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Number 4

# POLISH FACTS and FIGURES

*will seek to acquaint the American public with Polish political and social problems, and to give a true presentation of the struggle that the Polish Nation has carried on for its integrity and independence since September 1, 1939*

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# POLISH FACTS and FIGURES

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## PUBLIC EDUCATION IN POLAND

*"We fight for schools built on a foundation of books, not bayonets."*  
(Gen. Sommervell, Fort Belvoir, Va., March 9, 1944.)

At the very outset of her national history, Poland elected to link her destiny with the West, rather than with the East. Her national culture has always followed the pattern of Western civilization, and all cultural movements originating in France or Italy invariably had their counterpart in Poland. Poland prided herself on being an eastern outpost of western Latin civilization. This was clearly reflected in Polish culture and public education.

Poland often led rather than followed in the field of education: Cracow University, founded in 1364, was the third oldest seat of higher learning in continental Europe. It became an important cultural center, attracting students from all over the Continent. Nicholas Copernicus, the astronomer who "stopped the sun and moved the earth," was among its most famous *alumni*.

Poland's greatest achievements in the field of education were made in the latter half of the XVIIIth century, a few decades before the partitions, when a thorough educational reorganization, which served as a model for later reform in other European countries, was carried out. In 1773 the National Commission on Education was created. It was in fact the first Ministry of Education in the world.

### Period of Partitions

After 123 years of national extinction Poland was reborn as a sovereign independent State. Gone were the days when each succeeding generation paid its tax of blood, when Polish thought was driven underground, the use of the Polish language forbidden and all Polish culture ruthlessly suppressed. Victory had brought peace and freedom. The Poles eagerly set about the great task of reconstruction.

Among the most urgent problems of reborn Poland was public education, the building of a nation-wide school system to stamp out illiteracy and bring knowledge to the masses. One of the first bills introduced by the Polish Government in 1920 provided for compulsory education and began the work of unification. Conditions faced by free Poland were truly appalling, particularly on the territories that had been under Russian rule, where public education was virtually

non-existent. The partitioning powers—except Prussia which used schools as a means of ruthless germanization—made no effort to foster education in Poland. On the contrary, their activities were directed exclusively toward the suppression of the Polish language and of Polish culture, with the result that school facilities were most inadequate. However this is not quite true of Austria, where a more liberal policy prevailed.

**A Heavy Heritage** In 1918 Poland had to face the disastrous effects of decentralization brought about by the long partition between Russia, Germany and Austria, that had broken the country into three parts, as well as material destruction wrought on Polish soil during the last war. Free Poland had to start from scratch. She had to cope with devastation (6,500 school buildings had been destroyed in the course of the war); she inherited all the evils consciously introduced by the partitioning powers: high illiteracy, a tool in the hands of the occupants who strove to keep people unenlightened; scarcity of school buildings and equipment; education given only in foreign languages; all the unfortunate "pedagogical methods" of German and Russian teachers: flogging in Prussian occupied Poland, in Russian occupied Poland imprisonment, with deportation of Polish youth.

Underground activity in Poland was never confined merely to political resistance. In the latter part of the nineteenth century an illegal university in Warsaw played a prominent part in the intellectual life of partitioned Poland, and from its professors and pupils came many scholars of distinction. When in 1901 the school children at Wrzesnia, in German occupied Poland, refused to pray in German and brought heavy penalties upon themselves and their parents, the whole country, at the suggestion of Henryk Sienkiewicz, took up a collection for the victims. The bonds of national solidarity, the deep concern over the fate of the children, were far stronger than the artificial frontiers that divided Poland into three parts.

In "Madame Curie," the biography of her mother, Eve Curie gives a glimpse of what school conditions were in Poland under Russian rule. Maria Sklodowska-Curie, the great Polish scientist, must often have told her daughter about the secret Polish history class in her Warsaw school. A description of one of these classes is appended (see *Appendix I*).


Conditions in these Russian-dominated schools grew worse and finally exhausted the patience of the Poles. The Czarist *curriculum* not only forbade the use of the Polish language but did not even allow it to be taught as an additional language, as Latin or French were taught. Pupils were severely punished if caught talking Polish among themselves, even out of school hours. This policy kindled the fires of revolt.

Parents and children clung to their language and nationality, and cared nought for Russian diplomas. In 1905 there was a spontaneous mass protest against Russia's educational policy, that ended in a manifestation unique in history, "the school strike," all the Polish students walking out of the class.

rooms in open revolt against the Russian teachers. This school strike deeply impressed right-minded people all over the world, and forced the Russian government to adopt a more lenient policy.

Even after 1905 Russian schools were the only ones which could confer diplomas or academic degrees. The majority of Poles refused to attend these schools and migrated to the Austrian-occupied part of Poland, where conditions were more liberal and the general culture approached that of Western Europe. It was in the Polish schools of "Galicia," at the Universities of Cracow and Lwow, that the Polish intellectual class was educated. When persecutions raged in Russian and German dominated parts of the country, "Galicia" became the cradle of Polish cultural and political thought.

Poles had always understood that to retain their national identity it was imperative for them to preserve their language and their culture. Underground education fulfilled this task.



Elementary school building in a small village. Many schools of his type were established in Poland in the first years after the introduction of universal compulsory education.

## In Re-Born Poland

**Rebuilding the Ruins** Once their political independence regained, the Poles set to work with all the enthusiasm born of their age-long yearning for freedom. What they achieved in all the domains of national life during those short twenty years of Polish independence was truly remarkable. As everywhere the field of education has always been closely associated with general social development, and the progress of the Polish masses is clearly reflected in the growth of the Polish schools.

On January 3, 1918, the Ministry of Education was created. To it was allotted 15% of the total budget of the country, a grant exceeded only by that for national defense. Moreover considerable sums were allocated for educational purposes (in the field of professional training, seminaries, rabbinical schools, etc.) by municipal and rural administrative bodies, churches of all denominations, religious communities of all creeds, private institutions and educational societies; so even the large expenditures in the State budget for these purposes covered only part of the sums spent on education by reborn Poland. The Ministry was the chief educational authority and had to plan the rebuilding of Polish schools from the very foundations. Burdened with the remnants of three divergent educational systems, handicapped by extremely difficult economic conditions in a country that had been methodically impoverished and exploited for more than a century and ravaged by the war—Poland had to unify her school system, to centralize school authority, to create a common ideal of national education. Thus two factors were of special importance



Elementary school in Krolewska Huta (Silesia).

in the organization of Polish schools: a complete break with the old organization and the desire to create, by sound national education, a well-knit society, free from class-struggle, free also from the prejudices of other and less democratic countries.

**General Trend of Polish School System** The first impulse was to forsake the old "impractical" classical education, and to curtail the teaching of history, religion, Latin and Greek. Emphasis was laid on a program of teaching adapted as far as possible to the practical everyday life of the country. Poland aimed at producing her own type of enlightened and democratic citizen, and at removing all class distinctions. "Pure culture" did not disappear from the *curricula* of Polish schools, yet the so-called "radical" spirit permeated the Polish schools and strongly influenced their organization. Thus it was that primary schools received far greater financial support than secondary schools, and the *curriculum* in the three highest classes of primary schools was made identical with that of the three lowest classes in the *gymnasia* (secondary schools). Manual training existed in all schools, and among the *gymnasia* the most favored were those of the mathematical-natural science type.

**Achievements of Twenty Years** When in November 1918 the streets of London and of New York throbbed with excited crowds cheering the Armistice, they knew the war was ended. Not so, however, in Poland where the work of peaceful reconstruction did not begin until 1920, two years after the Armistice. Despite this late start, despite overwhelming financial difficulties and lack of material assistance from abroad (credits extended to Poland amounted to only 2.5% of those given to Germany), most remarkable progress was made.


In 1921 33.1% of the population of Poland were illiterate. On the territories liberated from Russia the situation was even worse, for illiteracy rose as high as 64.7% among adults, and 71% among children of school age.

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#### Schools, Teachers and Pupils in Poland (1936)

	Schools	Teachers	Pupils
Kindergartens .....	1,715	2,045	87,400
Elementary .....	28,337	91,224	4,743,000
Secondary .....	763*	11,602	200,600
Teachers' training .....	42	1,791	2,900
Trade .....	717	7,404	90,800
Continuation trade .....	611	4,307	97,600
Academic .....	24	3,409	48,000
Others .....	311	•	31,800

\* Most of these have *lyceums*.



Within ten years Poland reduced illiteracy to 23.1%; at the outbreak of the present war it did not exceed 18% for the whole population.

In 1921, only 68% of children of school age attended school. Within ten years the percentage rose to 89.5% and immediately before the outbreak of the war school attendance reached 90.6%. Of this achievement the Poles were justly proud, for it approached the ideal of American education where in the same age group school attendance has reached 94.1%.

In 1921 Poland had 57,158 elementary school teachers. In 1938 they numbered 89,122. This figure reflected not only an actual increase in the number of pupils, but also of a decrease in the number of pupils per teacher.

The first five years of independence brought an increase of 15% in the number of schoolrooms. In Eastern Poland, so woefully neglected by the Russians, this increase reached the amazing figure of 105.2%.

The first twenty years of independence witnessed a remarkable development, in the field of elementary education: 23,604 new primary schools were opened.

The first schools of independent Poland were organized in the midst of war with Soviet Russia (1918-1920). In the ensuing years, the constant effort of the whole nation tended to promote national and democratic education. Primary education was free. The prewar scarcity of schools and teachers was remedied to a great extent. Of the primary schools 95% were State owned. The remaining 5% of private schools, maintained by private persons or institutions, attracted only 1% of the children to their schoolrooms. Half of the secondary

schools were State-owned and there also tuition was free, except for a small charge for books, etc., amounting to about \$45 a year. Children of government employees paid only half that sum, and there were numerous exemptions and reductions for poor students.

**School Reform of 1932** An unified school system for the whole of Poland was completed in 1923, but took final form only after the National Education Act of 1932. This aimed at giving wider and more extensive educational opportunities than provided by the elementary schools, and emphasized vocational training. The reform introduced into the Polish educational system the principle of grade schools embracing all degrees of teaching as a uniform whole. This entailed four basic grades of education. Each higher grade was based on the one below and derived from it. The four grades were:

Elementary;

Secondary or *gymnasium* (either general education or vocational training);  
*Lyceum*;

Academic (universities, technological institutes, etc.).


The elementary school formed the basis of the whole system of Polish education which was nation-wide and compulsory. The Polish elementary school had seven grades. In many schools, however, one class comprised several age groups, an abnormal and transitory phenomenon. Attendance at school was possible from the age of three, but was not compulsory till the age of seven and was to last through a period of seven years, to complete the elementary *curriculum*. This *curriculum* was identical throughout the country, in private as well as in public schools, and included social and civic training, and some degrees of preparation for economic life. Elementary schools were to be opened in all localities having 40 children of school age within a radius of three kilometers (about 2 miles). The classification of the school depended on the number of children attending. Thus a school with 60-80 children was a two-class school; that with 90-120 children a three-class school, etc.

Abnormal and backward children were provided for in special schools.

As regards Polish secondary schools, these were not increased in number but were expanded. Secondary education, under the law of 1932, provided a six-year course: four years in *gymnasium*, two in *lyceum*.

The *gymnasia* consisted of four grades and were of two types: a) general education and b) vocational education. The *curriculum* of the first type *gymnasia* was uniform and included Latin. The vocational *gymnasia* gave a certain minimum of general knowledge, but their *curricula* varied considerably according to the field for which the school prepared the students. Thus there were commercial, technical, trade, etc., *gymnasia*.

The two-year *lyceum* course constituted the third degree of the Polish school system. It was conceived as direct preparation for university and technological institute study, to correspond to the differentiation of academic schools. Accord-



ingly, the *lyceums* were of four types: Classical (Latin and Greek), Humanist (Latin), Mathematical and Physical, and Natural Science.

Only upon completing the *gymnasium* and *lyceum* courses could a student enroll in one of Poland's academic schools.

There were 35 academic schools in Poland. The bulletin of the Office of Education of the U. S. Department of the Interior lists them as follows:

- 6 classical universities (Warsaw, Cracow, Lwow, Wilno, Poznan and the Catholic University at Lublin), with the faculties of humanities, mathematics, natural science, jurisprudence, medicine and theology. Four of these universities had in addition an agricultural faculty;
- 2 free universities (Warsaw and Lodz);
- 4 technical institutions (among them the Mining Academy in Cracow);
- 4 schools of business administration;
- 4 schools of fine arts, music and drama;
- 4 schools of military science (intendancy, sanitary education, strategy, etc.);
- 3 special teacher-training institutions;
- 2 schools of political science;
- 2 schools of orientology;
- 1 academy of veterinary medicine;
- 1 school of agriculture;
- 1 school of journalism;
- 1 stomatological academy.


During the partitions only the Universities of Cracow and Lwow were able to continue their work. Both had a long and glorious academic tradition, and were famous far beyond the borders of Poland.

Wilno University was founded in the XVIIth century and reached its most magnificent development in the XIXth. Among its *alumni* were the brothers Sniadecki, eminent mathematicians and natural scientists, the geographer Domyko, and Poland's two greatest poets: Mickiewicz and Slowacki.

#### Academic Schools in Poland (1938/39)

	Faculties	Students	Diplomas 1936/37
Theology and Canon Law .....	8	1,000	•
Law, political science .....	14	13,200	2,027
Medicine .....	5	3,900	520
Pharmacology .....	5	1,200	277
Veterinary medicine .....	2	800	136
Dentistry .....	1	500	85
Arts and sciences .....	21	12,000	1,301
Agriculture .....	8	2,400	361
Technical sciences .....	11	7,600	667
Fine arts .....	8	700	•
Commercial sciences .....	5	4,300	448
Physical culture .....	2	200	•
Journalism .....	1	300	•
Hebrew sciences .....	2	100	•
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>93</b>	<b>48,200</b>	<b>5,842</b>

Besides lower diplomas, 233 MA degrees were conferred and 89 foreign equivalencies issued in 1936/37.



Lwow University.

Warsaw University, founded in the middle of the XIXth century, was promptly taken over and finally closed by the Russians.


Poznan University inherited the traditions of the Lubranski Academy, which existed from the XVIth to the XVIIIth Century. During the last stage of partition (1903) the Germans opened an Academy in Poznan for the purpose of germanizing Western Poland, but it proved a complete failure. And when Poland was reborn Poznan University (6,000 students) was located in the castle of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Lublin University, the youngest of all Polish universities and founded by Catholic organizations, was the only private university in Poland. In 1943 Fordham University symbolically adopted the University of Lublin and dedicated a special Lublin room "where Lublin can find an honorable refuge until the day of victory and peace when all the universities of Poland will again light their lamps."

Education for adults and adolescents was also organized by the Government, by municipalities and by private societies.

In 1936/37 there were 7,308 afternoon and evening courses with 12,026 teachers and lecturers and 140,379 pupils. More than sixty regular evening schools held 358 courses, attended by 6,711 persons.

There were also 599 so-called Popular Universities that gave evening and Sunday lectures.



Despite all efforts, the building of schools and training of teachers could not keep pace with the tremendous increase in the number of children. Schools were overcrowded and to give the proper care and attention to every child Poland needed 40,000 more schoolrooms and 100,000 more teachers.

*The School as Cultural Center* Polish schools were by no means purely educational. Each school became the cultural center of the community, particularly in country districts. Many schools opened lending libraries, children's clubs, health centers, clinics, etc. In addition to his school duties each teacher took an active part in community life as a moderator and



Boy Scouts' parade on the Warsaw Stadium. Among all the youth organizations in Poland, the Boy Scouts attracted the largest number of followers.

#### School Libraries (1936/37)

	Number of libraries	Number of volumes
In State-owned elementary schools .....	24,934	4,869,000
Secondary schools (gen. educ.) .....	743	2,109,000
Teachers training schools .....	27	82,000
Trade schools .....	429	500,000
Academic schools .....	22	2,941,000
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>26,155</b>	<b>10,501,000</b>

organizer of Boy Scouts, Red Cross units, civilian defense or cultural organizations. The school sponsored various philanthropic and patriotic activities, organized summer camps, and each year arranged short tours of Poland for the pupils. Thus the school was complementary to the home and together with the church formed a well integrated educational whole.

The tasks that awaited young Polish engineers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, business and other professional men and women were tremendous, and the best efforts of the Polish educational system were directed to training a type of Pole who would not shirk those tasks and would know how to deal with new problems of Polish national life in political, social and economic spheres. Polish schools made a determined attempt to reconcile the past with the future and to obliterate the 123 years of political and social frustration to which Poland had been subjected by the partitioning Powers.

**Foreign Language Schools** Another great effort was made to solve the "minority problem" in Poland. Full equality of national minorities had not been achieved in Poland when war came, although among all states of Eastern Europe—with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia—the foreign language groups enjoyed the greatest freedom in Poland. Their rights were most respected and best complied with in the field of education.

Article 110 of the Polish Constitution states:

"Polish citizens belonging to national minorities or linguistic minorities have, together with other citizens, the right to establish, supervise and manage at their own cost, charitable, religious and social establishments as well as schools and other educational establishments and in them to use their own language with complete freedom and to follow the rules of their own religion."

Under the Constitution the State financed schools in which the minority language was the language of instruction or in which both Polish and a minority language were used. The foreign language groups could also establish and direct their own private schools in accordance with existing regulations. In case of need many of these schools received Government grants. In 1937/38, some 20% of Poland's elementary schools and 15% of her secondary schools, used Yiddish, Hebrew, Ukrainian, German and other national minority languages.


Elementary schools for children of minority groups fell into three classes: 1) schools in which the minority language was taught as a required subject; 2) schools where half the subjects were taught in Polish and half in the minority language; 3) schools which used the minority language exclusively for teaching.

Assiduous propaganda by Poland's western neighbor led to unfavorable comment on the way Poland dealt with her German minority. Here are the facts regarding the education of the German minority in Poland and of the Polish minority in Germany.

Prior to 1939 there were in Poland 741,000 Germans. They had 924 scien-

tific and educational establishments (675 schools). At the same time Poles in Germany numbered 1,500,000 and had but 58 elementary schools and two high schools. There could be no more striking comparison between the way Poland treated her German minority and the treatment of the Polish minority in Germany.

In 1937/38 Poland had 78 schools in which German was a required language, 203 bilingual Polish-German schools and 394 purely German schools. Including secondary schools and colleges (exclusively German) 75,635 German children in Poland were given opportunity to study in German.



As regards the Ukrainian minority there were in Poland in 1937/38: 2,123 elementary schools where Ukrainian was taught as a required language; 3,064 bilingual schools (half the subjects taught in Polish, half in Ukrainian); and 461 schools in which Ukrainian was the language of tuition.

Thus 539,262 children of the Ukrainian national group were taught in Ukrainian and 339,054 were taught the language. Some 7,000 pupils attended exclusively Ukrainian secondary schools.

86% of the minority schools in Poland were State schools.

#### *Spirit of Polish Educational System*

Poland in the course of her twenty years of independence built up a sound and democratic school system, providing the highest possible nation-wide public education, fostering the culture of various national minority groups, educating new cadres of teachers, building new schools.

"The progress made in education in so short a time by this nation of 33 million people has been less spectacular perhaps and less controversial than in some other countries, but remarkable for its rapidity and steadiness of purpose."—(*Office of Education of the U. S. Department of the Interior in 1936.*)<sup>1</sup>

Is there any yardstick by which to measure the effectiveness of any system of education? Should such a one exist, could it be more reliable than the supreme test that, in the day of trial under German terror, the soul of Polish youth, remained undaunted.

In this the darkest hour of the nation's history, the high standard of education in reborn Poland has proved to be one of the basic reasons why Poland although occupied is unconquered.




Graduation exercises in a Warsaw school.

<sup>1</sup> *Poland's Institutions of Higher Education, U. S. Department of the Interior, Office of Education, Bulletin 1936, No. 14.*

### German Occupation

*War* Two days before the academic year of 1939/40 was to open, the first German bombs fell on Polish towns and villages, the first Polish women and children were killed by German airmen with machine-gun fire. That dawn of September 1, 1939, marked for the Polish youth the opening of a new school year which is still running and has brought tests harder by far than even the most difficult of university examinations.

German *Kultur* came to Poland goose-stepping from the West. Soviet *kultura* inaded from the East. While in eastern Poland the portraits of Lenin and Stalin were being hung in the classrooms on both sides of the crucifix—the German authorities summoned all the professors of Cracow University to an important meeting.



Court of the Cracow University Library. Established in 1364 the Jagellonian University in Cracow is one of the oldest in Europe (the second after Prague in Central Europe). Nicholas Copernicus, *above*, was a student at this University.

**German Kulturtraegers** It was November 6, 1939, a day the Poles will not easily forget. In the aula of the old Jagellonian University of Cracow, founded in 1364 by King Casimir the Great, Polish scholars met to hear an address on "The Attitude of German Authorities towards Polish Learning." The attendance was in fact compulsory for all the professors and lecturers. The lecture was short and to the point: almost all the scholars present were seized by the Germans and sent to the concentration camp at Oranienburg near Berlin. In the course of the severe winter of 1939/40, seventeen of the arrested professors died, among them such outstanding Polish scientists as professors Chrzanowski, Siedlecki and Kostanecki.

In three years of foreign occupation (up to the end of 1943), 166 Polish University professors and scientists have met their death, most of them as hostages or in German concentration camps, or in man-hunts conducted by the Gestapo in the streets of Polish cities.<sup>2</sup>

Thus was the German attitude toward learning made manifest. Shortly thereafter an official statement of Governor-General Hans Frank revealed the ideas underlying German cultural theories.

"The Poles do not need universities or secondary schools; the Polish lands are to be changed into an intellectual desert (*eine intellektuelle Wueste*)," Frank said, "Poland was to be changed into a community of manual workers, or serfs (*knechten*) who would provide a reservoir of labor for German industry."

**Verboten!** Except for elementary and training schools, there are no schools left in German-occupied Poland today. All Polish schools have been closed, the Universities turned into German Wehrmacht barracks, and the Gestapo occupies the beautiful building of the Ministry of Cults and Public Education in Warsaw.

It is far easier to destroy than to build. The net result of German efforts in the course of the first three years of occupation was the total ruin of elementary education, the abolition of such secondary education as had so far managed to survive even under the German rule in the form of finishing courses for technical schools, the closing of all academies and universities and the restriction of training schools to the narrow field of trade and industry.


Elementary schools are allowed to remain in existence, for even the lowest laborers would be less valuable if they could not read or write. They continue their work in incredible conditions.

Polish elementary schools have no textbooks. The old Polish primers were confiscated by the German authorities and no new ones have been issued. A periodical in Polish, called *Ster* (The Rudder) is supposed to take the place of the primers. In five months one issue of *Ster* has appeared. It contained information on "the country of habitation" (a dry name indeed for one's fatherland!) and on elementary science.

<sup>2</sup> A list of scientists and professors of Polish academic schools who have died since September 1, 1939, is appended (see *Appendix II*).



\* The German Gestapo occupied the Ministry of Education in Warsaw.



Polish elementary schools today lack teachers. In certain counties 70% of all teachers have been arrested and removed by the Germans (for instance, in Radom county).

Polish schools have no proper classrooms. Many buildings were destroyed by bombardment and military operations during the war in Poland. Others were requisitioned by the German army when they occupied the country. What schools remain have new problems to face.

**Destitution** Evicted from their buildings, deprived of teachers and textbooks, muzzled and intimidated—the Polish schools carry on. Many of the schools moved into private houses after their eviction, and had to cope with the problem of heating the classrooms. Winter in Poland is severe. As a rule, all schools are now closed during the three winter months when the cold is most biting. But in the fall and early spring, days are often bitterly cold and children's hands and faces are red and chapped. Parents try to remedy the situation and collect some fuel for use in the schools, depriving themselves of coal which has become invaluable. But even this sacrifice is of little avail, as the coal collected for the schools is frequently requisitioned by the Germans.

Scientific starvation of the Polish people by the German invaders is tragically reflected in the few schools left open. Many cases are reported of undernourished children fainting in class for want of food. Trembling with cold,

faint with hunger, these pupils are getting what little education the Germans allow, in the hardest way.

The dire material need of most families has had its inevitable effect on school attendance. Children have to work to help support the family. In certain counties school attendance has fallen 50% below what it was before the war (the county of Lowicz), although there are still some districts that have maintained their prewar level (the district of Warsaw, excluding the city).

**Yesterday Students—  
Today German Slaves** On April 30, 1938, a new law regulating the working hours of minors was proclaimed in Germany. The law reflected a modern, progressive spirit. Its preamble said:

"To protect youth is to protect the nation."

On October 5, 1940, a decree regulating labor conditions of Polish workers was issued by the German authorities of occupation. It provided that the 1938 law on the protection of youth did not apply to Polish minors. The decree further laid down that should German youth be threatened in its privileges, the conditions under which Polish youngsters work would be made even more stringent. Thus children of fourteen were to be employed in mines, and in man-hunts even 12-year-old children are caught and sent to forced labor in Germany.

Small wonder that when there was a choice between earning bread or learning the alphabet—bread was chosen. Life itself was at stake and life is more important than the printed pages of a text-book.

On the other hand, there were those who claimed that life itself was a matter of no great concern.

When the Gestapo set up its quarters in the Ministry of Education, when all the schools of higher learning had been looted and closed, when in February, 1942, a program had been drawn up by the invaders doing away with preparatory courses for technical secondary schools, when children were driven to the mines and to peddling in the streets—the Polish School went underground.

**Hoodwinking  
the Gestapo** An important feature of national resistance to the Germans takes the form of secret education. All stages of higher education, from high school through university are carried on underground. A secret school administration has been set up to direct and unify the work. The Polish Underground pays teachers' salaries and provides text books, printed by the underground press, and issues school and matriculation certificates.

Secret education in Poland flows through two channels: strictly "illegal" schools and the secret extension of the teaching programs in those schools which are still allowed to exist. The second method is fairly simple in primary schools.


Although history, religion, Polish language and culture are strictly banned, these subjects are taught even though the children themselves hardly realize that it is being done. Difficulties increase greatly on the secondary level of education.

In a nursing school, for instance, students were secretly given a regular medical course. A German inspector came to the school for the final examinations. They went off fine, till the German waved the teachers away and proceeded to examine the girls himself. Unobtrusively he drifted from nursing to medicine and questioned the girls as he would have questioned medical students. When questions grew more difficult, and answers still came smoothly and without effort, the German inspector realized he had in front of him future doctors, not nurses. He pounded the table and shouted at the girls. Half-finished answers died on nurses' lips. The inspector strutted out . . . The next morning large posters appeared on the school's bulletin boards, doors, walls, everywhere. "*The students are strictly forbidden to overstep the official teaching program approved by the German authorities.*"

Yet wherever a technical or trade school is allowed to exist, it provides a certain basis on which the Underground can build its teaching program: it has its classrooms, teachers and a quasi-official status. Above all it has a pretext for meetings. None of these exists in the secret high schools or secret universities. None of these exists in the primary schools conducted underground. They have to meet in small groups, to change their quarters often, to cope with the constant threat of discovery and lack of space, fuel and school aids. Certain underground schools have had to change their quarters nine times in a year. Cases have been reported of three different classes being conducted in one room, lessons given in unheated corridors with pupils sitting on the floor for lack of benches.

**Struggle for Poland's Future** One cannot write about the Polish underground schools without paying a tribute to the Polish teachers. In every social group there are brave men and cowards, good workers and drones. But even in a country where the nation as a whole has borne itself so magnificently Polish teachers stand out. Their heroic work commands general respect and admiration.

Their risk is of the greatest. Children are often stopped in the streets by Germans and their satchels searched for incriminating textbooks of Polish history or geography. When a course of secret instruction is discovered, the children are beaten severely, their parents often sent to a concentration camp. But for the teachers it always means death. The underground teachers work under assumed names, but in practice their pupils know their true identities. Boys of 12 or 14 who know their teacher has something to hide are not slow to find out just what it is. Thus every teacher is really "at the mercy" of his pupils, and has to rely on their patriotism and understanding to withstand German pressure and refuse the privileges and rewards they would earn by a betrayal that would cost their teacher's life.



Central Institute of Physical Education in Warsaw. Many students from Central and Southern European countries attended this Institute.

**Results** It is amazing that under such conditions underground education does not wilt. On the contrary it flourishes and grows stronger. In Central Poland alone, in the Warsaw district, between 85,000 and 100,000 pupils are going to secret schools. Since the autumn of 1942, the only secondary education available in Poland is that provided by the underground. In the school-year 1942/43 in Warsaw alone there existed 71 secondary schools (32 for boys and 39 for girls) and some 1,700 pupils graduated and received their certificates.

The graduation diplomas issued today in Poland will be recognized in the future by the educational authorities of independent Poland. Graduates of underground schools will have the right to take their examinations to the universities and their admission will depend upon the outcome. The same applies to various high school grades.

The academic level of Polish schools today is necessarily lower than the prewar level. On the other hand the underground schools teach the students some things they could never learn in peace time and demand from them infinitely more.

Polish underground schools today are not only teaching children the involved rules of Polish grammar. Every boy and girl receiving secret education, is passing through a preliminary course of training for work in the Underground.

"As is well known, the German authorities pursue a particularly loathsome policy in regard to the young people of Poland. The Germans have closed all the secondary and high schools, and all the universities, they have confiscated from 4000 to 5000 different works of history, geography and Polish literature, they have banned the publication of even a single truly Polish classic. At the same time they attempt to demoralize the youngsters who are thus deprived of education and books. They print special pornographic literature in Polish, they issue special magazines with pornographic text and pictures, they open special cinemas and theatres for doubtful types of films and performances, they have opened special gaming houses which only Poles may attend and that bear the sign: '*Wehrmacht and deutschen Genossen nicht erlaubt.*' (No admittance for members of the German Army and German comrades)".<sup>3</sup>

**Crusade** Polish schools today are engaged in a crusade.

In a country devastated by war, crushed under the heel of the German invader, caught between two currents of ruthlessness and hate—the Polish schools cement the nation's resistance, uphold its spirit, and personify Poland's unconquered will to live. They have taken up a crusade against

<sup>3</sup> *Polish Facts and Figures*, No. 1, article "Polish Underground State," p. 31.



Municipal *Kindergarten* in Warsaw suburb.

depravity, against evil and baseness, fully conscious of their responsibility for victory, a responsibility before God, before Poland and before the community of world nations.

With the end of the war Poland will face a great and crucial problem—the problem of restoring her cultural life. Thinking in terms of educational reconstruction in post-war Poland it must be clear that no other nation's cultural and educational life had been subjected to such thorough destruction as that carried out by the Germans in Poland since 1939, and that the conditions under which Poland will have to reorganize her national education after this war will be even more difficult than in 1918.

**Plans for a Better Life** In Poland the problem of educational reconstruction is closely linked with that of general economic and social reconstruction. In view of the terrible devastation wrought in Poland and of the policy of extermination pursued by the Germans, it will call for a broad program of relief and a comprehensive plan to restore national life to normal.

A short time ago representatives of the Teachers' Movement met somewhere in Poland to discuss plans for the future. Before the war Polish teachers were organized in a large, progressive and democratic Teachers' Union, that was constantly expanding. The Teachers' Movement, as part of the Polish Underground, continues the work of the Teachers' Union. At the meeting, the leaders laid down the principles that are to guide the future schools of independent Poland:

"Since man can achieve full participation in cultural life only after his economic needs have to some extent been satisfied, we urge the democratization of the economic system."

Among the many problems of educational reconstruction calling for adequate solution, the representatives of the Teachers' Movement emphasized the necessity of extensive adult education. This will have to be one of the main cares of Polish educators in the future. The Teachers' Movement proposed to provide for it through:

- 1) Universities and colleges for all citizens irrespective of their previous schooling (on the basis of entrance examinations);
- 2) People's Universities, and in particular universities for the peasantry, as well as normal schools for educational and cultural workers;
- 3) public libraries;
- 4) theatres, museums and radio;
- 5) social education for the adult including tours for peasants and workers, camps, vacations, athletics, etc.

**Unanimity at Home and Abroad** In September 1943, at the time when Polish schools used to begin their new school year, the Polish teachers met in London. It was an unusual meeting, a meeting of people who had forsaken books and gowns for arms and uniforms. The Congress of the Polish Teachers in England was unanimous in accepting the principles formulated by the Underground Teachers' Movement in Poland and in endorsing the spirit that animated their work.

Plans have thus been laid for postwar public education based on truly democratic principles, that will give every citizen an equal opportunity, regardless of race, creed or social standing. The Polish Prime Minister in London, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, declared:

"Polish education must be universal, available to all, and must ensure equality of opportunity to everyone."

**While We Are in Exile** Preparing itself for the great task of reconstruction of the public education system destroyed by the Germans, the Polish-Government has asked the Ministry of Education:

- 1) to prepare a system of public education in post-war Poland,
- 2) to organize the education of Polish youth now in Western Democracies, no matter how small their number.

In all larger Polish settlements (especially in Iran, India, South-Western Africa and Mexico) primary schools, *gymnasias* and *lyceums* have been established with a *curriculum* similar to that of pre-war Poland. The most important change is the added importance given to the study of foreign languages, especially English, which is now compulsory in all types of schools. In addition to a large number of kindergartens, there are evening and special courses to supplement the vocational training of youth who have passed the school age. In the Middle East a Cadet Corp. was established for Polish boys who after deportation to Russia managed to leave that country and who wished to prepare themselves for a military career.

Among schools of higher learning, attended by Polish students in Great Britain, mention may be made of:

The Polish Medical Faculty at Edinburgh University,  
 The Polish Faculty of Architecture at Liverpool University,  
 The Polish Institute of Technology in London,  
 Courses in Civil Administration and Law in London,  
 Higher Commercial courses in Glasgow.

Most of the students are on leave from the Polish Armed Forces and will be returned to duty in time for the invasion of the continent.

Apart from the above some 200 Polish students continue higher studies begun in Poland at British universities.

The Polish Ministry of Education has already printed the necessary text books. The plates have been preserved to enable the Ministry to supply Polish schools as soon as Polish independence is restored.

\* \* \*

In England more than a hundred years ago the most prominent citizens of Birmingham issued a *manifesto* summoning people to a public meeting on Polish affairs.

"We, the undersigned, considering the present situation of Poland and the unexampled barbarity which occurs daily in that country, contrary to all rights and treaties, considering the entire ruin of that brave nation which has so much right to our Christian and patriotic sympathy and whose ruin is for the freedom of Europe the most dangerous of blows, considering further that the fate of Poland is not a party matter, there are not many . . . who do not feel hatred and aversion towards those who have carried out these horrors on the heroic Polish nation . . ."

The situation today is far worse than that of 1832, when after the failure of the national insurrection against the partitioning Powers a new wave of persecution swept over Poland, drawing storms of protest from all civilized countries, revolted by the methods used by the Germans and the Russians, and outraged at the sight of a gallant nation's plight. And yet now there is a new element.

For twenty years Poland had lived as an independent nation. In the course of those twenty years she had given conclusive proofs of her vitality and her ability to cope with all the problems a reborn country has to face. This time Poland asks no pity nor does she claim to be "the Crucified among nations." She has learned her own strength and each year of the war brings not despondency and despair, but an ever growing faith in the righteousness of her cause and the wealth of resources from which the nation draws its strength. Thus only can be explained the unflinching Polish resistance that has withstood terror and temptation, threats and persecution, confident that her struggle will not have been in vain.

***We Shall  
Begin Anew***

Polish schools today know that years of hardships and work lie ahead. They look forward to it, as they did in 1918, for it will be constructive and not destructive work. It is nothing new for Poles to start from scratch, and Poland's educational achievements in twenty years of independence were inspiring and heartening enough to justify confidence and hope in the coming period of reconstruction. Polish schools have a record that cannot be measured by the marks of their students. They

have raised children who have assumed responsibilities of adults and discharged them well. They have fashioned souls, like that of a 15-year-old boy who, when caught and tortured by the Gestapo, replied to a message from the Underground asking how they could help him, by quoting a poem of Asnyk:

*Though I perish, though I fall  
Yet life will not have been squandered  
For life's best part is in strife.  
To see magic crystal building,  
To reach the realm of the ideal  
—Is worth the price of blood and pain.*

Polish youth knows the value of imponderables, things that cannot be weighed or measured but which never die. And if anyone mentions difficulties, hardships and obstacles—the Poles shake their heads.

"The impossible takes a little longer," they say.

## APPENDIX I

POLISH HISTORY LESSON WARSAW 1872  
from  
MARIE CURIE

a Biography, by Eve Curie, copyright, 1937  
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It was a cruel fate, in the year 1872, to be a Pole, a "Russian subject," and to belong to that vibrant "intelligentsia" whose nerves were so near the surface; among them revolt was ever brooding, and they suffered more painfully than any other class in society from the servitude imposed upon them.

Exactly a century before, greedy sovereigns, the powerful neighbors of a greatly weakened state, had decided Poland's ruin. Three successive partitions had dismembered it into fragments which became officially German, Russian and Austrian. On several occasions the Poles rose against their oppressors: they succeeded only in strengthening the bonds that held them prisoners. After the failure of the heroic revolution of 1831 the Tsar Nicholas dictated severe measures of reprisal in Russian Poland. The patriots were imprisoned and deported in a body; their property was confiscated. . . .

In 1863 another attempt and another catastrophe: the rebels had nothing but spades, scythes and clubs to oppose to the Tsarist rifles. Eighteen months of desperate struggle—and in the end the bodies of the insurgent leaders swung from five gibbets on the ramparts of Warsaw.

Since then everything had been done to enforce the obedience of a Poland that refused to die. While the convoys of chained rebels made their way toward the snows of Siberia, a flood of policemen, professors and minor functionaries was let loose over the countryside. Their mission? To keep watch over the Poles, to wear down their religion, suppress suspicious books and newspapers, and abolish the use of the national language little by little—in a word, to kill the soul of a people.

But in the other camp resistance was quick to organize. Disastrous experience had proved to the Poles that they had no chance of reconquering their liberty by force, at least for the moment. Their task was, therefore, to wait—and to thwart the dangers of those who wait, cowardice and discouragement.

The battle, therefore, had changed ground. Its heroes were no longer those warriors armed with scythes who charged the Cossacks and died saying (like the celebrated Louis Narbutt): "What happiness to die for my country!" The new heroes were the intellectuals, the artists, priests, schoolteachers—those upon whom the mind of the new generation depended. Their courage consisted in forcing themselves to be hypocrites, and in supporting any humiliation rather than lose the places in which the Tsar still tolerated them—and from which they could secretly influence Polish youth, guide their compatriots.

\* \* \*

"Marya Skłodowska."

"Present."

"Tell us about Stanislas Augustus."

"Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski was elected King of Poland in 1764. He was intelligent and very cultivated, the friend of artists and writers. He understood the defects that were weakening the kingdom and tried to remedy the disorders of the State. Unfortunately, he was a man without courage. . . ."

The schoolgirl who stood up in her place—in the third row it was, near one of the big windows that looked out over the snow-covered lawns of the Saxony Garden—looked much the same as her comrades as she recited her lesson in a clear, assured voice. Boarding-school uniform of navy-blue serge with steel buttons and a well-starched white collar imprisoned the figure of the ten-year-old child. Strict costume, severe coiffure: that was the rule in Mlle Sikorska's Warsaw's "private school."

The teacher in the chair had no frivolous demeanor, either. Her black silk corsage and whalebone collar had never been fashionable, and Mlle Antonina Tupalska had not the slightest pretension to beauty. She had a heavy, brutal, ugly face, which nevertheless appealed to the sympathies. Mlle Tupalska—currently nicknamed "Tupsia"—was not only teacher of arithmetic and history, but also exercised the functions of study superintendent; in that capacity she had been obliged to act with vigor, sometimes, against the independent spirit and stubborn character of the little Sklodovska.

However, there was much affectionate kindness in the look she bent on Manya. How could she not be proud of this brilliant pupil, two years younger than her classmates, who seemed to find nothing difficult and was invariably first in ciphering, first in history, first in literature, German, French and catechism?

Silence reigned in the classroom—and even something a bit more than silence. These history lessons took place in an atmosphere of passionate fervor. The eyes of twenty-five motionless, exalted little patriots and the rough countenance of the teacher reflected their earnest enthusiasm. And, speaking of a sovereign dead many years ago, it was with singular fire that Manya stated in her chanting voice:

"Unfortunately he was a man without courage. . . ."

The unattractive schoolmistress and her too-serious pupils, to whom she was actually teaching the history of Poland in *Polish*, had the mysterious look of accomplices in conspiracy.

And suddenly, like accomplices, they were all startled into silence: the faint clatter of an electric bell had been heard from the landing.

Two long rings, two short ones.

The signal set up an instant agitation, mute but violent. Tupsia, on the alert, hastily gathered up the books spread out on the chair; swift hands had piled up the Polish books and papers from the desks and dumped them into the aprons of four lively schoolgirls who disappeared with their load through the little door that led to the dormitory of the boarders. A sound of chairs being moved, of desk lids opened and stealthily closed. . . . The four schoolgirls, breathless, returned to their places. And the door to the vestibule opened slowly.

On the threshold, laced into his fine uniform—yellow pantaloons and a blue tunic with shiny buttons—appeared M. Hornberg, inspector of private boarding-schools in the city of Warsaw. He was a thick fellow, sheared in German fashion; his face was plump and his eyes piercing behind their gold-rimmed glasses.

Without saying a word, the inspector looked at the pupils. And near him, apparently unmoved, the director who accompanied him, Mlle Sikorska, looked at them too—but with secret anxiety. The delay had been so short today. The porter had just had time to sound the agreed signal when Hornberg, going ahead of his guide, reached the landing and plunged into the classroom. Was everything in order?

Everything was in order. Twenty-five little girls bent over their work, thimble on finger, making impeccable buttonholes in squares of stuff unraveled at the edges. Scissors and spools of thread lay about on the empty desks. And "Tupsia," with purple face and veins which showed in her forehead, held on the table in front of her a volume properly printed in orthodox letters. . . .

"These children have two hours of sewing each week, Mr. Inspector," the directress said calmly.

Hornberg had advanced toward the teacher.

"You were reading aloud. What is the book, mademoiselle?"

"Krylov's\* *Fairy Tales*. We began them today."

Tupsia had answered with perfect calm. Bit by bit her cheeks were regaining their natural color.

As if absent-mindedly, Hornberg opened the lid of the nearest desk. Nothing. Not a paper, not a book.

After having carefully finished off the stitch and fastened their needles in the cloth, the girls interrupted their sewing. They sat motionless with crossed arms, all alike in their dark dresses and white collars; and the twenty-five childish faces, suddenly grown older, wore a forbidding expression which concealed fear, cunning and hatred.

\* Krylov was a famous Russian poet. (*P. F. and F.*)

M. Hornberg, accepting the chair offered him by Mlle Tupalska, seated himself heavily.

"Please call on one of these young people."

In the third row Marya Sklodowska instinctively turned her frightened little face toward the window. A prayer rose in her: "Please, God, make it somebody else. . . . Not me. . . . Not me."

But she knew very well that the choice would fall upon her. She knew that she was almost always chosen for the government inspector's questioning, since she was the most knowledgeable and since she spoke Russian perfectly.

At the sound of her name she straightened up. She felt very warm—no, she felt cold. A dreadful shame seized her by the throat.

"Your prayer," snapped M. Hornberg, whose attitude showed his indifference and boredom.

Manya recited "Our Father" correctly, in a voice without color or expression. One of the subtlest humiliations the Tsar had discovered was to make the Polish children say their Catholic prayers every day *in Russian*. Thus, while pretending to respect their faith, he was able to profane what they revered.

Again silence.

"Name the tsars who have reigned over our Holy Russia since Catherine II."

"Catherine II, Paul I, Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II."

The inspector was satisfied. This child had a good memory. And what a marvelous accent! She might have been born at St. Petersburg.

"Tell me the names and titles of the members of the imperial family."

"Her Majesty the Empress, His Imperial Highness the Cesarevitch Alexander, His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke. . . ."

At the end of the enumeration, which was long, Hornberg smiled faintly. This was excellent, he thought. The man could not see, or did not wish to see, Manya's suffering, her features hardened by the effort she made to dissimulate her rebellion.

"What is the title of the Tsar in the scale of dignities?"

"*Vielichestvo*."

"And my title—what is it?"

"*Vysokorodye*."

The inspector took pleasure in these hierarchic details, more important to his way of thinking than arithmetic or spelling. For his own simple pleasure he asked again:

"Who rules over us?"

To conceal the fire of their eyes, the directress and the superintendent stared hard at the registers they held before them. As the answer did not come quickly enough, Hornberg, annoyed, asked again in louder tones:

"Who rules over us?"

"His Majesty Alexander II, Tsar of All the Russias," Manya articulated painfully. Her face had gone white.

The session was over. The functionary rose from his chair, and, after a brief nod, moved off to the next room, followed by Mlle Sikorska.

Then Tupsia raised her head.

"Come here, my little soul."

Manya left her place and came up to the schoolmistress, who, without saying a word, kissed her on the forehead. And suddenly, in the classroom that was coming to life again, the Polish child, her nerves at an end, burst into tears.

## APPENDIX II

List of Scientists and Professors of Polish Academic Schools  
Who Died After September 1, 1939.

This list mentions only persons whose death has been definitely ascertained. It should be added that in many cases the death was a direct consequence of ill treatment, especially deportation or confinement in prison or a concentration camp.

1. **Helena d'ABANCOURT (Mrs.)**—Librarian of the Polish Academy of Science.
2. **Wladyslaw ABRAHAM**—Professor of Ecclesiastical Law at Lwow University, died in Lwow during the Russian occupation.
3. **Marian AUERBACH**—Lecturer in Classical Philology at Lwow University, committed suicide in connection with the persecution of the Jews.
4. **Waclaw BAEHR**—Professor Emeritus of Cytology at Warsaw University.
5. **Maier BALABAN**—Professor of Jewish History at Warsaw University, died in January, 1943.
6. **Kazimierz BARTEL**—Professor of Descriptive Geometry at the Polytechnic Institute in Lwow, shot by German firing squad in 1941.
7. **Edmund BARTLOMIEJCZYK**—Professor at the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts, died in a German concentration camp.
8. **Adolf BECK**—Professor Emeritus of Physiology at Lwow University, committed suicide in connection with the persecution of the Jews.
9. **Adam BEDNARSKI**—Professor of Ophthalmology at Lwow University, died in Lwow during the Russian occupation.
10. **Stefan BEDNARSKI**—Instructor in Russia at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
11. **Ludwik Stefan BENIS**—Assistant in Chemistry at Cracow University, killed in action in September 1939.
12. **Ludwik BERNACKI**—Director of the National Ossolinski Institute, Lwow, died during the military operations in September 1939.
13. **Kazimierz BIALASZEWICZ**—Professor of Animal Physiology at Warsaw University.
14. **Józef BIRKENMAJER**—Professor of Polish Literature at Lublin University, died from wounds received during military operations in September 1939.
15. **Rafal BLUTH**—Specialist in Polish Literature, shot by the Germans.
16. **Arnold BOLLAND**—Director and lecturer in Microchemical Analysis in the Faculty of Philosophy of Cracow University, died under German occupation after release from the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
17. **Franciszek BOSSOWSKI**—Professor of Roman Law at Wilno University.
18. **Kazimierz BROKL**—Curator of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, killed in the bombardment of the Castle, in September 1939.
19. **BRONIKOWSKI**—Lecturer at Graduate School of Agronomy in Warsaw.
20. **Odo BUJWID**—Professor Emeritus of Bacteriology and Hygiene in Cracow University.
21. **Edmund BURSICHE**—Professor of Historical Theology at Warsaw University, died in the German concentration camp of Matthausen.

22. **Ignacy CHRZANOWSKI**—Professor of the History of Polish Literature at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
23. **Wieslaw CHRZANOWSKI**—Professor in the Faculty of Mechanics at the Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.
24. **Andrzej CIERNIAK**—A high official in the Ministry of Public Education.
25. **Ludwik CWIKLINSKI**—Professor of Classical Philology at Poznan University, died during the German occupation.
26. **Stanislaw CYWINSKI**—Lecturer in Polish Literature in Wilno University, died in Russia.
27. **Bronislaw DEMBINSKI**—Professor of Modern History at Poznan University, died under German occupation.
28. **Jerzy Antoni DEMBOWSKI**—Assistant Curator National Museum, Warsaw, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
29. **Stefan DEMBY**—Director of National Library, Warsaw, died under German occupation.
30. **Stanislaw DOBINSKI**—Lecturer in Experimental Physics at Cracow University, died from wounds received in the defense of Warsaw, September 1939.
31. **Aureli DROGOSZEWSKI**—Professor of the History of Polish Literature in the Free Polish University of Warsaw.
32. **Bohdan DYAKOWSKI**—Natural scientist, author of numerous school text-books.
33. **Stefan DZIEWULSKI**—Professor of Theory of Economics and History of Economics in the Free Polish University at Warsaw, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
34. **Stefan ESSMANOWSKI**—Specialist in Romance languages, secondary school master.
35. **Stanislaw ESTREICHER**—Professor of History of Western-European Law at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
36. Right Rev. Mons. **Leon FORMANOWICZ**—Librarian of the Archdiocesan Chapter in Gniezno, died in a German concentration camp.
37. **Adam GADOMSKI**—Geographer, died in the concentration camp of Oswiecim.
38. **Tadeusz GARBOWSKI**—Professor of Philosophy at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
39. **Bronislaw GEMBARZEWSKI**—Colonel, creator of National Museum, Warsaw, lately curator of Army Museum, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
40. Rev. **Adam GERSTMANN**—Professor of Moral Theology at Lwow University, died in Lwow under Russian occupation.
41. **Stanislaw GLABINSKI**—Professor emeritus of Political Economy at Lwow University, died in 1941 after deportation to Kharkov (Russia).
42. **Józef GOLABEK**—Lecturer in Slavonic Literatures at Warsaw University, killed in the bombardment of Warsaw in September 1939.
43. **Lucjan GRABOWSKI**—Professor of Astronomy and Geodesy at Lwow Polytechnic Institute.
44. **Mieczyslaw GUTKOWSKI**—Professor of Economics at Wilno University, shot by the Germans as a hostage.

45. **Tadeusz HALEWSKI**—Lecturer in Aeronautic Law at Lwow University, killed in action in the Polish Air Force.
46. **Marceli HANDELSMAN**—Professor of General History at Warsaw University, killed by the Germans in Sokolow Podlaski.
47. **Adam HEYDEL**—Professor of Political Economy at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oswiecim.
48. **Jan HLASKO**—Professor of Chemistry at Wilno University.
49. **Antoni HOBORSKI**—Professor of Mathematics at Cracow Mining Academy, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
50. **Stanislaw HROM**—Assistant at the Faculty of Medicine at Warsaw University, died during a Russian air raid on Warsaw, May 12, 1943.
51. **S. JAKOMOWSKI**—Assistant professor at Graduate School of Agronomy in Warsaw.
52. **Kazimierz JANTZEN**—Professor of Geodesy and Meteorology at Wilno University.
53. **Tadeusz JAROSZEWSKI**—Assistant librarian, Warsaw University, died of wounds sustained during the bombardment of Warsaw by Soviet planes in June 1941.
54. **Stanislaw KALANDYK**—Professor of Medical Physics at Poznan University, died under German occupation.
55. **Leon KALINA**—Physician.
56. **Stefan KEMPISTY**—Professor of Mathematics at Wilno University.
57. **Edward KLICH**—Professor of Linguistics at Poznan University, died under German occupation.
58. **Julian KLEINER**—Professor of History of Polish Literature at Lwow University, shot by the Germans.
59. **Rev. Stanislaw KOBYLECKI**—Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Warsaw University, died in September 1939.
60. **Jan KOCHANOWSKI**—Professor Emeritus of Mediaeval Polish History at Warsaw University.
61. **Stefan KOLACZKOWSKI**—Professor of History of Polish Literature at Cracow University, died after release from the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
62. **Kazimierz KOLBUSZEWSKI**—Professor of History of Polish Literature at Lwow University, died February 21, 1943 in the concentration camp at Majdanek, near Lublin.
63. **Stefan KOMORNICKI**—Lecturer in History of Art at Cracow University, killed in Cracow after release from the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
64. **Mieczyslaw KONOPACKI**—Professor of Histology at Warsaw University, killed in the bombardment of Warsaw in September 1939.
65. **Stefan KOPEC**—Professor of Embriology at Warsaw University, shot by German firing squad.
66. **Antoni KOSTANECKI**—Professor of Political Economy at Warsaw University, died under German occupation.
67. **Kazimierz KOSTANECKI**—Professor of Anatomy at Cracow, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
68. **Rudolf KOTULA**—Director, Lwow University Library and Baworowski Library, died in Russia.
69. **Felicjan KOWARSKI**—Professor at the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts.

70. **Jan KOZAK**—Professor of General Chemistry at Cracow University, died under German occupation.
71. **Edward KRASINSKI**—Curator of the Krasinski Library, Warsaw, donor of library building, died in a German concentration camp.
72. **Stefan KREUTZ**—Professor of Mineralogy at Cracow University, died at Cracow under German occupation.
73. **Konstanty KRZECZKOWSKI**—Professor of Political Sociology and Director of the Library at Graduate School of Agronomy at Warsaw, professor of Communal Policies, Free Polish University, died in Warsaw after release from a German prison.
74. **Ludwik KRZYWICKI**—Professor of History of Social Organization at Warsaw University, died under German occupation.
75. **Kazimierz KUMANIECKI**—Professor of Administrative Law at Cracow University, died in Cracow under German occupation.
76. **Stanislaw KUNICKI**—Professor at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute, died on December 8, 1942.
77. **Stefan KWIETNIEWSKI**—Lecturer in Descriptive Geometry at Warsaw University, died from exhaustion on a Warsaw street.
78. **Konstanty LASZCZKA**—Professor emeritus of Cracow Academy of Fine Arts, died in Cracow under German occupation.
79. **Roman LESZCZYNSKI**—Professor of Dermatology at Lwow University, died under Soviet occupation.
80. **Bohdan LEPKI**—Professor of Ukrainian History and Literature at Cracow University, died during the German occupation.
81. **Karol LUTOSTANSKI**—Professor of Civil Law at Warsaw University, died from wounds received during the bombardment of Warsaw in September 1939.
82. **Waclaw MAKOWSKI**—Professor of Penal Law at Warsaw University, died in Rumania in 1942.
83. **Zygmunt MANN**—Historian, assistant in Old Prints Department, National Library, Warsaw, died in the German concentration camp of Oswiecim.
84. **Irena MATERNOWSKA (Mrs.)**—Professor of Animal Dietetics at Warsaw University, died in the Pawiak prison in Warsaw.
85. **Antoni MEYER**—Professor of Mining Law at Cracow Mining Academy, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
86. **Boleslaw MIKLASZEWSKI**—Professor of Chemistry at Graduate School of Agronomy in Warsaw, died under German occupation.
87. **Stanislaw MINKIEWICZ**—Lecturer in Chemistry at Wilno University, shot by the Germans as a hostage.
88. **Jozef MIRSKI**—Pedagogic writer, shot by the Germans in Pawiak prison.
89. **Zygmunt MOCARSKI**—Curator of the Copernicus Polish Library in Torun, died in Warsaw under German occupation, after his expulsion from Torun.
90. **Józef MORAWSKI**—Professor of Romance Philology, at Poznan University, died under German occupation.
91. **Melchior NESTOROWICZ**—Professor of Civil Engineering at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.
92. **Julian NIEC**—Historian, Curator of the Library and Museum of Volhynian Society of Friends of Arts and Sciences in Luck, died in action in September 1939.

93. **Jan NOWAK**—Professor of Geology and Paleontology, at Cracow University, died in Cracow after release from the German concentration camp at Oranienburg.
94. **Stanislaw NOWOGRODZKI**—Historian, Secretary of the Chancery of the Polish Academy, died in the concentration camp at Matthausen.
95. **Wiktor ORMICKI**—Lecturer in Economic Geography at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Dachau.
96. **Kazimierz ORZECOWSKI**—Professor of Neurology at Warsaw University, died under German occupation.
97. **Michal ORZECKI**—Lecturer in Law at the Free University of Warsaw.
98. **Celina OSIECZKOWSKA (Mrs.)**—Member of the Committee of History of Art, Polish Academy, died as an exile in Brazil, in 1940.
99. **Antoni OSSOWSKI**—Professor of Pharmaceutics at Warsaw University.
100. **Romuald PACZKOWSKI**—Assistant professor of Civil Law at Poznan University, died under German occupation.
101. **Jozef PACZOSKI**—Professor of Botany at Poznan University, died in 1942, after deportation to the Government General.
102. **Julian PAGACZEWSKI**—Professor of History of Art at Cracow University, died at Cracow under German occupation.
103. **Aleksander PATKOWSKI**—In charge of Department of Museums, Ministry of Public Education, ethnographer, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
104. **Jozef PATKOWSKI**—Professor of physics at Wilno University, killed in a Russian air raid on August 21, 1942.
105. **Stanislaw PAWLOWSKI**—Professor of Geography at Poznan University, died under German occupation.
106. **Zbignitw PAZDRO**—Professor of Polish Administrative Law at Lwow University, died in 1940 under Soviet occupation.
107. **Kazimierz PELCZAR**—Professor of Internal Medicine at Wilno University, shot by the Germans as a hostage.
108. **Stanislaw PILAT**—Professor of Oil Technology at the Lwow Polytechnic Institute, shot by the Germans.
109. **Tadeusz PRUSZKOWSKI**—Director of the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts, shot by the Germans.
110. **Jozef PRZYBOROWSKI**—Professor of Plant Cultivation and Experimentation at Cracow University, died during military operations in September 1939.
111. **Leon PUCIATA**—Professor of Theology at Wilno University.
112. **Antoni PSZENICKI**—Professor of Civil Engineering at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.
113. **Ferdynand RABOWSKI**—Geologist.
114. **Franciszek RASZEJA**—Professor of Orthopedy at Poznan University, killed by the Germans when attending a Jew in the Warsaw ghetto.
115. **Stanislaw ROGOYSKI**—Historian of Art.
116. **Feliks ROGOZINSKI**—Professor of Physiology and Animal Dietetics at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
117. **Franciszek ROLEWSKI**—Assistant, Army Museum, Warsaw, died under German occupation.

118. **Henryk ROWID**—Writer and Educator, killed by the Germans.
120. **Adam ROZANSKI**—Professor of Agricultural Engineering at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
121. **Roman RYBARKI**—Professor of Finance at Warsaw University, died in the German concentration camp of Oswiecim.
122. **Stanislaw SCHAYER**—Professor of Indian Philology at Warsaw University, died in Otwock under German occupation.
123. **Mojzesz SCHORR**—Professor of Semitic Languages at Warsaw University, died on July 8, 1941, as prisoner in the Vth Correctional Labor Camp at the Uzbek Soviet Republic, buried in the Prisoner's Cemetery, tomb No. c-30.
124. **Franciszek SIEDLECKI**—Specialist in Polish, Assistant Curator of the National Library, Warsaw, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
125. **Michal SIEDLECKI**—Professor of Zoology at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
126. **Jozef SIEMIENSKI**—Professor of History of Polish Law at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oswiecim.
127. **Jozef SLESZYNSKI**—Founder of Volhynian Society of Friends of Sciences and Arts.
128. **Jerzy SMOLENSKI**—Professor of Geography at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
129. **Kazimierz SMOLENSKI**—Professor of Organic Chemistry at the Warsaw Polytechnic Institute, shot by the Germans in Pawiak prison.
130. **Franciszek SMOLKA**—Professor of Papyrology at Lwow University.
131. **Michal SOBESKI**—Professor of Philosophy at Poznan University, died under German occupation.
132. **Stanislaw SOKOLOWSKI**—Professor Emeritus of Forestry at Cracow University, died on August 31, 1942.
133. **Oskar SOSNOWSKI**—Professor of Polish Architecture at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute, killed during the bombardment of Warsaw in September 1939.
134. **W. SOSNOWSKI**—Lecturer in Descriptive Geometry at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute, died in 1941 in the German concentration camp of Oswiecim.
135. **Jerzy STALONY-DOBRZANSKI**—Lecturer in Organic Chemistry at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.
136. **Witold STANISZKIS**—Professor at Graduate School of Agronomy at Warsaw, died in the German concentration camp of Oswiecim.
137. **Leon STERNBACH**—Professor of Classical Philology, at Cracow University, died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
138. **Antoni SUJKOWSKI**—Professor of Geography at Graduate School of Agronomy at Warsaw, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
139. **Stanislaw SUMINSKI**—Entomologist, died in the concentration camp at Majdanek.
140. **Bohdan SWIDERSKI**—Professor of Geology at Cracow University, died of ill treatment in a German concentration camp.
141. **Ludwik SWIDERSKI**—Specialist in Polish Literature, editor of works of Eliza Orzeszkowa.
142. **Rudolf SWIERCZYNSKI**—Professor of Architecture at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute, killed in a Russian air raid, May 12, 1943.

143. **Kazimierz SZUMOWSKI**—Assistant in the Faculty of Medicine at Lwow University, died in Lwow under Russian occupation.
144. **Tadeusz SZYDLOWSKI**—Professor of History of Art at Cracow University, died in Cracow on October 23, 1943, after release from the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
145. **Antoni TAKLINSKI**—Professor of Mechanics at Cracow Mining Academy died in the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
146. **Karol TICHY**—Professor at the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts.
147. **Jozef TRZEBINSKI**—Professor of Botany at Wilno University.
148. **Tadeusz TUCHOLSKI**—Lecturer at the Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.
149. **Kazimierz TYSZKOWSKI**—Lecturer in Modern Polish History at Lwow University, curator of the Library of the Ossolinski Institute, died in Lwow under Russian occupation.
150. **Wladyslaw VORBRODT**—Professor of Agriculture Chemistry at Cracow University.
151. **Leon WACHHOLTZ**—Professor Emeritus of Legal Medicine at Cracow University.
152. **Bohdan WASIUTYNSKI**—Professor of Administration and Administrative law, at Warsaw University, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
153. **Eugeniusz WAWRZKOWICZ**—Historian, died in Russia.
154. **Antoni WIECZORKIEWICZ**—Historian of Art, Curator of the National Museum, Warsaw, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
155. **Antoni WILK**—Senior assistant in the Astronomical Observatory at Cracow University, died after release from the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
156. **Witold WILKOSZ**—Professor of Mathematics at Cracow University, died at Cracow under German occupation.
157. **Stanislaw WINDAKIEWICZ**—Professor of History of Polish Literature at Cracow University.
158. **Edward WITTIG**—Professor at the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts, died in Warsaw of malnutrition.
159. **Jan WLODEK**—Professor of Soil and Plant Cultivation at Cracow University, died after release from the German concentration camp of Oranienburg.
160. **Zygmunt WOYCICKI**—Professor of Botany at Warsaw University, died in Warsaw under German occupation.
161. **Zygmunt WOYNICZ-SIANOZECKI**—Professor of Organic Technology, at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.
162. **Bronislaw WROBLEWSKI**—Professor of Penal Law at Wilno University.
163. **Kazimierz ZAKRZEWSKI**—Professor of Byzantine History at Warsaw University, shot by German firing squad.
164. **Stanislaw Zaremba**—Professor Emeritus of Mathematics at Cracow University.
165. **Maria ZEBROWSKA (Mrs.)**—Assistant in Educational Psychology at Warsaw University, died in the concentration camp at Oswiecim.
166. **Leon ZIELENIEWSKI**—Jurist, assistant curator of the Sejm and Senate Library, Warsaw, died under German occupation.
167. **Zdzislaw ZMIGRYDER-KONOPKA**—Lecturer in Ancient History at Lwow University, died in Lwow under Russian occupation.

**Deported, presumably dead**

The following Polish scholars were arrested during the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland and deported to various parts of the Soviet Union. As it has proved impossible to trace them, most of them must be presumed to have died.

1. **Jerzy CHWALIBOGOWSKI**—Assistant at Lwow University.
2. **Michal CZARNOKONSKI**—Professor in the Central Institute of Physical Education, Warsaw.
3. **Ludwik DWORZAK**—Professor of Penal Law at Lwow University.
4. **Rev. Jerzy JAGLARZ**—Assistant at Lwow University.
5. **Wladyslaw JAKOWICKI**—Professor of Gynecology at Wilno University.
6. **Adam KOZAKIEWICZ**—Assistant at Lwow Polytechnic Institute.
7. **Antoni LEWAK**—Director of Publications at the Ossolinski Institute, Lwow.
8. **Zygmunt LANCUCKI**—Assistant at Lwow Polytechnic Institute.
9. **Eugeniusz MASLAK**—Assistant at Lwow Academy of Veterinary Medicine.
10. **Wladyslaw MIKUSZEWSKI**—Lecturer at Lwow University.
11. **Leszek OSSOWSKI**—Lecturer at Lwow University.
12. **Andrzej PININSKI**—Assistant at Graduate School of Business Administration, Lwow.
13. **Zelman REISIS**—Founder of Jewish Research Institute, Wilno.
14. **RUDKO-ZAKRZEWSKI**—Professor at Warsaw University.
15. **Aleksander STULGINSKI**—Lecturer at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute.
16. **Tadeusz SZANTROCH**—Professor at Cracow University.
17. **Rev. Stanislaw SZULMINSKI**—Professor at Lwow University.
18. **Zenon WACHLOWSKI**—Lecturer at Lwow University.
19. **Aleksander WALENTA**—Assistant at Lwow University.
20. **Stanislaw WAWRZYNCZYK**—Assistant at Wilno University.
21. **Kazimierz WIERONSKI**—Lecturer at Lwow University.
22. **Kazimierz WISNIEWSKI**—Lecturer at Warsaw University.
23. **Marcin ZIELINSKI**—Professor of Neurology at Poznan University.

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No. 2.

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PSF: Poland

THE  
**POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER**

*by*

**STANISŁAW GRABSKI**  
CHAIRMAN OF THE POLISH NATIONAL COUNCIL

**POLISH INFORMATION CENTER**  
745 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N. Y.



#### STANISŁAW GRABSKI

Stanisław Grabski, Ph.D., LL.D., born in 1871, graduated at the Faculty of Law, Warsaw University, post graduate studies in Berlin, Bern and Paris (École des Sciences Politiques). From 1910 professor of economics and political science at Lwow University. Elected to the Polish Diet (Sejm) in 1919 and appointed Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, was three times Minister of Education. Author of numerous works on social economy; his "Social Economy" (1931) in ten volumes, is standard in Poland. A member of the Polish Socialist Party (1887-1895) he worked to make Polish independence part of the socialist program.

Imprisoned after the entrance of the Soviet Army into Poland in 1939, he was deported to Russia. Released after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941, he proceeded to London and is now Chairman of the Polish National Council (the war time Parliament).

Prof. S. Grabski is an authority on Russian affairs and a strong believer in collaboration with Russia. In this pamphlet he discusses the Polish-Russian frontier established by the Treaty of Riga in 1921. As a member of the Polish delegation at the peace conferences in Minsk and Riga, Mr. Grabski was a participant in the events he discusses.

Prof. S. Grabski is the younger brother of the late Prof. Władysław Grabski, three times Prime Minister of Poland, who headed the Polish delegation to the Spa Conference.

## THE POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER

On August 23, 1939, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics concluded a Pact of Non-Aggression with Germany. Eight days later, Hitler, having by this Pact made sure that the attitude of Soviet Russia would be favorable to himself, launched his attack on Poland. Despite the enormous numerical and technical superiority of the German armies, Poland stubbornly defended itself. In the course of the first fortnight of the war the Polish Army suffered heavy losses, but it was constantly improving its methods of fighting armored forces. From September 11 to 21 it offered fierce resistance at Kutno. On September 13, Lwów held the attacking German army in its suburbs and continued to defend itself successfully until the 22nd. The defence of Modlin lasted even longer, until the 28th, and the Germans did not enter Warsaw until October 1. They took Hel on October 2, while the remains of the Polish army held out at Kock until October 5.

However, in the middle of the fierce and ever more successful fighting which the Polish armies were carrying on against the German invader, the Soviet armies, without warning or provocation, crossed the Polish frontier on September 17. At that date the Germans had occupied the western half of Poland. The whole of the eastern half was still in possession of the Polish government and armed forces. A rainy autumn was coming, as greatly desired by the Polish divisions which were reorganizing for a fresh war of movement east of the Bug, where the terrain was much less favorable for the motorized German *Blitzkrieg*. But all their plans and hopes were thwarted by the action of the Soviet armies in cross-

ing the eastern frontier of Poland. It became obvious that victory over the Germans could be sought only in the west.

Pressed as they were from two sides—by the Germans in the west and the Russians in the east—the Polish armies, rather than lay down their arms, made their way through Roumania and Hungary to France. The President and Government of Poland left the country. Whatever may have been the faults and omissions of that Government, it remained to the end faithful to its alliance with Great Britain and France, and preserved intact the honor of the Polish State and nation. It passed the Polish-Roumanian frontier only when the entry of the Soviet forces into Poland had deprived the Polish army of all possibility for further resistance to the Germans.

The Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, issued a proclamation on September 17 announcing the armed occupation of the eastern half of Poland, not yet invaded by the Germans, in order that its inhabitants might be spared the horrors of war. And, indeed, by their action the Soviet authorities did shorten the military operations in Poland, perhaps, by a few months.

But the population of Lwów, at least, had quite another aim. Although on the 18th the city was already cut off from the rest of the country by Soviet forces which had advanced from the east, it successfully resisted the German attacks for another four days.

The Soviet-German Pact of August 23 was supplemented five weeks later by a further pact between the same two countries providing for the partition of Poland, the Germans taking 72,806



Soviet forces in the eastern half of Poland lasted only one-third as long as that offered by the less well-equipped Polish army in the smaller western half of the country, although in the east there was more room to manoeuvre.

It was not till they reached Smolensk and were fighting on their own soil that the Soviet armies resisted the German armored divisions as fiercely as the Poles had done.

#### POLISH-SOVIET AGREEMENT OF JULY 30, 1941

On July 30, 1941, the following agreement was concluded between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

"(1) The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity. The Polish Government declares that Poland is not bound by any agreement with any third power which is directed against the U.S.S.R.

(2) Diplomatic relations will be restored between the two Governments upon the signature of this Agreement and an immediate exchange of ambassadors will be arranged.

(3) The two Governments mutually agree to render one another aid and support of all kind in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.

(4) The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses its consent to the formation on the territory of the U.S.S.R. of a Polish army under a commander appointed by the Polish Government, in agreement with the Soviet Government. The Polish army on the territory of the U.S.S.R. being subordinated—in an operational sense—to the Supreme Command of the U.S.S.R., in which the Polish army will be represented. All details as to command, organization and employment of this force will be settled in a subsequent Agreement.

(5) This Agreement will come into force immediately upon its signature and without ratification. The present Agreement is drawn up in two copies, each of them in the Russian and Polish languages. Both texts have equal force."

The following protocol is attached to the agreement:

"The Soviet Government grants an amnesty to all Polish citizens now detained on Soviet territory either as prisoners of war or on other sufficient grounds as from the resumption of diplomatic relations."

After this agreement had been signed, at the Foreign Office, Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski the following note:

"On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet agreement of today's date, I desire to take the opportunity of informing you that in conformity with the provisions of the agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25 of August 1939, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertakings towards the U.S.S.R. which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939."

Mr. Eden's declaration is clear. There is no ambiguity in it. It permits of no distorted interpretation. Great Britain does not recognize any territorial changes made in Poland since August 1939—including the detachment from Poland and the incorporation in the U.S.S.R. of the Polish provinces lying to the east of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. And since the declaration was made immediately after the signature of the Polish-Soviet agreement, it has the force of an official commentary by H.M. Government on that agreement—in complete accord with the Polish interpretation thereof.

This was stated by General Sikorski when he handed to Mr. Eden the following reply:

"The Polish Government takes note of your letter dated July 30, 1941, and desires to express its sincerest satisfaction at the statement that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognize any territorial changes

which have been effected in Poland since August 1939. This corresponds with the view of the Polish Government which, as previously informed His Majesty's Government, has never recognized any territorial changes effected in Poland since the outbreak of the present war."

A strictly legal analysis of Article I of the Polish-Soviet agreement permits of no other interpretation. The Government of the U.S.S.R., when admitting that "the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 concerning territorial changes in Poland have lost their force," thereby admitted that the territorial changes made in Poland by virtue of those treaties have ceased to have any legal significance. For the reference in the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, could only be to the legality of the partition of Poland carried out by the U.S.S.R. in conjunction with Germany in September 1939, or to the legal claims of the U.S.S.R. to the Polish territory east of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line thereby assigned to it. Actually this territory was at that moment in German hands.

Article I of the Polish-Soviet agreement was not the only one to which the detachment from Poland of the eastern half of the Republic, annexed by the U.S.S.R. in September 1939, was repugnant.

This is clear also from Article 4, whereby the Soviet Government declares its assent to the raising, in the territory of the U.S.S.R., of a Polish army, whose commander is to be appointed by the Polish Government. For a Polish army could only be an army composed of Polish citizens. And the Poles from whom an army could be raised were those who had been deported into the centre of Russia from Polish districts occupied by virtue of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement. By acknowledging the Polish Government's right to raise an army in the territory of the U.S.S.R. from the inhabitants of those

districts, the Soviet Government likewise acknowledged that they were Polish citizens, and that the districts in questions legally belonged to Poland.

The Polish citizenship of the inhabitants of the Polish provinces annexed by the U.S.S.R. in 1939 is still more clearly asserted in the note added to the agreement, where it is said:

"The Soviet Government grants an amnesty to all Polish citizens now detained on Soviet territory . . ."

For at least 90 per cent of all Polish citizens who were deprived of their liberty within the territory of the U.S.S.R. came from those provinces.

The provisions of the agreement of July 30, 1941, were at first understood in this sense by the Soviet Government. As an eye-witness of the liberation of Polish citizens in August and September of that year from prisons, forced-labor camps, and places of compulsory settlement where they had been confined, and as one of those who thus regained his freedom, I must do the authorities of the N.K.V.D. justice. At that time, notwithstanding the great difficulties of communication caused by the war, they endeavored as quickly as possible to restore the rights of free Polish citizens to the majority of those inhabitants of the eastern half of Poland arrested and deported between September 1939, and June 1941—irrespective of their nationality or religion. The only ones whom they retained in prisons and camps were Ukrainian Nationalist leaders, for the alleged reason that they were decidedly inclined to support Germany, and that if they were set at liberty, the Polish Embassy in the U.S.S.R. would have no means of preventing them from taking action injurious to the Allied cause.

## POLISH ARMY IN THE U.S.S.R.

This state of affairs continued in October and November. In the first four months after the signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement some hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens (including a considerable number belonging to national minorities) received their freedom and, with the co-operation of the Soviet authorities, at that time well-disposed toward them, were given Polish passports and cultural and material support by the Polish Embassy. Simultaneously the ranks of the Polish army were filled by about 46,000 volunteers from the Polish citizens (including many Jews and White Ruthenians, and a smaller number of Ukrainians) who had been released from prisons and camps. But in November the Commissar of the Kazak Republic, General Shcherbakov, issued an order that all Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, and Jewish nationality, at liberty and fit for military service should be directed to the Red Army. To a protest made by the Polish Embassy, the Soviet Government replied in a note of December 1, in which it threw doubt upon the Polish citizenship of persons of Jewish, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian origin who had been deported from the eastern provinces of Poland during the Soviet occupation, "because the question of the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. and Poland is not yet settled, and is subject to revision in the future." On December 4, Stalin did, indeed, sign a declaration at the Kremlin with General Sikorski, to the effect that the relations of the Soviet and Polish Government would be based on "mutual honest observance of the undertakings they have assumed." Yet immediately after General Sikorski's departure from Russia the So-

viet Government, in its notes to the Allied States concerning German atrocities began to mention Polish towns as if they were towns of the U.S.S.R. In 1942 it was made impossible for the Polish Embassy to continue to protect Polish citizens; on January 16, 1943, the U.S.S.R. Government informed the Polish Embassy that it was withdrawing the right of Polish citizenship from all those whose possession of it had been previously acknowledged; and on April 26 it broke off diplomatic relations with Poland.

Although the Government of the U.S.S.R. thus failed to carry out the provisions of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941, it did not denounce the agreement, which accordingly remained in full force and effect. By that agreement the Soviet Government admitted that the German-Soviet treaties concerning territorial changes in Poland had lost their validity—and that the Ribbentrop-Molotov line partitioning Poland, described in those treaties, had accordingly also lost its validity. But if the partition of Poland between Germany and the U.S.S.R. was no longer valid, then Poland continued legally to exist undivided as it had been before September 1939. And if it still existed, though temporarily under German occupation, and was recognized not only by Great Britain and the United States, but also by the U.S.S.R.—as was indicated by the mere fact that the Soviet Government concluded with it the agreement of July 30, 1941—then there was no common Soviet-German frontier. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Line was never at any time the Polish-Soviet frontier. It was a Soviet-German frontier, drawn across Poland, which, as both the contracting parties asserted, had vanished from the surface of the earth and was never to reappear.

Doubts have, however, been raised from time to time by eminent American and British publicists as to Poland's right to her pre-war eastern frontier, though this was undoubtedly determined by international treaty; and whether it would not be fitter to take as frontier the Curzon Line.

As one of those who took part in the peace negotiations at Minsk and Riga which ended in the conclusion of the peace treaty of 1921, whereby the frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R. was determined, I wish to state certain facts concerning the negotiations and the circumstances which preceded them, and also to give a certain number of geographical and historical details designed to enable my readers to judge for themselves which of the three lines that at different times have been proposed, is the most suitable: the Riga, the Curzon, or the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line.

## II.

The Treaty of Versailles fixed the frontiers dividing restored Poland from Germany. The question of its eastern frontier was left for future decision by the Allied and Associated Powers.

This was done because whatever frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia might have been drawn on the map by the Peace Conference, it would not have been recognized by Russia, and in the existing circumstances the frontier could only be determined by direct understanding between Poland and Russia.

But meanwhile these two States were at war.

The Polish nation never recognized the partitions of the Republic carried out at the end of the 18th century by Prussia, Austria and Russia. It protested violently against them by the armed insurrec-

tions of 1794, 1806, 1830, 1848, and 1863. There was not a generation of Poles but rose in arms to demonstrate to the world the right of the Polish nation to regain its liberty and reunite the territories torn apart by the annexing powers.

### LENIN'S DECREE

Accordingly, when all three dynasties that had partitioned Poland fell in 1918, the Polish people at last saw that the triumph of Right over Might was at hand, that the historic injury to their country by the partitions was about to be undone. This conviction was further strengthened by the decree of the People's Commissars signed by Lenin in August 1918:

"All agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in connection with the partitions of Poland are annulled for ever by the present Resolution. In view of the fact that they are contrary to the principle of the self-determination of peoples and to the revolutionary legal conception of the Russian nation, which recognizes the inalienable right of the Polish nation to independence and unity."

When, however, after the capitulation of Germany its armies withdrew from the areas they had occupied in 1918, and which Russia had taken from Poland at the time of the partitions, these areas were immediately reoccupied by the Soviet armies moving westwards in pursuit of the retreating German forces and authorities. On the other hand, the Polish armies moved eastward. During 1919 they freed from Russian rule almost the whole of the area taken by Russia at the third partition, of 1795, and half of that taken at the second partition, in 1793.

Nevertheless Poland, though it had a perfect historical right to do so, did not incorporate all the provinces of the former Polish Republic it had freed. After driving back the Bolsheviki from Wilno,

the Head of the State and Commander-in-Chief, as he was at that time, Joseph Piłsudski, issued a manifesto on April 22, 1919, announcing a temporary administration of the country through local autonomous committees under Polish protection, until the people should have freely decided on their legal and political status for the future. In accordance with this, elections to Municipal Councils were held immediately in all the larger towns freed from Russian rule in 1919; and for the general administration of the country a special "Eastern Districts Committee" was set up, composed of local citizens. Still earlier—on March 21—The Polish Socialist Party had approached the Soviet Government with the proposal that both the Bolshevik and the Polish armies should be withdrawn from the area taken by Russia at the time of the partitions, in order that the population might decide their future allegiance by a free plebiscite. But the Soviet Government preferred to have the question of the Polish-Russian frontier settled by its armies.

In these circumstances the Allied Supreme Council issued the following declaration on December 8, 1919:

"The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing that it is important as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty, in which the Polish nation is placed, and without prejudicing the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland, hereby declare that they recognize the right of the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919, to organize a regular administration of the territories of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below."

There follows a description of the line as shown on Map V (*see* p. 11).

In conclusion the declaration went on:

"The rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line are expressly reserved."

On July 11, 1920, the British Government proposed the above line to the Soviets as an armistice line between Poland and Soviet Russia. The Polish Army was to withdraw to it, and the Russian Army to stand fifty kilometres to the east of it.

From that time the line has been called the "Curzon Line."

What was it actually?

#### THE CURZON LINE

In 1920 it was proposed by Lord Curzon to Poland and the Soviet Union as a line along which military operations were to cease, and not at all as a frontier line. The frontier was to be determined later by a peace conference which it was suggested should be held in London. But this proposal was rejected by the Soviet Government in its certainty of military victory. Indeed, its real aim was not so much to obtain of the best possible frontier for itself in the west, as the occupation of the whole of Poland and the establishment there of a communist government, the future members of which accompanied the Bolshevik armies on their march on Warsaw.

Attention may be drawn to the following sentences from an order of the day issued by General Tukhachevsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, on July 2, 1920:

"In the west the fortunes of the world-revolution are at stake. Over the corpse of Poland lies the way to world-conflagration."


In 1919 the Supreme Council had fixed the above line provisionally, without prejudice to the final determination of the eastern frontier of Poland, as the boundary of the area to be regularly administered by Poland, while "the

rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line" were "expressly reserved."

In view of the military situation between the Soviet Union and Poland at that time, any Polish-Soviet frontier drawn by the Supreme Council would have been unreal. Accordingly, the Supreme Council confined itself to determining the frontier of such indisputably Polish territory as was not questioned at that time either by the Bolsheviks or

Russia, which she might put forward when her frontiers were being finally determined.

Neither His Majesty's Government in 1920, nor the Supreme Council in 1919 described the "Curzon Line" as a suitable Polish-Russian or Polish-Soviet frontier. It was intended only to delimitate indisputably Polish territory; and beyond it to the east lay territory in dispute between Poland and the Soviet Union—or the Russian Empire, for many governments in Europe at that time were still



even by the so-called White *émigrés* and the White armies of Kolchak, Denikin, and Wrangel. But at the same time it expressly admitted that Poland had claims to the territory in dispute with

counting on the victory of the Russian White generals.

What was the origin of this line dividing the Polish provinces of "the former Russian Empire" into lands indisputably

Polish and lands in dispute between Poland and Russia?


#### SOME FACTS FROM THE PAST

Its genesis lies in the history of the partition of Poland as it may be followed on the accompanying maps.

Map II (see page 8) illustrates the three partitions, of 1772, 1793, and 1795.

Map III (see below) shows the former Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napo-

the exception of the district of Białystok, which Napoleon presented to Czar. In 1809 the Duchy recovered from Austria the districts which the latter had taken from Poland at the time of the third partition. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 took from the Duchy and returned to Prussia the two provinces of Poznań and Bydgoszcz, forming the remainder of the Duchy into the so-called Kingdom of Poland, under the same crown as Russia. The boundaries of this Kingdom are




leon when he concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Czar Alexander I. This Duchy comprised part of the territory taken from Poland by Prussia at the first partition, as well as the territory taken by it at the second and third partitions, with

shown on Map IV (see page 10).

The Kingdom of Poland, although incorporated in Russia under a common monarch, was nevertheless a separate State. Its constitution was quite different from that of Russia. Whereas Russia was

an absolute monarchy, the Kingdom of Poland had parliamentary representation, in accordance with three hundred years of Polish tradition. (Parliamentary

King of Poland, and Alexander I's successor, Nicholas I, had himself solemnly crowned at Warsaw in 1825. He was, however, an oriental despot, hating par-




government had been established in Poland at the beginning of the sixteenth century.) The Kingdom also had a separate government (except for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and a separate army. The Czar took the title of

parliamentary institutions, and he restricted constitutional liberties in the Kingdom of Poland by the most various measures. This led to ever-increasing excitement among the Polish community, and when, in 1830, he determined to use the Polish

army for the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in France (where it had been dethroned by the people), and for crushing the revolution which had broken out in Belgium, the National Revolution occurred in Warsaw.

Grand Duchy of Warsaw), the Polish educational system (apart from the university of Warsaw, which was abolished because so many students had taken part in the insurrection), the description "Kingdom of Poland," and the previ-



The numerical superiority of the Russian armies was, however, too great. After suppressing the revolution, Czar Nicholas I abolished the Diet of the Kingdom of Poland, and its separate Council of Ministers, and appointed the Russian Field-Marshal Paskevich governor, with absolute authority. The separate Bank of Poland was, however, retained, along with the Polish currency, the *Code Napoléon* (introduced by the

ously-existing boundaries. Paskevich introduced a military government with hardly any but Russians in the higher posts, but he made no attempt to russify the Polish community. In the schools instruction continued to be given by Polish teachers in Polish; in the law-courts Polish judges still conducted trials in Polish, and the majority of the lower and middle grades of officials was composed of Poles.

In 1863 a fresh insurrection broke out in the Kingdom. After its suppression the Russian Government began the russification of the whole administration (including even local administration), the judicial, and the educational, systems throughout the Kingdom. In all the class-rooms and corridors of the Warsaw secondary schools notices were posted up in Russian to the effect that "speaking Polish within the walls of the school is forbidden." (None the less, during the nine years in which I attended secondary school at Warsaw I never heard my schoolfellows speaking anything but Polish. I was occasionally punished with a few hours in the school *carcer* for speaking Polish, but that was all.) Yet the Czar retained the title of King of Poland, and the boundaries of the Kingdom remained unchanged. After Russia had received a Constitution, none but Poles were elected to the Duma to represent the Kingdom, at four successive elections; they constituted a homogeneous Polish bloc.

#### THE LAST WAR

When the last war broke out in 1914, Germany and Russia tried to outbid each other with the promises they made to the Polish nation. On November 5, 1916, Germany and Austria-Hungary announced the erection of the Kingdom of Poland into "an independent State with an hereditary monarchy and a constitutional government", and set up a Polish Regency Council, which immediately proceeded to establish a Polish administration under the control of the occupying military authorities. On the Russian side a number of declarations were made, by the commander-in-chief, the premier, the minister for foreign affairs, and finally by the Czar himself, promising the re-

union of the whole Polish nation, and the grant to it of the right freely to organize its own national, social, and economic institutions. These promises were definitely formulated by Prince Lvov, Prime Minister in the government established in March 1917, after Nicholas II had been dethroned. In a manifesto addressed to the Poles he assured them that "the Russian nation, which has thrown off the yoke, admitted the full right of the Polish brother-nation to decide its own fate according to its own will." Moreover, he promised aid in the "establishment of an independent Polish State."

In fact, however, the Russian revolutionary government was unable to give the Polish nation any aid against the Germans, who still retained possession of the provinces of Poznań and Pomerania (*Pomorze*), which had been detached from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw by the Congress of Vienna; or against the Austrians, who likewise had no intention of giving up Galicia. For the Revolution had seriously disorganized the Russian Army, in which soldiers' councils had been immediately introduced and had removed, and sometimes even murdered, their officers.

In point of fact, Prince Lvov's declaration was equivalent to the recognition by Russia that the union established by the Congress of Vienna between the Congress Kingdom and the Russian Empire has ceased to exist.

On Map V are shown: (*a*) the frontiers of Poland before the Partitions, (*b*) the frontiers of the Polish Kingdom 1815, (*c*) the Curzon Line. From a comparison of these three lines it is evident that the Supreme Council on December 8, 1919, acknowledged as indisputably Polish the territories taken from Poland by Austria and Prussia at the time of the

three partitions, with the exception of the Danzig area, while those taken by Russia in 1772, 1793, and 1795 were regarded as in dispute.

For the Curzon Line marks almost exactly the limit of Russia's 18th-century acquisitions, or in other words the eastern border of the Kingdom of Poland plus only the district of Bialystok, presented to Alexander by Napoleon in 1807.

Of course, the Supreme Council could not deny to Poland the right to claim the return of the provinces taken from it by Russia at the partitions, when it recognized the recovery by Poland of all the territories (except a small piece at the mouth of the Vistula) taken from it by Austria and Prussia when these States and Russia partitioned Poland. So it expressly reserved "the rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line."

### III.

What were these rights that Poland might properly claim to territories lying east of the Curzon Line, *i.e.*, to the territories taken from it by Russia between 1772 and 1795?

If I am to give an exact answer to this question, I must be permitted first to give a short account of the circumstances under which these territories originally came to be included within the frontiers of the Polish Republic.

In the 10th century, out of the numerous Slavonic tribes inhabiting the area between the Elbe and the Dnieper three States were formed: the Ruthenian, on the Dnieper; the Polish, on the Oder and the Vistula; and the Czech. But in the 12th century the Ruthenian State fell

apart into numerous petty duchies. In 1170 there were seventy-two of them. Simultaneously, however, the Ruthenian dukes subdued the Finno-Turanian tribes dwelling between the upper reaches of the Dnieper and the Volga. There a number of new Ruthenian duchies came into being, the strongest of which was the duchy of Suzdal, near Moscow. In the middle of the 13th century all these Ruthenian duchies were subjugated by the Mongols, who ruled over them for two hundred years, without, however, modifying their political or ecclesiastical structure. They contented themselves with the exercise of a general suzerainty and supervision over the Ruthenian dukes and the exaction of tribute from them.

A hundred years later, however, the powerful Mongol empire, created by the military genius of Genghis Khan, had begun to decay. In the 14th century suzerainty over the Ruthenian dukes was exercised by the khans of the "Golden Horde," who led a nomad life on the Volga steppes. By their astute policy, taking advantage of the quarrels between individual Tartar leaders and securing their support, the Muscovite dukes gradually obtained authority, by conquest or dynastic union, over an ever-increasing number of north-east Ruthenian duchies.

At this same time Lithuania, a not very numerous but warlike pagan nation, made its appearance on the stage of history. The Lithuanian dukes, taking advantage of the decay of the Mongol empire, tore from it increasingly large areas which had belonged to the old Ruthenian duchies on the Dnieper, and extended their dominion southwards to Kiev and beyond. In the second half of the 14th century the majority of the population of Lithuania was composed of Ruthenian

Slavs. Wilno became the capital. The influence of the Ruthenian knightage made itself increasingly felt at the courts of the Lithuanian dukes, and the White-Ruthenian language was more and more used. While Moscow became the rallying point for the mixed Slavonic and Finno-Turanian peoples of the north-east Ruthenian districts in their struggle against Tartar domination, the purely Slavonic west and south-west Ruthenian tribes came together under the rule of the Lithuanian dukes who had liberated them from the Mongol yoke.

The tribes of what is now called White Ruthenia and the Ukraine maintained a certain political and cultural contact, from the middle of the 10th to the end of the 13th century, with those of Great Russia, who were ruled by Muscovite dukes. After that, however, until the time of the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, the paths of their cultural development completely diverged, and three separate languages came into being: Russian, in the Muscovite dominions; White-Ruthenian, to the north of the Pripet, and Ukrainian, on the lower Dnieper. The Great Russians always spoke of themselves as *Ruskiye*, which Latin writers trans-literated as *Russi*; whereas the Ukrainians formerly called themselves *Rusyny*, which Latin writers modified into *Rutheni*. Since the end of the 19th century, however, in order to mark more clearly their difference from the Great Russians, the southern Ruthenians have begun to call themselves "Ukrainians." The White-Ruthenian language is undoubtedly more akin phonetically to Polish than to Russian. From the middle of the 19th century onwards the Russian Czars did their utmost to stifle this Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian feeling that they were a people distinct from

the Great Russians, and they put forward the official view that the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian languages were merely dialects of Russian. This conception, however, did not survive the fall of the Czars. This event was immediately followed by the creation of a provisional Ukrainian government at Kiev: an Ukrainian Soviet, which replaced Russian by Ukrainian as the language of the administration, schools and army. But even in the 14th century neither the White-Ruthenian nor the Ukrainian knights had felt any consciousness or desire, of unity with Moscow.

#### POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH

Lithuania increased in power and united more and more of the old Ruthenian duchies under its dominion, not without considerable aid from their inhabitants. But at the same time its relations with the still powerful Tartars became inflamed, and an increasingly aggressive attitude towards it was taken up by the Order of Teutonic Knights, which had made itself master of Pomerania (Pomorze) and East Prussia. Consequently Lithuania was brought to the conclusion that its own forces were insufficient for successful defence, and that if it were to acquire permanent allies it must renounce paganism and enter the community of Christian civilized nations. It had only to choose whether it would receive Christianity from Catholic Poland or from Orthodox Moscow. It chose Poland. In 1385 a congress of Polish and Lithuanian Notables was held at the Lithuanian town of Krewo, where it was decided that Lithuania should be dynastically united with Poland by the marriage of the Lithuanian duke Jagiello [who at baptism took the purely Polish name of Władysław (Ladislas)] with the

fifteen-year-old Polish queen Jadwiga, who had been crowned three years before.

This dynastic union of the two countries, though at first intended to be exclusively political, soon began to change into a social and cultural union. The mere fact that Lithuania voluntarily received the Christian faith from Polish hands—the first clergy in the country were Polish—caused the Lithuanian knights to take a keen interest in Polish manners and customs.

This, in turn, led to the holding of another congress of Polish and Lithuanian Notables, at Horodło, on the Bug, in 1413, on which occasion the Roman-Catholic knights of Lithuania (and later the Orthodox also) were received into the Polish knightly clans (*związki herbowe*). This was the beginning of a process which lasted fifty years, whereby the knights and burghers of Lithuania, White Ruthenia, and the Ukraine were incorporated ever more closely in a cultural community with those of Poland, whose civilization was quite distinct from that of Moscow. In 1569 the united Lithuanian and Polish Diets changed the dynastic union into a more far-reaching one. From that time onwards there was only one parliament for the united Republic, one legislature, an uniform currency, a single customs system, and a single college for the election of kings. The treasuries and armies of Poland and Lithuania still remained distinct. For a certain time also, the official language of Lithuania continued to be White-Ruthenian, which was still spoken by the majority of the knights. But the Act of Union was drawn up in Polish. The Union was at first opposed by the Lithuanian Magnates, but was strongly supported by the smaller nobility and

gentry, and more particularly by the White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian sections. The last-named, indeed, went so far as to incorporate in Poland the south-eastern districts inhabited by them. It was also accepted by the great lords from the formerly separate Ruthenian and Lithuanian duchies, who were above all afraid of Moscow, which was constantly at war with Lithuania. They saw their only hope of successful resistance in the closest relations with Poland.

In the 17th century not only the whole of the Lithuanian and White-Ruthenian nobility and gentry, but also the White-Ruthenian burgher class, adopted the Polish language. In the 18th century Lithuania and its White-Ruthenian dependencies were incorporated with Poland as closely as is Wales today with England. The Lithuanian and White-Ruthenian languages were still spoken only by the peasants in their villages, whereas the educated classes used only Polish. The sermons and hymns in churches were also in Polish. The feeling of Polish patriotism was just as great in the regions of former Lithuania and of the old Ruthenian tribes on the Niemen and the Dnieper as on the Vistula and the Warta. Accordingly, after the first partition of Poland in 1772, Lithuania was finally made into one homogeneous State with Poland, on May 3, 1791. The insurrection directed simultaneously against Prussia and Russia in 1794 was headed by Kościuszko, who came from White Ruthenia and was undoubtedly of White-Ruthenian origin. The main centres of the insurrection were Cracow, Warsaw, and Wilno.

#### PARTITIONS OF POLAND

The partitions of Poland led to the amalgamation of the eastern provinces

of the Republic with the Russian Empire. But Polish civilization long maintained its position there. The Empress Catharine, who carried out the partitions in conjunction with Prussia and Austria, attempted to introduce the official use of the Russian language throughout the territory she had annexed; but her son Paul restored the use of Polish, which was maintained likewise by Czar Alexander I. It was during the reign of the latter that the Polish University of Wilno attained its greatest splendor, and another Polish institute of higher learning was founded under the name of the "Lyceum" at the Volhynia town of Krzemieniec, while numerous Polish secondary schools sprang up in all the larger towns of the country.

After the failure of the insurrection of 1830, in which men from the provinces of Wilno and Volhynia took a distinguished part, Czar Nicholas I abolished Polish institutes of learning everywhere except in the Kingdom of Poland, and began the russification of the districts annexed at the time of the partitions by the compulsory conversion of the Uniates or Greek Catholics to the Orthodox faith. Nevertheless not only the nobility, gentry, and burghers, but even the peasants of Wilno province rose in large numbers in 1863. That province also produced the most eminent leader of the insurrection, namely Traugutt, and Piłsudski, the creator of the Polish Legions during the last world war.

It was not only army leaders, however, who grew up in the eastern provinces of the Republic. Until quite recently they produced also outstanding figures in the progress of Polish civilization: the two greatest Polish poets, Mickiewicz and Słowacki; the most distinguished musicians, Moniuszko and Paderewski; a

number of eminent novelists: Rzewuski, Kraszewski, Orzeszkowa, and Rodziewiczówna; the well-known scholars Jan and Jędrzej Sniadecki; and very many others.

After the insurrection of 1863 had been crushed, the pressure of russification increased enormously. The speaking of Polish in all public buildings and the sale of land to Poles were forbidden. A Pole might not even purchase a piece of ground from another Pole. All Polish cultural associations were abolished. Teaching in the schools was conducted only in Russian. The government introduced large numbers of Russian merchants and industrialists, who alone received government contracts. The children of educated burgher families remained Polish in spite of the pressure exerted by the administration and the schools. But the children of the peasants, whose parents spoke White-Ruthenian at home, succumbed and were easily russified by the schools.

In the course, therefore, of the forty years from 1864 to the beginning of the present century Russian nationalism and civilization took root to a certain extent in the consciousness of the broad masses of the people torn from Poland by Russia at the partitions.

None the less, the tradition not only of Polish civilization, but of Polish nationality, continued to have strong influence. In 1906, the first parliamentary elections in the Russian Empire were held. These districts—declared by the Czarist government to have been Russian from time immemorial—returned twenty Polish members.

#### POLISH INFLUENCE IN THE EAST

When Nicholas II granted a constitution to his own State, he at the same time introduced into the provinces taken

from Poland provincial autonomous councils (Polish *ziemstwa*, Russian *zemstva*) which had already existed in Russia for some fifty years. On Map VI (see page 18) are shown: the counties (*Powiaty*) in which the Poles had (a) 35-45 percent, (b) 45-55 percent, (c) over 55 percent of the votes in the *Zemstvos* (Local Government Councils). In a large area of the country the local White Ruthenian and Ukrainian population bestowed their full confidence on the Polish representatives. This fact so alarmed the Russian Government that it endeavored to prevent the collapse of its russification policy by dividing the electors to the *zemstva* into the two national groups, Polish and Russian, all Ukrainians and White Ruthenians being counted as belonging to the latter, so that they might not in future elect Poles.

After the fall of the Czars in February 1917, an end was put to all the restrictions which had up to that time hampered the social and cultural initiative of the Polish, White-Ruthenian, and Ukrainian population in the annexed provinces of the former Polish Republic. The Poles immediately took occasion to organize their national system of elementary schools. In the course of one year they organized several thousand schools.

The White-Ruthenian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian populations lived in free association with Poland—at first a dynastic union and later a Commonwealth—for almost 500 years. To Russia they were bound by annexation and armed force for 130 years. Poland never endeavored to polonize them by force. They voluntarily adopted the Western-European civilization of Poland, as being higher than their own. Russia throughout the ninety years after 1830 used every method of compulsion open to the ad-

ministration in the provinces taken at the time of the partitions, to annihilate every trace of their former union with the Polish State and Polish civilization, and to make of them a purely Russian country.

The introduction by the Russian government of separate Polish and Russian electoral groups afforded official confirmation that the country had not become Russian despite all that had been done to make it, but was a country of mixed nationalities, in which the Polish civilization exerted strong influence.

In view of these facts the Supreme Council in December 1919, could not deny Poland's rights to the territories situated east of the Curzon Line. Whereas it recognized the territories of the Polish Republic to the west of that line as indisputably Polish, it regarded the districts taken by Russia in the course of the three partitions (as already said) as in dispute between Poland and Russia.

#### IV

There were two possible methods of settling the question of the territories in dispute between Poland and Russia.


These territories were of mixed Polish, White-Ruthenian, and Russian population; or of Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian. Poland had historical rights to them by virtue of their 500 years of voluntary union with her. Russia put forward claims to them because of their attachment to the Russian Empire throughout the last 130 years. One method would have been to divide the area in question between Poland and the Soviet Union; the other, to erect White Ruthenia and the Ukraine into buffer States, which would themselves determine their relationship

to Poland on the one hand and to Russia on the other; either entering into a union with one or other of them, or deciding to remain completely independent, legally and politically.

#### PILSUDSKI'S POLICY

This second idea was supported by Marshal Pilsudski, at that time Head of

pering the exercise of the will and often destructive to your manner of life. This state of constant slavery—which I personally know well, since I was born in this unhappy land—must at last be brought to an end; and at last this land, forgotten as it seems of God, must win its freedom and the full right to declare its aims and needs without fear. The Polish Army, which I have led here to overthrow the rule of violence and superior force, and to put an end to the government of the country against the will of



the Polish State, who gave expression to his views in his proclamation "To the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania" of April 19, 1919.

"For a hundred and twenty years your country has known no freedom under the pressure of hostile power, Russian, German or Bolshevik, which without consulting the people has imposed upon them foreign modes of action, ham-

pering the exercise of the will and freedom of action to all of you. I desire to make it possible for you to deal with internal affairs and decide questions of nationality and religion for yourselves, without suffering any violence or pressure from the side of Poland. And so, although guns are still firing and blood is still flowing in your country, I am not introducing a military administration, but a civil one composed of native sons of this land."

The most ardent upholders of Pilsudski's policy were to be found in the Polish Socialist Party.

At that time I was Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Diet. Personally I had grave doubts respecting the feasibility of this programme. In 1917 and 1918 I had travelled through the length and breadth of the Ukraine and had reached the conviction that Ukrainian national consciousness existed at that time only among a small intellectual minority, while to the masses of peasants and workers it was still completely foreign. When the weak Bolshevik army (comprising less than 10,000 bayonets) attacked Kiev at the end of December 1917, it was defended by about 4,000 "free Cossacks" under Hetman Petlura. But the 500,000 inhabitants of the city looked on, to see who would win, with about as much interest as a crowd at a football match. They were afraid of the Bolsheviks, but they did not identify themselves with the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. Among the White Ruthenians the desire for a separate state was still weaker. Religious consciousness was stronger among them than national consciousness. The Catholics had a distinct feeling of fellowship with Catholic Poland, whereas the Orthodox felt rather their kinship with Russia.

So neither the Ukraine nor White Ruthenia had sufficient strength to support an independent régime of its own. Were such to be set up, Poland would have to defend its separate existence against Russia: a task beyond the powers of a Polish State which was in the throes of reconstruction after more than a century of political subjection. Further, the question of Polish aid for an independence movement in the Ukraine was

enormously complicated by the fact that less than half the territory had belonged to Poland before the partitions, the part situated to the east of the Dnieper having detached itself from Poland at the end of the 17th century and put itself under the rule of the "Orthodox Czar." To make an independent State out of only half of the Ukraine would be unjust. But to detach the whole of the country from Russia would have meant the exclusion of the latter from access to the Black Sea and to its richest coal and iron deposits, and the consequent end of its economic self-sufficiency. To that Russia would never have agreed. An independent Ukraine created by Polish armed force and not by the will and force of its own people would have been the cause of endless antagonism between Russia and Poland.

#### FEDERATIVE PROGRAMME

Consistently with my constant political activity on the side of England, France and Russia against the Central Powers throughout the 1914-1918 period, which had compelled me (for I was an Austrian subject) to leave Galicia for Russia in 1915, I regarded as the main task of Polish international policy the amicable solution of the frontier question with Russia, red or white, in order that Poland might be free to concentrate all her strength on preparation for meeting the German counter-attack which was sure to come sooner or later. But I must confess that I had the determined support of only the right wing of the Diet, its left being just as strongly in favor of Pilsudski's scheme, while the centre hesitated. This was not, after all, surprising, for both sentimental considerations and the loftiest traditions of the Polish struggle "For our freedom and

yours," favored a programme which proposed to liberate from Russian rule, no matter whether Czarist or Bolshevik, the territories torn from the Polish Republic in 1772, 1793, and 1795, and to give their populations full freedom to decide their own political future. Further, the whole left wing was certain, and the majority of the centre confidently hoped that, if Poland by armed force aided the Ukraine and White Ruthenia to gain their political independence, they would, in gratitude, voluntarily enter an union with Poland such as existed at the end of the 14th century, or at least make a permanent alliance with her. Accordingly, Pilsudski's programme was widely known among the Polish public as the "Federative," or "Jagiellonian" programme.

An alleged federative programme was likewise being brought from the east by the Bolshevik army. It too favored the creation of a White-Ruthenian and an Ukrainian Republic. But it was intended that these republics should be communist and closely united to Russia; so closely, indeed, that their supposed independence would have been more like the local government of an English county than the government of a British Dominion under the Statute of Westminster.

#### SOVIETS OFFER POLAND MORE

However, when the Polish-Soviet military operations took a turn unfavorable to the Red Army, the Soviet Government proposed peace negotiations on the basis of a division of the White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian areas between Poland and Russia. In a note addressed to the Head of the Polish State and signed by Lenin and Chicherin the Soviet Government made the following declaration:

"The Council of People's Commissars declares that the Red Army will not cross the present line of the White-Ruthenian front, running near the following points: Dryssa, Dzisna, Polotsk, Borysov, Parichi, Ptich station, and Byelokorovichl. As regards the Ukrainian front the Council of People's Commissars declares in its own name and in the name of the Provisional Government of the Ukraine that the Soviet armies will not engage in military operations to the west of the present line, of Cudnov, Pilava, Derazhnya and Bar."

"The Council of People's Commissars considers that so far as the essential interests of Poland and Russia are concerned, there is not a single question, territorial, economic, or other, that could not be solved in a peaceful way through negotiation, mutual concessions or agreement . . ."

The Council of People's Commissars accordingly considered in January 1920, the Polish-Russian frontier along the line from Dryssa to Bar, as shown on Map VII (*see* page 26), would not be injurious to "the real interests of Russia," notwithstanding that this line is considerably to the east of the frontier, fixed by the Treaty of Riga in 1921.

#### ATTITUDE OF POLISH DIET

Likewise in the opinion of the majority of the Polish Diet it was not injurious to the real interests of Poland. Even the adherents of the "federative" programme, led by Daszyński, chairman of the Polish Socialist Party, declared themselves in favour of the acceptance of the Soviet offer of negotiation, if a clause were inserted in the protocol proposing that the frontier between Poland and Russia should be dependent on the will of the inhabitants of the territory in dispute. At that time I brought about a compromise between the parties of the left and of the right. The Foreign Affairs Committee, after an exhaustive discussion in the presence of the Prime

Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, unanimously passed a resolution, in which it declared:

"The Polish Government in answer to the Note of the Russian Soviets puts forward the principles on the basis of which it is ready to enter into peace negotiations, and the acceptance of which by Russia would secure a permanent eastern frontier for the Republic and its international status. . . . The demarcation of the two States must be carried out in accordance with the desires and interests of the actual population [of the areas concerned]. This has for long been the attitude of the Government and Diet of the Polish Republic. The Polish Republic is unalterably resolved to fix its eastern frontier in agreement with the local population and has the right and duty to demand likewise that the population of those districts which are situated beyond the present boundary of Polish administration, but belonged to Poland before 1772, be given the opportunity of freely deciding their own future allegiance."

Marshal Piłsudski was not very pleased with this resolution. For at that very time there had come to Warsaw a delegation from the Ukrainian Nationalist army, which under Hetman Petlura was fighting in the Ukraine against the numerically superior Red Army, to ask for aid. In the course of several conversations I had with Piłsudski, I warned him that Petlura was deluding both himself and Poland when he promised a general outburst of Ukrainian patriotism if the Ukrainian people saw the Polish Army coming to their aid. To that kind of argument Piłsudski for a long time had only one answer: "Refusal of aid to a nation with whom we lived in a voluntary union for five hundred years would be an indelible stain on Polish honor."

But when I came to him with Premier Skulski and Daszyński, the leader of the left wing in the Diet, to tell him that the whole of the Diet regarded the Soviet proposal as likely to lead to a

permanent understanding with Russia about the territories in dispute between it and Poland, and therefore thought that peace negotiations should be commenced at once, and the Ukrainians helped to gain their national liberty by these negotiations and not by armed action, Marshal Piłsudski agreed, and proposed to the Soviet Government that peace delegations from Russia and from Poland should meet at the town of Borysov.

#### INSINCERITY OF SOVIET PROPOSAL

Unfortunately, however, the Soviet General Staff, more strongly influenced it seems by Trotsky than by Lenin, gathered a large force near Borysov, and agreed to negotiate only in order to lull Polish watchfulness, and to gain time to defeat General Wrangel's White Army, before throwing all its forces against Poland. For this reason the Soviet Government firmly refused to conduct peace negotiations at Borysov. This refusal served to convince not only Marshal Piłsudski's staff, but also the leaders of the left and centre in the Diet, of the insincerity of the whole of the Soviet peace proposals. They therefore authorized Piłsudski to send armed aid to Petlura. Having learnt this, I called upon the Foreign Affairs Committee to renew their demand for peace negotiations, though at some other place than Borysov. However, this time I and the members of my party found ourselves in a minority, so that I had to resign as chairman.

It was not till a few months later, when my warnings against exaggerating the influence of Ukrainian nationalism on the masses of the Ukrainian people had, unfortunately, been justified, that the Foreign Affairs Committee reelected me chairman.

I was decidedly opposed to Pilsudski's offensive against Kiev. And afterwards, at the time of his *coup d'état* in 1926, I fought against him. But I must do justice to his memory. Pilsudski's doubts as to the sincerity of the Soviet peace proposals at that time were well-founded, and it is not right to accuse him of imperialistic designs of conquest. He was in truth a chivalrous defender of "our freedom and of yours." He was perfectly sincere when he said in his manifesto to the Ukrainian people of April 26, 1920:

"The Polish armies will clear the territory inhabited by the Ukrainian nation from the foreign invaders against whom the Ukrainian people have risen in arms, in defence of their homes against violence, robbery and pillage. The Polish armies will remain in the Ukraine until such time as a truly Ukrainian government is able to take over the administration. As soon as armed bodies of Ukrainians stand on the border, capable of defending the country against a fresh invasion, and as soon as the free Ukrainian nation is in position to decide its own fate, Polish soldiers will withdraw behind the frontier of the Polish Republic."

#### POLISH ARMY TAKES KIEV

The Ukrainian people were favorably disposed to the Polish armies which were driving the Bolshevik armies and administration from the country, for the Bolsheviks forcibly took from the Ukrainian peasants their grain and cattle, for the relief of starving Moscow. But it was a far cry from mere favorable disposition to armed co-operation. There was, in fact, no such co-operation, despite the promises of Petlura and the assurances of the Ukrainian Nationalist leaders; although Pilsudski was joined for a time by Hetman Makhno, an extreme radical, with whom the Bolsheviks had so far been unable to deal, owing

to the support he received from the Ukrainian peasants. Pilsudski was compelled to carry on the struggle for Ukrainian independence almost exclusively with Polish forces. He began on April 28, and by May 8 he had already taken Kiev. But with it he also occupied an extensive area of territory. And the forces of which he disposed amounted to little more than 300,000 bayonets and sabres. The more the front line in the Ukraine was extended, the thinner it became, for the volunteers who had been expected from the local population did not arrive in sufficient numbers. And by thus giving armed aid to Petlura, Pilsudski greatly weakened the reserves which otherwise he might have used for strengthening the northern, so-called White-Ruthenian, sector of the front. Meanwhile it was from this sector that the commander-in-chief of the Red armies operating against Poland, General Tukhachevsky, delivered his main counter-offensive. The Polish armies had to withdraw.

#### BRITISH MEDIATION

In July the British Government endeavored to mediate between Poland and the Soviet Union, proposing, in a note of July 11, 1920, an armistice on the so-called Curzon Line and the holding "in London in the near future of a conference of representatives from Soviet Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland for the purpose of concluding a final peace with Soviet Russia." However, the Soviet Government declined the mediation of Great Britain, declaring, in its note of July 17, 1920, that it regards the Curzon Line as a proposition of "imperialists in London and Paris," unjust toward Poland and is ready

to grant to Poland, through direct negotiation, a more advantageous frontier. It also refused to stop its military operations.

The Polish Government, however, desired to fulfill the obligation it had taken upon itself in the presence of the Allied Powers at Spa in the first half of July, and agreed to negotiate with the Soviets even within the area of military operations and on the territory of the Soviet administration, at Minsk.

On August 14, therefore, a peace delegation left Warsaw for Minsk. It was composed of representatives of all parties in the Diet, of whom I was one, under the chairmanship of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jan Dąbski.

On that same day began the three days' battle of Warsaw, which ended in complete victory for the Poles.

#### MINSK PEACE CONFERENCE

The Bolshevik authorities did not make the Polish delegation's path easy. We only arrived at Minsk on the third day, when the retreat of the Soviet armies had already begun. Everything possible was done to prevent us learning the result of the battle. We were assigned to a house with a garden surrounded by a high wood-fence. Outside were sentries who did not allow the local population to come into the least contact with us. We were not allowed to go into the town. We were *de facto* interned. The Russian newspapers which reached Minsk contained no war news at all. We had, indeed, a portable wireless transmitter and receiving set which we had brought with us

for communication with our government at Warsaw. But at the hours appointed for our talks "atmospherics" invariably caused such disturbance as to make communication impossible. But from all this we drew the conclusion that things must be going badly for the Bolsheviks at the front. And five days after our arrival one of our wireless operators succeeded in catching part of a war-communicé broadcast from Warsaw. From it we learnt that the Bolshevik armies were in full retreat, having lost hundreds of guns and tens of thousands of prisoners. However, the Bolshevik delegation expected we would be disheartened by the treatment we had received on the way to Minsk and after our arrival; so on August 19, its chairman, Danishevsky, laid before us the draft of a peace treaty which would have made Poland a political vassal of the Soviet Union. The armed forces of the Republic were to be limited to 50,000 men, of whom only 10,000 might compose the regular army, while the remaining 40,000 were to be a militia consisting exclusively of workers. Further, the whole equipment of the existing Polish army, except for light arms for the above-mentioned 50,000, was to be handed over to the Soviet Union. The complete demobilization of Polish war industry was to follow. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was to maintain an army of 200,000 on the Polish frontier. The frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union was to follow, with slight divergences, the line of the third partition of Poland; that is to say, it was to be slightly more favorable to Poland than the Curzon Line. Further, the Soviet Union was to have the right of free transit through Poland both for persons and goods; which in practice would have meant the right to

send armies across Poland to the aid of German communists.

#### BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

The Polish delegation asked for time to prepare its answer. In order to make us more inclined to concession, on the next day, August 20, a manifesto by General Tukhachevsky, commander-in-chief of the Soviet armies, was posted up in the streets of Minsk, accusing the Polish delegation of having "disturbed the peace in the most disgraceful manner. The Polish delegation, composed exclusively of spies and counter-espionage agents, is attempting to utilize its position for purposes of espionage." To increase the effect of this proclamation the commandant of the local Cheka came to the chairman of the Polish delegation and informed him that he would defend us to the best of his ability against the indignant mobs, but doubted whether he would succeed. That same day, however, we got the above-mentioned fragment of the Warsaw broadcast. So at the next meeting of the peace conference our chairman first and foremost lodged a strong protest against General Tukhachevsky's insulting manifesto, and then declared that we absolutely rejected the Soviet proposals, which were designed to destroy the sovereignty of the Polish Republic and impose upon it the unilateral will of the Soviet Union, as though it were victor and Poland vanquished; whereas in point of fact it was the other way round. Having seen that we must know the true state of things at the front, Danishevsky changed his tone, expressed his regret for General Tukhachevsky's tactless procedure, and affirmed that his draft treaty was not final, but was merely a basis for discus-

sion. Further discussion, however, turned out to be impossible, since the Soviet delegation was composed of third-rate yes-men, who dared not say anything which was not strictly within the limits of the instructions they had been given by Moscow. The negotiations therefore came to a deadlock. To save the situation there came to Minsk for semi-official talks with members of the Polish delegation the communist Radek, of Polish-Jewish origin, who at that time played a considerable role at Moscow.

With him we came to the conclusion that the scene of the peace negotiations should be transferred to a neutral country. At the same time we told him that Poland did not feel called upon to intervene in the domestic affairs of Russia, that it was accordingly not waging war in aid of Wrangel's White Armies, nor did it desire the destruction of the Russian Empire. Since Petlura's assurances regarding the general desire of the Ukrainian people for national independence had proved delusive, Poland was freed from any obligation to fight on for the independence of the Ukraine, and was prepared to give up its interest in the Ukrainian question, if Russia would cease to interest itself in the Polish-Lithuanian dispute and would agree to give Poland a frontier indispensable for its defence and including districts in which the prevalent culture was distinctly Polish. These talks convinced Radek of the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and dispelled Moscow's fears that Poland was fighting, not so much in its own interests as at the instigation of western-European capitalist circles who were anxious to see the destruction of Bolshevism. Accordingly an understanding was soon afterwards

reached that the peace negotiations should be transferred to Riga.

#### NEGOTIATIONS IN RIGA

There we met a very different delegation, composed of better qualified persons under the chairmanship of Joffe, an experienced diplomat, and provided with a totally different set of instructions. For Soviet diplomacy does not differ at all from the traditional diplomacy of czarist Russia, which was always complementary to military plans and strategic activities.

In January 1920, after a year of constant Polish victories, the Council of People's Commissars was ready to recognize as in harmony with Russian interests a frontier running a hundred kilometres east of that fixed at Riga; whereas a few months later, when the Soviet armies had advanced to Warsaw, the Bolshevik government prepared the draft treaty presented to us at Minsk, rendering Poland completely dependent on Moscow and making it into a bridge over which the communist revolution might pass to the west. But when the Soviets were again defeated by the Polish army, Moscow sent to Riga a delegation prepared for a really reasonable compromise, in harmony with the Council of People's Commissars' declaration of January of the same year that "there is no single question, territorial, economic, or other, which could not be solved in a peaceful way through negotiation, mutual concessions and agreement."

On the other hand, the instructions given to the Polish delegation by its Government and Diet when it went to Riga were almost the same as those it had received when it went to Minsk. The Polish nation did not want its relations with Russia to be dependent on

the temporary posture of affairs, or on changes of situation at the front. During the world war the great majority of its population had stood fast against the Germans. Even Piłsudski after the fall of the Czar—whom he considered to be the chief enemy of Poland—ceased all co-operation with the Central Powers, for which he was arrested by the Germans and flung into the fortress of Magdeburg. And Poland did not change its anti-German attitude when it had regained its independence. In view of this, then, we desired good neighborly relations with Russia, if only the grave injury done us at the time of the partitions were even partially made good. Accordingly, the instructions given to the Polish peace delegation charged it to reach a peace which should

"put an end to the struggles which have been carried on by Russia and Poland for the territories in dispute between them, and to establish a basis for good neighborly relations between the two nations. The State frontier to be determined by a just harmonization of the vital interests of both parties."


#### V

The final treaty of peace between Poland and the U.S.S.R. was signed on March 18, 1921. But military operations had been stopped immediately after the signature of the preliminary peace on October 12, 1920. The Polish-Soviet frontier was also preliminarily fixed at the same time. A week earlier a common communiqué had been issued by the chairmen of the two peace delegations, Messrs. Dąbski and Joffe, announcing that an understanding on all fundamental questions had already been reached. In point of fact a decision had been amicably reached on October 5 in the most important matter at issue, viz., the demarcation of those parts of

the former territory of Poland detached at the time of the partitions in 1772, 1793 and 1795, which were now to be returned.

The first meeting of the peace conference at Riga took place on September 21. On October 5, fourteen days later, the Soviet delegation, duly authorized by

particular, as responsible for the formulation of our territorial demands at the conference, for having been over-hasty in arriving at a frontier settlement, instead of prolonging the negotiations until our army had again reached the December 1919 front line. These complaints came from countrymen of ours, natives of the



the Council of People's Commissars at Moscow, accepted without modification the frontier line proposed by the Poles. The weather at that time was very fine, military operations might have been continued for another six weeks. The Polish armies were pushing steadily forward. Afterwards and for many years sharp complaints were made against the Polish peace delegation, and myself in

districts left to the Soviet Union, though they had been offered to Poland by the Union in January 1920.

I never at any time had any feeling of resentment against those who made these complaints. For I understood perfectly how extremely disappointed must have been these whose families had for a century and a half resisted the powerful pressure brought to bear on them by the

czarist government, who amidst the harshest persecutions had never ceased to cherish the hope that at last the day of freedom and complete reunion would dawn for the Polish nation, torn apart by three partitions—when now, after rejoicing for nearly a year at the sight of Polish administrative officials, schools and soldiers in their towns, villages and countryside, they found themselves handed back, by the Polish-Soviet peace treaty, to a foreign totalitarian government more ruthless than the former czarist régime.

#### RIGA TREATY BASIS FOR LASTING PEACE

In point of fact the Bolshevik government carried out such harsh measures directed to the extermination of Polish civilization from the districts east of the frontier fixed at Riga, that in eighteen years it reduced the number of Polish inhabitants from a million and a half to 626,000. Between ten and twenty thousand of the population relinquished their landed possessions, their houses and their undertakings, and withdrew to Poland. But frequently they left near relatives behind, and afterwards lived in constant fear concerning their fate, and with immeasurable longing for their native soil. It was only too natural that they should not feel particularly grateful to the authors of the Treaty of Riga. And instead of taking it ill of the few who gave public expression to their resentment against me and my comrades on the Riga delegation, I felt deep respect for the civic discipline of the many who, despite the great personal losses they had suffered in consequence of the exclusion of their native places from Poland, yet said, "Thank God that we have at any rate lived to see our Country's independence!"

*And now that I have mentioned my critics in connection with the Treaty of Riga, I must admit that if we had, by prolonging the peace negotiations, given our army the necessary time to push a further hundred kilometres to the east, the Soviet Union would indeed, according to all the available data, have agreed to a frontier with Poland along the armistice line, it had proposed in January, 1920, through Dryssa and Bar (see Map VII).*

*Why did we not follow this procedure?*

*Because we had not come to Riga with instructions to secure for Poland the greatest possible extent of territory and the farthest possible frontier towards the east, but with instructions to "establish a basis for good neighborly relations between the two nations," by making a peace "without victors and vanquished," based on "a just harmonization of the vital interests of both parties."*

The Polish delegation at Riga was composed not only of Chairman, Vice-Minister Dąbski and representatives of the six parties in the Diet,<sup>1</sup> but also of three representatives of Head of the State and Commander-in-Chief Piłsudski: General Kuliński and Messrs. Wasilewski and Kamieniecki. And I can say that all three of them co-operated honestly and successfully with the representatives of the political parties to conclude peace within the shortest possible time and bring military operations to an end in accordance with the above instructions. There is no truth in the story that Piłsudski was inspired by particular hatred of

<sup>1</sup> Peasant Party, deputy Kiernik; Polish Socialist Party, deputy Barlicki; Christian Democracy, deputy Wichliński; National Labor Party, Waszkiewicz; Christian-Nationalist Fraction, Mieczkowski; and People's National Union, myself.

Russia, or had imperialistic designs of conquest. When, despite the assurances of Petlura and Makhno of a coming nationalist uprising in the Ukraine, the thirty million population furnished less than forty thousand sabres to fight for its independence, Pilsudski concluded that he must relinquish his federal programme; for it would be impossible to set up national Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian States by Polish armed force when the great majority of the population showed no patriotic feeling. He did, therefore, relinquish it sincerely and boldly.

He had desired a federation with Poland, based on the real will of the population, of regions which had once before been united with it in a voluntary union. And so he had desired to liberate them from the Russian rule that had been forced upon them at the partitions by the Czars and after the revolution by the Red Army. But when the realization of this project turned out to be impossible owing to lack of support from the masses of White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian peasants, whose national consciousness was undeveloped—he recognized the necessity of basing the security of Poland not on its separation from Russia by buffer States such as an independent Ukraine and White-Ruthenia would have been, but on permanent peace with Russia. And the reality of such a desire was not to be determined by the existence of any temporary front line. Accordingly, the Polish delegation did not make its territorial claims dependent on the development of military operations. And there was no difference over this question between the representatives of the six parliamentary parties and the representatives of the High Command.

#### POLISH POINT OF VIEW

During the first ten days of the peace negotiations there were several plenary meetings of the conference, at which the delegates of both sides set forth the principles on which they proposed to base a treaty of peace. The Polish delegation put forward its programme on September 24. Following the instructions which had been given them, they declared:

"The demarcation of a frontier between the negotiating parties in the territories detached from the Polish Republic by the former Russian Empire should be based on an equal regard by both parties for the following principles: (a) The termination of the struggle between Poland and Russia for the territories in dispute between them, and the establishment of a basis for good neighborly relations. The State frontier should not be determined by reference to historical claims, but by a just harmonization of the vital interests of both the negotiating parties. (b) The just solution of questions of nationality in the above territories in accordance with democratic principles. (c) The permanent assurance of each of the negotiating States against the possibility of attack by the other. Because Poland desires a freely negotiated peace and has no wish to dictate its conditions, it proposes to the other party a common determination of the frontier on the basis of the above principles."

There were, however, other subjects for discussion at Riga besides the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier. A number of fundamental questions were dealt with in the preliminary negotiations; *e.g.* the right of Poland to a portion of the gold in the former Imperial Bank of Russia; the return of libraries and works of art carried off from Poland to Russia at various times; the insurance of each of the two countries against interference by the other in its domestic affairs; and the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens deported into the interior of Russia during the military operations of 1915. All these

questions were dealt with by separate committees appointed from the ranks of each delegation and including also experts, which met for discussion. I was chairman of the Polish committee which drew up the proposals for our future eastern frontier.

#### CRUCIAL DAYS

As a general rule in negotiations of this kind each side at first puts forward its maximum demands, which are afterwards gradually reduced in response to pressure from the other side. This was the course followed by the Russian delegation. At the plenary session on September 28, Mr. Joffe proposed to us the same frontier the Russians had sought to force upon us at Minsk. But as he met with determined opposition, he declared only four days later that the greatest territorial concessions he was authorized to make extended to the railway line (shown on Map VI) connecting Brody, Równe, Sarny, Łuniniec and Baranowicze: a line closely approximating to the frontier as finally determined.

We, for our part, proceeded differently. The Polish frontier committee considered that if the peace treaty concluded by us was really to be a basis for good neighborly relations, it should not be the outcome of a trial of strength, or the exploitation of a temporary military superiority of one side or the other, but must embody a reasonable compromise between the actual, permanent vital interests of both parties. Consequently we decided to put forward, not several variants between our maximum and minimum territorial demands, but a single project for the equitable demarcation of a frontier in the territory taken from Poland by the former Russian Empire at the time of the three partitions.

This demarcation, we thought, should be made by reference, not to historical claims, but to the actually existing state of affairs, as expressed above all in the desire of the population of the various sections of the territory in dispute for incorporation with Poland or Russia respectively.

For it seemed to us indisputable that, if one of those States should incorporate districts, a considerable majority of whose population desired to break away from it and unite with the other, the resultant situation would be an ever-smouldering source of conflict and sooner or later would lead to open war.

The most trustworthy indications of the real state of affairs in this respect we took to be the results of elections to the Duma and the national composition of the *zemstva* and municipal autonomous councils. At the first, and only really free, elections to the Duma in 1906, all the seven representatives in the government of Wilno (which included besides the modern voivodship of Wilno a portion of that of Nowogródek) were Poles.<sup>1</sup> In the government of Minsk, to which belonged the eastern portion of the modern voivodship of Nowogródek, seven out of nine representatives were Poles<sup>2</sup>; and in that of Grodno, with which was incorporated a portion of the modern voivodship of Białystok and almost the whole of the voivodship of Polesie, three out of seven elected representatives were Poles.<sup>3</sup> Further, the mayors of the two largest towns in White Ruthenia, Wilno and Minsk, were constantly Poles. And in

<sup>1</sup>Ropp, Jałowicki, Jankowski, Aleksandrowicz, Gotowiecki, Hryncewicz, and Węslawski.

<sup>2</sup>Lednicki, Lubecki, Janczewski, Lubański, Skirmunt, Wiszulewski, and Massonius.

<sup>3</sup>Żukowski, Kurop, and Sgalló.

the *zemstva* of the government of Wilno of those days the Poles had everywhere about 50 per cent. of the seats, and more than 55 per cent. in the three districts of Wilno, Świąciany and Dżisna. In the government of Minsk, in only three *zemstva* (those of Bobruysk, Rychitsa and Mozyr) did the Poles hold as few as 20-25 per cent. of the seats, while in two (Pińsk, Slutsk, Nowogródek and Minsk) more than 55 per cent. But in districts much further to the east such as Dryssa and Lepel in the government of Vitebsk, and Orsha in the government of Mogilyev there were more than 45 per cent. of Poles in the *zemstva* (cf. Map VI).

Taking these facts into consideration, we had every right to include in the area of prevalently Polish civilization the whole of the then Russian government of Wilno and the districts of Borysov, Igumeń, Pińsk, Slutsk, Nowogródek, and Minsk in the government of Minsk. Nevertheless, of these last six districts we laid claim only to Pińsk and Nowogródek, leaving the rest outside.

#### ETHNOGRAPHY OF EASTERN POLAND

This we did because we took into account the future as well as the past. In the Russian Empire there was no universal franchise; and at elections to the Duma, the *zemstva*, and the local autonomous councils, the chief influence was exercised by the possessing and educated classes. It is very noteworthy in this connection that the local peasants and townfolk preferred to put their confidence in representatives from the educated Polish classes, rather than from the Russian. But we could not overlook the fact that in the democratic Polish Republic, which had universal


franchise and in which agrarian reform was already being taken in hand (having been unanimously approved by the Diet six months earlier), the thoughts and emotions of the broadest masses of the people would constitute an increasingly important factor in political life. Nor the further fact that nationalist feeling scarcely existed among the White Ruthenians, and their leaning towards Polish or Russian civilization was dependent almost entirely on their attachment to the Catholic or the Orthodox Church. So first the Committee of which I was chairman, and afterwards the whole Polish delegation, accepted the principle that only that part of White Ruthenia should be incorporated in Poland, where the Catholic population was in the majority. We were scrupulous in counting only White-Ruthenian Catholics in the area in question, so as not to make up a majority by including Poles, and we did not press for the incorporation in Poland of even so strong a centre of Polish culture as Minsk, which, as I have just said, always elected Poles to the Russian Duma, and to the presidency of the municipal council. For had we included Minsk, we should have had to include also some districts in which, though they usually elected Poles to the Duma and the *zemstva*, yet more than 75 per cent. of the population were Orthodox. Following these two indications, viz., the confidence of the local population in Polish deputies as shown at the elections to the Duma and the autonomous councils, and the religious bond between White-Ruthenian Catholics and Poland (for they always used Polish prayer-books in church and sang the hymns in Polish), the territorial committee of the Polish delegation worked out a project

for a frontier which should include on the Polish side the following parts of White Ruthenia: the whole of the former Russian government of Wilno, where the majority of the population were not only Catholic but Polish; and, of the former governments of Grodno and Minsk, the areas of the present voivodship of Białystok, Nowogródek, and (in part) Polesie.

Throughout this area the Catholic population is in a decided majority.

even the least conscious politically do not make false statements concerning their religion if they are sincere in their belief. And both the Catholic and the Orthodox population in Poland were always and are deeply religious and strongly attached to their churches. So the statistics of their religious adherence cannot be subject to doubt.

Now, according to the census of 1931, there were 2,090,000 Catholics and 1,690,000 Orthodox in the voivodships



Possibly the foreign reader may be inclined to doubt the accuracy of the Polish statistics of nationality in an area where the national consciousness of the population is so little developed. But

of Białystok, Wilno, and Nowogródek which constituted the western part of the region with a White-Ruthenian population, incorporated with Poland by the Treaty of Riga. Russia could not

put forward any serious claim, political, nationalist, or religious, to this territory, which embraced 78,000 square kilometres and had a population in 1931 of 3,686,000. For of the seventeen members by which it was represented in the Duma, the Russians, at (I repeat) the only free elections, in 1906, elected only three. And according to official Russian statistics the Russian language was used in daily life by scarcely 5 per cent. of the population of the government of Wilno; by 5.08 per cent. of that of Grodno; and by 4.39 per cent. of that of Minsk.

#### LITHUANIAN PROBLEM

Accordingly, feeling their position in this region insecure, the Soviet Union had, in the spring of 1920, surrendered the town and the greater part of the former government of Wilno to Lithuania, in order to exclude from White Ruthenia the strongest centre of that Polish civilization which prevailed in its western districts. Yet the right of Lithuania to Wilno and the region round about was and is no greater than that of Russia. According to figures given by the Germans after their registration of the population in territories of the Russian Empire which they occupied in 1916, the percentage of Lithuanians was as follows: in the town of Wilno 2.6 per cent.; in the district of Wilno 4.3 per cent.; in the town of Grodno 2.4 per cent.; in the district of Grodno 0.5 per cent.

I believe that anyone who desires to arrive at an impartial judgment on our Riga peace negotiations with Russia will at most reproach us with too great moderation in formulating our claims to parts of White Ruthenia, and will certainly not accuse us of excessive greed.

The northern part of the eastern frontier we asked for was so fully justified by the undoubted bias towards Poland shown by the population to the west of it, that the only objection which Mr. Joffe, the chairman of the Soviet delegation, could bring against it was to point out that the right of Lithuania to a considerable portion of this territory had been recognized by the Soviet Union not long before. However, he soon agreed to the removal of the resulting difficulties for the U.S.S.R. by the insertion of the following statement in the draft peace treaty immediately after the description of the frontier:—

"The two Contracting Parties agree that, in so far as the territory situated to the west of the frontier fixed in Article 2 of the present Treaty includes districts which form the subject of a dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the question of the attribution of these districts to one of these two States is a matter which exclusively concerns Poland and Lithuania."

#### UKRAINIAN PROBLEM

It was a much more complicated problem to demarcate the frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R. in the southern portion of the region taken from Poland at the time of the partitions, and inhabited for the most part by an Ukrainian population. For, whereas to the north of the Pripet, in Polish White-Ruthenian territory, the influence of Polish civilization is to be felt prevalently in the west, and the further east one goes the weaker it becomes—to the south the strongest centres of Polish civilization and influence were scattered, and as a rule were actually most numerous in the east. In Czarist times this region was divided between the three governments of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. The last-named was the most strongly russified. But even

there the Poles had about 50 per cent. of the seats in the *zemstva* of one district (Lipovets), and about 40 per cent. in three others (Berdichev, Skvira, and Tarashcha). Further, the Poles held 50 per cent. and more of the seats in the *zemstva* of the districts of Yampol, Hay-sin, Proskurov, Lityn, Litychev, Ushitsa, and Kamenets Podolski in the government of Podolia, and the districts of Starokonstantynov, Zaslavl, and Włodzimierz in the government of Volhynia. In the remainder of this government, *i.e.*, in the districts of Ostróg, Równe, Krzemieniec, Dubno, Łuck, Kowel and Zhitomir, the Poles held between 35 and 45 per cent. of the seats in the *zemstva*.

Had all the districts where the Poles had 50 per cent. and more of the seats in the *zemstva* been united to Poland, the southern sector of the Polish-Soviet frontier, as is shown on Map VIII, would have run much further east than in the sector to the north of the Pripet. Moreover, the south-eastern border of Poland would have taken in a country of almost 100,000 square kilometres, where about 75 per cent. of the entire population was composed of three and a half million Orthodox Ukrainians; and as the fundamentally democratic and liberal structure of Poland would rapidly have led to the rise of an educated class from the masses of the people, a strong national consciousness would soon have developed. Despite the sincere intention of the Polish State not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union, and in particular not to interfere in the Russo-Ukrainian problem, yet the existence of so large an Orthodox Ukrainian population of rapidly growing nationalist tendencies would inevitably have inspired Moscow with the fear that a strong and dangerous centre of Uk-

rainian irredentism might be established in Poland.

Sincerely desiring a peace which should lay the foundations of permanent good relations between Poland and Russia, the Polish delegation decided at my suggestion not to push the southernmost sector of the frontier further east than the old eastern frontier of Galicia, which had belonged to Poland from the middle of the 14th century, and had never belonged to Russia. Even in the peace conditions proposed to us at Minsk the Soviet Union had laid no claim to it, and its population, apart from the Jews, was Catholic irrespective of differences of nationality. The eastern border district now forming the voivodship of Tarnopol was particularly strongly influenced by Polish civilization.

According to the Austrian statistics of 1910, the percentage of Poles in the various districts on this border was as follows: Czortków, 39.1; Przemyślany, 39.5; Kamionka Strumiłowa, 40.3; Brzeżany, 40.9; Husiatyn, 44.2; Zbaraz, 46.7; Buczacz, 46.7; Tarnopol, 48; Trembowla, 51; and Skałat, 52.

The two strongest bastions of Polish civilization in Polish White Ruthenia and the Polish Ukraine—regions of mixed population, two Polish Ulsters as one might say—were the eastern borderland of Galicia, in which the chief town was Tarnopol; and the western portion of the White-Ruthenian area, with the important scientific, literary, and artistic centre of Wilno.

The most cursory glance at the map will show that the primary condition of security for Poland was the linking of the eastern frontiers of these two bastions by a defensive line running from the north-east corner of the present voivodship of Tarnopol to the south-

eastern corner of the present voivodship of Nowogródek (*see* Map VIII).

#### RAILROAD CONTROVERSY

This line did indeed cause a few days' argument between the two peace delegations. On October 1, 1920, Mr. Joffe informed Mr. Dąbski that his instructions did not permit him to agree to a frontier east of the railway line Brody, Równe, Sarny, Łuniniec, Baranowicze, which should be left in Soviet hands. The next day Mr. Dąbski put before him the Polish project for a frontier including on the Polish side the above-named railway together with a sixty- or seventy-kilometre-wide security strip to the east of it. At the same time he declared:

"I do not wish to proceed in the usual way, by suggesting a frontier-line further to the east and then gradually withdrawing it westwards until I have reached the maximum we are prepared to yield. I prefer at once to describe the line beyond which we are in no case prepared to withdraw."

On October 3 a conversation took place between Mr. Joffe, Mr. Dąbski, deputies Barlicki, Kiernik and myself. Mr. Joffe asked me how I justified the claim that the railway line should be given to Poland rather than to Russia. I replied that Russia with its population of 150 millions would never need to fear aggression on the part of Poland with its 30 millions; whereas the numerically stronger Russia might some day display aggressive tendencies against Poland, in which case not Russia but Poland would need the best possible defensive line together with the strategically important railway behind it. Continuing, Mr. Joffe asked what guarantee we could give him that Poland would not let itself be pushed into war with the Soviet Union by the western capital-

ist world. To this my answer was as follows:

"The best and surest guarantee of the action of States is given by a consideration of their interests. Now, the interests of Poland do not allow it to join in any kind of military co-operation with Germany. And the idea that Great Britain or France would ever send armies to Poland to join in a common expedition against Moscow is ridiculous. Further, if Poland concludes a treaty with Soviet Russia demarcating the frontier it desires, it will not be so foolish as to help anyone to overthrow the government in Russia which signed the treaty, and to set up another government there, which would not feel bound by the treaty."

Mr. Joffe then informed me that in view of these explanations he would put our frontier proposal before the Council of People's Commissars. Two days later, on October 5, he informed us that the Council of People's Commissars had empowered him to accept our proposal in its entirety, if the Polish delegation would agree to reduce their claim to a portion of the gold in the former Imperial Bank of Russia. How typical of Russians to make a condition like this! Russia apparently had more interest in keeping the largest possible reserve of gold than in keeping the territories claimed by us, where Polish culture was indubitably predominant.

#### TREATY OF RIGA

After the preliminary peace had been signed on October 12, 1920, the Polish delegation, composed of representatives of the political parties in the Diet, returned to Warsaw. Shortly afterwards a fresh delegation, composed of officials and experts, came to Riga to conclude a definitive treaty of peace. As before, its chairman was Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dąbski.

After the signing of this definitive treaty, which was only slightly more

comprehensive than the very detailed preliminary draft, Mr. Dąbski made the following declaration:

"The Peace Treaty which we have just signed marks the beginning and forms the foundation of a new period in the life and development of the Polish and Russian nations. After a century of Polish struggle for independence, after two years of a severe war, there comes a period of peace and mutual collaboration. . . . We have endeavored to settle all problems in a spirit of fairness and justice, making concessions not only in order to reach agreement, but also to facilitate our future relations."

For his part Mr. Joffe declared:

"We have concluded a peace treaty giving full satisfaction to the vital, legitimate and necessary interests of the Polish nation. . . . The peace negotiations lasted several months and encountered considerable difficulties, especially in the settlement of economic and financial problems.<sup>1</sup> I must state, however, that both when guns were firing along the front line and blood was being shed, and during calmer periods, the knowledge of affairs and tact displayed by the Polish Delegation and particularly by its Chairman have assisted both the progress of the negotiations and their final satisfactory conclusion."

Thus in concluding the Peace of Riga we made great sacrifices—not under compulsion, but in accordance with our own free decision—in order to assure permanent peaceful relations with Russia. In no small degree I was responsible for this decision. For nineteen years I calmly bore the criticism to which I was subjected on that account, for I thought that permanent peace had really been established on our eastern borders. In 1932 a pact of non-aggression was concluded between Poland and the U.S.S.R., and in 1934 this pact was renewed and extended to December 1945.

But afterwards, when the German offer of a fresh partition of Poland was

<sup>1</sup>Noteworthy words, showing as they do that the frontier negotiations encountered no particular difficulties.

so quickly accepted by the U.S.S.R. in 1939, and in consequence I found myself along with hundreds of thousands of others of my countrymen in a Soviet gaol, sometimes, reviewing my life as I lay alone in my cell, I sadly asked myself whether I had done right in exacting from a million and a half Poles the heavy sacrifice of remaining outside the borders of their country in order to establish permanently peaceful relations with Russia, which had now proved a delusion. However, in July 1941, General Sikorski concluded an agreement with the Soviet Government annulling the Russo-German treaty for the partition of Poland, and with it the Ribbentrop-Molotov line of demarcation. And then again I said to my countrymen: You see, no Russo-German understanding can be permanent; while a proper understanding of the true interests of the Polish and Russian nations bids them maintain good neighborly mutual relations and the widest political co-operation.

But, notwithstanding the fact that we were engaged in a common struggle against the Germans, the Polish-Russian co-operation initiated by General Sikorski did not last long. Today it is non-existent.

#### FAITH IN POLISH-RUSSIAN COLLABORATION

And yet I sincerely believe that the logic of facts will lead, if not before the end of the war, at any rate after it, to the re-establishment of good relations between Poland and Russia. But this will not be accomplished by means of fresh sacrifices on the part of Poland. The experience of the last five years has taught us only too clearly that sacrifices made by the Polish nation for the sake

of Polish-Russian friendship merely weaken Poland without diminishing the imperialist tendencies of Russia. Having convinced itself of the uselessness of the sacrifices made in 1920, the Polish nation will in no case agree to unilateral concessions. For it could not possibly put faith in the permanence of any fresh treaty of peace or of any new frontier determined by it, if the precedent set by Russia in unilaterally cancelling the Treaty of Riga and violating the frontier fixed by it were allowed to go unchallenged.

In 1920 we left about a million and a half Poles beyond the border, in the U.S.S.R. Now another million Polish citizens have been deported beyond the Urals, of whom about 115,000 left Russia in 1942, and are now in the Polish forces or in settlements for women, children, old people and other civilians. I hope that not more than one-third of those left behind have died of want, and that therefore about half a million are still alive. Are we finally to abandon them? Today the U.S.S.R. is putting forward claims to the whole of that part of Poland assigned to it by the Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty. This territory was inhabited by 5,274,000 Poles. About 800,000 of these, together with about 200,000 Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, were deported into the interior of Russia in 1940 and 1941. The conduct of the Soviet Government in the part of eastern Poland it occupied from the end of October 1939 to July 1941, leaves no room for doubt that if the present territorial demands of the U.S.S.R. were to be accorded to, it would be equivalent to surrendering more than four million Poles, left in the eastern

voivodships of Poland after the deportations, to the most ruthless extermination. If the Polish nation agreed to that, in truth it would not deserve to survive.

There are people who think that the modification of the frontiers of a State is nothing more than moving a line a few millimetres on a map, whereas in truth it is a question of the most fundamental importance to millions of people.

I ask those of our friends who advise us, with the best intentions, to give up our eastern territories to Soviet Russia, to ask themselves the question whether it is right and just to condemn millions of people who in Poland had their private property protected by the State, freedom of speech, of association, and of political opinion, and the assurance of a religious education for their children at school, to the loss of all these rights by handing them over to a totalitarian State which does not recognize the right to hold private property, in which all political parties except the Communist are prohibited, where a man may be sent without trial (as I was), by mere administrative order, to eight years' compulsory labor camp, and where atheism is taught in the schools.

I repeat once more: good neighborly relations between Poland and Russia are required, not only by the true interest of the two countries, but also by the interest of permanent European peace. But the only possible basis for such relations lies in the principle put forward by the Polish delegation at Riga: namely, that of equal respect for the vital interests of both sides, and not the injury of the weaker by the stronger, or the unilateral breach of obligations voluntarily undertaken.

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TOWARD

POLISH-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING

By Wladyslaw R. Malinowski

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**W**LADYSLAW R. MALINOWSKI, LL.D. For many years an active worker in the Polish Labor Movement. He was active in the Polish underground, after the German invasion in 1939, before coming to this country, and is a representative of the Polish underground labor movement in the U. S. He is an economist and statistician and studied at Jagiellonian University, Cracow, and the London School of Economics. In 1939, was appointed lecturer at the Free University in Warsaw. With Manfred Kridl and Jozef Wittlin, he published recently an anthology of Polish democratic thought, **FOR YOUR FREEDOM AND OURS.**

# TOWARD POLISH - SOVIET UNDERSTANDING\*

*Clara pacta — claros faciunt amicos*

By WLADYSLAW R. MALINOWSKI

**D**URING the last few years, the necessity for the democratic countries to wage total war has created a particular atmosphere, which has limited, even among liberals, real freedom of thought and freedom of expression to some extent. Certain explanations of what is going on, certain slogans, certain fetish-like words are fed to public opinion by adroit opinion-fashioning centers.

In this country, for example, anybody may write an article criticizing the President of the United States and his political or administrative acts, attacking internal conditions in general, assailing racial prejudice, and describing inadequate results of war production. All that can be done without risk of being attacked by progressive or liberal people. On the contrary, this criticism is hailed by liberal and progressive opinion and considered as "pro-American." But there are certain themes within which every critical word is condemned as reactionary *per se*.

These "uncriticizable" themes are not, as one might expect, general principles and ideas commonly accepted by all democrats. It is the Soviet Union, valiant and admirably fighting ally, which is granted immunity. She is considered by some people as a criterion of democracy and progress. Practically every word of criticism about the Soviet Union is considered anti-Soviet and reactionary.

The panegyric method of praising the USSR, which originated before the war within the USSR, is used by friends of that country abroad. This happens—undoubtedly—with considerable harm to the USSR itself. In a democratic country certain attitudes are bound easily to create reactions. While the USSR and her attitudes are discussed in a panegyric that sees a crime in every criticism, the inevitable reaction is bound to be an extremity that we all want to avoid. The way in which the USSR and its politics are discussed is an injury to itself for even another reason: when we like a country and want to favor it, we should treat it as our own. And none of us will ever divest himself of the basic right of criticizing his own country for things bad, and also of praising it for really worthwhile achievements.

In troubled times of ideological misunderstandings, it is particularly important to use proper terms for proper schemes. Inconsistency of terminology does not solve problems, but only veils them and results in a still deeper misunderstanding. When speaking, for instance, about expansion, the same word should be used irrespective of whether the expansionism referred to will be British, American, or Soviet, though I realize that this differs somewhat from current practice. Putting aside fetish-like words and slogans, I shall try to use the same words whenever identical phenomena will be referred to. All this should be clearly stated before discussing Polish-Russian relations.

The democratic countries consider the severing by the USSR of its diplomatic relations with Poland as a very important fact. It was the first open admission of a rift existing among the United Nations. This rift may prove to be of utmost importance not only for Poland and for Central-Eastern Europe, but for all of Europe, and perhaps for all the world as well, because the USSR is a world power astride two continents. This is why, in approaching this problem, slogans and prejudices should be neglected.

**T**HE development of the relations between Poland and Czarist Russia is wellknown by Western democrats. Throughout history the influence of two nations met on the fertile steppes of the Ukraine and in the woods and marshes of White Russia. They

were Poland, connected with Latin culture and civilization, and Russia, which was under Byzantine cultural and civilizing influences. After Poland's fall toward the end of the 18th century, only two centers of power remained in Central-Eastern Europe: Russia and Germany (the policy of the two Eastern-German states, Austria and Prussia, was, to a great extent, concordant in that sphere). Both Germany and Russia had long since tended to achieve that state of affairs. For centuries, Poland has been a barrier against German expansion toward the East. On the other hand, Poland attracted (particularly in the Jagellonian era) the smaller nations of Central and Eastern Europe. For that reason, and also because of its Latin civilization, Poland constituted a permanent hindrance to the increasing imperialism of the Czarist Empire and its tendencies to expand westwards.

When Poland was finally partitioned, leading diplomats thought that, by eliminating her from the European scene, a more durable equilibrium could be created, based on the balancing of the strength of two big, now neighboring empires, Germany and Russia, who met over Poland's grave. But it was a temporary equilibrium, an equilibrium maintained by the enslavement of more than a dozen small nations, larger in the aggregate of their populations than each of the countries that enslaved them. This equilibrium led inevitably to war, to war on a much larger scale than any previous war. Moreover, this kind of equilibrium accumulated huge centrifugal forces within the great powers, and these forces revealed themselves as the national and social movements of the oppressed nations. The equilibrium that was the result of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 was maintained not by a genuine system of international politics, but by absolutism leading toward national and social oppression, as well as by the military strength of competing great powers. The European equilibrium of the 19th century was not a solution of the problem of European organization, but a temporary halt to natural evolution. It was made possible by the all-over development of capitalism, which in its optimal and most creative form was a positive factor; economic progress in those days often developed beyond the framework of Europe's political setup.

For Poland, this period was one of slavery, of partition among three powers. It was Czarist Russia that used the most perfidious and most painful methods of national and social oppression. That is why Poland rose several times against Czarist Russia to cast off the chains of slavery, although the Poles were well aware that the struggle was uneven.

This is the source of the traditional Polish dislike of Russia. That dislike is a child of Czarist Russia. Throughout the 19th century, democrats of all the world, including the leaders of the labor movement and the originators of Socialism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, always posed the Polish problem as the test-case by which democratic views were examined and judged.

**T**HE revolutionary period after the last war brought the victory of revolution in Russia, and freedom to most of the oppressed nations. It permitted Poland to regenerate and to create a modern democratic state.

The tradition of dislike of Russia still existed and influenced Polish relations with Russia. But, on the other hand, there was keen sympathy for the Russian people for having destroyed the Czarist yoke. Lenin, who was a grand-style revolutionary leader, knew how important it would be to detach revolutionary Russia from the wrong done to Poland by the Czarist governments. This was the reason for the Soviet Government's Decree of August 29,

\*An extended version of an address delivered on September 23, 1943 at the European-American Club of the Free World Association.

1918, published on September 9, 1918, concerning the partitions of Poland. Article three of this decree reads:

"All agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the late Russian Empire with the Governments of Prussia and of the Austro-Hungarian Empire relating to the partitions of Poland are forever annulled by the present Resolution, considering that they are contrary to the principle of free determination of peoples as well as to the juridical revolutionary conception of the Russian Nation which has recognized the Polish Nation's "imprescriptible" right to decide its own fate and its unification."

This was the realization by the Soviet Government of one of the paramount points of the Russian revolutionary program. But there were also other reasons for the formula given above. The Bolshevik party thought, at that time, that the revolutionary movement would sweep Europe (the concept of "Socialism in one country" did not exist at that time). The Russian Bolsheviks were particularly anxious about the success of the revolution in Germany, as it was generally thought then that the Russian revolution could not succeed unless the German revolution also succeeded and spread into European revolution. As Poland stood astride the way from Russia to Germany, the Bolsheviks desired revolutionary success in Poland, as the belt separating Russia from the West.

At that time Poland was ruled by Pilsudski. He was one of those who were dominated by the traditional dislike of Poles for Russia, and he was also strongly suspicious of Russia. He considered it of utmost importance that Poland be separated from Russia by a belt of buffer states, such as an independent Ukraine and White Russia. A great majority of Poles were against a Bolshevik revolution in Poland, and the government was ready to counteract any revolutionary moves. Thus, two tendencies emerged: the Bolshevik tendency to expand westwards and Pilsudski's tendency to create a belt of buffer states between Poland and Russia. The inevitable clash between these tendencies brought the Polish-Russian war of 1920. When both sides were so exhausted that they could no longer wage war, peace was concluded in Riga, on March 18, 1921. This treaty was confirmed, on March 15, 1923, by the Conference of Ambassadors. The Treaty of Riga drew the frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. The line accepted was the result of a compromise. It passed across areas without clear ethnographical character with basic Ukrainian or White Russian population, where Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, and White Russians rubbed elbows in the same villages and townships. Another border was not feasible.

The line suggested in December 1919 by the Supreme Council, later called the Curzon line, was never accepted by Poland. At that time, even the Soviet Government rejected it as unfair to Poland. It is interesting to note that, when the British Government offered to mediate between Poland and Russia, and proposed that the Curzon line be adopted as a temporary demarcation line (it was never suggested as a final frontier), it was the Soviet Government that rejected the proposal of mediation with the argument that the line was exceedingly unfair to Poland, and that therefore no mediation was needed as they themselves were ready to offer Poland a much more favorable frontier line.

The Treaty of Riga, being a frontier compromise, settled the major issues of the war: Pilsudski had to give up his idea of creating buffer states between Poland and Soviet Russia, and the Soviets had to give up the idea of revolutionary conquest of Poland.

**D**URING the eighteen years following the Treaty of Riga, normal relations existed between Poland and Soviet Russia. But they were suspicious of one another. Poland had had some experience with Communist undercover work—Soviet Russia was continually afraid that Poland would become a springboard for a "general anti-Soviet crusade," of which there was much talk at the time.

Russian suspicions became even stronger as Poland moved toward reaction. But the mutual suspicions did not materialize. Communism had no real headway in Poland, and the "general anti-Soviet crusade" became more and more of a legend. That is why, as the mutual suspicions allayed, Polish-Soviet relations

became more and more neighborly. On July 25, 1932, Poland and the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact. On July 3, 1933, a Convention for the Definition of Aggression was signed in London by representatives of the USSR and her neighbors, Poland, Rumania, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. The Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact was extended by the signing of the Soviet-Polish Protocol of May 5, 1934 in Moscow, and was binding until December 31, 1945. On February 14, 1934, M. Litvinov, speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government at a reception given in honor of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Col. Beck, in Moscow, proposed "a toast to the further strengthening of the friendly relations between the USSR and the Republic of Poland." And this continued until the middle of 1939. On May 31, 1939, M. Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, spoke at the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union about "a certain general improvement" in the relations between Soviet Russia and Poland.<sup>1</sup>

It should be noted that Poland, although aware of the Communist undercover activities, and of the possibility of being attacked by Soviet Russia, was even more aware of the danger of being attacked by Germany. It so happened that the Soviet Government never questioned the frontiers outlined at Riga. Germany, on the other hand, including the most liberal political leaders of the halcyon days of the Weimar Republic, insisted continually that she would never reconcile herself to the loss of the Western Polish territories. Thus Poland found herself in a situation in which she had never made up her mind as between her two neighbors.

Poland was one of the safety valves of the European security system. As long as the strength of both her powerful neighbors—Western and Eastern—was checked and kept in equilibrium by the mere existence of the armed forces of France and Great Britain, Poland was able to exist as a safety valve and thus play her international role in the East, as France did in the West.<sup>2</sup>

When Hitler seized power in 1933, the German danger for Poland became more acute. Marshal Pilsudski then secretly proposed to France that a preventive war be made against Germany. Perhaps he realized that the coming changes in power-relations in Europe were making the international role of Poland, keeping the European security system in Eastern Europe, no more possible, thus endangering Poland herself.

The Polish-German non-aggression agreement was concluded January 27, 1934. The semi-dictatorial government of that time sought Poland's security in her bilateral agreements, first of all in collaboration with the Fascist states. It was their guess that Fascism showed the direction of Europe's development. The pro-fascist-minded Col. Beck tried to find security by way of Berchtesgaden talks and Bialowieza Forest discussions. But even the prewar dictatorial régime of Poland was unable to have that program fully realized. The Fascist links of the Polish Government's foreign policy, symbolized by the German-Polish non-aggression agreement, had an important influence on the government's internal policy. These links were not strong enough to make Poland a full-fledged member of the Nazi-Fascist bloc of aggression. Poland did not become committed to Hitler's plans of expansion toward the East. This was impossible as membership in the Fascist bloc was so glaringly contrary to the national interests of Poland that the majority of the Polish people would never accept it. The tendencies of the Polish Government in the field of foreign policy were one of the targets of the constant attack made by the people's oppositional majority. The "Memorandum" of the Polish Labor Movement to the President of the Republic of Poland of 1937, widely circulated in the country, stated clearly:

"At such a time the foreign policy of our State can no longer bind us to nations whose vengeful aggression will soon, no doubt,

<sup>1</sup> See *Polish White Book*, Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London.

<sup>2</sup> This role of Poland was recognized recently by Walter Lippmann. See his article in the *New York Herald Tribune* of August 9, 1943, stressing the role of "two great neighboring states" of Germany, France and Poland in the architecture of the European security system. Wrote Lippmann: "The German question is obviously the paramount question. But it is insoluble of and in itself alone. The moment Messrs. Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt sit down seriously to discuss the settlement of Germany they would find that they had to settle first the position and the role of France and Poland. For Poland stands between Russia and Germany. France stands between the English-speaking nations and Germany."

be directed against Poland, as it has been against others. Upon this decision depends not only Poland's security but her independence and integrity as well.<sup>3</sup>

After the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany, in which Poland played a very unfortunate role, choosing then to seize the Teschen district, it was more and more obvious that European war was approaching. As Poland refused to join Hitler's bloc of aggression,<sup>4</sup> it became obvious too that Hitler would try to play a game with Poland according to the Czechoslovak pattern, before making up his mind about the major blow and its direction: West or East.

It was the time of parallel Anglo-French-Soviet and Soviet-German negotiations, the latter being for several months secret.<sup>5</sup> The logic of the situation pointed to the assumption that both Eastern and Western powers did not believe in avoiding war. Their policy was directed chiefly in trying to determine the direction of the first inevitable blow of Hitler. Both East and West were mutually suspicious, Russia because of the results of the policy of appeasement, and because she was not invited to Munich. Britain and France underestimated Russian military strength and feared the spread of Communism, while Soviet proposals for the Baltic States and Poland did not diminish that fear. The contracting parties did not believe probably in their united action, as they could not get Hitler's "promise" that he would strike East and West at the same time, and they had no confidence in the behavior of one partner when another would be attacked.

For Poland, the only decisive element was her readiness to resist aggression. All the other decisions could be made only by an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement, particularly so, as it was necessary to know what would be finally the attitude of the big powers (experience of Munich). This probably has been one of the reasons for the non-acceptance of Russian proposals for Poland.

The Anglo-French-Soviet alliance of that time does not seem to have been made impossible by Poland, as some people were inclined to think later on, blaming Poland for having refused the establishment of Soviet military bases in Poland and the right of the Red Army to cross the Polish territory. First, it seems evident that Hitler could have struck before Soviet military help could have been made effective. Secondly, the German Blitzkrieg in Poland, in the West, as well as in the East, taught us that only the strategy adopted by the Red Army in Russia—the war of depth—could make the German defeat possible. The Red Army in Poland could not and would not apply another strategy. Third, the acceptance of Soviet proposals for Poland would have been important for Soviet Russia only if it could have made the USSR sure that the first German blow would be to the West, the probability of which was evidently small. This is why it could not have been a substitute for the already negotiated "better tool" to achieve this aim—the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty.<sup>6</sup>

Documents relating to the Soviet proposals, as well as relating to the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, are not public yet. There are, however, indications that the Soviet proposals were of a character similar to their policy of 1939-1940, as applied to the Baltic States and Eastern Poland.<sup>7</sup> And this was probably another reason for non-acceptance of Russian proposals. The opinion of Daladier, as quoted by Arthur Krock,<sup>8</sup> from Ambassador Bullitt's

<sup>3</sup> See *For Your Freedom and Ours, Poland's Democratic Heritage*, Frederick Ungar, New York, 1943, pp. 226-270.

<sup>4</sup> See *Polish White Book*, Hutchinson & Co. (Publ.) Ltd., London, p. 181, No. 159: "M. Beck to all Polish Diplomatic Missions abroad, Warsaw, November 9, 1937: So far no proposals to join the Italo-German-Japanese Protocol (Anti-Comintern Pact) have been received by Poland. In any case, Poland could not be a party to that Protocol in view of her special position as neighbor of the USSR, as well as her objection in principle to the formation of any bloc."

<sup>5</sup> See *British War Blue Book*, London 1939. Speech by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 24, 1939; *The Polish White Book*, London 1939, and Arthur Krock, "How War Came: Extracts from the Hull Files," *New York Times Magazine*, July 18, 1943.

<sup>6</sup> The negotiations started probably late in 1938, as Ambassador Kennedy warned Daladier about it as early as January 1, 1939 for the first time (see Arthur Krock—*op. cit.*).

<sup>7</sup> See Alter Brody—"Behind the Polish-Soviet Break," pamphlet published by the semi-official Soviet paper *Soviet Russia Today*, wherein the author writes about "suicidal obstinacy of the Polish Government in refusing to permit the Red Army to occupy battle stations in 'Eastern Poland.'" This proves that Soviet Russia thought then about defending only this part of Poland she acquired later and agreed to with Germany by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.

report of August 22, 1939, was then that "the Russians had hoodwinked the French and British completely, and even if the Poles had agreed to admit an assisting Russian army, the Russians would probably have found an excuse to conclude the pact with Germany anyhow." It seems to be difficult to understand why Poland could not get Russia's help only by the assurance that she would resist German aggression, as she gained it from Britain and France on that basis alone.

If there has been lack of confidence and goodwill, it has been first of all among the big powers. Poland, in any case, as the September campaign of 1939 proved, fulfilled her duty and her fight was decisive, for another Munich was not to be.

While the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations were proceeding in Moscow, Soviet Russia signed a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939. The Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance followed on August 25, 1939. The Anglo-French Military Mission left Moscow. Thus, the blueprint of the coming war was outlined. The British included the text of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR in their *War Blue Book* in the chapter called "Developments leading immediately to the outbreak of hostilities."

SEPTEMBER 1, 1939, at dawn, Germany attacked Poland. In that uneven struggle Poland alone resisted German aggression with all her power. September 17, 1939, at dawn, M. Potemkin communicated a note of the Soviet Government to M. Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, the content of which the latter refused to take into cognizance, expressing the most categorical protest. The Soviet Government spoke of "the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State"; "therefore the Agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland have ceased to operate" and "in these circumstances the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia."<sup>9</sup> At the same time the Red Army attacked Poland. The Polish Government withdrew its Ambassador from Moscow, protesting before the Allied Governments and before the world, as it did later on in relation to other Soviet decisions and agreements that violated international law and the rights of Poland.

Poland continued to fight the German hordes, as the capitulation of Warsaw took place only on September 27, 1939 and there were other centers of resistance that held out in Poland even longer.

The Polish-German campaign engaged a large part of the German Army and the Luftwaffe. It was not possible for Hitler, as winter was also nearing, to attack further the same year. Thus Poland played an important role. Had she become part of the German system, the time that elapsed between the outbreak of war and the attack on France or Russia would have been probably almost one or two years shorter, respectively. Who knows whether those priceless months given to England and France, and to Russia, did not decide the world's fate? Who knows whether Poland's resistance did not have an influence on the fate of the war similar to the British fortitude in the face of the Blitz of 1940-41, or to that produced by the Red Army's resistance before Moscow and Stalingrad in 1941 and 1942?

But at the time of the German-Polish campaign in 1939, the action of the Soviet Union was practically to assist the Nazis' vicious assault. By September 29, 1939, a treaty was concluded between Russia and Germany delineating what was emphatically called the "final and permanent" border between those powers, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop line. Thus Soviet Russia acquired the Eastern part of Poland. So far, Soviet policies could be justified by some democrats with the argument that the real value of that move was to create an advance battlefield for the protection of Russia proper, and in inducing Germany to believe that the Soviet Government considered itself safe. But the Russians did not

<sup>8</sup> Arthur Krock, "How War Came: Extracts from Hull Files," *N. Y. Times Magazine*, July 18, 1943.

<sup>9</sup> Quote from the *Polish White Book*.

stop there. As soon as the agreement between Germany and Russia was concluded and regular trade between the countries began, the Soviet Government started to treat the Polish areas it had occupied as "territory liberated from Polish slavery" (that was the official term used many times by Soviet authorities), not as "territory protected from German occupation." On October 22, 1939, elections to "National Assemblies" were arranged throughout Polish territories under Soviet occupation, under the eyes of the army of occupation. These "elections" were preceded by a wave of terrorism against Poles, particularly against Polish democrats and socialists. Only one slate was nominated, no independent candidates being allowed to run, the slate permitted having been prepared by Soviet authorities and consisting mostly of Communists. Under moral and even physical terror, the population was forced to vote. Appearance at the polls was equivalent to voting for the Communist slate. The "National Assemblies" elected by these methods, immediately after convening, petitioned the Supreme Soviets of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia to have their respective areas (so-called Western Ukraine and Western White Russia) incorporated into the corresponding Soviet republics, and thus made parts of the USSR. The petition was, of course, granted, and the areas in question were officially incorporated by being added to the article of the Soviet Constitution that enumerates the constituent parts of the USSR. Thus, the USSR then did all it could to show that it considered collaboration with Germany as a means of permanently increasing its area, though it was done in a way absolutely contrary to international law. No government—with the sole exception of Germany (by the treaty of September 29, 1939)—has recognized the Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland.

In its newly acquired territories, the Soviet Government worked toward the degradation, and uprooting, of the Polish population, with the aim of changing territories with mixed populations into an area with preponderantly Ukrainian and White Russian populations respectively. Even a part of the Jewish population was to be degraded, as the Jewish intelligentsia, Polish-speaking and with Polish culture, and the Jewish Labor Movement were treated like the Polish Gentiles. More than one million Polish citizens—both Gentile and Jewish—were deported compulsorily, from the area occupied by the Soviet, to Siberia and the Central Asiatic region of Kazakhstan. Many were imprisoned, while most were interned in forced labor camps. Even the word *Poland* was hated and forbidden. Even men like Boleslaw Drobnier, a pronounced friend of the USSR, who is now active in the "Union of Polish Patriots" in Moscow, were prevented from starting an "Association of Friends of Soviet Poland." At that time, Polish Communists and Communist sympathizers, Wanda Wasilewska and others living in the USSR and the occupied areas, accepted Soviet citizenship and had to claim that they were "liberated from the yoke of the Polish landowners, and happy under the sunshine of the Stalinist Constitution," at least as a measure of self-protection.

At about the same time, the Germans incorporated the Western and parts of Central Poland into the German Reich, and started mass deportations of the Polish population into what was called a Polish reservation, the General Government.

Future historians will have to say that the policy adopted by both of Poland's neighbors between September 1, 1939 and June 22, 1941, begun by the fourth partition of Poland, was a policy to exterminate the Polish people. At that time, both Soviet Russia and Germany proclaimed that there would be no Poland in the future. It is clear that this policy of the Soviet Government was not conducive to a Polish-Russian understanding. The partitioning powers were astonished at the Poles' reaction. The Polish army was defeated in the field, Poland was partitioned, the Poles persecuted, and millions deported from Poland, but the Polish people continued to exist and struggle. An increasingly efficient underground movement was created inside Poland, and the Polish army abroad became the fifth in strength among those of the United Nations. It was also not expected by Russia and Germany that the Polish Government abroad would retain its constitutional and legal continuity and enjoy the confidence of the homeland as a Government for the duration of the war and the confidence of the

Allied Governments. The participation of Poland in the war was not finished with the end of the Polish campaign in September 1939. Poland has stayed in the war and will stay until the day of final Allied victory. This is one more proof that the Polish problem cannot be solved by conquest and diplomatic trade.

THE time came when Hess flew to England and Hitler attacked the USSR. Almost at the same moment when Mr. Churchill stated Great Britain's readiness to stand by Russia and help her, the late Premier Sikorski broadcast a declaration of mutual aid to Soviet Russia and stated Poland's readiness to let bygones be bygones. It was Poland who was the first to extend her conciliatory hand to Russia. Premier Sikorski foresaw the developments and, long before the German attack on Russia, delivered a memorandum to the British Government stating that, should Russia find herself in the Allied camp, Poland would be ready to collaborate with Russia after the Soviet Government made up for the losses and wrongs caused Poland since the Soviet aggression. Thus the policy of Polish-Soviet collaboration is not opportunistic, but a permanent and constructive element of Polish democratic foreign policy. This line of Poland's foreign policy was obliterated by the fact of German-Soviet collaboration, which culminated in the dismemberment of Poland. At that time, Poland chose to enter the struggle single-handedly, counting only upon the distant help of France and Great Britain. It does not seem possible that anyone could consider this fact "treason" against the idea of Polish-Soviet friendship.

After short but difficult negotiations, undertaken with the help of the British Government, the Polish-Soviet agreement was signed on July 30, 1941. Making up, for the most part, wrongs done to the Poles, the agreement stated, among other things: "the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity."

On the day the Soviet-Polish Agreement was signed, Anthony Eden, on behalf of the British Government, handed a note to General Sikorski, stating:

"On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet agreement of today, I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that in conformity with the provision of the agreement of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland of the 25th August, 1939, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no understanding towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939."

On July 31, 1941, Sumner Welles made a similar statement on behalf of the United States Government.

This was reaffirmed by both Britain and Russia, as late as May 26, 1942, when the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Russia was signed. In Article 5 of that Treaty, both Governments stated that "they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States," in full accordance with the Atlantic Charter, adhered to by the United Nations, including the USSR (United Nations Declaration of January 2, 1942).

Thus it should be clear that Soviet Russia did recognize the status *de jure* existing between Poland and Soviet Russia until September 17, 1939.

A great historic act was thus accomplished, furthering the unity of the Allied and United Nations. For Poland this fact was of paramount importance. One cannot diminish its significance for the Soviet Union too. Poland, "the inspiration of the world," as President Roosevelt described her, showed to the whole world that, despite the greatest of wrongs that one country can do another, it is possible to forgive everything for the sake of the common fight against the common enemy. Poland testified to the whole world, and especially as a Christian nation before the whole Christian world, and before all those who, for the twenty years

of the Comintern's activities, learned to hate Bolshevism, that in this war the first and most important goal is the defeat of the Axis. Poland broke the moral isolation of the Soviet Union and sealed her decision by a personal visit that General Sikorski paid to the USSR, where he signed a declaration of Polish-Soviet Friendship, in Moscow, on December 4, 1941.

AT the beginning, the Soviet-Polish Pact seemed to be the starting point of a really new era in Polish-Russian relations. One could assume that out of the struggle against the common enemy carried on by Poland since 1939, and by the USSR since 1941, a new, coordinated policy would emerge; such a policy that, alone, would be adequate to remove all the old prejudices, making all wrongs really bygones. That is possible, however, when, between partners, there exists not only military partnership, but when the military alliance is strengthened by political understanding, and first of all, coordinated peace aims. The Polish-Soviet rift which later on came into being, is the first and the most evident proof that a combined military and political strategy among the Allies is necessary. It is the first evidence too of what is behind the military unity of a war of coalition. That is why the case of Poland becomes a test-case of the peace aims of the anti-Axis fighting coalition.

Since the very beginning of this war, the big powers have avoided a clear statement of, or have clouded, their peace aims. Some of the peace aims, being basic principles of Anglo-Saxon democracy, as contrasted with totalitarianism, were embodied in the Atlantic Charter without, however, practical interpretation. Attacked Soviet Russia, meanwhile, proclaimed the "war of national liberation" and later adhered to the Atlantic Charter perhaps, in greater degree, as a consequence of the wartime coalition than as a statement of its own peace aims. The big powers, however, were and are now preparing the peace. The forthcoming conference of Foreign Ministers is treated as a preamble to the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin full-scale political conference. It was made clear what will be the real issue of the Foreign Ministers' conference: not only the war that is going to be won, but the peace that must be prepared in advance.

The same applies to Polish-Russian relations. The Polish-Russian Pact was considered by Poland both as a military alliance for carrying on the war and as the basis for postwar collaboration of both countries. Soviet Russia, however, as was shown later by many deeds and facts, considered the pact a useful tool in the first period of her collaboration with her new Allies, the western democracies, and as a military useful step (creation of the Polish Army in the USSR). But as soon as Hitler's first blows lost their momentum, Soviet Russia made it quite clear that she wanted a free hand in the future formulation of her peace aims. In the case of Poland, she ignored to some extent the consequences of the Polish-Russian Pact, giving evidence in diplomatic activities that she took for granted her position and territorial aggrandizement as of June 22, 1941.

According to the Polish-Russian Pact, Soviet Russia had to free all Polish citizens, regardless of their faith and nationality. She started to do this in the first months of Soviet-Polish collaboration. Later, when it was stopped, the Polish Embassy in the USSR was able only to gather information about still imprisoned Polish citizens from those fortunate ones already freed. Then the Soviet Government refused to treat as Polish citizens those Polish citizens of Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian nationality. Then the Jews were deprived of their Polish citizen-

<sup>10</sup> The Soviet Government even arrested and later executed two prominent anti-Fascists, leaders of Jewish workers in Poland, Henryk Ehrlich and Victor Alter. They had appealed to Polish Jews in the USSR to join the Polish Army, and the Soviet Government, by arresting them, gave proof of its "sovereign rights" over Polish Jews. Alter and Ehrlich were accused fantastically of being "German spies," this accusation being a warning to the whole of European non-Communist Labor movement as to what it might expect if it became eager to keep its independence. By the case of Alter and Ehrlich, the Soviet Government tried to open the way to the most unbelievable accusations made against Poland. When the world can be made to believe that two Polish Jews, internationally known Socialists and Labor leaders, are "German spies," it will be willing to believe in any incredible accusation made against the Polish Government, the Polish Army, or the Polish Underground.

ship.<sup>10</sup> All these activities were but an effort to get the indirect Polish confirmation that the consequences of the Russian-Polish Pact, as to the territorial changes, were cancelled. This game finally came to a climax when Polish citizens of Polish nationality were not treated as such. They were "discovered" again only after the Soviet-Polish break of diplomatic relations for furthering the activity of the "Union of Polish Patriots" and the "Kosciuszko Division," acting by the will of the Soviet Government as certain substitutes of the Polish Government and the Polish Army respectively.

There was not enough food and not enough arms for the Polish Army in the USSR, but the Polish Government was placed in a very difficult position because to speak about these facts would have been treated as disclosing military secrets. Being silent, it made possible the Soviet accusation that Poland was sabotaging the common struggle. The same applies to the withdrawal of the Polish Army, which has been done according to Soviet plans and orders. Despite this, the whole proceeding has been presented to the world by Soviet propaganda in just the opposite light.

At the same time, the Soviet Government on many occasions stated indirectly that the Soviet-German agreement of September 29, 1939, as to the territorial changes in Poland, had not lost its validity. The motives were the following: 1. Soviet Constitution. 2. Strategic necessities. 3. Racial basis. Finally, as revealed by an editorial in the British monthly *Nineteenth Century and After* of June, 1943:

"On January 16 of the present year (1943) the Russian Government declared in a note to the Polish Embassy at Kuibysheff, that the exemption<sup>11</sup> in favour of persons of Polish 'nationality' would be withdrawn. The entire population of Eastern Poland was, thereby, declared part of the population of Russia. In the same note the Russian Government declared that the Polish 'claim' to the 'Western districts of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics' conflicted with Russian 'sovereign rights.'<sup>12</sup>

At the first opportunity, unfortunately provided by the wrong step of the Polish Government in appealing to the International Red Cross in connection with the Katyn affair, the Soviet Government "severed" diplomatic relations with the Polish Government. A flow of Soviet accusations followed. Let us discuss these accusations first, as they form a part of Soviet policy toward Poland both in the diplomatic and propaganda fields.

THE most grave accusation made by the Soviet Government is that the Polish Army did not want to fight the Germans and that that is why it was withdrawn from the USSR.

The Polish Army in Soviet Russia was created on the basis of the Polish-Soviet Pact of July 30, 1941, and the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement of August 14, 1941. It was known that 181,000 Polish soldiers (including officers) were taken by the Red Army as war prisoners,<sup>13</sup> thousands of Polish citizens were conscripted into the Red Army during the occupation, and thousands of able military men were deported inside Russia.

Unfortunately, the Soviet authorities did not release every man capable of carrying arms, and, when the Polish Army reached 46,000 by the end of October, 1941, restricted its supply of food to 30,000 men. According to the military agreement, the Polish Army was to reach nearly 100,000 in the first period.

The Soviet authorities did not supply uniforms and shoes, which were supplied finally by British shipments to USSR. There was lack of military equipment, even rifles, for Polish soldiers. One division only was supplied with arms, but even this one was inade-

<sup>11</sup>Exemption of treating Poles as Polish citizens.

<sup>12</sup>The same article, after a detailed discussion of Soviet-Polish relations draws the following conclusion: "The 'claim' referred to was never made by Poland, nor could it have been made. To have done so would on her part have been to claim what was her own and had been recognized as such by Russia herself, as well as by Great Britain. The meaning of the Russian note is clear. It simply announces that with regard to the Polish-Russian frontier the Polish-Russian Treaty of July, 1941, is invalid, and that the German-Russian Treaty of September 1939, is valid once again with regard to the same frontier."

<sup>13</sup>According to the Red Army's paper *Red Star*, September 17, 1940.

quately equipped as it lacked almost all the artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and many other essential weapons. It was clear from the very beginning that the Soviet Government did not want a really strong Polish Army in the USSR. Here we come to the most important reason for General Sikorski's visit to Moscow in the winter of 1941. But even his efforts improved the situation only temporarily without changing the course of Soviet attitude toward the Polish Army in general. Beside this, up to the last moment before the rupture in Soviet-Polish relations, none of the nearly 10,000 Polish officers, prisoners of war in the Russian prisoners-of-war camps in Kozielsk, Starobielsk, and Ostaszkow, had been found. In the diplomatic notes and negotiations after August 1941, the Soviet authorities stated many times that all the Polish prisoners of war had been released. Since April 1940, there has been no sign from these officers, although thousands of messages were sent from the outermost parts of the USSR, where Polish deportees or prisoners were housed.

These facts, not provided by the Polish Government, made much harm and trouble for the Soviet Government when Nazi propaganda started to use them for its ends. The unfortunate step taken by the Polish Government in addressing the International Red Cross in Geneva was misused by the USSR. The Soviet Government took advantage of it and broke diplomatic relations with Poland.

The withdrawal of the Polish Army from the USSR was done twice, in both cases as the result of Russian initiative and desire. The first part (30,000 men) was evacuated in March 1942 as the result of the Soviet Government's decision to reduce Polish Army contingents to 44,000. This could be considered, however, to a certain extent, as in accordance with the Polish-Russian Military Agreement, which provided the possibility of strengthening Polish Forces outside Russia. The second evacuation, after which further recruitment was prohibited, had no justification at all in the Polish-Russian Military Agreement. The evacuation was ordered by the Soviet Government in spite of the tragic efforts of the late General Sikorski to keep the Polish Army in Russia. This evacuation took place in August 1942.

In the light of these facts, one has to conclude that the Soviet Government, refusing a full-scale recruitment and adequate equipment of the Polish Army, made the creation of a frontline army impossible and then ordered its evacuation. These are the facts behind Soviet propaganda. Nobody, however, is able to provide facts testifying that the Polish Army did not want to fight the Germans. It has proved its readiness many times, as all the Polish people are doing, to fight against Nazi Germany.

From time to time Soviet propaganda has used the argument that, among the Polish soldiers, there are many reactionaries. Certainly there are reactionaries, but it is necessary also to keep in mind that, in every country, the Army is drafted from all its citizens. Every army, be it Polish, American, or British, has its progressives and democrats along with its reactionaries. As far as officers are concerned, it is known that this social group in every country is not prominently progressive, radical, or democratic as a whole. But one should admit that both reactionaries and progressives in American, British, or Polish uniforms were and are fighting and dying in Poland, France, Norway, Africa, or Italy. The same applies to the Polish Army. It has proved beyond any doubt its readiness to fight against the common enemy, wherever it had and has a possibility to do so. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government refused to give it this chance.

**A**NOTHER important accusation remains to be dispersed. Soviet propaganda says that the Polish Underground, because of the Polish Government's attitude, is not fighting the Germans. It is no secret now that the Polish people is a real force in the underground. It is no more a secret that the Polish Underground Movement is probably one of the best organized undergrounds in Europe. It keeps close and constant contact with the Polish Government in London and with the political centers represented in the coalition Government.

The Underground's strategy is twofold: it consists, on one

hand, in an everyday struggle to raise the people's morale and to harass the enemy by sabotage and slow-down, and, on the other hand, in preparing for the insurrection that will come at a moment when the underground armed forces and a popular uprising will be able to contribute to the enemy's defeat in conjunction with the operations of the Allied regular armies. None of the great divisions of underground activity is neglected in favor of another.

It is well known that the Gestapo broadcasts appeals from time to time over allegedly underground radio stations to the Poles to rise up in arms immediately. This action, intended to provoke a premature uprising and aimed at the extermination of those *bona fide* Poles who would follow the fake appeals, has never had any serious results. All the harm it has done was to result in the arrest of isolated groups on the fringe of the Underground. Such tactics of the Gestapo are well known.<sup>14</sup>

What Soviet propaganda has been doing for nearly two years, in particular through the medium of the Kosciuszko broadcasting station in Moscow, is to continually call upon the people of Poland to rise up now. Any opposition to these irresponsible appeals causes a considerable amount of name-calling. This method is particularly revolting as it is directed against those who, by their very participation in the underground struggle and their everyday efforts, have given many proofs that, like the Red Army, they are not shunning any sacrifice in the fight against the Germans. Stalin, who showed himself to be the great strategist of this war, has not thrown all the forces at his disposal into one sector of the battle and at the same time. He has proved that he knows how to husband reserves. By the same token, the forces of Underground Poland cannot be thrown into battle before the right time comes. The open uprising against Germany must be timed to suit the military plans of the Allies and must, therefore, be coordinated with them. Thus, Soviet accusations are no reproach against the Polish underground. They are rather a praise of the military and political maturity of the Polish underground army. It is a matter of course that because of the long-range planning of the uprising, immediate demands and immediate aims are not neglected. The following summary of Polish Underground sabotage for the months of January-April 1943<sup>15</sup> proves this:

Type of Incident:	No. of Cases
<b>Germans Killed:</b>	1175
Army officers, civilian officials, and Gestapo agents	124
Other Germans (soldiers and civilians)	1051
<b>Villages Destroyed</b> (inhabited by recent German settlers, destruction usually accomplished by fire):	10
<b>Attacks on Prisons to Free Prisoners:</b>	10
<b>Railway Sabotage:</b>	
<b>Traffic Tie-ups</b>	124
Derailments	32
Rail Destruction	19
Other tie-ups	73
<b>Rolling Stock Damaged or Destroyed:</b>	
Engines	558
Cars and Trucks	2241
of which: tank cars carrying gasoline or alcohol	64
<b>Tele-Communication Sabotage</b>	56

It is impossible now to disclose everything what was and is done by the fighting Polish Underground. The Soviet propaganda takes advantage of this situation and spreads vague or false information about its attitude. There are certain political reasons for doing so, but they have nothing in common with the actual fight against the German invaders in Poland.

The Soviet Government through its propaganda tried to defame or disgrace the Polish Forces abroad, as well as the "underground army" inside Poland, the last one—by its very nature—a large scale, true democratic people's army.

**A**LONG with the campaign directed against the Polish Army abroad and the Polish Underground Movement at home, Soviet propaganda started a campaign against Poles abroad, charging all

<sup>14</sup>I recall that, early in 1942, the International Coordination Council in New York, headed by Frank Kingdon, acting on a motion of the German Socialist, Paul Hagen, submitted a memorandum to the appropriate American authorities, in which the danger of Gestapo-provoked, premature uprisings in the occupied countries was clearly stated.

<sup>15</sup>See *Poland Fights*, No. 47, October 5, 1943.

See pages 9 and 11

of them (with the sole exception of Communists and Communist-sympathizers) of being reactionaries.

The Polish people has never been and shall never be mute as are the people under totalitarian régimes. Progressive and conservative forces have their place in every nation, as well as democratic and reactionary forces. Could one expect that Poland, for several years under the régime of a reactionary military clique with pro-Fascist tendencies, is completely free of them? Soviet propaganda over-estimates the weight and role of these reactionary emigré circles, most of these people being not only outside the Polish Government, but openly opposing it. These circles have nothing in common with the prevailing general democratic feelings of the Polish people in Poland, who are backing the Polish Government. This is why they cannot be considered as capable of producing a change in Polish policy, or as an element sufficient to give the Soviet Government any fears about the future of Polish-Soviet relations. The Soviet Government is realistic enough not to accept the view of some of the Polish Communists or their sympathizers who tried to explain Col. Matuszewski's articles in a Polish-language daily as the reason for the break in Polish-Soviet relations. The articles of Col. Matuszewski and his crowd are harmful. Reactionaries of the Matuszewski type must disappear from Polish political life, but they do not influence the trends of Poland's as well as Soviet Russia's policy. The leftist British weekly, *The Tribune*, with outstanding sympathies for Soviet Russia, wrote these words on May 21, 1943:

"We know that the activities of some reactionary cliques are not able to strain or blur the magnificent and almost unique record of suffering and heroism of which the Poles have been so justly proud. . . . Unfortunately, every nation has the sad privilege of 'possessing' its own reactionary forces."

THE Soviet Government's claims that the Polish Government was reactionary were allegedly one of the reasons for breaking relations with it. If the reactionary character of the Polish Government prevents the Soviet Government from maintaining diplomatic relations with Poland, how could the Soviet Government collaborate with the German Government and its satellites for a year and a half, closing in Moscow the legations of nearly all the conquered countries, and how can it, even now, maintain diplomatic relations with the Japanese Government? The break of diplomatic relations with the Polish Government resulted from other reasons. The Soviet Government reckoned with reality; it was aware who represented the Polish people when, in 1941, it concluded an agreement with General Sikorski and his Government, and not with Wanda Wasilewska, now a Soviet citizen, member of the Supreme Council of the USSR and wife of the Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and head of the "Union of Polish Patriots" in Moscow. Now the Soviet Government is carrying out another policy toward Poland and presents the "Union of Polish Patriots" as allegedly having the confidence of the Polish people. But the Polish people clearly realizes the character of this organization and considers it "nothing but the creature and a tool of the Soviet Government," jeopardizing "the friendly good neighbor relations between Poland and the USSR,"<sup>16</sup> the "Union" being composed of a few Communists and other persons politically irrelevant in Poland.

The Polish Government in London is the legal Government of Poland, accepted by the Polish people for the duration of the war.

<sup>16</sup> Quote from a report of Underground Labor Movement, published in *Poland Fights* of August 20, 1943. This report says: "The 'Union of Polish Patriots' in Moscow is nothing but the creature and a tool of the Soviet Government to interfere with Polish internal affairs. The Polish people clearly realize the true character of this organization, which will never succeed in destroying the unity of the Polish forces fighting the German invader."

"... For the sake of the unity of the Allied Nations in their common fight against the Axis powers, the Soviet Government should put an immediate stop to the diversionist activities of the 'Union of Polish Patriots' in Moscow, which does nothing but jeopardize the friendly good neighbor relations between Poland and the USSR."

"Both in the interests of Poland and the Soviet Union, the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 1941 should, in its full realization, clearly and unequivocally mark the entrance of the two nations upon a phase of true mutual understanding."

"The Polish people sincerely wish to maintain good neighbor relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of respect for Poland's full independence and integrity . . ."

It is a coalition government, composed of those major Polish political groups, or foreign representations, that accepted the democratic standpoint. In the Polish Government, which is far from being the type of Government the Polish Labor Movement would like to see it be, the democrats play the important role. After the tragic death of General Sikorski, when his personal authority was no more present, the composition of forces within the Government had to shift even more to the progressive and democratic side.<sup>17</sup> The representative of the Polish peasants became the Prime Minister; the representative of Labor, Deputy Prime Minister; and the whole representation of the workers and peasants within the Government was strengthened. One cannot say that this Government is more reactionary than many others of the United Nations, with whom the Soviet Government maintains quite good relations.

The changes within the Polish Government had its expression in several friendly declarations toward the USSR. The new Prime Minister Mikołajczyk's declaration of July 16, 1943, and the statement of the new Foreign Secretary, Minister Romer, of September 13, 1943,<sup>18</sup> testify to the profound desire of the Polish Government to continue close collaboration with Soviet Russia.

Would the Soviet Government act toward the Polish Government with the same feeling with which it acts toward the Czechoslovak Government, it would facilitate reconciliation and a real and true Polish-Soviet rapprochement.

The alleged reactionary or anti-Soviet nature of the Polish Government is not the real reason for the fact that the Soviet Government does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government. In his well-known statement of May 7, 1943, accusing the Polish Government, the Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vyshinsky, did not call reactionaries those of the Polish Ministers whom we of Polish Labor would be inclined to question as far as their democratic state of mind is concerned. Mr. Vyshinsky's accusations were directed most strongly against such men as the former Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Professor Kot, prominent Peasant leader, who probably knows too much about the Russian attitude toward Poland and Russia's fulfillment of the Polish-Soviet agreements, but who himself is an ardent follower of these agreements.

The struggle for changes within the Polish Government for further shifting it toward democracy and the Left is a worthwhile fight. Polish Labor does not stint in its efforts, though it knows the Polish People's Government cannot be really established until we are at home. But this fight is not the task of the Soviet Government, or any other Allied Government. It is a purely internal affair, as the Polish people do not seek any changes in other Allied Governments whose individual ministers we may like more or less. This Soviet move caused bad feeling among Poles, especially because the history of Poland knows such facts as the pressure of Repin, Ambassador of the Tsarina Catherine, to recall or appoint Polish Ministers according to Russian desires, which resulted later in the partition of Poland.

If the Soviet Government intends to maintain relations with the Polish people during this war, it has to be done through the good offices of the Polish Government. Any other policy toward the Polish people must be considered as an attempt to meddle in internal Polish affairs, which can hardly be understood as a war necessity. It may be considered as a phase in shaping the future peace policy, and that is, perhaps, the "mystery" of Soviet policy toward Poland.

<sup>17</sup> Johannes Steel, news analyst and columnist, known for his fervent sympathies for the Soviet Union, wrote in the second edition of his book, *Men Behind the News*, the following opinion about the character of the new Polish Government: ". . . On the death of General Sikorski, fears that the new Government might fall into the hands of reactionaries proved to be exaggerated. . . . The new Prime Minister, Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, was one of the leaders of the peasants' strikes of 1937 which tried to force a more liberal policy on Marshal Pilsudski. . . . As his deputy, the Prime Minister has chosen Jan Kwapiński, a Socialist, and the rest of the cabinet has enough men of liberal tendencies to offset the Right wing in the Government. . . ."

<sup>18</sup> Also see the recent broadcast of Professor Kot, Minister of Information, to Poland, of September 30, 1943. With statesman-like realism and obstinacy, Prof. Kot stated: "Poland cannot allow herself to have the 'luxury' of two enemies. . . . Germans always have been and shall remain our mortal foes. . . . so it is natural that Polish relations with Soviet Russia must be based on a durable and honest agreement, which should, however, take into account the vital interests of the Polish nation, its honor and its rights. . . ."

**I**N discussing Soviet accusations, it becomes more and more clear that they are but a tool of a certain Soviet policy. The real issue is the Polish-Soviet difference with regard to peace aims, the Polish-Soviet frontier dispute being only a part of it.

Poland is the only one among the Allied countries that is asked directly or indirectly to agree, in the course of this war, to relinquish a part of her prewar territory. As the Molotov-Ribbentrop line divided Poland into two nearly equal parts, the territory in question constitutes quite a substantial part of Polish prewar territory. This would be not a territorial adjustment, but a new partition. It would signify to the Poles that it is their country that is going to pay for this war, just because one of their powerful neighbors is carrying on a policy of territorial aggrandizement.

At the same time, the Polish-Soviet frontier problem opens the large question of all the European frontiers, on both sides of which there is no balance of power. Why should not other countries ask the same from their weaker neighbors? There are quite a number of similar problems in Europe. This could result, in the period of Europe's liberation, in the greatest possible anarchy, particularly dangerous as it could direct developments in Europe along nationalistic lines and push the regenerated nationalisms of European countries toward new imperialism. On the other hand, the territorial aggrandizement of any of the Big Powers weakens the morale of all the European undergrounds, proving that even those very general peace aims as stated in the Atlantic Charter are only a paper agreement.

When General Sikorski was asked about changes of Poland's prewar frontiers, he used to reply that he and the Polish Government represented and spoke for a Poland with the territory she had when she entered the war on September 1, 1939. This point was understood by the USSR when it cancelled the treaty with Germany on the partition of Poland. For moral and military reasons, territorial changes and frontiers shifting cannot be forced on Poland during this war.

For the USSR this problem might be equally important, but for other reasons. As territorial aggrandizement, of course, it means nothing to the immense Soviet Union astride two continents. But it does mean an abolition of certain principles, which may serve as an obstacle toward the realization of possible USSR future policy.

To cancel these principles, the USSR has used many arguments. For quite a long time, after September 1939, the Soviet Government asserted that the Eastern parts of Poland were a part of the Soviet Union. This legalistic standpoint was based on the Soviet Constitution, as amended in 1939. As compared with Polish legal rights, based on international law, it could not be maintained, and then the Soviet Government tried to explain it by strategic reasons. But even this old-fashioned scheme of strategic reasoning cannot be maintained any more, even from a purely military point of view. It seems to be now clear that only through a general and broad system of European and world security can we reach a really stable peace.

The only argument that remains is based on the national composition of the population of the Eastern part of Poland. The only existing statistical data are of the last Polish census of 1931, which—even if amended—together with the historical studies of these territories show clearly that the basic national groups of a large part of Eastern Poland are Ukrainians and White Russians. For many years this population was mixed with a Polish and Jewish population. In that part of Poland, where different civilizations met and conflicted for centuries, strange population conglomerates emerged, as in many other parts of Europe, and in these territories frontier disputes were difficult to solve. These territories (with the exception of Eastern Galicia, which never was under Russian rule) were, as even Warsaw itself, under Czarist Russia's domination before World War I. But even Czarist Russia's national persecution of Poles and Jews could not change their mixed character as far as the population was concerned. From 1920 to 1939, these territories have been within Poland as a result of a frontier compromise.

There is still a substantial difference between Ukrainians and White Russians in Poland and in the USSR. Prewar Poland applied an undemocratic and inconsistent policy toward her Ukrainian

minority, changed later on into terror. While Soviet Russia with even more terror may successfully have produced a new type of Soviet Ukrainians, Poland, as a result of her policy, enhanced a strong Ukrainian nationalism, but economically and socially similar and tending toward Polish conditions. Ukrainian and White Russian peasants and workers in Poland were more inclined, as the Polish workers and peasants are, toward democracy than toward the Soviet régime. During the war these territories were under Soviet rule. Later on, and now, they were under Nazi occupation.

It is certainly true that among the population of these territories there was no sympathy for Soviet Russia, as there was no sympathy for prewar Poland. It is true that the Soviet occupation, especially its economic aspects and consequences, turned a great part of the Ukrainian and White Russian population, and an overwhelming majority of the Jewish and Polish population of these territories, against communist rule. It is true, too, that later a great part of the Ukrainian population, and undoubtedly some of its important groups, as well as some of the White Russian groups, started to collaborate with the Germans. Quite recently some changes have occurred, as the Ukrainians and White Russians seem to be disappointed with the German policy and now begin to turn more toward an understanding with the Poles.

There are reasons to believe that, in a really free and truly democratic new Poland, there will be a place for every inhabitant of Poland, be he Pole, Jew, Ukrainian, or White Russian by nationality. Then, and only then, when they will have real freedom, internationally guaranteed, to make their choice, the Polish people, I believe, will not refuse them the right of self-determination in the final settlement when all other similar European problems will be treated accordingly. It will be then up to them to choose among different possibilities. One of them will be to live within the really democratic Poland, granting them all national autonomous rights and self-government, in the process of decentralization or "internal federalization," which must emerge as a consequence of the democratic development of such countries as Poland, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia.

The Polish Government and the Polish people consider the Eastern part of Poland as an integral part of their country, and thus replies to anybody who has become interested in these territories, particularly during the war. The Polish Labor Movement and the whole camp of Polish democracy shares this point of view, but at the same time they understand that we are living in a revolutionary period. And when the revolutionary wave shakes up the world, many new solutions may be decided, independent of the will of today's Great Powers, because the coming people's revolution will undoubtedly not stop before any frontier. There are no frontiers fixed and sealed for ever, as the world is changeable. In these revolutionary circumstances, the will of the Polish people may find another solution, different probably from those of the framework of today's world, which is everywhere still the world of yesterday. In these circumstances to come, the people of Poland, as well as the other peoples of the world, shall have a rightful share in decisions framing a new and better world.

These revolutionary decisions will have nothing in common with today's bargaining for territories, for which the only basis seems to be the right of power. If the leaders of the United Nations intend to influence and direct these developments of European peoples, they should preserve until this day at least the ideas of freedom and democracy, and the elementary principles of justice not only for the powerful, but also for the weak. Poland, insisting on her rights today, is not an obstacle, but an incentive toward preserving something more than naked force and power. In the case of her Eastern frontier, she is probably an obstacle, to use Edgar Mowrer's words, "to nineteenth century land grabbing."<sup>10</sup>

**A**PPROACHING the differences in the Soviet and Polish peace aims, we must first take into consideration what are the major possibilities of organizing Europe's security after the war is over. The discussions of these problems are so advanced in the

<sup>10</sup> See Edgar A. Mowrer, "Destiny in Moscow," *N. Y. Post*, Oct. 7, 1943.

present period of the war that it may be possible to see the major issues.

There will be, in any case, two Big Powers in Europe: USSR and Great Britain; and the U. S. probably will not withdraw from world politics, which implies its interest in a European security system.<sup>20</sup> Then we face two possibilities:

1. Anglo-American-USSR alliance.
2. Anglo-American alliance on one hand, and the USSR on the other.<sup>21</sup>

The first possibility may develop in one of the two following directions:

- A. Toward international democracy, which will start by any kind of collective security.
- B. Toward World War III, which will start by delimiting the "spheres of influence."

Thus we are presented with three possible courses that I shall refer to as IA, IB, and 2, respectively.

The second possibility means the creation of two blocs with two respective spheres of influence. Thus it represents, from the very beginning, what will develop from possibility IB.

The only conception that provides hope for a better future is possibility IA, the Anglo-American-USSR alliance, moving toward international democracy, starting by a kind of collective security which implies:

I. That the principles violated by Axis countries will not be dropped by the Great Allied countries. The Atlantic Charter should be developed. Freedom, democracy, and international justice must mean the same thing for big and strong nations as well as for small and weak nations.

II. That the big alliance will proceed along the federal line as a useful means of organizing international collaboration and of expressing the opinions of all nations, which must have their rightful share in all decisions, at least those concerning them directly. If the federal system is to work efficiently, it should be built up in several "layers": the top layer should consist of a global world organization; the intermediate layers should be, in Europe's case, an European organization; and the bottom layers should consist of several regional organizations within the European framework.

As long as the American position cannot be defined, Britain may play a double game, trying to be a bridge between the U. S. and the USSR. But Britain may be obliged to choose finally an Anglo-Soviet alliance, if threatened by the U. S.'s withdrawal from Europe. On the other hand, as long as the USSR is carrying on an independent policy of her own, the other two may think in terms of appeasing the USSR by dropping certain principles at her request which may also imply territorial concessions to the USSR.

Great Britain and the U. S. are playing between possibilities IA and IB. Some elements, however, within these two countries prefer possibility 2. Those elements back all deals with Darlans and Badoglio. The USSR is playing between possibilities IB and 2, and perhaps her high military officials, in particular, would even prefer possibility 2 as a consequence of the Red Army successes.

Possibility 2 is envisaged for Britain and the U. S.—in the face of Soviet military successes—as a possibility for the USSR becoming master of Europe, particularly as different Moscow "Free Committees" are already tools of this policy. That is becoming more and more possible in the face of all the Allied deals with semi-Fascist and reactionary cliques directing the progressive forces of Europe more and more toward the USSR as a "better solution" than Darlans and Badoglio. But if so, the situation will be governed by USSR policy, and not by these people in Europe who *volens nolens*—will only serve Soviet State policy.

At the same time, the full military strength of the Allies is not in action. The lack of a large-scale "second front" (besides

<sup>20</sup> Of course, in a world system, there is a place for China in a Big Four Alliance. Discussing Europe only, I omit China for purposes of making the scheme simpler.

<sup>21</sup> I am not discussing a third possibility: Anglo-USSR alliance and the U. S. standing alone, as this implies the withdrawal of the U. S. from world politics, which I do not consider very probable.

Italy) might direct Britain and the U. S. toward concessions to the USSR to make Soviet Russia's choice to be not possibility 2, but eventually possibility IB. As possibility IB will sooner or later develop into possibility 2, roughly speaking, the price that might be paid to the USSR will be equal to the difference between possibilities IA and IB. In concrete language, it will be the matter of granting to the USSR the exclusive right to control Central and Eastern Europe as her sphere of influence. As, however, control over Eastern Europe brings the USSR close to Germany, the further implication of such a deal becomes obvious, as "it is impossible to abandon Eastern and South Eastern Europe without abandoning all Europe."<sup>22</sup>

What is the position of Poland? Let all the prejudice toward Russia be of the past. With all the good will for collaboration with the USSR and with the same good will for collaboration with Britain and USA, Poland should and must favor exclusively possibility IA.

In spite of all the non-democratic trends in Polish prewar policy, there is in Poland a long tradition that she can only be really free when freedom, democracy, and justice prevail in Europe. At the same time, here lies the problem of Poland's internal freedom too, as power politics of spheres of influence always promotes the sharp development of reactionary forces.

All the other possibilities, besides IA, mean for small nations the necessity of becoming satellites of one of the Big Powers, i.e., being at the mercy of one of them. In the case of Poland she will sooner or later become not a friend but a satellite of the USSR, which puppet elements in Moscow are advocating and are ready to realize.

There always remains, of course, the possibility of playing another game to find a "better" place among these satellites. Poland, however, has not abandoned the principles for which this war started, and even the official Polish-language paper in London,  *Dziennik Polski*, wrote recently that "schemes of freedom, independence and love of our country have for us the same meaning, independent of the military situation."

Poland favors the creation of a Central and Eastern European Federation as an element of solution IA, and according to the ideas of the late President Masaryk, directed against any eventual revival of German militarism and friendly toward the USSR, and based on the old Polish principle "equals among equals and free among free" nations.

When there is talk today about Poland's alleged intentions to build a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia, it should be remembered that if Poland ever was a *cordon sanitaire* in post-Versailles Europe, it proved to be a *cordon sanitaire* to protect Russia from Germany. Even if the Soviet-German pact of 1939 is treated as a diplomatic move aimed at gaining time for Russia, every honest man must admit that this was possible too at the price paid by Poland through her decision to oppose German expansion. Poland's armed resistance, short as it was, gave Soviet Russia nearly two years in which to prepare against the coming German aggression. From the Soviet point of view, Poland did her part as a *cordon sanitaire*, not against Russia, but to protect Russia. The Central and Eastern European Federation, including nations with outstanding sympathies for Soviet Russia, will be the best medium to assure for Russia the deep sympathy of all the free nations of this region, a real sympathy as based on real freedom, which is the best protection against any future aggression from the West.

It appears clearly that if Soviet Russia does not like the federal system of security, it is not because she is afraid of Poland, Czechoslovakia, or of a federation composed of these countries and their neighbors, but for other reasons. Perhaps Russia's expansionist plans would be upset by such federal plans. But, on the other hand, Russia is suspicious that, after the victory is won and effort is made to crush Prussian military and expansionist spirit, she will have no guarantee of a real Britain's and the U. S. friendship.

Can anybody conceive of a situation in which Poland, or a Central and Eastern European Federation, would be a danger for Russia, if an international system of collective security is working? Can there be a danger for Russia, for the great power that was

<sup>22</sup> Quote from an editorial on "Poland, Russia and Great Britain" in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, June 1943.

able to withstand the attack by Nazi hordes, from its smaller neighbors, even if they join their countries in a federal system?

What is essential is to organize a system in which the great powers will not organize crusades against one another, and that appropriate safeguards of security, as well as friendship will exist among them. If this state is reached, any federation, world federation and European federation, European federation and regional federations, including the Central and Eastern European Federation, which the concerned peoples so much desire, will be instruments of peace and international collaboration. But if confidence among the Great Powers is non-existent, the victimization of small nations is but a short-lived substitute of security, and a temporary price to pay for temporary peace.

The Soviet vision of the future European order—within possibility 2—is described by Alexander Werth, an eminent journalist and keen observer, full of profound sympathy for the USSR. I quote from Mr. Werth's recent correspondence, cabled from Moscow, for the *New York Times*:<sup>23</sup>

"... There are numerous indications that Russia will continue to maintain a large army... Measures are already being taken for maintaining large cadres of a peacetime army, and young officers are being invited to take up a military career..."

"The propaganda and economic encouragement used in the last years before the war to encourage a solid and large family unit will undoubtedly be resumed after the war."

"One of the most significant educational developments in this respect is the end of coeducation."

"So while a boy is essentially a growing soldier, the girl is a future mother."

"Thus Russia, judging from the latest trends in education, will be essentially a country of technically efficient and military prepared men and of family and child-conscious womanhood."

"They are a nation of patriots..."

"They respect the capitalism that works efficiently and as a social service to the community and not merely for profit."

This is a blueprint for the future. Mr. Werth assumes that Russia intends to include about one-third—or even more—of what constituted prewar Central-Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union. Mr. Werth adds that Soviet Russia will be eager to see half of Poland independent, "provided, however, that she does not end by becoming the nucleus of an Eastern European Federation."

Among many Russian opinions dealing with international politics, there are some that openly come out against any kind of international federal organization on whatever scale.<sup>24</sup> Quite recently the Soviet periodical *War and the Working Class* published an article on this question. That article has been reprinted in this country by the "Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the USSR," of August 24, 1943. The article states:

"Anti-democratic and semi-fascist elements are striving to prevent the participation of the USSR in the organization of the post-war world, setting up the most fantastic plans in this direction, plans obviously hostile to the Soviet Union. There are quite a few such plans, starting with the plan for creating a Europe divided into various federations, confederations and regional blocs of States."

The point of view taken by that article is confirmed by another—and later—article published in the same magazine and partly reprinted in the September 20, 1943 issue of the *New York Times*.

The Soviet official policy toward small countries of Central and Eastern Europe consists now of an offer of bilateral pacts of friendship and mutual assistance, a model of which is assumed to be the proposed Soviet-Czechoslovak pact. Bilateral agreements can mean only that nobody else would be interested in them, that all these countries would enter the exclusive Soviet sphere of influence.

In this light, there is not much doubt about it, the role of a great alliance will be to delimit "supra-Lebensräume." Here again, the aims of Soviet policy appear to be in possibility 2.

In spite of many ideological misunderstandings, this kind of policy is met in the most logical and—let me say—cynical way

<sup>23</sup> *New York Times Magazine*, August 15, 1943.

<sup>24</sup> One has to remember that the USSR considers herself as a "federation" or "Union" of nations.

by the most reactionary forces in this country and Britain. A recent editorial of the *New York Daily News*, September 16, 1943, says:

"... we must find out what Russia wants in payment for her fight, and we must be realistic about it."

"If Russia wants, as is now supposed, something like the old Czarist boundaries—including Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and a large chunk of Poland—we'd better concede to her wishes, rather than stick to the Atlantic Charter."

"The Poland that was resurrected from the last war was in reality an artificial state. The Versailles Treaty and other pacts of the times, creating an enlarged Roumania, a synthetic Czechoslovakia and an arbitrarily bounded Yugoslavia, at the same time created, as we know now, the certainty of future trouble."

If all the international forces that advocate this kind of solution come together, and if they will decide the victory will bring again the late Prime Minister Chamberlain's "peace for our times," it would be perhaps not for much longer than that brought by him from Munich.

And then the peoples of Europe will have before them only one possibility—the revolutionary struggle for their freedom against a new "Holy Alliance," more oppressive probably than that of the 19th century. I hope and am confident that they will have at their side all really progressive and liberal forces of Britain and America and of all the world. The fight for the world of Roosevelt's four freedoms and Wallace's century of the common man will start from the beginning.

A tragic perspective is in sight, but it is still a chance to choose the way of freedom, democracy, and justice. The eyes of the world are directed toward the Moscow conference and the ideas that will prevail there, and to the expected Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference. There is still a chance that the so-called realism of power politics will not overshadow those strong and mature closing words of the recent issue of *Foreign Policy Reports* devoted to "The USSR and Post War Europe":<sup>25</sup>

"It is essential that those in all countries who are concerned about post-war reconstruction should oppose territorial aggrandizement by any one of the great powers, including Russia, and insist that the problems created by the co-existence, side by side, of great and small nations should be adjusted through orderly processes of negotiation and mutual adjustment. This policy should be determined not by our fear of Britain and Russia, or their fear of us, but by the realization that, if each great power acts without consideration for the rights and interests of others, there will be nothing but anarchy; and that if there is anarchy in the wake of war, the hopes of Britain, Russia and the United States, and of all other countries, for a stable peace cannot but be frustrated. The great powers will have an opportunity, after this war, to turn over a new leaf in international practice. And unless we all turn the new leaf over together, undeterred by remaining mutual doubts about each other's political and economic system, we all risk slipping back into the malpractices of the past, which can only lead us to further catastrophes."

ON the basis of democratic principles, applied subsequently to international relations (collective security), there are no essential differences of interest between Poland and the USSR. These principles are the best guarantee of the interests of Poland, and perhaps of all nations. Within these principles, in their full application, I believe that there is a possibility for a new, and this time better, Polish-Soviet collaboration, leading toward real friendship. That is why the leading Polish Underground Labor paper, *Freedom (Wolnosc)*, as early as February 1942 (III:17) stated openly:

"We want peaceful and good-neighborly relations with the USSR; we want an extensive economic and cultural collaboration between our countries; and this is why we formulate clearly our premises, which are the necessary basis for good relations."

<sup>25</sup> See *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 15, 1943, "The USSR and Post War Europe," by Vera Micheles Dean, published by the Foreign Policy Association, Inc.