August 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is given below a suggested reply to Premier Nikolajczyk's message to you sent from Tehran on July 31. If you approve this message it could be delivered to Premier Nikolajczyk through Ambassador Harriman in Moscow:

"Thank you for your message of July 31 expressing your sincere desire to make every effort in your discussions with Marshal Stalin to bring about the establishment of Soviet-Polish relations on a new and firm basis.

"I need hardly assure you of the hope of the United States Government for the success of your efforts to establish friendly relations between your country and the Soviet Union on a firm and lasting basis which will not only further the prosecution of the war against our common enemy but will represent an important contribution to a just and lasting peace."

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
August 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LAFAY

Since we have been engaged in official conversations with Marshal Stalin, I believe that it would be helpful if you would be in harmony with our general policy if we were to send the attached telegram to the American Embassy.

Attached are two secret memorandums for the President which I shall appreciate your transmitting to him in the next pouch.

[Signature]

Attachment:

Draft telegram to Ambassador Harriman.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since Prime Minister Nikolajczyk is now actively engaged in conversations with Marshal Stalin, I believe that it would be helpful and very much in conformity with our general policy if we were to send the attached telegram to Ambassador Harriman.

If you agree it will be despatched immediately upon the receipt of your telegraphic approval.

Attachment:

Draft telegram to Ambassador Harriman.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter 11-72
By J. Schanbue Date FEB 15 1972
DRAFT TELEGRAM

AMBASSADOR

MOSCOW

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE UNDERSECRETARY.

In the light of Prime Minister Mikołajczyk's conversations with Marshal Stalin (your __________), we believe it would be helpful if you would take an early opportunity to express to Mr. Molotov the interest which the Government of the United States is taking in the Prime Minister's talks in Moscow and the hope of this Government that these conversations will result in an amicable and mutually satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions between the Soviet Union and Poland.

I would appreciate your instructions on what action, if any, we should take in regard to this Polish request.

POLISH DATE 1, 1972

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 15 1972
By J. Schaubie Date
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This morning the Polish Ambassador left with me the attached document containing further incidents according to Polish information in which the Soviet military authorities have arrested or forcibly impressed into the Soviet armies or into the Polish divisions operating as part of the Red Army the members of the Polish Underground forces, irrespective of the fact that these Underground forces have been engaged in open battle against the common enemy.

You will note on the first page that the Commander of the Polish National (Underground) Army requests that we take immediate steps to obtain from the Allied Command recognition of the Polish National (Underground) Army as a component part of the Allied armies as was done in the case of the French Underground.

You will also note that the Polish Government attaches particular urgency to this matter since it is stated that "this attitude on the part of the Soviet may force us to acts of self-defense".

I would appreciate your instructions as to what actions if any we should take in regard to this Polish request.

Attachment:

Polish note dated
August 4, 1944.
The Polish Ambassador submitted to the Secretary of State the following most urgent information received by the Polish Government from the Commander of the Polish National (Underground) Army in the course of the last few days. The texts of the telegrams from Poland have been communicated to Minister Schoenfeld for the Secretary of State and to the British Foreign Office.

Telegram from the Commander of the Polish National (Underground) Army dated July 30th, 1944:

The Soviet authorities are arresting the officers in command and the staffs of the Polish National (Underground) Army. The same fate undoubtably awaits the leaders of the Polish Underground Civilian Administration.

Please do your utmost to save these people from liquidation by the NKWD.

It is urgent to inform the British and American Governments about this activity tending at the extermination of the Polish Underground Organization. We ask you to undertake immediate steps in order to obtain from the Allied Command the recognition of the Polish National (Underground) Army as a component part of the Allied Armies similarly as has been done in the case of the French National Underground Army.

On July 26th, 1944, a detachment of the 8th Infantry Regiment in the region of Lublin was disarmed when entering into contact, as ordered, with the Soviet forces.

At the point of a revolver the Polish Commander was forced to sign a declaration of willingness to enter the Berling army.

DECLASSIFIED
On July 25th, 1944, the Soviet authorities began to disarm our 27th Division of Infantry which before the arrival of the Soviet troops had taken and was holding the regions of Stalowa Wola and Lubartów.

This fact, coupled with the hostile Soviet attitude towards our forces in the region of Wilno, clearly shows that the Soviet authorities intend to carry out the liquidation of the Polish National (Underground) Army regardless of the loyal and active support which this army has been and is giving to the Soviet forces.

It is imperative and urgent to bring these facts to the knowledge of the Allies as this attitude on the part of the Soviets may force us to acts of self-defense.

In the fighting for the City of Lwów our detachments, amounting to 3,000 men, took an active and effective part. After our Commander had disclosed himself to the Soviet Command he was told that the region of Lwów is Soviet territory and that his detachment must therefore surrender arms within two hours and consider itself as liquidated. It was added that the mobilization will be carried out by the Soviet authorities in that region. The Poles will then be given the choice between entering the Berling army or the Soviet Army. The officers of the Polish National (Underground) Army are not liable to mobilization. They can conserve their arms and enter the Berling army.

The Polish Ambassador is instructed by the Polish Foreign Minister additionally to communicate these facts to the Secretary
Secretary of State with the urgent request for appropriate steps in view of the perilous situation of the Polish National (Underground) Army, the Polish Underground Civilian Administration and the population of Poland, as well as the urgency of the matter.

Washington, August 4th, 1944.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Does this need a reply?
If so, will you prepare one?

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Stanley Woodward, 7/27/44, to Miss Tully, transmitting a message from Hon. Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, London, 7/20/44, to the Secretary of State, together with a letter to the President dated 7/20/44 from the Polish Prime Minister, Stalislav Mikolajczyk.

July 27, 1944

Reply to letter of a despatch from Government at London intelligence communication to our Stalislav Mikolajczyk President.

July 27, 1944

The Head of the Polish Embassy and the Polish Mission in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Woodward, July 20, 1944, with enclosure.

Miss Grace C. Tully,
The White House.
In reply refer to
PR 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./7-2344

July 27, 1944

My dear Miss Tully:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a despatch from the American Embassy near the Polish Government at London dated July 20, 1944, forwarding a sealed communication which the Polish Prime Minister, Monsieur Stalislaw Mikolajczyk, has addressed to the President.

Sincerely yours,

Stanley Woodward
Chief, Division of Protocol

Enclosures:

From Embassy near the Polish Government,
no. 632, July 20, 1944,
with enclosure.

Miss Grace G. Tully,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 16, 1944

Your approval of the suggested reply to Premier Mikolajczyk's message to you, sent from Tehran on July 31, arrived in the Department on August 14, after Premier Mikolajczyk had returned to London. The following reply is therefore suggested for delivery to him in London if you approve:

"As you are doubtless aware, I was in the Pacific when your message from Tehran arrived in Washington and was unable to reply immediately. I have, however, followed the reports on your conversations in Moscow with the greatest interest.

"I need hardly assure you of the hope of the United States Government for the success of your efforts to establish friendly relations between your country and the Soviet Union on a firm and lasting basis which will not only further the prosecution of the war against our common enemy but will represent an important contribution to a just and lasting peace."

\[\text{[Handwritten initials: CH]}\]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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"I need hardly assure you of the hope of the United States Government for the success of your efforts to establish friendly relations between your country and the Soviet Union on a firm and lasting basis which will not only further the prosecution of the war against our common enemy but will represent an important contribution to a just and lasting peace."

C H
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1944

FILE MEMORANDUM:
The following messages received by the President were referred to Admiral Leahy by the President:

No. 758 P.M. to the President dated August 18, with Pres. message to P.M. 600
759 P.M to the President
760 P.M to the President with draft of proposed reply

Map Room message from Winant to the President, file number 1815502, dated Aug. 18.

Message to the President from Harriman, Aug. 18 in regard to Poles.

Since Ambassador Harriman has received assurances from Vyshinski

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schuette Date
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Funds for the Polish Underground.

When Prime Minister Mikolajczyk was here, as you will recall, he requested the continuance of funds from the United States for the support of the Polish Underground forces, and after receiving the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you approved the allocation of ten million dollars for this purpose subject to the provision that the Polish Underground should establish a working relationship with the Red Army.

Having received assurances in writing from the Polish Government to the effect that specific orders have been issued to the Polish Underground to cooperate with the Red Army advancing into Poland, the sum of ten million dollars was allocated by the Bureau of the Budget. However, subsequent developments in the Polish situation, in particular the formation of the Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee of Liberation, which seem to cast a doubt on the possibility of cooperation between the Polish Underground and the Red Army, the matter was resubmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who recommended as you were informed that the actual handing over of funds be deferred for the time being.

The Polish Ambassador has recently expressed the concern of his Government over our decision to defer the payment and emphasized the fear that the shutting off of the American funds formerly made available to the Polish Underground would have a far-reaching effect on Polish morale. The Ambassador was assured that we would take this matter up with you on your return.

Since Ambassador Harriman has received assurances from

Vyshinski
Vyshinski that the Soviet Government has no objection to the American and British Governments furnishing aid to the Polish Underground forces, there appears to be no reason why we should not contribute assistance to the Polish Underground forces by making available the ten million dollars which we promised Premier Mikolajczyk we would send. This decision on the part of the Soviet authorities would appear to meet the feelings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that payment might be deferred for the time being.

We are accordingly making arrangements to have the money delivered immediately.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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When Prime Minister Nikolajczyk was here, as you will recall, he requested the continuance of funds from the United States for the support of the Polish Underground forces, and after receiving the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you approved the allocation of ten million dollars for this purpose subject to the provision that the Polish Underground should establish a working relationship with the Red Army.

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Since Ambassador Harriman has received assurances from

Vyshinski

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schlesinger Date FEB 10 1972
Vyshinski that the Soviet Government has no objection to the American and British Governments furnishing aid to the Polish Underground forces, there appears to be no reason why we should not contribute assistance to the Polish Underground forces by making available the ten million dollars which we promised Premier Molotov we would send. This decision on the part of the Soviet authorities would appear to meet the feelings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that payment might be deferred for the time being.

We are accordingly making arrangements to have the money delivered immediately.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you and the Secretary of State be good enough to prepare a joint reply to the enclosed for my signature?

Will you show the Secretary a copy of the joint message to Stalin from Churchill and me?

F. D. R.

Message to the President from Premier Mikolajczyk, dated August 18, 1944 - through State Department -- re clearance of American crews for flights to Warsaw from Stalin.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR THE NECESSARY
ACTION.

F. D. R.

Secret memorandum for the President, 8-16-44, from Hon. Cordell Hull, attaching memorandum, dated Aug. 14, 1944, containing text of a telegram to the President by the Vice Premier of the Polish Government, Warsaw, Aug. 12, appealing for immediate aid to the Polish Forces fighting in Warsaw.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION

OR FILE.

F. D. R.

Message from the Prime Minister to
the President, No. 761, dated Aug. 19, 1944, re appeal from Soviet
broadcasting stations to the Polish
population to start a general rising
against the Germans.

(Copies of this memo filed - Churchill folder, 1-44
and Russia folder, 1-44)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
August 23, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

Perhaps you would like to have these for your files.

The President's approval, through Admiral Leahy, was marked on the original.

James E. Brown, Jr.

August 23, 1944.

ADAMIAL LEAHY

For your request you will find the approval a draft reply letter of August 18. Approved we shall see that.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram for Schoenfeld.

I received your letter of August 18, and am glad to say that the United States Government has replied to the Soviet Government to cooperate in phasing out the Soviet forces in Europe, and that Chicherin and I have addressed a personal appeal to present Stalin's expression. We hope that he will give immediate orders to stop sending and pulling out the Russian forces in Europe, as they are needed to do in defense and as a counter to any German advance.
August 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

In compliance with your request you will find attached for the President's approval a draft reply to Premier Mikolajczyk's letter of August 18.

If this message is approved we shall see that it is transmitted immediately.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram for Schoenfeld.

[Handwritten note added:] The President has approved.

[Handwritten note added:] 20/5/4
U.S. URGENT  NO DISTRIBUTION - NO STENCIL

AMBASSADOR,

LONDON.

POLRES.

FOR SCHÖNFELD.

MIACT.

Please deliver immediately following message from the President in reply to Nikolajczyk’s letter of August 16 (your 74, August 16):

QUOTE.

I received your letter of August 16, containing your urgent request for me to appeal to Marshal Stalin in order to obtain permission for flights of American planes to assist the heroic Warsaw garrison against the Nazis.

For your strictly confidential information I am glad to assure you that the United States Government has urged the Soviet Government to cooperate in getting aid to the Polish forces in Warsaw, and Mr. Churchill and I have addressed a personal appeal to Marshal Stalin expressing the hope that he will give immediate orders to drop supplies and munitions to the Polish forces in that city, or that he
will agree to help our planes in this task.

I have not given up hope that our intervention will have the desired results.

In regard to the broader question of the solution of Polish-Soviet differences, I fully realize the difficulties which confront you, particularly in the light of the heroic and unequal struggle of the Warsaw garrison. I feel, however, that these unfortunate developments should not deter you from presenting reasonable proposals to the Polish Committee of National Liberation and I am of the firm opinion that if reasonable proposals are not presented to the Committee, and if a crisis should arise in the Polish Government, such developments could only worsen the situation.

UNQUOTE.
My dear Mr. President:

I received your letter of August 12, 1944, asking aid for the heroic Polish forces fighting the Nazis in Warsaw.

I have been following these matters with close attention, and I am sure that Premier Mikolajczyk has informed you of all the efforts we have made to assist the valiant Polish troops in your capital.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Władysław Raczkiewicz,
President of the Republic of Poland,
London.
There is attached a draft acknowledgment for your approval and signature to the message from the Polish President of August 12, 1944. It was felt that no reply to the Polish President could be made until the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been received as to whether, from a military point of view, it would be feasible to accede to all or any of the requests made. A letter to Admiral Leahy was drafted on August 14 asking for the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A reply was received from Admiral Leahy on August 21 explaining that it was not feasible to accede to the Polish President's requests and recommending that no commitments be made in this matter. Since, in the meantime, the Polish Government was informed in London that we were prepared to send flights to Warsaw if arrangements could be made for the planes to land in the Soviet Union and since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had indicated that no commitments should be made, it was felt that the reply should be postponed.

Enclosure:

Draft reply to Polish President.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington

Prime Minister,

There is a possibility that the conference in Poland will be moved (Fri) from
Washington to Moscow.

Please send to

Prime Minister,

October 2, 1944

File
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

September 2, 1944

Enclosed herewith the White House Letter from the Polish Prime Minister, Lajczyk.

For lateness of date and all new developments, plus the fact that the message to Premier Mikolajczyk a few days ago taken place, plus the fact that the Department feels that no reply is necessary to the Prime Minister's letter of July 20.

George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:
File
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

September 2, 1944

I am returning enclosed herewith the White House file containing a letter from the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.

In view of the lateness of date and all new developments which have taken place, plus the fact that the President sent a message to Premier Mikolajczyk a few days ago, the Department feels that no reply is necessary to the Prime Minister's letter of July 20.

George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:
File
September 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I am returning enclosed herewith the White House file containing a letter from the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.

In view of the lateness of date and all new developments which have taken place, plus the fact that the President sent a message to Premier Mikolajczyk a few days ago, the Department feels that no reply is necessary to the Prime Minister's letter of July 20.

George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:
File
July 27, 1944

D./7-2044

Dear Miss Grace G. Tully,

Enclosures:

From Embassy near the Polish Government, no. 632, July 20, 1944, with enclosure.

Miss Grace G. Tully,

The White House.

Sincerely yours,

Stanley Woodward
Chief, Division of Protocol
In reply refer to PR 811.001 Roosevelt, F.D./7-2044

July 27, 1944

My dear Miss Tully:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a despatch from the American Embassy near the Polish Government at London dated July 20, 1944, forwarding a sealed communication which the Polish Prime Minister, Monsieur Stallislaw Mikolajczyk, has addressed to the President.

Sincerely yours,

Stanley Woodward
Chief, Division of Protocol

Enclosures:

From Embassy near the Polish Government, no. 632, July 20, 1944, with enclosure.

Miss Grace G. Tully,
The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
near the Polish Government

URGENT
No. 632

Confidential
SUBJECT: Transmitting Letter addressed by the
 Polish Prime Minister, Monsieur
 Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, to the
 President.

Air mail

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

At the request of Premier Mikolajczyk, I have the
honor to transmit herewith a sealed letter addressed by him

Respectfully yours,

RUDOLF E. SCHOFIELD
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

Letter, as stated.
Mr. President,

Permit me to submit to you the latest radio messages received from the Commander of the Polish Home Army regarding the participation of our forces in the capture of Wilno, and their collaboration with the Soviet Army in the campaign against the Germans in the North Eastern provinces of Poland.

The information given in these messages confirms once again the precision with which the relevant instructions of the Polish Government, which are well known to you, are being carried out despite the difficult military and political circumstances.

As was the case some months ago in Volhynia, the Polish and Soviet Forces have again collaborated in the province of Wilno. To my mind this may be regarded as a fresh opportunity for obtaining the more general Polish-Soviet
Soviet understanding desired by the Polish Government and the remaining United Nations. From the conversations I had the privilege of having with you, Mr. President, I know what significance you and the American people attach to the materialization of such an understanding. I am deeply convinced that if the present happenings in the province of Wilno and the North-Eastern Polish provinces are handled appropriately, they could be made conducive to the achievement of results desired by all of us.

At the same time, however, I must express my apprehension as to the effect, if the necessary steps are not taken in time. This contact of the Soviet Army with the Polish Home Army, fighting for the liberation of Poland, may then turn into a source of difficulties and friction harmful to the general cohesion and collaboration of the United Nations.

In these circumstances and in view of the great understanding and sympathy you have always evinced for the needs and trials of the Polish Nation, I venture to appeal to you, once more, Mr. President, to urge upon the Soviet Government the need for avoiding the execution of any measures detrimental both to the most vital interests of Poland and the Allied war effort.

Moreover, it seems to be in the indisputable interest of all the United Nations that at the moment when large parts of Polish
of Polish territory are rapidly becoming the scene of great military events, the Polish Home Army should be enabled to continue the fight against Germany and, while owing allegiance to the Polish Government in London, fight under the operational command of the Soviet Army, as was agreed in March of this year by the Polish Regional Commander in Volhynia and the Soviet officer commanding that front.

This being so, I beg to submit herewith the request of the Polish Government, which is so strongly seconded by the pressing appeal of the Commander of the Home Army, that an American liaison officer be dispatched immediately from Moscow to Wilno.

At the same time, I have the honour to submit to you once more, Mr. President, the request that American representatives be secretly sent forthwith to the Polish Underground authorities under German occupation.

The very presence of such representatives on Polish territory must inevitably influence the desired course of events. Furthermore I feel impelled to point to the impression that may be made on the Polish people by the absence at the present juncture, which is so vital for the future of the Polish State, of any Allied representative on Polish soil.

I am
I am convinced that you, Mr. President, realize the importance and urgency of the matters which I have the honour to submit and hope that you will be able to comply with the Polish Government's request.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

[Signature]

1 Engl.
TRANSLATION OF A CODE MESSAGE FROM POLAND

Dated July 14th
Received July 17th

"Reports from Wilno dated July 16th say that the city was taken with the large-scale cooperation of the Polish Home Army. The city is devastated and losses in men are high. Relations with the Red Army are correct for the time being."

/Sign/ Commander of the Home Army.

SECRET

TRANSLATION OF A CODE MESSAGE FROM POLAND

Dated July 17th
Received July 18th.

"Reports received so far from Wilno and Nowogródek are submitted hereby.

1. In the night of 7/8 July strong detachments of the Polish Home Army equaling one division carried an attack on Wilno on their own but in cooperation with the Soviet Army. The District Commander of the Home Army entered into contact with the Soviet Front Commander."

"2. The foregoing and lasting military operations of the detachments of the Home Army have cleared the ground and enabled the swift march of Soviet troops through the province of Wilno and the northern part of the province of Nowogródek. Polish militia is in charge at Towo-Wilejka. At Targale Polish administrative authorities have come into the open."

"3. The following units of the Polish Home Army have taken part in the fight for Wilno: the first, third, fourth and twenty-fifth brigades of the Partisans, together with the Soviet Division."
"Izvestya" falsely reported that Lithuanians fought for the capture of Wilno.

"4. The District Commander of the Home Army, using the pseudonym of Jagoda, believes that the Soviets intend to "liquidate" Polish detachments and that this process is retarded only because of the difficulties of the Soviet Army arising from their exceptionally swift march. The Soviets delegated a staff officer of Gen. Chernyakhovski's Front to the Wilno District Commander of the Polish Home Army. Polish detachments were detained by the Soviet military authorities on the place of fighting and debarred from entering Wilno. When the Polish Home Army Commander in Wilno demanded supplies of heavy equipment and ammunition he got nothing beyond a promise. It is reported that Berling's units may arrive in the region of Wilno and that the Soviet-Lithuanian Government of Paleskis is supposed to be in the vicinity of the town.

"5. On July 13th the main force of the Polish Home Army units in the Wilno district in the strength of 3 battalions reinforced by an artillery platoon cooperated with the Soviet Division in the fight on the river Wilja, 30 klm. south-west of Wilno; apart from that one battalion fought 15 klm. due north; another battalion 15 klm. due south of Wilno and still another together with local underground units in the town itself, while two battalions were operating south of the Rudnica forest. No news is available about the remaining units in the province of Nowogródek /2 battalions/ and a part of the Wilno partisan detachments.

"6. Up to July 13th no negotiations of importance took place between the Polish Regional Commander and the Soviet Front Commander.

"7. The Polish Regional Commander of Wilno in a message dated July 13th reports that tension in the relations with the Soviets is growing and requests that an Inter-Allied Mission or at least one British and one American liaison officers be immediately despatched by air to the spot. The danger exists that not only the Polish units in North-Eastern Poland totalling one organised division and smaller units will be put out of action, but moreover that the achievements of the Polish Home Army in fighting against the Germans on the north-eastern territories, including the latest attack on Wilno, will be frustrated."

/Sign/ Commander of the Polish Home Army
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

dated 28 September 1944, attached, is re-
turned for your file with a copy of the
reply addressed to the Secretary of State.

J. V. Smith,
Commander, U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 15 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR

Miss Tully:

The original memorandum from the Secretary of State for the President, dated 23 September 1944, attached, is returned for your file with a copy of the reply addressed to the Secretary of State.

J. V. Smith,
Commander, U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 15 1972
The Polish Ambassador, who is in Montreal at the UNRRA Conference, has just informed the Department by telephone that he had received an urgent telegram from Premier Mikolajczyk regarding the situation of the Polish forces in Warsaw.

The Polish Premier stated that the situation in Warsaw is still very serious and that the resistance forces are in urgent need of food and ammunition. Although Premier Mikolajczyk realizes that many difficulties are involved in dropping supplies from American planes to aid the Warsaw garrison, he expressed the urgent hope that at least one more flight by American planes could be made and asked that his request be brought to your attention.
September 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

The President has forwarded to me your memorandum of September 30, 1944, referring to the request of the Polish Ambassador that at least one more flight of American planes be made for the relief of the Polish Resistance Forces in Warsaw.

A message has been sent to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz informing them that it is highly desirable to carry out this mission if it is possible and requesting to be advised as to the action taken. It is not known here at the moment whether they can comply with this directive. The U.S. bases in Russia which are necessary to the accomplishment of this mission are being closed and it may be that they already have been abandoned to such an extent that they can no longer be used.

You will be informed as to the action taken upon receipt of advice from General Eisenhower.

Responsibility of WMA in Poland. It is expected that the principal source of civilian supplies to meet immediate needs in Poland will be Warsaw and it has always been assumed that Poland would be one of the principal responsibilities of WMA. However, it has been extremely difficult, owing to the situation in the Soviet-Polish dispute, for WMA to make preparations for this task.

Walter Bedell Smith

Date: 7-14-44

Signature: Carl L. Spaatz
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 19, 1944

Subject: Relief for Poland.

Following our conversation Friday afternoon on the subject of relief for Poland, I have looked into the matter carefully and have prepared the following summary of the immediate question of relief for Poland.

I am also preparing a memorandum on the broader problem of Polish reconstruction which will be ready for you in a few days.

Responsibility of UNRRA in Poland. It is expected that the principal source of civilian supplies to meet immediate needs in Poland will be UNRRA and it has always been assumed that Poland would be one of the principal responsibilities of UNRRA. However, it has been extremely difficult, owing in large part to the Soviet-Polish dispute, for UNRRA to make adequate preparations for this task. Unlike Greece and Western Europe where relief will initially be the responsibility of the Anglo-American military authorities,
authorities, Poland will, of course, fall within the sphere of the Soviet armies and it will be necessary to work out with the Soviet authorities many important aspects of relief in Poland. A further complicating factor is that the Polish Committee of National Liberation is now established in Lublin while UNRRA has hitherto dealt with the London Poles who are represented on its Council.

Status of Preparations by UNRRA. In recent weeks UNRRA has made some progress on its arrangements for handling relief in Poland. It is now working out with the Lublin Committee arrangements to send a mission of ten to twelve technical experts to Poland to survey the extent and nature of relief needs, to receive supplies from UNRRA, and to supervise their distribution. (This will be done on a non-political basis and the London Poles have been kept fully informed.) The Soviet Government has given oral assurances that they will facilitate the transit of supplies and UNRRA is negotiating with the War Shipping Administration for the necessary shipping space to send relief supplies from the United States. However, the control of the amount of supplies which can be shipped to Poland rests largely with the Soviet Government which controls all available inlets to Poland at this time. The UNRRA mission to Lublin expects to leave early in November. In addition, UNRRA hopes
hopes to send a separate mission to Moscow, which may be headed by Governor Lehman himself, to discuss with the Soviet authorities other questions of mutual interest to UNRRA and the Soviet Government, including the cooperation to be extended by the Soviet authorities to UNRRA's work in Poland. UNRRA had hoped that this mission could proceed to Moscow around October 1 but its departure has been delayed at the request of the Soviet Government; the reason for this delay is not known.

Temporary Participation by the American Red Cross.
The American Red Cross has consented, on a temporary basis until UNRRA is operating fully in Poland, to send supplies to that area under the supervision of its representatives in the Soviet Union. It plans to send supplies to Poland immediately from stocks in the Soviet Union which will be replaced from here, and, if necessary, the Red Cross will send special representatives from the United States to supervise the distribution of additional supplies sent from the United States.

Assistance from Russian War Relief and the Joint Distribution Committee. The Russian War Relief and the Joint Distribution Committee are completing arrangements to send relief supplies to Poland from the United States and from stocks already in Tehran. It will eventually be necessary
necessary for activities of voluntary agencies in Poland to be coordinated through UNRRA so as to prevent duplication.

Efforts of the Polish Government. The American and British Treasuries have consented to the transfer of funds by the Polish Government to Sweden and Switzerland where supplies are being purchased for distribution inside occupied Poland under the supervision of the International Red Cross.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 19, 1944

Subject: Relief for Poland.

Following our conversation Friday afternoon on the subject of relief for Poland, I have looked into the matter carefully and have prepared the following summary of the immediate question of relief for Poland.

I am also preparing a memorandum on the broader problem of Polish reconstruction which will be ready for you in a few days.

Responsibility of UNRRA in Poland. It is expected that the principal source of civilian supplies to meet immediate needs in Poland will be UNRRA and it has always been assumed that Poland would be one of the principal responsibilities of UNRRA. However, it has been extremely difficult, owing in large part to the Soviet-Polish dispute, for UNRRA to make adequate preparations for this task. Unlike Greece and Western Europe where relief will initially be the responsibility of the Anglo-American military authorities.
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Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing for your approval the reply to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk which has been drafted in accordance with your instructions to me yesterday.

If the message meets with your approval, if you will return it to the Department of State I will see that it is delivered to its destination.

Enclosure:

To London for Schoenfeld.
Please deliver the following message for Prime Minister Mikolajczyk from the President:

QUOTE PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR PRIME MINISTER MIKOLAJCZYK FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your message of October 26 is receiving my personal consideration. I very much hope that your problems will be composed satisfactorily. I expect to send you another message soon. END QUOTE.

ERICH LIS
10/31/44

DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM TO MISS GRACE TULLY

At a recent Cabinet meeting, a question relative to the reconstruction of Poland was raised. The President turned to me and asked if I would have a memorandum prepared on this subject.

You will find this memorandum attached. I am sorry it is so long but I have prepared a two-page summary for the President's convenience in case this is a matter he would like to review himself.

[Ettinger's signature]
1. **Interest of the United States**

**General:** The future economic pattern of Europe will be largely determined by policies and procedures established during the period of reconstruction. Whether postwar conditions lead back to bilateralism, restriction and autarchy, or are resolved in a manner which will permit the progressive growth and liberalization of trade and investment will depend in no small measure on the ability of the wartorn countries to obtain outside (i.e., mostly American) help in reconstruction.

**Specific:** Postwar Poland will be under strong Russian influence. In this situation, the United States can hope to make its influence felt only if some degree of equal opportunity in trade, investment, and access to sources of information is preserved. American aid in Polish reconstruction would (a) help bring about economic conditions which would permit the adoption of a liberal policy of this nature, (b) gain Polish good will.

2. **War Damage:**

Up to the present damage to property in general has been relatively slight. Most of Poland’s industry is located in Silesia and Poznan, west of the present battle line. Moreover, some construction has taken place during the war, so that with respect to industrial facilities Poland is believed to be no worse off, on balance, than at the outbreak of the war. There has, of course, been considerable destruction of housing and municipal facilities, bridges, railways and rolling stock.

3. **Needs and Cost of Reconstruction**

The magnitude of Poland’s reconstruction needs will depend almost entirely on the future course of the war over Polish territory. If the extensive industrial installations in the west remain intact, Poland may be able to supply almost all of her reconstruction requirements from internal resources. Should these districts be “scorched”, however, not only would the amount of damage
damage be enormously increased, but there would also be destroyed, in whole or in great part, Poland's ability to repair the damage by herself.

The need for external assistance may range from a minimum of $50-100 million, on the basis of the present situation, to upward of half a billion dollars on pessimistic assumptions regarding the extent of industrial damage. These requirements can be met from three possible sources:

(a) **Foreign Assets**: Poland's liquid foreign assets consist almost entirely of $84,000,000 in gold, an amount only large enough to reconstitute pre-war central monetary reserves.

(b) **Reparation**: The extent of deliveries on reparation account are at best highly conjectural.

(c) **External Credits**: Practically the only source of large-scale credits will be the United States (directly or through the International Bank).

4. **Lack of Financing Facilities**

A sudden end of the war would find the United States without adequate financial facilities for making substantial aid immediately available to Poland (or other countries).

The Export-Import Bank would be estopped from making loans to Poland by virtue of the provision (similar to the Johnson Act) which prevents it from lending to governments in default to the United States. In any event, the Bank has most of its funds committed. Private credits would similarly be ruled out by the Johnson Act. The proposed International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is unlikely to receive the necessary ratifications before the middle of 1945. Direct loans by the United States Treasury would require special legislation.

To remedy this situation the following steps are recommended:

(a) A substantial increase in the lending power of the Export-Import Bank and elimination of its default (similar to Johnson Act) limitations

(b) Repeal of the Johnson Act

(c) Early ratification of the International Bank.
RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND

The problems of immediate relief and rehabilitation for Poland have been treated in a separate memorandum. What is said herein will therefore relate exclusively to the longer-term problems of reconstruction.

I. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLISH RECONSTRUCTION

The interest of the United States in the reconstruction of the Polish economy is both general and specific.

General Interest

The general interest, which encompasses other countries as well as Poland, derives from the fact that the nature of the reconstruction process is likely to exert a tremendous influence on future world stability, peace and prosperity.

At the cessation of hostilities Europe will be faced with economic problems of the most urgent character arising out of the destruction and dislocation of war. Among these will be impaired productive capacity, loss of manpower, loss of working capital and markets, weak and unstable exchanges, etc. Whether such conditions lead back to bilateralism, restriction and autarchy, or whether they are solved in a manner which will permit the progressive growth of trade and investment on liberal lines, will depend in large part on the ability of the war-ravaged countries to obtain outside help in reconstructing and readjusting their economies.

Specific Interests

Poland’s geographic position in Europe is such that she will necessarily be under strong Russian influence. It is to the interest of the United States that Poland maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but it is also to the interest of this country, as well as that of Poland, that Russian influence does not become so dominant as to affect international political stability or restrict the exercise of the legitimate rights of third countries.

The United States can only hope to exert some influence in this part of the world if some degree of equality of opportunity in trade, investment and communication, including access to sources...
to sources of information, is preserved for outside countries, and exclusive privileges for one power are avoided. To obtain the good-will of the Polish people and to help bring about the economic conditions which are related both as cause and effect with a liberal policy of this nature, it will be in the interest of the United States to help Poland rehabilitate her economy at the earliest possible moment.

Finally, it is clear that the sooner a condition of reasonable prosperity can be re-established in Poland, the less chance will there be for extreme ideological doctrines, dangerous to both democracy and peace, to take root in that country.

II. POLAND IN THE PREWAR PERIOD

Country and People

Poland is predominantly agricultural, with industry developed to meet military as well as economic needs. Her people, 34 million, are crowded on the land and provide an abundant source of labor for industrial development. The prewar area of Poland, 151,000 square miles, was somewhat smaller than that of France or Germany.

Agriculture

A large percentage of the area is used for farming and, although the country normally exports rye, barley, ham, bacon, and some sugar, agriculture, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, is carried on in a condition of poverty that results in part from unequal competition in grain growing of wooden plow and sickle with tractor and combine on fertile lands overseas. Land tenure, with both economic and political aspects, is a perennial problem of Polish governments. During the prewar period there was real progress in converting part of the acreage in large holdings to peasant ownership, while tiny parcels were being put together for more effective use. But land tenure still remains an active issue.

Industry

Reborn Poland inherited a textile industry from Czarist Russia and received iron and steel works in Polish Silesia through the peace treaty. Coal and zinc are produced in excess of domestic
of domestic needs, oil and potash to meet home requirements. There are also industries which process farm products - flour and sugar mills, slaughter houses, tanning, and a considerable timber industry.

The development of the railways, which were of the same gauge as in Western Europe, and of electric power reflected the backwardness of the country.

Foreign capital, of which French, British, American and German was most important, was invested in Poland in a variety of forms. The total amount was estimated, in 1936-37, at about $1.1 billion. The American investment (estimated at $175 million) was largely in government bonds, in zinc mining and in petroleum. Poland at that time was indebted to the United States Government in amount of $208 million. This debt was in default.

III. WAR DAMAGE

Though the war has surged twice over Poland and brought a five year occupation of notorious savagery, the population is so dense that the slaughter, dreadful as it has been, does not seem to have had much effect on the labor aspect of the country's economic potential.

The extent of war damage to industry will depend on future military operations. There is little precise information as yet on damage to industrial facilities. There must have been wide-spread damage in Warsaw. There has also been industrial expansion, and till now there seems to have been little net industrial destruction. However, the battle line is still east of the principal industrial regions. The toll of damage to dwellings and other buildings in Warsaw and elsewhere must have been tremendous and will be increased. It may be assumed that bridges will have been destroyed by the retreating Germans, that railways will be in poor condition and that much rolling stock has been lost or will be recovered in bad order. Transportation will carry a high priority in reconstruction. Polish financial institutions have been among the victims of Nazi occupation. However, gold reserves of 84 million dollars found safety in Dakar and New York.

IV. NEW ECONOMY

The frontiers of the new Poland have not been determined. It is assumed that the Eastern Provinces will not be part of
the new state, but that East Prussia and German Upper Silesia will become part of Poland. No assumption is made as to changes affecting other territory east of the Oder or as to Lvov Province.

Immediate reconstruction in its details will depend largely on damage suffered in the coming months. Priorities in restoration will go to transportation and industries supplying necessities, electric power systems, coal mines, food processing plants, textile and tanning establishments. The varied industries of Upper Silesia may play an important part in reconstruction. The short run program depends on war damage to so great a degree that it cannot now be appraised.

Longer range reconstruction will involve the broad development of modern industry based on the extensive coal fields and the complex of industry already established in Upper Silesia and in Polish Silesia. An active iron and steel industry with increased production of chemicals, including fertilizers, and farm machinery, are obvious elements in the new economy. Additional electric power plants and modernized and expanded railway and highway systems will be essential. As living standards rise new industries will be developed to meet demands.

Farm practices should be brought in line with modern scientific agriculture: better seed and breeding, more tools and machines, more fertilizer and better organized marketing. Some changes should probably be made in types of farming. The number of livestock, including poultry, should probably be increased, and some land now in grain should go into forage crops. The United States could supply technical assistance in research, needed in Poland as elsewhere, for the study of local farm problems, and in organizing a program of education to bring knowledge of better practices to the peasant.

V. POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

Poland's reconstruction needs must be viewed not only against the background of probable territorial adjustments but also in the light of possible changes in the economic structure of the country.

Land Tenure

The Polish Committee of National Liberation has announced a program of agrarian reform looking toward the breaking up of the large
large landed estates into five-hectare holdings to be sold to the peasants on very easy credit terms.

Whether or not this program will be fully realized (which may depend in part on the future government of Poland) and, if realized, whether it will be practicable, cannot be foretold. There is considerable doubt as to the viability of such small holdings. What is almost certain, however, is that reform of the prewar system of land tenure will be continued and probably intensified.

It may confidently be expected that land reform will be accompanied by efforts to increase farm productivity both through expanded educational facilities and increased mechanization. If agrarian reform is to succeed, it will require large outlays for farm equipment of all sorts and for the establishment of agricultural schools, experimental stations, etc.

State Socialism

Before the war Poland had developed state socialism perhaps to a greater extent than any other country in Europe outside of Russia. The state owned all or practically all of the railroads, merchant marine, post, radio, telegraph and telephone, and commercial aviation. It possessed 70 per cent of the iron production, 30 per cent of the coal output, 99 per cent of the salt mines, 80 per cent of chemical industry, 20 per cent of the oil refineries, 50 per cent of the metal industry, 37 per cent of the forests of the country, and the entire armament industry. It manufactured automobiles and airplanes, and operated monopolies in alcohol, matches, tobacco, and salt. In addition, state insurance companies wrote almost half of all insurance policies and state banks dominated the supply of commercial, investment, and agricultural credit.

The absence of an important middle class permitted the growth of Polish étatisme without much opposition, and for this reason, among others, there may be expected a continuation of the trend after the war. Yet it should be noted that private enterprise was never proscribed - on the contrary, was encouraged - in prewar Poland. Whether this policy, too, will be continued will, of course, depend largely on the political character of Poland's future government.

VI. POSSIBLE NEEDS AND COST OF RECONSTRUCTION

The magnitude of Poland's reconstruction needs will depend,
in very great measure, on the future course of the war over Polish territory. As pointed out in Section III, war damage until now has been relatively light. If Poland should recover substantially intact industrial installations of the Silesian district (Polish and German) and of the Poznan area, it is not an overstatement to say that she will be able to supply almost all of her reconstruction requirements from internal resources. On the other hand, should these districts be subjected to "scorching", not only would the amount of the damage be enormously increased, but there would also be destroyed, in whole or in great part, Poland's ability to repair the damage by herself.

Poland will in any event be able to provide the labor and most of the building material needed in the reconstruction of housing, etc. On pessimistic assumptions regarding the extent of the damage, Poland will depend on outside sources for many kinds of capital goods, especially locomotives, factory machinery, and electric equipment.

Poland's need for external assistance may range from a minimum of $50-100 million, on the basis of the present situation, to upward of half a billion dollars if future industrial damage is very heavy.

Some of these requirements may be met out of deliveries in kind made by Germany on reparation account, partly from existing stocks (dismantled factories, inventories, etc.) and partly from current production. The extent of the help Poland may expect from this source is, of course, highly conjectural.

The balance, and probably by far the greater part of Poland's external reconstruction requirements will have to be met through either (a) dollars or other foreign exchange assets, or (b) external credits. Since Poland's liquid external assets are no more than sufficient to reconstitute her prewar central monetary reserves, payment for imports needed in reconstruction, apart from those obtained by way of reparation, will depend almost entirely on outside credits.

VII. ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES, SOVIET UNION, AND OTHER COUNTRIES

In any foreseeable future the Soviet Union will probably insist on a Polish Government sympathetic to itself. The extent to which Russia may seek an exclusive position in Poland is not known. It seems unlikely, however, in view of the
Soviet's own needs, that it will be a large scale supplier of the products needed in the reconstruction of Poland. While other countries especially the United Kingdom and Sweden may be sources of supplies, the extent to which they will furnish goods to Poland will be related to their willingness and ability to extend credits.

The United States will be in a position to supply goods and materials of all sorts on a substantial scale. As pointed out previously, our interest in a rebuilt and prosperous Poland will make the extension of credits to that country desirable. Basic conditions in Poland are favorable to the development of a substantial industrial economy so that in spite of her present poverty and distress, she may be regarded as a reasonable credit risk for reconstruction loans.

VIII. LACK OF FINANCING FACILITIES

A sudden end of the war would find the United States without adequate financial facilities for making substantial aid immediately available to Poland (or other countries).

The Export-Import Bank would be estopped from making loans to Poland by virtue of the provision (similar to the Johnson Act) which prevents it from lending to governments in default to the Government of the United States. In any event, the Bank has most of its funds committed.

Private credits would be ruled out by the Johnson Act.

The proposed International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is unlikely to receive the ratifications necessary for it to begin operations before the middle of 1945.

The use of Lend-Lease for general reconstruction purposes would be contrary to policy and would require Congressional approval.

Direct loans by the United States Treasury would require special legislation.

To remedy this situation the following steps are recommended:

(a) A substantial increase in the lending power of the Export
Export-Import Bank and elimination of its default (similar to Johnson Act) limitations.

(b) Repeal of the Johnson Act.

(c) Early ratification of the International Bank.

It has been impossible in the time allotted and in a memorandum of this size to present anything but the barest outline of the problem of Polish reconstruction. Studies now under way or completed on various aspects of the Polish economy will make possible a much more comprehensive statement at an early date. A definitive appraisal of the problem will, of course, have to await the termination of hostilities.

1/ On the financial aspects of reconstruction in general, see Reconstruction Financing and Related Problems (ECEFP D-5/44, May 24, 1944).
October 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO MISS GRACE TULLY

At a recent Cabinet meeting, a question relative to the reconstruction of Poland was raised. The President turned to me and asked if I would have a memorandum prepared on this subject.

You will find this memorandum attached.

I am sorry it is so long but I have prepared a two-page summary for the President's convenience in case this is a matter he would like to review himself.

Section 1: Role of the President

The reconstruction of Poland's constitution must depend entirely on the needs and wishes of the Polish people themselves. In the meantime, however, the United Nations must take steps to ensure that the Polish people are protected and that their interests are safeguarded. This can be achieved by the provision of economic aid, technical assistance, and military aid as needed.

Section 2: Immediate Measures

Immediate measures should include the following:

1. Restoration of Territorial Integrity: Poland's territorial integrity must be guaranteed. The annexations of territories that were part of Poland prior to the Second World War should be restored.

2. Rehabilitation of the Economy: Efforts should be made to rehabilitate Poland's economy by providing financial aid, technical assistance, and necessary equipment. This includes the reconstruction of transportation systems, industrial plants, and agricultural facilities.

3. Humanitarian Assistance: Assistance should be provided to help Polish refugees and displaced persons. This includes medical care, food aid, and shelter.

4. Support for Independence Movements: The United Nations should support the efforts of the Polish independence movement. This includes providing military and financial support to help the Polish people defend their sovereignty and independence.

5. Legal Recognition: The United Nations should recognize Poland as an independent nation and support its right to self-determination.

By taking these measures, the United Nations can help Poland achieve its goal of independence and freedom.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND

MEMORANDUM

1. Importance of the United States.

General: The future economic pattern of Europe will be largely determined by policies and procedures established during the period of reconstruction. Whether postwar conditions lead back to bilateralism, restriction and autarchy, or are resolved in a manner which will permit the progressive growth and liberalization of trade and investment will depend in no small measure on the ability of the Western countries to obtain outside (i.e., mostly American) help in reconstruction.

Specifically: Postwar Poland will be under strong Russian influence. In this situation, the United States can hope to make its influence felt only if some degree of equal opportunity in trade, investment, and access to sources of information is preserved. American aid in Polish reconstruction would (a) help bring about economic conditions which would permit the adoption of a liberal policy of this nature, (b) gain Polish good will.

2. War Damage

Up to the present damage to property in general has been relatively slight. Most of Poland's industry is located in Silesia and Pommer, west of the present battle lines. However, some destruction has taken place during the war, so that with respect to industrial facilities Poland is believed to be no worse off, on balance, than at the outbreak of the war. There has, of course, been considerable destruction of housing and municipal facilities, bridges, railways and rolling stock.

3. Needs and Cost of Reconstruction

The magnitude of Poland's reconstruction needs will depend almost entirely on the future course of the war over Polish territory. If the extensive industrial installations in the west remain intact, Poland may be able to supply almost all of her reconstruction requirements from internal resources. Should these districts be "seached", however, not only would the amount of
damage be enormously increased, but there would also be destroyed, in whole or in great part. Poland's ability to repair the damage by herself.

The need for external assistance may range from a minimum of 650-800 million, on the basis of the present situation, to upward of half a billion dollars on pessimistic assumptions regarding the extent of industrial damage. These requirements can be met from three possible sources:

(a) Foreign Assets: Poland's liquid foreign assets consist almost entirely of 384,000,000 in gold, an amount only large enough to reconstitute pre-war central monetary reserves.

(b) Reparation: The extent of deliveries on reparations account are at best highly conjectural.

(c) External Credits: Practically the only source of large-scale credits will be the United States (directly or through the International Bank).

4. Bank of Financing Facilities

A success and of the war would find the United States without adequate financial facilities for making substantial aid immediately available to Poland (or other countries).

The Export-Import Bank would be debarred from making loans to Poland by virtue of the provision (similar to the Johnson Act) which prevents it from lending to governments in default to the United States. In any event, the Bank has most of its funds committed. Private credits would similarly be ruled out by the Johnson Act. The proposed International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is unlikely to receive the necessary ratifications before the middle of 1945. Direct loans by the United States Treasury would require special legislation.

To remedy this situation the following steps are recommended:

(a) A substantial increase in the lending power of the Export-
Import Bank and elimination of its default (similar to Johnson Act) limitations

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RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND

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I. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN POLISH RECONSTRUCTION

The interest of the United States in the reconstruction of the Polish economy is both general and specific.

General Interest

The general interest, which encompasses other countries as well as Poland, derives from the fact that the nature of the reconstruction process is likely to exert a tremendous influence on future world stability, peace and prosperity.

At the cessation of hostilities Europe will be faced with economic problems of the most urgent character arising out of the destruction and dislocation of war. Among these will be impaired productive capacity, loss of manpower, loss of working capital and markets, weak and unstable exchanges, etc. Whether such conditions lead back to bilateralism, restriction and autarchy, or whether they are solved in a manner which will permit the progressive growth of trade and investment on liberal lines, will depend in large part on the ability of the war-ravaged countries to obtain outside help in reconstructing and readjusting their economies.

Specific Interests

Poland's geographic position in Europe is such that she will necessarily be under strong Russian influence. It is to the interest of the United States that Poland maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but it is also to the interest of this country, as well as that of Poland, that Russian influence does not become so dominant as to affect international political stability or restrict the exercise of the legitimate rights of third countries.

The United States can only hope to exert some influence in this part of the world if some degree of equality of opportunity in trade, investment and communication, including access to sources
to sources of information, is preserved for outside countries, and exclusive privileges for one power are avoided. To obtain the good-will of the Polish people and to help bring about the economic conditions which are related both as cause and effect with a liberal policy of this nature, it will be in the interest of the United States to help Poland rehabilitate her economy at the earliest possible moment.

Finally, it is clear that the sooner a condition of reasonable prosperity can be re-established in Poland, the less chance will there be for extreme ideological doctrines, dangerous to both democracy and peace, to take root in that country.

II. POLAND IN THE PREWAR PERIOD

Country and People

Poland is predominantly agricultural, with industry developed to meet military as well as economic needs. Her people, 34 million, are crowded on the land and provide an abundant source of labor for industrial development. The prewar area of Poland, 124,000 square miles, was somewhat smaller than that of France or Germany.

Agriculture

A large percentage of the area is used for farming and, although the country normally exports rye, barley, hemp, bacon, and some sugar, agriculture, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, is carried on in a condition of poverty that results in part from unequal competition in grain growing of wooden plow and sickle with tractor and combine on fertile lands overseas. Land tenure, with both economic and political aspects, is a perennial problem of Polish governments. During the prewar period there was real progress in converting part of the acreage in large holdings to peasant ownership, while tiny parcels were being put together for more effective use. But land tenure still remains an active issue.

Industry

Reborn Poland inherited a textile industry from Czariat Russia and received iron and steel works in Polish Silesia through the peace treaty. Coal and zinc are produced in excess
of domestic needs, oil and potash to meet home requirements.
There are also industries which process farm products — flour
and sugar mills, slaughter houses, tannin, and a considerable
timber industry.

The development of the railways, which were of the same
gauge as in Western Europe, and of electric power reflected the
backwardness of the country.

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German was most important, was invested in Poland in a variety
of forms. The total amount was estimated, in 1936-37, at
about $1.1 billion. The American investment (estimated at
$175 million) was largely in government bonds, in zinc mining
and in petroleum. Poland at that time was indebted to the
United States Government in amount of $208 million. This debt
was in default.

III. WAR DAMAGE

Though the war has surged twice over Poland and brought
a five-year occupation of notorious savagery, the population
is so dense that the slaughter, dreadful as it has been, does
not seem to have had much effect on the labor aspect of the
country's economic potential.

The extent of war damage to industry will depend on future
military operations. There is little precise information as
yet on damage to industrial facilities. There must have been
wide-spread damage in Warsaw. There has also been industrial
expansion, and till now there seems to have been little net
industrial destruction. However, the battle lines are still
east of the principal industrial regions. The toll of damage
to dwellings and other buildings in Warsaw and elsewhere must
have been tremendous and will be increased. It may be assumed
that bridges will have been destroyed by the retreating Germans;
that railways will be in poor condition and that much rolling
stock has been lost or will be recovered in bad order. Trans-
portation will carry a high priority in reconstruction. Polish
financial institutions have been among the victims of Nazi
occupation. However, gold reserves of $4 million dollars found
safety in Dakar and New York.

IV. NEW ECONOMY

The frontiers of the new Poland have not been determined.
It is assumed that the Eastern Provinces will not be part of

the new
the new state, but that East Prussia and German Upper Silesia will become part of Poland. No assumption is made as to changes affecting other territory east of the Ucker or as to Lvov Province.

Immediate reconstruction in its details will depend largely on damage suffered in the coming months. Priorities in restoration will go to transportation and industries supplying necessities, electric power systems, coal mines, food processing plants, textile and tannin establishments. The varied industries of Upper Silesia may play an important part in reconstruction. The short run program depends on war damage to so great a degree that it cannot now be appraised.

Longer range reconstruction will involve the broad development of modern industry based on the extensive coal fields and the complex of industry already established in Upper Silesia and in Polish Silesia. An active iron and steel industry with increased production of chemicals, including fertilizers and farm machinery, are obvious elements in the new economy. Additional electric power plants and modernized and expanded railway and highway systems will be essential. As living standards rise new industries will be developed to meet demands.

Farm practices should be brought in line with modern scientific agriculture; better seed and breeding, more tools and machines, more fertilizer and better organized marketing. Some changes should probably be made in types of farming. The number of livestock, including poultry, should probably be increased, and some land now in grain should go into forage crops. The United States could supply technical assistance in research, needed in Poland as elsewhere, for the study of local farm problems, and in organizing a program of education to bring knowledge of better practices to the peasant.

V. POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

Poland's reconstruction needs must be viewed not only against the background of probable territorial adjustments but also in the light of possible changes in the economic structure of the country.

Land Reform

The Polish Committee of National Liberation has announced a program of agrarian reform looking toward the breaking up of the large
Large landed estates into five-hectare holdings to be sold to the peasants on very easy credit terms.

Whether or not this program will be fully realized (which may depend in part on the future government of Poland) and, if realized, whether it will be practicable, cannot be foretold. There is considerable doubt as to the viability of such small holdings. What is almost certain, however, is that reform of the prewar system of land tenure will be continued and probably intensified.

It may confidently be expected that land reform will be accompanied by efforts to increase farm productivity both through expanded educational facilities and increased mechanization. If agrarian reform is to succeed, it will require large outlays for farm equipment of all sorts and for the establishment of agricultural schools, experimental stations, etc.

State Socialism

Before the war Poland had developed state socialism perhaps to a greater extent than any other country in Europe outside of Russia. The state owned all or practically all of the railroads, merchant marine, post, radio, telegraph and telephone, and commercial aviation. It possessed 70 per cent of the iron production, 30 per cent of the coal output, 99 per cent of the salt mines, 40 per cent of the chemical industry, 20 per cent of the oil refineries, 90 per cent of the metal industry, 37 per cent of the forests of the country, and the entire armament industry. It manufactured automobiles and airplanes, and operated monopolies in alcohol, matches, tobacco, and salt. In addition, state insurance companies wrote almost half of all insurance policies and state banks dominated the supply of commercial, investment, and agricultural credit.

The absence of an important middle class permitted the growth of Polish datetime without much opposition, and for this reason, among others, there may be expected a continuation of the trend after the war. Yet it should be noted that private enterprise was never proscribed — on the contrary, was encouraged — in prewar Poland. Whether this policy, too, will be continued will, of course, depend largely on the political character of Poland's future government.

VI. POSSIBLE NEEDS AND COST OF RECONSTRUCTION

The magnitude of Poland's reconstruction needs will depend,
in very great measure, on the future course of the war over Polish territory. As pointed out in Section III, war damage substantially intact industrial installations of the Silesian district (Polish and German) and of the Poznań area, it is not an overstatement to say that she will be able to supply almost all of her reconstruction requirements from internal resources. On the other hand, should these districts be subjected to "scorched earth", not only would the amount of the damage be enormously increased, but there would also be destroyed, in whole or in great part, Poland’s ability to repair the damage by herself.

Poland will in any case be able to provide the labor and most of the building materials needed in the reconstruction of housing, etc. On pessimistic assumptions regarding the extent of the damage, Poland will depend on outside sources for many kinds of capital goods, especially locomotives, factory machinery, and electric equipment.

Poland’s need for external assistance may range from a minimum of $50-100 million, on the basis of the present situation, to upward of half a billion dollars if future industrial damage is very heavy.

Some of these requirements may be met out of deliveries in kind made by Germany on reparation account, partly from existing stocks (dismantled factories, inventories, etc.) and partly from current production. The extent of the help Poland may expect from this source is, of course, highly conjectural.

The balance, and probably by far the greater part of Poland’s external reconstruction requirements will have to be met through either (a) dollars or other foreign exchange assets, or (b) external credits. Since Poland’s liquid external assets are no more than sufficient to reconstitute her prewar central monetary reserves, payment for imports needed in reconstruction, apart from those obtained by way of reparation, will depend almost entirely on outside credits.

VII. ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES, SOVIET UNION, AND OTHER COUNTRIES

In any foreseeable future the Soviet Union will probably insist on a Polish Government sympathetic to itself. The extent to which Russia may seek an exclusive position in Poland is not known. It seems unlikely, however, in view of the Soviet’s
Soviet's own needs, that it will be a large scale supplier of the products needed in the reconstruction of Poland. While other countries especially the United Kingdom and Sweden may be sources of supplies, the extent to which they will furnish goods to Poland will be related to their willingness and ability to extend credits.

The United States will be in a position to supply goods and materials of all sorts on a substantial scale. As pointed out previously, our interest in a rebuilt and prosperous Poland will make the extension of credits to that country desirable. Basic conditions in Poland are favorable to the development of a substantial industrial economy so that in spite of her present poverty and distress, she may be regarded as a reasonable credit risk for reconstruction loans.

VIII. LACK OF FINANCING FACILITIES

A sudden end of the war would find the United States without adequate financial facilities for making substantial aid immediately available to Poland (or other countries).

The Export-Import Bank would be stopped from making loans to Poland by virtue of the provision (similar to the Johnson Act) which prevents it from lending to governments in default to the Government of the United States. In any event, the Bank has most of its funds committed.

Private credits would be ruled out by the Johnson Act.

The proposed International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is unlikely to receive the ratifications necessary for it to begin operations before the middle of 1945.

The use of lend-lease for general reconstruction purposes would be contrary to policy and would require Congressional approval.

Direct loans by the United States Treasury would require special legislation.

To remedy this situation the following steps are recommended:

(a) A substantial increase in the lending power of the Export
Export Import Bank and elimination of its default (similar to Johnson Act) limitations.

(b) Repeal of the Johnson Act.

(c) Early ratification of the International Bank.

It has been impossible in the time allotted and in a memorandum of this size to present anything but the barest outline of the problem of Polish reconstruction. Studies now under way or completed on various aspects of the Polish economy will make possible a much more comprehensive statement at an early date. A definitive appraisal of the problem will, of course, have to await the termination of hostilities.

This information received from the British Government has been sent to you, shows that the Government is awaiting some further word from Moscow as to the possibility of an early meeting between President Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. It was requested not to raise the specific question of giving Marshal Stalin the opportunity to make any definite decision or take any action requested by the Polish question prior to the meeting.

There is accordingly enclosed for your approval a draft letter message to Marshal Stalin along these lines and to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, both of which if you approve, could be reprinted to Prime Minister Churchill.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Letter enclosed]

November 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that in your reply of November 1, cabled to Mr. Schoenfeld for Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in regard to his appeal that you take up with Stalin the question of Lwow, you said you would have a further message for him at a later date.

Recent information received from the British Government, which has been sent to you, shows that the Polish Government is waiting some further word from you. In view of the possibility of an early meeting with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill it appears wisest not to raise the specific question of Lwow with Marshal Stalin by cable but merely to request him not to make any definite decisions or take any action in regard to the Polish question prior to the meeting.

There is accordingly enclosed for your approval a suggested message to Marshal Stalin along those lines and one to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, both of which, if you approve, could be repeated to Prime Minister Churchill.

Enclosures:

Suggested messages to Stalin and Mikolajczyk.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

I have been much encouraged to learn from Ambassador Harriman of the progress which was made in the Moscow talks towards a solution of the Polish question.

As you know, I attach the highest importance to a mutually satisfactory solution of all the questions at issue in regard to Poland, and because of its importance to our common cause I am prepared to make any contribution I can towards that end. I am looking forward to the opportunity of discussing these questions when we meet.

Roosevelt
I have kept constantly in mind the difficulties and problems which you face in your efforts to reach a satisfactory solution of the Polish-Soviet question.

After the most careful consideration I believe the wisest course is not to attempt to raise by cable with Marshal Stalin the specific question of Lwow but to leave the unresolved questions open pending an opportunity for me to explore the subject further with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 15, 1944.

The following suggestions as to policy in regard to the Polish question and in particular to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's message of October 26 and recent conversations with the Polish Ambassador are predicated on the possibility that you do not expect to meet with Mr. Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill before the end of the year.

The Polish issue is so acute that we believe some statement of this Government's position on general lines is due Premier Mikolajczyk. I therefore suggest for your approval the attached letter for your signature to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk. It covers the points on which from our information we know the Polish Government is especially anxious to learn our attitude.

I suggest that Ambassador Harriman, who is shortly returning to Moscow via London, present this letter to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in person and at the same time discuss the question of Lwow. If as a result of this discussion Ambassador Harriman is convinced of the necessity of our taking a last attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to leave Lwow and the oil fields within the frontiers of Poland, I hope you will authorize him on his return to Moscow to take up orally on your behalf the question of Lwow with Mr. Stalin.

Enclosure:

Suggested letter to
Premier Mikolajczyk.

Suggested letter was signed by FOR 17 Nov. Copy filed in Naval Aide's office.
November 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the message to the Polish Prime Minister and recommendations in regard to policy on Poland about which I spoke to you today and which I hope you will discuss with Averell when you see him before his departure.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
Subject: Message from Premier Mikolajczyk to the President regarding Lwow

There are attached for your files extra copies of a note left by the Polish Ambassador containing Premier Mikolajczyk's message to you of October 26.

The Polish Ambassador delivered the attached note on the evening of October 27. Since you were out of town the copy was delivered that evening to the Map Room with the request that it be delivered to you as soon as possible.

Enclosure:

From Polish Embassy, October 27, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Message from Premier Mikolajczyk to the President regarding Lwow

There are attached for your files extra copies of a note left by the Polish Ambassador containing Premier Mikolajczyk's message to you of October 26.

The Polish Ambassador delivered the attached note on the evening of October 27. Since you were out of town the copy was delivered that evening to the Map Room with the request that it be delivered to you as soon as possible.

Enclosure:

From Polish Embassy,
October 27, 1944.
The Polish Ambassador has received today a telegram from Premier Mikolajczyk dated London, October 26th, instructing him immediately to communicate to the President the following personal appeal of Premier Mikolajczyk. Premier Mikolajczyk would greatly appreciate it if he could receive at the President's earliest convenience the reply and decisions of the President in view of the great urgency of the situation.

Text of Premier Mikolajczyk's telegram to the President reads as follows:

Mr. President,

From Ambassador Harriman you undoubtedly know the pressure being exercised on the Polish Government definitely to accept already at present and without any reservations the so-called Curzon Line as the basis of the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. In all my political activities I have proved how fully I realize the necessity of Polish-Soviet understanding and how sincerely I desire to achieve it, not only in the interest of my own country, but also in that of the common cause of the United Nations and of future peace.

I am no less convinced, however, that the Polish nation would feel itself terribly deceived and wronged if, as the response to all its sacrifices, to its indomitable attitude, and its uninterrupted part in the fight in the course of this war it were faced as a result with the loss of nearly one-half of its territory on which are situated great centers of its national and cultural life and considerable economic values. The Polish Government cannot give its agreement to such a solution, as it realizes that it would thereby lose the confidence and following of its nation to such an extent that
this would close its way to the exploration of possibilities of reaching understanding with the Government of the USSR in other fields. It would in fact deprive the activities of the Polish Government of practical value.

In the course of the Moscow conversations I have applied all my best efforts to convince Marshal Stalin and Premier Churchill of the importance of the above considerations. In particular I stressed that it would constitute a great conciliatory and amicable gesture on the part of Russia towards Poland, - a gesture which would be regarded as such by the Polish people and make it easier for the Polish nation to reconcile itself with the other already so great territorial sacrifices demanded of it, if the City of Lwow and the East Galician oilfields were left with Poland in accordance with the so-called Line "B". This line would not infringe on the principle of the Curzon Line, as the latter did not formally extend through East Galicia.

However, my endeavors in this direction have hitherto remained un成功的. I cannot, in the face of my great responsibility, regard these endeavors as exhausted as long as you, Mr. President, have not expressed your stand in this matter. I retain in vivid and grateful memory your assurances given me in the course of our conversations of June, last, in Washington, pertaining particularly to Lwow and the adjacent territories. The memory of these assurances has not been dispelled even by Mr. Molotov's one-sided version about your attitude in Teheran, which he gave me during the last conversations in Moscow. I have no doubt that in your attitude, Mr. President, purely objective arguments have played the most important part. It is known that for the last six hundred years Lwow has been a Polish
Polish city no less than Cracow and Warsaw, and one of the sources of Polish civilization. On the other hand, the production of the East Galician oil fields, so important to the economic system of Poland, constitutes barely one per cent of the oil production of the USSR.

I fully realize how deeply absorbed you are in your duties at this time and in the course of the next days. I believe, however, that in the face of the great importance of the decisions facing the Polish Government, which will bear on the entire future of the Polish Nation, and in a great measure on world relations as a whole, you will not refuse, Mr. President, my fervent prayer once more to throw the weight of your decisive influence and authority on the scales of events.

I am firmly convinced that if you, Mr. President, will consider it possible immediately to address a personal message to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that it is of consequence to you that the Polish question should be settled in such a way that the City of Lwow and the oil field basin of East Galicia should be left in Poland, - such a demarche, as foreseen by you, would have chances of being effective.

By removing from the way the chief and basic difference of opinions in the present negotiations between the Polish and the Soviet Governments, - such a demarche would render possible the achievement of an over-all Polish-Soviet understanding and would bring to you, Mr. President, not only a new title to the warm gratitude of the Polish people, but likewise an agelong merit of having solved one of the capital difficulties on the way of collaboration of the United Nations and of the future peace of Europe and the world.

I place
I place in your hands, Mr. President, this matter with the greatest confidence and I shall await your decision.

Signed: MIKOLAJCZYK.

Washington, October 27th, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resignation of Mikolajczyk

I think you will be interested in looking at the two enclosed telegrams in regard to the Polish situation, the first reporting a conversation between Mikolajczyk and Schoenfeld in which the former explained in some detail his reasons for resigning and the latter quoting extensively from British press discussion of the subject. You will notice that a number of British papers erroneously attribute Mikolajczyk's resignation to our refusal to guarantee Polish frontiers.

In order to counteract the London news stories regarding the frontier guarantee, the Department on November 25 released the following statement:

The specific question of the guarantee of the Polish frontier by this Government was not and could not have been an issue since this Government's traditional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe is well known.

Enclosures:

2. Copy of telegram no. 10/34 from London, November 26, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resignation of Mikolajczyk

I think you will be interested in looking at the two enclosed telegrams in regard to the Polish situation, the first reporting a conversation between Mikolajczyk and Schoenfeld in which the former explained in some detail his reasons for resigning and the latter quoting extensively from British press discussion of the subject. You will notice that a number of British newspapers erroneously attribute Mikolajczyk's resignation to our refusal to guarantee Polish frontiers.

In order to counteract the London news stories regarding the frontier guarantee, the Department on November 25 released the following statement:

The specific question of the guarantee of the Polish frontier by this Government was not and could not have been an issue since this Government's traditional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe is well known.

Enclosures:

2. Copy of telegram no. 10434 from London, November 26, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Mr. Mikolajczyk's Explanation of London News Stories

The Polish Ambassador recently called at the Department and mentioned that he had received a message from Mr. Mikolajczyk who was greatly disturbed by the news stories in London to the effect that he had resigned after his talk with Ambassador Harriman because the United States Government had refused to guarantee the frontiers of Poland. Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that not only was this not true, since he had decided to resign before he saw Ambassador Harriman, but that as far as he was aware this information did not emanate from Polish sources. Moreover, Mr. Mikolajczyk added that he felt so strongly about this matter that he had discussed it with Mr. Eden and explained his concern regarding these false rumors.

Mr. Mikolajczyk suggested that the Ambassador might pass this word on to you and express his deep appreciation for the message you sent him outlining the United States Government's policy toward Poland.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Mr. Mikolajczyk's Explanation of London News Stories

The Polish Ambassador recently called at the Department and mentioned that he had received a message from Mr. Mikolajczyk who was greatly disturbed by the news stories in London to the effect that he had resigned after his talk with Ambassador Harriman because the United States Government had refused to guarantee the frontiers of Poland. Mr. Mikolajczyk stated that not only was this not true, since he had decided to resign before he saw Ambassador Harriman, but that as far as he was aware this information did not emanate from Polish sources. Moreover, Mr. Mikolajczyk added that he felt so strongly about this matter that he had discussed it with Mr. Eden and explained his concern regarding these false rumors.

Mr. Mikolajczyk suggested that the Ambassador might pass this word on to you and express his deep appreciation for the message you sent him outlining the United States Government's policy toward Poland.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Lane.

In view of the uncertainty surrounding the Polish situation, I am asking Ambassador Lane to stay in Washington pending further developments.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaeble Date
December 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Lane.

In view of the uncertainty surrounding the Polish situation, I am asking Ambassador Lane to stay in Washington pending further developments.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schleske Date FEB 15 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: "Provisional Government of Poland"

You will be interested in the enclosed telegram from Harriman stating that Stalin informed de Gaulle that the Lublin Committee would soon declare itself the provisional government of Poland.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 4795 from Moscow, December 12, 1944.
December 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: "Provisional Government of Poland"

You will be interested in the enclosed telegram from Harriman stating that Stalin informed de Gaulle that the Lublin Committee would soon declare itself the provisional government of Poland.

Enclosures:

Copy of telegram no. 4795 from Moscow, December 12, 1944.
This message has been distributed as follows:

**ACTION**

copy to:

EUR

Copies to:

SU
EUR
EE

Washington, December 22, 1944

Interesting the Harriman setting forth some of the difficulties which will be involved in the proposed shift of the Polish western frontier.

Enclosures:

2. Copy of telegram no. 4913 from Moscow, December 19, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish Situation

I am sure you will find most interesting the enclosed telegrams from Schoenfeld reporting a conversation with Mikolajczyk and from Harriman setting forth some of the difficulties which will be involved in the proposed shift of the Polish western frontier.

Enclosures:

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December 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish Situation

I am sure you will find most interesting the enclosed telegrams from Schoenfeld reporting a conversation with Mikolajczyk and from Harriman setting forth some of the difficulties which will be involved in the proposed shift of the Polish western frontier.

Enclosures:

2. Copy of telegram no. 4913 from Moscow, December 17, 1944.

Edward E. Stettinius, Jr.

I appreciate your expression of thanks for the publication of the United States Government's final statement regarding Poland outlined in my message to you this morning.

By: J. Scheuble Date: Feb 10 1972
My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Ambassador Ciechanowski has forwarded to me your kind letter expressing deep gratitude on behalf of the Polish Government for my friendliness to the Polish nation. All Americans have a deep feeling of sympathy and admiration for the courageous and brave Polish people who have borne with such strength and fortitude the most arduous burdens and privation under the Nazi yoke.

It is this admiration which has guided us in our efforts to be of assistance to the Polish people in order that they may build their future on the firmest possible foundations. With this thought in mind I was gratified to note that you share Mr. Mikolajczyk's earnest desire to reach an equitable, just and durable understanding with the Soviet Union. I feel, in this connection, that I should express to you my earnest hope that it will, in the near future, be possible to reach a mutually satisfactory solution of the frontier question in order that thereafter the Polish people may bend their efforts to the restoration of their native homeland and the establishment of a strong, free, and independent democratic nation.

I appreciate your expression of thanks for the definition of the United States Government's position regarding Poland outlined in my message to Mr. Mikolajczyk of November 17, 1944.
You will have also noted that the Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius, has made public this position of the Government of the United States.

Thank you for your most friendly message.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Tomasz Arciszewski,
Prime Minister of Poland,
London.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall the telegram dated December 14 which you received from the Polish Prime Minister, Tomasz Arciszewski, which we forwarded to you upon receipt from the Polish Ambassador here.

There is enclosed for your consideration a draft reply. If you approve and sign this letter, we will send it to Mr. Schoenfeld by airmail for delivery to the Polish Prime Minister.

We feel it is important to get this letter to the Polish Prime Minister in as short a time as possible since it makes clear to him that we believe an early settlement of the frontier question would be of great benefit to the Polish nation and people. There have recently been signs that the present Polish Government is considering some form of statement on the frontier question which could only do harm, and this letter may help to keep things quiet until the meeting.

Enclosure:
Draft reply to the Polish Prime Minister.
December 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President,

December 22, 1944,

Mister President,

Upon assumption of my duties as Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, I have the honor to address to you the Prime Minister of your country. I have received a recent request from Prime Minister Tadeusz Adamec to facilitate for your consideration a draft reply to the letter which we forwarded to you upon receipt from the Polish Ambassador here.

There is enclosed for your consideration a draft reply. If you approve and sign this letter, we will send it to Mr. Schoenfeld by airmail for delivery to the Polish Prime Minister.

We feel it is important to get this letter to the Polish Prime Minister in as short a time as possible, since it makes clear to him that we believe an early settlement of the frontier question would be of great benefit to the Polish nation and people. There have recently been signs that the present Polish Government is considering some form of statement on the frontier question which could only do harm, and this letter may help to keep things quiet until the meeting.

In closing, may I express to you, Mr. President, my heartiest thanks for your readiness for Poland expressed in your letter of December 17, 1944, handed to Prime Minister Michalak by Ambassador Harriman. I shall have the honor to return the favor in the near future.

Enclosure: Draft reply to the Polish Prime Minister.

Poland, December 18th, 1944.

[Signature]

[ILLEGIBLE]
The Polish Ambassador received a telegram dated London, December 14, 1944, addressed to the President by Premier Tomasz Arciszewski. The text of the telegram follows:

Mr. President,

Upon assumption of my duties as Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Poland, I have the honor to convey to you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Polish Government and on my own, expressions of deep gratitude for your constant friendliness to Poland and the Polish Nation.

Your name, Mr. President, is on the lips of all Poles fighting in Poland as well as of those fighting in foreign lands for the freedom and independence of their State. They firmly believe that their sacrifices in the present war will not be in vain.

With this in mind the Polish Government fervently appeals to you, Mr. President, for your support of its endeavors in view of assuring for Poland just bases of national existence, of freedom and independence.

I beg to assure you, Mr. President, that the Polish Government will be faithful to the same principles which have guided the preceding Polish Governments since the German aggression on Poland. This Government, as its predecessors aiming at the strengthening of our alliances and of our friendship with other United Nations, will not spare any effort to reach an equitable, just and durable understanding with our Eastern neighbor.

In closing, may I express to you, Mr. President, my heartfelt thanks for your friendship for Poland expressed in your letter of November 17, 1944, handed to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk by Ambassador Harriman. I shall have the honor in the nearest future more extensively to refer to the problems discussed with Ambassador Harriman.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(signed) TOMASZ ARCISZEWSKI

The Polish Ambassador personally transmits the above message to the Secretary of State and would be most grateful if it could be immediately communicated to the President.

Washington, December 18th, 1944.
The Polish Ambassador received a telegram dated London, December 14, 1944, addressed to the President by Premier Tomasz Arciszewski. The text of the telegram follows:

Mr. President,

Upon assumption of my duties as Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Poland, I have the honor to convey to you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Polish Government and on my own, expressions of deep gratitude for your constant friendliness to Poland and the Polish Nation.

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(signed) TOMASZ ARCISZEWSKI

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Washington, December 18th, 1944.

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish Situation

I am enclosing three cables on this question, two from Moscow and one from London, which will be of interest to you. Harriman states (1) that it seems likely that the Lublin Committee will proclaim itself a Provisional Government within the next few days and (2) that Stalin, because of alleged terrorist activities of the Polish underground conducted under Mikolajczyk's authority, is through with Mikolajczyk and will never allow him to return to Poland.

The telegram from Schoenfeld in London reports a conversation with Mikolajczyk in which the latter expressed great dissatisfaction at Churchill's concession to Lwow and the Galician oil fields to Russia. Mikolajczyk also mentioned the following points: (1) the immense population transfer problem which would be created by the proposed new western frontiers of Poland, (2) the fact that the Peasant Party has decided to go into open opposition to the London Government, (3) the present ferment within the London Government which Mikolajczyk believes, however, will come to nothing because of the firm hold maintained by President Raczkiewics, and (4) Mikolajczyk's intention to work out a positive policy concerning Poland which might be presented at your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

(For enclosures, see following page)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. 11/27/72
By J. Shauble Date FEB 15 1972
Enclosures:

1. Copy of telegram no. 4973 from Moscow, December 23, 1944.
2. Copy of telegram no. 5009 from Moscow, December 26, 1944.
December 27, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish Situation

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scheuble
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you speak to me about this?

F.D.R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1944

IDENT

If the Polish Liberation as of Poland, had indicating that, the Polish Com­
mittee itself to be and that it might be Slav and Czecho-

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y the Committee as it might be advis­
with Lord Halifax
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We have no informa­
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representative and appear to be no justi­
recognition from the

London Government to the Committee. It is suggested, in
the circumstances, that despite any action taken by the
Committee, we should be prepared to make it clear, in
conjunction with the British, that at least until the
meeting we continue to recognize the Polish Government
in London.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Recognition of the Polish Committee of National Liberation as Provisional Government of Poland.

Various reports have been received indicating that, within the next few days, it is possible the Polish Committee of National Liberation will declare itself to be the provisional government of Poland and that it might be recognized as such by the Soviet, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments.

The British Government has indicated that, if such action does take place, it will continue for the present at least to recognize the Polish Government in London (last paragraph of the Prime Minister's telegram to you, no. 854, December 16).

In view of the possible action by the Committee as indicated above, it is suggested that it might be advisable for me to discuss this question with Lord Halifax in order to assure that we and the British act in harmony in this matter prior to the meeting. We have no information indicating that the Committee is representative of the wishes of the Polish people and have some positive information that it is definitely not representative and therefore we feel that there would appear to be no justification for us to transfer now our recognition from the London Government to the Committee. It is suggested, in the circumstances, that despite any action taken by the Committee, we should be prepared to make it clear, in conjunction with the British, that at least until the meeting we continue to recognize the Polish Government in London.