une bonne partie de mon temps au cours de mon dernier voyage. J'ajouterai seulement qu'en parlant de mon pays, j'ai insisté non seulement sur l'effroyable martyre du pays occupé mais encore sur la lutte implacable, tenace et courageuse que la Pologne a entrepris contre l'envahisseur.
J'ai exposé le résultat acquis par nos Forces Armées et les plans en ce qui concerne notre participation ultérieure dans la guerre, les plans de l'organisation de notre vie économique et sociale après la guerre que nous voulons voir fondée sur une large base démocratique.

J'ai également eu des entretiens fort intéressants avec des Polonais d'Amérique. Comme vous le savez, Messieurs, nous avons aux États-Unis une vieille et importante émigration. Il serait ardu d'en déterminer le chiffre exact, en raison de l'absence de statistiques précises, mais on peut l'évaluer actuellement à environ 5 millions de ressortissants américains de provenance polonaise. C'est une population imbue d'un fort patriotisme à l'égard de sa nouvelle patrie, mais qui est en même temps conscience et fière de son origine. Ce sont des ouvriers et des agriculteurs et une nouvelle génération de la " intelligentsia ". Dans beaucoup de centres de l'industrie de guerre ils se trouvent plus de 30% de Polonais, - ainsi à Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo etc. Ils travaillent avec enthousiasme pour la cause commune, sentant en même temps qu'ils travaillent aussi pour leur ancienne Patrie qui souffre aujourd'hui. Les Polonais d'Amérique, démocrates ou républicains, sont en général partisans du Président Roosevelt. Au Congrès de Washington, ils appuient la politique d'une conduite énergique de la guerre et ils veulent gagner la paix.

Dans le mouvement ouvrier, les Polonais montrent également une grande activité.
L'on constate avec satisfaction que le mouvement ouvrier américain, non sans la collaboration de leurs camarades polonais, pense sérieusement à la reconstruction de l'Europe. Imbus d'un sens profondément démocratique, ils suivent cette question avec un intérêt particulier et je dirais même avec sentiment. Le mouvement ouvrier américain veut que, non seulement les travailleurs américains soient les bénéficiaires des quatre libertés, mais que les Européens en profitent également. Or, le mouvement ouvrier des États-Unis exerce et exercera certainement à l'avenir un rôle important.

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Comme l'on sait, j'ai fait, au cours de mon séjour aux États-Unis, une visite au Mexique. Je m'y suis rendu à la suite d'une invitation du Président Cárdenas, non seulement afin de discuter la question de l'asile pour 20,000 malheureux Polonais, évacués de Russie, ce que nous avons obtenu, mais aussi pour établir des contacts politiques avec les pays de l'Amérique Latine, ce à quoi le Président Roosevelt m'avait encouragé à faire.

Les États latino-américains ont interprété cette visite, la première qu'un chef d'un Gouvernement européen faisait au Mexique, comme un geste à l'adresse de l'Amérique latine. Dans un discours que j'ai prononcé conjointement avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Monsieur Padilla, aux pays sud-américains nous avons insisté sur le danger allemand dans la constellation mondiale.

Au Mexique, j'ai pu constater un très grand progrès en ce qui concerne la stabilisation politique et l'essor économique de ce pays, et de
tous les entretiens avec les hommes politiques latino-américains, j'ai tiré l'impression qu'ils étaient désireux d'intensifier leurs relations avec les pays du continent européen.

Il me semble qu'il serait un tort de minimiser l'importance et les possibilités potentielles du jeune continent latin qui a fait au cours de cette guerre des progrès énormes aussi bien au point de vue industriel qu'à celui de la collaboration mutuelle ainsi que de la stabilisation politique. La coopération politique avec ce continent dont l'importance ira en croissant, est donc d'une haute importance. Je n'ai pas besoin d'insister sur l'importance économique de ces relations après la guerre.

Voilà, Messieurs, ce dont j'ai voulu vous rendre compte de mon voyage. J'exprime l'espoir ardent que nous allons suivre de très près ce que l'on pense dans les milieux de Washington en continuant d'une manière toujours plus étroite et plus effective notre coopération.
My dear Mr. President:

I have just received from the Polish Ambassador the communication from General Sikorski attached herewith.

In accordance with the authorization you gave me when I talked with you last week, I have told the Polish Ambassador that you would receive him the latter part of this week. I believe you will wish to read this message from General Sikorski before you see the Ambassador.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
1) General Sikorski expresses his thanks to the President for his friendly understanding of the gravity of the situation created in Polish-Soviet relations by the sudden and illegal decision of the Soviet Government to withdraw Polish citizenship of the Polish deportees in Soviet Russia.

2) The General lays great hope in the President's intervention in this matter and realizes that the choice of time and method for this intervention must be entirely left to the President's decision.

3) At the same time, General Sikorski takes the liberty to point out the importance of the element of time. It appears to him inevitable that delay in defining an appropriate attitude on the part of the United States and Great Britain cannot fail to encourage the creation of accomplished facts detrimental to Poland's rights and interests and difficult to readjust in the future.

4) The Polish Government will remain calm being aware that this new attempt on the part of the Soviet Government to exercise pressure on the Polish Government must be regarded as a direct result of the present military successes of the Red Army which may be of a temporary nature.
5) Soviet tactics at present consist in depriving the Polish deportees of relief and in treating them as hostages - in anticipation that such action would undoubtedly arouse the Polish community.

This action has as its ultimate purpose to prepare the way for pressure on the Polish Government with regard to the problem of Poland's Eastern boundaries.

It makes the situation of the Polish Government especially difficult at a time when it has to encourage the population in occupied Poland to keep up its heroic resistance to German pressure and to German promises to renounce all terrorism in exchange for collaboration of the Polish population in the struggle against "the Soviet danger."

6) The refusal to grant permits to leave the USSR to the families of Polish officers and enlisted men, as well as orphans, and the threat to deprive them of further relief, causes great bitterness particularly in the ranks of the Polish Army in the Middle East and may seriously affect its morale.

Washington, February 8, 1943.
February 9, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

With reference to our conversation last week in which you said you would be glad to receive the Polish Ambassador sometime after the middle of this week, I enclose for your information a copy of a letter I received from the Ambassador containing information which he requested be passed on to you.

The report from the Ambassador contains rather detailed information relative to the recent arrest of Polish Food Distribution delegates and the closing of Polish relief supply stores in the Soviet Union. This action is somewhat similar to the action taken last summer by the Soviet authorities when they arrested over one hundred Polish Food Distribution delegates on charges of espionage.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
From Polish Ambassador dated February 8, 1943, with enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
The Polish Ambassador has received on February 7th, 1943, the following telegraphic information from Count Raczyński in London, relating to the further developments resulting from the situation in Polish-Soviet relations in consequence of the decision on the part of the Soviets to withdraw Polish citizenship of the Polish deportees in Soviet Russia.

1) Up to January 31, 1943, the Soviet Government has closed 13 relief supply stores supervised by the men of trust of the Polish Embassy in Kuybishev and has demanded the closing of further 7 stores. These stores supplied the needs of 30,000 persons.

2) Furthermore, the Soviet Government has liquidated the auxiliary personnel of 13 men of trust of the Polish Embassy for relief in Russia and has ordered the liquidation of further 13 centers supervised by such men, thereby rendering impossible the relief of another 35,000 people.

In four specific cases the men of trust of the Polish Embassy for relief work have been informed by the Soviet authorities that they are to cease their work because it is henceforth regarded as illegal. As the latter four centers looked after the relief of over 3,000 persons, therefore the total number of deportees affected by the above mentioned orders has now reached about some 70,000 people.
3) The closing of central supply stores of the Polish Embassy in Kuybishev, containing supplies valued over one million dollars, makes it impossible for the dispatch of aid and relief to various relief centers. The Polish Embassy in Kuybishev has intervened in this matter as in all the cases mentioned above relating to the centers in other districts supervised by Polish men of trust.

4) All Polish citizens in Semipalatynsk have been summoned and ordered to transfer to kolhoz farms. The man of trust looking after them in Semipalatynsk has been arrested and the stores under his supervision have been liquidated, while his personnel was dispersed. This order affects 1,192 women, 628 children and 303 invalids, all mostly belonging to the Polish intelligentsia.

5) The Soviet authorities have started to register Polish citizens, noting specially the dates when they have arrived in the USSR. and where they were in November, 1939.

6) Of the 597 children grouped at Ashabad in view of their evacuation from Russia to Iran, only some 60 have left. The Soviet authorities have refused the right to evacuate the remainder of the children and their guardians regardless of the fact that they had previously agreed to the evacuation of 600 children from Ashabad.
7) Contrary to the promise given to the Polish Embassy in Kuybishev of returning the archives confiscated at the time of the arrest of the relief delegates to the Embassy, these documents are being returned to the men of trust of the Embassy in various localities who have no possibility of transferring them to the Embassy.

As the liquidation of the offices of the men of trust in question is taking place and all their stores and documents are being liquidated, these archives will either be lost or will once again find themselves in the hands of the Soviet authorities.

Washington, January 8th, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:

At General Sikorski's request

1/
I am forwarding you hereto attached a

I am forwarding you hereto attached a

copy of the General's confidential

copy of the General's confidential

address delivered on January 28, 1943

to a meeting of the Prime Minister and

to a meeting of the Prime Minister and

Foreign Ministers of the Allied Govern-

Foreign Ministers of the Allied Govern-

ment established in London. I am also

government established in London. I am also

attaching (a) a resumé of the main

attaching (a) a resumé of the main

points in this address, and (b) a copy

points in this address, and (b) a copy

of my despatch on the reactions thereto

of my despatch on the reactions thereto

of Allied Governmental and Russian diplo-

of Allied Governmental and Russian diplo-

matic quarters here.

matic quarters here.

With warmest regards and every good

With warmest regards and every good

wish, I am

wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Faithfully yours,

Tony Blader

Tony Blader

The President

The President

The White House,

The White House,

Washington.

Washington.

Enclosures:

Enclosures:

1/, 2/, & 3/: address, Resumé and despatch, as stated.
Subject: Referring to my despatch Polish Series No. 262, January 20, 1943, and my cable Polish Series No. 3, January 28, midnight; attaching copies of an address delivered by General Sikorski on January 28, 1943, to meeting of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Allied Governments (also resume of main points thereof); my observations (a) on the immediate and secondary reactions of certain Ministers present; and (b) on the general atmosphere caused by Russia's attitude towards the "Middle Zone".

FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER-SECRETARY.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch Polish Series No. 262, January 20, 1943, regarding Russia's opposition to federation in the "Middle Zone", and to my cable Polish Series No. 3, January 28, midnight, regarding the Russian note of January 16, 1943, to effect that Moscow considered all Poles in Russia now Russian citizens; I have the honor to forward the attached copies of an address delivered by General Sikorski, January 28, 1943, to a meeting of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the Allied Governments established here, as well as a Resume of the main points of the address, and herein to report my observations (a) on the immediate and secondary reactions of certain Ministers present, and (b) on the general atmosphere caused by Russia's attitude towards the "Middle Zone".

General Sikorski, as host of the aforementioned meeting, had invited as observers the British Ambassador to the Polish Government, Sir Cecil Dormer, Russian Ambassador to the Allied Governments, M. Bogomolov, and myself. Ambassador Bogomolov's presence marked his
initial attendance at these meetings.

Immediate reactions to the General's address:

During the General's reading of his address I sat between him and the Russian Ambassador. Feeling in advance that the General might possibly touch on points likely to irritate the Russian point of view, I was not surprised when this turned out to be the case, nor was I surprised to note Bogomolov's consequent expression of annoyance, particularly at two points of the address: (a) at the General's mention of having been requested by the Allied Governments to represent their views to President Roosevelt; and (b) at the General's emphasis on the importance of federations in the "Middle Zone". At these junctures the faces of the other Ministers present bore signs of a steadied attempt to reveal no sense of emotion or interest; their eyes were rigidly fixed either on the tips of their shoes or on the floor directly in front of them. They were all obviously conscious of the implications of the General's remarks, as well as of the Russian Ambassador's antagonism.

Russian Ambassador's immediate reactions: His flat statement re - Russian opposition to federations in "Middle Zone".

The instant that the General had finished his speech, Bogomolov crossed the room to Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Kleffens. Referring to Sikorski's remarks concerning his having been asked by the Allied Governments to represent their views to the President, Bogomolov said that he had been led to understand that Van Kleffens had assured his Embassy that General Sikorski had not been authorized to represent the Allied Governments - and here was Sikorski still claiming to have been authorized. In response, Van Kleffens reiterated his former assurances: that since Sikorski had talked with most of the Allied officials before his departure he was able to tell the President some of their general thoughts on post-war problems, but that he had not been officially authorized to represent them. Bogomolov thereupon said he had noted the General's persistent emphasis on the importance of federations in the "Middle Zone". As far as his country was concerned, he could flatly state that "Russia was utterly opposed to this idea, in fact Russia simply would not have it!".*

Russian Ambassador's secondary reactions: Remarks re - the 1939 Polish-Russian frontier and re - Vilna and Lwow, "two Soviet cities".

A few days later I had luncheon alone with Bogomolov at/  

* This marked the first time, to my knowledge, that the Ambassador had come out openly on this subject to an official of any Government other than of the "Middle Zone".
at his house. After luncheon, Madame Bogomolov joined us for coffee. In the course of conversation the Ambassador referred to "Polish post-war aspirations". He said that according to the recent flood of propaganda articles** in the Polish press and other Allied periodicals, as well as to a brochure by Dr. Marian Seyda entitled "POLAND AND GERMANY AND THE POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION", it seemed to him that "the eyes of our Polish friends were becoming larger than ever". Turning to Madame Bogomolov, he remarked that the Poles were now claiming that post-war Poland should include not only Western Germany up to the Oder, as well as East Prussia and Lithuania, but that they were even insisting upon "the restoration of the 1939 eastern frontier" including Vilna and Lwow "both Soviet cities"*** Insistence on the frontier question and upon the restoration of these two cities represented, to his mind, the most preposterous dream of all. The Ambassador thereupon remarked to me that he had recently seen a map drawn up by some of the Polish propagandists here, which included Berlin within Poland's post-war frontiers. This was equally as fantastic, he added, as Dr. Seyda's proposal that the Poles should be entrusted with the occupation of the eastern part of Germany, and the Czechs with that of the area of Germany contiguous with Czechoslovakia.

Netherlands Foreign Minister's secondary reaction to Sikorski's address and his annoyance with the character of Polish propaganda.

In subsequent conversation with Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Kleffens, he referred again to Sikorski's report. While in all aspects it had interested him intensely, he felt it would have been more tactful, and perhaps even more effective, if Sikorski had handled several of the points concerned in a confidential talk with Bogomolov, rather than to have brought them up in the presence of the other Allied Ministers. He thereupon referred to a recent article in the British press which had stated in effect that under the chairmanship of General Sikorski a meeting of the Allied Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers had taken place; that the General had reported on his visit to the United States where, in behalf of his own and the Allied Governments, he had discussed with the President a number of post-war problems of common interest to these Governments. As a result of this article, the Minister said, the Russian Embassy had telephoned him to ascertain whether he was aware of the source of information contained. He had replied in the negative, although he felt that the Polish Ministry of Information would have been a "pretty good guess". He went on to say that in view of Moscow's known feelings/

** This marked the first occasion on which the Ambassador had openly stated, in my presence, that Moscow considered Vilna and Lwow Soviet cities.

*** In view of their important bearing both on the trend of Polish thought, and on increasing Russian antagonism, I shall refer at greater length to these publications in a supplementary despatch.
feeling, he considered this sort of press propaganda merely provocative. Indeed, the Poles, in his opinion, had gone too far with this line of approach. He had accordingly sent the Polish Government word to this effect. As for himself, he did not like being placed in a position whereby his presence, as Netherlands Foreign Minister at the aforementioned meetings was exploited for Polish political purposes vis-a-vis the Russians. His Government's relations with Moscow were good, and he did not intend to have them spoiled by involvement in a Polish-Russian quarrel. He would express his own Government's views in good time, if and when Russia showed signs of exercising a "territorial appetite". He was now even considering not attending the next meeting of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers.

Norwegian Foreign Minister's secondary reaction:

For that matter, Van Kleffens continued, Norwegian Foreign Minister Lie was also considering absenting himself. The latter had just received confirmation that rumors, which for some time had been in circulation to effect that Lie was a communist, had been deliberately inspired by Polish Government quarters. Lie had long been aware of Polish attempts to bring his Government into a collective demonstration vis-a-vis the Russians. Equally was he aware of consequent Polish annoyance with his refusal to permit the Norwegian Government to become involved in a Polish-Russian quarrel. He therefore marked this "Communist" allegation down to a characteristic Polish machination to discredit the individual who refrained from serving the Polish purpose. My subsequent talk with Prime Minister Lie bore out the foregoing disclosure with Netherlands Foreign Minister.

Unfavorable secondary reactions of the Greek, Czechoslovak and Belgian Foreign Ministers to those parts of Sikorski's speech which were obviously offensive to Russian sensibilities.

In subsequent talks with other Ministers, including the Greek, Czechoslovak and Belgian Foreign Ministers, each took occasion to express his misgivings regarding the manner in which General Sikorski had advanced certain points on which Moscow was not to be supersensitive. They each felt that Sikorski would have done better to have stressed these points to Bogomolov confidentially.

Indications of growing uncertainty among Allied Governments as to shape of things to come and as to their role therein.

These signs of annoyance on the part of the Allied Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers with what they term "misguided Polish political tactics" throws into sharp relief the disturbing bearing of Polish-Russian differences/
differences and the far-reaching bearing of the causes thereof. As a result there is a distinct undercurrent of growing uncertainty in Allied Governmental circles as to the shape of things to come, as to their part in planning it and as to the role they are subsequently to play therein. Aside from the Poles, whose natural tendency vis-a-vis the Russians is to assume the initiative regardless of the potential psychological effect, there is now a growing feeling among the other Governments concerned (especially those of the "Middle Zone") that until an understanding would have been reached between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and M. Stalin, definitely settling the question of Russia's post-war "security frontiers", post-war planning along political and economic lines would be of little, if any, use.****

Respectfully yours,

A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.

AJDBJr:GMT

In triplicate.

Enclosures:

1/ and 2/ as stated.

**** Only last night, February 14, "Radio Paris" in its 6.30 p.m. news and commentary broadcast, threw off on the Allied Governments established here. Among other unfavorable comments concerning them, the broadcast stated that the "emigré" Governments had very recently been made aware that they must not expect any move to oppose Soviet aims in Europe; that there would be no American or British soldiers to obstruct these aims. There followed an unflattering skit on the individual Governments and an estimate of the effect of this situation on each of them. This was concluded by a statement that the personality in the worst predicament of all was "poor General Sikorski".
Enclousure No. 2 to Despatch Polish Series No. 267, February 9, 1943, from the Embassy at London.

Resumé of main points of General Sikorski's address delivered on January 28, 1943.

The first part of the report consists, in effect, of a tour of the military horizon: the General maintained the war had entered a new phase, thanks to the heroism of the Soviet Armies. The initiative was now passing progressively, but surely, into the hands of the Allies. In a memorandum he had prepared two months previously, he had written his opinion that when Hitler and his General Staff became convinced that total German victory was excluded, they would decide to adopt a defensive program on all fronts of the European continent; that in passing to the defensive Germany would endeavour to create conditions capable of convincing the Allies that blood spilled in a war of attrition was spilled in vain. They would thus aim to persuade the Allies to cease hostilities and accept the idea of a compromise peace by way of an international arrangement; that on this hypothesis German propaganda would spare no effort towards convincing the Allies that only this solution was capable of saving western civilisation whereof Germany was thus the protector.

Today, when the general lines of this hypothesis seemed to have been fully realised, it was necessary to observe that Germany was experiencing a very serious crisis on her eastern front. It was more grave than the hardships of the Russian winter, of which Hitler himself had so realistically painted a picture to the German people. Consequently German possibilities as regards an offensive action of great span in 1943 would be compromised.

The vast distances in Russia were absorbing immense forces and they annulled the opportunities for a decision in order that the Germans might master the situation. Inasmuch as the Germans could master the situation they would have more of a tendency to wear out the Soviet forces by the aforementioned defensive program. But, in that the shortening of the front was imposed by the adversary, and in that it came too late, it would not give the Germans, already considerably weakened, the economy of forces to which above all they aspired. In other words, it would not allow them to reconstruct powerful reserves.

Although this was not yet the defeat, it remained a fact that the results of the German military campaign of 1942 had netted approximately zero; (b) that German losses in personnel and material were already extremely heavy; and (c) that the German plan to defeat Russia by offensive action had failed. There remained for them, for the moment, defence on a line which would be either chosen or imposed by the Red Army.

It
It was true that in North Africa there had been accomplished the junction of Axis forces hitherto separated, a condition which did not exclude the possibility of a passing initiative in this sector. Let us hope, however, that the Allied would succeed in rapidly annihilating these forces and that they would regain complete mastery of the Mediterranean. We were in a word the witnesses of the passing of the entire initiative into the hands of the Allies.

Unity amongst the United Nations constituted not only the way which led to victory, but also to a rapid victory. Unity as regards principles alone was not sufficient. It was also necessary that unity existed as regards the working out of details.

We had witnessed the damage caused by an insufficient preparation and an inadequate study of all alternatives in the French problem in North Africa. It would be necessary to prevent this being repeated in Europe. The invasion of the continent must necessarily be prepared not only from the military but equally from the political point of view.

In his opinion this preparation would necessarily follow two lines. The United Nations' Governments would have to find agreement on points of primary consideration through the practical and detailed interpretation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It would be necessary to eliminate divergences of opinion which existed and to elaborate a common basis in view of the action which would be required at the moment of the liberation of the territories concerned, when Germany would have definitely capitulated. Hitherto the Allies had in a way confined themselves to generalities; the difficulty to translate these generalities into practical language, in taking into account not only the political but also the social, economic and technical aspects of problems, had proven a great one.


The General had gone to Washington in a double role: as Commander in Chief of the Polish forces and as Polish Prime Minister. He had at the same time been asked by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers present to disclose to President Roosevelt certain problems which had engaged their common interests.

He had submitted to President Roosevelt and to the combined Chiefs of Staff his aforementioned memorandum, which had previously been submitted to the British Government. The guiding idea of his statement had been to accelerate the conduct of the war by means of a more effective coordination and concentration of offensive efforts by all the Allies.
The second idea contained in his statement concerned the principle of concentration, in the course of the current year, of the war effort against Germany which would remain enemy number one. But it would appear possible, under certain conditions, to defeat Germany this year. As for operations in the Far East, they could assume a character of a delaying action.

In each of the occupied countries there existed a dynamic power which drew its force from its desire for liberty. To use this force in an appropriate manner was not only a necessity for the Allies, it was also a duty. It was for this reason that the whole problem of the acceleration of the war constituted for the Allied Governments an aspect other than what it constituted for the Allied Governments an aspect other than what it constituted for the Major Allies. The Governments of the latter would not then be astonished if in Allied Governmental circles there were insistence on this point.

In the President of the United States, that great man who united at the same time American patriotism and broad views and sentiments of brotherhood for the whole of humanity, the General had found a full comprehension of these ideas. Furthermore, as the initiator of conversations between the Prime Ministers present, the General had informed the President of the state of cooperation and coordination hitherto accomplished in the work between these Governments. He contested an idea that one found so frequently among American circles - to consider that a number of Governments could not agree amongst themselves and were incapable of arriving at an agreement in problems of primary importance which by the nature of things were common to all of them. He had informed the President of the existence of certain inter-allied commissions which were already functioning in London, and were occupied with the following problems: the repression of war crimes, problems concerning the armistice as well as the propaganda of the Germans and their satellites.

In effect he had just received a very interesting report from M. van Zeeland which had been prepared following a unanimous decision of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It concerned a suggestion to create a commission for the study of the reconstruction of the Europe of tomorrow. For his part he would heartily support this project as soon as certain questions had first been elucidated.

President Roosevelt listened with a discernible sense of satisfaction to the results already achieved in this domain and he asked me to communicate to the assembled Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers a message of encouragement for us to go on with the work.
The President attached the greatest importance to our obtaining a maximum of uniform views concerning post-war problems; to our ability to solve problems which divided us or at least to reduce them to such proportions, or to formulas sufficiently concrete for eventually international decisions one day to be facilitated.

For his part he had to declare that his conversations in Washington had confirmed him in the conviction that the setting in accord of the Allied Governmental points of view, the clarification or the elimination of their reciprocal difficulties, would contribute in a very large measure to augment the importance of all the Governments provisionally established in London. They would prejudice in a positive way the reorganization of Europe founded on mutual cooperation in a secure and liberal order. He had equally the definite impression that this would depend in a large measure not only on the active interest of the Department of State but also on the American people, for these problems of European construction.

Concrete post-war problems.

The General went on to mention concrete problems for after the war which he had had the opportunity to discuss in the name of the Polish Government. He mentioned them because he felt they bore a European character in general. These problems were: the punishment of the war-guilty, armistice terms, relief and reconstruction, and finally the question of the organization of central-Eastern Europe.

Main points of his three conferences with the President and of several conversations with the Under-Secretary of State and of a series of conversations with other representatives of our Government.

As regards the problem of retribution, he insisted on the extent, not only moral but also political, of the real exercise of justice conforming to the principles adopted by the Inter-Allied Declaration of January 13, 1942 at St. James's Palace.

In response, President Roosevelt had emphasised that we had to eradicate Hitlerism completely and to erect the peace on these ruins. His reply was definite and left no doubt.

As regards the question of an armistice, the General had expressed his conviction that it would be necessary to consider Germany not as a partner after the war, but as a criminal having merited its name by its activities up to that point. Hence the necessity for a radical disarmament of Germany, not only military but also economic; this would comprise
the deindustrialisation of certain branches
and the deprivation of certain means of transport;
the necessity for a military occupation extending
over a period of years; the re-education of
German youth; finally the necessity of establish-
ing a permanent economic control over Germany by
way of appropriate Allied organizations.

On this occasion the General had emphasised the
difference between the occupation of the central
territories of Germany and its frontier regions. He
had insisted on the necessity of organizing a system
of integral restitution of stolen and pillaged goods,
in some form or other (without excepting the so-called
"economic" method) and finally on the reparation for
damages incurred directly or indirectly by the way
and by occupation.

In accord with the opinions of President Roose-
velt it stood out clearly that the United States did
not have the intention to end this war by an armistice
or by a treaty. Germany had to surrender unconditionally.
Therefore it would be necessary to occupy Germany and to
apply thereto a quarantine, even the most severe,
perhaps even for 30 years. It was during such a
period that it would be possible to educate a new
German generation in the democratic spirit.

Relief and Reconstruction:

As regards relief and reconstruction, he had
insisted that relief embrace not only foodstuffs but
also raw materials for industry, and indispensable
tools, in view of enterprises and the employment
of hand labor.

The organization of an energetic relief in
Europe was considered in the United States as a
moral necessity. Washington was of the opinion that
it had to begin by nourishing, clothing and caring
for the liberated peoples.

Governor Lehman, a man of broad views, had
declared to him that relief and reconstruction
embraced not only foodstuffs and essential raw
materials, but also industrial raw materials, tools
etc. He envisaged three periods:

(1) the period of aid and feeding;
(2) a period of rehabilitation which would
afford the populations the means for
establishing their places of work and
their return to a normal life;
(3) a period of stabilization or a period of
peace which would give the possibility for
taking into fuller consideration the
basis of international cooperation, in

virtue
virtue of a new accord. The Bureau which he was organizing at the moment had nothing in common with the Hoover Mission such as existed after the last war; it transacted its business with an office in the Department of State. Its aim was to prepare the foodstuffs, the material, the transport by ships in such a way that help could arrive immediately.

In his conversations with Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Adolf Berle, it came to light that the United States realized the enormous economical-political implications that comprise planning in the domain of relief and reconstruction.

Education:

On the initiative of the University of New York, the General had presented to President Roosevelt, who had referred the matter to Governor Lehman, a project to create an International Institute for members of the United Nations only. It would be established on a basis similar to the "I.L.O.". Its aim would be to prepare and to execute a plan for the reconstruction of teaching and moral education in Europe and to fortify their democratic ideas. The General had equally supported a project calling for the creation of a fund of one hundred million dollars to cover the expenses of reconstruction of institutions of instruction and of the education of youth, which the demoralization of the Hitler regime was today poisoning in the occupied territories. Furthermore, he had had occasion to submit a project for the creation of an "upper school" for reconstruction of Europe where Poles, Greeks, Czechs, Yugoslavs etc. could study. The aim of this school would be to prepare experts in the lines of administration and teaching, all towards the end of facilitating the ideological and cultural understanding of the countries situated in a region which called for the fullest cooperation between each other.

Problems concerning the organization of peace in Central and Eastern Europe:

He had been able in London to formulate on more than one occasion a project for a federation in this region of Europe, whereof the starting point had been the Polish-Czechoslovak Declaration of November 11, 1940. Later there had been the Greek-Yugoslav Declaration of January 1942. As far as the British Government was concerned, these projects had found a favorable echo and support. Mr. Eden
publicly given expression to this on several occasions, and in particular in his address at Leamington, September 26, and in that of December 2, 1942; at the same time he had always emphasized that such a federation remained consistent with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, provided that it was not of an exclusive character. Other members of the British Government, such as Sir Stafford Cripps or Mr. Ernest Bevin, had for their part expressed, on several occasions, their approval of this idea.

For the General's part, he attached the highest importance to this attitude of the British Government, for it was Great Britain which by the nature of things would be called upon to collaborate in an organized and permanent way with the Continent.

Encouraged thereby, and being sincerely convinced that it was necessary that Central and Eastern Europe be organized in this spirit, the General had disclosed to President Roosevelt the general principles on which, in the General's opinion, a scheme for the federation of nations in this part of Europe could be supported. He had presented both sides of the problem to the President.

Central and Eastern Europe had emerged from the last war free but economically unorganized and divided. They therefore rapidly became the victims of the rebirth of German economic expansion. This danger would recur after this war, if not immediately, then later.

The nations of this region had their old culture and traditions. They had the natural right to live freely and to organize freely their relations, a right recognized by the Atlantic Charter. In view of the geographic, economic and ethnical conditions of this part of the world, this right could be realized in a more efficient way if this region were organized, so to speak, as an entity.

A federation must not have for its aim the creation of a kind of bastion against anyone except Germany. On the contrary, one of the aims of a federation should be a close collaboration with the USSR which from the outset ought not to be kept out of conversations in this domain and should remain constantly informed on their development.

He believed in effect that to draw Russia into European collaboration was one of these principles having to find a continuous practical application in the organization of post-war Europe.

Nor was it the aim of such a federation to save from destruction the Fascist and pro-Hitler elements especially in Hungary and Rumania. On the contrary,
one of the principal conditions for the success and solidary of a federal regime would be the elimination of these elements. The peasant problem in these regions was particularly inflamed and he imagined that its solution by way of substantial agrarian reform would contribute to clear up the political atmosphere in these countries.

A federation or a confederation was not and could not be conceived - for reasons of principle and constitutionalism - as an instrument of imperialism open or hidden. An organization composed of a great number of ethnic groups would be organizationally incapable of this. The federal organization would be above all conceived an entity of economic cooperation, with an aim to raising the well-being and to safeguarding peace.

In Washington he had emphasized that the federal principle could usefully find in Europe an application not only in the part of Europe he had just mentioned, but also in other regions.

In these conversations in Washington he had encountered a very live echo, a comprehension and sympathy for conceptions of this character. They encouraged "us" in each step to study these problems and to formulate concrete plans (as much as possible after consultation with other Governments, and if it became impossible to reach an agreement at least to be aware of the divergent points).

He had good cause to believe that the Government of the United States would then be ready to take its part in efforts to obtain a constructive solution for the problem in this part of Europe, within the framework of world-wide settlement. Could he add finally and parenthetically that he had observed the strong impression that the Polish-Czechoslovak declaration and the Greco-Yugoslav declaration, as well as the resolutions of the agrarian conference of the Central and Eastern European countries had made in the United States.

The General thereupon stated certain impressions he had gained as concerns our general ideas on post-war problems.

Having finished his report on his conversations in Washington, the General touched on the war effort of the American citizens of Polish origin and extraction.

He closed his address by rendering a short resume of his visit to Mexico.
My dear Mr. President:

At General Sikorski's request I have the honor to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the very recent publication of a translation of his book "Modern Warfare", which was originally published in the French language in 1934.

I recall that in the course of my tour of duty in Warsaw I forwarded from time to time translations of excerpts from this book when and as they appeared in Kurjer Warszawski. I recall having been deeply impressed by the General's foresight in emphasising the importance of the offensive and the vital part to be played by tanks and mechanized arms as decisive offensive weapons in modern warfare. I was no less impressed by the emphasis he laid on the role of the Air Force.

Each time I have seen the General since his return here, he takes occasion to reiterate an expression of gratitude for your great kindness to him during his visit to the United States. He was deeply touched by your friendly reception and by your frankness and helpfulness in the course of your discussions together.

With warmest regards and every good wish,

Yours faithfully,

The President

The White House,
Washington.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
PA

To give me before I see
the Polish ambassador today.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

The Polish Ambassador has just come to see me and has left with me a message addressed to you by General Sikorski which I am transmitting herewith.

I understand you are to receive the Ambassador tomorrow and I believe you will wish to read this message before you talk with him.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
February 13th, 1943.

Mr. President,

Acting on instructions cabled to me by Prime Minister General Sikorski today, I have the honor to submit to you the telegraphic text of a letter addressed to Prime Minister Churchill concerning the crisis which has now arisen in Polish-Soviet relations. The text as received by me in General Sikorski's cable is as follows:

"The staunch and uncompromising attitude of Poland, unique among the countries of the European continent, drew upon her the most cruel and inhuman reprisals of the enemy and did not protect her from grave wrongs inflicted by her Eastern neighbor who only joined the Camp of fighting Democracies after the war had already lasted for nearly two years and did not do so on his own initiative.

The President,

The White House."
"The Polish Government, acting in close understanding with the British Government, showed its readiness to disregard these wrongs in the name of solidarity in the fight against the common enemy and being desirous to lay the foundations for friendly cooperation between the two countries after final victory.

"The agreement between the Polish and the Soviet Governments, signed in London on July 30, 1941, was the expression of this attitude on the part of Poland. This agreement was complemented by a declaration made on the same day in the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Eden in which, among other things, he stated that the British Government did not recognize any territorial changes brought about in Poland after August, 1939.

"The Polish Government continues faithfully to fulfill its signed obligations and takes every opportunity to show its readiness to collaborate with the Government of the USSR on a basis not merely restricted to Polish-Soviet relations, but on a larger, general European basis. On the other hand, the Soviet Government departs from the terms
terms of its signed agreement in essential matters and in matters of principle.

"INSTANCES: Interruption of recruitment to the Polish Army already in the Spring of 1942, contrary to the resolutions of the agreement of July 30, 1941. The attitude adopted by the Soviet Government with regard to Polish citizenship, which the Soviet Government attempted formerly to limit and which it finally now refuses to recognize in respect of all Polish citizens in the USSR.

"On this basis the Soviet authorities have at present started the recruiting of Polish citizens to the Soviet army and have ordered the final disruption of Polish relief activities.

"The above mentioned measures taken by the Soviet authorities are contrary to international law and to the letter and spirit of the Polish-Soviet agreement, and must be regarded as an unfriendly act towards a co-belligerent nation fighting in defense of a common cause in the name of principles commonly accepted and declared.

"The
"The difficulties thus provoked by the Soviets and the lack of appropriate reaction on the part of the great Allies are causing serious uneasiness and ferment in Poland and have deeply affected the spirit of the Polish Army. The families of numerous Polish soldiers are still in the USSR. The evacuation of these families from Soviet Russia has now been entirely stopped by the Soviet authorities.

"Mr. Tadeusz Romer, Polish Ambassador to the USSR., who was spending a few days in London for the purpose of direct contact with the Polish Government, has left for Kuybishev bearing a personal letter from Prime Minister General Sikorski to Premier Stalin, as one more attempt at a friendly settlement of mutual relations.

"The letter of Prime Minister General Sikorski to Premier Churchill ends with an appeal for his immediate intervention in Moscow in order to prevent the creation of further accomplished facts on the part of the Soviets and to safeguard the most fundamental rights of Allied Poland, among others, her imalienable right to protect her own citizens and
and to assist them in their urgent need."

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

J. Ciechanowski
My dear Mr. President:

The Polish Ambassador has requested me to submit to you in accordance with your conversation with the Polish Ambassador two days ago the letter which he has just sent me. I am consequently transmitting this letter to you herewith, together with the enclosure thereto.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

From the Polish Ambassador,
February 18, 1943.

The President,

The White House.
February 18th, 1943.

VERY URGENT - PERSONAL.

Dear Mr. Wells,

As I had the honor of informing you on February 17th, the President, during my conversation with him at the White House on February 16th, requested me to look up the statements on the policy of the U.S. Government regarding non-recognition of territorial changes to which I had alluded as one of my suggestions.

I take the liberty to draw your attention to the following official statements which I know about on this subject:

1) Statement of policy by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson in connection with the annexation of Manchuria by Japan in 1931 (p. 5 of PEACE AND WAR, paragraph entitled "Non-Recognition" Policy)- which, as far as I know, is regarded as a basic statement of policy still in operation;

2) EUROPE - BALTIC REPUBLICS, Statement by Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles (The Department of State BULLETIN Vol. III: No. 57 - Publication 1489 - p. 48);

3) OUR FOREIGN POLICY - Address by the Secretary of State (The Department of State)

The Honorable

Summer Welles,

Under Secretary of State.
I believe there have been other statements to the same effect. I seem to recall that there were also references to this policy in some of the earlier speeches of the President during this war. I am afraid however that I cannot precisely remember them at this moment.

Today, in listening to Madame Chiang Kai-shek's address in the Senate and the House of Representatives I was reminded of the declaration of policy made by Mr. Stimson on Manchuria. If the President is to deliver an address, or make any declaration on the occasion of George Washington's birthday next Monday, I thought that it might perhaps be timely and appropriate to make reference to this declaration. I take the liberty of suggesting that it might be possible to link such a passage on Manchuria in the address and the basic statement of the U. S. Government at that time - with the presence here of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and to say that the U. S. Government has never deviated from the policy and does not intend to do so, and that it will not recognize any territorial changes by force or threat of force.
force or by unilateral act on the part of any power and is, (quoting your own words) "opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak", and that none of the territorial changes brought about since the attack of Japan on China on any continent would be recognized by the United States Government.

I should be most grateful if you would very kindly submit this to the President in answer to the verbal request he made to me to elaborate on my suggestion.

I am,

Yours very sincerely,

J. Ciechanowski

- 3 -
Mr. Welles described as gratifying to this government the Russian-Polish agreement signed in London yesterday. He made clear, in commenting on it at his press conference, however, that he was discussing only general policy, not details.

The United States position toward Poland, he pointed out, was made clear immediately after that country was invaded. It was one of not recognizing any change in her status as a free, sovereign and independent nation. That position, he added, is maintained and continued.

His understanding of the Russian-Polish agreement was that it was in line with the United States policy of non-recognition of territory taken by conquest.
February 19, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

The Polish Ambassador left with me this afternoon a further document with the request that it be submitted to you. I am transmitting it herewith.

You will see that this document constitutes a written and formal statement on the part of the Soviet Government that it regards the populations of the western districts of the Ukraine and White Ruthenia as having voiced their "freely expressed will" to become a part of the Soviet Union.

Believe me

[Signature]

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
The Polish Ambassador handed to the Under Secretary of State on February 19th, 1943, the enclosed texts (Polish and literal English translation) of a note transmitted by Ambassador Bogomolov to Count Raczyński on February 7th, 1943, and received by the Polish Ambassador in Washington on February 12th, 1943.

enclosures:

texts referred to above.
"W związku z notą Pańską z dnia 26-go stycznia 1943r. mam zaszczyt zakomunikować, że Rząd Sowiecki nie uważa za możliwe przystąpić do rozpatrywania sprawy obywatelstwa osób, które znajdowały się 2 - 2 listopada 1939r. na terytorium zachodnich obwodów ukraińskiej i białoruskiej socjalistycznych Republik Rad, ponieważ sprawa ta całkowicie dotyczy dziedziny praw suwerennych Związku Sowieckiego odnośnie wymienionych terytorjów.

"Co się tyczy Pańskiego twierdzenia o niezgodności oświadczenia Rządu Sowieckiego z dnia 16-go stycznia 1943r. z duchem polsko-sowieckiego układu z dnia 30-go lipca 1941r., z deklaracją z dnia 4-go grudnia 1941r., z IV Konwencją Haską z 1907 roku i Kartą Atlantycką z dnia 14-go sierpnia 1941r., to twierdzenie takie pozbawione jest wszelkich podstaw.

"Rząd Sowiecki zdecydowanie odrzuca jako całkowicie nieuważadnione i wypaczające rzeczywistość znajdujące się również w nocie z dnia 26-go stycznia 1943r. twierdzenie Rządu Polskiego o rzekomym jakoby narzuconiu obywatelstwa sowieckiego wyżej wymienionym osobom.

"Rząd Sowiecki uważa za niezbędne przypomnieć, że obywatele zachodnich obwodów Ukraińskiej i Białoruskiej Socjalistycznych Republik Rad, nabyli obywatelstwo sowieckie wyłącznie na mocy swobodnie wypowiedzianej woli ludności, co znalazło swój wyraz w jednomyślnych uchwałach, przyjętych na Zgromadzeniach Ludo-"
wykonanych obwodów oraz na mocy dekretu Prezydium Rady Najwyższej ZSRR z dnia 29-go listopada 1939 r., przyjętego na podstawie tych uchwał."

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Received by the Polish Ambassador in Washington and communicated to the Under Secretary of State on February 19th, 1943.
"In connection with your note dated January 26th of this year, I have the honor to communicate that the Soviet Government does not consider it possible to enter upon an examination of the matter of citizenship of persons who, on November 1-2, 1939 were (found themselves) on the territory of the Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics, as this matter entirely pertains to the domain of the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union over the mentioned territories.

"As regards your contention about the non-conformity of the declaration of the Soviet Government of January 16th, 1943, with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941, of the declaration of December 4th, 1941, of the IV-th Hague Convention of 1907, and of the Atlantic Charter of August 14th, 1941, - this contention is devoid of any foundations.

"The Soviet Government decidedly rejects as entirely unfounded and as distorting reality the assertion, likewise contained in the note of the Polish Government of January 26th, of this year, about the alleged imposition of Soviet citizenship to the above mentioned persons.

"The Soviet Government considers it indispensable to remind that the citizens of the Western districts of the Ukrainian
Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Socialist Republics have acquired Soviet citizenship exclusively on the strength of freely expressed will of the population, which found its expression in the unanimous resolutions adopted at Peoples' Assemblies of the mentioned districts, as well as by virtue of the decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR of November 29th, 1939, adopted on the basis of said resolutions.

- - - - - - -

Received by the Polish Ambassador in Washington and communicated to the Under Secretary of State on February 19th, 1943.
March 16th, 1943

My dear Mr. President,

I am writing to thank you, Mr. President, most sincerely for your message, which I received through our Ambassador in Washington.

Both the Polish Government and myself have the highest regard for your viewpoint and we are prepared to do all in our power in order to prevent the breaking off of Poland's relations with Soviet Russia if only we are met with good will and some response on the other side. Meanwhile, however, as you know, the situation has deteriorated still further since my return from the United States.

I would like, therefore, on behalf of my Government to describe to you, Mr. President, the difficult position in which the latest Russian declarations have placed us. We are expected to fight side by side with Russia at a time when the Soviet Government are making claims to one half of our territory and to one third of the people of Poland, and when in their note of January 16th, 1943, they once more insist on the Ribbentrop - Molotov line. The Soviet Government is invoking for this policy the Atlantic Charter, which is to justify their present imperialist designs. The denial to Poles, forcibly deported to the U.S.S.R., of all rights, including the right to live, completes the measure of their affliction. The men, women and children concerned are on the verge of physical exhaustion. The interruption of all humanitarian activities organised for the benefit of the deportees with the generous help of the United States would be tantamount to a condemnation to death.

Many of

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Many of the Polish soldiers, airmen and sailors have relatives in the U.S.S.R. or in that part of Poland to which Russia - our Ally - is making her unprecedented claims, contrary to all the principles proclaimed by the United Nations and it requires great efforts on my part to keep their feelings under control.

On February 27th, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow had a three hour conversation with M. Stalin, who appeared somewhat less exacting than it might have been expected from previous semi-official Soviet enunciations. I am afraid, however, that we cannot rely on vague assurances that there is no enmity in Russia towards Poland, but that we must take into account the hostile manifestations of Soviet policy consistently conducted by M. Molotov.

The Polish people suffered beyond measure in this war. It would be an incomprehensible wrong, if at a time when the development of war is taking a turn to the advantage of the Allies, the Polish people were to realise, that the imperialist claims of Allied Russia are to be met at the expense of Poland.

At this distressing time I find support in your friendship and your understanding, Mr. President, which you expressed so often towards my country and myself. I believe that the solid front of the United Nations will be maintained and that acting together the British and American Governments will find the means to confirm their solidarity with us.

In this connection I take the liberty to make the suggestion that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain may agree, either publicly or by means of notes addressed to the Governments of the United Nations, to reaffirm the principle of non-recognition by them of any accomplished facts, effected after September the 1st, 1939, on the occupied territories of States, belonging to the United Nations.

The confirmation of this principle would strengthen the position of Poland during the diplomatic negotiations, which the Polish Government are conducting at the present time in Moscow. The publication of such a declaration would, moreover,
find a favourable echo throughout the Continent of Europe, especially in the countries adjoining the U.S.S.R., and supply a valuable counter-weight to German propaganda and German agitation on behalf of the war effort of the Axis Powers, which are exploiting Soviet territorial claims against Poland for their own purposes.

Believe me,

Your very sincerely,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

General Sikorski has just asked me to forward you the enclosed letter dated March 16.

He starts out by thanking you for your message sent him through Ambassador Ciechanowski, which, he disclosed, was "to keep his shirt on".

He goes on to say that his Government and he have the highest regard for your viewpoint, and are prepared to do all in their power to prevent a break in Polish-Russian relations if only his Government and he are met with goodwill and some response on the other side. Meanwhile, the situation has deteriorated.

Describing the difficult position in which the latest Russian declarations have placed his Government and himself, he states that they are expected to fight side by side with Russia at a time when the latter is making claims to one half of the Polish territory and to one third of the Polish people, and when Moscow once more insists, in its note of January 16, 1943, upon the Ribbentrop-Molotov line. In an effort to justify its imperialist designs, Moscow is invoking the Atlantic Charter. The denial of all rights, including the right to live, to the Poles forcibly deported to the U.S.S.R. completes the measure of their affliction.

Many of the Polish soldiers, airmen and sailors have relatives among the Poles in the U.S.S.R. or in that part of Poland to which Russia - "our Ally" - is making her unprecedented claims, and it requires great efforts on the General's part to keep their feelings under control.

While M. Stalin, in his February 27 conversation with Polish Ambassador Romer, appeared somewhat less exacting than might have been expected from previous semi-official Soviet enunciations, the General is afraid that he cannot rely on vague assurances that Russia bears Poland no enmity; that he must take into account/

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
account the hostile manifestations of Soviet policy consistently conducted by M. Molotov.

The Polish people have undergone great suffering in this war. It would be an incomprehensible wrong if, at a time when the war is taking a turn to the advantage of the Allies, the Polish people were to realize, that the imperialist claims of Allied Russia are to be met at the expense of Poland.

At this distressing time the General finds support in your friendship and your understanding which you have so frequently expressed towards his country and himself. He believes that the United Nations will maintain a solid front and acting together, the American and British Governments "will find the means to confirm their solidarity with us".

In this connection the General takes the liberty to suggest that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain may agree, either publicly or by means of notes addressed to the Governments of the United Nations, to reaffirm the principle of non-recognition by them of any accomplished facts, effected after September 1, 1939, on the occupied territories of the United Nations. Confirmation of this principle would strengthen Poland's position during the diplomatic negotiations now being conducted in Moscow. The publication of such a declaration would, moreover, find a favorable echo throughout the European Continent, especially in the countries adjoining the U.S.S.R., and would supply a valuable counter-weight to German propaganda and German agitation on behalf of the war effort of the Axis powers, which are exploiting Soviet territorial claims against Poland for their own purposes.

While General Sikorski's internal political position has come under tense fire from the Polish armed forces in Scotland and the Middle East, and from certain Polish political circles here, I have the impression that he is holding his own and will survive the pressure. His position was considerably helped by the publication of the enclosed Low cartoon in the "Evening Standard" depicting 'John Citizen' standing over a Polish officer who is aiming a machine gun in the direction of Russia. (On calling at the General's office the morning after the publication of this cartoon, I found that he had completely missed the point, and was even wondering whether it might be a slap at him. You would have been amused had you witnessed the scene that followed my explanation to him and his gathered associates, of the real motive. I emphasized that it boiled down to a defence of his position against the pressure of his opposition. With "Oh! I see", he turned abruptly to his associates, who still wore tense but decidedly tense expressions, and before he could utter a further word, they had about-faced and were scurrying off in a pandemonium/
pandemonium of flying memoranda, and pince-nez falling to the floor, to order the distribution of this cartoon throughout the Polish armed forces and political circles. I'd bet that, as a result, no issue of the "Evening Standard" has ever had such a notable and rapid rise in circulation).

As to Russian attitude towards him, I doubt whether Moscow would press its campaign against him personally to the point of causing his political downfall - for Moscow would more than likely figure that it would result in his replacement by someone far less realistic and more violently anti-Moscow.

Moreover, as regards the possibility of Sikorski's either permitting internal political pressure to push him out, or resigning in a huff, or as a result of hurt feelings, I believe it is well to bear in mind not only his moral as well as physical courage and determined purpose to regain Poland's independence, but also his own forward-looking political aspirations. I am aware that towards this end, he pictures himself returning to his country at the head of the Polish forces of liberation; hence he would more than likely recognize the importance of remaining Prime Minister, if for no other reason than to ensure his remaining Commander-in-Chief.

With my warmest regards and every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

Tony Biddle

Enclosures:

1/ and 2/ as stated.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

For preparation of reply, if you think one is necessary.

F.D.R.

Ltr. 3-17 from Anthony Biddle, encl. cartoon from Evening Standard and ltr. 3-16 to Pres. from Gen. Sikorski, Prime Min. of Poland, re difficult position in which last Russian declarations have placed Poland. Suggests US and Gr. Br. reaffirm principle of non-recognition of any accomplished facts effected after Sept. 1st, 1939 on occupied territories of States belonging to United Nations.
Mr. President,

I have the honor to refer to the decision of the USSR Government to withdraw the Polish citizenship of Polish citizens deported to Russia during the period of Soviet occupation of Polish Eastern territories which, as stated in the note of the Soviet Government dated January 16, 1943, has been taken in view of the Polish Government's refusal to recognize Soviet sovereignty over Poland's Eastern territories described in the note as "Western Ukraina" and "Western White Ruthenia".

In the course of February and March, acting on instructions of my Government, I had the honor to inform you through the intermediacy of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State about the crisis reached in Polish-Soviet relations as a result of this decision on the part of the USSR Government. I was privileged personally to explain the situation to you when I had the honor of being received by you on February 16, 1943.

On February 5, 1943, the Under Secretary of State told me that you had instructed him to inform me that you realized

The President,

The White House.
realized the gravity of the situation, that you requested me to ask General Sikorski that the Polish Government should preserve a calm attitude pending the intervention which you intended to undertake at a time and in a manner which you would personally determine. I communicated this decision to General Sikorski.

On February 16th, when I had the honor of being received by you, I had the privilege of informing you of all the developments of the Polish-Soviet crisis, and of communicating to you the reply of General Sikorski, who had instructed me to express his gratitude, his assurance that the Polish Government would preserve the calm attitude you had recommended and to draw your attention to the urgency of the situation, in view of the fact that the Soviet Government was applying ruthless measures to enforce Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens and was creating accomplished facts which would be difficult to retract in the future.

You very kindly told me that you realized the gravity of these facts and that you would communicate at once with Prime Minister Churchill with a view to undertaking an intervention in Moscow.

We further discussed the possibility of a restatement of the United States' policy of non-recognition of territo-
torial changes brought about in wartime by force or threat of force, and, at your request, I discussed this subject with the Under Secretary of State on February 17th and wrote to him some suggestions on February 18th.

Since that time, I have kept the Secretary of State and Mr. Welles informed of the rapid and ominous further developments in Polish-Soviet relations and of the conversations of Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador to the USSR, with Premier Stalin and later with Mr. Molotov. These conversations, which have been continuing in Moscow for over a month, clearly show that the USSR Government has no intention of making any concessions in its arbitrary interpretation of the rights of citizenship, that it is decided to disrupt and to liquidate our Relief organizations, to uphold its refusal to allow the previously promised evacuation of some 30,000 persons constituting the families of the Polish soldiers evacuated to the Middle East, and of 60,000 Polish children.

While keeping up the pretense of negotiations, the Soviet authorities are simultaneously proceeding with the liquidation of all Polish Relief centers, of Polish schools and orphanages, are arresting Polish welfare employees, school teachers and confiscating the storehouses and the American relief supplies which they contain. At the same time, under threat of arrest, and by means of beatings, starvation
starvation and ejection from their dwellings, they are forcing our citizens to surrender their Polish passports and to accept Soviet citizenship documents. According to the latest information they are actually attempting to force some employees of the Polish Embassy and their families to accept Soviet passports. Polish citizens who succeeded in applying personally at the Polish Embassy have been arrested when leaving the building.

In view of these facts which require no comment, General Sikorski informs me that he is convinced that only your kind support, in the form of an urgent intervention with Premier Stalin, may still save the situation and justify his ceaseless and patient efforts to pursue his steadfast policy aimed at friendly Polish-Soviet relations. Moreover, he feels that the lack of a tangible proof of support on the part of the United States Government and of the British Government serves to encourage the USSR Government in the belief that they can safely pursue their action without risking any protest on the part of the Principal United Nations.

General Sikorski has instructed me to assure you, Mr. President, that he firmly believes that you will not abandon Poland in this very serious situation in which she appears to have been selected by the USSR as a test case of the application in practice of the principles proclaimed by the United
United Nations. He has instructed Ambassador Romer to do his utmost to keep up for a time the fiction of further conversations pending your intervention.

General Sikorski is aware, however, that the USSR Government is doing all it can to provoke a break of Ambassador Romer's conversations and will most probably try to place the responsibility for it on the Polish Government, and that the present tension cannot be indefinitely maintained without very serious consequences. He requests me once more to appeal to you for an intervention with Premier Stalin, which alone can change the situation. He asks me to stress the urgency of this intervention and indeed to emphasize that in all probability this is the last moment for an effective intervention.

General Sikorski has also laid the facts before Prime Minister Churchill and has asked him to act without delay.

In view of the gravity of the situation and of its very serious consequences which unfortunately affect not only Polish-Soviet relations, but likewise cannot fail to affect the Polish war effort, the unparalleled resistance to Germany in Poland proper, and, in fact, may react on the unity of the United Nations as a whole, I take the liberty of asking you, Mr. President, to let me have your answer.
answer to General Sikorski's appeal as soon as possible.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ivan
ciechanowicz
Summerlin advises that the Polish Ambassador has informed the Department that he has been instructed by General Sikorsky to seek an interview with the President at the earliest possible moment. The Ambassador added he is compelled to leave Washington Friday, April 9th, and hopes the President can see him before then.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

The Polish Ambassador informed the Department that he had been instructed by General Sikorski to seek an interview with the President at the earliest possible moment. The Ambassador added that he would be compelled to leave Washington on Friday, April 9th, in order to keep a speaking engagement in the South and therefore it was his hope that the President might find it possible to see him some time before Friday.

Will you be good enough to let me know the President's wishes in this matter? If you will also be good enough to let me know the time it will be agreeable for the President to receive the Ambassador, I shall be pleased to let him know.

George T. Summerlin
My dear Mr. President:

I understand that the Polish Ambassador has asked for an appointment to see you this week in connection with the latest developments in Polish-Soviet relations.

As of possible interest to you in this connection I am enclosing herewith three memoranda which the Ambassador delivered recently to the Department and which he suggested might be brought to your attention.

The first memorandum deals with recent developments in Polish-Soviet relations; the second discusses Polish-Soviet relations and their bearing on Soviet-United Nations relationships; and the third deals with the urgency of the British and American reactions to the territorial demands of the U.S.S.R.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

Three memoranda.

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM ON POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS.

I - The Polish Ambassador has continuously informed the Department of State of all the developments in Polish-Soviet relations since the signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement on July 30th, 1941, to the present moment.

II - The following conclusions emerge from this factual documentation:

a) Both as regards the Baltic States and Poland, the USSR has been and is pursuing a policy aiming at the annexation of these countries,

b) this policy has been carefully thought out and prepared with a view of creating the impression that the populations of the countries in question desire their incorporation in the USSR,

c) in her attempt to create this illusion calculated to impress British and American public opinion, - the USSR has largely benefited by her successful defense, by the ignorance of Soviet mentality and methods which characterizes British and American public opinion, by the traditional secrecy with which all Soviet internal affairs are surrounded, by the fact that at the time when Soviet Russia alleges to
have carried out "popular consultations" during her occupation of these countries, she was allied to Nazi Germany and her activities in those countries were practically outside any possible control on the part of the Allied Powers,

d) since that time, however, reliable information has become available which proves that:
1) no acceptable popular consultations had taken place,
2) Soviet military and political authorities ruthlessly terrorized the population of these countries and deported millions of men, women and children to Russia and applied mass sovietization in those areas entirely disregarding all international laws defining the rights of an occupying power.
3) During the occupation of the above mentioned countries, intense communication was forcibly being introduced.

III - Ever since Germany's attack on the USSR, Soviet Russian diplomacy and her widespread and intensive propaganda in Great Britain and the United States have diligently tended to prepare the way for the territorial claims recently openly put forward by the Soviet Government.
In putting forward her demands the USSR has, as far as diplomacy is concerned, made use of gradually increasing pressure on the Polish Government and the British and U. S. Government, and of methods of virtual blackmail (second front, insufficient support etc.), while her propaganda, methodically conducted by means of newspaper articles, radio broadcasts and speeches, maps and by other means, - has mostly taken the form of familiarizing British and American public opinion with Russia's allegedly inalienable rights to these territories with the obvious aim of taking full advantage of ignorance and war enthusiasm for Russia's part in the war to obtain the tacit recognition and acceptance of unilaterally created accomplished facts.

Soviet Russia has been singularly assisted in this work by numerous American and British propagandists who for various reasons have seen fit to espouse her cause in their respective countries.

IV - Having prepared the background, the Soviets launched their territorial claims after having informed the Polish Government of their decision to withdraw the right of Polish citizenship of the Polish citizens deported by them to the USSR at the time of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland. The incredible reason given in the said note of January 16th, 1943,
was the refusal of the Polish Government to recognize the sovereign rights of the USSR to these Polish territories, termed in the note as the territories of Western Ukraine and White Ruthenia.

This novel method of procedure contrary to all laws and usages governing international relations, requires no comment, - and is clearly inadmissible.

V - The Polish Government had 'bona fide' concluded the agreement with the USSR of July 30, 1941, disregarding the Soviet attack on Poland of September 17th, 1939, which had finally crippled her resistance in her defense against Germany, and shelving all the unspeakable wrongs inflicted by the Soviet Government on the Polish population.

In doing so the Polish Government proved its far-sighted statesmanship and its determination to remain actively solidary with Poland's Ally Great Britain in the war and to place the vital issue of future peaceful collaboration between European nations above all other matters.

In the opening paragraph of this Polish-Soviet agreement the high contracting parties agreed to regard the German-Soviet agreement partitioning Poland's territory as no longer operative. Logically therefore Poland was entitled to regard that the Polish-Soviet agreement restored the 'statu quo ante' of the territorial delimitation of Poland's Eastern boundaries fixed by virtue of
of the Riga Treaty of March 18th, 1921, and recognized by the Allied Powers on March 15, 1923.

Ever since July 1941, however, the USSR Government has taken every opportunity to place in doubt these legally established Polish boundaries and has gone out of its way to bring pressure to bear upon the Polish Government, by means inadmissible in normal relations between civilized countries, and contrary to the specific terms of the Atlantic Charter and of the Declaration signed by the United Nations, to both of which the USSR is a signatory.

The documentary evidence supplied by the Polish Government to the Department of State contains numerous instances of bad faith on the part of the Soviet Government in its dealings with the Polish Government and definite instances of non-fulfilment by the Soviet Government of its signed obligations.

VI - It must be reluctantly admitted that the Soviet Government is interpreting the lack of any direct reaction to Soviet claims on Poland on the part of the Chief Allies, as a proof of their indifference and even decision not to support Poland's legitimate territorial rights.

This has served to encourage the USSR in the belief that Poland was isolated, that she could not count upon the firm support of the principal United Nations, and has convinced the Soviets that they could pursue their policy of territorial annexation without encountering any
any opposition.

**VII** - As a result of the facts enumerated above the situation has at present reached a climax which threatens to force a rupture between Soviet Russia and Poland. It is probable, on the basis of certain indications, that the USSR will try to set up (provisionally on its own territory), - a communist Polish puppet government (similar to that which she prepared when she invaded Poland in 1920) with a view to its establishment on Polish territory as soon as the Soviet army reaches Poland.

**VIII** - From the legal viewpoint the case for Poland is unassailable:

a) The Eastern frontiers of Poland have been definitely established in a freely negotiated treaty with Soviet Russia signed at Riga on March 18th, 1921;

b) these boundaries have been duly recognized by all sovereign States;

c) they have never been questioned by the USSR in the course of the peace period until the present time;

d) the populations of these territories have never expressed any desire to have these territories incorporated in the USSR although there were 37 Ukrainian representatives of this territory in
IX - In the case of Poland, an active member of the United Nations, the first Nation who actively opposed German aggression, the only one who has not had one single Quisling, one who has succeeded in maintaining under most difficult conditions uninterrupted contact with its nation and can rightly claim to represent it, - the conduct of the USSR, herself one of the four principal fighting United Nations, must be regarded as an open challenge to the principles laid down for the United Nations Concept.

In the light of this fact, and considering that the USSR is a totalitarian communist Dictatorship whose basic principles and policies have never in the past shown any tendency towards democratic principles and ideals, her present attitude towards Poland is highly symptomatic and probably constitutes merely a test case aimed at the disruption of United Nations' ideology.

If the USSR were to succeed in her designs to subject Poland or part of Poland, the way would be opened for her to further territorial demands by means of blackmail, based on her present part in the war.
Poland has an army of over 80,000 men at present in the final stages of training in the Middle East. The families of these soldiers, contrary to a solemn promise given by the Soviet Government, have been prevented from leaving Russia and are virtually held as hostages in the USSR and are being forced by beatings and starvation to "accept" Soviet citizenship.

It would seem that preservation of the morale and fighting spirit of this reserve army, so conveniently placed, is of direct interest to the United Nations effort. Recent developments in Polish-Soviet relations directly endanger the morale of these Polish soldiers and the ferment already noticeable among them is a matter of grave concern to the Polish Government and to General Sikorski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. Dissatisfaction will inevitably also spread to the Polish Army, Airforce and Navy in Great Britain.

General Sikorski has succeeded under most difficult conditions in organizing guerilla detachments and army units in Poland proper. This force is secretly preparing for the eleventh hour and counts several hundred thousand men who will become most useful to the United Nations war effort at the decisive period of the war. Their reliability and consequently the
possibility of using them as a considerable organized force against Germany will undoubtedly depend on the attitude of the USSR to Poland.

These pregnant military considerations cannot be lightly brushed aside by the United States and Great Britain.

Finally, some consideration should be given to the position of General Sikorski himself. He initiated and carried out his policy of friendly collaboration with Russia in the face of considerable opposition both within his government and on the part of some important groups of Polish public opinion. He persevered, on the understanding that his policy was approved and would receive the necessary support on the part of the British and the U. S. Governments.

It is becoming increasingly probable that only firm and active American and British support by means of effective interventions in Moscow can allow him to maintain his undisputed authority in Poland and among the Polish people abroad and the Polish Armed Forces, and enable General Sikorski to pursue his policy towards the USSR.

March 22, 1943.

A survey of facts pertaining to the development of Polish-Soviet relations leads to the following conclusions:

1) Soviet Russia's claims to Polish territory are contrary to signed agreements and treaties and to the principles declared in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

2) As far as the USSR is concerned, her territorial claims are a test case intended to prove the sincerity of these principles and the degree of importance attached by the Democratic Powers to their maintenance.

3) Failure on the part of the Principal United Nations to support these principles can result in the serious danger of disruption of the United Nations unity, the loss of faith in the sincerity of the declared United Nations war aims and slogans among the armed forces and the populations of the invaded and oppressed countries.

4)
4) The loss of faith and hope among those Nations, coupled with constant and exclusive German propaganda exhorting them to join Germany in fighting the Soviet Communist menace, may have grave results. It may lead to despair, internal strife, anarchy and communism. (The Soviets are continuously spreading communist propaganda in those countries by means of radio broadcasts and agents).

5) The argument spread by the Soviets that opposition by the Principal United Nations to Soviet territorial claims might result in the conclusion of a separate Soviet-German peace should be entirely rejected.

6) While the possibility of the conclusion of such a separate peace should not be entirely disregarded if Germany were to offer the USSR adequate territorial and other advantages at an appropriate time, this rather remote possibility could not be prevented by a passive attitude towards Soviet territorial claims on the part of the United States and Great Britain or, in fact, by anything the two Powers might or might not do at present. On the contrary, the danger of such an eventuality would be enhanced by any tacit or expressed recognition of
of USSR claims on German occupied territories.

To those who understand the intricacies of Russian mentality it is clear that the pressure for such recognition will rather tend to increase in proportion to the development of a tendency on the part of Stalin to a separate peace. Stalin's realism, based on peasant logic, spurs him to preserve a free hand in all his dealings at all cost and by all the means at his disposal. Rightly or wrongly he has probably gained the certainty that the United States and Great Britain will never fight against Russia. At present, still at an undecided phase of the war, the territories he covets are held by Germany. He may obtain them from Germany by conquest or by concession in a separate peace. As a distrustful realist hitherto unimpressed by the military power of the United States and Great Britain, he most probably admits that the defeat and surrender of Germany may not be complete and unconditional. He may likewise be apprehensive as regards the possibility of an Anglo-American negotiated peace with Germany in the case of an unduly long war. In all and every eventuality he aims at ensuring his gains.

If
If the United Nations are victorious, - the advanced recognition of his territorial aspirations would insure him against future negotiations and bargaining within the United Nations camp.

In case of a negotiated peace, such advanced recognition would force the United Nations to register his claims on Germany as one of their joint peace aims.

**Advanced recognition of Stalin's territorial claims by the principal Allies** would be especially useful to him, and in fact might encourage him, if at a given moment and in favorable circumstances, he were contemplating the conclusion of a separate peace. If Germany, unburdened in the East by the conclusion of such a peace were not finally defeated by the United Nations, his territorial gains conceded by Germany would have been already sanctioned by the Allies and would thus be recognized by both sides. If Germany were completely defeated after a German Soviet separate peace, he could still count on retaining his territorial gains, previously recognized by the Allies.

7) Stalin's realism appears to be frequently misinterpreted.
That realism forces him, above all else, to reckon with the United States and with American public opinion, while, at the same time, it prompts him to take fullest advantage of his temporarily unique position as the foremost actively fighting Power in the United Nations camp.

As such, his conduct and tactics in relation to the Allies will be calculated to make the most of his advantages within the limits dictated to him by cunning and by the necessity to obtain all the help and support without which he can neither hope to continue fighting on so large a scale, to feed his population or to rebuild his devastated country.

How greatly he reckons with the United States and American public opinion which Soviet propaganda has done so much to gain, is amply proved by his immediate favorable reaction to Ambassador Standley's press statement on Lend-Lease services.

3) Every serious expert on Soviet Russian mentality certainly known that Russian realism can only be influenced by a display of realism.

Contrary to German realism which only reacts to
directly applied force, Russian realism will react to a definitely worded statement and will be influenced by strong realistic arguments.

It should always be remembered that Russians suffer from a deep inferiority complex which is especially apparent in their dealings with persons of Western civilization and particularly with Anglo-Saxons and Americans. Like many shy persons, Russians frequently adopt an overbearing and exacting attitude to cover their inferiority complex. In reality this defense can be easily broken through.

9) At this psychological moment in American-Soviet relations their entire future depends on the firm reassertion by the United States Government that it will not sacrifice its principles to Soviet imperialism.

March 22, 1943.
Memorandum on the Urgency of British and American Reaction to USSR Territorial Demands

1) A crisis has been reached in Polish-Soviet relations. It has been finally accelerated by measures which the Soviet Government is applying to Polish citizens, at present in the USSR, to force upon them Soviet citizenship by methods of coercion such as intimidation, use of force, threat of force, beatings, starvation, ejections, imprisonment, - all of which are inadmissible in normal international relations.

2) These measures of coercion are intended to bring pressure to bear upon the Polish Government with a view to obtaining recognition of USSR sovereign rights over the territories of Eastern Poland which the USSR invaded and occupied in the Autumn of 1939 by virtue of an agreement between the USSR and Germany, signed on September 28th, 1939.

2) While applying these measures of pressure the USSR Government deems it expedient for reason of propaganda, to keep up the illusion that it is carrying on negotiations with the Polish Ambassador in Moscow on matters pertaining to citizenship of the Polish citizens in question, the evacuation of families of Polish military previously evacuated from the USSR to the Middle East, relief activities conducted by the Polish Embassy among the Polish deportees in the USSR. These so-called negotiations are proceeding
in an atmosphere of tension and with no serious prospects of success, due to the fact that, contrary to universally accepted customs, the USSR Government has not seen fit to suspend the application of the above stated measures of coercion and is ruthlessly carrying them out with the obvious aim of setting up accomplished facts, of creating the impression abroad that Polish citizens have freely accepted Soviet citizenship, of so dispersing them from their present centers of residence that later it will be impossible for the Polish authorities to trace them and, finally, in the hope that the Polish Government will yield on the question of territory in order to save over one million and a half of its citizens.

4) Conscious of this Soviet manoeuvre, the Polish Government has officially declared to the British Government and to the U. S. Government, that it is firmly determined to refuse even to discuss the question of Poland's Eastern territorial boundaries, which it regards as finally settled by virtue of the Polish-Soviet Treaty signed at Riga on March 18th, 1921, and to accept no compromise in the matter of Polish citizenship, the grant and withdrawal of which is and must remain solely the attribute of the Polish State. Moreover, even a temporary compromise admitting discrimination between the rights of Polish citizens to Polish citizenship, according to their having formerly resided in the Western or the Eastern part
of Poland, would in itself be interpreted by the USSR as constituting a first step on the part of the Polish Government on the way towards a possible compromise on the subject of Poland's territorial status.

5) By continuing these fruitless conversations with the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, the USSR Government tends to give the impression to the U. S. Government and the British Government that the problems which it has raised and the territorial claims which it has advanced with regard to Poland, - can be satisfactorily solved in direct and seemingly friendly negotiations between the USSR and the Polish Governments and that there is no necessity for outside intervention.

6) The Polish Government is convinced that the lack of any intervention in support of Poland's rights on the part of the United States and British Governments in Moscow has encouraged the USSR Government in the belief that Poland is at its mercy and that USSR territorial claims on Poland are at least tacitly approved by the Governments of Great Britain and the United States.

7) The Polish Government has now reached the firm conviction that the further prolongation of the present fiction of "friendly negotiations" with the Soviet Government would be not only fruitless but indeed harmful.

It has therefore informed the British and U. S. Governments.
Governments of the details of the situation, of its apprehension arising out of the probability that these conversations may soon have to be discontinued, and once more appeals to them for energetic and urgent intervention in Moscow in support of Poland's rights, which alone can still save the situation.

3) The Polish Government is firmly confident that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States have not abandoned their determination to adhere to their repeatedly declared policies of not recognizing any territorial changes brought about in the course of the war by force or by threat of force, and that it is not their intention to depart from these policies in the case of Poland, hereself an actively fighting member of the United Nations.

2) The Polish Government considers it urgent that an Anglo-American intervention in Moscow in support of Poland should be backed by an unequivocal restatement of these policies.

10) The Polish Government is of the opinion that, contrary to appearances, the USSR Government attaches in fact the greatest importance to statements made by the two Allied Governments and to reactions of American and British public opinion, and that it is also most sensitive in its interpretations of any lack of such reactions.

11) However,
11) However, even admitting that the USSR Government would not immediately favorably react to Allied intervention, such intervention and restatement of principles appears to be urgently necessary for reasons of the utmost importance to the stability of the United Nations front and its unity.

The most recent official German broadcasts increasingly prove how fully German policy in Europe and her propaganda in the occupied countries and abroad are taking advantage of the implications deriving from the hitherto noted lack of Allied reaction to Soviet territorial demands on Finland, the three Baltic Countries, Poland and Rumania. (See "Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service" of the Federal Communications Commission, Thursday, March 18, pp. D 2, D 3; Saturday, March 20, p. B 3; Wednesday, March 24, pp. B 1, D 4 to D 7). Germany is building up the thesis that Europe has been abandoned and is being handed over by Great Britain and the United States to the USSR.

On this basis an Inter-European Conference is announced, to be held under Axis auspices after Mr. Eden's visit in the United States.

In the present situation bordering on despair in the occupied European countries, the utilization of the allegedly plausible slogan that Europe is being sacrificed to Soviet Russia and abandoned to Communism by the Principal United Nations,
Nations, constitutes a very real danger. It may prove to be the last straw which may break down the splendid resistance to Germany on the part of European populations. It may sound the end of sabotage, may greatly assist German war production, and may even induce some hitherto recalcitrant anti-German leaders in occupied countries to rally to the Axis as to the only remaining salvation from the spectre of Soviet Bolshevism so generally abhorred and feared on the Continent of Europe.

12) Only an energetic intervention in Moscow on the part of Great Britain and the United States, backed by a firmly worded and unequivocal restatement of their non-recognition policies and the reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and United Nations Declaration, - even if it is not fully effective, - will at least enable the Governments of the occupied European United Nations:

1) effectively to counteract the above mentioned Axis policy,
2) to reassure the populations of their countries that the Principal United Nations have no intention of sacrificing them to Soviet Russian domination,
3) to maintain their spirit of resistance,
4) to maintain the morale and fighting spirit of their armed forces, so important at this phase of the war.

Washington, March 25, 1943.
April 6, 1943

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your kind letter of March 16, 1943 which was forwarded to me through Ambassador Biddle.

I have given careful attention to the information contained in your letter, which in general conforms to that which I have received from your Ambassador. Since your last visit Mr. Ciechanowski has been keeping me currently informed with regard to developments in the relations of Poland with the Soviet Union, and I am asking to be kept informed of the developing situation.

I agree with you that it is important that the solid front of the United Nations be maintained and am glad that both you and the Polish Government are prepared to do all in your power to prevent any rupture of Polish relations with the Soviet Union. It is the purpose also of the American Government to do all that it properly can to promote unity among these nations in the prosecution of the war and in preparing for the peace.

You may be sure, as I stated in my letter of January 5, 1943, that the Government of the United States is determined that Poland be reestablished.

His Excellency
Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.
and I am bearing constantly in mind the problems referred to in your letter in order that I may decide what course of action would be most helpful to pursue in the interests of Poland and of all the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
My dear Mr. President:

You will find enclosed the original letter from Ambassador Biddle dated March 17, 1943 forwarding General Sikorski's letter to you of March 16, 1943, as well as a suggested reply for your consideration.

In as much as a failure to find a mutually acceptable solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties may have important repercussions in many quarters, particularly in other nations under Axis domination or neutral European countries, in all of which Axis propaganda is extremely active, it is felt that it would be advisable to send a reply to the Prime Minister which would indicate that we do not fail to realize the seriousness of the situation.

It is my understanding that in your conversation with the Polish Ambassador you indicated that you feel that

The President,

The White House.
that you must remain the judge of what we can do to be helpful in this question and when it might be most propitious to be of assistance. In preparing the suggested reply to General Sikorski we have endeavored to conform to our understanding of your handling of the matter.

There is also enclosed the original of a letter to you dated April 4, 1943 from the Polish Ambassador giving further details of the Polish-Soviet difficulties and again requesting, at the instance of General Sikorski, that we intervene to bring about an improvement in the situation. If you agree, the Department of State can reply to this letter in the sense of the attached letter to General Sikorski which sets forth our understanding of your desires in connection with this problem.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

1. From Biddle, March 17, with enclosure from Sikorski, March 16, returned.
2. Draft reply to Sikorski.
3. From Polish Ambassador, April 4, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:

Reference is made to my letter of April 6 forwarding a draft letter to General Sikorski for your approval which you signed on April 6 and returned to the Department for transmission.

On reading again the letter to General Sikorski, I wonder whether it is advisable for us to reiterate at this time the phrase contained in your letter to General Sikorski of January 5, 1943 in which it is stated that "the Government of the United States is determined that Poland be reestablished." In the belief that you may concur in this suggestion I enclose herewith for your consideration a revised draft of the letter to General Sikorski excluding the above phrase in paragraph 4. For purposes of comparison I am also returning the original letter which you signed on April 6.

Please

The President,

The White House.
Please indicate which letter you desire to send to General Sikorski and I will see that it is delivered to him.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:
Two letters to General Sikorski.
My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your kind letter of March 16, 1943 which was forwarded to me through Ambassador Biddle.

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I agree with you that it is important that the solid front of the United Nations be maintained and am glad that both you and the Polish Government are prepared to do all in your power to prevent any rupture of Polish relations with the Soviet Union. It is the purpose also of the American Government to do all that it properly can to promote unity among these nations in the prosecution of the war and in preparing for the peace.

You may be sure I am bearing constantly in mind the problems referred to in your letter in

His Excellency
Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.
order that I may decide what course of action would be most helpful to pursue in the interests of Poland and of all the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) Franklin D. Roosevelt
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I have given careful attention to the information contained in your letter, which in general conforms to that which I have received from your Ambassador. Since your last visit Mr. Ciechanowski has been keeping me currently informed with regard to developments in the relations of Poland with the Soviet Union, and I am asking to be kept informed of the developing situation.

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His Excellency
Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.
and I am bearing constantly in mind the problems referred to in your letter in order that I may decide what course of action would be most helpful to pursue in the interests of Poland and of all the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
LONDONER'S DIARY

"Hi! You can't do that there 'ere"

PRIVATE WAR ON RUSSIA

(Copyright in all Countries)
His Excellency

Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz,

President of the Republic of Poland,

London (England).

I desire on this day, the national anniversary of Poland, to send to you and the people of Poland my sincere and heartfelt greetings.

I am happy on this occasion again to emphasize how deeply the American people admire the courageous and self-sacrificing manner in which the Polish people and their valiant army are continuing their struggle on the side of freedom and justice against our common enemy both inside and outside Poland.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

U.S. Government Printing Office 16-22040-1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF
COORDINATION AND REVIEW

May 1, 1943.

For the President's signature.
June 7, 1943

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your kind letter of May 4 which I have read with deep interest.

I need hardly assure you that I have been following with concern the developments in the Eastern European situation and desire to do what may appear to be most effective in healing on an equitable basis what I trust is only a temporary suspension of United Nations' unity.

I was particularly gratified to have your assurances that you and your Government are anxious to do everything in your power to reestablish the united front against our common enemy and to work together with the other United Nations, including the Soviet Union, with a view to bringing the war to a victorious conclusion.

On its part the United States Government will continue to cooperate with your Government and all the Governments of the United Nations in attempting to bring about maximum understanding among these nations in order that the full weight of our armed forces may be brought to bear against our common enemy and thus hasten victory and a lasting peace based on justice and goodwill.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Wladyslaw Sikorski,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.
May 4th, 1943.

My dear Mr. President,

I wish to thank you very sincerely for the kind interest you have shown in our problem during the last few days, as well as for your letter, which the United States Ambassador handed to me.

You may well imagine that it was with great regret that I and my Government were faced, the other day, with the Soviet Government's decision to break off, or suspend, diplomatic relations. Our invitation to the International Red Cross to investigate the circumstances of the death of thousands of Polish officers, recently brought to light by the Germans, may be criticised in some quarters. However, in view of the fact that many Poles, both here and in the Middle East, had near relatives or comrades-in-arms who had been killed in that neighbourhood, it was very difficult for us to ignore the news. I trust that you realize that this action on the part of the Soviet Government was not a sudden or isolated one, but the climax in a sequel of events all directed against the Polish nation and the Polish Government.

You will recall that on December 1st, 1941, the Soviet Government already initiated the policy of depriving some of the deportees of their Polish citizenship, linking this activity closely with the problem of the Soviet-Polish borders. This was directed in the first place against Polish citizens belonging to the national or racial minorities. At the beginning this policy was somewhat shy and it coincided exactly with the moment when I arrived in the U.S.S.R. in 1941 to pay a friendly visit to Mr. Stalin.

A campaign against myself and my Government was already planned at that early date. It is not for other reason that a so-called "Committee of Polish patriots" was formed which published

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
a paper entitled "Free Poland". Simultaneously there was being prepared a small military detachment of Polish Communists in the Red Army. Needless to say that those "Polish patriots" are unknown in Poland and of no importance whatsoever.

The policy of depriving deportees of their Polish citizenship reached its climax on January 16th, 1943, when Polish citizenship was withdrawn from every deportee regardless of his nationality or the part of Poland from which he came, so that even persons coming from the western borders of the country were to be considered Soviet citizens. Besides this policy and that of fostering attacks against myself and my Government, there have been other facts, the most notorious of which was the execution of Bhrlich and Alter.

Then a demand was made for the Molotov-Ribbentrop line as a boundary between the future Poland and Russia. This, of course, would have meant the beginning of the end of Poland as an independent state.

I fear that what the Soviet Government wants is a Polish Communist Government which would offer them Poland as a Soviet satellite state.

In view of the tremendous sacrifices which our people are making daily in Poland, and the achievements of Poland's Armed Forces on many battlefields, it was outrageous to announce to the world that I and my Government were conniving with the Nazi régime.

I trust that you, Mr. President, will also understand our anxiety at the present moment with regard to the scores of thousands who are still in Russia and that you will not refuse your help in protecting them and securing their departure from the Soviet Union.

I want you to know, Mr. President, that in spite of this record we are determined to work together with our Allies, including our Russian neighbours, with a view to bringing the war in Europe to a victorious close as soon as possible. No one realises better than we do that Goebbels's propaganda has taken advantage of recent events.

My Government and I are only too anxious to do everything in our power to re-establish the United Front against our common enemy within the shortest possible time, and I feel hopeful
that with the help of yourself and Mr. Churchill this will be speedily achieved.

I also feel, however, that if this is to be done within the near future certain impediments should be removed. In the first place the Soviet authorities should allow the tens of thousands of Polish soldiers' families, including tens of thousands of Polish children and orphans, to leave Soviet territory. We also ask for the release of men fit to carry arms, and, in conclusion, that the welfare and relief work for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. who were deported after 1939 should be continued until they are able to return to their homes in Poland.

I hope you will find these demands reasonable; they are dictated by humanitarian reasons and by our desire to strengthen our Armed Forces.

Once again may I thank you, Mr. President, on behalf of my Government and on my own for all the understanding and help which you have given us consistently in these difficult days.

Believe me, Mr. President

Yours very sincerely,

(Handwritten Signature)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.
May 24, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your request you will find enclosed a suggested draft reply to General Sikorski's letter of May 4.

If you approve this draft and return it to the Department, we will make arrangements to have it delivered.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. From Sikorski, May 4, returned.
2. Suggested reply.

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 5-4-43, from Gen. Sikorski, in reply to Pres' ltr. handed him by U.S. Ambassador. Re Soviet's decision to break off diplomatic relations says Soviet authorities should allow the tens of thousands of Polish soldiers' families, including children and orphans, to leave Soviet Territory; asks for release of men fit to carry arms; and that the welfare and relief work for Polish citizens in U.S.S.R. who were deported after 1939, should be continued until they are able to return to their homes in Poland.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
and
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

To read and return.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Let to the P. 6/2/43 from Amb. Biddle 40, Berkeley Square, London, W. 1, enclosing strictly confidential memo re background Professor Kot, Polish Minister of Infoł Minister in charge of Post-War Planning, Marian Seyda; and Professor Grabski, President of the Polish National Council

Orig., in A. J. D. Biddle folder 1-43.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. CORDELL HULL

Does this need an answer?

F.D.R.

Mr. President:

No.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
SEP 28 1943

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
September 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. CORDELL HULL

Does this need an answer?

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Tony Biddle, Embassy of the U.S.A., London, 9/7/43, to the President, enclosing letter for the President from Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, Poland, 9/7/43, thanking, on behalf of the Polish Government and himself, for the determined warning delivered by the American Administration to the Germans in reference to their cruel acts of terror committed against the Poles.
Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Polish Government and myself I would like to thank you most sincerely for the determined warning delivered by the American Administration to the Germans in reference to their cruel acts of terror committed against the Poles.

Our unhappy but heroic nation, fights for over four years now and resists the invader. It is just that our great Allies stand by the Poles in the defence of their most sacred rights.

Conscious as I am of the justice of our principles, confident in your profound sympathy for our cause, and trusting that you will Mr. President, continue giving me, as the successor of General Sikorski, the same trust and understanding,

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, USA.

September, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:

I take pleasure in forwarding you the enclosed letter which Prime Minister Mikolajczyk has asked me to transmit to you.

With warmest regards and my every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

1/ letter as stated.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
November 22, 1943

Dear Tony:

Thank you for your letter of October 18, 1943 forwarding a communication from Prime Minister Mikolajczyk which enclosed a message of greeting to Mrs. Roosevelt from the underground organization of Polish women.

Please deliver the attached letter from Mrs. Roosevelt to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in reply to his communication.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Enclosure:

To Mikolajczyk
from Mrs. Roosevelt.

The Honorable
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.,
American Ambassador to Poland,
Care of American Embassy,
London.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON December 1, 1943

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am most grateful to you for your courtesy in forwarding the message addressed to me by the underground organization of Polish women in Poland.

I would be very appreciative if you would be so kind as to thank them for their greeting and convey to them my deep admiration for their courage and fortitude during the long years under Nazi oppression.

Please also convey to these brave women my conviction that the day of Poland's liberation is at hand when they may again live in a world at peace and devote their energies to their normal pursuits of life.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.

Note: This is not an actual carbon of Mrs. Roosevelt's letter to the Prime Minister of Poland. Mrs. Roosevelt's office retyped the letter for her signature, but the text is the same.
40, Berkeley Square,  
October 18, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:  

The Polish Prime Minister, Molotov,  
wishes me to send you the enclosed letter,  
attached to which is a message to Mrs. Roosevelt  
from the Women's "Underground" Council in Poland.  

As you are undoubtedly aware, the  
communications between the Government here and  
the underground in Poland are, as a rule, very  
good. This particular message has just recently  
come through, and it is believed to have been  
sent in the very last days of September.  

With warmest regards and every good wish,  

I am  

Yours faithfully,  

Tony Biddle  

The President  
The White House,  
Washington.  

Enclosure:  
1/ as stated.
Dear Mr. President,

I am sending you the enclosed message, which was despatched to me from Poland by the underground organisation of Polish women for transmission to Mrs. Roosevelt. I shall be grateful if you will give the message to Mrs. Roosevelt with assurances of the sincere regards of myself and my fellow-countrymen.

Yours very sincerely,

The President
of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, U.S.A.
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt;

The women of Poland from their underground council send you their greetings. The whole society of Polish women nourish in their hearts the warmest gratitude for your friendly sympathy towards our tortured country. We recognize in you, working by the side of your great husband, an advocate of Poland's cause among the nations of the world.

September, 1943.
My dear Mr. President:

There is submitted herewith draft letters for your and Mrs. Roosevelt's signatures, addressed to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and Ambassador Biddle in reply to the letter from the Ambassador enclosing greetings to Mrs. Roosevelt from the underground organization of Polish women.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

1. To Ambassador Biddle.
2. To Prime Minister Mikolajczyk from Mrs. Roosevelt.

The President,

The White House.
Return to Mr. Latta
November 27, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS THOMPSON:

I am sending on to you the attached file containing a letter for the signature of Mrs. Roosevelt, drafted by the Department of State. If you will return it to me, we shall be glad to see that the letters are forwarded to the State Department for transmittal.

M. C. L.

Letter signed by the President, 11/22/43, to Hon. A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., in reply to letter of 10/18/43 in re communication from Prime Minister Mikolajczyk which enclosed a message of greeting to Mrs. Roosevelt from the underground organization of Polish women. Attached is letter for Mrs. Roosevelt's signature to the Prime Minister of Poland, His Excellency Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. Our White House file attached.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

For preparation of reply for
Mrs. Roosevelt's signature.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Tony Biddle, 40, Berkeley Square, London, W. 1, 10/18/43, to the President, attaching letter from the President from the Polish Prime Minister, Mikolajczyk, 10/18/43, attached to which is a message to Mrs. Roosevelt from the Women's "Underground" Council in Poland. This is a message of greetings to Mrs. Roosevelt.
For the President from Secretary Hull:

As the Russian Army approaches the Polish frontier the Polish Government is showing its extreme anxiety over the future of Poland and I believe that I should send you a rather full summary of developments.

The following are the principal points of a confidential memorandum from the Polish Premier to you which has been handed to me by the Polish Ambassador:

The Prime Minister referred to the Polish Government's memorandum of October 6 which among other things expressed the hope that normal Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations could be restored in order that the Polish and Soviet Governments could then endeavor to settle their mutual problems and asked for British-American guarantees of the independence and integrity of Polish territory as well as the security of its inhabitants. To assure this the October 6 memorandum made the impractical suggestion that
American-British troops should be stationed in Poland to prevent friction and possible reprisals. That memorandum indicated that if the Soviet Government should openly attempt to communique Poland after its armies had occupied Polish territory this might cause the Polish population as an act of desperation to retaliate in self defense.

The latest memorandum dated November 18 appeals to you QUOTE to intervene with Marshal Stalin with a view to restoring Polish-Soviet relations, safeguarding the interests of the Polish State and the life and property of its citizens after the Soviet troops have entered Poland. UNQUOTE

The memorandum asserts that QUOTE the unwillingness of the Polish Government to enter into discussions on frontier questions is based on the following considerations: UNQUOTE

1. Poland has never given up the fight against Germany since 1939 and is fully entitled to emerge from the war without reduction of territory.

2. Soviet claims to Eastern Poland comprise half of
The memorandum continues: QUOTE The Polish Government could not see their way to enter into a discussion on the subject of territorial concessions above all for the reason that such a discussion in the absence of effective guarantees of Poland's independence and security on the part of the United States and Great Britain would be sure to lead to ever new demands. The attribution to Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, Opole, Silesia and the straightening and shortening of the Polish Western frontier are in any case dictated by the need to provide for the stability of future peace, the disarmament of Germany and the security of Poland and other countries of Central Europe. The transfer to Poland of these territories cannot therefore be fairly treated as an object of compensation for the cession to the USSR of Eastern Poland which for reasons adduced above does by no means represent to the USSR a value comparable to that which it has for Poland. The attempt
of Poland—both Poles—shall be taken place after the restoration
from the enemy. Consequently, in case the enemy or Poles
sovereignty over Poland hands to the Allied
occupied, the Polish government to exert to
to Poles, in accordance with the procedure adopted in
issue of Poland,
before or at the very moment of the entry of Poles troops
a moment mutually agreed upon with our Allies either
Poland occupied Germany to be made ready to break out at
the memorandum then states that under a Peace in
occupations. Note
those which have been applied in the past by consecutive
in view of the increasing menace applied there today and
the will of the population in proclaiming those territories
equality impossible to obtain a genuine expression of
any other authority or legal. It would be
occupation by the occupying authorities the without
by means of a popular vote organized under Poles
made to preserve the role of Poland Eastern territories

Washington,

Department of State

Telegram SENT
be anxious, as it has already informed the American Government, to return immediately to Poland together with the Commander-in-Chief, and to cooperate there in the further struggle against Germany.

QUOTE The entry of Soviet troops on Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty while the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground. In that case the Polish Government foresee the use of measures of self-defence wherever such measures are rendered indispensable by Soviet methods of terror and extermination of Polish citizens. UNQUOTE

Asserting that the Moscow Conference did not bring the question of resumption of Polish-Soviet relations nearer to a satisfactory solution, the memorandum states that the Polish Government has reason QUOTE to fear that in present conditions the life and property of Polish citizens may be exposed to danger after the entry of

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

-3-

Soviet troops into Poland and the imposing on the country of Soviet administration. In that case desperate reaction of the Polish community may be expected following the violation of the principle adopted in Quebec assuring to the United Nations their liberty and their own administration. UNQUOTE

The memorandum further indicates that the Polish Government does not believe that the principles applied to Italy as adopted at the Moscow Conference would be satisfactory for Poland which is not an enemy country but a member of the United Nations. Moreover, it is stated that the presence of a few American and British liaison officers in Poland would not assure proper safeguards in the administration of the territory occupied by the Red Army.

When the Ambassador handed me the above memorandum he also delivered a personal message to you from the Polish Prime Minister stating that he is anxious to submit to you personally and verbally certain alternatives for the solution of existing difficulties and would be grateful for the opportunity of doing so. He

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added QUOTE I am ready to undertake the necessary journey at any time and in complete secrecy. UNQUOTE

In presenting the Polish Prime Minister's request to see you the Ambassador indicated that Nikolajczyk wished to join you and Mr. Churchill to which I replied that I did not believe it would be possible to arrange this since you would be busily engaged in military matters of great urgency.

Subsequent to this Ambassador Biddle telegraphed on November 20 that Nikolajczyk and the Polish Foreign Minister had insisted that they should be consulted in advance concerning any decisions that might be taken involving Polish interests.

The Poles indicated that decisions taken without full consultation with the Polish Government upon which the underground in Poland stakes its hope would undoubtedly lead to a serious crisis in that quarter. Furthermore, it would create a crisis in Polish circles in England, the Middle East, and might have QUOTE serious repercussions among Americans of Polish origin. UNQUOTE

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Nikolajczyk interjected that even a man condemned to
death was granted a last word before the court.

The Polish Foreign Minister referred to a formula
which Mr. Eden, he said, is considering which envisaged
dividing Poland into regions in which respectively the
military administration of the "QUOTE liberating forces
UNQUOTE and the Polish Government might function. He
added that it was logical that whatever formulae were
advanced would meet with counter proposals and the
Polish Government considered it of the utmost importance
that its representative be on hand during these discussions.

In pressing for arrangements so that he could meet
you Nikolajczyk said that there were things he could
present orally but could not put in writing at this time.

On the basis of the foregoing and the attitude of
the extremely agitated state of mind of the Polish Ambas-
sador here it is apparent that the Polish Government feels
that it is in a desperate position. This may well lead
to unfortunate public outbursts. In an effort to calm
the Ambassador I made it clear to him that I had emphasized
at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and had urged Molotov to find a basis for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Poland; that once these relations were restored ways and means could be found to work out and adjust their differences. I told the Ambassador that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity to be of service to both Governments.

I also pointed out to the Ambassador that I regretted to find on my return Polish attacks on the Four-Nation Declaration when this Declaration means everything to the future of Poland. I also indicated my regret at shortsighted Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature which has manifested itself in other ways than condemning the Four-Nation Declaration.

We are making every effort here and through Biddle in London to convince the Poles, official and unofficial, that they must take a calmer outlook and not prejudice their case by undue public agitation regarding our policies.
With the approach of the Red Army to former Polish territory it would appear that every friendly opportunity should be taken to bring about a resumption of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. If this is not possible at the moment, I believe we should exert all our influence to persuade the Polish Government to give instructions to its underground army to launch at the opportune moment a full-fledged attack on the Germans behind their lines and to assist the Red Army in its battle. The Polish Government should realize that if this is achieved the British and ourselves will be in a better position to convince the Soviet Government of the Polish Government's desire to make a material contribution to the shortening of the war, and to collaborate with the other United Nations after the war in working for the establishment of an organization of peace-loving nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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Sent by operator M. 19
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

Referring to the President's letter to Mr. A.J.D. Biddle, Jr., American Ambassador to Poland, in which the President suggested that Prime Minister Mikolajczyk might visit Washington sometime after January 15, I would suggest for the President's consideration that the Prime Minister be invited to arrive on or about Wednesday, January 26.

President Medina of Venezuela will be in Washington from January 19 to January 24 and the date of the 26th would not only be clear at the White House but also give the President an opportunity to put up the Prime Minister at the Blair House following the departure of President Medina.

Could you let me know whether this schedule meets with the President's approval.

George T. Summerlin
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

December 27, 1943

The British Embassy this morning informed us that Mr. Eden has had a talk with the Prime Minister of Poland and has explained to him something of the attitude of the Soviet Government as expressed during the Moscow Conference toward the Polish Government and the question of resumption of relations with that Government. Mr. Eden is anxious to have the Prime Minister of Poland have a further talk with Mr. Churchill if possible before Mikolajczyk comes to Washington for his visit with you. As Mr. Churchill will not be back in London before the middle of January this would entail a postponement of Mikolajczyk's visit to Washington now set for January 15. Mr. Eden of course would not wish to make any suggestion toward postponement of the Polish Prime Minister's visit to you unless he were certain that you would be entirely in accord with any such suggestion.

As far as I can see it would appear desirable for Mikolajczyk to talk with Churchill if possible before coming to Washington. Will you let me know whether you have any objection to the postponement of this visit in order that I may so inform Mr. Eden.

C H

W. K. Go ahead, JFR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 28, 1943

I telephoned Mr. Summerlin, at the direction of the President, to ask him to talk with the Secretary of State, as the President is trying to postpone the visit of the Prime Minister of Poland.

(Prime Minister of Poland was to come on Wed. Jan. 26)

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Reminder for GGT

President Medina of Venezuela will be in Wash. from Jan. 19th to Jan. 24th.

Dinner, Wed. Jan. 19th - [Inferable word]
POLAND THROUGH THE AGES

EIGHT MAPS
Re-drawn from
"The Eastern Boundaries of Poland"
By
A. BRUCE BOSWELL, M.A.
Professor of Russian History, Language and Literature
in the University of Liverpool

POLISH INFORMATION CENTRE
745 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y
POLAND THROUGH THE AGES

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POLAND
FIRST TO FIGHT!
EIGHT MAPS OF POLAND

MAP 1:
This Map shows the Polish Commonwealth prior to 1667. Outlined in heavy black is pre-war Poland of 1939, indicating how much territory was never returned to her after the last War, 1914-1918.

MAP 2:
This Map shows Poland after the loss of territory ceded to Russia by the Treaty of Andruszów, which ended the Polish-Russian war of 1654-1667, and after East Prussia ceased to be a Fief of Poland in 1657. Poland retained these boundaries until the First Partition.

MAP 3:
This Map shows Poland after the First Partition by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1772. Prussia, stopped in her age-old aggressions against Poland by the victory of Grunwald in 1410, had joined hands with Russia to perfect her plans for the "Drang nach Osten." Austria was invited and not reluctant to join.

MAP 4:
This Map shows Poland after the Second Partition of 1793, by Russia and Prussia. Austria received no further spoils this time.

MAP 5:
This Map shows Poland after the Third Partition by Russia, Prussia and Austria in 1795. Poland disappeared entirely from the Map of Europe. Warsaw was given to Prussia.

MAP 6:
This Map shows Poland after the Congress of Vienna, 1815. After the idea of re-establishing Poland as an Independent State had been abandoned, the ensuing policy of power culminated in the First World War, 1914-1918.

MAP 7:
This Map shows the territory of reborn Poland after the First World War with her Eastern frontiers as defined by the Treaty of Riga in 1921 between Poland, Soviet-Russia and the Soviet Ukraine. These frontiers were recognized by the Conference of Ambassadors, by the League of Nations and by every other country, including the United States.

MAP 8:
This Map shows the Fourth Partition of Poland under the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement signed by Soviet Russia and Germany on September 28, 1939.
COMMONWEALTH OF POLAND in 1657

POLAND on Sept. 1, 1939

MAP 1
COMMONWEALTH of POLAND after 1667

POLAND on Sept. 1, 1939

annexed by Prussia

1657

MAP 2
First Partition of POLAND
1772
By PRUSSIA, RUSSIA and AUSTRIA

MAP 3
Second Partition of POLAND 1793
By PRUSSIA & RUSSIA

MAP 4
MAP 6

POLAND after Congress of Vienna 1815-1918

MAP 6