

● PSF

Russia

1935-36

*file
private*

*Rosen
1935*

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1935.

Dear Colonel McIntyre:

The President may wish to see the enclosures.

This morning at his press conference the Secretary declined at this moment to make any particular comment on Litvinov's statement, but he thinks it may be desirable to correct the impression that Litvinov was ever promised a cash loan or an uncontrolled credit, and that, in that connection, there should be a substantial rehearsal of what occurred when Litvinov was here.

✓
||
If the President could arrange to see me, with the Chief of the Eastern European Division tomorrow morning for a short time, I would like to obtain his view of what we should say on the question raised by Litvinov, and also to take up with him the form of our statement relative to certain changes in our representation in Moscow. Please let me know whether this would be possible.

Yours very sincerely,

R. W. Rosen

Colonel Marvin H. McIntyre,
Assistant Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

MED

A portion of this message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (d)

MOSCOW

Dated February 3, 1935

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

45, February 3, 4pm

(Gray) My 39, February 1, 6pm.

The Soviet papers this morning have published in full your press release of January 31, 1935, together with a statement by Litvinov. The Translation of this explanation as set forth in the MOSCOW DAILY NEWS is as follows: "The basic principles of the agreement for the liquidation of the mutual Soviet American monetary claims were worked out during my personal negotiations with President Roosevelt about a year ago. These principals were in full accord with the reiterated statements of the Soviet Government of its readiness to discuss the question of old debts only provided its counter claims were recognized and a monetary loan was advanced to it. I therefore left Washington with the full confidence that the further negotiations would affect only the details of the agreement and would not therefore present any difficulties.

To our regret in the subsequent negotiations begun

by Mr.

-2- #45, from Moscow, February 3, 4pm

by Mr. Bullitt, American Ambassador, with me in Moscow and continued subsequently by the State Department with Comrade Troyanovski, one of the basic factors of the agreement reached in Washington, namely, that of a loan, was placed in doubt. The Soviet side in its proposals strictly remained within the confines of this agreement making concessions to a point beyond which the whole of the Washington agreement would begin to be revised. We refused to enter this path which might have led to the complete annulment of the results secured in Washington and the necessity of new negotiations on the principles of the agreement. We naturally regret very much that the negotiations have so far failed to bring the desired results but, nevertheless, believe that this fact must not affect the relations between the two states including trade relations, the development of which has been rather hampered by the negotiations conducted up to this time. Besides the Soviet Union and the United States as other peace loving states are confronted with more serious general objects for which it is possible to work without injuring the material claims of this or that state. The difficulty of solving the problem of mutual monetary claims between states has now become a general phenomenon of international life but it does not interfere with international co-operation in the development of trade relations

-3- #45, from Moscow, February 3, 4pm

relations or in the preservation of peace"

This translation has been checked with the Russian text by the Embassy and has been found satisfactory.

Soviet newspapers also state that in response to an inquiry whether the breakdown of the debt negotiations might affect diplomatic relations, you replied that you had not heard such a possibility mentioned. When questioned whether the Department planned any further move you are quoted as replying you knew of no other move for us to make.

Soviet newspapers also publish a United Press message from Washington to the effect that State Department officials have denied reports that Mr. Bullitt intends to resign (End gray).

Impression from Rubinin and other Soviet officials is that they consider present development to be of routine nature. Am reliably informed that Soviet tactics are based on conviction that American business interests will bring effective pressure on Government to extend credits irrespective of results of our negotiations.

Am lunching with Karakhan today and will privately and discreetly present our point of view.

WILEY

KLP

KLP

Moscow

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (d)

Dated February 3, 1935.

Rec'd. 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

46, February 3, 7 p.m.

Discreetly reviewed and analyzed developments with Karakhan (who is an outstanding opponent of Litvinov). He declared that the way Litvinov had acted towards United States was "filled with dark spots". I suppose he will discuss matter with Kremlin. By another Soviet official, a reliable source, am informed that your press release came as complete surprise to Litvinov, that his position was not improved thereby.

Rubin in conversation with me emphasized Molotov's and Rosengoltz's references to excellent credit position of Soviet Union. This would indicate Soviet determination to conduct campaign for cheap long term credits and loan.

In my Soviet conversations I am emphasizing following paradox: since simultaneously and daily Soviet spokesmen warn of great danger of war of conquest being waged against Soviet Union, Soviet Union is thereby branded as very dubious credit risk.

For

- 2 -

46 from Moscow

For Ambassador Bullitt: Would it not be well to have foregoing paradox discreetly ventilated in American press? It should be easy to deflate Litvinov-Rosengoltz credit balloon.

WILEY

KLP

FEB 4 1935

Mr. Litvinov Alleges Bad Faith

The formal and official comment which Mr. Maxim Litvinov has made on the collapse of the Russian debt negotiations in Washington is in its essence a charge of bad faith against President Roosevelt. Mr. Litvinov alleges that the settlement agreed upon by the President and himself in private conversation in November, 1933, included "of necessity" some sort of "provision for a loan." Mr. Litvinov would now have the world believe that the Administration has gone back on its bargain.

It is, of course, for President Roosevelt himself or a competent Administration spokesman to say just how much or how little justification Mr. Litvinov has for this charge. Seldom have such conversations been surrounded with greater secrecy than were Mr. Litvinov's talks with Secretary Hull and the President in 1933. There was so little leakage that the press correspondence of the time reflects nothing but confusing and often contradictory speculation in the highest official circles. The most persistent rumors were that the government's claim for the so-called "Kerensky loans" and for war supplies was to be offset by Soviet claims for damage done by the American expeditionary force in the Archangel region, while private claims of private bondholders, of banks and of firms once domiciled in Russia would be met from a small tax on the stupendous purchases of American wares that the Soviet government was going to import from this country.

Conspicuously absent from all this gossip was any suggestion of a loan other than the credits or guaranties of credits that were going to prime an export business of at least \$500,000,000 a year. Whatever Mr. Litvinov's misunderstanding of the terms offered him in 1933, the real obstacle to a settlement is the Soviet Union's fear of establishing a precedent for other nations. This is so plain and there was so little contemporary suggestion of a loan that Mr. Litvinov's charge would seem to call for some proof.

hu-rip
Phony Dip

PSE.
Russia
1935

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 6, 1935.

Dear Mr. President:

Attached is a telegram just received from Moscow, which you may find of interest. With it is a copy of telegram received from Bullitt early in 1934, in which he states what was understood by the use of the word "loan" in the agreement with Litvinov. This morning announcement was made of the reduction in our staff at Moscow. While of course it will be inferred that the action was influenced by the refusal of the Soviet representatives to enter into a satisfactory debt agreement, at the same time it will be clear that our office in Moscow will remain fully equipped to take care of all work that comes along.

Yours very sincerely,

R. Walton Stone

Enclosures:
As stated.

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

PSF Russia

RR
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (D)

Moscow
Dated February 5, 1935.
Recd. 7:22 a. m. 6th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

50, February 5, 9 p. m..
Section two of number 49.

Litvinov said that (*) long since accepted the
rupture of the negotiations with the United States for
a settlement of debts and claims as a foregone conclusion.
That was why he had consented to have the negotiations
transferred to Washington. He claimed that when the
American Government decided to abandon the "letter of
the agreement" namely a loan he had "capitulated" just
as far as possible. However, it was not possible for
the Soviet Government to accept a settlement which
involved the extension of credits to the manufacturers
instead of direct to Soviet agencies. He added that he
thought it was a good thing for the negotiations to be
"put on ice" for a while. Perhaps at some later date they
could be resumed with better chances of success. I asked
what inspired his optimism, he replied that political
conditions would change and might greatly influence matters
I answered that the possibility of any such political
change

50 from Moscow

-2-

change in the United States was indeed remote. He explained he had Europe in mind; not the United States, he did not clarify his cryptic allusion.

Though Litvinov appears both serene and intractable, I am reliably informed that high quarters are much disturbed over the rupture of negotiations and that a new and more favorable Soviet orientation is not entirely impossible.

Litvinov expressed regret that you had gone into "so much detail" in your press release. In consequence he was under heavy pressure from the press. He was reluctant to yield to it as he did not wish to embarrass either the President or you. I intimated that neither the President nor you feared embarrassment in the matter.

End of message.

RR WWC

WILEY

(*) Apparent omission.

*This is a copy of a letter
received from Mr. Bullitt
copy in 1934* *Richard M. Nixon*

It is I believe opportune to review our understanding of the commitment accepted by Litvinov in Washington with regard to claims and indebtedness.

I was present at all conversations between the President and Litvinov. It was clearly impossible that the Government of the United States should give either a loan or an uncontrolled credit and Litvinov never indicated that he expected either a loan or uncontrolled credit. I was as you know astounded when he took that position after my arrival in Moscow. The President and I talked over the matter repeatedly and there was in our minds never the faintest idea of a straight loan or uncontrolled credit. Furthermore, we were both convinced that Litvinov had agreed to pay extra interest on all loans or credits of whatsoever nature obtained from any American individual or corporation for both the President and I discussed the question of whether or not we should hold up recognition until the debt agreement had been worked out in detail as were all other agreements. The President felt that this was not necessary as he thought his understanding with Litvinov was clear and because as a result of changes of personnel at the Treasury Department it was somewhat difficult for us to go into the details of any financial matters. You will recall that Mr. Morgenthau had been charged with control of the economic and financial questions involved in our negotiations with Litvinov; that he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury at the crucial moment and was so occupied with
urgent

urgent Treasury business that he was unable to organize his office in time to present concrete proposals to Litvinov. The single concrete detail mentioned in Litvinov's talks with Morgenthau was that of interest rates which was touched upon inconclusively. Litvinov said that he was ready to offer only 7 per cent as a total rate to cover both interest on credits and extinguishment of indebtedness. Morgenthau greeted this with laughter and indicated that the total rate would have to be at least 10 per cent.

The President and Litvinov discussed in detail the total sum to be paid, the President indicating that he felt he could not get Congress to accept less than \$150,000,000, Litvinov offering \$75,000,000, but promising to recommend the payment of \$100,000,000 provided the President after examining all the facts should consider such a sum fair.

When I asked Litvinov how he could have imagined ever that he was going to get a straight loan or uncontrolled credit in view of the opposition of the people of the United States to further loan abroad, he replied that the President had used the word "loan", that he had felt it would be most difficult for the President to obtain the money but that he thought the President could find a way to get it. Litvinov's position is based on the fact that from time to time in speaking of credits the word "loan" was used synonymously therewith by the President. It is my impression that the word "loan" was even used in the one conversation of which a memorandum was made.

However,

However, the general tenor of all conversations was such, the general position with regard to loans and credit was so well known that it is difficult for me to imagine that any one could have derived the impression that the President had a loan or uncontrolled credit in mind.

The subject of claims and indebtedness was never discussed in my presence by Litvinov except in the conversations with the President and Morgenthau referred to above.

I personally believed as did the President that Litvinov was ready to pay extra interest on all loans or credits from any American sources, public or private, until the agreed amount of indebtedness had been extinguished.

PSF: Russia (Closed)



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 7, 1935.

Personal and
Confidential

Dear Mr. President:

I wish I could sit down with you this evening for a long gossip in the White House. I should like to have another look at you and there is so much to write that fifty pages could not contain a full description of the facts and fantastic projects that have been poured into my ears since I reached Paris. The whole of Europe is concentrating in and on Paris these days and the statesmen and diplomatists without exception seem to be neurasthenic. I find myself in a condition of Buddhistic calm compared to everyone I meet. The people at the top have even lost all sense of the ridiculous. For example, yesterday afternoon I called at the house of a French friend and there were Andre Geraud (PERTINAX) of the "Echo de Paris" and the Soviet Ambassador, Potemkin, seated together in one large chair with their arms around each other whispering intimacies. Inasmuch as there is no human being who hates the Soviet Union more deeply than PERTINAX and no one who has been distrusted more than PERTINAX by the Soviet Government (for years he has been in the pay of the Japanese) the spectacle seemed to be a good sample of the unreality which underlies all the diplomatic combinations now being made.

The

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

The one fortunate element in the situation from our point of view is that no one expects the United States to become involved in any way whatsoever. Comert said to me last night that when the American Ambassador appears at the Quai d'Orsay everyone has the same feeling as if the Dalai Lama had dropped in. The French and all the others feel that there will not be the slightest chance of drawing us into the war which they now regard as inevitable. As nearly as I can gather the present situation is the following:

Eden went too far in his conversations in Moscow to please the British Government although he pleased the Soviet Government immensely. He had a heart attack in Cologne and may be out of the picture for some time. He may not even be able to go to Stresa. His conversations in Warsaw were a flat washout. Pilsudski was apparently enjoying one of his periodic relapses and was too ga-ga to reply intelligently to any of Eden's questions. Beck, I am told, was not more satisfactory and still remains obsessed by his dislike of France. (In this connection I have heard from two reliable sources the following statement: General Weygand is reported to have said that when Beck was Polish Military Attache in France, he was given access to many of the secrets of the French Army. The French General Staff became suspicious of him and, after giving him certain important papers, sent to him an agent who pretended to be acting for a foreign power. The agent bought from Beck exact copies of the documents handed to Beck in strictest confidence by the French General Staff. The French General Staff had Beck recalled immediately.

immediately. It is alleged that this episode is the basis of Beck's hostility to France. Whether the story is true or not it is at least interesting to know that it is believed in the French Foreign Office.)

The relations of France and the Soviet Union seem to be the following:

Flandin does not want the alliance. Laval does not want it. Flandin is entirely ready to let the Germans expand to the east as a method of avoiding war in western Europe. Nevertheless, the French Government will probably be pushed into the conclusion of the alliance in the form of an agreement for mutual assistance in case of aggression, tied into the mechanism of the League of Nations. Titulescu has been the prime mover in drawing together the Russians and the French. The Russians a couple of weeks ago demanded that the French put up or shut up, intimating strongly that if France did not do so the Soviet Union would begin to develop as close relations as possible with the German Reichswehr which has always been, as you know, pro-Russian and anti-French. The Quai d'Orsay then prepared a text which was entirely unsatisfactory to the Russians and Potemkin then called on Laval with an extremely harsh statement from Stalin. Titulescu then began running back and forth between the French and the Russians as he said to me, "I represented France with the Russians and the Russians with the French, and there is now a text in preparation at the Quai d'Orsay which will provide that in case of aggression against either France or the Soviet Union the matter shall first be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. If the Council declares unanimously against the aggressor either

either France or the Soviet Union, as the case may be, will place its forces totally at the disposal of the other. If the Council of the League should not be unanimous the Powers will recover their liberty of action and France and the Soviet Union will place their forces unreservedly at each other's disposal". This, of course, amounts to an alliance but is so camouflaged by the League of Nations declaration that the French people will accept it. There is, however, the additional point that adherence to such an agreement will be open to all nations on the continent including Germany.

It is confidently believed in Paris that Czechoslovakia will at once enter a similar agreement with the Soviet Union and that Italy may also. It is hoped that Rumania and Yugoslavia and even Poland finally may be persuaded to join.

Laval has promised to leave for Moscow on the 20th and will have to sign something definite there. The above seems to be the inescapable minimum. How unhappy he is about the matter may be judged from the fact that Titulescu told me yesterday that Madame Laval had said to him at least once a day for the past week, "You are driving my husband to destruction".

The possibility, which we discussed before I left, that Hungary might follow the example of Germany and introduce conscription and thus precipitate a march by the Rumanians and the Czechs to Budapest seems to be definitely eliminated. In this connection, Titulescu told a story which I hesitate to retell because this letter is already too long, but he related the incident with such a wealth of detail that he seemed not to be lying and I think you might be interested. He

said

said that as soon as Hitler had reintroduced conscription he (Titulescu) had told the British Minister in Bucharest that if Hungary should follow Germany's example and introduce conscription, the Rumanian Army would at once be mobilized and would occupy Bucharest. A few days later the British Minister in Bucharest presented to him a severe and superior note from Sir John Simon calling to his attention the fact that Rumania under the Covenant of the League of Nations was obliged not to resort to armed force but to settle such disputes through the League. Titulescu said that Simon's note was so Olympian and offensive that he had insisted that the British Minister then and there should take a reply from his dictation. He said that he had then dictated to the British Minister the following:

Mr. Titulescu replied that he had had much longer experience at the League of Nations than Sir John Simon and could not regard Sir John Simon as a superior authority with regard to duties of nations under the Covenant of the League; that he would, however, be glad to have Sir John's advice on certain judicial points on which Sir John was an authority. As legal precedent for the action Rumania would take in case Hungary should introduce conscription he would be glad to know on just what legal ground the British Government had based itself when it had sent warships up the Yangtze River to Nanking to impose concessions on the Chinese Government. He would also be glad to know on what judicial ground the Italian Government had based itself when it sent troops into Abyssinian territory.

Titulescu

Titulescu said that a few days later he had received a written note from Sir John Simon saying that he had merely desired to express the hope that Rumania would act with prudence, adding that the British Minister in Budapest had received the most categorical assurances that the Hungarian Government would not follow the example of Germany in introducing conscription. Mr. Titulescu said that he had then terminated the matter by sending a most fullsome telegram of thanks to Sir John Simon for his assistance to Rumania.

I am going to spare you an attempt to replace an evening of conversation by a letter. There are a thousand facts and statements that I should like to pour in your ear. For example, the Soviet Ambassador here told me that the Soviet Consul in the Yemen, whom he knew intimately and knew to be an absolutely accurate informant, had let him know recently that through the Yemen were coming streams of enormous packing cases from Japan addressed to Addis Ababa and labeled "Pianos". He was not certain as to the exact type of munitions contained therein.

Wiley writes me from Moscow that there is every prospect that the Soviet Foreign Office will continue to be as disagreeable as possible both personally and officially. If the French alliance or pact of mutual assistance, as you prefer, should go through the Soviets will be cockier than ever and I may find it difficult to send back as much information as heretofore. I shall, however, endure any such situation with considerable equanimity.

Dodd wrote me from Berlin asking me to stop off for a conversation

with

P.S. Out of the way Tom! I'm not
with details. Can't sell
with a lot
P.P.S. I'm a Communist

with
Caval's proposal is
League of Nations

P.P.S. At dinner tonight Titulescu confirmed the report of Laval's promise to Potemkin and gave all the details. Laval will leave for Moscow on the 23rd and sign the mutual assistance agreement on the 26th.
P.P.P.S.!!! (Turn over the page.)

- 7 -

with him and I shall stop between trains just long enough to find out what he wants. Cudahy telephoned that it was absolutely essential that I should stop in Warsaw and I shall spend twenty-four hours with him, reaching Moscow on April 13. The conversations which I have had in Paris have made me more than ever certain that your present policy of keeping out of this mess now and hereafter is the only one consistent with the interests of the United States. We can do nothing now that will really help and any commitments we make will tend to produce our involvement from the beginning in the ultimate conflict. To say nothing, do nothing, and carry a large cannon seems to me the only policy for us to pursue. I do not expect any conflict in the near future. When it does come, provided we stay out of it, we shall be in good shape to help reconstruct what remains of Europe.

Bless you for your kindness to me when I was in America and for your friendship. It means a great deal.

Yours permanently,

Jilliam A. B.

P. S. I have just heard from a reliable French friend that last night Laval promised Potemkin, the Soviet Ambassador, that he would go as far in the mutual assistance pact as predicted above. Potemkin is still struggling to obtain automatic and immediate declaration of war without waiting for the Council of the League in case of aggression -- to be defined according to the well-known Litvinov definition. My guess is that he won't get Laval to go any further.

Laval's proposal is tantamount to an alliance in spite of the League of Nations Cause on flag.
J. C. B.

I have been trying to avoid seeing Laval as I have not wanted Jesse to feel that I was butting into his cow pasture, and turned down politely three suggestions from his subordinates that I should see him. Tonight in my absence Laval personally phoned and got Office and said he insisted on seeing me tomorrow morning. So I shall have to see him and as he will certainly tell me the whole story I shall be in the highly embarrassing position of having to prepare a telegram with care. But he is a good fellow and will not, I think, go prima donna. His white spot brigade will, however, be delivered of kittens all over the office floor.

Love to you all.

Bill

Handwritten notes on the right margin, including dates and names, partially obscured and difficult to read.

Handwritten notes on the bottom of the page, including the name 'Laval's professor' and other illegible text.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 8, 1935.

Personal and
~~strictly confidential~~

PSF.
Roosevelt - 1935

Dear Mr. President:

You will, I fear, think that your remark that you really wanted me to write to you is going to produce an endless flood of letters when you see this in addition to the pages I wrote you yesterday. I want simply to explain to you developments flowing from that P. P. P. S.

It was indeed Laval who phoned last night and I saw him this morning. I reported at once to Jesse Straus and you will unquestionably have seen the telegram which Jesse dictated as a result of my reports on conversations with Titulescu, Laval and Potemkin.

Laval said that he would reach Moscow on the 25th and would sign the mutual assistance pact on that date or on the 26th. I asked him if he would remain in Moscow for the fetes of the first of May and he said that he would not as the French people would consider that he should not participate in a revolutionary celebration! It is a long way from 1789!

Laval said that the definitive text of the pact was
not

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

not yet established but that he was working on it. He added that he had had some hesitation about concluding the agreement because, in his opinion, the Soviet Army was essentially a force for keeping down the Russian people and handling internal problems and could not operate effectively outside the Soviet Union. He added that his military advisors, however, believed the Soviet air force had a certain value. He then described the agreement and indicated that France and the Soviet Union in case of aggression against either by another power would convoke the Council of the League of Nations immediately. If the Council should agree unanimously in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article XV of the Covenant of the League, France and the Soviet Union would place all their armed forces at each other's disposal. If the Council should fail to adopt a unanimous report France and the Soviet Union would regain their liberty of action under paragraph 7 of Article XV of the Covenant of the League and would at once place all their armed forces at the disposal of each other. He added that he hoped he could persuade the Italians to make a similar agreement with the Russians and that he hoped to bring into a similar pact the entire Little Entente and the Balkan League. He also said that he was not without hope of bringing in Poland. He added that the mutual
assistance

assistance pact would, of course, be open to the participation of Germany and went on to say that he himself would continue to make every effort to prevent the conclusion of the mutual assistance agreement between France and the Soviet Union being interpreted in Germany as an act to encircle the Reich. He said he believed personally there would be no genuine peace in Europe until France and Germany had been reconciled and that he would continue to work for good relations between France and Germany.

He then asked me what policy I thought the Russians would follow. (This question seemed to me to be the cause of his insistence on seeing me.) I replied that the Russians would doubtless follow the example of France and attempt to develop close relations with Germany. He said that he thought the agreement would place the Soviet Union in a very favorable position to bargain between France and Germany. I replied that I agreed that Russia would be in the happy position of being able to wait for the offers of the highest bidder.

Laval then said that he was somewhat troubled about his relations with the United States. He said that he had never published his conversations with Hoover at the time of the Moratorium but that Hoover had promised him there would be no waiting for action by **definitely**

definitely not that the United States would cancel the French debt but that the Moratorium would be extended. He asked me what was the present attitude of the United States towards the debts. I replied that for the first time the debts were beginning to have some value, that so long as they were not paid they would constitute an insurance policy that the American people would not precipitate themselves into a terrible conflict which did not concern them. He laughed and said that he quite understood that point of view, and added that the American people had every reason to remain aloof.

We talked about lots of other things of minor importance and he displayed a really surprising cordiality throughout our conversation.

Potemkin, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, confirmed today at luncheon all the statements that Laval had made and said in addition that he was discussing with Laval a subsidiary pact which would be adopted shortly after the pact of mutual assistance. Potemkin said that this subsidiary agreement would provide for immediate declaration of war by the Soviet Union and France in the case of flagrant aggression by Germany. He said that there would be no waiting for action by the League Council
and

and that the agreement would be fitted into the language of Article XVI of the League. How that is possible I leave to subtler brains than mine and I do not believe the French will sign any such document. Potemkin said also that after the signature of the mutual assistance agreement by France and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would sign immediately a similar mutual assistance agreement with the Czechoslovaks. Both Potemkin and his staff were in a triumphant state of mind. Potemkin told me that Litvinov will arrive in Berlin the same morning I arrive (April 10) and urged me strongly to telephone the Soviet Ambassador and see Litvinov enroute.

My own opinion is that the Soviet Union will be the single great beneficiary of the agreement described above. Neither Germany nor Japan will dare to attack the Soviet Union, and France and Germany will be compelled to begin to bid high for Soviet assistance. A few months after the agreement with France is signed, Litvinov will begin negotiating with the Reichswehr via Voroshilov, and the French within six months will begin to be as worried about the condition of their Soviet alliance as they are now about their Polish alliance.

It is obvious, of course, from all of these maneuvers and counter maneuvers that no one in Europe is any longer

thinking

thinking of peace but that everyone is thinking furiously about obtaining as many allies as possible for the next war. As each day passes I become more convinced that our only sane policy is to stay just as far as possible outside the mess. In this connection it was interesting at luncheon today at the Soviet Embassy to see the reaction of a large table full of guests which included French cabinet ministers and former ministers. Rosenberg, who is now the Soviet assistant secretary at the League of Nations and was formerly Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, called across the table to me and said that he felt that the United States should participate actively in the present negotiations and asked me why the United States was remaining so aloof. To a silent table, I delivered a short oration which, if I may say so, was worthy of yourself. At the end of the discourse everyone, including the French cabinet ministers, said, "You are perfectly right! No one can expect the United States to involve itself in the events which are approaching".

During the course of the luncheon I said to the Soviet Ambassador that of course the mutual assistance agreement with France was just an old fashioned alliance camouflaged by a smear of League of Nations paint for the benefit of the French people. He said, " You are quite right". I then said that I felt the only weak point in the whole project was Austria, that I was informed on good authority
that

that there was a considerable possibility that Austria, not from external pressure but from internal force, would go Nazi this summer and that I could not with a telescope ascertain any legal justification for an invasion of Austria by Italy or anyone else if the people of Austria should desire of their own accord to have a Nazi Government. He replied that he agreed that Austria was the sore and dangerous point and that no scheme but war had yet been proposed that promised to keep Austria out of the hands of the Nazis.

My guess is that Laval's visit to Moscow will be followed by a series of visits of the ministers of the minor powers especially the Little Entente. Titulescu indicated that he would probably visit Moscow in June, ~~and my impression is a mutual assistance pact similar to the French one~~

I write you all this because from Paris I cannot report ~~especially~~ to the Department. I have given Jesse a full written account of all the conversations I have had but I do not know how much finally will reach Washington.

Excuse me if I have burdened you too greatly. Good night and the Lord be with you.

Yours permanently,

Bill.

PSF Russia

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
—
THE SECRETARY

April 20, 1935.

ble
Russia
1935

Mr. Secretary:

Memorandum for the President.

Since the press is censored largely in most all countries except the United States, the policy of this single step proposed is very much doubted.

C.H.

PSF Russia

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

MOSCOW

Dated April 17, 1935

Rec'd 3 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

148, April 17, 6 p. m.

Ralph ^{Barnes} ~~Beard~~, correspondent of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, has just told me that Umansky, chief of the press section of the Soviet Foreign Office (chief censor) has informed him that unless within three days he will enter into a formal agreement to refrain in future from telephoning news from the Soviet Union and will submit in advance all stories to the censorship and approval of the Foreign Office, his privileges as a correspondent will be withdrawn. This would necessitate his departure from the Soviet Union.

Umansky further stated to Barnes that the same ultimatum would be delivered to all other American correspondents here. Barnes requested my advice and I replied that I could be in no way responsible for his decision; that the matter was one for him and his newspaper to decide. In the past it has been possible for American correspondents here occasionally to evade the

REP

2-#148, From Moscow, April 17, 6p.m.

the censorship by using all long distance telephone. It seems probable that the Soviet Government intends now to close this avenue of truthful statement in view of the increasingly critical situation in Europe and the tendency of all dictatorships to tighten censorship. I venture to suggest that the position of American correspondents abroad might be improved and the American public in some measure protected from distorted news and foreign propoganda if a bill should be introduced immediately in Congress providing that news despatches or telegrams from all countries maintaining censorships should carry the sub-caption "The following has been censored and accorded approval by the Government of". The future introduction of such a bill at least would have a wholesome effect in Moscow.

BULLITT

WVC

WSB

Russia
1935

April 26, 1935.

Dear Bill Buddha:-

Alas, for the first time in your life you are too late! We have offered Ireland to Owsley. In any event, I would not like to take Cudahy away from Warsaw at this particular time because I think he is doing a good job.

What a shame that you missed Litvinov in Warsaw and could not travel with him in his compartment to Moscow!

As ever yours,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow,



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

On train enroute to Moscow
from Warsaw, April 12, 1935.

Personal and
Confidential.

Dear Mr. President:

John Cudahy, with whom I have spent the past twenty-four hours in Warsaw, astonished me this morning by saying that he had only one wish in life: to be appointed Minister to Ireland. He is anxious to get out of Poland as he has had more than enough of the physical disorder of Eastern Europe. It occurred to me at once that this wish of Cudahy's might be the key to a happy solution of your diplomatic appointment problems.

As the appointment of Tony Biddle to Dublin has not been announced, I assume that the difficulty of obtaining the agrément of the Irish Government to the appointment of a divorced and remarried man proved to be insuperable. I don't want to do anything to stop Tony getting the job and I write you this about Cudahy on the assumption that Dublin for Tony has proved to be impossible.

In my opinion Cudahy would make an admirable Minister to
Polish will under any circumstances. It is not, however,
impossible that Poland might come into some general agree-
ment with the United States which would make any agreement
to

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

to Dublin. He loves to hunt and is a very attractive fellow of the type that the Irish like and his private life is as blameless as the Pope himself could desire. I don't know what you are thinking about doing with Tony Biddle but in the shuffle that would be produced by Cudahy's moving out of Poland you ought to be able to find a satisfactory post for Tony. The man you send to Warsaw must know French and, if possible, should know German and, if you want to get any information from Warsaw, should also be very much of a gentleman and acutely intelligent.

I had a long talk in Berlin night before last with Lipsky, the Polish Ambassador, and one last night with the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw. I am convinced not only from these conversations but from every other piece of evidence I have been able to get in Paris and elsewhere that there is no secret agreement or alliance between the Poles and the Germans, and that the basis of Polish policy is and will remain refusal to make any agreement permitting either German or Russian forces to set foot on Polish soil under any circumstances. It is not, however, impossible that Poland might come into some general agreement to withhold aid from an aggressor. In Poland the hatred of Russia and fear of the ultimate power of Russia, is greater than the fear and hatred of Germany. The Poles
are

are convinced that so long as Hitler is in power the German drive will be toward annexing to Germany those portions of Europe which are inhabited predominantly by Germans and not toward the acquisition of any Slav territory. That is to say, the Poles expect the German advance to be toward Austria and Bohemia. If the German drive on those territories should result in war, Poland would attempt to stand aside until it could safely rush to the rescue of the victor.

I think I wrote you from Paris that Titulescu claimed that Beck had told him that there was an understanding between Poland and Hungary with regard to Czechoslovakia — to the effect that Poland would not assist Czechoslovakia in case of an Hungarian attack.

I see nothing in Polish policy which requires any more explanation than the above.

Cudahy has traveled from one end of Poland to the other and is very pessimistic about Poland's future. He insists that the Polish oil fields in Galicia will be exhausted in ten years at the present rate of production and foresees complete collapse at the time of the elimination of this resource. He also insists that the Polish Army is extremely deficient in all forms of motorized material and in guns of the larger calibers.

Litvinov

Litvinov passed through Warsaw without stopping last night on his way to Geneva so that I missed him entirely and shall probably have little news to cable you until he returns to Moscow.

If Tony Biddle is out, I hope you will be able to send Cudahy to Dublin. He is exceptionally well-fitted for the post and would be deeply grateful. When he told me that he wanted Dublin, I said that before taking up the matter I should like to know absolutely definitely that there would be no question of his rejecting the post if it should be offered. He replied, "You let the President know that I would almost jump out of my skin with joy if I should get a telegram transferring me from Warsaw to Dublin. I don't even need to be asked."

Good luck and love to you all.

Yours permanently,

Bullitt



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1935.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the President a copy of the telegram indicated below.

As the telegram was transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if it could be returned to the Department at the President's convenience for appropriate disposition.

Enclosure:

No. 168, April 29, 3 p. m., Moscow, from Bullitt.

*PSF.
Rosen
1935*

PSF Russia

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

MOSCOW

Dated April 29, 1935

Rec'd 1:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

168, April 29, 3 p. m.

The following communique is published by all newspapers this morning:

"Tass has received from an authoritative source the following information concerning the progress of the Franco-Soviet negotiations:

Contrary to reports of various organs of the press the question of so-called 'automatism' of assistance did not and does not cause any disagreements. Both parties agreed from the very beginning that mutual assistance must be rendered on the basis of a decision of the League of Nations Council. The Franco-Soviet pact will thus be in accord with the Locarno agreements also. It was precisely on this basis that the negotiations

REP

2-#168, From Moscow, April 29, 3pm

negotiations were begun both on the question of the regional Eastern Pact and of the Franco-Soviet Guarantee Pact.

Certain difficulties have been encountered in finding proper formulas. The Soviet Union on its part seeks to (first) secure full mutuality of obligations, (second) to give the pact such a form in which it could not be interpreted as being aimed against any particular party, (third) to agree beforehand on an identical interpretation by both sides of the limits of the obligations undertaken by them.

There is reason to think that these desires do not correspond to the wishes of the French Government or that insuperable obstacles exist to the achievement of full agreement on the wording of all the articles of the pact." (END GRAY)

This seems to indicate that in order to obtain the consent of the French Government to the agreement for mutual assistance the Soviet Government has decided to recede from its position with regard to "automatic" action described by the Turkish Ambassador, reported in my No. 165, April 27, 5 p. m.

WSB-CSB

BULLITT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1935.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

file
PSF: Russia
1935

My dear Mr. President:


At the request of Ambassador Bullitt I enclose, as of possible interest, a highly confidential despatch from Moscow regarding the Kirov murder.

Mr. Bullitt has especially requested that the despatch be treated as secret, since the position of the Lithuanian Minister in Moscow might be gravely compromised if the source of the information contained in this despatch should become known to the Soviet Government.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Despatch.

The President,
The White House.



No. 552

Moscow, April 26, 1935.

Subject: The Kirov Murder.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL - FOR THE SECRETARY.~~

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report certain highly confidential information with regard to the Kirov murder.

You will recall that when I had the honor and pleasure of discussing the Kirov case with you personally in Washington I expressed the opinion that the reports then in the Department and the explanation of Ambassador Troyanovsky did not give an intimate or altogether incredible account of the affair, and promised you to attempt to discover the underlying facts when I returned to Moscow.

Cn

On the evening of April 17 from Mr. Baltrusaitis, the Lithuanian Minister, I obtained an explanation of the affair which seems to me to come close to the truth and, indeed, may be entirely accurate.

(Mr. Baltrusaitis enjoys a unique position in the Soviet Union. He has been a resident of Moscow for more than forty years. Before the Revolution he became one of the leading poets of Russia -- his works being written not in Lithuanian but in Russian. When Litvinov was in Washington, I asked him if there were anyone in the diplomatic corps in Moscow of particular value. He replied that there was only one man, Baltrusaitis, who knew Russia intimately. Litvinov went on to explain that Baltrusaitis was so well-known as a Russian poet and had played a role so friendly to the Bolsheviks in the early days of the Revolution that he, (Litvinov), had not realized that Baltrusaitis was not a Russian until the day when he had been appointed Lithuanian Minister. He said that Baltrusaitis was trusted as a friend by Russians of all classes and that his position was altogether extraordinary.

On reaching Moscow, therefore, I cultivated an intimacy with Mr. Baltrusaitis which I have found of value on many occasions. Our relations are extremely friendly and he seems to have no hesitation in telling me anything that he knows. In the past I have found the information which he has given me to be correct and the story he told me regarding Kirov was supplemented by such a wealth of detail and such assurances of absolute accuracy that I felt it
contained

contained the kernel of the Kirov mystery.)

Mr. Baltrusaitis said that Nikolaiev, the murderer of Kirov, had been for a long time a special agent of the OGPU. His place of activity was, in the main, Leningrad. He said that Kirov had been sent to Leningrad for an "executive education", and added that Kirov had been given almost independent authority in the Leningrad Oblast in order to prepare him to assume at a later date the dictatorship of the Soviet Union. He asserted that Stalin had decided definitely that Kirov should be his successor and commented that Kirov, whom he (Baltrusaitis) had known personally, was very much the same type of human being as Stalin and was trusted implicitly by Stalin.

Mr. Baltrusaitis went on to say that Kirov had fallen in love with the wife of Nikolaiev and that Nikolaiev, although he cared about his wife, had consented to a liaison between her and Kirov in order to further his own career. He said that this liaison of Nikolaiev's wife with Kirov, as well as Nikolaiev's position as a OGPU agent, had given Nikolaiev a halo of power which had opened to him all doors in the Leningrad Oblast. Mr. Baltrusaitis added, "He could walk into Kirov's office at any moment he wished".

Mr. Baltrusaitis said that in spite of Nikolaiev's subservience to Kirov he had not received the promotions to which he considered himself entitled and finally had become enraged with Kirov, considering that Kirov had purchased his wife and had not paid the price. The shooting of Kirov, Mr. Baltrusaitis insisted, was a crime committed by Nikolaiev in a moment of passionate

and

and uncontrollable rage.

Mr. Baltrusaitis then described the scene which took place in Stalin's apartment in the Kremlin when Yagoda, Chief of the OGPU, (who is now called Commissar for Internal Affairs), called on Stalin after the murder. He asserted that Stalin, as Yagoda walked into the room, moved toward him with a hand outstretched as if to take him by the throat, calling out, "This time you have bitten off more than you can chew". He said that Stalin at that moment had been under the impression that Yagoda had procured the murder of Kirov by his agent Nikolaiev.

Mr. Baltrusaitis asserted that Yagoda had been intensely terrified, but, perceiving at the same moment that Stalin himself seemed terribly shaken, had preserved sufficient presence of mind to defend himself and to accuse Yenukidze, Secretary of the TsIK (Central Executive Committee), a personal enemy of his, of responsibility for the murder because he had once protected Nikolaiev from arrest by the OGPU.

Yagoda had, furthermore, pointed out to Stalin that Yenukidze -- (a more humane and decent fellow than most of the high executives) -- had repeatedly protected from exile or execution members of the Communist Party and others who had in some way displeased the OGPU. Yagoda convinced Stalin that he would have eliminated Nikolaiev except for the intervention of Yenukidze. In addition, Yagoda finally convinced Stalin that Yenukidze was trying to build up a personal machine to enable him to succeed Stalin as dictator.

As a result, Yenukidze was dismissed as the Secretary of the Tsik and sent to be Governor of the Trans-Caucasus. All members of the office force of the Tsik inside the Kremlin were exiled. In addition, all Yenukidze's particular friends in the Kremlin were exiled, including the two immediate subordinates of Pedersen, Commandant of the Kremlin. In addition, all members of the so-called "secret guard" of fanatical young Communists in the Kremlin were exiled.

Mr. Baltrusaitis said that he had seen Mr. Yenukidze, an old and intimate friend of his, just before his departure for the Trans-Caucasus and that Mr. Yenukidze, with tears running down his face, had cried, "It is for this that I have given my whole life".

Mr. Baltrusaitis then asserted that the story of a plot of former followers of Trotsky and Zinoviev to murder Kirov, Stalin, et al, was a fabrication by Yagoda for the purpose of protecting himself from Stalin's wrath, eliminating his personal enemies, and getting rid of all possible leaders for the discontented Communist youth. Mr. Baltrusaitis said that he knew of his own knowledge that many of the younger members of the Communist Party were now dissatisfied with Stalin's regime and were as eager to revolt against the present government as their predecessors had been to revolt against the Czar.

Mr. Baltrusaitis stated further that Yagoda had played on Stalin's personal fears of assassination in a most subtle and able manner. For example, Mr. Baltrusaitis asserted

that

that Stalin receives his meals from the kitchen of the Kremlin hospital restaurant in containers and that Yagoda, shortly after the murder of Kirov, had placed six OGPU agents in the kitchen to watch the cooks and that since that time Stalin had received all his containers sealed with the seal of the OGPU to protect him from poison.

Mr. Baltrusaitis said further that since Kirov's murder Stalin had become inordinately suspicious of everyone around him with the exception of Voroshilov and Molotov. He said that Kaganovich's assignment to the difficult post of Commissar for Transportation had been a method of getting out of the Kremlin the man who was commonly spoken of by the public as Stalin's possible successor. He said that Stalin had done this because of the fear that Kaganovich might be building up a machine to overthrow him. He stated further that Stalin had lost all confidence in Bubnov, Commissar of Education and that Bubnov was now completely under the direction of one of Stalin's personal secretaries. With regard to Litvinov Mr. Baltrusaitis stated, "Of course neither Stalin nor anyone else could imagine that Litvinov could build up a personal following. The fact is that every day when Litvinov is in Moscow he carries all important telegrams personally to Stalin for decision. When Litvinov is abroad Krestinski does the same thing. Litvinov is an extremely clever agent of Stalin but nothing else."

The arrest and exiling of innocent human beings in all quarters of the Soviet Union continues apace. Mr. Baltrusaitis asserted that everyone in the slightest degree

distasteful

distasteful to the Soviet Government in Leningrad had already been arrested and asserted that a card of individual exile numbered Leningrad 21,000 had come to his attention. (From another wholly reliable source I have the information that a Leningrad card of exile with entire family numbered 7,000 has been seen.)

The arrests in Moscow are still in progress. As I have already reported to the Department the only two fairly competent dentists in Moscow have been exiled recently and the fear of arrest is so great that the Muscovites now do not dare to have any contact with foreign embassies.

In this connection it may be of some interest to the Department to know that Mr. George Andreytchine, who last year was assigned to work out the physical difficulties of the American Embassy by the Foreign Office and was of invaluable assistance to us, was seized some weeks ago by the OGPU. He is, I am now informed, most privately, in the Lyublianka prison and may be shot or exiled. Among the charges against him is the accusation that although he saw constantly the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union he was unable to influence the Ambassador to take a more favorable view of Soviet policy.

Respectfully yours,

William C. Bullitt.

WCB/CO

844

Qn.

PST
Pursued
1935

June 3, 1935.

Dear Bill:-

I have been a long time in writing to you but, as you undoubtedly know, we have had much excitement here due to the decision of the Supreme Court. However, the fact remains that the principles of NRA must be carried on in some way.

As usual I was much interested in your letter to me and also the dispatch which the Secretary of State let me read. That was a fascinating story. Do write me often.

The Ball sounds magnificent but I hope you will not have to have another one very soon again -- at least not until you are quite well.

I have been much interested in hearing from Missy the story of Grace Davidson. You must be glad to have her on her way back to America.

We were all quite worried at the reports in the paper about your illness in Warsaw and are delighted to hear from Judge Moore that you had gone on to Vienna to be looked over. Do let us hear what the Doctors

in Vienna said and for heaven's sake do as they
tell you. I hope they have been able to make you
more comfortable.

As ever yours,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow.

Personal and
~~Confidential~~

Moscow, May 1, 1935.

Dear Mr. President:

I have just come back from the May Day parade on the Red Square. It has been a great show with tanks galloping across at 60 miles per hour and new pursuit airplanes at 400 kilometers p. h. Stalin came late and left early due, I was told, to a last minute hitch in the negotiations with the French. It was also noticeable that when he walked the short space from the Kremlin wall to Lenin's tomb he held a handkerchief to his face. He may really, after all, be a bit frightened as indicated in the very confidential despatch I am sending by this pouch which I have asked the Secretary to send over to you.

Physically, Moscow is a pleasanter place than this time last year. The subway has been completed.

Blocks

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House,

Washington.

Blocks of old buildings have been turned into streets and squares, and the paving of the streets has been improved. Emotionally, however, Moscow is by no means so pleasant a place. The terror, always present, has risen to such a pitch that the least of the Muscovites, as well as the greatest, is in fear. Almost no one dares have any contact with foreigners and this is not unbased fear but a proper sense of reality. The chief engineer of the Amo works, now the largest producers of trucks in the world, has just spent eight months in jail because he ventured to call on the Latvian Minister, a very old friend of his. Every single acquaintance, even the most casual, of the Japanese language students in Leningrad, has been exiled. The only real friend of this Embassy, George Andreytchine, whom I asked you to pardon last year, is in the Lyublianka prison awaiting either death or exile. The only decent guide in the Soviet Union who took my cousin, Marshall, and his family around the country last year and is a thoroughly good friend of mine, has been exiled. Every-

one who has had any contact with the Japanese Embassy,
Heldingere and Tolens a lot of birch trees & even remature
leafage and arranged the end of the dining room as a
collective fare with peasant accordian players, dancers,

even down to the tailor, has been exiled. And the three not-too-awful dentists of the town suffered the same fate, leaving members of the American Embassy hanging on to temporary fillings!

It is extraordinarily difficult to preserve a sweet and loving exterior under the circumstances. I can, of course, do nothing to save anyone. In fact, strictly between ourselves, I got a message from Andreytchine, sent grapevine from the OGPU Lyublianka prison, asking me for God's sake to do nothing to try to save him, if I should, he would certainly be shot.

The Russians still dare to come to my house for large entertainments when there can be no possibility of private conversation. There was a good turnout for the ball I gave on the 23rd of April. Litvinov came with his wife and eldest daughter. It was an astonishingly successful party, thoroughly dignified yet gay. Everyone happy and no one drunk. In fact, if I can believe the letter I got from the British Ambassadress and many verbal messages, it was the best party in Moscow since the revolution. We got a thousand tulips from Helsingfors and forced a lot of birch trees into premature leafage and arranged one end of the dining room as a collective farm with peasant accordion players, dancers,
and

and all sorts of baby things, such as birds, goats, and a couple of infant bears about the size of cats. We also had pleasant lighting effects done by the best theater here and a bit of a cabaret. It was really great fun and the Turkish Ambassador and about twenty others remained until breakfast at eight.

I survived the night with the assistance of a few doses of strychnine, but with the exception of that evening I have been getting to bed at 7:30 P. M. I am all right for work beginning at 7 A. M. but have not yet sufficiently recovered from this bug to go out at all at night. I shall go right on with my regime of twelve hours in bed and plenty of exercise until I have fully recovered. There is nothing to worry about but it is a nuisance.

Do you remember our bet of one red apple or whatever (I have forgotten what) as to the scene of the first outbreak of war? You picked Europe and I picked the Far East. I am beginning to be inclined to think that you will probably turn out to be right as usual. The Austrian situation seems to contain all the elements of a major explosion while the Far Eastern situation is momentarily quiet. The long range outlook everywhere is about as bad as can be and the worst of it is that we
can

can do nothing whatever to stop the march of events. The economic basis of Germany and Japan is such today that neither nation has any future, except a continuously diminishing standard of living, unless it can acquire new sources of raw materials and new markets. The Japanese line is obvious. My guess is that Hitler has decided that the German line of advance shall be down the Danube and not toward the Ukraine, although if he is blocked in his economic domination of Central Europe and the Balkans he will certainly try to turn toward the Ukraine.

I see no way that we can achieve anything by attempting to stop the march of events - horrible as it is - except our own involvement in war and I hope that you will turn a very deaf ear to the songs of the sirens who must be keeping you awake nights with their music. I saw that Stimson had donned the mermaids tail and there must be a thousand others whose hearts are better than their heads.

There is nothing very gay to report from Moscow except an incident that happened the other day when, on the completion of a tremendous new hospital at Gorki, aviators were sent up to take pictures from the air for propaganda purposes.

purposes. When they came down and the pictures were developed, the hospital turned out to be the most perfect German swastika! The architect was immediately exiled and new wings are being built feverishly.

I wish I could hear the sound of your voice.

Bless you.

Bill

PSF: Russia
1935

June 21, 1935.

Dear Bill:-

Your letter of June third proves (a) that your sense of humor is completely intact and (b) that by this token your physical well-being must be vastly improved.

What a grand picture that is of that Goering person! If you get a figure like his I will order a special uniform for you and send you to all official funerals.

I am interested in what you say about the chocolate diet. I had always supposed that a liquor diet and a sugar diet were practically synonymous from the point of view of chemical result but evidently I am wrong!

Breck Long has been here and he, too, is much encouraged because what he feared was something serious turned out to be a mere stomach ulcer. In spite of this he is still pessimistic about the future of Europe!

I am off to the New London Races and am much afraid that your damn Elis will sweep the river.

Do not get too high a blood pressure. If you can keep it at that of a new born babe,

perhaps you will live three score years and ten longer!

We miss you. Good luck!

As ever yours,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow,
U.S.S.R.

P.S. I take it the small growth on your spine
will develop eventually into wings!

JUNE 3, 1935

The flight was as easy and comfortable as could be. I then crossed the frontier by train and the Poles had waiting for me Pilsudski's private car which they hooked on to a train that got to Warsaw an hour before the ceremonies began.

The Polish Government was obviously delighted that you should have sent a Special Representative (only Crosby,³ our Chargé d'Affaires seemed somewhat miffed), and went out of its way to place me at the top of the procession by using a pleasant twist of the French diplomatic alphabet. I was the representative of "Amerique, Etats-Unis de," and not "Etats-Unis de Amerique." That put me for all the ceremonies next to Goering who, as representative of "Allemagne," had place No. 1.

Goering swept into the Warsaw cathedral late as if he were a German tenor playing Siegfried. He has the usual German tenor proportions. He is at least a yard across the bottom as the crow flies! In an attempt to get his shoulders out as far as his hips he wears two inches of padding extending each one. It is useless. The shoulders just won't go that far. He is nearly a yard from rear to umbilicus, and as he is not even as tall as I am and encases himself in a glove-tight uniform, the effect is novel. He must carry with him a personal beauty attendant as his fingers, which are almost as thick as they are short, carry long-pointed, carefully enamelled nails and his pink complexion shows every sign of daily attention. His eyes pop wildly as if he were either suffering from a glandular derangement or still taking cocaine. His lips are as thin as those of an infant. When he was 250 pounds lighter he must have been a blond beauty of the most unpleasant sort. He is really the most appalling representative of a nation that I have ever laid eyes on. He made me feel that the Germans will achieve nothing but a series of national disasters until they cease to take the *Nibelungenlied* seriously.

Goering stole the show from the moment he entered the cathedral, and it became not Pilsudski's funeral but Goering's great first-act entrance. Throughout the march from the cathedral to the aviation field—three hours in a drizzling rain—I walked behind the young Siegfried who struck poses everytime a camera appeared.

The crowds that lined the streets were impressive. They were absolutely silent and did not even stir. At the field the troops marched past the coffin to the beat of a drum. The silence was more impressive than any music. That night we took the train from Cracow and the next day the march was repeated, ending at the Wawel, the old hill castle of the Polish kings. The Catholic Church did itself proud by putting on a really beautiful service. It was rather long, however, and Goering went to sleep.

JUNE 3, 1935

Afterward, President Moscicki⁴ held a reception for the representatives of the various nations and asked me to thank you personally for having sent a Special Representative for the occasion. The next day I had luncheon at the Potocki's⁵ with Petain.⁶ He and Laval⁷ had been treated throughout as if they were unwelcome cousins from the country and Laval was sore; but the old man was in great form. He is seventy-nine but after luncheon he kept a crowd of about thirty persons in screams of laughter for a half hour with an account of his attempts to avoid ice water on his visit to the United States during prohibition.

As Vienna is only two and one-half hours by plane from Cracow, I thought I might as well fly down and consult a decent doctor and did so. My last Cracow view was of a regiment turned out to do the honors as I got into the plane.

The visit to Vienna was a colossal success. Professor Luger⁸ spotted the difficulty immediately. It appears that the streptococcus is now entirely out of my body but that it took with it about one-half the sugar in my blood. The result was that my blood pressure when I reached Vienna was exactly one hundred, that of a new-born babe! Hence the exhaustion.

It is difficult to believe, but four days of sunlight and plenty of chocolate in Vienna raised my blood pressure from 100 to 130 and I returned to Warsaw feeling quite alive.

When I was in Vienna I saw Schuschnigg⁹ and Berger-Waldenegg,¹⁰ the Foreign Minister, and scores of Austrians whom I have known for years. Messersmith arrived just before I did and I had a number of long talks with him. The most interesting conversation I had was with an old friend of mine who for some years has been one of the secret leaders of the Austrian Nazis. He confirmed everything which I gathered from our own representatives and all the Viennese with whom I talked.

No one in Austria really likes the present Government. Schuschnigg is a colorless, bloodless, young man who resembles a tight-lipped young priest in civilian clothing. He wears a gold cross hanging from one button hole and the old Greek sign for Jesus Christ in the other. On a small table just in front of his desk stands a large crucifix with a silver Christ and two candles. He is the representative of the Catholic Church and does nothing without consulting Cardinal Innitzer. That means that he will do nothing especially foolish but also that he can not catch the imagination of a nation in the twentieth century.

Berger-Waldenegg, the Foreign Minister, is an orderly bureaucrat who reminded me of Burian,¹¹ the first Austrian Foreign Minister I ever saw at that desk in the Ballhaus.

JUNE 3, 1935

In addition to the support of the Catholic Church the Government has the support of the Jews of Vienna, including the bankers who are scared to death of a Nazi Government. Moreover, the remnants of the Christian-Socialist Party which used to control all the farmers of the country gives a lukewarm support.

Starhemberg¹² doesn't like Schuschnigg much but is not inclined to clash with him immediately. Starhemberg, it appears, has not been taking his politics too seriously lately and has been devoting his larger energies to a series of charming young ladies. Schuschnigg is frankly a monarchist. I asked him when he thought the Emperor would return and he replied that the matter had not yet come up in serious form, that it might be twenty years, that it might be in ten years, and it might be in one. Starhemberg is not too anxious to have the Hapsburgs return. An old friend of mine told me that he had been talking with Starhemberg on this subject a few days before my arrival and Starhemberg had said, "Why should I or Austria want to have the nouveau riche Hapsburgs back again? My people were good enough to defend Austria for centuries before the Hapsburgs were ever heard of." The spirit of the Philadelphia Club is also international.

The financial situation in Austria has improved out of all reason and the general economic situation is improving. The Nazi boss whom I have known so well in the past that I feel able to vouch for the sincerity of the statement, stated that he did not anticipate any Nazi putsch this summer or for a "very long time thereafter." He said that all the public leaders of the Nazis were either in jail or beyond the frontiers, that all the Nazi centers had been smashed, that Hitler was sending few funds, only enough to keep together small nuclei, and that the Government at the moment had all the cannons and machine guns, the decisive factors. Temporarily, therefore, the Austrian structure seems secure although it would collapse at a moment's notice if any of the supporting beams should be withdrawn. If Mussolini withdraws his support, it will surely go. If Starhemberg should get really angry with Schuschnigg there would of course, be a collapse, but if the present planks in the structure hang together there is no chance of the Government being overthrown by a Nazi explosion. I was much surprised to reach this conclusion as all the news I had received here and in Warsaw had led me to believe that the position of the Austrian Government was threatened by internal Nazi explosion. Incidentally, Messersmith holds the same opinion that I do and he is no fool.

When I returned to Warsaw I had lunch alone with Beck¹³ and his

JUNE 3, 1935

wife. The lady, who is a charmer, left us immediately after the meal and we had a good talk. From Beck and from many other persons in Poland I got the following bits of information: Before Pilsudski's death it had been arranged that as soon as the new constitution, which gives dictatorial powers to the President, should take effect, Moscicki, who is now President, should resign and be replaced by one of Pilsudski's chief assistants. Pilsudski had not indicated which one he would choose but the general opinion was that it would be General Rydz-Smigly,¹⁴ now Inspector General of the Polish Army. I was told on good authority that just before Pilsudski's funeral, Rydz-Smigly went to Moscicki and asked him how soon he intended to resign and Moscicki replied that he would be glad to consider the question of his resignation at the end of his presidential term, to wit: in 1940! Moscicki is a savant and has some knowledge of economic matters but is a mild old gentleman—about the last man that one should pick as a dictator. The question agitating everyone in Warsaw is whether Rydz-Smigly and the generals, Beck and the colonels, Prystor and the politicians, will attempt to overthrow Moscicki and start a battle royal for the dictatorship. My own guess is that nothing of the kind will happen for some time at least. The Poles are sincere patriots and unless Moscicki should collapse physically or make some big mistakes, I think that Beck, Rydz-Smigly, and the rest will be content to work under and through him. Beck assured me that this would happen and so did many others.

I am more convinced than ever that there is no secret agreement between Poland and Germany. The Polish Army is definitely anti-German and I can not find in Beck a trace of real pro-Germanism. His whole policy is based on the determination never to allow the foot of a German or Russian soldier to be placed on Polish soil and never to permit airplanes of either power to fly over Polish territory. That is not pro-Germanism but plain common sense.

I said this to Litvinov when we travelled together from Warsaw to Moscow. (Incidentally, our late guest in Washington was most affable and invited me to join him in his private car for the trip, which I did.) Litvinov replied that while he agreed that there was no written agreement between Poland and Germany he believed that Beck's unwillingness to enter into a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union was based on the hope that within the next few years Japan would attack the Soviet Union and that Poland would then be able to annex sections of the Ukraine and also would participate in a joint German-Hungarian-Polish demolition of Czechoslovakia. That seems to me pure Bolshevism

JUNE 3, 1935

propaganda. As Litvinov and I were in the same car we talked for many hours about everything in heaven and earth and were finally reduced to playing a Russian card game, the central feature of which is a cork in the middle of the table which one tries to slap before one's opponent.

Litvinov is a quick slapper.

I wish I could transfer myself to Washington by radio for an evening of talk with you. A volume of typewriting would be needed to cover all I have to tell you. And I would like to hear your voice again.¹⁵

Good luck and every good wish.

Yours always,

Bill

[PSF:Russia:TS]

¹ Josef Pilsudski had died May 12.

² See *New York Times*, May 17, 1935, p. 13.

³ Sheldon L. Crosby, counsellor of embassy at Warsaw since 1932.

⁴ Ignacy Mościcki was president from 1926 to 1939.

⁵ Jerzy Potocki, Polish ambassador to the U.S.S.R., was sent to Washington as ambassador in 1936.

⁶ Marshal Henri Phillippe Pétain.

⁷ Pierre Laval, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

⁸ Dr. Alfred P. Luger.

⁹ Kurt von Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria.

¹⁰ Egon Berger-Waldeneegg.

¹¹ Presumably Count Stephan von Burián von Rajecz, Austrian Foreign Minister in 1918.

¹² Ernst Ruediger von Starhemberg, Austrian vice-chancellor.

¹³ Josef Beck, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁴ Edward Rydz-Smigly became marshal of Poland after Pilsudski's death.

¹⁵ Roosevelt's reply of June 21, 1935, is printed in *Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, I, 488-489.

PSF Russia

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

*File
Russia
1935*

August 25, 1935

Miss LeHand:

Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Walton R. Moore, requested that I have these copies of telegrams received by the State Department from Ambassador Bullitt this morning placed in the hands of the President.

Will you kindly see that they reach the President.

M. J. McDermott
M. J. McDermott

MP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (A)

Moscow

Dated August 25, 1935

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

384, August 25, 4:15 p.m.

I handed our note of protest to Krestinski this
afternoon at 4 o'clock without comment except the state-
ment that we should make it public at once. Krestinski
replied "if your note is a protest with regard to the
Congress of the Communist International I can tell you
before reading it that it will be rejected". He added
"I will, however, read it".

BULLITT

RR

MP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (B)

Moscow

Dated August 25, 1935

Rec'd 6:17 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

383, August 25, noon.

Will see Krestinski and present note at four o'clock this afternoon and release to press at four fifteen (eight fifteen a.m. Washington time). The first sentence reads "under instruction from my Government I have the honor to call your attention to the activities, involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, et cetera".

BULLITT

RR

PS F Russia

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

AUGUST 25, 1935.

The following is the text of the note presented today to the Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow by Ambassador Bullitt and thereafter made available to the press at Moscow by Ambassador Bullitt:

"Under instructions from my Government, I have ^{call attention} the honor to ~~refer~~ to the activities, involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, which have taken place on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the VII All-World Congress of the Communist International, and, on behalf of the Government of the United States, to lodge a most emphatic protest against this flagrant violation of the pledge given by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on November 16, 1933, with respect to non-interference in the internal affairs of the United States.

"That pledge, which was given by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a result of the discussions which took place prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reads in full as follows:

'Washington, November 16, 1933.

'My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that coincident with the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two Governments it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

'1. To

'1. To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions.

'2. To refrain, and to restrain all persons in government service and all organizations of the Government or under its direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquillity, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or propaganda having as an aim, the violation of the territorial integrity of the United States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

'3. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group - and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group - which makes claim to be the Government of, or makes attempt upon the territorial integrity of, the United States, its territories or possessions; not to form, subsidize, support or permit on its territory military organizations or groups having the aim of armed struggle against the United States, its territories or possessions, and to prevent any recruiting on behalf of such organizations and groups.

'4. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group - and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group - which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

'I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MAXIM LITVINOFF

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

'Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.'

My

My Government invites particular attention to the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contained in the paragraph numbered 4.

"In view of the fact that the aim and activity of an organization, such as the Congress of the Communist International, functioning on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, cannot be unknown to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it does not seem necessary to present material to show the aim of the Congress of the Communist International with respect to the political or social order of the United States or to quote from the published proceedings of the Congress to show its activity relative to the internal affairs of the United States, as evidenced in the discussion at the Congress of the policies and activities of the communist organization in the United States and the determination and formulation by the Congress of policies to be carried out in the United States by the communist organization in the United States. Nor does it appear necessary to list the names of representatives or officials of the communist organization in the United States who were active at the above mentioned Congress and whose admission into the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was, of course, known to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"As I have pointed out to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs when discussing earlier violations of the undertaking of November 16, 1933, the American people

people resent most strongly interference by foreign countries in their internal affairs, regardless of the nature or probable result of such interference, and the Government of the United States considers the strict fulfillment of the pledge of non-interference an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of normal and friendly relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The Government of the United States would be lacking in candor if it failed to state frankly that it anticipates the most serious consequences if the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is unwilling, or unable, to take appropriate measures to prevent further acts in disregard of the solemn pledge given by it to the Government of the United States.

"I may add that it is a source of regret that in the present international situation the development of friendly relations between the Russian and American peoples will inevitably be precluded by the continuance on territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the promise of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of activities involving interference in the internal affairs of the American people."

In the final sentence Mr. Sultzev asks that this
be brought to the President's attention

Personal Memo - March 3 -

LMS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (D)

Moscow

Dated March 2, 1936

Rec'd 3:00 p. m.

*filed
personal 1936*

Secretary of State,
Washington.

76, March 2, 6 p. m.

I was able to arrange for Mr. Roy Howard to inter-
view Stalin yesterday.

In the course of the interview Stalin made the
flat statement that if the Japanese invaded Outer Mon-
golia Russia would fight. He also expressed fear of
German aggression against the Soviet Union. He clever-
ly evaded the issue of his direction of the Communist
Party of the United States and expressed hopes for ex-
cellent relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Howard talked with Litvinov today; the
conversation was without interest with the possible
exception of a statement by Litvinov that no difficul-
ties would have arisen between the Soviet Union and the
United States if it had not been for my hostility to
the activities of the Comintern Congress.

I feel that it might be worth while to impress
on Troyanovsky and especially Umansky when he arrives
that resentment of interference in the internal af-

fairs

LMS 2-No. 76, March 2, 6 p. m. from Moscow.

7
fairs of the United States by the Comintern acting under orders of Stalin is felt not only by myself but by the entire Government of the United States and the American people.

Howard informed me that he had (?) to Stalin that in his opinion as a newspaper man a repetition of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the United States similar to the interference during the Comintern Congress last August would produce an immediate break in diplomatic relations.

Howard during his entire visit in Moscow conducted himself as a most loyal American and I feel that the officials of the Department will find conversations with him valuable.

I should be obliged if you would bring this telegram to the attention of the President.

BULLITT

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

PSF: Russia 1936

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

March 16, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE MOORE

This seems so important
that I suggest that you and Stanley
Reed have a confidential talk in
regard to it. I believe that we
should not remain passive.

F. D. R.

Letter addressed to Judge Moore from
Ambassador Bullitt in re Umansky who
is coming to Washington.

This refers to Bullitt's letter
to Moore, 2-22-36, filed in the
CLOSED portion of the R. Walton
Moore Papers. —

PSF
PSF: Russia 1936 ✓

March 16, 1936.

Dear Bill:-

It is good to get yours written on Washington's Birthday. I am glad you were able at least to stop in so many Capitols.

Meanwhile, since a week ago, the fat is in the fire again. What a thoroughly disgusting spectacle so-called civilized man in Europe can make himself!

I fear I cannot send you any message until I get back April fourth. The Secretary has left and I go on the nineteenth. Many foundations have been laid.

Our all American conference is coming well and I think it will be held in September. The Secretary stands so well in South America that already they are talking of erecting statues to him. Pretty good for a Democratic Administration and a great fellow!

As ever yours,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow.

Personal and
Confidential.

Moscow, February 22, 1936.

Dear Mr. President:

In order to spare you a solemn Cook's tour across Europe, I am going to confine this letter to disjointed fragments.

1. LONDON

Our little friend, the King, is spending his week ends at the Fort Belvedere end of Windsor Great Park, not the Windsor Castle end! I had an invitation from a charming Maryland lady but had to move on to Moscow before the date fixed.

There is something like a wilful hysteria in London. In order to make sure that the increased military and naval estimates will encounter no opposition, the fear of Germany is being played up deliberately and the most commonplace remark at every lunch and dinner table is to the effect that within three years England will have to choose between making war on Germany or permitting Germany to dominate Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania preparatory to an attack on the Soviet Union. Strangely enough, all the old anti-Bolshevik fanatics like Winston Churchill are trumpeting this Bolshevik thesis and are advocating an entente with the Soviet Union!

2. PARIS

There is a rising wave of feeling that France should not go to war with Germany to save either Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union:
Hence

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington.

5. PARIS

Hence the stubborn opposition to ratification of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

Jesse Straus was not in Paris as he had gone to Vienna with poor Mrs. Straus, who is suffering severely from urticaria which is, I believe, a disease that makes one itch.

3. BRUSSELS

I spoke to Van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, about the matter in which he was interested. He seemed pleased by the few amiable words I uttered and said he quite understood.

Dave and Mrs. Morris were both in prime form and I am sure that you can call on Dave for any campaign work that you may want him to do.

4. BERLIN

I stopped in Berlin only between trains and had a talk with Dodd, who is still somewhat under the weather.

As you know, my close friend, Attolico, is now Italian Ambassador in Berlin. He had just come from Rome where he had seen a great deal of Mussolini. I therefore pricked up my ears considerably when he suggested most seriously, as I cabled the Department, that the time was approaching when you might intervene with a "Hoare-Laval proposal with modifications favorable to Italy". I have no doubt that the Foreign Offices of both Britain and France, as well as Mussolini, would be delighted to have you take the onus of proposing such a settlement. The English could then throw up their hands in holy horror and say that you had forced them to accept an immoral compromise. I felt so sure that you would not rise to that bait -- and hook -- that I did not pursue Attolico's suggestion. But I warn you it was serious and you may hear more of it.

5. WARSAW

I saw a large number of Poles in Warsaw, including Beck, the Foreign Minister, with whom I had a long and intimate conversation. The Poles have not deviated from their determination not to allow a single Russian or German soldier to set foot on Polish soil. But, on the other hand, I gathered from Beck that Poland would offer no resistance, either physical or diplomatic, to a German attack on Czechoslovakia. Beck emphasized the closeness of the relations between Poland and Hungary and I gathered the impression that he would be glad, rather than otherwise, to see Germany control Austria and Bohemia, and to see Hungary walk off with Slovakia, while Poland got "frontier rectifications" in the Teschen district.

Needless to say, all the way from London to Moscow the chief topic of conversation was the dangerous situation of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak position is made somewhat more desperate by the fact that nobody in Europe likes Czechs, to say nothing of Czechesses, whose piano legs and aversion to soap are notorious from one end of the continent to the other.

Gudahy was in Paradise when I told him that D. V. the Auld Sod was his. He is eager to come home to campaign and promises 3,000,000 Polish votes!

6. MOSCOW

Russia, as usual, is looking up. The improvement in physical conditions is striking even after so short an absence as mine. The people are certainly better fed and clothed than at any time since the Revolution. And the Moscow Street Cleaning Department today puts that of New York to shame. In spite of the perpetual snows, you can see the asphalt on every street.

Litvinov

Bill

Litvinov greeted me in an unusually amiable manner. The day of my arrival I had an ordinary tea and movie at my house, and both he and Madame Litvinov, Marshal Budenny, and a host of army officers and government officials turned up to bid me welcome. It means absolutely nothing from the political point of view but it does mean, I believe, that Stalin has told Litvinov to be more polite to this Mission.

Stalin's latest imitation of Le Roi Soleil is to dictate in the field of music and drama. Recently he went to see a modern Soviet opera and a modern ballet which had been praised by the critics as the supreme achievements of the human race. In the ballet Georgians were shown to be comic, in the opera Russians were shown to be drunk. Stalin at once caused ukases to be issued damning all the musicians and producers who have been heralded for the past few years by the Soviet press as demi-gods. The result is that half the artists and musicians in Moscow are engaged in having nervous prostration and the others are trying to imagine how to write and compose in a manner to please Stalin.

7. THE HOME FRONT

That osteopath I saw in New York worked so effectively that the pains have left my shoulders and arms and I feel ready for anything in the way of work.

By the time you get this letter I shall be engaged in waiting for that cryptic telegram from you. I warn you that from the 15th of March to the first of April, I shall be at the office each day from 7:30 A. M. forward to open personally all messages.

Bless you and good luck.

Yours always,

Bill

RF Russia

RF
AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
APR 27 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RR

1-1228

GRAY

FROM

Moscow

Dated April 27, 1936.

Received 7:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

114, April 27, 1 p. m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It was marvelous to hear your voice on the telephone. Apparently you heard me better than I heard you but at least I heard something pleasant.

RR WWC

BULLITT

123 BULLITT, WILLIAM C./228

*The President was the first
American official to use the
telephone to Moscow —
R.W.C.*

W

R

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

May 25, 1936.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may find of interest these despatches from Bullitt. I can hardly credit the statements of the Russian scientist that we have not adequately explored the mineral possibilities of this country, but it seems to me, if that is correct, the matter needs attention. It would certainly be a fine thing to discover that we are not as short on tin as is supposed.

R. Waller

copy file

*File
BSF:Russia
1936*

PSF: Russia

No. 1548

Moscow, April 27, 1936.

Subject: Conversation between Mr. V. I. Mezhlauk
and Ambassador Bullitt.

A3



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In supplement to my despatch No. 1537 of April 20, 1936, I have the honor to report certain remarks made to me last night by V. I. Mezhlauk, Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

Mezhlauk is unique among Bolsheviks in that he habitually speaks the truth. I have no reason to doubt that his statements to me were sincere and, to the best of his knowledge, truthful.

Mr. Mezhlauk said that the functioning of the
railroads

railroads in the Soviet Union had been so improved by Kaganovich that today no carload of freight is delayed because of inadequate railroad facilities. He added that henceforth he expected the Soviet railroads to keep pace with the increasing demands of the country.

I questioned Mezhlauk with respect to rubber production in the Soviet Union. He said that the natural rubber plantations of the Soviet Union were already beginning to bear but would not begin to produce large quantities of rubber for another two or three years. He referred to the large production of artificial rubber in the Soviet Union and commented that it had been far inferior to natural rubber. He added, however, that recent experiments in making rubber from the waste wood of the lumber industry by "hydrolysis" had resulted in the production of a form of rubber "which was superior in all qualities to natural rubber".

I questioned this statement but Mezhlauk insisted that it was true. He said that this new form of artificial rubber at the present time cost about twice as much as natural rubber on the world market but added that with increased production the cost would diminish greatly. In conclusion, he stated that he was certain that within three years the Soviet Union would produce all the rubber it might require.

Indeed,

Indeed, he went so far as to say that he hoped it might be possible for the Soviet Union to sell its artificial rubber in the world market in competition with natural rubber.

With regard to tin, Mr. Mezhlauk stated that large tin deposits had been discovered recently in Kazakstan, the southern portion of Central Asia, the Far East and the far north. He stated that he believed the Soviet Union this year would produce fifty percent of the tin it requires and added that he was confident that within two years the Soviet Union would be able to cover its tin requirements from its own resources.

Mezhlauk stated that the Soviet Union was now producing sufficient antimony for its own needs, as well as all other minor metals.

In conclusion, he asserted that within three years the Soviet Union would be one hundred percent self-sufficient and able to function with full efficiency as a completely closed economy.

In the conversation which followed, Mezhlauk stated that he believed the United States contained many valuable mineral resources which had never been properly explored or developed. He asserted that the United States geological surveys, with all of which he claimed to be familiar, had been extremely superficial. He said that he was sure

there

there were considerable deposits of tin within the boundaries of the United States. He asserted that Soviet experience had shown that tin invariably was present in gold-bearing strata though not in immediate connection with gold. He added that invariably tin was present in direct connection with wolfram and lead, both of which are mined in the United States.

In commenting on his previous remarks, Mezhlauk said that the greatest difficulty he had had as Chairman of the State Planning Commission had been to discover the tin resources of the Soviet Union. He said that he had summoned the leading mining experts, geologists, physicists and chemists of the Soviet Union and had compelled them to make a really thorough geological survey which had produced astonishing results. He added that in his opinion it might be highly advisable for the Government of the United States to organize a similar thorough geological survey, especially with a view to discovering tin in the United States, as it would remain possible for the United States to be cut off from this commodity.

I have such confidence in Mr. Mezhlauk's integrity that I am inclined to accept his statements about the Soviet Union at their face value. The remarks, with respect to the self-sufficiency of

the

- 5 -

the Soviet Union, contained in my despatch No. 1537 of April 20, 1936, therefore, appear to be justified.

Respectfully yours,

William C. Bullitt.

850

Quintuplicate to Department.

WCB/co

No. 1537

Moscow, April 20, 1936.

Subject: The Policy of the United States With
Respect to the Soviet Union and Com-
munism.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit my views as to
the policies the United States should follow
with respect to the Soviet Union and Communism.
I apologize for the length of my observations.

The Soviet Union is unique among Great Powers.
It is not only a state but also the headquarters
of an international faith. To understand its
geographical position, resources, and racial com-
position is essential for comprehension of its
policies

Supplement
No. 192A

policies and definition of our own. But to understand the communist faith is even more vital. It is this faith which produces not only the peculiar internal institutions of the Soviet Union but also its extraordinary attitude toward all other nations. Any attempt to formulate American policy with regard to the Soviet Union must begin, therefore, with a discussion of the communist faith as expounded in the gospels according to Marx, Lenin and Stalin.

The mystical essence of the communist faith is the belief that when communism has been established on earth, all cruelty, hatred, jealousy, avarice, and deceit will ipso facto be eliminated from human nature. Heaven will exist on earth. Until communism is established, all power and authority will be concentrated in the State - "then the State will wither away". The millenium will arrive. There will be no more war. There will be no poor. Each human being will receive all that he desires. Mankind will live in bliss.

Merely to state these beliefs is to render them absurd to those who have been nurtured in the tradition of Greece, Rome, and the Church. Moreover, they run counter to all that anthropologists and psychologists have been able to learn about the nature of man. But the fact remains that these beliefs are held sincerely not only by millions of young

young Russians but also by the dictator of the Soviet Union and his most powerful assistants.

It may be that men like Litvinov and Rosengoltz are mere profiteers of the Revolution, that men like Radek and Yagoda find in communism and the mass murders it approves merely outlet for their venomous hatred of the superiors of their childhood; but it can not be denied that in Stalin, Voroshilov, Ordjonikidze, and their like, there is love of mankind as well as hatred, and that they are ready to sacrifice not only all other men to the triumph of their faith but also themselves.

Moreover, the absurdity of a faith is no measure of its strength. Islam was never free from gross absurdities, but the armies of the faithful reached the walls of Vienna.

To consider communism as a religious movement is indeed to enter the labyrinth of the Soviet Union by the right path. The Soviet Union is a godless theocracy, if such a contradiction in terms may be permitted.

The ultimate fate of such a faith is clear. Even Islam was wise enough to proclaim, "God is God", and to place the seventeen dark-eyed houris in Heaven; but communism has been sufficiently indiscreet to proclaim that there is no God and to promise heaven on earth. Nevertheless, the comparison with Islam is often illuminating. In particular, the primitive

primitive fanaticism of the communists recalls again and again the fanaticism of the early Mohammedans.

Like Islam during its first centuries of expansion, communism offers all men conversion or the sword. The works of Marx are its Koran. Lenin, who lies embalmed in the Red Square to be worshiped, is the second great prophet. Stalin is the third.

Just as fanatical Mohammedans were able to commit the most atrocious crimes with a happy sense of virtue in order to promote the interests of their faith, so today the believing communist is superior to all restraints of justice, truth, honor, kindness, or human decency. To lie or murder for the spread of the gospel of communism is a virtue. To forgive an enemy is a criminal weakness. Even the mass murder of millions is transformed into an act of piety by the simple process of calling it "the liquidation of class enemies".

Moreover, like early Islam, communism is a faith which is larger than any state unit which it may conquer or create. The ultimate repository of authority and power is the community of the faithful of all nations whose representative is the ruling prophet - the communist Caliph. Adoration and absolute obedience are his prerogatives. He is the embodiment of the holy spirit of communism.

The communist Caliph expresses his will through two organs of government - the Comintern and the

Soviet

Soviet State. As a result the Soviet Government is not a government in the usual sense of the word. It is but one agency for the expression of the Caliph's will. It reigns but does not rule. Hence the phenomenon, so bewildering to outsiders, of appeals to the Central Committee of the Communist Party over the heads of the leaders of the government.

To preserve the purity of the faith, the Party itself is purged and repurged constantly. At this moment it contains probably not more than one million and a half persons out of a population of 180,000,000. Stalin's aim is to give it the discipline and order of the Jesuit Order or the imaginary "Order of the Samurai" in Mr. H. G. Wells' "Modern Utopia".

It is true that Stalin is the most absolute dictator in the world; but it is also true that he is the representative of the Communist Party and the communist faith, and is no more free to follow his individual whim than any Caliph or Pope.

Belief in world revolution is at the core of the faith of the Communist Party. Neither Stalin or any other leader of the Communist Party has deviated in the slightest from the determination to spread communism to the ends of the earth. Frequently an appearance of compromise is produced by strategic maneuvers. Today, for example, the communist leaders consider

consider it advisable to talk of their respect for international law and international engagements, but their real views are expressed in the recent official publication entitled, "OCHERKI PO NEZHDOZHARODNOMU PRAVU (Essays on International Law)" in which international law is described as "a weapon of the policy of the proletarian state".

Today Stalin considers it sound strategy to support democratic forms of government in countries in which communism is still weak; but the meaning of that support was displayed by Dimitrov at the Comintern Congress in August, 1935, when he pointed out that at the moment the cause of communism could be promoted best by use of the tactics of the Trojan horse and warned his communist comrades that they were not good communists if they felt that it was indecent or unduly hypocritical to become the collaborators and pretended friends of democrats in order the better eventually to lead these democrats to the firing squad.

The problem of relations with the Government of the Soviet Union is, therefore, a subordinate part of the problem presented by communism as a militant faith determined to produce world revolution and the "liquidation", (that is to say, murder), of all non-believers.

There is no doubt whatsoever that all orthodox
communist

communist parties in all countries, including the United States, believe in mass murder. Moreover, the loyalty of a believing communist is not to the nation of which he is technically a citizen but to his faith and to the Caliph of that faith. To such men the most traitorous betrayals are the highest virtues.

In the history of the human race many nations have had to deal with citizens whose loyalty lay beyond the boundaries of their native land. To deal with such men by means of secret police and firing squads is traditional. But to deal with them while preserving the liberties which have been gained so painfully by western peoples since the Middle Ages is extraordinarily difficult. To adopt the methods of the Nazis is to sacrifice the freedom from fear of the State which is among the most precious conquests of civilization, and to slay our heritage in attempting to defend it.

Yet it must be recognized that communists are agents of a foreign power whose aim is not only to destroy the institutions and liberties of our country, but also to kill millions of Americans. Our relations with the Soviet Union, therefore, involve questions of domestic policy which can not be answered except on the basis of a careful estimate of the strength of world communism and the reality or unreality of its threat to our liberties and lives.

The

The territory which the communists hold today is a base uniquely adapted to their needs. One sixth of the surface of the earth is in their hands. And this vast land mass is so placed geographically that it is attackable only at its extremities, in the Far East and in Europe. Moreover, this territory produces every commodity necessary for human life except rubber, nickel, tungsten, antimony and tin. Recently the Soviet press has reported that experiments in growing rubber are expected to be successful and that immense deposits of nickel have been discovered. In consequence, the Soviet Union is, or may become shortly, more self-sufficient than any other nation.

The population of the Soviet Union is 130 million. Yet its area is so great that it is an empty land. Just as the free land of the West forced for more than a century an area which took care of the economic problems of the United States, so today Siberia is the dumping ground for all the problems of the Soviet Union. If Stalin desires to exile two million peasants from the Ukraine or 150,000 townfolk from Leningrad, there is plenty of room for them beyond the Urals - new land to till, new mines to dig, new railroads to build, new factories to serve, new cities to construct.

The Soviet Union has survived and will survive
the

the inefficiency and errors of the Soviet bureaucracy because of the vast riches of the earth within its boundaries. In spite of the inefficiency of its government, it is progressing far more rapidly than Nazi Germany for the simple reason that Hitler has no colossal virgin territory to exploit while Stalin has in his hands a continent the surface of which has scarcely been scratched.

I have reported so often to the Department on the economic situation in the Soviet Union and on its form of government that I need not burden this despatch, or anyone who is patient enough to read it, with further remarks on these subjects. I should like to say merely that progress continues to be extraordinarily rapid. The production of heavy industry for the first quarter of this year was 36% above the production for the first quarter of last year. The production of light industry was 25% above that of last year. If the Soviet Union can avoid war, production of all commodities will continue to rise rapidly.

Moreover, the time is not distant when the Soviet Union will become a dangerous factor in the field of international trade. The Soviet Government has not the slightest intention of abandoning its monopoly of foreign trade. It is attempting to

make itself as self-sufficient as possible and it will use its monopoly of trade ruthlessly to undercoll and injure its enemies and to assist its friends. It will not, in good faith, enter into any international agreements which have as their object improvement of the general economic condition of the world. It will, on the contrary, try to produce as much chaos as possible in the economies of capitalist countries in the hope that misery may beget communist revolution.

The standard of living in the Soviet Union is still extraordinarily low, lower perhaps than that of any European country, including the Balkans. Nevertheless, the townsfolk of the Soviet Union have today a sense of well-being. They have suffered so horribly since 1914 from war, revolution, civil war, and famine that to have enough bread to eat, as they have today, seems almost a miracle. Moreover, in each of the past three years, the quantity and variety of their food has increased and many varieties of merchandise which have been missing from Russia for years are now making their appearance in the shops.

The condition of the peasants has been but little improved; indeed, physically it seems to be worse than their condition in 1914. There are, of course, certain showplaces: highly successful and well-

organized

organized kolkhozes and sovkhoses. But the peasants have not yet adjusted themselves to the system by which the leaders of the Soviet Union hope to "proletarianize" them. Moreover, all that is being done to improve conditions in the cities, to build up industries, communications and the war machine, is being done at the expense of the peasants. Eighty-one percent of the revenues of the Soviet Government in 1935 were taken from the peasants by the simple means of keeping the price paid them for their products atrociously low - the Government taking the resulting profit on sales. Nevertheless, the land itself is rich, the peasants have been given some education and have been encouraged to develop an interest in sports; and among the young, at least, there is hope.

The difference in the point of view of youth and maturity in the Soviet Union remains great. The generation born since the Revolution has been shielded conscientiously from the intrusion of truth and subjected to forcible feeding of communist propaganda. The world beyond the confines of the Soviet Union has been pictured as a seventh circle of hell, and the young sincerely believe that the living conditions they enjoy today are superior to those enjoyed by any population anywhere. The old are wiser. But it is not to be forgotten that while the old die, the young come on forever. The number

of those who knew the relative liberty which existed under Tsar Nicholas II diminishes daily, the number of those who know only communism steadily increases.

Moreover, the young do not feel the hidden hand of the secret police always behind their necks as do the old. It is only when a man begins to have ideas of his own which disagree with the prevalent orthodoxy that he begins to feel the fear which is far more prevalent than the sun in this cold northern land.

Anyone in this country who cares for liberty and freedom from fear must think often of Voltaire's remark when, - asked what exactly he meant by his incessant slogan, "écrasez l'infame", - he replied, "I mean not alone the Catholic Church today in France but all privileged and persecuting orthodoxies." The Communist Party in the Soviet Union today is a privileged and persecuting orthodoxy. It is "l'infame". Those who protest, even those who are suspect for any reason, or no reason, receive a visit from the OGPU at night and disappear.

There is much in this regime of terror and suspicion which is communist, but there is also much which is Russian. The hack phrase about Russia used to run, "Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tatar". The hack phrase today runs, "Scratch a communist and you will find a Russian".

The reports written by the British Ambassador

of the time of Ivan the Terrible and Boris Goudonov resemble strangely reports which are written today by this Mission. The same is true of reports of the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great; and as the Department may recall, I sent recently a despatch (No. 1436 of March 4, 1936) which contained an accurate description of life in Moscow today but was composed entirely of excerpts from despatches written by The Honorable Neil S. Brown, the American Envoy to Russia in the years 1851, 1852, and 1853.

To speak of the Russians as "Asiatics" is unfair to the Asiatics. Both China and Japan created magnificent civilizations. The Russians have never created a civilization. They have never emerged wholly from the status of barbarians. Progress in this unhappy land has been made always by spasmodic and dreadful jerks. Ivan the Terrible was the first great reformer. He killed three-fourths of the clergy and three-fourths of the nobility in an attempt to set up a stable, centralized government. Peter the Great, in his attempt to westernize the Russians killed perhaps half the nobility and half the clergy. Stalin has followed this tradition. The fact that the peoples of this land have never known anything but tyranny and suffering, and that human dignity and character have always been conspicuous by their absence, helps to explain why they accept

accept so resignedly the present regime.

Russia has always been a police state. It is a police state today. The authority of the Kremlin rests on the strength of its army and the omnipresence of its secret police, no less than on the fervor of the convinced communists.

The secret police and the army are better fed, housed, and entertained than any other portion of the population. Their loyalty to the Soviet regime is unquestionable. And there is no longer reasonable doubt as to the strength of the Red Army. It numbers today nearly a million and a half men. Its material equipment in artillery, airplanes, and tanks is abundant in quantity though deficient in quality. It can not undertake offensive operations due to the fact that the railroads are still inadequate for the peace time needs of the country and to the equally important fact that there are literally no modern highways in the entire Soviet Union. But on the defensive, the Red Army would fight hard, well and long.

The only actual threat to the Soviet Union is the Japanese. All Litvinov's propaganda trumpeting to the contrary, the Soviet Government knows very well that Germany can not be in a position to make war on the Soviet Union for many years. Every

feasible

feasible route for German attack leads across Polish territory and the whole basis of Polish policy is never to permit the foot of either a German or a Russian soldier to be placed on her soil.

The Japanese threat is actual. But the Japanese have so bungled their relations with the Mongols, and the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army has increased so fast, that the Russians today are confident that a Japanese attack would end in destruction of the Japanese Army.

The single real fear of the communists is that their bureaucratic machine might break down under the strain of war. Dread of the Kremlin is so great that all Russian officials, except the highest, hesitate or refuse to make decisions. The life of the entire Soviet Union might well be clogged hopelessly in time of war by unsigned papers.

The chief weakness of the Soviet State today is, indeed, the inefficiency of the bureaucracy. The communist form of state requires a bureaucracy of exceptional ability. The Russians have always been and are bad bureaucrats. In consequence, extraordinary numbers of Jews are employed in all the Commissariats. Only one out of each sixty-one inhabitants of the Soviet Union is a Jew; but twenty of the sixty-one Commissars and Vice-Commissars are Jews.

The upper bureaucracy in nearly all Commissariats is Jewish. The Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade from Litvinov and Rosengolts down are almost totally Jewish. The Commissariat for Internal Affairs (OGPU) is under a Jew - Yagoda. So is the State Bank. And so is the Commissariat for Ways of Communication, which controls the railroads. The official news service (TASS) which supplies all the newspapers of the Union, is under a Jew - Doletski. The newly created Art Administration, which controls the entire artistic life of the country, is under a Jew - Karshentsev.

Only the Army is relatively free from Jews but there are many in the Ordnance Department.

This astonishing number of Jews in the better paid positions has not yet produced overt anti-semitism but there are many bitter comments on the fact that about 80% of those who can arrange to pass their vacations at Sochi, the expensive and fashionable summer resort on the Black Sea, are Jews. The strain of a long war, therefore, might produce a wave of violent anti-semitism, and increase the already notable inefficiency of the Commissariats.

To sum up: only a major war can stop the steady improvement of physical living conditions within the Soviet Union and the rapid growth in
strength

strength of the Soviet armies, industries, and State. Only crushing defeat in a major war can destroy the faith of the young in the communist system. It is safe to predict that within ten years, or perhaps five, the Soviet Union will be so strong as to be safe from attack by any nation or combination of nations.

What then? The line of communist advance in the East is easy to predict. The communists hope now that Inner Mongolia will feel the attraction of Outer Mongolia and join that State, which is controlled from Moscow. It is hoped now that Sinkiang will soon be sufficiently under control of Moscow to be set up as another "independent" state of the Outer Mongolian variety. It is hoped that from Mongolia and Sinkiang communism will eat its way steadily into the heart of China, using the Chinese Red Army as its teeth.

The Communists of Moscow do not expect early advances in the West. But they are ready to take advantage of any opportunity which appears. (Twenty young Spaniards, trained in Moscow in the technique of Bolshevik revolution, left Moscow yesterday for Spain.) The Bolsheviks do not expect communist revolutions in other parts of Europe except as a result of general European war. Hence
their

their desire to keep Europe divided and to promote enmity between France and Germany. They are convinced that, if either Poland or Rumania should become involved in war, social revolution would follow. They would then be ready to send the Red Army at once to assist any communist government which might be set up in either Poland or Rumania - even for a day.

In my despatch No. 730 of July 19, 1935, I discussed Soviet foreign policy at some length and as I have little to add to the remarks therein contained, I shall refrain from detailed comment, merely calling attention once more to the fact that to the communists all capitalist states are enemies. "Friendly relations" mean to the Soviet Government the relations existing during an armistice. During the armistice period and peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk the Bolshevik negotiators hated General Hoffman, the German representative, more bitterly than they hated Count Czernin, the Austrian representative. But both were enemies and they hated both. So it is today. Japan and Germany are hated more than England and the United States - but all are hated, all are enemies.

What then should be the policy of the United States with regard to the Soviet Government and the world communist movement?

We should not cherish for a moment the illusion
that

that it is possible to establish really friendly relations with the Soviet Government or with any communist party or communist individual.

We should maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union because it is now one of the Greatest Powers and its relations with Europe, China, and Japan are so important that we can not conduct our foreign relations intelligently if we do not know what is happening in Moscow. Moreover, in spite of all efforts to conceal the truth from foreigners, it is possible to obtain in Moscow considerable information as to the Soviet Union and the world communist movement.

We should use our influence quietly to oppose war in the Far East between the Soviet Union and Japan not only because of our moral opposition to war but also because, if there is a war, someone may win it. In case the Soviet Union should win, a Communist China would be inevitable. In case Japan should win, China would be completely subjected to Japan. If war comes between Japan and the Soviet Union, we should not intervene but should use our influence and power toward the end of the war to see to it that it ends without victory, that the balance between the Soviet Union and Japan in the Far East is not destroyed, and that China continues to have at least some opportunity for independent development.

development.

We should instruct our diplomatic representatives in Europe to use all opportunities in personal conversations to point out the danger to Europe of the continuation of Franco-German enmity and to encourage reconciliation between France and Germany.

We should attempt to promote our trade with the Soviet Union by direct bargaining of the sort involved in our agreement of July 13, 1935. But we should have no illusion that our trade with the Soviet Union may ever be stable or permanent. It may be cut off for political reasons at any minute. Therefore, we should not make loans or give long-term credits to the Soviet Union and should advise American industrialists against putting in expensive machinery to produce for the Soviet market.

We should realize that with every year that passes the products of the Soviet Union and the United States will become less complementary and more competitive. Soviet oil and grain will compete increasingly with our oil and grain. The Russian market for our cotton will decrease as the new Soviet cotton plantations increase their productivity. The market for our machines may increase until Russian industry improves in quality and productivity and is able to produce complicated machines of the highest quality.

quality. For a few years we may be able to sell the Soviet Union more than we buy from her but in the long run a fairly even balance of trade will be insisted on by the communists and if we are not ready to buy more than today we shall not be able to sell so much as we sell today.

Our Federal Government should inform itself as to the membership of the Communist Party in the United States and as to the relations between the American communists, the Soviet Diplomatic and Consular Representatives, and the other agents of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party in the United States: Amtorg, Intourist, Voks, International Red Aid, etc.

In our domestic policies, we should act on the realization that there is one fatal blow which can be struck at communism, not only in the United States but also in every other country in the world. The final argument of the believing communist is invariably that all the battle, murder, and sudden death, all the spies, exiles, and firing squads are justified because communist dictatorship is the only method which permits a modern economic machine to run at full speed and to find always an unsatisfied buying power, whereas the maldistribution of the national income in our system causes inevitably recurrent crises and unemployment. (The recent con-
clusions

clusions of the Brookings Institution of Washington as to the causes of our crises are, seriously enough, the same.) If we can achieve such continuous increases in the buying power of the masses of our population that our fullest possible production may find demand, the single effective plea of the communists will disappear. No town a much greater proportion of our national income each year into the pockets of those who have little so that there may be effective demand for the products of our fields and factories is, therefore, not only the moral obligation of a democratic people but also the most certain method of destroying the single intellectual justification of the Communist faith.

The keynote of our immediate relations with the Soviet Union should be patience. The communist movement in the United States today constitutes a potential danger but not an actual threat. We do not need to get excited about it. Our political relations with the Soviet Union are negative; but our trade is increasing. It is difficult to conduct conversations with the Soviet Foreign Office because in that institution the lie is normal and the truth abnormal and one's intelligence is insulted by the happy assumption that one believes the lie. But patience and diplomats exist for just that sort of difficulty.

We should neither expect too much nor despair of getting anything at all. We should be as steady in our attitude as the Soviet Union is fickle. We should take what we can get when the atmosphere is favorable and do our best to hold on to it when the wind blows the other way. We should remain unimpressed in the face of expansive professions of friendliness and unperturbed in the face of slights and underhand opposition. We should make the weight of our influence felt steadily over a long period of time in the directions which best suit our interests. We should never threaten. We should act and allow the Bolsheviks to draw their own conclusions as to the causes of our acts.

Above all, we should guard the reputation of Americans for businesslike efficiency, sincerity, and straightforwardness. We should never send a spy to the Soviet Union. There is no weapon at once so disarming and effective in relations with the communists as sheer honesty. They know very little about it.

Respectfully yours,

William C. Bullitt.

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In quintuplicate to Department.

WCB/co

PSF Russia

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1936.

Dear Mr. President:

Up to this time, Senator Glass has remained silent. I talked with his secretary this morning, who has not heard that Cary Grayson has made any impression on him. It seems that Glass has to be in Washington today, and I requested his secretary to tell him for me that he is regarded as the very best asset of the opposition, and if he cannot make a speech, he should submit to an interview and declare his earnest support of you and his strong desire for your reelection. The secretary promised to telephone me the result this afternoon, and I will hold this letter a few hours in order to inform you of anything I hear.

I notice there is now much consideration of what is possible to readjust our government activities so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of work and to effect economies. When I entered the House of Representatives in 1919, with the ardor of a new member almost at once I introduced a resolution calling attention to that subject -- a resolution you commended in a letter to me printed in the New York Times -- and soon there was a joint committee of investigation created, on which I served, made up of three Senators and three Representatives. The committee took a great mass of testimony that was printed in a large volume, and bills were introduced, but there was no legislation enacted. For obvious reasons there is much difficulty in enacting detailed legislation that would bring about what is desired,


and

The President,
The White House.

and I am firmly convinced that the wise and practical course would be for Congress to vest much more extensive authority in the President. When the committee mentioned was functioning, I did not favor the unification of the War and Navy Departments, but based upon what I have seen and learned since then, I am pretty strongly inclined to believe that is something that deserves very serious consideration.

Some time when you have a few minutes of comparative leisure, I think you will be interested in reading the enclosure, written by our Charge at Moscow, giving his impression of the recent trial which he attended. It is the best brief description I have seen of what was certainly one of the most remarkable trials that ever occurred. So far as I can recall, there is no record in either sacred or profane history of defendants charged with crime vying with each other in a very dramatic and eloquent way, not only to confess guilt, but to claim priority in doing what was done or sought to be done. When Mr. Troyanovsky was in my office not long ago, he seemed to be about as much at a loss as anyone else in explaining the attitude of the defendants, some of whom he knew well and rated very highly.

Yours very sincerely,



Enclosure:

Despatch from Moscow,
dated September 1, 1936.

P.S. Since the above was dictated, Glass' secretary has telephoned me that he thinks the Senator is prepared to do what is desired, and intends to write me.

R.W.M.

These documents are declassified
by authority of E. Taylor Parks'
letter of December 4, 1963.

May 7, 1964
CLS.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PSF Russia

No. 1850

Moscow, September 1, 1936.

Subject: The Kamenev-Zinoviev Trial.

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to my telegram No. 195, ¹¹⁶³⁰ August 27, 1936, relating to the trial and execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their alleged co-conspirators, I have the honor to inform the Department that a despatch setting forth the personal impressions obtained by myself at the trial and submitting summaries of evidence not published in the Soviet press is in course of preparation and will be forwarded to the Department at a later date. Unfortunately this Mission is hampered in the preparation of reports on this and

and other important subjects by the lack of stenographer-typists.

I feel that pending the completion and submission to the Department of a more detailed report regarding the trial and the circumstances surrounding it, I should without delay supplement my telegram referred to above with the additional information *set forth below.*

W. J. G.

The small former ballroom of the former Noblemen's Gatheringplace (now the House of the Labor Unions), in which the trial was held, was so arranged as to seat precisely 400 spectators. Three rows of seats in the center of the portion of the hall allotted to spectators were reserved for correspondents. These rows on the right of the aisle bisecting the center of the hall were given over to Soviet correspondents, and those to the left to foreign correspondents. Altogether 30 seats were reserved for "foreign correspondents." Of these seats, five were occupied by Soviet officials, six by members of the diplomatic corps, two by Soviet citizens taking notes for the American correspondents, four by foreign visitors who for some reason or another were given tickets of admission, and the remainder by the correspondents themselves. During the intermissions three of the Soviet officials present, who were members of the Press Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, were busily engaged in trying to convince the foreign correspondents that the trial was bona fide and the

Chief

Chief of the Protocol Section of the same Commissariat was usually occupied in talking along the same line to the diplomats. Assisting the members of the Press Section in endeavoring to influence the outgoing stories of the journalists were Mr. Kunits, an American citizen and member of the American Communist Party, who represents the NEW MASSES in the Soviet Union; Mr. D.E. Vendrov, formerly an American citizen but now a Soviet citizen, who represents THE JEWISH TELEGRAPH AGENCY; and Samuel Rodman, an American citizen who represents the London NEWS CHRONICLE and several American newspapers. Louis Fisher, the representative in Moscow of THE NATION and the BALTIMORE SUN, who is usually extremely helpful to the Press Section in propagating its views among foreign journalists and visiting foreigners, could not be present since he was engaged in conducting a group of tourists through southern Russia.

The small number of diplomats present is to be explained by the fact that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed members of the diplomatic corps who applied for tickets after August 17 that all available tickets had already been distributed. I had applied for two tickets on August 17 in the hope that they could be used by the various Secretaries on duty in the Mission. I was informed, however, that no diplomatic representatives, other than Chiefs of Mission, would be admissible.

The trial was beautifully staged. The three judges

Judges and their alternate, clad in uniform, sat behind tables on a high platform facing the audience. To their ~~right~~^{left} on a platform enclosed with a fence and guarded by four soldiers armed with rifles sat the 16 prisoners. To their ~~left~~^{right}, facing the prisoners, the State's Attorney, or Procurer, as he is called in the Soviet Union, sat behind a desk also on a high platform. to be expected was obvious.

The trial was conducted with dignity despite the fact that at times little witticisms on the part of the prisoners or of the other actors in the drama caused the audience, the judges, the Procurer, and even the prisoners themselves, to laugh. In spite of the scathing names applied to them by the Procurer, and the sarcastic remarks made from time to time by the Presiding Judge, the accused were in general treated with courtesy and consideration by the court officials. With the possible exception of Zinoviev, who appeared to be under considerable physical strain, they seemed to be in a good condition physically. They wore better clothes than the average Moscovite, some of them being almost nattily dressed. The Procurer, Mr. Vyshinski, was exceedingly well-groomed and highly theatrical in manner. He reminded one of Lionel Barrymore acting in one of his favorite rôles as a criminal lawyer.

The way in which the Procurer dominated the prisoners was impressive. They arose in turn and gave with only a few promptings from him the testimony apparently expected of them. His attitude was at times helpful,

helpful, at times almost threatening. The prisoners when testifying were apparently extremely careful not to enter into a dispute with him. They showed hesitation in answering some of his questions, as though they were not sure as to the nature of the reply expected. When such occasions arose he usually assisted them by reframing his question in such a manner that the reply to be expected was obvious.

As I observed the performance day after day I began to feel that I was looking at a circus director putting a group of well-trained seals through a series of difficult acts. The manner in which the prisoners, while testifying, anxiously watched the face of the Procurer in order apparently to assure themselves from its expression that they were making no mistakes and the way in which they hastened to correct themselves when they felt that they were not saying the proper thing were convincing evidence to me that they were under the absolute domination of the latter. The foreign correspondents and diplomats present who had never witnessed such a Soviet trial sat astounded as the various prisoners eloquently endeavored to convince their hearers not only that they were guilty of conspiracy to murder Stalin, Kirov, Voroshilov, and other prominent Party leaders, but also that they, themselves, were despicable, irredeemable characters, that they had acted under the instructions of Trotski, who was a traitor to the working classes of the world and an ally of the German Fascists, that the German Fascists, with whom

whom they had cooperated, were the vilest of reptiles, that Stalin had always been right and that the population of the Soviet Union and the world proletariat in general should never in the future doubt the wisdom of his policies, and that the Soviet Union as a truly socialist state was making wonderful progress in the direction of bringing happiness and prosperity to its inhabitants.

All the prisoners were more or less accomplished public speakers and their confessions were apparently in the nature of carefully memorized orations. Kamenev was the dominating personality of the group and by far the most effective orator. His calm intellectual face and his gray-white hair and well-trimmed beard, as well as his dignity of manner, reminded one somewhat of Chief Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme Court. Even while delivering his "last word," that is, the farewell address which each of the accused was permitted to make before the passage of the sentence, he maintained his composure and distinguished bearing. Although the effect of his oratory and presence was such as to cause a number of the foreign correspondents and even several of the apparently hostile Soviet audience to weep during his farewell address, his own voice broke only once, and then but slightly, when he referred to his three sons serving as Soviet aviators and expressed the hope that they would live to redeem the name of their father. Zinoviev, although apparently crushed and unnerved, also proved to be an effective

effective orator in spite of the fact that he was handicapped by lack of personality and by a high-pitched and almost whining voice.

In delivering their farewell addresses some of the accused did not maintain the high rhetorical level attained during their previous speeches. A number of them, including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Reingold, M. Lure, Pikel, and Olberg talked for from thirty minutes to an hour and a half with all the fervor of collegians engaging in an oratorical contest. Ter-Vagaryan, the Armenian, had difficulty in finishing his last speech. He was apparently suffering from nervous contractions of the throat which were only slightly remedied by the consumption of glass after glass of water.

The accused apparently expected the sentence of death. I was examining their faces carefully when it was passed and failed to note a sign of emotion on any of them. I am convinced, however, that at least some of them expected clemency in view of past services rendered to the cause of revolution or as a reward for the manner in which they had cooperated with the State in denouncing Trotski and the other accused.

It is extremely difficult for persons accustomed to the Anglo-Saxon methods of criminal procedure to accept as entirely bona fide trials of the type under discussion. It has been the belief for hundreds of years in countries accepting the Anglo-Saxon principles of law that to endeavor to determine the innocence or guilt

guilt of persons accused of crime by means of the extraction of confessions is likely to result in the obtaining by inquisitorial methods of statements of guilt from innocent persons. It is usually the custom in such countries, therefore, not to base the prosecution upon confessions extracted from the accused before the trial or to require the accused to testify against himself, but to determine his guilt largely upon the strength of evidence furnished by other persons. The Soviet criminal procedure system, judging from the more important public trials of recent years, appears, in practice at least, still to be based upon obtaining admissions of guilt from the accused before the case comes to trial and of confining most of the testimony to an oral restatement by the accused of confessions already made in writing. Since under a dictatorship of the type existing in the Soviet Union there are numerous effective devices for prevailing upon accused persons to confess to crimes of which they are not guilty, it is not difficult to understand why persons accustomed to Anglo-Saxon legal procedure should be somewhat shocked at what seems to them to be medieval methods of determining guilt, particularly when the accused are known to have given offense to the dictator himself. As stated in my telegram under reference, I have not been convinced from what I saw at the trial or from a careful study of the evidence presented that the accused were really implicated in a specific plot to kill Stalin

Stalin, Kirov, or other prominent Soviet leaders, that Trotsky ever gave instructions to his adherents to assassinate Stalin, or that the German police had connections with any of the defendants. In this connection it may be pointed out that the various defendants who allege that they had any connections in Germany with the German police were Jews of a pronouncedly eastern European type and that it is difficult to imagine that there should have been any relations between them and officials of the German Fascist Government. It may be added that eleven of the sixteen defendants were Jews and that all of the accused spoke Russian so well that if not of Russian origin they must at least have lived in Russia many years. The views expressed by myself are those of all the foreign diplomats present at the trial, as well as of the other Secretaries of this Mission and of the foreign journalists whom I consider to be most competent to judge matters pertaining to the Soviet Union. The Minister of Norway, who attended certain sessions of the trial and whose opinion is of particular interest since he is the representative of the country in which Trotsky is now residing, has informed me that he considers the trial to be a farce and that in his opinion the charges that Trotsky had participated in a plot to kill Soviet leaders had not been substantiated.

From such contacts as the Embassy has among the Russian population, it would appear that many Soviet citizens are also inclined to look upon the trial with skepticism.

skepticism. They are, naturally, careful not to reveal their true feelings except to persons in whom they have explicit confidence and at places where they are sure that they will not be overheard.

It is reported to the Embassy from sources believed to be reliable that hundreds of persons have been arrested on charges of disloyalty to Stalin and the Party and that some of them are being tried in secret at the present time. The announcement of the execution of all sixteen of the condemned men within 24 hours of the passing of the sentence has made a profound impression, and a wave of fear, almost equal to that noticeable following the assassination of Kirov in December 1934, is said to be sweeping over the country. It is understood that members and former members of the Communist Party who at some time may have been on friendly terms with persons now branded as adherents of Trotski or with any of the persons accused or mentioned in the trial are now terror-stricken. The effect upon that section of Soviet officialdom charged with dealing with foreigners is particularly marked. Foreigners have noted that many Soviet officials who a few weeks ago spoke to them with an air of self-confidence are now most diffident and are apparently afraid to come to any decisions without protracted consultations with their superiors.

Respectfully yours,

Loy W. Henderson
Loy W. Henderson
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

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