

● PSF

Russia

1945

PSF; Russia ~~4-45~~ 4-45

file

January 2, 1945.

Dear Edgar Snow:-

I am tremendously interested in those notes. Many thanks for your letter.

I do hope to see you one of these days soon but we had better put it off for a short time on account of the new Congress, the Inauguration, etc.

With every best wish for the New Year,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Edgar Snow, Esq.,
Saturday Evening Post, x4287
c/o Curtis Publishing Company,
Philadelphia, Pa.

noted gen.
Winters' office
9.3

EDITORIAL ROOMS

THE SATURDAY
EVENING
POST
FOUNDED BY
Benjamin Franklin

BEN HIBBS
EDITOR

THE CURTIS
PUBLISHING COMPANY
PHILADELPHIA 5

Madison, Conn.
December 26, 1944

Dear Miss Tully:

I think the President might be interested in the enclosed notes, which I typed out especially for him. As you will see, they deal with a confidential talk I had with Maxim Litvinov.

I would appreciate it if you would see that this memorandum reaches only the President, and that if that proves impossible it is promptly destroyed.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Edgar Snow

Edgar Snow

Miss Grace Tully
Personal Secretary to the President

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BEN HIBBS
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Madison, Conn.
December 28, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I am sorry I did not get to see you while I was in Washington, but I fully appreciate how crowded your hours are.

One thing I think worth bringing to your attention is the substance of a talk I had with Maxim Litvinov, not long before I left Russia. This was completely off the record and he asked me not even to discuss his comments with Mr. Harriman. He was so frank that I believe you may find something useful in these notes--especially the paragraphs checked in red. I am sure, from our conversation, that Litvinov is very glad to see you back in the White House, as needless to say I am.

With every good wish,

Sincerely yours,

Edgar Snow

The President of the United States
The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation between Maxim Litvinov, vice-commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and Edgar Snow. At the conclusion of these remarks Mr. Litvinov stressed again that it was all "completely off the record." "I would appreciate it if you would not only not quote me in any way," he stressed, "but don't mention it to anyone here. That includes your ambassador--especially your ambassador." "But it doesn't include the President?" I asked. "Just don't discuss it while you are here," he replied.

Moscow, October 6, 1944

Litvinov asked my opinion about the coming election and whether there would be a change of policy--foreign policy--if Dewey won. Then he asked whether I was satisfied with my visit to Russia this time, and I replied: "It's been disappointing in many ways--but I knew what I was coming to, when I came. I suppose you know all the complaints of the correspondents by now? It's an old story to you, isn't it?"

L: "Yes, you needn't go into detail. I've heard it all before and I personally have done all I can to improve matters. But it's no use. This government (sic!) doesn't understand the role of the press in the west. It thinks the government makes public opinion and that the government can make policy regardless of what the press says."

I said I thought the Soviet government was creating a lot of unnecessary difficulties for itself by continuing to refuse to give background and explanation to the press for its diplomatic moves. Up to now the favorable American press for Russia was due largely to two things: 1) recognition of the Red Army's achievements as an ally, and 2) the unwillingness of returning correspondents to let their personal irritations in Russia get the better of their objective appreciation of the country and its people, and thus launch a series of attacks. I doubted if this situation would outlast the war, and in the meantime the press policy was throwing away wonderful chances to get a more solid understanding and appreciation built up abroad, by taking the correspondents into the confidence of the leaders, and treating them as Soviet correspondents were treated abroad.

Snow: "As far as I can see what Russia wants after this war more than anything else is a breathing spell, a chance to make up lost ground. Allied sympathy and help are essential for that task. To win Allied sympathy or understanding of its difficulties is or ought to be the main aim of Soviet press relations policy. Before I left America I saw Cordell Hull and I asked him what he considered the most useful service a correspondent in Russia could perform. He told me that when he was in Moscow he had found the leaders here fellow pretty much like the rest of us--human beings full of the same aches and pains. But somehow he had never got to know these men as people in the reports he had read from Moscow. He thought the best service a correspondent could perform would be to help us get to know the Russians as people--all about how they live and work and the problems they face and how we could help them. How can I ~~xxx~~ do that adequately under present conditions?"

L: "You can't, I know it. I've tried often enough to make them see the need to treat the foreign press with more consideration, ~~and they won't~~. They just don't think it matters. Even if some of the correspondents do go back and work off their personal grudges by attacking ~~by attacking~~ this country, that won't make any difference. They still wouldn't think their policy was in any way responsible for it. They don't see that they are creating unnecessary difficulties for themselves. The same thing applies to diplomacy. God knows there are enough real difficulties, ~~but~~ why create others?"

✓ Snow: "I'd like to ask you this question. Do you think this war is going to end in the elimination of all anti-Soviet forces in Europe, or will there still be a base for a future anti-Soviet combination? It looks like there will be no base left anywhere in Eastern Europe, nor in Germany itself. The only other possibility is France, but France is not going to play that role again, as far as I can see from here."

✓ L: "I have no faith in France. DeGaulle and all the rest--they'll repeat the history of the past decade, I'm afraid. And there's Franco, and there are still plenty of fascists left in England, don't forget that. See how they have let out that scoundrel Captain Ramsay--how can I explain that to this government? There is a lot more behind his release. The French under deGaulle are just making a show of getting rid of the fascists, but the worst of the lot are untouched. The old crowd will survive--and with them all the corruption intrigue, compromise. France needs a thorough purge and nothing less than that will save her. She won't get it--not under deGaulle anyway."

✓ S: "Don't you think Franco will go after the end of the war? Can he continue to stand next to post-war France and with nothing to lean on but the Vatican?"

✓ L: "Who will put him out? The Spanish people are powerless, he has broken them. The French won't move a finger without Anglo-American support. Do you see any sign of the British or the Americans being dissatisfied with Franco? No, I think he'll stay, Churchill will insist on it."

✓ S: "So that means that western Europe will be reorganized as a potential anti-Soviet bloc? And that suspicious ~~xxxx~~ of Anglo-American policy will continue here?"

✓ Lit: "I'm afraid so, things being what they are on both sides. Just look at the Polish issue! The British and particularly the Americans don't even want to throw out the old crowd there. I disagree with my government (sic) on many things, but we are absolutely right about Poland. In fact we have been too lenient, if anything. We cannot put up with the old Beck crowd any more, it's intolerable and fantastic to talk in such terms now. The basic trouble is that all these anti-Soviet Poles have their eyes firmly fixed on a mirage, they keep thinking about Poland as the great power of the 16th century, when Russia was divided and weak. I knew all of them and tried to work ~~xxx~~ with them at Geneva for years. They always had one idea and one only: to make Poland a great power and the gate against Russia barring us from Europe. Why, do you know what Beck kept proposing all the time? He wanted a 5-power council, with Britain, France, Germany, Italy--and Poland! Russia to be excluded--think of that, right up to the beginning of the war. As long as the British cling to that crowd there is no hope of real trust or collaboration between us. . . . But I fear we haven't made our position clear enough. Fundamentally, it's just this: Poland has got to be friendly toward this country and must abandon the idea that she can be a springboard against Russia and in that way get back her 16th century empire. Before the war the Becks and Sosnkowskys offered their services in that respect to Germany. Now they offer themselves to ~~xxxx~~ Britain and America. We won't have it."

S: "If that's the case there is no real hope of the London Poles and the Lublin Poles getting together, is there? The London people won't come in unless they can run the show? In other words, they wouldn't come in on a minority position in the cabinet, or even on a 50/50 basis?"

L: "Of course not. They offered the Lublin government a minor role. Their idea is to use Moravsky and Beirut for a while and then get rid of them. We won't have these people back ~~ing~~ running the country in the old way and the sooner Churchill understands that the better. I think your government knows

it all right, but it's those 800,000 Polish votes that cause the trouble. "

S: "I have the feeling, just as an outsider, that the British hold onto the Poles not out of any genuine concern for their interest but because they are a card in the whole diplomatic game in Europe. They aren't going to throw in that card till they can get something for it. The real stake is Germany. If they can win some of the arguments about Germany they may feel it's worthwhile throwing the Poles overboard?"

L: "Yes, of course Germany is the key to everything."

S: "Do you think--are you able to answer frankly?--do you see any possibility of a united Germany after the ~~war~~/x war?"

L: "Why are you so interested in a united Germany?"

S: "I'm interested because right now the whole question is being widely discussed in the British and American press, and there seems to be quite a lot of concern expressed in some British quarters, especially, that Germany is going to be carved up entirely. What I wonder is whether this represents a division of opinion in the higher strata on what to do with Germany. I mean, does this government foresee in the predictable future anything like a Germany in one piece again, under a single administration? To me it looks this way. In areas where the Red Army goes you are certainly going to get rid of a lot of people called fascists who will, in the areas we occupy, probably escape at least with their heads, and maybe with their property. I mean the landowners and the industrialists. Thus we will get two or three Germanys to start off with because the fundamental economic basis will differ widely--"

L: "If--~~if~~--the Allies could agree on how to reconstruct Germany, how to reeducate the Germans, how to make them harmless and peaceful people--then maybe we could get a small but unified Germany."

S: "Your emphasis on the if shows you don't think we shall be able to do that? Is that correct?"

L: "It is. We won't be able to agree on a common program for Germany. Maybe I'm unduly pessimistic--I'm speaking for myself only, you understand."

S: "So the alternative is the break-up of Germany into small states?"

L: "That's my opinion."

S: "Does it mean going back to all the pre-Bismarckian states, as they are arranged on the new Soviet map of Germany?"

L: "Not all 35 of them! But probably the most important national divisions. Maybe in time each one will become an autonomous republic."

S: "But without any center?"

L: "Without any center--at least not for a long time!"

S: "I suppose that would mean setting up separate administrations under the Allied Control Commission for states like Bavaria, Saxony, Hessen--"

L: "Not Hessen. Hessen would probably be included in the Rhineland."

S: "But Baden, Westphalia, Hannover?"

L: "Yes--those, anyway."

S: "And things would go along like that as long as the Allied Control Commission worked together?"

L: "Of course. That applies to everything. If the Three-Power combination breaks down then everything breaks down with it."

Litvinov said he feared this collaboration was already threatened by ^{revival of} British traditional diplomacy in Europe, and their inability to think in new terms. They only understood the balance of power system and now they were going back to it, this time fully backed up by America. "Britain has never been willing to see a strong power on the continent," he said, "without organizing a counter-force against it. The idea of collaborating with the strong power is alien to her thinking. She is ~~already~~ at work in France and the Lowlands doing that already. She will want to use her occupation ~~for~~ ~~of~~ Germany ~~France~~ for the same ends. We are drifting more and more in the same direction. Diplomacy might have been able to do something to avoid it. If we had made our purposes clear to the British and if we had made clear the limits of our needs, but now it is too late, suspicions are rife on both sides."

S: "But what about Dumbarton Oaks and the agreement there? Isn't this going to result in a security organization that will cut across the balance of power and spheres-of-influence system?"

Litvinov said that at one time he had hoped so, but that the chances were lost. "It should have been preceded (Dumbarton Oaks) by informal talks and sounding out the ideas of each government, and a sharing of views and frank statement of aims. If I had been authorized to do so, I would have gone to England first, and sounded out opinion there and then gone on to America and reached some kind of common formula. As it was--it ended in fiasco."

S: "What was the main cause of the break-down?"

L: "It was over the question of unanimous decision of the Big Four, that's true enough. We insisted on that, the Americans and the British thought it was unacceptable. From this government's point of view it was fundamental: it meant permanent elimination of distrust, permanent cooperation, permanent solution of the German question, as against restoration of the British balance of power system, the maneuvering to get a bloc of powers into combination vs. the Soviet. You know we have never been accepted in European councils on a basis of equality. We were always outsiders. I spent all my time trying to break that down, when I was head of the Narkomindel (Foreign Office). Right up to Munich, I didn't succeed. The principle of unanimity (at D.O.) was our way of demanding a guarantee of equality, a guarantee against combinations, and a rejection of the balance of power system. Now, with its rejection, there is nothing left but to go back to the old system, with all its faults. It will be called something else, but that will be the essence of it."

L. said that he had been afraid, before the Soviet scheme was presented, that it would be misunderstood and would fail. It was sprung as a surprise and it was poor diplomacy. He said that he himself had authored an alternative scheme, but that it had finally been rejected by his government "because they thought it would be considered naive by the British and Americans, and turned down." What Litvinov had advocated was the ~~xxxxxx~~ scheme that had earlier been outlined in a magazine called "Leningrad", and signed by "N. Malinin." L. indicated that he was "Malinin." (This article was cabled back to America almost in full, before the D.O. conference, and Americans took it for gospel, and apparently were surprised when Gromyko pulled out a different scheme from his portfolio.) In essence what L. had advocated was formation of a Council of Four, sealed by alliances, and 2) creation of an International

 *See notes at the end of this report, which elaborates these fears.

secretariat, with small nations in the membership, and organized in 3) continental sections, as Europe, Asia, Africa, South America and North America. Major questions of security would be decided by the Big Four. Purely continental questions would be handled by the continental sections, each decision having broad effects being subject to review by the Big Four.

S: "Now I see why you didn't go to Dumbarton Oaks;"

LXXX L. grinned and shrugged his shoulders.

S: "When are you and Mr. Malsky going to take over the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs? It seems to many people that you are ~~the~~ both ~~making~~ being wasted. As the two people in Russia who know most about America and England, whose relations are more important to this country than any others, it seems odd that you aren't playing more prominent roles. Or, excuse me if I am mistaken, maybe a lot of things are going on behind the scenes--"

L: (Laughing) "What you say is true. We're both back numbers. We're both on the shelf."

Suddenly L. asked me what I thought was an astounding question. "If it came to a choice," he demanded, "if the United States had to choose between supporting Britain or supporting Russia in a war, do you think the Republicans would be more likely to line up with the British than the Democrats?"

XXXX I said I thought that in the long run the foreign policy of the U.S. would turn out about the same, whoever ran the country. On the face of it we had no serious conflict over vital interests, with Russia. Economically speaking, we were not rivals on the world market, our needs seemed to be complimentary. On the other hand, everywhere in the world we were coming into conflict with British economic interests and the war had profoundly deepened this rivalry. But we have strong traditional and emotional ties with Britain. We were closely tied up with Canada and Australia and a war with those countries was unthinkable, except in terms of civil war. The British were extremely accomplished in the art of exploiting all these factors in their favor and one only had to look back on the last forty years to see how skillfully they had maneuvered to get our help in maintaining their security and Empire."

L: "In other words, if British diplomats were as bad as ours, America might fight Britain instead of Russia?" Laughing, he shot another question: "Will the United States be prepared to let Britain take over Europe and the European market, in exchange for British withdrawal from South America?"

I answered as best I could, and we talked a little about the Far East (he would not commit himself on Soviet attitude toward Japan, except to say that everything was quiet on the borders) and then I asked him how soon Russia could recover her pre-war industrial production. He was emphatic in his optimism. He said:

"Very so on, in fact we have almost restored it now. We have doubled production in the unoccupied areas during the war. Factories we moved ~~xxx~~ from Moscow and other cities are now producing in the East. At the same time we have restored production in the old factories here. Thus we now have two factories for ~~one~~." He thought the cities could be rebuilt--in the west--in about ten years.

S: ~~XXX~~ "Do you think that in 10 years Russia will be able to say that most of her people are reasonably well housed, decently fed and decently clothed?"

LX L: "That depends on one thing--how much we have to put into armaments. How big an army will we have to maintain? As long as things in Europe remain

~~xxxx~~ uncertain, Russia will keep a big standing army. Only if," he trailed off vaguely, "we can feel secure in Europe, only then can our people get the lion's share, and only then can we talk about general disarmament."

Before leaving (this had strung along for nearly three hours) I asked L. again if he thought there was any way of opening up more doors between Russia ~~and~~ her allies, and of dispelling any of the suspicion and distrust in the atmosphere. What can a writer do to try to make the thing work and to try to avoid things getting worse and leading to more war?

"I can't do any more than I have," he concluded. "I have little influence here now. This commissariat is run by only ~~three~~ men and none of them know or understand America or Britain, or how those countries work."

S: "Who are the ~~three~~ three?"

L: "Molotov, Vyshinsky, and Dekinasov."

S: "How is it Dekinasov is so powerful?"

L: "He was ambassador to Berlin during the year of the pact. He is the man who sat next to Ribbentrop for a year and that's all he knows about foreign countries."

S: "Do you see any possibility of a change in this set-up?"

L: "No, I think it will go on this way, as far ahead as we can see."

S: "To a layman on the outside it looks like this government believes everything that has happened shows that its policy was right in 1939, in making the pact with Hitler, and that everything that led up to that was a failure. In other words, there is no recognition of the fact that your policy before 1939 was largely the thing that made it possible ~~xx~~ for us to be allies, in spite of that pact?"

L: "That's right, that's the way they look at it."

Before going I came round once more to the subject of improving press relations, and L. reiterated again that his government just didn't believe the press was important. "When anti-Soviet articles appear they attribute them to ~~malice~~ malice and intrigue and to anti-Soviet interests, rather than to dumbness and ignorance on the part of the writer, and they don't see how their policy helps to deepen that ignorance. I've told ~~them~~ them again and again that it's important to reach public opinion abroad. I've used every argument. It makes no impression."

S: "Well, did you ever talk that way in the Kremlin to Mr. Big himself?"

L: "That's who I mean, that's what I've been talking about."

I suggested it was so important that it probably could be ~~xxxx~~ improved only on the level of talks between Roosevelt and Stalin when they met again. He instantly agreed. "THAT'S ABSOLUTELY THE ONLY WAY, IN FACT, TO IMPROVE MATTERS." (Emphasis mine.)

L. seemed very sincere and once or twice very moved. A moment or two, when he seemed to reflect on his own pessimistic views, his eyes grew wet. I do not know how or why he happened to open up this way to me. I have known him for some years but I never heard him speak so frankly. I can only conclude he must have

LITVINOV--6--

felt the need to get these views known in the White House, and that is why I am writing up these notes.

I never met another Soviet official who talked so frankly, not even Maisky. We sat in a closed room and no one else was present. In every other case when I have talked to a high official--with vice-commissars Lozovsky and Vyshinsky, for instance, and with Shcherbakov--there was always a secretary present, taking down everything in a notebook.

Litvinov is fearless and indifferent, apparently, to his own fate. Nevertheless I would not be able to reconcile myself to the fact if these notes fell into hands that would use them in any way against him.

Egar Snow
Egar Snow
Madison, Conn.
December 28, 1944

P.S. I cannot be sure of the exact wording used in the foregoing text--or at least not of all the quotations--because I took no notes during the interview. Immediately afterward I wrote it up just as it appears above, however, and I am reasonably confident that this is a faithful reflection of the main content of the talk.

PPS. I should have mentioned that Litvinov is now in charge of post-war planning in the European section of the Markomindel.

Inpfile

PSF: Russia folder 1-45

file confidential

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


January 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Request for Long-Term Credits

Molotov has presented to Harriman an aide-memoire requesting from the United States six billion dollars in post-war credits to run for thirty years at an interest rate of two and one-half percent. In transmitting the text of the aide-memoire, Harriman has also in the enclosed telegram submitted his own reactions thereto which I believe you would be interested in reading in full.

Harriman indicates his belief that the Russians will expect this subject to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting and states his view that (1) it is to our interest to assist in the development of the economy of the Soviet Union, (2) the Russians should be given to understand that our cooperation in this respect will depend upon their behavior in international matters, and (3) the discussion of these long-term credits should be wholly divorced from the current lend-lease negotiations.



Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 61 from Moscow,
January 6, 1945.

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 947-948]

PC-498

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Moscow

Dated January 6, 1945

Rec'd 11:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

61, January 6, 10 a.m.

SFSEC

Now that I have recovered from my surprise at Molotov's
strange procedure in initiating discussions regarding a
post-war credit in such a detailed aide memoire, I believe
the Department will be interested in receiving my reactions.
(REEMBS 29, January 4, 2 p.m.)

One. I feel we should entirely disregard the uncon-
ventional character of the document and the unreasonable-
ness of its terms and chalk it up to ignorance of normal
business procedures and the strange ideas of the Russians
on how to get the best trade. From our experience it has
become increasingly my impression that Mikoyan has not
divorced himself from his Armenian background. He starts
negotiations on the basis of "twice as much for half the
price" and then gives in bit by bit expecting in the process
to wear us out.

Two. Molotov made it very plain that the Soviet
Government

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 945-947]

-2- #61, January 6, 10 a.m., from Moscow

Government placed high importance on a large postwar credit as a basis for the development of "Soviet-American relations" From his statement I sensed an implication that the development of our friendly relations would depend upon a generous credit. It is of course my very strong and earnest opinion that the question of the credit should be tied into our overall diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and at the appropriate time the Russians should be given to understand that our willingness to cooperate wholeheartedly with them in their vast reconstruction problems will depend upon their behavior in international matters. I feel, too, that the eventual Lend-Lease settlement should also be borne in mind in this connection.

Three. It would seem probable that the timing of the delivery of this note had in mind the prospects of "a meeting". I interpret it therefore to indicate that should there be a meeting the Russians would expect this subject to be discussed.

Four. It would seem that the time had arrived when our government's policy should be crystallized and a decision reached on what we are prepared to do provided other aspects of our relations develop satisfactorily.

Five. It is my basic conviction that we should do everything we can to assist the Soviet Union through

credits

-3- #61, January 6, 10 a.m., from Moscow

credits in developing a sound economy. I feel strongly that the sooner the Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they will become. One has to live in Russia a considerable period of time to appreciate fully the unbelievably low standards which prevail among the Russian people and the extent to which this affects their outlook. The Soviet Government has proved in this war that it can organize production effectively and, I am satisfied that the great urge of Stalin and his associates is to provide a better physical life for the Russian people, although they will retain a substantial military establishment.

Six. I believe that the United States Government should retain control of any credits granted in order that the political advantages may be retained and that we may be satisfied the equipment purchased is for purposes that meet our general approval.

Seven. I notice in the note recently delivered to the Department by Gromyko accepting the Fourth Protocol the request by the Soviet Government that we should put into production industrial equipment "which the Soviet Government agrees to pay for under the terms of the long term credit". No reference, however, is made to the terms of this credit and I assume therefore that the Soviet

Government

-4- #61, January 6, 10 a.m., from Moscow

Government refers to the terms proposed in the aide memoire handed me. If this is correct, it would seem that the Soviet Government is attempting to improve our proposals for the three C credit under Lend-Lease in this new proposal for combining the Lend-Lease and postwar credits.

Eight. Quite apart from the question of the postwar credits, I recommend that the Department inform the Soviet Government promptly, either through Gromyko or through me to Molotov, or both; A/ that the credit under Lend-Lease must be segregated from the consideration of postwar credits B/ that the Department has already given its final term for the credit under three C; C/ that agreement must be reached on the terms of this Lend-Lease credit before any further long range industrial equipment can be put into production. From the experience we have observed in the length of time the Russians are taking to erect the tire plant and oil refineries there is little likelihood that equipment for long range projects now put into production will have a direct influence on the war, and unless the Soviet Government is willing to accept the generous terms of our offer of financing it would not (repeat not) appear that the equipment for these projects is urgently needed at this time.

HARRIMAN

JM

Imp file

Russia folder, 1-45

~~SECRET~~

file confidential


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Czech Attitude toward
the Lublin "Government"

You may be interested in the enclosed telegram from Harriman indicating that Benes may have made some commitment to the Russians in regard to the recognition of the Lublin group and also suggesting that the disposition of Czech Ruthenia has not yet been finally determined.



Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 63 from Moscow,
January 6, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

PC-460

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Moscow via Army

Dated January 6, 1945

Rec'd 9:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY

63, January 6, 1 p.m.

The Czechoslovak Ambassador told me today that his Government had been approached by the Soviet Government to recognize the Lublin Committee "In accordance with Dr. Benes' agreement". He says that his instructions from his Government are not clear, as, although they express a willingness on the part of his Government to recognize the Provisional Government, they appear to indicate an intention to delay recognition. He is cabling for clarification.

He told me further that Dr. Benes intended to return to Czechoslovakia just as soon as Kosice was liberated. The Soviet Government has given its approval.

He told me also that his Government had reached an agreement with the Soviet Government, that neither Government would involve itself in the Ruthenian separatist movement at the present time and that both would await liberation to ascertain whether the people really wanted

to join

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972

-2- #63, January 6, 1 p.m., from Moscow

to join the Ukraine. He does not believe that the Soviet Government is agitating the question but undoubtedly Ukrainian Red Army officers are stimulating the movement as they have obtained a considerable number of recruits from Ruthenia for the Red Army fighting on that front.

HARRIMAN

LMS

file → ~~SECRET~~


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Gromyko

Ambassador Gromyko told me at dinner last night that he had just received a wire instructing him to return promptly to Moscow for consultation. The presumption is that the purpose of the trip is to bring them up-to-date in Moscow preparatory to the conversations ahead.



Russia folder 1-43-

~~SECRET~~

file


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Participation in
Allied Control Commission for
Hungary

The enclosed telegram from Harriman describes the position which the Russians are taking in the present Hungarian armistice negotiations to the effect that British and American members of the Control Commission should merely be informed of policy directives being issued to the Hungarian authorities in the name of the Commission. Only after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany would the Russians be willing to consult with the British and American representatives on the Commission before the issuance of such directives.



Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 75 from Moscow,
January 8, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

FEH-934

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Moscow

Dated January 8, 1945

Rec'd 1:15 a.m., 9th

Secretary of State

Washington,

75, January 8, 10 p.m.

We met again today to discuss Hungarian armistice terms. Molotov consented to restore the clause envisaging possible reparations claims by other countries, as proposed in paragraph three of the Department's 37, January 6, 7 p.m. I emphasized again our insistence on participation in a committee of the control commission on reparations. While Molotov gave no encouragement as to a favorable reception of our views he said he would report them to the Soviet Government.

With respect to the control commission, we received from the Foreign Office shortly before the meeting a Soviet counter-draft of the statutes for that body. Our original draft had followed closely the lines of the statutes for the Rumanian commission (REEMBS 3651, September 23, 9 p.m.) adding such of demands brought out in the Department's 2908, December 29, 8 p.m. as were not already included in that document. The principal change embodied in the Soviet counter draft, as compared

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date _____

FEB 18 1972

with our

-2-#75, January 8, 10 p.m. from Moscow

with our proposals, was that whereas we had provided for consultation of our representatives on policy directives during the first period and their concurrence in such directives during the second period, the Soviet draft merely provides that they should be informed of the issuance of such directives during the first period and should be consulted about them during the second. The Russian draft on this point read as follows: "During the first period (i.e. from the moment of the entry into force of the armistice to the end of the military operations against Germany) the Chairman (or Vice Chairman) shall call meetings and inform the British and American representatives of policy directives (i.e. directives involving matters of general principle) being issued to the Hungarian authorities in the name of the commission. During the following period (i.e. from the moment of cessation of hostilities with Germany until the conclusion of peace with Hungary), no policy directives (i.e. directives involving matters of general principle) shall be issued to the Hungarian authorities in the name of the commission except after consultation of the Chairman (or Vice Chairman) with the British and American representatives." (Molotov explained at the meeting, in response to my inquiry, that this did not necessarily

mean that

-3-#75, January 8, 10 p.m. from Moscow

mean that during the first period our representatives would be informed in advance of the issuance of policy directives in the name of the commission) saying that whether notification would precede or follow the issuance of the directive would depend on circumstances. In addition to this, the Soviets eliminated entirely from the draft statutes our proposed clause which would have assured to our representatives all facilities, including landing privileges for airplanes, for the entry and exit of members of their staffs and diplomatic couriers. Our proposal that our representatives on the control commission should be allowed to determine the size and composition of his own staff was watered down to a clause, similar to that contained in the Rumanian statutes, that this should be determined in agreement with the Chairman of the Commission. Our proposal that our representative should be permitted to move freely throughout Hungary was replaced by a clause which recognized his theoretical right to make journeys into the provinces but required him to apply to the Vice Chairman of the Commission with respect to the arrangements for the journey. All other points listed in the fourth paragraph of the Department's 2806, December 29, 8 p.m. are satisfactorily covered in the Soviet draft.

I did not (repeat not) undertake to discuss this
draft

-4-#75, January 8, 10 p.m., from Moscow

draft at today's meeting, and merely said that I would study it myself and communicate further with my Government on the subject. I took occasion, however, to stress the unhappy nature of our experiences in Rumania and Bulgaria with respect to the control commissions and to emphasize the need for assurance of better treatment in the case of Hungary.

HARRIMAN

EMB

file

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Kravchenko Case

You will recall that last week we spoke to you about the case of Kravchenko, a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, who is regarded by the Soviet Government as a military deserter and whose return to the Soviet Union on this basis has been demanded by the Soviet Government. You will recall that during our discussion you agreed that if the man is in fact a military deserter, in the interests of our relations with the Soviet Union, we should endeavor to find some means of complying with the Soviet request.

Since our conversation I have gone into the whole matter again most thoroughly with the Attorney General and with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. As a result of this discussion it is now entirely clear that in the absence of a specific treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union covering such offenses there is absolutely no legal ground for turning Kravchenko back to the Soviet authorities as a civilian.

Since Kravchenko was admitted to the United States in a civilian capacity and was so registered in the Department of State, we have no official proof that he had any direct military connections at the time of and during his service with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. We have only the bare statement in a communication from the Soviet Embassy that he had military status. Before this Government, therefore, could apply military law to

him

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72


By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

him on the basis of military desertion, it will be necessary to have some proof that he was actually a member of the Soviet Armed Forces when he entered the United States. I have explained our position to the Soviet Ambassador and have asked him to endeavor to obtain for us the necessary evidence as to Kravchenko's military status which would enable us to consider his deportation under military law. This the Soviet Ambassador has promised to take up with his Government.

The present status of the case is, therefore, that we are waiting proof that Kravchenko is connected with the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union before proceeding any further with this matter. I shall, of course, let you know of any further developments in this case.



DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

4002

hms

Russia folder
1-45

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, 1/1/45, to the President, in re his discussions with Ambassador Harriman about a plan which the Treasury Dept. has been formulating for comprehensive aid to Russia during her reconstruction period. They are not thinking of mor Lend-Lease or any form of relief but rather of an arrangement that will have definite and long range benefits for the U.S. as well as for Russia.

Russia folder 1-45

Copy file

~~SECRET~~

file confidential

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Foreign Policy

While you may not have time to read in full the enclosed lengthy interpretive report from Harriman on developments in Soviet policy derived from the attitudes of the Russian press, I believe that, in view of your forthcoming meeting, you will find it worthwhile to look over at least the first two paragraphs of the report which summarize the Ambassador's conclusions in regard to the main lines of Soviet foreign policy at the present time.

Joseph P. Grew
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 90 from Moscow,
January 10, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 18 1972
By J. Schauble Date _____

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

HJD-1688

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via Army

Dated January 10, 1945

Rec'd 11 a.m., 11th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY

Herewith my ninth interpretative report on de-
velopments in Soviet policy based on the Press for the
period October 13 to December 31 for distribution as
suggested in my 2215, December 14, 2 p.m., 1943. (Sent
to Department as 90 repeated to London as 8 for Winant,
Schoenfeld and Patterson, code text to be forwarded to
Stockholm; to Paris as 3; to Rome as 2, code text to
be forwarded to Athens; to Cairo as 6; to Ankara as 1;
and to Chungking as 1):

Report begins: No. 9.

The relative lull in military activities on the
Eastern Front has in effect given the Soviet Union a
chance to pursue its political objectives in areas
liberated by Russian Army. As a result the pattern
of Soviet tactics in Eastern Europe and the Balkans has
taken shape and the nature of Soviet aims has been

clarified.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

-2- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

clarified. It has become apparent that the Soviets, while eschewing direct attempts to incorporate into the Soviet Union alien peoples who were not embraced within the frontiers of June 21, 1941, are nevertheless employing the wide variety of means at their disposal -- occupation troops, secret police, local communist parties, labor unions, sympathetic leftist organizations, sponsored cultural societies, and economic pressure -- to assure the establishment of regimes which, while maintaining an outward appearance of independence and of broad popular support, actually depend for their existence on groups responsive to all suggestions emanating from the Kremlin. The tactics are endless in their variety and are selected to meet the situation in each particular country, dependent largely on the extent and strength of the resistance to Soviet penetration. It is particularly noteworthy that no practical distinction seems to be made in this connection between members of the United Nations whose territory is liberated by Soviet troops and ex-enemy countries which have been occupied.

The unbending consideration in Soviet foreign policy is the preoccupation with "security", as Moscow sees it.

-3- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

sees it. This objective explains most of the recent Soviet actions which have roused criticism abroad: the demand for unanimity of decision in the council of the security organization; the opposition to regional blocs; the sponsorship of puppet regimes in all contiguous countries; the demand for the thorough purge of reactionary elements in all liberated areas, the constant harping at the European neutrals; the demands for vast oil and mineral concessions in Iran. The Soviet Union seeks a period of freedom from danger during which it can recover from the wounds of war and complete its industrial revolution. The Soviet conception of "security" does not appear cognizant of the similar needs or rights of other countries and of Russia's obligation to accept the restraints as well as the benefits of an international security system.

One. The major theme of Allied unity, dominant since the Tehran and Moscow conferences, continued to be played in all major pronouncements on foreign affairs; but it had acquired a certain perfunctory quality; and a minor chord was introduced to condition the Soviet public for differences which the approaching end of war in Europe might bring. The German offensive in the Ardennes was

-4- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

Ardennes was dispassionately portrayed to the Soviet reader as a sally with limited objectives designed to throw the grand Allied offensive off balance. Meanwhile the Soviet reader was frequently reminded that the bulk of German manpower was engaged by the Red army in the East, and the press was quick to resent any implication that the Red army was not doing its share and that the operations in Hungary served primarily political aims.

Two. Keen but wary interest continued to be manifested in projects for international cooperation in various fields. No change occurred in the Soviet attitude toward participation of the great powers in voting in the security council on issues involving themselves, and the Soviet position was reiterated by Stalin in his November 6 speech. War and the working class in December advanced a proposal for continental zones within the security organization in which the great powers would be represented if their interests were involved. This scheme was patently designed to offset projects for regional blocs to which the Soviets, fearing that such blocs may

-5- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWQ) from
Moscow via Army.

blocs may sooner or later be directed against the Soviet Union, are strongly opposed.

With the Kremlin plainly determined to bring into being, and gain control of, a new and powerful international trade union organization, the press displayed keenest interest in trade union questions, particularly in their international aspects. The CIO and AF of L conventions were reported in detail, and the usual criticism was leveled at the latter for its continued refusal to participate in an international trade union gathering at which Soviet delegates would be present. The trade union movement was revived in Bulgaria and Rumania, and the Bulgarian federation asked permission to send delegates to the forthcoming international meeting in London. Attendance of delegations from countries under Soviet occupation would, of course, strengthen the influence of the Soviet delegates at such a meeting.

Soviet refusal to participate in the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference was officially motivated by the fact that Spain, Portugal (?) (?) (?) (?) (?) nearer Soviet dislike for Dewey became more articulate and confidence in Roosevelt's reelection were marked. An effort was made to link Dewey to Polish reactionary groups in the
United States.

-6- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

United States. On the eve of the elections IZVESTIYA predicted a sweeping Roosevelt victory, at the same time revealing its ignorance of or willfully distorting American politics by suggesting that a last minute attempt on Dewey's life might be staged by stampeding the electorate. Roosevelt's reelection and the defeat of outstanding isolationists in Congress were greeted enthusiastically. Subsequently Professor Krylov, a member of the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks, delivered an excellent public lecture in which he described with sympathy and understanding the electoral system and the campaign and paid high tribute to Roosevelt, Hull and Stettinius. This lecture was not reported in the press.

The press followed with interest the controversy in Congress over approval of the nominations of new State Department officials.

Four. After several months of unsuccessful attempts to effect a reconciliation on Soviet terms of the Lublin Committee with the more moderate elements of the Polish Government in London, the Soviets abandoned the effort following Mikolajczyk's resignation and set in motion an intensive agitation in liberated Poland which culminated in the formation of a provisional
government

-7- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

government in Lublin on December 31. Meanwhile several of the more prominent leaders in the early stages of the life of the National Council, including Wanda Wasilewska, who was head of the union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union, General Berling, who commanded the Polish forces in the Soviet Union and later on the Warsaw Front, and Andrzej Witos, who was in charge of land reform, have been removed from their posts with little explanation. The tight control exercised over political parties and public opinion in Poland is manifest in the unanimity of support reported for the various measures undertaken by the Committee. The influence of Moscow is also evident in a law adopted by the Council providing stern penalties for the familiar crimes of treason, wrecking and sabotage. A delegation from Warsaw visited Moscow to express gratitude for aid rendered by the Soviets; meanwhile the press laid the delay in receipt of aid from the United States to the intrigues of reactionary Polish circles there.

The committee proceeded energetically with its program of land reform and by the end of the year was able to announce that the division of large estates and the
distribution of

-8- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

distribution of the land to Peasants had been practically completed in the area liberated to date. It was obvious that the parcelling up of the estates was uneconomic, since the new holdings were very small and their new owners often without draught animals and tools to work them. It appeared inevitable that some kind of cooperative or collective system would have to be introduced before the new holdings could be worked with any degree of efficiency. Meanwhile the reform doubtless served the purpose of increasing support for the Lublin Committee in an area where the Communist industrial element was small and the peasantry largely apathetic.

Five. In the other United Nations countries on whose soil the Red army was fighting, the situation was apparently much less complicated than in Poland. After the entry of Soviet troops into Ruthenia a mission headed by Nemeč arrived in Moscow from London to take over the administration of the liberated territory in accordance with the Soviet -- Czechoslovak agreement concluded last spring. The mission was permitted to proceed to Ruthenia but did not take direct part in the civil administration, which was in the hands of a pro-Soviet Ruthenian National Committee of obscure origin. Messages were published in
the Moscow

-9- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

the Moscow press from mass meetings in Ruthenian towns demanding union of the province with the Ukrainian SSR, but Red army authorities on the spot were reported to have remained strictly aloof from this agitation. War and the Working Class on two occasions took Czech Foreign Minister Masaryk to task, once for suggesting that his country might become a bridge between the Soviet Union and the West, once for reviving the idea of a Czech -- Polish federation.

The entry of Soviet troops into Belgrade was the occasion for a message of gratitude and solidarity from Tito to Stalin, but in general Yugoslavia received much less notice in the Press than normally. Subasic's Moscow visit passed almost unnoticed.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Lie, who was shown marked cordiality during his stay in Moscow, apparently established a satisfactory working agreement with the Russians and all press references to relations between Soviet troops and the Norwegian population in the liberated areas of Norway have indicated full understanding and accord.

Six. In the ex-enemy countries which have broken
with Germany

-10- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army

with Germany the Soviets have been interested primarily in the prompt and complete fulfillment of the armistice terms and the purge of former Fascist and Collaborationist elements. Toward Finland, which had been praised in the press for its efforts to fulfill meticulously its obligations under the Armistice, the Soviet attitude has been correct but not cordial. The failure of the Social Democratic Party at its convention to oust Tgener and other conservative leaders who in Soviet eyes were largely responsible for the alliance with Germany and to yield control of the Party to pro-Soviet elements caused dissatisfaction in Moscow and led to a threat (in the press) that the Party might be eliminated from Finnish political life. There were also periodic press attacks and demands for punishment of Ryti, Erkkö and other pre-Armistice leaders. The Finnish -- Soviet Union Society and other Soviet sponsored cultural groups were increasingly active.

In contrast to its coolness toward Finland, the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria was one of warmth and approbation. The object and servile submission of the Bulgarian delegates during the Armistice negotiations, Soviet satisfaction with the Fatherland Front Government and the enthusiasm with which purge measures were adopted coupled with the traditional benevolence of the Russians
for the

-11- #90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army

for the Slav, Bulgars and the strategic position of Bulgaria adjacent to British occupied Greece, combined to create for Bulgaria a place of special privilege among the defeated powers. Suggestions for the federation of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia received the endorsement of the Soviet press.

Rumania remained the bad boy. Although Press

HARRIMAN

EH

NOTE: A portion of this message undecipherable, repetition has been requested.

STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

DCG-1802
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (S [redacted])

Moscow
Dated January 10, 1945
Rec'd 4:50 p.m. 11th.,

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
material for the most part was light, the Russians did not conceal their dislike for the Rumanians and their dissatisfaction with Rumanian failure to cooperate fully in meeting their obligations under the Armistice. Vice Foreign Commissar Vyshinski spent several weeks in Bucharest endeavoring to effect an improvement in the situation.

The coup d'etat in Hungary following Horthy's armistice feelers in Moscow led to violent Press attacks on Szalasy as a Nazi stooge. Following Russian occupation of the greater part of Hungary, a Provisional Government was formed at Debrecen obviously under Soviet sponsorship but apparently with wide and respectable non-Communist participation. The new government immediately declared war on Germany and despatched a new delegation to Moscow to conclude an armistice with the United Nations.

Seven. The general attitude of the Press toward United Nations countries which were not liberated or in the process of liberation by Soviet troops was one of polite reserve

-2-#90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWQ) from Moscow.

polite reserve. Soviet sympathy for the resistance forces in these countries which were frequently under Communist leadership was not concealed. The Belgian Government was censured for its uncompromising demand for disarmament of the resistance forces. Greece which had long been almost entirely ignored by the Press, became suddenly prominent after the Churchill visit to Moscow and the outbreak of strife between British troops and the ELAS forces. Soviet Press coverage, while extensive, was limited largely to publication of factual reports from London including long excerpts from statements by Churchill and Eden defending their policy. Some critical Foreign comment was published but in nothing like the volume used when the Soviets have taken a definite position. Notwithstanding this apparent disinterestedness and desire not to interfere, a WAR AND THE WORKING CLASS article endorsing EAM made amply clear where Soviet sympathies lay.

De Gaulle was invited to Moscow and his visit resulted in the signature of a twenty-year alliance which was ratified without delay by both countries. The Press interpreted the new alliance as a security measure directed against a renewal of German aggression. Thorez the French Communist leader, returned to Paris from

Moscow,

-3-#90; January 10; 1 p.m.; (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

Moscow. Following recent visits by Soviet Trade Union delegations to Britain and Italy another delegation arrived in France.

Eight. On the expressed assumption that the war was approaching its end the press published rather less than the usual amount of material against Germany. It expressed concern about efforts of leading Nazi to flee Germany and the transfer of German resources to neutral countries. International cartels and their advocates in Allied countries were flayed (particularly in connection with the Rye Conference) as a possible haven for German capital and influence and a rallying point for German efforts to rise up and fight again. An appeal by 50 German generals headed by Marshal von Paulus, once more calling on the Germans to overthrow Hitler and submit, was a reminder that the free Germany movement in Moscow is still active. The appeal warned the Germans that they must now expect occupation and punishment but that they would subsequently be able to take their place among the free nations.

Several reports of the Extraordinary State Commission described ghastly German atrocities committed in the Baltic States and the Lwow region. Long lists of Germans charged with responsibility including

Commanding

4-#90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

Commanding Front generals formed part of the reports and in one Himmler was held to be directly responsible.

Nine. Those European neutrals who are without diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union namely Switzerland, Spain and Portugal were under almost constant Press attack. Swiss overtures to establish diplomatic relations were refused on the grounds that the Swiss Government had not disavowed its former anti-Soviet attitude.

Long detailed articles indicating ignorance of or non-concern for the realities of the economic warfare program of the Western Allies outlined the economic aid each of these countries had rendered Germany in the course of the war. Franco was under steady attack and much American material was published demanding a break in Spanish American diplomatic relations. Spain was pictured as merely a stopover point for escaping Nazis on their way to Argentina which was frequently identified with Spain as being under strong Nazi influence.

Sweden was rebuked for receiving refugees from the Baltic states who fled before the approaching Soviet armies and there were insistent suggestions that arrangements be made regardless of their own wishes for their immediate return.

Ten. Growing

-5-#90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

Ten. Growing Soviet interest in Latin America was manifested by some increase in press material on that area and by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Chile (obviously regarded as something of an achievement) and with Nicaragua.

Eleven. Refusal by Iran to consider the grant of oil concessions in northern Iran to the Soviets until after the war led to a violent campaign against the Saed Government which eventually brought about its resignation. Mass meetings in Iran organized by Soviet sympathizers and attacks on Saed in the left wing papers were fully reported by the Soviet Press. It was alleged that Saed and his government were Fascist in their outlook, that they maintained contact with bandits who interfered with supply lines leading to the Soviet Union, that their continuance in office was detrimental to the prosecution of the war. At the height of the controversy IZVESTIYA asserted that there was no legal basis for the presence of American troops in Iran. Saed Khaedden was a favored target for attack and there were frequent reports of mass meetings demanding that he be exiled. Following Saed's resignation it was urged that he and responsible members of his government be brought to trial. Pressure for immediate grant of oil

concessions

-6-#90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

concessions relaxed but the Soviets made it clear that they did not intend to drop the issue.

Twelve. Most significant development in Soviet policy in the Far East was Stalin's definition of Japan as an aggressor nation in his November 6 speech. Foreign Press reaction to this departure was played down but the new line gradually became apparent by subsequent Press material. The sharp denunciation of Japan made at the Congress of the British Communist Party was published. A book on the siege of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese war, publication of which had been withheld for several years appeared and was favorably reviewed in the Press. The regular reviews of the Pacific war stressed the worsening situation of Japan from the damage being caused by B-29 raids. While Press handling of Japan continued to be cautious and gingerly, Soviet dislike of the Japanese was much more clearly apparent than a year ago.

Hostility continued to be expressed toward the Chiang Kai Shek regime because of its failure to reach an accommodation with the Chinese Communists. No enthusiasm was shown for the cabinet changes which were viewed as merely a change in lineup without any fundamental modification of policy or direction.

Thirteen. Internal developments during this period

-7-#90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

period were of limited interest. Elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviet and local Soviets, who were elected in 1937 and 1938 for terms of 4 and 2 years respectively were again postponed. For the first time the Press felt it necessary to defend this step by urging deputies to maintain close contact with their constituents.

Great interest was manifested in the return of all categories of Soviet Nationals or persons who could be claimed as such particularly those found among German forces captured by Allies. A special commission was established to expedite repatriation. Extreme touchiness was shown over reported reluctance of many of these people to return and over alleged encouragement being given to such sentiments by foreign authorities. Press stories of warm reception accorded repatriates did not check with reports of Embassy observers and apparently reflected a desire to disarm the suspicions of those still abroad. Population transfers along western borders continued.

Press devoted much space to the progress of reconstruction in the Baltic area while inveighing against so called "Bourgeois--Nationalist" groups both there and in the Ukraine. It seemed clear that Nationalist remnants survived in these areas and were creating difficulties for the Soviet authorities.

The first

-8-#90, January 10, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

The first wartime change in top government personnel occurred with the replacement of Voroshilov, the only fully military representative on the State Defense Committee (War Cabinet) by Bulgarian political general and Kagenovich's removal as Railway Commissar and appointment as Vice President of the Council of Peoples Commissars.

While occasional anti-religious articles still appear in the press the trend is increasingly toward recognition of the church as a beneficial factor in Soviet society. Metropolitan Nikolai and other churchmen were awarded defense of Moscow medals. A meeting of the Holy Synod to elect a new patriarch was announced for January. All the eastern patriarchs were invited to attend.

Recipients of awards made during the November holiday celebrations included a long list of Foreign Office officials. This appeared to be another step toward strengthening the prestige of the Foreign Office.

HARRIMAN

BE

Published in

Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill,
Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman

Vol. 11 Page 191

CL3
7-14-66

1-45

TRANSLATION

I. V. STALIN

Koreiz, 9 February 1945

Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

Please accept my appreciation for the sentiments expressed by you in the name of the American people and the Government of the USA in connection with the tragic death of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, C. A. Goumansky, his wife and assistants of the Soviet Embassy.

The Soviet Government accepts with thanks your proposal concerning the bringing to Moscow of their remains on an American military airplane.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) I. Stalin

I. Stalin

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
"Livadia", Crimea

И. В. СТАЛИН


Кореиз, "9" февраля 1945 г.

Уважаемый г-н Рузвельт,

Прошу Вас принять мою благодарность за выраженные Вами от имени американского народа и Правительства США чувства в связи с трагической гибелью Советского Посла в Мексике К.А.Уманского, его супруги и сотрудников Советского Посольства.

Ваше предложение о доставке их останков в Москву на американском военном самолете Советское Правительство принимает с благодарностью.

С искренним уважением



Президенту Франклину Д.РУЗВЕЛЬТУ.

"Ливадия", Крым.



file

152: Russia

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATTA:

In compliance with the request in your memorandum of February 27, 1945, I am enclosing herewith the original message addressed to the President by Joseph Stalin and a translation thereof.

G. T. Summerlin
George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:

Message from
Joseph Stalin,
February 27, 1945,
with translation.

FOR DEFENSE



BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS

Russia folder 1-45

TRANSLATION

PWS VIA PREWI

TC - 9452

32 MOSCOW 71 27 0415 STAT URSSGVT

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

White House,

Washington, D. C.

I beg you, Mr. President, to accept my thanks for your friendly greeting on the occasion of the 27th Anniversary of the Red Army. I am confident that the further strengthening of the collaboration between our countries having found its expression in the decisions of the Crimean Conference will shortly bring about the complete collapse of our common enemy and the establishment of a stable peace based on the principle of the cooperation of all freedom-loving peoples.

I. Stalin

Published in

Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill
Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman

Vol. 11

Page 193

CLS
7-14-66

MESSAGE
"VIA PREWI"
PRESS WIRELESS, INC.
918 NATIONAL PRESS BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
TELEPHONE NATIONAL 2451

FEB 27 1945



PWS VIA PREWI

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FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

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FROM

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RUSH
PRESS MESSAGE

To His Excellency "The President of The United States"

Of America

Franklin D Roosevelt

White House - Washington, D.C.




DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATTA:

I am enclosing herewith, for your files, a copy of a telegram addressed by the President to Joseph Stalin on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Red Army.


George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
to Joseph Stalin,
February 23, 1945.

FOR DEFENSE



COPY

February 23, 1945

HIS EXCELLENCY
JOSEPH V. STALIN,
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW.

In anticipation of our common victory against the Nazi oppressors, I wish to take this opportunity to extend my heartiest congratulations to you as Supreme Commander on this the twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the Red Army.

The farreaching decisions we took at Yalta will hasten victory and the establishment of a firm foundation for a lasting peace. The continued outstanding achievements of the Red Army together with the all-out effort of the United Nations forces in the south and west assure the speedy attainment of our common goal - a peaceful world based upon mutual understanding and cooperation.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT


~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON*file*

March 15, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Difficulties in Repatriation of
United States Prisoners of War from
Soviet-Occupied Territory

I believe you will be interested in looking over the enclosed message from Harriman in which he describes the difficulties we are encountering in facilitating the evacuation from Poland of liberated United States prisoners of war. It would appear that the Soviet authorities may be endeavoring to use our desire to assist our prisoners as a means of obliging us to deal with the Warsaw Government.



Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 738 from Moscow,
March 14, 1945.

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 1079]

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PH-1449

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. [REDACTED]

Moscow via Army

Dated March 14, 1945

Rec'd 7:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY

738, March 14, 3 p.m.

I assume the Department has been informed by the War Department of the great difficulties General Deane and I have been having with the Soviet Government in regard to the care and repatriation of our liberated prisoners of war. In the beginning it appeared that the Soviet authorities were going to interpret our agreement substantially as we did, namely that we be allowed to send our contact officers to several points within Poland to which our prisoners first find their way, to fly in emergency supplies and to evacuate our wounded on the returning trips of the planes, although in Soviet planes rather than United States planes. We obtained authority for one contact team of an officer and doctor to go to Lublin with one plane load of supplies and they have done extremely useful work there. No other teams or supplies

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 1079-1081]

-2- #738, March 14, 3 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

supplies have since been permitted and authority for the Lublin team to remain has recently been withdrawn. The Soviets have now contended that Odessa is the only present "camps and points of concentration" referred to in the agreement to which our contact officers are to be permitted. The Soviets are, however, planning also to establish camps at Lwow, Bronnita and Volkowisk which are just east of the present Polish border and will be accessible to our officers, but even these camps are a long way from the original points of liberation.

Our prisoners have suffered serious hardships from lack of food, clothing, medical attention, et cetera, in finding their way to concentration points in Poland and on the long rail trip to Odessa because we have been stopped from sending in our contact teams and emergency supplies. A considerable number of sick and wounded are still hospitalized in Olan, I have been urging for the last two weeks that General Deane be permitted to survey the situation with a Red Army officer. This was first approved in writing with the qualification that arrangements must be made with the Polish authorities. An officer of our military mission informally approached the Polish

-3- #738, March 14, 3 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

the Polish Embassy here and was advised that no Polish authorization was necessary as it was entirely within the competence of the Red Army. We have been unable, however, to get authorization for Deano's trip.

It seems clear that the Soviets have changed their point of view during the last several weeks and are now rigidly determined that none of our officers shall be permitted in Poland.

I saw Molotov again today about the situation. He maintained that the Soviet Government was fulfilling its obligation under the agreement and both the Red Army authorities and the Polish Provisional Government objected to the presence of our officers in Poland. When I pressed him on what valid objection the Red Army could possibly have, he pointed out that we had no agreement with the Polish Provisional Government. In spite of my contention that this was a Soviet responsibility he kept reverting to the above fact. I then directly asked him if he was implying that we should make such an arrangement with the Poles and if so, whether the Red Army would remove its objections. He did not answer

-4- #738, March 14, 3 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

answer this question directly but left me with the impression that he wished me to draw that deduction.

I am satisfied that the objection comes from Soviet Government and not the Provisional Polish Government as our military mission has been in informal contact with the Polish Embassy here who have been extremely cooperative as have all Polish authorities including the Polish Red Cross to our prisoners in Poland.

I feel that the Soviet Government is trying to use our liberated prisoners of war as a club to induce us to give increased prestige to the Provisional Polish Government by dealing with it in this connection as the Soviets are doing in other cases. General Deane and I have not (repeat not) been able to find a way to force the Soviet authorities to live up to our interpretation of our agreement. We have used every argument to no avail. Unless some steps can be taken to bring direct pressure on the Soviets, our liberated prisoners will continue to suffer hardships, particularly the wounded and sick. I recommend that the Department consult with the War Department with a view of determining what

further

-5- #738, March 14, 3 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

further steps might be taken here or elsewhere to induce the Soviets to change their present un-cooperative attitude.

It is the opinion of General Deane and myself that no arguments will induce the Soviets to live up to our interpretation of the agreement except retaliatory measures which affect their interests unless another direct appeal from the President should prove effective. We therefore recommend that the first step be a second request from the President to Marshal Stalin along the line of the suggestion I have already made in my Army cable March 12, perhaps now amplified in light of developments since. In the meantime, however, we recommend further that the Department and War Department come to an agreement on what retaliatory measures we can immediately apply in the event an unfavorable answer is received by the President from Marshal Stalin.

Consideration might be given to such actions as, or combination thereof: (One) That General Eisenhower issue orders to restrict the movements of Soviet contact officers in France to several camps or points of concentration of their citizens far removed

-6- #738, March 14, 3 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

far removed from the points of liberation, comparable to Lwow and Odessa; (Two) That Lend-Lease refuse to consider requests of Soviet Government additional to our fourth protocol commitments for such items as sugar, industrial equipment or other items that are not immediately essential for the Red Army and the Russian war effort; (Three) That consideration be given to allowing our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the War Department explain the provisions of our agreement and the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of the agreement according to any reasonable interpretation.

I request urgent consideration of this question and the Department's preliminary reaction. General Deane requests that this cable be shown to General Marshall.

HARRIMAN

LMS

Russia folder 1-45

~~TOP SECRET~~

file


THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Policy toward the Soviet Union

Although they have been briefly summarized in my daily information sheet to you, I believe that you may wish to read the full texts of two recent telegrams from Ambassador Harriman, in the first of which dated April 4 he advocates a modification in our economic policy toward Russia, and in the second of which he replies to a request which I made of him for an over-all report on the present status of our relations with the Soviet Government.



Enclosures:

1. Copy of telegram no. 1038 from Moscow, April 4, 1945.
2. Copy of telegram no. 1061 from Moscow, April 6, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

EOC-220

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Moscow via Army

Dated April 4, 1945

Rec'd 10:09 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

1038, April 4, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

~~TOP SECRET~~

I fully agree with the Department's views expressed in 768, April 1, 11 p.m. regarding the British proposal for tripartite conversations in Moscow on relief supplies for Europe. Aside from the practical reasons given in the Department's cable indicating that these tripartite conversations would overlap other established commissions I feel that we have now ample proof that the Soviet Government would use such conversations to promote only their own welfare and political objectives. As we would approach the conversations from the humanitarian aspect we would start at an insuperable disadvantage. Should our own study of these problems together with British develop specific matters on which we wished to obtain Soviet cooperation I believe we should then approach the Soviet Government through one of the established

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 817-819]

-2-#1038, April 4, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

established commissions or through diplomatic channels in order to attempt to persuade or induce the Soviets to cooperate. I refer to such things as the general problem of feeding Germany, since I understand that the Russians will occupy the food surplus areas of Germany whereas the British and we will occupy some food deficit areas. Another case might be the stimulation of production and the direction of the distribution of oil in Rumania. In this case I still believe that we should insist upon the establishment now of the tripartite committee of experts in Rumania as has been suggested by the Department and also in Hungary. I can see no reason why we should not inform the Soviet Government that until they show willingness to cooperate along these lines we will be forced to give less attention to Soviet protocol requests for petroleum products. Pressure of this kind is the only way we can hope to obtain even partial Soviet cooperation.

Turning to the matter of policy, we now have ample proof that the Soviet Government views all matters from the standpoint of their own selfish interests. They have publicised to their own political advantage the difficult food situation in areas liberated by our troops such as
in Franco,

-3-#1038, April 4, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

in France, Belgium and Italy, comparing it with the allegedly satisfactory conditions in areas which the Red Army has liberated. They have kept our newspaper correspondents under strict censorship to prevent the facts becoming known. They have sent token shipments to Poland of Lend-Lease items or those similar thereto in order to give the appearance of generosity on the part of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party or its associates everywhere are using economic difficulties in areas under our responsibilities to promote Soviet concepts and policies and to undermine the influence of the western Allies.

In my War Department message of March 31 to the Protocol Committee in answer to the War Department message the Department refers to, which evidently crossed the Department's cable to which I am now replying, I suggested in the first paragraph "that minimum requirements of our western Allies be given first consideration". I feel I should expand the reasons for this suggestion and if the Soviet Government had shown any willingness to deal with economic questions on their merits without political considerations, as we approach them, I would feel that we should make every effort to

-4-//1038, April 4, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

effort to concert our plans with those of the Soviet Government. On the other hand our hopes in this direction have proved to be futile. Unless we and the British now adopt an independent line the people of the areas under our responsibility will suffer and the chances of Soviet domination in Europe will be enhanced. I thus regretfully come to the conclusion that we should be guided as a matter of principle by the policy of taking care of our western Allies and other areas under our responsibility first, allocating to Russia what may be left. I am in no sense suggesting that this policy should have as its objective the development of a political bloc or a sphere of influence by the British or ourselves, but that we should, through such economic aid as we can give to our western Allies including Greece as well as Italy, reestablish a reasonable life for the people of these countries who have the same general outlook as we have on life and the development of the world. The Soviet Union and the minority governments that the Soviets are forcing on the people of eastern Europe have an entirely different objective. We must clearly recognize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know and respect it.

In addition

-5-#1038, April 4, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from
Moscow via Army.

In addition the Soviet Government is attempting to penetrate through the Communist parties supported by it the countries of western Europe with the hope of expanding Soviet influence in the internal and external affairs of these countries.

HARRIMAN

WWC

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 817-819]

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

RP-226

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Moscow via Army

Dated April 4, 1945

Rec'd 10:22 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date ~~FEB 18~~ 1972

1038, April 4, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Since we under no circumstances are prepared to involve ourselves in the internal political affairs of other countries by such methods, our only hope of supporting the peoples of these countries who resent totalitarian minority dictatorships is to assist them to attain economic stability as soon as possible. Lack of sufficient food and employment are fertile grounds for the subtle false promises of Communist agents.

The Soviet Government will end this war with the largest gold reserve of any country except the United States, will have large quantities of Lend-Lease material and equipment not used or worn out in the war with which to assist their reconstruction, will ruthlessly strip the enemy countries they have occupied of everything they can move, will control the foreign

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 819-820]

-2-#1038, April 4, 8 p.m., (SECTION TWO) from Moscow via
Army

the foreign trade of countries under their domination as far as practicable to the benefit of the Soviet Union, will use political and economic pressure on other countries including South America to force trade arrangements to their own advantage and at the same time they will demand from us every form of aid and assistance which they think they can get from us while using our assistance to promote their political aims to our disadvantage in other parts of the world.

I recognize that it may be thought that much of this has no relationship to the question raised by the Department's message. On the other hand, I am stating it in order to justify my final recommendation, namely that the Soviet Government's selfish attitude must, in my opinion, force us if we are to protect American vital interests to adopt a more positive policy of using our economic influence to further our broad political ideals. Unless we are ready to live in a world dominated largely by Soviet influence, we must use our economic power to assist those countries that are naturally friendly to our concepts in so far as we can possibly do so. The only

hope

-3-#1038, April 4, 8 p.m., (SECTION TWO) from Moscow via
Army

hope of stopping Soviet penetration is the development of sound economic conditions in these countries. I therefore recommend that we face the realities of the situation and orient our foreign economic policy accordingly. Our policy toward the Soviet Union should, of course, continue to be based on our earnest desire for the development of friendly relations and cooperation both political and economic, but always on a quid pro quo basis. This means tying our economic assistance directly into our political problems with the Soviet Union. This should be faced squarely in our consideration of the fifth protocol.

END OF MESSAGE

HARRIMAN

WWC

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 819-820]

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

EOC-1040

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Moscow via Army

Dated April 6, 1945

Rec'd 3:23 a.m. 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 10 1972

PRIORITY

1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE SECRETARY.

You request a report on our relations with the Soviet Government in your personal cable No. 777, April 3, 5 p.m. You will recall that on September 18 in Department's No. 2234, 10 p.m. a similar request was made to which I replied in cable No. 3572 September 19, 1 p.m. and No. 3600 September 20, 8 p.m. At that time I pointed out that a telegraphic message was a difficult medium in which to report on as complicated a situation as then existed and suggested that a satisfactory report could only be given if I were directed to return to Washington. The situation today is even more difficult to analyze and explain in a message. It is for this reason that I urgently request that I be permitted to return at once to Washington. However, in the meantime, for such a limited value as it may be, I will attempt

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 821-823]

-2-//1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow via
Army.

will attempt to outline the situation as it appears
from Moscow.

We have recognized for many months that the Soviets
have three lines of foreign policy. (One.) overall
collaboration with us and the British in a World
Security Organization; (Two.) The creation of a uni-
lateral security ring through domination of their border
states; and (Three.) The penetration of other countries
through exploitation of democratic processes on the part
of Communist controlled parties with strong Soviet
backing to create political atmosphere favorable to
Soviet policies.

We have been hopeful that the Soviets would, as we
have, place number one as their primary policy and would
modify their plans for two if they were satisfied with
the efficacy of plan one. It now seems evident that
regardless of what they may expect from the World
Security Organization they intend to go forward with
unilateral action in the domination of their bordering
states. It may well be that during and since the Moscow
Conference they feel they have made this quite plain to
us. You will recall that at the Moscow Conference
Molotov indicated that although he would inform us of
Soviet action in Eastern Europe he declined to be bound
by consultation

-3-#1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow via
Army.

by consultation with us. It may be difficult for us to believe, but it still may be true that Stalin and Molotov considered at Yalta that by our willingness to accept a general wording of the declarations on Poland and liberated Europe, by our recognition of the need of the Red Army for security behind its lines, and of the predominant interest of Russia in Poland as a friendly neighbor and as a corridor to Germany. We understand and were ready to accept Soviet policies already known to us.

We must recognize that the words "independent but friendly neighbor" and in fact "democracy" itself have entirely different meanings to the Soviets than to us. Although they know of the meaning of these terms to us they undoubtedly feel that we should be aware of the meaning to them. We have been hopeful that the Soviets would accept our concepts whereas they on their side may have expected us to accept their own concepts, particularly in a reas where their interests predominate. In any event, whatever may have been in their minds at Yalta, it now seems that they feel they can force us to acquiesce in their policies. Since we are resisting, they are using the usual Soviet tactics of retaliating in ways that they think will have the most effect, one of which is the decision not to send

Molotov

-4-#1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow via
Army.

Molotov to the San Francisco Conference. They are fully aware of the importance we place on this conference.

I have evidence which satisfies me that the Soviets have considered as a sign of weakness on our part our continued generous and considerate attitude towards them in spite of their disregard of our requests for cooperation in matters of interest to us.

I am further satisfied that the time has come when we must by our actions in each individual case make it plain to the Soviet Government that they cannot (repeat not) expect our continued cooperation on terms laid down by them. We have recognized that the Soviets have deep seated suspicions of all foreigners including ourselves. Our natural method of dealing with suspicion in others is to show our goodwill by generosity and consideration. We have earnestly attempted this policy and it has not been successful. This policy seems to have increased rather than diminished their suspicions as they evidently have misconstrued our motives. I feel that our relations would be on a much sounder basis if on the one hand we were firm and completely frank with them as to our position and motives and on the other hand they are made to understand specifically how lack of cooperation with our legitimate demands will adversely affect their

-5-#1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow via
Army.

effect their interests.

I hope that I will not be misunderstood when I say that our relations with the Soviet Government will be on firmer ground as soon as we have adopted a policy which includes on the one hand at all times a full place for cooperation with the Soviet Union but on the other a readiness to go along without them if we can't obtain their cooperation. Up to recently the issues we have had with the Soviets have been relatively small compared to their contribution to the war but now we should begin to establish a new relationship. As you know I am a most earnest advocate of the closest possible understanding with the Soviet Union so that what I am saying only relates to how such understanding may be best attained.

Turning now to practical suggestions, they fall into two general categories. The first relates to policies toward other nations. I feel that we should further cement our relations with our other Allies and other friendly nations, settle our relatively minor differences with them and assist them economically as described in my 1038 April 4, 8 p.m. which I suggest be read in connection with this message. I am in no sense suggesting that in settling our political differences with them we should compromise our principles, but that we should

make it our

-6-#1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow via
Army.

make it our business with energy and understanding to
make these countries feel that they are secure in dealing
with us that we will be understanding of their problems
and needs.

HARRIMAN

BTM

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 821-823]

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

CC-1015

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Moscow via Army

Dated April 6, 1945

Rec'd 12:20 a.m. 7th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 18 1972

PRIORITY

1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

If such an atmosphere is developed, the people of these countries will feel less dependent politically and economically on Soviet Russia and, as their concepts are much the same as ours, they will be inclined to orient their policies along lines similar to ours. A policy of this kind in itself will have an influence on our relations with the Soviet Union as I believe they fear more than anything else a close understanding among the western nations and I believe they will be more ready to deviate from their unilateral policies if they find that they cannot play one against the other and that they are not indispensable to us.

China is a subject by itself and I will not attempt to deal with it in this telegram.

My suggestions in the second general category relate to our current dealings with the Soviet Union.

Although

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 823-824]

-2-#1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow
via Army

Although we should continue to approach all matters with an attitude of friendliness we should be firm and as far as practicable indicate our displeasure (will ?) in ways that are definitely affect their interest in each case in which they fail to take our legitimate interests into consideration by their actions.

In the compass of this message I cannot list the almost daily affronts and total disregard which the Soviets evince in matters of interest to us. Whenever the United States does anything to which the Soviet take exception they do not hesitate to take retaliatory measures. I must with regret recommend that we begin in the near future with one or two cases where their actions are intolerable and make them realize that they cannot continue their present attitude except at great cost to themselves. We should recognize that if we adopt this policy we may have some adverse repercussions in the beginning. On the other hand we have evidence that in cases where they have been made to feel that their interests were being adversely affected we have obtained quick and favorable action. In any event I see no alternative as our present relations are clearly unsatisfactory.

Leaning to

-3-#1061, April 6, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow
via Army

Leaning to the military, General Deane on his return to Washington will present recommendations for a line of policy in which I concur. We both are satisfied that whatever the Soviets do in the Far East will be because of their own interests and not because of any conciliatory policy on our part.

I recognize that I am attempting to discuss in this message most fundamental questions. I feel that regardless of other considerations, serious as they are, I should be ordered home immediately for a very brief stay in order that I may report more fully on developments here and their implications. In spite of recent developments, I am still satisfied that if we deal with the Soviets on a realistic basis, we can in time attain a workable basis for our relations. There is ample evidence that the Soviets desire our help and collaboration but they now think they can have them on their own terms which in many cases are completely unacceptable to us. They do not understand that their present actions seriously jeopardize the attainment of satisfactory relations with us and unless they are made to understand this now, they will become increasingly difficult to deal with.

(END OF MESSAGE)

HARRIMAN

[Printed in FRUS, 1945, V, 823-824]