Photos of expedition of
Lt. Colonel H.B. Hopkins A.V.S.

to Saudi Arabia
August 1943
(explanations on back of each photo)

25 4x5 glass plate prints
Filed in Photo File
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the confidential nature of Colonel Hoskins' recent mission to see the King in Saudi Arabia, he was asked on completion of his mission to return to Washington and to deliver his report to you in person. As a result of following this procedure, his mission was accomplished with a minimum of publicity or leakage, and at the same time a more complete picture of the situation in Saudi Arabia was obtained.

You will recall that on June 29 when the British Foreign Office was informed of the purpose of Colonel Hoskins' mission to Saudi Arabia they asked specifically that they be "fully informed of the tenor and outcome" of his mission. As yet we have given them no information.

I believe that the most satisfactory procedure for informing the British will be for Colonel Hoskins to proceed to London and to give to Mr. Churchill and to the Foreign Office at first-hand the results of his mission. Also, while he is there, he can see Dr. Weizmann and inform him of King Ibn Saud's answer.

May I have your approval to this procedure?

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
My dear Mr. President:

Our Minister at Cairo reports a conversation with Shaikh Youssef Yassin, who as the representative of King Ibn Saud has arrived in Cairo for conversations with the Egyptian Prime Minister on Arab union.

According to the Shaikh, Ibn Saud has certain reservations and suspicions regarding the present activities looking to Arab union, but does not wish to be obstructive. The King feels, therefore, that he might show a favorable attitude towards eventual economic and cultural union among Arab states but withhold, for the present, approval of furthering the political aspects of such union.

Before taking a position, the King desires to know whether the American Government approves of his attitude and also what our attitude is on the general question of Arab union. Mr. Kirk requests instructions.

Shaikh Youssef

The President,

The White House.
Shaikh Youssef made similar inquiries at the British Embassy at Cairo where he was referred to the Eden statement of 1941, to the effect that the British would support any scheme for unity on which the Arabs could agree.

There is attached a draft telegram to our Legation at Cairo for your approval, if you concur, which gives our approach to the question of Arab union based upon this Government's general policy in the Near East. Our attitude is consistent with the Eden declaration, and the note of caution which the proposed message strikes is in harmony with King Ibn Saud's own reservations.

Faithfully yours,

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram
To Cairo.
AMERICAN LEGATION.

CAIRO.

You may say to Shaikh Yousef Yassin, with reference to your 1859, October 13, 9 a.m. and 1857, October 14, 4 p.m., that although we have not issued any statement equivalent to the Eden statement on Arab union, our general attitude toward the nations of the Near East is well known and has undergone no recent change. That attitude is, in brief, that we desire to see the independent Near Eastern countries retain their liberties and strengthen their economic and social condition. The aspirations of other Near Eastern countries for full independence have our complete sympathy. It naturally follows that if those peoples find it advantageous to unite of their own free will, we would view such a development with sympathy, always on the understanding that it takes place in accord with the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter and in line with the declarations of Secretary Hull, notably those of July 23, 1942 and September 12, 1943.

You may also say that while of course the countries
concerned will shape their own decision, it seems to us that the events and problems of the last few years have shown that the Near Eastern countries need a great deal more strength in the economic, social and cultural domains and that first steps toward unity might well have these ends primarily in view.

The foregoing is for Shaikh Youssef's background information only.

Repeat to Jidda.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Rifles to be Supplied to Saudi Arabia.

In accordance with your request I have assembled the facts on this matter:

1. The British and American military authorities agreed, on December 2, 1943, that certain reconnaissance cars, machine guns, rifles and miscellaneous equipment and stores be supplied to the government of Saudi Arabia, 50% by the U. S. and 50% by the U.K.

2. Preliminary steps have been taken to supply some of these military goods out of stocks in the Middle East in accordance with the above agreement, but deliveries have not yet begun and are in suspense.

3. The agreed deliveries include about 10,000 rifles.

4. The British propose that 50% of these rifles be of British caliber, but the U. S. military authorities object.

5. The U.S. War Department has arranged for the manufacture within the United States, during 1944, of about 150,000 military rifles of British caliber. These arrangements were made as a result of very strong representations from the British as to the urgent need of the British forces for these rifles. The U. S. military authorities question whether the U. K. military needs can have been correctly stated if the U. K. is able to provide rifles to Saudi Arabia.

6. The U. S. military authorities further recommend that the Munitions Assignment Board adopt a general policy that the U. K. be required to obtain the consent of the U. S. to the disposal of all equipment of U. S. origin which is surplus to the military requirements of the U. K. and also all equipment of U. K. origin to the extent that the U. S. has furnished the U. K. with the same or similar items.

7. I understand that on February 8 Mr. Stettinius expressed his readiness to join the U. S. Army authorities in opposing the transfer of rifles of British caliber and in proposing this general policy as to consent.

8. The Munitions Assignment Board on February 9, 1944 deferred consideration of these recommendations for one week.

[Signature]
Llewellyn Currie
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I saw Henry Morgenthau last night and we discussed what you had said about Ibn Sa'ud still insisting that he had been offered a bribe.

We both agreed that it would be well to hand you the attached copy of a letter which Dr. Weizmann sent to Sumner Welles last December, explaining this whole situation and giving the facts as he knows them.

The letter was sent to Mr. Welles with the idea that he show it to you but I do not know whether he did.

There is also attached excerpts from a statement sent to Dr. Weizmann by Mr. St. John Philby, who seems to have been the principal actor in the transaction.

S. I. R.
It was with deep regret that I learned of your leaving the Department of State. I hope you will forgive me for troubling you, even now, with a matter discussed between us while you were in office; for I should like it to be brought to the attention of the President, and if you are willing to do me this great service, I feel that no one is as well acquainted with the subject as you are yourself.

2. You will doubtless remember that during my conversations with you I mentioned a scheme for a Jewish-Arab agreement, originally put to me by Mr. St. John Philby, the well-known Arabian traveller and scholar, who is a personal friend of King Ibn Sa'ud. This I briefly repeated to the President when I had the honour of seeing him. May I remind you of its main outline? The Arabs should relinquish Palestine west of the Jordan to the Jews if, at that price, complete independence is secured to them in all other Arab lands in Asia. Mr. Philby envisaged considerable transfers of Arab population, and a compensation of £20,000,000 was to be paid to Ibn Sa'ud. When Mr. Philby first discussed this scheme with me in the autumn of 1939, in the presence of my colleague Mr. Namier, we replied that Jewry, though impoverished, will be able to meet the financial burden, of which part would have to take the form of Palestinian goods, or work on land to be developed for re-settlement of Arabs. But the political part of the programme could only be implemented by Great Britain and the United States.

3. In the talk with the President you suggested sending Colonel Hoskins to King Ibn Sa'ud. I felt reluctant to express my doubts, but, after careful consideration, I wrote to you deprecating the proposed choice because I know Colonel Hoskins to be in general out of sympathy with our cause. The position with regard to Ibn Sa'ud was extremely delicate. As you will see from the enclosed letter from Mr. Philby, he had put his scheme before Ibn Sa'ud on January 8th, 1940. Ibn Sa'ud replied that he would consider it, if it came to him as a firm offer, but that he would disavow Mr. Philby if this attitude was prematurely divulged. Clearly he feared opening himself to attack by rivals in the Arab world on account of a scheme which might never reach the stage of practical consideration.

4. After leaving America last June, I heard no more until the end of October, when Colonel Hoskins came to see me here three times in November. He told me that he had been to Arabia and had there heard for the first time about the Philby scheme.
scheme. He reported King Ibn Sa'ud as having spoken with great bitterness about me, declaring that I had sent Mr. Philby to him with the offer of a bribe, which was contrary to his honour, patriotism, and religion; and that he had turned Mr. Philby out, and would not receive him in Arabia again. Colonel Hoskins also reported Ibn Sa'ud as saying that the £20,000,000 was to be guaranteed by the United States. Colonel Hoskins further informed me that Ibn Sa'ud had sent a written statement to the President in which Mr. Philby is alluded to, but not named.

5. The assertion about the United States guarantee for the money compensation was obviously based on a misconception somewhere (see above, paragraph 2). I should be profoundly distressed if the President thought I had used his name in this connection, which was never the case. Further, I was astonished by what Colonel Hoskins reported Ibn Sa'ud to have said about Mr. Philby, as I knew that Mr. Philby had remained a guest of the King for quite half a year after having put his scheme before him. I was therefore relieved the next time I met Colonel Hoskins to discover that the report of Mr. Philby's disgrace had been merely Colonel Hoskins' own deduction: he said he could not imagine that the King would welcome back a man who had suggested so distasteful a scheme. Mr. Namier and I discussed the matter frankly with Mr. Philby, who has also seen Colonel Hoskins alone. Mr. Philby's view (as you will see from the enclosure) is that Colonel Hoskins' mission left matters much as they stood, and that if the original scheme was offered to Ibn Sa'ud on behalf of the President and Mr. Churchill, it would be accepted.

6. When I was in America you were good enough to discuss with me at length the Palestine question. I hope that you have not lost the interest in Palestinian affairs which gave me so much encouragement and pleasure. May I put my views before you once more in special connection with Mr. Philby's scheme? It is conceived on big lines, large enough to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of Arabs and Jews, and the strategic and economic interests of the United States and Britain. In my belief, none of the problems of the Middle East can be effectively settled piecemeal, but only by treating them as a connected whole. The world is deeply interested in solving the Jewish problem, the overwhelming majority of the Jews themselves desire a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, and expect its establishment to normalise the position of Jews in the Dispersion; the Arabs demand complete independence and freedom to achieve unity.

7. If the world supports the Jews in their demand for Palestine west of the Jordan, let the Arabs concede it as a quid pro quo for fulfilment of their claims everywhere else. Our heritage in Palestine was cut down to the bone when Transjordan was separated in 1922. What is left, is clearly a unit, and further partition of it would deprive the settlement of finality. If the whole of western Palestine is left to us, we plan to carry out a Jordan Development Scheme suggested to us by American experts. This would also benefit the Arab land on the western bank, and facilitate transfers of population. A scheme on such large lines would be greatly helped by the backing of an outstanding personality in the Arab world, such as Ibn Sa'ud. I therefore feel, in spite of Colonel Hoskins' adverse report, that, properly managed, Mr. Philby's scheme offers an approach which should not be abandoned without further exploration.

Yours very sincerely,

Signed........CH. WEIZMANN.
It was, I said, on January 8th, 1940 - a few days after my return to Arabia - that I communicated "the plan" to the King. There was nothing whatsoever to prevent him telling me then and there that it was an impossible and unacceptable proposition - in which case I should have informed Dr. Weizmann accordingly and dropped the whole thing. But the King did not tell me that. He told me, on the contrary, that some such arrangements might be possible in appropriate future circumstances, that he would keep the matter in mind, that he would give me a definite answer at the appropriate time, that meanwhile I should not breathe a word about the matter to anyone - least of all to any Arab - and finally, that if the proposals became the subject of public discussion with any suggestion of his approving them, he would have no hesitation whatsoever in denouncing me as having no authority to commit him in the matter. I was perfectly prepared to accept that position, and the King knew that I would communicate his answer to Dr. Weizmann. He did not forbid me to do so!

So far from being a persona non grata to the King owing to my connection with this business, I remained in Arabia until July 21st of that year (1940) - six and a half months after the fatal communication, and practically all the time as the King's guest at Riyadh or in his desert camp. Indeed, on June 1st His Majesty made me a gift of a newly-built house on the assumption and in the hope that I should live permanently in Arabia. Time dragged on with never a sign from the King, and on a certain occasion when Yusuf Yasin and I were alone together in the desert I ventured to broach the subject to him. As I expected he was hostile, but, so far as I know, he kept my confidence and I heard no more of the incident. Still later, under similar conditions of confidence, I told Bashir Sa'dawi the general outline of the plan, and found him unexpectedly favourable; but within the hour he had told the King of our conversation, and, when I walked into the audience-chamber that afternoon, the King summoned me to his side. Didn't I tell you, he said, not to talk to anyone about that matter? I made some very lame excuse, saying that I thought he must have forgotten all about it, and that there was no harm in talking about it as an academic proposition. Well, remember, he said; don't do it again! Meanwhile, the European situation was having a gloomy effect on Arabia, and I imagined that appropriate conditions for the discussion of Palestine affairs would be long in establishing themselves. In May I decided to press the King for an answer, but, as I anticipated, he put me off again - though without one single word of reproach.

It was entirely on my own initiative that I decided about the middle of June to leave Arabia for America. Communications with my family in England had been cut off by the closing of the Mediterranean; but, when I gave this as my reason for going to America, the King telegraphed to the
Arabian Minister in London to telegraph a weekly bulletin regarding my family. Nevertheless, I insisted on going despite the efforts of the King and the Amir Sa'ud to dissuade me on the ground that I might get into trouble owing to my habit of free speech. I answered that England was a democratic country cherishing the right of free speech at all times. In the end, unable to dissuade me, the King insisted on my recording in my diary that he himself had warned me not to leave Arabia lest I might get into trouble. On the very day of my departure the Crown Prince, who had come to the door to see me off, begged me to change my mind even at the last moment, and begged me to record in my diary that he too had tried to prevent me leaving Arabia.

I explained all this in detail to Colonel Hoskins in order to disabuse him of the impression that I was at any time, after making "the plan" known to Ibn Sa'ud, a persona non grata at his Court. As regards the future, I put it to Colonel Hoskins that the suggestion of my return to Arabia being unwelcome to the King was obviously susceptible of a very simple test. The very same suggestion had been officially made once before (in February 1941) and I had applied the test with the result that I had been categorically assured by the Arabian Minister in London not only that I would be welcome back in Arabia, but that he was ready at any time to give me the necessary visa for the purpose of returning thither. In view, however, of the withdrawal of Colonel Hoskins' original statement that the King would not permit my return, I did not think it necessary to take any specific action in the matter. I was, indeed, as I explained to Colonel Hoskins, completely satisfied with his explanation of the whole matter, and he readily accepted my suggestion that, as his remarks about the King's attitude to me had naturally shocked Dr. Weizmann, he should seek an opportunity of explaining the real position to them as he had done to me. With that, I brought the conversation back to "the plan". On his own showing, I said, he had known nothing of "the plan" until it had been mentioned to him by the King. It followed that he had not gone to the King with anything in the nature of a firm offer on the lines of "the plan" on behalf of the United States Government. A further statement, made by Colonel Hoskins to Dr. Weizmann (but not repeated to me) was that Colonel Hoskins started by asking the King whether he would see Dr. Weizmann; that the King replied that he would consider the matter, but some days elapsed without his returning to the subject. Concluding from this that the answer was negative, Colonel Hoskins asked him whether he would meet one of Dr. Weizmann's colleagues? It was then that the King is reported to have broken out against Dr. Weizmann and the Scheme. Colonel Hoskins was now aware, I went on, from what I had said, that the King had sworn me to complete secrecy and had warned me that he would, if necessary, denounce me. That was exactly what had happened, and the deduction I drew from the whole story was as follows:

The King, on hearing that he was to be visited officially by a confidential emissary of the American Government naturally assumed that the emissary was coming to communicate to him a firm offer on the lines of "the plan". The emissary came with no such offer, but merely with the suggestion that Ibn Sa'ud should meet Dr. Weizmann or some other Jewish leader, presumably for the purpose of further bargaining

/ over
over Palestine. The King, fully accustomed to the tortuous ways of diplomacy, had deliberately refrained both from giving a definite answer and from expressing his opinion of Dr. Weizmann. He may well have thought that a few days of silent incubation would produce the firm offer which he had a right to expect if "the plan" reflected the desire of the British and American Governments. But Colonel Hoskins had no firm offer to make him; and when some days later he merely asked for the King's reply to his original suggestion about seeing Dr. Weizmann, His Majesty, realising that "the plan" had obviously not won acceptance on the part of the two Governments concerned, allowed himself, as he occasionally does in moments of disappointment, the luxury of a fit of ill-temper at the expense of Dr. Weizmann, the Jews in general, and myself. It was exactly what I would have expected in the circumstances. King Ibn Sa'ud is getting very weary of the ways of Western diplomacy, and he perhaps rightly suspects that the strategic, economic and political interests of certain Great Powers debar them from making any really acceptable offer to the Arabs.

Nevertheless, as I made clear to Colonel Hoskins after our very full talk over the whole business, his account of his conversations with King Ibn Sa'ud had not in the least shaken my conviction - a conviction on which I was prepared to stake my whole reputation, which was all I had to stake since I had already sacrificed my career by my fight for Arab independence - that, had he gone out to Arabia with President Roosevelt's firm offer, made on behalf of the American and British Governments, on the lines of "the plan", that offer would have been accepted. I could only draw the rather disappointing conclusion that the British and American Governments are not prepared to make the relatively light sacrifices involved in "the plan" even to save the Jews from persecution, torture and death. If, however, I am wrong on this point the opportunity presents itself for putting the matter to the test. If the two Governments are really desirous of an arrangement on the lines of "the plan" and are prepared to make to Ibn Sa'ud a firm offer in that sense, I am convinced that the King will accept it - but it must be a firm offer on the lines of "the plan", to be accepted or rejected as it stands without modification or bargaining. I have only my own conviction to pit against the views of Colonel Hoskins, but no harm can come of putting the matter to the test. Either "the plan" is accepted, or the status quo remains intact without prejudice to anybody. For my part, I guarantee (for what my guarantee is worth) that the suggested firm offer will be accepted if made by any reasonably intelligent person of indisputable goodwill on behalf of the two Governments concerned.

H. St. J. Philby.
17.11.43.
AMLEGATION,

JIDDA.

You are authorized to reply to the Finance Minister in the following sense (your 57, February 27, 11 a.m.):

The President has read with interest the message from the King. You may state that the President was glad that the King communicated his views frankly to this Government and that the President considered this as a manifestation of the attachment and friendship existing between the United States and Saudi Arabia. You may further advise him that the President is in agreement with the views regarding the Palestine resolutions contained in the Department's telegram no. 408, to Cairo, the substance of which you have already conveyed to the King. You may also say that the President wishes to renew the assurances he has previously given to the King that it is the view of this Government that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.
Washington, Feb. 26, 1944 9 p.m.

It now appears unlikely that the Palestine Resolutions will be reported out of either the Senate or the House Committee (Department's 341, February 19, 5 p.m. and your 417, February 23, 6 p.m.). You may make discreet use of this information in any conversations you may have on this subject. In such conversations you should stress (Department's 318, February 16, 9 p.m.) the point that even if the Resolutions had been reported out and passed, such action would merely have represented the views of the members of the two Houses and would not have been binding upon the Executive.

In this general connection the Department is under the impression that few people in your territory, even educated and intelligent leaders, fully understand the structure and method of operation of the American form of government. You should take every opportunity to explain our system, particularly with regard to such matters as the Resolutions under discussion.

Repeat to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus and Jidda. A separate message is being sent to Baghdad.
March 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reply to King Ibn Saud Regarding Palestine.

I am attaching for your approval a telegram to our Legation at Jidda containing a message from you to King Ibn Saud in reply to his recent protest regarding the Palestine resolutions. There is also attached a copy of the Department's telegram no. 408 to Cairo which is mentioned in this message.

Enclosures:

1. Telegram to American Legation, Jidda.
2. Telegram no. 408, February 26, 1944, to American Legation at Cairo.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

April 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I forgot to take this up with you this morning. In the event that you approve these recommendations therein, do you not think that we should elevate the status of the diplomatic representative at Jidda, who is now only a Minister Resident?

O.K.
F.D.R.

CH
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 3, 1944

Subject: Extension of Increased Financial and Economic Assistance to Saudi Arabia.

It is believed necessary for this Government to extend additional financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia in order to safeguard adequately the American national interest in the great petroleum resources of that country.

During the past few years the Government of Saudi Arabia has relied principally upon British subsidies to meet its deficits arising from inadequate sources of revenue. Recently this Government has furnished limited quantities of Lend Lease durable goods and also silver for coins, which is to be repaid in kind five years after the war.

It has now been ascertained that the British Government proposes in 1944 to subsidize Saudi Arabia to the extent of nearly 12 million dollars for the purchase from British sources of such consumer goods as foodstuffs and textiles. This sum is approximately six times greater than the value of Lend Lease aid this Government contemplates extending during the current year.

Furthermore, it has just been reported that the British Minister in Jidda has persuaded King Ibn Saud to remove certain key Saudi Arabian officials known to be friendly to the United States and to agree to appoint a British economic adviser and possibly a British petroleum adviser as well.

If Saudi Arabia is permitted to lean too heavily upon the British, there is always the danger that the British will request a quid pro quo in oil. To obviate this danger, it is recommended that this Government share the subsidy on an overall equal basis with the British. In view of the immediate urgency of so doing, it is suggested that the American share of the subsidy take the initial form of Lend Lease aid and that the Foreign Economic Administration be authorized to provide whatever goods may be necessary. Subsequently Congressional approval might be sought for outright financial assistance. In connection with the extension of such assistance it is recommended also that a proposal be made to the Saudi Arabian Government to establish a central bank under purely American auspices, in as much as nothing has been heard of a proposal made by this Government to the British on February 17, 1944 for the establishment of such a bank under joint American and British auspices.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GEORGE SUMMERLIN.

Dear Sunny,

Will you please let me know where and when you think I learned to read and translate Arabic?

Please take pity on me and have this translated, and any similar Arabic letters that come in the future, before sending them to me.

F. D. R.

Letter in Arabic from King Ibn Saud.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Favorable Action by King Ibn Saud with Regard to Saudi Arabian Radio Station.

Word has just been received that King Ibn Saud has taken favorable action with regard to the Saudi Arabian radio station matter by ordering appropriate official written notice given to Cable and Wireless, Limited. For this reason it will not be necessary to send to the Prime Minister and King Ibn Saud the messages we discussed in the course of our recent conversation.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Saudi Arabia - Financial Assistance

When we talked together on the 23rd of December, I referred briefly to the attached memorandum outlining a program of seeking Congressional approval for direct financial aid to Saudi Arabia.

Lend-Lease aid will not be available for this purpose after this fiscal year. The attached memorandum gives reasons indicating why it is in our national interest to extend this assistance otherwise, Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly turn elsewhere with resulting grave long range effects on our position in that country. The War and Navy Departments agree as to its desirability. Estimates of the amount involved vary from a minimum of 28 million to a maximum of 57 million, for the five year period 1945 - 50.

We did not have the time to go into the matter thoroughly together but it was my understanding that you were favorably inclined towards the proposal. I enclose the memorandum from which we talked for your consideration and approval.

Enclosure:

Memorandum on Financial Aid for Saudi Arabia.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals for the Extension of Long Range Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia

In a memorandum from the Secretary of State dated April 3, 1944, which you approved, it was recommended that lend-lease funds be used for the extension of increased economic assistance to Saudi Arabia and that subsequently Congressional approval be sought for the provision of direct financial aid.

Largely because of wartime conditions, Saudi Arabia is experiencing budgetary deficits. These may be expected to continue for the next few years until oil royalties and a revival of normal trade provide sufficient sources of revenue to meet essential governmental expenditures. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia is dependent for survival upon help from abroad. If such help is not provided by this Government, undoubtedly it will be supplied by some other nation which might thus acquire a dominant position in that country inimical to the welfare of Saudi Arabia and to the national interest of the United States.

An American national interest, basically strategic in character, exists in Saudi Arabia for the following reasons:

1. A strong and independent Saudi Arabian Government in the Near East, where

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-41-72
two
By J. Schraube Date FEB 18 1972
two great world powers come in contact, is less likely to fall victim to war-breeding aggression than a weak and disintegrating state vulnerable to economic and political penetration.

2. The vast oil resources of Saudi Arabia, now in American hands under a concession held by American nationals, should be safeguarded and developed in order to supplement Western Hemisphere oil reserves as a source of world supply.

3. The military authorities urgently desire certain facilities in Saudi Arabia for the prosecution of the war, such as the right to construct military airfields and flight privileges for military aircraft en route to the Pacific war theater.

King Ibn Saud has indicated that he prefers to rely upon the United States for the assistance his country needs and that he would adopt a much more independent attitude toward third countries if he were assured that this Government will extend adequate aid on a long-range basis. This cannot be done through lend-lease (a) because the Foreign Economic Administration is unwilling to continue it beyond the present fiscal year; and (b) because there is no assurance in any case that lend-lease would be available on a long-range basis.

Your approval is requested of the following steps to be taken in order to enable this Government to extend adequate long-range assistance to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of affording protection to the American national interest in that country and of obtaining wartime facilities urgently needed there:

1. That
1. That the Congress be requested to appropriate funds for use in meeting the urgent financial requirements of Saudi Arabia to the extent deemed necessary by the Secretary of State;

2. That the Secretary of State inform the President of the Export-Import Bank that you desire the Bank to make a commitment in principle of its intention to extend, after the necessary study, development loans to finance long-range projects for the improvement of economic conditions and living standards in Saudi Arabia;

3. That the military authorities, after consultation with the Department of State, give immediate consideration to such projects as it may be advisable for them to undertake promptly in Saudi Arabia in order to provide interim assistance by means of such measures as the construction of airfields and related installations, the dispatch of training missions and equipment, and the construction of strategic roads, together with other facilities.

The Secretaries of War and the Navy concur in the foregoing proposals.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaufle Date ___FEB 18__1972
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ENTITLED "PROPOSALS FOR THE EXTENSION OF LONG RANGE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA."

It cannot be stated with certainty at this time the funds which will be needed to meet the urgent financial requirements of Saudi Arabia. It is estimated, however, that the budgetary deficits of the Saudi Arabian government will continue for approximately five years. If the war should continue for several years more and if the return of normal trading conditions should be delayed unduly, the maximum sum to meet these deficits is estimated at $57,000,000. Should the war end in the near future, and should more favorable economic conditions obtain, only about $28,000,000 will be needed. A reasonable expectation, however, is that the sum of $43,000,000 will suffice to meet these budgetary deficits over a five-year period until Saudi Arabia becomes financially self-sufficient.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Attitude of Ibn Saud Toward Arab Union and Palestine

I think that you will be particularly interested in these two telegrams from Jidda regarding King Ibn Saud's attitude toward Pan-Arab matters and the Palestine question.

We attach considerable importance to his action in signing the Protocol of Alliance between the Arab states drawn up at the recent Alexandria conference, first, because there was some question whether Saudi Arabia would sign the agreement at all, and, second, because in doing so the King has proposed certain amendments to make the Alliance more effective, with particular reference to Palestine.

Ibn Saud's statement that he regards himself as a champion of the Arabs of Palestine and would himself feel it an honor to die in battle in their cause is, of course, of the greatest significance.

Enclosures:
1. Telegram no. 8, January 4, 1 p.m., from Jidda.
2. Telegram no. 9, January 5, 4 p.m., from Jidda.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO

The President,
The White House.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

8, January 4, 1 p.m.

King Abdul Aziz has informed Abdul Rahman Azzam, Egyptian Minister of State in charge of Arab relations:

(one) that Saudi Arabia will support the Pan-Arab protocol.

(two) that he proposes certain basic amendments to make unity of action more effective against foreign infringement of Arab independence and to strengthen Arab solidarity.

These basic amendments not disclosed will be further discussed at royal meeting with King Farouk.

Repeated Cairo Jerusalem Beirut and Baghdad.

EDDY

WMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Jidda
Dated January 5, 1945
Rec'd 3:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

9, January 5, 4 p.m.

Abdel Rahman Azzam informs me (RELEGS 8, January 4, 1 p.m.) that in signing pan-Arab protocol King Abdul Aziz al Saud urges (one) military alliance to protect Arab states against aggression and (two) joint commitment to defend Arab Palestine against Zionism, by force if necessary. King stated he would be honored to die on battlefield himself, a champion of Palestine Arabs.

With Axis radio propaganda grossly exaggerating US official support of Zionism I submit that any pro-Zionist move by US Government would be most unfortunate.

Details by airgram A-3, January 5, 9 a.m.

Sent Department; repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut and Baghdad.

EDDY

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

78, February 28, noon
Re: Department's 53, February 26, 1 p.m.
Informed this hour by Foreign Ministry that King Abdul Aziz has changed original decision notified to British Minister and will (repeat will) declare war tomorrow March one Germany and Japan and adhere to United Nations declaration.

EDDY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM
MB-414
Dated February 28, 1945
Rec'd 7:42 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

78, February 28, noon
Re: Department's 53, February 26, 1 p.m.
Informed this hour by Foreign Ministry that King Abdul Aziz has changed original decision notified to British Minister and will (repeat will) declare war tomorrow March one Germany and Japan and adhere to United Nations declaration.

EDDY
Secretary of State,

Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

79, February 28, 2 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KING ABDUL AZIZ
(RELEG 78, February 28, noon)

"Since the beginning of the World War we have been inclined to the cause of justice defended by the Allies. We have already taken our stand against the Axis Governments in several events, chiefly in their aggression and others which are well known to the Axis and the Allies. We have decided that it is for the good of our country that we should be in a state of war with both Germany and Japan from March 1, 1945. I have decided to adhere to the Allies in this war. We exclude from this declaration the zone of the Holy Shrines. Because of their sanctuary we should preserve complete neutrality for them. Thus they will not engage in war or will war be declared on them. They are the zone of safety and peace for all
-2-#79, February 28, 2 p.m., from Jidda

for all those who live therein, and all those Muslims who come to them. Thus I ask God to direct our steps to righteousness and to grant us to ever act in behalf of Islam and Muslims. Abdul Aziz."

EDDY

RB
RETURNED FOR THE WHITE HOUSE FILES.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

See message no. 59 of March 1, to Jidda, copy attached.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Declaration of War by Saudi Arabia

I am enclosing a message to you from King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia stating that his country is from March 1 in a state of war with Germany and Japan.

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 79 from Jidda, February 28, 1945.
MH-547
Dated February 28, 1945
Rec'd 2:53 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE
79, February 28, 2 p.m.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KING ABDUL AZIZ
(RELEG 78, February 28, noon)

"Since the beginning of the World War we have been inclined to the cause of justice defended by the Allies. We have already taken our stand against the Axis Governments in several events, chiefly in their aggression and others which are well known to the Axis and the Allies. We have decided that it is for the good of our country that we should be in a state of war with both Germany and Japan from March 1, 1945. I have decided to adhere to the Allies in this war. We exclude from this declaration the zone of the Holy Shrines. Because of their sanctu­ary we should preserve complete neutrality for them. Thus they will not engage in war or will war be declared on them. They are the zone of safety and peace for all

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 18 1972
By J. Schauble Date
-2-#79, February 28, 2 p.m., from Jidda

for all those who live therein, and all those Muslims who come to them. Thus I ask God to direct our steps to righteousness and to grant us to ever act in behalf of Islam and Muslims. Abdul Aziz."

EDDY

RB
U. S. URGENT
AMLEGATION
JIDDA
[59]

FOR KING ABDUL AZIZ FROM THE PRESIDENT. "I have received Your Majesty's telegram of February 28, 1945 stating that since the beginning of the war Saudi Arabia has been inclined to the cause of justice defended by the Allies; that Saudi Arabia has already taken its stand against the Axis Governments and has decided that it should be in a state of war with Germany and Japan from March 1, 1945.

"I appreciate that long ago Saudi Arabia made known its sympathy with the cause of the United Nations and has been contributing to our war effort. It is a source of genuine satisfaction to have Saudi Arabia now formally aligned with the United Nations in the struggle against the common enemies and in building for the peace of the future.

ROOSEVELT"

GREW
Acting

S/GC:CS:WJ

3/1/45

OK

FDR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Memorandum (Secret) to the President, 3-1-45
from Hon. Jos. C. Grew, Acting Sec. of State,
enclosing message to the President, 2-28-45
from King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia,
stating that his country is from March 1
in a state of war with Germany and Japan.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 10, 1945

Subject: Meeting between Ibn Saud and Churchill

I think you will wish to note the attached TOP SECRET despatch from Eddy at Jidda giving an account of a private conversation with King Ibn Saud on February 20, 1945, during which the King described his meeting with Prime Minister Churchill.

You will note that in the King's words Mr. Churchill began the conversation by "wielding the big stick," and urging the King, in return for British support during the past twenty years, to exert a moderating influence over the Arabs on the Palestine problem and to make a compromise with Zionism. Ibn Saud, however, declared that what Churchill was proposing was "an act of treachery to the Prophet" and the Moslem world and he could not compromise with Zionism, much less take any initiative. After the King had urged that support of Zionist aims would bring bloodshed and wide-spread disorder, Mr. Churchill "laid the big stick down" but refused to give the King any assurance that Jewish immigration into Palestine would cease.

Ibn Saud concluded the conversation by reminding Mr. Churchill that the British and their allies must choose between a free and peaceful Arab world and a struggle to the death between Arabs and Jews in the event of further "unreasonable" Jewish immigration.

Enclosure:

Copy of Despatch 74 dated February 22, 1945, from Jidda.
Subject: Conference between King Abdul Aziz and Prime Minister Churchill.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram No. 69, February 21, noon, and to report in greater detail the discussion of Zionism between the King and Mr. Churchill.

On the day of his return to Jidda, February 20, 1945 (see Legation's Despatch No. 73, February 21, 1945), the King asked me to return after lunch for private audience with him at which no one else was present, not even his body-guard. He said he wanted my government to know exactly what was said about Palestine during his conference with Mr. Churchill. The King's statement is closely paraphrased as follows:

"Mr. Churchill opened the subject confidently wielding the big stick. Great Britain had supported and subsidized me for twenty years, and had made possible the stability of my reign by fending off potential enemies on my frontiers. Since Britain had seen me through difficult days, she is entitled now to request my assistance in the problem of Palestine where a strong Arab leader can restrain fanatical Arab elements, insist on moderation in Arab councils, and effect a realistic compromise with Zionism. Both sides must be prepared to make concessions and he looks to me to help prepare the Arab concessions.

"I replied that, as he well knows, I have made no secret of my friendship and gratitude to Great Britain, a friend I have always been ready to help as I shall always help her and the Allies against their enemies. I told him, however, that what he proposes is not help to Britain or the Allies, but an act of treachery to the Prophet and all believing Muslims which would wipe out my honor and destroy my soul. I could not acquiesce in a compromise with Zionism, much less take any initiative. Furthermore, I pointed out that even in the preposterous event that I were willing to do so, it would not be a favor to Britain, since promotion..."
of Zionism from any quarter must indubitably bring bloodshed, widespread disorder in the Arab lands, with certainly no benefit to Britain or anyone else. By this time, Mr. Churchill had laid the big stick down.

"In turn I requested assurance that Jewish immigration to Palestine would be stopped. This Mr. Churchill refused to promise, though he assured me that he would oppose any plan of immigration which would drive the Arabs out of Palestine or deprive them of the means of livelihood there. I reminded him that the British and their Allies would be making their own choice between (1) a friendly and peaceful Arab world, and (2) a struggle to the death between Arab and Jew if unreasonable immigration of Jews to Palestine is renewed. In any case, the formula must be one arrived at by and with Arab consent."

Respectfully yours,
(signed)
William A. Eddy

To the Department in ozalid.

840.1
WAE:mmg
April 6, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has signed the draft of letter to the King of Saudi Arabia which you submitted with your memorandum of April second. The letter is herewith returned for forwarding to King Ibn Saud through our Minister to Saudi Arabia, as you suggest.

M. C. LATTA
Executive Clerk
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 2, 1945

Subject: Reply to Ibn Saud.

I send you herewith a suggested reply to the letter from King Ibn Saud, which you sent us on March 26, 1945.

If the attached reply meets with your approval, you may wish to send it back to us for forwarding to the King through our Minister to Saudi Arabia, Colonel Eddy.

Enclosures:
1. Letter to President from King Ibn Saud, dated March 10, 1945.
2. Suggested reply for the President's signature.
April 5, 1945

Great and Good Friend:

I have received the communication which Your Majesty sent me under date of March 10, 1945, in which you refer to the question of Palestine and to the continuing interest of the Arabs in current developments affecting that country.

I am gratified that Your Majesty took this occasion to bring your views on this question to my attention and I have given the most careful attention to the statements which you make in your letter. I am also mindful of the memorable conversation which we had not so long ago and in the course of which I had an opportunity to obtain so vivid an impression of Your Majesty's sentiments on this question.

Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.

It gives me pleasure to renew to Your Majesty the assurances which you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own, as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and to inform you that the policy of this Government in this respect is unchanged.
From Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal Al Saud to
His Excellency Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States
of America.

Your Excellency,

This is indeed a happy occasion for us to join with you in rejoicing at the triumph of those principles in defence of which war was declared and to remind those great personalities in whose hands, after God, the fate of world order rests, of a right which has existed unquestioned since the dawn of history. This right men now seek to destroy by injustice unparalleled and unequalled in history. Such is the right of the Arabs in Palestine which the spokesmen of Jewish Zionism wish to scorn and abolish by the use of various forms of lying propaganda, invented, concealed and employed by them throughout the world. They have acted unjustly and are making hostile preparations against the Arabs, some of which are known, although much remains undetected. They are preparing to create a form of Nazi-Fascism within sight and hearing of the democracies and in the midst of the Arab countries as well as in their very heart and in the heart of the East which has proved itself loyal to the Allied cause in these critical times.

All people have the natural right to live in their own homeland, a right guaranteed to them by natural law established by the principles of humanity which the Allies have proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter and on numerous other occasions. The Arabs have a natural right in Palestine which needs no explanation. We have on a separate occasion mentioned to Your Excellency as we have many times to the British Government that the Arabs have inhabited Palestine since the beginning of history and that they
have throughout the ages been its masters and enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority. We would now make a brief reference to Palestine's history, ancient and modern, up to the present day, to make it clear that Zionist claims in Palestine are not based on historical facts.

The earliest recorded history of Palestine begins in the year 3500 B.C., its first inhabitants being the Canaanites, an Arab tribe which emigrated from the Arab peninsula and had its first abode in the lowlands, hence the name Canaanites. In 2000 B.C. a section of the Jews under the leadership of the prophet Abraham emigrated from Iraq (Ur of the Chaldees), settled in Palestine and then immigrated because of famine into Egypt where they were delivered into bondage by the Pharaohs. The Jews remained scattered there until their delivery from exile by the prophet Moses, who brought them back to the land of Canaan by the south-eastern route, either in the time of Ramses II i.e. 1250 B.C., or his son Munfitah, 1225 B.C.

If we accept the text of the Bible we find that the conqueror of Palestine was Joshua the son of Nun who crossed with his army and captured the city of Jericho from the Canaanites with great cruelty and barbarity, witness his words to his army: "Burn ye all that is in the city and slay with the edge of the sword both man and woman, young and old, and ox and sheep, and burn the city with fire and all that is therein". Joshua Ch. 7 vs. 21-24. Thereafter the Jews split up into two kingdoms. One, the Kingdom of the Israelites with its capital Samaria (Nablus) lasted 250 years and then fell into the hands of Shalmaneser, King of the Assyrians, in the year 722 B.C., and was led into captivity. The other, the Kingdom of Judah, with its capital Jerusalem, lasted 130 years after the Kingdom of Israel had perished. It was later destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, who burned down the city and the
temple with fire, and led the people into captivity to Babylon in the year 580 B.C.

The captivity in Babylon lasted 70 years, and then the Jews returned to Palestine by order of Cyrus, King of the Persians. The Greek conquest followed in 332 B.C., under the command of Alexander the Macedonian, their rule continuing in Palestine for a period of 272 years. The Roman conquest took place next in the year 63 B.C. under the command of Pompey, their rule lasting in Palestine for 700 years. In the year 637 A.D. the Arabs occupied Palestine, and their rule lasted continuously for 880 years. The orders of the Caliph to the conqueror were "you shall not act treacherously, dishonestly, commit any excesses or mutilation, kill any child or old man, cut or burn down palms or fruit trees, kill any sheep, cow or camel, and shall leave alone those whom you find devoting themselves to worship in their cells". This was related by Ibn-al-Atheer, the famous historian.

Palestine then passed under the rule of the Turks in A.D. 1517, during the reign of Sultan Saleem the First, and their rule lasted for 400 years. The Arabs were the inhabitants and participated with the Turks in the government and administration of the country. It was then occupied by the British who are still there.

This history of Palestine, an Arab country, shows that the Arabs were its first inhabitants and that they dwelt there for a period of 3,500 years before Christ, and have remained there since Christ until the present day. They ruled it alone or with the Turks for a period of about 1,300 years, whereas the disjointed reign of the Jews did not exceed 350 confused and sporadic years. No Jewish rule has existed in Palestine since 332 B.C. nor until the British forces entered Palestine in 1918, i.e. for 2,200 years there have been few Jews there and they have had no influence. They numbered
not more than eighty thousand when the British entered Palestine, and lived comfortably, happily and prosperously in the country with the original inhabitants the Arabs. The Jews were merely aliens who had come to Palestine at intervals and had then been turned out over two thousand years ago.

The permanent rights of the Arabs in Palestine rest on the following:
1. The right to dwell there. This they have done since the year 3500 B.C. without ever leaving the country.
2. The natural right of life.
3. The existence therein of the holy land.
4. The Arabs are not aliens in Palestine, and there is no intention to bring any of them from other parts of the world to settle there.

The historical claim of the Jews is, however, a fallacy. As already mentioned their brief and sporadic rule gives them no right to claim that they own the country, for to occupy a country and then leave it entitles no nation to claim and demand ownership thereof. The history of the world is full of such examples.

The solution of the problem of the persecuted Jews in the world differs from the fictitious problem of Zionism. For to provide homes for the scattered Jews is something in which the whole world can co-operate, and here Palestine has borne more than its full share. But to bring these scattered people, put them in countries already occupied and do away with the original inhabitants is an act unparalleled in human history.

We state frankly and plainly that to help Zionism in Palestine not only means to endanger Palestine, but all neighbouring countries. The Zionists have given clear evidence of their intentions in Palestine and in all neighbouring countries. They have organised dangerous secret military formations. It would thus be a mistake to
say that this was the action of a group of their extremists and that it had met with the disapproval of their assemblies and committees. We declare that the actions of the Zionists inside and outside Palestine are based on a programme agreed upon and approved of by world Jewry. These people began their vile work by wronging the government that had treated them kindly and sheltered them, namely the British Government. Their assemblies declared war on Britain and organised dangerous military formations, which at present hold in Palestine all the arms and military equipment they require. Their members have carried out various attacks of which the most shocking was the attack on that outstanding figure, so kind and charitable towards all men and with the greatest sympathy for persecuted Jewry, Lord Moyne. The proof that all Jews aided and abetted their vile deed is to be seen in the demonstrations and efforts made by Jews everywhere, demanding a light sentence for the criminals in order to encourage others to do the same.

This, then, is the way they behave with the Government which has treated them so kindly. What would be the position if they were able to realise their objects and make Palestine entirely their own country, in which and near which they could do as they pleased.

If the matter were left to the Arabs and these aggressors it might perhaps be easy, but they are protected by the British Government, the friends of the Arabs. The Zionists did not respect the sanctity of this protection but plotted mischief, beginning first with Britain and threatening the Arabs after Britain with similar and more dangerous plots. Thus if the Allied governments, whose friendship the Arabs are aware of, wish to see the fires of war break out and blood shed between Arabs and Jews, their support of the Zionists will surely lead to this result. What we and the Arab countries fear from the Zionists are:

1. That they will carry out a series of massacres as between themselves
and the Arabs.

2. That the Zionists will be one of the main causes of dissension between the Arabs and the Allies. The latest proof of this is the case of the two Jews who killed Lord Moyne in Egypt. Had the Jews been able to hide the criminals, a dispute would have occurred between the British Government and Egypt.

3. That the ambitions of the Jews are not confined to Palestine alone. The preparations they have made show that they intend to take hostile action against neighbouring Arab countries.

4. Supposing that the Jews obtain their independence somewhere in Palestine. What is to prevent them from coming to an agreement with any power that may be hostile to the Allies and to the Arabs? As it is, they have begun taking hostile action against Britain while under her protection and mercy. Such factors should no doubt be taken into consideration in regard to the establishment of peace in the world when the problem of Palestine is discussed. Not only is the gathering of Jews in Palestine based on no historical argument nor on any natural right, and is in fact absolutely unjust, but it constitutes at the same time a danger to peace, to the Arabs and to the Middle East.

The crux of the matter is that the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine will be a deadly blow to the Arabs and a constant threat to peace, for disturbed conditions are bound to prevail between the Jews and the Arabs, and if the patience of the latter is one day exhausted and they despair of their future, they will be obliged to defend themselves and future generations against this aggression. No doubt the Allies, who are working to uphold peace and respect for men's rights, are aware of this. We have no doubt that they are dissatisfied with this uneasy situation which threatens peace in the Middle East.
We did not wish to bother Your Excellency or your Ministers with this matter during the present titanic struggle in which you are engaged. Confident that the Allies will treat the Arabs fairly, however, we would have preferred the Arabs to forbear until the end of the war had it not been for the provocative and offensive acts committed by the Zionists who, regardless of war conditions and the preoccupation of the Allies, seek to bring every form of pressure to bear on them to adopt a policy which is inconsistent with the principles of right and justice which the Allies have proclaimed. That is why we wished to explain the true rights of the Arabs in Palestine so as to refute the flimsy arguments of the Zionist party, counter their aggressive tactics, and set out the facts in order that the Allies may fully understand the rights of the Arabs in their country, the country of their fathers and forefathers. The Jews should not be permitted to exploit the forbearance of the Arabs or their desire to avoid any embarrassment to the Allies, to obtain concessions to which they are not entitled.

All we ask is that the Allies should fully realise the rights of the Arabs and for the present prevent the Jews going ahead in any new matter which may be considered a threat to the Arabs and to the future of every Arab nation, in order that they, the Arabs, may be assured of justice and equity in their lands.

With highest respects,