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Foreign Relations
of the US
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VOL PAGE 14-16

and Vol. II, 1933, pp. 791-794
MEMORANDUM.

My dear Mr. President:

I requested Judge Walton Moore and William Bullitt each to prepare a memorandum on the more important conditions and understandings that might be considered significant in connection with the development of plans for the recognition of the Russian Government. These two memoranda are attached hereto for whatever the information may be worth.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:
Two memoranda.

The President,
The White House.

October 5, 1933.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to our conversation of this afternoon:

Whatever method may be used to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government, it seems essential that formal recognition should not be accorded except as the final act of an agreement covering a number of questions in dispute. Before recognition and before loans, we shall find the Soviet Government relatively amenable. After recognition or loans, we should find the Soviet Government adamant. Among the chief agreements which, in my opinion, must be reached before recognition are the following:

1. Prohibition of communist propaganda in the United States by the Soviet Government and by the Comintern.

2. Protection of the civil and religious rights of Americans in Russia which are inadequately protected under current Russian practice (e.g. "economic espionage").

3. Agreement by the Soviet Government that the act of recognition shall not be retroactive to the foundation of that government (which is the usual practice), but shall take effect only from the day on which it may be accorded. This is essential to protect both our Government and many citizens and corporations from suits for damages.

By negotiation before recognition, we should also attempt to obtain an agreement in regard to the repayment of the loans of the Government of the United States to the
Kerensky Government, a waiver of Russian counter claims based upon our Vladivostock, Archangel and Murmansk expeditions; also some sort of provision for the settlement of claims of American nationals and corporations for property, goods and cash seized by the Soviet Government.

There are of course scores of other questions involved in resuming normal relations with Russia. Our position would be strongest, I believe, if all these questions, whether of a legal, economic or financial nature, should be handled as a unit in one global negotiation, the end of which would be signature of the agreements and simultaneous recognition.

Yours very respectfully,

[Signature]

October 4, 1933
MEMORANDUM

S

Mr. Secretary:

Impressions relative to the recognition of the Russian Government derived from the data furnished me by the Secretary and other data available at this moment:

(1) It seems clear that there should and must be recognition eventually and without delay, provided there is assurance that the Russian Government will not directly or indirectly make any effort to affect the political institutions or integrity of the United States and that certain other major matters can be satisfactorily disposed of.

(2) According to the statements contained in Mr. Atherton's communication, as illustrated by the experience of Great Britain, Russia is (a) inclined to a more reasonable attitude towards nations that have not accorded the recognition she seeks than towards those that have, and (b) after eagerly seeking and obtaining recognition she would be inclined to a more reasonable attitude towards nations that have not accorded the recognition she seeks than towards those that have.
she becomes more indifferent to her obligations than theretofore.

(3) If what is said in the last paragraph can be assumed as a correct premise, it may be thought best in advance of actual recognition to take the time necessary to explore the entire situation and endeavor to reach a full agreement between the two governments to be embodied in a treaty, pertaining to all or most of the very large number of important questions that sooner or later will call for consideration, e.g. as to the alleged desire of Russia to undermine our system of government; as to the personal, religious and property status and rights of our nationals in Russia and the ports of that country; as to the claims of Americans for the repayment of loans or for damages, and the claims that may be asserted against our Government by the Russian Government in its own behalf or in behalf of its subjects; as to the basis and character in various aspects of the commercial dealings between the two nations, etc., etc.

(4) An act of recognition is not revocable and it is certainly retroactive unless otherwise limited. Oetgen vs Central Leather Co. 246 U.S.297.

Should the President extend recognition without the
situation being dealt with in advance as suggested, then for the purpose of eliminating disputable questions as far as possible it might be accompanied by such conditions as may be agreed upon. The general effect of conditions attached to recognition is stated as follows by a leading authority, it being noticed, however, that in cases where such conditions are violated there is really no practical method of enforcing their observance:

"Recognition will, as a rule, be given without any conditions whatever, provided the new State is safely and permanently established. Since, however, the granting of recognition is a matter of policy, and not of law, nothing prevents an old State from making the recognition of a new State dependent upon the latter fulfilling certain conditions. Thus the Powers assembled at the Berlin Congress in 1878 recognised Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania under the condition only that these States should not impose any religious disabilities on any of their subjects. The meaning of such conditional recognition is not that recognition can be withdrawn in case the condition is not complied with. The nature of the thing makes recognition, if once given, incapable of withdrawal. But conditional recognition, if accepted by the new State, imposes the internationally legal duty upon such State of complying with the condition; failing which a right of intervention is given to the other party for the purpose of making the recognised State comply with the imposed condition." (Oppenheim, International Law, page 136, Volume I)
A restricted representation of each country, in the other until otherwise mutually determined, might well be specified and in such manner as to encourage the performance of the conditions accompanying recognition.

(4) It would seem that immediate and unconditional recognition would not be of any special moral or material advantage and, on the other hand, might be attended by very widespread adverse criticism.
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1933
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and "The Soviet Union, 1933-39"
pp. 25-26
My dear Mr. President:

Litvinov and I continued to argue for two hours on the subject of debts and claims. I finally managed to shake him a bit by telling him that the Johnson Bill, forbidding loans to countries in default on their indebtedness to the Government of the United States, was certain to be passed in January and that if the Soviet Government should make any absurd offer of settlement such an offer would surely be turned down by Congress and the Soviet Government would be unable to obtain one penny of credit from either the Government or any private corporation or individual in the United States, or their agencies abroad.

I urged Litvinov not to fix the lower figure at $50,000,000, as his Government would surely insist that that should be accepted as the maximum figure once the sum had been stated. He finally asked, "What sum would you consider might be acceptable to Congress?" and added "You will, of course, say $150,000,000." I replied, "No, I will say nothing. I cannot predict what Congress will do, but the President can predict very exactly what Congress will do, and you should address that question to him."

The President,

The White House.
Litvinov proposes to ask you that question when you meet at 2 o'clock.

Litvinov added that he would say to you that he had entire confidence in your fair-mindedness, and he was sure that when you looked at the facts about our loan to the Kerensky Government and found that the money had been spent for the most part by Bakhmetieff buying supplies for Kolchack's army, you would agree that the Soviet Government should not be obliged to assume liability for money used by its enemies.

The fact is that two-thirds of this Kerensky loan was telegraphed at once to Kerensky's Government and used fighting the Germans.

Litvinov added that the private claims had been so padded that $50,000,000 he considered would be a fair settlement of all claims and debts. This is, of course, absurd, and I think you should endeavor forcibly to get him to fix at least $100,000,000 as the lower limit.

I am delighted that you have appointed Henry Morgenthau Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and I suggest that you might invite him to come in at two o'clock, since he will have to handle future negotiations on this matter.

I shall stop at your office at ten minutes before two, in case you should wish to draw up a final plan of campaign.

Yours devotedly,

William C. Bullitt
Special Assistant to the Secretary.

P.S. I think we were a bit too gentle with him this morning. J.C.B.
On Board
Steamship PRESIDENT HARDING

December 6, 1933

Dear Mr. President:

You owe me a red apple, but the victory is yours, not mine. Do you remember that a year ago I bet you an apple that you would have prohibition buried before Christmas of this year and you bet that repeal would not come before March of next year? I have to remind you of this because it is the only case on record in which my guess as to timing has been better than yours!

In Washington it is difficult to see the wood for the trees and you have achieved so many extraordinary things that I imagine you are taking the end of prohibition as a matter of course; but I am sure that nothing that you have done will do more to restore civilized life in the United States. It is a great achievement and I congratulate you from the depths of my palate.

We are having an exceptionally disagreeable passage and are delayed a day. We should reach Moscow on the 11th. I still hope to take the WASHINGTON on the 28th of December and to see you again on the 5th of January.

The President,

The White House.
I think you know what a joy it is to me to be able to work with you and under your orders. I know you refuse to admit it—especially to yourself—but the fact is you are a very great human being and a great President.

It has just occurred to me that I have never thanked you properly for this assignment to Russia. The reason is, I think, that I feel myself so completely at your disposal and am so entirely ready to do anything anywhere that you may wish that I have the feeling of carrying out a job for you rather than any feeling of personal success. I honestly do not care where you use me or in what capacity so long as I can be useful to you. But it does give me deep satisfaction to undertake this mission and I thank you for sending me on it. The only regret I have is that I shall not be able to work with you in Washington. I would rather do that than any job anywhere.

A Merry Christmas to you and a Happy New Year, and every good wish to Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Le Hand and all your children. The Lord be with you!

Yours devotedly,

[Signature]

[Handwritten signature]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1934

Dear Mr. President:

The Lord bless you till we meet again!

Yours permanently,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
My dear Miss LeHand:

I understood Mr. Bullitt to say that the originals of the enclosed copies were already in your office. He asked me to send these to you for your files.

Yours very sincerely,

George A. Morlock

Enclosures: George A. Morlock,
Formerly secretary

to Mr. Bullitt.

2 copies of
2 letters.

Miss Marguerite LeHand,

Personal Secretary to the President,

The White House.
Dear Cordell:

The offer by the Moscow Soviet of the building site in the park which we discussed with Bullitt seems to me so favorable that we should be sure not to delay our acceptance of it. I understand that Bullitt had a further conversation with Troyanovsky on Saturday, and that Troyanovsky said that he hoped to have word from his Government on Monday that the lease could be renewed at the end of the ninety-nine-year period. If the Soviet Government refuses this extension, I think we should accept the ninety-nine-year lease and trust to the skill of our successors to retain the property if we should wish to retain it at the end of that period.

The Honorable

Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State.
I suggest that you should call a meeting of the Foreign Service Buildings Commission as soon as possible to consider the matter and that you should consult the Chairmen of the Congressional Committees on Appropriations and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate with a view to having an amendment to the present State Department appropriations Bill added in the Senate.

I understand that there is an unappropriated balance of $1,250,000 in the $10,000,000 authorized by the Foreign Service Buildings Act of May 7, 1926. A similar sum of $1,250,000 was appropriated, I believe for Tokyo and as much, I think, will be needed for Moscow, in view of the unusual problems there: e.g., hospitalization. I should not recommend the expenditure of such a sum at the present time if I were not convinced that it is
essential for our Government to construct in Moscow as soon as possible permanent offices and living quarters for our officials. The site which has been offered us seems to me to present an opportunity to do in the finest manner what necessity compels us to do. We can build an embassy on that hill in the city park overlooking the river which will be as simple and beautiful as Monticello and I myself should like to see a modern version of Monticello built there with subsidiary buildings patterned after those which fringe the lawn of the University of Virginia. I like the idea of planting Thomas Jefferson in Moscow. For this particular job I know no one as well fitted as Harrie T. Lindeberg of 2 West 47th Street, New York, and I hope that it will be found possible to employ him. I suggest that as soon as possible he should be requested to prepare preliminary sketches and draw up the
final project. I understand that there is an unspent balance in the Foreign Buildings Fund already appropriated which might be used for this purpose. It occurs to me that since there are no American contractors doing business in Moscow, as there were in Paris when the Government building there was constructed, you might wish to have the Foreign Service Buildings Commission authorize you to manage the construction without regard to American statutes, which is permissible under the Act of May 7, 1926 (C.850 3.44 Stat. 404).

Yours very sincerely,
Dear Cordell:

The offer by the Moscow Soviet of the building site in the park which we discussed with Bullitt seems to me so favorable that we should be sure not to delay our acceptance of it. I understand that Bullitt had a further conversation with Troyanovsky on Saturday, and that Troyanovsky said that he hoped to have word from his Government on Monday that the lease could be renewed at the end of the ninety-nine-year period. If the Soviet Government refuses this extension, I think we should accept the ninety-nine-year lease and trust to the skill of our successors to retain the property if we should wish to retain it at the end of that period.

The Honorable
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State.
May 15, 1934

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Before Bullitt's departure, I told him that I wished him to meet me in Hawaii on July 12th and asked him to visit Japan and China and study the political situation in those countries as well as the Soviet Union before embarking for Hawaii.

Will you please issue orders to Bullitt to meet me in Hawaii, proceeding via Japan and China by whatever route he may choose? He should also be instructed to return to his post by way of Vladivostok, with freedom to stop in Japan or China on his return journey if he should consider it advisable.

Yours very sincerely,

The Honorable
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
February 16, 1934

Confidential

My dear Miss LeHand:

I understood Mr. Bullitt to say that the originals of the enclosed copies were already in your office. He asked me to send these to you for your files.

Yours very sincerely,

George A. Morlock,
Formerly secretary to
Mr. Bullitt.

Enclosures:

2 copies of 2 letters

Miss Marguerite Lehand,
Personal Secretary to the President,
The White House
Yesterday, with Moore and myself present, Troyanovsky, who had sought the interview, talked with the President and was told that the negotiation should not be transferred to Washington but continued at Moscow, particularly in view of the fact that you and Litvinoff are thoroughly familiar with all that occurred here last fall, and the interview ended with that understanding.

During the conversation, Troyanovsky said that, if $75,000,000 dollars in payment of the debts is unsatisfactory, Litvinoff is prepared to increase the amount. On this point the President was very clear in showing the effect of the devaluation of the dollar on the minimum and maximum totals discussed last fall. Furthermore, the President stressed the fact as something he must always bear in mind that any debt agreement will be subject to the Senate approval. Troyanovsky submitted a memorandum analyzing the expenditure of the Kerensky loan.

There was some, but not definite or important, mention of interest rates and other details and it was explained to Troyanovsky that the matter of debts and the matter of contemplated credits are so linked together as to make it unreasonable for the Export Bank to engage in transactions in advance of a debt agreement satisfactory to the President.

There is really nothing concrete to say except that the President leaves the negotiation in your hands without having made any committal or statement conflicting in any way with what you have done or anticipating what you may attempt to do.
Various considerations which may influence Litvinoff, as, for instance, his apparent failure to obtain a loan from Sweden, and the present Japanese situation you, of course, fully appreciate.

We assume you will bring the negotiation to a climax as soon as possible and that, if Litvinoff remains obdurate, you will wish us to acquiesce in Troyanovsky's request that the negotiation be further carried on here.

President's longhand: The President could not well decline this request out of hand, but made it clear to Troyanovsky that this is a circuitous method because of every proposal made in Washington we should have to consult you and he would have to consult Litvinoff.
My dear Mr. President:

Since the beginning of my Administration, I have contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the hundred and sixty million people of Russia.

It is most regrettable that these great peoples, between whom a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century to their mutual advantage, should now be without a practical method of communicating directly with each other.

The difficulties that have created this anomalous situation are serious but not, in my opinion, insoluble; and difficulties between great nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations. If you are of similar mind, I should be glad to receive any representatives you may designate to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between our countries.

Participation in such a discussion would, of course, not commit either nation to any future course of action, but would indicate a sincere desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the problems involved. It is my hope that such conversations might result in good to the people of both our countries.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Mr. Mikhail Kalinin,
President of the All Union Central Executive Committee, Moscow.
Moscow,
October 17th, 1933.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your message of October tenth.

I have always considered most abnormal and regrettable a situation wherein, during the past sixteen years, two great republics—the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—have lacked the usual methods of communication and have been deprived of the benefits which such communication could give. I am glad to note that you also reached the same conclusion.

There is no doubt that difficulties, present or arising, between two countries, can be solved only when direct relations exist between them; and that, on the other hand, they have no chance for solution in the absence of such relations. I shall take the liberty further to express the opinion that the abnormal situation, to which you correctly refer in your message, has an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned, but also on the general international situation, increasing the element of disquiet, complicating the process of consolidating world peace and encouraging forces tending to disturb that peace.

In accordance with the above I gladly accept your proposal to send to the United States a representative of the Soviet Government to discuss with you the questions of interest to our countries. The Soviet Government will be represented by Mr. M. M. Litvinov,
PEOPLE's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, who will come to Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Mikhail Kalinin.

Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt

President of the United States of America,

Washington.
March 2, 1934.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
WARSAW

SECRET-CONFIDENTIAL

Please convey following message to Bullitt when passing through Warsaw, keeping no copy for Embassy's files.

Draft note regarding claims was handed to Troyanovsky February 20. Draft was same as that approved by you except to add after the words QUOTE together with interest in the manner hereinafter provided UNQUOTE the words QUOTE the payment to be completed within twenty years UNQUOTE. This addition was sanctioned by the President.

Troyanovsky is unwilling to carry through the discussion here and states that Litvinoff intends to discuss the note with you upon your arrival in Moscow. The Ambassador has commented on three points in the note. He thinks it is not clear as to what is included under the term QUOTE all credits UNQUOTE and considers that the last paragraph in which the Soviet Government QUOTE waives all demands and claims of every character by it or any of its nationals against the United States or any of its nationals UNQUOTE is too broad and not in harmony with the first
first paragraph of the note. Department believes that it will not be difficult to clear up these two matters, but you can obtain Litvinoff's views. Finally he expressed the opinion that the provision with respect to the payment of five per cent interest on the capital sum was not included in the gentlemen's agreement between the President and Litvinoff. With regard to this matter the President has stated that he feels that provision should be made for the payment of interest on the capital sum and that the rate should be at least as much as this Government pays for money it borrows.

For your information and guidance, the President feels very strongly that one hundred and fifty million dollars is the minimum which he can accept, especially in view of the fact that this sum in dollars of present gold content represents only ninety million dollars in dollars of gold content at the time of conversations with Litvinoff. While, of course, it is true that the foreign exchange rate of the dollar in November was approximately the same as that existing at the present time, it is also true that, if the gold content of the dollar had not been reduced, the foreign exchange rate of the dollar would certainly have strongly tended to move towards the previous gold parity.
parity of the dollar and consequently the Soviet Government would pay off its obligation, not on the basis of the foreign exchange rate current in November, but on the basis of a rate approximating the then gold parity of the dollar. While Troyanovsky has made no comment with respect to the fixation of QUOTE additional interest UNQUOTE at ten per cent of the stipulation of a time limit of twenty years for payment, it may be stated that the maintenance of these two provisions is considered of great importance.

With regard to the interest to be paid on the capital sum, in view of the fact that the Government of the United States is paying on its loans an average interest rate of three point three per cent, an effort should be made to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Government to a rate of at least four per cent. The Department of course will be glad to have any recommendations which you may desire to make with regard to this or any other points for submission to the President, and as you have often said it must be borne in mind that whatever agreement is made must receive the approval of Congress.

For your further information, Peek has accepted presidency of Export-Import Bank and at a meeting of board of trustees on February 27 at Peek's suggestion Stuart was charged with open-
ing negotiation with Amstrong with regard to placing of Soviet orders in the United States. He is already in contact with the Soviet Ambassador and Bogdanoff. It is contemplated that these discussions will continue parallel with negotiations concerning the debt settlement, so that when the latter are completed the Bank will be ready to start functioning. As you understand, the Bank will not start functioning, of course, until the question of claims has been definitely settled.
I have the honor to refer to the conversations

between the President of the United States and the Commis-
sar for Foreign Affairs of my Government with regard to

the question of the settlement of debts and claims, and
to subsequent discussions of that matter, and to inform

you that in full settlement of the indebtedness of

former Governments of Russia to the Government of the

United States and its nationals, and of all claims

of nationals of the United States against my Govern-

ment, arising prior to November 16, 1933, with the

exception of claims arising out of contracts for

services, goods, supplies or material, entered into

between my Government, or an Agent thereof, and American

nationals, my Government will pay to your Gov-

government, in currency of the United States, the sum of

One Hundred and Fifty Million Dollars ($150,000,000.00),

together with interest, in the manner hereinafter provided:

On all credits or loans to be extended after

the date hereof to my Government or any of its

agencies by your Government, its nationals, or any

agencies
agencies of either, my Government will pay, in addition to the charges or interest contracted for in each particular transaction, an additional sum hereinafter called "additional interest", namely, ten (10) per centum per annum of the respective amount upon which the contractual charge or interest is based, such additional interest to be paid at the same respective times that the contractual charge or interest is paid. Such additional interest shall be paid to the Export-Import Bank of Washington, D. C., or to any other agency or agencies your Government may designate, for the account of the United States Treasury, and applied first toward the interest on the above sum of One Hundred and Fifty Million Dollars ($150,000,000.00), and thereafter to the reduction of the principal thereof.

A credit or loan is deemed to be extended under the above provisions upon either the opening of an irrevocable credit or the granting of a loan.
My Government will submit to your Government from time to time, as it may be requested, a schedule of all credits or loans extended to it by nationals of your Government.

The said sum of One Hundred and Fifty Million Dollars ($150,000,000.00) shall bear interest at the rate of five (5) per centum per annum, commencing July 1, 1934, payable semiannually, on the first day of January and the first day of July of each succeeding year. Any interest remaining unpaid on these respective dates shall be added to the principal and shall thereafter bear interest at the same rate per annum.

The said sum of One Hundred and Fifty Million Dollars ($150,000,000.00) shall not include, but shall be in addition to, any assets that have been assigned or released to the United States.

My Government waives all demands and claims of every character by it or any of its nationals against the United States or any of its nationals.
Moscow, Easter Day, 1934.

My dear Mr. President:

I have not burdened you with letters because I know you get too many from ambassadors. But I wish so much that I could talk with you tonight that I am seizing the excuse of a couple of matters that cannot go into despatches to the Department in order to give myself the sensation that I am not utterly cut off from you.

First — a pardon, which would not only give me a deep personal satisfaction but also would greatly strengthen our position in Moscow.

George Andreytchine has been appointed by the Foreign Office to look out for all the wants of this Embassy. He saves our tempers and almost our lives two or three times a day. He is one of the loveliest

The President,

The White House.
loveliest human beings I have ever known - a sort of Jack Reed in Macedonian terms. Some day he should be the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. He has been a close friend of mine for years and his feeling for the United States is deep and genuine.

Andreytchine was born in 1894 in Macedonia. He came to America before the war and joined the I.W.W. In August 1918 Judge Landis, in Chicago, sentenced him to twenty years hard labor in Leavenworth for anti-war propaganda. He was the editor of a paper in the Bulgarian language called "Worker's Thought". He was not charged with any overt act.

Andreytchine was in Leavenworth from August 1918 to June 1919, when he was released on bail pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. In April 1921 his sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court. He jumped his bail and escaped to Russia.

In Moscow, Andreytchine served in the Foreign Office and at other government jobs. Trotsky was his intimate friend, and when Trotsky was exiled Andreytchine was imprisoned in Siberia. About two years ago he was released. Since then he has been acquiring gradually the position to which his brain and personality
personality entitle him. He is deeply anxious to be
pardoned, and I can think of no other act which would
cost us so little and win so much good will here for
you and for me.

Quite aside from any other considerations,
Andreytchine is a really fine human being. It is no
credit to our country that he was ever condemned. And
it is fantastic that the best friend the United States
has in the Soviet Union should be, according to our
laws, an escaped criminal! If you can pardon him, I
hope very deeply that you will. In any event will you
let me have a line about the matter and if you pardon
him let me have a cable so that I can break the news
to him? I want to see his face.

Second - Madame Litvinov is very anxious to have
their seventeen year old son visit America this summer.
If he should visit Troyanovsky, would you invite him to
lunch or dine at the White House - or better still,
could you drop me a line saying that if he should come
over you would be glad to have him overnight as your
guest? Litvinov would appreciate this more than a dozen
large concessions, and, as we do not intend to concede
anything to him officially, such an invitation might pull
a lot of chestnuts out of the fire for us.

Moscow
Moscow has turned out to be just as disagreeable as I anticipated. The honeymoon atmosphere had evaporated completely before I arrived. As Wiley says, "The Japanese have let us down badly." The Russians are convinced that Japan will not attack this spring or summer and, as they no longer feel that they need our immediate help, their underlying hostility to all capitalist countries now shows through the veneer of intimate friendship. We shall have to deal with them according to Claudel's formula of the donkey, the carrot, and the club.

In addition to the "misunderstanding" about the extra interest on credits, there have been similar "misunderstandings" about the property on which we expect to build our Embassy, the obtaining of paper roubles, the payment of consular fees in paper roubles, repairs to the Embassy residence, and apartments in the office building. The only effective way of dealing with this general attitude, I believe, is to maintain the friendliest possible personal relations with the Russians but to let them know clearly that if they are unwilling to move forward and take the carrot they will receive the club on the behind. For example, the next time I discuss the payment of debts and claims
claims with Litvinov, I shall allow him to derive the impression that if the Soviet Union does not wish to use the credits of the Import-Export Bank the Japanese Government will be eager to use the facilities of the Bank to finance large purchases from certain American heavy industries.

The bright spot in the murky sky is the Embassy staff. The men I selected in Washington have turned out to be both able and filled with the finest spirit. We have had to have secretaries of Embassy and clerks answering the front door bell and carrying furniture, and they have done so as a matter of course without complaint. I am delighted with every man on the staff.

But I am a bit homesick. It is a new sensation for me and it arises from a very happy thing. In many years I have not had the sensation that I had a home, but in this past year you and Mrs. Roosevelt and Miss Le Hand have made me feel that I was a member of the family, and the thing I miss so much is the afternoons and evenings with you in the White House. I am much too fond of you all.

Take good care of yourself. Good luck, and the Lord be with you!

Yours always,

[Signature]
May 9, 1934.

Dear Bill:—

Reginald Leaycraft, who sends me the enclosed, is a distant cousin of mine; was at school with me and is an awfully nice fellow. He is going to Russia on business but I do not know anything of the details or the merits of said business!

I get a lot of chuckles out of the scraps that you and Litvinov have. Keep up the good work!

As ever yours,

Hon. William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow.
May 14, 1934.

Dear Bill:--

I am heartbroken about the Hawaiian trip but a decision had to be made now on account of the cruiser and also in order to make other preparations.

I was ganged! Your dear old Far Eastern Division, plus the Assistant Secretaries, the Under-Secretary and the Secretary, felt that if you came I would have to have Grew and Johnson also, in order apparently to accord equal importance to Russia, Japan and China. That being decided by them, they felt that a gathering of this kind would be almost a Far Eastern Pacific conference and would create such a stir that there might be real discussion and speculation at a time when they want to avoid just that.

With much reluctance I yielded, though I am not in a happy frame of mind about it and still believe that you and I could have had our little party in Hawaii without bringing on a World War! However, there is one consolation - the foregoing of the Hawaiian trip gives you a much better excuse to run back here this fall.
After this wild-eyed Congress goes home I will be able to pay more attention to dispatches and you might also write me the real low-down on what happens at your parties with the Russian foreign office at 3 A.M.

We all miss you much. Take care of yourself.

As ever yours,

Hon. William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow.
Personal and

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a telegram from the Secretary of State informing me that you think it would be inadvisable for me to meet you in Hawaii.

I am deeply sorry that I shall not see you. I should like to hear the sound of your voice and be with you for a few days. I don't like being so far away from you.

I am sure also that I need to know your point of view on this Russian business, and I think it might be worth while for you to have a first hand report from me. I have a feeling that together we might be able to devise a method of settlement. I realize, however, that my chief regret is simply the human one that I shall not see you.

I shall, I think, have my little girl come to meet me by way of Leningrad -- not by way of the Far East.

The President,

The White House.
East -- and shall put her in school here and plan to remain here without vacation until you want to see me.

We are all still in good health and spirits but snowed under with work. Every detail of life for the entire staff has to be the subject of negotiations with the Foreign Office. Every detail with regard to the building of the new Embassy, also. I find that I keep going about fifteen or sixteen hours a day and make little progress.

The so-called debt negotiations at the moment are hopeless. The Soviet Union has taken an absolutely decided position and will, I believe, maintain that position for some time. Litvinov was so delighted by your invitation to his son, which I received just before his departure for Geneva, that he talked amicably and seemed ready for concessions; but when I called on Krestinsky to attempt to obtain the concessions I was met by a flat refusal even to discuss the matter on the basis of the Department's draft agreement.

The Foreign Office has promised me a reply within a couple of days in regard to our establishing a consolidated
consolidated Embassy and Consulate here. There is
one point which I hope you will keep in mind in case
this relatively minor matter should have to be
brought to your attention: If the Consul General
and/or any other Consul becomes a Secretary of
Embassy, it must be clearly understood that his posi-
tion is no different from that of any other Secretary
of Embassy; that he is under the orders of the
Ambassador exactly as other Secretaries, and that
one set of reports -- not separate Embassy and
consular reports -- go to the Department. Nothing
could be more disastrous than to have an Embassy
in which the Ambassador had control over only one-
half of his Secretaries. I believe that the estab-
lishment of a consolidated office is desirable but
only if that office has one boss.

No furniture for my house has yet arrived from
the Department so that I have had to give up all
idea of entertaining this spring. As the Department
has also been unable to deliver any wire screening,
we are, however, entertaining considerable numbers
of flies and mosquitoes. I thank God daily that I
picked the staff so carefully. The physical discom-
forts would make life hellish if all the men were not
such good pioneers.
Take good care of yourself and don't forget that in Moscow there is a fellow who is very fond of you.

Yours permanently,

[Signature]

William G. Bullitt
Moscow, June 14, 1934.

Dear Mr. President:

A courier has just brought your letters of May 9, 14, and 21. I am deeply grateful to you for your letter about the Hawaiian trip. I really miss seeing you and hearing the sound of your voice.

You may be sure that if there should be another 3 a.m. party in the Kremlin I will write you privately. I got word from the Kremlin a few days ago that Stalin had chided his intimates for not seeing more of me. They replied that the lack of such parties had been my fault and not theirs. They have all entertained me lavishly and as yet I have not been able to have one of them in the house. That sort of party requires at least one door that can be closed and kept closed, and I still have the privacy of the information clerk in the Grand Central Station.

Within two weeks, however, I expect to have the Chancery out of my house and the dozen boys who

The President,

The White House.
who are boarding here safely in the Mokhvaya building. Moreover, I hope to have a dining room table and some living room furniture. I shall then try to make up for lost time.

I will do everything I can, of course, to help your cousin Leavcraft.

Fair winds and a smooth sea to you both for your Hawaiian trip and thereafter.

Yours affectionately,

[Signature]
August 14, 1934

Dear Bill:

I am back again after a perfectly heavenly cruise. I wished that you were in Hawaii with us. It was too lovely.

I am a little late in telling you but I was glad that you and Lieutenant White landed right side up in the plane. That was a very close call. Your cable was a joy.

We are prepared to recommend you highly as a moving picture actor and, as far as I can tell, your Russian is perfect.

I am anxious to hear all that has happened. Do write.

We go to Hyde Park the twenty-fourth and I will be back here after Labor Day.

The construction of the new building is in process and working here is much like working in a boiler factory!

Are you coming back this fall? I have not had a chance to have any conversations on the Russian debt situation but expect to before I leave.

My best to you.

As ever,

Hon. William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow.
For President

Box of Apples
From William C. Bullitt Farm
Conway, Mass

Received Sept. 24, '34

Handed to
Mr. Nester
Dear Mr. President,

Can you grow as good apples as those in the Hudson Valley?

William G. Bullitt
Ambassador of the United States of America

Moscow
Moscow, September 8, 1934.

Dear Mr. President:

I was delighted to get your letter of August 14, and even more to get that cable. Thank God, I shall see you all again before Christmas.

I am sorry that the State Department was not able to get anywhere with Troyanovsky. I hoped that a discussion of specific trade deals might lead to a settlement.

The answer, I think, is that the Russians have had so much success lately that they are feeling exceedingly cocky. The harvest, which at one time looked catastrophic, was so revived by continuous rains that it will be good, and the Russians are convinced that if the Eastern Locarno should fail, France and Czecho-slovakia will at once enter an alliance with the Soviet Union. The Government, therefore, feels that its back will be protected by France from attacks by either Poland.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Poland or Germany in case Japan should decide to go after the maritime provinces.

Furthermore, the Government believes that Japan will not attack either this autumn or next spring and that by next summer the Red Army in the Far East will be so strong that Japan will not dare to attack.

The maintenance of really friendly and intimate relations with us, therefore, seems to the Russians much less important than it did when Litvinov was in Washington. If a Japanese attack should again seem likely, or if we should begin to develop any sort of a real understanding with Japan, it would not take the Soviet Government very long to discover that our demands with regard to debts and claims were most reasonable.

I cannot tell you how glad I shall be to see you.

This place is fun but I often wish I were with you in Washington. Good luck till we meet and a large embrace to the entire White House.

Yours permanently,

Bill.
Odessa, U. S. S. R., August 18, 1934.

Dear Mr. President:

I was absolutely delighted by that speech of yours in Wisconsin. It made me want more than ever to have a talk with you. Even at this distance I cannot keep my mind off the problem you are facing at home.

More power to your good right arm and good luck!

Yours affectionately,

[Signature]

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.
WHAT DO YOU THINK OF OUR LITTLE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA LOVE TO YOU ALL = BILL.
April 21, 1935.

Dear Bill Buddha:

The batch from Paris is grand. All the news makes me think that your old buddy Laval does not like your Vatican, as he has apparently postponed that weekend visit to Moscow. What a mess it all is! You, too, seem pessimistic and I think you are right, though one gets curious slants the other way.

Sir Stafford Cripps lunched with me - he evidently has some fairly close German connections - and he does not think Germany will be ready for five years and will, in the meantime, wiggle out of any actual war. Also he told me, with a straight face, that Hitler does not feel he can count on the German people to back him up in a war. I asked him if he was playing the role of a Haldane and he laughed it off.

I hope you are not being ostracized by the "information givers" at Moscow, though I gather that no European Capitol in the present confusion cares a continental damn what the United States thinks or does. They are very unwise in this attitude.

Things here are going better. I had a very successful cruise with Vincent.

We have offered Norway to Biddle and I think he will take it. Armour will go to Canada.
After all the howls and squawks the Social Security Bill passed the House with only thirty-three votes against it. Before I get through I shall get the Senate to adopt a decent cloture rule. Even Senators can become nationally unpopular!

It is Easter day -- pouring and raw. I suppose you are out sleighing in a samovar! Pin a rose on Lenin when you attend the May first celebration. He is a great man because dead!

As ever yours,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow.

P.S. I never worry about your health mentally but I do worry about you physically. Therefore, do take care of yourself. Why not try one of the French or Italian "cures" this summer? They are wonderful for sleep and for internal and external cleaning. Also, you would be nearer the war than in Moscow!
Personal and Confidential

Moscow, June 3, 1935.

Dear Mr. President:

Now that I have returned to the status which Queen Victoria used to refer to as that of a "common Duke", I think I ought to give you an account of my experiences during my elevation to the rank of your Special Representative.

To get to Pilsudski's funeral on time was not easy. I received the Secretary's telegram Thursday morning (May 16) and had to be in the church in Warsaw at nine on Friday morning and there were no regular trains or planes available. I got a plane and flew from Moscow to Minsk, noting with stupefaction the improvement in conditions throughout White Russia. The fields were extraordinarily well-planted and there were hundreds of new apple orchards beautifully tended, each tree with its

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington.
its trunk neatly whitewashed. Minsk, the traditional garbage heap of the Jewish pale, was clean and contained one enormous Government office building which would not have been out of place in Washington. The reports that my plane had a crash in Minsk were a pure invention. The flight was as easy and comfortable as could be. I then crossed the frontier by train and the Poles had waiting for me Pilsudski's private car which they hooked on to a train that got to Warsaw an hour before the ceremonies began.

The Polish Government was obviously delighted that you should have sent a Special Representative, (only Crosby, our Chargé d'Affaires seemed somewhat muffed), and went out of its way to place me at the top of the procession by using a pleasant twist of the French diplomatic alphabet. I was the representative of "Amerique, Etats-Unis de", and not "Etats-Unis de Amerique!" That put me for all the ceremonies next to Goering who, as representative of "Allemagne", had place No. 1.

Goering swept into the Warsaw cathedral late as if he were a German tenor playing Siegfried. He has the usual German tenor proportions. He is at least
least a yard across the bottom as the crow flies!
In an attempt to get his shoulders out as far as
his hips he wears two inches of padding extending
each one. It is useless. The shoulders just won't
go that far. He is nearly a yard from rear to um-
bilicus, and as he is not even as tall as I am and
encases himself in a glove-tight uniform, the effect
is novel. He must carry with him a personal beauty
attendant as his fingers, which are almost as thick
as they are short, carry long-pointed, carefully
enamelled nails and his pink complexion shows every
sign of daily attention. His eyes pop wildly as if
he were either suffering from a glandular derangement
or still taking cocaine. His lips are as thin as
those of an infant. When he was 250 pounds lighter
he must have been a blond beauty of the most un-
pleasant sort. He is really the most appalling re-
presentative of a nation that I have ever laid eyes
on. He made me feel that the Germans will achieve
nothing but a series of national disasters until they
cease to take the Niebelungenlied seriously.

Goering stole the show from the moment he entered
the cathedral, and it became not Pilsudski's funeral
but Goering's great first-act entrance. Throughout
the
the march from the cathedral to the aviation field -- three hours in a drizzling rain -- I walked behind the young Siegfried who struck poses everytime a camera appeared.

The crowds that lined the streets were impressive. They were absolutely silent and did not even stir. At the field the troops marched past the coffin to the beat of a drum. The silence was more impressive than any music. That night we took the train for Cracow and the next day the march was repeated, ending at the Wawel, the old hill castle of the Polish kings. The Catholic Church did itself proud by putting on a really beautiful service. It was rather long, however, and Goering went to sleep.

Afterward, President Mosciak held a reception for the representatives of the various nations and asked me to thank you personally for having sent a Special Representative for the occasion. The next day I had luncheon at the Potocki's with Petain. He and Laval had been treated throughout as if they were unwelcome cousins from the country and Laval was sore; but the old man was in great form. He is seventy-nine but after luncheon he kept a crowd of about thirty persons
persons in screams of laughter for a half hour
with an account of his attempts to avoid ice water
on his visit to the United States during prohibition.

As Vienna is only two and one-half hours by
plane from Cracow, I thought I might as well fly down
and consult a decent doctor and did so. My last
Cracow view was of a regiment turned out to do the
honors as I got into the plane.

The visit to Vienna was a colossal success.
Professor Luger spotted the difficulty immediately.
It appears that the streptococcus is now entirely
out of my body but that it took with it about one-half
the sugar in my blood. The result was that my blood
pressure when I reached Vienna was exactly one hundred,
that of a new-born babe. Hence the exhaustion.

It is difficult to believe, but four days of
sunlight and plenty of chocolate in Vienna raised my
blood pressure from 100 to 130 and I returned to
Warsaw feeling quite alive.

When I was in Vienna I saw Schuschnigg and
Bergner-Waldeck, the Foreign Minister, and scores of
Austrians whom I have known for years. Messersmith
arrived just before I did and I had a number of long
talks
talks with him. The most interesting conversation I had was with an old friend of mine who for some years has been one of the secret leaders of the Austrian Nazis. He confirmed everything which I gathered from our own representatives and all the Viennese with whom I talked.

No one in Austria really likes the present Government. Schuschnigg is a colorless, bloodless, young man who resembles a tight-lipped young priest in civilian clothing. He wears a gold cross hanging from one button hole and the old Greek sign for Jesus Christ in the other. On a small table just in front of his desk stands a large crucifix with a silver Christ and two candles. He is the representative of the Catholic Church and does nothing without consulting Cardinal Innitzer. That means that he will do nothing especially foolish but also that he can not catch the imagination of a nation in the twentieth century.

Bergner-Waldeck, the Foreign Minister, is an orderly bureaucrat who reminded me of Burian, the first Austrian Foreign Minister I ever saw at that desk.
desk in the Ballhaus.

In addition to the support of the Catholic Church the Government has the support of the Jews of Vienna, including the bankers who are scared to death of a Nazi Government. Moreover, the remnants of the Christian-Socialist Party which used to control all the farmers of the country gives a lukewarm support.

Stahreaberg doesn't like Schuschnigg much but is not inclined to clash with him immediately. Stahreaberg, it appears, has not been taking his politics too seriously lately and has been devoting his larger energies to a series of charming young ladies. Schuschnigg is frankly a monarchist. I asked him when he thought the Emperor would return and he replied that the matter had not yet come up in serious form, that it might be twenty years, that it might be in ten years, and it might be in one. Stahreaberg is not too anxious to have the Hapsburgs return. An old friend of mine told me that he had been talking with Stahreaberg on this subject a few days before my arrival and Stahreaberg had said, "Why should I or Austria want to have the nouveau riche Hapsburgs back again? My people were
were good enough to defend Austria for centuries before the Hapsburgs were ever heard of." The spirit of the Philadelphia Club is also international.

The financial situation in Austria has improved out of all reason and the general economic situation is improving. The Nazi boss whom I have known so well in the past that I feel able to vouch for the sincerity of the statement, stated that he did not anticipate any Nazi putsch this summer or for a "very long time thereafter." He said that all the public leaders of the Nazis were either in jail or beyond the frontiers, that all the Nazi centers had been smashed, that Hitler was sending few funds, only enough to keep together small nuclei, and that the Government at the moment had all the cannons and machine guns, the decisive factors. Temporarily, therefore, the Austrian structure seems secure although it would collapse at a moment's notice if any of the supporting beams should be withdrawn. If Mussolini withdraws his support, it will surely go. If Stauffenberg should get really angry with Schuschnigg there would, of course, be a collapse, but if the present planks in the structure hang together there is
is no chance of the Government being overthrown by a Nazi explosion. I was much surprised to reach this conclusion as all the news I had received here and in Warsaw had led me to believe that the position of the Austrian Government was threatened by internal Nazi explosion. Incidentally, Messer-smith holds the same opinion that I do and he is no fool.

When I returned to Warsaw I had lunch alone with Beck and his wife. The lady, who is a charmer, left us immediately after the meal and we had a good talk. From Beck and from many other persons in Poland I got the following bits of information: Before Pilsudski's death it had been arranged that as soon as the new constitution, which gives dictatorial powers to the President, should take effect, Mosciski, who is now President, should resign and be replaced by one of Pilsudski's chief assistants. Pilsudski had not indicated which one he would choose but the general opinion was that it would be General Rydz-Smigly, now Inspector General of the Polish Army. I was told on good authority that just before Pilsudski's funeral, Rydz-Smigly went to Mosciski and asked
asked him how soon he intended to resign and Mosciski replied that he would be glad to consider the question of his resignation at the end of his presidential term, to wit: in 1940. Mosciski is a savant and has some knowledge of economic matters but is a mild old gentleman -- about the last man that one should pick as a dictator. The question agitating everyone in Warsaw is whether Rydz-Smigly and the generals, Beck and the colonels, Prystor and the politicians, will attempt to overthrow Mosciski and start a battle royal for the dictatorship. My own guess is that nothing of the kind will happen for some time at least. The Poles are sincere patriots and unless Mosciski should collapse physically or make some big mistakes, I think that Beck, Rydz-Smigly, and the rest will be content to work under and through him. Beck assured me that this would happen and so did many others.

I am more convinced than ever that there is no secret agreement between Poland and Germany. The Polish Army is definitely anti-German and I can not find in Beck a trace of real pro-Germanism. His whole policy is based on the determination never to allow
allow the foot of a German or Russian soldier to be placed on Polish soil and never to permit airplanes of either power to fly over Polish territory. That is not pro-Germanism but plain common sense.

I said this to Litvinov when we travelled together from Warsaw to Moscow. (Incidentally, our late guest in Washington was most affable and invited me to join him in his private car for the trip, which I did.) Litvinov replied that while he agreed that there was no written agreement between Poland and Germany he believed that Beck's unwillingness to enter into a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union was based on the hope that within the next few years Japan would attack the Soviet Union and that Poland would then be able to annex sections of the Ukraine and also would participate in a joint German-Hungarian-Polish demolition of Czechoslovakia. That seems to me pure Bolshevik propaganda. As Litvinov and I were in the same car we talked for many hours about everything in heaven and earth and were finally reduced to playing a Russian card game, the central feature of which is a cork in the middle of the table which
one tries to slap before one's opponent.

Litvinov is a quick slapper.

I wish I could transfer myself to Washington by radio for an evening of talk with you. A volume of typewriting would be needed to cover all I have to tell you. And I would like to hear your voice again.

Good luck and every good wish.

Yours always,

Bill.
Moscow, June 1, 1935

Dear Mr. President —

The decisions of the Supreme Court will, I know, make your work harder, and I am sorry for the country and for you. I hope you know that if there is ever anything I can do to help, in any capacity however small or obscure, you have only to say a word.

Love to you and good luck.

Bill.
Personal and Confidential.

Moscow, July 15, 1935.

Dear Mr. President:

This letter should reach you before the issue raised by the impending congress of the Third International in Moscow becomes acute. As I cannot have a talk with you, I am going to bore you by writing you what I would say if I were with you in the White House.

I am engaged in attempting to keep the congress off the subject of the U. S. A. by exuding gloom and expressing my personal opinion that the congress may produce the severance of diplomatic relations. I think I shall be successful in reducing somewhat the activities of the congress with respect to the United States but have almost no hope that I can forestall violation, at least technical, of the last article of Litvinov's propaganda pledge to you.

Some

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.
Some people in Washington will doubtless want to break relations even if the violation is merely technical; but I can hear you roar with laughter over the idea of breaking relations on the basis of a mere technical violation of Litvinov's pledge. Indeed, if the Soviet Government should lean over backwards to avoid offending the United States, I suppose that you will wish to ignore the congress altogether. If the violation should be merely technical and if you should feel that we cannot ignore it, I think we should confine our action to an oral protest by me to Litvinov, a simultaneous withdrawal of the exequaturs of the Soviet Consuls in New York and San Francisco and a tightening of our liberal policy of giving visas to the United States to Soviet officials.

If we should take these steps the Soviet Government would retaliate by making the position of this Embassy as difficult as possible and might very well pretend that our reluctance to issue visas makes it impossible for the Soviet Government to carry out its intention to purchase thirty million dollars worth of goods in the United States year after year. And I shall probably get no sleep all night.
dollars worth of goods in the United States this year. And I shall probably get no news at all from Litvinov or any communist for some time.

If the violation should be not technical but gross and insulting, I suspect that you will feel obliged to break relations. If we should not, the Soviet Government would be convinced that it could break its pledges with impunity and would feel free to direct actively the American communist movement. The results of a break in relations, I think, would be, (1) Reduction of Soviet purchases in the United States; (2) A long period without relations, since, if we break on the ground that the Soviet Government has not kept its pledges, it will be most difficult later to say that we consider its pledges trustworthy; (3) The loss of an observation post in Moscow; (4) An increased chance that Japan will attack the Soviet Union; (5) A considerable decrease in the prestige of the Soviet Union and a weakening of its present ascending influence.

(Parenthetically, it occurs to me that if we break with the Soviet Union it would be a pleasant gesture
gesture to ask the Finns to take charge of our interests here. We could not trust any great power. The Finns have more influence than the Norwegians or the representatives of any other minor power. And they paid their debts.

If the violation should fall between the two extremes and be neither technical nor gross and insulting (and I think it will fall between the extremes) it will be most difficult to decide what to do.

Whatever we do, we should do promptly - instantaneously, if possible. I think we should avoid at all costs the usual practice of writing a large pontifical note of protest which the Soviet Government will answer by a larger, more pontifical and intensely insulting note. It will probably break the heart of Mr. Ralph Hill, the State Department's leading pundit, who loves to find technical violations and to set them forth in legal phraseology; but I think it is in our national interest that his heart, if necessary, should be broken. We shall get no satisfaction by the notes we write and shall merely become a target for...
for the sort of ripe tomatoes that the Bolsheviks throw with genius.

The internal political reaction in the United States to the Communist congress will also have to be considered. About that I shall know nothing.

If we want to do something short of breaking relations, I believe that our protest should be oral and should be accompanied by various actions. We might cancel the exequatur of the Soviet consuls in the United States, withdraw our Military Attaché in Moscow, indicate to the Soviet Government that the Soviet Military and Naval Attachés in Washington are no longer welcome, withdraw our Counselor of Embassy in Moscow, practically eliminate the issuing of visas to Soviet officials, and show extreme frigidity all along the line.

The gesture of cancelling consular exequatures would not be as empty as it might appear. It is the practice not only of the Soviet Government, but also the British Government and the governments of all European countries to run their illegal activities not through their Embassies but through their consulates and our Government could explain that, in view
view of the Soviet Government's disinclination to respect its pledges with regard to propaganda, we cannot have consular representatives of the Soviet Government at large in the United States.

I hope most heartily that all this may blow over and that our relations may continue. The Soviet Union is quite likely to become involved in war, both in the Far East and in Europe, during the next few years and it seems honestly desirable to have diplomatic representation here.

I apologize for this solemn screed. You will know exactly what to do without advice. In a few minutes I shall write Judge Moore the above solemnities.

Every possible good wish to you all.

Yours affectionately,

[Signature: William J. Bullitt]
August 14, 1935.

Dear Bill:

I wish I could have been acting as the butler when the eminent Justice lunched with you. I probably would have spilled the soup down his neck!

In regard to that other piece of news about the confidential matters going through the open mail from Riga through Germany, I will say nothing about it until you tell me whether you have taken it up with the State Department or not — for I do not want them to think that you are telling tales out of school! Let me know.

Since you wrote on August third, there is no violent news of your Congress so I take it I shall not have to send an ambulance for you.

My Congress is also less violent and I think that in time it will be wholly well again!

I am glad you are not here this week. I should probably pull the hair on the top of your head! Why don't you find out the Russian secret of becoming hirsute?

Many thanks for remembering that I am a stamp collector. There was no sign that your letter had been opened.

I miss you much.

As ever yours,

Hon. William C. Bullitt,
American Embassy,
Moscow.
Moscow, August 3, 1935.

Dear Mr. President:

I wish I could be in the White House with you this evening to talk about the Congress of the Communist International and several thousand other subjects.

The emotions of the Congress in deciding to cooperate with the Socialists and bourgeois Democrats in a fight against Fascism are, of course, on all fours with the emotions of the tiger when he went out for that historic ride with the young lady of Niger. The Communists feel sure they will come back from the ride with the Socialists and Democrats inside.

As I have no knowledge of the reaction of American public opinion or your own feelings, and as I wrote you solemnly on July 15, 1935, I shall await a word from you before again bursting into song.

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington.
I shall not, however, spare you two strange bits of news. Justice Van Devanter lunched with me a few days ago. We had a delightful conversation in the course of which, although he was careful not to tell tales out of school, he indicated apropos of the T. V. A. that, while he considered it constitutional for the Government to sell electricity which might be generated from dams erected to improve navigation, he considered it unconstitutional for the Federal Government to sell electricity generated by a dam built for the specific purpose of generating and selling electricity.

I asked him if he did not feel that the present line of the Supreme Court would prevent the Federal Government from exercising adequate control over internal affairs and leave the great banks of New York the only forces able to exercise power on a nation-wide scale. He replied that that would be true if it were not for the power of the Government over taxation and finance. He said that he felt
felt the Government could constitutionally do all the controlling necessary under the same constitutional powers which had enabled it to set up the old system of national banks.

Personally, I don't see much sense in this remark; but you may, and I pass this along to you briefly merely as an interesting indication of the thoughts which may be flowering among those nine sweet old gentlemen.

Aside from his ideas, Van Devanter is entirely charming.

The other bit of news which will, I think, raise your hair as high as it raised what remains of mine, was the discovery of the fact that our confidential despatches, letters, and even most secret cipher tables of our confidential codes are being sent to Riga by a pouch that goes calmly through the open mail via Nazi Germany!

The duplication of seals has certainly not become a lost art in Germany since the World War and I think we may assume safely that the Germans now have all our confidential codes except the special one I have in Moscow.

You
You will remember that I spoke to you some months ago about the Department's habit of sending cipher tables in the open mail and that we tried then to have the practise stopped.

However, the administration of the Department of State has been for so many years in the hands of people who are without knowledge of the world or comprehension of human guile that I feel that it will be impossible to handle secret matters in a secret way until you decide that a 1935 Foreign Service is just as essential as a 1935 fleet and ordain a full reorganization and reconstruction, on the solid ground that a Merrimac-Monitor Department and Foreign Service, in 1935, is dangerous. It is.

Incidentally, if the Bolsheviks should become so violent before this Congress is over that you decide to break relations, please let me have a personal and strictly confidential intimation well in advance so that I can send out of the country by courier our code books, confidential despatches, and telegrams before our Soviet friends grab them. They are entirely capable
capable of behaving like Bolsheviks.

God bless you and good luck, and apologies for putting so much unpleasantness in one letter.

Yours affectionately,

William P. Bullitt
Moscow, October 27, 1935.

Personal.

Dear Mr. President:

As I shall follow this letter in about a month I shall preserve news and words of wisdom for personal delivery. Anyhow, you don't seem to need either. I think your handling of the Abyssinian matter has been masterly and I like just as well everything else you've done.

I want to thank you, however, for your last letter and to let you know that I seem to be thoroughly out of the streptococcus woods. The couple of weeks I had in the sun at Ragusa and Capri made me feel wonderfully well. I suspect that the answer to the whole thing is that one should not attempt to recover from a streptococcus infection in an entirely sunless spot like Moscow.

On my way back to Moscow I talked with Breck Long, Messersmith, Dodd, and Cudahy. The latter is still crazy to go to Ireland. Don't forget him if the old sod opens again.

I hope you had as good a trip as I did. When I see you I shall tell you about a

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington.
a seafaring town named Ragusa, which was an independent republic for 1240 years. Do you, as an ancient mariner, know the derivation of the English word argosy? If not, I shall tell you that and much more on December 10.

The Lord be with you until I arrive.

Yours affectionately,

Bill
Dear Mr. President:

Roy Howard has just blown through Moscow like a healthy wind and I hope that when he calls on you in Washington you will tell him what a great little fellow he is.

Before he arrived I had arranged for him to interview Stalin and on the night of his arrival he was given a dinner by Doletsky, the head of TASS, at which a lot of prominent Bolsheviks were present. When he rose to reply to a toast he made a speech which was so perfect that it might have been made by yourself.

This is the first time within my knowledge that any prominent American has talked like an American to the Bolsheviks. The usual run of business men who come here think that they will get somewhere by licking the Bolshevik boots. Howard, on the contrary, told the Bolsheviks that while there had been no country in the world that had regarded their experiment with more sympathy than the United States, they could not expect our friendship so long as they continued to interfere in our internal affairs. He did it politely and beautifully and it would have done you good to have seen the shocked expressions on the faces of the more fanatical Bolsheviks -- like Radek and that filthy little squirt, Umansky, who is about to go to America to replace Skvirksky.

In

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington.
In the course of Howard's conversation with Stalin, which lasted three and one-half hours, he told the Dictator that he was certain, as a newspaper man, that any repetition of Soviet interference in American internal affairs would produce a break in diplomatic relations. Umansky was interpreting and Howard said that when Umansky had to translate that remark his face looked "like a spanked baby's butt."

Howard is really a great fellow and it pleased me immensely to discover that his support of you was based on real friendship.

Incidentally, Howard would make a startling but superb Ambassador of the United States to Great Britain. The King, at least, would love him. You will recall the King's thrice repeated remark to me (apropos of Atherton) about his wish to see America represented in London by Americans, not imitation Englishmen.

The chief excitement of the week in Moscow, however, was not provided by Howard but by the Tokyo assassins. As I cabled the Department, the Bolsheviks were at first extremely apprehensive, fearing that General Mazaki was about to achieve control of the government and that a vigorous advance into Outer Mongolia would follow his appointment. As soon as the Bolsheviks discovered that Prince Saionji had advised the Emperor to treat the mutineers with the greatest severity possible and that it was improbable that the government would fall into the hands of the extreme militarists, they calmed down and began to feel that the mutiny had been a very good thing for the Soviet Union. Their belief now is that the mutineers destroyed whatever respect might still exist in foreign countries for the Japanese Government, made Japan ridiculous by killing Okada's brother-in-law instead of Okada, and created such a condition of internal tension in Japan that it would not be possible for Japan to follow any strong policy for some time.
I felt sure that Stalin's readiness to receive Howard was not due primarily to any love for my beautiful eyes or his desire to improve relations with the United States, but because he wished to make an announcement about Outer Mongolia. I told Howard that before he saw Stalin and Howard asked the appropriate question. Stalin came out with the blunt announcement that the Soviet Union would fight if the Japanese should invade Outer Mongolia.

The Bolshevists at the moment are extremely confident about their position in the world. Their most recent information from Paris indicates that the Franco-Soviet Pact will be ratified by the French Senate. The Soviet-Czech Pact which, as you know, does not come into effect until the Franco-Soviet Pact has been ratified will then exist also; and they expect confidently that a Soviet-Rumanian Pact will then be concluded.

I have got to the bottom of the delay in the conclusion of the Soviet-Rumanian Pact. There is no serious dispute; but both Titulescu and Litvinov are oriental bargainers of the Levantine-rug-vendor type and each one feels it is his duty to haggle until the customer leaves the shop. They understand each other perfectly, however, and each one knows that the rug is going to be sold.

The Bolshevists are still engaged in talking about the imminence of German aggression against the Soviet Union, and their present disposal of their military forces on the western frontier gives a clear indication of the line of German advance they fear. I have been informed most confidentially that they have now sixteen divisions in the Kiev-Odessa military district; that is to say, the Rumanian border; six in the White Russian district and only three in the Leningrad area.

There are, in addition, six divisions in the triangle, Moscow-Kiev-Kharkov, for support of the sixteen that are closer to the Rumanian border.
This distribution of forces indicates clearly that the Council of Peoples Commissars is of the opinion that if German attack is to be expected it is to be expected by way of the line Czecho-slovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

I can not find anyone in Moscow who believes any longer that the Germans may try to march on the Soviet Union by way of Lithuania and Latvia although Stalin made a remark about attack via the Baltic States to Howard. In that region the railroad communications would be so poor and the front so narrow that it would be impossible for the Germans to maneuver any great force. In order to deploy, it would be necessary for the Germans to follow the classic route of invasion via Vilna. As Vilna is in the hands of the Poles and as Pilsudski had the political cleverness to have his heart buried there, it is almost impossible for the Poles to let the Germans through by that route.

German communications to Rumania via Czecho-slovakia, even if Austria were included, would be so inadequate that it would be most difficult for them to maintain a big army on the Rumanian frontier of Russia unless they had permission of the Poles to use the main line which runs from Breslau through Cracow and Lemberg.

It is, therefore, clear that unless the Germans have the cooperation of the Poles they can not make an attack on the Soviet Union with any hopes of success. I am absolutely convinced that the Poles today will not permit the Germans to send an army through Poland. This Polish attitude might conceivably change if the Germans should be able to annex Austria and overwhelm Czecho-slovakia, but I believe that even in that case the Poles would refuse to allow the foot of a German soldier to be placed on Polish soil. They would be damned fools if they did allow that and they are no longer such idiots as they were in the 18th century.
The Bolsheviks will continue to emit loud cries about the Japanese and German militarists but in reality they will have little to fear unless some incident changes the international situation.

As I said to you in Washington, we are, in my opinion, back where we were before 1914 when the familiar and true remark was, "Peace is at the mercy of an incident." The recent Japanese incident might have touched off war. It appears, on the contrary, to have strengthened the possibility of peace; but a new incident in Europe or Asia can loose the whirlwind.

I was delighted by your proposal for an Inter-American Conference. There is constructive work to be done in the Americas but there is little that we can do in the rest of the world except get ourselves mixed up in a hopeless mess.

Before you get this letter I hope I shall have received that wire from you. In any event, the Lord be with you and good luck.

Yours affectionately,

Bill
April 21, 1936.

Dear Bill:

Your cables have been very amusing. I know how anxious you are to have some definite work and I hope to Heaven you will have it by the middle of May. You know, without my telling you, that these things move very slowly and this particular bit of work involves several changes. I can tell you this, however, that when the change is made you will pack up your furniture, the dog and the servants -- where you will deposit them, we will have to tell you later.

As you may know, Louis Howe died on Saturday night and the funeral services are held this afternoon. While we all feel a sense of great personal loss, we know that for him it must be a blessed release.

As ever yours,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,  
American Embassy,  
Moscow.