INTRODUCTION
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No. 1 From Warsaw I had observed the course of Hitler's machinations and the fulfillment of his aggressive plans vis-à-vis Austria then Czechoslovakia and Lithuania. As stated in my cable of March 12, 1938 from Paris, neither in the case of Austria nor of Czechoslovakia, did I look for support from the Western powers.

No. 2 At the same time, however, I felt that when in turn Poland became the object of Nazi appetite, the Poles could be counted upon to fight, and that by the time Germany's aggressive attention would have turned vis-à-vis Poland, the continental picture would have become so changed as to have prompted the Western powers to lend their support to the first country willing to resist Herr Hitler's apparent determination to redraw the map of Europe.

No. 3 In observing various aspects of Nazi technique vis-à-vis Austria and in turn Czechoslovakia, I discerned the same formula in the preliminary stage of machinations against the latter as had been practiced against Austria. Herr Hitler was still playing on the "right of self-determination" as a pressuring instrument, a political pretext for intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states. By then he had made it a "racket".

No. 4 In a later stage, however, he broke even his own moral code, by deliberately enveloping the Slavs of former Czechoslovakia in his aggressive drive.

No. 5
No. 5 During the course of the foregoing lamentable events, Nazidom's policy was one of divide and conquer, a policy involving the study of and the play on weakness. The formula, moreover, conceived by Berlin's "political engineers" and applied in the cases of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and eventually Poland, entailed in each case, similar tactics by stages: first demands, then hate propaganda, including insults and pin-pricking, then wild accusations, then inspired border-incidents, and finally leading up to shameless, deliberate aggression.

No. 6 As regards the policy of "divide and conquer", (a leaf more than likely taken from the Hapsburg's book) I discerned and appraised as significant, the fact that while Herr Hitler was engaged in waging his campaign vis-à-vis Vienna, (and simultaneously feeling the pulse in London and Paris), his attitude towards Prague was cordial; towards Warsaw unusually friendly. (That Herr Hitler was more friendly towards Warsaw than Prague at this time, augured to my mind, that Czechoslovakia was "next" on Herr Hitler's "political menu").

No. 7 Once Austria was swallowed, Herr Hitler's attitude towards Prague changed from friendly to frigid; thence to ice cycles.

No. 8 Meanwhile, he became even more disarmingly amicable with Warsaw, (an attitude which by this time might be likened to the wolf in "Little Red Ridinghood").

No. 9 When Czechoslovakia had succumbed, Herr Hitler in characteristic fashion "glared" at Warsaw in turn - his next potential victim.

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PIVOTAL EVENTS, FACTORS
AND FORCES WHICH LED TO
WARM
October 16, 1938

No. 1 Polish official circles, shortly after October 16, 1938, informed me confidentially to the following effect:

In conversation with Polish Ambassador Lipski on this date, Herr von Ribbentrop had alluded significantly to the necessity of an early settlement of the Danzig problem, and to the question of facilitating communications, in terms of an autostrada, between the Reich and East Prussia. On this occasion, however, Herr von Ribbentrop had not mentioned the question of extra-territoriality in connection with the proposed autostrada. Ambassador Lipski had subsequently imparted to his Government, his concern over Herr von Ribbentrop's insistence upon an early settlement of these two points.

No. 2 I was aware, moreover, that the Polish Government had been studying various formulae looking to a solution of the Danzig problem, as well as of the question of facilitating German-East Prussian communications across Pomorze.

In this connection, I had gained the impression that Minister Beck and his associates were inclined to prefer a non-extra-territorial autostrada to the then existent numerous routes of communication between the Reich and East Prussia. In that they felt these numerous routes served to facilitate anti-Polish espionage activities, they looked upon the establishment of one main route as affording better
better opportunity to guard against these activities. I furthermore gained the impression that they hoped to trade a Polish-financed non-extra-territorial autostrada for a just and permanent settlement of the Danzig question.

No. 3 In connection with the foregoing, a leading official of the Foreign Office subsequently told me that in studying Berlin's envisaged plans in connection with the proposed autostrada, his attention was drawn to the fact that not only did each successive plan envisage an extra-territorial highway, but also that each plan in turn specified an increase thereof, ranging from five to twenty-five kilometers in width. In discussing this point with Minister Beck, he emphasized his opinion that Berlin's specifications on this score only went to show that Berlin regarded the project more as a strategic factor, than one facilitating communications.

* * * * * * *
January 5

No. 1  Following Minister Beck's return from his January 5, 1939 visit to Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden, I asked him whether Herr Hitler was difficult to talk and deal with personally. Minister Beck replied that on occasions previous to January 5, when he had had meetings with Herr Hitler, the latter had usually evinced a clear and reasonable attitude and a most cordial manner.

No. 2. During the Minister's aforementioned meeting with Herr Hitler, however, he stated the latter was cordial as usual, but in other respects a different man; a discernible change had taken place. In the course of their lengthy conversation, Herr Hitler seldom looked Minister Beck in the eye as had previously been his custom; instead, he kept his eyes focused on the ceiling. (I gained the impression that this conversation took the form more or less of a monologue, wherein Herr Hitler "thought out loud" in a tour d'horizon for several hours).

No. 3  This attitude of Herr Hitler's put Minister Beck on guard. The Minister sensed that this was not the man he had known before, and even during the course of the conference, he realized that Poland henceforth had to be more alert than ever before vis-à-vis Germany.

No. 4  In response to my further question as to whether he thought Herr Hitler was bluffing or meant war, he did not know. Minister Beck observed that Herr Hitler, previous to the
close of 1938, had been confident he could gain his objectives without involving Germany in a war. His easy "bloodless" successes had apparently gone to his head, an effect which had in large measure contributed towards the change which he, Minister Beck discerned on January 5.

No. 5 In response to my further inquiry as to whether among the circles around Hitler, there were any individuals possessing the qualities of real leadership, Minister Beck stated in effect the following: when Herr Hitler had surrounded himself with what now composed the inner Nazi circles some of the latter, like Herr Rosenberg and Herr von Ribbentrop, acted on their own initiative along lines of their own conception. Minister Beck attributed to them the attempt to set up Ruthenia as a center of Ukrainian agitation, for he had been unable to discern Herr Hitler's hand therein. Indeed, Minister Beck felt that Herr von Ribbentrop had become a danger for Herr Hitler's regime in that Minister Beck suspected him of refraining from giving Herr Hitler the correct versions of discussions and communiques. In this connection, Herr Hitler could read only German and was thus at the mercy of translators under Herr von Ribbentrop's direction.

No. 6 Men of the calibre of Herr von Neurath were not whole-souled Nazis, but they carried our Herr Hitler's orders to the letter. Field Marshal Goering possessed the qualities of leadership, but his influence on the direction of German foreign policy was apparently eclipsed for the moment at least, by Herr von Ribbentrop's hold on Herr Hitler.

No. 7
No. 7 Minister Beck went on to say that during his January 5 meeting with Herr Hitler, the latter revealed for the first time that he regarded Field Marshal Goering as his successor. In this connection, Herr Hitler remarked that he regretted that the necessity to concentrate so much labor on the construction of the Siegfried Line had retarded progress on his construction program for Berlin. However, Field Marshal Goering was thoroughly familiar with his program and could carry on in case anything happened to him.

No. 8 After his conference with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Minister Beck and Count Michal Lubienski, his Cabinet Chief, dined with Herr von Ribbentrop in Munich. Minister Beck informed me that during the dinner he had told Herr von Ribbentrop that following all previous conferences with Herr Hitler he had left Germany with a feeling of optimism as to the possibility of coming to an arrangement on whatever Polish-German differences happened to have been outstanding at the moment. This time, however, he was leaving with a sense of pessimism as to the future. Minister Beck inferred to me that he had deliberately made this remark in the hope that Herr von Ribbentrop would repeat it to his Chief. Minister Beck felt, however, that Herr von Ribbentrop failed to do so.

No. 9 From the time that Minister Beck returned from Berchtesgaden, I discerned underlying signs of increasing Polish-German dissension.

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MARCH 1939

EVENTS AND OBSERVATIONS
March ushered in a crucial political period, with a series of pivotal events which from the Polish point of view, proved strategically, as well as in other ways, disadvantageous to the security of the Polish state; in brief, they marked Poland’s partial encirclement:

Occupation of Prague, March 15
Germany’s ultimatum to Lithuania, March 20
Germany’s treaty with Slovakia, signed March 23
Germany’s treaty in connection with Memel, signed March 24

In sum, this spelled the liquidation of one country, and the partial decomposition of another, all within a period of two weeks.

Thenceforth, it became increasingly clearer that the European situation in general was rapidly deteriorating. The Polish-German situation in particular from bad, swiftly to worse. Herr Hitler’s action vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia was interpreted by the Polish Government and military circles, as a breach of Herr Hitler’s avowed code of bringing back within the Reich only people of German nationality. Moreover, these Polish circles felt that this action presaged the possibility of unlimited adventures in Eastern and Central Europe. I became aware moreover, that the above-enumerated series of events between the 15th and 24th of March augured added difficulties for future potential negotiations between Poland and Germany, in that through these actions, Herr Hitler had destroyed the last vestige of confidence
confidence the Polish Government and military circles might otherwise have had in his word.

**No. 3** Partly attributable to Germany's unilateral actions between March 15th and 20th, and partly due to Ambassador Lipski's having discerned signs of an early presentation of German demands on Poland, the Polish Government, on the night of March 20 undertook a "regroupment" of its armed forces, as well as a secret calling up of certain classes of reserves. No mobilization posters appeared; the police discreetly notified the reservists at night time. Several cleverly conceived black-outs in Warsaw served to cover the movement of men out of the city.

**March 21**

**No. 4** I was informed by Polish officials that on March 21, Herr von Ribbentrop verbally communicated in behalf of his Government the following "proposal" to the Polish Government:

1. Danzig's return to the Reich.
2. Extra-territorial railway line and autostrada between East Prussia and the Reich.
3. The Reich in exchange was willing to recognize the whole of the Polish Corridor and the whole of Poland's Western frontier.
4. The Reich would recognize the maintainance of Poland's economic interests in Danzig.
5. The Reich would recognize the settlement of the outstanding economic and communications problems arising for Poland out of the union of Danzig with the Reich.

**No. 5**
No. 5  In Herr von Ribbentrop's conversation with Ambassador Lipski on this occasion he stressed the importance of speed in the settlement of these questions as a condition of the Reich's maintaining its proposals in force in their entirety.

No. 6  Minister Beck subsequently told me that his Government was surprised by the urgency with which these proposals were presented, and the circumstances under which they were made, however, animated by the desire of maintaining good Polish-German relations, his Government did not refuse conversations, although they considered the German demands were unacceptable in the sense in which they were presented.

March 26

No. 7  Minister Beck informed me that in the interests of a search for an amicable solution of outstanding Polish-German differences in regard to Danzig and the transit roads between the Reich and East Prussia, his Government had that day formulated its point of view in writing to the German Government in effect as follows:

Fully appreciating the importance of maintaining good neighborly relations with Germany, the Polish Government proposed a guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate entity of the Free City of Danzig, the existence of which would be based upon the complete freedom of the internal life of the local population, and the safe guarding of the respect for the rights and interests of Poland. Moreover, the Polish Government was willing to study together with the German Government all further facilities for travellers
in transit, as well as technical facilities in railway and road transit between the Reich and East Prussia.

No. 8 Minister Beck interjected at this point that his Government was guided by the idea of offering to the citizens of the Reich all possible facilities for them to travel in transit across Polish territory without any difficulties.

No. 9 The Minister went on to say that his Government in its writing of that date had stressed, moreover, that it was its intention to treat with the utmost liberality, German demands in that respect with the only reservation that Poland could not surrender her sovereignty over the territory through which the transit roads would pass. Finally, his Government had stated that its attitude in the matter of communications facilities through Pomorze was dependent upon the attitude of the Reich with regard to the question of the Free City of Danzig.

No. 10 Minister Beck emphasized moreover, that his Government in formulating these proposals was acting in the spirit of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934, which provided for the direct exchange of views in problems concerning both countries, entitling each of them to state its point of view in the course of negotiations.

No. 11 The Minister concluded by stating that on the occasion of Ambassador Lipski's transmitting the Polish Government's afore-described reply to Herr von Ribbentrop, the former had replied to Herr von Ribbentrop's question that in view of events which had threatened Poland's strategic position, Poland had undertaken as a precautionary measure,
measure, a regroupment of her armed forces.

March 29

No. 12  An officer of the President's household as well as an official of the Foreign Office, divulged in strictest confidence in effect the following broad outline of Poland's plan of defense: (a) to keep the Polish army intact; (b) to resist as long as possible an attempted capture of Warsaw and/or the "Industrial Triangle"; (c) withdrawal of the main body of Polish forces under cover of delayed action if and when pressure from a potential German attack made it necessary, to the main defensive position, on the line of the strategic Narew, Bug, Vistula, and San rivers; (d) to delay the adversary's advance 1/ until the advent of rainy and wintry weather and 2/ until assistance from Poland's Western Allies might have diverted the full brunt of the German attack from off the Polish front. My informants went on to say that while this was the Polish defense plan in terms of the broad sweep, the Government and the General Staff had decided that, in event the capture of Warsaw by the adversary became imminent, the Government and the General Staff would withdraw from Warsaw - the Government re-establishing its seat in Eastern Poland, the General Staff setting up its headquarters at some point between the newly established Government seat and the fighting front.

No. 15  In other words, allowing for unforeseen turns in the course of a potential conflict, the Polish Government and High Command (a) regarded as their paramount aim: to hold the Polish fighting forces intact, awaiting the
the effects of wet and subsequently wintry weather, and effective action of Poland's Western Allies to alleviate pressure on the Polish front; and (b) had come to feel that they could less afford the loss of any sizeable portion of their first line fighting strength, which would be difficult, if not impossible to replace, than the loss in the preliminary stage of a conflict, of territory and even of their capital, the recapture of which, changed conditions and counter attacks in a later stage might permit.

No. 14 The British Ambassador on numerous occasions between March and the outbreak of war, as well as the French Ambassador and the Belgian Minister, discussed with me the question of evacuating Warsaw in the event the Government decided to move its seat, and the General Staff its headquarters, into Eastern Poland. On these occasions we exchanged ideas as to the most practical methods of transporting our respective staffs, and the kind of clothes and equipment which, as well as provisions, our staffs should take along.

March 31

No. 15 On March 31, Prime Minister Chamberlain announced the assurance of British and French support to Poland "in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist."

No. 16 Between that date and April 4, the date of Minister Beck's departure for London, Berlin directly and indirectly exerted pressure on Poland in an effort to prevent
prevent the Minister's London visit. This was done obviously with a view to precluding the signing of any agreement. Notwithstanding, Minister Beck left on the appointed day.

No. 17 In connection with Germany's efforts on this score, I noted that Berlin resorted vis-à-vis Danzig and the Ukrainian minorities, to what had become its classical pressuring tactics. In fact, I came to consider the condition of a political atmosphere in Danzig as a barometer of the state of Polish-German relations. In turn, the state of these relations were reflected in the relations between the Polish Government and the Ukrainian minority.

No. 18 On April 6, an Anglo-Polish Communiqué recorded the assurances of mutual support agreed upon by both Governments, pending the completion of a permanent agreement. In other words, the result of Minister Beck's meeting in London was a "covering letter". (The Agreement of Mutual Assistance was signed on August 25, 1939).

No. 19 Upon his return from London, the Minister informed me that he had been deeply impressed by the seriousness and earnestness both of Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. He had talked perhaps four hours with each. Their conversations were characterized by a tour d'horizon in general and a discussion of Polish-German relations in particular.

No. 20 Minister Beck reminded me of a remark he had made several months previously to the effect that if war were eventually to be declared on Germany, it would be
be decided in Paris. Now, since his trip to London, however, he said he felt that the point at which it might be decided to declare war on Germany, was about "mid-channel".

No. 21 The Minister concluded his remarks by emphasizing his sense of profound appreciation of London's comprehension of Poland's position in particular and European developments in general.

No. 22 The Anglo-Polish Pact was unique in that it marked Britain's first definite commitment in Eastern Europe. The Pact prescribed that it was for each country to decide when and if the independence were threatened. These provisions placed each contracting country in respect to the other, in a position somewhat similar to the bridge player who watches over the shoulder of his partner while the latter plays the hand. In the current situation it was Britain watching over the shoulder of Poland.

No. 23 In discussing these provisions with me, Minister Beck emphasized that he was profoundly sensible of Poland's responsibility as a partner in the Pact.

No. 24 In the last days of March, the Belgian Minister imparted to me that he and several others of our colleagues had learned in strictest confidence, a general idea of the Government's defense plan. He added he felt that well in advance of any move on the part of the Government and the General Staff to re-establish their seat and headquarters respectively, in Eastern Poland, a train should definitely be reserved for and assigned to the Diplomatic corps in order to
to avoid last minute confusion. He wondered whether I would make some discreet soundings on this score and apprise him of my findings.

No. 25 In response I said that I understood that the Government's plan provided among other factors for transportation facilities for the Diplomatic corps as well as for the various governmental departments in event the Government decided to move its seat elsewhere.

* * * * *
For over one month, the Polish Government received no formal reply to its counter proposal of March 25, (made in reply to Herr von Ribbentrop's verbal proposal of March 21 to Ambassador Lipski). Minister Beck told me at about this time that he had been led to understand that his Government's counter proposals had been treated by Berlin as a refusal of negotiations.

On April 28, however, Herr Hitler delivered an address to the Reichstag wherein he announced that he had proposed to the Polish Government the following:

1. Cession of Danzig to the Reich.
2. Extra-territorial railway line and autostrada between East Prussia and the Reich.
3. In exchange, the Reich would recognize the existing Polish-German frontiers.
4. In addition, Herr Hitler said that these proposals had included two other conditions which the Reich was willing to give in exchange, namely: a 25-year non-aggression pact; and a Polish-German-Hungarian condominium of Slovakia.

Moreover, Herr Hitler stated that these proposals which had been transmitted to the Polish Government on March 21, represented Germany's minimum demands of Poland.

Minister Beck subsequently told me that Herr Hitler's mention in his address of a triple condominium of Slovakia was the first he had heard of that suggestion.
He added that in former conversations only allusions had been made to the effect that in the event of a general agreement the problem of Slovakia could be discussed. As far as Poland was concerned, however, Poland had not consented to carry on such conversations, for it was not Poland's custom to make bargains with interests of others. The Minister also stated that Herr Hitler's mention in his address of an extension of the non-aggression pact to 25 years had not been put forward in any definite form in any of the recent conversations.

No. 4 In this same address as well as in a memorandum handed to the Polish Government on the same day, Herr Hitler unilaterally denounced the Polish-German non-aggression Pact of 1934, on the grounds that it was incompatible with the recent Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance and hence no longer binding.

No. 5 In analyzing the contents of the memorandum and the speech, I was of the opinion that the memorandum represented more or less a translation in diplomatic language of Herr Hitler's speech.

No. 5 In discussing with Minister Beck, later in the day, his and his associates' reactions to Herr Hitler's Reichstag address and memorandum, Minister Beck said in effect the following: Herr Hitler had misrepresented facts in suggesting that Poland had become intransigeant after the British Prime Minister's announcement on March 31 of British "assurance of support to Poland in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which
which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist."

No. 6 The Minister emphasized that Poland had been compelled to take precautionary measures for defense in mid-March. Indeed, he was explicit on the date whenon Poland had made its stand vis-à-vis Germany, stressing that these measures had been taken on March 20-21, which was prior to the British Prime Minister's offer of support.

No. 7 The Minister went on to say that in that he regarded Herr Hitler primarily in the light of an Austrian mentality, he thought the latter would still have a flash of reasoning. Moreover, Herr Hitler in his own interests had moved inadvertently in having changed his methods of diplomacy and his diplomats at the same time. He might have successfully changed one or the other separately but having effected the changes simultaneously, it had been a major error. Herr Hitler had been confused and off-balance since he had learned of the Anglo-Polish Pact and had not yet collected himself.

No. 8 It was obvious that Herr Hitler was now trying to create a cleavage between the Western powers and Poland. Minister Beck earnestly hoped Herr Hitler's efforts on this score would not succeed, for if the Western Powers and Poland stood together, they might possibly hold Herr Hitler in check. The greatest danger lay in the possibility that he might be allowed to gain the illusion he could localize a conflict. He might be halted - yet this could
could not be accepted as a foregone conclusion - for Minister Beck recalled that Herr Hitler had remarked to Admiral Horthy, that if matters came to the point whereat he found it necessary to risk war, it was better to have it soon. Minister Beck felt that should this be the mood Herr Hitler might develop in the course of the next few months, it would be dangerous.

No. 9  This the Minister said was in line with his own thought that the Austrian mentality knew how to deal with weakness but became undecided when faced with the necessity of dealing with strength.

No. 10  Herr Hitler had committed a major diplomatic error in having resorted to an open declaration of demands in a public address. Moreover, Herr von Ribbentrop had committed an even greater blunder (for it was his professional duty to advise his Chief) to have permitted his Chief to omit diplomatic channels, after the Anglo-Polish Pact, as a means of exchanging ideas towards ascertaining Poland's position vis-à-vis Herr Hitler's contemplated demands. Indeed, by having resorted to an open declaration of demands, Herr Hitler had given Poland its first opportunity subsequently to make public Poland's side of the case.

No. 11  The Minister then said that he had previously abstained from making public reference to Polish-German differences in order to avoid risking a challenge to Herr Hitler's prestige in view of the potential dangers involved therein.

No. 12
No. 12 Turning to the subject of Herr Hitler's unilateral denunciation of the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, Minister Beck said that his Government could not accept any interpretation thereof which would amount to a renouncement of the right to conclude political agreements with third parties - for this would be practically equivalent to the renouncement of the independence of foreign policy. Indeed, Poland's acceptance of such an interpretation would boil down to Poland's permitting Germany the right to define what corresponded to Poland's interests. As far as this point went, Germany had herself publicly undertaken obligations towards Italy and the German-Slovak agreement of March 1939. These were clear indications of what interpretation Germany had placed on the Pact of 1934.

No. 13 Moreover, Minister Beck said his Government rejected as groundless, Herr Hitler's objections to the alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Polish-German Pact of 1934. The Anglo-Polish Pact had a purely defensive character and threatened the Reich in no way, in fact, no more than did the Polish-French Alliance, the compatibility whereof, with the Pact of 1934, had been recognized by the Reich.

No. 14 The Minister pointed out that the Pact of 1934 stated clearly in its opening paragraphs that: "the two governments are determined to base their mutual relations on the principles contained in the Paris Pact of August 27, 1938".

No. 15 The Paris Pact, a general renouncement of
of war as an instrument of state policy, just as the Pact of 1934 constituted such a renouncement in bilateral Polish-German relations, clearly made the reservation that "every signatory power which would henceforth seek to promote its state interests through war, will have to be deprived of the benefits of the present treaty." Germany, the Minister said, had accepted that principle by signing the Paris Pact, and confirmed it in the Pact of 1934, along with the other principles of the Paris Pact. It followed therefore that Poland would be no longer bound by the Pact of 1934, if Germany had recourse to war in contradiction with the Paris Pact. Poland's obligations, according to the Polish-British understanding, would come into operation in event of German action threatening the independence of Great Britain and consequently in the very circumstances wherein the Pact of 1934 and the Paris Pact had ceased to be binding on Poland as regards Germany.

No. 16 Minister Beck added in this connection that Herr Hitler had no justification for his unilateral decision to renounce the Pact of 1934. He also stated that the manner in which Herr Hitler had abrogated the Pact was a flagrant violation of the provisions contained in the Pact which called for a 6 month's notice by either Government before denunciation. Moreover, the Minister pointed out that the decision to renounce the 1934 Pact had taken place after the previous refusal of the Reich to accept explanations as to the compatibility of the Anglo-Polish Pact with the 1934 Pact, which the Polish Government had intended to furnish
furnish the Reich's representative in Warsaw.

No. 17 Herr Hitler as indicated by the text of the German memorandum, had apparently made his decision on the strength of press reports without consulting the views either of the British or the Polish Governments as regards the character of the agreement concluded. It would not have been difficult to do so, for immediately upon the Minister's return from London he had expressed his readiness to receive the German Ambassador who had hitherto not availed himself of the opportunity. Hence, Poland had had no possibility to discuss its viewpoint because since April 6, the Reich had rendered impossible all direct contact.

No. 18 In reviewing the substance of Herr Hitler's April 28 speech, I was aware that in many respects it was a skillful as well as menacing bit of oratory. Since the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia and previous to his address, reports had indicated that in terms of home public opinion, Herr Hitler's star had gone into a tail spin. However, by this speech, he had succeeded in regaining over night, public favor and had started his star again in the ascendency.

No. 19 Indeed, his play up of "encirclement" proved a popular rallying slogan for Germans of all shades of opinion. Moreover, to internal mass opinion, lacking in factual data, he appeared convincing in his claims as to the great value of the country's material gains. I noted furthermore, that his address, though probably primarily designed to meet demands of his internal situation was at the
the same time aimed at serving external policy as well.

No. 20 In this respect it seemed to me that Herr Hitler was making a subtle bid to detach the Western powers from Poland, and in line with this a bid for renewed intervention of the "peace at any price" elements in Western Europe.

No. 21 As a matter of fact, as early as May 4, the London Times, as I recall it, bluntly stated that Danzig was really not worth a war. One of the leading foreign correspondents in Warsaw informed me the day after the address that London had telephoned him several times asking why the Poles had refused what seemed like reasonable proposals and at the same time adding that in London political circles there was considerable consternation.

No. 22 In my own opinion, I felt that the speech was far from reassuring. As a matter of fact, it served to abrogate two important Facts: the Anglo-German Naval Accord, and the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact.

No. 23 Herr Hitler's allusions, moreover, to President Roosevelt's constructive efforts on the side of peace savored of a play to the home galleries at the expense of dignity and statesmanship.

No. 24 To my mind, his "play up" of "Lebensraum" smacked again, as it always had in the past, of long-range war-like intentions. The very word "Lebensraum" implies to me intended aggression, for boiled down, it indicates a program envisaging the annexation of those resources which the
the country would require for the conduct of war - otherwise, access of these resources might be acquired through normal commercial channels. I considered the speech as a whole mainly in the light of defensive prestige propaganda for home consumption.

No. 25 As to the potential effect of the address I was inclined in the first place to consider it not as a "marking time" dissertation, but one presaging events to come. While the door was left open a crack, it had been slammed on the only worthwhile factor - disarmament. Moreover, I felt that it left Europe in a state of iron tension with alliances the only alternative.

No. 26 Polish Official circles "kept their chins up" in face of Herr Hitler's unilateral abrogation of the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, and did their best to minimize the potential effect thereof. I had the impression however, that the Polish Government's industrialization program was based, more importantly than they were willing to admit openly, upon the Government's hope of maintaining this Non-Aggression Pact in vigor for another year and a half at the least. As a matter of fact, while a large part of the "Industrial Triangle" had been constructed with a notable degree of efficiency (indeed a credit to the engineers and organizers) by the time war eventually broke out, the project as a whole required at least six months for completion - and additional time for tuning into volume production schedules.

No. 27
No. 27 Before embarking on its program of industrialization in the so-called "Industrial Triangle" Poland, I was informed by Polish official circles, was faced with the question as to whether to confine its acquisition of the main part of its armaments' requirements to purchases abroad, or to construct an industrial base of supply thereof.

No. 28 My informants admitted that in adopting the latter course, the Government's decision was partly attributable to optimism as to the duration of the 10-year Non-Aggression Agreement signed in 1934. They believed they would at least have the "Industrial Triangle" a going concern before encountering a definite challenge from Germany.

No. 29 It appeared moreover, that the Government's industrialization program envisaged (a) from a military standpoint, building up a capacity to supply its army with essential arms and ammunition, after as well as before the potential outbreak of war, which the Government felt would immediately cut Poland's access to western sources of supply, and (b) from a social and economic standpoint 1/ creating an industrial balance in/chiefly agricultural state, 2/ creation of additional fields of employment as a contribution towards solving the increasing problem of over-population.

No. 30 As matters turned out, when the challenge came after only five years of the 10-year Non-Aggression Agreement, and war appeared inevitable, construction of the industrial
industrial center had progressed too far to permit a turning back. This meant that funds which might otherwise have been available for the large-scale purchase of much needed armaments, were tied up in the uncompleted industrial development at the time war broke out.

No. 31 As of connected bearing, in a lengthy conversation with Minister of Finance, Kwiatkowski, he remarked that previous to Poland's March regroupment of armed forces, Poland had been on her way towards a gradual raising of the living standard of the masses, and towards economic rehabilitation. It had long been his dream and the object of his strenuous efforts to witness during his term of office, tangible evidence of progress resultant from the combined endeavors of himself and his associates to bring Poland out of "red ink". In a predominantly agricultural state such as Poland, benefits from economic and financial ascendency were slower in reflecting themselves in the lives of the masses than in the more industrialized states. However, little by little he had, during the past year, perceived a noticeable amelioration in the economic structure of the country as a whole. Moreover, he and his associates realistically facing the problem of over-population with which Poland would be increasingly faced during the ensuing 10 years, had determined to diversify the economic structure of the country through an industrialization program which they aimed, among other factors, as a means of creating openings for employment.

No. 32 Then came the necessity to mobilize, forcing
forcing the Government to alter instantly and completely, its comprehensive program of economic rehabilitation. Indeed, in a country with such limited financial means, mobilization to the extent of the present one meant a diversion of the flow of funds from the channels of economic development, into purely defense channels. There was no alternative, for there was not enough money to serve both purposes simultaneously. However, under the circumstances, the Government had decided to protect the state which they had helped reconstruct. There was no course but to prepare to defend Poland's independence through sacrifice.

No. 33 Moreover, the Government was profoundly impressed by the whole-hearted and consolidated support of the Polish people, behind their decision. There was a minimum of grumbling, and the mood and capacity of the masses to make sacrifices for the independence of their country was indeed touching. Mobilization was costing Poland at the rate of 2,000,000 złotys per day. The Government was meeting these costs not with an ideal schedule, but in the most practical manner possible.

No. 34 I was aware that as late as March 7, 1936, Herr Hitler had made a public utterance to the effect that it would be unreasonable and impossible to deny a state of such a size as Poland an outlet to the sea. However, I had frequently received reports from usually reliable sources to the effect that Herr Hitler's plan vis-à-vis Poland...
Poland envisaged the diminution of the Polish state by the annexation of Danzig, Pomorze (the Corridor) and Upper Silesia, as well as the decomposition of the rest of Poland (in line with Herr Hitler's further reported plan to set up a chain of small units, dependent upon Germany, as a buffer between Germany and Russia). I felt that if these reports were well-founded, Herr Hitler envisaged a Polish state reduced considerably in terms of territory, and to about 15,000,000 racial Poles, in terms of population.

No. 35 The obvious inconsistency between Herr Hitler's statement of March 7, 1936, and his reportedly envisaged plan along the aforesaid lines, raised the question in my mind, as to whether, if Herr Hitler eventually succeeded in reducing the size of the Polish state, would he still feel morally bound by his March 7, 1936 declaration as to the reasonableness of a state, the size of current-day Poland, possessing an access to the sea.

* * * * * * * * * * *
MAY

EVENTS AND OBSERVATIONS
May

May 5

No. 1 On May 5, Minister Beck delivered an address before the Polish Parliament, elaborating Poland's case in reply to Herr Hitler's address to the Reichstag on April 28.

No. 2 In general Minister Beck said that his Government regarded the proposals of the Reich, as a demand for unilateral concessions. He emphasized moreover that his country was prepared to approach objectively and with utmost good will any points raised for discussion by the Reich. However, two conditions were essential if the discussions were to prove of real value: peaceful intentions, peaceful methods of procedure.

No. 3 The address moreover reiterated most of the points which the Minister had previously imparted to me in a discussion following Herr Hitler's speech to the Reichstag of April 28, and which I have recited in substance under date of April 28 of this report.

No. 4 On the same day, May 5 moreover, the Polish Government sent a memorandum to the German Government explaining their point of view in reply to the German Government's memorandum of April 28. The Polish memorandum repeated the Polish Government's counter proposals which had been advanced as a basis for negotiation in reply to the German proposals and refuted the German argument that the Anglo-Polish mutual assistance pact was incompatible with
with the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. It moreover reminded the German Government that no formal reply to the Polish counter proposals had been received for a month and that only on April 28, the Polish Government had learned that "the mere fact of the formulation of counter proposals instead of the acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without alteration or reservation had been regarded by the Reich as a refusal of discussions."

No. 5 In addition the Minister developed his Government's point of view on the question of Danzig along the following lines: in refuting Herr Hitler's description of Danzig as a German city whose contacts with Poland were forced upon it by the dictators of the Peace of Versailles, Minister Beck stated that Danzig was not invented by the Versailles Treaty. It had existed for many centuries. (As a matter of fact, Danzig was under Polish domination from 1455 to 1772).

No. 6 As a result, properly speaking, if one were to set apart the emotional element, Danzig was a positive cross between Polish and German interests. The German merchants of Danzig had assured the development and prosperity of that time, thanks to the Polish overseas trade. Not only the development but the very reason of existence of Danzig were formerly due to the then decisive fact that it was situated at the mouth of Poland's only great river, and now to its position on the main waterway and railway line connecting Poland of today with the Baltic.

While
While the population of current-day Danzig was predominantly German, its livelihood and prosperity depended upon the economic potential of Poland.

No. 7 Poland stood firmly on the ground of its rights and interests in connection with its overseas trade and its maritime policy in Danzig. Seeking reasonable and conciliatory solutions, Poland had purposely not endeavored to exert any influence on the free national ideological and cultural development of the German majority in Danzig.

No. 8 Minister Beck stated that he heard a demand for the annexation of Danzig to the Reich. When he received no reply to his Government's proposal of March 26 of a common guarantee of the existence and rights of Danzig, and when he subsequently learned that this counter proposal had been regarded as a refusal of negotiations - he asked himself what was the real aim of it all. Was it the freedom of the German population of Danzig, which was not menaced, or a matter of prestige - or was it a matter of barring Poland from the Baltic, wherefrom Poland would not let herself be barred.

No. 9 He went on to say that the same considerations concerned the communications across Pomorze (the Corridor). Poland had granted the Reich all railway facilities, and had allowed the citizens of the Reich to travel from the Reich to East Prussia without customs or passport formalities. Moreover, the Polish Government had
had suggested the extension of these facilities to road transport - and again the question appeared - what was the real aim of it all. Poland had no reason to obstruct the German citizens in their communication with their eastern province. Neither did Poland have any ground whatsoever for restricting its sovereignty on its own territory.

No. 10 In connection with both questions, the future of Danzig and the communications through Pomorze, it was still a case of one-sided concessions which the Government of the Reich seemed to be demanding from Poland.

No. 11 A self-respecting nation did not make one-sided concessions. Where was reciprocity? It looked rather vague in the German proposals.

No. 12 In Herr Hitler's speech, the Minister continued, he had proposed as a concession, the recognition and definite acceptance of the existing frontier between Poland and Germany. In that it would have been a recognition of Poland's property, indispensable, de jure and de facto, this proposal also could not alter the Minister's point, that the German claims with regard to Danzig and communications across Pomorze remained one-sided demands.

No. 13 In concluding his address the Minister stated that peace was a valuable and desirable thing. His generation which had bled in several wars surely deserved a period of peace. However, peace, like almost all things of this world, had its price, high but definable. He and his countrymen of Poland did not know the conception of peace
peace at any price. There was only one thing in the life
of men, nations, and states which was without price - that
was honor.

No. 14 About 20 minutes after I returned to
my office from Parliament, the Minister telephoned to ask
me whether I thought that he had presented Poland's case
in such a way as to be understood clearly by the Anglo-
Saxon mentality. He then requested me to call on him later
in the afternoon.

No. 16 In the meantime, my inquiries amongst
the known experts on all sections of Polish public opinion,
disclosed that the tempo of public sentiment was considerably
in advance of the calm tone of Minister Beck's address.

No. 16 Later in the day when I called on the
Minister he touched on several outstanding points. He said
that good neighborly relations with Germany had always been
a cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. Hence, the German
memorandum would be studied with understanding and attention.
He felt that Germany's recent demands for an extra-territorial
autostrada and railway had been caused, not by the communica-
tions needs of the German citizens so much as by Berlin's
desire to disorganize Poland and other countries neighboring
on Germany. His envisaged plan vis-à-vis Poland was far
more extensive than his stated claims in respect to Danzig.
Indeed, strategic and lebensraum considerations had played
a larger role than racial considerations in Hitler's desire
for Danzig's annexation to the Reich.

No. 17
No. 17 Just as the cession of the Sudeten area to Germany removed the keystone in the dam in Czechoslovakia, so the cession of Danzig and an extraterritorial passageway across Pomorze to a Germany, whose Fuhrer envisaged himself the sovereign of a pan-Germanic Europe, would prove, as Herr Hitler obviously intended, the barring of Poland from the Baltic, and Poland's consequent economic suffocation leading to Poland's eventual undoing as an independent state and throwing her at the mercy of Germany. In other words, for Poland it was not a question of prestige but of keeping open the national economic windpipe.

No. 18 While Poland in thus taking this strong stand was preliminarily actuated by a desire to protect her own interests, she also hoped thereby to instill in other states a spirit of resistance against Germany's boa-constrictor appetite. Hence, Poland's submission to Germany's demands would undermine the physical and moral forces which Poland was trying to foster. Poland felt that were Hitler ever to be stopped, this was the time to do it, and since Germany's aggressive attentions at that moment were turned on her, it was her duty to "halt Hitler". It was essential at this point to draw the line whereat all countries would resist Germany's aggressive intentions.

No. 19 In discussing the more general aspects the Minister said that Germany had had recourse to a policy of pressure and faits accomplis in Eastern Europe. Now
Germany was no doubt of the opinion that she could employ
the same methods against Poland. Poland however, to all
No. 12 With reference to Herr Hitler's demand
attempts of the kind, would duly answer. No one-sided
for an extra-territorial secession giving POWs, the
decisions would ever be accepted by Poland.

No. 20 It was obvious that Herr Hitler was
exerting great efforts towards detaching the Western powers
from Poland. Moreover, Herr Hitler had evinced considerable
resentment of what he endeavored to make out as Britain's
as a barrier almost as formidable as a broad river,
interference in German aims in Eastern Europe. The Minister
would like to rectify moreover, one statement which Herr
Hitler had made regarding the Non-Aggression Agreement,
wherein Herr Hitler had said that he himself had initiated
it. The Minister was in a position to know that it was
the former Marshal Piłsudski who had actually conceived of
the Non-Aggression Pact.

No. 21 Moreover, were Danzig eventually to
be militarized under German control, this would spell a
German threat to the Port of Gdynia, and all traffic of that
Port. It only took a glance at the map to appreciate that
Gdynia would come within easy range of any high calibre guns
in the Free City. (In connection with Germany's possible
eventual militarization of Danzig, one of Herr von Ribbentrop's
agents who visited Warsaw about this time, remarked to me
that Germany would eventually insist upon Danzig's annexation.
In fact, Herr von Ribbentrop had been known openly to state
that his Government would have to have Danzig by September
at the latest. My informant further remarked that in order
to
to satisfy German mass mentality, a triumphal victory march into Danzig would be an essential requisite).

No. 22 With reference to Herr Hitler's demand for an extra-territorial passageway across Pomorze, the Minister said that the Polish General Staff, having studied the effect of the autostrada in Czechoslovakia, stated that from the military viewpoint, an autostrada in the width envisaged by the Germans, could be made to serve strategically as a barrier almost as formidable as a broad river.

* * * * * *
JULY
1939
EVENTS AND OBSERVATIONS
JULY

No. 1  According to British Embassy circles, General Ironside, during his visit to Poland, had denoted his sense of satisfaction over the Polish General Staff's defensive plan envisaging, when circumstances made it advisable, gradual retirement of the main body of Polish troops, under cover of delayed action, to a main defense position along the line of the Naroe, Bug, Vistula and San rivers. Furthermore, while I was unable to acquire confirmation from official circles, I understood from unusually reliable sources, that both General Ironside and representatives of the French General Staff, had made it clear in Paris as well as Warsaw, that the Western powers could not be expected to render Poland effective assistance for at least three months from, say the first of August.

No. 2. Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Lipski, me imparted to, as an illustration of the increasingly imperialistic attitude of upper Nazi circles that during a conversation a few days before with a German industrial magnet, closely connected with inner Nazi circles, he had made an astonishing remark to him. He had said that Poland, as well as other smaller states, had to come under German domination since their economic structures were complementary to that of Germany. This would be only good business - these were no times to consider sentiment and the rights of smaller nations to independence. This remark, the Ambassador felt, typified the increasingly imperialist view that the inner Nazi circles were assuming.
No. 3  Towards the end of July there arose amongst that part of the diplomatic corps in Warsaw which represented states forming links in the chain of anti-aggression forces, a feeling that further delay in the implementation of the Anglo-Polish Pact with some definite form of financial accommodation, might conceivably serve German diplomacy as an instrument for discrediting London with other anti-aggression forces.

No. 4  Moreover, reports were reaching official and diplomatic circles of Warsaw to the effect that Berlin was maintaining close surveillance over Anglo-Polish relations - and particularly negotiations envisaging the extension of financial and military equipment aid to Poland.

No. 5  Further reports indicate that Herr von Ribbentrop continued to tell Herr Hitler that certain political and financial influences in London opposed to Britain's involvement in war over Danzig or Pomorze, were still sufficiently effective to exert a restraining influence upon the leading members of the British Government.

July 20

No. 6  By July 20, I had come to the conclusion that Europe was headed for war some time before the middle of October - that little short of a miracle could prevent it. I was convinced moreover, that the first stage thereof would be a Polish-German conflict. Accordingly, I felt that we should take at least preliminary steps towards establishing a practical means of evacuating American citizens from Poland.
Poland in event of an emergency. I discussed this matter with the officers of my staff, and with Consul General John K. Davis. They were all in accord with my foregoing views. Following several further conversations between Mr. Davis, Mr. O. Burke Elbrick, Third Secretary of Embassy, Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey, vice consul, and myself, Mr. Elbrick, accompanied by Mr. Bailey and clerk of consulate, Mr. Sadler, proceeded to Brzesko (which we considered to be the most practical center for evacuation, due among other reasons, to its geographical position, as well as to its being an important railway junction), to seek a near-by country place which might serve as a suitable concentration center for American citizens in event of hostilities. After careful search, Mr. Elbrick, Mr. Bailey and Mr. Sadler, returned to Warsaw, and submitted a well-considered recommendation that an estate belonging to Mr. and Mrs. W. Vierzbicki, be leased for the purpose in view. They found it possible to rent the second floor of the rather large manor house, the chapel, and other premises. This place was 10 kilometers northwest of the Brzesko railway. As a result we took an option on this estate, pending (a) further developments in the international and political arena, and (b) authorization from the Department to accomplish a formal lease.

No. 7 In conversation with Minister Bock in the latter days of July, he told me that Poland did not want war. However, if war came, Poland would fight. He felt nevertheless, that peace could still be preserved, but not
at the price of unilateral concessions.

No. 8 At this point he imparted that at a recent meeting of the Council of Ministers, it was decided Poland had a line beyond which she would not permit German infringements. While on that occasion the Minister refrained from divulging what constituted that line, it later became clear that Poland would not tolerate any arbitrary alteration in the political status of Danzig as a Free State. Moreover, Poland would not tolerate interference either with the Polish-Danzig customs union or Polish rights and interests in the Free City.

No. 9 He referred then to Herr Hitler's renunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact, stating that he had asked himself how and why could a new non-aggression pact be expected to give assurance when the Pact of 1934 had been denounced out of hand.

No. 10 By this time, I was aware that while Minister Beck felt that peace could still be preserved, he had not shut his eyes to signs indicating that an eventual German attack was almost unavoidable. I knew however, that he was striving in every way to postpone the hour of a potential clash as long as possible.

No. 11 I recall his having stated on several occasions that if it had to come eventually, he earnestly hoped he could put it off as long as possible - at least until the winter weather set in. He emphasized that the Poles would fight if necessary and if an attack came in the
wet and wintry weather, Poland could defend herself more effectively against the type of warfare to which the German fighting machine was attuned.

No. 12 On each of these occasions he would add that the prospect of another war was lamentable—grim. Two wars for one generation were more than enough. What Poland needed and what he had always hoped to see were at least 15 more years of peace wherein to rehabilitate herself. He would then add that if there were no way to prevent the threatened conflict honorably, the he for his part would do his utmost to gain time for his country and his allies.

No. 13 In conversation with Economic Counselor of the Foreign Office, Mr. Jan Wraszacki, on July 31, I asked him what was the attitude of Polish officialdom and the "man in the street" in Poland towards the United States, in connection with the prospect of war in Europe. He replied that neither official circles nor the "man in the street" looked to the United States for active intervention. While both elements regarded the United States as a great moral force on the side of peace and of the maintenance of the international codes of law and order, they felt the United States was too remote from the scene of European difficulties to assume other than a neutral role at least during the preliminary stage of a European conflict.

No. 14 In a subsequent conversation with
Minister Beck, he expressed similar observations.

**No. 15** Towards the end of July the Polish financial delegation who for some weeks had been negotiating in London for financial accommodation, in implementation of the Anglo-Polish Pact, returned to Warsaw. They were disappointed over the results of their negotiations which had yielded them export credits only. These, they were unable to translate in purchases other than in England where they could not get an immediate delivery in essential military requirements in time to meet a rapidly approaching German challenge.

**No. 16** By this time the Polish Government realized that if they were to acquire the necessities in terms of military equipment before the threatened outbreak of war, they would need cash with which to purchase in the open market, planes and anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, and other vital necessities of war.

**No. 17** Marshal Smigly-Rydz bore out this thought in his remarks which are recounted in a later part of this report under date of August 10.

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AUGUST

FINAL STEPS OF THE CRISIS

A

PRELUDE TO THE GERMAN ONSLAUGHT
AUGUST

FINAL STEPS OF THE CRISIS

A

PRELUDE TO THE GERMAN ONSLAUGHT

No. 1 The end of July led into an August marked by crucial developments. By the beginning of August the situation in Danzig had rapidly deteriorated. It appeared that German diplomacy was exercising all the chicanery at its command to build up a case of an envisaged aggression. The swift march of events in connection with Danzig and the German minority in Poland were drifting towards a situation wherein it was likely that neither side would be in a position to "climb down". German accusations in the persecution campaign inspired by Nazi propaganda increased in tempo and volume. Minister Beck in regard thereto remarked to me that Herr Hitler's technique entailed making a statement - then repeating it a sufficient number of times, to force the reader to believe it.

No. 2 Gradually, the familiar Nazi technique came into full play, reminding one of the days preceding the violation of Czechoslovakia: pin-pricking and baiting incidents along the frontier increased.

No. 3 As over the past 18 years, the Free City had frequently been looked upon as Europe's powder magazine, so now it was rapidly taking its place at the head of the list of "high explosives".

No. 4 I recall that during my visit to Danzig
during the first week in August, my conversation with a leading official of the Danzig Senate, revealed to me the rapidly growing imperialistic attitude on the part of Danzig statesmen, reflecting no doubt the attitude in Berlin. This official said to me that Danzig and the Corridor represented only a part of the question in Germany's mind vis-a-vis Poland - there was Upper Silesia as well, and even the matter of Poznan. He personally liked some of the Poles and realized they saw the question from their own standpoint. However, since the question at issue was a matter of German policy, it would have to be settled on German terms.

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SUMMARY OF CRUCIAL EVENTS IN PERIOD
LEADING TO OUTBREAK OF WAR

August 9  On August 9th, the German Government made a démarche in form of a Note Verbale, to the Polish Government, through the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, which marked Germany's first direct intervention in differences between the Polish Government and the Danzig Senate. In brief, this démarche took issue with the Polish Government over the tenor of the latter's then recent Note to the Danzig Senate. Moreover, the German Government made itself clear in no uncertain terms that it regarded Danzig as a German question.

I recall that before sending their reply to this Note, Minister Beck and his associates weighed the question with utmost care. After consideration of all aspects (and in step with current Polish public opinion), Minister Beck requested Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Arciszewski, to convey to the German Chargé d'Affaires, Poland's reply to effect Poland would regard any future intervention by the German Government, to the detriment of Polish rights and interests in Danzig, an act of aggression. Minister Beck dined with me that night, and informed me of the foregoing.

August 10  As near as I can recall, it was on this date, during the visit of Post Master General Farley and his daughters, that Marshal Smigły-Rydz, General Sosnkowski (Inspector General), General Stachiewicz and officers of
their respective staffs, dined at my house.

In the course of after dinner conversation, Mr. Farley asked the Marshal as to how well prepared Poland was for war in event of a Polish-German conflict. The Marshal replied to effect that in numbers of able and courageous troops, Poland was rich, however, Poland was in serious need of additional equipment both for the air and ground forces. In fact, Poland was more in need of equipment than money at the moment, for the potential outbreak of war would immediately result in cutting Poland's communications with the west, in the Baltic, thereby delaying if not to a large degree, preventing Poland's receipt of raw materials and equipment.

The Marshal went on to say that he was well aware that Poland would have to bear the main brunt of the early stage of any war in the near future. He moreover, realized that this brunt would take the form of an attack unprecedented in fury. He had full confidence in the courage of his troops and in their willingness to resist an attack but he wanted to furnish them with every possible chance to defend themselves with adequate modern equipment, against the form of attack he anticipated.

Referring again to the character of attack anticipated, the Marshal felt that for a period of between two and three weeks after the outbreak of war, the weight and swiftness of attack would undoubtedly tend to disrupt communications and cause a general state of confusion. In fact, Poland would probably
probably be cut off from the outside world during that stage. In the meantime, the Polish armies would be endeavoring to adopt their tactics to the adversary's strategy. He estimated that the Polish forces would be able to readopt their tactics effectively, in about two weeks after the commencement of hostilities. (The first signs of definite victory by Polish forces under the leadership of General Sośnkowski at Lwow on September 15, tended to bear out the Marshal's forecast on the above score, in that General Sośnkowski demonstrated a readoption of tactics during this battle against the German forces. For further details see my observations under date of September 16).

The Marshal concluded by stating his belief that despite anticipated unprecedented violence of attack, the individual courage and persistence of the Polish soldier would eventually enable a reconsolidation of the Polish forces to emerge from what might possibly appear preliminarily to have been chaotic conditions.

**August 11** In the course of the day, I learned from our Consul in Danzig, Mr. Kuykendall, and from Polish official circles, that (a) League High Commissioner, Burckhardt conferred with Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden, having flown there by plane from Danzig, and (b) concurrently, a meeting between Count Ciano and Herr von Ribbentrop took place at Salzburg.

Information subsequently reaching Polish official circles indicated (a) that while there was reason to doubt that Herr Hitler was cognizant of the full text of the Polish response of August 10 (to Herr Hitler's aforementioned démarche of August 9) at the time of his meeting with Dr. Burckhardt on
on August 11, since it was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Berlin only that same day, (b) that there was but little doubt that Herr Hitler was fully aware of the text when he received Count Ciano shortly after his conference with Dr. Burokhardt.

In this connection, I was subsequently informed that reports from Berlin indicated that the contents of the final paragraph of the Polish response of August 10 had thrown Herr Hitler into a towering rage. This, together with other information I received at that time, lead me to feel that while all signs indicated Herr Hitler had already laid out his intended campaign against Poland, this reported fit of anger might possibly have served to hasten his decision to strike. By this I do not mean that had the Polish reply been conciliatory in tone Herr Hitler might have called off his intended campaign, but rather, it might conceivably have served the extent merely of postponing the German thrust for a matter of days or possibly weeks. (Later in the month reports reaching Warsaw indicated that having studied their meteorological reports which forecast a spell of clear weather in the first half of September, the German High Command were pressing for early action, if a march on Poland was to be effected.)

At the time, I gained the impression that: (a) on the one hand, Minister Beck felt Herr Hitler would compromise at the last moment rather than risk coming to grips with Britain and France (moreover, the Minister felt and earnestly hoped, that through diplomatic tactics, he might stall off as long as
as possible - at least until late autumn - what was then assuming the complexion of an inevitable Polish-German conflict; and (b) on the other hand, Herr Hitler was led by his close not advisers to believe Britain and France would intervene in Poland's behalf. If my impressions were correct, then subsequent events proved them both to have been mistaken.

**August 21** Reports reaching official circles in Warsaw indicated acceleration in the pace of concentration of German troops vis-a-vis Poland. Major Colbern, Military Attaché and I had long regarded the degree of discernible troop movements especially in the Breslau-Opeln area, a barometer of Germany's possible military intentions vis-a-vis Poland. By August 21, moreover, our information led us to expect a potential German attack to take the form of a frontal drive from the Breslau-Opeln area in the direction of Warsaw, under cover of a flanking attack from the southwest, driving towards Warsaw.

**August 22** With the approval of the Department of State, I entered into a formal lease for the estate belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Wierzbicki, about 10 kilometers from the Brześć railway station and which Mr. C. Burke Elbrick of my staff, Vice Consul E. Tomlin Bailey, and clerk of Consulate, Mr. Sadler had recommended as an appropriate evacuation center after a careful search of the countryside.

I called a meeting of the members of our Mission and stated in effect (a) my apprehension of the eminence of war, and (b) my belief that we should take steps to notify American
American citizens in Poland that they should make up their minds whether to evacuate or remain in Poland in face of possible hostilities. My associates all being in accord with these suggestions, we subsequently released by mail as of August 22, the following message which had already been prepared before the aforementioned conference:

"1. In view of the recent developments in the unstable situation of which you are undoubtedly acquainted through the press and otherwise, it is suggested that you give immediately serious consideration as to whether in case an emergency arise, you would remain in Poland or depart. In case you should have the intention to depart from Poland in such circumstances, it is further suggested that as transportation and other facilities might be interrupted or made difficult, arrangements for a planned departure should not be delayed too long.

"2. American citizens in Poland are expected at all times to comply fully with Polish law and regulations including the measures promulgated recently for the defense of the country, such as anti-air, gas defense, and similar measures.

"3. American citizens should study carefully all requirements of this nature with a view to being thoroughly familiar with them in case any emergency arises."

August 23 In Moscow, Herr von Ribbentrop and Molotoff signed the German-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression.

President Roosevelt made an appeal to King Victor Emmanuel for intervention in the cause of peace.

The King of Belgium broadcast a peace appeal in behalf of the Oslo States.

Reports reaching Warsaw indicated that the British Ambassador to Germany delivered to Herr Hitler a message from the British Government, and a personal letter from the British Prime Minister. I subsequently learned that the main points in
in the Prime Minister's letter were:

(a) reemphasizing Britain's resolution to fulfill its obligations to Poland;

(b) affirming his willingness to discuss all Anglo-German problems provided a peaceful atmosphere could be created;

(c) expressing earnest desire that a détente might be brought about permitting direct Polish-German discussions on reciprocal treatment of minorities.

The main points in Herr Hitler's reply to the Prime Minister's letter were:

(a) Britain's resolution to support Poland could not modify the policy outlined in the German Government's Note Verbale of August 9th to the Polish Government;

(b) he was prepared to accept even a long war rather than sacrifice German honor and national interests;

(c) if Britain persisted in its own mobilization measures, he would immediately order the total mobilization of German forces.

**August 24** President Roosevelt sent messages to the Polish President and Herr Hitler urging peaceful settlement of differences by direct negotiation, arbitration or conciliation at the hands of a disinterested power.

Minister Beck imparted to me that Polish Ambassador Lipski had an interview with Field Marshal Goering during the course of the afternoon. According to Ambassador Lipski's report, the interview had been most cordial. The Marshal expressed regret
regret that his policy of friendly German-Polish relations had met with failure, and admitted his influence no longer counted in the matter; he added that he did not exclude the possibility of war with Poland. The Marshal, moreover, significantly stated that the main obstacle to any diminution of German-Polish tension was Poland's alliance with Britain. Upon receipt of the foregoing report, Minister Beck, after consultation with President Moscicki and Marshal Smigly-Rydz, determined that if Berlin made any further suggestions along this line, the answer would be decidedly in the negative. This, together with previous reports of like bearing led Minister Beck to look for Berlin to resort vigorously to such methods, in hopes of detaching the Western Powers from Poland, and thus gaining a free hand in Eastern Europe. He emphasized to me his determination that Poland should not be drawn into intrigues of this character.

With further reference to the aforesaid Lipski-Goering conversation, Ambassador Lipski reported that Marshal Goering asserted that Germany, faced with two possibilities: to go along with Britain or with Russia, was forced to go with Russia.

By decree of Danzig Senate, dated August 25, Herr Forster was appointed Chief of State of the Free City of Danzig.

Peace appeal broadcast by His Holiness the Pope.

August 25 I was informed by reliable Polish officials that British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson called on Herr Hitler at the latter's request at about 1:30 p.m. I subsequently...
subsequently learned that Hitler's proposals concerning two groups of questions, in brief: (a) necessity for an immediate settlement of Polish-German differences; (b) an offer of eventual friendship and alliance between Britain and Germany, were presented at this interview. Herr Hitler moreover urged the Ambassador to fly by plane to deliver his proposals to the British Government.

Minister Beck informed me that the President of Poland had that day replied to the peace appeal broadcast by the King of Belgium on August 23. Minister Beck pointed out that in his reply, President Moscicki expressed his admiration for the ideas expressed by His Majesty, and stated Poland had always defended the idea that power, if was to last, could not be based on the oppression of others. Similarly, Poland had always considered the best guaranty of peace to be the settlement of international disputes by the method of direct negotiations based on justice and respect for the rights and interests of those concerned.

The Moscow radio broadcasting station announced that the question of ratification of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had been set back on the Agenda of the Assembly of Soviet Commissars.

An official of the Foreign Office informed me that the Anglo-Polish Accord of Mutual Assistance was formally signed at about 4 o'clock that afternoon. (I later learned that a Polish official who had arrived in London that morning was urged by an official of the British Foreign Office to return immediately
immediately by plane to his country, in that London had received information indicating the stage was set for a German march on Poland on August 26.)

A report which reached official circles in Warsaw indicated that that night, Hitler learned from his Ambassador in London of the signing of the Anglo-Polish Accord.

I was apprised by informed Polish officials that reports which subsequently reached them from informed quarters in Berlin indicated (a) that, comforted by the strategic bearing of the German-Soviet Pact upon his own forward-looking schemes, Herr Hitler was inclined to waver, after receiving the Prime Minister's personal letter on August 23, and (b) that while he was subsequently offended by the news of the formal signing of the Anglo-Polish Pact, tending to consider it in form of a response to his message to the British Government (impacted to the Ambassador at 1:30 p.m. the same day), he was still inclined to waver, and refrained from renewing marching orders which he had reportedly meanwhile countermanded.

It is not inconceivable to my mind that Herr Hitler's hesitance over the next five days was in part attributable to a combination of his report on the formal signing of the Anglo-Polish Pact, and the previously broadcasted announcement of Moscow's postponement of ratification of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Agreement. Moreover, I gained the impression that during those days of hesitancy, Herr Hitler had hopes less for a compromise in Polish-German differences than for a detachment of Britain from Poland.

Reports reaching official circles in Warsaw disclosed that during
during the afternoon, Berlin's telephonic communications with London and Paris were suspended several hours.

Other reports indicated Signor Mussolini had been several times in telephonic contact with Herr Hitler throughout the day.

Moreover, I learned from our Consul, Mr. Kuykendall in Danzig, as well as from informed Polish officials, that the pace of military preparations in Danzig had markedly accelerated.

During the evening I was informed that at about 5 p.m., Herr Hitler asked the French Ambassador to transmit a message to Premier Daladier. In effect this message suggested that France, with whom Germany had no motive to quarrel, should abstain from continuing to support Poland, against whose attitude Herr Hitler complained vehemently.

Polish President Moscicki replied to President Roosevelt's appeal of August 24. In effect, President Moscicki accepted President Roosevelt's proposal, stating (a) Poland considered direct talks between Governments to be the most suitable method of resolving difficulties between states; (b) on basis of these principles, Poland concluded non-aggression pacts with Germany and Russia; and (c) Poland considered also that the method of conciliation through the intermediary of a disinterested and impartial third party was a just method of restoring differences between nations. President Moscicki added that although he clearly wished to avoid even the appearance of desiring to profit by the occasion to raise points of litigation, he deemed it his duty, nevertheless, to make clear that in the present
present crisis, it was not Poland which was formulating demands and demanding concessions of another State.

President Roosevelt made a second appeal to Herr Hitler for maintenance of peace, enclosing the reply from the Polish President.

German merchant ships reportedly ordered by the German Government to remain in or return to German ports.

During the course of the evening, Minister Beck told me that despite an intensification of efforts of German provocateurs to inspire incidents along the frontier and in Danzig, he and his associates would continue not to permit their emotions to cloud their perspective.

August 25  I learned from informed Polish officials that the British Ambassador to Germany flew by plane to London, delivered Herr Hitler's message of August 25 to his Government, and sat in the Cabinet meeting which considered the question of a reply.

Herr Hitler cancelled Tannenberg celebrations.

Reports reaching Warsaw indicated a further exchange of messages took place between Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini.

Major Colbern, Military Attaché and I were informed by Military and Governmental circles respectively, that their reports revealed German troop concentrations vis-à-vis Poland * were reaching a point indicating readiness for an attack.

August 27  Herr Hitler cancelled the Nazi Party "Congress of Peace" at Nuremberg.

Reports reaching Polish governmental circles indicated (a) all German airports closed, and that except for the

* See supplementary note attached to section on military aspect.
regular civilian lines, flights over German territory as a whole were forbidden. All German aviation services were suspended, and (b) rationing was introduced in Germany.

The Polish-German frontier was closed to railway traffic.

The British Cabinet met to consider reply to Herr Hitler's proposals.

I was told by informed Polish officials (a) that the British Admiralty had assumed control of British shipping; (b) that reports indicated France had about 3,000,000 men under arms; (c) that Herr Hitler received Premier Daladier's response to his letter of August 25; (d) that Herr Hitler had rejected Premier Daladier's proposal that one more attempt be made at direct Polish-German negotiations; and (e) that at the conclusion of Herr Hitler's letter to Premier Daladier, he had made the demand that the Corridor as well as Danzig must become a part of the Reich.

In my conversation with Minister Beck in the late afternoon, he stated he earnestly believed Poland was demonstrating its sense of responsibility to its allies as well as to the cause of peace, through restraint which it had practiced in the face of accumulative incidents obviously inspired by Nazi agents in Danzig and at other points along the Polish-German frontier. Moreover, he emphasized his and his associates' determination to keep cool. He furthermore remarked that he had the impression that Herr Hitler had not yet made up his mind to go to war.

British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard, in a later conversation, imparted to me that following inquiries in the matter
matter of German allegations of mass ill treatment of the German minority by the Polish authorities, he had found that these allegations were characterized by exaggerations, if not complete falsification. Moreover, he had already telegraphed his Government at length to this effect on August 24th, and was, previous to our talk, preparing a further cable in the same sense, based upon additional investigation.

In connection with the foregoing, I was aware that the German press alleged that one Mr. Karletan, who had been arrested in connection with the murder of a Polish policeman, was beaten to death and his wife and children cast out of the window. The Manchester Guardian correspondent who subsequently made it his business to check the allegation, told the British Ambassador and a member of my staff, that upon visiting Mr. Karletan in prison, he had found him well, that he had not been beaten, and that the allegations regarding his wife and children were erroneous.

I was moreover aware that in May 1939, a considerable exodus of members of the German minority of the Katowice and Żodz districts took place. Mid-August, according to usually reliable sources in Katowice and Żodz, marked the commencement of a further illegal exodus, under pressure from the German side of the frontier. When a number of them asked to return, the Poles evinced their disapproval, since they held they had reason to suspect the members of the German minority had, during their sojourn in Germany, been schooled in espionage propaganda activities and sabotage. In this connection, the Polish authorities uncovered a training center of this character.
character in Katowice, conducted by the Junge Deutsche Partei and several centers of similar nature in Zodz.

I was aware that numerous Germans were discharged particularly from plants engaged in war industry. However, there were cases drawn to my attention in May as well as August, by plant managers of Zodz, wherein the attitude of individual German provocateurs amongst the combined Polish and German working forces became so obnoxious as to force the managers to discharge a number of the Germans in each case to avoid serious clashes between them and the Polish element. In such cases, moreover, according to my informants, the usually well behaved German element had unfortunately been forced into a false position by the provocateurs, and consequently suffered discharge along with the latter.

My sources of information in southwest Poland held moreover, that many Germans left Poland in order to be on the German side of the frontier, should war break out.

Of pertinent bearing, informed Polish officials maintain that the number of refugees from the German minority approximates nearer the figure of 16,000 to 17,000 than the exaggerated figure of 76,000 alleged by the German press.

**August 28** Late on the night of August 28th, I was told by informed Polish officials that British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson had returned to Berlin. He was received by Herr Hitler about 10:30 p.m. that same evening, and handed the latter the British Government's reply dated August 23, to the German Government’s communications of August 23 and 25.
I was aware that this reply, previous to delivery had been communicated to the French and Polish Governments. Pursuant the Polish Government's authorization, moreover, this reply informed the German Government that Poland was ready to enter immediately into direct discussions with the German Government. (The aforementioned British reply of August 28th, to my mind, represented the key document of the British-German exchange of Notes, in that it announced Poland's declared willingness for direct negotiations, and thus served importantly to place on Germany, the responsibility for waging war).

My aforementioned informant told me moreover, that Herr Hitler, after reading a translation of the text of the communication, stated he would study it, and would give the British Ambassador a written reply the next day.

I learned the following day that during the course of the conversation which took place between the British Ambassador and Herr Hitler, when the former handed the latter the British Government's aforementioned reply, Herr Hitler expatiated on Poland's misdeeds, spoke of his generous March offer to Poland, and stated it could not be reiterated. He said, moreover, that nothing short of the return of Danzig, and the whole of the Corridor, as well as a rectification in Silesia, would satisfy him. Moreover, Hitler held that Poland could never be reasonable, and he spoke of annihilating Poland.

Concurrent events of importance:

The British Admiralty ordered the Mediterranean closed to British shipping.
Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.

The Dutch Government ordered mobilization of army and Navy.

August 29. On the night of August 29th, I was informed by Polish official circles that at about 7:30 p.m., Herr Hitler handed the British Ambassador his reply to the British Government's Note, at the same time offering verbal explanations. The Ambassador thereupon cabled the message to his Government. Later, Minister Beck imparted to me the following: in brief, the message stated that, though skeptical as to prospects of a successful outcome, the German Government accepted the British Government's proposal of direct Polish-German negotiations, provided a Polish plenipotentiary with full powers arrived in Berlin during the course of the following day, Wednesday, August 30th. The communication concluded by stating that the German Government would at once draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves, and, if possible, would apprise the British Government thereof before the arrival of a Polish negotiator.

In response to the British Ambassador's observations that this condition smacked of an ultimatum, Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop both assured him it was only intended to stress the urgency of the moment.

Concurrent events of importance:

The Polish Government issued a protest against the German occupation of Slovakia, stated to have been effected in order to protect Slovakia against the Poles.
August 30th. Scene in garden of Ambassador's Residence, Warsaw.
Women, children and men (not called up for military service)
挖 trenches to serve as bomb shelters.
The Government ordered these dug in all gardens
and other available places.

Another view of bomb shelter trenches in the garden
of Ambassador's Residence, Warsaw.
Diplomatic representatives of Poland, France and Britain, accepted Queen Wilhelmina's and King Leopold's joint offer of mediation.

As a result of urgent requests by the British and French Ambassadors, that the Polish Government postpone its call for general mobilization, in order to avoid provoking Herr Hitler at this crucial hour, the Polish Government reluctantly accepted to postpone the order from 11 p.m., August 29, as was originally planned, to August 30, at 3 p.m. o'clock. On the morning of August 30, Minister Beck, in imparting to me the reasons for postponement of general mobilization orders, stated in marked earnestness that while his Government had consented to comply with the requests of their allies, they had done so contrary to their own realistic views on events current and in-the-making. However, he had agreed with his associates that Poland, fully aware of her responsibilities to her allies as well as to herself, was capable of proving herself a worthy ally under all circumstances. (I am aware this delay in mobilization proved costly to Poland, in that it served to prevent many reserve troops - estimated by Polish authorities at between 350,000 to 400,000 men - from reaching the western theater of operations before the German aerial attacks had bombed the rail junctions, thus crippling east to west transportation facilities).

August 30 I learned from Polish official sources (a) that the British Cabinet met to consider Herr Hitler's last communication of August 29, and sent a reply thereto; and (b) that in behalf of his Government, the British Ambassador
in Berlin delivered an interim response to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between midnight of the 29th and 6 a.m. of the 30th, wherein it was pointed out, among other factors, that it was unreasonable to expect that the British Government could arrange for the appearance of a Polish representative with full powers in Berlin within the course of the following day and that the German Government should not count upon it.

I later learned in effect the following:

1. During the course of the day, the British Ambassador received three messages to transmit to the German Government: the first was a message from the British Prime Minister direct to Herr Hitler: it informed him of having made representations urging Warsaw to guard against frontier incidents, and asked the German Government to take similar precautions. The second, informed the German Government that the British Government's counsel of restraint had met with the Polish Government's assurance that the Polish Government had no intention of provoking further incidents, and it asked for a like attitude on Germany's part. The third, pointed out that the demand that a Polish Emissary with plenary powers come to Berlin to learn of German proposals was unreasonable. It suggested the German Government pursue the normal procedure - to invite the Polish Ambassador to come and hand him the proposals for transmission to the Polish Government. This communication, moreover, recalled to the German Government that it had promised to communicate its proposals in detail to the British Government which would undertake, if a reasonable basis were offered, to
to do its best in Warsaw to facilitate negotiations.

2. At about midnight, (the hour set in the "ultimatum" embodied in Herr Hitler's Note of August 29, as the limit for the arrival of a Polish Emissary with Plenary powers), the British Ambassador called on Herr von Ribbentrop and handed him the British Government's formal reply to the German Government's Note of August 29. In the final paragraphs of this reply, the British Government, in pointing out the necessity of an early commencement of discussions, insisted upon a military standstill on both sides, during the period of negotiations. It expressed, moreover, its confidence in acquiring a like engagement from the Polish Government, provided the German Government gave similar assurances. Finally, it suggested the establishment of a temporary *modus vivendi* in Danzig, of such nature as to avoid incidents which might render Polish-German relations still more difficult.

3. Herr von Ribbentrop's attitude throughout this meeting was, according to reports, markedly hostile and excited, and according to Polish officialdom's subsequent reports, this hostile attitude exhibited by Herr von Ribbentrop became increasingly violent as the British Ambassador conveyed in turn each communication received from his Government during that day.

4. After the Ambassador had finished making his communications, Herr von Ribbentrop produced a lengthy document which he rapidly read aloud in German. The Ambassador thus found it possible to gain only the gist of about seven of the 16 points contained in the document. When, at the close of Herr von Ribbentrop's reading, the Ambassador, pursuant the undertaking in
in Herr Hitler's Note of August 29, asked for a copy of the
text of these proposals in order to communicate the substance
thereof to his Government, Herr von Ribbentrop refused,
stating the proposals were now out of date, in view of the
failure of a Polish Emissary to come to Berlin by midnight.
The Ambassador thereupon observed that in such case, the
clause in Herr Hitler's Note of August 29, to which the
Ambassador had drawn Herr Hitler's and Herr von Ribbentrop's
attention the proceeding night, actually constituted an ultimatum.
Herr von Ribbentrop denied this was the case, and reiterated
it was intended only to stress the urgency of the moment. The
Ambassador asked why then, could Herr von Ribbentrop not adopt
normal procedure; let him have a copy of the proposals; invite
the Polish Ambassador to call on him, and hand him the pro-
posals for transmission to the Polish Government. Herr von
Ribbentrop replied in violent terms that he would never ask
the Polish Ambassador to come to him. Herr von Ribbentrop
hinted, however, that it might be different if the Polish
Ambassador were to ask him for an interview.

About 10:30 p.m., Minister Beck telephoned to ask me to
come to his house. The Minister met me at the door and escorted
me to his living room where we joined a group consisting of
several members of his family and officers of his staff. The
ensuing hours were devoted to an informal review of events
of the day. Moreover, the Minister "filled me in" on details
concerning what had recently transpired between the four
capitals, Warsaw, London, Paris and Berlin. Touching on the
German
German demand for the appearance of a Polish Emissary in Berlin by midnight, Minister Beck stated that neither he nor his associates intended that he should go to Berlin to be treated as another President Hacha.

I left Minister Beck shortly after midnight, the hour which marked the commencement of the heated conversation between Sir Nevile Henderson and Herr von Ribbentrop in Berlin.

August 31 I subsequently learned that British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson was informed during the early hours of the morning of the 31st, that the German Government had decided to issue orders for a march on Poland by 1 p.m. o'clock, should a Polish Emissary with plenary powers, not arrive before that hour. It is conceivable to my mind, that the Ambassador was correct in having attributed a further delay in the attack until dawn of September 1, to a final attempt on the part of the Italian Government to preserve European peace.

In this connection, I later learned that during the course of August 31st, the Duce sounded out Paris and London as to their willingness to collaborate towards a peaceful settlement. While the replies from the French and British Governments were reportedly favorable in principle, lively interest being evinced by the French Government, the replies were not received by the Italian Government until September 1, after Germany and Poland had already come to grips.

The following day, I learned from an informed officer of Minister Beck's staff, that at about 2 o'clock that morning
morning in Berlin, the British Ambassador disclosed to
Polish Ambassador Lipski, the substance of his midnight
conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop, and pointed out that
the plebiscite in the Corridor and cession of Danzig were
the two main points in Hitler's proposals. The British
Ambassador moreover observed his doubts as to whether any
negotiations might succeed if conducted with Herr von Ribbentrop,
and suggested that Ambassador Lipski recommend that his
Government propose immediately a meeting between Field Marshals
Smigly-Rydz and Goering. Following his talk with the British
Ambassador, Ambassador Lipski communicated the substance of
the foregoing to Minister Beck.

During the course of the same night, August 30-31,
British Ambassador to Poland, Sir Howard Kennard communicated
to Minister Beck, the British Government's (a) reply to
Herr Hitler, and (b) comments contained in Lord Halifax's
cable of August 30, to effect 1/ that British Government had
proposed in Berlin a military standstill during discussions,
to which it was hoped the Polish Government would have no
objection, and 2/ that since the Polish Government had authorized
the British Government to say Poland was prepared to enter
direct discussions with the German Government, the British
Government hoped that provided a method and general arrange-
ments for discussions could be satisfactorily agreed, the
Polish Government would proceed without delay.

Following British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard's early
morning telephone call, I called on him at about 8:40 a.m.,

whereupon
whereupon he imparted to me a summary of the foregoing and asked me whether I thought any further peace efforts might be expected to be exerted by President Roosevelt. In response I pointed out that Herr Hitler had failed to reply to messages the President had already sent him, and that I had no indication that the President was contemplating further steps.

Subsequent to the above meeting, I learned from official sources, that about 9:30, British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard, called on Minister Beck. Minister Beck handed the Ambassador the Polish Government's reply to the Ambassador's aforementioned démarche which had taken place during the night of August 30-31. (Count Joseph Potocki attended this conference, in case the necessity arose to translate Poland's reply which was written in the Polish language). Minister Beck told the Ambassador that he would at once instruct Ambassador Lipski in Berlin to seek an interview either with the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the State Secretary, with a view to stating Poland had accepted British proposals. In response to the Ambassador's question as to what attitude the Polish Ambassador would adopt if Herr von Ribbentrop handed him the German proposals, Minister Beck said that the Polish Ambassador would not be authorized to accept such a document as, in view of past experiences, it might be accompanied by some ultimatum. In this view, it was essential that contact be made in the first instance, and that then details should be discussed as to where, with whom, and on what basis negotiations should be commenced.
At the same time, Minister Beck emphasized his opinion as to the importance of securing a modus vivendi in Danzig, permitting release of those arrested, and a resumption of railway traffic. He suggested Dr. Burekhardt might be able to effect this. Minister Beck concluded by repeating what he had previously said to me, to effect, that if invited to go to Berlin, he would of course not go, as he had no intention of being treated as President Hacha.

Minister Beck subsequently informed me:

(a) that in the text of the Polish Government's formal reply (above referred to) which the British Ambassador telegraphed to his Government, the Polish Government confirmed its readiness for a direct exchange of views with the German Government on the basis proposed by British Government and communicated to the Polish Government by Lord Halifax's telegram of August 28, addressed to the British Ambassador to Poland. The Polish Government also expressed its readiness on a reciprocal basis, to give formal guarantees that in event of negotiations, Polish troops would not violate German frontiers, provided a corresponding guarantee were given regarding non-violation of Polish frontiers by German troops. The Polish Government moreover, stressed the necessity of securing a simple provisional modus vivendi in Danzig;

(b) that at noon, following his talk with Ambassador Kennard, Minister Beck telephoned instructions to Ambassador Lipski in Berlin to seek an interview at once, either with the Foreign Minister, or the State Secretary, and inform either or both that Poland would accept the British proposals of August 28, as a basis for direct negotiations. Accordingly, about 1 p.m. o'clock, Ambassador Lipski telephoned State Secretary
Secretary Weisacker to request an early appointment with the Foreign Minister. About 5 p.m. o'clock the State Secretary telephoned Ambassador Lipski to ask him whether he would appear as Ambassador or Embassy with plenary powers, to which question Ambassador Lipski replied he would appear as Ambassador. At 6 p.m. o'clock, the State Secretary telephoned Ambassador Lipski to say that the Foreign Minister would receive him at 6:30 p.m.

I was subsequently told by an officer of Minister Beck's staff, that during the meeting which took place, Ambassador Lipski stated he was appearing solely in capacity of Ambassador without plenary powers to discuss or negotiate, and handed Herr von Ribbentrop a brief communication to effect that the Polish Government was weighing favorably the British Government's proposal for direct discussion, and that a formal answer in this matter would be communicated to the German Government in the immediate future. Neither did Ambassador Lipski ask for the German proposals, nor did Herr von Ribbentrop offer to give them to him. Their meeting which lasted but a few minutes proved, in terms of results, futile. Ambassador Lipski subsequently described the meeting to me as "ceremonious".

Following this occasion, Ambassador Lipski failed in his efforts to establish contact with Warsaw, due to the German Government's having closed all means of communication between Poland and Germany.

At about 9:30 p.m., the German Government radio broadcast their 16 point proposals, in spite of the vigorous efforts (which I later learned) British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson had
had made to forestall the broadcast. I moreover learned that previous to the broadcast, the Ambassador pointed out to Field Marshal Goering that this procedure would probably finally wreck the last prospect of peace. Moreover, when the Ambassador begged the Field Marshal to intervene in the matter, the latter said he could not, adding that the German Government felt obliged to broadcast their proposals to prove their "good faith".

This conversation which, according to the Ambassador's report, was his last one with the Field Marshal, lasted about 2 hours. The Ambassador gained the impression from certain of the Marshal's remarks, that it represented a last effort on the part of the Marshal to detach Britain from Poland. Moreover, the Ambassador augured the worst from the fact that the Marshal was in a position at such a moment to give him so much of his time. The Ambassador felt that since the Marshal, a few days before had been made President of the New German Defense Council (war cabinet), he could scarcely have afforded at such a moment to spare time in conversation if it did not mean that everything down to the last detail was then ready for action.

I later ascertained from authoritative sources that orders had that night been issued to march on Poland.

In Warsaw, Minister Lepkowski, Counselor to President Moscicki, was at Minister Beck's house during the early part of the evening. While listening in to a German radio broadcast about 9:30 p.m., Minister Lepkowski heard the broadcast of Germany's
Germany's 16 point proposals. He immediately imparted to Minister Beck the substance of what he had heard, and Chief of Foreign Office Press Bureau, Skiwski, who had taken down a shorthand record of the broadcast, gave the Minister the details. (This radio broadcast marked the Polish Government's first receipt of the full text of Germany's 16 point proposals). Minister Beck immediately informed Marshal Smigley-Rydz thereof by telephone. Later, in response to Minister Lepkowski's question, Minister Beck stated there was no use in waking up the President, and bothering him with a recital of these points.

In bidding good night to Count Joseph Potocki, Chief of the Anglo-Saxon Division of the Foreign Office, who had dined with Minister Beck that night, the Minister stated in effect that he felt they could go to bed feeling that at least that night there would be no war.

In discussing this with Count Potocki at a later date, he shared my impression that Minister Beck's aforementioned remark to him might conceivably have been attributable to the following thoughts in the back of the Minister's mind: (a) that Herr Hitler, deeming Britain's acquiescence essential to the success of his aspirations might at the last moment refrain from marching on Poland if he became convinced Britain would come to Poland's aid; (b) that in accepting Britain's proposals of August 28 as a basis of direct negotiations with Germany, Poland had given Herr Hitler a face-saving formula for at least a postponement of a conflict with Poland; and (c) that his (Minister Beck's) proposal of a provisional *modus vivendi* might prove a potentially effective card.
I later was apprised shortly before dawn on September 1 that the British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard, received from Lord Halifax, a telegram in response to his own message of August 31 imparting Poland's acceptance of Britain's proposals of August 28 as basis for direct discussions, together with Minister Beck's appurtenant observations. Lord Halifax stated that while the British Government was glad to learn that the Polish Ambassador at Berlin was being instructed to establish contact with the German Government and while the British Government fully agreed as to the necessity of discussing detailed arrangements for negotiations, and agreed to the undesirability of Minister Beck's visit to Berlin, the British Government failed to see why the Polish Government should find difficulty in authorizing the Polish Ambassador to accept a document from the German Government. Moreover, the British Government hoped that the Polish Government might see its way clear to modify its instructions to him in this respect.

Lord Halifax then went on to point out that there was no indication of ultimatum in the report on the German proposals which had been sent by Ambassador Henderson to the British Government, and the suggestion that the demand for the appearance of a Polish Emissary in Berlin on August 30 amounted to an ultimatum was vigorously repudiated by Herr von Ribbentrop in conversation with British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson. If the document had contain an ultimatum, the Polish Government would naturally refuse to discuss it until the ultimatum was withdrawn. Lord Halifax went on to point out that he should have thought that
the Polish Ambassador could be instructed to receive and transmit a document, and to say 1/ if it bore the complexion of an ultimatum that he anticipated the Polish Government would be unable to negotiate on such a basis, and 2/ that in any case, in the view of the Polish Government, questions as to the venue of the negotiations, the basis on which they should be held, and the persons to take part in them, had to be discussed and decided between the two Governments.

In response to the foregoing communication from Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard telegraphed to effect that Lord Halifax's telegram had been decoded at 4 a.m. the morning of September 1, and that Polish Ambassador Lipski had already called on Foreign Minister Herr von Ribbentrop at 6:30 p.m. the previous day. The British Ambassador pointed out moreover, that in view of this fact, which had been followed by the German invasion of Poland at dawn that day (September 1), it was clearly useless for him to take the action suggested.

Several points in connection with the foregoing exchange of diplomatic communications stand out clearly in my mind:

(a) had Hitler honestly desired a peaceful settlement, he could have taken full advantage of the British Government's offer of good offices in the matter of direct negotiations between the German and Polish Governments;

(b) the Polish Government's practice of restraint under trying circumstances, and its further assurances of continued restraint to the British Ambassador in Warsaw, as late as August 30,
August 30, in spite of an intensification of increasingly intolerable German provocation in Danzig and at other points along the frontier, revealed the Polish Government's willingness to contribute its share towards an improvement of the atmosphere;

(c) it seemed unlikely that Hitler believed it reasonable to expect a Polish Emissary with plenary powers, to come within 24 hours to Berlin without even knowing in advance the basis of negotiations in which he would be required to engage;

(d) it seemed that Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop attached more importance to the appearance of a Polish Emissary with plenary powers in Berlin than to the demands contained in the 16 point proposal.

Concurrent events of importance:

In Warsaw, on the night of August 31, I turned on the radio about 9:30 p.m., and heard the announcement of Russia's ratification of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. This engaged my suspicion, lest it serve as a signal to set the German military machine in motion against Poland. This suspicion on top of my previous uneasiness about the situation, prompted me to put in a telephone call for Mr. Kuykendal, our Consul in Danzig. The operator said it would be difficult to complete the call, as lines were occupied to such extent that I would have to await my turn. I let the order stand, requesting her to call me regardless of what hour she could put me through. At about 11:30 I again called the operator, and was told there was trouble somewhere along the line; she thought
thought however, this might be repaired in short order. This
aroused my concern. I thereupon telephoned Mr. Jan Wrszelacki,
officer of the night at the Foreign Office, and asked whether
his night reports indicated that conditions along the frontier
were more than hitherto disturbing in character. He replied
in the affirmative, adding that all along the line, and especially
down towards Katowice, border incidents had been rapidly in-
creasing during the evening. Moreover, the atmosphere in
Danzig was becoming disturbingly more tense.

Immediately following this conversation I sent a cable
to the President and the Secretary, stating in effect that
while the Germans might conceivably still be bluffing, the
situation was becoming more tense along the border and called
for even closer watching than hitherto. As a matter of fact,
I felt that matters had reached a point whereat anything
could happen.

I then retired for what I instinctively felt would be a
night of uncertain length.

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FACTORS CONTRIBUTING
TO
POLAND'S DEFEAT
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TO
POLAND'S DEFEAT

No. 1  In the belief that it would enable the reader to gain a clearer perception of events covered in the subsequent chapters of this report I take occasion at this point to cite below a summary of factors which to my mind contributed towards Poland's defeat:

1. Suddenness of the attack. Fighting commenced between 4 and 5 a.m., Friday, September 1, simultaneously at Danzig and at numerous points along Poland's western and southern fronts. Warsaw experienced its first air raid at about 5:15 a.m.

2. Failure of the British and French as well as the Polish military authorities to visualize the full capacity of the German air force to disrupt communications, to cripple industrial operations and to render general confusion by harassing civilian communities as well as the military forces in the field. As matters turned out, Germany employed between 85 and 90 percent of her total first line air strength, a ratio of 4 or 5 to 1, in relation to the Polish air force.

3. At the commencement of the conflict, the German air force effectively bombed all Polish airplane, spare parts, and motors manufacturing plants, as well as pilot training schools. In fact, within four days after the commencement of hostilities there no longer existed the means of turning out more planes and pilots, and Poland could thenceforth count
count upon no planes other than those in actual use - upon no pilots other than those already trained.

4. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, German bombers continually shuttling back and forth in three broad bands between East Prussia and Slovakia, as well as former Austria effectively bombed all important rail junctions in Poland. This crippling of the main east-west as well as north-south transportation lines was largely responsible for preventing (a) the completion of mobilization which had been postponed for 16 hours at the urgent request of the British and French Governments (according to Polish official circles, between 300,000 and 400,000 Polish reserves failed to reach their assigned positions), and (b) the prompt movement of supplies and munitions and reinforcements.

5. Failure of Poland's system of communications to stand up under the destructive effects of aerial bombardments. It is safe to say that after the first few days of hostilities there was no Central Command. Too much reliance, in my opinion, was placed on mechanical methods such as tele-wiring which events proved impractical for operations in the field against the violent effects of the modern offensive. The inner communicating above ground wiring proved vulnerable to aerial attack and to cutting by parachute technicians who were frequently dropped from planes behind the Polish fighting lines. In brief, this tele-wiring system proved too dependent upon line maintenance to be practical. The field commands were moreover to my mind, inadequately provided with field short-wave radio apparatus and there was a lack of sufficient motorcycle despatch riders and messengers.
6. Failure of the Central Command, when at the outset it became clear that the Polish army was faced with about 75 percent of the entire German armed forces, to execute its original plan to withdraw the main bodies of troops under cover of delayed action to the main defense lines along the strategic rivers. (This plan had gained General Ironsides' expressed approval, according to the British Embassy, during his visit to Warsaw). The Polish army allowed itself to become engaged in pitched battles instead of effecting a delayed action either to cover an orderly withdrawal to the rivers or a maneuvering position.

7. Lack of an organized fortified main line of defense. On September 12, Minister Beck told me that while he had been aware of the desirability of constructing a fortified line of defense along the strategic rivers, Narew, Bug, Vistula and San, he and his associates had realized that the expense involved in such an undertaking was more than Poland could afford. Indeed, it was all Poland could do to raise through its recent internal loan, funds to purchase the bare necessities in terms of planes and anti-aircraft equipment, without permanently crippling Poland's economic structure. Even at that, however, these funds could not be expected to afford Poland adequate resistance against 85 to 90 percent of Germany's first line air strength. In other words, Poland had had to spread whatever moneys she had at her disposal to the maximum extent in terms of war preparation.

8. German air mastery permitted their reconnaissance and bombing planes to uncover and to a large extent prevent
the secret concentration of Polish troops for counter attack.

9. After the first phase of the conflict, the continual German aerial bombardments served to terrorize the civilian communities, prevented the Government from functioning effectively, and harassed General Headquarters.

10. Long lines of civilian refugees frequently cut across the Polish troops on march. This had a demoralizing effect upon the troops in that they thus ascertained that their homes were being destroyed, and their families injured and killed. In many cases, moreover, these lines of refugees requisitioned military rail transportation, and appropriated supplies destined for the army.

11. Failure of Poland's Western Allies to afford relief in terms of diversion activities particularly in the air (I am inclined to believe that this largely attributable to the Western Allies' joint desire to gain equality if not superiority in terms of air strength).

12. The delay on the part of Poland's Western Allies in declaring war on Germany. While this delay is understandable in each case for various reasons, nevertheless, the fact remains that the Poles were rushed off their feet. This delay moreover, served undoubtedly to render Germany confidence that she had no great cause to fear a major attack in the west.

13. The Poles were given no time for revision of military leadership where required or to revise their tactics to meet the strategy of the adversary, or to give their troops a breathing spell. There were many Polish soldiers who never saw
saw a German soldier - only tanks and planes. In most
cases, however, when Polish infantry or cavalry came into
direct contact with the Germans, the former proved themselves
superior.

14. The unusual dry weather which prevailed throughout
Poland previous to and at the time of the conflict, rendered
the country as a whole a sort of dry hard plain which
greatly facilitated the employment of tanks and other elements
of mechanized divisions. Moreover, the excellent visibility
permitted the German planes to operate anywhere at all times.

15. The large minorities in the loosely knit Polish
state, had served as fertile ground for the skillful and
effective subversive machinations of German agents previous
to the conflict. In fact, elements thus organized in advance
of the conflict, proved valuable aids to the German totali-
tarian form of campaign in terms of internal sources of
information as well as agents in fomenting internal unrest
and division during the course of the conflict.

16. The disadvantage of a mainly agricultural state
fighting a highly industrialized state. Only an industrial
country organized along totalitarian lines and equally
ruthless as the adversary, could have resisted the recent
thoroughly equipped modern offensive which Germany launched
unless the following factors existed: (a) climatic,
geographic and geological conditions, (b) a previously con-
structed fortified defense line, supplemented by strong
air defense elements, which might enabled it to hold out
long enough, and (c) a highly industrialized ally to
"knock out" the adversary's factories, communications, and air bases.

In all these essential conditions Poland was lacking.

No. 2 At the outset of the conflict the main bodies of the Polish fighting forces were divided into three army groups, covered by advanced attachments at about 7 different points: the north army group based on the Vistula river southeast of Torun. This group, according to the original defense plan, was to withdraw to a position ranging from the Narew-Bug-Vistula rivers' junction and up to cover Warsaw.

No. 3 The Central army group was based on an area southeast of Łódź. This group according to the original defense plan, was to withdraw to a position on the Vistula, mid-way between Warsaw and the junction of the Vistula and the San rivers.

No. 4 The southern army group was based on the Nida river in an area northwest of Tarnów and northeast of Kraków. This group according to the original defense plan was to withdraw to a position along the San river.

No. 5 Moreover, the plan called for an extension of the line along the Narew river by moving up reserve divisions.

No. 6 Reports indicated that the northern group, contrary to plan, allowed itself to be drawn into pitched battles with the adversary. This in face of overwhelming odds together with the swiftness of the German pincer-like thrusts (which developed from the converging
major drives from the German army groups in the northwest, and in the southwest of Poland as well as from the "Condor Legion" frontal attack on the Polish defenses in front of Katowice) tended to cut off this group's retirement, and served to prevent its executing its withdrawal according to the original plan.

No. 7. This upset in the original plan caused the central army group to alter the scheduled direction of its withdrawal and instead to take up the position originally assigned to the northern army group in covering Warsaw.

No. 8 At the same time, the southern army had to withdraw likewise in a northeasterly instead of its scheduled direction north to maintain contact with the central army group. This left the San river line insufficiently defended to check a swift moving powerful German mechanized thrust aimed at Lwow.

No. 9 Notwithstanding the aforesaid among other difficulties and set-backs, there was still a possibility of the Polish forces reconsolidating behind a newly massed contracted line of defense, for the Polish forces had actually taken up position along part of their main defense river line. At this juncture, however, Russia delivered the "coup de Grace" by suddenly marching in and occupying the very territory where the newly envisaged Polish position would have necessarily looked for supplies and reinforcements.

No. 10 The following are a few examples of
the important role which espionage played in the German campaign:

1/The system of communication between the spies behind the Polish lines with the German forces both ground and aerial was conducted with marked efficiency. The spies had been organized in Poland to such an extent previous to the outbreak of war that in many cases they commanded key positions in the communications as well as in other fields. After the commencement of the war, numerous spies were dropped behind the Polish lines by parachute from German planes. These men engaged in cutting communications lines, spreading alarming rumors amongst Polish communities and in many cases, disguised in Polish officer’s uniforms, intercepted and countermanded military orders.

2/ Shortly after the outbreak of war an official of the Foreign Office in Warsaw noticed from his office window, the continued presence of a man in the side street below, onto which gave the private entrance to Minister Beck’s house. The Minister frequently used this entrance, and whenever statesmen and diplomats were received by him confidentially in his home, they likewise made use thereof. Suspecting the man was up to no good, the aforementioned official of the Foreign Office ordered his arrest. Subsequent police investigation revealed that the man had been noting on a piece of paper the license numbers of Minister Beck’s and visiting diplomats’ automobiles. It was moreover disclosed that he intended to communicate these numbers to agents in the eastern part of Poland in order that they might be able to
to identify the cars in the case of their possible arrival in that region during further stages of the conflict. While this spy wore Polish clothes, he was identified by his German shoes.

3/ Again, an officer in command of troops near Krzemieniec sent orders for the delivery of a given amount of supplies for a certain time of the day. The supplies failed to arrive. Upon investigation, the officer commanding found that his orders had been countermanded. In subsequently tracing back to Krzemieniec, he found an individual in the uniform of a Polish officer, walking along the roadside. Something about the man caused the officer commanding to stop and question him. He replied in broken Polish with a discernible German accent. He put the man under arrest and discovered, under further examination that it was this spy in the uniform of a Polish officer who had countermanded his order.

4/ It was found by the Polish military intelligence that German aviators were receiving signals from German spies (dressed as Polish peasants) who stepped out numbers and other signs with their feet in plowed fields throughout the countryside.

5/ I personally became suspicious of telegraph operators in small towns along the line of our trek. My suspicions were supported by remarks of some of my colleagues who felt that while telegraph operators accepted their cables, they destroyed instead of despatching them; in other cases, deliberately juggled the message in such a way as to arrive at the other end of the line in a garbled state. I am convinced that this happened to some of my own cables.

* * * * * * *
POLISH-GERMAN CONFLICT

AND THE

EMBASSY'S ACTIVITIES
September 1st. Watching the first large-scale air raid over Warsaw from the courtyard of the Chancery.

September 1st. The first air raid.
September 1

No. 1 I awakened at 5:30 in the morning. At first I did not understand what had disturbed me. I went to the window and peered over a tranquil city - all was quiet - and yet I felt trouble was in the air. (It was only later that I ascertained it had been Warsaw's first air alarm that had disturbed my rest - I had evidently been subconsciously aroused by the sirens, which had ceased by the time I awoke. The plane which had caused the sounding of the siren had bombed the race course at the edge of town). When I put in a telephone call for Mr. Jan Wrazelaacki at the Foreign Office, the night operator (still on duty) informed me his line was busy. It remained busy so long that I felt confident something was wrong. Finally I succeeded in getting through to him, and in response to my question, he said I was correct in my expressed suspicion that the Germans had attacked. He said moreover, that he had just been able to confirm preliminary reports to effect that the German troops had been attacking at various points along the frontier, including Danzig, since dawn. Moreover, the air fields at Katowice, had already experience air attacks.

No. 2 Aware that I should lose much time in getting word to the President and the Secretary of State, by cable in that this would entail coding at our end and decoding at their end of the line, I requested my house telephone operator to try making a call to Ambassador Bullitt in Paris, who could relay the message to Washington. When the operator later told me that a call
call to Paris over lines through Berlin was impossible. I suggested he take a chance, and try placing the call via Copenhagen. To my happy surprise, the idea worked — and with no undue delay, under the circumstances, I succeeded in reaching Ambassador Bullitt. Realizing we might be cut at any second, we were brief — I told him war had started, and asked him to apprise the President accordingly by telephone. He assured me he would. Having long known the Ambassador to be a man of clear thinking, energy, and action, I felt confident the President and the Secretary would learn the news in a matter of minutes. (I later learned to my profound sense of satisfaction that this turned out to be the case).

**No. 3**  After my telephone talk with Mr. Wraszlecki, I awakened all members of my household, telephoned Consul General J. K. Davis and members of my staff, and notified them that war had commenced.

**No. 4**  In that I had been inclined to place considerable credence in the substance of the Turkish Ambassador's disclosure as to what his Military Attaché had some weeks before been able to learn of Germany's contemplated plan of attack, envisaging among other factors an aerial bombardment characterized by flights of about 100 planes at 20 minute intervals (which I subsequently reported to the Department, and which subsequent events proved approximately correct in many cases); and in that early morning aerial bombardments within the close proximity of several cities, including Warsaw, had already been officially reported to Mr. Wraszlecki at the Foreign Office, I decided to install, at
at the earliest moment, the clerks and all American women members of my staff in the house which preparatory to just such eventuality, I had previously rented for them at Constancin, a resort in the midst of a pine forest about 18 kilometers from the heart of Warsaw which the Foreign Office had in February recommended as a reasonably safe haven from aerial bombardments in event of an attack. I felt they would be safer there, at least, until I might have been able to gain a clearer picture of what tactics the Germans intended employing vis-à-vis Warsaw. Besides, I felt that even if, in the preliminary stage, the city itself did escape bombing, there might possibly be planes passing over and around Warsaw, causing air alarm sirens at various intervals during the night as well as day time. Hence, I believed my staff would be able to get a better night's sleep, (so important during tense times) in Constancin than in Warsaw. Moreover, conditions permitting I planned to have them come into town to work at the Embassy during the daytime.

No. 5 As I was warned by the police authorities that all roads leading out of Warsaw were already under guard, and that passes would be required to go beyond the city limits, (a matter which would have required considerable time to accomplish), I personally escorted the women members of my staff to Constancin. They arrived in time for breakfast, and promptly installed themselves in their house. I thereupon returned to Warsaw for a prearranged conference with Minister Beck and
and his associates at the Foreign Office.

No. 6 During the course of this conference, the Minister and several officers of his staff disclosed the substance of their reports from the battle front, and from abroad, as well as their reports of aerial bombardments which had taken place at various intervals over a wide area of Poland.

No. 7 Minister Beck stated his opinion that Herr Hitler pictured himself sovereign of a pan-German continent, adding that Poland had decided to contribute her part towards halting Herr Hitler's drive towards that objective. Minister Beck moreover imparted confidentially that in a message from Lord Halifax, the latter indicated he now understood the Minister's policy vis-à-vis Rumania. Later, during a conversation at the Embassy with officers of my staff, I urged that, following further air raids, in and around Warsaw, one and whenever possible two of us, together should proceed to the scenes of bombardment for the purpose of making eye-witness reports on the circumstances and the damage incurred. From the very outset of the conflict, the importance of recording only eye-witness reports, was clearly understood by all the members of our Mission.

No. 8 Towards the close of the afternoon the first sizable flight of German planes took place over the city. From the courtyard of our Chancery we watched maneuvers between Polish pursuit planes and German bombers. Since the German planes were flying at an altitude of between 12 and 15,000 feet, the fire from the anti-aircraft batteries
batteries and heavy machine guns fell short of their marks. (We could see the tracer bullets shoot through space like balls of fire, headed for their objectives). There was a heavy machine gun battery on the roof of a house next door to our Chancery. However, the anti-aircraft fire appeared to prevent the planes from risking flying lower and diving. This raid however entailed no bombardment of the heart of the city.

No. 9 I thereupon decided to have the women members of my staff whom I had that day left at Constanscin, come to work in town during the day and return to Constanscin to spend the night, pending a turn for the worse in the aerial attacks over Warsaw.

No. 10 During the course of the day, (and again on September 2) the following message at our request was radio-broadcasted over the government-controlled broadcasting station:

"It is requested that American citizens who desire to leave the country and who may experience difficulty in doing so, report to the American consular officers at Brazesc na Bugiem where efforts will be made to arrange for their departure."

These measures contributed importantly towards the evacuation of between 300 and 400 American citizens before the railway communications to the north were cut after the commencement of hostilities.

No. 11 During the course of the afternoon I was informed by an official of the Foreign Office (a) that at about six A.M. o'clock that morning Herr Hitler issued proclamation to effect he would meet force with force;
force; (b) that the scrapping of Danzig's constitution and the annexation of Danzig was proclaimed; and (c) that subsequently Herr Hitler in address to Reichstag declared he would not call upon Italy for assistance. (It later came to light that in an exchange of views which took place between Count Ciano and Herr von Ribbentrop on May 6th and 7th in Milan they concurred, among other points, 1/ in the need of striving to preserve peace in Europe for a long period, in order to afford both Italy and Germany time to perfect their internal reconstruction and military preparations, and 2/ the duration of this period was to be fixed by Italy at three years; by Germany at four or five. These among other points formed the foundation of the Treaty of Alliance signed by Berlin on May 22nd.)

No. 18 Motoring out to Constantecin that evening (it was still light) we were stopped by military guards at the outskirts of Warsaw. The guards pointed to an air raid which was taking place a short distance ahead of us, over what was reportedly an ammunition dump in close proximity of the Vilanow Palace. When the attack appeared to be over, we continued on our way. A few minutes later, however, we spotted a plane, evidently one of the same group of German planes which had engaged in the aforementioned attack. It was flying at about tree-top height, from the direction of the Vistula, and turned to cross the road ahead of us. To our discomfort, the pilot gave every sign of intending to swoop in behind us. Just as he started up the road after us, however, he apparently
apparently spotted a heavy machine gun nest in the field at his right - and as they opened fire, he sped off like a sky-rocket.

**No. 13** It was not until late that night at our villa in Constanscin that I found that the day's bombardments had severed the telephone connections between Constanscin and Warsaw.

**September 2**

**No. 14** I had already talked on August 29 with Mr. Brooks on the telephone, managing director of the Giesha Mines of Katowice with whom I had previously been in frequent contact regarding serious developments. On this occasion after ascertaining from him that the affairs of his company had been taken over by the Polish Government as a war emergency, I urged him to evacuate his American engineers and employees as soon as possible. He assured me he would act on this advice immediately.

**No. 15** On that same day I discussed the serious trend of events with executives of the Gydinia-America Line, and ascertained that they were taking all possible precautions under the circumstances against the occurrence of an early emergency.

**No. 16** Moreover, I discussed with Count Czapaki, of the American Scantic Line for the third or fourth time within ten days the seriousness of the current trend of developments, and ascertained that he and his associates were well aware of the pending emergency, and accordingly were taking all precautionary measures possible under the circumstances in connection with American business interests, direct or indirect.

Mr. Sztoleman, of the Vacuum Oil Company, with whom I had
had talked on several occasions previous to the outbreak of war, informed me on September 2nd that he was removing the headquarters of the company's operations to Lwow. At the same time our Embassy facilitated Mr. Wilder, Mr. Sztoleman's assistant, towards obtaining visas permitting his departure by automobile from Poland.

No. 17  In my early morning meeting with Minister Beck and several officers of his staff, the Minister told me that at about 2:00 A.M. o'clock the first secretary of the Polish Embassy in Berlin had telephoned Count Potulicki Officer of the night at the Foreign Office, that in line with President Roosevelt's initiative, Herr Hitler wished to notify the Polish Government that he had given orders to limit aerial bombardments to military objectives. Minister Beck, moreover, pointed out that it was evident that the German Government had re-established telephone communications with Warsaw specifically to enable the secretary of the Polish Embassy in Berlin to transmit this message to the Polish Government. The Minister said that he would discuss this matter further with me later in the day.

No. 18  Air alarms became more than hitherto frequent throughout the day.

No. 19  During luncheon in the garden restaurant of the Europejski Hotel my family and I, as well as the other guests of the restaurant, watched an air raid overhead. No one evinced other than calm interest, and aside from an occasional glance upward to note the progress of the aerial action, the waiters served the various tables,
as if the raid were a usual occurrence.

No. 20 In the course of my second call at the Foreign Office, about 4:00 P.M. o'clock an air alarm sounded. The officials with whom I was talking received warning from the guards on duty at the Ministry that the raid was expected to be of serious character. They therefore invited me to continue our discussion in the air-raid cellar of the ministry. Once in the cellar I found it most efficiently fitted out for the emergency, in fact I have seen nothing since, anywhere so well equipped: a special air ventilation system connected with the roof, telephones, for inner-office and inter-ministry communication, operated on electric power system, independent of the regular city service. Moreover, there were several guards trained on technique of gas defense and several trained nurses. The walls and ceilings of the spacious compartments, into which the cellar had been partitioned, were painted white and the compartments were furnished with comfortable chairs and long benches.

No. 21 Minister Beck eventually came down and joined our conversation. He informed me that his Government was then replying through the Hague to the German Government's aforementioned proposal to limit aerial bombardments to military objectives. In effect the Polish reply stated that the Polish Government had given "similar" orders, that it was maintaining them despite bombardments which had caused numerous casualties, amongst the Polish civilian population, but that it reserved
reserved the right to retaliate should this happen again.

No. 22 Minister Beck went on to say that despite Herr Hitler's afore-described message, his reports indicated that at 8 o'clock that morning German planes had bombarded (a) Ciechanow, a town close to the East Prussian border; killing 21 civilians and 4 soldiers, and wounding 36 civilians, 9 of whom were women, 4 children; and (b) Lublin, killing 30 inhabitants. Minister Beck added that his Government took a grave view of these acts, particularly in view of Herr Hitler's message transmitted both through the Hague and by telephone from Berlin to Warsaw; the Polish Government was considering what action to take.

No. 23 Of pertinent bearing, I was aware that Polish Government circles attached considerable significance to the fact that Herr Hitler transmitting his aforementioned message to Warsaw had not only called upon the Hague to serve as intermediary, but had also re-established telephone communications with Warsaw for the purpose. These circles were inclined to ascribe this "double-barreled" action to Herr Hitler's anxiety lest, when Britain and France honored their respective alliances with Poland, they might bombard the industrial areas of Western Germany, (after Britain's and France's intervention, Berlin was quick to discern the Western Powers' disinclination to engage in aerial bombardments of German industrial areas. At least during the course of the Polish-German conflict.)

No. 24 In connection with air raids, I anticipated
anticipated that any delay in intervention by the Western Allies might make the Germans less apt to observe scrupulously the conditions embodied in their September 2nd agreement with the Poles, i.e., limiting aerial bombardments to military objectives. In fact, I considered that potential fear of reprisals in form of allied aerial attacks over the industrial areas of Western Germany about the only factor which might serve to restrain the Germans from broadening the scope of their aerial activities from strictly military objectives. Subsequent developments appeared to bear out my thought on this score.

No. 25 At 6 P.M. o'clock, the Polish radio broadcasting station addressed a broadcast to the then convened French Chamber of Deputies, refuting a report which Minister Beck had just learned was being circulated amongst the Deputies, and which Minister Beck was inclined to ascribe to Berlin's inspiration, to effect that German troops had suspended all attack. During the broadcast a German air raid was taking place over the outskirts of Warsaw.

No. 26 In the late afternoon, Major Colbern, Military Attaché and I met to review the course of military and aerial activities, since the outbreak of war. The Major reported that, as in the case of the previous day, the German airforce had continued on an extensive scale, its attacks on objectives throughout Poland. As far as either of us could ascertain at that juncture, attacks were divided chiefly at military, industrial,
industrial, and communications centers. We ascertained, at the same time, however, that many casualties amongst civilians had resulted due in part to the fact that garrisons existed in all Polish cities. The effect of the bombs in most cases reported, indicated light incendiary bombs. We concurred moreover, in our observations that in the course of that day, German bombers had flown over Warsaw at two hour intervals at estimated height of 12 to 15,000 feet; moreover, neither of us had observed any hits by Warsaw anti-aircraft batteries. The Major then stated that the Polish General Staff estimated 600 German planes had taken part in these raids, and that the direction indicated they were shuttling back and forth between East Prussia and former Austria.

Major Colbern furthermore reported in effect the following resume of German ground attacks which had taken place up to noon that day, (September 2): Danzig Division which had attacked in direction of Gdynia was driven back by Polish counter-action at Orlowo, East Prussian front: four German infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade attacking in direction of Neidenberg-Mlawa, reached Mlawa vicinity: Pomorze frontier: two German infantry divisions and one light armored division attacked on front Chojnice-Noteć River, advancing 25 kilometers to Nakło vicinity. Poznan frontier: One Lanwehr division and mechanized units, elements of one fortress division attacked in direction Zbąszyn-Poznan, advancing about 15 kilometers. On front Wartenberg-Manalau, one mechanized and
and two infantry divisions attacking in direction Nielun and Kepno reported making slow progress. Silesian front: one armored and four infantry divisions attacking on both sides of Katowice to Rybno and Czestachowa; Katowice uncaptured. Slovakian frontier: one armored and one infantry division attacking on either side of Zakopany advanced about 50 kilometers to Nowy-Targ. At no point had the Polish main defensive positions been reached or broken through. The Polish forces claimed to have captured or destroyed one German armored train and 100 tanks during fighting of September 1.

No. 27 Major Colbern told me, moreover, that at 2 P.M. o'clock that day, September 2, severe fighting was reported to be taking place (a) in area of Neklo, west of Bydgoszcz; (b) in area of Nowy-Targ; (c) in area of Miawa on the East Prussian frontier; (d) in area of Kohl, west of Czestachowa.

No. 28 Dined that night at Europejski hotel and went afterwards to the Foreign Office to ascertain reports on latest developments before motoring out to Constantin for the night.

No. 29 We were awakened by the drone of German bombers, which at about 6:30 A.M. o'clock began passing over Constantin and Warsaw in flights of threes and fours at about three-quarters of an hour intervals. They seemed to be flying at about 15,000 feet.

No. 30 Suddenly a medium-sized bomber swooped down in a low power-dive, so low that it seemed as though the plane had scraped our roof, dropping eleven bombs in rapid
Ambassador Biddle's villa at Constantin after the bombing.
September 3, 1939.
rapid succession (6 of which fortunately proved duds). One bomb exploded and another landed unexploded in our yard, about an acre in size, while a dud went through the roof of the adjacent villa (situated about 200 feet apart from our villa), landing unexploded in the cellar. The pilot started releasing his bombs close to and between a small brick factory (about 200 yards distant) and the villa adjacent to ours - and he continued releasing his bombs in rapid succession as he dove down towards our villa. As we heard the explosions coming nearer and nearer, and as our villa correspondingly shook with increased intensity, we stood crouched against the wall of the stair-well (in order to be away from the windows) expecting each moment that the next bomb would crash in on us. It was therefore with a sense of relief that I saw the tail of the plane, signalling the end of the raid. I subsequently discovered how fortunate we were in having swiftly sought refuge in the stair-well, in that the concussion and flying fragments of the bombs had burst and scattered the glass of the windows of the rooms which we had previously evacuated.

No. 31 I was later informed by the police authorities that in their investigation, shortly after the bombing they collected in various rooms of our villa, 20 pounds of fragments of exploded bombs. These fragments had come in through the windows. Moreover, I saved as a souvenir of the occasion, a piece of metal about half the size of my hand. It served as a sort of signal of attack as it whistled in its flight through space and with a dull clang, landed against the wall several feet from where I was
was standing on the second floor veranda, previous to entering the villa to take refuge in the stair-well.

No. 32 Having experienced the worst, short of a casualty, both my family and I became more or less fatalistic; we gained a sense of being so-to-speak veterans of the more violent aspect in the "war of nerves". In fact, this experience served psychologically useful in dealing with what was to come.

No. 33 One of the two following possibilities as in effect I cabled the Department after the incident, represent to my mind, about the only conceivable explanation for the pilot's action: (a) he might conceivably have dived to bomb the nearby small brick factory, mistaking its comparatively broad wooden shingle roof line for a hangar (for it was close thereto that he started releasing his bombs) or (b) having dived to bomb what he may have mistaken for a hangar he might possibly have seen a Polish pursuit plane take off at the pilot's school some three and one-half kilometers distant, in which case he might have released his rack of bombs regardless in an effort to lighten his load preparatory to a quick get away.

(As regards the Foreign Office's recommendation in February as to the safety of Constanscin from the theater of aerial attacks over Warsaw, I am aware that my informants had in mind the following:

The nearest objectives of possible military bearing from our villa was 1/ a small aerodrome used as a school for civilian pilots a little over 3 kilometers distant, 2/ an electric power plant about 5 kilometers distant, and 3/ a
3/ a wooden bridge across the Vistula river about 8 kilometers distant).

No. 34 After the bombardment, I proceeded immediately to the nearby house wherein the women members and several of the clerks of my staff were quartered, to see whether they were all right. They had experienced several vibrations from the bomb explosions but suffered no injury or damage.

No. 35 I then proceeded into Warsaw. Due to the damage to our villa, and the fact that the line-
men had failed to restore telephonic service between Constancein and Warsaw, I decided to take up quarters for my family and myself in the apartment on the second floor of the Chancery. (By this time most of our own domestic household had been called up for military service.)

No. 36 Had both luncheon and dinner at the Hotel Europejski.

No. 37 During one of my two visits to the Foreign Office, in the course of the day, my conversation with several officers was again adjourned to the air raid cellar, where the discussion was continued in an atmosphere of calm. On this occasion my informants disclosed: (a) The British Government's final note presented in Berlin about 9 A.M. giving Herr Hitler until 11:00 A.M. to give an undertaking to withdraw his troops from Poland; (b) at 11:15 A.M., Prime Minister Chamberlain radio-broadcasted to the nation that no such undertaking had been received and that consequently Great Britain was at war with Germany; (c) the ultimatum of the French Government was presented at
at 12:30 P.M. Expired at 5:00 P.M.

No. 38 When I dropped by the Foreign Office after dinner it was about 9:30 P.M., I received a message inviting me to Minister Beck's house adjacent to the Ministry. There I was greeted by the Minister and Mrs. Beck who were dining informally with a few officials of the Minister's staff and their wives. I joined them at the table until dinner was over. Subsequently over coffee, Minister Beck told me that he and his associates profoundly appreciated France's and Britain's honoring their respective alliances with Poland. He went on to say, moreover, (a) that in the course of September 2, twenty-seven Polish towns and cities had been objects of German aerial attacks; (b) that during the course of the day, September 3, Dębliń, Toruń, Poznań, Kraków, Płock, among other cities and villages had experienced attacks from the air. Moreover, bombs had been released in several cases amongst the peasants working in the fields; (c) about 1500 civilians had to date been either wounded or killed in Poland. The Minister then stated that Polish forces had since the outbreak of war brought down a total of 64 German planes. Poland had meanwhile lost a total of 11 planes.

No. 39 In concluding our talk the Minister said that his Government was immediately transmitting a vigorous protest to The Hague, wherein would be listed violations of the Polish-German agreement of September 2, to limit aerial bombardments to military objectives.

No. 40 On leaving the Foreign Office and in walking through the fore-court I discerned signs of packing up archives, an indication which at the moment I was inclined
to mark down as a precautionary measure.

No. 41 During the course of that day, September 3, the tempo of air raids over Warsaw was about the same as on the previous day. The suburbs and several localities close by experienced bombings.

No. 42 I was aware that Minister Beck and his associates had been hoping that the Western allies would stage a diversion activity either in the air or on the ground or both.

No. 43 After the close of the conflict, I met Polish Ambassador to London, Count Raczyński in Paris. In strictest confidence he imparted in effect the following: He had engaged in numerous conversations with Mr. Winston Churchill just previous to and immediately following September 1, the date of the outbreak of Polish-German hostilities. During earlier conversations, Mr. Churchill had expressed his personal feelings that Britain as well as France should make some effective move in terms of a diversion activity in order to allow Poland to reconcentrate her armies. On the day that Mr. Churchill was appointed first Lord of the Admiralty, Ambassador Raczyński had another conversation with him. At that time Ambassador Raczyński pressed him for an explanation as to why neither Britain nor France had undertaken some form of effective aerial activities vis-à-vis Germany. In response, Mr. Churchill stated that his Government refrained from waging aerial bombardments over Germany for fear of antagonizing American public opinion. Ambassador Raczyński was not satisfied with this explanation,
feeling that it was being put out to camouflage the real motives for lack of aerial action. Hence, he continued daily to press Mr. Churchill until finally the latter told him the following in utmost confidence: He said that France was still weak in the air and depended upon British air strength to support her in the event of a German attack. Accordingly, if France were to engage in aerial activities at that time which might provoke retaliation measures, and if the British air fleet became engaged in the North Sea area, France might find herself a victim of the same type of aerial warfare which the Germans were then conducting against Poland and that France might fare no better than Poland. Britain at that moment had to look to the French army for ground resistance while the French had to look to the British air force as the main stay for her air resistance.

Ambassador Raczenski told me in strictest confidence that he realized that Mr. Churchill was telling him straight facts.

September 4

No. 44 Awakened by early morning air raid.
A number of raids occurred at regular intervals throughout the day. Other than when the broadcasting station warned that the raids might be of serious character, however, the alarm, after the morning attacks, was not sounded.

No. 45 In the afternoon at about 4 o'clock, while I was at the Foreign Office, the alarm sounded shrilly, warning of a large-scale bombardment. Again
the conversation in which I was engaged was adjourned to
the cellar. A few minutes after our arrival there,
Minister Bock with whom I had had an appointment within
a quarter of an hour of that time, came to join us. He
had been on his balcony watching the machine gunners on
the roof of the Ministry shoot down a comparatively low-
fly| German bomber directly over head.

No. 46 This air raid was longer than usual.
The flight, consisting of about 20 or 30 planes, seemed
to be trying to destroy the main bridges leading across
the Vistula. The German pilots demonstrated a reckless
daring in swooping down low over the city, and dropping
bombs on their objectives. The Polish anti-aircraft guns
were able to defend the bridges, and after a lengthy
attack, the Germans abandoned their efforts in that re-
gard. Before leaving, however, they dropped incendiary
bombs in the outskirts, causing a circle of fire to be
laid around the city. The Polish authorities were appr-
hensive lest this circle of fire had been effected
deliberately in order to facilitate the bombing of the
city on a return flight that night.

No. 47 Three German bombers were shot down
that day. I left the Foreign Office just as the last one
met its end. Damage resulting from the raid was considerable.

No. 48 On this as on previous days, all
members of our Mission at various times, personally checked
on all accessible scenes of bombings.

No. 49 Dined at the Europejski. An officer
of
of G-2 joined us. He mentioned among other things his concern over the reported effectiveness of the drive of German columns in the direction of Modlin.

No. 50 Upon entering the Foreign Office at 11:30 P.M., I immediately gained the distinct impression that the Ministry in general was uneasy over reports of the turn of military developments in the vicinity of Modlin, north of Warsaw.

No. 51 Mrs. Beck, who together with a number of the wives of officers of the Foreign Office, had been working like a trojan, was in charge of the information desk. On this occasion she was assisted by Countess Joseph Potocka who took turns with Countess Michael Lubienska as well as Countess Paul Staraszynska, wife of Minister Beck's secretary in operating the telephone switch board while Mrs. Beck answered the questions of the numerous callers at the Ministry. I watched them while I was awaiting word to go upstairs. They worked fast and efficiently. I recognized in this scene another example of the admirable capacity and willingness of Polish womanhood to meet a crisis.

No. 52 I went upstairs. It was dark save for the meager rays of a blue shaded lamp in the corner of the enormous gallery on to which open the offices of the officials. There were small groups of officers speaking together in whispers as they walked up and down the carpeted gallery. The atmosphere was charged with electricity; uneasiness.

No. 53 My conversation with several officers of Minister
Minister Beck's staff confirmed my previous impression: the turn in developments in the vicinity was causing grave concern. If anything arose which they thought I should know, they would telephone me.

**No. 54** I departed, and as I walked through the Ministry courtyard, to get into my car, I perceived in the clear light of the moon that what had the night before looked like a packing up of the archives had now the earmarks of an evacuation move in the near future. I noted that along with the archives, army cots were being packed in several large motor trucks.

**No. 55** Chief of Protocol, Major Lubienski imparted next day that Minister Beck had called him at midnight to inform him that reports from the direction of Modlin indicated an early heavy attack in a southerly direction, towards Warsaw. He then told Major Lubienski to come to him again at 5:00 A.M., adding that at that time he would either tell him to go back to bed or instruct him to notify the Diplomatic Corps to evacuate Warsaw by gradual stages throughout the day.

**No. 56** At about 2:00 A.M., night of September 4 5, I was awakened by sounds of motor lorries and tanks passing by the Chancery. I found it was a lengthy mechanized column consisting of troop-filled lorries, heavy guns, and medium-sized tanks which were rushing through the heart of the unlighted city toward Modlin. The column travelling at a speed of approximately 40 miles per hour took about two hours to pass our chancery. It was evident, in view of
After the first week of the war - American Embassy in Warsaw struck by flying splinters of shells.

After the first week of the war - Interior of the American Consulate General in Warsaw after four direct shell hits.
of my talks earlier in the night these were reinforcements being rushed to check a threatened break-through at Modlin. It was a grim picture.

**September 5**

No. 57 At 5:00 A.M., Minister Beck conferred again with Major Lubienski, this time informing him (a) of the Government's decision to evacuate Warsaw, and (b) of his decision to evacuate the Diplomatic Corps gradually during the course of the day. Moreover, he instructed the Major to notify the various missions accordingly.

No. 58 Between 11:00 A.M. and noon (September 5) military developments north of Warsaw had taken so unfavorable turn as to cause Minister Beck to call in Major Lubienski and instruct him to accelerate the pace of the diplomatic Corps' evacuation. On this occasion Minister Beck emphasized he wanted the entire corps out of Warsaw by the end of the day.

No. 59 During the course of the preliminary phase of Poland's mobilization in March, I learned in strictest confidence from an official of President Moscicki's household as well as from an official of the Foreign Office that the Polish Government was considering among other precautionary measures, the possible necessity of removing the seat of Government to another section of Poland in event the capture of Warsaw were threatened during a potential Polish-German conflict. While the Government guarded with utmost secrecy this possibility as well as the designated evacuation point, I later became aware (a) that
that confidential instructions had been issued to plant managers of the "industrial triangle" to start moving their machinery to the Lublin area, and (b) that the President secretly sent a representation to the Lublin-Zamość area to make a census of billeting possibilities, to organize a communications center et cetera. This and other information prompted my belief that the Government had decided upon the same area for its own possible evacuation.

No. 60

It was still in March that my aforementioned informants divulged in strictest confidence in effect, the following broad outline of Poland's plan of defense: (a) to keep the Polish army in tact, (b) to resist as long as possible an attempted capture of Warsaw and/or the "Industrial Triangle", (c) withdrawal of the main body of Polish forces under cover of delayed action if and when pressure from a potential German attack made it necessary, to the main defensive position, on the line of the Strategic Narew, Bug, Vistula, and San rivers, (d) to delay the adversary's advance 1/ until the advent of rainy and wintry weather and 2/ until assistance from Poland's Western allies might have diverted the full brunt of the German attack from off the Polish front. My informants went on to say that while this was the Polish defense plan in terms of the broad sweep, the Government and the General Staff had decided that, in event the capture of Warsaw by the adversary became imminent, the Government and the General Staff would withdraw from
from Warsaw - the Government re-establishing its seat in Eastern Poland, the General Staff setting up its head-quarters at some point between the newly established Government seat and the fighting front.

No. 61 In other words, allowing for unforeseen turns in the course of a potential conflict, the Polish Government and High Command (a) regarded as their paramount aim: to hold the Polish fighting forces intact, awaiting the effects of wet and subsequently winter weather, and effective action of Poland's Western allies to alleviate pressure on the Polish front; and (b) had come to feel that they could less afford the loss of any sizeable portion of their first line fighting strength, which would be difficult if not impossible to replace, than the loss in the preliminary stage of a conflict, of territory and even of their capital, the recapture of which, changed conditions and counter attacks in a later stage might permit.

No. 62 Still later I was informed confidentially by an official of the Foreign Office to the effect that, in event the Government decided to evacuate Warsaw (a) it would want the Embassies and Legations to follow, (b) that the Government would supply each Embassy and Legation with a large motor truck, (c) that besides motor trucks a special train would be placed at the disposal of the diplomatic corps to transport the Chiefs of Mission and their respective staffs to whatever new capital might eventually be designated; and (d) that our respective automobiles might join the trucks in a military guarded "caravan" to their destination. While I appreciated the good intentions of the Government, to extend us these

conveniences,
conveniences, I anticipated that a potential German campaign would entail aerial as well as ground attacks aimed at crippling at the outset transportation and communications lines, which might tend to cause confusion to such an extent as to render unlikely the Government's ability to place transportation facilities at our disposal. Hence, I purchased a large truck, with a view to providing against the possibility of our Embassy's being forced to spend the winter in Eastern Poland (even possibly on the edge of the Pinsk marshes). I loaded the truck with canned goods, kerosene lanterns, candles, et cetera, for I felt that I should provide our Embassy group at least with enough of the bare necessities of life to tide them over a possible preliminary shortage of food in event we suddenly found ourselves forced to set up headquarters at some eastern point inaccessible to supply centers.

No. 63 In conversation with General Carton de Wiart, V.C. (Chief of the British-Military mission) at about 10:30 A.M., he expressed his apprehension lest Warsaw be surrounded and possibly come under the fire of German guns within several days. (From these remarks I gained the distinct impression that little, if anything, in the form of an effective diversion activity might be expected from the British and possibly the French forces in the course of the next few days at least).

No. 64 Pursuant to Chief of Protocol, Major Lubionski's notification, at about noon members of our Embassy staff evacuated Warsaw by automobiles at various hours throughout the day arriving towards the end
and of the afternoon at the newly designated Foreign Office headquarters at Naleczow, about 23 kilometers west of Lublin. In accordance with cabled instructions from the Department the Consulate General moved into the Chancery and the Embassy remained with the Government.

No. 65 As we crossed the bridge from Warsaw to Praga an air raid took place and the police authorities stopped us, counseling us to pull over to the side of the road to await the end of the attack. When the authorities realized that the planes were headed eastward, they let us continue our journey. As we turned from the outskirts of Praga into the road for Lublin, we ran into a second raid from the same flight of planes. Anti-aircraft units along side of the road fired over our heads at the bombers.

No. 66 Further along the road, British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard accompanied by his Counselor, Mr. Clifford Norton and Mrs. Norton, having passed us in a fast moving car, stopped a little way ahead of us to ask if all was well with our group.

No. 67 Before leaving Warsaw I decided to leave my motorcycle with attached sidecar, at the Chancery in case stranded American citizens who might wish to evacuate Warsaw, lacked means of transportation. Besides, I left two 200 liter barrels of gasoline. I also left a sack of flour and several boxes of canned provisions, at the Chancery in case food stock might run low.

No. 68 Pursuant to Mr. Harrison's earnest request that he be allowed to delay his departure in order to
to attend to some outstanding personal matters, I requested him to accelerate completion of his business, and to join us as soon as possible at Naleczow. (Pursuant to a conversation with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Count Szembek, the next morning (September 6) I telephoned Mr. Harrison and Major Colbern, who had postponed his departure in order to contact the General Staff, requesting them both to come to Naleczow at the earliest moment. Accordingly, they assured me they would leave Warsaw that afternoon at about 4:30 P.M.)

No. 69 Upon arrival in Naleczow I made arrangements with Foreign Office officials and the Chief of Police to billet and board my family and the members of my staff.

No. 70 As I cabled the Department, Naleczow is a small cure resort. We were billeted in several rooming houses. Part of the diplomatic corps was billeted in and around Naleczow and part in Kazimierz about 7 kilometers distant.

No. 71 Together with a number of our colleagues we had dinner that evening in the dining hall of the newly established Foreign Office, formerly the cure house of the resort. French Ambassador Noel joined our table and remarked to Mrs. Biddle that he did not think we would remain long in Naleczow.

No. 72 At that time, and under war circumstances, living conditions were comparatively primitive, gasoline for the automobiles scarce, and communications difficult. We soon found Naleczow was in the direct path of
cabled on September 6, the nearest point thus far bombarded was the local railway station, three kilometers distant from the civilian community in which we were billeted. This bombardment, however, took place a few hours previous to our arrival on September 5. Subsequent investigation revealed that several German planes hand, on a low power-dive, bombed two trains which had come to a stop alongside the little station; one was a troop train the other filled with civilian passengers. The bombing had been concentrated, severe. Many civilian passengers and to a lesser degree the troops, received serious injuries. (I was aware of the blunder both of the station master and of the conductors of both trains, in having permitted a train of civilians to stop alongside a troop train). Upon arrival at one of the rooming houses to which we had been assigned I found a number of the injured women and children receiving first aid treatment inside the house, and on the back porch, one woman who was due shortly to give birth to a child, had had her leg severed at the knee. Most of the others had suffered head wounds. There were no proper dressings for the wounded available. We thereupon contributed some gauze and bandages which I had fortunately secured for emergency purposes in a Red Cross kit, from Mrs. Beck, Minister Beck's wife, on the previous night in Warsaw. After these unfortunate people had been taken off to a hospital
hospital in Lublin, we moved into the house.

No. 73 Counselor of Embassy, Mr. North Winship and Third Secretary, Mr. C. Burke Elbrick joined us shortly thereafter.

September 6

No. 74 During my early morning conversation with Count Szembek, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, he imparted that his reports indicated that the Polish forces, reinforced by the mechanized column which had rushed through Warsaw on the night of September 4 - 5 had succeeded in arresting the drive of the German mechanized columns, and were, then holding position in the Zegrze-Modlin sector north of Warsaw.

No. 75 In the early part of the afternoon, the Breslau radio broadcasting station announced in the Polish language that our Embassy had arrived in Nalęczow. As the location of the new capitol had until then been guarded confidentially by the Polish Government for protection of Government officials as well as the diplomatic corps, this announcement indicated, to my mind, efficiency of German espionage activities.

No. 76 During the course of the day, I cabled the Department my observations on certain aspects of aerial bombardments. I pointed out that experience during aerial raids and subsequent investigations of outcome thereof, prompted my belief that the question of limiting bombardments from the air to objectives of military bearing bore serious consideration in light of circumstances which prevailed
prevailed throughout the belligerent countries. Accordingly, in Poland as in France, Britain and Germany as well, during war time, mobilization involved the billeting of troops in civilian communities. As for Poland practically every village of say 500 inhabitants housed 50 to 100 troops. As regards industry, moreover, in the case both of the larger and the smaller manufacturing plants engaged in production both of armaments and articles for domestic consumption were usually surrounded by densely populated communities of employees. I felt therefore that the question concerning aerial bombardments called for consideration in the light of whether the bombardment of objectives of military interest, in connection, for example, with villages and industrial plants, was of sufficient value to the program of the adversary to warrant endangering the civilian population. (In view of the foregoing cabled observations, it was with more than ordinary interest that subsequently, on September 13, I learned of the German Government’s announcement of that date, that all Polish towns and villages harboring armed soldiers, snipers or marauding bands, would be regarded forthwith as military objectives.)

No. 77 During a conference at about 7:00 P.M. between French Ambassador Noel, and myself, at the house where my family and I were billeted, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Szombek telephoned me urgently requesting that both the Ambassador and I meet with him at the earliest moment at his headquarters. He added that British Ambassador Kennard was already on his way. Within
a few minutes, we reached the Foreign Office.

No. 78 I recall that Count Szembek, a charming character, possessing the manners and general attitude of the 18th century Polish nobility, greeted us with characteristic cordiality. After friendly inquiries as to the state of our comfort in our new quarters, and after apologies for calling a conference on such short notice, he remarked with dignity and composure, (as if he had just recalled the purpose of the conference) that the reason for calling us together was to inform us that a German mechanized column of considerable strength had unfortunately just broken through the Polish lines north west of us, and was rapidly approaching Puławy, some 18 kilometers distant from Nalęczów. He went on to say that it was difficult at the moment, due to poor communications, to ascertain the exact strength of the German force. However, in the absence of full information in regard thereto, his Government after consulting General Headquarters, had considered it advisable that the Foreign Office and the diplomatic corps move on to some point where at they were less likely to be surrounded, cut off from General Headquarters and possibly captured.

No. 79 At the close of our conference, and as I was taking leave of Count Szembek in the garden outside the newly set-up Foreign Office, a Polish pursuit plane brought down a German light bomber directly overhead. The German pilot, wounded in the shoulder, landed by parachute at the other end of the garden, a comparatively short distance from where we were standing.

No. 80 Before conclusion of the afore-described conference
of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Corps were to evacuate Nalęczów immediately, and proceed directly to Krzemieniec located about 480 kilometers from Nalęczów and about 30 kilometers from the Russian border. He added that the Prime Minister would establish headquarters for himself and staff at Łuck, and that the President would set up his headquarters at a point in the vicinity of Łuck. I thereupon earnestly requested Count Szembek's assurance that members of my staff driving automobiles be allowed enough gasoline to carry them at least to Łuck, where I understood there was a supply of gasoline sufficient to afford refueling. Count Szembek admitted that the scarcity of gasoline in Nalęczów was deplorable, but assured me he would do all possible to see that the gasoline requirements of my staff were met. Forseeing, however, the hectic rush for fuel, I urged Mr. Winship and Mr. Albrick to drive their automobiles, at the earliest moment, to the gasoline pump and remain in their cars in order to avoid confusion.

No. 81 I was anxious, moreover, to save the women members of my staff the confusion and discomfort of becoming involved in what promised to be more or less of a "tussle" for gasoline around the pump of the service station. Fortunately, finding, therefore, that I could spare some gasoline, I turned over to Miss Mcquatters, who throughout the entire trek from Warsaw to Krzemieniec at the wheel of my Ford station wagon, drove Miss Saunders, Miss Hillery, Miss Pinard, and Mr. Aneksztejn, assistant to the disbursing officer, a sufficient amount of gasoline in
in tin containers to carry the car through to the refuelling service station at Żuck. (Miss McQuatters, the only woman to drive a car during the trek, gained the respect and esteem both of Polish official and diplomatic circles, for having safely conducted her car and passengers through the lengthy and exhausting, as well as dangerous day and night runs which the trek entailed). Furthermore, I subsequently succeeded in obtaining a "best-efforts" promise from the Chief of Police (with whom I had previously established a friendly relationship) to furnish American citizens, who might come through during the course of the night or the next day, with sufficient gasoline to see them at least on their way to Żuck. Following these preliminaries, the members of our Embassy, commencing at about 11:00 P.M., departed from Małopszow at various intervals throughout the night.

No. 82 I endeavored to arrange the distribution of passengers amongst the automobiles of our caravan in such a way as to have (a) two drivers per car where possible, and (b) some one who spoke the Polish language in each car. In cases where this was not possible due to lack of space in any car, I urged that a car lacking someone familiar with the Polish language, accompany a car occupied by one.

No. 83 Night travel under war conditions then prevailing, was, to say the least, a difficult, and dangerous task. Only the most meagre amount of illumination was permitted from our headlights which according to regulations, were covered by a blue cloth hood. Moreover,
upon approaching towns the military authorities stopped all cars and instructed the driver to extinguish all lights. This coupled with the fact that "black-outs" in Polish towns were practiced in the literal sense of expression, made driving throughout the cities and towns a precarious matter. One had to slow down to a speed of about 3 or 4 miles an hour and frequently come to a stop, due to loss of bearings. I recall that the night we passed through Tarnopol enroute from Krzemieniec to Zaleszczyki I had to walk ahead of the car with one hand on the radiator, literally feeling my way, and calling back to Mr. Charles Moszczynski (a member of my staff) who was then at the wheel. We progressed thus, for some 6 or 7 city blocks' distance, and until we reached a part of the town where the buildings were sufficiently low to permit the glow of the moon to light the street.

No. 64 On the other hand, night driving along the open road entailed other difficulties. Dry weather had made the roads exceedingly dusty - a white pulverized dust arose in the wake of each car like a thick fog, and frequently took from 3 to 4 minutes to settle sufficiently to permit visibility. Moreover, the military authorities chose the cover of night to effect their major movements of troops, supplies, and heavy guns. Hence, one frequently passed lengthy lines of troop-laden buses and lorries, and columns of mechanized equipment, including artillery of varying calibre. This, the lack of light, the narrowness of the average road, and the exasperating dust contributed towards making the automobile driver's position
position an uncomfortable one.

No. 85   Driving by day along the open highways, moreover, one frequently encountered a special set of difficulties. As a matter of fact, despite the aforementioned discomforts entailed in night-driving, I finally came to the opinion that as against day-driving the former was far safer.

No. 86   After the first few days of hostilities the German pilots discovered that, aside from anti-aircraft measures at Warsaw, several other important cities, armaments, communications, and other centers of vital military interest, there was little if any resistance to fear. Hence, these pilots soon became increasingly daring in their general operations, power-diving to surprisingly low altitudes, and frequently "hawking" traffic along the highways. The latter usually entailed machine-gunning.

No. 87   The drivers and passengers of automobiles were usually prevented by the hum of the automobiles' motors from detecting the approach of a plane.

No. 88   We finally developed a technique along the following lines: we left open the radio switch, for the approach of a plane usually registered a distinct clicking noise, and we constantly kept an eye on peasants working in the fields. If we noted their faces turned skyward, we instantly made for the nearest trees (if any were within a short distance - and if they were not, we instantly stopped the car. We then shut off the motor, opened the doors of the car, and ran for the nearest cover. If woods were at hand, so much the better, if not, we

sought
sought the culverts at either side of the road, lying face up, to keep an eye on the plane. If the plane went on, we would immediately shift backwards or forwards from our positions in case the pilot returned with an idea of machine-gunning the spot whereat he had originally marked us (this proved to be the practice of the pilots).

No. 89 Another measure, but more extreme in character, in event of emergency, was the following: if one was suddenly found to be the objective of a plane close overhead, and in the absence of nearby cover, the best procedure in event of machine-gunning, was to stop and stand absolutely straight; in event of a bombing, to drop instantly to the ground and lie flat.

No. 90 Careful study of maps and inquiries as to the terrain along the route preparatory to embarking on day trips, moreover, were essential. Bombardment flights usually occurred at dawn; again about 11:00 A.M., and again between 4 and 6 P.M. It was therefore only prudent for one to have in mind the probably necessity of seeking shelter (for one's automobile) just previous to or during these periods.

No. 91 Leaving Nielczow we drove throughout the night. In passing through various towns along the route, I gave the Starostas lists containing the names of those members of our Mission, who were driving automobiles, requesting that, should they run short on gasoline in those vicinities, the Starostas replenish their supply. At the same time, I urged the Starostas to assist any other Americans who might be in need of gasoline.

No. 92 Several kilometers west of Wlodzimierz, and
and just as we were approaching a railroad crossing, we
noted ahead of us an automobile accident. It turned out
to be a collision between a truck and a small sports model
automobile belonging to the officer in charge of the French
Embassy's codes. While he had escaped injury, his wife
was seriously shaken up, and had received a deep cut on the
head as well as a concussion. By good fortune, Mrs. Kulaka,
wife of the assistant counselor of the Polish Foreign Office,
(as Mr. and Mrs. Kulski lacked transportation, I had in-
vited them to accompany us from Naleczow) proved herself an
expert at First Aid. By the side of the road, with ordinary
needle and thread, she stitched the head wound. (I recently
received a report that the young French woman finally
reached Rumania in safety and was well on the road to re-
cover.

September 7

No. 95 After refuelling in Yuck each car of
our Embassy Group in turn proceeded through Dubno to
Krzemieniec. At the outskirts of Dubno the car I was
driving was halted by military guards. We stopped under
some trees during an aerial bombardment of the railway
yards, not far distant. I arrived at Krzemieniec at about
10:30 A.M. (Thursday, September 7). Mr. Kulski (assistant
Counselor of the Foreign Office, who together with his wife,
had accompanied us from Naleczow in one of my two cars)
took charge of preliminary arrangements towards setting up
the Foreign Office and billeting the various Embassies
and Legations. I succeeded in behalf of the members of my
staff in acquiring, in addition to several rooms in a hotel,
Embassy at Kzicmieniec.

Ambassador Biddle, Mrs. Biddle and daughter, in front of Embassy at Kzicmieniec.
X marks American Embassy.
Building at left and in foreground is British Embassy.

The main street. Market place, seen at end of street, was bombed. Automobile in foreground is parked opposite American Embassy. This tranquil scene, before bombing.
a small house on the main street. It was totally lacking in furniture but Mrs. Middle finally succeeded in obtaining sufficient cots and bedding, consisting of heavy denim, sown together, and filled with straw, to accommodate those of us who had arrived at various times throughout that day. We took our meals in a small restaurant across the street for the first several days of our stay in Krzemieniec.

No. 94 I was informed by the Foreign Office that their reports indicated (a) the Polish forces were experiencing a major three-column attack; in the north one column was headed for Warsaw; in the central region another column was headed for Warsaw via Częstochowa; still another column was headed for Krakow from the direction of Slovakia; (b) Polish forces in Pomorze consisting of about 100,000 troops were threatened by pincer movement consisting of columns from East Prussia and from the direction of Częstochowa; (c) that day was considered critical concerning success or failure of German flanking attacks via-à-vis Warsaw.

No. 95 Observation during our lengthy motor trek eastward had revealed that at the very outset of the conflict, the first day, the German bombers engaged in a series of effective attacks on all important railway junctions. Shuttling back and forth between Slovakia and East Prussia in three main broad bands of flight in the general direction respectively, Białystok-Lwów in the East, Mińa-Jarosław in the central part, and Gdynia-Katowice in the west, these bombers had succeeded in putting most of the main railways junctions
Picture of upper portion of American Embassy.

Tranquil scene in typical street nearby American Embassy - before bombardment.

Destruction along main street, with mountain in background.
junctions out of business in short order. To this, perhaps to more than any other factor was attributable the disruption of the transportation of reserve forces, which in turn caused the failure to complete mobilization.

No. 96 By this time, moreover, I was aware (a) of the effectiveness of the German mechanized thrusts under cover of the withering effect of efficiently coordinated aerial bomb and machine-gun barrages; (b) the German mechanized columns were breaking through wherever possible and pressing forward in swift long-distance thrusts, frequently leaving the opposing divisions behind to fight it out; (c) of the mastery of the German air force. It was estimated by official circles at this point that the Germans were employing between 85 percent and 90 percent of their first line force. It was found necessary by the Polish command to limit the main part of the Polish air force to collaboration with the troops in the line, thus leaving but few planes to combat effective efforts of the German bombers to disrupt communications to cripple industrial operations and to render general confusion.

No. 97 After the close of the Polish-German conflict and in conversation with newly appointed Prime Minister of the Polish Government, General Sikorski; he imparted to me in strictest confidence the following: On November 11, General George, Chief of Staff of the French Army, had told him that on the seventh day of the war, the French High Command urged the French Government to permit the French army to march on Germany, pointing out that there were less than 20 German divisions vis-à-vis the Maginot line, whereas France at that time had about 46 divisions.

* General von Reichnau directed part of his campaign by radio while flying over the battlefield—first time in history an aeroplane has thus been used.
divisions prepared for action. Moreover, the High Command felt that an opportunity which would not again present itself, was at hand. The French Government however refused this suggestion. Assuming this disclosure to be exact, I should attribute the French Government's refusal to reasons confidentially cited by the First Lord of the British Admiralty in his aforesaid conversation with Polish Ambassador to London, Count Raczyński on September 3rd. In other words I am inclined to believe that the hesitancy on the part both of the French and British Governments to permit their military forces to launch an attack against Germany was primarily due to their desire first to gain equality if not superiority in terms of air strength.

**No. 98** During a subsequent visit at the Foreign Office I was informed (a) that the Prime Minister was establishing his headquarters at Luck, (b) that President Moscicki was establishing his headquarters in three different locations within the district between Krzemieniec, the President's headquarters, and Luck.

**No. 99** While I found that proper communications from Krzemieniec had not yet been established, a spokesman of the Foreign Office expressed his hope of placing at our disposal in the near future, short wave sending facilities. We were meanwhile experiencing difficulties in receiving and sending communications.

**No. 100** Under the extraordinary circumstances prevailing and as I was aware that the American Press correspondents
correspondents lacked means of communication with the outside, I cabled our Minister, Mr. Gunther, in Bucharest asking him to notify the respective agencies that the following correspondents could be contacted if addressed care of our Embassy. Mr. Petersen, Associated Press, Mr. Walker, New York Herald Tribune, Mr. Neville, Time Magazine, Mr. Small, Chicago Tribune, Mr. Szapiro, New York Times.

No. 101  Having expected Mr. Harrison, Second Secretary of Embassy at Kaloczow pursuant to my telephone instructions of September 6, to join us there that day, and having had no information as to his whereabouts since that telephone call, I became concerned regarding his welfare. Accordingly, I asked the Starosta of Krzemieniec to telephone other Starostas along the line for news of Mr. Harrison. The Starosta subsequently reported no information available. The first news I learned of him was from an American newspaper correspondent who arrived in Krzemieniec. He had seen Mr. Harrison leaving Warsaw in his car on September 6 with a Polish friend and much luggage. I was relieved when Mr. Harrison finally arrived in Krzemieniec on September 9. It seemed that his delay in arriving at Krzemieniec was due to his having conducted some Polish friends to their country place in the area north east of Lublin.

September 8

No. 102  News reaching the Polish Foreign Office from G.H.Q. during the course of September 8 continued to indicate an unfavorable turn for the Polish forces. It moreover became clear that the preliminary objectives
objective envisaged in the rapid eastward advance of the German troops in south Poland, was the capture of Lwow. In that a German seizure of Lwow might conceivably have presaged a further German advance toward the Russian frontier, a possibility which might have spelled a severance of our connections with Rumania, I decided (much against their personal desires in the matter, for they wanted to stay and render all possible assistance and cooperation) to send Miss Mcquatters, Miss Hillery, Miss Pinard, and Miss Saunders, as well as Mrs. Pedersen (the wife of Mr. Carl Pedersen, our Chief Clerk) to Rumania at the earliest possible moment. Concurrent with my decision on this score the Foreign Office made an inquiry as to the number of liters of gasoline which each mission might require, in event it became suddenly necessary to evacuate Krzemieniec, with a view to proceeding thence for a distance of about 200 kilometers to a then unidentified destination. (While at that moment the Foreign Office declined to disclose officially the intended direction, I was reasonably sure they had in mind some point on the Polish side of the Polish-Rumanian border).

No. 103 On the first day of arrival at Krzemieniec one of the local Ukranian leaders imparted to me that he concurred with the local belief that there was a secret agreement between the Germans and the Russians to refrain from bombarding the area lying within 60 kilometers of the Polish-Russian frontier.

No. 104 Cabled Department to the following effect: Aerial bombardments by German air force includes, railways
railways (frequently endangering trains of refugees and wounded); factories engaged in war production (endangering surrounding communities) bridges (endangering public in transit and people living near bridge-heads) and moreover, all places resembling airports, troop centers, and barracks (as military system entails billeting troops in civilian communities, there is scarcely any village, town or city not billeting at least some troops.

No. 105 I went on to point out that while they were ostensibly giving the appearance of adhering to the principle of limiting aerial bombings to objectives of military bearing, the German planes, in my opinion, were straining the point, and taking advantage of every opportunity irrespective of danger to the civilian population. It was moreover, evident that the crews of the German bombers released their bombs even when in doubt as concerned the identity of the objectives.

By way of illustrating this point, I cited the following cases: 1/ bombardment of a sanitorium in the woods nearby Otwock; ten children living there were killed; 2/ bombardment of modern flats one kilometer from barracks on Warsaw outskirts; 3/ bombardment of hospital train (clearly marked with Red Cross on roof) standing alongside of uncovered Warsaw East Station, and during the process of unloading wounded soldiers. This and the demolition of a girl guide hut (12 girls killed) resulted from the heavy bombardment of the East Station 4/ bombardment of a refugee train bound eastward from Kutno.

September 9

No. 104 Shortly before 9:00 A.M. on the morning
Loading station wagon at Krzemieniec preparatory to evacuating women members of my staff to Rumania.

Conversation with British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard and his Counselor, Mr. Clifford Newton, immediately after loading of station wagon.
Miss McQuatters just ready to drive station wagon to Rumania.
morning of September 9, I sent Miss McQuatters, Miss Saunders, Miss Hillery, Miss Pinard of my staff, in my Ford station wagon, and Mrs. Pedersen in the car of and driven by her husband, to Sniatyn, a Polish-Rumanian border town, where, thanks to the friendly assistance of one Mr. Egerton Sykes acting in behalf of the British Embassy in Poland, they were enabled to acquire sufficient gasoline to enable my car and that of Mr. Pedersen of my staff to return to Krzemieniec, as well as to procure transportation from the Rumanian border to Gernauiti.

No. 105 Shortly after my arrival in Paris, in late September Polish Ambassador to France, Lukasiewicz, imparted in effect the following: Either on September 9 or 10, (he was a little vague as to the exact date) he was taken a-back when General Burckhard-Sukaeki (Polish General Staff Officer attached to the French General Staff) told him that General Gamelin had emphasized his opinion that the Polish armies should withdraw to a position in southeast Poland behind a contracted line somewhat described by a line drawn from the southwest corner of the Pinsk marshes, to the western junction of the Polish-Rumanian border.

No. 106 The Ambassador’s immediate reaction to the foregoing was unfavorable. To him it indicated that Poland could count on little if any effective help from France. Moreover, he pictured that a move of this character might conceivably lead (a) to a Russian advance through the Vilno area, and (b) to a grim outcome for the Polish forces, under continued and probably redoubled ferocity of German aerial attacks, if the former were concentrated in
in a contracted area. The Ambassador thereupon wrote, in his own handwriting, a report on his aforesaid reactions, requesting General Burokhard-Bukacki to transmit it to General Gamelin. (This had taken place during the night of Paris’ first alarm).

No. 107  As of connected bearing both on General Gamelin’s aforesaid remarks and Ambassador Lukasiewicz’s subsequent reactions thereto, the Ambassador told me that in reflecting on the full implications of General Gamelin’s remarks, he called to mind the following: In the first half of August during a meeting between British and French representatives with Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Molotoff, in Moscow, M. Molotoff had bluntly remarked that an agreement between the Western powers and Russia could be practical only if Britain and France could persuade Poland to permit Russian troops to enter Poland via the Vilno and east Galician areas at any time that the Russians deemed such action necessary.

No. 108  The British and French representatives had replied that this was a matter which M. Molotoff should take up directly with Poland.

No. 109  In response, M. Molotoff said that Russia had only non-aggression and commercial agreements with Poland and that since Britain and France were Poland’s allies, they were the proper parties to put the question to Poland.

No. 110  French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Bonnet, had later sounded out Ambassador Lukasiewicz on
on the above score. In response the ambassador had remarked to Minister Bonnet that the latter was unquestionably aware of the answer before putting the question. Moreover, the ambassador had pointed out his opinion that M. Molotoff's remarks along the above lines represented merely a tactical play. Indeed, while on the one hand, M. Molotoff was undoubtedly playing for time, on the other hand, he had deliberately posed the one question which might cause tension between the Western powers, and Poland. The ambassador had added, moreover, that he would therefore prefer to consider that the question had not been breached by Minister Bonnet - and emphasized that if France pressed the question formally, it would be a mistake, for such action might lead to an "all round" serious misunderstanding.

No. 111 The ambassador went on to say to me that about the same time, Minister Beck had replied along similar lines to British ambassador to Poland, Sir William Howard Kennard's soundings on the above score. Ambassador Lukasiewicz then told me that following these unfruitful soundings on the part of Minister Bonnet and Ambassador Kennard, he personally gained the impression that the British and French representatives in Moscow resorted to stalling the issue in their further conversations with the Soviet authorities.

No. 112 In concluding his remarks Ambassador Lukasiewicz told me that about the 19 or 20 of August, Minister Bonnet in conversation with him evinced considerable optimism over the prospect of coming to a deal with Moscow. The ambassador had replied frankly that while
while the representative then negotiating in France's behalf was no doubt a military expert of high standing, nevertheless, the Ambassador felt it would be difficult for the French representative to gain a clear insight as to what was in the back of the Russians' mind, in that the French representative was not familiar with the Russian language, and had been in Moscow but a short time.

No. 113 At a later date, Minister Bonnet had admitted to Ambassador Lukasiewicz that he had been right as to his reaction on this score.

September 10

No. 114 I walked to the height of the mountain adjacent to and overlooking the town of Krzemieniec. From that point I peered down and studied the effect of the reflection of the sunlight both on the nickel trimmings and the shiny roofs of cars of our Embassy group. I had in mind that the parking of automobiles in a group served according to our experience, to invite the attention of passing German pilots. I thereupon decided that, in the interest of protecting our motor vehicles, it was essential to construct a shed to shelter them from the sight of passing German pilots. Hence, I ordered the construction of a lean-to shed for our automobiles. Moreover, I requested as a further precautionary measure, that the nickel trimmings on all of our cars be painted a dull gray. (Besides, my chauffeur and I together did a quick, if not artistic job, in giving one coat of dark gray paint to my yellow cadillac. I subsequently threw several buckets of dust on the paint before it dried. The result proved an excellent form of camouflage.) Contrary to the counsel of a number of my colleagues, and their chauffeurs, I painted
painted the roof so as to leave a yellow U.S.A. They held it would only draw attention from the sky.

No. 115 Lunched quietly in the back room of a small restaurant at the north end of the village, with Soviet Ambassador Charanov, Mrs. Charanov, their small son, and Daughter, their military attaché, and Estonian Minister, Marcus. In the course of conversation the military attaché remarked that he had just talked by telephone to the Soviet Consul at Lwow, who said the bombardment, especially of the railway station and yards, was becoming steadily more intensive. Moreover, the German southern forces were advancing rapidly towards the City from the west. The Ambassador then mentioned the large scale mobilization which was currently taking place in Soviet Russia. In response to my question as to whether the mobilization was attributable to Moscow's anxiety lest, if the thrust of the German southern forces towards Lwow succeeded, the Germans might declare Lwow the Capitol of an independent Ukrania state under German auspices, the Ambassador merely smiled, and shifted the trend of conversation. When Minister Marcus had departed, however, Ambassador Charanov referred to my question, stating that, "strictly off the record" and quite unofficially speaking, I had probably hit the nail on the head. However, he was lacking in sufficient information to be clear on the situation. Either his Government had not communicated with him or what communications they had sent had failed to reach him. He would therefore ask Minister Beck the next morning for permission.
permission to go to the town on the Russian side of the frontier, in order to telephone his Government. In response to my question as to whether he believed his country, in view of its own oil requirement for its agricultural structure based upon about 85% to 70% motorization, and now for this reported augmentation of mobilized forces, could afford to satisfy Germany's oil requirements, the Ambassador stated his belief that Germany would suffer a great disappointment. His own country's oil requirements would increase rapidly in proportion to the increase in mobilization. In concluding our conversation he informed me that many of my colleagues had requested him to grant them and their respective staffs visas for Soviet Russia in case the Government and Diplomatic Corps were cut off from Rumania. This was another matter regarding which he wanted to discuss with his Government by telephone.

No. 116 Soon after my arrival in Paris in late September Polish Ambassador to France Lukasiewicz told me in effect the following: He had requested General Burckhard-Bukački (just arrived in France to consult with French General Staff) to inform the French General Staff that if Britain and France did not at an early hour lend Poland some assistance in terms either of ground or aerial diversion activities vis-à-vis Germany, the Polish military situation might be expected to disintegrate rapidly. Moreover, Ambassador Lukasiewicz asked General Burckhard-Bukački to warn the French General Staff that if they did not quickly lend aid along the foregoing lines, they must beware of Russia's eventual entrance into the conflict. In this
this connection, Ambassador Lukasiewicz pointed out that Russia would be motivated (a) by a desire to relieve Germany of the apprehension and necessity of fighting on two effective fronts and thus give Germany a free hand to turn against the west, and (b) by a determination to prevent the possibility of Lvow's being captured by the Germans and declared the capital of a Ukrainian state under German auspices, and (c) by a desire to gain sufficient part of Poland for herself to improve strategically her then currently vulnerable western frontier.

No. 117 Economic Counselor of the Foreign Office, Mr. Jan Wrazlacki, came by our embassy in a drosky accompanied by three other members of the Foreign Office. They were a pathetic sight. Their laps were piled with suitcases; their faces looked haggard and worn. They had just arrived from the railway station about five kilometers distant. Their arrival in Krzemieniec proved a welcome sight, for we were aware that the train, of which Mr. Wrazlacki and Count Potulicki (associate counsel of the Foreign Office) had been in charge, had left Warsaw five days before with the wives and children of the officers and the staff, as well as a number of junior officers of the Foreign Office. We were aware, moreover, that while this journey would have taken no more than over night under normal conditions, it had taken more than four days under the current circumstances.

No. 118 During the train's journey reports reached Krzemieniec from time to time, indicating that it had frequently been forced to change its routing because
of repeated bombardments from the air. This led to its being referred to as the "Phantom Train". Mr. Brzslacki subsequently told me that the train, carrying about a thousand passengers, had suffered aerial bombardments seventy-two times. Enroute he and Count Potulicki had adopted and successfully developed a system of protecting the passengers from the air raids. The planes began by releasing bombs directly at the train fortunately missing though narrowly in each case. At a signal either from Mr. Brzslacki or Count Potulicki the locomotive engineer would stop the train. All passengers who could, instantly left the train, running for the nearest woods at the side of the tracks. Those who failed to reach the door of the cars before the return of the planes, to machine gun the passengers fell flat on their faces on the floor of the steel cars. Moreover, before the planes returned following the bombing, to carry out their machine gunning, the locomotive engineer usually reversed the train some distance in order to prevent the pilots from marking the place, at which the train refugees had sought cover in the woods. Mr. Brzslacki had the highest praise for the engineer's intelligence as well as courage. He said that on almost all occasions when the engineer had thus shifted the train's position, the returning bombers had blindly machine-gunned the woods directly opposite the train's new position, thinking the passengers had sought shelter there. Despite seventy-two aerial bombardments of this character, there were no casualties among the passengers - though there had been many "close shaves". The German air force's continuous knowledge
knowledge as to the whereabouts of this train is an outstanding example of the efficiency of the German espionage activities in Poland.

**September 11**

**No. 119** Minister Beck arrived in the morning. He informed me that accompanied by several experienced members of his staff he had for the past four days been maintaining a mobile position, in order to coordinate operations of the Foreign Office with those of the other Ministries as well as the High Command. The Minister went on to say with emphasis that until September 9 the Germans had given at least a semblance of adherence to Germany's agreement of September 2 with Poland (to limit aerial bombardments to military objectives). Since then, however, the activities of the German airforce had in his and his associates' opinion been characterized by "methodical bombardment of open towns". The Minister by way of illustration then cited (a) bombardment both of the Transfiguration and Piłsudski hospitals, the summer theater and civilian dwellings in Sienna street, all in the center of Warsaw; (b) what had amounted to the demolition of Siedlce (a communication center), and (c) the destructive bombardment of Zamosc, which he emphasized possessed no military interest whatsoever; (d) intensive bombing of Breszecz on September 9 when five heavy bombs evidently aimed at the railway station, missed their mark, landing one kilometer distant in the center of the civilian community rendering a number of casualties and considerable property damage. He and his associates had been eye-witnesses on this occasion.
occasion and had narrowly escaped with their lives.

No. 120 Just outside the Foreign Office I was hailed by Soviet Ambassador Charanov, who told me he had just talked with Minister Beck. The Minister had granted him permission to cross the frontier to telephone his Government. He bade me adieu and walked to his house. About an hour later the Brazilian Minister told me he had seen Ambassador and Mrs. Charanov, accompanied by their two children and military attaché leaving Krzemieniec in their large automobile. The Minister added that he failed to see why the Ambassador's desire to telephone from a point only about 25 kilometers distant necessitated piling at least five bags on the roof and 4 or 5 others on the side of the car. Events proved my Brazilian colleague's skepticism, as to the Ambassador's intentions, to have been correct. This was the last we saw of Ambassador Charanov.

No. 121 General Carton de Wiart, V.C., Chief of British Military Mission, imparted his opinion based on recent observation that the Polish soldier, in action in direct contact with his German adversary, was worth four German soldiers.

No. 122 Had picnic lunch at top of mountain overlooking Krzemieniec, with British and French Ambassadors. We reviewed events current and of recent past.

No. 123 During the night of September 11-12, Count Michael Potulicki, officer on duty during the night at the Foreign Office, received an urgent telephone call from the P.A.T. Office (Polish Telegraph agency) in Lwow,
Result of a bombardment on outskirts of Warsaw previous to September 5th.

Mountain overlooking Krzemieniec, and opposite American Embassy. Bombers flew in, and commenced releasing bombs as they swung into the main street, on which Embassy was located.
Lvov, stating that two columns of tanks were headed from
the direction of Sanbor; one towards Luck, aiming to cut
off the Government from the south, the other towards
Tarnapol, and that both columns were skirting Lvov.
Count Potulicki was also told that the F.A.T. agency
had received orders to evacuate Lvov for Luck, as had
the staff of the Lvov Radio Broadcasting station.
Count Potulicki sent a message to Minister Beck apprising
him of this conversation. As a result Minister Beck gave
orders to mobilize all Government officials for a conference
in the morning.

September 12

No. 124 On the morning of September 12, at
about 10:50 A.M. Krzemieniec, a defenseless, open village,
suffered a severe bombardment, immediately following which
I cabled the Department a full report.

No. 125 The little restaurant where I lunched
on September 10 with Soviet Ambassador Charsanov was blown
and burned to bits.

No. 126 In brief, a flight of four German
bombers suddenly swooped down on our section of the village.
They commenced to release their bombs at the edge of the
town and at a short distance just opposite to the British
and American Embassies located on the main street. As
they swung into line with the main street they continued
to release their bombs. Thence they followed the main
street to the crowded market place which they swept with
a spray of machine gun bullets.

No. 127 Three more planes flew low over the
village from another direction releasing bombs within even
closer
One of the results of the bombardment on way to the market place.

On the way to the market place.

Another hit.
A scene in the market place - note the holes from machine gun bullets in the wall of the building.

Market place - note the machine gun bullet holes in the walls of the buildings.

Market place - a bomb crater.
closer proximity of the other foreign embassies and
legations as well as the Foreign Office.

No. 128 Upon verifying the casualties I
found they included 16 civilians killed, 40 seriously in-
jured, and many slightly injured. Besides considerable
damage to business and residential property resulted.
Moreover, the population was terrorized by the suddeness
and viciousness of the raid. The aftermath was a pathetic
scene: burning houses, local inhabitants rushing hither
and thither in meaningless fashion; unfortunates bewailing
the loss or injury of their dear ones, small groups silently
and grimly carrying off several fatally shot women and
children; many run-away horses dragging their rattling
peasant carts after them, and upsetting everything before
them - in general a scene of panic. Almost all merchants
and restaurant-keepers rushed into the hills, locking
their places of business behind them. This forced our
Embassy group thenceforth to take our meals in the cellar
of the University which housed the Foreign Office, and where
a restaurant had been provided for the officials and staff
of the Foreign Office. The fires caused by the incendiary
bombs were difficult to extinguish, in that the water supply
of the village depended upon a primitive system: filling
barrels with water from the nearby river, hauling them up
to one's house, and emptying the barrels into the house
tank. Water thus delivered cost 80 groscher per barrel.
Hence, in several parts of the village whole sections of
houses went up in smoke.

No. 129 Shortly after my arrival at Krzemieniec
Further along main street, just after bombardment.

Another scene of destruction further along main street.

Destruction and panic - further along main street.
The market place - victims of aerial machine-gunning.

A scene on the main street not far distant from the American Embassy - after the bombardment.

Primitive fire-fighting apparatus - Water had to be carried from the nearby river in barrels and hand-pumped. The incendiary bombs dropped by the German planes caused considerable fire loss in residential and business properties.
I looked around for some place which might serve as an air
raid shelter in case of an attack. I concluded that the
best place for the members of my staff and my family, was
a narrow gulley, about 18 feet in depth, directly opposite
and about 300 feet from our Embassy. At the outset of the
raid which actually took place, and recognizing the familiar
drone of the bombers, I called to members of my staff and
family who were in and around the Embassy at the time to
make for the aforementioned gulley. On the way across the
main street, Mrs. Biddle, suddenly experienced a presen-
timent, she said she instinctively felt the gulley was a
dangerous place. As the explosions were rapidly coming
nearer - not only could we hear the whistle of the bombs
on their downward course then, from what seemed almost
overhead, but also could we see the shell fragments and
pieces of clay, kicked up by the explosions, passing over-
head and around us - a quick decision was essential. We
reversed our course, and stepped in behind the back wall
of the British Embassy. As matters turned out Mrs. Biddle's
presentiment proved a fortunate one, in that three bombs
exploded in the gulley I had previously chosen as a shelter.

No. 130 Shortly after the bombardment, one
of my colleagues, came to see me. Though calm, he expressed
his annoyance over the Government's failure to provide the
Diplomatic Corps (a) with some measures of air-raid pro-
tection and (b) with adequate police protection from what
he had been led to apprehend might possibly develope into
an uprising against both the Diplomatic Corps and the
Foreign Office on the part of some of the more restive
elements
elements amongst the civilian population. It was evident, he thought, that part of the German plan of attack, envisaged discrediting the Polish Government in the eyes of the Diplomatic Corps by so harassing the Government as to cause it to overlook providing protective measures for the accredited missions. It was not inconceivable, he moreover thought, that anticipating the Government's oversight on this score, as a result of general confusion, the German plan might aim at driving the Diplomatic Corps out of the country. He concluded by stating he felt confident that in view of prevailing circumstances his own Government would sympathetically regard a recommendation, should he make one, that he and his staff leave Poland at the earliest moment. In response, I said the pace of the conflict was unprecedented in tempo and that, given several days wherein to "dig in" in its new quarters and reconsolidate its position, the Government might possibly ameliorate conditions for the Foreign Missions. Meanwhile, I believed the best thing he could do, was to keep his "chin up", and make the best of a situation which was no more pleasant for the Government than for the members of the accredited Foreign Missions. This, I added, was a time when only the primitive factors of life counted - everyone had to shift for oneself - and if one wished an air raid shelter, one ought to get out and dig one; moreover, as regards the restive elements among the local population, I too was aware of their mounting recalcitrance towards the presence of the Diplomatic Corps as well as the Foreign Office in
their village, in that, they since the morning's bombardment regarded the combined presence of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Missions as having brought on the bombardments. The best measures I could conceive at the moment of meeting difficulties with these elements, was to walk in the middle of the street, especially after dark, and preferably not alone. I concluded by stating that as far as our Embassy was concerned, we were going to "sit tight" and stick with the Government either in Krzemieniec, or any other place to which they might possibly have to go. When I next encountered my same colleague several hours later, he said he had thought it all over carefully, and was going to remain at the Government's side, no matter what the circumstances, and he did.

No. 131 Moreover, three others of my colleagues came to me towards the close of the afternoon and stated that the neutral mission chiefs were considering requesting either the Italian Ambassador or myself to urge in their behalf that the Diplomatic Corps be sent immediately to some point either on the Polish or Rumanian side of the Polish-Rumanian frontier in order to be out of the theatre of aerial bombardments and threatened thrusts. In reply I stated that our Embassy would remain with the Government, but that I believed that already there had been some talk amongst Polish official circles as to the possibility of moving further south.

No. 132 By this time I became worried over the condition of Mr. Burke Elbrick's (third secretary) health. During the lengthy dusty run from Naleczow to Krzemieniec he
had contracted a bad throat. Now it had developed into an abscess, and he was running a high temperature. As he insisted upon being on the job day and night I had a difficult time persuading him to remain in bed even for a part of one day. Despite the doctor's energetic efforts, the throat went from bad to worse. As a long motor ride to the Romanian border might prove dangerous for him in his weakened condition I hesitated to send him to Bucharest for treatment. His untiring energy, moreover, and conscientious and dependable application to his work—he was always on the job inspite of his temperature and painful throat—gained my high respect and esteem.

No. 133 About noon that same day, the Papal Nuncio emphasized his desire that I attend a conference of neutral mission chiefs which he intended calling at 4:00 P.M. He stated his purpose was to acquire the consent of the conference to address a collective protest to some leading world statesman, and asked me whether I would personally approve his suggestion that the protest be addressed to his Holiness the Pope. I expressed my approval, emphasizing that in joining such a protest, I should want it understood that there was no political significance attached to the protest and that I would do so merely as an objective observer of what had taken place and on humanitarian grounds. He expressed his appreciation of my attitude. I then consented to his request that he announce to the meeting my personal approval of his proposal on the foregoing grounds.

No. 134 The Nuncio thereupon chose as our meeting place, a small grandstand at one end of a sports field.
field, close by the Foreign Office, and at the edge of a series of freshly dug but still incomplete trenches. Twice during the conference we were driven into these trenches by two separate flights of German planes at exceptionally low altitudes over the town. On these occasions, however, the planes refrained from releasing bombs, and it was believed they had returned for purposes of reconnaissance.

No. 135 When the Nuncio announced the purpose of the meeting, stating at the same time, my approval on the basis afore-described, the Turkish Ambassador declared his support thereof. Thereupon in turn, the Italian Ambassador, the Spanish, the Swiss and Bulgarian Ministers arose, and in most emphatic terms, stated their refusal to become a part to such a protest. They each pointed out that, in view of the delicate political situation prevailing in Central Europe, they did not wish to go on record as having taken action which might conceivably be subsequently interpreted as as criticism of German military tactics. The Nuncio, the Turkish Ambassador, and I thereupon re-emphasized the fact that the Nuncio's proposal was devoid of political significance and was based upon a purely humanitarian standpoint, and entailed merely our observations as individuals who had been the eye-witnesses of an aerial bombardment of an open town. Nevertheless, our aforementioned colleagues refused to waver from their respective stands. The Nuncio thereupon proposed, and it was unanimously agreed, that he make a record, merely of the fact that the conference had taken place; and that each neutral Mission Chief present had stated his intention to transmit his observations to his
his respective government. Thereupon, the conference ended.

No. 136 The Nuncio subsequently made the aforementioned record, handing it to Cardinal H@ond (who just arrived in Krzemieniec) with the request that he transmit it personally to His Holiness the Pope.

No. 137 In later conversation with the Cardinal, he expressed to me his disgust with the brutality and ruthlessness of German aerial tactics throughout the interior of Poland. (I consider Cardinal H@ond a man of outstanding courage and intelligence; he is fair and just in his opinions, and not given to exaggeration).

No. 138 Cardinal H@ond and Mr. Elbrick's route to Krzemieniec had had to leave their cars and seek shelter from an air bombardment in the same woods.

No. 139 About 10:00 o'clock that night Major Colebern, our military attaché, arrived in Krzemieniec by automobile from Tarnopol where he had been consulted with the General Staff, in which area he had been observing military activities. Enroute from Tarnopol, he had taken a short cut which had led him through back country. Had observed evidences of recalcitrance on the part of the Ukrainian population along the way. As a matter of fact, he came to a stop at a cross-road in order to read the signs for it was after dark. Suddenly he became aware that he was surrounded by 7 or 8 Ukrainian peasants who appeared to be closing in on him. The spokesman for the group bluntly declared that they intended to have his automobile, and ordered him and his chauffeur out of the car.
car. Realizing his predicament, he whipped out his revolver warning them that he would shoot the first one to touch his car. He then bade his chauffeur to go on, leaving the group behind without further incident. The Major cited this incident as a warning to us and the members of my staff, should we be forced to take the same road in event we evacuated from Krzemieniec.

No. 140 During this conference with Major Colbern we compared notes as to our respective observations and reports we had received regarding the theater of military operations. Immediately subsequent to the aerial bombardment I discerned that the local population turned bitterly against the diplomatic corps as well as the Foreign Office, in the belief that their presence in the town was a danger. As a matter of fact, several officials in the Foreign Office imparted to me their concern over the rapidly mounting recalcitrance of the local population. Moreover, the Starosta, commencing that day, declared a nightly curfew between 9:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M. In order to police this curfew, the Starosta armed a number of the local youths with old fashioned rifles. Most of them I feel confident had never had a gun in their hands before. This action alarmed several of my colleagues to such an extent that they protested vigorously to the Foreign Office, but without avail. The only practical steps I could take to insure the safety of my staff was to obtain special cards of identity for them which might serve to pass them by the guards at night. Even at that, however, the
situation was difficult, in that a number of these armed youths could not read. Moreover, when one turned on one's flashlight to show his card of identity, these youths usually forbade the light, (unless the bulb had previously been rubbed with carbon paper and thus dulled the light to such extent as to render it useless for reading).

September 12 - 13

No. 141 At mid-night, M. Sequin, Counselor of the French Embassy, rushed into the officer of the night at the Foreign Office, and informed him that an officer of the French Military Mission had just reported that a mechanized column consisting of tanks and motorized infantry was rapidly advancing in the direction of Krzemieniec.

No. 142 Shortly after my arrival in Paris, in late September, Polish Ambassador to France, Lukasiewicz, told me that pursuant to Minister Beck's instructions, he had imparted in effect the following to Monsieur Leger, permanent Undersecretary of the Quai d'Orsay on September 12 at about 10:30 P.M. He said that Minister Beck had proposed any one of the following courses in order to permit the Polish army a sufficient breathing spell to reconsolidate; (a) a ground attack, or (b) at least a feint in terms of preparation for a ground attack of sufficient magnitude to divert Germany's attention, and (c) an air attack over military objectives in the interior of Germany, 1/ to impress the German population with the fact that Germany was at war with France and Britain (many German prisoners taken in Poland up to and including September 12 professed ignorance of this fact) and 2/ to divert the brunt of German aerial attention from Poland.

No. 143 Ambassador Lukasiewicz went on to say
say: that during this talk he reiterated the same warning regarding the possibility of Russia's entrance into the conflict as he had informed the French General Staff through General Burckhard-Bukacki on September 10.

**No. 144** In response to the foregoing, Mr. Leger had seemed inclined to agree with the strategic bearing of Minister Beck's suggestions, thus transmitted. Later that same evening, through arrangements made by Mr. Leger, Ambassador Lukasiewicz had repeated to Premier Daladier the foregoing message from Minister Beck, together with his own observations regarding Russia's possible intervention, in the event Russia gained the impression that France and Britain would do nothing to help Poland. The Ambassador told me that at the outset of his talk Premier Daladier evinced a sympathetic attitude. At the end of the conversation, however, Premier Daladier had remarked that while he understood the position, the British were opposed to aerial bombardment in the interior of Germany, for fear of offending American opinion. In response to Ambassador Lukasiewicz's request, moreover, Premier Daladier said he had no objection to the former's verifying Britain's stand in this matter.

**No. 145** In subsequently verifying the foregoing, Ambassador Lukasiewicz found that while such an idea might have existed in the minds of the British Government the idea might have existed in the minds of the British Government the idea had not been based on any statement by official American sources. Ambassador Lukasiewicz thereupon
thereupon sought another meeting with Premier Daladier, and after considerable delay gained the impression that the latter was deliberately avoiding him. However, he finally gained access to the Premier, and frankly stated his findings on the above score. He felt that Premier Daladier wished to avoid further discussion of this aspect. The Premier thereupon called in General Denain of the French General Staff who produced a military map of Poland. Upon examining it, the General stated that according to his report the situation in Poland appeared to be in hand and that Ambassador Lukasiewicz's apprehensions accordingly seemed to be unfounded, adding that the Polish forces were in the process of being reconsolidated behind the Vistula-San line.

No. 146  Perceiving there was little use of arguing the point further, since he gained the impression that Premier Daladier welcomed this means of avoiding the issue at stake, Ambassador Lukasiewicz retired.

No. 147  Reports reached the Foreign Office indicating (a) that the German Government announced that all Polish towns and villages harbouring armed soldiers, snipers or marauding bands would be regarded forthwith as military objectives, and that the civil population would be bombarded, and (b) that Lord Halifax, warned Herr Hitler that the British Government in consequence held itself free to take reprisals.

September 13

No. 148  On September 13 Minister Beck invited me to have a talk after luncheon in the cellar of the University
University which was then housing the Foreign Office. Minister Beck thereupon stated his concern over the lack of communication facilities with the outside world, and urged me to try to establish communications with my Government, either directly or through relays by way of Bucharest and Paris. He added that it would also be a source of comfort to him and his associates, to know that a neutral mission had established touch with the outside world. Besides this, he discussed other aspects of current developments.

No. 149 In a further conversation with Minister Beck he disclosed in effect the following: 1/ the German air and ground forces had succeeded in destroying all lines of Polish armament industry, 2/ that while the situation was now exceedingly difficult, both the Polish Government and the High Command were determined to consolidate their forces and continue resistance, 3/ that among military and other official circles, the impression was rapidly gaining ground that France and Britain were staging more of a demonstration than a serious attack vis-a-vis Germany, for that his reports indicated that Paris and London official circles were informing the Polish Ambassadors in both capitals that they hesitated to permit their respective air forces to bombard German communications and war industrial plants, for fear of the potential unfavorable effect thereof on American public opinion. (During this conversation, a ranking officer of the Polish army, who was present stated at this point that he did not see why the French and British did not send planes for
Polish pilots to carry out the disagreeable task, if the French and British hesitated to engage in bombardments of this character themselves. The officer concluded by stating his opinion that for the Poles, it would be a case of justified retaliation).

No. 150 At the end of my talk with Minister Beck, he emphasized that this was a dramatic moment for Poland; perhaps a matter even of Poland's life or death. He intimated moreover that we might possibly soon be on our way towards the south.

No. 151 I was aware that Minister Beck and his associates in the Government as well as the High Command felt that if the French and British did not launch immediately a major shock attack, it might spell the end for Poland.

No. 152 About 3:00 P.M. that same afternoon, it was officially decided and announced that the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic corps were to evacuate Krzemieniec immediately and proceed to Zaleszczyki, about 250 kilometers distant.

No. 153 Later in the afternoon, I had another talk with Minister Beck upon which occasion he informed me (a) that his military reports showed that whenever the Polish infantry had come into direct contact with the German infantry, the former had proved themselves superior, (b) that Polish troops had succeeded in checking the German advance on Lwow by the previous day's capture of about 7 tanks which had been part of a reconnoitering mechanized thrust at the city's outskirts, (c) in the theatre of military operations in Western Poland, the Polish army hitherto trying
trying to withdraw eastward from a "pocket" formed by the German forces between Warsaw and Modlin, had suddenly wheeled into a southwestward counter attack, recapturing Zods, 2/ the German southward drive was threatening to break through the Polish lines at Modlin, 3/ Polish forces were still holding Warsaw.

No. 154 Minister Beck stated that he had personally already participated in two wars; the Great war, and the Polish war with the Bolsheviki. In this third war, he had had to stand aside. However, he still hoped to take active part in a fourth war, and perhaps to end his days on a battlefield as had his forefathers.

No. 155 Minister Beck then stated he had urged Marshal Smigly-Rydz during the first days of the conflict, to launch every bomber at his disposal in an attack on Berlin - at any cost. The demoralizing effect in Germany, the inspiring effect it would have had in the West, would have justified the sacrifice. I gained the impression during my talk with him that the Minister was suffering from deep emotions and mixed feelings about the performance of Poland's military establishment. In fact, I felt he knew at that time that nothing could really pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Poland.

No. 156 At about the same hour that I received from Mr. Kirk, Chargé d'Affaires of our Embassy in Berlin, a telegram via Stockholm and Bucharest to the effect that the German Government was urging Consul General John K. Davis' and his Staff's departure from Warsaw, Minister Beck received from the Polish Minister in Riga a radio message to effect that Minister John Wiley of our Legation in Riga had requested the
the latter to ask Minister Beck to issue instructions to
cover the evacuation of Consul General Davis and his staff.
In discussing the substance of Mr. Kirk's message with
Minister Beck, he disclosed his receipt of the message
from Riga. He then told me that both communications had
reached Krzemieniec when it was no longer possible to
communicate with Warsaw, even over military lines.

No. 157 Though orders had been issued to
proceed immediately to Zeleszczyki, I decided, that it would
safer, based upon previous experience, to proceed after
nightfall, especially in view of the customary flights
of German planes between 4:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the after-
noon. Several of our group decided to proceed by day light.
I preferred to wait until after dark before starting out
with the cars containing my family and Mrs. Kulaka of the
Polish Foreign Office (who still lacked other means of
transportation. The Government by that time had provided
a place for her husband, Counselor of the Foreign Office, in one of the official cars). Again there was considerable
confusion and difficulty in acquiring sufficient gasoline
to fuel all cars bound for the south.

No. 158 Before leaving Krzemieniec I went back
to the University where Mr. Alex Small (correspondent of
the Chicago Tribune) was billeted, to make sure that he
was aprized of the evacuation, and that he would have trans-
portation south from the town. (I had seen to it that all
other Americans in the town were notified and provided for
in terms of transportation). Armed with a flash light I
passed through the immense halls of the University and
entered
entered what I believed to be his (Small's) room. It appeared to have been recently vacated. I then went outside the building and shouted for him, whereupon I felt the muzzle of a rifle in my back, and turned only to find, to my added discomfort, that the young lad who held the gun had his finger on the trigger. I knew sufficient Polish to understand that in a Ukrainian dialect he was ordering me not only to cease shouting, but also to cease using my flashlight. Having finally persuaded him that my mission was a friendly one and an effort to help get another foreigner out of town, (an action which I felt confident would appeal to him), he accompanied me through six or more rooms in the University. Having made a thorough search for Mr. Small, and having later received a report that several Americans had left by a train which had departed for the north that same day, I decided it was best to go on, leaving behind one car for several hours, in case Mr. Small might appear. I learned subsequently from the Paris office of the Chicago Tribune that Mr. Small had actually left Krzemieniec on the aforementioned train and after a harrowing experience, succeeded in keeping ahead of the incoming Russian troops and reached German-occupied Poland through which he traveled on a refugee train to Berlin, whence he proceeded to Paris.

No. 159 Having made sure that all the cars of our group would be able to acquire ample fuel for the trip, we proceeded by way of Tarnopol (which as I pointed out in an earlier part of this report was in utter darkness, having suffered a severe aerial bombardment during the late
late afternoon, and again just previous to our entry. (The blackout was so intense that I found it necessary to walk in front of the car, with one hand on the radiator cap, and feel my way along, calling back directions to Mr. Moszczyński at the wheel of my car. It took us well over an hour to traverse this comparatively small city).

No. 160   We continued to our destination, Zaleszczyki. The only incident worth recording enroute was that on attempting to pass a slow moving truck on a mid-country road, I was forced to turn on the dimmers of my headlights for an instant (having driven thus far entirely without lights) since the road was narrow and the driver of the enormous truck in front either failed to hear my claxon or refused to pull over. Just at that moment the canvas flap in the back of the truck opened and a Polish soldier, obviously intoxicated, pointed his rifle (which was far from steady in his hands) at us shouting he was going to shoot, because I had flashed on the lights. Realizing he was drunk and suspecting we might be "for it", I felt there was nothing to do but leave the lights on and make a dash to pass the truck. Pressing the accelerator down to the floor, the car leapt forward, and missing the ditch by inches, we fortunately got around to the side of the truck before the soldier, whose brain at that point was fortunately functioning slowly, decided to pull the trigger.

September 14

No. 161   The remainder of the journey was uneventful
uneventful other than that we passed several cavalry units on reconnaissance, and noted a number of mechanized units moving up into position under the cloak of darkness. We drew into Zaleszczyki about 3:30 A.M. September 14, and went straight to the Starosta, of whom I requested information as to whether there were rooms available for our party. He politely indicated there was one bed available, and that if we wanted it, we had better claim it at the earliest possible moment - before someone else came along. I said we would prefer to park our cars under trees, and sleep in the cars the rest of the night. With an expression of considerable relief he offered to conduct us personally to a nearby park which, he would gladly put at our disposal. Having subsequently parked each car carefully under the shelter of a grove of trees we all settled down for the rest of the night.

No. 162 In the course of the morning, the Breslau radio announced in Polish the arrival of the diplomatic corps at Zaleszczyki, another example of efficient German espionage.

No. 163 At 6:00 A.M. we were awakened by the hum of a plane directly overhead. Everyone was so exhausted however, that no one evined any interest. In view of the low altitude of the plane I particularly welcomed the sight of the Polish insignia. We thereupon cooked breakfast on our kerosene stove, and upon looking around, found we were drawn up in the park of an old estate on the edge of the Dniester River, and about 200 yards from the Polish bridge head, of the International bridge, connecting Poland with Rumania which two days later became
the object of a fierce German aerial attack.

No. 164 The first action I undertook was to contact the Starosta again in an effort to billet the members of my staff and my family. By that time an officer of the Polish Foreign Office had set up headquarters in the building of the Starosta, and he indicated to us certain quarters which would be available during the course of the day. Meanwhile, Mrs. Biddle went to the old Palace on the estate whereon we had parked our cars, and inquired as to whether rooms might be available for our use. The proprietor said he would be glad to accommodate us provided we could supply our own beds, as the house was completely unfurnished. I subsequently succeeded in acquiring the approval of this move on the part both of the Foreign Office official and the Starosta. Thereupon procured beds in the town and assigned rooms to the various members of my staff. In the early morning we set up an office on the front lawn, and I succeeded in acquiring the services of two policemen; one for the day, and the other for the night, to guard our automobiles and trucks, and to see that all automobiles on the estate were kept under shelter of trees (this precaution became an essential throughout our trek).

No. 165 About noon Mr. Kuloki, Assistant Counselor of the Foreign Office arrived from Kuty at which town Minister Beck and his associates in the Government had decided on route south, to headquarters, instead of Zaleszocyki. Mr. Kuloki imparted confidentially that the President and his cabinet had changed their minds about Zaleszocyki for several
Zamek Zalesczyki where American Embassy was quartered in Zalesczyki.

Opening of American Embassy office on lawn, morning of September 14th, Zalesczyki.
several reasons, the main one being that the General Staff had decided to set up its headquarters at Kolomyja, and the Government wanted to be at a point nearby. (I feel moreover, that two other factors had contributed to the Government's decision, notably: (a) disturbing reports of a large concentration of mechanized units in southwest Russia indicated a possible Russian move into Poland, (b) Kuty was further distant than Zaleszocyki from the Russian border and (c) the vehicular bridge across the Dniester river at Zaleszocyki seemed a more prominent objective for aerial attacks than the long but low wooden bridge at Kuty). Mr. Kulcki then gave me Minister Beck's private telephone number in Kuty, stating that the Minister wanted me to have it but cautioning me not to communicate it to anyone else. Moreover, Mr. Kulcki said that Minister Beck would appreciate my coming to Kuty after I might have established a communications relay bureau in Cernauti. Minister Beck did not wish any other members of my staff, however, to come to Kuty in view of the shortage of food and inadequacy of lodgings.

No. 166 I immediately interpreted this message from Minister Beck to mean that Zaleszocyki would no longer be regarded as an official center for the Diplomatic corps. My impression on this score was subsequently borne out by a message received by my colleagues advising them to proceed to Cernauti in Rumania, from whence they could maintain contact with the Government at Kuty, by automobile.

No. 167 During the afternoon of September 14, I cabled the Department that Minister Beck on the previous day
day had earnestly requested me to communicate his conviction, based upon tragic scenes at various points, to which he had been an eye-witness, that from the outset Poland had been the "victim of methodical aerial bombardment of open towns", which too frequently had been defenseless and of no military interest.

No. 168 In this cable I added (a) my own observation that in view of what members of my staff and my family had experienced and witnessed I found it difficult to ascribe the frequently wanton aerial bombardment by German planes to anything short of a deliberate intention to terrorize the civilian population with a view to its creating a state of general confusion, to demoralizing repercussions on the Polish fighting forces, as well as to discrediting the Polish Government in the eyes of its people and the accredited foreign missions; (b) that Major Colbern Military Attaché and his companions had witnessed during their passage through Siedlce and Brzesco three distinct instances wherein unjustified bombardment had taken place, and (c) that my further investigation of the outcome of the aerial bombardment of Krzemieniec revealed that the low flying planes had dropped in the vicinity of the Foreign Office diminutive parachutes to which were attached glass bulbs and other small containers, which being suspected of containing bacteria were then under examination by official laboratories.

No. 169 It occurred to me by way of illustration that if the world were forced to accept Germany's interpretation of objectives of military interest in connection with aerial bombardments, as demonstrated by German
German air force during the Polish-German conflict, then the civilian communities of today, should they wish to safeguard themselves against being considered in any way of military interest, would have to undertake a radical re-vamping in terms of physical layout. Moreover, the planners, architects and engineers of civil communities of tomorrow would have to conceive of an entirely different adoption from what we have come to accept as a normal city plan. Accordingly they would have to consider the necessity of isolating by a distance of at least 10 kilometers, the center of civilian habitations, not only from military barracks but also from railways, factories public utilities, and even churches and hospitals. Moreover, in order to guard against possible air attacks, the water and gas supply lines and communication lines running between the utilities plants and the center of civilian habitations, would have to be sunk no less than 30 and preferably 40 feet below ground - for it should be borne in mind that a 1,000 pound bomb, according to experience in the Polish-German conflict, can cut through 27 - 29 feet of reinforced concrete like a knife through butter.

No. 170 Moscow's official Pravda attacked Poland for its treatment of the Russian minority.

September 15

No. 171 In the early morning, after consultation with Major Colberg, Military Attaché, I cabled the Department the following observations: If the Polish Army were to effect a reconsolidation, a breathing spell was essential. In this connection, about the only means of diverting the attention of the German air force from Poland would
would be some form of diversion activity in the west.
As matters then stood the Polish forces were unable ef-
fectively 1/ to counter attack, 2/ to concentrate either at
any threatened point, for any protracted defense, and 3/
to maintain effective communications between what then
appeared to be three Polish armies operating separately.

No. 172 I also cabled the department on the
same day, that Major Colbern's and my observations indicated
1/ German mechanized units threatened to surround Lwow,
2/ German columns hitherto advancing eastward in direction
of Lwow had divided, one element going forward towards
Przemysl-Stryj, in center of Polish oil fields, one other
element going forward in the general direction of Rawa-Ruska,
- Jaroslaw, 3/ German column at Radom attacking in north-
easterly direction towards Gerwolin was reported encountering
difficulty in forcing crossing of river Vistula, 4/
East Prussian force attacking in general direction of
Minsk-Mazowiecka-Wyszkow had reportedly reached the
Siedlce-Minsk road, 5/ report that a second column was
approaching Brześć on River Bug was unverified, 6/ advanced
elements of the German forces above indicated consisted
mainly of mechanized units; infantry of main bodies had
reportedly advanced to line: San-Vistula-Bug Rivers, 7/
Polish Poznan army under command of Bortnowski in area
Kutno-Warsaw-Zlodz was reportedly attempting counter offen-
sive in direction of Rawa-Mazowiecka-Skierniewice. Until
10:00 o'clock on the morning of September 14, the Polish
forces were reportedly holding Warsaw-Toruń-Kutno-Poznan,
8/ terrain and weather favorable for operations of German
motorized
motorized and air forces. It was doubtful whether the Polish plan envisaged reorganization behind the San-Vistula-Bug line would succeed unless heavy rainfall restricted action of the German forces. 9/ the British military mission had reportedly recommended the withdrawal of all organized Polish military units east of the Vistula River to general area south of the Finsk marshes in an effort to maintain communications with Rumania; current disorganization of the Polish army would make such concentration difficult.

No. 173 Information which reached official circles indicated that on this date the German Government had invited (a) Lithuania to occupy Vilno and (b) Hungary to occupy the Polish oil fields up to and including Stanisławow.

No. 174 Vice-consul Morton, who had just arrived in town from our own evacuation center at Brzesko, accompanied by Mr. Dzieduszynski, went with Mr. Biddle in the morning to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Rumanian Embassy to assist Mr. Morton in obtaining visas for Rumania. Mr. Morton volunteered to remain at Zaleszczyki as long as possible to assist any stray American citizens which might find their way to that point. I highly approved of his suggestion.

No. 175 Having ascertained that gasoline in Kuty, or at any place enroute on the Polish side of the border, was more scarce than in Zaleszczyki, and having gotten down to our last few liters, as well as having in mind Minister Beck’s expressed hope that I establish some kind of a communications center in Cernauti before joining him at Kuty, I left Zaleszczyki. Before leaving however,
however, I asked Mr. Harrison to remain there until the following day, when I planned to reach Kuty.

No. 176 I arrived at Cernauti, Romania, late in the afternoon. I immediately telephoned our Minister, Mr. Franklin Mott Gunther in Bucharest asking (a) his approval of my setting up a provisional relay communications office in Cernauti, (b) his good offices in requesting permission of the Romanian Government to permit my carrying out this plan, and (c) to release Miss McQuatters and Miss Saunders. Moreover, I asked Minister Gunther whether he would be so kind as to permit his counselor, Mr. Fred Hibbard to come to Cernauti in order to facilitate me in organizing the mechanics in connection with my aforementioned plans. Through the helpful cooperation of Minister Gunther and Mr. Hibbard, I was able to set up a provisional office in Cernauti.

September 16

No. 177 Miss McQuatters and Miss Saunders arrived early in the morning by train from Bucharest. Mr. Hibbard arrived the following day by train.

No. 178 Mrs. Biddle and I left Cernauti for Kuty during the morning. On arrival at Kuty we were assigned quarters in a small cottage in the center of the town. The British Ambassador and his Counselor, Mr. Clifford Norton, (who was accompanied by his wife) were assigned quarters in a small house nearby. The French Ambassador and his Counselor were also billeted nearby upon their arrival later that day. I had numerous conversations with various officials of the Government as well as with
Ambassador's motor-truck opposite "Black Eagle"
hotel in Cernauti, Roumania.

Another view of Ambassador's motor-truck
opposite "Black Eagle" Hotel in Cernauti, Roumania.
with Minister Beck.

No. 179  As far as I recall, we were the only three Mission Chiefs assigned quarters in Kuty.

No. 180  In informal conversation with a group of Polish officials at Steve Kuty, on September 16, they all expressed their concern over Russia's mobilization in general and over the concentration of Russian mobilized units vis-à-vis Tarnopol, and along the Polish-Russian border south of Tarnopol. This concentration indicated either a move against Poland or Bessarabia; they were apprehensive lest it be the former.

No. 181  Minister Beck's Chief of Cabinet, Count Michel Lubieniiski, remarked at this point that in his opinion Russia's paramount aims in terms of imperialism were the same today as during the reign of the Czars: (a) Control of the Baltic (b) Control of the Dardanelles, and (c) possession of India. All other moves were comparatively insignificant in terms of imperialistic ambitions.

No. 182  Before my aforesaided conversation with a number of Polish Government officials terminated, one of them disclosed in effect the following:

Between the 15th and 17th, the Germans had succeeded in piercing the Polish front lines by 6 motorized raids. These raids penetrated in most cases to the extent of about 200 kilometers behind the Polish armies.

Aside from combating each raid in an effort to localize the effect thereof, Polish G.H.Q. remained comparatively unperturbed thereby. (Nevertheless, I am aware that the sudden appearance of mechanized columns in areas
areas formerly unentered by German troops, created a
demoralizing effect upon the civilian populations in each
respective case). These motorized raids took place some-
what as follows:

1. One column broke through from a point between
Zamoza and Ostroleka, eastward, reaching the outskirtas of
Bialystok.

2. Another column from somewhat the same point of
origin penetrated in a southeasterly direction reaching
the outskirts of Bresza.

3. Another column penetrated from Wyszkow southward,
reaching the neighborhood of Warsaw from the east. After
this column had retreated to Kaluszyn, it was attacked and
defeated by the First Division of Polish infantry.

4. Another column originating at a point between
Sobata and Kutno, penetrated to the outskirts of Warsaw,
from the west. This column reached the outskirts of
Warsaw, and after an encounter with defense forces retreat-
et to the neighborhood of Raszyn. On September 14, this
column was defeated by the army of General Kutrzeba which
first fought its way out of the Kutno-Lodz line and later
out of the Skiernevice-Lawicz line into Warsaw to form part
of the city defenses.

5. Another column succeeded in crossing the Vistula
and the Bug rivers at about Mlodawa, penetrating eastward
to the outskirts of Wlodzimierz-Wolynski.

6. Another column originating at a point near Rzeszow
penetrated eastward to the outskirts of Lwow, dividing at
a point west thereof into two columns, one proceeding in
a southeasterly direction, the other in a northeasterly
direction,
direction, with a view to encircling the city. The main forces of this column were attacked by divisions under the orders of General Sosankowski, at the time when he was leading them from the neighborhood of Przemysł en route to Lwow.

In connection with columns mentioned in sub-sections 1, 2, 5, above, it was hoped by the High Command, that they could also be successfully turned back by reserve divisions.

No. 183 In the course of a conversation that evening with Minister Beck he said in effect the following: he (as in the case of other Government officials with whom I had previously talked) was apprehensive in connection with Russia's mobilization and concentration of troops vis-à-vis the Polish frontier.

No. 184 He recalled that Herr Hitler had spoken to Marshal Pilsudski in 1934 regarding Germany's possible association with Poland in a campaign vis-à-vis Russia. Field Marshal Goering had spoken in like terms to Marshal Smigly-Rydz on one occasion in 1935 and on occasion in 1937. Even during Herr von Ribbentrop's January 1939 visit to Warsaw, he had significantly alluded to the possibility of joint Polish-German action vis-à-vis Russia.

No. 185 He then recounted with marked enthusiasm the report of General Sosankowski's victory of the previous day (September 15) against an attempt of the German forces to capture Lwow. He said that General Sosankowski's troops had succeeded in defeating the German thrust and had captured 10,000 prisoners, besides having put out of business about 100 tanks. News of this victory had served to instill
the Polish forces with renewed fighting spirit. Moreover, it indicated that General Soankowski had been able to adopt his tactics to the strategy of the German forces. (This statement recollected to my mind Marshal Smiley's Hy forecast on August 10 to the effect that it would probably take the Polish forces between two and three weeks to adopt their tactics to German strategy).

No. 186 In response to my question as to whether the Polish forces had sufficient ammunition to continue effective resistance behind the new defense line then being established, Minister Beck frankly admitted that Poland was then low in ammunitions and he was aware that every possible effort had to be made to obtain fresh supplies. (At this moment I was of the opinion that even the Poles succeeded in setting up a contracted line of defense, they could not be expected to hold out for more than three weeks at the most against continued concentrated German aerial bombardment and redoubled mechanical thrusts, unless the Western powers extended to Poland effective assistance in terms, (a) of guns and ammunitions and (b) some form of military diversion activity in the west to draw off at least part of the German forces from the Polish front).

No. 187 Minister Beck then told me that King had been "very chic" in his attitude especially during past several days. (The Minister did not develop this point further, however.)

No. 188 At this point, Minister Beck turned to me and in marked earnestness, asked whether I could and would...
would cable immediately to President Roosevelt, stating that he, Minister Beck sincerely hoped that if the President found occasion again to mention the possibility of the United States' sending raw materials to France, and Britain, that the President might see his way clear to include the mention of "Poland". (Minister Beck said he had learned that on a recent date, President Roosevelt had made a public statement to the effect that he did not believe that our neutrality law would prevent the United States from shipping raw materials to France and Britain). The Minister went on to say that he realized the difficulty if not the impossibility of sending raw materials from the United States to Poland, however, since Britain and France were belligerent countries as well as their ally, Poland, he felt that it would not be too much to ask that Poland be included in any subsequent statement of like character.

No. 189  Minister Beck informed me at this time, that President Moscicki had set up his headquarters at Zalucze about four kilometers from Smiatyn. Moreover, general headquarters was being re-established at Kolomja, a short distance from Kuty. The Polish army, at this time, was considered by the High Command to be almost intact, and the High Command was already commencing the re-establishment of a new Polish front line behind which it was intended that the Polish army would adopt a definitely defensive position. Minister Beck stated with convincing sincerity that for Poland it was now a matter of life or death, and every hour counted. Reconsolidation of Polish forces on a new line had to be effected and munitions had to be made immediately.
No. 190  At the conclusion of our conversation, Minister Beck urged me to start in motion at the earliest possible moment at least some measures which might form a basis of establishing the means of aiding the wives and children of Polish officers engaged in the war, and who then were rapidly accumulating as refugees in Rumania. He said that individually and collectively their case would shortly become a pathetic one in that the few days that they did possess would soon be of little value.

No. 191 In response I told him I would go immediately to Cernauti and cable the President. I would at the same time take steps towards setting up some form of relief for the aforementioned Polish refugees. This would probably take me until about 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock the next morning, at which time I would return to Kuty. He thanked me warmly and asked me to come to see him upon my return.

No. 192 While I was engaged in conversation with Minister Beck, Mrs. Beck told Mrs. Biddle that enroute from Brazesc to Krzemieniec, the Minister told her that, not having slept for three nights and days, he must have a nap. They turned their car into a nearby wood, where in the shelter of the trees, he stretched himself out on the ground and slept for two hours. Up to that moment they had been driving rapidly but at a steady speed, and each town they encountered enroute was bombed severely just as they arrived. This unexpected break in their journey had evidently put the German bombers schedule out of balance for both

Mrs. Beck
Mrs. Beck and the Minister had noticed that on continuing their trip southward, each town they passed through had been bombed just about two hours previous to their entry. They believed that they had been spotted by spies who had communicated to the planes overhead at the outset of their journey. They felt very fortunate in having escaped what had appeared to be a plan to net their car in the bombardments of the villages.

No. 193  Shortly after this conversation I talked with Major Colbern who with us was headquartered at that time in Kuty, maintaining contact with the General Staff at a nearby point. I informed the Major of the substance of my conversation with Minister Beck and requested him to remain there while I proceeded to Cernauti immediately to carry out the Minister's expressed desires and return in the morning. I thereupon departed for Cernauti arriving late that evening.

No. 194  Once in Cernauti I endeavored to communicate with Ambassador Bullitt with a view to discussing with him the means of communicating to relief organizations in the United States the increasing plight of reportedly accumulating Polish refugees in Rumania, only to be informed by the operator that only an officer of the American Mission accredited to Rumania would be permitted to telephone out of the country, I was therefore forced to await the arrival of Mr. Fred Hibbard, before being able to contact Ambassador Bullitt by telephone.

No. 195  Reports reached Kuty that after a
"cease fire" order had been sounded in the Manchukuo border conflict, Japan and Russia had agreed on a truce.

September 17

No. 196 About noon Major Colbern Military Attaché, came to my room, having arrived from Kuty. He confirmed reports which I had learned previously during the early part of the morning.

No. 197 (The Major had not awaited my return to Kuty, since he had been informed that the Government itself would leave Polish soil for Rumania that day, due to the fact that they had been cut off from their army by the entry into Poland of Russian mechanized columns which were rapidly closing in on Kuty and Kolomya).

No. 198 The Major went on to say that between 8 and 9 o’clock that morning he had talked with officers both of the British and French Military Missions, both of whom in response to his question said they had no news other than the massing of Russian troops at the Polish frontier. While he was subsequently out on a reconnoitering trip, in an eastwardly direction from Kuty, at 10:00 o’clock in the morning, he met coming towards him, a column of Polish infantry, marching side by side with a lengthy column of tanks. He stopped his car and the first tank in the column also stopped. As the door of the tank opened, he was surprised to see a young Russian officer step out, for at the outset, the Major believed these tanks must be either Polish or French, since they were going along side of an in the same direction of the Polish infantry.

No. 199 In response to his question in Polish as to where the tanks were going, the young officer stated
stated in apparent sincerity that they were going to fight
the Germans. About one half hour later, he encountered a
group of Polish officers, who told him that the Russians
had come to their aid against the Germans, and what was
more they were willing at that point to accept help from
the devil himself.

No. 200 British Ambassador Kennard accom-
panied by Mr. and Mrs. Norton came to my rooms about noon
and confirmed news of the Government's intended early
departure from Kuty.

No. 201 When I finally reached Ambassador
Bullitt in the early part of the morning he informed me
that he had just heard a radio broadcast announcing the
entrance of Russian troops into Poland. Shortly after this
telephone call I met several newspaper men in the lobby
of the Hotel in which I was stopping who confirmed the re-
port which Ambassador Bullitt had imparted. One of the
correspondents stated that streams of Poles were already
pouring into Rumania in most cases blocking the roads at
the bridge heads at Zaleszeczyki and Kuty and that the
Polish Government was expected to leave Poland at any minute,
if they had not already done so. A little later while I
was discussing with my chauffeur over a map as to the best
way I might skirt around the blocked roads in order to
get back to Kuty, several of my colleagues as well as the
chauffeur of an official of the Polish Foreign Office came
along the street. They informed me that there was no use
in attempting to return to Kuty as the Government had
decided to leave during the day and that the roads leading
to
to Kuty were so jammed with traffic and refugee pedestrians that I could not hope to get near the bridge leading across the river to Kuty anyway. Besides, the bridge itself was jammed with refugees making their way into Rumania.

No. 202 A few moments later as we were talking together we were informed by another colleague that we should remain in Cernauti, for Major Alexander Lubieniski, Chief of Protocol who would transmit a message to the diplomatic corps in behalf of Minister Beck. Shortly thereafter, Major Lubieniski appeared and stated that Minister Beck wished to convene a meeting of the diplomatic corps upon his arrival in Cernauti and that the Major would keep us posted as to the hour of his arrival. As matters turned out events henceforth moved rapidly and I subsequently learned that we were to meet with the Chief of Protocol at 4:00 o'clock that afternoon.

No. 203 Even before the hour appointed for this meeting I learned that it was uncertain whether Minister Beck would be permitted by the Romanian authorities to meet with the Diplomatic Corps either individually or collectively. Accordingly, I came to the conclusion that if Minister Beck and his associates in the Polish Government were granted safe conduct through Rumania they would eventually forage at the Polish Embassy in Bucharest. My thoughts on this score were later confirmed by Major Lubieniski who said that if the Government were permitted transit through Rumania the most likely place for a meeting would be at the Polish Embassy in Bucharest.

No. 204 I therefore telephoned our Minister Mr.
Mr. Franklin Mott Gunther in Bucharest and asked his cooperation towards arranging for our railway transportation from Cernauti to Bucharest for the members of my staff and family. I had foreseen that the current state of political confusion then existant in Rumania would reflect itself in causing difficulties to motor by road to Bucharest and therefore preferred to proceed by train. Experiences on the part of my colleagues and several members of my staff who did motor down, bore out my apprehensions on this score. Through the kind cooperation of Minister Gunther and the local railway authorities, I was enabled to have a car attached to the train for Bucharest that evening.

No. 205 Before leaving however, information which I received convinced me that a meeting between Minister Beck and myself in Cernauti would be prevented by the local Rumanian authorities. I had already learned that German pressure on the Rumanian Government was already causing them to waver in their expressed intention to grant the Polish Government safe conduct through their country. Subsequent events proved this information to be correct.

No. 206 As we boarded the train we counted 40 or more Polish planes flying into Cernauti. The Rumanian Government had permitted these planes to enter Rumania provided they maintained an altitude not exceeding 200 feet.

No. 207 These among other Polish planes which flew into Rumania composed the last stand behind the formerly envisaged contracted line of defense which had
had been in the process of forming when the entry of the Russian troops provided the "coup de grace".

No. 207 I later learned from President Moscicki's Counselor, Minister Lepkowski that at 6:30 A.M. that morning (September 17) he had been telephoned at Zalucze, the President's headquarters 4 kilometers from Sniatyn, by the Polish Prime Minister, then headquartering at Kosów, near Kuty, that Russian troops had already entered Poland at various points along the Polish frontier. The President, accompanied by his Counselor had subsequently proceeded to Kuty where the President called a Council of Ministers' meeting. Among other matters, it was decided at this meeting (a) that President Moscicki send a message to the Polish nation by means of radio, to be transmitted by means of Minister Beck's mobile radio station in Kuty, to Ambassador Lukasiewicz in Paris, with instructions that he rebroadcast it in the President's name. The message was to the effect that the Polish Government would continue its struggle for the Polish nation even if forced to evacuate into an allied country. (b) that since the Government had already been cut off from the army, the Government would evacuate into Rumania, but only when this move was found absolutely essential in order to avoid capture by the Russian troops.

No. 208 Later in the afternoon, President Moscicki had, according to his rights under the Constitution, told his Counselor, Minister Lepkowski, that he felt it necessary in order to insure the Constitutional succession, that the latter prepare a decree voiding his
decree voiding his decree of September 1, 1939, nominating Marshal Smigly-Rydz as his successor. The President, realized the urgency of this action, and of dating the document from Polish soil, since he could not foresee the fate in Rumania of Marshal Smigly-Rydz, should the latter, as well as the Government be eventually forced into Rumania. He later signed the decree prepared according to his instructions in the presence of his associates at Kuty.

No. 209 Towards evening, when the Government learned that a Russian mechanized column had reached Sniatyn, 28 kilometers distant from Kuty, the Government decided to proceed to Rumania.

No. 210 Accompanied by members of his Government, the President started across the bridge between Kuty and Ryzynica on the Rumanian side. At the bridge, Minister Lepkowski, the President's Counselor, and General Schallay, Chief of the President's Military House- hold, encountered Rumanian Ambassador to Poland, Grigory and Secretary of the Rumanian Embassy, Rosetti, who stated that the Rumanian Government proposed either one of the two following procedures: (a) safe transit through Rumania to a neutral country, or (b) residence for the Polish Government in Rumania provided it ceased to function politically. The Ambassador then stated he understood the President would prefer the former proposal. He then offered to lead the President and his group in automobiles to Cernauti.

No. 211 Minister Lepkowski went on to say that during the course of the day of September 18, Polish Government
Government circles learned that under threat of aggression Berlin had forbidden Bucharest to allow safe transit of the Polish Government through Rumania.

No. 212 During the latter part of September 18, Rumanian Ambassador to Poland, Grigory, transmitted to President Moscicki an invitation for him, his family and his official household, to occupy the shooting lodge of Prince Nicholas, at Bicaz. Moreover, the Ambassador invited Minister Beck, his staff and other Cabinet Ministers including the Prime Minister to proceed to Crimea where they would be afforded temporary quarters. At the same time, Minister Lepkowski learned that Marshal Smigly-Rydz had been conducted to Craiova.

No. 213 On September 21, President Moscicki received King Carol's Minister, Mr. Flandor, at Bicaz. Following this conversation, the President became convinced there was no hope of safe conduct for him and his Government through Rumania. He consequently instructed his Counselor, Minister Lepkowski to proceed at once to Paris to see that his aforementioned decree was put into effect.

No. 214 Meanwhile, in Bucharest I found that it would be impossible for me to make contact either with President Moscicki or with Minister Beck or any of the officers of the Polish Government due to their strict internment by the Rumanian Government.

September 19

No. 215 In the lobby of the Hotel Palace Athenee I spotted Colonel Gestenberg, former German Military Attaché, in Warsaw, and an officer whom Polish official circles came to regard as Field Marshal Goering's local "mouth piece", and then currently accredited to Bucharest.

I
I remarked to Dutch Minister to Poland, Mr. Rosenthal, with whom I then was talking, that since he had been charged with the protection of German interests in Poland, I thought it would not be inappropriate if he were to engage Colonel Gestenberg in conversation with the view to ascertaining information regarding conditions in Warsaw. Minister Rosenthal accepted my suggestion in good spirit, promising to inform me later as to the substance of his talk with the colonel. Subsequently Minister Rosenthal told me the following:

No. 216. In response to his question as to why the German air force had released bombs close by the two villages at Constanoscin, Colonel Gestenberg said that since he lacked information on this incident he was unable to offer any explanation therefor. In referring, however, to the bombardment of Kresmieniec the Colonel admitted that this had been a blunder on the part of the German planes. Colonel Gestenberg then went on to say in response to the Minister's further questions that the German High Command expected Warsaw to surrender shortly. Already the population was suffering from a shortage of food supplies and he thought that this together with the growing tendency to loot would cause early civil strife amongst the inhabitants. This, in turn, would undoubtedly result in a call for truce. He understood that in the meantime the air force would refrain from releasing highly explosive bombs. This he thought was no longer necessary. As a matter of fact the air force had up its sleeve other methods even more effective at this stage of the game (he later admitted under questioning by Minister Rosenthal that what the air force had up its sleeve was the use of incendiary bombs containing thermite). The Colonel concluded his remarks by
by saying that he understood that the German High Command would shortly renew an offer to permit the evacuation of whatever staffs of foreign missions still remained in Warsaw. This indicated to my mind that once this evacuation had taken place, and in event Warsaw refused to surrender, the German air force would concentrate upon "firing" the city into submission. In my opinion, moreover, the German High Command's desire to remove whatever mission staffs were left was motivated on the one hand by the desire to avoid harming the foreign representatives, and on the other hand to clear the city of all possible foreign witnesses to what the German air force had in store for the city.

No. 217 Of pertinent bearing, it is interesting to note the following inconsistency in Germany's attitude in connection with her tactics vis-a-vis Poland:

No. 218 During and immediately subsequent to the Polish-German conflict, any public references to the barbaric character of German aerial tactics drew from the "propaganda factory" in Berlin, the most vigorous denials as well as most energetic efforts to discredit the sources of such references.

No. 219 By contrast, however, in late October, the Germans assumed actually a boastful attitude as regards the destruction rendered Poland in general and Warsaw in particular. They appeared to be attempting to exploit the extensive destruction wrought with a view to impressing and instilling fear in visiting neutral diplomats - perhaps even with a view to scaring them into the German camp.

No. 220 Indeed, German agencies in Budapest were
were openly advertising excursions to visit the scenes of destruction in Poland. Moreover, the Reichkommissar of Warsaw, when he delivered a "welcoming" address at the Warsaw station to the passengers (mostly diplomats) of an incoming train about October 28th, urged in effect that they look around carefully at the extensive destruction. He went on to say that while he deplored the outcome of the bombardment, nevertheless, the Poles had brought it on themselves. Moreover, he felt confident that close observation of the vast amount of damage would lead the visitors to recommend that their respective Governments intercede for peace. A former officer of my staff who was present on this occasion and reported the foregoing to me stated his opinion (a) that the expedition conducted by a Dr. Strebe, an officer of the Wilhelmstrasse Protocol Division, had been organized mainly in the interest of propaganda, and (b) the Reichkommissar's aforementioned address was obviously directed towards instilling fear in the foreign representatives, by drawing their attention to damage to Warsaw as an example of the capacity of the German air force and to a lesser extent the German 105 and 150 millimeter guns to render destruction.

No. 316 After President Moscicki and the Members of his Government had been interned at various points in Rumania, direct communication between them was prohibited. This served seriously to impede the mechanics of arranging for President Moscicki's Government's retirement with view to setting up a new Government in Paris.

No. 217 I learned authoritatively that Minister Beck had at once recognized the necessity of a Governmental change, and that he and Mrs. Beck worked diligently to facilitate the matter. In fact, due to his being
being prevented from leaving his place of internment, Mrs. Beck served as liaison between the President and his Ministers. Thus conducting the necessary negotiations.

No. 216 I later talked with a close friend and associated of Minister Beck, who had just left him in Rumania. He said that the Minister had earnestly bade him be loyal to the new Government. However, bitterly opposed the latter might be towards him, he said he would not lift a finger to obstruct them. In fact, he recognized that support from all quarters behind the new Government was a matter of vital necessity.
Ambassador's residence, Warsaw, after the bombardment during the week of September 24, 1939.
MILITARY ASPECTS
OF THE
POLISH-GERMAN CONFLICT
AND
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED THEREFROM
MILITARY ASPECTS
OF THE
POLISH-GERMAN CONFLICT
AND
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED THEREFROM

No. 1 Reports indicated, previous to the outbreak of the conflict, and campaign operations revealed, following the commencement of hostilities, that the German plan vis-à-vis Poland envisaged the lightning destruction of the Polish armed forces before the development of an effective threat from the West.

No. 2 It was clear from the outset that Germany had pitted against the Polish forces an efficiently organized modern, and powerful fighting machine. The outstandingly efficient co-ordination of air and ground force operations proved highly effective in the forward thrusts of Germany's swift moving campaign. That the conception and execution of the German plan of campaign were brilliant, was moreover demonstrated by events - Germany had gained complete domination over Poland in less than a month's time.

No. 3 In brief, it may be said that against Poland the German High Command applied their entire "bag of tricks" in terms of Blitzkrieg tactics, formerly tried out and perfected in the military laboratory of the Spanish civil war.

No. 4 In tracing the successful course of numerous
numerous swift, long-range thrusts of German mechanized columns (which in some cases left far behind them important bodies of German and Polish forces in the throes of combat), and in reviewing reports describing the effectiveness of these thrusts, it is well to bear in mind the following:

1. Weather conditions prevailing throughout Poland were highly favorable for this campaign of swift, long-range movement.

2. The comparatively flat terrain in Western Poland and the parts of Central and Southern Poland traversed, offered little if any effective check to the advance of these columns.

3. The exceptionally dry weather had so dried up the rivers that they were reduced in effectiveness as strategic barriers.

4. The Polish forces were inadequately equipped with anti-tank guns.

5. The Polish forces were quantitatively out-mastered in the air.

6. The possibility of German reconnaissance as well as bombing planes to shuttle back and forth from East Prussia to former Austria as well as to Slovakia. This permitted the discovery of any and all attempts of the Polish troops either to concentrate or maneuver their forces.

**No. 5**  As of connected bearing on the military aspect, I take occasion to draw the reader's attention to the following modern angle.

**No. 6**  Professor Dr. Yakimowicz, formerly professor
professor in charge of the general clinic of Warsaw University, told me that previous to the outbreak of war, he had received confidential reports through what he considered reliable channels in the international medical fraternity, that Germany, in its totalitarian war program was prepared to engage in bacterial as well as other forms of warfare, not only against Poland, but also if subsequently deemed necessary against Poland's Western Allies. He had brought this to the attention of his Government, and while his Government were distinctly averse to the employment of any such type of warfare, they permitted him to proceed with research in connection therewith, with the view merely (a) to ascertaining the practical possibilities in this field, and (b) to keeping up their sleeve whatever formula the professor might conceive.

No. 7 Accordingly, Dr. Yakimowicz had, after considerable research, worked out a formula which he called the "bacterial cocktail". This entailed the mixture of certain quantities of the germs of dissenter, typhus, and pneumonia, in bouillon in a container about the size of a small water glass. This, according to the Professor, was sufficient to permeate fifty or more gallons of bouillon.

No. 8 This bacterial lotion could be spread in the adversary's territory by several methods: (a) it could be dispersed on a rainy or misty night by a type of spray gun over a given objective from an aeroplane, (b) it could be dropped from the plane over the villages or countryside selected, in small colored glass tubes attached to
to small parachutes (the tubes must be colored in order to keep out the light which renders the germs ineffective), or (c) a specialist in bacterial warfare might be let down from the plane by parachute - once landed he could empty the contents of the bacterial tubes into artesian wells, water supply tanks and other vital places.

No. 9  The Professor emphasized that while daylight tended to diminish the effectiveness of the bacteria, damp or wet weather at any time was the most favorable condition for spraying bacterial lotion from a plane. He then went on to say that because villages as a rule depended mainly upon artesian wells, and in general an open water system, this type of community would serve as the easiest victim of bacterial warfare such as above described.

Fortunately, for both sides in the Polish-German conflict, this type of warfare was not resorted to.

No. 10  After the close of the conflict, Dr. Yakimowicz informed me that he had imparted the results of his bacterial research to the head of the Pasteur Institute, pointing out to the latter that he had reason to believe that the Germans were prepared to resort to this, among other forms of totalitarian warfare. In response to the remark of the head of "Pasteur", to the effect that such a thing was too horrible to contemplate, and that he refused to entertain such barbaric ideas. Dr. Yakimowicz pointed out that if and when the Germans did resort to this type of warfare, the French and British laboratories would be forced to conceive of some form of retaliation. Moreover, they would
would have to prepare large quantities of serums to fight
the spread of disease thus introduced. Dr. Yakimowicz told
me that he was surprised at the attitude of the Head of
the Pasteur Institute, for he felt that it was indicative
of Western Europe's lack of comprehension of the extent
to which their adversary was prepared to go under pressure.

No. 11 Observation and study of the course
and effect of military tactics provided by the Polish-German
conflict brought to light the following lessons, which in
my opinion might be usefully applied in considering our own
national defense problems.

1. That success in the modern offensive is largely
dependent upon complete co-ordination of air and ground
force operations.

2. That success in defensive action against modern
offensive operations necessitates (a) a completely organized
fortified position, (b) adequate equipment essential for
standing off the adversary's air raids. This includes the
integral essential, an air force at least equal to that of
the adversary.

No. 12 Superiority or at least equality in
the air is essential to challenge effectively the adversary's
planes (a) operation in coordination with the efforts of
the troops and mechanized units in the theater of combat,
and (b) bombing and otherwise harassing various points in
the interior of the country.

No. 13 In Poland, during the first several
days, the German air force made at least a pretense of
limiting its intense aerial bombardments to objectives of
military interest. The German pilots soon abandoned all
pretense however, and resorted to indiscriminate and large-
large-scale use of incendiary bombs over cities, towns and villages.

No. 14 This new phase raised the question of the necessity of adequate fire prevention and fighting apparatus and organization, as an essential defensive factor.

No. 15 Most cities, towns and villages other than Warsaw, many of them composing industrial, rail and other communications centers, were short of, and in many cases totally lacking in anti-aircraft cannon. Poland, with her meagre supply of this essential equipment was only able to distribute it sparsely throughout the country.

No. 16 After witnessing a number of air raids, I came to the conclusion that in centers where machine gun batteries composed the only element of defense against air attacks, the machine gunners would frequently have proved themselves more effective, had they held their fire until the planes risked flying in low, and power diving. Instead, as in a number of cases I recall the machine gunners started firing ineffectually at the planes when they were still out of range, thus exposing their positions to subsequent attack from the planes.

No. 17 Experience through the conflict taught us that from the standpoint of comparative safety for the civilian, large cities, provided they were afforded the maximum requisite in air defense measures, afforded more security than the smaller towns and villages throughout the comparatively sparsely defended countryside. In the latter centers, air defense, as well as bombproof shelters, were practically non-existent.
No. 18  From the reports of Major Colbern, Military Attaché, as well as from observations of Polish official circles, I gained the impression that in sectors along the battle front where the character of fighting permitted patrolling operations, patrol units would have derived considerable advantage from the use of sub-machine guns (the kind frequently employed in the past by "gangsters" in the United States). The lightness and mobility as well intense volume of fire of this gun would render the patrol the maximum capacity to cope with surprise attacks of opposing patrols without diminishing his essential mobility.

No. 19  I furthermore noted with interest that in General Sołąkowski's defense of Lwow against the eventually overpowering forces of his adversary, General Sołąkowski brought into use a number of 7.92 mm anti-tank rifles, secretly developed by the Polish armament industry previous to the conflict. The General later told me that this weapon, fired from the shoulder, proved effective especially against the comparatively thinly-armored German tanks. (The latter, he said, were inferior to the tanks formerly manufactured in Czechoslovakia).

No. 20  Major Colbern observed that during the recent conflict, the Germans replaced their old 77's with 105 mm guns. These 105's, not much heavier than the old 77's, have about the same mobility and fire a heavier projectile with a range of some 2,000 to 3,000 meters greater than the 77's. In fact, reports indicated that the 105's had an effective range of about 10,000 meters.
No. 21 Moreover, in their artillery bombardment of Warsaw, the Germans brought into play, in addition to their 105s, their 150s which, with a range of from some 12,000 to 15,000 meters, proved effective for counter battery work, and in cases where destructive power was required. However, according to the judgment of my former Military Attaché, Major Colbern (who visited Warsaw about October 29) he believed that notwithstanding the intense artillery fire, Warsaw suffered less therefrom than from aerial bombardment.

No. 22 Further lessons derived from the Blitzkrieg campaign against Poland, as well as from reports on German aerial tactics vis-à-vis British and French naval and commercial tonnage, raise the following additional factors for consideration in connection with our own national defense problems.

1. A two-power air force of no less than 10,000 first line planes, this includes strategically placed air bases with underground hangars.

2. Sufficient naval aircraft carriers.

3. A two-coast swift, long-range light navy, equipped with guns of the maximum caliber possible.

4. A two-coast fleet of submarines, mine layers, and mine sweepers, equipped with the most modern devices.

5. A great quantity of mines stored and ready for immediate use on both coasts.

6. Sufficient tank and mechanized divisions.

7. Rapid-fire rifles for the infantry, cavalry and motorized
motorized troops, and sub-machine guns for patrol units.


9. Motor transport sufficient to enable at least the military forces to be independent of railways.

10. Anti-aircraft elements: longest possible range anti-aircraft cannon and heavy machine guns - being governed as to requisite quantity by realistic appraisal of Germany's and Russia's recently manifested interpretation of military objectives, as an example of what to provide against in modern totalitarian warfare.

No. 23 We as citizens of the United States should come to regard this necessity in the light of a national insurance policy and accept the necessary annual military and naval appropriations as a constant over that period.

No. 24 In arriving at this opinion I have taken into consideration the following factors: If an early cessation of current European hostilities materializes before a definite victory by either side, then such a cessation, in my opinion, would prove more in the light of a truce, providing a breathing spell for recuperation and realignment of forces, than a prelude to durable peace.

No. 25 Even if however, a definite victory were attained by either side in current hostilities, I can foresee little better than a post-war period of say, 10 years or more, marked by economic and social unrest, growing
growing out of shutdowns in war industry and leading perhaps even to revolutions and counter-revolutions, particularly on the Continent. Besides, another factor which I do not overlook and which may conceivably have an important bearing on future trends, is that current-day youth both in Germany and Russia are born and raised in an exclusive spartan atmosphere, all trace of the athenian having been elbowed out by totalitarian leadership. Conquest in one form or another is the keynote of their upbringing - they know little else. Hence, with the mentality of the oncoming generations of two major powers of the world attuned to warlike thought, we, even as geographically remote as we feel ourselves today, must take into account the possible developments from this condition over the next fifteen to twenty years.

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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

No. 1 Since finishing this report I encountered the Managing Director of one of the most important American interests in Poland who imparted in strictest confidence what I consider of sufficiently interesting bearing to attach to this report.

No. 2 He had evacuated into Germany by southwest Poland on August 26,(by error I reported his departure as of August 29) accompanied by a number of his staff, pursuant to a telephone conversation with me.

No. 3 In two automobiles, he and his staff headed for Breslau via back roads. For a distance of 65 kilometers, and as far as they could see on both sides of the road, they drove through a mass of materiel consisting of tanks, artillery, airplanes et cetera. In one field alone, they counted 151 airplanes. If this was the case on side roads, my informant assumed that all main roads and the fields bordering them, leading towards the Polish frontier, would be equally, if not more, massed with materiel.

No. 4 Upon arrival in Breslau, he contacted a few of his acquaintances amongst the German General Staff. To his surprise they openly stated that their main and only concern was whether the Poles would fight. They were afraid they might not.

No. 5 These and other remarks of my informant's acquaintances led him to the definite conclusion that the
RUSSIAN ASPECT
RUSSIAN ASYMETRY

No. 1 As a matter of interesting background in regard to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Agreement, and its implications, I recall Minister Beck’s having said that there were two times when Russia became dangerous: (a) when the Russian Government derived a measure of self-confidence from prosperity throughout the country in which case, the Government felt it had a free hand to engage in world revolutionary tactics abroad, and (b) when the Government was on the defensive in relation to the peoples of Russia due to the country’s experiencing hard times - in which case there was a danger of the Government’s deciding that foreign conquest was necessary to divert the attention of the masses from their internal difficulties.

No. 2 Minister Beck’s expert on Russian affairs imparted to me that according to Lenin’s works and in the records of the 6th International, Moscow had envisaged a Russo-German Block eventually under Russian domination - that the Russian’s did not plan to attack Germany, but rather to let the Western powers weaken her, then at the psychological moment jump in and liberate the German people from the Nazi regime - decompose Germany - then Bolshevisce her.

No. 3 As far back as March 1937, I recall having reported from Oslo, that informed circles there had confidentially disclosed to me that through usually reliable channels they had received a report to the following
following effect:

No. 4 During a conference in London between Foreign Minister Eden, and German Ambassador Herr von Ribbentrop (shortly before the latter's departure for Berlin to sign the anti-Comintern Pact) Mr. Eden stated he had information that conversations had been taking place between certain Generals of the German and Russian armies and that their discussions envisaged a military alliance. While Mr. Eden admitted receipt of the foregoing report, he omitted reference to the fact that his information also indicated that Herr von Ribbentrop was aware of these conversations and their purpose.

No. 5 In response to Mr. Eden's question as to whether his information was correct, Herr von Ribbentrop reminded Mr. Eden that he had undoubtedly been long aware of the close relationship between the military circles of Germany and Russia.

No. 6 Mr. Eden said yes, but that was before Nuremberg, where Herr Hitler had taken occasion to attack Bolshevism.

No. 7 In response Herr von Ribbentrop lamely offered to try to ascertain further light on Mr. Eden's report.

No. 8 Mr. Eden then concluded by stating that the British Government would regard with grave concern any such negotiations.

No. 9 While I was unable to confirm the substance of the aforesaid report and in that I regarded this
this talk (if true) and its implications one of the potential pivots of history in the making, I considered it of sufficient interest to pass on to the Department for its information and verification.

No. 10 Previous to my arrival in Poland, I had been informed by a Polish diplomat whom I consider not only extremely well-informed on his own country's affairs, but also one of the most able diplomats in Europe, that Poland due to her geo-political position had to practice a policy of "balance-diplomacy" between Germany and Russia.

No. 11 It was not long after my arrival in Poland that I found my informant's appraisal of Polish policy to be exact. (Moreover, it was clear to me that in Poland's interest Polish foreign policy was directed towards the maintenance of correct relations with each of her neighbors and towards preventing collaboration between the two - a prospect which would prove fatal to Poland).

No. 12 In connection with this policy of "balance-diplomacy", I was interested in Minister Beck's remarks that as far back as 1935, Field Marshal Goering had proposed to Marshal Smigly-Rydz, Polish-German collaboration vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, I was informed by a leading official of the Polish Foreign Office, that the period 1935-37 was marked by several further German overtures on this score. Indeed, he recalled that on several visits to Berlin during that period German people from the boot black to the intellectual, greeted him with some direct or indirect reference
reference to eventual Polish-German collaboration vis-à-vis Russia. In other words, it had become common talk.

No. 13   Moreover, Minister of Finance, Kwikatkowski, told me that as late as January 23-25, 1939, Herr von Ribbentrop, during his visit to Warsaw significantly alluded on several occasions to a possible collaboration between Poland and Germany against Russia.

No. 14   Appraising Polish-Russian relations, I felt that in spite of the existence of a non-aggression and a commercial agreement, there was a deep sense of distrust and hatred between these two Slav nations. Moreover, I had my doubts whether if Russia had a chance to make a turn to her own advantage she would stand steadfastly by the sanctity of these agreements.

No. 15   As for Poland, she represented to my mind the last western window looking east and in such light could be depended upon to adhere strictly to her obligations. To be sure, while Poland manifested no affection for Russia, Poland did her best to maintain correct relations.

No. 16   Outside the non-aggression agreement, Poland was determined to confine her relations exclusively to the commercial aspects in line with her commercial agreement. She wanted no political "trucking" with the Soviets.

No. 16   Of related interest, Polish Ambassador to France, Lukasiewicz, informed me after my arrival in Paris following the Polish-German conflict, that in the first half of August, during a meeting between British and French
French representatives with Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Molotoff, in Moscow, M. Molotoff had bluntly remarked that an agreement between the Western powers and Russia could be practical only if Britain and France could persuade Poland to permit Russian troops to enter Poland iva the Vilno and East Galician areas at any time that the Russian's deemed such action necessary.

No. 17 The British and French representatives had replied that this was a matter which M. Molotoff should take up directly with Poland.

No. 18 In response, M. Molotoff said that Russia had only non-aggression and commercial agreements with Poland and that since Britain and France were Poland's allies, they were the proper parties to put the question to Poland.

No. 19 French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Bonnet, had later sounded out Ambassador Lukasiewicz on the above score. In response the Ambassador had remarked to Minister Bonnet that the latter was unquestionably aware of the answer before putting the question. Moreover, the Ambassador had pointed out his opinion that M. Molotoff's remarks along the above lines represented merely a tactical play. Indeed, while on the one hand, M. Molotoff was undoubtedly playing for time, on the other hand, he had deliberately posed the one question which might cause tension between the Western powers and Poland. The Ambassador had added, moreover, that he would therefore prefer to consider that
that the question had not been broached by Minister Bonnet - and emphasized that if France pressed the question formally, it would be a mistake, for such action might lead to an "all round" serious misunderstanding.

No. 20 The Ambassador went on to say to me that about the same time, Minister Beck had replied along similar lines to British Ambassador to Poland, Sir William Howard Kennard's soundings on the above score. Ambassador Lukasiewicz then told me that following these unfruitful soundings on the part of Minister Bonnet and Ambassador Kennard, he personally gained the impression that the British and French representatives in Moscow resorted to stalling the issue in their further conversations with the Soviet authorities.

No. 21 In concluding his remarks Ambassador Lukasiewicz told me that about the 19 or 20 of August, Minister Bonnet in conversation with him evinced considerable optimism over the prospect of coming to a deal with Moscow. The Ambassador had replied frankly that while the representative then negotiating in France's behalf was no doubt a military expert of high standing, nevertheless, the Ambassador felt it would be difficult for the French representative to gain a clear insight as to what was in the back of the Russians' mind, in that the French representative was not familiar with the Russian language, and had been in Moscow but a short time.

No. 22 At a later date, Minister Bonnet had admitted to Ambassador Lukasiewicz that he had been right as to his reaction on this score.

No. 23
No. 23 I recall having felt that after Poland had decided to cut its bridges with Germany, it was inclined to pay insufficient attention to Poland's relations with Russia. Moreover, I was inclined to feel that at about that time the Polish Intelligence Service in Russia was not functioning up to standard - had failed to keep Warsaw fully apprised of developments in the making.

No. 24 While I fully understood Poland's reluctance to permit the Red Army to step one foot onto Polish territory, I questioned in my mind, whether in the event of a German invasion, Poland might not be inclined to accept help from the Devil himself. The thought therefore occurred to me that if Poland and Russia could work out a formula whereby Poland could attach Russian forces to the Polish war machine, and whereby the Polish Government were the sole judge as to the character, extent and timing of Russian assistance, Poland might have held this up her sleeve as an effective weapon vis-à-vis Germany.

No. 25 In the early part of August, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Potemkin, came to Warsaw and conferred Minister Beck. The Minister subsequently imparted to me his opinion that Mr. Potemkin throughout his conversation had shown full comprehension of Poland's position. Moreover, Mr. Potemkin had remarked that Poland's attitude towards Russia was not as bad as had been widely suspected, for it was clear that Poland was not playing ball with Germany. He added that enlightenment on this score had led towards greatly facilitating a clearer Polish-Russian understanding. (I was aware that at this time, Poland felt that all she needed
needed from Russia were raw materials and that she entertained hopes of obtaining further requirements whenever needed, within the framework of the commercial agreement).

No. 26 After the signing of the Anglo-Polish Accord, I looked for Russia to relax in that the accord removed the possibility of a Russian-dreaded Polish-German collaboration vis-à-vis Russia. In this light, the Accord afforded Russia a strategic advantage in a political sense and thus allowed her to sit back and take her time before making her next move.

No. 27 Following March 31, whereon British Prime Minister Chamberlain announced Britain's and France's "assurance of support to Poland in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist", the British and Polish Government's "covering note" of April 6, Herr Hitler reportedly reacted violently in that the completion of the Agreement envisaged in this covering note, implied a potential two-front conflict, should Herr Hitler embark on further adventures - a prospect to which Germany was historically opposed. Both Germany and Britain shortly thereafter bid vigorously for Mr. Stalin's hand. Thus Mr. Stalin was afforded the opportunity to choose with which side he would throw in his lot, both of which powers Mr. Stalin, in my opinion, considered imperialistic.

No. 28 A leading official of the Polish Foreign Office informed me that in February his Government had received secret reports from Berlin indicating that the German

Government
Government had reached a conclusion that unless its efforts to detach the Western powers from Poland succeeded, war was inevitable. It was at this point that according to my informant, Berlin seriously started laying the groundwork for a German-Russian rapprochement.

No. 29 Again, Polish official circles received reports in early April which indicated that after March 31, Germany initiated in earnest the conversations which were signed on August 23 and ratified in Moscow on August 31, 1939.

No. 30 There was no logical reason for Mr. Stalin to back Great Britain which he considered as the personification of capitalistic imperialism and regarded rightly as not yet ripe for Communist propaganda. (Indeed, Trade Unionism in England is too healthy and too politically strong to admit Bolshevist theories).

No. 31 As regards Germany, there was from Mr. Stalin's point of view, every reason to back it:

1. The obvious gains to be achieved in Poland.
2. Both systems are based on totalitarianism and near-Communist ideals.
3. Similarity of ultimate aims. Germany or Hitlerism aims at world domination by conquest; Stalinism or Communism at world domination by world revolution.
4. Only one barrier existed to prevent an understanding—Herr Hitler, professed anti-Communist, was after all just one mortal man.
5. Germany, as a reaction to Nazi rule, was becoming internally
internally ripe for Communist propaganda and social unrest.

No. 32 Cooperation with Germany in conquest or occupation of Central and Eastern Europe would bring the Russian ideology closer to Germany and sap theirs, speed up internal trouble, liquidate Nazism and natural evolution towards something closer to Stalinism and less dangerous for Moscow.

No. 33 In both Germany and Russia, statesmanship had given way to novel experiments in general, based upon the glorification of the state as a super deity in itself, upon the suppression of the individual, upon the worship of one man who regards himself as the exclusive master of the fate and souls of his people, upon the doctrine of one given race over all others, and of its consequent right to bid for world domination - in cases of Germany and Russia, the objective was the same, though the approach to that end differed at the outset.

No. 34 Moreover, National Socialist totalitarianism is in my opinion a general adaption of Bolshevism, as Communist totalitarianism entailing a policy of world domination by means of social revolution, in the name of Internationalism. Nationalist Socialism is a near-Communist totalitarianism, entailing a policy of world domination through conquest primarily in the name of militarized Nationalist Socialism.

No. 35 In assessing the real strength of the National Socialist Doctrin it is well to bear in mind that while
while declaring a ruthless crusade against Communism to
destroy the Communist Party in Germany, Herr Hitler borrowed
some of the most characteristic axioms of Communism for his
State Totalitarian and Social program. The explanation of
this phenomenon rests in the fact that in Germany, dictator-
ship was instituted as the direct result of growing social unrest.

No. 38 Shortly after Herr Hitler came to
power in Germany there was a break in cordial relations
between Moscow and Berlin. This was brought about by the
necessity of ideological shadow-boxing: Berlin's so-called
anti-Bolshevist crusade, and Moscow's so-called anti-Fascist
line-up. When however, ideological tactics were no longer
useful there was a natural tendency on the part both of
"National Bolshevism" of Germany and "Bolshevist Nationalism"
of Soviet Russia, to come closer together - both are
opposed to the so-called capitalist democracies.

No. 37 Russia's participation in the European
conflict substantially augmented the complexities of the
scope of the war.

No. 38 The implications of German-Russian
collaboration are far reaching.

1. In the current stage - for Europe.

2. In a later stage - for Asia and possibly for the
world at large unless broken up before it gained momentum.

No. 39 Herr Hitler and Mr. Stalin might be
expected to collaborate against the rest of society which
upholds
upholds the principles of human freedom and the rule of right over might, so long as it suited the interest of one or the other. At the same time, however, like two gangsters, they might attempt to "do each other" at every turn and perhaps even work subversively towards the other's downfall.

No. 40 With ideologies now so to speak "out of the window" and with the lid off "power politics", western civilization finds itself faced with an unlimited menace in the combination of imponderable sinister imperialistic forces.

No. 41 Seen from the Warsaw angle the following observations stand out as important bearing on what eventually developed into a Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression.

No. 42 I recall that during the formative period of the anti-aggression front, all signs indicated that Moscow, was deliberately giving encouragement to Britain, France, Turkey, Poland, Rumania and other links in the anti-aggression chain. During the course of Moscow's encouragement to these powers, I gained the impression that Moscow discerned signs of concern in Berlin over growing resistance abroad, which Herr Hitler chose to label "coercement".

No. 43 At about this juncture, my interest was engaged by what I considered the significant implications of remarks on the part of Russian Ambassador to Poland, Charanov. He inferred that Russia was not going to permit itself to become an instrument of British policy, whereby so frequently in the past, Britain had looked to others to fight
fight her battles for her. These remarks indicated to me
that Moscow was still making up its mind as to which side
to choose.

**No. 44** Later, Moscow offered Berlin a
Non-Aggression Agreement. At the time, I interpreted this
as a move aimed among other factors at boosting Berlin's
confidence in the face of increasing resistance from abroad.
Moreover, aside from whatever subtle designs in behalf of
Soviet imperialism Stalin might have envisaged, he undoubtedly
had in mind laying the groundwork for world revolution.

**No. 45** Hence, I felt that while Moscow had on
the one hand lent its encouragement towards building up
resistance against Germany, on the other hand, Moscow had
deliberately taken steps to relieve Berlin of the worry of
a Russian attack in the East by agreeing to conclude a
Non-Aggression Agreement. As observed in my previous writings,
Moscow's machinations smacked of a deliberate attempt to
foment a European conflict.

**No. 46** In line with this thought, Moscow
ratified the Non-Aggression Agreement on the night of
August 31, and Germany attacked Poland between 4 and 5 o'clock
the following morning, September 1, indicating to my mind,
that ratification had served as the final factor which
released the German forces against Poland.

**No. 47** Reports just subsequent to the entry
of Russian forces into Poland indicate (a) that German
military observers had accompanied the former, and (b) that the
German
German observers upon their return to Berlin pointed out that judging by organization and performance of the Russians on this occasion, Germany could crush the Russian military establishment at any time it decided to do so. These reports might possibly lead Herr Hitler to believe he could afford to permit Russian forces to engage in a westward thrust, feeling he could arrest the thrust whenever he chose. Once Herr Hitler gained such an impression, he might let the Russians lunge westward with a view to "bringing home" the Bolshevik menace, in the minds of western Europe, feeling at the same time, that if he thus succeeded in sufficiently frightening the Western powers, he might either enlist their active assistance towards checking the Russians, or at least count on their neutrality while he turned against Russia.

**No. 48** If he failed however, in his efforts to frighten the Western powers with the Bolshevik "bogey", and/or with the implications of a German Russian Pact, either into a compromise peace or into giving him a free hand in the East, he might conceivably embark upon a set plan for joint action with Russia, to break up the British and perhaps even the French Empires.

**No. 49** By that time, Russia might request, and Herr Hitler might be glad to accord her, technical assistance towards reorganizing Russia's military and economic forces. This process might involve a period of as much as two years, during which time Herr Hitler might attempt to freeze the Western front while he whipped the Russian army into shape.

**No. 50** As far possible joint action between Germany
Germany and Russia, it might in a preliminary stage involve in terms of Russian aspirations, a diversion thrust against Britain via Scandinavia, with a view to gaining submarine and aviation bases, from which to hold the major portion of the British fleet in the North Sea and Home waters to cover a Russian move—vis-à-vis possibly India, Turkey, and perhaps Iran. In this connection, I was aware that between 65 and 70 percent of Russian agriculture is on a motorized basis, and that an air or naval attack from the Black Sea or effective air attacks from Iran vis-à-vis Baku, might paralyse Russia's economic as well as military structure. Accordingly it is not inconceivable that with a view to protecting her oil bases, a campaign against Iran may later figure in Russia's military plans.

No. 51 I feel that when Herr Hitler authorized Herr von Ribbentrop to sign the German-Russian Pact on August 23, he was willing to pay a high price for Russia's neutrality, and an even higher price for Russia's support, should he subsequently require it. Herr Hitler's plans previous to the outbreak of the Polish-German conflict, according to all indications, had envisaged a swift "blitzkrieg" victory over Poland, with subsequent vigorous efforts towards bringing about a peace with the Western powers. Towards this end, he had probably hoped (a) to neutralize Russia during his "blitzkrieg" vis-à-vis Poland, and (b) subsequently intimidate the Western powers by the implications of a German-Russian Pact. In other words, he hoped to make the Bolshevnik "bogey" and its implied joint action with Nazism serve
serve as a pressuring instrument vis-à-vis Britain and France, in an effort to make them more responsive to peace proposals in the western theater.

No. 52  Failing in these efforts, Herr Hitler might conceivably enter into a joint program with Mr. Stalin, envisaging the redrawing of the map of Europe.

No. 53  During the period of Herr Hitler's efforts however, to free himself of a conflict in the West, I should look for him to put the wheels of his "propaganda machinery" in motion towards subtly building up the Bolshevik "bogey" and picturing it as the "world's menace No. 1".

No. 54  In this connection, Herr Hitler would probably work on the neutrals. Moreover, he might possibly encourage Italy, (the sole member of the Axis free to express openly its consistent dread of the Bolshevik doctrine) to launch a propaganda campaign aimed at playing up Bolshevism as Europe's paramount danger. Indeed, were Signor Mussolini to perceive anywhere along the line, that the Western powers were gaining superiority over Germany, it is not inconceivable that Signor Mussolini fearing Herr Hitler's fall might spell his own undoing, and therefore hoping to keep the Nazi regime intact, might spare no effort in staging a propaganda "play-up" along the above lines.

No. 55  The foregoing observations are all based upon the assumption that Britain and France do not contemplate initiating offensive action, due mainly to
the desire first to acquire equality if not superiority in the air. If action by Germany and/or Russia should in the meantime prompt the Western powers to take the initiative this of course, might change the whole picture.

No. 56 It is moreover, not inconceivable that the Polish-German conflict represented only one of several episodes in the current war.

No. 57 Should the scare methods of Herr Hitler and the political pressure of the "peace-at-any-price" elements in Western Europe fail towards giving Herr Hitler a free hand in the East, by say March, I should be inclined to look for present hostilities to endure for a minimum of two years.