Hotel Miramar  
Saint-Jean-de-Luz, France, February 8, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I am not surprised that there is intense feeling in America on the Spanish war. The issue is most fundamental. As I have tried to make clear for two and a half years, the issue is clear-cut between fascism and democracy, between reaction of the blackest type and progress. I note with delight that the poll of Public Opinion shows 75 per cent of the people at home with the Democracy and that 40 per cent of the Catholics are with it. It is gratifying to note that the Americans retain their old unerring capacity to interpret a political situation. I have felt all along that the Spanish war has been the testing of the Democracies by the Totalitarian States to see how far they dare go. It is tragic that in this testing the British and French Governments

The President,

The White House.
Governments have been in the hands of such pronounced reactionaries as Chamberlain and Bonnet.

I have been to Perpignan and had an hour's talk with Sr. Del Vayo, the Minister of State, and have reported on the conversation to the Department. The loss of Catalonia is in no sense remarkable. During the fighting on the Ebro, when the Loyalists for weeks more than held their own and in fact carried on a successful offensive for many days, the Loyalists were over-matched four to one in artillery, planes and tanks. With only four to one they were a match for the enemy. That so shocked Franco, Hitler and Mussolini that the two latter determined to take no chances on the next offensive. So beginning November 1st and continuing through November, December and to mid-January, German and Italian ships crowded the rebel harbours, unloading machine guns, artillery in general, planes and tanks. This was known to the Spanish Government but it underestimated the amount. It will be noted by history that during this period it was known that this was going on. In truth, one of the most amazing things in the reports of proceedings in the Commons in all time, I fancy, is found in the report of one day when Mr. Chamberlain solemnly said that Mussolini and
3.

and Hitler were sending in no supplies now because those paragons of veracity had told him so. That same day Mr. Hudson of the Foreign Office, in charge of overseas trade, taken to task in the Commons about British trade, and reminded that no British commercial ships were seen in Franco waters while German ships crowded them, blithely, and perhaps a bit idiotically, replied that these German ships were not commercial at all, but that they were "taking in war material to General Franco". Really, you know, "too much is enough".

At any rate when this push on Barcelona began, the rebels and their foreign allies had a hundred machine guns to the Loyalists' one, twenty planes to one, sixty tanks to one. No human organization could compete under such conditions. That is the story of Barcelona. Of course, during these two and a half months extraordinary precautions were taken by Chamberlain and Bonnet to see that the constitutional Democratic Republic should not be permitted to buy a cartridge. Historians will record that too. It will not make the most glowing page in the history of Democracy.

There are powerful forces in England, the Churchills, Lloyd George, Lord Cecils, Edens, Coopers, who have fought this
this outrageous intervention of the European democracies in the interest of the Fascist offensive. In France there has been more indifference. That, more than anything, has amazed me. The spirit of 1789 is evidently dead.

But that brings me to a remarkable experience I had recently. Herriot, perhaps the strongest of the French just now, and not at all in sympathy with Bonnet's Bourse program and policies, communicated to me through a third party a desire to see me very secretly. He said he was going to his home in Lyon for the week-end, and that he would like for me, if possible, to drive through Lyon and call unostentatiously.

Nothing was said to indicate the reason but it was not hard to read between the lines. It was evident that he wished to convey something to you independent of the French Government and for that reason preferred not to do so through our Embassy in Paris. I had planned to make the drive. Then came the fall of Barcelona. I was then notified by the third party that Herriot was thrown off his stride by that event and would wait a while longer to note developments.

The Spanish Government will continue the fight in the central section. The French have acted generously in permitting the Catalanian army to cross the frontier, along with
with great hordes of civilians, women and children, in flight before the "army of liberation" and the "Christianizing influences" of the Nazis and the Moors. It saved many lives and the war material of the Loyalist army - saved the latter from Franco. So long as that great territory including Madrid is held and the legal Government functions and its army is in the field - 500,000 in the central zone - I am convinced we should stand pat. We are dealing with a weak sister of the Rome-Berlin Axis which, however, is just as offensive in its controlled press, as Rome or Berlin regarding the United States, yourself and Hull. This with translations of the articles has been sent from time to time to the Department. And we are dealing with one who has made a mockery of agreements, violated international law with ribald mirth, practiced piracy on the high seas, and slaughtered thousands of women and children by bombings and machine gunning from the air. We can afford to stand pat under existing conditions.

Russia? The League Commission was able to locate 235 of these. In the beginning there were about 600 at the utmost. Thus do the "Russian hordes" evaporate in the sun.

I saw Del Vayo about the pictures from the Prado in compliance with instructions from the Department. While these canvases had been "sent to Russia" as "everyone knows"
knows", it appears that they really were very carefully packed and protected in a fort near Figueras. The morning of the day I saw Del Vayo at night he had completed arrangements for these to be sent to Geneva under the auspices of the League to be kept there till the war is over. The "custodians of civilization" made several attempts to bomb the forty lorries, bearing them, from the air, but happily there was no hit.

Murphy sent me his statement before the Senate Committee. It pulverized his enemies. No one who knows Murphy could have doubted that he would.

Regards and all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Claude R. Bowen

American Ambassador
Mon., Aug. 16, 1939

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter to Miss X which I have already discussed with you. Please let me know which you finally determine.

Sincerely,

Ezra Taft Benson

Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Hotel Miramar
Saint-Jean-de-Luz, France, February 16, 1939.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In view of the feverish desire of England and France to curry favor with Franco with the war still on, with the constitutional Government established in the nation's capital which remains in its possession along with a large territory, and with 400,000 soldiers in the field, I was delighted to read in the press an alleged announcement from Washington that in accordance with our traditional policy no question of recognition would arise until Franco has conquered the entire country and shown his power to enforce peace; and that then there will have to be an understanding regarding indemnities to Americans and the intended policy toward us.

When Del Vayo confessed to me at Perpignan that on the

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
the day of the conversation the French Ambassador had had the impertinence to say to the legal Government of Spain that the French Government wished it to surrender, and when the British Government interested itself in the same way, I recognized the Munich pattern. Did not the French and British Ambassadors call on Benes and in the most impudent manner order the Czechs to surrender?

However, in view of the notorious character of the war in which the Fascist powers unite with men and war material on an enormous scale to destroy democracy and legality in Spain, I avail myself of the opportunity, as I consider it part of my official duty, to submit reasons why, in my opinion, we cannot, consistently with our traditions and principles, recognize Franco under the existing conditions, regardless of the attitude of the "Munich Powers".

(1) The legally elected Government of Spain still exists and functions.

(2) That Government is established in Madrid, the capital of the nation, which remains in possession of the forces of legality.

(3) A large section of the country is in possession of
of the legal Government and between 400,000 and 500,000 soldiers of that Government are in the field.

(4) So long as the Italian army and the thousands of German soldiers and technicians remain in Spain, and three-fourths or more of the planes, tanks and guns on which Franco is absolutely dependent remain, a recognition of Franco would be the bestowal of a blessing on aggression.

(5) The Franco press, completely under the domination of Franco who names the editors and dictates every line of the policy, has carried on a vicious and abusive campaign against the United States, its President, yourself and American institutions and ideals.

(6) The seriousness of these inspired and continued attacks, emanating beyond a doubt from Berlin and Rome, is in the fact that they were most aggressive and offensive during, just before, and just after, the Lima Congress, when they urged South American countries to oppose us, thus parroting the press of Berlin and Rome and matching them in scurrility.

(7) The Franco junta is encouraging and sponsoring the organization of South and Central Americans in Spain into a Fascist society having for its purpose, as the press proclaims, the aggressive urging of Fascist and Nazi doctrines and plans on South and Central America.
4.

(8) Franco has refused to forego reprisals and I predict that the wholesale killing of liberals, democrats, republicans will shock mankind when the facts emerge from behind the military censorship. We can afford to wait and see.

(9) For two years everyone of sound judgment from Franco Spain, including press correspondents, has predicted a bitter struggle in the end to determine which Franco faction shall gather the harvest of the victory. Of course, all these incompatible elements are antipathetic to democracy - equally so. The indications are for a struggle between the Falangists - supported by Hitler and Mussolini, - and the monarchists, nobility, great landowners and Carlists - supported by England and France. Whichever side wins, the people will lose their freedom. I suggest that we should adopt a waiting policy to see if Franco really can dominate. He has not been able recently to control his Italian allies who bombed the British warship at Minorca in defiance of Franco's orders.

(10) I have talked with many outstanding men from Franco's side and I gather from these that they are hoping for loans and financial assistance generally from the United States. We certainly do not need Spain as much as Spain needs
needs us, and they, not we, should be the suppliants in the matter of recognition.

It is quite possible that Mussolini's speech next Sunday may throw light on the early future of Spain. Whatever he may say, however, I submit that the ten reasons against following England in the matter of recognition at this juncture are sufficient. Some one nation among the Democracies must maintain its dignity and stand on principle and tradition. I have observed in the case of Franco, as everyone has observed in the case of Hitler and Mussolini, that obsequious attempts to curry favor arouse their contempt and increase the insolence of their demands. Both England and France are despised in Franco-Spain and never so much so as now. Important men in Franco's organization have said to me several times: "We are sorry your country cannot be actively with us, but you have been straight and honest, and have followed your traditional policies and principles and we can understand that." I am sure we shall follow that line to the end, for it seems to me the only line consistent with the dignity of a great nation.

Sincerely yours,

CLAUDE C. BOWERS
American Ambassador
NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)

From: PRESIDENT
X-MD

Released by: [Redacted]

23 FEBRUARY 1939

To: STATE DEPARTMENT

Tentative to

Routine to

Priority to

(DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE)

TEXT

I have no objection to sending for Bowers, but as soon as it
is known it will of course be obvious that he will not return to
Spain as Ambassador and when we recognize Franco. It seems to me
therefore that you should consider possibility of sending Bowers
to another post at the same time you announce his recall from Spain.

In this connection I think there need be no haste in recognition
of Franco Government. Without having any official statement made
I should not mind if it leaked out that we expect to recognize Franco
but are watching first to see whether he treats the Loyalists with
the Christian magnanimity that ought to be shown by the victors
in a long and destructive civil war. To persecute the losers will
take from Franco the good will of most people in the Western Hemis-
phere and this thought can, I think, be unofficially conveyed to
him and to the public Roosevelt.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our conversation on the telephone of yesterday, I have sent a telegram to the Chargé d'Affaires at St. Jean de Luz asking for any information he can give me with regard to the alleged statements made by some official of the Franco government concerning Puerto Rico. As soon as I have a reply I will send it to you.

With regard to the publications in the press of this country, I may say that on March 9 both the Herald Tribune and the New York Times carried stories from San Juan, Puerto Rico, based on an article in the English-Spanish weekly "Puerto Rican Herald", which asserted that Franco expects German and Italian aid in reconquering this former Spanish colony. That article was in turn based on information from "a Puerto Rican who was a resident of Madrid many years before the Spanish civil

The President,

The White House.
war", who said that the statement of aims of the Falange Espanola, the original Fascist supporters of Franco in Spain, expressed determination to reconquer Spain's lost possessions and rebuild the lost Empire.

The story as published in the American press would consequently appear to be based solely on an unfounded rumor, but if there is any more to the story our Chargé d'Affaires will undoubtedly send us the information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to the story that the Franco regime had indicated it desired to obtain the return to Spanish sovereignty of Puerto Rico, I am enclosing herewith a telegram from our Chargé d'Affaires in St. Jean de Luz which was sent in reply to an inquiry addressed to him.

My own belief is that the opinion expressed in the first paragraph is probably correct.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

No. 595, March 17, 5 p.m. from St. Jean de Luz.

The President,

The White House.
Secretary of State

Washington

595, March 17, 5 p.m.

Department's 491, March 14.

I am not of course in a position to obtain first hand information on this subject or to judge whether responsible authorities of the Franco regime entertain such ideas. Inquiries made thus far have not been productive, but have elicited the opinion that the report is probably of German origin and designed to embarrass us in Latin America (in retaliation for our alleged commercial aggression there against German interests) and also in Spain. None the less, I recall having heard while in government Spain several references to the new Spain to be erected by Franco in which the term "empire" was employed—but this may merely have been an allusion to the African and island possessions.

An examination of Nationalist news for the last two weeks has disclosed no reference to Puerto Rico and the only paper here which has carried the story, insofar as I am aware, is the PARIS HERALD TRIBUNE for March 11 which
HRE 2#595 From Madrid-St Jean de Luz—March 17,5 p.m.

which gave it a San Juan dateline and attributed it to the United Press as a pickup from local papers.

I shall continue investigation.

THURSTON

NPL: EMK
San Jean de Luz, May 25, 1939

Dear Mr President:

I have just told Bullitt that I will accept the mission to Chili. I am convinced that our most vital interests are in South America and I appreciate the opportunity to serve in that region.

During my six years in Spain I have had but one months home leave. I was entitled to two months each year, but conditions in Spain never were such as to justify me, in my judgement, in leaving at the time I would ordinarily have availed myself of leave. During the war I was not away from my post but three times, and then for two days each time only, and on two of these occasions I went to Paris to see the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain at his request. For more than a year and a half during the war we were all in the office every Sunday until I o'clock and on every legal holiday. For this reason I hope to get two months this summer. My plans, which I hope are satisfactory, are these:

I shall be able to arrange about getting my things out and packed by next Wednesday and I plan to go to Paris on Wednesday or Thursday. There are a number of things I want to do there and my family will want to do some shopping. I plan to sail for home on the Manhattan on the 15th.

At home I have to attend to numerous things that have been neglected and I hope to get as much as five weeks of solid rest and change. If absolutely necessary I can sail for Chili the first of August but I hope I may have until the middle of August to sail. I would like your reaction to these plans.
There is one other matter in which I may have to ask your support. I am very anxious to take Mr. Garrison Biddle, who is most valuable in gathering information other than that which comes through the Embassy secretaries whose associations are largely confined to the diplomatic corps— which I have found singularly poorly informed here in Spain. He is now slated as a junior clerk and gets $96 a month. During the war he was invaluable in all our evacuation work on the northern coast and in the early days of the war he personally evacuated some American women at his grave peril. He has used his car in trips to San Sebastian on official business times without number and without cost to the Government. It was he brought out the insane women at the request of Eddie Flynn and Sam Foley. He understands the Spanish and gets along with them perfectly. He has a private income, is a graduate of Princeton, but he is not rich in the generally accepted sense. He has a wife.

There are four clerks in Santiago. I want Garrison assigned there at a salary of not less than $2000 a year. He ought to have $2,500. I will then make him my secretary and he can do coding, decoding, translating, etc. in addition to special work I may wish to assign him. I feel very strongly on the subject. He worked as my secretary for a year without any salary at all.

Won't you please personally mention this matter to Welles or Hull— I presume Welles is the man—and have it arranged?

My predictions about the Telephone Company and the new regime have come true. I shall be much surprised if we do not have serious troubles there. Much depends on which element behind Franco dominates and I still think that domination will ultimately be determined in a contest. The Germans have enormous influence. More than 5000 marched in the parade which my daughter witnessed. The Italians with their usual arrogance lead the procession and it took almost an hour and a
half for them to pass. Evidently there were more than 10,000 unless the sprinting capacity of the legions of Caesar has diminished since the famous flight of Guadajara. I am sure there are many more and that thousands will stay and pose as road workers.

Have just read your speech to the retailers with keen interest. To "appease" Big Business is as hard a job as Chamberlain has found in appeasing the dictators. I think a stiff stand is best.

I need not assure you of my appreciation of the proffer of Canada and Chili. There were several reasons why I could not accept the first.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Claude E. Bowers

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Señor Don Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, newly appointed Ambassador of Spain to the United States

Señor Don Juan Francisco de Cárdenas is a career diplomat, having entered the Spanish diplomatic service in 1904. Since then he has served in Lisbon, Montevideo, Habana, Mexico City, Bucharest, Tokyo, and in Washington as First Secretary in 1915 and again in 1917; as Minister Resident and Counselor of Embassy in 1920; and finally as Ambassador from March 1932 to June 1934. Upon leaving Washington he served as Ambassador at Paris until after the outbreak of the conflict in Spain in 1936. Thereafter he returned to this country where he has been acting as the agent of General Franco, residing in New York.

His wife, who is with him in Washington, is the sister of Mr. F. C. Nano, formerly Counselor of the Rumanian Legation in Washington.

Señor de Cárdenas speaks English.

May 29, 1939.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of June 7, I am transmitting herewith a suggested letter for you to send to Ambassador Bowers in reply to his letter to you of May 25.

Before drafting the suggested reply for you to send to Mr. Bowers, I consulted Howland Shaw with regard to the request made of you by Mr. Bowers that his "secretary", Garrison Biddle, be transferred to Santiago.

For your information I am enclosing a copy of the memorandum Mr. Shaw sent me in response to my request for a statement of the facts with regard to Garrison Biddle and with regard to the desirability of acceding to Mr. Bowers' request. From the statements contained in this memorandum it would seem to me that there would be no justification for the transfer of

The President,

The White House.
Garrison Biddle to Santiago nor, in fact, for his retention in the service of the Government as a clerk. If our appropriations provided for the assignment of private secretaries to ambassadors, it would seem to me entirely suitable that the transfer which Mr. Bowers desires be carried out. Since, however, we have no appropriations for that purpose and since Mr. Biddle is neither a stenographer nor a typist and is qualified as being "practically useless for routine clerical work"., I cannot see that there is any justification for putting the Government to the expense involved merely because Mr. Bowers likes Mr. Biddle, nor would there seem to be any justification for continuing him on the Government payroll as a clerk when he cannot do clerical work.

As you will see, in the suggested letter for you to send to Mr. Bowers it is merely stated that you have referred his request to the Department of State, which will be glad to take the matter up with him upon his return to Washington.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM

June 8, 1939

Mr. Welles:

Mr. Biddle Garrison originally went to Madrid as the private secretary of Ambassador Bowers. Because of Mr. Bowers' insistence, Garrison was appointed a clerk at $1200 on September 30, 1935, although the Embassy was considered to be adequately staffed and it was felt that Garrison continued to be occupied chiefly with the Ambassador's private affairs. He took the written examination for the Foreign Service in 1936 and made 54%.

From information supplied by Mr. Wendelin, there appears to be no doubt that up until the outbreak of the Spanish War Mr. Garrison occupied himself exclusively with duties of a private secretarial nature. During the Spanish War he rendered some useful services such as contact work, carrying messages and helping evacuate a few people. However, reports from Wendelin, Consul Chapman, who was for a considerable time at St. Jean de Luz, and Thurston, indicate that Mr. Garrison is practically useless for routine clerical work - that he has never made a pretense of doing such work even when it was obvious that he could lend real

assistance and was never otherwise occupied. He is neither a stenographer nor a typist.

Should he be sent to Santiago, he could only be considered as going in the capacity of private secretary to Mr. Bowers, and we have not been able to provide an assistant with private secretarial duties. It should be added that Mr. Bowers can be consulted with regard to the employment of such officers as Flexner, Roeder and Thatcher.

We are closing the office at Madrid in accordance with instructions transmitted to us, and believe that no useful purpose would be served by sending Mr. Garrison to Santiago. This would constitute a real burden on our operations, which we have already been unable to staff adequately before the outbreak of the Spanish War.
assistance and was at the time not otherwise occupied. He is neither a stenographer nor a typist.

Should he be sent to Santiago, he could only be considered as going in the capacity of private secretary to Mr. Bowers, and we have not been able to provide ambassadors with private secretaries as the appropriations requested for the purpose have never been passed by Congress. The office at Santiago is adequately staffed with clerks and contacts of the nature mentioned by Mr. Bowers can be taken care of by such officers as Flexer, Trueblood and Lyon.

It should be added that it would cost something over $1700 to move Mr. Garrison and his wife from St. Jean de Luz to Santiago. This would constitute a real burden on our transportation fund which is always exhausted before the end of the fiscal year with considerable resulting inconvenience in the matter of moving personnel.

We are closing the office at St. Jean de Luz and had planned transferring Mr. Garrison to the consulate now being opened at Madrid, where, because of his knowledge of Spain, there would be a possibility of making limited use of his rather restricted qualifications.

G.H.S.
JAY ALLEN THOUGHT THIS MIGHT INTEREST YOU

Fil. 7-14-34

[Signature]
WHY AID FRANCO FURTHER?

In view of all the aid the United States Government gave Franco through the embargo on shipments of arms and ammunition to Spain, it does not seem excessive that our Export-Import Bank should actually be advocating a virtual gift of 300,000 bales of cotton to Franco's Spanish Government.

While it is argued that unless we will supply Franco, he will get his cotton from India, the best authorities feel that we aren't going to be paid for it, and that consequently the deal will be of no value to us. That is the view of the Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau. Certain elements in the State Department are said to favor the "sale", just as they violently opposed lifting the embargo, in order to give the Spanish Loyalists a fighting chance against Hitler, Mussolini and the Moors.

Why does it seem unlikely that we'd ever be paid for the 300,000 bales of cotton? Because Franco has filed a claim for silver obtained by us from the pre-Franco government of Spain, and if he loses the suit, as he is believed sure to do, he will probably refuse to pay for the cotton, on the ground that we haven't paid him for the silver.

It does seem absurd for us to be practically making a gift of 300,000 bales of cotton to Franco, whom Hitler and Mussolini are trying to penetrate Latin-America, in desperate competition with us. What is the Administration trying to do, anyway? Promote the cause of International Fascism?
NEW YORK ENQUIRER,
July 17, 1939.

By Weldon James
(United Press Staff Correspondent)

SPAIN MAY AGAIN BECOME GOOD U. S. COTTON CUSTOMER

WASHINGTON, July 16 - Government sources indicate that prospects for
disposal of 300,000 bales of cotton to Spain have been enhanced by the New York Federal
Court's dismissal of a suit of the Franco regime to recover $15,000,000 as damages for
United States as purchasers of silver from the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War.

This suit, it was learned, has been one of the obstacles delaying
conclusion of negotiations between Spain and the United States for an agreement extending
credit for the purchase of up to 300,000 bales of American cotton. Some officials here
noted that the amount asked by the Franco Government in the silver suit, $15,000,000 was
approximately the value of cotton involved in the prospective agreement.

Pre-revolutionary Spain bought most of its cotton from the United States,
consuming between 250,000 and 400,000 bales annually. That nation had excellent credit
here. War-time Spain's consumption of American cotton was nil and only a few thousand
bales have been sold there since the war ended.

The suit for recovery of damages claimed from the U. S. Treasury pur-
chase of Spanish Loyalist silver was based on the contention that the silver belonged
to the Bank of Spain and that the Loyalist Government had no right to sell it. The suit,
brought against the Superintendent of the New York Assay Office, was dismissed by
Federal Judge Vincent Leibell.
From: State Department, Washington, D.C.
To: The President.

0023 WE HAVE BEEN OFFICIALLY ADVISED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO RECOGNIZE THE REGIME OF GENERAL FRANCO AS THE DE JURE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN AND WILL DO SO NOT LATER THAN TOMORROW. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MAY BE EXPECTED TO ACCORD SIMILAR RECOGNITION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THE NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER HAS JUST INFORMED OUR MINISTER AT THE HAGUE THAT THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO RECOGNIZE FRANCO AND WILL PROBABLY MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THEREOF TOMORROW. SINCE THE FIRST OF THIS YEAR IRELAND, SWITZERLAND, PERU AND URUGUAY HAVE EXTENDED DE JURE RECOGNITION TO FRANCO. PRIOR TO THAT TIME THE GOVERNMENT OF TWELVE OTHER COUNTRIES HAD SO RECOGNIZED THE FRANCO REGIME. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IN ORDER TO INSURE OUR HAVING COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION TO MEET ANY CONTINGENCIES IN OUR RELATIONS WITH SPAIN YOU MAY WISH ME TO SEND TELEGRAPHIC INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR BOWERS TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION. I SHALL BE GLAD TO HAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE ME ON THIS MATTER. 1600

Distribution:
President Adm. Leahy Rear Adm. Mil. Aide Naval Aide Adm. Aide Flag Office
McIntire (MC)
MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. ROOSEVELT

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

RETURN TO THE PRESIDENT:

I HAVE SEEN. MANY THANKS FOR
SENDING IT.

E.R.
July 19, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In your memorandum of July 15 with regard to the letter written under date of July 10 by Jay Allen you asked for my comments with regard to the various points touched upon in that letter.

There is no question at all that a great deal of money is being spent by German agents in Mexico, particularly in the Mexican press but also in Government circles, in order to create anti-American sentiment. There has already been, however, a very considerable spontaneous reaction in Mexico against this kind of activity, and I am not at this moment particularly concerned by it. If, however, this Government were to engage in some controversy with the Mexican Government, German activities of this character would, I think, be gravely disquieting. So long as we maintain the cordial relationship with Mexico which now exists, this form of

The President,

The White House.
German propaganda, while objectionable, would not seem to be actually dangerous.

Mr. Allen expresses the emphatic belief that this kind of German propaganda is being undertaken in cooperation with the Franco Government and that agents of the Franco Government are being utilized for this purpose. I think it is true that certain Spaniards in Mexico and in other American Republics are serving as agents of the German Government. On the other hand, I think it is no exaggeration to say that no Spanish Government over a period of many years has been as unpopular throughout Latin America as is the present Spanish régime. This is due in part to the events of the civil war but it is due even more to the fact that the Franco Government has got itself into a violent controversy with the Chilean Government and with some other South American governments over the question of the treatment of political refugees who have taken refuge in the missions in Spain of these South American countries. The Chilean Government has very recently circularized the entire continent requesting continental support of the stand taken by Chile in this matter. As a result there have been hostile demonstrations against Spanish embassies and legations in many capitals of the South American Republics and I believe that the prestige of the present Spanish régime is at an
all time low ebb throughout the continent.

In this connection Mr. Allen recommends that this Government, as a government, should undertake the expenditure of money in subsidizing foreign newspapers. This suggestion is so thoroughly at variance with the traditional policy of the United States, and so completely opposed to our national faith in the ideal of a free press, that it does not seem to me that the suggestion that we embark upon a policy of this kind in peace-time warrants consideration.

Mr. Allen likewise makes the suggestion that we should, as a government, utilize the good offices of Señor Negrin with the Mexican Government, particularly with President Cárdenas. While I think that Señor Negrin's interest in good relations between Mexico and the United States is helpful and desirable, it does not seem to me that we should, as a government, request him to undertake any specific mission for us. Furthermore, as a matter of practical fact, the admiration which General Cárdenas personally has for you is such that any message from you to him would have far greater effect than the interposition of any third party, no matter who that third party might be.

The third point made by Mr. Allen is set forth in
his very vigorously phrased opposition to the extension of credits to the present Government of Spain for the purchase of cotton in the United States.

You will remember that you have talked over this proposed transaction at some length with this Department and likewise with Jesse Jones and the Export-Import Bank. It seems to me that there are two questions involved, first, whether it is advantageous to this Government that such a transaction be consummated from the commercial angle, and, second, from the political angle.

With regard to the commercial aspect of the question, it would seem to me that in view of the surplus cotton that we have in this country, which we are exceedingly anxious to dispose of in the world market, it would be desirable to sell to Spain such cotton as she is willing to buy here, provided we have assurance that the cotton would be utilized solely in Spain, and provided also that we obtain satisfactory assurance that the money advanced for such purchase by the Export-Import Bank will be reimbursed. The Spanish Government has given us formal assurance that the cotton she desires to purchase here will not be reexported, and will be utilized in its entirety by Spanish industry. The assurances as to reimbursement are a matter which only the Export-Import Bank can determine. My understanding is that the
Export-Import Bank has expressed a willingness to grant credits for this purchase of cotton, the total amount thereof to be paid back within a period of two years.

With regard to the political aspect of the proposed transaction, I may remind you that prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, Spain offered a good market for American cotton and that that market was shut off during the years of the civil war. It would seem to me, now that we have recognized the Franco Government, we should make every reasonable effort to recapture the Spanish market for our cotton exports. Under present conditions it is doubtful whether we could recapture this market unless some governmental agency of the United States assisted in the facilitation of the credits necessary.

Furthermore there is going on within Spain today a bitter rivalry between some of the factions that were supporting Franco at the conclusion of the civil war. If the Falangist element in Spain gets the upper hand, the closest kind of relationship between the Spanish Government and the Governments of Germany and Italy will in all probability be brought about. If the Center Republican elements, or the Carlist and Monarchist elements become predominant, the Franco régime will presumably swing more in the direction of a better understanding
with England and with France, and in the direction of
those normal relations with the rest of the world, in-
cluding ourselves, which they are even now advocating.

If, at this stage, therefore, we treat the Franco
Government as an outcast, and refuse to negotiate com-
mercial arrangements with that Government similar to
those which we are negotiating with many other govern-
ments in the world, it would seem to me that we would
strengthen the hands of the Falangist element, who are
at this moment maintaining that there is no hope of
bettering Spain's situation except through a watertight
agreement with the Axis powers.

In that connection I may remind you that the Export-
Import Bank has authorized cotton credits amounting to
four million dollars to Italy in addition to the amounts
outstanding on previous commitments. It would seem to
me highly illogical for the Export-Import Bank to author-
ize credits for this purpose to Italy, and yet be unwill-
ing to extend them in far lesser amount to Spain.

The gist of the latter part of Mr. Allen's letter is
that this proposed credit to Spain "is highly political
in its implications", and he reverts once more to the old
theme that there are some hidden and devious Fascist ac-
tivities going on in the inner recesses of the Department
of State. So far as I am informed, this question of cotton
credits to Spain was taken up originally by Spanish agents, as a purely commercial transaction, directly with the Export-Import Bank. It was only later submitted to this Department for its opinion. To the best of my knowledge the opinion of this Department has been formed solely as a result of the considerations set forth in this letter.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

to Mrs. Roosevelt
from Jay Allen
July 10, with enclosure.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
See Mrs. Roosevelt’s note:
"FDR - PLEASE READ AND RETURN WITH COMMENT. E.R."
21 WASHINGTON SQUARE NORTH

New York, New York,
July 10, 1939.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Hyde Park, New York.

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

You were very kind to have our caravan in for lunch on Saturday. Negrin was very touched by your hospitality and not a little comforted to find you so aware of certain trends.

He wanted rather to talk to you about Mexico in more detail but did not feel that he should. Later on in the day he spoke to Mr. Morgenthau at length.

He wants more than anything else to see a better understanding between the United States and Mexico and is prepared to use his personal influence wherever possible to bring this about. He tells me that he talked at length to Cardenas about this when he first saw him at Hermosillo, urging him to face the fact that his enemies, with Germany and Italy behind them, would continue to profit as they have profited from the trouble with us. He was pleased to note that two days later Castillo Najera, the Mexican Ambassador to Washington, was called to talk to Cardenas and Beteta sent here. He fully realizes how far the Mexican Government is at fault in its relations with the United States, but feels that the threat from our totalitarian friends is so imminent that heroic steps should be taken to settle outstanding difficulties.

He told the Secretary of the Treasury that he thought that most of the anti-American sentiment in Mexico was being stirred up by the Germans and Italians, working directly or through Franco Spaniards and that the anti-American press is for the most part subsidized by the Nazi-Fascists. He is shocked, as many of us have been in the past, to see that our Government is too pure to subsidize papers in countries where subsidies are the thing. I was in Paris in 1928 when the French threw out Herriot over the American debt settlement and at that time I wrote that had we been willing to spend $100,000 on the French press we would have collected the debts. After all, the anti-ratification campaign in the press was paid for by others and cost, I am sure, less than $100,000.
I don't think I have to tell you that after all that he has done in Spain, Negrín commands Cardenas' deepest respect. There has been plenty of evidence of this in recent weeks. And Negrín finds in Cardenas a most admirable and devoted and capable person, though perhaps a little over-generous and a little over-optimistic in some respects.

I don't see why this Government shouldn't make use of Negrín's good offices with the Mexicans if it were necessary to get to Cardenas directly. After all, what could be accomplished would be to Negrín's interest as well as to the interest of democratic America and democratic Mexico. We have a common enemy.

I was shocked to learn Saturday that the Secretary's efforts, as reported in the press, to block the credit to Franco, for the purchase of 300,000 bales of cotton, seem doomed to failure.

Its proponents say that it is purely a commercial affair. That view is, of course, nonsense. Everyone knows that Franco will never pay and that the credit is highly political in its implications. If export subsidies for Spanish-American countries are political (or politicommercial) in purpose why is an export subsidy for Franco innocent of political implications? And especially when, as I say, no one expects him to be able to pay?

It is all very ironic and not a little frightening. We propose such fine ideas. We said we were going to embargo aggressors. What we did, in the case of Spain, was to embargo the aggressors and maintain that embargo as part of the Non-Intervention set-up long after the true character of Non-Intervention was—or should have been—apparent to everyone. We propose to subsidize exports to South America to help counteract the politicommercial penetration by the totalitarian states. And now the Export-Import Banks undertakes to subsidize exports to Franco through whom in South America the Germans and the Italians are doing their most effective penetration. (One has only to look at the recent riots in Mexico City where Franco Spaniards did the dirty work, on inspiration from the Germans, Italian and Japanese consulates.)

It is frightening to see the good ideas go into reverse so soon.

And please let me presume so far to say, as a foreign correspondent who can look at his Government as he looks at others, with a certain degree of detachment, that there is a curious Jekyll and Hyde quality to our administration in foreign policy.
at this moment. As Dr. Jekyll we propose some very fine and workable ideals; as Mr. Hyde that other half (?) of us - I would not attempt to name individuals in the Department or elsewhere because in naming some I would be neglecting others - proceeds to undo all that Jekyll has done. And permit me to say that I think that Hyde is ahead.

It was a very great pleasure for me to meet you again. I am continually delighted in following through your column and elsewhere your same, determined and urbane championship of the decencies.

My wife joins me in thanking you for your hospitality.

Sincerely,

Jay Allen

P.S. Apropos of the totalitarian (for which read German Italian and Franquist) influence on the Mexican press: in the illustrated journal Hoy of July 1st, #123, there is an article called "La Diplomacia Roja del Presidente Roosevelt en España" (The Red Diplomacy of President Roosevelt in Spain) by Carlos Pereyra, Mexican historian long resident in Spain and Fascist agent. There is an article on the power of the Italian fleet now that it had new bases in the Mediterranean and another one objecting to the entry of Spanish Republican refugees into Mexico.

P.P.S. I am enclosing a memorandum on a long conversation with Mr. Alfred Cope, one of the two Quakers just back from Spain. I really think that you would find much of interest in it although I grant that it is long. Perhaps Mr. Pickett would consent to bring Cope, who lives up in Westchester somewhere, to see you. He is a very fine, and even a very moving person. I thought that, knowing Spain, my apprehensions over a Franco victory were fairly comprehensive; from what Cope tells me I can see that I was quite unprepared for the full horrors of it.
Q. Can you comment on the religious situation as you saw it during the Republican regime and during the Franco occupation?

A. All the churches were closed during the war while Murcia was in Republican hands. Some had been damaged, some had not. I was given the opportunity to visit the Murcia Cathedral during the Loyalist period. We had to get a pass, but this was a reasonable request, for the huge building was filled with religious treasures brought in from the countryside for safe keeping. Apparently there had been trouble in the earlier days of the war because of irresponsible persons who took advantage of the war to do looting. There were many sealed boxes filled with priestly vestments and other church materials, many wooden images and statues of Christ, the Madonna, and the saints. These were stored where the cathedral walls were thickest so that they would be safer in case of bombardment. I have reason to know that several individuals who had looted the churches were caught and punished by the Republican officials. After the Franco occupation many of these religious articles were used in the Easter services. The local art institute also had many religious objects stored under lock and key and two police were kept on guard at all times.

Q. What about the priests?

A. The story often advanced about the priests is that they were systematically massacred, but that seems untrue; some acts of violence were no doubt the inescapable horror of any civil war, in which private individuals take arms against their personal enemies until the reorganising government can maintain order. It is true that I never saw a priest save in civilian garb during the Republican regime, but within an hour after the news of the government collapse there were many priests in the streets of Murcia. These had obviously been there all the time, and surely the government knew of their presence. We lived on the third floor of a Murcia
house. Across the street lived an old man. We often saw him sitting on the roof reading. When the change of government came, he just put on his priest's clothing, and went out into the streets. Those who did not engage in spying or espionage were left alone, though reports were frequently released telling of priests engaging in sabotage. The government was apparently reluctant to countenance more open religious worship owing to the fact that Catholic authority was so wholly on the side of the rebels. I noted several newspaper reports of Loyalist funerals, even of army officials, conducted according to Catholic rites.

Q. There were also some hair-raising stories about the nuns.

A. I think they were largely exaggerated, although I do not know what happened in the early days of the war. In the Province of Muroia we actually had nuns working for us either in civilian or in their regular uniforms. In Totana the Loyalist mayor was placed in local charge of a canteen under our supervision and with our permission asked the nuns to do the actual feeding which they did to the satisfaction of all. Attitudes toward the church varied greatly with the locality. Some felt resentful toward the church and objected to evidence of what they felt to be Fascist sympathies on the part of the Church. I know that in Muroia a church that had been used as a garage was carefully swept out by the Republicans before they fled toward the coast trying to escape.

Q. What do you know about foreigners in Republican Spain?

A. I have seen some members of the International Brigade, but no Russians that I know of. There were some Russian trucks which had been there from the early part of the war. Franco used them to haul his artillery in his victory parade in Valencia, which I saw. These were some of the best trucks for hard conditions I have seen. Of simple construction, they had no speed, but stood up well under punishment. Not much good was done by most of the foreign aid of a military sort given to the Loyalists. There was enough to give the opposition a basis for propaganda abroad,
but not enough to make much difference in the final outcome of events.

Q. Did you see any foreigners after the Fascists came in?
A. We saw a great many Italians when the Franco people came in. I was told later that there were about 75,000 Italians in the Alicante region. This came from trustworthy sources, in fact from the new Fascist mayor of Crevillente, quoting the Provincial Governor. I saw these Italians myself, and many were encamped near our children's hospital at Polop de la Marina. These troops came in from the North and did not apparently include any units marching in the victory parades at Valencia and Madrid. Murcia Province was largely taken over by the Navarrese, but the stretch of coast in Alicante Province and cutting the Valencia road was completely in the hands of the Italians, who were not too well received by the population. There were many unconfirmed rumors of trouble in Alicante. There is a persistent and probably untrue rumor of 30,000 executions there, the actual truth I believe is that about 20,000 were in concentration camps there, a part of those probably being Republicans who were captured trying to escape by sea.

The Italians were, it will be noted, located strategically for operations in the western Mediterranean, cutting the French off from their African bases. The only Germans I saw were in San Sebastian, though some were reported to have arrived in Murcia and other centers before we left, apparently as administrative or police advisors. The Germans kept discreetly in the background. However German and Italian flags were displayed freely, envelopes were sold bearing these foreign flags on them in color, and one of our workers had the interesting experience of haggling with a shopkeeper over the price of an obus (a shell) bearing a crucifix with the body of Christ, and further decorated with the Italian, German, Spanish, Falange and one other unidentified emblem.

Q. What idea did you get of the imperialist plans of the Spanish Fascists?
A. About ten days after the collapse of the Republican forces in South Spain, the local .
paper came out with the announcement, quoting the Italian press, and specifically Gayda, to the effect that Gibraltar, Tangiers, and Algiers would soon be returned to the "imperial" and "liberated" Spain. The erratic Franco press later issued denials of troop movements about Gibraltar, and Franco was supposed to have issued a statement that he had no such intentions, or that he had been misunderstood. We rather gathered at the time that the British and French had probably sent reinforcements to Gibraltar. There was a great deal of broad political talk about expansion, but it was difficult to know just where it was to be. There was some hint of South America or Mexico.

Q. What do you know about Franco's executions of Republicans?

A. I never personally saw anyone shot by the Fascists but there were constant unconfirmed reports of arrests and killings. You can imagine the situation. One of our workers would come in and say that so-and-so whom we knew had been jailed or shot. Some of our Spanish helpers were thrown into jail or concentration camps. A few days after the Fascists gained control of Murcia the secretary of the Provincial Governor reported to the Governor in my presence that all the jails were full, and wanted to know what to do about it. (This I was not supposed to have heard.) The newspapers were full of accounts of the arrests of people described as 'assassins' and 'murderers', and while there would be quite full accounts of the charges, there was little about the sentences.

The nurse in charge of our Murcia hospital reported having heard shots nightly for almost two weeks, apparently coming from the local jail. I once slept in our cars near the hospital which was about three blocks from the jail and was awakened on the night we took this precaution by shots which occurred between twelve and two in the morning. This should not of course be considered as conclusive evidence, but one is compelled to control his imagination quite a bit, if rather obvious conclusions are not to be drawn. During the daytime we saw often during a period of
three weeks squads of fifteen men circulating in the streets, regular soldiers with guns on their backs, whose job it apparently was to surround and capture wanted people from specific houses. I personally saw one instance of this, though they apparently failed to find whomever they went after. Hearsay of other individuals told of many who were caught or who committed suicide rather than be found alive.

We were constantly getting reports such as "Twenty-three were killed in Valdepenas" or "All the ablebodied men of --- --- were put in a concentration camp." After the first day or so of victory, there seemed to be fewer people in the streets than formerly; this could be attributed however to the egress of refugees, who attempted to return home. Atrocity stories are however easy to manufacture and hard to stop. It is fair to draw the conclusion that a lot of executions and jailings took place, but not to make too broad statements, even though we are ourselves convinced of the truth of such things.

Many, of course, were fined for minor infractions such as refusing to salute, or to take down the posters of the former regime from the houses. The Republicans themselves, it should be noted, had, when in power, issued a statement to the effect that no one who did not want posters displayed on the walls of his house need fear if he took them down. There were many reports of arrests of those who, owing to the shortage of food, refused to buy and sell at the Franco prices. An interesting report from the Franco press was that of the Catalan who was fined the sum of 10,000 pesetas for writing a letter in the Catalan language, and using the word "collectivize". Such incidents as this were quite spice to the day's news.

Q. What do you think of the future of religious freedom in Spain?

A. A man who worked for us had two daughters nursing in the hospital. They were Protestants and the circumstances of their dismissal seemed to imply that the discharge had been effected for that reason. I felt that Catholic intolerance was certainly in the ascendency in Franco Spain. The Governor's seal was reputedly an adaptation
of that used by Torquemada. Stamps bear the picture of 'Isabella la Católica'. If Spaniards wish to be Catholics, that is their own business of course, but it is my understanding that membership in the Falange party - a prerequisite for getting work - is confined to those who can prove their Catholicism. This I hope is a temporary condition. The situation will be probably what it was before the Republic, when all Protestants and free thinkers had rough going. Propaganda posters mass Jews, communists, masons and those who believe in class distinctions as those who are to be swept out of the incoming regime.

Two Swiss Protestant missionaries who have been in Spain since 1931 administered a canteen in Archena for the Quakers, feeding from 800 to 1500 children - and without either political or religious propaganda. When Franco came in the local Falange brought pressure and took their food, administering it badly, to the distress of the villagers. Thereafter for a time the couple were persecuted by constant searches of their house, six times in four days, the excuse being that they were hiding munitions and machine guns. When they tried to get a salvoconducción to Murcia to see us about what to do, they were told by the local military head that they might have the safe conduct to leave town, but not to come back. The police also called asking why they had not left. A later report, I am glad to state, says that this persecution had stopped, at least for the time being. The couple wanted to leave the country, but have stayed and outlived the persecution inspired by the local priest.

Q. What about Franco's concentration camps?
A. Concentration camps were set up supplementing the jails all over former Republican territory as Franco took over. One of our trusted employees, and apparently a Franco sympathizer, was put, probably by mistake, in the Ciudad Real camp but released after nineteen days. He reported about twenty thousand in the bull ring with him without shelter and with but little food and water. He was badly sunburned, covered with vermin, and had lost about twenty pounds when he returned to us. These concentration
Q. How is the food situation now in Spain?

A. It is very bad, not only from lack of food but from disorganization. This year's harvest and the cessation of war may improve matters. Even at the best hotels there is little to eat. In Saragossa, we asked to be taken to the best hotel, where, however, we got only some watery soup and fish balls. They did have ice cream which seemed unusual.

Food under the new regime has gone far above the legal prices. Sugar legally is supposed to sell for about ten cents a pound, but is sold speculatively for fifty to seventy cents. Olive oil, the Spanish substitute for lard and butter, presents a like problem. The Franco people found empty warehouses when they came into Republican territory. They reported a smattering of a few tons of flour in the town of Murcia which had almost 100,000 living in it for a time counting the refugees. Civilians had practically no bread for three weeks, and the army had very little.

We believed throughout the war that food conditions were bad on the Nationalist side, but not of course as bad as with the Republicans. Our workers on Franco's side reported need, but said that it was difficult to meet it because it would be officially denied, as the policy of totalitarianism is to admit no weaknesses. It would
be difficult to prove that the Nationalists specifically withheld food from non-cooperating towns during the war, though I have had one report to the effect that the distribution was being made between towns on the basis of contributions to Franco's cause, rather than in accordance with need. An investigation should be made as to what quantity, if any, of wheat was sold to Germany during the war in order to obtain credit. Our whole experience with the food problem is dealt with more fully in a report of relief operations.

Q. What other repressive measures do you know of?
A. A footnote should be added about those who were in jail during the Republican regime. There were many political prisoners and probably the Loyalists made quite a number of mistakes also. They, as I observed, had many in jail, but they to my knowledge used only the ordinary prison systems, not bull rings and the like. It is significant that there was even in the first outbreak of the Nationalist press, very little criticism of the treatment afforded in Republican jails. Certainly those in jail must have had as good food as the others, though none had very much. In comparing the two sides in highly political matters, it is better to understand that you cannot call one side wrong entirely or right entirely. It is a question of comparison only.

The fishermen on the Mediterranean used to go out at night, using lights to fish by. They reported with the change that they were forbidden to go out at night for fear that they would try to escape to Africa. This, the fishermen reported, made the food problem of their villages still very acute, and Mr. Emmet Gulley who followed me out of Spain a month later reports great suffering in some of the fishing towns of southeast Spain. Even in the daytime, the fishermen told me, only small amounts of gasoline were issued. This, it is well to point out, might have been true under the Republican regime also, either for shortage or for political reasons, though it was not brought to my attention.

There is political disunity today in Franco Spain. We found that a pass from the army or the Governor was of no good unless also approved by the Falange, and one
suspects that the rumors of strife between the Catholic-conservative-money party, the Fascist Falange, the Carlists, the Monarchists, and the Army may one day blossom into an unpleasant situation. Franco is guarded; we had to get off the road an hour before he travelled by, and his soldiers were placed every 100 meters. Before his victory parade in Valencia, the police made a house to house canvass warning against "incidents." From Madrid came reports, reliable in source, of sniping against Franco soldiers at night, and of the distribution of anti-Franco handbills. While I believe his regime will fall one day, yet his control of the military power does not make such a change seem imminent.

The money situation is difficult of course. Some of the old government money was honored by Franco, some was not. This brought poverty to some people, fortunate wealth to others. People are also succumbing to a campaign persuading them to turn over to the Nationalists various valuables to be used as a metallic basis for the currency. Metal in circulation is forbidden, it must be turned in. Small denomination bills are printed in Italy, by a Milan firm; incidentally, and laughably enough, it is rumored to be Jewish. Higher denominations are printed in Germany. The old money was likewise printed abroad - in England. Landlords who had been paid rent in Republican money got, after Franco took over, an enforced payment of an equivalent amount from those who had occupied their property during the war. During the war we rented a warehouse from a man who was in a Republican prison and paid the rent to his agent. When Franco came in, or rather his group, we had to pay the landlord again in Nationalist money. These regulations of course applied only to the owners of property. The farm laborers and the like got paid with the then worthless Republican money on the first payday after the change, and of course received no restitution for their savings lost.

Q. What did you see of bombing during the war?

A. None in Murcia, but much in the ports and some other towns. I happened to be in Barcelona for three days before its capture. During this period we counted thirty-
six separate air bombardments, and there certainly were some that we missed. Caldetas was bombed the morning Barcelona is supposed to have fallen, and the bombs fell close to two French destroyers anchored off shore and nearly struck Americans who were being evacuated. Commissions sent to Spain have testified as to the objectives of Franco's bombings. I can only add a warning to nations such as France and Britain not to continue with such flimsy air-raid precautions as are seen by the casual London or Paris visitor. There is a liquid air bomb which would smash most of their shelters, its deadliness coming more from concussion than from material explosion.

A day or so after the fall of Barcelona proper I was returning to South Spain via a British destroyer and we anchored off Caldetas and were able to watch the road for a day. Refugees passed all morning until noon; then eighteen planes came over and machine gunned the road, and, according to the ship's officers, threw out hand grenades at the refugees. There was no opposition except the occasional pistol or rifle shot of some who might happen to have arms. The planes finally left and I saw no more people on the road. The bombing of Cuthbert Wigham during the evacuation of Manresa just before the fall of Barcelona had been recorded in the British press. The truckload of children was machine gunned, but they all took to cover in time.

It was reported to us that the new regime was asking residents whose property had been destroyed by bombing to make declaration that this had been done by irresponsible elements of the former regime in moments of violence, rather than by Franco bombing planes. The Franco regime is now issuing a pamphlet listing bombing atrocities allegedly carried out by the Republicans. It shows a red bomb, with a black hammer and a scythe, falling on a defenseless city.

Q. What evidences were there of anti-Semitism?

A. There are of course few Jews in Spain, as they were expelled at the time of Columbus. I noticed anti-Semitic books in San Sebastian bookshops. Henry Ford's "International Jew" was one of the titles displayed. Books praising Italy and Germany were there
of course, and the posters, before mentioned, which attacked the Jews, were common. Those Jews known to me expected their troubles to be in proportion to the amount of German and Italian control over the country.

From further conversations with Mr. Cope, the following facts emerge:

The Quakers wanted to preserve their records for historical reasons but the Valencia records were burned because the Franco police had indicated that they intended to examine them for evidence against Republicans.

Experiments in diet testing were carried out in Archena with the help of Swiss Protestant missionaries and were considered important enough to have scientific value. Unfortunately, when the Franco police came in, they searched the house six times in four days on the pretext of hunting machine guns, so that the survival of these records is uncertain.

On March 28, 1939, the Quakers were feeding some 100,000 children, and were anxious to continue this work whatever the outcome of the war. To this end they negotiated an agreement with the Franco forces, safeguarding their property and right to work in the territory. Subsequent events caused them to feel that the agreement was violated.

In Madrid the Swiss workers had their cars confiscated but finally got them back and then turned over their stocks of food to Franco’s forces and left the country, because, they said, “they had more self-respect than to stay and watch what was going on.”

When the Franco forces came into Albacete, the two relief workers, David Luscombe and Maria Boroyd, were given 24 hours to leave town or go to jail. The fate of their supplies is not known. Police visited the home of Maria Boroyd thirteen times trying to catch her but failed.

The situation in Valencia was especially bad and the whole Quaker force was threatened with imprisonment. Four or five boatloads of food in Valencia harbor were seized by General Aranda’s troops and were moved off in spite of protests made with
the help of the American consul, Woodruff Wallner. Two weeks later, General Aranda apologized and promised that the food would be returned, but a month and a half later this had not been done. Thus, food donated for Spanish child aid by British housewives was eaten by the army and much of it was offered for sale in Valencia hotels.

In Alicante, more than 200 tons of milk powder was seized and sold over Quaker protests. An incoming ship was seized, apparently by the military governor, and the Quakers do not know what happened to the food on it. A shipload of supplies at Castellon was also seized and it is thought that supplies on the dock at Almeria were also taken by Franco's men.

The Quakers found great inefficiency among the Auxillo Social workers. In Almeria, the work was to be turned over to an eighteen year old girl whose previous experience had consisted of mixing milk in a canteen. There was great disorganization, conflicting orders and petty thievery in the Auxillo Social organization. It is doubtful, despite all the propaganda published abroad, that the Auxillo Social brought any large amount of food into conquered towns, but rather that they depended on enforced sales and even confiscation.

The Quakers were forced to give up their children's hospital at Murcia on orders of the Auxillo Social and move their sick children out into much worse quarters on the pretext that the hospital was needed immediately for a clearing house for refugee children. Three weeks later not a single child had yet been admitted into the hospital. The clinic run in connection with the Murcia canteen was staffed with inexperienced people and thieving by the Franco people became so notorious that the Quakers had to refuse further canteen supplies. Employees of the Quakers were approached on the subject of buying supplies stolen by Franco employees from the canteens.

The general feeling among the Quaker workers in Spain seems to be that the agreement signed by Franco's representatives had been repeatedly violated and that while the Franco people would like to get hold of the Quaker supplies, they do not want the Quakers.