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Page 2
2-41

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Observations in Russia*

As related to Chicago
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By

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Russia is so big and so new to us, so many things are going on there which our previous training and education has not prepared us to judge, that no two people who come out of the country are likely to tell the same story. In some cases I found that two American engineers who worked together on the same job and lived together in the same apartment had totally different reactions to the Russian situation. One could tell you why it was succeeding and would continue to succeed; the other could tell you why it was failing and must ultimately fail.

Very few people who come out of Russia have travelled extensively in the country. Travel is difficult. Only those who have been there a long time are likely to have covered much ground, particularly off the beaten path. I talked to many tourists. I talked to engineers, American, German, Swedish, Danish, French and English, in various parts of Russia. Almost without exception they had seen only a small part of the country. Some have spent as long as two years in one city. Therefore, it is not surprising that we hear such a variety of stories about Russia. Then, too, much depends on what one undertakes to see. It was my business to study the industrial program.

If we were to lay a map of the United States on the part of Russia that I saw, we would find that I had covered the equivalent of a trip from New York to San Francisco and back, stopping at Wichita and Kansas City, and Pittsburgh, Pa.; a trip from Washington, D. C. to Florida in the south via Birmingham, Ala.; a trip from Butte, Montana to Phoenix, Arizona, stopping at Denver and Amarillo, Texas and Boulder Dam; with a five days' trip down the Mississippi River from Keokuk, Iowa to Shreveport, Louisiana; a trip by boat from Mobile to Galveston and a visit to the coal fields of Illinois. That gives you an idea of the amount of territory covered.

A word about my first impression of Moscow. One leaves Berlin on a good train, with Wagon Lite sleeper. Thirty-six hours later one is in Moscow. In the meantime you have traveled over land as level as our plains, scarcely a rise in the ground for 1,000 miles. You give up your passport on the Polish side of the border. Your baggage is given the once-over, you get your passport back and pass the last outpost of the Polish soldiers. Presently you pass a barbed wire fence which divides Poland and Russia, and are on the

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Red side, with a red flag, with Red soldiers lined up in the log barracks close to the border. In a few minutes you arrive in Negerecle, the customs station, a big, barren looking, log station, with long tables. Your baggage is gone over as it is in most customhouses, except that the process seems slower. Nobody speaks English, but you get your baggage through and pass out the other side to the Russian train. You have left the comfortable train for one more comfortable than ordinarily found in Russia but less comfortable than the European trains, -- wider gage, six feet. It doesn't make quite so much speed. You are on your way. You land in Moscow at eight or nine or ten o'clock in the morning in a station that is jammed full of people with all sorts of baggage. You find yourself in the midst of a great swarm of peasants who have come off the train, riding third class, with coarse bags of food and clothing, bed clothing etc., under their arms and over their backs. They seem to be moving everything but furniture. The language is strange. The thing is all new.

You go to a hotel. You find an interpreter. At last you are able to make yourself understood. You may or may not get a room that day. I got one that night, after long hours of argument.

My first impression -- "This is a terrible place. If I had the nerve to do it I would go back immediately." I didn't have the nerve.

Russia has reached the half-way mark in its five-year plan, a plan which purposes to lay the foundation for the industrialization of Russia that will make it the equal of any industrial country in the world. Nobody in Russia believes this result will be achieved in five years. Everybody realizes that it will require several five-year steps to achieve the goal. But a great start has been made. Hundreds of millions, even billions of rubles are being spent in Russia to build new plants of every conceivable sort. The only comparison that came to my mind as I went about Russia was that of our own country in the midst of the war when we were feverishly building plants, cantonments, and so forth, for the prosecution of the struggle. There is a terrific urge to get things done all over Russia. You feel yourself in a war atmosphere.

There is not an office (and there are great numbers of them in the principal cities like Moscow and Leningrad) that isn't jammed full of clerks and engineers and draftsmen and tracers. Every place you go people are in conference with this program or that program or this project or that project.

The business of the country is being operated by large trusts. A trust has control over all the activities and all the functions within a specific industry. There is one steel trust. There is one trust that controls all bus transportation. There is a trust that controls all street car transportation, one that controls all railroad transportation, and another that controls the chemical industry, the food industry, the leather industry, and so on. Many of these trusts have subdivisions corresponding to some of our large companies.

Then the activities of all these trusts, outside of agriculture, head up in what is called the Supreme Economic Council, referred to in Russia as V. S. N. H. These are the Russian initial letters of the Supreme Council of Economy. It was with the head of the Supreme Economic Council that I had my most interesting conversations in Russia. Before seeing him I had, on my own, visited several plants. After I had gotten a reasonable amount of background

I then went to him and discussed with him what I thought were some of the fundamental problems in Russia. After we had had that talk, I then met him on one of the biggest jobs in Russia, the Magnito-gorsk steel plant in Siberia. For the most part, however, my observations were made without assistance from anybody except a single letter of introduction which I dictated and he signed for me.

The question has been asked many times, "Can one see what he wants to see in Russia?" Many people told me before I went that one could see only what he was shown, and since I have come out many people have told me that one can't possibly see anything in Russia that the Russians don't want you to see. I don't know exactly what they mean by that. Not any of those people who have told me that have been in Russia. It is all second-hand information. But for myself I think it is only fair to the Russians to say that I saw anything and everything that I wanted to see. The only limitations were those of time and physical ability to cover the job.

In no case did I call up the director of a plant and ask him if I could come in. In no case did I even ask if it would be convenient to see the plant. When I wanted to go to a plant I went with my interpreter, and we got in. In many cases I went to plants that the interpreter hadn't even heard of. I even went to plants that I only knew about myself because I saw them as we passed along in an automobile. We went back and went into the plant.

Specifically, where did I go in Russia? After a week in Moscow visiting not only industrial plants but many of the museums that are extremely interesting because they afford a background without which one cannot understand Russia, I went to Leningrad, Nishni Novgorod where the Austin Company is constructing the new plant to build Ford cars and trucks, to Sverdloosk, capital of the Urals, and in the very heart of the non-ferrous metal mining district, to Chilibinsk where a new plant is being constructed to build the caterpillar type tractors, to Magnito-gorsk where a plant designed by Arthur McKee & Company of Cleveland is under construction, back over part of the same route, through Kazan and down the Volga River through Samara and Saratov and Stalingrad. In Saratov, incidentally, I saw a large combine plant under construction that nobody had mentioned to me anywhere in Russia. I saw it from the boat as we came down the river. When I found the boat was to be in dock about three hours, we got transportation and went over to the plant. From there we went to Stalingrad where I spent two days. I will come back to that because Stalingrad represents one of the most interesting phases of modern Russian industry.

Then I went to Rostov, north of the Black Sea, where in one single plant manufacturing agricultural implements, a new plant opened last year, there are 6,000 separate machines, practically all of them American machines, twenty-two buildings, three of the finest foundries I ever saw, - gray iron, malleable, and steel foundries, - as well as well-equipped forge shops, heat treating plants, assembly plants for rakes, wagons and all that sort of thing, a fine woodworking plant and the last word in the pre-treatment of wood before it goes into the plant. They are building a new large combine plant, with the design of which an American engineer is assisting.

From there I went to Gigant and Verblut and Seattle Commune. Seattle Commune is a farm of considerable acreage that was started in 1921 by Finnish-Americans from Seattle, Washington, who went to Russia -- some 300 of them -- and established this farm. They run it as a commune.

Gigant and Verblut, one of them an experimental farm and the other - Gigant - a big state farm, together cover about 500,000 acres. To see those properties I hired a car and spent from ten o'clock in the morning, having spent two hours with the assistant director, until half past eight that night riding through the farms. They were terrifically big enterprises. On one of those farms there is an agricultural school with 1,000 students. The consulting engineer there, an American from Iowa and California told me it is the finest agricultural school he knows -- and he has been teaching for some years in agricultural schools.

From there we went to Kislovodsk, a watering place in the Caucasus, which in the old days was a famous resort for wealthy Russians. It is a beautiful place. We haven't anything quite like it. It suggests Colorado Springs before it got shabby. At any rate it is a beautiful spot in the mountains, with good buildings, all built before the revolution, but now operated entirely by the trade unions for workers on their vacations. People are sent there when their health is not quite up to standard. In the hotel where I stayed there were 425 guests, all belonging to one of the trade unions. The business was run by a doctor.

From there I flew to Baku, on the Caspian Sea, the center of the oil business in Russia. On the way we flew over Grosney which is one of the newer fields, with thousands of wells, splendid looking plants for the maintenance of equipment, for the building of pipe and that sort of thing.

Baku itself is an old city. Oil was discovered there many, many years ago. It was being exploited in a small way by the Russians before the revolution, but since the revolution, of course, it has been opened up on a large scale. American oil men whom I talked to there pointed out many of the weaknesses of operation in the field. There is, of course, a great deal of wasteful operation there. No deep drilling has been undertaken. Wells are all too close together. Nevertheless they are taking out a great deal of oil. Thousands of men are at work all over that field.

From there we went to Tiflis, in the Caucasus, in the center of some of the mining operations in that area. It is an old city, founded in the fourth century, and looks it. I spent most of my time in the old quarter because there one still finds some of the evidences of private industry. Much of the small work, like blacksmithing and tinsmithing, shoemaking and dyeing of textiles, is done as it was hundreds of years ago, with small tools and small pots.

From there we went to Batum on the Black Sea, twenty miles from the Turkish border. It is there the pipe lines end that come out from Baku, and it is there the Standard Oil Company and the other companies dealing with Russia, get their oil, put it on ships and send it out.

From there we took a boat on the Black Sea, a boat equivalent to one of our D & C boats, a good cabin ship with two six-cylinder Diesel engines, built in 1930 in the yards at Leningrad, for Yalta in Crimea. Yalta is another of the summer resorts made famous in the old days by the wealthy Russians. There are beautiful places, beautiful homes, palaces, all along the northern shore of the Black Sea, Sukhum, Sochi, Yalta, and several other places. In Yalta the czar had a palace. All of those places were beautifully maintained, with the exquisite Black Sea at their front door, with the mountains rising in the back, and walled roads and walled yards. Gardens all over the hillsides, afforded grapes, cherries and that sort of fruit.

Yalta, like the other resort cities, is given over to the trade unions for rest and recreation. There again I saw what I saw in Kislovodsk, just crowds of people, every single room occupied, the streets crowded at night with people marching back and forth, and bathing along the shore the next morning.

From there I went by automobile across the Crimea to Sevastopol, and from Sevastopol to Alexandrovsk which is seven miles from Dnieperstroy, where the so-called Cooper dam is being built. Even in Alexandrovsk, the name of which I hadn't even heard up to the time we got off the train there, at three o'clock in the morning, I found a combine plant in operation and working a night shift.

At Dnieperstroy we found the dam well along toward completion. The day I was there they let the first gate down, with a view to letting the water in the dam. The water will rise all summer and this winter. Next year, according to the engineer's plans, the dam will be full. When it is finished they will generate 780,000 horsepower. They were just setting the scroll rings that I saw at Newport News last October, when I visited the Newport News ship-building yards.

On the other side of the dam I saw two things: first, well arranged locks which will make that river navigable for many miles up, and then over an area of between twelve and fifteen square miles there is this gigantic new industrial enterprise which will be known as Combine-at, designed to manufacture aluminum, iron, steel, new agricultural equipment, combines, chemical materials, brick, cement. Some of the buildings are well along. Some of them are just being started. There, as everywhere else, simultaneously with the building of these plants goes on the construction of new houses, all of which are fairly well standardized into apartment houses for somewhere around sixty families. A whole city has already risen on that side of the Dnieper where three years ago, the Cooper Engineers told me, there was nothing but farm land.

From there we went to Kharkov which is the capital of the Ukraine, one of the richest sections of Russia. Again, we had an opportunity to talk to American engineers as well as to Russian engineers. It was in Kharkov I saw one of the most interesting things that I came upon in Russia. Down a side street I encountered a clothing factory. Having spent some years in the clothing business a few years ago, I was interested. I went in and found they had 5,000 employees in a building that was originally used for other purposes. I think I had a little more difficulty convincing those fellows that I ought to see the plant than I did with anybody else. Four or five comparatively young, shrewd men, in their early thirties, sat around the desk and talked and argued with the interpreter. As soon as they were convinced we might see the plant, they brought out their figures on costs, standards of production etc. They amazed me by saying they had their plant laid out in such a way as to take forty-seven seconds for every operation in the manufacture of a coat. Well, that didn't seem very reasonable. They also told me they had the plant conveyORIZED. I couldn't quite understand that. We went into the plant; we went in late in the afternoon, an hour before the day shift quit and stayed an hour after the night shift came on. I found that what they told me was true, that they had so organized and standardized the garment, that each operation took exactly forty-seven seconds. If anybody was a little slow, somebody had to wait. If anybody was faster, he might rest. There wasn't very much variation. I observed the operations carefully. It enabled them to manufacture coats, not quite as good as our own, not quite so well tailored, but good

enough for people who do not have enough clothing anyway, for less than we manufacture them, with less time, and with practically no work in process, because every operation, as it was finished, was passed to the next person. Instead of having physically conveyerized the plant, they conveyerized it as to method. In other words, every garment passed from one person to the next without any delay and without any extra handling.

We found a somewhat similar thing in a shoe factory in Rostov where 6,000 people were turning out 20,000 pairs of shoes a day. Our guide in that particular plant was the head of what they called the norm department, that is, the department that sets the production standards -- a very capable girl who, when she found I had some experience in that field, wanted us to meet some of the other officials of the company. She was especially interested to know how to apply motion study methods.

From Kharkov we went into the Dunbaz where some of our American mining engineers are assisting with the rationalization of Russian coal mining. Allen and Garcia of Chicago have a corps of engineers there, and Stuart of Stuart, James and Cook of New York, have a group. One or two other American engineering firms are in or have been in the Dunbaz. There I had an opportunity not only to see the top works but to go underground in the mines. They have a long way to go in Russia to put their mining on as modern a basis as it is in America. They know that, but they are making considerable progress.

From this little mining town we went to Stalina and to Meekvka. Stalina is one of the oldest steel towns in Russia. Perhaps fifty years ago a man named Hughes, a Welsh-American, got British capital and organized this steel plant in Stalina and developed the mines around there. In fact, the town, until the revolution, was called Hughesovka. It is an old mill, a good deal like our mills were thirty or forty years ago, but it is being modernized. A new pig-casting machine was being put into operation while I was there. They have increased the power plant. They have modernized two of the blast furnaces, and altogether there are evidences about the place that in a few years it will be quite as modern as any of our old plants that we would undertake to rationalize.

I learned, as I did in many other places, that they had almost twice as many employees as they had before the revolution. I was prepared for that, because it is a fact that the Russians at present do not produce as much per man per day as we do in this country. I should say offhand it may take anywhere from three to six Russians to do the same work that would be done in this country by one man. I don't think that will always be true, but that is the situation today.

From Stalina we went to Meekvka, another plant, the same sort, opened by the French at about the same time. There again we found a modernization program in effect. A new pig-casting machine had already been installed under the supervision of an American blast furnace man. Fourteen new open hearths were being erected, to be ready next year.

Bill Harris, an American blast furnace man who had spent four years in India and more or less knocked around the world, a hard-boiled sort of fellow, told me he pointed out to the Russians after he had been there a short time, that the force report showing the number of men at work on the blast furnace showed sixteen men, whereas in America, on a furnace of similar capacity, they would have only three men. Bill looked at the force report the next day

and it showed "three men and thirteen students." That is characteristic of many things in Russia. Nobody wants to be caught in a position of inferiority to the best practice that he knows about any place else, if he can get out of it.

Then, too, practically every job in Russia is actually overloaded today because they are preparing for this rapid expansion, which leads me to their plan of education as I observed it in many places. They realize that they have got a huge task to change from an agricultural country to an industrial country, a terrific job to remold the thinking of millions of peasants accustomed to the slow work of small strip farming, either to collective farming, which calls for a high degree of mechanization, or to work in industrial plants. Therefore, all over the Union they have industrial schools. They are putting their emphasis, of course, on the youth in Russia. Starting out with what they call the Central Labor Bureau in Moscow, where they have a training school that is theoretically fine but practically not very valuable, except that it does stimulate thinking and gives some degree of training on machines, they build into every factory that they erect, a school, and this school is more important in Russia today than the old schools for regular curricula. They take it more seriously.

Curiously enough, these schools built into these plants are operated jointly by the Supreme Economic Council and the Commissar of Education. They work together on the curricula. They work together in the administration of these schools. These schools are designed to give boys and girls half-time instruction in the classroom and half-time on the job. They speak of it over there as the Henry Ford idea, carrying out more or less the theory that Ford has expounded in this country, that much of our education is wasted because boys and girls come out of our schools without knowing anything about industry. That will not be true of Russia because they hear, see and think almost nothing but industry and work. All over Russia there is propaganda for work, propaganda for the development of specialists. You will find it everywhere, in stores, on the streets, in the plants, on the walls, on the cars, in the stations.

In some plants I saw excursions of school children from seven years to ten years of age. In one place, out at Agitostroy, I noticed a group of school girls, about twelve to fifteen years, dressed about like our school girls would be, handling brick. I inquired first from the Russian engineer with whom I was spending a couple of hours and later from the American engineers who had been there for a year and one-half, who they were. They were school girls out on their rest day, giving their rest day to the plant. They were carrying brick for the bricklayers -- all girls, no boys in that party.

I have driven through the streets of Moscow when you would pass perhaps thirty or forty boys and girls with transits and instructors, groups of three or four or five with a transit, making their studies. They are creating engineers. Obviously they are not going to be as good engineers as the old engineers were under the old Russian system, so far as theory is concerned, but they will at least have an acquaintance with industry, and they will enter industry with an eagerness that we are more or less unaccustomed to. So much for education.

Transportation. What is the situation with regard to transportation in Russia? One hears all sorts of things. In the first place, practically every mile of Russian railroad is single track. Practically all of it was

laid at the time there were no heavy engines or heavy cars, and there is little ballast. Cars are small and light; engines are small and light, much smaller than ours. The speed of trains is not at all equal to ours, and the delay at stations is much greater than our own. But I did find that almost universally they are building long side tracks, miles and miles of long side tracks. It is an intelligent way to go about the double tracking of a railroad. It won't take much to double track a great many of the railroads in Russia. They are also building many, many miles of new railroad. I rode for some thirty hours on one of these new roads, built about twelve months ago. But there are miles and miles and miles of new roads going back into chemical plants, back into plants for the preparation of timber and so forth. Every place we went we found the side tracks loaded with cars that themselves were loaded with merchandise. They had lumber and logs. They had machinery coming from the ports. They had wheat; they had seed. They had what not. In many cases they had army supplies, carloads of portable kitchens and small guns and that sort of thing. But everywhere the trains are jammed.

Airplanes -- some, yes. I flew twice, once 1900 kilometers, and another time about 1,000 kilometers. In both cases the planes were off on time and arrived on time, just as the trains started on time and arrived on time. I dare say neither one starts on time or arrives on time in the winter. I was there in favorable weather, arrived in April and left just before the beginning of July.

Boats -- plenty of boats, good boats on the Volga River and on the Black Sea, and they operate, and operate on schedule. We were late going down the Volga because the river was way out of her course, as a result of the heavy snows of the previous winter just melting. Incidentally, it was interesting to note going down the Volga that we passed scores and scores of log rafts anywhere from one-quarter mile to a half mile long. The food was not so good on the Volga boat. Fortunately we had taken our own.

Street cars -- in the cities, crowded everywhere, all the time. It is almost impossible to get on, much less get a seat. An interesting thing: They have no difficulty collecting fares on the street cars. An inspector may get on the car anywhere and if the rider cannot show a receipt, he may be fined up to 100 rubles. In those crowded cars people are jammed together, and I have seen the fare passed from the front clear back to the conductor and the receipt passed back from hand to hand. Nobody in Russia will ride on a street car without a receipt. The cars are operated by women. I never saw our conductors handle a crowd as efficiently as those women handle these jamming throngs. I rode on a lot of street cars in different places, as far as 2,000 miles apart.

Buses -- they are getting them. Roads aren't good. But there are buses in all of the large cities, and as these new industrial plants develop within seven and eight and ten miles of the cities, as they are doing at Rostov, Kharkov, Stalingrad and many other places, they must expand their bus service. Italian and German buses seemed to me to predominate. I saw only one comfortable bus, an Italian bus that I rode in outside Stalingrad, which was the equal of the best buses we have here.

Taxis -- practically none anywhere. Sometimes you go into a city and there is only one car in the city, which accounts for the fact that I walked more than I have in twenty years. Droshkies -- yes. It takes two hours to bargain with a fellow who knows he is going to charge half what he asks, and he knows you are going to walk away and he will follow you. It is the most

annoying thing in the world. Some of them are so old that they carried the czar around when he was a small child. Some of the uniforms are the uniforms that they used when the czar was a boy, with this old bustle business. They must have been gorgeous things in their day like the czar's own uniforms.

Living conditions -- there isn't anywhere near enough housing in Russia to take care of modern Russia's requirements. In spite of all the houses and apartments that have been built in the past two years, and thousands of them have been built, there is a terrific housing shortage everywhere. Even in these new centers I have seen as many as five and six and seven people living in one small room. It will take a long time for Russia to catch up with her housing needs.

Of course, almost everywhere I went the job was only in the process of building. Therefore, the barracks were still in existence. For instance, in Magnito-gorsk, I have it on good authority from the records as well as from the American engineers who went in there early, that fifteen months ago it was only grazing land. It happens to represent somewhat of a saucer in the hills, approximately five miles in diameter. It was grazing land. The Don Cossacks had special privileges there. Today there are 72,000 people living in that community, almost all, of course, in barracks, most of them in wooden barracks, some in tents. The Socialist housing program is going slowly. Nobody is living in the apartments yet. But 72,000 people had to be taken care of in that short time. In fact, they had to be taken care of in a very few months. Forty thousand of those people, men and women, are working on the job.

Excavation alone on that job represented 5,500,000 cubic meters. That is the total excavation on that job alone. When they have finished they will have a plant designed to produce 2,500,000 tons of steel. They are beginning by building blast furnaces and coke ovens. By the way, Koppers has a group of men out there who are getting along better with the Russians than almost anybody I met.

Labor -- everybody in Russia tells you there is a shortage of labor. On the basis of their present efficiency, there is. I was quite frank in my talk with Russian officials everywhere, in saying that in a country where it took from three to six or seven men to do one man's work, quite naturally they had a shortage of labor. They really have a shortage of efficiency and management. When they learn more about management, when individuals and groups are more efficient, they are not likely to have a shortage of labor.

Men and women do the same work for the same pay. There are almost as many women found on construction jobs as anywhere else. About thirty-five per cent of the workers on the Kharkov tractor plant, for instance, scheduled to open in October, were women, right in the midst of construction, digging ditches, mixing cement, sifting gravel, sand, everything. They drive tractors; they do anything that men will do. Not all but a great deal of the maintenance-of-way work on the railroad is done by women. I saw them running steam hammers in plants as old as the Putilov plant, and, of course, in the machine shops they are just as numerous as they are in our own shops here in America. On the whole, I found that the American instructors say they learn quicker; they really think they are more efficient than the men.

I said a word a little while ago about Gigant and Verblut, these two very large farms. There is a closer relationship between industry and agriculture in Russia than we recognize in this country. In the first place, the revolution can't be a success unless the peasants are as satisfied as the city workers are. This was recognized very early, in spite of the fact that the earliest revolts in Russia were organized by the peasants. In fact, the backbone of the revolution for 200 years was among the peasants in Russia who were serfs. The war and perhaps the orientation given by the revolutionary philosophy, by Lenin himself, took the play away from the peasants, as it were, and put the power, at least the early power, into the hands of the workers in Leningrad and Moscow and old Ekaterinburg, and in Baku. The workers really gave the big push to the 1917 revolution, but, as I say, it was recognized by all the leaders that without the support of the peasants, the revolution itself could not be an ultimate success. That accounted, of course, for Lenin's New Economic Policy, just before he died, which gave the right and privilege of trading to various groups in Russia. It was meant to allay peasants' dissatisfaction. The story is a long one. You are familiar with it. "Humanity Uprooted" by Hindus is one of the best stories in that general field. But the fact remains that there must be close coordination between the peasants and the industrial workers if the revolution is to continue to be successful. That is recognized throughout Russia.

What did the city workers promise the peasants for giving up their land, for giving up their old method of farming and of individual trading? They offered to give them machines to produce large quantities of grain with small amounts of labor. That accounts for the fact that the biggest emphasis in Russia today is placed on the development of agricultural machinery. All over the land you find these agricultural machinery and tractor plants starting up. They are situated in places that are strategic from the political point of view rather than from the industrial point of view. Rostof is right at the very base of the Ukraine, the richest wheat land in Russia. There they have built one of their largest agricultural implement factories. At Kharkof, the capital of Ukraine, again, another big plant to make tractors -- Stalingrad, along the Volga, Cheliabinsk, out in Siberia, in the very heart of Siberian farming area. So it goes all over. These are spotted so that the peasants can see the tractors come out or can be told by local people and local papers that they are coming out and are coming into their area.

So we find a very much greater effort to coordinate the activities of industry and agriculture in Russia than we are likely to find even here at home.

Quality and quantity production. It is a little early to say definitely just what Russia will mean in the world of commerce ten or fifteen or twenty years hence. This whole plan was conceived by dreamers, by men whose whole life had been devoted to a study of revolutionary philosophy. It was conceived by what they call in Russia, party men, theoreticians. Therefore, party men and theoreticians had the top places in the early days of this five-year program, but as they began to spend money, send money outside for machinery, and as they began to put this machinery into place, as they began to compare accomplishment with the plan, it dawned on a good many people in Russia that while theory is a fine thing, and while philosophy is important to the revolution, the realities of economics meant that somebody with practical industrial experience must have something to say in the guiding of this work. That is really at the base of this so-called new statement of Stalin's about recognizing individual efficiency and listening to the advice of outside

engineers, and so forth. But what brought this to a head? It seems to me that this situation is responsible. The Stalingrad plant was the first of the tractor plants to be put into operation. The building was erected by an American. A Russian commission came to the United States, looked over plants here, went out to Ford's and saw what had been done at Dearborn. They said, "We want for Stalingrad the architect who designed and the erector who put up that building." They hired John Calder, the erector. He went to Russia. Without having another English-speaking person on the job, he erected the steel three months in advance of schedule.

Before the job was done he went to Ivanoff who was the director and a very competent executive and said, "You had better get your machinery here."

Ivanoff said, "It is no use, you won't have the building done."

"Yes, we will. We are going to have it done in such-and-such time."

Finally, the building was completed and it laid idle some three or four months before they got the machinery and put it into operation. That went through Russia like an electric spark. Throughout the whole country people were told, "Ah! See what we can do. See what we did in Stalingrad. We built the plant three months ahead of schedule. We will finish the plan in two years." They brought in machinery, and they brought in peasants and brought in some 437 men from Detroit, some foremen, assistant foremen, job setters, die-makers, and mixed them with the Russian peasants. The first thing they knew, there was a great mess. The plant was designed for 154 tractors every day, one every eleven minutes. It limply and lamely began to turn out a lot of junk. The machines got loose and some were abused and some were out of order, and they were short this material and that. They were taking from one job to put on another.

Presently they were getting six, seven or eight tractors a day, just groping along. It went for some months before they got up to fifteen or sixteen, with the result that a newspaper in Moscow, Pravda, sent a commission down there, also sent reporters who could sit on the job and get all the facts. They began to burn them up. Before I went to Stalingrad, I began to see this in the paper. I didn't need any translator to tell me what the problem was, because big charts showed what they had produced yesterday and the day before that and a month ago, and compared this with schedule. That, plus a little translation, gave me the whole story. I was able to say to the director when I talked to him, when he said, "Oh, yes, you got your criticism of Stalingrad in America," "No, I didn't. I got it from Pravda which is your own party mouthpiece."

The result was a shake-up. Some of the Americans were sent home because they weren't efficient, and others went because they didn't want to stay. They began to take better care of the machines and began to organize the maintenance department under the direction of a competent American. Many things happened, with the result that within three months the production went up first to forty and then to approximately fifty tractors. Even so, all those tractors are not entirely satisfactory.

It was the best lesson that Russia could possibly have had. If that plant had started out as they thought it would because they had the last word in American machinery; if it had started out producing anywhere near the schedule for which it was planned, they would have been ruined. They would

have gotten the mistaken notion that you can press a button, and that peasant boys could operate these highly complicated machines. But now they realize that this is not possible. Hundreds and hundreds, even thousands of Russian engineers have been sent to Stalingrad to study that situation, and the experience of Stalingrad is beginning to penetrate throughout Russian industry.

The Russians have learned more in Stalingrad than they could possibly have learned in ten years without that experience. They couldn't blame the machinery. They still say it isn't designed right. That is characteristic of these Russian engineers, all of whom know a great deal more about design than even the combined engineering talent of nations that have been at it for hundreds of years. But they couldn't very well blame the machinery because similar machinery in other countries, even in Europe, was turning out a great deal more production.

Some other time we will talk about "Russian engineers versus American engineers." Perhaps I ought to say this now, no two American engineers have quite the same experience in Russia. I talked to many of them in different parts of Russia. I saw them when they were going in to start their jobs. I saw others who were going out after five months and getting their contract cancelled. I saw others who had been there four years. I saw others who were going back on their second contract, after having come out for a two week's vacation. I spent many hours with them. I was on the job with them. I saw them everywhere except on the trains. On the trains I encountered Americans only once except from Berlin to Moscow and return.

Many American engineers ought not to go to Russia. They are not equipped either technically or psychologically to go. Some of the men who were getting on best in Russia were not good engineers. One or two who are termed engineers but who are not engineers at all, are darn smart fellows, good executives, good business men. They have knocked around. They know how to get along with people. Others who are among the best technical men anywhere don't get along. They either want to come out or ought to come out. You get into all kinds of situations. One of the things I hope we can do is probably prepare some sort of an article for our journals that will say a word about that situation, because there are so many fellows, under our economic depression here, who think they would like to go to Russia. It is a nice trip, a trip to Europe, and a lot of romance about it, and so forth. It is not so hot. The food isn't very good, and it is certainly different from anything we have here.

Recreation: There is very little recreation in Russia for anybody. There are parks, of course, and people go to the parks. You see them in the parks in the evening. There are practically no games. They are talking about a golf course down in Magnito-gorsk for the foreign engineers, and they may get one. They have plenty of land.

There is horse racing in Moscow, the only thing in Moscow I missed that I am sorry about. They race from five o'clock in the evening until ten o'clock. It is daylight until ten o'clock. The place is crowded. They have pari-mutuel. I never did get there, although my friends went and I go clear out to Arlington here and take hours to do it. There I could have gone in a few minutes.

Everybody in Russia is either studying something or teaching something. I think that is pretty generally true. They certainly go to school a lot. Everybody has a brief-case under his arm, every boy and girl and engineer. I met a Russian engineer on the train. In his Russian and my English he explained to me that he was designing a new excavator to be a better excavator than one of our fifty-ton machines. He showed me the drawing which was copied. He was complaining because some of the drawings he got, some of the catalogs didn't have all the details, and they had to tear a machine down and measure it. Quite naive. He pulled down his brief-case and I thought, "Here is where I am going to see some more drawings, perhaps of the plant," but all he had in it was a loaf of bread and some bologna.

Workers' clubs: Along with the building of plants and houses and schools go what they call workers' clubs or cultural clubs. I found them everywhere in Russia. You have seen pictures of them, large buildings, the so-called new German modernistic architecture, not very handsome from the outside but efficient, with a theater, that will hold from 1,000 to 2,000 people, depending on the size of the plant and the size of the town, a great many school rooms full of exhibits and charts. If any child in Russia doesn't know exactly how many more acres of wheat can be raised on an Ukrainian field than on a field in Illinois, it is not the fault of the Russian government. They have every conceivable bit of information about every phase of our life, health, agriculture, dairying, industry, the difference between the strength of materials, and everything you can think of, on charts in all these places. There are thousands of boys and girls and men and women in these places at night. You don't see many peasants. I say again that the peasants don't participate. These are for city and town people.

Theaters -- yes, in the cities. I went to the Ballet twice in Moscow. It is almost the equivalent of the old Russian Ballet with which some of you are familiar. It is crowded from top to bottom. Who goes? Who gets the tickets? The tickets are passed out in workshops. Perhaps some plant exceeded its schedule or did something else, and 600 tickets go there, and 400 here and 300 there. It is just an ordinary working crowd. Half of the men have their boots on, and few take their caps off. The women are dressed a little bit better than the men, usually, but they come in from all over the town. I went to the opera "Eugene Onegin." The opera house was crowded. There was a long wait between acts, and the people would go out and drink tea and wander around. There were two revolutionary plays at the Meyerhold and Art Theaters. Meyerhold is recognized as one of the outstanding artists in all Europe. These are old theaters modernized and simplified. Upstairs there was a model of the stage setting for every play produced recently and those that were planned to be played for the next year or so. This was in charge of an actor too old to act but enthusiastic about his new responsibility. The revolutionary plays like "The Last Fight" and "Bread" have a political significance. "The Last Fight" has to do with the military situation and "Bread," for instance, is a propaganda play for the collectivization of farms and the technic that should be used in the development of collectives. Interesting plays. The finest combination of motion picture effects and the ordinary stage drama that I ever saw. When they want mass action they throw on the screen the motion picture and then it fades out and you are back in the play again. The orchestras are very good. These are in the larger cities. The smaller places don't have so many theaters, although they have traveling troupes such as we have here, stock companies, that go up and down the Volga and elsewhere.

Reading. Everybody in Russia is reading. Newspapers circulate the same as they do here. You find them on all corners. Books are rather crudely put together, but all have a technical slant. You find in them all kinds of drawings of gas engines and tractors and what not as part of the whole scheme.

Museums are well maintained. I talked to several authorities on museums, Germans and Americans who had been asked by the Russian Government to look at Russian museums. One archaeologist, a Harvard man, well known, was just coming out after having made an appraisal of some of the art work in Russia. The old palaces have been turned into museums, and, of course, utilized to the fullest extent for propaganda for the new life.

Religion is out. There is no Sunday. You almost never see anybody in church. Occasionally one or two people drift in and out, but there is no such church-going as we have in this country.

A word about two other things. One is the May Day parade. The activities in Moscow on May Day began between half past seven and eight o'clock in the morning on Red Square. I got there early. I stayed through until about twelve o'clock. During that time it was a military spectacle. The Red Army was in. They had all the various divisions of the army, the functions of the army, with airplanes overhead, the cavalry and artillery, and what not, and a lot of drilling and the taking of the oath by the new men, and so forth. Then started the parade, that is, the parade of the proletariat, the parade of the workers, men, women and children, a parade that started through the Square at about twelve o'clock and finished about ten minutes to six at night. I didn't stand up, although I had a ticket, and my ticket entitled me to stand up all day, not to sit down, because nobody sits down. They stand up straight between twelve and six. At half past twelve I went back to my hotel. I had a window overlooking the entrance to the Square and could see the thirty-two lines, the eight lines of four each, that went through. Bronx-like I lay on my stomach in the window sill from one o'clock until ten minutes to six and counted people. That just gives you some idea of how they turn out on a day like that. Of course, it is true that everybody was expected to parade. Word went down the line in these factories that they were supposed to be in the parade, and they were in the parade.

I made up my mind before I came out that I would see Lenin's mausoleum. Lenin is buried in Red Square, immediately in front of the Kremlin, the Kremlin itself being the old czar's headquarters, before they moved to Leningrad. Ivan lived in the Kremlin and so did many other czars of Russia. Just outside Kremlin Wall is this gorgeous mausoleum of black and brown marble, very simple in design. Lenin lies in a glass case downstairs, with a soldier standing at attention at his head and one at his feet. He looks perfectly natural; as you probably gathered from what George Bernard Shaw or Lady Astor said, he looks like a man who had just died or perhaps wasn't quite dead. He has a fine, intellectual head.

The mausoleum is open two hours a day, every day in the week, usually from seven to nine. I never hit it without running into a big crowd. I was told I could get a special pass that would allow me to go in without waiting in line but I didn't want to do that. The night before I left, I went out to the Square at eight o'clock. People had been going in for an hour, and the line then was almost a mile long, not in one place because they worked a snake-line up and down the Square. I joined the line. At two minutes to nine I got in. The crowd entertained itself by watching the clock on Kremlin wall and checking

progress of the line against time. In fact, I learned again to count in Russian by listening to people discuss the possibility of being left outside. There were 1,000 people back of me when I went in.

That has been going on for some two or three years. It is always that way. How long it will continue, I don't know. There were all kinds of people in that line. Nobody asked them to go; you don't have to do that. People say, "How long is it going to last?" and all that business. Of course, nobody knows. Nobody knows, I suppose, the inner recesses of the Russian's mind. But I came away with the impression that we know entirely too little about Russia, that we have been quite completely misled, most of us, by the ordinary reports that we read about Russia. The ordinary observer, even the newspaper correspondent, frequently misleads us because he puts too much emphasis on non-essentials.

But looking at it from our point of view, that is our interest in industry, I have a feeling that American business men ought to give much more serious consideration to Russia than they have been giving. I think they ought to shake out of their minds the ordinary rubbish that is handed to them many times by people who have more to gain by keeping them disturbed about Russia, or misled by Russia than they have by giving them anywhere near the truth. People say, "Should we be in business in Russia?" I say, "We are in business in Russia." There are hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of American equipment all over Russia. We are already in Russia. It is too late to ask the question whether we will do business with Russia. We have got a lot of money invested in Russia. There are many ramifications to the problem that I haven't even touched upon.

Russia is determined to create for the people some means of life. They have made headway. They have made headway along the lines of consolidating the interests of a hundred separate races found in European Russia in the Caucasus, the Urals and Siberia. A lot of people who really weren't Russians in the beginning are closer together than ever before.

Talking again about our approach to it, I am not saying people should give them credit. I am not saying that. That isn't the thing. That is for each concern to work out for itself, but I do think that business men ought to realize that we are now in business in Russia. We have extended a terrific amount of credit. The Russians want more credit, they want longer credit. They play one nation against another; they can do it. They know how to take advantage of our economic depression as well as that of Germany and England and Italy; they know how to do it. They are much keener psychologists. They are much keener bargainers, on the whole, than are our business men.

They have another advantage. Business, politics, industry and education are all together in Russia. The whole thing is all welded into one single knot, not scattered all over. A small group of men in Russia can talk to you about any particular situation. They have to have a meeting of only thirty or forty to have a meeting of the responsible executives of all industry and agriculture in Russia. They don't have to get 10,000 men together and have them appoint committees down, down, down, down until the committees are so far removed from the original plan that they themselves don't know what they are negotiating about. It is not so in Russia. Thirty or forty men in one room can talk to you about all the problems that Russia has with regard to the rest of the world. That is a lot to think about.

X

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 24, 1941. For the President, Secretary, and Under Secretary.

Relates his discussions with roving Japanese ambassador, Matsuoka and discusses his impressions of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Japanese aims and policies in China.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 921-922.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 3, 1941. For the President, Secretary, and Under Secretary.

Describes a meeting which took place between Matsuoka, Stalin, Molotov, and the Japanese Ambassador, and states that no "business" of any kind was discussed.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 929.

X

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 8, 1941. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary.

Relates a conversation with Matsuoka in which he, Matsuoka, described an interview with Hitler and Ribbentrop. In this interview the Germans discussed at length their relations with Japan, Italy, and Russia.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 932-934.

X

The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 9, 1941. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary.

Transmits a letter from Matsuoka to himself (Steinhardt) asking for a paraphrased abstract of Steinhardt's cable to Washington discussing Matsuoka's views. Also discusses his views on Japan-China relations.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 934-935.

X

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 11, 1941. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary.

Reports that he has read, orally, to Matsuoka excerpts from his previous report to Washington, that Matsuoka has categorically approved each of the sixteen statements and amplified a few.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 936-937.

X
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 12, 1941. For the President [and] the Secretary. [Transmitted at 5 p.m.]

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 12, 1941. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. [Transmitted at 8 p.m.]

Discusses arrangements by which Ambassador Cripps (British) was enabled to meet with Matsuoka "by accident" at the Moscow Art Theatre. Other discussion of the British position.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 938-940.

>

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 13, 1941 - 4 p.m. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary.

Relates the incident of the meeting between Matsuoka and Cripps at the Moscow Art Theatre during which Cripps transmitted a message from Churchill which Matsuoka "surreptitiously" slipped into his pocket.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 940-941.

X

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 13, 1941, 10 p.m. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

Announces the signing of a treaty of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan and states his interpretations of the reasons underlying the negotiations. Includes the text of a confidential letter written in longhand by Matsuoka to Steinhardt.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 942-944.

*
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),
Washington, July 4, 1941. (Approved by President Roosevelt on
July 3, 1941)

Delivers a message from the Secretary of State for the
Prime Minister of Japan indicating alarm concerning reports
that Japan plans to attack the Soviet Union and requesting an
assurance from the Prime Minister that such is not the case.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 994-995.

BT Russian
Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1941.

Dorel
JH

MEMORANDUM FOR

S. T. E.

Tell him I'm sorry I cannot see him -- wish I could.-- but do the best he can and be sure to come in to see me when he gets back.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:

Mr. Early asks if you will show this to the President and ask him what he wants to do and then send a telegram to Ingersoll.

RR

COPY SENT TO GENERAL WATSON

PSF Russia

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ingersoll of PM is going to Russia.

He is leaving Wednesday for the West Coast,
en route to Russia.

Ingersoll would like to know what
he can do for you, in addition to the work he
will do for PM. He asks five or ten minutes,
either Monday or Tuesday.

Ingersoll can be reached at
PM Publications, 27 Sixth Avenue, Brooklyn,
New York.

S.T.E.

PSF

Russia Fold
1-4

July 8, 1941

Dear Larry:

This letter will be brought to you
by Ralph Ingersoll who is carrying a message
to you from me.

Good luck to you.

As ever,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Honorable Laurence A. Steinhardt,
The American Ambassador,
American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

wdh-mw

Russia Folder

August 2, 1941.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR WAYNE COY:

I raised the point in Cabinet on Friday that nearly six weeks have elapsed since the Russian War began and that we have done practically nothing to get any of the materials they asked for on their actual way to delivery in Siberia.

Frankly, if I were a Russian I would feel that I had been given the run-around in the United States.

Please get out the list and please, with my full authority, use a heavy hand -- act as a burr under the saddle and get things moving!

The enclosed comes in just before I leave. In regard to bombers, we should make and the British should make small token deliveries. In regard to P-forties, it is ridiculous to bring any back here from England by steamer through the submarine zone and we should expedite 200 of them via Fairbanks from the total number now in this country.

I have told the Russians that I am dividing things into two categories -- first, material which can be delivered on the Russian western front in time to take part in battle between September first and October first -- and secondly, those materials which physically could not get there before October first. I have chosen that date because after October first, we all doubt if there will be very active operations in view of rain, snow, frost, etc. and that if Germany can be held until then, Russia is safe until the Spring.

Step on it!

F.D.R.

Memo from Gen. Marshall to the Pres. 8/2 subject: Transfer of air material to Russia.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE FOR
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
RECEIVED
AUG 4 1941
WAYNE COY

August 2, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transfer of Air Materiel to Russia.

The following steps have been taken toward the transfer to the Russian Government of aviation materiel:

It has been proposed to the Russian Embassy, and accepted by them - subject to the confirmation of their government - to utilize our aviation set-up at Fairbanks, Alaska, as the point of transfer of equipment, including the transition training of pilots and mechanics. The Russian Embassy has been requested to have fifty single-engine pilots, 25 mechanics and ten two-engine bomber pilots and ten mechanics flown to Fairbanks, Alaska via Nome. The Russian Embassy says that these men can be in Fairbanks by August 11.

The War Department is assembling the pilots and mechanics necessary for the ferrying of planes to Fairbanks and the training of pilots and mechanics at Fairbanks.

There are 59 modern P-forties (Tomahawks) on British order now in this country. 28 of these are at the Curtiss Plant, and the remainder have been delivered on the docks on the Atlantic seaboard. We have the Curtiss plant now uncrating the 28 at Buffalo and have directed the return from the seaboard to Buffalo of the remaining planes. As these planes all lack radio and their wiring will not permit the installation of our radio, we have cabled London to send the British radios by B-24 transport planes as quickly as possible. Meanwhile we will undertake to fly these planes into Alaska, convoying them with our planes to provide the radio control. There is some hazard in this on account of the bad weather in passing out of the North Temperate zone, but this will have to be accepted.

Our principal complication at the moment is that the British authorities in this country, with whom our Air officers have been in contact, state that they have no definite instructions

to release any planes. We have committed ourselves to the extent of having their planes uncrated and others ordered to Buffalo from the seaboard. We are endeavoring to get some authorization to go ahead with the matter.

As to the bomber types, we are preparing five B-twenty-fives for flight to Fairbanks with the necessary officers to give pilot and mechanic instruction. There is a slight complication here, as the Norden and the AFCE (automatic control) has to be removed. However, we will install a substitute sight.

The only bomber, approximately medium type, that the British have under order in this country is the Lockheed-Hudson. We are discussing with them the possibility of five of these being matched with five of our B-twenty-fives. The difficulty here would be that while this British plane has its radio installed in this country, the turret is installed in England. Possibly it would be simpler for the British to fly their bomber contribution directly from Great Britain into Russia.

4,000,000 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition have been allotted, and will have to be shipped to some agreed-upon point in Eastern Siberia, possibly Vladivostok. A portion of this will be placed in the planes at Fairbanks as flight equipment during their transit flight to Siberia.

The 50 caliber ammunition required for these planes will have to be supplied by the British, who up to the present time have indicated an unwillingness to do so. Our Army reserves have been so depleted in building up to the Navy's requirements that we should not release any of this ammunition. We are arranging to provide bombs on the same basis of "missions" as the 30 caliber ammunition.


P-forties in England:

Approximately 140 P-40s of the British 200 are in England. Just what their degree of readiness for service is I do not know, but there is a probability that spare part shortage will affect the availability of a number of these planes. I understand from ^{General} Burns and Colonel Faymonville that you wish us to make available from our Air forces the necessary P-forties to off-set planes of this type now in England, if we could not obtain them elsewhere - presumably from British orders in this country. At the present time we have 149 P-tens in service in continental United States. The

remaining 138 which have been delivered lack wing tips, or complete wings or propellers, due to the tendency to ground-loop and a shortage of spare parts.

The matter of the delivery of planes beyond the 59 first referred to can be adjusted a little bit later, as the first problem is to establish our contact at Fairbanks and get the instruction of pilots and mechanics under way.

The unadjusted difficulties of the moment in this matter are (1) the lack of authorization in this country for the British to turn over planes to us, and (2) whatever delay is involved in hearing from the Russian Government.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'W. H. ...', is written over the typed title. The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with a large initial 'W' and a long horizontal stroke.

Chief of Staff.



*file
personal.*

*Russia Folder
1-41*

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

August 16, 1941.

The President,
The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

Secretary Morgenthau has asked me to write to you to tell you of a transaction which he entered into on Friday with the Soviet Ambassador.

Mr. Oumansky came to the Treasury shortly before noon on Friday and told Secretary Morgenthau that he was in great difficulty because of urgent need for funds. He said he had been negotiating with Jesse Jones for a \$500,000,000 loan, but that the negotiations had reached a difficult stage and could not be terminated quickly and his buying representatives had obligations immediately due beyond their capacity to meet. He asked if some way could not be found to arrange an advance of ten million dollars from the Treasury.

After exploring various possibilities Secretary Morgenthau agreed with the Ambassador to advance him ten million dollars for a period of ninety days against anticipated shipments of gold. A letter embodying the agreement was drafted during the afternoon and was signed by the Ambassador and by me as Acting Secretary. I am enclosing a carbon copy of it.

Instructions were sent to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to effect the transfer.

Sincerely,

Herbert E. Gaston
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

August 15, 1941.

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Pursuant to and in confirmation of the conversations had between you and the Secretary of the Treasury it is agreed as follows:

(1) The Government of the United States hereby purchases from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 301,000 fine troy ounces of gold which 301,000 fine troy ounces of gold the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby agrees to deliver to the United States Mint at San Francisco or to the United States Assay Office at New York within ninety days from the date hereof for the account of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.

(2) The purchase price of such gold will be at the rate of \$35 per fine troy ounce less 1/4 of 1% and less usual mint charges. Ten million dollars, constituting an advance payment, shall be paid by August 16, 1941 to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by credit to the account of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, U.S.S.R., on the books of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Final adjustment will be made after the gold is melted, weighed and tested at the mint or assay office.

(3) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to reimburse and indemnify the Government of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury for any advance payments and expenses in the event that the gold herein purchased is not delivered as herein provided within ninety days from the date hereof or in the event that the gold is under weight. All risk of loss remains with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics until delivery of the gold at the United States Mint

at San Francisco or the United States Assay Office at New York, and all expenses incurred in connection with the delivery of the gold to such mint or assay office shall be for the account of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Herbert E. Gaston

Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

His Excellency
Constantine A. Oumansky,
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.

The foregoing is agreed to on behalf
of the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics.

(Signed) C. Oumansky
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.

X
file
personal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At your conference with Oumansky this morning it seems to me the following points need to be made:

1. The political problems in reference to Russian aid.
2. Divide the financial problem into two parts.
 - a) Between now and January 1 Russians pay in gold as much as possible.
 - b) We agree to buy manganese and other raw materials at once for which the Export-Import Bank, under the law, can make advance payments.

These two methods should provide all the actual cash that the Russians should require up until the first of the year or, at any rate, the first of December.

3. That the much larger problem of finance be handled by you at a later date. That our Government will take the responsibility for working out those details.
4. That there should be no holding up of supply orders.
5. Oumansky should be impressed by the fact that tanks and airplanes are matters that have got to be settled at the Moscow conference and that he can not get large quantities of these until that conference is held.

H.L.H.

H.L.H.

Published in

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1941 Vol. 1 General
The Soviet Union

Pages 832-834

CLS
7-14-66

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: SEPTEMBER 11, 1941

SUBJECT: U. S. CREDITS FOR RUSSIA

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. HARRY HOPKINS AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MR. CONSTANTINE A. OUMANSKY

COPIES TO:

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*** 1-1403

The Soviet Ambassador called on the President at the former's request. The Secretary of State and Mr. Harry Hopkins were also present.

The Ambassador brought up the matter of Soviet requests for credit, war materials, and supplies, which included a request to apply our lease-lend policy to Russia. The President explained in some detail to the Ambassador the extreme difficulty of getting the necessary authority from Congress on account of the prejudice or hostility to Russia and the unpopularity of Russia among large groups in this country who exercise great political power in Congress. The President also referred

to

to the fact that Russia does have churches and does permit religious worship under the Constitution of 1936. He suggested that if Moscow could get some publicity back to this country regarding the freedom of religion during the next few days without waiting for the Harriman mission to reach Moscow, it might have a very fine educational effect before the next lease-lend bill comes up in Congress. The Ambassador agreed that he would attend to this matter.

The President then said that to get a lease-lend proposal for Russia through Congress, we should have an official statement showing Russian assets, the amount of gold and also barter that could be carried on between the two countries both now and after the war. The President also stated that maximum quantities of manganese, chromium and other commodities of use to the United States could be purchased and paid for now, with the understanding that production and delivery would not necessarily take place until after the war.

The Ambassador said that his Government would still prefer to effect adequate arrangements to secure the maximum of military supplies within the minimum of time, which might involve the financial cooperation of the

Reconstruction

Reconstruction Finance Corporation under Jesse Jones, or an advance from the stabilization fund of the Treasury Department, but if it were impossible now to make such arrangements as were necessary, then the Soviet Government very earnestly would ask for lease-lend aid.

Mr. Hopkins referred to possible aid to the extent of fifty million dollars in the form of a credit from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Ambassador replied that he had not been able to work out any barter arrangements or perfect other plans that provided for post-war payments and that no agreements with Mr. Jones had been thus far reached. He referred to the fact that his Government had borrowed ten million dollars from the Treasury Department by putting up gold as collateral.

The Ambassador, adopting a most serious tone, said that Moscow today is bitter about the credit situation. The Soviet Government needs one hundred and forty million dollars, whereas the Amtorg Trading Corporation has only one hundred and sixty thousand dollars. He said that he and Jesse Jones could work the barter plan up only to seventy-five million dollars by stretching it in every possible way with respect to the kind and quantity of commodities that might be used by the United States and he

again

again referred to the fact that he had been able to secure only ten million dollars from Mr. Morgenthau with gold as security.

It was remarked that there might be a possibility of getting Congressional approval for some method of advancing credits to the Soviet Union but there was no probability just now of a lease-lend provision for Soviet Russia on account of political difficulties. The Ambassador urged that Russia be granted a credit out of the two billion dollar Treasury stabilization fund and said that its use in this way was permissible.

The upshot of the conversation was that this Government would undertake to perfect credit and barter arrangements to the amount of seventy-five million dollars through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and other sources, so that the matter would be taken care of for a few months during which time full and adequate arrangements for Russian military supplies might be worked out.

G.H.

X

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 22, 1941. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary.

Steinhardt reports on his discussion with the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow regarding those matters which are the subject of negotiation between Japan and the Soviet Union.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 1019.

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 29, 1941

TO: AMEMBASSY
MOSCOW

TO HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT

MY LETTER SEPTEMBER 17 DELAYED IN TRANSIT, LATER DESTROYED.

WILL YOU PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R.:

✓ "MY DEAR MR. STALIN: THIS NOTE WILL BE PRESENTED TO YOU BY MY FRIEND AVERELL HARRIMAN, WHOM I HAVE ASKED TO BE HEAD OF OUR DELEGATION TO MOSCOW.

✓ MR. HARRIMAN IS WELL AWARE OF THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF YOUR FRONT AND WILL, I KNOW, DO EVERYTHING THAT HE CAN TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

✓ HARRY HOPKINS HAS TOLD ME IN GREAT DETAIL OF HIS ENCOURAGING AND SATISFACTORY VISITS WITH YOU. I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW THRILLED ALL OF US ARE BECAUSE OF THE GALLANT DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET ARMIES.

✓ I AM VERY SURE THAT HITLER MADE A PROFOUND STRATEGIC MISTAKE WHEN HE ATTACKED YOUR COUNTRY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WAYS WILL BE FOUND TO PROVIDE THE MATERIAL AND SUPPLIES NECESSARY TO FIGHT HIM ON ALL FRONTS, ✓

INCLUDING YOUR OWN.

✓
✓
I WANT PARTICULARLY TO TAKE THIS OCCESION TO
EXPRESS MY GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT YOUR ARMIES WILL
ULTIMATELY PREVAIL OVER HITLER AND TO ASSURE YOU OF
OUR GREAT DETERMINATION TO BE OF EVERY POSSIBLE MATERIAL
ASSISTANCE.

YOURS VERY SINCERELY,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."

ROOSEVELT

September 17, 1941

My dear Mr. Stalin:

This note will be presented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to Moscow. ✓

Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance of your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion. ✓

Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies. ✓

I am very sure that Hitler made a profound strategic mistake when he attacked your country. I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight him on all fronts, including your own. ✓

✓ I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance. ✓

Yours very sincerely,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of
People's Commissars of
the U.S.S.R.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

October 8, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:

Dear Grace:

Here is the press release
I have just issued.

Also attached you will find
hereto very secret and confidential
copies of the letter and cablegram.

I assume these may be filed
now.

S.T.E.

OCTOBER 8, 1941

Careful comparison of the language of the German announcement, made today by DNB in Berlin, and that actually contained in the President's letter of introduction of Mr. Harriman to Mr. Stalin, is invited. When such a comparison is made, the propaganda objectives of the Nazi action become very clear.

The President's letter reads as follows:

"My Dear Mr. Stalin:

"This note will be presented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to Moscow.

"Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance of your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion.

"Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies.

"I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including your own.

"I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance.

"Yours very sincerely,

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

- - - - -

For the Press

Oct 8 - 41
October

Immediate Release

Careful comparison of the language of the German announcement, made today by DNB in Berlin, and that actually contained in the President's letter of introduction of Mr. Harriman to Mr. Stalin, is invited. When such a comparison is made, the propaganda objectives of the Nazi action become very clear.

The President's letter reads as follows:

"

~~through~~
A ~~careful~~ investigation to find out how the Germans got the contents of the President's letter is in progress.

//

Actual cablegrams
as sent by the State Dept.

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (br)

September 29, 1941

10 a.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1093

Your 1718, September 28, 4 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT

My letter September 17 delayed in transit, later des-
troyed.

Will you please deliver following personal message
from me to His Excellency the President of the Soviet of
People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.:

✓ QUOTE " My Dear Mr. Stalin: This note will be pre-
sented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have
asked to be head of our delegation to Moscow.

✓ " Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic impor-
tance of your front and will, I know, do everything that
he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a success-
ful conclusion.

✓ " Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his en-
couraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell
you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant
defense of the Soviet armies.

I am

✓ " I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including your own.

✓ " I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance.

" Yours very sincerely,

" FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE

HULL

S: ASB:AR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Sept. 28, 1941.

Telegraph Room,
The White House.

Please transmit the following urgent message to the President:

Ambassador Steinhardt's telegram no. 1718, dated September 28, 4 p.m., contains the following message for the President from Mr. Harriman: It is important for the objectives toward which we are all working that I should receive from you a personal message that I may deliver to Stalin. I understood that I would receive a message from you for Stalin before I left London, but it did not arrive. Lord Beaverbrook has come to Moscow with such a message for Stalin from Churchill. I shall be happy to deliver your message if you wish to cable it to me here.

[Faint typed text, likely a carbon copy or a note:]
The following is a copy of the letter which was sent to Mr. Harriman about ten days ago and have it cabled to Mr. Harriman in Moscow. This was done.

*Transmitted to
Pay AKESPJE,
C. T.
2:25 PM*

S:ASB

Telegraph room
White House to Hyde Park

*file
personal*

September 28, 1941.

Please transmit following urgent message to the
President:

Ambassador Steinhardt's telegram #1718 dated
September 28, 4 PM, contains the following message
for the President from Mr. Harriman:

It is important for the objectives toward which
we are all working that I should receive from you
a personal message that I may deliver to Stalin. I
understood that I would receive a message from you
for Stalin before I left London, but it did not
arrive. Lord Beaverbrook has come to Moscow with
such a message for Stalin from Churchill. I shall
be happy to deliver your message if you wish to
Cable it to me here.

~~Wagon~~ The President asked me to telephone to
Harry Hopkins suggesting that he get out the copy of
letter which was sent to Mr. Harriman about ten days
ago and have it cabled to Mr. Harriman in Moscow.
This was done.

Moscow, Kremlin,
October 3d, 1941.

Translation

B F R. 2

My dear Mr. Roosevelt,

Your letter has been presented to me by Mr. Harriman. I avail myself of the opportunity to express to you the deep gratitude of the Soviet Government for having put at the head of the American Delegation such an authority, as Mr. Harriman, whose participation in the proceedings of the Moscow conference of the three powers has been so effective.

I have no doubt, that you will do everything necessary to ensure the carrying out of the decisions of the Moscow conference as speedily and as completely as possible particularly in view of the fact that the Hitlerites will certainly try to take advantage of prewinter months to exert every possible pressure on the front against the USSR.

Like you I have no doubt that final victory over Hitler will be won by those countries, which are uniting now their efforts in order to speed up the annihilation of bloody Hitlerism - a task, for the sake of which the Soviet Union now makes so great and so heavy sacrifices.

Sincerely yours

(signed)

J. Stalin



СОЮЗ
СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

СОВЕТ НАРОДНЫХ КОМИССАРОВ

3 октября 1941 г.

МОСКВА, КРЕМЛЬ

Уважаемый г-н Рузвельт,

Ваше письмо мне передано г.Гарриманом.

Пользуюсь случаем, чтобы выразить Вам глубокую благодарность Советского Правительства за то, что Вы поручили руководство американской делегацией столь авторитетному лицу, как г.Гарриман, участие которого в работах московской конференции трех держав было так эффективно.

Я не сомневаюсь, что Вами будет сделано все необходимое для того, чтобы обеспечить реализацию решений московской конференции возможно скоро и полно, особенно ввиду того, что предзимние месяцы гитлеровцы наверняка постараются использовать для всяческого нажима на фронте против СССР.

Как и Вы, я не сомневаюсь в конечной победе над Гитлером стран, которые теперь объединяют свои усилия для того, чтобы ускорить ликвидацию кровавого гитлеризма, для чего Советский Союз приносит теперь столь большие и тяжелые жертвы.

С искренним уважением

И. Сталин

The October 3, 1941 letter of Marshal Stalin
to President Roosevelt has been printed in
Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee,
Roosevelt and Truman [1941-45], Vol. II p. 13.
E. P. Dutton & Co.: New York, 1958.

file personal . PSF Russia Folder 1-41

[10-25-41?]

My dear Mr. Stalin:

Mr. Harriman has handed me your kind note dated October 3, 1941. I appreciate very much hearing from you.

A cable has already gone to you advising you that we can include the Soviet Union under our Lend-Lease arrangements.

I want to take this opportunity to assure you again that we are going to bend every possible effort to move these supplies to your battle lines.

The determination of your armies and people to defeat Hitlerism is an inspiration to the free people of all the world.

Very sincerely yours,

**His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of People's
Commissars of the U.S.S.R.**

BF Russia Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

Do you think this should be
replied to, especially in view of the
apparent pleasure of Stalin when
Harriman said I would be delighted to
hear from him directly?

F.D.R.

Ltr. to the President and translation signed
J. Stalin, Moscow, Kremlin, 10/3/41; express-
ing gratitude for having put Mr. Harriman at
the head of the American Delegation, and that
he has no doubt everything necessary will be
done to ensure the carrying out of the deci-
sions of the Moscow conference as speedily
and as completely as possible.

BERLIN.--DNB PUBLISHED WHAT IT ASSERTED WAS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO JOSEF STALIN EXPRESSING "MY GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT YOUR ARMIES FINALLY WILL BE VICTORIOUS OVER HITLER."

THE LETTER, DNB SAID, PROMISED THE U. S. WOULD FIND MEANS OF SUPPLYING THE SOVIET UNION WITH ALL EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO DEFEAT THE GERMANS.

DNB SAID THE LETTER, OBTAINED "FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE," CARRIED THE SALUTATION "MY DEAR FRIEND STALIN." IT ALLEGEDLY WAS DELIVERED TO STALIN BY V. AVERELL HARRIMAN, HEAD OF THE U. S. DELEGATION TO MOSCOW.

DNB SAID THE TEXT OF THE LETTER WAS AS FOLLOWS:

"MY DEAR FRIEND STALIN;

"THIS LETTER WILL BE HANDED TO YOU BY MY FRIEND HARRIMAN, WHOM I HAVE INSTRUCTED TO BE LEADER OF OUR MOSCOW DELEGATION. ✓

"I WISH TO TAKE OPPORTUNITY OF EXPRESSING MY GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT YOUR ARMIES FINALLY WILL BE VICTORIOUS OVER HITLER. ✓

"MR. HARRIMAN IS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH YOUR PROBLEMS AND WILL, I KNOW, DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO BRING THE MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. ✓

"HARRY HOPKINS REPORTED EXTENSIVELY ABOUT HIS SUCCESSFUL AND SATISFACTORY VISIT IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I CANNOT SAY HOW DEEPLY WE ALL WERE IMPRESSED BY THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE BRAVE SOVIET ARMIES. ✓

"WE SHALL FIND SUITABLE WAYS OF OBTAINING MATERIALS AND THE EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO FIGHT HITLER ON ALL FRONTS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET FRONT. ✓

"I ASSURE YOU OF OUR GREATEST DETERMINATION TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY MATERIAL SUPPORT. ✓

"IN CORDIAL FRIENDSHIP (IHR IN FREUNDSCHAFT ERGEBENER)

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT."

(THE ABOVE TRANSLATION IS FROM THE GERMAN VERSION AS DISSEMINATED BY DNB.)

10/8--RS1029A

*file
personal* *RF Russia Folder*

9-17-41

My dear Mr. Stalin:

This note will be presented to you by my friend Averell Harriman, whom I have asked to be head of our delegation to Moscow.

Mr. Harriman is well aware of the strategic importance of your front and will, I know, do everything that he can to bring the negotiations in Moscow to a successful conclusion.

Harry Hopkins has told me in great detail of his encouraging and satisfactory visits with you. I can't tell you how thrilled all of us are because of the gallant defense of the Soviet armies.

I am very sure that Hitler made a profound strategic mistake when he attacked your country. I am confident that ways will be found to provide the material and supplies necessary to fight him on all fronts, including your own.

I want particularly to take this occasion to express my great confidence that your armies will ultimately prevail over Hitler and to assure you of our great determination to be of every possible material assistance.

Yours very sincerely,

His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of
People's Commissars of
the U.S.S.R.

HLH/lmb 9/17/41

BF Russia

Moscow, Kremlin,
October 3d, 1941.

Translation

My dear Mr. Roosevelt,

Your letter has been presented to me by Mr. Harriman. I avail myself of the opportunity to express to you the deep gratitude of the Soviet Government for having put at the head of the American Delegation such an authority, as Mr. Harriman, whose participation in the proceedings of the Moscow conference of the three powers has been so effective.

I have no doubt, that you will do everything necessary to ensure the carrying out of the decisions of the Moscow conference as speedily and as completely as possible particularly in view of the fact that the Hitlerites will certainly try to take advantage of prewinter months to exert every possible pressure on the front against the USSR.

Like you I have no doubt that final victory over Hitler will be won by those countries, which are uniting now their efforts in order to speed up the annihilation of bloody Hitlerism - a task, for the sake of which the Soviet Union now makes so great and so heavy sacrifices.

Sincerely yours

(signed)

J. Stalin

The original of this document is preserved in the South Section of the Main Library of the Government of the USSR.

PSF 7561a



СОЮЗ
СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

СОВЕТ НАРОДНЫХ КОМИССАРОВ

3 - октября 1941 г.

МОСКВА, КРЕМЛЬ

Уважаемый г-н Рузвельт,

Ваше письмо мне передано г.Гарриманом.

Пользуюсь случаем, чтобы выразить Вам глубокую благодарность Советского Правительства за то, что Вы поручили руководство американской делегацией столь авторитетному лицу, как г.Гарриман, участие которого в работах московской конференции трех держав было так эффективно.

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Как и Вы, я не сомневаюсь в конечной победе над Гитлером стран, которые теперь объединяют свои усилия для того, чтобы ускорить ликвидацию кровавого гитлеризма, для чего Советский Союз приносит теперь столь большие и тяжелые жертвы.

С искренним уважением

И. Сталин

The original of this document is on display in the South Section of the Main Gallery of the Museum as of 3/71.

Господину ФРАНКЛИНУ ДЕЛАНО РУЗВЕЛТУ,

ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ
АМЕРИКИ.

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. ~~XX~~ ~~The Far East~~
I General, Soviet Union
page



*file
confidential*

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*PSF Russian Folder
1-41*

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL MISSION
TO THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

October 29, 1941

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith the report of your Mission to Moscow with covering letter describing the conclusions.

I wish to record my appreciation of the valuable services rendered by the members of the Mission and the members of the staff as well. The satisfactory conclusion of the conference is due largely to the intelligent teamwork displayed by all of the delegation. It has been a high privilege for me to work with them.

I wish to record, also, our appreciation of the cooperative and energetic spirit with which our recommendations have been accepted and acted upon by all departments of the Government.

Faithfully yours,

W. G. Harrison

P5F Russia

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
DIVISION OF DEFENSE AID REPORTS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10-29-41

The President

The White House

Dear Mr. President:

As Chairman of your Special Mission to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am pleased to submit the following report.

In general, the Mission followed the procedure outlined in your letter of August 30, 1941, to the Secretary of War and the cablegram of September 9, 1941, to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Discussions were held in London during the period September 15 - 20, 1941, in order to determine the possibilities of British and American aid to Russia. These discussions were held with the Prime Minister, with Lord Beaverbrook and other British officials through joint committees. As a result of such discussions and your cabled decisions, the Mission was able to proceed to Russia with a well formulated program.

The American and British Missions arrived in Moscow on September 28th and after a number of conferences with Mr. Stalin and other Russian officials through committees the attached protocol was signed as of October 1, 1941.

Joint Committee discussions were held in London on the Victory Program of overall production required for the defeat of enemies and potential enemies. It was agreed that the studies should continue in Washington and that requirements for the maintenance of Russian resistance should be added after the return of the Missions from Moscow. In the discussions in Moscow it was not practicable to obtain, at that time, the long-range American productive capacity that would be needed by Russia.

The aid to be furnished by the United States under the protocol during the period October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942 is detailed in the attached subsidiary reports which are summarized as follows:

Army:

Aviation. The United States to furnish 200 planes per month - 100 fighters and 100 bombers. The total of 1800 planes to consist of 900 - P-40, 828 - A-20 and 72 - B-25 type airplanes, together with armament, ammunition and bombs.

Ground Weapons. United States to furnish an average of 250 tanks per month, part light and part medium, together with armament and ammunition; also, 152 - 90 mm anti-aircraft guns with ammunition and 756 - 37 mm anti-tank guns with ammunition.

Navy:

The naval program was entirely changed as a result of the Moscow Conference and studies are still under way to determine the amount of help that can be given. Practically all items conflict with American and British commitments.

Raw Materials:

The requests included some sixty items, with a total value of \$340,000,000 for the items and quantities to come from the United States. A study that has been made since the return of the Mission indicates that material to the value of \$270,000,000 can be furnished. On the whole, the quantities requested are considered to be modest in view of the extent of the Russian effort and Russian losses. It is believed to be of major importance to furnish all the material possible in order to make full use of and balance the Russian productive capacity.

Medical Supplies:

The total value of the supplies requested is about \$15,000,000. About one fourth of these supplies can be delivered in sixty days and the remainder within a period of one year. The American Red Cross, with the aid of the British Red Cross, is prepared to provide that part presumably intended for civilian relief. This approximates \$5,000,000 in value.

Food:

The protocol lists 200,000 tons of wheat and 70,000 tons of sugar per month. It was contemplated that the wheat would come from Canada and the sugar from the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. It is understood that negotiations are now under way between the British and American representatives as to the best sources for these materials.


Transportation:

This is a vital part of the aid program. The Russians desire to import some 500,000 tons per month, of which 270,000 tons represent food; 20,000 tons, oil; and the remainder, raw materials and war supplies. This will require 1,500,000 tons of shipping, of which the Soviet will provide 117,000 tons. They estimate that an average of some 270,000 tons of cargo per month can be received through the Port of Archangel, 224,000 tons through the Vladisvostok region and 6,000 tons through the Persian Gulf. Archangel is vulnerable for two reasons: one, it is ordinarily frozen from December to June, although it is hoped to keep it sufficiently open this winter by icebreakers to permit the receipt of a large part of its capacity, and, two; the only exit is over one railroad which is not too distant from the front. The difficulties with Vladisvostok are the danger of interruption by Japan and the long freight haul of one hundred days duration to the Moscow region. The Persian route passes through extensive and difficult mountain terrain and requires considerable development before it can be of importance. It is expected that steps will be taken to increase the capacity of this route to 60,000 tons per month. It is obvious that difficult shipping problems are involved and they must be solved jointly by the Russian, British and American shipping authorities.

The aid programs outlined above will cost approximately \$1,000,000,000 prior to next July. While the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with the aid of Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Treasury loans, has financed the October shipments, it is impossible for Russia to continue to finance the full program. In addition, there are practical reasons of procedure making the use of lend-lease mechanism most desirable. It is recommended that the use of lend-lease funds be authorized at the earliest moment possible.

In conclusion, it is the conviction of the Mission that Russia can make very effective use of the latest types of American equipment and that Russia will continue to fight even in retreat. It is believed that her continuation as an active belligerent is of paramount importance and that every effort should be made to assist her and assist her promptly. It is recommended that the aid proposed herein and in the attached reports of the various committees be approved by you.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "W. A. Harrison". The signature is written in dark ink and extends across the width of the page.

Chairman,
Special Mission to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.

Russia Folder
11/4/41

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ТОЧНЫЙ ТЕКСТ ОТВЕТА И.СТАЛИНА ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ
США ГОСПОДИНУ РУЗВЕЛЬТУ

Подписано 4 Ноября 1941 г

Господин Президент, хотя текст Вашего послания я еще не получил, Посол Соединенных Штатов Америки Господин Штейнгардт передал мне через Господина Вышинского 2-го ноября сего года памятную записку с изложением содержания Вашего послания на мое имя.

В связи с этим позвольте мне, прежде всего, выразить полное согласие с Вашей оценкой работы конференции трех держав в Москве, что следует отнести в наибольшей мере к заслугам Господина Гарримана, а также Господина Бивербрука, сделавших все возможное для успешного завершения работы конференции в кратчайший срок. За Ваше заявление о том, что постановления конференции будут максимально выполнены, Советское Правительство выражает свою глубокую признательность.

Ваше решение, Господин Президент, о том, чтобы предоставить Советскому Союзу беспроцентный заем на сумму в 1 миллиард долларов на оплату поставок вооружения и сырьевых материалов Советским Союзом, Советское Правительство принимает с искренней благодарностью, как исключительно серьезную поддержку Советского Союза в его громадной и трудной борьбе с нашим общим врагом, с кровавым гитлеризмом.

По поручению Правительства СССР я выражаю полное согласие с изложенными Вами условиями предоставления Советскому Союзу этого займа, платежи по которому должны начаться спустя 5 лет после окончания войны и будут производиться в течение 10 лет после истечения этого пятилетнего периода.

Правительство СССР готово сделать все возможное, чтобы поставлять Соединенным Штатам Америки те товары и сырье, которые имеются в его распоряжении и в которых могут нуждаться Соединенные Штаты.

Что касается выраженного Вами, Господин Президент, положения, чтобы между Вами и мною был бы незамедлительно установлен личный непосредственный контакт, и если этого потребуют обстоятельства, то я с удовольствием присоединяюсь к этому Вашему пожеланию и готов со своей стороны сделать все возможное для осуществления этого.

С искренним уважением - И.СТАЛИН


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personal.

November 8, 1941

Dear General Watson:

I am enclosing herewith the note which Mr. Gromyko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, left with the President yesterday together with a translation thereof which has been prepared in the Department.

Sincerely yours,



Edward Page

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

TRANSLATION

THE EXACT TEXT OF THE ANSWER OF
I. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE U.S.A., MR. ROOSEVELT.

Signed, November 4, 1941.

Mr. President:

Although I have not yet received the text of your message, Mr. Steinhardt, the Ambassador of the United States of America, on November 2, 1941 transmitted to me, through Mr. Vyshinski, an aide-mémoire setting forth the contents of your message to me.

In this connection permit me first of all to express complete agreement with your evaluation of the work of the conference of the three powers in Moscow which is to be attributed in the greatest degree to the services of Mr. Harriman and also Mr. Beaverbrook who did everything possible for the successful conclusion of the work of the conference in the shortest time. The Soviet Government expresses its deep gratitude for your statement that the decisions of the conference will be carried out to the maximum extent.

Mr. President, the Soviet Government accepts with sincere gratitude your decision to grant to the Soviet Union a non-interest bearing loan in the sum of

one

one billion dollars to pay for supplies of armaments and raw materials for the Soviet Union, as exceptionally substantial assistance to the Soviet Union in its great and difficult struggle with our common enemy, blood-thirsty Hitlerism. On behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R., I express complete agreement with the conditions set forth by you concerning the granting of this loan to the Soviet Union payments on which shall commence five years after the termination of the war and be made during the ten years after the expiration of this five year period.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. is prepared to do everything possible in order to furnish the United States of America those goods and raw materials which are at its disposal and which the United States may need.

With respect to your proposal, Mr. President, that personal direct contact should be immediately established between you and me, should circumstances require this, I share your desire with satisfaction and am prepared to do everything necessary to make this possible.

With sincere respects,

I. STALIN

Eu:EP:RIC

Copy is being sent
to Norman Davis.
Does it require an
answer to Stalen?
no file ~~confidential~~

PSF
Russia
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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1941

TEXT of Personal Message of J.V. Stalin
Mr. F.D. Roosevelt


My dear Mr. President:

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires called upon me this morning and requested me to give you a personal message addressed to you by Stalin, in reply to your recent message to him regarding the question of Red Cross supplies.

I am enclosing the message handed to me by the Chargé d'Affaires.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Signed --- Stalin.

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

PS F Russia

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[11-21-41?]

Text of Personal Message of J.V. Stalin to
Mr. F.D. Roosevelt.

Your message informing me of the favorable solution of the question in regard to deliveries of medical supplies by the American Red Cross was received by me on November 11, 1941. The Soviet Government has no objections to the establishment of organizational forms of cooperation between the Red Cross Societies of our both countries. It is understood that this cooperation will be organized in accordance with the exchange of letters, the contents of which was agreed upon by representatives of both countries in the beginning of November in Kuibyshev.

Signed --- Stalin.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ТЕКСТ ЛИЧНОГО ПОСЛАНИЯ И.СТАЛИНА
ГОСПОДИНУ РУЗВЕЛЬТУ

Ваше послание с сообщением о благоприятном разрешении вопроса о поставках медицинских материалов американским Красным Крестом получено мною 11 ноября. По вопросу об установлении организационных форм сотрудничества между обществами Красного Креста обеих наших стран у Советского правительства нет возражений, при этом имеется ввиду, что это сотрудничество будет организовано в соответствии с обменом письмами, тексты которых были согласованы в начале ноября между представителями Красного Креста обеих стран в городе Куйбышеве -

И.СТАЛИН

file →

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

At the present time various cargoes which are to be shipped to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the United States in accordance with the October program of deliveries and requiring 15-17 vessels are lying in United States ports. These cargoes consist of armaments and items of military importance.

Among these cargoes are:

120 pursuit planes P-40

100 light bombers B-7

8 medium tanks

2,456 trucks

176 scout cars (Jeeps)

12 tons of chemicals

14 tons of army shoes

165 tons of brass

815 tons of aluminum

26 tons telephone wire

119 tons Ethyl (liquid)

459 tons presses, hammers and different machines

1,110 tons Isopentane

and other very important goods, the total weight of

which is 21,000 tons and which occupies a space of

4,180,056 cubic feet.

In addition to the aforementioned cargoes, there is some merchandise which is ready to be delivered to ports, but which has not been delivered due to lack of transportation facilities.

In

A. J.

In connection with this absence of means of transportation much cargo is now distributed at various railroad stations. The condition of the freight has been adversely affected by weather conditions, etc. This applies particularly to that freight now lying in the railroad yards twelve miles from Boston. No adequate provision has been made for the protection of this freight not only against the elements, but also against any harmful acts such as theft, malicious mischief or other acts of damage.

The United States Maritime Commission promised us ten vessels for shipment of cargo in October. Actually only five ships were granted to us. Of these five ships, the S/S "Friar Rock" was not in seaworthy condition, as borne out by the fact that within two or three days after sailing it was necessary for this vessel to return to port due to the bad condition of this ship, resulting in the unloading of the cargo in port.

For delivery of cargo to the Soviet Union in November the United States Maritime Commission had planned 31 ships. Actually, by November 24th only 7 ships had been placed at our disposal.

Thus for October and up to November 24th, there had been granted to us a total of only twelve vessels instead of forty-one as promised. It is understood that twelve ships could not fulfill the requirements for delivery of cargo from the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the October program.

We cite below an example to illustrate the serious situation which exists with reference to deliveries of material and other cargo from the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

By November 24th only the following part of the quantity planned

planned for delivery in October had been actually shipped:

Trucks	37.63%
Airplanes	30.07%
Tanks	43.04%
Scout cars	27.02%

As to the November program for delivery of goods from the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is necessary to state that delivery has not commenced as yet.

In order to facilitate the shipments of military supplies and other cargoes which are urgently required by the U.S.S.R. we are ready to deliver monthly some of the cargoes through the Persian Gulf, such as airplanes DB7, 2,000 military trucks, leather, shoes, part of sugar shipments, and other cargoes. We are providing for shipment to Archangel of all kinds of armaments and other cargo of military importance, raw materials, chemicals, toluol, TNT, and so forth.

In order to ship all the cargo which is in ports now and which is to be transported to ports in accordance with the October, November, and December schedules we need 98 ships by January 1, 1942. 63 of these ships will go to Archangel, 21 to the Persian Gulf, and 14 to Vladivostok. To relieve the tense situation in shipping no less than 30 ships are needed by December 1, 1941.

As can be observed from the foregoing, the situation pertaining to shipments from the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is most critical. Therefore everything possible should be done to remedy this situation, so that to ensure the fulfilment of the established program of monthly deliveries of vital war materials and armament from the United States to the Soviet Union.

~~State Dept. copy of J. E. D. Conference w/ Litvinov~~
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 730-731.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES
BOWEN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

For Review
file

December 8, 1941.


Dear Mr. President:

I have been trying in a small way
to sustain your marvelous effort.

Here is a confidential memo which
might possibly help you assess the Soviet
situation and psychology.

Thank God your great sagacity and
wisdom saw through Japan's cloak of infamous
deceit in time.

Faithfully yours,



Joseph E. Davies

The President,
The White House.

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE HAD WITH
AMBASSADOR LITVINOV UPON HIS ARRIVAL
DECEMBER 7, 1941

When Ambassador and Mrs. Litvinov were lunching with me alone, word came of the Japanese attack. Litvinov asked me how I felt about it. I replied that it was a terrible thing, but it was providential. It assured unity in this country. It also assured a united battle front of the non-aggressor great nations. It was now "all for one and one for all."

I asked him how he felt about it. He said that had the United States come into the war earlier it would have undoubtedly thwarted Hitler. He was not so sure that it was advantageous now. I gathered that what was in the back of his mind was that this development would prevent the delivery of vital war materials to Britain and Russia.

I asked him if that was what he thought would be the reaction of his government. He said that he could not say. He had been out of touch with his government for three or four weeks. He intimated that his government had been handling Japan gingerly, under the non-aggression pact, to avoid war on two fronts.

Madame Litvinov expressed great concern over Moscow. In reply to my question she said that if Moscow fell it would have a bad effect on the morale of the Soviet people. I did not press the discussion further.

The matter of air bases in Siberia and Kamchatka and the question of Soviet bombing of Japan from Vladivostok is vital. Hitler will decide it. If by his direction the Jap forces in Manchukuo attack Russia the problem becomes academic.

If on the other hand, Japan may have been able to prevail upon Hitler not to require such a pincer movement against the Soviets because of the bombing danger, then the problem will be vital. The question of policy will then arise as to whether it is better to try to get the Soviets to attack and aid us or not. We might win the battle, but hazard the war.

If the Soviet should be defeated by an attack on two fronts; or if they should lose heart, it might affect the ultimate issue.

The Soviets, if attacked by Japan and Germany, might be in a desperate plight, or think that they were. Particularly is this true if the Germans cut the Murmansk rail line of supply. Shipments by way of the Persian Gulf in the Caspian sea are also dubious. The limited rail facilities are accentuated because of lack of harbor equipment on the south shore of the Caspian.

J.E.D.

Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, Chungking, December 9, 1941.

Transmits information from Generalissimo that he is urging simultaneous Soviet-Chinese de~~cl~~aration of war on Japan following American de~~cl~~aration.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, pages 738-739.

State Dept. copy

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 742-744.

THE PRESIDENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: **DECEMBER 11, 1941**

file confidential

SUBJECT: **SOVIET POLICY IN UNITED STATES-JAPANESE WAR**

PARTICIPANTS: **SECRETARY HULL AND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, MAXIM LITVINOV**

COPIES TO:

*** 1-1403

The Ambassador of Soviet Russia called at my request. He stated that earlier today he had conferred with Harry Hopkins in regard to our policy of carrying out fully our Lease-Lend allocations to Russia for war purposes. He then said that he came in contact with the President during this visit to Hopkins and that they talked over the situation in regard to cooperation between the United States and Russia and other countries opposing Germany, Japan and Italy in the world war. Without going into detail concerning the conversation between himself and the President, he proceeded to say that he had received the final decision of his Government today and that it was not in a position to cooperate with us at present

in

in the Japanese Far Eastern area; that his Government is fighting on a huge scale against Germany and that to take part with us in the Far East would mean a prompt attack by Japan, which would result in serious fighting on two fronts by Russia. In those circumstances his Government felt that it should obtain better and more secure control of the situation over Germany in Europe and the west. This was the substance of his contention, which was rather positively stated.

I replied that, of course, if his Government has its mind made up about the matter, there is not much more to be said at this time. I stated that during last January information that I considered absolutely reliable came to me to the effect that Hitler would attack Russia sometime around May of this year. I had requested Mr. Welles to convey that fact to the Soviet Government -- a fact, however, that they did not accord it at the time. I added that I now have information I deem equally reliable to the effect that Japan, notwithstanding the terms of the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement, is now under the strictest commitment to Germany to attack Russia and any other country fighting against Germany, whenever Hitler demands that Japan do so, and that this arrangement contemplated that Japan would first attack the United States and Germany and Italy would join, and that at a given time

later --

later -- at any time demanded by Germany, in fact -- Japan would carry out this agreement to attack Russia.

The Ambassador seemed very much interested in this but still did not seriously attempt to discuss it, although indicating that he did not doubt the truth of it. I said that, of course, this is a world movement in its practical effects and that these international desperadoes, operating together in all mutually desirable respects, will not cease their movements of conquest voluntarily; that somebody must stop them; that they will not be stopped by merely slowing down one phase of this world movement and world combination of invaders; that, therefore, if this world movement and method of resisting and suppressing it is to be dealt with effectively, it must be considered as a whole and the fact must be realized that the movement of resistance must be carried on in each part of the world at the same time. He did not disagree with this.

I then said that if this Government could get two air bases, one on the Kamohatka Peninsula and one around Vladivostok, our heavy bombers could get over Japanese home naval bases and the home fleet, as well as over the cities. The Ambassador did not argue the former but suggested that bombing of cities did not necessarily

settle

settle the matter in view of experiences in Moscow, London and other cities.

I emphasized the extreme importance right now and each day hereafter of obtaining these two bases for the purpose of permitting our aircraft to operate over all portions of Japan from the air. I said that we could scarcely do so without them, and that, therefore, it is a matter of very great importance to the present resistance to Japan by us -- that, in fact, there is no substitute for effective attacks just now when compared with the injury that we could and would inflict from the air.

The Ambassador then inquired whether Singapore could defend itself successfully in the present circumstances, to which I replied that forces from all of the other countries, from Australia across to Singapore and to the Philippines were unifying themselves and coming to the aid of Singapore and that probably they would be able to hold out successfully. The Ambassador inquired if they had a unified command over there, to which I replied that there was the fullest confidence among staff officers and others in each of the countries interested, which was the next thing to unified command but, of course, is not that in some respects.

I again brought up quite a number of circumstances

and

and conditions illustrating the world nature of this movement of conquest and the extreme dangers of more and more cooperation between Japan and Germany, such as the possibility of the Japanese fleet going across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf oil fields, to the mouth of the Canal, to the Cape of Good Hope, and, if Germany should be successful in her contemplated African invasion, Japan on the sea would meet her on the African Coast, extending up towards French Africa, and that the effect of this on the whole British European situation would be terrific, with the result that Hitler and Japan would have a new lease on life, the effects of which would be terrible on all of us, including Russia. The Ambassador nodded his head and spoke in the affirmative but did not discuss these views.

Throughout the conversation I constantly came back to the point that if Russia should refrain from cooperation with us in the East while we continue to aid her, there will be a constant flow of criticism about why we are aiding Russia in a world movement involving all alike and Russia in turn is not cooperating with us in the Far East. I said I issued a statement today in an effort to allay some of this very kind of rising criticism and that it will become an increasingly serious matter for both Governments.

After

After bringing this up several times, the Ambassador always agreeing, I finally remarked that it is highly important for some kind of formula to be worked out in regard to what each government is doing and should do and that at present I am unable to formulate a statement on this subject, which is a most difficult thing to do.

The Ambassador inquired if I had any suggestions or propositions to offer on this or in a general way. I replied that since he informed me that the President and he have gone over these phases I need not go into them now. I then added that, having just arrived here on Sunday, there has been no time before today for him to get settled and find out something about the general situation from his Government preliminary to a conversation between us touching such matters as cooperation in the war against the Tripartite group, and since his Government has made up its mind on the governing question, there is not much, as far as I can see, for me to take up with him just now. I then invited him to keep this question of cooperation in the East, as well as in the West, especially in mind and lend his cooperation to improve the situation in these respects because it will call for every possible attention as we go along hereafter.

G.H.

S:CH:AR

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Chiang), [Moscow, December 12, 1941].

Explains that Russia is carrying the principal burden of the war against Germany and urges Chiang not to insist that Russia at once declare war against Japan.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 747.

[Translation received in the Dept. of State from Dr. T.V. Soong, o/a Dec. 16. Forwarded by Welles to FDR on Dec. 17 after Welles had first read the message to FDR on the telephone.]