

●PSF

Portugal

PSF:
Portugal

d-1 Portugal

November 12, 1938.

Dear Bertie:-

I am glad to have yours of the twenty-first. Since that time we have had our Election and while the State of New York did very well on the whole, we lost in a good many other States because, frankly, our office-holders and our candidates had not measured up.

You are right about the European situation. Our British friends must begin to fish or cut bait. The dictator threat from Europe is a good deal closer to the United States and the American Continent than it was before.

My love to Olive. I am glad that all goes well.

As ever yours,

Honorable Herbert C. Pell,
American Legation,
Lisbon,
Portugal.

PSF Portugal

Lisbon, October 21, 1938

My dear Mr. President:

I have read a good many of the more important speeches in Parliament on the subject of the present crisis and I am struck by the unreality of most of them.

The question at issue is the future and to judge the wisdom of the Prime Minister's course we must look ahead after having first appraised the cards which were in his hand this spring.

The Nationalist Government has been in power in England for a long time, amply long enough to be responsible for all phases of British foreign policy at the present time and for the condition of British armament.

It is political pettifogging to deny the basic contention of the Prime Minister that the peace of Europe is worth any price that is asked. We can not give too much permanently to prevent war but a truce may well be too costly. The price paid at Munich is cruelly apparent. The Germans received practically

everything they asked for and within a few days of the time they wanted. it.

I was in France during August and in England during the early part of September. In both countries I found the people hateful of war but prepared to meet the issue, morally ready and united to an extent that may not recur for some time. I was tremendously impressed by the courage and determination which I saw and heard. From the highest to the lowest in both France and England, the people were ready to march to a task that they loathed. A combination of even and red would only occur on the roulette wheel once in four times and I do not believe that the psychological preparedness of two great nations will coincide much more frequently. The feeling in foreign countries was strongly behind the English and French.

The situation today is different from that of 1914. Then Great Britain and France had enormous holdings of American securities which could be converted into cash; they had unimpaired credit, and free access to the American money market. Today their investments in the United States are very much less, their credit is not so good and the law of the United States denies them access to the American

market. Unless they can appeal to the sympathy of a great part of the American people it will be impossible for them to use the American manufacturing plant as readily, or as anywhere near as readily, as they did in 1914. This will put an almost ruinous burden on their own resources.

From a strictly military point of view the British Army is probably better relatively than it was in 1914. I ask you to remember that on military affairs I am speaking not as an authority, I am merely repeating what I have heard from those in whom I have the most confidence. The British fleet is in, or can readily be brought to, a relative position quite as high as that which it had in 1914. The French Army is at least as good relatively as it was then. Of the Russian Army we can say little but it could not be much worse. We must, however, remember that at least 300,000 French soldiers would have to be maintained on the Italian border and about the same number along the Pyrenees. Even if the Italians can not control the Mediterranean they will be able to make it much more difficult to transport French troops from Africa and it will certainly be impossible for the French, or the English either, to strip their colonies of soldiers to the extent that they did in the last war. Up to this summer at least 250,000 or 300,000 German soldiers would have been immobilized on the Czech frontier. These will now be freed and it is quite certain that German pressure could

put the great Skoda works at their disposal. This means that as the net result of Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, the British and French have lost by immobilization at least 800,000 soldiers and that the Germans have been able to increase the effective army that can be used against France by a quarter of a million.

In most other countries the prestige of Great Britain and France has fallen tremendously. In Portugal the Italians openly and the Germans somewhat more modestly look on the Munich conference as a second Canossa, a great victory for the Dictators and a crushing defeat for England. They seem to think that they can without real danger continue indefinitely to nibble at the strength and prestige of Great Britain. The so-called guarantee of the integrity of the remains of Czechoslovakia is generally considered to be a mockery. They could not or would not defend Czechoslovakia when it was in a position to defend itself and to provide great assistance to them but they are ready to guarantee it after stripping it of its military power. This of course is nonsense.

The rump of Czechoslovakia is scarcely more defensible than Monaco, and like Monaco it must follow and aid the policy of its great neighbor.

This seems to be to me a fair statement of the cost to Great Britain and France. Mr. Chamberlain believes, and quite rightly, that these nations can

afford to pay it in order to get permanent peace. The real question is not what he left at Berchtesgaden and Munich but what he brought back. Has he bought a gold brick?--that is the question. Will Hitler use his increased strength to demand even greater concessions within a year or have they crammed him so full that he will forever hate the sight of food? My observation of small boys at Christmas parties has lead me to the conclusion that a surfeit seldom kills.

The result of these conferences will be either an almost fatal loss to Great Britain or a great triumph. Which you think it will be, depends on your opinion of Mr. Chamberlain's appraisal of Hitler's appetite. If he is right, we will have peace for some time and if he is wrong the XX century will be as definitely German as the XIX century was English or the XVII and XVIII were French.

There can be no doubt that Chamberlain bet the future of the British Empire on Hitler's integrity and before making any permanent judgment we must await the event. I think he will lose.

Hitler will continue his demands and the British business element knowing that victory no less than defeat means the annihilation of private investments and, to a large extent, of private profits will surrender the pre-eminence of the country to get some reprieve for itself.

Olive sends her regards and I continue to thank you for my appointment to Portugal and hope for a letter from you.

Very respectfully yours,

Herbert C. Pell
Herbert C. Pell

The President,
The White House.

HOP:DG

PSF: Portugal

file
personal
Portugal

April 15, 1939

Dear Mr. President:

I think you would be very much pleased if you saw the way in which the ordinary people of Portugal admire you and appreciate your efforts.

Of course the majority of the people are illiterate and vastly too ignorant to have any more serious political opinions than have their own cattle but those who can read, especially the mechanic class, are most appreciative of your efforts to support the cause of peace.

The pogroms and the seizure of the remains of Czechoslovakia and more recently of Albania have thoroughly aroused the fears of the Portuguese people. Rumors of Italian troops in Spain are repeated with vigor and fear. The other day, the French Minister called on me in a great state of excitement. He seemed to think that an attack on Portugal was imminent and hoped that if it occurred, I would lodge his wife and children at the American Legation.

The British Ambassador quite confidentially expects

a war to break out soon. The Germans and Italians on the other hand say they are not worried. They say and apparently sincerely believe that all the English preparation is a bluff and that they can go ahead exactly as they please; they recognize the power of Great Britain but they are convinced that it will not be exerted,-- something like the attitude of the peasants I saw last summer cultivating vines on the sides of Vesuvius.

My own opinion is the same as it was last year, that war is inevitable. I do not think it will be possible for the German machine to change its direction. It is a very rare thing to find a well entrenched party able to change its policy and the more firmly it is in power the more difficult is the change. In 1922 the Republicans followed the old slogans of McKinley in spite of the manifest alteration of our international position, and in spite of the fact that McKinley himself in his last speeches showed that he thought they had seen their best days. Some years later they hung on too long to Prohibition. There is a human tendency to cling to things which have been useful in their time; men act as a shipwrecked sailor who long after he got ashore might continue to wear his life-preserver, first from habit and then as a sacred robe of office.

The German political machine is strong. It has succeeded beyond any possible expectation in its course and it is manned right down to the lowest member of the

organization by men who have profited from the system, who believe in its principles and who are accustomed to its methods. The Germans fear encirclement which, regardless of whether or not it is a response to their own activities, is a fact which they must face. They also believe that as long as Great Britain is controlled by the bourgeoisie they may have to suffer hard words but that will be all.

I am not discussing the accuracy of their conclusions, I am merely stating the fact of their belief.

On the other hand, I am too much of the XIX century to be able to believe in the peaceful collapse of the British Empire. Obviously that Empire can not have its capital anywhere but in England and it can not be lead by a second class European power. To maintain its Empire, Great Britain must maintain its position in Europe and to do this in the present conditions means war. My dispatches have not been cheerful in the past and I see no reason to think that they should be cheerful today.

I hope that the Neutrality Act is changed. It seems to me that we should consider the policy of the elder Pitt, who won Canada and maintained the balance of power on the continent by judicious subsidies given to the German states. We could do the same thing with munitions of war but I am doubtful if the people are ready for it.

There has been a great improvement in American interest in foreign affairs during the last twenty years. In the first place over a million Americans have visited Europe and however little they may have learnt they at


least know that European countries are something more than spots on a map and that their inhabitants are human beings and not just numbers in an almanac.

However little they know of European affairs, they know vastly more than the average European of the same class knows about American conditions. The "New York Times" for example will give appreciably more news of continental Europe than will the "London Times." As both these newspapers are successfully run for profit, it is probable that they appraise properly the public interest.

Except through occasional letters and the news from the "New York Times" I am out of touch with the American situation. Business seems to have ganged up pretty strongly but if the labor dispute can be settled, I see no reason why we should not pull through alive, though not perhaps unwounded.

I hope that I will be able to get back to America some time this year but at present it looks doubtful. In any case I want to be back for the Campaign next year and I am especially anxious to be a delegate to the Convention from Rhode Island. I do not need to tell you what principles I will support.

Faithfully yours,



Herbert C. Pell

The President,

The White House.

PSF: Portugal Folder

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


June 4, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

In the absence of Lord Halifax, Mr. Butler, by instruction of the British Foreign Office, called to see me yesterday and in the course of his conversation left with me the memorandum which I attach herewith and which comprises the point of view of the British Government with regard to the Azores question and the method of carrying on conversations with the Prime Minister of Portugal. I believe you will wish to read it at once.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'H. Halifax', written over a horizontal line.

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

On May 17th Mr. Sumner Welles informed Lord Halifax that the President was contemplating sending a confidential emissary to ask Dr. Salazar whether in the event of the Portuguese Government becoming obliged to move to the Azores they would welcome assistance from the United States and Great Britain in defending the islands. Mr. Welles explained that the United States Government would be glad to know the views of the British authorities on this suggestion. In reply, Lord Halifax, on instructions from London, explained to Mr. Cordell Hull on May 24th that it had now been possible for the British authorities to make soundings in Lisbon regarding the intentions of the Portuguese Government in the event of a German attack. Dr. Salazar had sent a communication to the British Government which was being urgently examined, and it was felt that as a result it might be possible to reach some arrangement regarding the Atlantic islands. That being so, the British authorities felt that in the meantime it might be preferable not to send any United States emissary to Lisbon, and that it would be better to hold American influence in reserve for the time being. In conveying this message to the Secretary, Lord Halifax undertook to keep Mr. Hull informed of the progress of the discussions between the British and Portuguese Governments.

Subsequently, on May 28th the President in conversation with Lord Halifax referred to the question of Portugal, and stated that he was anxious to reach complete understanding with the Prime Minister in regard

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to any action to be taken in the Azores and the Cape Verde islands in the event of Germany's invading Spain or Portugal. He referred to the suggestion already mentioned by Mr. Sumner Welles to Lord Halifax that Dr. Salazar should be induced to invite the protection of the United States and Great Britain for the Portuguese Atlantic islands in the case of German action rendering this necessary, and explained that he visualised the possibility that the British authorities would take action in regard to the islands immediately the necessity arose, the United States possibly collaborating at once with a small token force and subsequently taking over the defence of the islands from the British authorities. The President added that he attached great importance to an invitation to the American Government to take such action being issued by Dr. Salazar.

Lord Halifax promised to communicate the President's remarks at once to the Prime Minister. In reply Mr. Churchill telegraphed direct to the President on May 30th explaining that should the Germans take steps to render Gibraltar unusable by the British Fleet or be obviously about to take such steps, the British authorities were already prepared to send expeditionary forces to occupy the Grand Canary and Cape Verde islands and one of the islands in the Azores. He went on to say that the British authorities would welcome the collaboration of an American token force whether before, during, or after the occupation of these islands, and if it were so desired would be glad subsequently to turn the defence of these islands over to the American authorities.

Mr. Churchill added, however, that the British authorities were/

were already discussing with Dr. Salazar the question of how best the British Government could send help to Portugal, and suggested that in these circumstances it might be better if the British Government were to endeavour to obtain Dr. Salazar's approval of the idea of withdrawing the Portuguese Government to the islands before any further action was taken or any approach was made to the Portuguese Government by the United States Government.

The course of the discussions between the British and Portuguese authorities referred to in the message conveyed to Mr. Hull on May 24th and again in the Prime Minister's message to the President of May 30th has been as follows.

In March last, secret military conversations took place in London on the subject of the defence of Portugal. The hypothesis on which these conversations were based was that some Spanish resistance would be made the moment that German forces crossed the Pyrenees, and that Portugal would simultaneously appeal for assistance. On this hypothesis Portugal was offered limited supplies of war material and at the same time the necessity of taking steps to defend the Atlantic islands was emphasised. A provisional time-table was worked out for the despatch of a British force to Portugal, but no commitment to send such a force was undertaken.

The Portuguese Government took steps to reinforce the Atlantic islands, but on May 21st they submitted a memorandum in which they disagreed with the abovementioned hypothesis in two particulars. The Portuguese authorities considered that not only would Spain not resist the Germans, but that she might join Germany in an
attack/

attack on Portugal; they thought that the British authorities underestimated the scale and speed of the possible German attack. The Portuguese memorandum also explained that no appeal for help from Portugal would be made until Portugal itself was attacked.

In a reply dated May 30th the British authorities admitted that the Portuguese hypothesis was a possible one and that in such circumstances no British force could arrive in time to be of assistance. Owing to their other commitments it was, unfortunately, impossible for the British authorities to improve substantially on the programme for supplying war material which they had put forward in March, and it would not, therefore, be possible for the British authorities to provide material or armed assistance early enough or on a sufficient scale to give effective help to the Portuguese forces in the defence of the mainland.

The British reply went on to say that the British Government had therefore come to the conclusion that the best policy for the Portuguese Government to adopt as soon as Portugal was threatened would be to transfer the Government to the Azores and to offer only token resistance on the mainland. In the event of the Portuguese Government agreeing to adopt this course, the British authorities offered to assist them in connexion with the transfer of the Government to the Azores, to facilitate the early delivery of anti-aircraft defences to the Azores, to provide technicians to install the anti-aircraft defences, train the necessary personnel and develop the aerodromes, to furnish local naval defence equipment with the necessary personnel and provide coast defence/

defence guns with the necessary personnel to install them in the Cape Verde islands.

Finally, the British Government in their reply suggested to the Portuguese Government that a plan of action should be concerted to be put into effect in the event of Portugal being threatened.

It is requested that the foregoing explanation of the discussions which have been taking place between the British and Portuguese authorities should be regarded as highly confidential; it is particularly important that the fact that this information has been communicated to the United States authorities should not be disclosed to the Portuguese Government.

It will be seen from the above account of the discussions between the British and Portuguese Governments that the object of the British authorities is the same as that of the President, i.e. to arrange for cooperation in the defence of the Atlantic islands on the invitation of the Portuguese Government. The position has, however, been complicated by representations which were made to Mr. Eden in London on May 30th by the Portuguese Ambassador. The latter stated that the Portuguese Government had been somewhat disturbed by the references to the Atlantic islands in the President's speech of May 27th. He explained that recent suggestions by private individuals in the United States and in the American Press that the United States should take over the Azores or the Cape Verde islands had considerably excited public opinion in Portugal and that there was a feeling in Portugal that the United States Government

were/

were contemplating some aggressive action against the islands. The Ambassador handed Mr. Eden a note in which, inter alia, it was stated that the Portuguese Government, having no political commitments with the United States, could not do otherwise than consider any American attitude which ignored Portuguese sovereignty over the islands - even if this attitude were based on the presumption of a German intention to occupy the islands - as an act of aggression against Portuguese territory from which the logical reactions would naturally follow. The Ambassador urged that steps should be taken to dispose of this unfortunate situation which had arisen between the United States and Portugal, and that any steps should be avoided which might still further complicate matters or disturb Portuguese public opinion.

In reply, Mr. Eden did his best to convince the Ambassador that Portuguese opinion should feel that the safety of the islands had been greatly strengthened by the references to them in the President's speech. The Ambassador replied, however, that it was difficult for the Portuguese public to take a detached view and that he feared that unless care were taken the incident might be made use of for propaganda purposes by the Germans.

It would seem from the conversation between the Portuguese Ambassador and Mr. Eden that the Portuguese Government have drawn a distinction between their attitude towards the United States Government, with whom they claim to have no political commitments, and their attitude towards Great Britain, with whom they are of course

allied./

allied. In all the above circumstances it seems to the British Government that the best method of achieving the purposes common to the United States and Great Britain would be for the initiative in further pursuing the matter with the Portuguese Government to be taken by the British Government and for the possibility of American intervention to be kept in the background for the time being.

THE BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

June 2nd, 1941

PSF: Portugal

1304

Portugal

July 6, 1941

~~SECRET~~

Dear Sumner:

I think perhaps you had better wire Winant and tell him about our plan relative to a personal note to Salazar.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State.

HLH/lmb

MD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated July 3, 1941

Rec'd 3:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2827, July 3, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

~~MOST SECRET~~ TO THE ACTING SECRETARY FOR THE PRESIDENT.

While I was in Washington, we talked over the Portuguese situation. You had planned that I return by way of Lisbon and again contact Salazar on the general situation and particularly as it related to the Azores. I suggested that it might be better to see the Portuguese Ambassador here in London, who has Salazar's complete confidence, as my journey from the United States back to England through Lisbon might create additional pressure on Salazar in the present circumstances. You agreed but both these ideas were rejected after you had received the detailed memorandum from the British Government asking that they be left to negotiate with the Portuguese on this question.

Shortly after my return here Mr. Eden told me that he wished I could call on the Portuguese Ambassador. I reminded him of the British memorandum suggesting that

the

-2- 2827, July 3, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from London

the British Government be left to carry on the negotiations with Portugal alone and that you had agreed to meet their view. Mr. Eden then said that he was, of course, aware of their own memorandum but that it would be helpful if I contacted my Portuguese colleague and that the latter had said that he would like to talk with me.

WINANT

LMS

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated July 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2827, July 3, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I called on the Ambassador this morning. He told me, what we already knew, that his Government had been disturbed by Senator Pepper's reference to the Azores, that your address made shortly thereafter had given them further concern and that it had particularly troubled Salazar, since there was no specific reference to the sovereign rights of Portugal. He further told me that the Portuguese Government had sent a note of protest, to which we replied. The Ambassador said that our reply was felt in Lisbon to be cold and formal and to be rather a confirmation of their apprehensions than otherwise. He told me that his Government had sent us a second note and that he hoped the reply might be warm and friendly.

After reminding him that we fully recognized the sovereign rights of Portugal I suggested to him that in sending the formal note referred to my Government might have had in mind their interest. Then I asked him if the kind of note he suggested might not cause his Government to be pressed by the Germans. He said no, that on the contrary

-2- 2827, July 3, 1941 from London

the contrary it would be helpful. He was very definite in telling me that both he and Salazar were entirely in sympathy with the British and ourselves and that his Government had suggested to Great Britain three years ago the necessity for strengthening the defenses of the Azores. He plainly wanted me to understand that whatever was done in the Azores by Great Britain or ourselves they wanted done on a friendly basis.

I felt the same confidence in talking with Monteiro that I felt when I talked with Salazar four months ago. I realize however the difficulty of formulating the kind of note he suggests under all the circumstances and with the probability that it would be made public. I think however that Monteiro has given me an honest statement of Portuguese views as he understands them and that it would be helpful to follow his suggestion as far as possible.

(END OF MESSAGE).

WINANT

CSB

*file
Confidential*

*Portugal Folder
1-41*



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

In the event that it may not otherwise be brought to your personal attention, I am enclosing a copy of a telegram received today from Minister Fish in Lisbon which will be of interest to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

This telegram has been distributed to:

S

W

Please advise the Division of Communications and Records if further distribution should be made.

Classified
Declassify on: OADR
E.O. 13526

TEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Lisbon

Dated July 21, 1941

Rec'd 10:50 p.m.

secretary of State,

Washington.

381, July 21, 8 p.m.

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.

Your letter of July 14.

I have just delivered the President's letter to Salazar. He opened it but did not read it in my presence and made no comment other than that he was very pleased to hear from the President and would send a reply by our courier very soon.

FISH

HPD

lock box

EJ
This telegam must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated August 1, 1941

Rec'd 7:07 a.m., 2nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

972, August 1, 6 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~

I am informed today by an entirely reliable col-
league who asked that his name not be mentioned, as
follows: The Portuguese Minister, Dematta, has re-
ceived a telegram from his government informing him
that Von Keitel told Benoist Mochin that Germany will
in the near future occupy the Atlantic coasts of Spain
and Portugal in order to apply pressure on America to
accept peace terms that will be proposed when the Russian
campaign is completed.

Repeated to Algiers, Lisbon, Madrid and Tangier.

LEAHY

PEG

file
presnal

Respectfully forwarded to the President:

E. W. W.
E. W. W.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF PROTOCOL

Portugal Folder
1-41

October 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

I am enclosing as of possible interest to the President a copy of a despatch dated September 27 from the American Minister at Lisbon, which contains the translation of a brief editorial published in the evening paper Diario de Lisboa on September 23, 1941.



George T. Summerlin

Enclosure:
From Lisbon, September 27, 1941.

Lisbon, September 27, 1941

No. 213

Subject: Press Comment Regarding President Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to quote below a translation of a brief editorial published in the evening paper DIARIO DE LISBOA on September 23, 1941, as a commentary on the news report of the inheritance by President Roosevelt of a large amount of money from his mother's estate. The interest of this article lies in the fact that it speaks in more complimentary terms of the President than has been the case for some time in the Lisbon press.

"Roosevelt is a millionaire. The fact that he is rich, even remarkably rich, does not affect him in the least. His enormous fortune is for him a source of obligations and not an incentive to pleasure. He acts more like a

statesman

statesman and philosopher than really as a millionaire. He feels that life is not to be wasted in fireworks, inasmuch as there is at the bottom of it a deep moral and religious sentiment which makes one look down on money, not meaning that it should be wasted. Wealth implies duties, for the Bible distinguishes between the good and the bad rich.

"Is this still so today? We believe that it is, at least in the United States. The bad rich use their treasures to corrupt and belittle the rest of mankind. The good rich keep the poor in mind, as well as the weak, and give a helping hand to artists, scientists and gifted young men.

"Roosevelt must be one of the latter. When his meeting with Churchill took place, a religious service was held where we behold (in the moving pictures) each one reading in his own prayer book.

"To whom would their thoughts be devoted? To God, no doubt. If Roosevelt were a miser or a prodigal waster, how would he dare implore divine protection for the work which he is carrying out?"

Respectfully yours,

BERT FISH

In quintuplicate.

HPL/EG

A true copy of
the signed original.
D

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

From: G-2

Time: 2130 EST Dec. 18

The Secretary of the Treasury notified the Secretary of War that the Bank of Lisbon has requested a New York bank to cancel all credits wherever possible. This might indicate the possibility of an invasion.

PSF: Portugal

*file
Baker*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In connection with our conversation on the telephone of the day before yesterday, I am bringing immediately to your attention a copy of a telegram from our Legation in Lisbon sent in reply to the urgent inquiry I addressed to the Minister after speaking to you.

I fully discussed the whole situation with the British Ambassador last night. Lord Halifax felt - and I agree with him, as does Secretary Hull - that a further personal message from you to Dr. Salazar should be held in abeyance as a last resort. We all feel that because of the great value of such a message, it should not be sent by you unless we believe that a German occupation of Spain and a consequent possible entrance by the Germans into Portugal is actually imminent.

Lord Halifax further told me that just prior to the occupation of Timor, the British Government had satisfied themselves once again of the determination

The President,


The White House.

of the Portuguese Government to remain faithful to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. As a result of these conversations a plan has been drawn up for joint action from the moment the Portuguese Government decides to abandon their neutrality.

The information I have just mentioned is contained in a telegram sent to Lord Halifax under date of December 16 by the British Foreign Office and I am transmitting the entire text of this telegram since I believe you will wish to read it as soon as possible.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Encs.

WM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Lisbon

Dated December 18, 1941

Rec'd 7:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

753, December 18, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY.

Department's No. 856, December 17, 10 p.m.

Sampayo, Secretary General of Foreign Office
whom I saw this afternoon, informed that Portuguese
Government had received no information from Germany,
France or Spain regarding movement of German troops
or others which would alter in any way the situation
in Spain. He emphasized moreover that during the
past week Ambassador Franco, brother of the General,
had been in Madrid and that he had seen Salazar upon
his return when he had informed him in accordance with
terms of the treaty between the two countries that
there had been no change in Spain nor was any con-
templated.

To my inquiry regarding present Portuguese policy
he stated emphatically that there had been no alter-
ation in any way in Salazar's policy of strict neu-
trality and that it was his fervent hope that Portugal
could maintain it.

FISH

KLP

BAS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Lisbon

Dated December 18, 1941

Rec'd. 3:50 a.m.; 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

753, December 18, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

He made both these assurances with very evident
sincerity and from my knowledge of him I do not
think he would attempt to deceive me. Among
the people generally there continue to circulate
disgusting rumors regarding Spain, some of
which have reached the international press. My
British and Dutch colleagues state that they
have been informed that the tension is less in
Madrid and they feel that if Germany has attempted
any pressure Franco has been successful.

(END OF MESSAGE)

FISH

KLP

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt. telegram 1-12-72

By JL Date FEB 16 1972

Copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office,

London, to the British Embassy, Washington,

dated December 16th, 1941.

~~SECRET~~

Further confidential discussions with the Portuguese Government have now been concluded. These have enabled His Majesty's Government to satisfy themselves once again of the determination of the Portuguese Government to remain faithful to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

2. As a result of these conversations, a plan has been drawn up for joint action from the moment when the Portuguese Government decide to abandon their neutrality. This plan is based on the assumption that the Portuguese Government for the present will be able only to offer a token resistance on the Portuguese mainland and that the Portuguese Government will withdraw to the Atlantic islands or to a Portuguese colonial territory. The plan imposes immediate obligations both on the Portuguese Government and on His Majesty's Government. On the Portuguese side, the Portuguese Government undertakes to increase the defences of the Atlantic islands to the maximum possible extent, to lay in the necessary reserve of supplies on the islands and to make arrangements for the accommodation required by the Allied forces in the event of war. This involves the preparation of air bases and naval facilities in the islands. Plans have also been drawn up for the evacuation of the Portuguese Government and for demolitions on Portuguese territory.

On/

On the British side, His Majesty's Government undertake to supply the arms and equipment necessary for the fortification of the Atlantic islands, to supply all necessary technical advice and to undertake the training of officers of the Portuguese armed forces. As regards the future, the necessary plans for cooperation after the outbreak of war have been drawn up.

3. This plan is at present under consideration by the Portuguese Government who have given His Majesty's Government to understand that they intend to accept it without material modification. The question will then remain as to the moment at which the Portuguese Government decide to abandon their neutrality. This will form the subject of further discussions with the Portuguese Government.

4. Meanwhile discussions have taken place between the Portuguese Government and His Majesty's Government regarding the security of Portuguese Timor.

5. Please convey the substance of the foregoing paragraphs to the United States Government for their most secret information.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Does this need a reply?

F.D.R.

Secret memorandum, 9-25-43, from Adm. Wm. D. Leahy, in re proposals of the Admiralty in re previous plans concerning Initial American convoy to the Azores. Attached is draft message from the President to the Prime Minister.

*file
confidential*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


October 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

At twelve noon on October 12 Mr. Eden is making the attached statement concerning Lifebelt in the House of Commons. Unless instructed to the contrary I propose to have the Department issue the following press release immediately after Mr. Eden's statement:

"With reference to the statement made by Mr. Eden, concerning the use of facilities in the Azores, the agreement on which the statement is based was concluded by virtue of the ancient Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. The United States Government has been informed and has approved the arrangements made."



Enclosure:
Statement.

COEX

COPY

At the outset of the war the Portuguese Government in full agreement with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom adopted a policy of neutrality with a view to preventing the war spreading into Iberian Peninsula. The Portuguese Government have however frequently stated, and most recently in Dr. Salazar's speech of April 27th, that the above policy is in no way inconsistent with Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, which was reaffirmed by the Portuguese Government in the early days of the war.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, basing themselves upon this ancient alliance, have now requested the Portuguese Government to accord them certain facilities in the Azores, which will enable better protection to be provided for merchant shipping in the Atlantic. The Portuguese Government have agreed to grant this request and arrangements, which enter into force immediately, have been concluded between the two Governments regarding

conditions governing the use of the above facilities by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and

British assistance in furnishing essential material and supplies for Portuguese armed forces and for the maintenance of Portuguese national economy.

Agreement concerning the use of facilities in the Azores is of a temporary nature only and in no way prejudices the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over Portuguese territory. All British forces will be withdrawn from the Azores at the end of hostilities.

Nothing in this agreement affects the continued desire of the Portuguese Government, with which His Majesty's Government have declared themselves in sympathy, to continue their policy of neutrality on the European mainland and thus maintain a zone of peace in the Iberian Peninsula.

In the view of His Majesty's Government this agreement should give new life and vigour to the alliance which has so long existed between United Kingdom and Portugal to their mutual advantage. It not only confirms and strengthens the political guarantees resulting from the treaties of alliance, but also affords new proof of Anglo-Portuguese friendship and provides an additional guarantee for the development of this friendship in the future.

Portugal folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you tell Ed Stettinius
to get this word to the Prime Minister?

F.D.R.

Memorandum to the President, 10-14-43,
from Stettinius, encl. British Aide
Memoire, re indications of Portuguese
willingness to enter the war against
Japan. Attached is Secret Memo, 10-15
from Adm. Leahy re this Aide Memoire, and
saying there is no advantage for action at
this time by Joint Chiefs of Staff on this.

October 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

The British Embassy has just left with the Department the attached aide-memoire concerning indications of Portuguese willingness to enter the war against Japan. The British Embassy requests that this aide-memoire be communicated to the President with reference to the Prime Minister's telegram to the President no. 444 of October 8.

s/ E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

(Original of memorandum, together with aide-memoire given to Admiral Leahy by direction of the President.)

Eu:RSC:RS

Portugal folder 1-43
file
confidential



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will find attached a memorandum containing certain decisions reached this morning in a conference with the Secretary of War relative to the Azores, about which you will wish to be informed.

November 2, 1943

A conference took place in the War Department this morning about the question of facilities in the Azores.

It was attended by:

The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
General Marshall
General Arnold
General Kuter
Mr. Stettinius

It was decided that our Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon should proceed to present to Dr. Salazar certain modified requests, as generally envisaged by the existing instructions. These requests would be designed to obtain for us the earliest possible use of facilities for movement of our ferrying and transport aircraft via the islands. A statement of these requests is attached.

It was decided that the requests should be made at once to Salazar, without further prior consultation with the British.

Finally, it was agreed that Mr. Norweb would be asked to proceed to Portugal at the earliest possible moment, in order to take over the conduct of the negotiations.

AMERICAN FACILITIES IN THE AZORES TO BE
REQUESTED IMMEDIATELY OF DR. SALAZAR

1. Authorization to construct and utilize an airfield together with essential facilities to insure the movement of United States ferrying and transport aircraft; these facilities to include accommodations for necessary personnel, navigational aids and maintenance of aircraft; the airfield to be constructed on either Flores or Santa Maria Islands, to be determined by the suitability of the terrain, as determined by American engineers.

2. Authorization to send necessary construction personnel and equipment to assist British forces in the early completion of the airfield and installations at Lagens airfield at Terceira; and to share in the use of this airfield to the extent that may be agreed between the United States and British authorities.

3. The use of port facilities in Horta and shore accommodation for necessary personnel in connection with these facilities, a tanker and tug of the merchant marine to be stationed there.

4. Port facilities at Ponta Delgada restricted to those normally accorded a belligerent by a neutral.

5. Authorization for the occasional refueling of seaplanes other than commercial ones at Horta. (It is understood that in this connection we will make use of the existing Panair facilities.)

*Portugal folder
1-43*

PRIVATE AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 4, 1943.

My dear Dr. Salasari:-

Mr. George F. Kennan has been here for a few days and I have seen him just prior to his departure. He will tell you what I have emphasized to him in regard to shortening the war and saving lives by American, as well as British, use of Terceira and Horta facilities.

But may I take this opportunity to remind you of a story ~~with~~ which you are familiar. In 1918, when I was the Under Secretary of the Navy, I went to Horta and to Ponta Delgada, in both of which ports the Allies were using repair, fueling and anti-submarine facilities. In fact, in Ponta Delgada the American Navy had a full-fledged base of operations -- and very many of our ships used the harbor at Ponta Delgada for our fueling and repairs.

In those days there was never any question about the good faith of the United States in carrying out their pledge that as soon as possible after the war the bases would be dismantled and the shore batteries abandoned. I personally inspected everything and the relationship at that time between Portugal and the United States was on a basis of mutual confidence and great friendship. In 1919 all of our forces were withdrawn, and I am inclined to think that the use of these two places by us did much for the economic good of the people of the Azores.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date _____

I do wish that I could have a chance to see you one of these days because I want to talk to you about another matter -- the furtherance of cultural relations between the United States and Portugal and Brazil. In other words, a closer association between the three nations in regard to an improved status after the war is over. I do not need to tell you that the United States has no designs on the territory of Portugal and its possessions. I am thinking in long range terms because I do not think that our peoples have been in close enough touch in the past.

Very sincerely yours,

S/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
The Prime Minister of Portugal,
Lisbon,
Portugal.

PSF Pantugal

C
P
Y

"O.K.
F.W.R."

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As you know Kennan, our Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Lisbon, in his few days consultation here with our Army and Navy people has obtained a clear picture of their minimum requirements and the urgency of obtaining them. He is en route to Lisbon to open negotiations with Salazar. Immediately following his first talk Salazar is almost certain, in the name of the alliance, to ask the British Ambassador what he thinks of our requests for facilities. Salazar would love to detect and take full advantage of the slightest indication that the British are not in full accord with us. I think consequently it would be very helpful if you could send something along the lines of the attached draft to Prime Minister Churchill.

Sgd. E.R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:
Draft message.

see also Churchill folder 1-11

PSF Portugal folder 1-43

Y

(2084) (Originals of these papers returned to the Acting Secy. State
hms 11-8-43. hms)

[11-8-43]

Suggested Message from the President to
Prime Minister Churchill

George Kennan, our Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon is returning to his post after brief consultation with us here. He expects to take up with Salazar immediately upon his return the urgent question of obtaining what we consider minimum necessary facilities in the Azores for the operation of the air transport, ferrying, anti-submarine and convoy operations by United States forces in that area.

I hope that he can depend on the full support of the British Ambassador to Lisbon in impressing upon the Portuguese the compelling importance to our common war effort of the early use of these facilities by United States forces and would appreciate your sending him instructions in that sense.

Sgd "Roosevelt"

(orig. copies filed - Churchill folder, 1-43.)

T-193

PSI

Portugal folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What next?

F.D.R.

Letter, 12-16-43, to Gen. Watson from Mr. Summerlin, enclosing copy of a despatch, 12-3-43, from American Legation at Lisbon, transmitting letter, together with translation, to the President from Dr. Salazar, the Prime Minister of Portugal, in reply to the President's letter of November 4th.

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

Portugal - 1944
Files

(1342)

JULY 18, 1944

27/19/44

HIS EXCELLENCY
DR. ANTONIO DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR, x
PRIME MINISTER OF PORTUGAL

x 442

x2062

AS YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY AMBASSADOR NORWEG, WE ARE DESIROUS OF CONSTRUCTING AN AIRFIELD ON THE ISLAND OF SANTA MARIA TO BE USED BY US IN CONNECTION WITH OUR OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC THEATER. YOU HAVE BEEN THE REPORT OF THE SURVEY RECENTLY COMPLETED AND HAVE BEEN GOOD ENOUGH TO APPROVE THE REPORT.

OWING TO THE WEATHER HAZARD NO FURTHER DELAY IS POSSIBLE AND THE CONSTRUCTION MUST BE PROCEEDED TO AT ONCE OR THE PROJECT WILL HAVE TO BE ABANDONED.

BEARING IN MIND THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF YOUR COUNTRY AND MINE I TRUST THAT YOU WILL AUTHORIZE THE BENDING IMMEDIATELY TO SANTA MARIA OF ALL THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN AIRPORT AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE SURVEY.

I AM BENDING THIS URGENT REQUEST TO YOU BY THE HAND OF MR. PAUL CULBERTSON, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHOM I RECOMMEND TO YOU, AND WHO WILL EXPLAIN TO YOU ORALLY THE ANXIETY IN WHICH WE FIND OURSELVES TO ACCOMPLISH THE AFORESAID PURPOSE.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

x 249 official
x 4675
x b. f. State

July 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HONORABLE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE: *x 20*

Herewith is the message from the President to the Prime Minister of Portugal. I told Mrs. Phinney I would send it over in this form.

WILLIAM D. HASSETT
Secretary to the President

Enclosure.

wdh:aw

Long from Fover

July 18, 1944

~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:~~

~~Mr. Stettinius, with the approval of Secretary Hull, requests that the following message to the Prime Minister of Portugal be signed by the President: QUOTE~~

His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
Prime Minister of Portugal.

As you have been informed by Ambassador Norweb, we are desirous of constructing an airfield on the Island of Santa Maria to be used by us in connection with our operations in the Pacific theater. You have seen the report of the survey recently completed and have been good enough to approve the report.

Owing to the weather hazard no further delay is possible and the construction must be proceeded to at once or the project will have to be abandoned.

Bearing in mind the mutual interests of your country and mine I trust that you will authorize the sending immediately to Santa Maria of all the necessary equipment and material for the construction of an airport as contemplated in the survey.

I am sending this urgent request to you by the hand of Mr. Paul Culbertson, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of the Department of State, whom I recommend to you, and who will explain to you orally the anxiety in which we find ourselves to accomplish the aforesaid purpose.

~~Very sincerely yours,~~

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

~~UNQUOTE.~~

~~W. D. H.~~

~~His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
Prime Minister of Portugal.~~

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

MEMORANDUM FOR: HONORABLE, THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM: THE PRESIDENT:

I APPROVE SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO SALAZAR. PLEASE SIGN MY NAME AND SEND
IT.

JULY 18, 1944.

July 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Stettinius, with the approval of Secretary Hull, requests that the following message to the Prime Minister of Portugal be signed by the President: QUOTE

His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
Prime Minister of Portugal.

As you have been informed by Ambassador Norweb, we are desirous of constructing an airfield on the Island of Santa Maria to be used by us in connection with our operations in the Pacific theater. You have seen the report of the survey recently completed and have been good enough to approve the report.

Owing to the weather hazard no further delay is possible and the construction must be proceeded to at once or the project will have to be abandoned.

Bearing in mind the mutual interests of your country and mine I trust that you will authorize the sending immediately to Santa Maria of all the necessary equipment and material for the construction of an airport as contemplated in the survey.

I am sending this urgent request to you by the hand of Mr. Paul Culbertson, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of the Department of State, whom I recommend to you, and who will explain to you orally the anxiety in which we find ourselves to accomplish the aforesaid purpose.

~~Very sincerely yours,~~

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

UNQUOTE.

W. D. H.

~~His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
Prime Minister of Portugal.~~

(3358)

Portugal folder 1-44

lms

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Memorandum from Mr. Stettinius, 8/8/44, for the President, enclosing letter and translation of same addressed to the President by Prime Minister Salazar, 7/27/44, in answer to the President's message of 7/18/44 concerning the construction of an airfield in the island of Santa Maria.

August 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed an autographed letter addressed to the President by Prime Minister Salazar, dated July 27, 1944, in answer to the President's message of July 18, 1944, concerning the construction of an airfield in the island of Santa Maria.

An English translation from the original Portuguese is likewise enclosed.

Enclosure:

Letter to the President
from Prime Minister Salazar,
July 27, 1944

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date FEB 16 1972

ES

(Text of Message from Prime Minister Salazar to the President)

Lisbon, July 27, 1944

Mr. President:

I have received by the hand of Mr. Paul Culbertson the message which Your Excellency directed to me, dated the 18th of the current month, relative to the construction of an airdrome on the Portuguese Island of Santa Maria.

Between the date of sending Your Excellency's message and its delivery at Lisbon, there took place conversations with Mr. Ambassador Norweb which had already furthered the course of the negotiations and clarified the points of view of the Portuguese Government, and the considerations which it could form. Your Excellency is certainly informed of those conversations as well as of those with Messrs. Norweb and Culbertson which followed. Perhaps you are aware also of the correspondence exchanged with Pan American Airways.

In responding at this time to the message of Your Excellency, it does not appear necessary, therefore, to repeat that which Your Excellency already knows through your Ambassador, merely to confirm that which will have already been told by him in regard to the care which this project has merited from the Portuguese Government.

Your Excellency can be certain that I have never ceased to have in mind the importance which the plan possesses for the mutual interests of our two countries. Similarly I have not forgotten the interest shown by the Government of the United States in commencing the work as soon as possible.

It appears to me that the fundamental accord with the construction company has been satisfactorily made so that the work can commence immediately and continue at the rate considered proper. Thus is realized the first and essential condition for all the future developments.

I have exerted my best efforts in the study of the matter to the end that it should not suffer delays and that it should enjoy all possible facilities on our part, as was Your Excellency's desire and also mine.

I take advantage of the opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the protests of my highest consideration.

SALAZAR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached papers,
which you sent me to read,
are being returned in
accordance with your request
in your memorandum of
August 22.

*file
Personal*

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1944.

Read - 8/23

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
AUG 23 1944
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

A Sua Excelencia

o Senhor Franklin D. Roosevelt,

Presidente dos Estados Unidos da América.

PSF: Portugal folder 1-44

(COPY:ID)

(Text of Message from Prime Minister Salazar to the President)

Lisbon, July 27, 1944

Mr. President:

I have received by the hand of Mr. Paul Culbertson the message which Your Excellency directed to me, dated the 18th of the current month, relative to the construction of an airdrome on the Portuguese Island of Santa Maria.

Between the date of sending Your Excellency's message and its delivery at Lisbon, there took place conversations with Mr. Ambassador Norweb which had already furthered the course of the negotiations and clarified the points of view of the Portuguese Government, and the considerations which it could form. Your Excellency is certainly informed of those conversations as well as of those with Messrs. Norweb and Culbertson which followed. Perhaps you are aware also of the correspondence exchanged with Pan American Airways.

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Your Excellency can be certain that I have never ceased to have in mind the importance which the plan possesses for the mutual interests of our two countries. Similarly I have not forgotten the interest shown by the Government of the United States in commencing the work as soon as possible.

It appears to me that the fundamental accord with the construction company has been satisfactorily made so that the work can commence immediately and continue at the rate considered proper. Thus is realized the first and essential condition for all the future developments.

I have exerted my best efforts in the study of the matter to the end that it should not suffer delays and that it should enjoy all possible facilities on our part, as was Your Excellency's desire and also mine.

I take advantage of the opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the protests of my highest consideration.

SALAZAR

1

EL

Presidência do Conselho.

Lisboa, 27 de Julho de 1944

Senhor Presidente,

Recebi por mão do Snr. Paul Culbertson a mensagem que Vossa Excelência me dirigiu com data de 18 do corrente, relativa à construção de um aerodromo na ilha portuguesa de Santa Maria.

Entre a data da expedição da mensagem de Vossa Excelencia e a sua entrega em Lisboa, realisaram-se conversas com o Sr. Embaixador Norweb que tinham já auxiliado o proseguimento das negociações e tornado mais claros os pontos de vista do Govêrno português, e as considerações que êle não podia deixar de aduzir e a que

tem

Presidencia do Conselho.

tem de obedecer a sua attitude. Está Vossa Excelencia certamente informado dessas conversações, assim como das que se lhes seguiram com os Senhores Norweb e Culbertson. Porventura lhe será conhecida tambem a correspondencia trocada com a Pan American Airways.

Ao responder agora à mensagem de Vossa Excelencia não me parece por isso necessário repetir o que pelo seu Embaixador Vossa Excelencia já conhece, e apenas confirmar o que por êle terá sido dito, sobre o cuidado que êste projeto tem merecido ao Governo português.

Vossa

Presidência do Conselho

Vossa Excelencia pode estar certo de que não deixei nunca de ter presente ao espírito a importancia que o plano oferece para os interesses mútuos dos nossos dois países. Assim como não esqueci o empenho posto pelo Govêrno dos Estados Unidos no início dos trabalhos dentro do mais curto prazo.

Parece-me ter-se felizmente chegado a acordo fundamental com a casa construtora para que as obras possam ter começo imediatamente e proseguir no andamento julgado conveniente. Assim se realisa a primeira e essencial condição para todas as eventualidades futuras.

Puz

Presidencia do Conselho.

Puz a minha melhor diligencia no estudo do assunto para que ãle não sofrêsse delongas e encontrasse de nossa parte todas as possíveis facilidades, como era desejo de Vossa Excelencia e meu tambem.

Aproveito o ensejo para reiterar a Vossa Excelencia os protestos da minha mais alta consideração.

M. Arago



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1944.

S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed an autographed letter addressed to the President by Prime Minister Salazar, dated July 27, 1944, in answer to the President's message of July 18, 1944, concerning the construction of an airfield in the island of Santa Maria.

An English translation from the original Portuguese is likewise enclosed.

Enclosure:

Letter to the President
from Prime Minister Salazar,
July 27, 1944.

DEPT. OF STATE
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schmale Date FEB 16 1972

ES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

August 18, 1944

Mr. Maurice C. Latta,
Executive Clerk,
The White House.

Subject: Translation of Letter from
Prime Minister Salazar
to the President.

As you requested on the telephone yesterday, I enclose herewith two copies of the English translation of a letter from Prime Minister Salazar to the President dated July 27, 1944.

I very much regret that copies of the translation were inadvertently omitted from the original envelope.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to be the initials 'ES'.

PSF: Portugal folder 1-44

At the request of the State Department the original of the attached carbon was sent to Col. Parks, Map Room, to be coded and sent to the President.

M.C.L.

October 6, 1944

PSF: Portugal

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MR-OUT 452

October 6, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

On July 19, 1944 you addressed a personal message to the Prime Minister of Portugal concerning our desire for the construction of an airfield on the Island of Santa Maria (Azores) to be used by us in connection with our operations in the Pacific theatre. This message was delivered to Dr. Salazar by Mr. Paul Culbertson, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of the Department of State, on July 22, 1944. Dr. Salazar replied in a personal message to you dated July 27, 1944, from which the following passages are quoted:

"Your Excellency can be certain that I have never ceased to have in mind the importance which the plan possesses for the mutual interests of our two countries. Similarly I have not forgotten the interest shown by the Government of the United States in commencing the work as soon as possible.

"It appears to me that the fundamental accord with the construction company has been satisfactorily made so that the work can commence immediately and continue at the rate considered proper. Thus is realized the first and essential condition for all the future developments.

"I have exerted my best efforts in the study of the matter to the end that it should not suffer delays and that it should enjoy all possible facilities on our part, as was Your Excellency's desire and also mine."

In

The President,
The White House.

ANSWERED BY MR-IN-164f

In the course of the conversations in Lisbon which followed the delivery of your message, Dr. Salazar stated repeatedly that there was no objection whatever to our immediately proceeding to despatch all necessary materials and personnel to Santa Maria for the projected construction. Although in his reply to you, and also in his agreement to permit the deliveries to Santa Maria, Dr. Salazar clearly implied that he was in agreement that the construction itself should go forward without hindrance, we are now again being subjected to delays we can ill afford, by reason of the Portuguese Government's failure to appropriate the lands required for the construction.

We are now confronted with an attempt on Dr. Salazar's part to engage us in a detailed commitment covering a wide range of supplies and services in the strategic field, in the shipping field, and in the economic field. I do not believe this Government is in a position so to commit itself, even should this seem desirable, and the mere study of Dr. Salazar's proposals would entail a loss of time which would defeat our main purpose since action on our pending requirements is suspended while current conversations proceed.

The Prime Minister's present attitude calls for immediate strong measures on our part designed to gain his prompt agreement, or else for the abandonment of the Santa Maria enterprise. In view of the importance of this enterprise to us I propose, subject to your approval, to communicate the substance of the following message to the Portuguese Prime Minister:

"The Portuguese Government has expressed its desire to participate in an eventual expedition for the liberation of Timor, and in order to gratify that desire this Government has engaged in certain staff conversations which are now in progress in Lisbon. This Government has pointed out, however, that the greatest contribution Portugal can make toward the prosecution of the war in the Pacific, including the liberation of Timor, is to make available to the United States the facilities it requires in the Island of Santa Maria. This view has been confirmed by the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff.

"The

"The urgency of this Government's requirements in the Island of Santa Maria has been emphasized over and over again, and the Portuguese Government has professed to understand this urgency. On July 19 the President of the United States addressed a personal message to the Prime Minister of Portugal concerning our desire for the construction of a large airfield on the Island of Santa Maria to be used by the United States in connection with operations in the Pacific theatre. This message was delivered to the Prime Minister by Mr. Paul Culbertson, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of the Department of State. The Prime Minister replied in a personal message to the President dated July 27, from which the following passages are quoted:

'Your Excellency can be certain that I have never ceased to have in mind the importance which the plan possesses for the mutual interests of our two countries. Similarly I have not forgotten the interest shown by the Government of the United States in commencing the work as soon as possible.

'It appears to me that the fundamental accord with the construction company has been satisfactorily made so that the work can commence immediately and continue at the rate considered proper. Thus is realized the first and essential condition for all the future developments.


'I have exerted my best efforts in the study of the matter to the end that it should not suffer delays and that it should enjoy all possible facilities on our part, as was Your Excellency's desire and also mine.'

"In the course of the conversations which followed the delivery of the President's message, the Prime Minister stated repeatedly that there was no objection whatever to the immediate despatch of all necessary materials and personnel to Santa Maria for the projected construction. It was clearly implied that the Prime Minister was in agreement that the construction itself should go forward without delay, for otherwise there obviously could be no point to diverting personnel and critical materials to Santa Maria.

"This

"This Government is surprised and disappointed now to learn of the hesitancy of the Portuguese Government to make available the necessary lands and to issue the necessary authority to permit the whole construction to go forward. Viewed in a practical light, it can only interpret this hesitancy as a lack of complete cooperation. The present attitude of the Portuguese Government clearly does not harmonize with the previously expressed desire of the Portuguese Government to be of aid in the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. It is, in fact, a very grave obstruction to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific, and constitutes an important aid to Japan. In the circumstances, unless the Portuguese Government can see its way clear immediately to authorize all necessary land expropriations and issue all necessary authority to its officials in the Island of Santa Maria to permit the proposed construction to be resumed and brought rapidly to conclusion, the United States Government would be obliged to discontinue the staff conversations at once, and to decline to engage in any negotiations with Portugal concerning economic or other matters, and to adopt measures for the immediate curtailment of the economic aid currently being furnished Portugal under existing programs."

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name.

Sent 06/1603Z
B+G

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. CORDELL HULL:

I hope you will consider making Dr. Baruch (Bernie Baruch's brother) Minister to Portugal just as soon as the present incumbent can be taken care of somewhere else.

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

You asked me to make a memo reminding you to consider Dr. Baruch for appointment as Minister to Portugal or Ambassador to Brazil.

G. G. T.

3697

hms

Portugal friend 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

(German?)

Don't forget that I think you should send Dr. ~~Sailing~~ Baruch as Minister to Portugal just as soon as it becomes possible to make a change.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Under Secretary of State.

~~SECRET~~

file

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

November 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Signature of Santa Maria Agreement

The final agreement for the additional air base in Santa Maria, Azores, was signed yesterday and the Portuguese Government has instructed the Azores authorities to turn the base over to the United States Army for immediate use.



DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schmale Date FEB 16 1972

PSF: Portugal folder 1-44

file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Dr. Baruch

I want you to know that we are ready to appoint Dr. Herman B. Baruch as Ambassador to Portugal. The delay has been occasioned only by the need for moving Ambassador Henry Norweb to another post. As you may recall, we obtained the informal approval of the Brazilian Government a number of weeks ago to send Henry Norweb there. Since that time it was decided to offer Brazil to Adolf Berle. Consequently, we are held up until Mr. Berle decides whether he will or will not go to Brazil. I am hopeful that we shall obtain his decision early next week.

If Mr. Berle decides to go to Brazil, then we shall find another post for Mr. Norweb in order to carry out your wishes for Dr. Baruch. As soon as we know definitely where to place Mr. Norweb, we shall ask the Portuguese Government for the agreement on Dr. Baruch.

E. A. Tamm
x