NMC-829
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (undeclassified)

London
Dated September 1, 1944
Rec'd 7:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
7127, September 1, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

Please note the Embassy's messages 7029 twenty-ninth, 7077 thirtieth and 7109 thirty-first in relation to possible aid to Warsaw. I should appreciate having the President also see them.

It is my understanding that this information was first given to the Polish Government here in a message from the Polish Ambassador in Washington and in turn originally communicated by them to the press.

WILANT

BB
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 7-26-44

ADDRESS TO

Miss Tully
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

BJR - 476

PLAIN

London

Dated September 2, 1944

Rec'd 10:52 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

POLES

92, Second

FROM SCHOENFELD

Premier Mikolajczyk in a broadcast message yesterday to the Polish people on the fifth anniversary of the German attack on Poland made reference to the struggle in Warsaw and addressed a direct appeal for aid to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Defending the decision of the Polish forces in Warsaw to fight in the open Mikolajczyk said:

"You acted in the same way as your brothers did everywhere east of Warsaw from March, 1944, and as they continue to do, at the same time helping the heroic and victorious Soviet armies in their fight with the enemy... you have the right to assistance. No one has the right to lower the value of your struggle, undertaken with the purest
the purest intentions, for the sake of some opportunist motive or political intrigue.

You did not receive such help as was due to you in spite of all the devotion of the British, South African, and Polish airmen. Lately the latter were the only ones who helped you. We do all we can to obtain help for you in adequate time and measure. I hope have not lost that it will be obtained. Would this help not be given I will notify you of it.

I address myself once again in public to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Mr. Churchill: leaders of great powers, commanders of powerful and victorious land and air armies, Warsaw is waiting, the whole Polish nation is waiting, public opinion throughout the world is waiting. Do all you can to provide means for further fighting and to liberate this city and the population fighting in her ruins, drenched with blood, These people fight and die for Poland, but their desire to live for Poland is equally strong.

WINANT

WTD
SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

3362, September 7, 4 p.m.

Exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and Polish President on occasion of fifth anniversary of German attack on Poland, texts of which appear in radio bulletin No. 213, has not been mentioned in Soviet press.

HARRIMAN

WTD
Secretary of State,
Washington,

US URGENT
POLES, 102, September 16, 11 p.m.

Premier Mikołajczyk has requested me to transmit the following appeal of the Council of National Unity in Warsaw addressed to the President, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, dated September 15th and received in London today:

"On the forty-fifth day of the struggle of the people of Warsaw for the freedom of the capital and of Poland, witnessing the first signs of effective assistance in the form of air cover and dropping of arms and food, the Council of National Unity affirm that this has brought great relief to Warsaw.

The Council of National Unity stress the inflexible will of the people of Warsaw and of Poland to fight the Germans unto the end for the freedom and independence of Poland. To carry on this fight it is indispensable to supply the..."
supply the soldiers of the home army. The Council of National Unity therefore fervently appeal for continuous dropping of arms, ammunition and food, for permanent air cover to be organized and for the bombing of German concentrations and military objectives. The enemy is attacking the city with continuously reinforced formations. The lack of quick and effective succor may cause a catastrophe."

Mr. Nikolajczyk indicated that he was conscious that the arrangements made for lending assistance to Warsaw through the American Shuttle service and through British planes from Italy had been impeded by weather conditions recently but felt he must underline the continued urgency of assistance as reflected in the foregoing message.

WINANT

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3633, September 22, 7 p.m.

The Embassy has received a third personal note from the Delegation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Moscow requesting it to transmit to the President a message of which the following is a translation in paraphrase:

"To Mr. Roosevelt, President of The United States.

To you Mr. President, as the organizer of the great common effort, the representatives of the Polish Socialist Party of the liberated territories assembled in first conference of the party at Lublin send their fighting cordial salutations.

The Polish Socialist Party will adhere to democracy and in the decisive struggle against the enemy, will use all its forces in mobilizing the entire population.

The success of the heroic American Army on the continent of Europe is greeted by the conference with joy. We send to the American soldiers our fraternal salutations.

We are
-2- #3633, September 22, 7 p.m., from Moscow via Army

We are convinced that American democracy will aid the Polish people in decisively defeating the enemy in rehabilitating Polish economic life and in reconstructing an independent and great Polish state.

(Signed) Dr. Boleslaw Drobner, President of the General Council of the Polish Socialist Party; MG. Stefan Matuszewski, secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party; Edward Osunka - Morawski, President of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party".

HARRIMAN

JMS

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated November 2, 1944
Rec'd 4:27 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
Poles 118, November 2, 8 p.m.
FROM SCHOENFELD.

The President's message (your 24, November 1) was conveyed to Premier Mikolajczyk today. He expressed appreciation for it.

Mikolajczyk stated the Polish Government had not yet reached a decision on the proposals put forward at Moscow. Nor could he forecast when it was likely to do so. He commented on the extreme difficulty of the situation. The only thing definite in the proposals he said was the Soviet demand for the Curzon Line. All else was fluid. If the Polish Government accepted the Curzon Line it still did not know where it stood on the other points. He found it difficult to press the members of the Government for a hurried decision when he himself did not know what he was pressing them toward.

GALLMAN

DU
AMT-1966
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Secret)

London
Dated November 23, 1944
Rec'd 5:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
10326, November 23, 7 p.m.

FROM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN.

I lunched with Mikolajczyk and Romer today. Mikolajczyk told me that since receipt of your letter, he had had discussions with his associates in his Government. He is now convinced that he can not, repeat not, get any support for his program for reconciliation with the Soviets and the Lublin Poles.

He has obtained from the Peasant Party leaders within Poland complete support and authority to act but the leaders of the other three parties in his Government are all definitely opposed to settlement at the present time. Under the circumstances he cannot now in fairness ask you to intervene with Stalin in an attempt to obtain a more favorable settlement of the boundary.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-41-72

By J. Schaubel Date: FEB 15 1972
the boundary to include the Lwow area, since, even if Stalin would agree to inclusion of Lwow within Poland, he could not, repeat not, obtain the consent of his associates to any boundary settlement now. Therefore, unless you instruct me otherwise, I will not (repeat not) discuss the question of Lwow at this time with Stalin.

Mikolajczyk is very grateful to you for your letter and for your sympathetic consideration of the Polish problems. He will so communicate to you direct. He asked me to express to you his apologies for having asked you to intervene at a time when it develops he cannot obtain the support of his associates in attempting to reach a realistic settlement with the Russians.

Mikolajczyk said his associates were convinced what the Soviet policy was to communize Poland, and that they intended to wait until Poland was liberated, to retain within Poland a resistance to Russian domination, and to hope that at some future time the influence of Great Britain and the United States might be brought to bear on Russia to induce her to give the Polish people a free right of choice of their Government.
Government. Mikolajczyk personally does not agree with this policy and deeply regrets that he cannot get his associates to join him in making an earnest attempt now to find a solution.

Under these circumstances, it is Mikolajczyk's intention, after a further talk with Churchill and Eden, to resign. He feels that if he remains Prime Minister, he will be involved in recriminations and counterrecriminations with the Russians, that no good will come from it and that his usefulness in the future to his people will be destroyed.

I am waiting over one more day to see Churchill and Eden and will report to you their reaction to these developments.

Mikolajczyk told me further that the Communist influence in the Lublin Committee was increasing that several of the more independent individuals had been forced out or had resigned; and that he is fearful terrorism and counterterrorism will result. He is very pessimistic over the developments in London and Lublin and feels that his best course is to withdraw, keeping himself available to be of use if the moment arises.
arises in the future. He does not believe that the Lublin Committee, even with full Soviet support, can control Polish sentiment and that some day some compromise may be found which will give a chance for expression of Polish nationalism.

WINANT

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

10358, November 24, 8 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN.

I had lunch with the Prime Minister and saw Eden this afternoon. I reported my conversations with Mikolajczyk.

Both expressed the opinion that under the circumstances, they could not, (repeat not) interpose objection to Mikolajczyk's resignation, but that if he did resign the British Government would have to reconsider carefully its relationship with the Polish Government.

It is difficult to predict the course of events in Poland. It is unlikely that the group consisting of the Lublin Committee can obtain consolidated Polish support as further Polish territory is liberated. On the other hand, it would seem that without Mikolajczyk, the Polish Government in London by the unrealistic attitude of its members will lose respect in Poland and in world opinion.

If Mikolajczyk

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaalbe Date FEB 15 1972
-2- 10358, November 24, 8 p.m. from London.

If Nikolajczyk does resign, making a clear-cut statement of his policy to establish firm relations with the Soviet Government, he may well become a figure whom the Russians, is (*) British and ourselves can support at some future time in bringing together all Polish groups. For the present it would seem that our best policy is to stand aside and watch developments.

WINANT

LMS

(*) Apparent omission has been serviced.
POLES 125, November 25, 6 p.m.

FROM SCHOENFELD

I saw Mikolajczyk this morning. He told me he had resigned as Premier (my 124 November 24) because he felt a Polish Soviet agreement was a necessity at this time, whereas the three major political parties other than his own felt that the question of frontiers should be left until the end of the war.

He realized the attack he would have been subjected to if the Government had made the concessions desired by the Soviets but he reasoned that without an agreement, Poland would risk not only the loss of its eastern territories but probably also real compensation in the west. Once the war was over, he believed British and American public opinion would not support radical compensation for Poland in the West. Moreover, without an agreement, Poland was sure to be subjected to severe efforts at communication. The Lublin Committee was already largely
already largely Communist and those elements which were not Communist were being rapidly eliminated. If members of the London Government could return to Poland soon, they might succeed in preventing the country's communication. He could agree with those who doubted Soviet intentions, but if there was the slightest change of success, he thought they should at least try. Furthermore, without an agreement and in view of Soviet advances from the north and the southeast, the Polish Government was faced with the prospect of increasing difficulty in maintaining its communications with and supplying the underground organization of Poland.

He could have had more time, he would also have wished to gather up and preserve the "capital of energy" that Poland still disposes of abroad. If the parties could have united on a policy this would have been a source of strength in withstanding efforts to produce a Communist Poland. But divided they were necessarily ineffective. Furthermore, there were several hundred thousand Poles in western Europe and perhaps even a million in Germany. A surprising number had already been found in prison camps in recently captured German territory. He would have liked to recruit them for military service both in the interests of the war effort and of their own
and of their own rehabilitation and to use them as a nucleus to build up Poland anew. But the Supreme Allied Command felt it was too late to train them for the war effort and would permit only the numbers necessary to replace losses in existing Polish military units. Without unity among the parties and without greater support from the Allies, he could not hope to bring about this conservation of Polish energies.

In all the circumstances, he had felt obliged to resign.

Mikolajczyk referred to his recent conversation with Harriman and said he was grateful for the President's willingness to intervene with Stalin regarding Lwow and the oil areas in Galicia, but he had not felt he could take advantage of it since he could not in any case secure his own government's support for the general boundary settlement proposed by the Soviet Government.

Mikolajczyk said that perhaps he was wrong in his estimate of the future and "the others" right, but this was his honest conviction and in the circumstances he had not felt he could stay on as Prime Minister.

As for his immediate plans, Mikolajczyk said he did not know what he would do. I asked him whether, in case Kwapinski
POLES 125, November 25, 6 p.m., from London

case Kwavinski failed to form a government, he would perhaps undertake to do so. He said he would not.

He spoke throughout with quiet simplicity and, though somewhat more subdued than usual, retained all his normal calm and self-possession. Only as I took leave of him and told him how sorry I was that he had given over, did he show any emotion. He expressed deep appreciation of the understanding that had always been shown him from the American side and asked me to express his appreciation and great admiration to the President.

WINANT

WMB
AMT-800
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (ENC.)

London
Dated November 26, 1944
Rec'd 1:41 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

10433, November 26, 4 p.m.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE ACTING SECRETARY

Please read the Sunday news summary on the Polish-Russian situation cabled you this morning (Embassy's 10434, November 26). - Attached.

I think the President would also be interested in reading this message.

I forwarded to Harriman at the U. S. Embassy Paris early this morning your cable to him.

WINANT

JT
Secretary of State,
Washington.

10434, Twenty-sixth

Sunday papers play up the Polish cabinet crisis, articles by diplomatic and special correspondents suggesting it was precipitated by "suggestions brought to London by Mr. Harriman, United States Ambassador to Moscow". The Sunday EXPRESS in an undated front page article says "Mr. Stettinius at a press conference in Washington yesterday emphasized the traditional policy of the United States of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe. He said that this was not the issue behind the resignation of M. Mikolajczyk, the Polish Premier, which he described as a 'purely internal' Polish matter. It had been rumored in diplomatic circles that the crisis leading to the resignation of M. Mikolajczyk had been brought about by the delivery to the Polish Government in London by Mr. Averell Harriman of a letter from President
from President Roosevelt. M. Kwapiński, who has been asked by the Polish President to form a new government, proposes to retain a coalition of the four parties and to base his Russian policy on the memorandum of August last. This would leave the Polish frontiers to be settled by the Allies at the end of the war. The Polish Government recently suggested that Poland's frontiers should be guaranteed by the great powers. A refusal by America to join in such a guarantee, which is implied in the statement by Mr. Stettinius, adds some complications to the situation.

A front page article in the OBSERVER by a "special corresspondent" says "The resignation of the Polish Prime Minister, M. Nikolajczyk, which foreshadows a further sharp deterioration in Russo-Polish relations, came as a surprise even to his colleagues in the Government. The step had not been previously discussed at any meeting of the Government. The decision to resign was taken by M. Nikolajczyk after an exchange of views which he had on Thursday with the chiefs of the four parties forming the governmental coalition. He suggested to them the outlines of a definite reply to the proposals for a Russo-Polish settlement which were worked out during the conferences in Moscow last month. M. Nikolajczyk's latest scheme, it is believed, was connected with
-3-, #10434, Twenty-sixth, from London.

connected with suggestions brought to London by Mr. Harriman, the United States Ambassador to Moscow. During the conference with the party leaders M. Mikolajczyk reached the conclusion that his views were so different from those they held as to justify his immediate resignation from office. The main clash was between the Premier and the Socialist Vice-Premier, M. Kwapinski, who for some time had reproached M. Mikolajczyk with going too far in making concessions to the Russian demands. *** it had been M. Kwapinski's view that the Poles should make no concessions from their pre-war frontiers. M. Kwapinski's views however did not prevail with his own party and the clashes were somehow smoothed over. Recently opposition to M. Mikolajczyk inside the Government grew in strength. It expressed itself in among other ways a demonstrative motion of non-confidence in M. Grabski, Chairman of the National Council - the Polish Consultative Assembly in London - tabled by members of that Council. M. Grabski, a veteran Nationalist leader, accompanied M. Mikolajczyk in his two journeys to Moscow and had been regarded as the staunchest supporter of Russo-Polish conciliation. The constant skirmishes with his own opposition as well as Russian hostility and some impatience on the part of other Allied
-3-, #10434, Twenty-sixth, from London.

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other Allied
-4-, #10434, Twenty-sixth, from London.

other Allied leaders seem to have finally wearied and worn down M. Nikolajczyk. The Polish President has accepted M. Nikolajczyk's resignation and entrusted M. Kwapiszki with the task of forming a new government. M. Kwapiszki has been sounding leaders of the other parties. It is however quickly unlikely that M. Nikolajczyk's party, the Peasant Party, would agree to join the new government. Correspondent concludes by reviewing Kwapiszki's past and his attitude toward Russia which he says "is marked by emotional suspicion and aversion if not by outright hostility".

Diplomatic correspondent of the Sunday TIMES writes:

"With the resignation of M. Nikolajczyk as Prime Minister, the Polish crisis has entered a new and unpromising phase. If M. Kwapiszki, leader of the Socialist Party, to whom President Raczkiewicz has entrusted the formation of a new cabinet, succeeds in his task the chances of an agreement with Russia will be lessened, as the Socialists have always opposed a compromise. Solution on the basis of M. Nikolajczyk's talks in Moscow. Much will depend on the attitude of the Peasant Party who are holding meetings this weekend. If they support the cabinet and particularly if
particularly if M. Nikolajczyk should enter it, the hope of an eventual compromise cannot be entirely abandoned. On the other hand, if the Peasant Party remain out of the combination and M. Kwapinski relies on support of the other three parties and particularly a healing of the breach in the National Democratic Party, the outlook will worsen. The latest developments are primarily due to the message brought to M. Nikolajczyk from President Roosevelt by Mr. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to Russia. It will be recalled that the Polish Government had been prepared to accept the Moscow proposals provided they had positive assurance of the rectification of the western frontier and guarantees for the freedom, sovereignty and independence of Poland from Great Britain, America and the Soviet Union. There is reason to believe that M. Nikolajczyk was informed that the American Government was unwilling to accept any commitments of this nature in Europe, although not opposed in principle to frontier rectification. According to one account Mr. Harriman pointed out to M. Nikolajczyk the danger of continuing with an indecisive policy, especially in view of the growing strength of the Lublin Committee and the imminent new Russian offensive which is expected to liberate
to liberate Warsaw and Cracow. While M. Nikolajczyk took a realistic view and was prepared to reach a settlement, a majority of the Government felt that in view of the American attitude the proposed eastern frontier on the basis of the Curzon Line which was a condition of the proposed settlement with Russia could not be accepted. It is understood that the British Government, who earnestly desire an arrangement between their Russian and Polish Allies, keenly regret M. Nikolajczyk's failure to reach a settlement. Throughout his period of office M. Nikolajczyk in their view has given proof of conciliatory and statesmanlike qualities. M. Kwapiszki is conferring with the various party leaders and hopes to decide quickly whether he can or cannot form a government. Mr. Stettinius, American acting Secretary of State, asked in Washington yesterday whether the United States had refused to guarantee a Polish frontier, said, according to Reuter, that the specific question of a guarantee of the frontier was not and could not be an issue since the United States Government's traditional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe was well known.

The Sunday EXPRESS comments editorially:

"Mr. Nikolajczyk's resignation from the office of Polish Prime Minister"
-7-, #10434, Twenty-sixth, from London.

Prime Minister provides a new situation, one which entitles us to expect a new policy and a new approach. It is folly to go on resisting wise counsels because of past misunderstandings. The aim now must be unity of purpose at all costs. Mr. Nikolajczyk, free from the burdens of office, should go back to liberated Poland where the seat of the Polish Government should be anyway. And the principal objective of that Government should be to get into close contact with the Russian Government. For only in that contact lies their future. The British people share Russia's pride in her vast victories and have full confidence in Stalin's administration in relation to all the countries contiguous to his own territory".

WINANT

DU
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY

4735, December 10, 7 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

Last night De Gualle told me that he had been put under further great pressure by the Russians to send a delegate to Lublin, but he again assured me that he was going to await developments.

REPEATED TO PARIS AS NO. 40 AND SECRET FOR CAPFERY

He told me he had met the Lublin Committee, but he had found "that they were not Poles". He asked me about Mikolajczyk and what we thought of him. I could not inquire in more detail about his conversation with the Poles as I was afraid that the conversation might be overheard by the Russians.

HARRIMAN
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington

PRIORITY

4795, December 12, Midnight

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

The French Minister yesterday informed me that Stalin had told De Gaulle that the Polish Lublin Committee would shortly declare itself the Provisional Government of Poland. (REMEMBS 4777, December 11, 10 p.m.). I assume that the Soviet Government will, of course, then recognize them as such. I have received no information on this from the Soviet Government.

HARRIMAN

I MS

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schraible Date

Moscow via Army

Dated December 12, 1944

Rec'd 8:32 p.m.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

PRIORITY.

SPECIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

4913, December 19, 7 p.m.

I am somewhat concerned over the expanding concept of the Soviet Government in connection with the future western frontier of Poland.

The first Soviet proposal indicated a willingness that Poland should have East Prussia except the Königsburg area and an expansion of her western frontier perhaps even as far as the Oder and possibly including the cities of Stettin and Breslau.

Subsequently the Soviet intention appeared fixed that the western boundary should be the line of the Oder including Stettin and Breslau. In discussions with De Gaulle, Stalin now proposed the line of the Oder to the confluence of the lower Neisse and then south along the Neisse to the Czech border near the city of Gorlitz. (This proposal was confirmed by the recent PRAVDA.)
-2#4913, December 19, 7 p.m., from Moscow.
recent PRAVDA article). In this connection Stalin indicated to De Gaulle that the Czechs might wish to expand their boundaries to the north somewhat into Silesia, although this suggestion was not defined precisely. Benes, in talking with me a year ago, did not appear to be interested in taking German territory which would increase his problems.

When Mikolajczys was in Moscow he indicated that he was not at all certain that it was wise for the Polish boundary to go as far as the Oder and particularly to include the cities of Stettin and Breslau, as these cities and certain of the area were almost completely German. The Lublin Poles however showed complete readiness to assume these new responsibilities. Churchill indicated that he was willing to have the Polish frontiers go as far as the Poles wished, but I believe that at that time he had in mind only the line up to the Oder, but not beyond. What the British position is on the question of the lower Neisse line I do not know.

Both the Lublin Poles and Mikolajczys indicated in the October talks that they did not (repeat not) wish any German population to remain within Polish territory because of the acute minority problem that this would create.
create. The Russians and British accepted this principle. Churchill in his recent speech mentions the transfer of six million Germans out of territory to be given to the Poles. The new suggested boundary to the Neisse would evidently necessitate the transfer of several million more Germans.

Stalin also agreed with Benes in December 1943 that some if not all of the Sudeten Germans should be transferred.

We have not here exact information on the total transfers of Germans involved in these various areas nor have we information on where these people could be reestablished within Germany. We have little information to appraise the consequences to European economy and stability if so large an area were to be occupied by Poles presumably evacuated largely from the backward districts incorporated into the Soviet Union and to answer the question of where the technical skill could be found to administer and operate these highly developed and industrialized areas.

The Soviet policy towards Poland superficially appears to be that the Soviets are attempting to justify their annexation of old Polish territory and their domination
19, 7 p.m. from Moscow.
their domination of the internal affairs of Poland by expandingly generous offers of territory in the west at the expense of Germany.

I fully recognize our policy is not to commit ourselves in boundary questions until the peace settlement. The question I have in mind however is whether, if we have reservations in the present case they should not be registered on an appropriate occasion with the British and Soviet Governments before these concepts become so fixed that they are virtually a fait accompli.

HARRIMAN

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DCG-317

London

Dated December 21, 1944

Rec'd 9:32 p.m.

SECRET

US URGENT

POLES

134, December 21, 6 p.m.

FROM SCHOENFELD

I had a talk day before yesterday with former Premier Mikołajczyk. He referred to the debate on Poland in the House of Commons on December 15 and said he was dissatisfied with Mr. Churchill's statement that at the peace conference the British Government would support the Curzon Line, inclusive of Lwow and the oil bearing areas in Galicia, as the Soviet frontier. He said that when Ambassador Harriman was recently in London and discussed the President's willingness to intervene with Marshal Stalin in favor of leaving Lwow and the oilfields in Galicia to Poland, Mr. Churchill had offered to reinforce such an intervention. Now, about a fortnight later, he had publicly...
-2-134, December 21, 6 p.m. from London.

had publicly committed himself and the British Government to the inclusion of those areas in Soviet Russia. He regarded this as unfair and as presenting an added obstacle to a solution of Polish Soviet difficulties.

At the Moscow meetings, Mikolajczyk continued, Churchill had not touched on the question of Lwow. Even with regard to Vilna he had been more guarded even though he had indicated that the British had not approved of the manner in which Poland had taken Vilna. Besides the geographic position there was less favorable for Poland. An extensive area lies between Vilna and the proposed Polish Soviet frontier, but this is not the case with regard to Lwow and the oilfields. The latter area is small and could readily be given to Poland.

Mikolajczyk was pleased on the other hand that the question of Poland's western frontiers had been publicly discussed by Mr. Churchill and been the subject of debate.

He thought the debate indicated that British opinion was conscious of the immense transfer problems that the proposed frontier arrangements would involve. He had always had this in mind. On a visit to Chequers last spring he had urged Mr. Churchill not to commit himself to
December 21, 6 p.m. from London.

himself to the Curzon line, for it was evident that the more Poland was cut in the east the more it had to receive in the west. He had asked why make the transfer question harder than necessary, and had expressed his belief that the Prime Minister with all his popularity would not succeed in making so drastic a plan acceptable to British and American opinion. The debate had confirmed this.

As for the Arciszewski Cabinet's reaction to the debate, Mikolajczyk thought it was singularly unrealistic. They were pleased that Mr. Churchill had said that the British Government continued to recognize the Polish Government in London. They were also pleased by the amount of sympathy expressed for the Polish point of view in the debate and by the reactions of the British and American press. Mikolajczyk thought, however, that the Arciszewski Cabinet was naive in the satisfaction they derived from the speeches favorable to the Polish point of view. They did not seem to distinguish the difference in importance between a speech, however favorable, made by a back bencher like Mr. Pickthorn and a pronouncement of policy by the British Prime Minister adverse to the Polish point of view.
He thought the present Polish Cabinet had also taken an unrealistic view regarding Mr. Stettinius's statement on Poland. They had taken it as an endorsement of their view that the question of frontiers should be left until the end of the war. He on the other hand thought that while this was the general principle, the Secretary's statement meant that there could and ought to be exceptions.

Mikolajczyk indicated that there was an active ferment within the Polish political parties with respect to the present Polish Government, but he thought it would be a mistake to overestimate the likelihood of any change of government in the immediate future.

Of the four principal political parties only one, namely the National Democrats, is satisfied with the government.

The Peasant Party, Mikolajczyk said, had decided to go into open opposition. When the new cabinet was formed, the Peasant Party had taken the position that it would support it as the legal government. This did not mean that the party supported the government's policy (its role is something in the nature of "His Majesty's loyal opposition"). He was in agreement that the new cabinet should try out its policy but he objected to its pretending to follow his policy of seeking a Polish Soviet settlement.
-5-#134, December 21, 6 p.m. from London.

Soviet settlement when in reality it was seeking to postpone a settlement until the end of the war.

The Socialists were divided. The more moderate members had refused to join the Arciszewski Government. Moreover, following Mr. Churchill's speech, Mr. Giolkosz, one of the most influential Socialist leaders, came to see him and said he felt something had to be done. Mikolajczyk asked him whether this meant he would withdraw support from the present cabinet. Giolkosz was not prepared to go so far. It was arranged that a socialist delegation should later confer with Mikolajczyk.

The Christian Labor Party was also divided and there was some question of the party withdrawing its representatives from the cabinet. A decision, however, had not yet been reached.

If the Christian Labor Party should withdraw and with the Peasant Party in opposition, the Arciszewski Cabinet would be left only with members of the Nationalist Party and the more irreconcilable wing of the Socialist Party. Though in agreement in their attitude toward a settlement with Russia, the Nationalists and Socialists were otherwise as fire and water in their views. Normally such a combination could not survive.

But it would
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But it would be hazardous to underrated the tenacity with which they might cling to office, especially as they represented the viewpoint of President Raczkiwicz and his closest advisers regarding a settlement with Soviet Russia. (Those advisers include Zaleski, former Foreign Minister who resigned from Sikorski's Cabinet in protest against the Soviet Polish treaty of July 1941, and Lukasiewicz, former Polish Ambassador to France).

An element which may affect the situation is the attitude of the underground administration of Poland. On December 9 a message was received from it stating that the Arciszewski Cabinet should be reorganized so as to be fully representative of all parties and that the underground was drawing up its ideas on policy and would submit them when completed. Mikolajczyk said that when the proposals submitted to Moscow last August were drawn up, they supposedly represented the last word of the underground administration. By his resignation he had brought it about that they were now drawing up revised proposals. He imagined that their views should be nearer his views than those of the present government and that they would favor a settlement with Russia at this time and would agree to certain concessions. He did not know, however, whether they would go as far as Moscow desired in the boundary
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in the boundary matter. On this point, his own (Peasant) Party in Poland had sometime ago given him full authority to make any frontier settlement that he considered necessary, provided that the independence of the rest of Poland was fully assured.

He continued to be convinced that some effort had to be made to prevent a policy of draft. He thought the present cabinet did not recognize the dangers. Merely letting matters run until the peace conference would not meet the situation. If meanwhile the Soviets and the British agreed on Poland's eastern frontier, the United States would later scarcely be able to oppose it successfully. Meanwhile the Soviets were in actual possession and the results of not having an arrangement would be that several million Poles east of the Curzon line would be in danger of deportation and destruction, which would mean a permanent and irreparable loss to the Polish nation. There would in addition be the uncertainties regarding the western frontiers.

There was also the question of the Lublin Committee. He doubted whether the question of its recognition as the provisional government was immediate. He was aware, however, that the British had received a message on December 13 from Marshal Stalin (A.) stating that the Soviet Government
Soviet Government was unwilling that supplies should be sent to the Polish underground over Soviet occupied areas; and (B) asking whether the time had not come to recognize the Lublin Committee. He was also aware that the French were sending an unofficial representative to the Committee. If the committee should be recognized, this could be an added complication.

In the circumstances he was convinced that some effort had to be made to devise a positive policy. He felt particularly that when the President, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin held their meeting, there should be some coherent plan regarding Poland which would take into account all the elements in the situation and which would permit the organization of a government which might go to Poland. He was giving thought to the working out of such a plan.

He indicated that a further element which might eventually have an influence on the situation was the possible arrival here before long of Vicente Witos, the well known peasant leader (not to be confused with his brother Andre Witos, recently removed from the Lublin Committee). If Vicente Witos should get out of German occupied Poland and come here a reformation of the Polish Government around him might be possible.

While these
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While these are the principle elements in the situation at the moment, it is still too early to forecast in what form or when they will crystallize. But it should be remembered that changes in the Polish Government are less dependent on pressure of opinion or of parties than on the decisions of the Polish President. In consequence the present situation may readily run on for some time.

Repeated to Moscow.

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