

●PSF

Poland: Orlemanski - Lange

PSF: Orlemanski-Lange folder 4-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

March 15, 1944

Hasbeen sent file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enclosing draft telegram to Marshal Stalin concerning visit of Orlemanski and Lange.

With reference to our conversation at noon today I enclose copies of the memoranda submitted by Mr. Stettinius on March 8. Is it all right for us to send this message out to Marshal Stalin?

CH

COPY:S:ARK

CH
OK
JW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enclosing draft telegram to Marshal Stalin concerning visit of Orlemanski and Lange.

The attached telegram for Marshal Stalin regarding the visit to the Soviet Union of Father Orlemanski and Dr. Lange has been redrafted in accordance with your directions.

If it now meets with your approval we will send it to Ambassador Harriman for delivery.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram
to Stalin.

NO DISTRIBUTION

~~SECRET~~
AMEMBASSY,
MOSCOW.

Secret for the Ambassador.

Please transmit to Marshal Stalin the following
secret and personal message from the President:

QUOTE PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
MARSHAL STALIN:

In accordance with your suggestion Dr. Lange and
Father Orlemanski will be given passports in order to
accept your invitation to proceed to the Soviet Union.
Due, however, to military movements our transportation
facilities are greatly overcrowded at the present time,
and transportation, therefore, from the United States
to the Soviet Union will have to be furnished by Soviet
facilities. I know you will realize that Dr. Lange and
Father Orlemanski are proceeding in their individual
capacity as private citizens and this Government can
assume no responsibility whatsoever for their activities
or views, and should their trip become the subject of
public comment it might be necessary for this Govern-
ment to make this point clear.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 15 1972

Original of this memorandum & the
telegram returned to Mr Stettinius
4/3/44
hms

March 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enclosing draft telegram to Marshal Stalin concerning visit of Orlemanski and Lange.

The attached telegram for Marshal Stalin regarding the visit to the Soviet Union of Father Orlemanski and Dr. Lange has been redrafted in accordance with your directions.

If it now meets with your approval we will send it to Ambassador Harriman for delivery.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram
to Stalin.

"O.K.
but I think it
has been sent.
F.D.R."

~~SECRET~~

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMEMBASSY,
MOSCOW.

Secret for the Ambassador.

Please transmit to Marshal Stalin the following
secret and personal message from the President:

QUOTE PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
MARSHAL STALIN:

In accordance with your suggestion Dr. Lange and
Father Orlemanski will be given passports in order to
accept your invitation to proceed to the Soviet Union.
Due, however, to military movements our transportation
facilities are greatly overcrowded at the present time,
and transportation, therefore, from the United States
to the Soviet Union will have to be furnished by Soviet
facilities. I know you will realize that Dr. Lange and
Father Orlemanski are proceeding in their individual
capacity as private citizens and this Government can
assume no responsibility whatsoever for their activities
or views, and should their trip become the subject of

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Assistant of the U.S.,

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 1 1972

-2-

public comment it might be necessary for this Government
to make this point clear.

Acting

EE: CEB: EB
3/8/44

Department of State

BUREAU | **EE**
DIVISION |

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted **3/8/44**

ADDRESSED TO

The President

~~SECRET~~

Russia folder
1-447

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1944



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Marshal Stalin's inquiry concerning
Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski.

The request of Marshal Stalin that Dr. Lange and Father Orlemanski be permitted to go to Moscow for the purpose of discussing with a group of Poles in Moscow the future Government of Poland raises a very serious question.

These two men represent a specific and heavily slanted view on the Polish-Soviet question which is not shared by American citizens of Polish descent nor by American public opinion as a whole.

If they go to the Soviet Union with the tacit consent and assistance of this Government, we may become directly involved in the dispute between the Polish and the Soviet Governments. Their visit will be widely interpreted as the first step in the abandonment by this Government of the Polish Government-in-exile. In addition, inasmuch as we recognize the Polish Government-in-exile as the legal Government of Poland, it is possible that their activities in Moscow would bring them within the purview of the Logan Act which prohibits American citizens from having any dealings with a foreign government or agents thereof "to defeat the measures of the Government of the United States".

On the other hand, it may be undesirable, if not impossible to refuse these two American citizens permission to accept the invitation tendered by the Soviet Government.

If they go, some form of public statement on our part may be necessary, making it clear that they are proceeding as private citizens with no connection whatsoever with the Government of the United States. I believe, therefore, that it would be desirable for you to inform Marshal Stalin of the possible necessity for such a statement, and I attach for your consideration a draft cable to him.

Enclosure:

Draft cable
to Stalin

*Requests
Proposals -
no official
Russia
stamp*

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter

By R. H. Parks Date FEB 14 1972

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

4/25

Mr. Drissel,

A photostat copy, sent up from the Undersecretary's office is recorded as 760c.61/2243 $\frac{1}{2}$.

This ribbon copy should be returned to the White House.

OK
YK
Send to Miss Tulley

(2768)

Handwritten initials

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



*CFH
OK
- 7/27/44
Carbon included
and returned to
Dept. of State 3/29/44*

PSF: Orlemanski-Lange folder
4-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the instructions which you gave Mr. Stettinius on March 8 that passports should be issued to Professor Oscar Lange and the Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski in order that they might proceed to the Soviet Union, a passport is now being issued to Professor Lange, and one will be issued to Reverend Orlemanski as soon as he completes his application.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding as to the conditions under which passports are being issued to these men particularly in view of possible repercussions which may arise under the "Logan Act", it is proposed to inform them at the time the passports are issued that they must clearly understand that in proceeding to the Soviet Union they are acting in their own individual capacity and that this Government can take no responsibility for their actions.

Should their trip become the subject of public comment it is proposed to issue the following explanatory statement:

The Reverend Stanislaw Orlemanski and Professor Oscar Lange are proceeding to the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Soviet Government. They are making this trip as private American citizens acting in their own individual capacity. They have no official status and therefore are not in any sense representatives or spokesmen of the United States Government.

CFH



Copy of these papers, initialed by the President,
returned to Mr. Stettinius, Jr. 3/23/44
hms

March 3, 1944

"O.K.
Send
F.D.R."

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enclosing draft telegram to Marshal Stalin concerning visit of Orlemanski and Lange.

The attached telegram for Marshal Stalin regarding the visit to the Soviet Union of Father Orlemanski and Dr. Lange has been redrafted in accordance with your directions.

If it now meets with your approval we will send it to Ambassador Harriman for delivery.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram
to Stalin.

EE: OEB: EB
3/8/44

~~SECRET~~ NO DISTRIBUTION

AMEMBASSY,
MOSCOW.

Secret for the Ambassador.

Please transmit to Marshal Stalin the following
secret and personal message from the President:

QUOTE PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
MARSHAL STALIN:

In accordance with your suggestion Dr. Lange and
Father Orlemanski will be given passports in order to
accept your invitation to proceed to the Soviet Union.
Due, however, to military movements our transportation
facilities are greatly overcrowded at the present time,
and transportation, therefore, from the United States
to the Soviet Union will have to be furnished by Soviet
facilities. I know you will realize that Dr. Lange and
Father Orlemanski are proceeding in their individual
capacity as private citizens and this Government can
assume no responsibility whatsoever for their activities
or views and should their trip become the subject of

DECLASSIFIED

-2-

public comment it might be necessary for this Government
to make this point clear.

Acting

EE: CEB: EB
3/9/44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

March 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

With reference to our
telephone conversation of yester-
day, I am enclosing a copy of
the memoranda referred to.

GWR
G.W.R.

RESTORATION FOR WHITE HOUSE
FEBRUARY 22, 1944
THE SECRETARIES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

February 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mrs. Shipley tells me that these people must apply for visas from the Russian Embassy and then apply for their passports. So far, they have not applied for passports.

Mrs. Shipley tells me that these two gentlemen are connected with a pro-Soviet League here and she asks us not to commit ourselves about the passport because there maybe some objection from O.S.S.

GGT

MYZHH
-LINE WHIL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Feb. 22, 1944.

MEMO FOR GRACE:

The President said to call up Mrs. Shipley and ask if there is any reason why we should not give visas to these people to go to Russia for a visit and to let me know.

djb

Orlemansky, Prior of the Holy Mother Church in Springfield,
Massachusetts. He is the President of the League of Kostushko,
Detroit, Michigan.

Oscar Lange, Professor of the Chicago and Columbia Universities.

PSF: Orlemanski - Tange folder

file
"Secret"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5-24-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a secret memorandum regarding the statements of Father Orlemanski. It was sent by Mr. Gray to me by direction of Secretary Hull, as of possible interest to you.

E.M.W.
E.M.W.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This is extremely interesting.
What would you think of either you
or myself sending for Orlemanski
and seeing him "off the record"?

F. D. R.

148

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

May 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

As of interest, I enclose
in single copy a further memoran-
dum of conversation between
Mr. Poole and Father Orlemanski.

AWG

~~SECRET~~ N. 576

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE
REVEREND STANISLAUS ORLEMANSKI
NEW YORK CITY, 27 May 1944

file ↗

Father Orlemanski called on me in New York this morning, 27 May. The visit was entirely on his initiative. Though his voice was husky and he showed vestiges of mental fatigue, he seemed much more rested and reposed in spirit than when I talked with him at Springfield 16 May.

Having just read a condoning and rather sanguine editorial on Father Orlemanski's trip in the 2 June issue of the well-known Catholic weekly, Commonweal, I handed it to him and remarked that he appeared to have achieved a success on the church side and that this was beginning to be recognized. He expressed, in answer, particular gratification over two cordial messages of congratulation which had reached him from the entourage of Archbishop Spellman and went on to say that he had received to date between three and four thousand letters and telegrams. These had come from all over the country but especially from the West and Southwest. All but "three or four -- and those anonymous" were commendatory. They came from both Catholic and non-Catholic circles; he had noticed a particularly large number from Protestant clergymen. The messages were still coming in. When there was time he intended to sort them all out by region of origin and status of writer.

Turning to what he calls the political side of his mission, Father Orlemanski then told me he felt the time had come for him to make a public statement. Professor Lange would be back soon, he remarked, and might be saying all sorts of things. Then there was this big Polish congress about to begin in Buffalo. Therefore, Father Orlemanski continued, he had drafted a public statement and wished to show it to me.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 14 1972

I answered that I must make it at once clear that whether or not Father Orlemanski should carry out his idea of a public statement was a decision for him alone and I could have no part in it. Above all, I said, I would not do or say anything to interfere with his full right as an American citizen to make any public statement he wished.

When Father Orlemanski replied that he fully understood that but would still be grateful for any help I could give him, I said that I could only point out that, as the public had just learned from Prime Minister Churchill, the Polish-Russian problem was under very active consideration. I called particular attention to Churchill's assertion that "things are not so bad as they may appear on the surface between Russia and Poland." That statement, I pointed out to Father Orlemanski, fitted in with the story he had himself brought back.

Naturally, I answered to an inquiry on his part, I had made a record of what he (Orlemanski) had related to me in Springfield on 16 May. "It was not thrown in the waste basket?" he asked. "No, indeed," I replied.

Plainly the Polish-Russian situation was complicated, I continued, and in an active state, and if he was going to make a public statement, I was sure he would agree that it ought to be a carefully considered statement. That was just it, he said. He had a statement in his pocket which he had written out, and he really needed some advice and he would be most gratified if I would look at it. I said I would on the understanding that the entire responsibility remained with him.

A photostatic copy is attached of the draft which Father Orlemanski handed to me. Upon looking it through I said that there was only one

DECLASSIFIED
State Department, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 14 1972

point upon which it might be in order for me to comment. He had attributed to Stalin the statement that the Curzon line had been "imposed" on him. I thought that might simply make some people mad. Father Orlemanski thereupon inked out the sentence, as will be seen in the photostat. The inked out sentence had read: "That line was imposed on us."

Father Orlemanski wished to emphasize, however, that that exactly was what Stalin had said. Stalin got good and mad, Orlemanski recalled, when he talked about it. Stalin said he was told at Teheran, according to Orlemanski, that the Curzon line should be the eastern boundary of Poland and Germany should not be divided up. That seemed to Stalin pretty hard on Poland, left with just that much territory. Stalin had insisted there be compensation in the west and the eastern boundary ought to be "a Polish-Russian boundary."

Father Orlemanski then volunteered some remarks upon the idea, which he attributes to Stalin, of including some representative Polish-Americans in a provisional Polish government. Of course he knew this could not be done, he said. American citizens could not be members of a foreign government. Still he thought it right to let the American people know that Stalin had made the suggestion. It showed how anxious Stalin was to have the support of American public opinion.

Father Orlemanski went on to express some of his own general political views. This was a time of mass movements, he observed. He could not blame individuals for anything. There were mass movements everywhere. In the United States we had had a peaceful revolution under Roosevelt. In

DECLASSIFIED

State Department, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 14 1972

Russia they had to have a bloody revolution. They had to have a big war to have their revolution in Germany.

It was "cliques" that got things wrong. He enlarged again on the machinations of the "Polish clique" in the United States. He strongly condemned the attitude and conduct of most of the Catholic hierarchy in matters other than religious.

It was Roosevelt who understood things and could get them straightened out, he continued. He (Orlemanski) had always been a Republican but he was all for Roosevelt now. Roosevelt must be reelected, and he (Orlemanski) thought he had already helped a lot by getting the religious question out of the way in relations with Russia. He wanted to help too on the political side of the Russian-Polish problem.

He had chosen to go to Russia without his Bishop's permission because he wanted to relieve the Bishop of responsibility. "I might come back a man or a goat," he said, "but I came back a man." Now, he said, with the same thought in mind he was considering the issuance of a public statement without consulting the Bishop. The letter of apology he had written the Bishop when the Bishop removed his suspension related only to church matters and did not curtail his freedom in political matters.

At this point I had to ask Father Orlemanski to sit a while in an adjoining room while I did some urgent telephoning. That was fine, he said; he wanted to study further the draft of his proposed statement. When I rejoined him in about half an hour he said he was not so sure that he ought to make any statement just now. Perhaps it would be better in about a


INDEXED
State 11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 14 1972

month. Then it might be better after all to consult the Bishop in advance.

He hadn't seen the Bishop face to face since his return from Russia. The parish had just bought a fine new bell. It would soon be hung in the church belfry. Maybe the Bishop would come and bless it and then everything would be fine again.

Father Orlemanski left feeling a manifest uncertainty about the public statement. If when he got back to Springfield, he said, he decided to give it out after all, the AP and UP and INS were just as available there through the local newspaper offices as they were any place else.

"But," he gave me as a parting injunction, "be sure to tell the Big Fellow down in Washington that Stalin wants to work things out; it's just that he's awfully suspicious -- suspicious of nearly everybody. He likes Roosevelt though."



DeWitt C. Poole

27 May 1944

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 14 1972

"observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated." George Washington in his Farewell Address.

The church. The church question is a closed book with me. The historic document signed by Marshall Stalin was delivered by me to the higher church authorities for consideration.

The Polish question.

1. The government. Marshall Stalin expressed his believe and conviction that many members in the Polish government-in-exile would be very useful and helpful to Poland. Stalin's idea is to form a new temporary Polish government which would include the Polish Patriots in Moscow, members of the Polish government in London and Americans of Polish descent from the United States. The following statement came as a surprise to me. Said Stalin: "I knew that you want a democratic Poland according to your American pattern. We can help you solve this problem. Upon your return to the United States, will you please, pick a committee from the Americans of Polish extraction and have them come to Moscow to join the new temporary Polish government. Having support of your government and the American people, I am sure that your wishes will be realized. You will have a strong, independent and democratic Poland." To this I replied: "Marshall Stalin, I came as a private citizen and not as an authorized official to discuss, agree or sign agreements. This I must leave with my government and the American people for discussion and settlement."

2. Boundaries. "The Curson Line is not a Russian Line. ~~What we want is a Russian-Polish Line.~~" Continued Stalin. I am now repeating what was said and passing this information to my government and the American people. It is up to the new Polish and allied governments to define and establish this new Russian-Polish Line.

"In the West. The Western boundaries of Poland will be determined by Poland herself. I will sincerely cooperate and support Poland to get what

she wants in the West."

Many representatives from the United States visited the Polish government in London bringing us first hand information .On the other hand, I believe that I, as an American citizen of Polish descent, should have had the same privilege and opportunity to visit the Polish Patriots in Moscow and to bring to the American people first hand information concerning the other side of the story.

As a loyal American, I will shortly pay my respect to the President of the United States and the Secretary of State.

Rev. S. Orlemanski



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT June 2, 1944

I am very dubious as to the advisability of asking Father Orlemanski to come to Washington for the purpose of an off-the-record conversation with you or even with me. If I thought that any such conversations would be at all helpful in connection with the Polish-Soviet dispute, the very real risk of undesirable publicity would be worth running. However, a careful examination of Father Orlemanski's talks with the official of OSS, to which you refer, does not reveal any real departure from the position of the Soviet Government concerning which we have been fully informed through official channels.

As you know we have been subjected to some criticism from Polish-American and Catholic circles for having permitted Father Orlemanski to go to Moscow at all in order to mix in the Polish-Soviet dispute, and judging from his actions since his return it is almost certain that a visit to you would not be kept secret. Aside from the natural interest of talking to Orlemanski about his experiences in Russia, I believe we have received all the information which he brought back with him. Unless we were prepared to act on the somewhat vague indications of a slightly modified Soviet attitude towards Poland contained in Father Orlemanski's account of his discussions -- which would immediately involve this Government in an attempt to settle the merits of the Polish-Soviet dispute which I am sure you will agree is highly undesirable -- the only result of your sending for Orlemanski would probably be a good deal of unfortunate publicity.

Should Father Orlemanski come to Washington and call at the Department I would of course see that he is received by the appropriate officials.



C.H.

PSF. Orlemanski-Lange folder 4-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

Professor Oscar Lange telephoned Mr. Early requesting an appointment in order to present to him a report on his trip to Russia. After checking with Mr. C. E. Bohlen of the State Department, it was decided that I should receive him and accept his report along the lines set forth in my June 15th letter to the Professor.

I find that the report is a copy of the report which Professor Lange delivered to the Secretary of State through Mr. Stettinius. The Professor seemed happy at being received in the White House, and I think that this will close the matter. I have notified Mr. Bohlen of the contents of the report left with me.


T. D. B.

June 15, 1944

Dear Professor Lange:

This will acknowledge receipt from you of a copy of the Report on your recent visit to Russia, the original of which has been submitted to the Secretary of State, through the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius.

As you state in your covering memorandum to the President, this Report is submitted on your own initiative, and in your capacity as a private American citizen who is anxious to present his views on his own visit to Russia.

Very sincerely yours,

THOMAS D. BLAKE
Assistant to MR. EARLY

Professor Oscar Lange,
Department of Economics,
University of Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois.

TDB:mt1

The University of Chicago

Department of Economics

CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS

June 12, 1944

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of a report which I have submitted to the Secretary of State.

The report concerns my trip to the U.S.S.R., during which I visited the Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish Army.

I am submitting this report on my own initiative.

Most respectfully,

Oscar Lange

Oscar Lange

OL:j

Enclosure

MAY 17. CONFERENCE WITH MARSHAL STALIN AND MR. MOLOTOV.
Length, 2 hours, 20 minutes. Language, Russian. Also present,
Mr. Pavlov, who took notes of the conversation.

Marshal Stalin started by asking me my impressions of the Polish army. I told him what I had seen and heard, and observed that the ideas of the soldiers and officers were more radical than those of the members of the Union of Polish Patriots. I pointed out that whereas the overwhelming majority of the soldiers are for nationalization of big industries and banking, the Union of Polish Patriots holds back on this point. I mentioned that, in particular, the Polish Communists are now the right wing of the Union of Polish Patriots (as compared with the Socialists and the Peasant Party), and that they object to the demand for nationalization of big industries because they think this would undermine national unity. Stalin smiled and said, "That's because I've bawled them out." He added that he is very gratified to know that there is considerable demand for nationalization of big industries, and that he thinks that is very beneficial because it will serve to strengthen the power of the Polish government by providing it with a source of income independent of taxation. If the Polish people want to nationalize their big industries, it's their business, but the Soviet Union refuses to put any pressure in this direction; on the contrary, it will lean backward. I observed that I had the impression that he underestimates the radicalism of the Polish people, and that the social composition of the Polish army in the U.S.S.R. is not representative. It consists largely of government settlers and wealthier peasants. Once Poland is liberated, the Polish working class and the landless proletariat as well as the poorer peasants will become vocal. Stalin replied that he thinks the German occupation has destroyed class lines, particularly between poor and wealthy peasants. The reaction of the different social strata will be rather uniform.

I pointed out that the soldiers in the Polish army complain very bitterly about the condition of their relatives in the interior of the Soviet Union. I told him that I consider the dissatisfaction to be reaching a crisis, unless something is done. Stalin replied that he is well aware of it, but there is a war on and that the condition of the Polish population is no worse than that of the Soviet people in similar walks of life. I told him that I knew this and fully appreciate the difficulties of the situation, but there are certain special hardships to which the Poles are subject because they are refugees or deportees with no roots among the population. I pointed out further that even if some special privileges should be created for the Poles, this would be in the interest of the Soviet Union. When the refugees and deportees return to Poland, they will tell stories of their treatment in the Soviet Union, and these tales will be a potent factor in shaping Polish public opinion with regard to the Soviets. If these stories will be entirely of deprivations and sufferings, the Polish public will think of the Soviet Union very adversely. Strong measures on behalf of the Polish population taken now will create a much more favorable attitude. Stalin said that this was true, and fortunately now the economic situation in the

Soviet Union is improving rapidly and special measure may be taken. (The next day Stalin called in Wanda Wasilewska, told her that in view of the improving economic situation, improvement in the situation of the Poles is possible, and that the Union of Polish Patriots should prepare plans for improvement and submit them to the Soviet government.)

We returned to the question of Poland. Stalin said that he wants Poland as an ally, and therefore is interested that Poland be strong both internally and externally. He is ready to help the Poles build an army, and he wants to contribute with arms and equipment for 1,000,000 men. It is by no means the intention of the Soviet government to force Poland into the position of a small and weak buffer state. On the contrary, after the defeat of Germany, Poland will play a leading role in Europe. I asked whether he did not consider that the territorial demand of the Union of Polish Patriots with regard to Germany is exaggerated. I observed that even the demand for East Prussia has considerable opposition in American and British public opinion, but that I think the German nation will swallow the loss of East Prussia and Upper Silesia. The demands of the Union of Polish Patriots, however, go much farther and there might be some reason to fear that if granted, they would hurt German national feeling so deeply as to perpetuate German desires for revenge and make impossible the absorption of Germany into a new European order. Stalin answered that he did not care. There are two possibilities: either the peace will be such that it will create no desire for German revenge, or it will be such as to make German revenge impossible. In the latter case, it is bound to hurt German national feelings. The first course would be too risky to embark upon and almost certainly Germany would start another war of conquest within a generation. Stalin then went on to describe the history of German wars of aggression, and he concluded that Germany must be destroyed once and for all as a political power. At this point he gave an account of the agreement reached at the Teheran Conference. He added that not only Germany has to be destroyed as a political power, but also Japan. He said that the United States should show no mercy to Japan, and destroy once and forever its political and industrial power. Both Germany and Japan, he said, are also an economic menace: Germany by its great efficiency, Japan by its ability to undersell other nations in the world market through exploitation of cheap labor. The American workers, he said, have reached a cultural level at which they cannot work for wages which would enable American industry to compete with Japan. I asked Stalin whether he realized that such a policy with regard to Germany could be carried out under only one condition, namely, that the cooperation between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union be permanent. Should this cooperation break down and develop into rivalry or conflict, one of the powers will try to play Germany against the others. This would lead to a comeback of Germany, and as the treaty of Versailles was mere child's-play compared to what is being proposed now, German revenge would be terrific. Stalin answered that he is not worried about that, because the cooperation between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union is not merely a temporary conjuncture, but the result of a fundamental community of historical interests.

Conference with Marshal Stalin - 3

I asked Stalin whether he does not believe in the possibility of a socialist or semi-socialist Germany. After all, I said, German social democracy and the German Communist Party had educated the German working class in a Marxian spirit. Should the result of all this Marxist education be entirely destroyed? Mr. Molotov added at this point that there were more than 5,000,000 anti-Nazi votes in the last free German election. Stalin's reply was that the cadres of the German Labor movement have been entirely destroyed by fascism, and the rank and file has shown no moral resistance. He started describing all the atrocities committed by the German soldiers, the manner in which Nazism has destroyed all humane values and brutalized the soul of the German people. When describing the moral effects of fascism and the German brutalities, Stalin appeared to be deeply affected emotionally. He then related the experiences with German war-prisoners who do not even see the wrong they are doing, and when asked how they can do such non-human acts, answered that they were ordered to do so. He concluded by saying, what can you do with a nation which is ready to commit any atrocity because it is so ordered by the government. The comeback of the German Labor movement, he added, is a matter of one or two generations; in the meantime no chances can be taken with Germany.

The consequence for Poland of the policy chosen at Teheran with regard to Germany is obvious. With the destruction of Germany, Poland will emerge as a major European power. Poland should claim not only East Prussia and Upper Silesia, but all German territories up to the Oder, including Stettin. Stalin said that he is not sure whether the Poles should get Breslau or not. Furthermore, he said that President Roosevelt agreed with his point of view, but Mr. Churchill had some hesitations. Mr. Churchill asked who would guarantee the security of such Polish borders, to which Stalin replied, the armed might of the Soviet Union. Stalin added that this conversation was carried on in the presence of Sir Archibald Kerr. (The next day I asked Sir Archibald about it, and he confirmed in full Stalin's statement.) I asked what should be done with the German population of these territories. The answer was that they should be deported. About 3,000,000 might find room in Siberia, some return to Germany which has suffered a great loss of man-power in the war, and as for the rest, Stalin added, maybe there will be room in South American or somewhere else for them.

Somehow we came to talk about France. Stalin said that the trouble with the French is that they have lost their patriotism and are not willing to make sacrifices for their country. I observed that there seems to be a great moral and patriotic regeneration taking place among the French, particularly among the youth. He answered that he is quite aware of it, but these young people have no experience in governing a country. He quoted Lenin as having said that it takes at least 15 years for a new ruling group to acquire the experience necessary for good governing. In the meantime, he added, while they are learning the country cannot be strong. It will therefore take quite some time until France becomes a strong power again.

We came back to Poland and discussed the question of the

Polish government. Stalin said that there will be no AMGOT in Poland because military administration of Poland would involve a rule of Russians over Poles, which is quite impossible. The Poles must form their own administration. No Polish government will be formed by the Union of Polish Patriots; the Polish government must emerge out of Poland itself. He believes that such forces do exist among the Polish underground. The Union of Polish Patriots might collaborate, and an understanding with the London government might be desirable. "The door to an understanding with the Polish government in London is never closed," he added, meaning, of course, the Soviet government. He is favorably disposed toward Mikolajczyk. I asked about Mr. Romer, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both Stalin and Molotov think that he is all right. Molotov quoted a recent speech of Mikolajczyk in which he maintains that he has the support of 90 per cent of the people of Poland. Stalin laughed and said, "I do not know whether I have the support of 90 per cent of the Soviet people; how can he know in London how much support he has in Poland?" He then explained that representatives of the Polish government underground army got in contact with Soviet military authorities, proposing collaboration. The Red Army accepted the offer, demanding only subjection under Soviet military command, but refraining from making any political conditions. The Polish emissaries went back to consult their superiors, but failed to return. The rank and file, however, became impatient and started to join the Red Army or the Partisans. Stalin thought that Mikolajczyk should be warned against believing in the fairy tales of his own intelligence service.

At this point I asked whether there might be any possible changes in the Curzon line. Stalin's first answer was, "Oh yes, four kilometers to the east or to the west." Then I told him that I did not want to ask embarrassing questions, and did not come to embarrass the Soviet government, but to help create understanding. I therefore do not ask and question and do not expect an answer, but I should like to present certain facts and arguments. I told him how strongly the Polish soldiers feel about Lwow, and observed that Mr. Molotov should have read the passages of the reports of the American correspondants who were with me in the army, which had been censored. Mr. Molotov said that he was acquainted with the censored passages, and also knew about the feelings in the army from other sources. I added that Americans of Polish descent feel very strongly about it, and that all Polish refugees in New York who are most sympathetic with the Union of Polish Patriots asked me to raise this question of Lwow with the Soviet government. Stalin answered, "Yes, but if I concede to the Polish demands, I'll have to make war on the Ukrainians, and there are several million of them in the Red Army." I replied, "Once more I am not asking a question nor do I expect a reply, but I should like to express my own views on the subject." Then I said that somebody must be hurt, either the Poles or the Ukrainians. The problem is to hurt that side which can be hurt with less damage to the future of Polish-Soviet friendship. To the Ukrainians, I said, Lwow means less than to the Poles. The Ukrainians have other important cultural centers, and Lwow was anyway outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Then there are almost twice as many Ukrainians as Poles, and consequently Ukraine can more easily suffer

a territorial loss. In Poland there were five cultural centers: Warsaw, Cracow, Poznan, Lwow and Wilno. The loss of two of them would be very heavy, and acquisition of German cities without a Polish cultural heritage cannot be considered as compensation for the loss of old historical Polish cultural centers. If Poland must give up Lwow, this will be a constant source of anti-Soviet ill feeling and agitation. This may be most dangerous for the future of Polish-Soviet relations. I concluded by saying that this was a statement and not a question, and I did not expect an answer. Stalin said, "This problem must be studied further."

Stalin said that he understands to a certain degree the position of the Polish government in London. They are asked to make territorial concessions in the East, but they are not sure whether the promised acquisitions in the West will materialize. Therefore, he thinks, the Western frontiers of Poland should be settled first. Once they are settled, the discussion about Eastern frontiers will be much easier.

At the end of the conversation, Stalin asked me whether I found my visit to the Soviet Union interesting. I answered in the affirmative. He told me that he thought a visit to Great Britain to see the members of the Polish government should be equally interesting to me. He added that since I am a private person and an American, I can speak more freely than others who are in official governmental positions. I could tell the members of the Polish government in London, he added, what I saw in the U.S.S.R., including the present conversation. He also continued, if I were you I would not only speak to Mikolajczyk, but I would also visit, in your place, Sosnkowski and find out what that man really wants. I told him that I might enquire from the American authorities whether I would be permitted to make my trip back via London. Stalin replied that I should not do that because it would create the impression that I was carrying definite proposals from the Soviet government. If I want to go to London, I should go from the United States, and not say anything now to the British Ambassador in Moscow. He thought that such a visit might prove to be very beneficial, particularly since the Soviet government had no other possibility of dealing with the Polish government except through the British government, and this makes the machinery very heavy. I answered that if direct contacts are desired, why doesn't the Union of Polish Patriots send a delegate to meet a member of the Polish government, say in Stockholm. Stalin answered that this would mean official negotiations, for which definite proposals are needed, and the breakdown of which might make future contacts more difficult. I, as a private individual who speaks without obligation to anyone, could do much more. I replied that I shall investigate the problem upon my return to the United States, and mentioned that Mr. Stanczyk, Minister of Labor was in America. Stalin said I surely should see him, and I replied that I will make sure he doesn't leave the United States before my return.

Conference with Marshal Stalin - 6

At the very end, Stalin asked me whether I believed in the sincerity of the Soviet government's assurances that they do not want to encroach upon Poland's sovereignty and independence. I replied that I might or might not believe in his statements; that they might be political maneuvers. But the fact that he is arming the Polish army, which intends to win and protect Poland's independence, is the real proof of his intentions. I accept that proof.

OUTLINE OF TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION

- April 10. Departure from Chicago.
- April 17. Departure from Alaska.
- April 23. Arrival in Moscow; visit with Wanda Wasilewska.
- April 24. Conference with Mr. Harriman; conference with Mr. Molotov; meeting with General Berling.
- April 25-May 1. Private conferences with leaders of the Union of Polish Patriots; sightseeing; visit to Polish school and children's home in Zagorsk near Moscow; visit to Polish Officer's School and to Polish Military Hospital.
- May 2-May 6. Visit to Polish Army at the front.
- May 6. Return to Kiev; meeting with Mr. Korneichuk (Ukrainian Commissar of Foreign Affairs).
- May 7. Return to Moscow.
- May 7-May 14. Conferences with leaders of Union of Polish Patriots; sightseeing; visit to Polish children's home and school in Czkalovsk near Moscow.
- May 10. Meeting with the Presidium of Free Germany Committee and of German Officers' League.
- May 13(?). Visit with Mr. Maloney (Australian Minister in charge of Polish Affairs).
- May 14. Dinner with Sir Archibald Kerr (British Ambassador).
- May 15-May 17. Conferences with Polish leaders; sightseeing; visiting factories; presence at funeral liturgies for Patriarch Sergius; conference with Committee for Polish children.
- May 17. Conference with Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov.
- May 18. Tea with Sir Archibald Kerr and Mr. Baldwin (British Minister).
- May 20. Farewell visit with Mr. Molotov.
- May 21. Meeting with Mr. Fierlinger (Checkoslovak Minister); meeting with delegation of Polish National Council which had just arrived in Moscow.

Outline of Trip - 2

- May 23. Departure from Moscow in company of Mr. Skrzyszewski, Vice-Chairman of Committee for Polish Children, and Mrs. Koniakhina, Director of Polish Childrens' Homes (also member of Supreme Soviet of the RFSSR).
- May 25. Arrival in Barnaul, capital of the Altai country.
- May 27-May 29. Visit to Polish Childrens' schools and homes; conference with Polish leaders in Altai region; sight-seeing; visiting of factories and farms.
- June 1. Arrival in Alaska.
- June 7. Arrival in Chicago.

During my stay in Moscow, I visited Mr. Hamilton at the United States Embassy, to whom I gave periodic oral reports about my activities and meetings.

APRIL 24. CONFERENCE WITH MR. HARRIMAN.
Length, approximately 1 hour.

I introduced myself to Mr. Harriman, who gave me his private views on the Polish-Soviet problem. I asked him what policy I should adopt with regard to the press and public statements concerning my arrival and activities in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Harriman thought that since I was a guest of the Soviet Government, it would be wisest to follow their wishes in these matters, but to avoid being used for propaganda purposes. This advice expressed his private views, not those of the United States Ambassador.

APRIL 24. CONFERENCE WITH MR. MOLOTOV.

Length, 1½ hours; language, Russian. Also present, Mr. Molotov's secretary, who took notes.

On my arrival at the airport on the preceding day I was met by Mr. Molotov's secretary (together with the leaders of the Union of Polish Patriots), who brought greetings from Mr. Molotov and told me that Mr. Molotov considered me his guest. The next day I was asked to visit Mr. Molotov at his office. After an exchange of initial greetings, questions about my trip, etc., Mr. Molotov asked me to outline to him the problems I wanted to study. I answered that I wanted to study: (1) the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., its character and aims; (2) the character and aims of the Union of Polish Patriots; (3) the condition of the Polish population in the U.S.S.R.; (4) the intentions of the Soviet Government with regard to Poland. I gave a lengthy outline of each of these problems, and observed that the Polish question could not be studied separately from the policy of the Soviet Government with regard to the whole of Europe. I pointed out that I consider that the central problem of Europe is not that of Poland, but that of Germany, and I should like to know what the Soviet policy toward post-war Germany will be. The position of Poland, I told him, will largely be determined by the way the German problem will be solved. I asked him what kind of government is possible in Germany, in view of the fact that Germany's democratic forces have been so utterly destroyed by fascism. Mr. Molotov expressed the view that enough forces are left within Germany and in exile to form a liberal democratic government. He asked me my opinion of the proper future government for Poland. I stressed the necessity for all inclusiveness of such a government, and pointed out that it would be a mistake to base it one-sidedly on elements from the Union of Polish Patriots. Mr. Molotov expressed his full agreement with this point of view.

THE POLISH ARMY IN THE U.S.S.R.

The Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. presents a considerable force. It consists of four infantry divisions, three brigades of artillery, one armored brigade, one brigade of anti-tank artillery, one cavalry brigade, one brigade of sappers, one anti-aircraft division, one division of air-force, and other units. It is excellently equipped. The Army is increasing rapidly by recruitment from the Polish population in the recently liberated areas. When I left the Soviet Union it consisted of more than 80,000 men; by the middle of June it is expected to pass the 100,000 mark.

General Berling expects his army to grow to 1,000,000 men by the time the war is over, and told me that Marshal Stalin has promised arms and equipment for an army of that size. This promise was confirmed to me by Marshal Stalin personally. Part of the army has had battle experience in the battle of Lenine on October 12-13, 1943. During this battle the army is said (according to the opinion of Red Army officers) to have made an excellent show of bravery and fighting spirit. It has also had a number of minor engagements.

The army is excellently equipped, its equipment being on the level of the so-called "Guard" Divisions of the Red Army, which is superior to that of the average Red Army division. The army has so-called "Political Education Officers," whose purpose is to teach the soldiers the aims of this army as expressed in the program of the Union of Polish Patriots. It also has Roman Catholic chaplains, but attendance at religious services is not compulsory. In view of the rapid growth of the army, there was some difficulty in obtaining sufficient chaplains. Recently General Berling had a meeting with the Catholic Bishop of Luck, at which the Bishop promised to delegate some of his clergy as chaplains to the army.

The Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. is based on conscription of all Poles living on Soviet territory. In view of the fact that an unduly large percentage of the Polish refugees and deportees in the U.S.S.R. are Jews, they are not conscripted. The number of Jews in the Army is six per cent, all volunteers. The limitation to the six per cent is not a result of anti-Semitic attitudes, but a reaction to the fact that the Polish government in London in its propaganda claims that the Army consists of Jews and Bolsheviks. There is a small percentage of White Ruthenians and Ukrainians (3 to 4 per cent) who are accepted as volunteers provided they get permission from the Soviet government. Recently there has developed quite a rush to the Polish army among so-called Soviet-Poles, i.e., Poles who were Soviet citizens before 1939. They are accepted as volunteers provided they get a release from the Soviet government.

The bulk of the Polish Army consists of three groups:

- (1) Polish inhabitants of the areas incorporated into the

The Polish Army - 2

Soviet Union in 1939 who were deported by the Soviet government to the interior of Russia. Many of them spent some time in Soviet jails or concentration camps. By social origin, they are largely settlers who were brought into the Eastern part of Poland by the Polish government in order to strengthen the Poles against the Ukrainians; others were policemen, government officials, or persons otherwise connected with the old Polish government. From the point of view of Polish-Soviet collaboration, this was a very difficult element and it is to the credit of the Union of Polish Patriots that this element has been educated into an excellent fighting force which showed an excellent spirit of collaboration with the Red Army during the battle of Lenino. The First Division (Kosciuszko) consists entirely of this group. The Second Division (Dombrowski) consists largely of the same group.

(2) Poles drafted into the German army or German military labor service, who either became Soviet war prisoners or went straight over to the Soviet side. These came from the Western part of Poland, and never had any unpleasant experiences with the Soviet government. They are partly in the Second Division and in the Third Division (Traugutt).

(3) Poles living in the recently liberated areas which before 1939 belonged to Poland and later were annexed by the Soviet Union. Many of them were in the Partisan movement; a considerable fraction were in the underground army of the Polish government. The last mentioned were rather suspicious when drafted into General Berling's army, thinking that it was a communist army. Usually after a week in camp, they become very enthusiastic about the army, and feel most offended if anybody calls it a communist army. No special propaganda is applied to them. They are partly in the Third Division. The Fourth Division is entirely formed of them.

In addition to these, there are a few Poles who served in the Spanish Republican Army, were later interned by the French in North Africa, from whence they came to the Soviet Union to join the Polish Army. According to a story which I was unable to confirm, the Polish government in exile offered them entry into the army provided they were not Jews, and agreed to fight against Russia.

There is quite a shortage of officers in the Polish Army, because most of the old Polish officers left the Soviet Union together with General Anders. The officers are recruited from three sources:

(1) Officers of the old Polish army, who refused to leave with Anders (General Berling is one of them); and most recently, Polish reserve officers who were found in the liberated territories.

(2) Career officers of the Red Army, loaned by the Soviet government to the Polish Army. These are all of Polish nationality, the so-called Soviet-Poles. Some of them have been commandeered into

the Polish army; others have voluntarily asked for transfer, even at a loss of seniority. According to General Berling, they will be given the right of option for Polish citizenship after the war, or the right to return to the Soviet Union, according to their choice.

(3) Officers graduated in special training schools established by the Polish Army. At present, about 8,000 cadets are in training.

There are special training schools for Political Educational Officers, most of whom are designed for administrative duties in liberated Poland.

I have had more than fifteen informal conferences with the soldiers, who talked most freely. The answers of soldiers who had been in the Army for a longer time, and were subject to the instruction by the political education officers, did not differ from those who had just recently arrived in the army. I talked to 150 soldiers who had arrived in the army the day before, and their answers did not differ greatly.

The soldiers want Poland to be strong, independent, and democratic. They want the government elected by the people, freedom of speech and press, freedom of all political parties, except fascist ones. A few 17 year old boys who had received their education in the Soviet Union told me that there should be only one political party. To my question, what party, they answered, "a democratic one." The older soldiers protested violently, and said that all parties which are not fascist should have perfect freedom of action. The future form of government, they thought, should be determined by a constitutional assembly.

The majority of the soldiers have a thoroughly negative attitude toward the government in exile. They consider it a continuation of the pre-war colonels' regime, which is thoroughly unpopular and blamed for the debacle in 1939, and for the foreign policy which preceded the debacle. They are, however, quite sympathetic toward Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, in whom they recognize a leader of the Peasant Party. They are puzzled that he participates in the London government. I was repeatedly asked the question: "Why does Mikolajczyk sit with those reactionaries in London instead of coming here to us?" The opposition is directed rather against the policies of the London government than against specific persons. There is a great interest in the Polish armed forces operating under the direction of the London government. The soldiers are very well informed as to their whereabouts and doings. In particular, they are interested in the army of General Anders. They disapprove very strongly of Anders' withdrawal from the Soviet Union, but are full of sympathy for the rank and file of his army. "These are our brothers," the soldiers asserted repeatedly, "we want them back in Poland." There is considerable fear of a civil war when Anders and Sosnkowski's army comes back to Poland. The usual opinion is that

the soldiers do not want a civil war, and that if it starts, the responsibility will be that of leaders like Sosnkowski and Anders. Many soldiers, therefore, expressed the opinion that the army should come back but that the leaders should be kept out. The soldiers definitely want people like Mikolajczyk and other democratic elements in the London government to play a role in post-war Poland. One officer candidate suggested that a temporary government should be formed, consisting of underground leaders, the democratic members of the London government, representatives of the Union of Polish Patriots, and representatives of Polish-Americans. This idea was quite popular among his colleagues.

There is a great sympathy and admiration for the United States. At least one-third of the soldiers have relatives in the United States, and think of America as an Eldorado. Many, particularly among the women, told me that Poland should have a political system like that of the United States. The idea was obviously that this system would ensure American economic prosperity to Poland. "We want Poland to be like America" was a frequent formulation. There is considerable anti-British feeling in the Polish army in the U.S.S.R. The British government is being accused by the soldiers of delaying the Second Front and thus prolonging the sufferings of the Polish people; of supporting the London government and thus preventing an understanding between Poland and the Soviet Union; and, most of all, of tolerating the trials in the Polish army of those who expressed their sympathy with General Berling and his policy of cooperation with the Soviets. These trials have aroused great indignation among the soldiers and officers, and some also blamed the United States for failing to stop the Polish government in exile.

All the soldiers are unanimous in believing that an agrarian reform is needed. This should consist in the division of the large estates among the peasants. Collectivization of agriculture is most emphatically and quite unanimously rejected. The Polish agrarian system should be based on individual peasant ownership. In order to modernize agricultural technology, peasant cooperatives should be formed, which would purchase machinery and other equipment. An alternative, the establishment of governmental tractor and equipment stations was suggested. Some soldiers, however, were so afraid of government intervention that they thought it better to cultivate the land by the old-fashioned methods, than to expose the peasant to the discipline of cooperative organization or governmental intervention.

The soldiers are unanimous in their demand that private monopolies should be abolished. Most of them want big industry nationalized; some of them speak about abolition of monopolies without demanding nationalization of industries. All want the banking system nationalized. All the soldiers are most emphatic that small industry and trade should be based on private enterprise. All are also opposed to governmental regulation of trade and commerce.

Asked whether, after reaching Poland's western borders, they want to stop or advance further into Germany, the answer was "Right into Germany and destroy the reptile once and forever." The soldiers all want Poland's borders extended in the west "as far as possible." East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania were mentioned specifically. The formula "up to the Oder" was used frequently. The German population should be deported. "The Germans have shown us how to deport whole populations, now let them take their own medicine." It was generally pointed out to me that by their actions the Germans have lost any moral right to complain against forced deportation. It was also pointed out that the population of the requested territories was originally Slavic and later became Germanized, and that part of the population might become re-Polanized again.

Feelings as to the eastern borders are quite heterogeneous. There were answers like "First lets beat the Germans," "The Soviet Union will do us no harm," "We'll get a friendly arrangement with the Ukrainian people," to outright demands that the 1939 frontiers be restored. On the whole, the feeling is that some adjustments with the Soviet Union have to be made, and that Poland is bound to lose territory. There is little complaint about the loss of Wilno and other sections, but an almost unanimous desire that Lwow be restored to Poland. This may be due partly to the fact that a large proportion of the soldiers come from the Lwow region. The soldiers coming from territories east of the Curzon line all want to emigrate to Poland in case these territories go to the Soviet Union. Asked why they do not want to live in the Soviet Union, they usually replied that they don't want to be a Polish minority among Ukrainians. Probably the mass murders of the Polish population by the Ukrainian Nationalists was a decisive factor in forming these attitudes.

There is a great sympathy for Czechoslovakia. Of all nations in the world, the soldiers consider the Czechoslovaks their nearest brother nation. They very severely criticized the pre-war Polish government for its anti-Czechoslovak policy. As to the Teschen territory, some of the soldiers think it should go to Poland because the population is Polish; others want a plebiscite; still others are ready to cede it to Czechoslovakia as the price of friendship. All think that the matter is unimportant.

There is great respect for the power of the Soviet Union, but absolutely no desire to transfer the Soviet economic and political system to Poland. One soldier formulated the general trend of opinion in the following way: "We are grateful to the Soviet Union for the aid and for the arms to fight the enemy. But we expect the Soviet government to keep its promise and not to interfere in our internal affairs." Relations with the Red Army and with the local Ukrainian population are most friendly. The respect for the fighting quality of the Red Army is tremendous. Red Army officers with whom I spoke also expressed a great respect for the fighting quality of the Polish soldiers and officers.

MEETINGS WITH GENERAL BERLING

APRIL 24. FIRST MEETING WITH GENERAL BERLING.
Length, 2 hours; language, Polish.

General Berling gave me an extensive description of his army and his history. He analyzed for me the heterogeneous elements in this army and gave an appraisal of its political and social ideas. (During my subsequent visit to the army, I found his appraisal to be fully borne out.) He pointed out that the great majority of the soldiers and officers are not Communists; that they want individual ownership of the land, free enterprise in small industry, and no government supervision of trade and commerce. He also told me that among the soldiers there is a very deep attachment to Lwow, and that he had raised this question several times with Marshal Stalin. Stalin gave no answer, only asked, "Do you have confidence in us?" to which Berling of course replied in the affirmative. Berling is rather optimistic about Poland getting Lwow in the final post-war settlement.

Later I met General Berling repeatedly, both at the front and in Moscow. We took up the question of Lwow several times, and Polish-Ukrainian relations. Berling agreed that the new autonomy in foreign policy given to the separate republics makes the Polish situation more difficult, because the negotiations will have to be with the Ukrainians rather than with the central government. We also discussed the problem of pro-Nazi Ukrainian nationalists who are attacking the Polish army. General Berling told me that he has been empowered by Stalin to take strong repressive measures. I warned him to be cautious in order not to create the impression that the Poles are persecuting Ukrainians, and told him that I think the problem of Ukrainian nationalists should rather be taken care of by Soviet authorities.

During one of our conversations, General Berling expressed the opinion that the Soviet government is really not interested in Poland's internal politics. He told me that he thinks the Soviet government would even accept a monarchy in Poland, provided that it would pursue the foreign policy desired by the Soviets. He also told me that he expects his army to grow to 1,000,000 men before the war is over, and that Stalin has promised arms for that many. The readiness to provide arms for the Polish army of 1,000,000 was later confirmed to me by Marshal Stalin.

CONVERSATIONS WITH WANDA WASILEWSKA

Wanda Wasilewska being a close personal friend of mine since 1923, I had many casual conversations with her. There were no formal interviews.

On my first meeting on April 23, she told me that a delegation of the Polish National Council in German-occupied Poland was en route to Moscow. Upon my inquiries, Wasilewska explained that the Union of Polish Patriots has had nothing to do with the establishment of the Polish National Council. The Council is a quite spontaneous outgrowth, and the Union did not know any more than was announced in the press. They were awaiting with great eagerness the arrival of the delegation.

In later conversations I discussed with her the question of Lwow. She expressed herself as being against Poland claiming Lwow back. Her argument was that this would cause an anti-Polish uprising of the Ukrainian population in the Lwow region which would have to be quelled, and that this would undermine relations between the Polish and Ukrainian nations. She pressed very hard Poland's claims against Germany up to the Oder, including Stettin. Her whole attitude is violently anti-German.

In another conversation, she said that she thought Stalin underestimates the social radicalism of the Polish people, and that future developments in Poland will go much farther to the Left than the Soviet government expects. On the basis of my study of the situation, I agree with her in this estimate.

Wasilewska is very bitter about the Polish government in London. She accuses the government underground of having murdered several hundred members of the Peoples Army and of other organizations which sympathize with the Union of Polish Patriots. My subsequent conversation with the delegation of the Polish National Council confirmed these charges. Wasilewska also maintains that there were cases of collaboration of the Polish government underground with the Germans. This too was confirmed by the report of the delegation of the Council. Notwithstanding, Wasilewska favors an agreement with the Polish government in London, and was in favor of Marshal Stalin's suggestion that I go to London to talk to the Polish government.

MEETINGS WITH ANDRZEJ WITOS

Mr. Witos is the brother of the famous Polish peasant leader, Wincenty Witos. He himself was one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party, of which the Prime Minister, Mikolajczyk, is also a member. According to his information, his brother Wincenty is living under German police supervision. I expressed the fear that the Germans may kill him during the evacuation of Poland, and suggested that steps be taken by the Partisans to save Wincenty's life. Mr. Witos told me that actually such steps are under consideration, but that the matter must be handled very cautiously in order not to endanger his brother's life.

Mr. Witos thinks that the Poles should demand the return of Lwow, but that this is not the opportune moment to raise the question. After the liberation of Poland, when a firm Polish government is established, Poland's bargaining power will be much greater. The question of the eastern frontiers should be postponed to that day. As to the western frontiers, he demands them, like Wasilewska, up to the Oder, including Stettin. In matters of internal policy, he agrees with the general program of the Union of Polish Patriots. He told me that he thinks it might be desirable if I would see Prime Minister Mikolajczyk after my return from the U.S.S.R., and inform him of what Witos and other members of the Peasant Party who are in the Union of Polish Patriots think.

He also asked me to take up with Marshal Stalin the situation of the Poles in the U.S.S.R. He requested that I ask Stalin to undertake special relief measures for the Polish population in the Soviet Union.

CONVERSATIONS WITH DR. EMIL SOMMERSTEIN

Dr. Sommerstein was the Chairman of the Jewish Club in the old Polish Parliament. He was a deputy from Lwow, and is a Zionist. Recently he joined the Presidium of the Union of Polish Patriots. He is most critical of the Polish government in exile, and accuses it of having refused arms to the Jews in Warsaw during the battle of the ghetto. He is very much interested in building up contacts with the Joint Distribution Committee and other Jewish relief organizations in the United States. He thinks they should help all Poles in the U.S.S.R., not only those of Jewish religion. He would like his home town, Lwow, to go back to Poland.

MAY 10. MEETING WITH PRESIDUM OF FREE GERMANY COMMITTEE AND
OF GERMAN OFFICERS' LEAGUE
Length, 4 hours (including tea); Language, German.

This was the only meeting during my stay in the U.S.S.R. which was supervised. The reason was that the officers have the status of war prisoners. There was present a Red Army Colonel and a civilian who spoke German and sometimes translated the conversation for the Colonel. The meeting was held at my request, presented through Wanda Wasilewska. Wasilewska was rather displeased at my wish to talk to Germans. She told me that the Committee does not amount to anything anyway, and that no decent Pole would talk to these people. Finally she added, condescendedly, "Well, you're an American now and may as well talk to the Germans."

I was taken to a country residence about half an hour's ride outside of Moscow. There I was received by the Committee, headed by Mr. Weinert and General von Seydlitz. General von Seydlitz was in full dress uniform with the Iron Cross on his chest. Others present were General von Lattmann, Corp. Zippel, Lt. von Einsleten(?), Father Kaiser (a Catholic chaplain), and two civilians whose names I have forgotten. One was an underground trade union organizer until 1938, the other runs the Free German radio in Moscow.

There are four groups in the Free Germany Committee:
(1) Old pre-Nazi radicals, like Mr. Weinert, largely Communist or Communist fellow-travelers. They are very much like the anti-Nazi emigres living in the United States or in Great Britain. (2) German anti-Nazis who worked against the Nazi regime in Germany. To these belong the trade union organizer, Corp. Zippel who went over to the Russians in the beginning of the war, and Father Kaiser, who participated in religious anti-Nazi groupings. (3) Army officers who think that Germany is going to be defeated, and that the German nation can be saved only by the early downfall of Hitler. To this belongs General von Seydlitz, a Saxon from a known family of scholars and high officers. Von Seydlitz dislikes the Nazis very much, but considered it his duty as an officer to fight for his country irrespective of the form of government. After his capture at Stalingrad he arrived at the conclusion that only the overthrow of the Nazi regime can save the German nation from destruction. (4) People who want to jump on the Soviet bandwagon. I had the impression that General von Lattmann belonged to this group. He was a member of the Nazi party. But I may be doing him an injustice, and should not like to judge him prematurely.

Of all the persons present, von Seydlitz and Father Kaiser impressed me the most. During the conversation, Seydlitz and Lattmann tried very hard to whitewash the German army from responsibility for the atrocities committed by the Germans in Poland and the Soviet Union. They did not deny the atrocities, but said it was the S.S. and special units which were responsible. But pressed by me, they had to admit that they knew of cases where the German army participated.

Father Kaiser was more willing to admit that the whole German youth has been educated in a contempt of human life and dignity. He sees the problem largely as one of religious and moral reconversion and re-education.

The aim of the Committee is to establish a free democratic Germany which would not repeat the mistakes and weaknesses of the Weimar Republic. They definitely repudiate the idea of wanting to establish a German-Soviet republic. But they are definitely of the opinion that Germany's future lies in close collaboration with Russia as well as with the Western allies and consequently reject any ideas of using Germany as a cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union. I asked General von Seydlitz whether he considered it possible that the German army surrender in the West while maintaining resistance in the East in order to have Germany occupied by Anglo-American forces rather than by the Red Army. He replied that he considered this out of the question. First, he does not believe that there will be a strong trend of this nature in Germany, except among certain capitalist circles around Schacht; second, he considers it technically impossible. Any surrender in the West would lead immediately to a psychological breakdown on the Eastern front. All the members of the Committee were unanimously of the opinion that Germany has nothing to gain by playing up the Western allies against the Soviet Union, or vice versa. The formula which was given me was "Germany should be the bridge between the West and the East, not a separating wall."

The members of the Committee asked me a few questions about the activities of the German refugees in the United States as well as about political groupings among Americans of German descent. I replied to the best of my knowledge.

MAY 1945, KIEV
MEETING WITH MR. KORNEICHUK

I met Mr. Korneichuk together with his wife, Wanda Wasilewska, on May 6th in Kiev. The meeting took place in the Theatre, to which I was taken by Mr. and Mrs. Korneichuk. An Ukrainian drama of the middle 19th century was given, and Mr. Korneichuk, with great enthusiasm, spoke to me about the history of Ukrainian literature, folk customs, and similar subjects. He is a great scholar in this field. He did not bring up a single political subject and consequently, neither did I.

MAY 13(?). VISIT WITH MR. MALONEY
Length, 1½ hours.

I gave Mr. Maloney a detailed account of what I had seen and heard in the Polish Army, and told him that he was free to transmit this information to the Polish government in London, which he represents. I discussed in great detail the situation of the Poles in the U.S.S.R., particularly those 15,000 or more who have retained their passports given by the Polish government and who, accordingly, are under his jurisdiction. I discussed with him the possibility of relief measures, and of getting permission from the Soviet government for those under his jurisdiction to leave the country and go to Iran. He was rather pessimistic and reluctant to make far-going requests of the Soviet government. On the one hand, he feared political difficulties; on the other hand, he was under the impression that the war would end soon, and that there was no reason for taking the Poles to Iran or elsewhere, because very soon they would be able to go back to Poland.

MAY 14. DINNER WITH SIR ARCHIBALD KERR.
Length, 4 hours. No one else present but Sir Archibald and myself.

Sir Archibald started by expressing his great astonishment that I had been permitted to see the Free Germany Committee. He thought that I was the first foreigner to be permitted to see them, and asked me a number of questions about them.

He went on by asking me questions about the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., and the Union of Polish Patriots, and I gave him a very detailed account. In return, he told me the story of the withdrawal of the Anders army, as it appeared to the British government, and of the activities of the Polish Embassy, particularly of Professor Kot, of whom he was most critical. He thought that the solution of the Polish problem should consist in provoking a cabinet crisis in London, with the purpose of forming a new coalition government of Mikolajczyk with the Union of Polish Patriots. He was very pleased to hear that I had made a similar proposal in an article published in a Polish paper in Wisconsin last October.

The rest of the conversation was social and general.

MAY 15, 16 or 17. CONFERENCE WITH COMMITTEE FOR POLISH CHILDREN.

The Committee for Children was organized by the government of the Soviet Union in order to take care of Polish children. The finances are provided by the Union government, but for technical reasons the Committee is attached to the Commissariat of Education of the RFSSR (there is no Union Commissariat of Education). The Committee acts on the territory of the whole Union, not only on that of the Russian Republic. The Chairman is Mr. Ivanienko, Vice-Commissar of Education of the RFSSR; the Vice-Chairman and a ctual head of the Committee is Mr. Skrzyszewski, a professor of the Cracow Teachers College, and a member of the Presidium of the Union of Polish Patriots. The staff is prevailingly Polish. Mr. Skrzyszewski presided at the Conference.

The purpose of the conference was to give me a detailed outline of the Committee's activities. The Committee runs 142 schools, 47 childrens' homes, and 74 kindergartens. I had visited two childrens' homes and schools near Moscow; later I went with Mr. Skrzyszewski to the Altai country to visit the schools and childrens' home there. The education in these institutions is in a Polish patriotic spirit, designed to make the children worthy citizens of Poland. While friendship with the Soviet Union is strongly pressed, and Stalin's picture usually appears in the schools (together with those of Kesciuzsko, Wanda Wasilewska and Berling), there is no attempt to teach communist doctrines. Beginning next autumn, religious instruction is to be given to all children whose parents or guardians so desire. The instruction is in Polish, Russian being taught as a foreign language. Some difficulties arise from the fact that some of the children speak Russian better than Polish, and a great effort is being made to teach the children pure Polish, free from Russian influences.

The Committee is publishing text-books in Polish. A number of such text-books were available in the Soviet Union, printed for Polish-Soviet schools, particularly in the Western Ukrainian. The Committee, however, has rejected these text-books because they contain communist teachings and because of their anti-religious attitudes. New text-books are being written, and about six or seven have already been published. The next text-books are imbued with a general liberal democratic ideology, stress national unity, cooperation with the Soviet Union against Germany, the historical values of Polish culture, and the greatness of the Polish nation.

MAY 21. MEETING WITH MR. FIERLINGER.
Length, 1½ hours. Language, English.

I wanted to make sure that Mr. Stanczyk did not leave the United States before my return. I thought of sending him a message, and asked Mr. Hamilton whether the Embassy would do it for me. Mr. Hamilton refused because he thought this might create the impression that the United States government endorsed my trip, and said that I should use another channel.

I had an invitation to tea with Mr. Fierlinger, and when I came, asked him whether he could send a message to Stanczyk for me. He said that he would be very glad to do so, and I sent the following message:

"Should appreciate opportunity of seeing you before you leave the United States. Expect to arrive first days of June. Please keep this message confidential. Greetings."

Mr. Fierlinger gave me a detailed account of his impressions of the economic development of the Soviet Union, which he had studied very thoroughly. He also told me about the conversation of President Benes with Mikolajczyk after the former had returned from the Soviet Union. According to Fierlinger, Mikolajczyk asked Benes whether he thought the Red Army was already exhausted.

MAY 18. TEA WITH SIR ARCHIBALD KERR AND MR. BALDWIN
Length, 1½ hours.

Sir Archibald invited me to tea; upon my arrival I met Mr. Baldwin.

Sir Archibald inquired whether I had already seen Stalin, and I replied in the affirmative. I repeated what Stalin had told me of Poland's western frontiers and their guarantee by the Soviet Union, that Mr. Churchill hesitated, and Sir Archibald had been present at this conversation. Sir Archibald confirmed fully what Stalin had told me.

The conversation became general, touched upon general problems of American politics, and the role of the Polish-Americans in the coming election. Toward the end of the conversation, Sir Archibald thought it would be a good idea if I would follow up my visit to the Soviet Union with a similar visit to the Poles in Great Britain. He thought that such a visit, made by me as a private American citizen, might do considerable good. He thought that I might persuade Mikolajczyk to cause a cabinet crisis and form a new coalition government with the Union of Polish Patriots. I told him that I understood that travel in and out of Britain is now prohibited even for diplomats. He replied that he thought in my case an exception could be made. Since Stalin had asked me not to mention the idea of a visit of mine to London to the British Ambassador, I did not tell him that Stalin had made a similar suggestion. I reported the coincidence of the two suggestions to Mr. Hamilton in the United States Embassy.

(After Mr. Hamilton's report, I had some conversations with Sir Archibald and thought he might have wanted me to believe his naive.)

After an exchange of a few compliments, we parted. At my departure, Mr. Malotov asked me to present his compliments to Father Malowski.

MAY 20. FAREWELL VISIT WITH MR. MOLOTOV.
Length, 15 minutes. Language, Russian. No secretary present.

I thanked Mr. Molotov for his hospitality during my stay in the U.S.S.R. He asked me how I had enjoyed the trip, and whether I found my stay interesting and got the information I wanted. I answered in the affirmative.

He asked me whether I think that my report of what I had seen among the Poles in the U.S.S.R. will affect the attitude of Americans of Polish descent. I answered: very little, their attitude is thoroughly prejudiced by years of propoganda and they will consider me a Soviet agent or a Communist; only actual developments after the liberation of Poland can affect their attitude. I added that I hope, however, that my report will affect the attitude of the non-Polish section of the American nation toward the Polish problem, and that this is much more important. He asked me about attitudes toward the Soviet Union in the United States, and I replied that the Soviet government frequently makes grave mistakes in its approaches to the American public. I cited the criticism of Mr. Willkie in the Soviet press, which, in my opinion, was just stupid. Acts like that create the impression that the Soviet government is so dictatorial and intolerant of criticism that it does not accept 80 per cent friendship, but insists on 100 per cent. This alienates independent friends of American-Soviet collaboration. Mr. Molotov answered, "What's wrong. We wanted to help Roosevelt." I couldn't help laughing, but was quite unable to explain to him how foolish it was. He just couldn't get the point. (Later the thought came to me that maybe he wasn't so naive after all, and had some other reasons for criticizing Mr. Willkie and that he might have wanted me to believe him naive.)

After an exchange of a few compliments, we parted. At my departure, Mr. Molotov asked me to present his compliments to Father Orlemanski.

MAY 21. CONFERENCE WITH POLISH NATIONAL COUNCIL DELEGATION.
Length, 8½ hours, including tea and dinner. Language, Polish.

I went together with Wanda Wasilewska, who stayed for the first part of the conference.

The Polish National Council was organized in Warsaw on January 1, 1944, as a coalition of the major part of the Polish Socialist Party, of part of the Polish Peasant Party, of the Polish Workers Party (which in terms of personnel is a continuation of the disbanded Communist Party), and of various groups of liberal and democratic intellectuals. The Council has at its disposal an armed force--the Peoples Army--which consists of 15,000 members active in partisan units and 30,000 in reserves. (This compares with the Polish government's underground army of about 60,000 people, pre-vaillingly in reserves, according to what the delegation told me.) The delegation consists of two representatives of the Polish Socialist Party (one of whom is the Vice-President of the Council), one representative of the Polish Workers Party, and one representative of the Peoples Army. Two delegates of the Polish Peasant Party were enroute.

The purpose of the delegation is to establish contact with the Union of Polish Patriots and with the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., and to present its case to the governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. According to the report of the delegation, the Council has developed a network of provincial and local councils, which are considered to be the skeleton of a future Polish administration. The moment the German military occupation breaks down, the Council is prepared to set up a Polish government. Their attitude to the underground of the London government is highly critical. They accuse the underground of holding back resistance against the Germans, of appropriating in its propaganda the deeds of the Peoples Army which it fights against very strongly in Poland, of having provoked armed clashes with the Peoples Army, of having murdered several hundred supporters of the Polish National Council (this is associated with the death of Sikorski and the assumption of the command of the underground army by Sosnkowski), and of outright renunciation of supporters of the Council to the Germans. According to their report, the Polish government's underground is entirely in the hands of the former Pilsudski clique and a small group of socialists and Peasant Party members as mere decoration. The government underground spends funds very lavishly, and pays its members fabulous salaries. It has an established network of administrative officials who are supposed to take over power in the name of the London government the moment the Germans are expelled. The National Council is determined to prevent that, and to take over power by its own agencies. Among the underground officials maintained by the Polish government, there is even the post of a Governor of Odessa.

Polish National Council - 2

The delegation of the National Council requested me to see Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk and to explain to them the real situation in Poland. They thought that many of the members of the London government are misinformed of the real situation by their intelligence service, which is entirely in the hands of the Pilsudski clique. They also pointed out that the Polish police collaborate simultaneously with the Germans and with the underground of the Polish government in exile. This, they said, is very demoralizing and leads to many ambiguous situations. As in the Union of Polish Patriots, the Communists proved to be the right wing, and the Socialists the left wing of the coalition. In my presence, one of the Socialist delegates teased the Communist delegate as to how reactionary his party had become.

PSF: Orlemanski-Lange from
4-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Is it all right to file
this letter from Rev. S. Orlemanski
without acknowledgment? You will
recall you had me hold it at the
time you received it.

Yes
EB
Lange

PSF; Orlemanski-Lange folder

envelope
attached

Springfield, Mass.,

June 2, 1944

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:-

Certainly the greatest honor for me would be
to see in person the President of this most powerful Democracy
in the world. Not only honor, but [^] consider this my duty to
report to my "BOSS" on my trip to Moscow,

Wishing you health,

Sincerely yours,

Rev. S. Orlemanski
Rev. S. Orlemanski,

28 Underwood street,
Springfield (4) Mass

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER,
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

July 13 1944

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED]
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Major General Edwin M. Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Watson:

Reference is made to my recent letter referring to an article in the "Merry-Go-Round" written by Drew Pearson in the "Washington Post" on July 3, 1944, concerning the reports of Father Orlemanski and Professor Oscar Lange.

So that you might be advised as to the complete details in this matter as mentioned by Professor Oscar Lange in his telegram of July 3, 1944, there are attached copies of his letter dated July 5, 1944, as well as copies of the statements enclosed in his letter made by Dorothy Jaffe Sheinfeld, Secretary to Professor Lange, and Bert F. Hoselitz.

Please be advised that I am also making available copies of Professor Lange's letter to the State Department for its information.

With assurances of my highest esteem and best regards.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosures

DECLASSIFIED

COPY

July 5, 1944

Mr. John Edgar Hoover
Director Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I thank you very much for your telegram of July 4 and for your kind co-operation. As further explanation of my telegram of July 3 I submit the following information.

After my return from my trip to the Soviet Union, where I had a conference with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov, I submitted a private report (I travelled as a strictly private citizen) to the State Department and to the White House. As this report contained references to Teheran and similar matters I considered the account as confidential.

On June 26-th during my absence from Chicago, a Mr. David Karr visited my secretary, Miss Dorothy Jaffe, represented himself as being of Vice-President Wallace's office and requested, in the name of the Vice-President an account of my conference with Stalin. He explained that Mr. Wallace is leaving China for Russia where he intends to meet Stalin and that he wants information about what Stalin told me during my interview. He said that the information is needed immediately and is going to cable to the Vice-President. After some hesitation Miss Jaffe let him read the report I had prepared for the State Department and the White House. Miss Jaffe wrote me about it to New York.

I enclose statements of Miss Jaffe and of Mr. Hoselitz (my research assistant) which contain a detailed description of the incident.

The matter appeared rather strange to me and I investigated it further. I found that in April Mr. Karr had asked my friend Mr. A. Kulikowski (who had signed my passport application) about the details of my trip to Moscow. He did so in the name of the Vice-President. Mr. Kulikowski checked up with the Vice-President's secretary (Mr. Harold Young) who declared that the Vice-President had not asked Mr. Karr to call upon Mr. Kulikowski and knew nothing about it. Having become suspicious, I called up Mr. Karr on July 1 by telephone and asked him to explain whether the Vice-President had commissioned him to ask for a report on my meeting with Marshall Stalin. I asked for a clear "yes or no" answer. Mr. Karr refused to give such an answer. Later Mr. Karr called me up and explained that though the Vice-President had not asked specifically for a report, it was customary for him (Mr. Karr) to collect information for the Vice-President on his own initiative. I warned Mr. Karr against any attempts on his part to communicate the information he had obtained to persons other than the Vice-President. Mr. Karr told me that I can rest assured about it and that the notes he took are in the Vice-President's office awaiting his return to the United States. He invoked the fact I had seen him (in September 1943) in the Vice-President's party in Chicago as a proof that he is really connected with the staff of the Vice-President.

Mr. Kulikowski, from whom Mr. Karr had extracted information by posing as an official of the Vice-President, told me on July 1 that Mr. Karr is supplying information to Drew Pearson. Indeed, on July 2 and 3 an account of my conference with Stalin and Molotov appeared in Pearson's column. Fortunately, Mr. Karr or Mr. Pearson have picked the least important parts of the conversation and the leak of information proved less harmful than I had feared.

COPY

July 3, 1944

On Monday, June 26, 1944, at about 11:30 a.m., Mr. David Karr phoned me at Professor Oscar Lange's office at the University of Chicago, and said he was from Vice President Wallace's office. He said that Mr. Wallace was to leave China within one or two days, and on his way back to the United States, stop off to see Premier Stalin in Russia. Mr. Wallace, he said, wanted to get the pertinent details of the Lange-Stalin discussion before he (Wallace) saw Stalin.

I was somewhat dubious about giving him these details without Mr. Lange's consent, but he told me that he had introduced Mr. Lange and Mr. Adam Kulikowski to Mr. Wallace, and I asked him to come to the office that same afternoon at 3:00 o'clock.

When he arrived, I was in the office together with Mr. Bert Hoselitz, who is Mr. Lange's Research Assistant. When Mr. Karr came, he again reiterated that he intended to cable the Lange-Stalin interview to Mr. Wallace. I do not remember the exact words he used, but there was no doubt in my mind that, from what he said, he was a close and confidential political adviser to Vice President Wallace. In order to prove how well acquainted he was with Mr. Wallace's movements, he even mentioned that the Vice President was to go to Tashkent, and asked Mr. Hoselitz and myself to keep this information confidential. He said that this report had to reach Mr. Wallace immediately, and therefore could not wait upon Mr. Lange's return to Chicago.

After I became confident of Mr. Karr's position as an adviser to Vice President Wallace, I gave him a copy of the Lange-Stalin interview, and told him that this was a highly confidential report and not intended for publication. While reading it, Mr. Karr expressed at one or two places his opinion that the report, if published, would create political dynamite, and there is no doubt that he understood and agreed that the contents of the interview were not intended for anyone but Mr. Wallace. Since the report was rather long, Mr. Karr asked me to help him make a summary of the pertinent parts. Since we both agreed that this report was highly confidential, I asked Mr. Hoselitz to leave the office before we started discussing it.

I helped Mr. Karr get the pertinent facts of the report in order. When he left, he expressed his opinion again that he considered the report to be confidential, and he said that Mr. Wallace would be very interested in the information and that he would immediately send it to him.

During our conversation, Mr. Karr proved to my complete satisfaction that he was David Karr, and that he was getting this confidential information for no one but Vice President Wallace.

When he left, he said that he would get Mr. Wallace to send me an autographed picture of himself upon his return to his country.

/s/ Dorothy Jaffe Sheinfeld

Dorothy Jaffe Sheinfeld
Secretary to Oscar Lange

...office, ...
...I was ...
...to see ...
...Mrs. David ...
...me up ...
...Oscar ...
...on Monday, ...

COPI

July 3, 1944

On Monday, June 26, 1944, I was in Mr. Oscar Lange's office, where I work regularly as his Research Assistant, when about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. David Karr came to the office. He had an appointment with Miss Dorothy Jaffe (Mrs. David Sheinfeld). I knew that he had come to see a confidential report which Mr. Lange had made of his interview with Stalin, the contents of which were entirely unknown to me at that time.

When Mr. Karr came, he introduced himself as being a member of Vice President Wallace's staff, and in the short conversation which followed, he made a number of statements which convinced me that he was a close and confidential personal adviser to the Vice President.

He asked Miss Jaffe to show him Mr. Lange's interview, and since it was confidential, Miss Jaffe asked him to read it but not to discuss any of its contents in my presence. While Mr. Karr read the document, he exclaimed at least twice that it contained important confidential information which, if publicized, would cause a considerable political stir. Mr. Karr then said to Miss Jaffe that he did not think that all details of the report would be of interest to Mr. Wallace, and asked her to help him make excerpts of the most pertinent parts. I then left the office because Miss Jaffe and Mr. Karr wanted to discuss the contents of the document.

When I returned, Mr. Karr was just leaving, and expressed again his belief that the report would be of great value to Vice President Wallace. On my asking him how he could get it to Mr. Wallace, he answered that he would cable it. There was no doubt in my mind that Mr. Karr had come solely for the purpose of obtaining the confidential details of the Lange-Stalin interview for the exclusive use of Vice President Wallace, and there is equally no doubt in my mind that Mr. Karr was repeatedly warned, and understood, the confidential nature of the report.

/s/ Bert F. Hoselitz

Bert F. Hoselitz

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

7

July 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

The attached letter of July fourth to you from J. Edgar Hoover together with the two newspaper clippings which accompanied it are returned to you herewith.

They were sent to me with a brief memorandum of July thirteenth by the President, with the request that they be returned to you.

CH

TOP SECRET
DEVELOPMENT OF ENIGMA

RESPECTFULLY FORWARDED TO THE
PRESIDENT:

E.M.W.
E.M.W.

(re Drew Pearson's disclosure of secret
reports of Father Orlemanski and Prof.
Lange)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

July 4 1944

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED]
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Major General Edwin M. Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Watson:

Drew Pearson, writer for the "Washington Post", on July 3, 1944, published an article in the "Merry-Go-Round" referring to the reports recently furnished to the White House by Father Orlemanski of Springfield, Massachusetts, and Professor Oscar Lange, Polish-American leader and teacher at the University of Chicago.

In substance, Mr. Pearson referred to the interviews by Father Orlemanski and Professor Lange had with Premier Josef Stalin. Mr. Pearson stated that the net conclusion drawn from the "Lange-Orlemanski" reports is that Polish-Russian relations are on the eve of a wholesome rapprochement. He commented that shortly after the receipt of these reports, President Roosevelt began a series of conferences with the Polish Premier in Washington and the results of these conferences had exceeded expectations. During the interviews with Stalin, Father Orlemanski and Professor Lange were reassured that Russia wants a "strong" independent Poland after the war but a Poland which will be favorably disposed towards Russia. Stalin was said to have averred that he was ready to build a Polish Army of 1,000,000 men, to equip it fully, and arm it with the best guns the Soviet Union can make. Mr. Pearson also referred to Stalin's discussion of the boundary situation which reportedly had been discussed at Teheran. According to Mr. Pearson's column, Professor Lange had been permitted to visit the Polish Army inside of Russia and that he had been uncomplimentary in telling Stalin about the living conditions of the Polish population in Russia. Continuing, he reported that several days after Lange had made his complaint, Lange had learned that Stalin had arranged to better the living conditions of the Polish refugees in Russia.

At the conclusion of the news article, there appears an editor's note that a second and concluding column on the Stalin interviews would appear on July 4, 1944, giving in detail some of the Russian Premier's ideas on Germany and postwar collaboration.

Major General Edwin M. Watson

With reference to the above-mentioned article by Mr. Pearson, I wish to advise that I am in receipt of a telegram, dated July 3, 1944, from Professor Oscar Lange, 425 East 86th Street, Apartment 2D, New York, New York, which reads as follows:

"Drew Pearson column describes my secret report to State Department on talk with Stalin. Got it from Vice President Wallace's Office. David Carr, employee of Wallace, demanded report in name of Vice President from my secretary during my absence. Carr said Wallace going see Stalin wants my report. Carr used Vice President's name to obtain report and sell to Pearson. Pearson announces second column on Teheran. Please stop him."

In acknowledging Mr. Lange's telegram, I suggested that he personally contact the Office of Censorship with reference to this matter.

In view of the comments of Professor Lange, I thought you would like to be advised of Mr. Pearson's column appearing in the "Washington Post". I have taken the liberty of making available the above information to the State Department.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

279
(LB)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL &

[REDACTED]

July 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For your information and
return to General Watson for
his files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Report from J. Edgar Hoover 7/4/44
re Drew Pearson's disclosure of secret
reports of Father Orlemanski and Prof.
Lange.

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

PSF, Orlemanski-
Lange folder

4 THE WASHINGTON POST
Monday, July 3, 1944

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

TWO OF THE MOST important diplomatic reports of the war have been received at the White House recently, not from any trained diplomats, but from two private American citizens—Father Orlemanski of Springfield, Mass., and Prof. Oscar Lange, Polish-American leader and a teacher at the University of Chicago, both of whom had interviews with Stalin.

Although less widely publicized than Father Orlemanski's interview, Professor Lange had a long separate talk with Marshal Stalin and, perhaps because he was not circumscribed by church superiors, his report, on the whole, has been the more penetrating and helpful.

Net conclusion drawn from the Lange-Orlemanski reports is that Polish-Russian relations, one of the most troublesome problems of the war, are on the eve of a wholesome rapprochement, probably beginning about now.

It was shortly after the receipt of the Lange-Orlemanski reports that President Roosevelt began a series of three conferences with Polish Premier Mikolajczyk in Washington, the results of which exceeded expectations.

If Polish-Russian relations can be settled amicably, one of the worst obstacles to postwar peace will be removed. Poland, for a hundred years partially governed by Russia, has a deep-rooted suspicion of the Soviet, while the Russians, having borne the main brunt of the European war on land, naturally feel they are entitled to areas forcibly wrested away from them after the last war.

Stalin Discusses Polish Boundaries

with various Polish leaders inside Russia, and he told Stalin that he was deeply moved by the splendid treatment given the Polish Army by the Red Army.

"I am sorry to hear that you are surprised," Stalin said. "The world must think harshly of us if they believe we mistreat those who fight with us, or any other people because of race, color or creed."

However, Professor Lange was not so complimentary in telling Stalin about the living conditions of the Polish population now living in Russia. He described the situation as deplorable.

Stalin admitted that this might be true, and also admitted the truth of Professor Lange's contention that, when these people returned to Poland, they would be bitter against Russia.

"However," Stalin pointed out, "they are being treated no worse than Soviet citizens in the same communities. This is an economic condition brought on by the war, not because we like the Poles."

Several days after Professor Lange made this complaint, it was learned that Stalin had arranged with Wanda Wasiliewska, head of the pro-Soviet Union of Polish Patriots, to better the living conditions of Polish refugees in Russia. Stalin informed Madame Wasiliewska that better war conditions now permitted better living conditions and that Polish refugees should share in the improvement.

Scores Polish Intelligence Service

Stalin was quite cynical about the Polish intelligence service inside Poland and the reports of alleged conditions it had made to Premier Mikolajczyk. All it did,

brunt of the European war on land, naturally feel they are entitled to areas forcibly wrested away from them after the last war.

Stalin Discusses Polish Boundaries

In their separate interviews with Stalin, the two Polish-Americans, Father Oriemanski and Professor Lange, heard the reassuring words from the strong man of Russia that his Government wants a "strong" independent Poland after the war—a Poland which will be strong both internally and externally, but which will be favorably disposed to the Soviet Union.

Stalin went even further and said that he was ready to help create a new Polish Army.

"I am ready to build an Army for Poland, equip it fully and arm it with the best guns the Soviet Union can make," he told Professor Lange. "I will do this for at least one million men."

Stalin also discussed the question of Poland's future boundaries and revealed that they had already been discussed in some detail at Teheran. In doing so, he let drop a very important point—that, at Teheran, Roosevelt and he had agreed to the break-up of Germany after the war.

"Poland should claim East Prussia," Stalin said, "and should also claim Upper Silesia and all the German territory up to the Oder River, including Stettin."

NOTE—This would give Poland practically all of Pomerania, a great stronghold of Prussian militarism. Shortly after Teheran, this columnist reported that the Big Three had proposed giving Pomerania, East Prussia and Silesia to Poland, in order to separate the Prussian junkers from the rest of Germany and stamp out German militarism for keeps.

Stalin told his visitors that he was not sure whether Poland should get Breslau (in Silesia) or not. This was a point, he said, which needed further consideration.

When these plans for Poland had come up at Teheran, Stalin disclosed, President Roosevelt had been in complete agreement, but Prime Minister Churchill had hesitated.

"He asked me: 'who is to guarantee the security of this new Polish State?' I answered him simply: 'The armed might of the Soviet Union.'"

Poles in Russia

PROFESSOR LANGE had been permitted to visit with the Polish Army, inside Russia which is fighting side-by-side with the Red Army. He also had talked

Scores Polish Intelligence Service

Stalin was quite cynical about the Polish intelligence service inside Poland and the reports of alleged conditions it had made to Premier Mikolajczyk. All it did, he said, was deceive the Polish government in exile in London.

Foreign Commissar Molotoff, who was present during the interview, interrupted at this point to say that, in a recent speech, Premier Mikolajczyk had claimed he had the support of 90 per cent of the Polish people.

"Why," laughed Stalin, "I don't even know if I have the support of 90 per cent of the Soviet people. How can he, sitting in London, say that he has the support of 90 per cent of the people of Poland?"

"Mikolajczyk," he concluded, "shouldn't believe the fairy tales his intelligence tells him."

(Editor's note.—A second and concluding column on the Stalin interviews, detailing some of the Russian Premier's ideas on Germany and postwar collaboration, will appear tomorrow.)

Bali-Java Dancers To Be Presented At Meridian Hill

Dev Dja and her Bali-Java dancers, Orientals who are touring America to present dances of the Dutch East Indies, will appear Saturday and Sunday nights at the Starlight Concerts at Meridian Hill Park.

The company will be accompanied by native musicians who play exotic woodwinds and many-toned gongs of the rhythm Gamelan Orchestra which visitors to Bali have heard in the temple courts and the lavish native festivals.

In addition to the dances of Bali, the program will include exotic court dances of Java, comic sports dances of Sumatra and war movements of savage Papua. Tickets to these concerts, which are sponsored by The Washington Post, may be purchased at the Cappel Club Bureau, 1340 G st. n.w., and park box office.

BOND

From Page 1.

Forces Band from Bol Wives of distinguished officers will be honored at tonight's program. Maj. Samuel Grashlo, Americans to escape of death" in the program, which already included on Tech. Sergt. Cl. Kelly and Childers.

PSF: Orlemanski -
Lange folder

Washington Merry-Go-Round

WASHINGTON POST - JULY 4, 1944

By Drew Pearson

Editor's Note: This is the second of two columns describing Premier Stalin's views on Polish-Russian problems and on other phases of Soviet cooperation, as expressed in his interviews with Father Orlemanski and Professor Lange.

Stalin's interview with Prof. Oscar Lange of the University of Chicago, Polish-American leader, lasted 2 hours and 20 minutes, during which the strong man of Russia sipped tea and smoked an endless chain of cigarettes. Present at the interview were Foreign Commissar Molotov and Secretary Pavlov of the Foreign Office.

It is considered significant that Polish Premier Mikolajczyk, during his recent visit in this country, spent considerable time with Professor Lange, who had recently returned from his talk with Stalin. It is believed that the Lange-Mikolajczyk conferences in Chicago, together with those the Polish Premier had with President Roosevelt in Washington, have had much to do with the reported favorable trend of Polish-Russian relations recently.

However, Stalin did not talk only about Poland. At one point, he was asked about the danger of Anglo-Soviet-American harmony breaking up. His reply was that he was not worried.

"This alliance is not built merely on an agreement between three men," Stalin said. "It is the result of a deep and compelling fundamental community of historical interests. It is assured by the fact that we all need each other. As one of your American Statesmen once said, 'If we do not all hang together, we will hang separately.' So I am confident that, despite minor disturbances and occasional irritations, our friendship will continue and will assure peace to the post-war world."

Socialistic Germany

Unlikely

STALIN WAS ALSO ASKED about the chances of Germany becoming socialistic after the war. He replied that he did not believe that likely.

Foreign Commissar Molotov, however, expressed disagreement, pointing out that five million anti-Nazi votes were cast in the last free election before Hitler came into power.

But Stalin argued back: "The cadres (meaning cells) of the rank and file of the German labor movement have been com-

pletely destroyed by fascism. The come-back of the German labor movement is a matter of one or two generations. Meanwhile, we can take no chances with Germany."

When the subject of Hitler and the German atrocities came up, Stalin became emotional. He told how the Germans had burned villages, slaughtered children, destroyed everything they saw.

"How can you expect a people who have indulged in such sadistic, brutal atrocities to be Socialists or Communists? They are murderous barbarians. Human beings never could do such ruthless, savage things."

During his conversations, Stalin frequently referred to Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik revolution. "I am only following in the path laid down for us by Lenin," he once remarked.

No AMG for Poland

REFERRING TO POLISH PROBLEMS, the main subject in which both Professor Lange and Father Orlemanski were interested, Stalin stated categorically that there would be no AMG for Poland in the wake of Red Army advances.

(Note: AMG, or Allied Military Government, is the service largely trained at the University of Virginia, under the U. S. Army, to take over occupied areas after the advance of Allied armies.)

Stalin expressed deep distrust of the Polish officers trained by AMG in the United States, England and Cairo to reestablish Polish rule in reoccupied Polish territory. He described these men as bitterly anti-Soviet and almost pro-German.

"There will be no AMGOT rule in Poland," Stalin said, calling AMG by the name which was originally used but which was changed when the Allies discovered that "amgot" was the Turkish word for horse manure and carried an unfortunate connotation.

"The Poles must form their own government," Stalin continued. "The Polish government must emerge from Poland itself."

Assurance of Polish Independence

HE WAS TOLD that many of the Polish people in Russia are

now more radical than citizens of the Soviet. He said that this did not surprise him. The political feeling of the Poles, he said, approximated that of the Russians at the time of their revolution.

He said that, if the Polish wanted to nationalize their industries and introduce substantial agrarian reforms, it would be a good thing. He added, however, that Russia had no intention of telling them what kind of a government they should have, or how they should run it.

"We are only interested in the future peace of Europe," Stalin said, "and in not having Poland used as a doormat over which an aggressor nation can walk to assail our country."

In this connection, he made a pledge considered most significant to Polish-American leaders—namely, that the Union of Polish Patriots would not be used to form the basis for a new Polish government. The Union of Polish Patriots is the organization of Poles formed inside Russia and working closely with the Soviet. It has always been suspected that the Soviet planned to construct a new Polish government, perhaps with communist leanings, using the Polish Patriots as a nucleus. But throughout his interviews, Stalin gave assurances that he was not interested in a communistic Poland, but that he was very much interested in a friendly Poland.

NATIONAL
AMERICA'S FIRST THEATRE
NATIONAL
LAST 7 TIMES!
Gene Hickock
Famous Comedy **ABIES**
IRISH ROSE
Mats. Tomorrow & Saturday

TRANS-LUX
OPENS 10 A. M. - SUNDAY 11 A. M.
SPECIALS!
First Pictures
THE FRENCH CAPTURE
ELBA
GERMAN ROBOT PLANES
G. O. P. CONVENTION
Dewey & Bricker Nominations
WMAU Hourly Newscast
EXTRA! SUPER MARCH OF TIME
"BACK DOOR TO TOKYO"
War's Greatest Untold Story
MIDNIGHT SHOW EVERY SATURDAY

GROSS ROADS *Ball's X Roads*
THEATER *Va. 25 SEB.*
From Wash.
Curtain 8:45 P. M.
Opening Wed., June 26, thru July 5
"MURDER WITHOUT GRIME"
with
Mary Starring—Elizabeth Farrell
William Reed—Al Sizemore
A. E. W. House, 15th & Pa. Ave. N.W.
Marked Ball's X. Rd. Adm. 50c