CONTINUED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Secret cablegram from Moscow, Jan. 24, 8 p.m. for Gen. S. P. Spalding re deliveries to Russia.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS

For your information and comment, if any.

F. D. R.

RETURNED FOR THE FILES BY
MR. HOPKINS
My dear Mr. President:

I have caused to be prepared and am enclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum outlining the substance of certain conversations and negotiations of a political character which have taken place between the British and Soviet Governments since the outbreak of Soviet-German hostilities on June 22, 1941, and containing certain observations with regard thereto. There is also enclosed for your convenience a copy of a telegram sent to Ambassador Winant on December 5, 1941 which is referred to in the memorandum and which sets forth the attitude of this Government towards the entering into secret agreements or territorial commitments prior to the cessation of hostilities.

I am inclined to the opinion that the policies which we outlined in our telegram to Ambassador Winant are sound.

The President,

The White House.
sound and that a deviation therefrom would be unfortunate, particularly just now when we are endeavoring to unite all forces opposed to the Axis on the primary task of defeating the enemy.

In that telegram we took the position that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union should not be our willingness to agree to the recognition of extended Soviet frontiers at this time, but rather the degree of determination which we show loyally to carry out our promises to aid the Soviet Government with equipment and supplies.

I am sure that you will agree with me that by our actions we should make it clear to the Soviet Government in the future to an even greater degree that we are doing our utmost to live up to our promises.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

(For enclosures, see following page.)
Enclosures:

1. Memorandum, February 4, 1942, "British-Soviet Negotiations Looking Forward to the Conclusion of a Treaty of a Political Character with Particular Reference to Soviet Suggestions that Certain Territories Taken over by the Soviet Union During the Period September 1, 1939-June 22, 1941, be Recognized as Soviet Territory."

2. Telegram No. 5682 of December 5, 1941 to Ambassador Winant.
Washington, 
December 5, 1941.  
6 p.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
LONDON 
5682  
FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

With reference to your 5676, 7085, please read the following cable to Eden personally but leave no text of the message:

One. As proof of American policy of aid to Russia, this Government recently sent representatives to the Soviet Union in order to discuss the furnishing of supplies to the Soviet Union to assist it in its struggle against the Nazi invasion. These representatives entered into an agreement with the Soviet Government as to supplies; an agreement which was coordinated with a similar effort by the British Government.

Two. It is our conviction that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is the measure to which we fulfill the commitments our representatives made in Moscow. We are exerting every effort to carry out these obligations and will continue to do so until the final victory.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schambae Date FEB 18 1972
Three. In so far as our post war policies are concerned, it is our belief that these have been delineated in the Atlantic Charter which today represents the attitude not only of the United States but also of Great Britain and of the Soviet Union.

Four. In view of this fact in our considered opinion it would be unfortunate were any of the three governments, now on common ground in the Atlantic Charter to express any willingness to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post war settlement. Discussions between the several governments looking toward fullest possible agreement on basic policies and toward later arrangements at the proper time and with full public knowledge will of course be expected to continue. Upon the conclusion of hostilities those nations contributing to the defeat of the Hitler forces will join in an effort to restore peace and order.

As to number of paragraph seven of your telegram we abstain from comment because of material in your message on the subject of the discussion of this question. We anticipate we would like to have fuller information. In order not to jeopardize the aims we shall all share in common looking to an enduring peace it is evident that no commitments as to individual countries should be entered into at this time. It would be unfortunate if we should approach the peace conference thus hampered. Above all there must be no secret accords.
Five. Our basic policy of aid to England is no less strong than that of aid to Russia and we are confident that there is no doubt in the British mind as to our good faith in carrying out our policy. It was in this spirit the Atlantic Charter was conceived, to which the Soviet Government has now given its adherence. Given the limitations of this Government, it would be difficult if not impossible for us to implement this common understanding by agreements of a more detailed nature at this time. Furthermore, the constitutional limitation to which this Government is bound must be kept in mind.

We have very frankly indicated our position in order that in view of the short time before Mr. Eden's departure he may have no misunderstanding as to the general lines of our position.

As to numbered paragraph seven of your telegram we abstain from comment because of uncertainty as to its meaning. In the event that further discussions on this are contemplated we would like to have fuller information.

HULL

OK

FDR
February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM

BRITISH-SOVET NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF A POLITICAL CHARACTER WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SOVIET SUGGESTIONS THAT CERTAIN TERRITORIES TAKEN OVER BY THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1, 1939-JUNE 22, 1941, BE RECOGNIZED AS SOVIET TERRITORY

Immediately upon the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union the British Government made it clear that it desired to give the Soviet Union every possible military support. The Soviet Government did not display any marked enthusiasm in accepting this British support. It furthermore showed a tendency from the very beginning to introduce matters of a political character into conversations and negotiations relating primarily to military or supply problems.

Within three weeks after the launching of the German attack upon the Soviet Union, Stalin suggested to the British Government that it might be advantageous for the British and Soviet Governments to enter into a treaty of a political character. The British Government foresaw that certain complications might arise from an attempt to negotiate at that time a formal political treaty. It did, however
however, on July 12, 1941 sign "an agreement for joint action" with the Soviet Government which contained two provisions: (1) an undertaking on the part of the two Governments to render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Hitlerite Germany and (2) a mutual undertaking that during this war neither party would negotiate or conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. It was understood between the two Governments that this agreement might be supplemented by more detailed political and military agreements at a later date.

When the Harriman mission was in Moscow in September 1941, Stalin suggested to Beaverbrook that the two Governments might enter at once into a political agreement of a more far-reaching character than the agreement for joint action of July 12. Beaverbrook replied that he personally agreed and would discuss the matter with other members of the British Cabinet upon his return to London.

Apparently the British Government took no steps to follow up Stalin's suggestions during the months of October and November. In November, however, Stalin displayed a spirit of bad temper, which contributed to the decision of the British Government early in December to send Eden to Moscow in order, as Mr. Eden informed

Ambassador Winant,
Ambassador Winant, to smooth out relations in general, to explore the possibility of some kind of political agreement, and to discuss certain post-war problems. It would appear that Stalin had been informed in November that the British Government was planning to send two high-ranking military officers to the Soviet Union to discuss military matters. He had replied that he did not care to enter into such discussions until certain political problems had been settled between the two countries. Stalin's irritation seemed in part to be due to the failure of Great Britain to keep a promise to send a military expedition of several divisions to points adjacent to the Soviet frontier in order to assist in relieving pressure on the Soviet Army. This promise had been made, apparently ill-advisedly, after the departure of the Harriman mission from Moscow. Subsequent consideration of the matter had made it clear that the dispatch of such an expedition would be inexpedient.

Early in December Winant informed the Department regarding Eden's plan to go to Moscow and simultaneously submitted to the Department a memorandum prepared by Eden setting forth the purposes of his visit.

Subsequent to the launching of the German attack on the Soviet Union Stalin apparently had not broached to
the British Government questions of territorial concessions to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Eden's memorandum contained no indication that the British Government suspected that Eden while in Moscow would be pressed to agree to such concessions. The Department, however, had at no time been in doubt that Stalin's references to the desirability of entering into negotiations for a political agreement with Great Britain were in fact part of a maneuver the purpose of which was to place the British Government in such a position that it would be embarrassing for it to reject Soviet demands that it recognize certain Soviet territorial claims and that it promise to agree to certain territorial adjustments on the European continent and to other arrangements which would make the Soviet Union the dominating power of Eastern Europe if not of the whole continent.

The Department was therefore inclined to believe that Stalin would take advantage of Eden's presence in Moscow in order to exert pressure upon the British Government to give commitments of a territorial nature which might prove embarrassing both to the British and the American Governments during the period of the war and which might handicap proceedings at the peace conference.
For this reason the Department on December 5, 1941 sent Winant a telegram, which had been approved by the President, instructing him to inform Eden that it was the considered opinion of the American Government that "it would be unfortunate were any of the three Governments now on common ground in the Atlantic Charter to express any willingness to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post-war settlement". In this telegram the Department expressed the opinion that "the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is the measure to which we fulfill the commitments our representatives made in Moscow......In so far as our post-war policies are concerned, it is our belief that these have been delineated in the Atlantic Charter, which today represents the attitude not only of the United States but also of Great Britain and of the Soviet Union". The telegram also contained the following: "In order not to jeopardize the aims we all share in common looking to an enduring peace, it is evident that no commitments as to individual countries should be entered into at this time. It would be unfortunate if we should approach the peace conference thus hampered. Above all there must be no secret accords".

Ambassador Winant
Ambassador Winant conveyed the views set forth in this telegram to Eden who expressed his complete agreement with them. Eden left London for Moscow on the evening of December 7. Almost immediately after his arrival he had his first meeting with Stalin, which lasted four hours. During the course of this meeting he presented to Stalin a draft prepared in Great Britain of a proposed political agreement. This agreement was of a general nature. It confirmed the Atlantic Charter; it provided for collaboration of the two Governments in every possible way until the German military power had been completely broken; it provided for collaboration for restoring peace at the end of the war and in maintaining the peace; it provided for the joint carrying out of the task of the reconstruction of Europe and for the safeguarding and strengthening of "the economic and political independence of all European countries either as unitary or federated states"; and so forth.

Stalin, on his part, presented to Eden drafts of two treaties proposed by the Soviet Government: namely, a "treaty of alliance and mutual military assistance" and a "treaty concerning the creation of a mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in regard to the solution of post-war questions, and
concerning their common action to ensure security in Europe after the termination of the war with Germany. In general, the provisions of these two treaties were not objectionable to the British. What was extremely important, however, was a suggestion by Stalin which proved to be a stumbling-block to the negotiations. This suggestion was that a secret protocol be entered into relating to Soviet frontiers and to the working out of arrangements for the future frontiers of Eastern and Central Europe. His initial demand apparently was that the Soviet frontiers of June 22, 1941 be recognized by Great Britain. Such an act on the part of Great Britain would mean the British recognition of Soviet acquisition during 1939 and 1940 of certain territory and bases in Finland, of the whole territory of the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, of more than one-third of Poland, and of Bessarabia and other parts of Rumania. In addition, Stalin desired that Great Britain agree to the taking over by the Soviet Union after the war of certain bases in Rumania. Among other suggestions made by Stalin was an agreement for the restoration of Austria as an independent state; the detachment of the Rhineland from Prussia; the establishment of an independent Bavaria; the transfer of East

Prussia
Prussia to Poland; the transfer of Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia; the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey; certain territorial adjustments in favor of Greece; the transfer to Turkey of certain districts in Bulgaria and in Northern Syria, and so forth.

During the course of the first meeting and during other meetings that followed, Eden informed Stalin that he could not enter into agreements concerning commitments of a territorial nature without consulting the Dominions and the United States. Eden pointed out in particular that he had promised the Government of the United States that while in Moscow he would not enter into commitments of the nature requested.

Stalin continued, however, to press for certain territorial commitments on the part of the British Government. When Eden insisted that he could not give the commitments desired, Stalin demanded that in any event Great Britain immediately recognize the Baltic States as a component part of the Soviet Union. He also demanded that Great Britain recognize the Soviet position in Finland and in Rumania. With regard to the frontier with Poland he said that he hoped that Poland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would be able to come to an agreement. Generally speaking, the Soviet suggestion was that
that the Polish-Soviet frontier would follow the Curzon Line with certain modifications. It will be recalled that the Curzon Line does not differ greatly from the line which Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to consider as the boundary line between the Soviet Union and German-Poland when they partitioned Poland in 1939.

When Eden continued to resist the pressure placed upon him by Stalin, the latter displayed considerable irritation. Eden finally informed Stalin as follows: "You would not respect me if I were to go back upon my arrangement with President Roosevelt. I can get a decision upon this point before the Soviet troops occupy the Baltic States, even if they continued doing as well as they are doing now."

It appears that in the end Eden gave Stalin to understand that he would return to Great Britain with Stalin's proposals, discuss them with his own Government, with the Dominions, and with the United States and let Stalin have a reply to them at a later date. Eden went so far as to indicate that he would endeavor to obtain a favorable decision if Stalin attached so great importance to the matter. In the meantime, in order to smooth over the failure of the two Governments to come to an understanding in Moscow with regard to a treaty, it was agreed
agreed to issue a joint declaration regarding the accomplishments of the visit and an innocuous statement of this character was issued in the latter part of December.

Eden arrived in England in the early part of January and presented to his Government memoranda of the discussions, together with Stalin's proposals. He also permitted Ambassador Winant to inspect certain of the memoranda as well as copies of the draft treaties proposed by Eden and by Stalin. The whole matter is now being considered by the British Cabinet. It is likely that within a short time the British Government will approach this Government on the subject. This approach may be in the form of a request for a statement of the position of this Government with regard to the making by the British Government of certain territorial commitments to the Soviet Union or it may be in the form of a request that this Government approve certain commitments which the British Government may desire to make.

This Government thus far has not recognized as Soviet territory any of the areas which have been annexed to the Soviet Union since the outbreak of the World War on September 1, 1939. The attitude of this Government in that respect has been predicated on its general policy not
not to recognize any territorial changes which have been made in European frontiers since the outbreak of the World War and not to enter into any commitments of a territorial nature in Europe which might hamper the proceedings of the post-war Peace Conference.

It is believed that it would be unfortunate if, at the present time, an ally of the American Government of such standing as Great Britain, which also has thus far refused to make any commitments of a territorial nature on the European continent, should begin bargaining with the Soviet Union or any other continental country with regard to frontiers. There is little doubt that if the principle is once admitted that agreements relating to frontiers may be entered into prior to the Peace Conference, the association of nations opposed to the Axis, which thus far has been based upon the common aim of defeating the enemy, may be weakened by the introduction among its members of mutual suspicion and by efforts of various members to intrigue in order to obtain commitments with regard to territory at the expense of other members.

Furthermore, it is believed that the assent at the present time to any of the territorial demands of the Soviet Union would result in only a temporary improvement of the relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

If
If the British Government, with the tacit or expressed approval of this Government, should abandon the principle of no territorial commitments prior to the Peace Conference, it would be placed in a difficult position to resist additional Soviet demands relating to frontiers, territory, or to spheres of influence which would almost certainly follow whenever the Soviet Government would find itself in a favorable bargaining position. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government has tremendous ambitions with regard to Europe and that at some time or other the United States and Great Britain will be forced to state that they cannot agree, at least in advance, to all of its demands. It would seem that it is preferable to take a firm attitude now, rather than to retreat and to be compelled to take a firm attitude later when our position had been weakened by the abandonment of the general principles referred to above.

It is likely that Stalin will make use of all the weapons at his disposal in order to attain immediate recognition of at least some of the territorial gains which the Soviet Union has achieved since the outbreak of the war. He already has intimated that the failure to extend such recognition shows a lack of good faith and confidence. He may go further and refuse for a
time at least to cooperate with Great Britain and the United States in case he is unable to gain his points. He may even insinuate that the Soviet Union will not feel itself obligated not to enter into a separate peace unless such recognition is granted. He will without doubt cause the Communist Parties in the United States and Great Britain to use all their resources and influential friends and sympathizers in order to bring as much pressure as possible from the rear upon the British and American Governments and upon officials of those Governments. If, however, these Governments succumb to pressure of the type outlined above, Stalin will be encouraged to resort to similar tactics later in order to obtain further and more far-reaching demands.

Stalin's insistence upon obtaining at least certain territorial commitments at this time may be ascribed to his desires:

1. to break down the principle thus far observed by the American and British Governments not to make any territorial commitments prior to the peace conference;

2. to make use of the recognition of his territorial claims as evidence of the justification of the Soviet Union in invading Poland and the Baltic States and in making war on Finland in 1939 and 1940;

3. to
3. to have promises now with regard to Soviet frontiers which might be useful to him later at the Peace Conference in case the war should end with a weakened Soviet Union not in occupation of the territories which he has demanded.

The agreement by the United States and Great Britain at the present time to Soviet territorial demands or such agreement by Great Britain with the assent of the United States would be sure to have an unfortunate effect upon the attitude of small countries everywhere towards the United States and Great Britain and also upon that of countries which are especially opposed to the spread of Bolshevism. In case the commitments desired are made, Axis propaganda would be quick to charge that the United States, which has for years advocated high principles of international conduct, began trafficking or at least assented to such trafficking in the independence of small countries within a few weeks after it had become involved in war. Resentment would certainly be aroused, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, among circles which have thus far been extremely friendly to Great Britain and the United States. Moreover the American Republics, always sensitive on matters touching the rights of small countries, might well consider assent on our part to Soviet territorial
territorial expansion at the expense of other countries in Eastern Europe as a change in the policy of the United States, and would note with anxiety, quite apart from the religious aspects of the matter, such a departure from the principles the United States has hitherto advocated. Likewise the Vatican, according to reports which have reached us from Rome, has noted with concern certain rumors to the effect that the United States and Great Britain might be willing to recognize Soviet rights to territories which did not belong to the Soviet Union prior to the outbreak of the war.

The recognition at this time of Soviet claims to the Baltic States would be certain to have an effect upon the integrity of the Atlantic Charter. Eden apparently was concerned in this regard when in the course of one of his conversations on the subject with Stalin he said:

"Under the Atlantic Charter, we have pledged ourselves to take into account the wishes of the inhabitants. It may be that in this case, they have been taken into account, but that is a matter we must check upon before we arrive at a decision."

This remark contained a suggestion that certain British official circles might be considering the advisability of taking the position that the Baltic States had been annexed to the Soviet Union upon the expressed wishes of the inhabitants of those States.
It must be clear to all intelligent people who take the trouble to look into the matter that the Baltic States were invaded by Soviet armed forces and that the population of these States at no time had an opportunity freely to express their desires as to whether or not they would like to remain independent. Our own statements issued at the time showed that we had no doubt with respect to what was taking place. If, therefore, the British and American Governments should take the position that these States entered the Soviet Union in accordance with the expressed desires of the population, every Government in the world, irrespective of what might be its views with regard to opportunism in this connection, would know, at least privately, that the British and American Governments were guilty of insincerity. It would be extremely unfortunate if the manner in which the Soviet Union invaded the Baltic States and conducted the ensuing plebiscites should be accepted as a mode of ascertaining the wishes of a people with regard to their future. The establishment of such a precedent would destroy the meaning of one of the most important clauses of the Atlantic Charter and would tend to undermine the force of the whole document.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS

For your information and comment, if any.

F. D. R.

Let to the President from Secy Hull undated see attached.
My dear Mr. President:

I have caused to be prepared and am enclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum outlining the substance of certain conversations and negotiations of a political character which have taken place between the British and Soviet Governments since the outbreak of Soviet-German hostilities on June 22, 1941, and containing certain observations with regard thereto. There is also enclosed for your convenience a copy of a telegram sent to Ambassador Winant on December 5, 1941 which is referred to in the memorandum and which sets forth the attitude of this Government towards the entering into secret agreements or territorial commitments prior to the cessation of hostilities.

I am inclined to the opinion that the policies which we outlined in our telegram to Ambassador Winant are sound.

The President,

The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date, FEB 19 1972
sound and that a deviation therefrom would be unfortunate, particularly just now when we are endeavoring to unite all forces opposed to the Axis on the primary task of defeating the enemy.

In that telegram we took the position that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union should not be our willingness to agree to the recognition of extended Soviet frontiers at this time, but rather the degree of determination which we show loyally to carry out our promises to aid the Soviet Government with equipment and supplies.

I am sure that you will agree with me that by our actions we should make it clear to the Soviet Government in the future to an even greater degree that we are doing our utmost to live up to our promises.

Faithfully yours,

(For enclosures, see following page.)
Enclosures:

1. Memorandum, February 4, 1942, "British-Soviet Negotiations Looking Forward to the Conclusion of a Treaty of a Political Character with Particular Reference to Soviet Suggestions that Certain Territories Taken over by the Soviet Union During the Period September 1, 1939-June 22, 1941, be Recognized as Soviet Territory."

2. Telegram No. 5682 of December 5, 1941 to Ambassador Winant.
Published in Stalin's correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman, volume 2, pp. 19-20.
February 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

On Sunday you spoke to me of your desire, after having spoken to Secretary Hull, to send a further personal message to Stalin.

I have noted that you sent a personal message to Stalin yesterday regarding the shipment from the United States of war matériel. In the event that you wish to send an additional message of a more personal character, I am transmitting herewith a suggested message for your consideration.

The middle paragraph on page 2 has been cleared with Ed Stettinius.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
February 10, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Kuibyshev (USSR).

PERSONAL FOR THURSTON.

Please transmit to Stalin the following message from the President:

QUOTE I am much pleased that your Government has expressed its willingness to receive as the Ambassador of the United States my old and trusted friend, Admiral Standley. The Ambassador and I have been closely associated for many years. I have complete confidence in him and recommend him to you not only as a man of energy and integrity but also as one who is appreciative of and an admirer of the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, which, you will recall, he visited with Mr. Harriman last year. Since his return from Moscow Admiral Standley has already done much to further understanding in the United States of the situation in the Soviet Union and with his rich background and his knowledge of the problems which
are facing our respective countries I am sure that with your cooperation he will meet with success in his efforts to bring them still more closely together.

QUOTE It has just been brought to my attention that the Soviet Government has placed with us requisitions for munitions and supplies of a value which will exceed the billion dollars which last autumn were placed at its disposal under the Lend-Lease Act following an exchange of letters between us. I propose, therefore, that under this Act a second billion dollars be placed at the disposal of your Government upon the same conditions as those upon which the first billion were allocated. In case you have any counter-suggestions to offer with regard to the terms under which the second billion dollars should be made available, you may be sure that they will be given careful and sympathetic consideration. In any event it may prove mutually desirable later, in order to meet changing conditions, to review such financial arrangements as we may enter into now.

QUOTE The problems connected with the effecting of the prompt delivery of the supplies already ordered by
your Government in this country have been, I know, the subject of a message to you from Mr. Harriman and I am confident that we shall achieve complete success in solving them. UNQUOTE.
February 10, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Kuibyshev (USSR).

PERSONAL FOR THURSTON.

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QUOTE I am much pleased that your Government has expressed its willingness to receive as the Ambassador of the United States my old and trusted friend, Admiral Standley. The Ambassador and I have been closely associated for many years. I have complete confidence in him and recommend him to you not only as a man of energy and integrity but also as one who is appreciative of and an admirer of the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, which, you will recall, he visited with Mr. Harriman last year. Since his return from Moscow Admiral Standley has already done much to further understanding in the United States of the situation in the Soviet Union and with his rich background and his knowledge of the problems which
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QUOTE The problems connected with the effecting of the prompt delivery of the supplies already ordered by
your Government in this country have been, I know, the subject of a message to you from Mr. Harriman and I am confident that we shall achieve complete success in solving them. UNQUOTE.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

I think this is important
and that we should do it. Will
you prepare peply for my signature?

F. D. R.

Message from Stalin dated
Feb. 20, 1942 re the billion dollars
and transporting of armaments from
U. S. to the U.S.S.R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith two messages from Stalin to you which the Soviet Ambassador left with me this morning.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
Message dated February 19, 1942.
Message dated February 20, 1942.

The President,

The White House.
February 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Paysonville in Moscow sends this interesting cable, beginning with paragraph 3.

H.L.N.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 46  
From: MOSCOW

Dated: 2/21/42 3 p.m.  
Rec'd: 2/24/42 6:50 p.m.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

FROM PARYSVILLE FOR STETTINUS.

One. With reference to your message 38 of 11 a.m.

February 17, I wish to report that the visit of Colonel Michela
and Captain Park to the front was postponed as they were unavoidably
delayed in reaching Moscow, and they have now returned to Kuibyshev
in order to participate there in Red Army Anniversary observances
February 23. It is expected that they will shortly return to Moscow.

On their forthcoming trip to the front I have been promised that
their itinerary will be similar to that which Lieutenant General
MacFarlane was permitted to follow. As you know, he is Chief of the
British Military Mission.

Two. All personnel of our organization ordered to the Soviet
Union should be informed before departure from the United States
that to bring rubles into the Union is a violation of Soviet law.
At the suggestion of Minister Thurston, I request that they be so
informed. The Soviet Government is at present willing to accord
certain exchange privileges to American diplomatic representatives
on the understanding that Soviet currency will not be obtained

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaeble Date FEB 18 1972
illegally. It is especially necessary that the law be strictly observed, in view of this attitude of the Soviet Government.

Three. As the following points seem to me to be of importance, in estimating the military situation, will you please convey them to General Lee:

First, in withdrawing, the German Army is taking enough material and personnel to form the nucleus of a strong striking force two months hence. It is expected here that this nucleus will be augmented by four months' production of the German munitions industry and 700,000 men. If this is so, the German striking force will be able to deliver a blow equal to that of June 22 on either the northern or White Russian or Ukrainian front, but probably not simultaneously on two fronts. Second, the drive of the Soviet forces can be continued at present rate through spring and to do this is undoubtedly their plan. Any probable losses of manpower can be made good through recruiting and training. Newly raised Soviet armies can be provided with hand arms and ammunition. The more technical classes of equipment, including aircraft, tanks, and artillery are not yet being replaced by the Soviet munitions industry at the same rate as they are being destroyed and there is no prospect for many months of the destruction rate being equalled. Third, without critically weakening the western armies, there is no possibility that additional obligations can be assumed by the Red Army in the Far East. Fourth, Hitlerism can be defeated on the Russian front and probably more
quickly and decisively than elsewhere, in the belief of the Russian General Staff, but the immediate supply of munition items must be increased and the Soviet munitions industry must be strongly supported to finish the job in 1942. Tanks, planes, antiaircraft and antitank guns and ammunition remain the principal requirements in finished items. Fifth, the Red Army’s morale is high and even in face of losses there is no sign of weakening. In spite of new taxes, less food and a more difficult economic situation, civilian backing is strong. Greater unity of political thought and patriotic effort than at any time in modern Russian history has resulted from concentration on plans to liberate occupied territory. Sixth, there is a prevalent feeling that the sacrifices of the Red Army are not appreciated abroad, that the threat against Allied interests would have been reduced materially by an equal amount of fortitude shown in Africa and Malaya, that the greatest burdens in the common effort against Hitlerism have fallen on the Russian people and that the Allies abroad, who should be the first to acknowledge them, do not understand sympathetically the Russian desires to restore the boundaries of 1941.

THOMPSON
March 4, 1942

My dear Mr. Hopkins:

I have received instructions from my Government to raise once again the question regarding deliveries to the U.S.S.R. of the "Douglas" commercial airplane.

The present vast extent of the front lines demands great quantities of large commercial airplanes for the purpose of transporting troops to points at which reinforcements may be required at any particular time.

Taking into consideration the fact that it was difficult for the United States Government to deliver 600 airplanes as recently requested, my Government now asks whether it will not be possible to deliver immediately at least 100 and 25 airplanes monthly thereafter.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. is willing to accept not only new airplanes, but any airplanes available, including used airplanes.

It will be deeply appreciated if the United States Government will endeavor to use every means possible to effect delivery of these airplanes, for which the need is most pressing.

Sincerely yours,

Ambassador

The Honorable

Harry L. Hopkins

The White House

Washington
1. General Repin expressed the fear that Japan may force Russia to fight on two fronts by an attack on the MARITIME PROVINCES. He stated that his government deems it imperative that the United Nations create a Western Front in FUCINH and the LuANGMAE without delay in order that the Red Army may be relieved of Axis pressure. General Repin maintained that even though a heavy assault by air against the KITAKAN oil fields and Axis some of the interior would be of great assistance to Russia, she still desires that a Western Front be created. He also maintained that any contemplated action by GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES must be carried out at once.

2. Chuvalatin remarked that a separate peace would never be made by the Soviet. "Why not?" remarked General Repin. He explained that if the Allies of RUSSIA do not initiate an offensive on a large scale in the west, the Russian people would be justified in raising a separate peace. He stated that it would have been a Soviet war with a Soviet victory, and added that the Soviet may consider that no agreement has been violated unless the remainder of the United Nations actively participates in setting up a Western Front.

To: General Eisenhower
War Room
WPD Mag Ctr File
Joint Strategic Committee
Future Opr. (Col. Hull)

DECLASSED
JD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 2-24-70

Paraphrased by Lt. Col. David Laurence (EN)
MR. HOPKINS HAS NOTED BOTH OF THESE.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS

For your information and
return for my files.

F.D.R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Admiral Standley sent me after his departure a memorandum of which I enclose a copy for your information.

In order that I may comply with his request, which I know you will feel is justified, I shall appreciate it if Miss Tully will let me have personally copies of any communications of the character mentioned by Admiral Standley in order that I can communicate the substance thereof to him.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
March 17, 1942

Mr. Welles:

Referring to our conversation of this morning with regard to the messages through Litvinoff to Stalin and Stalin's replies, I would appreciate it if you would make sure that while I am in Moscow I receive copies of all communications exchanged between the President and Stalin through Litvinoff or any other channels. You can understand how important it is that I should know all details of Soviet-American relations at this time.

W. H. STANDLEY
April 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may recall that Admiral Standley asked that copies of messages sent to Mr. Stalin be sent to him as well for his information. As you sent one on April 11th, I thought you might like to send the text of it also to Admiral Standley.

What to do?

G.

MEMO FOR GRACE:

Ask Sumner Welles.

F.D.R.

MEMO FOR F.D.R.

If you approve I shall send Admiral Standley a brief summary -- not quoting any part of it.

S. W.

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.S.R. for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow on July 12th, 1941 and to replace them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to prevent further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in her acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention of collaborating closely with one another as well as with the United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made on August 14th, 1941 by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has adhered;

Desiring finally to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either of the high contracting parties by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe,

Part One

Article 1. In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R., the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 2. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with Hitlerite Government or any other Government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part Two
Part Two

Article 5.
(1) The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post war period.

(2) Pending the adoption of such proposals they will after the termination of hostilities take all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article 4. Should one of the high contracting parties during the post war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article 3 (2) in consequence of an attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance in her power.

This Article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties by mutual agreement shall recognise that it is superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article 3 (1). In default of the adoption of such proposals it shall remain in force for a period of 20 years and thereafter until terminated by either high contracting party as provided in Article 6.

Article 5. The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of the security of each of them agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples.

Article 6. The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

Article 7. Each high contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 8. The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the U.S.S.R.
U.S.S.R. and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at Moscow on July 12th, 1941.

Part 1 of the present treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace between the high contracting parties and Germany and the powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Part 2 of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years. Thereafter unless 12 months' notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of 20 years it shall continue in force until 12 months after either high contracting party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.
Supplementing London's 2897 which we have red penciled.

In the President's telegram of December 5 to London:

1. There were to be no secret agreements;

2. The three Governments, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, now on common ground in the Atlantic Charter, were not to enter into commitments regarding post war settlements until the conclusion of the hostilities.

3. The first objective must remain the common effort in defeating the forces of aggression.

As we read the draft treaty in the first place it would be a commitment entered into between two of the important members of the United Nations before the conclusion of hostilities. Furthermore, it appears to set up a special relationship under which one or the other parties could prevent the other Government from collaborating in a general post war arrangement. In fact it appears to be an undertaking under which the two contracting parties can arrive at arrangements to the exclusion of all other governments.
NO DISTRIBUTION
RUSH
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON
5682.
FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

With reference to your 5876, please read the following cable to Eden personally but leave no text of the message:

One. As proof of American policy of aid to Russia, this Government recently sent representatives to the Soviet Union in order to discuss the furnishing of supplies to the Soviet Union to assist it in its struggle against the Nazi invasion. These representatives entered into an agreement with the Soviet Government as to supplies; an agreement which was coordinated with a similar effort by the British Government.

Two. It is our conviction that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is the measure to which we fulfill the commitments our representatives made in Moscow. We are exerting every effort to carry out these obligations and will continue to do so until the final victory.

Three. In so far as our post war policies are concerned, it is our belief that these have been delineated in the Atlantic Charter which today represents the attitude not only of the United States but also of Great Britain and of the Soviet Union.

Four. In view of this fact in our considered opinion it would be unfortunate were any of the three governments, now on common ground in the Atlantic Charter to express any willingness to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post war settlement. Discussions between the several
several governments looking toward fullest possible agreement on basic policies and toward later arrangements at the proper time and with full public knowledge will of course be expected to continue. Upon the conclusion of hostilities those nations contributing to the defeat of the Hitler forces will join in an effort to restore peace and order. The participation at that time of the Soviet Government will be no less than that of Great Britain and our own. In order not to jeopardize the aims we shall all share in common looking to an enduring peace it is evident that no commitments as to individual countries should be entered into at this time. It would be unfortunate if we should approach the peace conference thus hampered. Above all there must be no secret accords.

Five. Our basic policy of aid to England is no less strong than that of aid to Russia and we are confident that there is no doubt in the British mind as to our good faith in carrying out our policy. It was in this spirit the Atlantic Charter was conceived, to which the Soviet Government has now given its adherence. Given the limitations of this Government, it would be difficult if not impossible for us to implement this common understanding by agreements of a more detailed nature at this time. Furthermore, the constitutional limitation to which this Government is bound must be kept in mind.

We have very frankly indicated our position in order that in view of the short time before Mr. Eden's departure he may have no misunderstanding as to the general lines of our position.

As to numbered paragraph seven of your telegram we abstain from comment because of uncertainty as to its meaning. In the event that further discussions on this are contemplated we would like to have fuller information.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MG)

London
Dated May 24, 1942
Rec'd 7 a.m., 25th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
2897. May 24, midnight.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY
The British-Russian negotiations have continued almost without respite since my message to you announcing Molotov's arrival. There were three major points of difference which at first appeared to block possible agreement.

One. There was a reference to Poland which Eden refused to accept because it ran counter to the British understanding with the Poles. (Agreement signed August 25, 1939).

Two. The complete rejection by the Russians of the clause suggested by us to the British to protect the inhabitants of the Baltic states in their persons and in their property and permitting migration.

Three. The Russians wanted a secret agreement with the
with the British in which the latter were to promise to support claims relating to the Finnish and Rumanian frontiers.

Up to noon yesterday both parties to the negotiations had apparently come to the conclusion that agreement was improbable. The Russians had explained that even if a treaty was not arrived at, good had come of the negotiations, and Eden had suggested a substitute treaty which made no reference to frontiers. Late yesterday afternoon, however, the Russians began to recede from their original position, and Eden called me at six o'clock tonight to say that the negotiations had gone so far that he would have a proposal to make to the Cabinet tomorrow afternoon. He went on to say that:

(One) The Russians had withdrawn their demands affecting Poland.

(Two) They had compromised on the protective clause but only to the extent of allowing minorities to withdraw, i.e. Poles from Lithuania. This, Eden acknowledged, did not help much.

(Three) The idea of a secret agreement was abandoned but they asked that a clause be inserted in which the British would recognize that Russia had special
had special interests in Finland and Rumania. Eden told me that he still hoped that this reference might be eliminated. 

From the beginning Molotov has been interested in two things: First, a second front, and second, the treaty proposals. I understand that the British have told him that we (United States and Great Britain) stand together on the second front issue. I was also told that both the Prime Minister and Eden did their utmost to make Molotov understand our opposition to the Russian frontier proposals.

I was to meet with the Russians on Friday but it could not be arranged. Eden then asked them to have lunch with him yesterday, explaining that he was inviting me. They in turn asked him to have lunch with them at their Embassy in London. He said that he would be delighted to, and that he would bring me. The Saturday morning meeting however, ran until late with many differences of opinion, so the Russians asked to postpone their luncheon until Tuesday. I lunched alone with Eden at the Foreign Office. Maisky had previously told me that he wanted to arrange a meeting for me with Molotov,
-4- #2897, May 24, midnight, from London.

Molotov, so I called him on the telephone. He called me back at six o'clock tonight (Sunday), inviting me to go to the Russian Embassy tomorrow at four o'clock. I called him back and told him that I thought it was unnecessary that we meet sooner than that, and he made an appointment for me at ten o'clock tonight at his Embassy.

Both Molotov and he were most courteous and cordial. I explained to them that we were trying to cooperate with them, that we were both interested in a second front, and that within the last week the Department had informed me that we were arranging to discuss commercial policy with them (Department's 2152, May 14, 7 p.m.) and that we were trying to work out a program in the relief field that went a considerable distance toward meeting the suggestions in Maisky's memorandum to me on that subject, but that both you and Mr. Hull were set against introducing frontier problems at this time and that that was true of other friends who were doing all that could be done to support our common war effort. I also told them very frankly that I did the best I could to present the Russian point of view to you and to Mr. Hull,
May 24, midnight, from London.

Mr. Hull, but that you were both definitely opposed to a British Russian Treaty containing agreements on frontiers. They listened with great attention and Molotov told me that the President's position on this question was a matter for their serious consideration. He then asked me if I had seen Eden's draft treaty which eliminated any reference to frontiers. I told him that I had, because I had worked with Eden in an effort to find the formula for a treaty that might be satisfactory to them and at the same time eliminate any reference to frontiers which was opposed by my country. He told me that he would reconsider the draft treaty and perhaps refrain from making any decision until after he had talked with the President. This was a definite concession, as Molotov had intended to return directly to Moscow from Washington and up to this point they had shown no interest in the draft treaty. I had just gotten back to our Embassy when I got a call from Eden, saying that Molotov had called him in the interim asking for an appointment tomorrow morning to discuss the draft treaty. I am attaching a copy.
-6- #2897, May 24, midnight, from London

copy of this treaty to my message.

The Russians are deeply interested in establishing a second front. They feel that both the Prime Minister and Eden have great sympathy for their point of view, but that Brooke is reluctant to move and that they could get no definite commitments on action this year. I have felt myself that there has been less support for action than when I returned here. Maisky asked me if I would suggest a date when such a front might be established. I told him that I had no authority to speak on the subject and that I could not even discuss it with him, that it was a question that Molotov would have to take up when he reached Washington. They plainly do not want to make any commitment on the Japanese situation and Molotov told me that in speaking of a second front he was speaking of a Western Front. They feel that they are carrying their maximum load on the Eastern Front.

Maisky told me that he is very grateful for our promise to do everything in our power to keep Molotov's visit secret until his return tomorrow.

(Department's
7- #2897, May 24, midnight, from London

(Department's 2297, May 22, 3 p.m.).

The draft treaty follows:

"SECRET.

DRAFT TREATY

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.S.R. for joint action in the war against Germany, signed at Moscow on the twelfth July, 1941 and to replace them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in her acts of aggression in Europe;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles
principles enunciated in the Declaration made on the fourteenth August, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the Government of the U.S.S.R. has adhered;

Desiring, finally, to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either High Contracting Party by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Have decided to conclude a Treaty for that purpose, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

PART ONE
#2897, May 24, midnight, from London.

PART ONE

ARTICLE I. In Virtue of the Alliance established between them the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE II. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

PART TWO

ARTICLE III. (One) The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to associate themselves with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression.

(Two) Pending
-10- #2897, May 24, midnight, from London

(Two) Pending the adoption of such proposals, they will take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE IV. --Should one of the High Contracting Parties become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III (Two) in consequence of an attack by that State against that Party, the other High Contracting Party will at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power.

This Article shall remain in force until superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article III (One). In default of the adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of (20) years, and thereafter until terminated by either High Contracting Party, as provided in Article III.

ARTICLE V. --The High Contracting Parties agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration
May 24, midnight, from London

collaboration after the reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples.

ARTICLE VI. --The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the War.

ARTICLE VII. --Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE VIII. --The Present Treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's
-12\#2897, May 24, midnight, from London.

Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, signed at Moscow on the twelfth July, 1941.

Part I of the present Treaty shall remain in force until the reestablishment of peace between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her acts of aggression in Europe.

Part II of the present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years. Thereafter unless twelve months notice has been given by either party to terminate the Treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either High Contracting Party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

In Witness Whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Duplicate in _____ on the ____ day of ____1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

WINANT

ALC
MDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

2901, May 25, 5 p.m.

MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

My 2897, May 24, midnight.

Eden just called me on a private wire to say that he has spent the morning going over the draft text with Molotov which I forwarded to you last night. Molotov explained to Eden that the statements made to him by the Prime Minister, Eden and myself convinced him that there would be serious objections to the Russian frontiers treaty in the United States. He further told him that he had recommended to his government in Moscow that he be permitted to work out an agreement with the British on Eden's draft treaty. Molotov expects to get a reply by this evening or tomorrow morning.

WINANT

jnh

WSB
Contents:

A. The Establishment of an Airplane Ferrying Service from the United States to the Soviet Union through Alaska and Siberia.

B. Establishment of a Civil Air Service between the United States and Vladivostok or some other railway point in Siberia through Alaska.

C. The Establishment of a Civilian Air Service between the United States and the Soviet Union through Africa and the Middle East.

D. The Supply Route over the Soviet Union to China.

E. Finland.

F. Economic Matters.

G. Iran.

H. Turkey
The Establishment of an Airplane Ferrying Service From the United States to the Soviet Union Through Alaska and Siberia

On a number of occasions American officials have endeavored to persuade the Soviet authorities to consent to the establishment of a ferrying service between the United States and the Soviet Union through Alaska and Siberia.

During his conversation with Stalin Admiral Standley particularly stressed the advantages to the Soviet Government of such a service. If it would be possible to ferry planes to the Soviet Union by this route delivery could be greatly expedited and there would be a tremendous economy in shipping space. Furthermore, the danger of the loss of aircraft as a result of operations of the enemy would be practically eliminated.

The Soviet authorities have for the most part taken an attitude that on account of weather conditions and other factors the Alaska-Siberian route might not be practical. When pressed by Admiral Standley, however, Mr. Stalin agreed to look into the matter. He has as yet made no definite reply. It is understood that the military authorities in the United States feel that it is of the utmost importance that this ferrying service be opened in the immediate future.
Establishment of a Civil Air Service between the United States and Vladivostok or Some Other Railway Point in Siberia Through Alaska

The advisability of the establishment of such a service has already been broached informally to Litvinoff. The Soviet Government has been given to understand that the American Government is prepared to operate this service as far as Nome or some other point in Alaska which might be selected. American pilots or American planes could cross the Bering Strait or the Bering Sea from Alaska to Siberia in order to make connections with a Soviet airline; or if the Soviet Government should prefer, Soviet pilots and Soviet planes could fly back and forth between Siberia and Alaska in order to make such connections.

The establishment of such a service would have so many advantages from the point of view of communications and of the transport of personnel and non-bulky supplies that it does not seem necessary to dwell at length upon its desirability.

The Soviet Government has thus far given no definite reply to the proposals made to it.
Subject: The Establishment of a Civilian Air Service Between the United States and the Soviet Union Through Africa and the Middle East.

At the present time United States-operated planes proceed regularly as far as Basra. There is no link, however, between Basra and Kuibyshev. Admiral Standley has recently proposed that if the Soviet Government would send a plane weekly from Kuibyshev to Tehran the Ferry Command would be willing to send from Basra to Tehran a civilian-operated plane to meet the Kuibyshev plane every week. The Soviet reply was vague, but a more definite reply was promised.

It is extremely important that there should be improvements in air communications between Kuibyshev and Washington through the Near East. At the present time it requires from six weeks to three months for mail to travel between the two cities. Similarly, it is difficult for officials and employees of the United States and Soviet Governments to travel between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although Soviet planes proceed from time to time from Kuibyshev to Tehran, they apparently have no space available for American personnel or mail. It is hoped that definite arrangements can be made with the Soviet Government so that a dependable airplane service between Kuibyshev and Washington can be established which would guarantee the rapid exchange of official mail and official personnel between those two cities.
May 27, 1942

Since the Burma Road can no longer be used to send supplies to China the position of China will become desperate unless routes can be found over which supplies may be dispatched to the Chinese Armies.

The Chinese Ambassador in Kuibyshev has been instructed by his Government to present the matter to the Soviet Government and to request that Government to collaborate in the opening of supply routes over Soviet territory. Ambassador Standley has been instructed also to take such steps as may seem to him to be appropriate in order to impress upon the Soviet authorities the importance of the opening in the immediate future of such supply routes.

It might be helpful to present this matter with considerable force to Mr. Molotov. A number of routes across the Soviet Union have been suggested, one by air from Alaska across Siberia into China, another through Iran across the Caspian Sea and over the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Chinese frontier. It would appear to be to the interest of the Soviet Union as well as to that of the other United Nations that China should have the materials necessary to enable it to continue its struggle.
At the present time the United States is the only one of the United Nations which has a diplomatic mission in Helsinki. It is possible that this Legation might be useful in connection with efforts to effect Finland's withdrawal from the war.

The Legation reports that there are several representative groups in Finland who are desirous of making peace. It appears, however, that they are unable to mobilize their potential strength as long as they are not in a position to demonstrate to Finnish public opinion that peace can be made with the Soviet Union on a basis acceptable to the wide masses of the Finnish people who, at the present time, are believed to be generally anxious for peace. From time to time spokesmen for these groups have approached American officials in Finland and in other countries in their endeavors to find a basis for a peace with the Soviet Union. Thus far, American officials have been unable to discuss the matter with them for lack of any information as to Soviet ideas regarding the basis for a peace.

Since it would obviously be advantageous to the United Nations' cause to effect Finland's withdrawal from the war as soon as possible, Mr. Molotov might care to consult Mr. Stalin with a view to informing the American Government whether there is anything which American officials might say to the peace-minded groups in Finland, in case a suitable occasion should arise, with regard to the Soviet desiderata as to a basis for a Soviet-Finnish peace.
You may wish to take up with Mr. Molotov the following economic matters:

1. A draft lend-lease agreement, identical (except for slight formal changes) with the similar agreement between us and the British signed on February 23 of this year, has been communicated to the Soviet Ambassador with a proposal that such an agreement be immediately concluded. The essence of the agreement is that each country will provide the other with material and other assistance for the prosecution of the war to the extent it is able, and that the definitive determination of the compensation for such aid shall be deferred until the extent of the aid and the conditions under which settlement will be made are known. However, the agreement lays down broad principles governing the ultimate settlement and contemplates that compensation will, to a large extent, consist of cooperation in the attainment of the basic objectives in the economic field envisaged in the Atlantic Charter.

Article VII of the agreement provides for consultation between ourselves and the other signatory government with respect to basic commercial and economic policies to be pursued after the war. We are now in the process of arranging for such conversations with the British and will presumably be ready to enter into similar consultations with the Russians as soon as the lend-lease agreement with them is signed. Thus, by signing the lend-lease agreement, the Soviet Union will place itself on exactly the same footing as Great Britain with respect to both the bases of lend-lease relations and consultation on post-war economic policy.

We intend to arrange for preliminary consultations of this kind separately with each lend-lease country as preparation for possible later multilateral consideration of the problems involved. Hence, it is our thought that in the process of such preliminary consultations with the British we shall keep the Soviet Government fully informed, and that in the process of similar consultations with the Soviet Government we shall keep the British fully informed. The respective consultations can, of course, proceed simultaneously. We also intend to inaugurate similar consultations with China and with as many other lend-lease countries as will be found practicable.

2. Since
2. Since 1937 there has been in existence a commercial agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which has been renewed annually, providing in essence assurances of most-favored-nation treatment on our part in return for certain provisions respecting Soviet purchasing policy. This agreement will be subject to further renewal in July of this year, and it is desirable that such renewal take place.
For some time we have been receiving reports from Iran of the disturbed conditions among the tribes, particularly the Kurds in northwestern Iran. The most recent reports indicate that the Soviet and Iranian authorities are cooperating in efforts to put down these disturbances and that the Soviet Government has agreed to the use of Iranian forces for this purpose.

It might be worth while to inform Mr. Molotov of the satisfaction with which we have learned of this Soviet-Iranian cooperation and to express the hope that such other difficulties that may arise as a result of Allied occupation of Iranian territory may be solved in the same spirit of cooperation and accommodation.

It is hardly necessary to stress the importance of maintaining orderly conditions in Iran and of cultivating the good-will of the Iranians in order to keep open the vital supply lines across their country.
TURKEY

It is no secret that Soviet-Turkish relations have lacked during the past two years that spirit of cordiality and friendship which characterized them during the preceding period of nearly two decades. We have no concrete suggestions as to how these relations might be improved, but it would be desirable to let Mr. Molotov know that we should be happy to see a return of Soviet-Turkish relations to their previous state of close and cordial friendship. We would be glad to have any suggestions as to steps which we might take to help out in this matter.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Sir Ronald Campbell came to see me this afternoon and, by instruction of his Government, asked that I send you the attached copy of a telegram received by the British Embassy from the British Foreign Office relating to the treaty recently signed by the British and Soviet Governments.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
Substance of a telegram from the Foreign Office to Lord Halifax dated May 29th.

It will be seen that it has been possible to avoid dealing in the Treaty with the whole subject of the Soviet claim to the Baltic States and their presumed designs in respect of Finland and Roumania. There is thus no question of the Treaty being in conflict with the Atlantic Charter. On the contrary, the preamble states the intention that post-war collaboration shall be on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, while the two principles enunciated in the Charter of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States are reaffirmed in Article 5 of the Treaty.

Collaboration with the United Nations is covered in paragraph 4 of the preamble, and in the second sentence of Article 5 of the Treaty.

As regards provisions for mutual assistance, these are confined to the case of renewed aggression by Germany and her associates. It is to be observed that the desire of the two parties to unite with other like minded States in adopting a post-war security system is covered in Article 3, and that the mutual assistance proposal lapses on the agreement of both parties that they are superseded by the adoption of such a system. It might conceivably be objected that

under/
under paragraph 2 of Article 4 the U.S.S.R. would be in a position to insist on the continuance of the mutual assistance provision after the general security system is agreed upon, by arguing that the latter does not supersede the former. The answer to this argument is that it is unlikely that any general security system in Europe would be of much practical value if the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom did not both participate and were not both satisfied that the system was adequate.

It may be argued that the words in Article 5 to the effect that the two parties will have "regard to the interests of the security" of each party could be used by the Soviet Government to reassert their claims to recover their 1941 frontiers and to control Finland and Roumania. It may be that the Soviet Government will in any case reassert their claims sooner or later, but it is important to note that these claims are not specified or recognised by implication in the present Treaty. The British Government are not pledged to do more than have regard to the Soviet Union's security interests in general if these are put forward by the Soviet Government after the re-establishment of peace; and even so, this pledge must be read in relation to the other undertakings assumed by both parties in Article 5.

In general, it can be claimed that this Treaty

(a) brings the U.S.S.R. closer to the United Kingdom in prosecuting the war in Europe up to the final victory,
(b) provides for collaboration of the most effective kind to prevent a repetition of aggression by Germany and her associates in Europe pending the setting up of a more general security system. The Treaty thus provides for the establishment of the first condition on which the effective economic reconstruction of Europe after the war depends.

(c) brings Russia finally into the circle of the United Nations not only in regard to the organisation of security but also in respect of economic reconstruction, and

(d) by the second sentence of Article 5, the interests of other States are not only affected but actually safeguarded.

The British Government have tried in these negotiations to increase Soviet confidence in their sincerity and at the same time to dispel the suspicions of neutral and allied States in regard to their collaboration with the Soviet Union. If this aim is achieved, results which may be of importance not only during the war but in the post-war period should have been obtained.

Please take appropriate steps to bring the foregoing points to the notice of the President and the State Department.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 2, 1942.

PERSONAL AND SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Letter from Lord Halifax to the Pres. 5/30/42 advising that a correction should be made in text of Anglo-Soviet Treaty at the very end of Article 5 the word "peoples" should be replaced by the word "States"
FILE MEMO:

These were taken up with Molotov before he left.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may wish to take up with Mr. Molotov the following economic matters:

1. A draft lend-lease agreement, identical (except for slight formal changes) with the similar agreement between us and the British signed on February 23 of this year, has been communicated to the Soviet Ambassador with a proposal that such an agreement be immediately concluded. The essence of the agreement is that each country will provide the other with material and other assistance for the prosecution of the war to the extent it is able, and that the definitive determination of the compensation for such aid shall be deferred until the extent of the aid and the conditions under which settlement will be made are known. However, the agreement lays down broad principles governing the ultimate settlement and contemplates that compensation will, to a large extent, consist of cooperation in the attainment of the basic objectives in the economic field envisaged in the Atlantic Charter.

Article VII of the agreement provides for consultation between ourselves and the other signatory government...
with respect to basic commercial and economic policies to be pursued after the war. We are now in the process of arranging for such conversations with the British and will presumably be ready to enter into similar consultations with the Russians as soon as the lend-lease agreement with them is signed. Thus, by signing the lend-lease agreement, the Soviet Union will place itself on exactly the same footing as Great Britain with respect to both the bases of lend-lease relations and consultation on post-war economic policy.

We intend to arrange for preliminary consultations of this kind separately with each lend-lease country as preparation for possible later multilateral consideration of the problems involved. Hence, it is our thought that in the process of such preliminary consultations with the British we shall keep the Soviet Government fully informed, and that in the process of similar consultations with the Soviet Government we shall keep the British fully informed. The respective consultations can, of course, proceed simultaneously. We also intend to inaugurate similar consultations with China and with as many other lend-lease countries as will be found practicable.

(2) Since 1937 there has been in existence a commercial agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union which has been renewed annually, providing in essence assurances of most-favored-nation treatment on our part in return for certain provisions respecting Soviet purchasing policy. This agreement will be subject to further renewal in July of this year, and it is desirable that such renewal take place.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I asked General Burns to go to see Molotov the night before he left and give him the answer to these questions verbally and not in writing. This was done.

Litvinov asked me about it the other day and I told him that I believed there would be no answer in writing and Litvinov indicated that none was necessary as he assumed Burns' statement was official.

The burden of Burns' statement was that none of these things could be done except No. 4.

H.L.H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
H. L. H.

Molotov gave this to me just before he left. Does it need any action?

F. D. R.

Memorandum Re: Supplies from the USA to the USSR.
ПОСТАВКИ ИЗ США ДЛЯ СССР

1. Организация ежемесячно одного каравана судов из портов Америки непосредственно в Архангельск с конвоированием военно-морскими силами США.

2. Ежемесячная поставка своим летом через Африку по 50 бомбардировщиков B-25 со сдачей в Басре или Тегеране.

3. Доставка в порты Персидского залива со сборкой там ежемесячно 150 бомбардировщиков Бостон-3.

4. Доставка в порты Персидского залива со сборкой там ежемесячно 3.000 грузовиков.

1 июля 1942 года.
SUPPLIES FROM THE USA TO THE USSR

1. Sending of one caravan of ships monthly from the ports of America directly to Archangel under escort by U.S. naval ships.

2. Monthly supplies of 50 bombers B-25 by flight through Africa with their delivery at Basra or Teheran.

3. Delivery of 150 bombers Boston-3 to the ports of the Persian Gulf and their assembly there.

4. Delivery of 3000 trucks monthly to the ports of the Persian Gulf and their assembly there.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Will you keep this for me?
I think it is pretty good.

F.D.R.

Map "Economics of Eastern Siberia"
Message from Stalin to FDR is published in Stalin's correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman, volume 2, page 25.

My dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram from Mr. Stalin and a telegram from Mr. Roosevelt addressed to you which I have received from Mr. Molotov.

If you will please me to do so, I would be glad to have your comments.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:

1. From Mr. Stalin;
   June 18, 1942.
2. From Mr. Roosevelt;
   June 19, 1942.

The President

The White House.
June 17, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith to you a copy of a telegram from Mr. Stalin and a telegram from Mr. Molotov addressed to you which I have received from Mr. Litvinoff.

If you should desire me to do so I would be glad to have drafted for your consideration reply to these messages.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. From Mr. Stalin, June 12, 1942.
2. From Mr. Molotov, June 12, 1942.

The President,

The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted 6/16

ADDRESS TO

THE PRESIDENT

[Handwritten text]

The Government shares your view, and is gratified to receive your kind letter, expressing your appreciation of the satisfactory results of your visit to the United States.

I take this opportunity to thank you, on behalf of the Soviet Government, for the personal courtesy extended to Mr. Molotov during his stay as their guest in the United States.

Mr. Molotov has safely returned to Moscow.

June 26, 1940
The Soviet Government shares your view, Mr. President, as to the satisfactory results of Mr. V. M. Molotov's visit to the United States.

I take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Soviet Government, for the cordial hospitality offered to Mr. Molotov and his staff during their sojourn in the United States.

Mr. V. M. Molotov has safely returned to Moscow today.

June 12, 1942
Translation of a telegram from Mr. V. M. Molotov to the President, dated June 12, 1942 and sent from London.

Before returning to my country I allow myself once more to express to you, Mr. President, the great satisfaction I feel in having reached a full understanding concerning the urgent tasks connected with the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942 for speeding up the rout of Hitlerite Germany and concerning co-operation of our countries in the post-war period in the interests of all freedom-loving peoples.

Please accept my sincere gratitude for the cordial reception and hospitality offered to us by you, Mr. President, and the Government of the United States of America, and my best wishes to you personally and to the people of the United States of America.

Vyacheslav Molotov.
July 3, 1942

Dear Mr. Forster:

Attached is the secret communication from Admiral Standley at Moscow which I believe the President would want to have as soon as possible.

John F. Stone
Published in Stalin's correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman, volume 2, page 28.

[Text not legible]
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM NO. 227, JULY 2, 3 P.M. FROM AMBASSADOR STANDLEY AT MOSCOW

Ambassador Standley refers to his telegram No. 214 of June 26 and states that he has received the following note dated July first from Molotov:

"I have been instructed by the President of the Soviet of Peoples Commissars of the U.S.S.R., Mr. I. V. Stalin, to forward the following message to the President in reply to the note handed to me on the 26th of June:

'With reference to your recent communications I deem it advisable to inform you that I concur with you in full regarding the expediency of the air route of Alaska and Siberia for delivering aircraft to the Western Front from the United States. The Soviet Government, taking this into consideration, already has issued the required orders in connection with finishing in the immediate future the work already begun in Siberia for receiving aircraft, namely, the equipping of the appropriate installations and the existing air fields. It seems to me that the delivery of the planes from Alaska may be entrusted to Soviet aviators, as was once proposed by the Department of State, who, at any agreed time would be sent to Nome or any other feasible spot. I believe that an appropriate group
group of these aviators may also be entrusted with the survey flight which you suggested. We would like you to let us know now how many planes the United States plans to deliver to the Western Front via this route in order to insure completely their reception.

The Soviet Government agrees to the organization of a meeting of United States Army and Navy representatives and Soviet Union representatives in order to exchange such information as is necessary, which was proposed by you, and proposes that Moscow be the meeting place."
July 21st

Dear Mr. Garst

The attached should probably merit the same handling as the one this morning. If you did not encode that you may wish to encode the last paragraph of the attached for security.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
Published in

*Foreign Relations of the United States*

1942 Vol. III Europe

Pages 604-605
Accompanied by my Military Attaché, I talked with Stalin today, and in confirmation of the President's statement regarding Japan's aggressive attitude in the Northern Pacific, I repeated the information furnished by telegram No. 174 from the Department. I then brought up the differences between the terms contained in the President's messages and those in Stalin's reply. The following were discussed specifically:

First. To my mention of the lack of any reference to heavy freight movement via northern rivers, Stalin replied that this route could not be used as during this season only one more navigation month remained. I was assured, however, that the Siberian area air fields were completely equipped and prepared to receive American planes.

Second. With regard to the suggestion of the President that representatives of the Soviet Union might participate in the proposed American planes survey flight, Stalin stated that it would be "entirely agreeable" for American representatives to accompany the Soviet plane on its test flight.

Third. With reference to the proposal by Mr. Stalin that
that American and Soviet representatives organize a meeting in Moscow for the exchange of information regarding the proposed route, and to the President's thought that meetings take place both in Moscow and Washington, I stated that it would be necessary to bring an American air expert to Moscow from Washington as there were none here, and suggested that a Soviet expert who is already in Washington might be named by the Soviet Government to confer with the appropriate American officials, adding that the American and Soviet experts could then return here to act as the President proposed and Stalin seconded. The latter replied that he saw no need of any additional discussions in Washington as it was obviously only a question of the monthly number of planes that could be delivered.

Fourth. Nome, or other feasible point in Alaska, then Semchon, then Yakutsk, then Kiresak and then Krasnoyarsk is the course that Stalin stated the route would follow.
My dear Mr. President:

Feeling that you may desire to send a personal letter to Mr. Stalin introducing Major General Bradley, who I understand is to have the personal rank of Minister, I have taken the liberty of having prepared for your convenience and consideration the attached draft of a letter. The conversations in which Major General Bradley is to engage are for the most part of a military nature and I am, therefore, not fully acquainted with the various factors involved. It is possible that the letter as drafted may not be altogether appropriate and that you may desire either to alter it or to prepare an entirely new letter.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure: Draft of letter to Mr. Stalin.

The President,

The White House.
July 20, 1942

Dear Mr. Stalin:

It is still a matter of deep regret to me that thus far the pressure of events has rendered it impossible for us to meet and personally discuss various matters vitally affecting the common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

As you are already aware I feel that one of the most important of our problems is that of finding ways for speeding up the delivery of airplanes to the Soviet Union. Your decision that the route across Alaska and Siberia should be utilized for the delivery of planes will, I am convinced, greatly aid our efforts to solve this particular problem.

In accordance with our understanding that there should be a meeting of the representatives of the Army and Navy of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America for exchanging such information as might be necessary in order that the most effective use should be made of the Alaskan-Siberian route, I am sending to the Soviet Union as my representative to conduct these conversations Major General Follett Bradley of the United States Air Corps with the personal rank of Minister. Relying as I do upon the discretion and judgment of General Bradley, I recommend him to you as one of the most able officers of the United States Army and hope that you and officers of the armed forces of the Soviet Union will find it possible to discuss with him various matters relating to the establishment of the new air route with the same degree of frankness as that which I have charged him to discuss these matters with you.

Very sincerely yours,

(Foreign) Franklin D. Roosevelt

His Excellency,
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HARRY HOPKINS:

TO DO THE NECESSARY.

F.D.R.

Memo for the Pres. from Gen. Burns, Aug. 3 re North Russia convoys.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HARRY HOPKINS:

TO DO THE NECESSARY.

F.D.R.

THIS CAN BE FILED.

H.L.H.
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Mr. Hopkins asked me to inform you as follows:

A cable was received from London dated July 31, 1942, which changes the North Russian convoy position. Sailings will now be resumed and one convoy will sail early in September, one at the end of September and one during October.

In order to provide our full quotas of ships for these convoys, it will be necessary to berth and to load, prior to September 10, 1942, some 35 ships additional to those now programmed for Russian aid.

The number of ships involved is appreciably less than the number required to meet the second protocol offer which has been made to Russia. However, when the recent decision was made providing for the more drastic reduction of North Russian convoys, ships were released which were then definitely committed to other important objectives, such as Bolero. These commitments must now be modified if we are to provide ships for the proposed Russian convoys.

A priority decision on the assignment of ships is therefore required.

When submitted to Mr. Hopkins he stated the President desires that ships be provided to fill our quotas in convoys to North Russia and to utilize to the full the capacity of the Persian Gulf route to Russia even though this action necessitates changes in commitments of ships already made to other purposes.

Necessary action is being taken.

J. H. BURNS,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Executive, Munitions Assignments Board.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973
August 12, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed memorandum covering a part of the conversation which I had with the Ambassador of Mexico this morning may be of interest to you.

I think the Mexican Ambassador is reporting accurately. If his account of the conversation he had with Litvinov is accurate, the Soviet Ambassador is, in my judgment, going far beyond the bounds of what is in the interest of his own country.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
The Ambassador of Mexico called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador told me that the last time he had come to see me the Soviet Ambassador was waiting to see me as he left. He said that he had a few minutes conversation with Mr. Litvinov, in the course of which he had asked Mr. Litvinov's opinion as to the military situation in Russia. To his surprise Mr. Litvinov had replied that "everything was over". The Ambassador then inquired whether that meant in the opinion of the Soviet Ambassador the war would be protracted and might even last two or three years longer. He said Mr. Litvinov had replied, "Not at all. What I mean is that Russia has been defeated and there is no hope left for us." The Ambassador said that Mr. Litvinov had suggested that he come and talk with him. The Mexican Ambassador, however, said that he had no desire to call upon Mr. Litvinov since he felt certain he would only hear an expression of the same views over again.

S. W.
October 5, 1942

My dear Mr. Stalin:

I am giving this letter of presentation to you to General Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War and at present United States Minister to New Zealand.

General Hurley is returning to his post in New Zealand and I have felt it to be of the highest importance that, prior to his return, he should be afforded the opportunity of visiting Moscow and of learning, so far as may be possible, through his own eyes the most significant aspects of our present world strategy. I wish him in this way, as a result of his personal experiences, to be able to assure the Government of New Zealand and likewise the Government of Australia that the most effective manner in which the United Nations can join in defeating Hitler is through the rendering of all possible assistance to the gallant Russian armies, who have so brilliantly withstood the attacks of Hitler's armies.

I have requested General Hurley likewise to visit Egypt, as well as Iran and Iraq, in order that he might thus personally familiarise himself with that portion of the Middle East and see for himself the campaign which is being carried on in that area.

His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.,
Moscow.

Signed original of this letter sent to Mr. Sumner Welles
10/5/42
As you know, the Governments of Australia and of New Zealand have been inclined to believe that it was imperative that an immediate and all-out attack should be made by the United Nations against Japan. What I wish General Hurley to be able to say to those two Governments after his visit to the Soviet Union is that the best strategy for the United Nations to pursue is for them first to join in making possible the defeat of Hitler and that this is the best and surest way of insuring the defeat of Japan.

I send you my heartiest congratulations on the magnificent achievements of the Soviet armies and my best wishes for your continued welfare.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt
October 3, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing the draft letter of which you spoke to me at lunch today.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
R. F.

Please return carbon to me —

[Signature]
October 21, 1942

My dear Father Braun:  

I am writing to thank you for your courtesy in sending me by Mr. Willkie your first-hand report concerning the religious situation in the Soviet Union.  

I have read the report with interest and I have brought it to the attention of the interested officials of this Government. Thank you much. Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Reverend  
Leopold Braun, A.A.,  
Chaplain to American Catholics,  
Administrator Apostolic,  
American Embassy,  
Moscow.

Signed original sent to Hon. Summer Willkie for delivery.  
10/20/42

FRW
Dear Mr. President:

It has been a great honor and privilege for me to speak to your personal representative, Mr. Wilkie, during his stay in Moscow.

In preparation of the questions he would ask on your behalf, concerning the religious situation in Soviet Russia, I prepared an objective report which I believe covers the entire scope of the topic. Mr. Wilkie graciously accepts to take it along and hand it over to you. I have the honor of submitting this report to you Mr. President, and take this unique opportunity to thank you most gratefully for your concern and continuous help.

Please believe in the expression of my deep respect.

Very sincerely yours,

Leopold Braun, A.A.

Leopold Braun, A.A.
Chaplain to American Catholics Administrator Apostolic.

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.
EN CLOSURES

I.- Objective report on the religious situation in Russia.
II.- Secret German document on the solution of the religious problem in the occupied Eastern Provinces.
III.- Two clippings from "Moscow News".
IV.- Two samples of anti-religious pamphlets.

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-
My dear Mr. President:

There is attached a draft reply to Father Braun's letter of September 25. If you should approve the draft and have it returned to us we shall see that the letter is dispatched to Father Braun.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

1. To Father Braun.
2. From Father Braun, September 25, 1942.

The President,

The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted: 10/16/42

ADDRESS TO

The President
October 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter from Leopold Braun, A.A., Chaplain to American Catholics Administrator Apostolic, c/o American Embassy, Moscow, 9/25/42, enclosing objective report on the religious situation in Russia, Secret German document on the solution of the religious problem in the occupied Eastern Provinces, two clippings from "Moscow News" and two samples of anti-religious pamphlets. These papers are in an envelope addressed to the President, c/o Mr. Wendell Willkie.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS

For preparation of reply
as I don't think any has been
sent.

F. D. R.

Enclosures
Message to the President delivered
apparently by Admiral Standley from
Premier Stalin together with transla-
tion - dated 10/7/42
RE WAR DELIVERies from the U. S. to
the USSR

DECLASIFIED
Господину У. Стендли,
Чрезвычайному и Полномочному Послу Соединенных Штатов Америки.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. H. L. HOPKINS.

I thought you might be interested in the attached on what has gone to Russia—ships sailed, ships lost, cargo lifted. The brief summary on the second page will perhaps save your time in reading.

I am passing it on to the President also.

L. W. Douglas,
Deputy Administrator.
November 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM ON SHIPMENTS TO RUSSIA

Since January 1, 1942, 249 U.S. controlled vessels, aggregating 2,562,398 deadweight tons, have departed from U.S. ports with full or part cargoes for Russia. They lifted 1,359,826 long tons of cargo. Fifty-five of these vessels with a total deadweight tonnage of 324,605 were lost while in services on Russian account. During the same period 35 other United Nations vessels having a deadweight tonnage of 275,516 and carrying 126,704 long tons of cargo for Russian account cleared U.S. ports for North Russia and the Persian Gulf and 113 Russian vessels of 689,796 deadweight tons sailed from U.S. Pacific ports with 474,612 tons of cargo. Five vessels under other United Nations control having a deadweight of 38,827 were lost.

The service from the U.S. to North Russia, over which the largest amount of cargo has been moved, has been carried on almost exclusively with U.S. controlled tonnage since January. A total of 169 ships of 1,501,707 deadweight with 465,741 long tons of cargo departed from U.S. ports in this service since January 1. Five of these were tankers which carried 42,552 tons of cargo. Forty-three ships of 339,387 deadweight tons constituting 25.9 per cent of all that sailed for North Russia, have been lost. Thirty-five of these with 218,023 tons of cargo on board were lost while outbound.
This involved the loss of 22.3 per cent of the cargo shipped to North Russia.

The second largest service has been that to the Persian Gulf. One hundred thirteen ships carrying full or part cargoes of Russian cargo sailed for this destination with 530,788 long tons of cargo on board. Six of these were tankers which carried altogether only 507 tons of Russian bombers as deck loads. Losses in this service amounted to 16 ships of 166,087 deadweight, or 14.6 per cent of the total that departed.

The following table gives a summary of the number and deadweight tonnage of ships that have departed from the U.S. in the three services to Russia together with the cargo lifted from U.S. ports and the number and deadweight tonnage of vessels lost.

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<tr>
<th>SHIPS SAILED AND LOST AND CARGO LIFTED</th>
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<td>January through October 1942</td>
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<td>(Dry Cargo Ships &amp; Tankers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ships Departed</td>
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<td>North Russia</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Persian Gulf</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>Trans Pacific</td>
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<td>All Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Includes only losses reported through November 10.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADmiral Leahy
Joint Chiefs of Staff

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

State Department dispatch from Hon. Patrick J. Hurley from Moscow, dated November 15, 1942, giving a report of his conversations with Mr. Stalin.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 26, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

What is your thought in regard to this tank problem?
Please return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

State Department dispatch #493 11/23/
Secret to Stettinius from Faymonville from Moscow re Soviet tank administration.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. FEB 18 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What do you think about sending this letter?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, 11/28/42, to the President, transmitting draft of letter for the President's signature to His Excellency Joseph Stalin, President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; copy of this letter has been retained for our files.
Dear Mr. Stalin:

When Myron Taylor returned from Vatican City last month he informed me of the earnest desire of the Pope to obtain for the prisoners of war held by the Soviet Government and for their families the comfort of an exchange of news. It was suggested only that some information of a general and innocuous nature regarding prisoners held by your authorities might be made available. The Pope has undertaken to interest himself assiduously in the welfare of Soviet prisoners in the hands of our enemies. I have been turning over in my mind the best method of bringing this to the attention of the appropriate authorities of your Government and have determined to approach you directly.

I have every confidence that the assurances of the Pope to alleviate the suffering of and obtain information concerning Soviet prisoners may be relied upon. In view of the benefit to your soldiers and their families I hope that you will feel that an arrangement of this nature can be worked out. If I can be of any assistance to you in the matter, you know that you are free to call upon me.

Very sincerely yours,

[Handwritten note: Not signed 12/1/42.]

His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What do you think about sending this letter?

F. D. R.

Enclosures
My dear Mr. President:

You will remember that among the various memoranda which Myron Taylor brought from Vatican City the Pope asked that you use your good offices to obtain information from the Soviet Government concerning prisoners of war held in territory under its control.

Thus far all efforts of this Government, the Vatican and the International Red Cross to persuade the Soviet Government to cooperate in the exchange of information regarding prisoners of war and in the carrying on of humanitarian activities with regard to prisoners have proven fruitless. The Soviet Union remains the only major belligerent which has neither become a party to the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention nor given any undertaking to apply its principles. Furthermore, it has not fulfilled the undertakings that it made through the International Red Cross Committee with regard to the exchange of information concerning prisoners taken and it permits no check by neutral inspectors of its degree of fulfillment of the Hague Convention of 1907 by which it considers itself bound.

Mr. Taylor feels that the serious interest of the Pope and the benefits which would accrue to the Soviets are such that you may wish to send a personal message to Stalin on the subject for whatever measure of success may result. In view of the record we appear to have exhausted all other avenues of approach.

The President,

The White House.
If you concur, the draft of a message to Stalin is enclosed for your approval.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Draft message.
Department of State

BUREAU

DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

to

Letter drafted 11-24-42

ADDRESS TO

The President
Dear Mr. Stalin:

When Myron Taylor returned from Vatican City last month he informed me of the earnest desire of the Pope to obtain for the prisoners of war held by the Soviet Government and for their families the comfort of an exchange of news. It was suggested only that some information of a general and innocuous nature regarding prisoners held by your authorities might be made available. The Pope has undertaken to interest himself assiduously in the welfare of Soviet prisoners in the hands of our enemies. I have been turning over in my mind the best method of bringing this to the attention of the appropriate authorities of your Government and have determined to approach you directly.

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Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
His Excellency
Joseph Stalin,
President of the Soviet
of People's Commissars of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept my thanks for the cordial greetings and good wishes sent on behalf of the American people to the armed forces of the Soviet Union and to transmit same to the Congress of the United States.

Joseph Stalin.

December 31, 1942
Admiral Standley's message to the Secretary of State, March 9, 1943 is published in

*Foreign Relations of the United States*


Pages 631-632
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you speak to me about this?

F. D. R.
March 10, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you Admiral Standley's message which gives his summary of what he said at his press conference. It does not seem to me that his version differs in any essential manner from the press reports carried in the newspapers yesterday.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enclosure:
From Moscow, 139, March 9, 7 p.m.

The President,

The White House.
May 5, 1943.

My dear Mr. Stalins—

I am sending this personal note to you by the hands of my old friend, Joseph E. Davies. It relates solely to one subject which I think it is easier for us to talk over through a mutual friend, Mr. Litvinov as the only other person with whom I have talked about it.

I want to get away from the difficulties of large Staff conferences or the red tape of diplomatic conversations. Therefore, the simplest and most practical method that I can think of would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me.

I fully appreciate the desirability for you to stay in daily touch with your military operations; I also find it inadvisable to be away from Washington more than a short time. There are two sides to the problem. The first relates to timing. There is always the possibility that the historic Russian defense, followed by taking the offensive, may cause a crack-up in Germany next Winter. In such a case we must be prepared for the many next steps. We are none of us prepared today. Therefore, it is my belief that you and I ought to meet this Summer.

The second problem is where to meet. Africa is almost out of the question in
Summer and Khartoum is British territory. Iceland
I do not like because for both you and me it involves
rather difficult flights and, in addition, would
make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite
Prime Minister Churchill at the same time.

Therefore, I suggest that we could
meet either on your side or my side of Bering
Straits. Such a point would be about three days
from Washington and I think about two days from
Moscow if the weather is good. That means that
you could always get back to Moscow in two days
in an emergency.

It is my thought that neither of
us would want to bring any Staff. I would be
accompanied by Harry Hopkins, an interpreter and
a stenographer — and that you and I would talk
very informally and get what we call "a meeting
of the minds". I do not believe that any official
agreements or declarations are in the least bit
necessary.

You and I would, of course, talk
over the military and naval situation, but I
think we can both do that without Staffs being
present.

Mr. Davies has no knowledge of our
military affairs nor of the post-war plans of
this Government, and I am sending him to you for
the sole purpose of talking over our meeting.

I greatly hope that our forces
will be in complete control of Tunisia by the
end of May, and Churchill and I next week will
be working on the second phase of the offensive.
Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver an all-out attack on you this Summer, and my Staff people think it will be directed against the middle of your line.

You are doing a grand job. Good luck!

Always sincerely,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS

Will you find out who is answering this and how?

F.D.R.

Personal and secret for the President
(Cable from Davies, Moscow, dated May 24 re immediate needs for Russia)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
May 27, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a copy of the telegram from Admiral Standley concerning which I spoke with you on the phone a few moments ago.
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1943 Vol. 111 The British Commonwealth Eastern Europe The Far East

Pages 653-655
GM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated May 25, 1943
Rec'd 9 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

527, May 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

Stalin entertained Davies at formal dinner in the Kremlin on Sunday night. Among those present were Molotov, Voroshilov, Beriyao Tumikyan the British Ambassador and myself together with General Burke and Paymonville and a large part of my staff. In general the dinner was marked by the usual abundance of food and wino kali was notable for the absence of spontaneous cordiality or genuine good humor. Stalin's greetings were pleasant but unenthusiastic and later his movements appeared heavy as if the occasion were no relief from the general load he is carrying. Only when he left his place at the table and advanced to drink a personal toast with the American Military Attache was the evening brightened by any gesture which went beyond the bounds of formal courtesy. The remarks of Molotov who acted as toast master were perfunctory and awakened
and awakened only indifferent support on the part of his various Russian colleagues present.

Applause on all sides was notably weak. The occasion failed to develop congenial conversations between the Russians and their foreign guests and it appeared that the whole entertainment was somewhat forced. It was the dullest Kremlin dinner I have ever attended and while an atmosphere of reserved friendliness on the part of the Russians prevailed most of them including Stalin appeared bored.

STANDLEY

WWC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
527, May 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Molotov proposed the initial toast to American-Soviet solidarity and in laudatory terms greeted Davies as a real friend of the USSR who had greatly contributed to closer friendly relations between our two countries. Davies replied with a long oration on the horrors of war, the glories of Stalingrad and the greatness of the Soviet armies, peoples and leaders. He proposed that Stalingrad be left in ruins as a monument of the atrocities of the Germans and that the new city be erected 5 miles up or down the river. I felt that Davies over-did his attempts to impress the Russians of his sincerity and love for them and that his speech was much too long. Molotov then spoke on the friendly relations and the unity of effort and cooperation in the prosecution of the war existing among the Allies and proposed a toast to the President, Churchill and Stalin.

I replied stating that Davies was a symbol of the friendship toward the Soviet Union, of the American people.
people and their President that friendship and cooperation was a "two-way street" and that ever since I had been in the Soviet Union I had made it my purpose to develop the flow of traffic on this street. I proposed a toast to unity of effort and purpose and close collaboration now and in the post-war period. The British Ambassador thereupon took occasion pointedly to support my remarks in respect to collaboration and post-war unity. Stalin then toasted the Allied military forces following which the American Military Attaché rose and toasted the Red Army. Molotov then offered a personal toast to me which I returned by proposing a personal toast to the continuance of our friendly personal relations. Shortly afterwards Davies proposed a toast to Litvinov who responded by commenting on Davies' fine work in helping the American people better to understand the Soviet Union. He stated that Davies was in effect also any envoy of the Soviet Union in Washington. The remainder of the toasts were worthy of no special comment.

Before the dinner had terminated the guests were asked to come to the motion picture hall to see MISSION TO MOSCOW. All the Americans present who expressed an
3- #527, May 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow

an opinion to me felt that the film was received with rather glum curiosity and doubted if the Hollywood treatment of events described in Davies book met with the general approval of the Russians. They successfully refrained from favorable comment while the film was being shown but Stalin was heard to grunt once or twice. The glaring discrepancies must have provoked considerable resentment among the Soviet officials present. Its Object flattery of everything Russian and the ill-advised introduction of unpleasant events in Soviet internal history that I am inclined to think the Kremlin would prefer to forget makes me believe that the Russians will not desire to give publicity to the film at least in its present form. In any event I feel that the film will not contribute to better understanding between the two countries.

STANDLEY

WSB
Dear Mr. Davies:

I ask you to accept as a remembrance of your visit to Moscow a few little things which I hope will not weigh down your plane too much. Among them are a Soviet Tommy gun and a German light hand machine gun from trophies of the Red Army. Both of these articles are being sent to you as gifts from Mr. I. V. Stalin.

On behalf of myself I send you a small painting by the Artist Soloviev, "Attack By Reconnaissance Party" which in some measure recalls the present war and the heroism of the people of our army, and also a table cigarette case which is the work of a Russian artisan.

At the same time I ask again that you accept the thanks of I.V. Stalin and of myself personally for your gifts.

I wish you Bon Voyage.

With sincere respect,

(Signed) V. Molotov.

Moscow, Kremlin, 28 May, 1943.
Г-ну Д. Э. Дэвису,
Москва.

Уважаемый г-н Дэвис,

Прощу Вас принять на память о посещении Москвы несколько небольших вещей, которые, как я надеюсь, не слишком обременят Ваш самолет. В числе их - советский пистолет-пулемет и немецкий ручной пулемет из трофеев Красной Армии. Обе эти вещи направляются Вам в качестве подарка от И. В. Сталина.

Со своей стороны посылаю Вам небольшую картину работы художника Соловьева "Атака разведчиков", в какой-то мере напоминающую о нынешней войне и о героизме людей нашей армии, и настольный портсигар работы русского мастера.

Одновременно прошу еще раз принять благодарность И. В. Сталина и мою лично за Ваши подарки.

Желаю Вам счастливого пути.

С искренним уважением

В. М. Молотов.

Москва, Кремль, 28 мая 1943 г.
Moscow, U.S.S.R.,

May 29, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President:

Supplementary to the report which I am making to you orally, I beg leave to submit the following general observations as to conditions which I found in the Soviet Union.

I. The Military Situation.

The President

The White House,

Washington.
I. The Military Situation.

A. The Soviet Government's view as I interpret it from discussions with high officials and members of the Diplomatic Corps.

1. Hitler's power has been greatly diminished but he has still a very strong army and great potential which he will employ in a desperate all-out effort against Russia this summer.

2. The Tunisian campaign and other pending second front plans have relieved the pressure somewhat on the Russian front. They also have affected Hitler's plans and have given him pause. Reliance is placed upon the Allied offensive this summer to relieve violent pressure which they are sure is coming.

3. Hitler's attack will be directed through the center at Voronezh. Its purpose is to encircle Moscow and take it from the rear, or possibly the attack will be diverted to an effort to take the oil fields of the Caucasus. The desperate defense which Germany is making at Kuba and Novorossiisk is cited as evidence that Hitler has not yet abandoned the use of these bridgeheads as "jumping off spots" for the oil fields.

4. The object of the attack will be primarily to destroy the Red Army, to drive the Government from Moscow, to destroy it if possible, to undermine morale, and enforce a victor's peace and secure oil desperately needed.

5. They have a quiet confidence that they can again successfully resist attack. They express an "indomitable" purpose to fight through to the end.

B. My Own Inferences
B. My Own Inferences and Conclusions.

1. If Britain and the United States fail to "deliver" on the western front in Europe this summer, it will have far reaching effects upon the Soviets that will be effective both on their attitude in the prosecution of this war and in their participation in the reconstruction of peace.

2. They will carry their war into Germany if it is a part of a concerted plan, and if carried on simultaneously by the Allies. Otherwise they will stop at their western boundary and be content with driving the invader out of their territory, if they can do so.

3. "The legacy of suspicion" is still very strong. The belief exists in some quarters that the United Nations want a weakened Russia at the peace table and a Red Army that is bled white.

4. I found some indications of an appeasement group in Russia. They advocate Russian withdrawal into itself, no further acceptance of lend lease, in order that it may not be hampered by any obligations after it has won the war.

5. On this trip I have seen much of the territory east of Moscow, along the Trans-Siberian Railway, in the Urals, and far into the eastern regions of Siberia. From what I have seen, I am more than ever convinced that Hitler cannot conquer Russia. The immensity of the territory, its resources, the vigor of its people and their morale, in my opinion, doom Hitler to failure in Russia. The vast expanses of tillable land, its fertility, its high state of cultivation and the extent of the agricultural resources to the east of Moscow for 2,000 miles and more are most impressive. No less so are the
are the vigor and power of the great new industrial cities and plants in the Urals and even in remote Siberia. It is much beyond anything that I had expected.

6. I have the very distinct impression that the leaders of this Government and the people have found themselves and are engrained with new and deep self-confidence. They feel secure in their ability to preserve their Army intact and to protect and maintain their Government and their country, quite independent of anything save themselves and their vast territory and their own strength.

II. The Political External Situation.

In my opinion:

A. They will quietly insist upon a return of their old boundaries as a restitution of an ancient wrong.

B. They will not be over-tolerant of non-realistic assumptions (as they term it), of Polish importance and of alleged fallacious Polish arguments. They are going to take back what they considered was wrongfully taken from them. This will be modified by consideration for England, somewhat; but only on the surface.

C. Their present disposition as the situation now stands is scrupulously to stay out of any interference with internal political affairs of other Governments. This is not for the reason assigned for the dissolution of the Comintern; but to have a "live and let live" good neighbor policy with the world if that is possible.

D. They
D. They insist that they have no further territorial aspirations, including specifically Iran.

E. They want a peaceful world; they believe that all nations of the earth will be so depleted after this war that all energies will be required to restore the earth and its peoples for a long time to come. But they will be alert to the possibility that they may have to "go it alone".

F. As to Germany, they are prepared to go the limit with the Allies in making it impossible for her again to break the peace of the earth.

G. They want a strong Poland and are prepared to recognize a strong, but not "reactionary", state, but they will not relinquish the Curzon Line.

H. They would not look with favor on the use of Polish divisions on a second front in Yugoslavia. There is strong assertion in some quarters that Mikhailovitch is an Italian stooge. There are rumors that he is dead or is in the custody of Nedich. There is undoubtedly sympathy for the partisans but under present conditions there would be no active aid extended by them as long as England is interested. They place great reliance upon the May 26, 1942 treaty with Great Britain. Their one regret is, as Molotov said on the occasion of the celebration of its first anniversary, that it was not entered into many years ago.

I. Their attitude toward England is cordial and strong.

I. Their attitude toward the United States is appreciative and favorable.

III. The Diplomatic
III. The Diplomatic Situation.

A. The Soviet attitude from what little I could see seemed to be cool both to China and Japan.

B. I was impressed with the power, capacity and good judgment with which the British had conducted and are conducting their relations with the U.S.S.R. They are doing many things to create good will and better mutual understanding. They are doing a good selling job. Their Ministry of Information is publishing a paper in the Russian language which is undoubtedly helping the United Nations effort. Their Ambassador and their officers apparently are getting along with the Soviet officials with signal success. Even their differences are conducted in a spirit of great good temper and a fine tolerance in disposition.

C. As to the particular mission I was engaged upon, I believe that the result thereof has been completely successful.

Respectfully,

Joseph E. Davies,
On Special Mission for the President,
With Personal Rank of Ambassador.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Marshall Stalin - Moscow

I am very grateful to you for your courteous letter and for my government's action in your favor and for the permission to receive the ambassador, Davis. He has arrived safely, bearing your letter. I am very happy that we are in complete agreement in principle on all the matters contained in your letter and in the letter from Harry Truman.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

In accordance with
recommendation herein your letter and your understanding with
Mr. Davis.

My warm personal regards,
with my best remembrances also to Mr. Brown.

Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

Will you speak to me about this?

F.D.R.

Telegram from Adm. Wm. H. Standley, Moscow, 6-1-43, to Secretary of State re failure of Gen. Burns to report to him and keep him informed of his activities in Moscow. Requested Faymonville to keep him fully informed on all Lend-Lease activities. Submits excerpts from report of Gen. Burn's visit; unable to report further.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

For recommendation of how
I should reply.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, May 3, 1943, from W.H. Standley, Moscow, U.S.S.R. requesting that he be not required to remain in Moscow later than Oct. 10, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister Counselor of the British Embassy, called at the Department today under instructions from his Government to ask that this Government support the efforts of the British Ambassador in Moscow to induce the Soviet Government to consent to the evacuation of certain categories of Polish citizens from the Soviet Union.

The Minister indicated that the British Government had instructed the British Ambassador in Moscow to request the agreement of the Soviet Government to the evacuation of the following categories of Polish civilians in the order named:

1. Relatives and members of the Polish armed forces already abroad.

2. Poles whose domicile was west of the Molotov-Ribbentrop line of 1939 (the line dividing Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union).

3. Polish orphans.

No previous discussion of this proposed approach to the Soviet Government has come to the attention of the Department of State.

Sir Ronald Campbell was informed that this request would be laid before the President for his consideration.

In connection with this request it is felt that if you are in agreement that it would be advisable at this time to send instructions to Admiral Standley regarding the
the Polish-Soviet dispute, the best course to pursue would be to collaborate with the British in this matter but to approach the problem from a broader base.

It is still felt that while collaborating with the British it would be advisable to present an American solution to the problem, the practical aspects of which are outlined beginning with the last paragraph on page 3 of the telegram to Mr. Churchill which was drafted some time ago but which apparently was not sent. For convenient reference a copy of this telegram is attached.

Attachment:

Draft telegram
to Mr. Churchill
referred to above.
TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

I appreciate your helpful telegram of April 28 containing your message of that day to Stalin and approve everything which you said, in particular your statement to the effect that we would not recognize another Polish Government set up in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. You are quite correct in expressing the belief that we share your view that Sikorski is the most helpful Polish leader whom we or the Russians are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause.

The setting up of a rival Polish Government by the Soviet Government constitutes in my opinion the chief danger at the present time and should be avoided at all costs. I believe you have chosen exactly the right line with Stalin on this point.

I also note with gratification that you do not mention the underlying territorial dispute between the Poles and the Russians, attempts at the solution of which would not add to the unity of the United Nations at this time, and that your approach to Stalin is based primarily upon the obvious necessity of creating the most favorable conditions for bringing the full weight of the armed forces of all the United Nations to bear upon the common enemy. Our efforts to heal the present breach will of course continue to be of a friendly nature and void of partisanship towards either side. Unless the other Allied nations
nations can prevail on Russia and Poland to adopt a course of collaboration with all members of the United Nations and to declare a truce with regard to all controversial questions likely to impede the prosecution of the war, our whole war effort will be jeopardized.

The winning of the war is the paramount objective for all of us. For this unity is necessary. All individualistic and nationalistic ambitions in the meantime must be held in abeyance. We must close our ranks on every front for the prosecution of the war. This is the only road to freedom. Thus both the Russians and the Poles and all United Nations alike during the period of the war must subordinate factional differences to the common struggle for victory. Each government has obligations not only to its own people but to the friends of freedom throughout the world.

The peoples on territory conquered by the enemy or those who have escaped from such territories must put their full weight behind the war effort and not by division and dissension become an impediment to the successful conduct of the war.

I have read a copy of the instructions to Clark Kerr and feel that they bring up various practical problems which must be squarely faced and solved if relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments are to be resumed on an enduring basis.
If the Soviet Government displays a willingness to accept in principle the broad considerations advanced in your message to Stalin, the practical problems which have created difficulties between the Soviet and Polish Governments can then be considered in more detail. I feel sure, however, that both of us realize that an equitable and mutually satisfactory solution of these problems must accompany the formal resumption of diplomatic relations.

It is also important that when diplomatic relations are resumed it be understood by both parties that the grievances of the past are not to be permitted to plague the future.

So far as the practical problems are concerned, I feel from a study of recent Polish-Soviet relations that a major defect in the agreement of July 30, 1941 as supplemented by informal agreements of the same year was the setting up of what amounted to an extraterritorial apparatus of a foreign government functioning in the Soviet Union. I wonder, therefore, if a more workable solution could not be reached if the Poles would agree to permit relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations with, of course, the understanding that Polish citizens would receive treatment no less favorable than that granted to Soviet citizens in similar circumstances. If the Poles would agree to this, the Russians on their part might be prepared to permit Polish citizens in the Soviet Union to have
have contact with the appropriate Polish consular officers.

With regard to the question of citizenship, it might be helpful if both the Russians and the Poles would permit the non-racial Poles to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship. Racial Poles, of course, as you suggest, would be recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens and would, therefore, not be called upon to opt. I place particular importance on the problem of evacuating from the Soviet Union Polish citizens who have close relatives abroad especially those who are members of the immediate families of men in the Polish armed forces. Similarly I feel that every effort should be made for the evacuation as soon as suitable arrangements can be made for their care elsewhere of Polish orphans and other children who cannot be properly cared for in the Soviet Union.
June 11, 1943

MEMO FOR GRACE

Please show this to Harry Hopkins before it goes out.

F. D. R.

H.H.H.

Please return to me when you have read it. — LST
Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am always pleased to receive letters from you as it gives me so much comfort to know that the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union are in such capable hands with you in Moscow. It has caused me some disturbance, however, to learn from your letter of May 3 that you feel that you should not spend another winter in the Soviet Union and that you would like to be relieved of your duties there as Ambassador sometime before October 10.

I am well aware of the public spirit which prompted you to accept the post in Moscow and to serve there in spite of the rigorous climate and of the living conditions which must be trying.

Although I regret your decision to retire, I can nevertheless understand it, and I shall begin at once to look for someone with the necessary qualifications to succeed you.

I wish to assure you again of my full confidence in you and to express my appreciation of the able and effective manner in which you are representing the United States in a country the friendship of which is so important to us at the present time.

Very sincerely yours,

Admiral William H. Standley, 
American Ambassador, 
Moscow.
June 9, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

As suggested by you I am enclosing herewith a draft of a proposed reply to Admiral Standley's letter to you of May 3.

I have devoted much thought to the problem of a successor to Admiral Standley and have decided to recommend Mr. Averell Harriman for this position. I feel that with his experience and background and with the contacts which he has both in the Soviet Union and in the United States he would be the logical person for this post. I have no other name to suggest at this time.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Draft reply to Admiral Standley.
2. From Admiral Standley, May 3, 1943.

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

I wish to inform you of a decision I have reached and one that has already been transmitted verbally to the Secretary of State by Mr. Dooman who recently returned to Washington from this post.

I do not wish to spend another winter here as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

As you must know I have always been ready to serve you or make any sacrifice for my country, just as so many of our young men are doing, if it were to my country's interest to do so. By the same reasoning I am not willing to attempt to continue service in a position where it can be better rendered by someone else.

The President of the United States of America

The White House

Washington, D. C.
I accepted the invitation to come here as your Ambassador believing that the military effort was of paramount importance and that diplomacy would remain in the background for the duration of the war. In such an event I felt that I could render effective service. But the time is rapidly approaching if not already here when plans will be in the making for peace discussions and the post war period. In the development of these plans, the interests of our country require that you have in Moscow as your Ambassador one who does not only enjoy your complete confidence but who is also skilled by training and long experience in the field of diplomacy and international affairs. I do not feel that I have this training and time and circumstances will not permit negotiations by special representatives.

I can and will if you desire give you many and good reasons why I should not remain here beyond this fall but for the desired objective suffice it to say that acceleration of waning strength due to declining years and the rigorous winter here compel me to request that I be not required to remain in Moscow later than October 10, 1943.
I would appreciate your bringing this letter to the attention of Secretary Hull in order that the necessary arrangements may be made for my recall.

With the utmost loyalty and respect,

W.H. Staudley.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your possible approval a draft telegram to Admiral Standley in reply to his telegram no. 689 of June 18 regarding the suggested joint approach by the British and ourselves in an effort to settle the Polish-Soviet dispute.

There are attached for convenient reference copies of the Department's telegram of June 12 to Admiral Standley as well as his reply referred to above.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW

SUBJECT FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

In your next conversation with Molotov please mention to him for the information of his Government that we have recently received indications that the Finnish Government may (repeat may) be considering an early approach to his Government with a view to opening peace negotiations between Finland and the U.S.S.R.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaeble Date FEB 18 1972
FILE MEMORANDUM:

The following messages received by the President were referred to Admiral Leahy by the President:

No. 758 P.M. to the President dated August 18, with Pres. message to P.M. 600
759 PM to the President
760 PM to the President with draft of proposed reply

Map Room message from Winant to the President, file number 1815502, dated Aug. 18.

Message to the President from Harriman, Aug. 18 in regard to Poles.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. CORDELL HULL:

Will you speak to me about this, please?

F.D.R.

Telegram, 9-2-43 from Standley, Moscow, to the Secretary of State, re his letter of May 3rd, enclosing copy of a letter to the President. Wants instructions issued to him so he may return to Washington, leaving Moscow in October.
The President in accepting the resignation of Admiral William H. Standley, U.S.N. (Retired), as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote to Admiral Standley under today's date as follows:

It is with real regret that I accept your resignation as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. During your term of office, as well as during your distinguished naval career, you have rendered valuable service to your country and I feel that you have greatly contributed to the cause for which we are fighting and also to the high purpose which led you to accept the position as Ambassador, namely, full and friendly cooperation and understanding between your country and the Soviet Union now and after the war.

I know that you are always ready to serve your country and to make any sacrifice for it. Your willingness to accept the post of Ambassador to the Soviet Union after having so loyally served your country for over half a century is witness to that. However, in view of the personal considerations set forth in your letter of resignation I do not feel that I can place any obstacle in the way of your wishes to retire.

In accepting your resignation, I want you to know how deeply appreciative I am of the faithful and valued services you have rendered your country and of your personal loyalty to me.

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(for file is in file room)
My dear Mr. President:

Enclosed are two memoranda which summarize my talks with Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov which I reported to you yesterday. I feel sure that you will want to take note of several points made in the memoranda, since they may be of considerable importance in any meeting between yourself and Marshal Stalin.

Respectfully,

Donald M. Nelson

The President

The White House
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From: Donald M. Nelson

Subject: Interview with Mr. Stalin, at the Kremlin in Moscow, on October 15, 1943.

My discussion with Mr. Stalin, lasting an hour and a half, centered on the question of Russia's postwar reconstruction problem, and its bearing on Russian-American postwar economic relations.

The gist of our talk was this: Russia wants to purchase capital goods in large quantities from America. It is Stalin's thought to obtain these goods, not through an American relief and rehabilitation program, but through normal business channels. To make these purchases possible, Russia would need long-term credits. Russia has her own self-rehabilitation program.

I was careful to point out to Mr. Stalin that I was not speaking officially for my government—that I could speak only as an American businessman—but that I believed my point of view would find wide support among American businessmen and the public generally.

He made it clear that he understood that the conversation was entirely unofficial. He said, "I am talking as head of my government—you as an American businessman." With that understanding, the conversation went swiftly to the heart of the matter.

His interest was immediately aroused when I referred to the problem which Russia will have in rebuilding her devastated areas and raising the living standards of her people. He asked me, "Do you think American business would extend long-term credits to Russia?" We had previously agreed that there was no early prospect of serious competition in world markets between Russia and America.

I replied that if satisfactory terms of payment could be developed, it was my opinion that such credits would be forthcoming.

Mr. Stalin said, earnestly: "We will guarantee our payments. Any obligation undertaken by this Government will be repaid—and not by token payments."

(continued on pages 2 and 3)
Memorandum to the President - 2
Interview with Mr. Stalin

He then took a sheet of paper and wrote out on it his conception of the quantities of the materials and equipment which Russia will want to buy from America immediately after the war. His list comprised:

- 250,000 to 300,000 Kilowatts of Power (Steam and hydro-electric equipment)
- 10,000 Locomotives
- 50,000 Cars and Flat Cars
- 30,000 Kilometers of Rail

Other items, it was understood, would be added.

A clear distinction was made in our discussion between postwar trade and existing lend-lease agreements, which were not touched upon.

Similarly, we did not at any point refer to the American relief and rehabilitation program.

We then turned again to methods of repayment. In view of the fact that Russia will be impoverished after the war, I said that a sliding scale of payments would seem to be indicated. For the first five years, the payments might be small, but they would mount as Russia became progressively stronger, until finally a level was reached at which the balance of the credit would be repaid. He declared himself in full agreement with such a plan. "I would approve that," he said. "How do you think we can arrange this?"

I replied, "I think it could be done simply. For example, we might appoint a commission consisting of five representative American businessmen and five ranking officials of your government who are, in effect, businessmen. This commission would work out the program and the terms."

Mr. Stalin replied, "That is fine. I approve wholeheartedly. I hope your President will approve of it."

In the conversation which followed, Mr. Stalin made several observations which showed considerable awareness of the American scene and a high appreciation of our people. He said, "We like people from the United States. You come to us not as aristocrats but as businessmen. We like to do business with the United States better than with the British. We like American material and American engineers. Everything you send us is of very good quality."

I answered, "I am sure our businessmen would be glad to hear you say that. We pride ourselves on satisfying our customers."
Memorandum to the President -3
Interview with Mr. Stalin

Stalin said, with a smile, "You have done so."

He then asked me my opinion of the Russian plants I had seen around Moscow. I told him I liked them, although I thought they could be improved. He asked, "Are they showing you everything you would like to see?" When I expressed interest in the Siberian industrial development and said that I should like to see what was being done there, if it were feasible and agreeable to him, he immediately replied, "It shall be so."
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From: Donald M. Nelson

Subject: Interview with Mr. Molotov, Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, at the Kremlin in Moscow, on October 12, 1943.

This discussion, which preceded my interview with Mr. Stalin, reported separately, brought out two main ideas on which we found whole-hearted agreement:

1. It is in the mutual interest of Russia and America to work together in promoting sound industrial and commercial relations, so as to further their common objective of raising the living standards of their peoples and insuring a lasting peace.

2. There seems to be no economic reason why such an exchange should not take place, especially since no serious economic conflict exists between our two countries. The United States now has a surplus of capital equipment, of manufacturing capacity, and of engineering and technical skills. Russia badly needs these same things, and has much to offer in the way of natural resources which the United States might advantageously use.

Mr. Molotov asked me directly whether the United States would be willing to supply Russia with important amounts of capital equipment after the war, and if so, whether financial arrangements could be made to enable Russia to pay for such equipment over a period of time. He was not referring to participation in an American relief program, but to direct purchase through normal business channels.

I replied that I felt sure that many American businessmen would be anxious to sell capital equipment to Russia, and that a common-sense approach to the problem by both sides would result in a workable financial arrangement. I had previously made the point that I was not speaking for my government, but simply expressing my views as a businessman.

Mr. Molotov volunteered one further statement which struck me as significant. With reference to the treatment of Germany after the war—a subject which he raised—he expressed the view that bad leadership was chiefly responsible for the German assault upon the peace of the world and that the people themselves had been poisoned by their leaders.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. (E) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By Date APR 1 0 1973 (continued on page 2)
Memorandum to the President -2
Interview with Mr. Molotov

The big job, as soon as victory has been attained, in his view, will be to cure the Germans of this poison. This, he said, was a problem for the United States, England and Russia to face together in a wholly constructive spirit.

I asked him whether, in his opinion, German history did not indicate that the roots of militarism go so deep into the hearts of the German people that it will be difficult to change their attitude. He did not seem to think so. His view, which he reiterated, was that German leadership and the actions of the rest of the world, as expressed in the Versailles Treaty, were chiefly responsible for the existing German psychology, which can be corrected.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Yes, I think this request of Molotov is all right. Please authorize Harriman to that effect. Please return enclosure for my files.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you speak to me
about this?

F. D. R.

Secret memo for the Pres. from Admiral
Leahy Nov. 10.
Subject: Russian request for delivery of
Italian surrendered naval and merchant
ships.
Memorandum for Miss Grace Tully

December 18, 1943

The White House
Washington

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

Dear Grace:

I think the President may be interested in seeing the attached copy of a message I had from Molotov.

H. L. H.

encl.
In reply refer to
Eu 740.0011 European War 1939/32218

December 10, 1943

My dear Mr. Hopkins:

The Soviet Ambassador has asked me to transmit to you the following communication from Mr. V. M. Molotov in answer to your telegram addressed to Mr. Molotov and handed to him by Mr. Hamilton, Minister Counselor of the American Embassy at Moscow, on December 3, 1943.

"Personal and Secret to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins from V. M. Molotov.

Just like you I cannot but express my satisfaction regarding our work together at the Teheran Conference and the possibility of continuation of this work in the future.

The meeting of Premier Stalin with President Roosevelt is of the greatest importance for drawing closer together the peoples of our countries in the interests of the cause of speeding up our common victory and post-war collaboration.

Best wishes."

Sincerely yours,

(s) Cordell Hull

The Honorable

Harry L. Hopkins,

The White House.
ЛИЧНО И СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО ОТ ПРЕМЬЕРА
И.В.СТАЛИНА ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ ФРАНКЛИНУ Д.РУЗВЕЛЬТУ

Считаю нужным информировать Вас о том, что
сегодня мной направлено г-ну Черчиллю послание
следующего содержания:

"Сегодня я получил два Ваших послания.
Хотя я писал президенту, что В.М.Молотов
будет к 22 ноября в Каире, должен, однако, сказать,
что по некоторым причинам, имеющим серьезный ха-
рактер, Молотов, к сожалению, не может приехать в
Каир. Он сможет быть в конце ноября в Тегеране и
придет туда вместе со мной. Со мной приедут и
несколько военных.

Само собой разумеется, что в Тегеране должна
состояться встреча глав только трех правительств,
как это было условлено. Участие же представителей
каких либо других держав должно быть безусловно исключено.

Желаю успеха Вашему совещанию с китайцами по дальневосточным делам."

12 ноября 1943 года.
Subject: The Establishment of a Civilian Air Service Between the United States and the Soviet Union Through Africa and the Middle East.

At the present time United States-operated planes proceed regularly as far as Basra. There is no link, however, between Basra and Kuibyshev. Admiral Standley has recently proposed that if the Soviet Government would send a plane weekly from Kuibyshev to Tehran the Ferry Command would be willing to send from Basra to Tehran a civilian-operated plane to meet the Kuibyshev plane every week. The Soviet reply was vague, but a more definite reply was promised.

It is extremely important that there should be improvements in air communications between Kuibyshev and Washington through the Near East. At the present time it requires from six weeks to three months for mail to travel between the two cities. Similarly, it is difficult for officials and employees of the United States and Soviet Governments to travel between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although Soviet planes proceed from time to time from Kuibyshev to Tehran, they apparently have no space available for American personnel or mail. It is hoped that definite arrangements can be made with the Soviet Government so that a dependable airplane service between Kuibyshev and Washington can be established which would guarantee the rapid exchange of official mail and official personnel between those two cities.
Establishment of a Civil Air Service Between The United States and Vladivostok or Some Other Railway Point In Siberia Through Alaska

The advisability of the establishment of such a service has already been broached informally to Litvinoff. The Soviet Government has been given to understand that the American Government is prepared to operate this service as far as Nome or some other point in Alaska which might be selected. American pilots or American planes could cross the Bering Strait or the Bering Sea from Alaska to Siberia in order to make connections with a Soviet airline; or if the Soviet Government should prefer, Soviet pilots and Soviet planes could fly back and forth between Siberia and Alaska in order to make such connections.

The establishment of such a service would have so many advantages from the point of view of communications and of the transport of personnel and non-bulky supplies that it does not seem necessary to dwell at length upon its desirability.

The Soviet Government has thus far given no definite reply to the proposals made to it.
The Establishment of an Airplane Ferrying Service From the United States to the Soviet Union Through Alaska and Siberia

On a number of occasions American officials have endeavored to persuade the Soviet authorities to consent to the establishment of a ferrying service between the United States and the Soviet Union through Alaska and Siberia.

During his conversation with Stalin Admiral Standley particularly stressed the advantages to the Soviet Government of such a service. If it would be possible to ferry planes to the Soviet Union by this route delivery could be greatly expedited and there would be a tremendous economy in shipping space. Furthermore, the danger of the loss of aircraft as a result of operations of the enemy would be practically eliminated.

The Soviet authorities have for the most part taken an attitude that on account of weather conditions and other factors the Alaska-Siberian route might not be practical. When pressed by Admiral Standley, however, Mr. Stalin agreed to look into the matter. He has as yet made no definite reply. It is understood that the military authorities in the United States feel that it is of the utmost importance that this ferrying service be opened in the immediate future.