Union of South Africa
Dear Mr. President,

By accident I met your personal representative Col. Johnston here at Cairo on his way back to the States and had an opportunity to discuss with him the present war situation as I see it. And it is partly on his urgence that I write you briefly on the same subject.

I have been visiting our front in the Middle East and given much thought to the strategical problems confronting us, as well as discussed them with others who have done the same. While remaining confident about the outcome of this war I feel the gravity of the immediate situation which appears to me greater than is generally realised.

To me the all important consideration is our time-table. It is 1942 that matters most. No doubt we can develop and deploy huge resources in 1943 and 1944, but we must first pull through 1942, during which the enemy is going to make his maximum effort to obtain a decision. Already we have lost so much during the last 2½ years of the war that further grave setbacks may put us in dire peril. We cannot afford mistakes in 1942.

To me it is not the Far Eastern situation that at present matters most, grave as the losses have been there. That position can in time be recovered. Nor do I consider Australia in dire peril. It is really off the real line of the enemy advance, and the apparent move of Japan in that direction may only be a clever feint to induce us to divide our resources.

There is an area which we cannot afford to lose, without the greatest danger to our future victory. That is the Indian ocean and the lands bordering on it, from the Middle East through Iran and Iraq to India and Ceylon. Their loss would put us in such an unfavourable position for defence and eventual offensive and the enemy in such a powerful position for the future that we dare not risk such/
such a loss. In effect it is therefore this year 1942 and this area which seem to me to dominate the whole position of our war strategy. We must concentrate our forces to hold this area in 1942, just as it will be the enemy's plan to obtain control of it and so paralyze our future effort, whatever our resources may then be.

As regards the land position in this area we must prepare for further Russian setbacks and the advance of Germany this summer to the Caucasus and its oil, and the virtual outflanking of the position we are now holding in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The Japanese may at the same time advance into India, the position of which is grave, as Col. Johnston will tell you. As regards the sea we have so divided our naval forces that we run a serious risk. While the British naval forces cannot separately face the Japanese navy in the Indian ocean, the American naval forces in the Pacific bordering on Australia may also be unable to defeat the Japanese navy. The British navy has already suffered grievous losses. The case seems to me imperative for the two navies joining hands in the Indian ocean and delivering a smashing blow at the Japanese navy at the earliest opportunity. Our naval dominance of the Indian ocean and the Bay of Bengal would put an end to the Japanese advance westwards and keep open our communications with the Middle East round the Cape. In fact the Cape route appears to be the way to victory so far as this part of the world is concerned. If we could meet the German and Japanese menace in this area this summer, we may have a good base from which to start an offensive towards Italy, Greece and the Balkans, and our air attacks as far as Italy and the Roumanian oilfields would have a deadly effect. We would be in a strong offensive position for the decisive campaigns of 1943.

For these and other reasons I therefore urge as great a concentration of our forces, especially naval, in the Indian ocean as soon as possible, and avoidance of their dispersal in the Pacific or Australian areas.

As regards Germany in the West I would urge concentrating our land and air forces in the British isles for the reconstruction of the Western front in 1943 and

launching/
launching from there the maximum Anglo-American attack by air and land in 1943. This great move I assume is in course of preparation and vigorous prosecution. It would enable us to strike at the heart of the German power. But the Middle East and the Indian ocean should meanwhile be firmly held and developed as a base for the offensive across the Mediterranean against the weaker members and hangers on of the Axis, and the further advance of Japan westwards should be prevented. Japan could then be dealt with at the proper time.

My point is that the further advance of Japan in 1942 and the imperilling of the position in the Middle East must be prevented at all costs. And we must not build our hopes too much on Russia during this fateful year. We should then - but then only - be in a favourable position for victory in 1943.

Pardon this insistence on what may appear to you to be the obvious. But the obvious course is not always followed or the easiest to follow in human affairs.

I cannot end without expressing my admiration for the immense effort of your people and their total concentration on the job. That spirit and your great leadership which match the spirit of the British people under Churchill's leadership will make our victory a certainty if meanwhile unnecessary strategical risks are avoided.

With all good wishes for our course and for your health and strength in a superhuman task,

Yours faithfully,
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
August 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. RALPH W. CLOSE  
MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Dear Mr. Close:-

I am enclosing what might be called a personal memorandum of my own thoughts in regard to war operations, and I should be glad if you would send it as such to your Prime Minister and tell him, at the same time, that I have been very happy to read his message of July twenty-seventh.

F. D. R.

(Enclosure)
PERSONAL MEMORANDUM IN REGARD TO SITUATION AS OF AUGUST 1, 1942.

I am in accord with the thought that the objectives of 1942 differ from those of 1943. This situation arises from necessity.

In 1942, while our strategy because of circumstances must be essentially defensive, tactics may be offensive in one or more operations.

Both the strategy and the tactics in 1943 will, however, depend on several factors and, while we can and should plan to meet each and every one of the events of the next six months, the United Nations cannot adopt a hard and fast strategical policy at this time except that the United Nations must seek a little later on to gain the initiative in 1943.

The factors relate to certain main problems not yet clearly foreseeable. The main ones are:

(a) The outcome in Russia that runs from pushing the Germans back at one end to Russian collapse at the other end, including in between three or four different kinds of situations as of December 1, 1942.

(b) The results in the Middle East, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Basra and the Caucasus line of communications.

(c) The control of lines of communications by the United Nations to Murmansk and Archangel, to Gibraltar and the west coast of Africa, to Egypt and to the Persian Gulf, including mastery of the Indian Ocean.

At this time I do not bring warfare in the Pacific into the picture because I greatly hope that while the Japanese offensive may be pushed forward into the Bay of Bengal, into
the New Guinea area and even to a greater distance into the Aleutians, it seems probable that most of India will be safe and that the United States can maintain the route to Australia and to Alaska.

American reserves and American planes and tank production are at least up to all reasonable schedules, but the controlling factor is to get these reserves and munitions to the scene of actual fighting.

I believe that the holding of the Middle East is of prime importance and that the so-called Second Front must be launched in 1942.

The United States is engaged in the twofold task of sending all possible help to the Middle East and, at the same time, sending all possible troops and munitions toward the objective of a Second Front. What that Front will be must depend essentially on agreement between the British and American Staffs.

It is good to know that these agreements are in a fair way to being completed.

I am, therefore, particularly interested in 1942 operations, and I regard the next five months as the most critical period of the war.

We should give consideration, but not final decision, to the actual strategy of 1943. Let us put all our effort into a successful conclusion of this year 1942.

F. D. R.
LEGATION OF
THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.

For

MR. PRESIDENT

Copy of Message from

FIELD MARSHAL SMUTS
Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa

To

THE MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
Washington, D.C.

LAID BEFORE THE PRESIDENT

by

[Signature]

MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 30th May 1942
TELEGRAM.

FROM: FIELD MARSHAL SMUTS
PRIME MINISTER, UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

TO: THE MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

27th July, 1942.

Mr. Churchill has received a similar message.
You may show the President this message.

Near end of third year of the war and in situation we are now facing we must suit our war programme to our still remaining resources and decide our limited objectives for 1942, and our plan of victory for 1943. A planned policy has always been difficult for us as enemy has had initiative all along and we have had to move accordingly, here, there and everywhere. There is the added difficulty now that war policy is settled both in London and Washington and single integrated scheme is not easily evolved. Our greatest countervailing asset however, the close understanding and collaboration between Roosevelt and Churchill which I look upon as vital to our victory. Our objectives for 1942 differ from those for 1943. For 1942 our strategy will continue to be essentially defensive, however offensive our tactics may be. America is now our great strategic reserve, and it can only come into full action in 1943. During 1942 we can only hope to hold what we have with our limited resources, especially with Russia probably out of the war as a serious fighting factor. For 1942 I therefore place our war priorities as follows. The Mid East Egypt (?) first among our objectives - both for defence in 1942 and for possible offence in 1943 against the weakest Axis countries. We must hold Egypt or risk the loss of the war, and Rommel has shown how precarious our hold may be. It is the nodal point of our whole Empire strategy. If we hold Egypt and extend our occupation in 1942 as far west as Tripoli we shall also reopen the Mediterranean and be in a position to attack
across it in 1943. By contacting Tunis we may even hope to save French North Africa. To this objective I would subject much else. The Murmansk route to Russia must now be given up as a death trap, and surplus naval and air forces must be moved to the Mediterranean to complete our task there - with the tanks which are now being sent to the bottom near Norway. The re-opening of the Mediterranean will reinforce our route round the Cape as the only feasible way to assist Russia via Suez, the Persian Gulf and India. Transport routes to Russia via Iraq Iran and India must be developed to the maximum. The reopening of the Mediterranean will also effect Spain and assist any possible move in North West Africa - Casablanca and Dakar. For 1942 the Mediterranean and the Mid East thus form the key to our strategy. Australia is essentially a side show and should only receive limited defensive assistance. That route leads nowhere either for us or Jap. The holding of the Mid East also implies the mastery of the Indian Ocean, the holding of India, and the possibility of reopening the Burma Road and giving succour to China. We should do all we can to keep China afloat as she will give us the most favourable areas from which to bomb Japan and cut Japan's southern lines through the China Sea. It may even form a good line of support for Russia if attacked in Siberia. From all these points of view the Burma Road may be a good secondary objective, but with our bitter experience there we should make very careful preliminary preparations and train special troops for the purpose. The U.S.A. will move as fast as it can to prepare and send men and machines to the areas I have mentioned and to stiffen the British effort to a maximum. It will also accelerate its preparations in the Pacific, West and North especially, and put itself in a position for the great naval offensives of 1943. So much for 1942. Meanwhile huge British and American forces are gathering in Britain which will call for a new front, the main offensive front possible of 1943. This could
be no other than the Western Front of the last war. With our
great bombing resources added to our other, especially American
reserves, the decision may confidently be looked forward to in
1943. But meantime we must hold the Mid East and prepare for the
offensive from that front also. Germany, Italy and Japan must be
simultaneously brought to a downfall in 1943. This is a bare
sketch of the directions in which my thoughts are moving. I hope
it may be useful in deciding on our war programme for this and
the following year.
Dear Mr. McIntyre,

I shall be obliged if you will please let the President have the enclosed.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honourable
Marvin H. McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr President,

Please permit me to acknowledge gratefully the receipt yesterday of your memorandum to me, dated the 3rd of August, 1942, enclosing a "Personal Confidential Memorandum" of the same date which you asked me to send to my Prime Minister.

I have sent by telegraph today, in a most secure, confidential manner, the text of both the memoranda mentioned above.

Yours faithfully,

Ralph W. Croze

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
MISS TULLY

Will you see that this
gets to the Boss?

MHM
PROPOSED ACTION FOR ASSISTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR PROGRAM

Office of Economic Warfare Analysis
Board of Economic Warfare

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 22 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

October 10, 1942
PROPOSED ACTION FOR ASSISTING
THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR EFFORT

Recommendations:

A - That the United States Government propose simultaneously to
the South African Government and the British Government the
immediate establishment in South Africa of a South African
Supply Council, of which the Chairman shall be a representa-
tive of the South African Government, and on which the
British and United States Governments shall have appropriate
representation. The purpose of this Council shall be to use
its best efforts to obtain the necessary shipping and materials
for the maintenance of the South African war economy,
in view of the increasing stringency both in shipping and in
supplies. Through this Council shall pass all South African
overseas orders, whether governmental or commercial, and re-
gardless of the means of payment, whether through Lend-Lease
agreement or otherwise. Such orders shall be certified in
order of priority, or rejected, by the Council in the light
of:

(1) the relative essentiality of the order in question,
based upon the part played by the requested mate-
rial in the war effort of South Africa, the over-all
South African stockpile position of the materials in
question and possibilities of substitution of other
materials;

(2) the condition of supplies and shipping prevailing
in the United States and Great Britain.

B - That, subject to the approval of the South African and British
Governments of the above recommendation, the appropriate United
States Government agencies shall receive and review recommen-
dations of the South African Supply Council insofar as they in-
volve supplies from the United States. Any unanimous certi-
fication by the South African Supply Council shall be accepted
as evidence of the essentiality of the order in question to the
maintenance of the war economy of South Africa, and the inter-
ested agencies shall exert their best efforts to see that
orders so certified shall be delivered. In exchange for the
best efforts of the United States Government to send as large
a quantity of supplies as possible for the support of the South
African war economy, the United States Government expects that
the South African Government will make every effort to increase
the proportion of resources used in its direct war effort.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaub Date FEB 22 1972
Reasons for the Forgoing Recommendations:

A Mission representing the Board of Economic Warfare in South Africa from May to September, 1942 has just returned after making an intensive study of the South African economy. The foregoing recommendations result from the conclusions of the Mission, as well as those of the specialists on South Africa within the Board. These conclusions are as follows:

(1) The United States Government must use every possible effort to assist the South African Government in the development of its war effort;

(2) Continued progress in the development of the South African war effort will be limited unless there is a considerable and continuing diversion of resources, particularly of manpower, from the gold mining industry to war industries;

(3) A reduction in the current record level of gold mining operations of at least 25 percent within twelve months, or possibly a lesser period, can be achieved without serious dislocation to the South African economy, provided that, coincidentally, materials are delivered to South Africa by the United States for the further development of its war industries. As the war industries develop, substantial further reductions of gold production can be effected.

Suggested Procedure of American Representative on South African Supply Council:

(1) The American representative on the proposed South African Supply Council shall be guided in his certification solely by the objective of increasing through such certification the activity of the war industries and related industries in South Africa;

(2) He shall carefully scrutinize all orders placed by the gold mining industry with regard to immediate essentiality and to stockpile positions. He shall cooperate with the South African Government, through the use of devices now existent, in the diversion of as
much of such stockpiles as possible for the use of the base metal mining industry in particular and war industries in general; he shall attempt to persuade the several South African Government Controllers of commodities to reapportion an increasing percentage of current general stockpiles and manpower now within their control to the advantage of the war industries;

(3) Periodically he shall report as to progress being made in the reduction of gold mining activity and on the increase in the war effort of the Union. If such reduction is not proceeding at a desired and reasonable rate, and if the Council's control of supplies, as affecting the level of gold mining activity, proves to be inadequate, further steps shall be considered for decreasing the level of gold mining activity.

(4) The services of the Special Representative of the Board of Economic Warfare in South Africa and assistants in South Africa, will be made available to the United States representative on the South African Supply Council.

(5) Pending the establishment of the South African Supply Council, appropriate and effective steps shall be taken by the interested agencies in Washington with regard to the export of materials to the gold mines, especially in view of their large stocks.
ANNEX "A"

TO STATEMENT ON PROPOSED ACTION TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR EFFORT

Summary of Subject Headings:

Strategic Importance

Outlook for Expansion of War Economy

Labor and Supplies Position of Gold Mining Industry

Labor Supplies

Possible Curtailment of Gold Production

Feasible Expansion of War Effort

Director General of War Supplies

Aerial Bombs

Ammunition

Armoured Fighting Vehicles

Explosives

Boots

Textiles

Spare parts for Tanks and Guns

Summary of the Contribution to the War Effort by the Director General of War Supplies and Estimate of Materials Necessary to Sustain his Effort

Base Metal Mining

Coal Mining

Steel Industry

Ship Repairing

Technicians for the Army

Railways

Power

Support of United Nations Forces

Support of Rhodesian Base Metal Mining

Conclusion
ANNEX "A"
TO STATEMENT ON PROPOSED ACTION TOWARD IMPLEMENTING
THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR EFFORT

A small mission was sent by the Board of Economic Warfare to South Africa in April 1942 to survey the possibilities of increasing the effectiveness of the South African war effort. This survey included studies of fundamental economic factors bearing on the operation of the South African war economy; the possibilities of increasing the output of war industries; potential increases in the production of base metals and of problems relating to the diversion of resources, principally of manpower, from nonessential to vital industries. The mission has just returned; its more important findings and recommendations, together with those of other specialists within the Board, are incorporated herein.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Commanding the only remaining water route from the United States and Great Britain to the Middle East and India, the Union of South Africa is of increasing strategic importance. That South Africa, because of its geographic and economic advantages, be used effectively as an intermediate supply base, and that its war industries be fully developed should be primary concerns of the United States Government. Its geographical position with respect to existing supply lines is illustrated below in nautical miles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York to Marseilles</td>
<td>11,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York to Port Said</td>
<td>12,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York to Basra</td>
<td>11,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York to Bombay</td>
<td>12,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban to Marseilles</td>
<td>3,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban to Port Said</td>
<td>4,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban to Basra</td>
<td>4,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban to Bombay</td>
<td>4,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, war materials manufactured in South Africa largely from South African raw or semifinished products represent a substantial saving in the over-all shipping position. Even in the case of fabrication of war materials in South Africa from semifinished American products, there is in most instances also a considerable saving; steel, for example, consumes less shipping space than finished war materials manufactured from it. Also, the utilization of South Africa as a source of such supplies as foodstuffs and coal for the Middle East further represents shipping savings.

One factor which gives South Africa strategic value disproportionately to its size is the development within the past decade of a large and expanding iron and steel industry -- the only such industry

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, L11-75
By J. Schausle Date FEB 22 1972
on the entire continent. It has brought to the Union technological skills
and a degree of industrial development never before in Africa and
of great significance for the prosecution of the war. As is indicated
later in this annex, the British and South African armies in the Middle
East have made considerable use of the skilled labor and industrial facili-
ties along the Kishonstram, both for the fabrication of various munitions
and for the repair of munitions parts damaged in hostilities in the Middle
Eastern area. The repair and production facilities available in South
Africa should be tremendously useful to the American armed forces now being
stationed in various parts of Africa.

That the British have recognized these advantages is evidenced by
the increasing heavy demands upon South Africa made by the Imperial
forces in the Middle East and by India (through the Eastern Group Supply
Council at New Delhi).

OUTLOOK FOR EXPANSION OF THE WAR ECONOMY

As the war progresses and as the economy of South Africa is
gradually diverted from a peace-time basis to a war footing, South Africa
is finding itself faced with

(1) Expanded activities of the Director General of War
Supplies in the production of war materials for

(a) the South African forces, but more
importantly for

(b) the Eastern Group Supply Council and
possibly for

(c) other United Nations forces;

(2) Increased production of base metals for the United
States and to a lesser extent for Great Britain;

(3) Increased production of coal for the Middle East
and for tanking;

(4) A 70 percent increase in its steel industry by the
early part of 1943 with the possibility of further
ultimate expansion;

(5) Extremely large increases in the volume of ship
repairing (exact figures are held by the British
Admiralty and were not requested by the Board's
Mission).
(6) The necessity of further increases in the volunteer South African Army and air force, particularly trained technicians and mechanics;

(7) Increased demands upon the state-owned railway system, which has already absorbed virtually all of the increased traffic it can stand without added equipment and manpower;

(8) Increased demands upon the state-owned Electricity Supply Commission, upon the municipally-owned electric plants and particularly upon the Victoria Falls Power Company, operating principally on the Witwatersrand;

(9) The necessity of feeding a Force of United Nations soldiers possibly to be located in South Africa for training purposes;

(10) The necessity of furnishing labor and some materials to effectuate the increasing chrome and asbestos output of Southern Rhodesia and the heavy demands of the Rhodesia Railways, as well as for both construction and mining work on the Northern Rhodesia copper mines.

Each of these expanded activities, which is discussed more fully later, requires increased labor, or materials, or both. The above analysis closely resembles that made by a wartime research committee, of which the deputy director general of war supplies is chairman, in a secret report made in August 1942 to Prime Minister South. This report pointed out that there is a present grave shortage of skilled and semiskilled labor and that this shortage is imperilling not only further increases in the war manufacturing and repairing industries, but that it will prevent the completion of the principal new projects now planned, some of which are included above. The report further stated that only one remaining source of skilled and semiskilled labor remains, the gold mining industry of the Witwatersrand, and urgently recommended an immediate 10 percent reduction in the level of operations, measured in tonnage milled.

LABOR AND SUPPLIES POSITION OF GOLD MINING INDUSTRY

At the beginning of the war the British Government informed the South African government that the production of gold constituted a primary source of war and requested that it vigorously pursue both production and development. This policy was communicated to the gold mining industry and tonnage milled has increased 17 percent from September 1939 to the present time. This policy on the part of the British and South African Governments has never been reversed and was confirmed by the South African Minister of Mines as late as August,
1942 in a public statement. However, in anticipation of shortage of supplies, development work on new properties was largely abandoned in 1941. Production should shortly commence a slow decline, unless the process is accelerated by a further tightening of supplies such as by the machinery proposed in the recommendations covered in this Annex.

This study does not deal with considerations as to the future monetary position of gold, but considers solely the two questions of the industry's consumption of manpower and materials in the light of the requirements of these two essentials by the South African war effort.

Labor

The manpower of the South African gold mines constitutes the only large body of skilled and semiskilled labor on the African Continent which can, at least in part, be diverted to the war effort. White male employees of the gold mines as of June 30 totalled 39,709, excluding 1,550 men subsequently released for the Army and not replaced. In addition, there were 2,146 white females employed. Native male employees totalled 368,935, of whom 260,638 were natives of South Africa and 116,307 imported from other areas, principally Portuguese East Africa.

The 17 percent expansion in the rate of gold mining operations since the beginning of the war has not been accompanied by a proportionate increase in the mines' labor force, with the result that the mines themselves are suffering from a labor shortage, particularly of white labor and in skilled categories such as engine drivers. Further, a shortage in the gold mines of semiskilled and even unskilled native labor is imminent upon the expiration of present labor contracts due to the recent British prohibition of native labor recruiting by the gold mines in the British protectorates of Bechuanaland and Basutoland. This prohibition has been for the purpose of putting natives in the understaffed South African coal mines and in the British army. Thus, a moderate reduction in the rate of operations by 10 or 15 percent would merely result in filling out the present thin spots in the gold mines and would not release to the war effort a proportionate amount of labor. After studying this problem on the ground, the Board's mission tentatively concluded that reduction beyond 15 percent would reduce the labor force roughly in proportion to the reduction in the volume of ore milled.

There follows a brief description of the present work of gold mining employees and a short account of how they could be transferred into the war effort.
No substantial increase in South African war production is possible without a diversion of labor from the gold mines to war industries. As has been indicated, South Africa is suffering from an increasingly acute shortage of skilled and semiskilled labor, both white and native. 40,000 European and 365,000 native laborers are employed by the gold mines. Two-thirds of the Europeans and three-fourths of the natives are employed underground. One-fourth of the whites are foreman, supervisors, technicians, and other white-collar salaried workers; three-fourths are classified as wage earners. All skilled and supervisory classifications are filled by whites. Native labor is classified as unskilled, although most of the natives already have sufficient experience to qualify them as semiskilled and skilled workers.

The Transvaal Chamber of Mines and certain sections of the South African and British Governments have stated that because some 80 percent of the workers of the gold mines are of the Afrikaner-speaking population, they could not work in the war industries. The Board's mission investigated this subject carefully, discussing the problem with various Afrikaner leaders and with some of the mine operators themselves, and came to the conclusion that this opinion was fallacious. In July, 1942, the Transvaal Chamber of Mines took a poll of all workers to determine whether they would enlist in the army, and only about five percent indicated that they would do so, but the poll was worded in such a manner that clear conclusions were impossible from its results. Nothing was asked as to the willingness of employees to work in war industries. The principal deterrent to the employment of gold mine employees in war industries is the present small wage differential in favor of the gold miners. We believe that the American representative on the proposed South African Supply Council and the proposed permanent United States Economic Mission can persuade the Controller of Mines and other interested persons at least to equalize wage rates between these two industries. There is a possibility that extreme anti-British Afrikaner gold miners might not desire to work in the munitions plants, but these could be readily absorbed by industries indirectly contributing to the war effort, such as the steel industry.

Factors tending to facilitate large scale conversion of labor from the gold mines to war industries are:

1. Skills in most types of mining are largely interchangeable: the 3,000 workers in the gold mines classified as miners, and the additional thousands engaged in other phases of mining activity could have little difficulty adapting themselves to similar work on other mines. American labor has been found to be largely interchangeable in the operations entailed in coal, iron, copper, zinc, and coal mines in the United States; there is no reason why South African laborers should not be equally interchangeable.
2. With the exceptions of beryllium and manganese, deposits of most of the critical minerals are concentrated in the Transvaal and northeastern Cape areas not far removed from the Rand gold fields.

3. Moreover, the great majority of workers now employed on the gold mines, could by reason of the wide variety of their training, shortly become workers in metal manufacturing, in shipyards, and on the railroads. Trades learned in and around the mines together with the number of white mine workers employed therein are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmiths</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiler attendants and firemen</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiler makers</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricians</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine guiders</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitters</td>
<td>1,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handymen</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learners</td>
<td>1,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipemen and track or plate layers</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riggers and splicers</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riveters and welders</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timbermen</td>
<td>2,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tube mill, shiftsmen and helpers</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The workers listed above account for over 25% of total white mine employees.

4. Thousands of workers employed in the gold mines have experience that would be particularly useful in the expanding of steel industries and other war plants in and around Johannesburg.

5. In addition to these workers employed on the mines who are readily transferable to war industries, there are thousands of other workers in various secondary industries with skills almost equally adaptable to war industries. Many of these industries, such as engineering shops, foundries, etc., exist only because of the demands of gold mines for their materials, from which it follows that reduced gold operations may be expected to occasion reduced demands upon these secondary industries and their wide range of production.
Activities vital to South Africa's war effort which are now experiencing labor shortages are as follows:

1. Base metal mining -- expansion will require at least an additional 145 white and 2665 native laborers.

2. Coal mining -- contemplated increases in coal output will entail an additional 10,000 workers, of which about 1000 will be whites.

3. Iron and steel -- the present expansion program can not be completed without an increase of about 2500 white employees.

4. Railway transportation -- as a result of shortages of skilled and semiskilled labor in the government-owned railways, essential repairs and maintenance operations are not being effected. So serious is the labor and the material shortage now experienced by both the South African and the Rhodesia Railways, that it is likely many thousand of tons of much needed coal and base metals will not be moved from mines to harbors for transshipment.

5. Plans have been perfected for expansion of port facilities at Capetown and Durban and work is under way. However, the Board's mission observed that progress was slow and that experienced management and skilled labor were necessary to expedite construction.

It is, of course, impossible to state accurately the exact number of additional men which will be required over the next year by the war supplies and related industries, but it is likely that this will be somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000 white men and around 50,000 blacks.

As previously discussed, a reduction of 15 percent in the volume of tonnage milled by the gold mining industry would not release any substantial number of men, but a 25 percent reduction would probably mean somewhere around 6,000 white men and approximately 50,000 natives would be available for employment in the war effort.

Supplies

That the gold mines are enormous consumers of supplies is indicated by the total issues in 1941 of $34,000,000 in value. The


importance of the gold mining industry as a consumer of supplies will be understood from the following estimates of direct consumption by the mines of certain materials for the year 1941:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>160,000 short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelignite dynamite</td>
<td>53,978 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc dust</td>
<td>1,311 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyanide</td>
<td>11,665 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbides</td>
<td>17,196 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
<td>125,200 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>2,187,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol fuel and lubricating oils</td>
<td>15,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>64,407 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>87,100 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,702,857</strong> &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, there are assorted items of other materials directly consumed by the mines, which bring the total tonnage of material consumed to roughly 3,000,000 tons per annum. Further, secondary industries, dependent in large part upon gold mining, such as the explosives industry, the power industry, engineering shops and foundries are also large consumers of supplies. Thus, the figures of direct consumption of supplies by the mines are misleading. The total amount of supplies necessary to support the present rate of production is actually much larger.

The materials directly required by the gold mines from the United States are relatively small in amount. We give below a summary of requirements of American materials for 1943 calculated to maintain the present level of tonnage milled, although it should be borne in mind that this is a distorted picture since the indirect requirements are very considerable indeed. Further, these figures, which were prepared by the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, assume first call by the gold mining industry upon all local production, such as steel. This assumption is questionable, since the Controller of Steel emphatically told the Board's Mission that he would give first preference to war industries rather than to gold mines. In addition, the figures assume the import of over 20,000 tons of materials from Great Britain,
and it is doubtful whether the British will be in a position to furnish these materials. Therefore, it appears that the materials directly required by the gold mines from the United States in 1943 will be in excess of 50,000 tons.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>5,532 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oils and greases</td>
<td>14,630 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>16,903 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry</td>
<td>1,040 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>2,065 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>190 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and spares</td>
<td>1,017 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The small amount of the 1943 desired materials stems directly from the insistence of the Board's Mission that the mines not order any materials of which there is at least a six months supply on hand. Direct gold mining requirements for American materials, based on current operations, average between 150,000 - 200,000 tons in a so-called normal year and will return to around this figure after stocks are reduced if the current rate of production is maintained.

POSSIBLE CURTAILMENT OF GOLD PRODUCTION

So far in this study it has been mentioned that

(1) South Africa is faced with the necessity of considerable expansion of its war and related industries in order to support its own armed forces and particularly to meet the requirements of the Eastern Group Supply Council, and

(2) South Africa is experiencing an acute shortage of skilled and semiskilled labor, and even in certain instances, of unskilled labor with no substantial increase anticipated above the present level of war production unless additional sources of labor and materials can be found, and

(3) The gold mines of the Witwatersrand are consumers of

(a) the only large remaining supply of skilled and semi-skilled labor existing on the African continent and

(b) large quantities of supplies, primarily derived from local production and secondarily from the United States and Great Britain which represent plant capacity both in South Africa and overseas, as well as electric power and water and rail
transportation, plus appreciable manpower involved in production of component raw materials and manufacture thereof.

Consequently, the interests of the war effort of both South Africa and the United Nations would be served by the curtailment of gold mining operations, thus providing a diversion of resources now used by the mines to the war effort.

However, the possibility of the United States Government being able to persuade the South African Government to effect such a reduction is more difficult than would appear on the surface.

On August 21 the Board's mission conferred with Prime Minister Smuts and recommended, in the light of its intensive study of South African economic conditions, that a voluntary reduction be effected by the South African Government, as a constructive step toward implementing the war effort of South Africa. The Prime Minister concurred, in general, with the economic reasoning of the Mission, but emphatically stated that for political reasons, which he explained in detail, it was impossible for him to agree to a reduction in operations. He left no doubt as to his position, stating that he would vigorously oppose any attempt on the part of the United States Government to force him to make such a reduction. Therefore, since General Smuts is the bulwark of the existing South African war effort, and since it would be unwise for the United States Government to place him in an embarrassing position, a voluntary reduction, effected by the South African Government — by decree or agreement or in some similar manner — seems out of the question.

However, General Smuts stated that he realized the supply situation would become increasingly tight, and that reduction in gold mining would inevitably result. It was plain that General Smuts believed himself capable of dealing with the problem arising from decreasing foreign supplies for the gold mines. More careful screening of supplies from the United States and Great Britain seems, therefore, to be the best approach to the problem.

It is difficult to carry out a detailed screening of supplies for South Africa from Washington. It is only in South Africa that a continuing intelligent appraisal of requirements can be made. For example, it would be catastrophic to the South African political and economic structure if all gold mining operations were suddenly to cease due to lack of a few critical materials resulting from uninformed control of supplies in Washington. Inversely, it is believed
that intelligent controls can be effectively administered in South Africa by careful screening of British and American orders at the scene of action.

Stocks of materials on hand, which when exhausted must in whole or part be imported from the United States, now average about nine months' supply. All stocks are adequate for approximately six months' operation. Obviously, these stocks must approach exhaustion before any appreciable curtailment may be expected. It is recommended (1) that gold mining orders be considered unfavorably by the Office of Exports of the Board of Economic Warfare pending the establishment of the proposed South African Supply Council and that (2) thereafter the American representative on the Council follow the policy of withholding approval on supplies until stocks are reduced to approximately three months' supply; beyond this point he should withhold approval of such supplies as would permit continued operation at the present level and design his certification so as to affect a 25 percent reduction as soon as possible. He would, of course, explain the problems of supply and shipping and the necessity of delivering an increasing volume of materials for the war industries.

By this procedure, which appears to be the only method acceptable to the South African Government, an initial reduction in the present volume of tonnage milled, together with an accompanying diversion of resources to the South African war effort, would be affected over 12 months or possibly a lesser period.

FEASIBLE EXPANSION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR EFFORT

Some details follow as to the present position of the South African war effort, possibilities of potential expansion and estimates of the materials necessary to affect such expansion.

1. Director General of War Supplies

South Africa has no large factories which are capable of being converted in whole or in large part to war industries, with the possible exception of its important explosives industry which is still largely used by the gold mines. Hence, the Director General of War Supplies has utilized small existing facilities such as parts of the railway work-shops, the steel mills, explosive plants, gold mine workshops, the South African Mint, and the engineering and machine
shops of the Witwatersrand. In none of these cases has adequate utilization for war production been affected. Excepting the railway shops and the Mint, and the steel mills to a lesser extent, by far the greater part of the total facilities continues to be used for gold mining purposes. In a few instances, such as shell loading plants, the government has made purely wartime installations; more are contemplated for a somewhat wider range of activities, such as a proposed textile plant for military purposes. The progress of such developments has, however, to date been hindered by the South African Treasury's policies, which are similar to those of a successful corporation in perspective.

Generally speaking, the war industries of South Africa, which are all under the close control of the Director General of War Supplies, have produced good, though small, results. There is adequate engineering talent in the country and most operations are well conducted, although few are yet on a mass-production basis and some, notably gun manufacture and airplane parts production, require skilled labor or supervision of a variety not yet available in the country. Those operations which are regarded as being most suited to expansion include the production of explosives, aircraft bombs, textiles, ship repair, boat manufacturing, and the manufacture of spare tank parts for airplanes delivery to the Middle East.

Brief discussions of some of the more important operations follow:

(c) **Aircraft Bombs**

Production of aircraft bombs was only commenced on an other than experimental basis in late 1941. The 1943 schedule of all aircraft bombs to be manufactured is as follows:
Size | No.
---|---
1000 lbs. | 2,400
500 lbs. | 67,200
250 lbs. | 36,000
100 lbs. | 18,000
20 lbs. | 137,600
11\(\frac{1}{2}\) lbs. (Practice) | 1,161,000

The Eastern Group Supply Council has repeatedly requested the Director General of War Supplies to manufacture a substantial quantity of bombs, notable 60,000 per year of 500 lb. bombs, and 120,000 per annum of 250 lb. bombs. To date it has been impossible to effect this production owing to (1) shortage of tonnel for manufacture of TNT, (2) lack of sufficient electric furnace capacity (this is being rectified), (3) shortage of sheet steel for bomb tails (this will be rectified by mid-1943), (4) insufficient machine tools, and (5) insufficient detonator tube capacity (being partially rectified). The Director General of War Supplies told the Board of Economic Warfare's Mission that production of aerial bombs could be considerably increased as the foregoing problems became solved.

The bomb casings are in large part manufactured by the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Iscor). Production of additional casings is largely a question of increased forging capacity. This is part of the Iscor extension program as described below. Casings are in large part finished on the gold mine shops by native labor, and in a few instances by women. It is clear that the steel industry of South Africa can be utilized to increase the production of casings and that South Africa's large explosives industry can be more advantageously used for manufacture of bomb explosives and detonators. This latter point is developed more fully under the expansion program of the explosives industry.

The Deputy Director General of War Supplies (Technical) told the Board's Mission that the South African production of aircraft bombs would be doubled within a year provided that he could obtain the necessary funds from the Ministry of Finance, and provided that the related expansion programs proceeded as now planned by the Director General of War Supplies.

To illustrate the importance of the South African war effort as an independent unit, the Director General of War Supplies estimated the total amount of steel required for the 1943 aircraft bomb program noted above as 57,000 tons. The total amount desired from the United States to effectuate this program is only 5,000 tons, all of the balance being obtained from local steel production. In 1944, this last figure should be reduced, if not eliminated, by the extension to the Iscor works.
This plant is engaged in the manufacture of small arms ammunition, fuses, and primers, and a number of small operations. Present production per month and estimated production for month by June, 1943 of small arms ammunition follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Present production per month</th>
<th>Estimated production per month by June, 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.303&quot; Ball</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>22 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.303&quot; A.P.</td>
<td>2.3 &quot;</td>
<td>3.3 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.303&quot; Flame</td>
<td>.4 &quot;</td>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuse and primer production is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>By June, 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuse 106</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuse 150 or 152</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primer No. 1</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1943 the total steel requirements of the ammunition section amount to 14,500 tons, based on the production schedules indicated above, of which supply over half, or 23,800 tons, will be desired from the United States. Copper and brass are produced locally.

(c) Armored Fighting Vehicle Section

The production of armored cars has been an entirely new development for South Africa. Such production was commenced on a small scale in 1939 and rapidly expanded in 1940 and 1941, and until early in 1941 the whole of the Middle East equipment of armored cars for all of the British, South African, Australian and New Zealand troops in that area were of South African manufacture. The materials and components required for the manufacture of this product are in part obtained from the United States and include chassis and sundry accessory fittings, such as electric light cable, fuses, copper tubing, fuel pumps, ball and roller bearings and V-belts. The chassis are manufactured in part by Hor ern-Herrington and by Ford. In terms of shipping tons, the total amount of chassis and all imported parts required from the United States amounts to 279 tons for each 100 Mark IV cars and 697 tons for each 100 Mark VI cars.

The Board's Mission examined both of these products, particularly the Mark VI car, which carries a 6-pounder gun, and studies cables from the Eastern Group Supply Council relating to the efficacy of both of these models in action. This program appears to have
merit, since the manufacture of the cars in South Africa is considerably more than just an assembly job. It involves not only the assembling of the knocked-down chassis but the building and fitting on of armor plate hulls, the manufacture of various mechanical components calling for precision machine tool work and automobile finishing work such as wiring, etc. In terms of shipping space there is no comparison between the knocked-down chassis and the finished product. All of the armor plate and mechanical components are locally manufactured by Iscor by various machine shops on the Witwatersrand.

To midsummer 1942 the Director General of War Supplies had produced 2,630 Mark III cars (which were the principal offensive land equipment in the Abyssinia campaign); 900 Mark IV cars for the South African Forces, and 1,230 Mark IV cars for the Eastern Group Supply Council; production is now getting under way on 750 Mark VI cars, of which 250 are for the Eastern Group Supply Council. The 1943 schedule calls for a total of 200 cars per month, of which the Mark VI will predominate. The increased armor plate capacity of Iscor should enable an increase above this number in 1944, provided the necessary chassis can be delivered from the United States. According to the Director of this operation, the principal bottle-necks in further expansion, other than lack of sufficient shipping and the present limited armor plate capacity, are lack of labor and somewhat inadequate machine tool capacity. It appears that there is merit in this operation based upon the saving in shipping space, the future ability of Iscor to manufacture the necessary armor plate and the convenience of South Africa to the Middle East.

(d) Engineering Section

This Section of the Director General of War Supplies handles all of the requirements of the South African Forces for such items as Bellman hangars, military bridges, multiple span workshop buildings, and other miscellaneous engineering equipment. It also has met demands in this respect from the Eastern Group Supply Council, having furnished 110 Bellman hangars out of 460 manufactured in South Africa recently. This Section is a heavy consumer of steel, too large a proportion of which has been imported from the United States, but this situation will be corrected upon completion of the Iscor extension. Future demands upon this Section by the Eastern Group Supply Council are summarized at a later point in this study, and aggregate an impressive total.

Because the engineering Section consumes large quantities of steel plates and sheets, the future is closely allied with the development of Iscor. Local manufacture of such items as hangars from locally produced steel results, of course, in a net gain in the overall war effort.
Explosives

This Section presents one of the principal opportunities for expansion, since South Africa has a very large explosive industry which is being used in large part by the gold mines. A small part of two of the three large plants of African Explosives and Industries, Ltd., has been diverted to explosives manufacture for the Director General of War Supplies. There is available through African Explosives a large highly trained technical personnel and plants producing such basic explosives as sulphuric acid, nitric acid, ammonia synthesis, nitro cotton, nitroglycerin, etc.

The present rate of output of purely military products is as follows:

9,250 short tons of cordite per annum
4,400 " " TNT per annum
450 " " tetryl per annum
430,000,000 caps per annum
12,000,000 military detonators per annum

In addition, a fairly large amount of demolition explosives (straight gelignites) for military operations in the Middle East, and various chemical products such as sulphuric acid, are being manufactured.

In large part local materials are used, but to effect the above program it is necessary to import 1,320 tons of toluol for TNT manufacture from the United States and an aggregate of only 373 tons of other materials, all from Great Britain.

The War Supplies organization believes that the proportion of work being done by the explosives industry for war manufactures should be considerably increased. It is interesting to note that in 1941 the gold mines of South Africa consumed 2,159,137 cases of explosives of 50 pounds each. Due to the continued high rate of operations of the gold mines, and since no pressure, either from within South Africa or from overseas, has yet been exercised to effect a reduction in gold mining operations, there are no plans at present to increase the ratio of war operations by African Explosives and Industries, Ltd., from both the United States and the United Kingdom. In this connection, there is a close community of interests between the gold industry and African Explosives, which is 50% owned by Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., and 50% by the DeBoers syndicate, the chairman of African Explosives also being the chairman of one of the largest gold mining groups.
The increased foundry capacity of Iscor now being constructed, as well as the other current extensions, should make an ideal link with the existing explosives industry for the manufacture of a wide variety of munitions. However, it appears that the facilities of African Explosives and Industries, Ltd., can only be more advantageously utilized upon a substantial reduction of gold mining operations.

It should also be mentioned that a number of strategic materials for the manufacture of explosives is being imported from Great Britain. The veto power which the American representative on the proposed South African Supply Council would exercise over importations from Great Britain might be advantageously used to persuade African Explosives to make a larger contribution to the war effort.

(f) Boots

In relation to its population South Africa possesses a large tanning and boot manufacturing capacity, and has furnished not only the entire boot and shoe requirements of the South African forces, but has been a large contributor to the Eastern Group Supply Council. At a later point in the consideration of the general subject of the Director General of War Supplies there is presented a statement of contributions made to the Middle East and India by this department. The figures in question do not represent maximum capacity and the Director General of War Supplies estimates that an increase of perhaps as much as 25% could be effected subject to importation of certain materials such as machine parts, and particularly subject to the availability of labor.

(g) Army Textiles

A satisfactory contribution is being made by South Africa both to the support of its own troops and to the Middle East. The South African blanket industry is today producing between 150,000 and 170,000 military blankets monthly, of which over 100,000 per month are being supplied to the Middle East. Increased production is hampered by lack of facilities in the Union for warp which is being supplied by the United States and India. Webbing is being manufactured by a recently erected plant which furnishes the entire demands of the South African forces for webbing equipment.

South Africa does not have any fine spinning and weaving capacity for cotton cloth such as drills but it has a very large make-up capacity. At present only 25-30% of the output of clothing factories is being utilized to meet military demands. The Director General of War Supplies has stated that it could easily absorb about 5,000,000 yards of cloth monthly in the manufacture of all types of military garments. Obviously, a substantial increase could be effected in the manufacture of clothing if labor were available.
Estimated military consumption in 1943 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Yards</th>
<th>Short tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canvas and duck</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
<td>2,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drill</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>3,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirting</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interlocked yard</td>
<td>680,000</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,000,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,497</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the above it will be necessary to import 3,225 tons from the United States, 1,769 tons from the United Kingdom and 1,503 tons (if possible) from India.

Since the existing textile plant capacity within the Union does not cover any of the above described items, the importation of such goods represents a further shipping problem to the United States. The Board's Mission investigated the possibility of South Africa's importing sufficient machinery to manufacture all of the foregoing external military textile requirements. A study was made by the Mission, in cooperation with the government-owned Industrial Development Corporation, precise specifications were drawn up, and it was determined that in terms of short tons the total amount of machinery necessary for the manufacture of these items was the equivalent of ten months' supply of the necessary importations. Upon installation of the plant in question, all production over and above the first ten months would represent a complete saving in shipping space. In the event of a long war, the advantages of this type of procedure are obvious.

(h) Spare Parts for Tanks and Guns in the Middle East

Unlike American tanks, British tanks up to now have not arrived on the battle front in the Middle East equipped with any spares. Therefore, when any part is broken, through action or otherwise, the tank was, in 1940 and during the greater part of 1941, immobilized. Since South Africa, and the Witwatersrand in particular, is the only place on the African continent (other than the new facilities in Eritrea) which has any sizeable machine shop facilities, the British called upon the Director General of War Supplies to furnish spare parts for tanks. These are flown to the battle front by a regular commuting service.
This repair function, which also includes spare parts for guns, has been one of the most important parts of the war effort of South Africa. As of July 1942, demands had been received for 5,000 different items, totalling 1,250,000 spare parts. The head of the Mid-East Spare Section of the Director General of War Supplies states that the estimated monthly capacity of the Union is 100,000 parts; much of this work is done in the shops of the railways and of the gold mines. The scope of this work could be increased appreciably if a larger part of the mine shops could be diverted from repairs on mining machinery to the manufacture of Mid-East spares. The Board's Mission visited a number of the shops in question and was impressed with the great possibility of both enlargement and improvement of technique.

The Union has sent to the battle front in the Middle East 1,120,000 spare parts. The greater part of the materials used in the manufacture of spare parts is locally manufactured. However, a small amount of special steel must be imported from the United States.

(i) Summary of the Contribution to the War Effort by the Director General of War Supplies and Estimate of Materials Necessary to Sustain this Effort.

From the isolated examples of a few of the departmental activities of the Director General of War Supplies shown above, it is apparent that virtually all of the supply requirements of the South African forces, both in South Africa and on fighting fronts, are being furnished by the Director General of War Supplies, with the exception of such items as airplanes, heavy guns and tanks, the production of which is impossible in the Union. The South African forces total approximately 150,000 men, or about nine percent of the total white population. In addition, the Director General of War Supplies has had heavy demands from the Eastern Group Supply Council and, excepting India, South Africa is the largest contributor to the Council. South African deliveries to the Council are rapidly gaining on those made by India. A summary of a few of the more important contributions of the Director General of War Supplies to the Eastern Group Supply Council is given below.

### Aerial bombs

- 600 lb. bombs: 1,000 per month
- 250 lb. bombs: 1,500 per month
- 2,000 per month

### Anti-tank Mines

- Mark 11: 14,000 per month
- Mark 5: 20,000 per month
- Mid-East pattern: 100,000 per month
3" Mortar bombs
Shells

3.7" Howitzer
25 lb. shells

Small Arms Ammunition

.303" Ball
.303" A.P.

Fuses, 106
Fuses, 150
Primer #1
Fabricated structural steel buildings
Water piping and fittings
Nails
Wire rope
Maintenance and road making plant
Cargo handling gear
Barrows, trucks, etc.
Mid-East Tank spares

120,000 per month*

55,000 per month*

55,000 per month*

10,000,000 per month*

2,300,000 per month*

40,000 per month*

40,000 per month*

70,000 per month*

11,600 tons per annum

99,000 tons per annum

7,300 tons per annum

4,420 tons per annum

10,000 tons per annum

14,000 tons per annum

4,000 tons per annum

100,000 items per month

*Includes small proportion for use by South African forces.

In order to meet all of the requirements of the South African forces and to make its relatively heavy contribution to the Eastern Group Supply Council, it will be necessary for the South African Government to import in 1943 from the United States for the Director General of War Supplies the following materials:

(short tons)

Lubricants, greases, etc.
Tinplate (canning for troops and Admiralty)
Timber
Paper
Tractors
Industrial chemicals
Steel (for South African forces)
Steel (for Eastern Group Supply Council)
Textiles
Machinery, parts, etc.

63,000
24,000
35,000
8,000
4,000
23,000
61,000
180,000
3,000
50,000
450,000

These figures exclude, of course, direct military purchases such as airplanes.
BASE METAL MINING

A relatively small increase is contemplated in base metal mining in South Africa during the balance of 1942 and during 1943. Such expansion as is likely to take place will require about 145 European and approximately 2,665 native laborers.

Vanadium--The present vanadium production of approximately 4,200 tons during 1942 may be increased by 1,200 tons with the addition of only 15 European and 350 native laborers. However, additional electric power and plant facilities are required in order to bring the Akmab mine into production.

Corundum--Six thousand tons of corundum will be produced in South Africa this year. An additional 15 European and 300 native laborers are expected to increase this tonnage mined by 2,500 tons during 1943.

Copper--Present copper production is at the rate of 22,000 tons per annum; this figure is expected to rise 5,000 tons with the addition of only 75 native laborers and a relatively small amount of drilling and smelter equipment for the O'Okiep property.

Asbestos--There are large quantities of various types of asbestos available in the Union of South Africa. The United States Government, however, is interested at present only in the amosite, Transvaal blue and Cape blue grades which comprise less than one-third of the Union's output. An additional 10,000 tons of these long-fibre types of asbestos can be produced beyond the present rate of 120,000 tons. To effectuate this 10,000-ton increase, 75 European and 1,500 native laborers must be obtained.

Chrome--A decline of some 50,000 tons is likely in chrome output in the Union, largely as a result of the decision of the United States Government to purchase not over 250,000 tons in 1943. This decrease in output should free about 40 European and 740 native laborers for other base metal mining.

Manganese--Anticipated shipping shortages during 1943 will keep manganese production at approximately the present level of 310,000 metric tons per annum. (South Africa is capable of supplying considerably more manganese than this figure, but production beyond 310,000 tons would be of inferior ores which appear undesirable to exploit at this juncture).

It is apparent that there is no appreciable labor or material problem involved in the feasible increases in production of South African base metals now required by the United States.

As described at a later point, it is necessary for South Africa to support the increasing volume of base metal production in both Southern and Northern Rhodesia. These areas are closely connected from an economic standpoint and the highly desirable copper and chrome of Northern and Southern Rhodesia form an important part of the war effort of southern Africa.
The only important known coal deposits in Africa are located in South Africa, primarily in the Transvaal and to a lesser extent in Natal. Since the outbreak of war there has been a considerable increase in demands upon the Union, the current rate of production being approximately 2,000,000 tons a month, as compared with 1,500,000 before the war. This increase in demand has resulted not only from the steady rise in consumption by the railways and for the manufacture of electric power, but is importantly due to the considerable increase in demand for bunkering and for export to the Middle East.

The number of ships calling at South African ports has, of course, risen appreciably since the Mediterranean was cut off. Most of this bunkering is done at Durban, close to the Natal coal fields, and at Lourenco Marques in Portuguese East Africa, adjacent to the Transvaal fields.

The demands for coal in the Middle East have risen abruptly during the past few months and the British Government has placed the highest priority upon the transport of coal to that general area. So great has the demand been that coal has outranked in priority many other strategic materials, such as the metallurgical chrome of Southern Rhodesia.

Needless to say, this relatively sudden and great increase in demand of coal has presented considerable problems of labor supply and indirectly of railroad transportation. The latter point is discussed in connection with the general problems of railways.

The labor problem became so great in the middle of 1942 that it was necessary for the British Government to prevent recruiting by the gold mines in the native Protectorates so that natives could be put into the coal mines. Thus, the present coal expansion, and the likelihood of continued expansion over a period of some time, has become largely a labor problem, and like that of so many other war industries, reflects the need of diversion of manpower from the gold mines.

The contribution of the United States to this expansion program, other than in the matter of shipping, is relatively minor, the total requirements of the coal mines of South Africa for American materials in 1943, designed to support the proposed increases, being only 770 tons.
It is wasteful to ship coal from the United States to the Middle East when there is ample coal available in South Africa. A complete survey should be made of the possibilities of further increasing coal production and related problems, such as railway transportation.

STEEL INDUSTRY

In South Africa there are three steel producers, of which by far the largest is the Government-owned South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation (commonly referred to as Iscor). In turn, Iscor controls the second largest producer, the Union Steel Corporation. The present ingot ton capacity of South Africa is summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>APPROX. INGOT TONNAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iscor</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Steel</td>
<td>Vereeniging</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumbarton Iron and Steel</td>
<td>Benoni</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>415,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is equivalent to approximately 310,000 tons per annum of finished material of the types of steel fabricated in South Africa.

South Africa is extremely well situated with respect to steel production. From the standpoint of raw materials there is virtually no limit to the future expansion possibilities of steel development in South Africa. Iscor operates from iron ore to the finished product. It obtains its iron ore from its own mine located at Thabazimbi in the northeastern Transvaal. The ore is of great purity, being a Haematite type running to 65/67 percent metallic iron and, in fact, is so pure that it has to be mixed with a small quantity of high silica iron ore mined near Pretoria to obtain the necessary slag volume in the blast furnace. Coal for the production of coke is drawn mainly from the Witbank coal field east of Pretoria. Manganese is obtained from Postmasburg in the northeastern Cape Province and limestone is also obtained near there. Dolomite is quarried at the site of the Pretoria works.

In addition to the above three companies engaged in the production of steel ingots and also of finished steel, there are a number of reprocessing plants within the Union which purchase ingots from Iscor and in a few instances from the other two companies. Further, there are other plants used for the production of secondary iron, ferro-manganese and ferro-alloys. In addition to these types of fabricators, there are twelve small steel foundries in South Africa operating small electric furnaces for foundry work.
Up to now South Africa has been essentially a steel importing country, its consumption ranging in recent years from 300,000 to 500,000 tons above local production. Most of the necessary imports in the pre-war period were obtained from continental Europe and the United Kingdom, but commencing in early 1940 European sources of steel imports were cut off and supplies from the United Kingdom became extremely difficult to obtain, with the result that from mid-1940 to the present South Africa has been a heavy buyer of steel from the United States.

As a result of increasing difficulty in obtaining imported steel and because of the growing demand for steel within the country, particularly from the Director General of War Supplies, both for local war materials and for refabrication for the Eastern Group Supply Council, Iscor commenced a long-range expansion program in 1941. This involves the following program, all of which has been fully approved and materials and equipment are now being obtained in the United States, Great Britain and South Africa. Completion of the following steps of the expansion program should be fully effected by the end of the first quarter of 1943:

(1) An increase in the output of the Thabazimbi iron ore mine to make possible
   (a) the supply of additional Iscor requirements of ore resulting from the erection of a third blast furnace and an installation of a Bessemer duplex plant and a cok­king mill at Pretoria and a plate mill at a new site located at Vereeniging; and
   (b) the delivery by Iscor to Great Britain of 30,000 to 40,000 tons per month of Thaba­simbi ore (to replace Swedish ore); during the past two years 540,000 tons of ore have been delivered to the British Government from this mine, but deliveries are now somewhat irregular due to replacement by Brazilian ore;

(2) A Bessemer duplex plant at Pretoria (now completed);

(3) A third blast furnace which will increase total ingot capacity of Iscor to 600,000 tons per annum (expected to be in operation by October, 1942);

(4) A blooming and slabbing mill with auxiliary equipment, auxiliaries and cranes, for the Pretoria works, which is on order in the United States and which should be in operation by February or March, 1943;

(5) A plate mill, now on order in the United States, due to commence operation also in February or March, 1943;
(6) A jobbing mill now on order in Great Britain, due to commence operation in December 1942.

(7) A tool steel mill now in course of manufacture by Iscor, although certain equipment and accessories are being imported largely from Great Britain. This plant should be in operation by the end of 1942.

Thus, by the end of the first quarter of 1943, the ingot steel output of South Africa should total 690,000 tons, which will be roughly equivalent to 515,000 tons of finished material.

As in the case of most principal industries in South Africa, the steel industry is controlled by a representative of the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, known in this case as the Controller of Iron and Steel. He has broad powers, including the allocation of steel to various industries and the power of seizure in favor of one industry as against another. For practical purposes he has full charge of what is commonly known as the "South African Steel Pool", which consists of all South African production and of imports from the United States and Great Britain. The Board's Mission regards him highly, and found that he favored the allocation of materials to the Director General of War Supplies in contrast to the demands of the gold mining industry.

Although completion of the Iscor extension will greatly reduce requirements for imported steel, total annual requirements, including those for the Eastern Group Supply Council, will probably be between 700,000-800,000 tons, leaving substantially over 200,000 tons still to be imported unless more rigid steel controls within South Africa are instituted. One of the most important functions of the American representative on the proposed South African Supply Council should, therefore, be close cooperation with the Controller of Iron and Steel to ensure that South Africa's gold mines do not consume more than the minimum amount of domestic production.

There is no reason why the steel industry in South Africa should not be expanded beyond the level of the present extension program, thus eliminating all steel imports and fabricating war materials directly from South African production. The United States military and naval mission sent by General Marshall from Cairo to South Africa early in 1942 submitted a report of recommendations to the South African Government, which the latter showed the Board's Mission. One of the principal recommendations contained in this report was that the steel capacity of South Africa be expanded from the proposed 690,000 ingot ton level to 1,000,000 ingot tons. We strongly concur in this belief, and it was the observation of the Board's Mission, which examined all phases of operations, that the South African Government would need little pressure to effect this. Obviously, there would be a considerable amount of machinery from the United States necessary to bring about expansion of this size. However,
all of the machinery from the United States required to bring about the Iscor expansion from 330,000 to 600,000 ingot tons aggregated only 9,600 tons. Thus, not only would there be a very great saving of shipping, but there would be an over-all gain to the war effort by the increased manufacture of munitions and related products in South Africa resulting from the expansion of local steel capacity.

The Board's Mission was impressed with the calibur of the Iscor management. Iscor has drawn over the past decade a substantial section of the younger executive and engineering brains of South Africa. The Mission has reported that the management is vigorous and intensely interested in the building up of South Africa as an industrial nation. Iscor ties in closely to the Industrial Development Corporation, another Government-owned body, which has sponsored most of the industrial development of South Africa in recent years: the proposed textile plant, mentioned above under the Section devoted to the Director General of War Supplies, is a case in point.

It is noteworthy that Iscor is exclusively a South African operation, that allegedly the British commercial interests opposed its creation and development and the gold interests were long hostile to it. Although until recently the gold industry has constituted one of its most important customers, the management of Iscor believes that the future of South Africa lies in industries other than gold mining.

SHIP REPAIRING

The large volume of United Nations shipping diverted from the Mediterranean to the Cape route has heavily taxed the ship repairing facilities of the Union, and it is anticipated that as the volume of supplies for the Middle East and possibly for India increases, the ship repairing problem will become acute.

The time has long since passed when the moderate ship repairing facilities at Capetown and Durban were able to handle all of the necessary demands. In late August there were, for example, three ships at Durban which had been awaiting repair for over four months, and a number of other vessels which had been there for the same purpose for lesser periods of time.

The Director General of War Supplies has proposed that the gold mining shops on the Witwatersrand, located 400 miles from Durban and 1,000 miles from Capetown, be utilized for the repairing of marine engines. According to him, shops of the gold mines are well suited for this purpose, since they are the only large industry which is accustomed to engine repairing on a substantial scale. The railways have agreed to run special trains for this purpose. Despite the distance involved, this plan would appear to be advantageous, since it would use existing facilities and would also tap trained labor.
However, it is impossible for the mine shops to undertake any substantial volume of this work as long as the demands upon them for repairs for gold mining equipment continue heavy.

In addition, other ship repairing projects are planned for Capetown and Durban and Port Elizabeth, all of which require skilled and semi-skilled personnel not now available. Again, the problem of obtaining labor is disproportionately large in relation to the importance of the industry in question.

At present Capetown and Durban are among the busiest ports in the world, and a considerable expansion of the harbor facilities of both of these ports has been virtually completed. A dry dock is proposed for Capetown, and another project at the Simonstown naval base is about to be commenced which will require an additional amount of labor. The Board's Mission was informed by the South African Railways and Harbours that a rather large project is to be started shortly on the development of a new harbor at Saldanha Bay north of Capetown.

There should be further investigation of ship repairing requirements and possibly aid to the South African Government may be desirable.

All of the materials directly required for ship repairing are purchased through the British Admiralty and are solely obtained from the United Kingdom.

TECHNICIANS FOR THE ARMY

The increasing mechanization of the South African army is at present drawing from the skilled and semi-skilled labor in the war industries. The Director General of War Supplies states that he anticipates this trend will continue.

RAILWAYS

The war-time demands upon the railways, which are owned by the Government, have been heavy. Gross tonnage hauled in 1942 is anticipated as being in excess of 35,000,000 tons in contrast to 29,000,000 in 1939. This strain has been aggravated by the increasing demands of coal in the Middle East. The Board's Mission, after a careful survey of the railway situation, believes that the increased traffic expected from expanding war industries and coal operations will call for a minimum of 1,000 additional bogie wagons.

The railways have done a good job in the war effort, contributing part of the facilities of their work shops for munitions operations and part of their staff to the army. An additional 800 men were released by the railways for army enlistment in July.
Although the position of the South African Railways is less grave than that of the Rhodesia Railways, the same labor problems affect the South African Railways, particularly if operations are to be further expanded.

The requirements of the South African Railways from the United States of materials necessary to maintain operations in 1943 are approximately as follows:

| Description               | Quantity
|---------------------------|----------
| Steel and steel products  | 29,000 tons |
| Oils and greases          | 8,000    |
| Miscellaneous (Approx.)   | 10,000   |
| Total                     | 47,000   |

Due to the expansion of war industries and to the maintenance of gold mining operations at all-time peak levels, there is a grave power shortage in the Transvaal. The Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company, which supplies the Witwatersrand both from its own power stations and through purchases from the Government-owned Electricity Supply Commission, has available only about 525,000 kw. capacity with which to meet peak demands of around 700,000 kw. in mid-1942. This is by no means a safe margin for sound utility operation. To give an illustration of the large part which the gold mining industry plays in the purchase of electricity, there follows a table showing the sales of electricity in 1941, in terms of kilowatt hours, by the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company:

Sales of Electricity - Year 1941

| Description               | Kilowatt Hours | Percentage |
|---------------------------|----------------|------------
| For Mining Purposes - Gold| 3,122,994,639  | 35.47%     |
| For Mining Purposes - Coal| 23,477,215     | 0.70%      |
| For Industrial Purposes   | 279,050,353    | 7.64%      |
| For Supplies to Municipalities | 121,665,956 | 3.32%      |
| For Railway Traction      | 104,164,765    | 2.87%      |

Total: 3,653,730,628 100.00%

There are now on order in England for the Klip power station, owned by the Electricity Supply Commission and operated by the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company, two new generating units of 33,000 kw. each, which will bring its total capacity up to 490,000 kw. In addition, the early purchase of another pair of generating units aggregating 66,000 kw. is contemplated in the near future.

Delivery of the first pair is anticipated early in 1943, and work has progressed too far to stop delivery on this order, since these machines are being especially designed for the Klip station. It is obvious, however, that the next pair need not be ordered if there is
any considerable reduction in the rate of tonnage milled by the gold mining industry.

To give a comparison of the value of those generating units, the Deputy Director General of War Supplies stated in 1941 that the man-hours involved in the production, transportation, and erection of one 33,000 kw. generating set and accessories was greater than the entire war effort of the gold mining industry in 1941.

A percentage reduction of tonnage milled by the gold mining industry would reflect an almost equivalent reduction in the amount of power consumed by the industry. At the present time the gold mines account for a demand of approximately 700,000 kw. Hence, a decline of 25 percent would release about 175,000 kw. of capacity for use by war industries.

The expansion of the ISCOR plant at Pretoria will no longer make it possible for it to produce its entire power requirements from its own station; the balance must be obtained from the municipally-owned Pretoria system. Indicative of the attitude of the South African Government towards the gold mining and steel industries, is its refusal to sanction the order by the Pretoria system for another British generating unit, power from which would be consumed by ISCOR and not by the gold mines.

Virtually all of the requirements of the power industry have traditionally been furnished by Great Britain, and the industry anticipates that it will be able to obtain its normal maintenance requirements from there.

SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN SOUTH AFRICA

It may become necessary for South Africa to support a considerable expeditionary force from the United States or other United Nations countries who might be stationed there for training purposes.

The economic problems attached to supporting an American expeditionary force should be studied and necessary cooperation arranged with the South African Government in their solution.

To assure the maintenance of South African agriculture, to say nothing of offsetting any desired increase in agricultural production for the support of an additional war-time population, it is necessary that agricultural machinery be imported from the United States. The Board's Mission was impressed with the possibilities of local manufacture of certain types of farm implements. Production of relatively
simple types of implements commenced in 1941 in South Africa; the rate of approximately 12,000 tons annually should be achieved by the end of 1943, dependent upon the delivery by the United States of certain machine tools.

Estimated agricultural requirements from the United States for 1943 will be approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural machinery</td>
<td>26,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oils and greases</td>
<td>4,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>4,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binder twine</td>
<td>1,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial chemicals</td>
<td>20,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>10,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>65,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUPPORT OF RHODESIAN BASE METAL INDUSTRIES

In terms of base metals both Southern and Northern Rhodesia are richer than South Africa.

There has been a considerable development of the chrome industry in Southern Rhodesia, and production is now running at the rate of approximately 380,000 long tons. It is planned that this will be increased to approximately 550,000 long tons in 1943. Coal production in the Wankie Flats is also being increased to help meet demands from the Middle East. Southern Rhodesia is a small country, having a total white population of only 60,000. The large number of white males in the army has produced a moderate labor shortage. If production is to be increased to the level indicated above, it will probably be necessary to import white supervisors from South Africa.

One of the outstanding problems in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia is the limited carrying capacity of the railways, which is now estimated as adequate for only 320,000 long tons of chrome per annum, leaving a deficiency of 130,000 long tons below the 1943 desired output. This deficiency will be even greater if the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia are able to increase their output and if coal continues to be given preference over chrome, as it was in August 1942. The basic problem of the railways centers in insufficient equipment; six new locomotives and 100 new bogie wagons in addition to the present lengthening program for 150 bogie wagons should overcome this deficiency. However, the management of the Rhodesian railways told the Board's mission that it was experiencing difficulties in obtaining labor, that the train crews were overworked, in many instances operating on 11-hour shifts. The Resident Director stated that he did not, at the moment, see where he could get the personnel to operate the new equipment upon its delivery.
Southern Rhodesia will therefore have to draw upon South Africa, as the only nearly source of labor supply, not only for white supervisors for the chrome mines, but for railway personnel as well. The only solution now apparent would be to make use of the services of some of the mine supervisors and other trained men from the gold mines of South Africa.

Construction has already commenced on the expansion of copper mining in Northern Rhodesia, particularly at the N'Changa mine. Construction firms undertaking this substantial job are having difficulty in obtaining labor and the South African Government has been requested to furnish at least 500 men immediately.

As a matter of policy the gold mines of South Africa have consistently declined to render aid to the Northern Rhodesia copper mines. For example, the operating head of two of the four large copper mines is still awaiting the arrival of 75 white supervisors and 2,000 natives whom he requested last December.

CONCLUSION

(1) Acute labor and material shortages now experienced by all parts of South African activity, largely occasioned by the current rate of gold mining operations, will prevent South Africa from fulfilling its potentialities as a producer of war materials and as a supply base.

(2) Gold mining operations must be curtailed if South Africa's full war potential is to be reached.

(3) It appears that the only practicable means of fulfilling the South African war potential is the immediate creation in South Africa of a South African Supply Council assisted by technicians and economic specialists on the proposed permanent United States Economic Mission to South Africa.
The Board's Mission brought back from South Africa over 2,000 pages of requirements data. It is planned over the next month to correlate this information into a program designed to implement the South African war effort to the maximum extent within the practical limitations of supplies and shipping. This program will go into great detail, down to individual items of machinery and equipment such as bolts and nuts, but some weeks will be required to complete this task. Meanwhile, it is believed desirable to proceed with the formulation of the proposed South African Supply Council, since the necessity of such an organization is not affected by the detail of the program mentioned above. Moreover, any program developed in Washington can only be regarded as tentative and is subject to considerable alteration by the proposed South African Supply Council as changing conditions within South Africa dictate.

Pending completion of the program in detail, there is given below a brief summarized schedule of estimated South African requirements in the United States for 1943. It will be appreciated that these figures are subject to alteration as work on the program progresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(short tons)</th>
<th>War Supplies</th>
<th>Railways</th>
<th>Gold Essential</th>
<th>Mines</th>
<th>Indus.</th>
<th>Agric.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubricating oils</td>
<td>59,919</td>
<td>7,275</td>
<td>14,363</td>
<td>21,470</td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>5,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraffin wax</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>10,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greases</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>4,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3,365</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinplate</td>
<td>24,080</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>3,620</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>35,157</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>16,603</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>2,634</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>11,355</td>
<td>27,259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric. machinery</td>
<td>3,472</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>11,355</td>
<td>27,259</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indus. chemicals</td>
<td>22,517</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>5,532</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>15,663</td>
<td>11,239</td>
<td>63,765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>243,156</td>
<td>25,372</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>272,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military textiles</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>3,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. mach., parts, etc.</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. consumers goods</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>451,212</td>
<td>41,353</td>
<td>14,510(A)</td>
<td>52,638</td>
<td>54,360</td>
<td>53,355</td>
<td>704,666</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) This total assumes continuance of gold mining operations at the current rate. Through the use of his powers, the American representative on the South African Supply Council, these requirements of the gold mining industry can be reduced substantially.

* * * * *

The total of 704,666 short tons required in 1943 is approximately equal to the current rate of shipping from the United States to South Africa and is somewhat lower than in 1940 and 1941.
TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington
October 20, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON
FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Please communicate the following message from the President to General Smuts:

QUOTE: Ambassador Pinant has informed me of his talk with you and I am happy to learn from him that you will give serious consideration to the possibility of coming to Washington before your return to South Africa. I hope very much indeed that this may be possible. I feel it would be in the highest degree useful to me to have the opportunity of exchanging views with you and of discussing both present and future problems with you. I realize that your time is limited but I trust I may have the opportunity of welcoming you here on your way home. UNQUOTE

I have just heard your splendid speech. Congratulations and good luck.

Roosevelt
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

5847, October 19, 7 p.m.

Your 5105 October 16, 9 p.m.

This afternoon I talked with General Smuts and he told me that he would give serious consideration to the possibility of accepting the President's invitation. His intention before my talk with him was evidently to return directly to South Africa. He feels very sincerely that his greatest personal usefulness at this time is in that area. I am sure that if he does decide to go to Washington it may well be only for a short visit. I believe he will come.

WINANT

CSB
My dear Mr. President:

In view of the way in which this telegram from Winant is worded, would you care to send a more personal message to General Smuts? In the event that you may think it desirable, I am enclosing a suggested message to be sent to Winant for communication to General Smuts.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
From London, 5847, October 19, 7 p.m.
Draft telegram to London.

The President,
The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF W. A. HARRIMAN

Washington, D.C.
November 23, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

After your comment the other night I cabled Field
Marshal Smuts expressing as strongly as I could your
desire that he come to the United States on his way back
to South Africa.

I am much disappointed to have the following answer:

"Have given closest attention to your message
from President and your suggestions. Unfortunately
visit to the States at present moment quite impossible
as urgent change of plans calls for my immediate return
to South Africa. Trust future opportunity of direct
visit from South Africa will be found and have written
President to that effect. All good wishes and thanks
for your intervention."

Sincerely,

The President
The White House
My dear General Smuts:

I am delighted that you saw my wife and I hope much that when you do come here from South Africa you will bring Mrs. Smuts with you.

I am, of course, disappointed that the visit must be deferred, but I count on your coming because I am very anxious to see you after all these years.

When you do come I think it will be unnecessary for you to make any extensive tour of this country. I will want you to see one shipyard and one munitions plant between here and New York, and one speech by you would thrill the Nation. I heard your address to the Parliament in London the other week and it is just the kind of thing that should be said over here. It was magnificent.

Especially do I want to talk with you about drawing plans now for the victorious peace which will surely come.

As you know, I dream dreams but am, at the same time, an intensely practical person, and I am convinced that disarmament of the aggressor nations is an essential first step, followed up for a good many years to come...
by a day and night inspection of that disarmament
and a police power to stop at its source any
attempted evasion of the rules.

But there are many other matters to
be worked out. Perhaps Winston has told you of
my thought of certain trusteeships to be exercised
by the United Nations where stability of govern-
ment for one reason or another cannot be at once
assured. I am inclined to think that the mandate
system is no longer the right approach, for the
nation which is given the mandate soon comes to
believe that it carries sovereignty with it.

On the other hand, the plebiscites
set up at Versailles were on the whole successful
and I think we should study the idea of succeeding
plebiscites until one side or the other makes a
decision by overwhelming vote.

These past two weeks have been
heartening. Your people in Egypt and Libya are
continuing very fine service and I hope that
they will soon join hands with my people and the
British who are moving eastward from Algiers.
I do not regard the Southwest Pacific as safe
yet but at least we have deferred a further
Japanese push to the southward for several weeks.

My warm thanks for the very beautiful
album of the recent issues of South Africa stamps.
They are a great addition to my collection.

Take good care of yourself.

Always sincerely,

Prime Minister Field Marshal,
The Honorable J. C. Smuts,
Victoria,
South Africa.
November 15, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

Mrs. Roosevelt will kindly bring you this letter from me.

First let me say to you how much her visit to England has been appreciated by everybody. The people of this country have for more than three years been passing through deep waters, and have gallantly and stubbornly borne the heaviest burdens. They feel the strain, and one like me who has not been here for many years can see the strain and the difference. To them her visit has been a great refreshment, not only because she is the wife of the President of the U.S.A. and the emissary of its great people, but also because of herself, of her kindliness, her deep sympathy and evident interest in everyone and everything. She has not spared herself to see everything and everyone, and has done far more than could have been expected of her. The effect of all this profound interest and interestedness has been very great and very welcome, and her visit has, from the human
point of view, been of the greatest possible service. She has unstintedly given herself and of herself, and people high and low are filled with gratitude. I wanted to tell you this as you might like to have the opinion of another visitor and spectator of this most human scene at this great moment.

Secondly, I want once more to thank you for your repeated invitation to me to visit the States. Mr. Winant has passed your kind message on to me and I have felt more than tempted to accept and thus have the opportunity of personal talks with you over the course before us both in war and after the war. Unfortunately it has finally proved impossible to come now, and when you receive this I shall probably be on my way back to South Africa. I need not trouble you with the details, but only wish you to believe that it has really not been possible. I shall look forward to a visit as soon as a convenient opportunity comes next year. With the efficient air service between South Africa and the States I may be able to come direct to Washington from there, and talk things over.

And it is possible that a visit later at the proper moment may
be more useful than one at present when the immediate course before us is so clear.

We have had great luck in the whole Mediterranean basin, greater than could have been expected, the first stroke of real luck we have had in the war. The effect on public morale has been electric, and everybody feels delighted. As I have always been an advocate of this theatre I feel specially happy. We seem at last to have reached the right road and to be moving freely and rapidly forward. So may it continue — so must it continue. I have seen your messages to Churchill and his to you. I need not say how fully in accord and in personal agreement I am with both of you. I think our course is clearly set out before us, and the initial success is further proof how right you have been. The rest seems to be a logical development and following up of that course. The great thing now is to keep the initiative and to give the enemy no chance to recover it and himself. These plans involve the hardest blows we are at present capable of striking against
Germany and Italy, the best way of helping Russia in her great task, and later of getting eastward to China and finally of striking devastatingly at Japan.

Finally I wish to say how very warmly I thank you for the help you have been giving South Africa in the war. Your sympathy and support with the Service and Production departments concerned have been invaluable, and my representatives, Close and John Martin, have continually reminded me how effective your sympathy has been in securing necessary supplies for South Africa. My political and other difficulties have been great, and your help has eased my position very considerably. And so I continue to look forward to paying you a visit and personally thanking you for all this assistance and exchanging thoughts with you "as from one Dutchman to another".

With all good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]
The President of the United States,

The White House,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

From Field Marshal Smuts.
MISS TULLY

MR. HOPKINS RETURNS

THE ATTACHED. THANKS.

R.D.

File personal
Dear Franklin:

This is my first letter to you from South Africa. You know, better than most of us, that there are problems here of which America will very likely have to take more account in the future than in the past. They are strange problems, and need a lot of study, but after a diligent month, I feel I can, and should, write you at least my first impressions.

Foremost among the problems I have in mind is that of defense; secondly there is what they call here the "racial" question; thirdly there is the difficult matter of handling the natives; and last, though not least, the economic problem. These are the big issues in all men's minds, and dominate the political scene, but cutting across them there are others of seemingly less importance, but equally vexing, such as the immigration question (quite a cardinal issue in my belief), and the religious problem.

Regarding defense, South Africa is pitifully weak in the prime requisite of man-power. The country is enormous and very sparsely settled, there being only about two million whites, and eight million natives, "cape coloreds", and Indians. Except for a narrow fertile strip between the mountains and the sea in the south and east ....

The President,

The White House,

Washington.
east, the land is largely desert and veld,—almost treeless plains, poorly watered and yielding only scanty pasturage. But mineral deposits render South Africa one of the richest countries in the world. Its physiography accounts for the very moderate population of blacks, since savagery subsists wholly on the products of the earth's surface, which here is arid. But its geology offers the digging white man the dearest prizes of civilized life, and yet the white population is but a drop in the bucket of the country's possibilities.

The reason for this lies, of course, in the history and character of the Boers, a tenaciously pastoral and fundamentalist people, who got here first and have dominated the life of the country for centuries—and, despite the Boer War, still dominate it. They have not been able to keep the "outlander" from building Kimberley and Johannesburg under the influence of the overpowering lust for diamonds and gold, nor could they prevent the incurably trading British from developing the ports. But weaker incentives to exploitation they have been able to discourage quite successfully, and since they themselves have no urge to live any other life than that which was found good by the Biblical patriarchs, the presence here of large deposits of coal and iron, as well as substantial ones of chrome, asbestos, manganese, copper, silver, lead, and tin, and quantities of rare "base metals," has not led to results which would be normal in another country.

On the basis of its population, the Union should be able to put fifty thousand whites and four hundred thousand natives and coloreds into the field as soldiers. General Smuts has done wonderfully with the whites. He has sent...
two full divisions to the North, and an expeditionary force of a few thousand men, with planes and armored cars, to Madagascar. He has a third division here in reserve (and also a fourth, but this is mostly "on paper," I am told.) Altogether, counting the necessary auxiliaries, women's organizations, and so forth, he probably has two hundred thousand people in active war service, or almost a tenth of the total white population! But the situation regarding "non-Europeans" (as the term is here) is very different. Most of the natives here—Bantus, Zulus, Basutos, their names are legion—are "first class fighting men", like the Fuzzy-Wuzzies. They all revere the memory of Queen Victoria, and are loyal to the British Crown, which carries on a policy of clemency and enlightenment actually and traditionally in strong contrast with Boer repression, and, at the natives' own desire, continues to this day to administer the great reserves of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, though these are surrounded as enclaves by the Union territories. Could this great reservoir of splendid man-power be adequately tapped, the British Colonial armies would be immensely strengthened. But the fear of the native is still strong in the Afrikaner nation, whose greatest holiday is still Dingaan's Day, the anniversary of the overthrow of a Zulu chief. Even Smuts's influence, which has so far carried enough Afrikaners along with him to insure the Empire attachment (their votes being added to those of the regular pro-British minority), has not been sufficient to overcome what almost amounts to the fanaticism of this fear. When he announced that he would enroll ...
enroll the natives in the Army should the Japanese invade the Union, he was met with a storm of opposition even among his own supporters. He has done what he could in this situation. As you know, "Slim Jannie" but—(which means, "Slick Johnny" in our language) is nobody's fool. He has without much opposition, enrolled many of the blacks in the Army Service Corps, and strictly on the quiet, has trained them to shoot, so that my Military Attaché estimates that he could now put twenty battalions (twenty thousand) of black infantry into the field and also increase his artillery strength by about twenty-five hundred men. In addition, black servicing crews for the anti-aircraft guns in the ports are reported to be trained gunners as well. But all this is very little indeed, compared with the possibilities, and the South African military force remains but a fraction of what it might or be. As to its present dispositions, the better part of it is thousands of miles away in North Africa, and its isolated reserves in the Union are so distributed that should the Axis overrun Portugal, or force her to come in on its side, Portuguese East Africa, always a strategic menace to the Union, might be quickly taken over. Otherwise mine, there is little to be said for South African defense measures. The local air force has only about a hundred pursuit planes, with bombers considerably fewer. The ports are most feebly guarded. Cape Town has a small harbor enclosed by moles, and a vast roadstead like that at Reykjavik but without even the submarine loop which we used in the latter place to detect approach. Coastal guns and anti-aircraft batteries are few and far between in which is powerful and wide-spread even today,—the Atl...
At Durban, by far the most important commercial port, oil storage tanks have actually been located in the most conspicuous position available. Naval defense is likewise weak, the South African naval forces contributing only a few light vessels to the small British groupment at Simonstown, a base only a fraction the size one would expect from its celebrity. German submarines have accordingly found the Cape area, once they got round to it, a very happy hunting-ground indeed. When our ship arrived at Cape Town, after dodging up from the Southwest with seven thousand Americans aboard, my Naval Attaché met me with a list of fourteen vessels sunk in that area within a week.

The "racial problem" in South Africa doesn't mean a racial problem, strictly speaking, at all. Boers and British belong to the same race, but the "racial problem" here is nevertheless understood to mean the problem of British-Boer relations. It is historical and psychological, not biological, and therefore perhaps not fundamental, but it bulks larger than all the other South African perplexities in the mind of men and women. Actually it is of fairly recent origin, too. Within your lifetime and mine, Boer and British got along well enough together, where they were living together, mostly in the Cape Province. Then came the Jameson Raid, and hinc illae lacrymae; a small matter, but, like the eating of an apple in Paradise, the origin of a great curse. That ill-considered attempt to foist Rhodésia's imperialism forcibly on the Boer Republic, already infested with exploiting foreigners (not British only) on the Rand, sowed a distrust and dislike of Britain which is powerful and wide-spread even today;—the Boer mind....
mind being tenacious, like the Irish—and caused antagonism between Boer and Briton even at the Cape. After that came the Boer War and Kitchener's devastations, and then, last but not least, the British policy of attempted understanding and conciliation, which left the British the victors of the war, but the Boers the victors of the peace. The opportunities afforded by this policy have been exploited continuously for a generation by Afrikaner leaders, who, with the bulk of the Boer majority behind them, have all but prevented the more liberal leaders, such as Botha and Smuts (supported by the British minority in bloc) from carrying on with the Empire connection. Furthermore, the overmastering anti-Britishism of the typical Boer has provided a wonderful breeding ground for foreign propaganda of an anti-British nature. Of most kinds of propaganda he takes but little account, being resistant to novelty in any form. There is no use, for instance, in trying to stir him up about Holland's present sufferings—he broke away from his parent country centuries ago, and his long memory tells him that the break was due to the unjust exactions of the Dutch East India Company. The only propaganda which will really reach him is the kind that touches him immediately and narrowly in his own home. Thus we Americans woo him by showing that we are helping to preserve his cherished independence, while the German radio suggests that we are here in pursuance of "imperialistic" designs. But stronger still is the appeal to his hates—since he is really an Old Testament person—and great masses of him are pro-German today merely to the extent that they enjoy seeing their old enemies, the British, take a beating.

Aside....
Aside from a very small minority, including some people of German origin and the more active members of certain "cultural" societies organized on Nazi models, it may be doubted whether any South African pro-Germans really want to see such an Axis victory as would bring the Germans here. More important for the future would appear to be another phase of the "racial question," namely, the Afrikaner cultural movement initiated by the Nationalist leaders in the post-Boer War period and now flourishing with schools and colleges of its own, here is something like the Celtic revival in Ireland, and its results would seem to be equally pernicious as regards "racial" understanding. While intermarriage, the gradual recession of the Boer War into history, the joint war service of Afrikaner and Britisher on foreign fronts, and the inevitable emergence of new problems, economic and social, should in time render the "racial" issue obsolete, the influence on the younger generation of the narrow-minded "patriotic" pundits of Pretoria, Stellenbosch, and other Afrikaner centers of "learning," tends potently to keep it alive. The native question is also all involved with history and psychology. The British here have reacted to the natives in the traditional British fashion, with a policy of enlightened self-interest. Nothing could be further from the Boer attitude, which one would hesitate to believe could still exist in our time, unless one saw it with one's own eyes. This attitude is frankly that God created the blacks inferior to the whites and any attempt to render them equal is sinful. Historically it must be remembered that the Dutch "Vortrekkers" suffered far more from the cruelty....
of the natives than the British who came after them; and psychologically, the long memory and narrow-minded intrinsigence of the Boer contrasts sharply with the British willingness to forgive and forget in the service of the main chance. The present South African policy, in the hands of the liberal Smutsites and their British supporters, now marches hand in hand with the Empire of policy administered here by the High Commissioner, who runs the Native Reserves. It comprises the conversion, education and enfranchisement of the native, with a view to raising his standard of living, and incidentally increasing the potential market for British and British-financed South African industry. But at every turn it meets the fanatical opposition of the Nationalists and other wholly Afrikaner parties, which demand that the steil, native be kept "in his place," lest, having eaten of the tree of knowledge he become as one of us. This is the single subject on which the political opposition here is completely united, and as this opposition is almost the equal of the government group when all noses are counted, the "betterment" of the non-Europeans is proceeding but slowly. Indians as well as natives and mulattoes are included in the color bar. Of the Indians, there are some quarter of a million, mostly in Natal. Gandhi took his political rise here, as you know, and the South provided. African Indians, originally imported to work on the sugar plantations along the east coast, are now producing many professional men. But possibly because of that same are Gandhi, they seem to be receiving the worst deal of all the "colored" races. Sir Sha'at Khan, the Indian High Commissioner, has told me that the British, so liberal to
the natives, are even harder on his people than are the
Boers. At Johannesburg, is not fitted to handle a

dispute.
On the economic front, the diamond and gold rushes
opened up this country to industry, but the tenacity of
the politically dominant pastoral Boers succeeded in
limiting this opening almost wholly to these two products,
and now that diamonds have been overproduced and most of
the diamond mines are inactive, the industrial and finan-
cial life of the nation is concentrated on the Rand.
From the earliest times, when Kruger was so hard on them,
the gold exploiters have been "outlanders," and even Anglo-
today profits mostly flow into English coffers. Taxes on
this great industry account for a large part of the Union's
running expenses, but little if any goes into building up
other industries. Something has been done to develop steel,
under the pressure of the war, and some munitions for North
Africa are being made here now. This may help by setting
a pace for the future, but normally speaking the infant
industries of South Africa cannot properly be called infant
at all, since infants grow. The enterprise necessary to
nourish them is forthcoming neither from the local people
nor from the London magnates. Hence the intervention of
our Board of Economic Warfare, which at least for the war
period, and for the benefit of the United Nations, is

   doing its best to see that somehow nourishment is provided.

Most thinking men in the Union agree that the country's
dependence on one industry is a bad thing, but fear politi-
cally to disturb a sacred cow. More reasonably, there are
those who point out the difficulty of diverting native
labor, trained for gold mining, to other enterprises....
hundreds of miles away, and the fact that the existing
railway....
railway system, which grew along with the industrial concentration at Johannesburg, is not fitted to handle a dispersed effort. Altogether, while a splendid case can be made out theoretically for slowing down on gold production and building up a whole host of enterprises on the basis of extraordinarily favorable mineral deposits, it is clear that there are many practical problems, created by the historical development of the country and the peculiar character of the inhabitants, which must be solved in ambulando. In this connection, a plan which I understand has been elaborated in Washington, for Anglo-American "assistance" to South Africa based on a shutting down of the less productive gold-mines, increased productivity in the others, and division of labor from the former to other industries, may have some chance of success. But here again it must be noted that the initiative comes from the "outlander," and whether such a plan can be sold to the Boers is still a question. The Boer character is still capable of making history here. General Smuts, a Boer himself, knows this well and, in handling his country for the Empire, handles it like a Boer—which accounts for much which seems strange to us, such as his refusal to set up anything like an F.B.I. here to take care of a very loose security situation. Generally speaking, the Boer character is averse to anything new-fangled, and would rather die under a treatment of herbs and simples than survive by grace of a synthetic pill.

The political situation here is affected by all these problems. The present Government, under General Smuts, certain circumstances, units. In my view, at least same... opposition has lost in General Hertzog, shorn though he was of all but a remnant of his immediate following, its
came to power on the neutrality issue, succeeding the "Fusion" government of General Hertzog, who wished South Africa to stay out of the war. Through the dark days of British defeat, it maintained, just as it originally won, its power, through the personal prestige and leadership of General Smuts. Allied successes have now given it, however, additional security, and should they continue, may well carry it into the post-war period, even should General Smuts die suddenly, as General Hertzog has just done. Up to recently the death of General Smuts would have thrown the whole question of South Africa's participation in the war once more into the balance. Now, even without him, his lieutenants might expect to continue on the basis of the brilliant justification which events are giving to his war policy. Furthermore the opposition parties are at odds among themselves on nearly every issue, while the leaders of all have at one time or another predicted German victory. They are now all dodging to cover on this question, sniping at each other as they go. Chief among them are Dr. Malan, an ex-pastor, or "predikant," of the Dutch Reformed Church, and Dr. Pirow, a brilliant German-South African, who as Defense Minister in the Fusion Government brought South Africa up to the very eve of the war with almost no defenses at all. These two men are potent campaigners and powerful political spell-binders, but essentially factional in their leadership. Both were lieutenants of Hertzog, and broke away from him and pulled him down, but neither can take his place as a great South African around whom all the opposition groups might, in certain circumstances, unite. In my view, at least, the opposition has lost in General Hertzog, shorn though he was of all but a remnant of his immediate following, its
most valuable asset. Meanwhile the United Party still has General Smuts.

While the "racial" problem and the war issue dominate politics now, however, the politics of the future seems likely to be more concerned with the native question and economics. The final triumph of the Smuts policies—pro-war and pro-Empire—which allied victory would bring, might very well put the quietus on many of the old issues now dear to the opposition—neutrality, independence, pro-Germanism, "new order", "Boer republic," and so forth.

But when peace is made, there will be bills to pay and men to find work for, and if the United Nations have won the war with the help of South Africa, South Africa will have to take her share in elaborating the new "charters" to prevent more wars, one of which may well be a charter for Africa and all her peoples. Whatever solution is given to the Indian question will also inevitably affect this country. General Smuts now has the support not only of his personal following but of the Dominion (or British Labor party is anti-Indian, and the Labor party "Jingo") party and the Labor party is certain to grow in power and independence after the war, when the boys come home. On the other hand, it may be said that if this country is to grow industrially in proportion to its potentialities, at the same time that the native's standard of living is raised without danger to white supremacy, which is the only possible road of progress, the present ban on immigration must be lifted, and Europeans not only permitted to come but enticed in great numbers to these shores. At present, while Boer prejudice jealousy limits immigration lest the existing Boer-British proportion ...
proportion of 60-40 percent one day find itself reversed, the blacks are out-breeding the whites at a great rate. But it is not to be expected that the sons of the Voor-trekkers, who regard this country as their own, will easily let down the bars which keep it so. It may be, and I believe is, the manifest destiny of this country to grow, as a white man's country, into a powerful industrialized modern state, but the road to fruition will be difficult, and not only the government which survives the war but others after it are likely to litter it with their wreckage.

Of all men on earth, I doubt if any is more unreasoning and stiff-necked than the typical Boer, even his some traditional courage sharing in these qualities. As you have seen, my "first impressions" of South Africa have reference continually to his character, which one must respect but cannot wholly admire. Particularly is this true of his religious character, which is something particularly baffling to the average foreigner. My assistant Military Attaché wrote recently, in a report which was well-documented as well as clever, "The chief characteristic of the Dutch Reformed Church is hypocrisy." If this is true, however, then the hypocrisy is unconscious, and the more deadly for being so. The predikants are given to politics just as the Hebrew prophets were, believing that in serving the best interests of the people they are serving God as well. No one can quarrel with them for this. The Greek Church, under Turkish rule, kept the Greek nation alive, and we praise it for so doing. The trouble with the predikants lies in the interpretation which they give to the "Best interests of the people," which is substantially

Affectionately yours, that ...
that they should look for their future only in their past. Since the narrowness of this doctrine fits in perfectly with the character of both preacher and congregation, the church has enormous power. Particularly strong in the undeveloped country districts, it has produced a leader of almost national proportions in Dr. Malan, who has actually stated publicly that God created the blacks to be subject to the whites. It persistently impedes the solution along cooperative, liberal, and progressive lines of every one of the problems I have discussed in this letter, and judging by the vitality of the character which it both expresses and reinforces, will continue to do so for years to come.

This is the best I can do with the few glimpses I have so far had of the South African scene. I have had to spend a good deal of time trying to bring cohesion and cooperation into the chaos of a rapidly growing Mission scattered over a very large and poorly coordinated country. But I will spare you details of this. The South Africans I have met are real people,—big, friendly men with a sense of humor; kindly, practical women of decent standards. The attitude to the United States is neighborly, often admiring, a bit, perhaps, on the expectant side, but refreshingly lacking in suspicion to one who has just come from Iceland. We appear to be both liked and trusted, and German allegations as to our imperialistic designs, echoed by Dr. Malan, have fallen quite wide of the mark. At the same time, these people are slower to move than we are and just as proud. It will not do to jostle them, or attempt to dictate to them, for under the skin of every man—jack of them, whether he follow Smuts or another, there is a lot of old Kruger still.

Affectionately yours,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a very interesting despatch dated December 1, 1942 and entitled "Field Marshal Smuts on the Progress of the War" which has been received from our Minister to the Union of South Africa, Mr. Lincoln MacVeagh.

This despatch quotes the summary of an interview, presumably off the record, given by Field Marshal Smuts on his recent return from a six weeks visit to Great Britain. The views expressed by the Field Marshal were later repeated to Mr. MacVeagh in the course of a personal conversation. They concern the operations now being conducted in North Africa.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From American Legation at South Africa.
December 1, 1942

The President,

The White House.
Pretoria, Union of South Africa
December 1, 1942

No. 30
Subject: Field Marshal Smuts on the Progress of the War.


The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to quote below a summary of an interview given to correspondents here by Field Marshal Smuts on his recent return from a six-week's visit to Great Britain. The summary was prepared by Consul General Bowman after conversation with one of the correspondents concerned. The interview, which dealt with the Field Marshal's impressions of the progress of the war, was given for background only and not for publication. This morning I personally had a talk with him covering the same ground and my report on this follows at the end of this despatch.

"General Smuts was in fine spirits and obviously highly encouraged by Allied successes. He stated that the Allies had now reached the turning point of the war. They had faced hard fighting ahead of them but he seemed very confident of their success.

"He stated that at his meeting with Churchill in Cairo last August the strategy of the present phase of the war in North Africa had been planned exactly as it was later carried out, except that success had come more quickly than had been expected, as explained later.

"German intelligence had been very poor, he said, as shown by the fact that not a single ship in all the huge convoys to North Africa had been lost; partly because the Germans had at that time concentrated a large force of submarines at the Cape; that they had sunk a number of ships near the Cape but their loss had been worthwhile considering the saving of the military convoys.

"Two thirds of the troops sent to French North Africa were American and the balance British. Americans were given the task of landing and attack for political reasons, now obvious.

"The Allies had negotiated with General Giraud and contrived for his movement to Algeria, but..."
Darlan's cooperation was a complete surprise. The French at Oran got advance warning of American landing but those at Algiers had been taken completely by surprise.

"Certain Frenchmen approached Eisenhower about the second day and advised him to get in touch with Darlan. He acted upon this advice and started negotiations. Darlan bargained, agreeing to utilize his French forces in cooperation with the Allies provided he, Darlan, were recognized as the commander of all French North Africa. He also promised to deliver Dakar without a fight. He also agreed to try to bring the Navy over but expressed doubt of his ability to do so saying it was too late. General Sauts pointed out that Darlan had kept his agreement so far; that there were between 60,000 and 70,000 French troops in North Africa who were now cooperating with the Allies, and that Dakar had likewise surrendered without bloodshed. Darlan's appointment of General Giraud as commander of the troops was further evidence of his loyalty to agreement.

"This action of Darlan's, which was entirely unexpected, greatly facilitated Allied progress in North Africa, as was obvious. He stated that President Roosevelt "had gone too far" in his statement to the effect that the agreement with Darlan was a temporary military expedient and that it almost upset the whole arrangement as it caused much confusion and dissatisfaction among the French who supported Darlan, and that it took a great deal of soothing and explaining to calm them down.

"With regard to the antagonism of the Free French to the Darlan agreement, General Sauts pointed out that the Free French could not give the French Allies North Africa and Darlan could; that in fighting a war you took advantage of every opportunity to make progress and Darlan had made the Allies' problem much easier and their progress much speedier.

"He said that Tunis was the most important part of the North African strategy, the crux of the whole campaign. Unseasonal and unusually heavy rains had slowed up the Allied advance in Tunisia. The Germans, anticipating an attack on Sicily next, had withdrawn heavy air force contingents from the Russian front and concentrated them in Italy and this had greatly facilitated the recent Russian successes around Stalingrad.

"The success of the Allies had served also to stiffen the backs of the neutrals, specially Spain and Turkey.

"He also said that the German troops in Libya had practically all been eliminated and the remaining forces were chiefly Italians."
"He reiterated that the greatest menace the Allies had to face now was the U-Boat campaign, but expressed confidence that this menace could be met from the air."

In his talk with me this morning, Field Marshal Smuts expressed substantially the same opinions and reactions as those reported above. However, he added that, in regard to the Anglo-American move to North Africa, he had done his best to persuade the authorities concerned to omit the landing at Casablanca and execute an immediate descent on Bizerta, instead, which if successful, would, according to him, have caused all the rest of North Africa to come in without a fight. As it was, he said, the enemy, having been forewarned of our intentions, was also forearmed, and we now have to fight hard to gain the really vital objective of the whole operation. He stated that General Eisenhower had agreed with him in this matter, but that the American Naval authorities in Washington had turned the idea down, out of hesitation to venture so far into the Mediterranean before being sure of what might happen in Spain and at Gibraltar. He said also that in the plan as originally approved in Washington, a landing as far west even as Algiers was not contemplated, and that the eventual inclusion of this landing was a concession to the views he advocated. He intimated that the remarkable ease with which the capture of Algiers was effected proves the correctness of these views.

The Field Marshal said that of course there was no use going over all this sort of thing, which is past history, and praised the North African operation as brilliant in the extreme, speaking particularly highly of General Clark, whom he said "we call the American Eagle". But he seemed unable to keep off the subject and discussed it at length with great animation. Whether his ideas are right or wrong, is not for me to say. The method actually adopted of making sure of communications before risking a decisive action may well appear the sounder strategy. But Field Marshal Smuts began as, and has always remained, a commando leader, both in war and politics, and the spirit of the commando is the spirit of the raid. One may therefore say that in the light of his own personal experience, at least, what he says makes sense. Regarding Spain, he expressed the opinion that to move into that country would be fatal to Hitler as it was to Napoleon, and added that "his information" is to the effect that living conditions there have already reached a dangerously low level.

Respectfully yours,

Lincoln MacVeagh
Pretoria,
Christmas Day, 1942.

Dear Franklin:

Following my Thanksgiving letter, here is another on the subject of South Africa.

The High Commissioners here—for Great Britain, Canada, and India—are not rated on the same plane with Diplomatic Chiefs of Mission, from the point of view of protocol, but for all that, the British High Commissioner remains the most important personage amongst us. The present incumbent of the post is one, Lord Harlech, a former Colonial Secretary of long service in Parliament and in the Government, who is as outstanding among our local diplomats as his job is beyond theirs in range and complexity. Shortly after I wrote you, he sent me a copy of a letter he had himself just written, which covers practically the same ground as mine, being intended to enlighten the new Governor General of Southern Rhodesia regarding the problems of the Union. It is of course private, and he says he would be hanged if it were made public, but I have asked him, and he has no objections to my quoting it to you. I am tempted to do so not only because some of his ideas resemble those which I tried to express to you myself out of the depths of ....

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
of inexperience, but because of the revelation he makes of how Britain is thinking of South Africa today.

Lord Harlech sees a troubled future ahead for this country. In his note enclosing the copy of his letter, he writes, "I am only here for the 'duration' of the war and shall be gone when most of the troubles I see lurking ahead will come on South Africa," and in the letter itself, after a brief eulogy of the scenery, he speaks at once of the "strains and stresses, the doubts and disturbing reflections that lie beneath." He speaks of the fact that "South Africa would have remained a poor and backward country but for its varied mineral resources," and describes how "economics enters into factors which make for division between the European elements of South Africa's population," the mines, banking business and the engineering professions being "largely in non-Afrikaner hands." He tells of the political power of the Dutch Reformed church, and how "the two citadels of Afrikaner Nationalist isolationism are the Dutch Reformed Church and Negrophobia." He puts in a note about the Calvinist French Huguenot element in Afrikanerdom, of which I made no mention in my letter, since its influence on South African problems only reinforces that of the Calvinistic Dutch element and in itself creates no problem of its own, though it is historically interesting as a survival. (Many of the best known South African names are of Huguenot origin—de Villiers, de Wet, du Toit, Pienaar (originally Pinard), etc.) The following is especially good: "The Dutch Reformed Church is still rigidly Calvinistic. Its inspiration is the
Old Testament rather than the New. The historical books of the Old Testament, particularly, Genesis, Judges, First and Second Samuel, and First and Second Kings are for Afrikanerdom the literal Word of God, and for loyal Afrikaners the interpretation of those books by the synods of the Dutch Reformed Church are the only way of life and conduct and politics that will ensure escape from the torments of hell in a personal and corporeal future life after death. Clericalism is an all-important feature of South African life, controlling and directing education, family life and personal relations, particularly in the country districts. The predikants are still a power in the land. All elements of Afrikanerdom, except the most recently arrived Germans, have long since severed any sentiment towards the lands of their fathers in Europe." And this also: "Perhaps the most serious factor looking to the future is the educational segregation at all stages from the elementary to the secondary schools up to and including the universities. So far from any element in the educational complex making for greater unity among the white races in South Africa, the segregation of youth into Afrikaners and non-Afrikaners, and the attitude of the teachers and the 'single medium' schools is tending to widen the gulf."

So far, Lord Harlech does little more than expand with authority some points which I made myself in my letter to you. But he makes frequent mention of the Jews, whom I left out of my briefer account. There is a Jewish problem here, of course, as everywhere, but specifically as ....
as a Jewish problem it would seem still to be relatively insignificant, though resentment of Jewish intrusion into every line of business, particularly real-estate, is growing. At present, the Jewish problem would seem important principally as an aggravation of the general "racial" problem of British versus Boer, the Jews being, along with the Britishers, "mainly town-dwellers and on an average far more wealthy than the average Afrikaner."

The Jew in South Africa has hitherto been, and still largely is, hated less as a Jew than as the "outlander" per excellence, the man most exclusively and successfully interested in the industrial exploitation of the country, which has always been regarded as wicked by the Boers.

It seems to me doubtful that Afrikanerdom will ever rise (or fall) to persecution of the Jews, though if it gets the chance it may still, as Kruger effectually did, render life difficult for the whole "godless" gold-seeking population of the Rand. Where a real Jewish problem per se is more likely to occur is among the non-Afrikaners of whom the Jews themselves form a part. It is there where the wealth lies, and where the typically Jewish exploitation of the exploiter, with its attendant human dangers, would seem to be gradually increasing, so far as the opportunities of a small population permit.

By far the most interesting, and lengthy, part of Lord Harlech's letter, however, has to do with the native problem,—as might be expected from the fact that he administers the local native reserves. He tells how the millions of blacks have no political power or influence whatever, but "are under the absolute power of the white South ...."
South Africans," who "depend upon them more and more for labour and for the continuance of what would be, without them, an abnormally high standard of European wages and living;" of how "segregation has broken down to such an extent that to revert to it now is quite impracticable;" of how, despite the fact that millions of natives are living de-tribalized, semi-European lives in the native "locations" of South Africa's cities and towns, the native reserves of Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland, "so far from being able to accommodate more natives, ought to be enlarged to accommodate their existing population even on subsistence standards of livelihood." In this connection, you may remember what I wrote you about the danger of the white population here being swamped unless white immigration is both permitted, on a greater scale than at present, and encouraged. Lord Harlech then goes on to describe what is being done for the natives, and notes, "educational services for the natives have out-run other badly needed social services and have not been accompanied by the adequate provision of 'opportunities' for the educated except in the teaching profession. This is ill-balanced progress and is inevitably creating a class of frustrated and politically disgruntled native educated proletarians."

"Worser and worser!" as I think it was Alice who said. Lord Harlech goes on, in a paragraph which is certainly worth quoting in full: "More serious than anything for the future of race relations between European and non-European is the statutory industrial color bar.

The ....
The existence of such a law of the State is due to the presence in South Africa as nowhere else on the African continent (except to a smaller degree in the Rhodesias) of an enfranchised European Wage-earning proletariat haunted by memories of an 'unemployment' problem, and fearing its recurrence unless a large number of jobs are 'reserved' for Europeans only. Nobody nowadays, seeing what Bantu workers are doing today north of the Zambesi—driving railway locomotives, engaging in quite skilled engineering occupations etc.—can any longer maintain that African natives cannot acquire the skill necessary to perform crafts now reserved by law for Europeans only. In South Africa the cost of building, and particularly house building, has been 'put up' against all users including the poorest by the existing colour bars in the building trades. Natives are permitted to become fully qualified doctors of medicine and to practice surgery but are debarred from becoming most classes (sic) of carpenters and joiners. This sounds fantastic but it is true, and the organized European Labour Party in South Africa is the chief obstacle to the useful and better employment of native labour in industry. Its policy is frankly the maintenance of a class privilege of one section of wage earners against another section of wage earners in State or Capitalistic employ, which would appear to be in flagrant conflict with the fundamental ethics of socialism elsewhere throughout the world."

If one considers this situation together with the existence of "millions of detribalized natives in the native locations of South African cities and towns" and the ....
the "class of frustrated and politically disgruntled native educated proletarians," above referred to, the possibilities of trouble ahead for the strictly limited white population of South Africa, now numbering less than one to five among the blacks, are great indeed. "These colour problems," says Lord Harlech, "are the fundamental problems of South Africa, but the Europeans carry on their internecine political warfare among themselves regardless of their non-European background and the trouble slowly but surely being nurtured for future generations." He points out that the economic progress of the country depends on a rise in the productivity and consuming power of the non-European masses of its population, and adds, "But the tendency in South Africa is to approach all problems not from the point of view of economics, and still less social economics, but from the purely political aspect of race relations and the caste privileges of the white section of the community." He notes how the majority of the Afrikaner groups, which desire a republic and severance from the Empire, want to establish Afrikaner ascendancy over all other races, committing themselves to policies which would react on them throughout the continents of Europe and Asia, and comments on the natural gravitation of such "republicans" to the side of Nazi Germany in opposition to "the liberal democratic ideals of Britain and the United States." Finally, his conclusion seems to me as interesting as anything else in his letter. --No wonder he doesn't want to be quoted! --"It is impossible to think of South Africa as if it were a national state or country in Europe. It is, indeed,
sui generis. Its very complexity makes any forecast of its future hazardous. Its continued partnership in the British Commonwealth will always be an uneasy partnership, yet its complete separation would probably turn out to be more injurious, politically as well as economically, to South Africa itself than to any other part of the world including Britain. Its history, like its climate, will always be stormy and uncertain."

All this is a far cry from the old imperialism of the Kipling days. "Raising the consuming power of the native" for the benefit of English trade is still certainly one of the cruder British objectives here, and dovetails in with the effort we feel here to take advantage of lease-lend in such a way as to canalize all local buying through British hands and thus effectively shut out American enterprise after the war. Lord Harlech naturally doesn't mention this, nor does he touch on the present dependence of South Africa on gold production, and the efforts of the controlling British-South African financial interests to keep gold-mining at full blast in our despite. In general he makes no mention of the things in which we are immediately concerned here, defense problems and the war-effort and industrial and commercial problems as these latter are affected by the former. He only passingly mentions politics, which are of interest to us in the same connection. He looks beyond these things to ultimate social questions, in which he thinks we as well as Britain must one day be involved, and shoulder to shoulder, too, to judge of the way the world is developing. He is so convinced that we are already inclining....
inclining toward taking a hand in the settlement of African problems that he sends me pamphlet after pamphlet on the Empire and its colonial policies, and has impressed on me his belief in regional councils. For myself, I cannot, of course, help remembering the end of the last war, when many European statesmen actually thought that the United States might be willing to take mandates in the Middle East! But I hardly think, either, that after the lessons of this war we shall ever go isolationist totally again. However distant the affairs of the whites and blacks in South Africa may appear, we shall surely have to take account of them on the other side of the Atlantic someday as "the individual withers and the world is more and more." Hence this exposé by a modern stream-lined liberal Commonwealth administrator may not be wholly out of place in the letter-bag of a President of the United States.

Affectionately yours,

[Signature]

[Handwritten signature]
Prime Minister's Office,
PRETORIA.
7th January, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I am deeply grateful to you for sending me the inscribed copy of your and Churchill's addresses in the United States of America last year. It will be a treasured possession to me and a token of personal goodwill from you.

I also appreciate very much your repeated invitation to visit the States. Conditions in South Africa did not permit of my adding an American to my English visit last Autumn. But if the omens should be favourable this year it will give me great happiness to come to you at a suitable time.

Meanwhile I send my felicitations on the favourable turn in our war fortunes towards the end of last year. That this change has at last come is a most significant event, and from now on I anticipate the advance on our side and the retreat for the enemy will be progressively and rapidly accelerated.

I was most favourably impressed by your military chiefs in North Africa and formed a very high opinion of both Eisenhower and Mark Clark. On the civil side your Ambassador in London and Averil Harriman proved most helpful to me.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
DEPARTEMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKEN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

His Excellency Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 20, 1943

With reference to the attached file submitted with your memorandum of November 9, 1942, the matter has been considered carefully in the Department and our views incorporated in a proposed telegram to our Minister in South Africa. This proposed telegram was sent to you for your approval under cover of a memorandum dated January 20, 1943 (copy attached).
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have attached to this memorandum, for your approval or disapproval, a proposed telegram to the American Minister in the Union of South Africa, which contains a suggested personal message from you to Prime Minister Smuts.

The telegram sets out a plan whereby essential supplies are to be furnished to the Union. It necessarily raises the question of the use of these supplies in the Union and thus brings up the difficult issue of the extent to which gold mining operations in South Africa should be reduced.

The plan is, briefly, that the United States and Great Britain will join in an undertaking to supply goods in large quantities to the essential war industries of the Union; that a supply council composed of representatives of the three Governments will be established in the Union to carry out the arrangements to furnish these supplies; and that the South African Government will be asked to agree that the maximum proportion of its resources will be used directly for war purposes.

The effect of this program should be to maintain and develop the essential industries of South Africa, such as the production of coal (for the purpose of effecting a substantial economy in the use of shipping); the manufacture of explosives and other war products; the repairing of ships; and the mining of base metals. At the same time there should be a reduction in the scale of gold mining operations, brought about by the shortage of necessary materials and by the increased emphasis on war industries.

The
The telegram and the proposed message from you to the Prime Minister do not raise directly the question of a reduction in gold mining. I believe it is unlikely that Prime Minister Smuts would make a direct commitment to reduce gold production. The message is accordingly phrased as an offer of our aid to a South African program of maximum war production, and not as a request for a reduction in the scale of gold mining operations.
November 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
&
HONORABLE HARRY L. HOPKINS

Will you be good enough to
let me know whether you think I
should approve this or not?

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. H. A. Wallace, Board of
Economic Warfare, 10/30/42, to the President,
enclosing resolution adopted by the Board
of Economic Warfare in re supply problem to
South Africa and means of assisting the
further development of the South African war
effort and the reduction of gold mining. Also
attached in a report "Proposed Action
for Assisting the South African War Program".
These papers were sent to the Secretary of
State. Copy of memorandum and explanation
of enclosures sent to Hon. Harry L. Hopkins.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE &
HONORABLE HARRY L. HOPKINS

Will you be good enough to let me know whether you think I should approve this or not?

F. D. R.

Assistant Secretary of State
NOV 10 1942
MR. ACHESON
October 30, 1942

The President

The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to inform you that the Board of Economic Warfare met on October 15 to discuss the supply problem to South Africa and to consider means of assisting the further development of the South African war effort and the reduction of gold mining. At this meeting a resolution was unanimously adopted, and a copy of it is attached. Each member had a copy of the enclosed report. May I call your attention to the marked paragraphs on page 14 and the first two and one-half pages.

Briefly, the plan provides that there shall be set up in South Africa the South African Supply Council, which will include South African, British and American representation. This organization will screen in South Africa all orders on both the United States and Great Britain, and will certify as to the essentiality of any order to the war effort of South Africa.

After almost a year of intensive study of this situation, the Board of Economic Warfare believes that this is the most effective and practicable means whereby the resources of South Africa may be gradually diverted from the gold mining industry to the more active prosecution of the war.

Negotiations will commence shortly between representatives of our Government and of the British and South African Governments to put this plan into action. We are working closely with the State Department on this matter.

Respectfully,

H. A. Wallace
WHEREAS, The successful and early conclusion of the war requires the most effective utilization of all the resources of the United States and of the United Nations;

AND WHEREAS It is believed the Union of South Africa is in a position to lend further aid to the war effort of the United Nations by maximum conversion of its industries to war production;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That the Board of Economic Warfare recommends that maximum and rapid conversion of the South African economy to a full war economy be achieved, that the appropriate U. S. agencies assist in such conversion by making available such supplies, within the limits of production and shipping facilities, as are necessary for the further development of South African war industries, and that appropriate administrative measures be taken for carrying out this program aggressively.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM: AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, Capetown
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: February 10, 1943
NUMBER: 151

SERIOUSLY CONFIDENTIAL

The following message is from the Minister.
You are advised that this morning, immediately after arrival from Johannesburg, I saw the Prime Minister and read to him the message from the President. He requested a written copy and a paraphrase of the President's message in the form of an aide-mémoire was given to him. He seemed to be favorably disposed with respect to the desired commitments listed in paragraph nineteen of the Department's cable of February 3, 1943, no. 22.

It was stated by the Prime Minister that he would immediately make an inquiry into the coal question. To show him that it might not be difficult to comply, I told him of Sharpstone's information contained in paragraph two of the cable from Johannesburg of January 20, 1943, no. 30, and of our willingness to consider giving coal shipments priorities in the event that congestion should occur (refer to paragraph nineteen of Department's telegram no. 22). The magnitude of the submarine menace deeply impresses him personally and he fully understood the importance attached to this matter.
In connection with the proposed Supply Council, he was especially pleased with the idea that it would be set up in South Africa.

The question of the gold mines was brought up by him and he stated that he is forced to look after their needs and that the British are also interested in the gold production in South Africa. In reply to this I only stated that I supposed that this question, among other questions of supply, is one of the things which we would expect to be solved by the proposed Council and I pointed out that the British would have representation on the Council as well as South Africans and Americans. He registered real satisfaction in the fact that in the message from the President no mention was made of gold mining.

In general during this conversation the fact was stressed by me that we want to do everything possible for South Africa within the limitations imposed upon us by the war, the successful prosecution of which, moreover, must be his as well as our chief aim. He promised to let me hear from him within a short while.

In connection with the above message reference is made to the Department's cable of February 3, 1943, no. 20.

DENBY
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: CONSULATE GENERAL, Capetown
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: February 19, 1943
NUMBER: 186

CONFIDENTIAL

The following message is from the Minister.

"I refer to my cablegram, No. 151, from Capetown dated February 10. A long aide memoire was handed to me this morning personally by the Prime Minister which stated substantially the following:

Topic one: The Prime Minister agrees thoroughly that as much as possible all production should be devoted to the war effort and to other essential aims as little as possible.

The Prime Minister would emphasize, however, the importance of goldmining to South Africa and he states that, without jeopardizing the country's war effort, there are limits to the extent to which it can be cut down. Consequently while he is ready to agree as to such limits with the British and American Governments through the medium of the proposed joint body, he "feels that in advance there should be a joint understanding to the effect that there will be made available supplies for South

South
South Africa's needs within those limits).

Topic two. In meeting the increased demands for export coal his government will continue to cooperate fully. However, South Africa is limited in this and other production by the availability of railway and from abroad other equipment unavoidably obtained, and if he pleads for "most important" additional equipment for the steel industry, now on order and anxiously awaited to cut down South Africa's imports or needs and equivalent shipping.

Topic three. He is in agreement with the wisdom of setting up a supply program and a joint body to carry it out on conditions acceptable to the three governments as proposed, and such detailed proposals as the President may suggest will be considered by him with sympathy and pleasure. The remainder of the message expresses thanks to the President and appreciation of his attitude, assurance of agreement with the President's general point of view, admiration for our contribution, especially Lend-Lease, to the common cause in the war, a determination to maintain a maximum war effort, and also a statement that all future supplies requisitioned by the Union Government under priority ratings will have, in the estimation of the latter, the vital character which the President referred to. For the information of the Department there is being forwarded by airgram the full text".

DENBY
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          Eastern Europe
1943     The Far East

Pages 184-185
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington
TO: AMBASSADOR, Pretoria
DATED: March 6, 1943
NUMBER: 44

In connection with the following message, which is for the information of the Minister, reference is made to the Legation's telegram, dated February 19, 1943, from Capetown, no. 186.

Since the main points of our proposal have been in principle answered, the reception of the President's message by the Prime Minister seems encouraging to us. With his suggestion that an advance commitment be made by us to provide supplies for gold mining before a decision has been made concerning the limits to be imposed on gold mining operations, we are, however, not in agreement. On the day that you delivered the message of the President, the Minister of South Africa here made a similar proposal. It is evident that the problem of gold mining is preferred by the South Africans to be given separate treatment, but it may be that they do not realize that it is less likely that the supply authorities here will grant allocations for the gold
the gold mines if their requirements are independently presented, than if they are presented as a part of the total requirements which the Union economy necessarily requires. It is essential to our proposal, according to our feeling, that the needs of the gold mines be considered in relation to the Union requirements as a whole. In that way we should be in a position to know to what extent Union resources were being devoted to the war effort and we should have some basis for determining what quantities of materials we will endeavor to make available for gold mining and other purposes.

Our view is that there should be no separate consideration or advance consideration of the question of gold mines and you are requested to make this view clear, also that the question of the gold mines must be considered together with South Africa's other supply problems. Until an answer is received by us concerning the proposed council and supply program from the British Embassy, we shall not be in a position to discuss further details. You are kindly requested, meanwhile, to submit any further portions of the memorandum of the Prime Minister, which in your opinion might be useful to us, by cable to the Department.

WELLES
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, London
DATED: March 6, 1943
NUMBER: 1426

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

You are informed that on February 10 the message of the President was delivered to Prime Minister Smuts. The Prime Minister seemed favorably disposed to the commitments suggested in paragraph nineteen of the Department's telegram according to Mr. MacVeagh. The Prime Minister appreciated the importance of the shipping question and stated that at once he would make inquiry into the coal matter. The location of the supply council in South Africa pleased him. It was pointed out by the Prime Minister that he was obliged to look after the needs of the gold mines and that in gold production the British were also interested. In his reply to the Prime Minister Mr. MacVeagh stated that he expected that the council on which the British would be represented, would consider the question of gold mining requirements. Satisfaction was expressed by the Prime Minister with the fact that the President's message had not specifically mentioned gold mining.

The President's message had subsequently been referred to John Martin with whom several conversations were had by Mr. MacVeagh. Great emphasis was laid on

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaub Date FEB 22 1972
Lend-Lease by Mr. Martin who suggested that the council should consist of American and Union members only if it were established in South Africa. The representative of Lend-Lease in South Africa would be the American member and although there might be present a British representative he would be on the outside. Mr. MacVeagh had the impression that it was the hope of Martin to make the council innocuous and to give to Lend-Lease a new extension, the manipulation of Lend-Lease being already familiar to him.

A memorandum in reply to the President's message was delivered to Mr. MacVeagh on February 19 by the Prime Minister. In this memorandum were three main points:

1. The fact that South African production must be devoted to war purposes as far as possible is agreed to by the Prime Minister, but without prejudicing the war effort the activities of the gold mining industry cannot be reduced beyond certain limits as gold mining is so important to the Union. Through the proposed council the Prime Minister is prepared to reach an agreement as to the limits of reduction with the American and British Governments, but within those limits he feels that to supply South Africa's requirements there should be an advance agreement.

2. Full cooperation to satisfy the increased need for
for exports of coal will be given by the Union Government. However, unless certain additional steel equipment, which is now on order, can be made available to the Union this effort will be limited.

3. The suggestion for the establishment of a supply program and a joint council on terms acceptable to the three Governments concerned is approved of by the Prime Minister.

Mr. MacVeagh is being informed by the Department that the gold mining problem should not be considered apart from South African requirements as a whole. Concerning our proposal a reply has not as yet been received by us from the British Embassy here, but when such a reply has been received we will proceed with the details of the council and of the program.

WELLES
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMERICAN LEGATION, Pretoria
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: March 10, 1943
NUMBER: 62

SECRET

In talking with me here, no sign has been shown by either Smuts or Martin of a desire to treat separate from other supply problems of South Africa, problems of gold mining, or of expecting that the proposed council will treat them separately. A very clear understanding has been shown by the General in particular of the purport of the council in this connection. Furthermore, what the Prime Minister suggests in his message does not seem to be precisely that an advance commitment be made by us to provide gold mining supplies before a decision has been made concerning the limits to be imposed on gold mining operations. He simply asks there for a joint understanding that if and when such limits have been imposed, there will be made available the supplies allowed there under. It seems that his request is accentuated by the fear that actual deliveries may be restricted by other agencies of our Government, thus bringing about a dangerous local situation, after the council has cut orders for gold mining supplies down to the minimum consistent with economic and political stability. The pertinent parts of his message are given below.
"While he is willing to consider how far the gold industry could be reduced and war industries expanded, he wishes to make it clear to the President that the essential importance of the gold industry to the internal economy of the Union is such that without jeopardizing South African war effort, there are limits to the extent to which the gold industry can be cut down. While he is ready to agree those limits with the United Kingdom and the United States through the medium of the joint body proposed, he feels, therefore, that in advance a joint understanding should be reached that supplies for South Africa's needs will be made available within those limits."

Although some of his subordinates may be differently inclined, it is my impression that the General, himself, is taking our proposals not only in the spirit in which they are made, but in the belief that both for him and for us the proposals constitute a hopeful and constructive way out of an embarrassing position of long standing, and it is not my impression that the General, himself, is trying to be smart in this matter.
Give cards to the President with copy Mr. F.'s letter
March 13, 1943

Dear General Smuts:

My husband and I are delighted to have the card from you and Mrs. Smuts, which has just arrived.

We send you and Mrs. Smuts our warmest greetings and look forward to seeing you here in this country.

Very cordially yours,

Prime Minister Field Marshal
The Honorable J. C. Smuts
Victoria, South Africa
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, Capetown
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: March 15, 1943
NUMBER: 283

The following from the Minister with reference to his no. 62 of March 10 from Pretoria.

I duly presented on my return the Department's views as instructed in its telegram of March 6, no. 44, and expect to be able to transmit the Prime Minister's views in reply very shortly.

It is insisted upon by Martin, meanwhile, that there is no desire here to have gold mining considered separately, but he also states that within the limitations to be imposed there is a desire for some sort of assurance that its essentiality will be recognized. It is suggested by Gage that this attitude may not be unconnected with War Production Board recent refusal to release supplies for gold mining.

At my request the South African Legation in Washington is being instructed to give the Department a copy of the Prime Minister's message, a full text of which the Legation has.
Dear Franklin:

Not long after I last wrote you, the South African Government picked up and transferred itself to the Cape, according to its usual custom, for the Parliamentary Session. Now, in the big Union Buildings which Baker, Rhodes' architect, built on the northern slopes of the Pretoria valley, only a few deserted secretaries flit like ghosts. The South African official world and his wife are here, which accounts for the heading on this letter. But they say the Session will be over by Easter, and we'll all go back up-country then.

As you know, owing to provincial jealousies existing at the time of Union (which still persist, of course, to a certain degree today) South Africa has three capitals: the Administrative at Pretoria, the Judicial at Bloemfontein, and the Legislative at Cape Town. In addition, the Commercial capital is unquestionably at Johannesburg.

I said the South African world and his wife are here now. But there is a notable exception. Sir Patrick Duncan, the Governor General, who came out here first as one of Milner's "Kindergarten", and has been a devoted and popular servant of South Africa

The President,
The White House.
ever since, is slowly dying, they say of cancer, and he and his wife are still in Pretoria. In his place we have here the Chief Justice administering the Government, a grand old warrior who served with Botha in the Boer War and was Minister of Justice in a former Smuts cabinet.

I shall begin this letter with politics. Parliament is conducted with the utmost formality and decorum,--prayers, wigs, mace, and all,--but the speeches made in it are often outrageously acrimonious, owing to the so-called "racial" feeling between the British and Dutch elements. Happily there is also considerable brilliance among the members, especially the older parliamentarians, and rapid-fire exchanges of wit are rarely lacking even on the dullest subjects. I have found attending the debates amusing as well as instructive.

General Smuts heads a coalition which gives him a majority of about twenty. Besides his own party, the United Party so-called, he has with him the pro-British Dominion Party and the Labor Party. Both of the latter are small but important in view of the strength of the Opposition. This last includes the Nationalists, headed by Dr. Malan, the Afrikaaners, headed by Mr. Havenga, and the New Order Party, headed by Dr. Pirow.

There are seeds of disunity in both groups, but these are more marked in the case of the Opposition. General Smuts came to power on the War issue, against General ....
General Hertzog, who enjoyed a personal ascendancy which none of the present Opposition leaders has inherited. For some months past, it has looked as if Smuts had guessed right about the war, and when allied successes are mentioned in the House, as they are just as often as the Government can manage it, the General's supporters leer across the Chamber in triumph at a dispirited Opposition which sometimes votes all together and sometimes splits. Accordingly, General Smuts, who hardly is ever absent from the floor, and watches for every possible move of Dr. Malan and his friends like a cat at a mouse-hole, has adopted a strategy for this session which stresses the conduct of the war to the virtual exclusion of purely domestic issues, on which debate might prove more precarious. He has struck early and hard for an endorsement of his war policy—with a motion to permit volunteers to serve outside Africa—and got it by the best margin he could expect from the existing line-up. His next effort has been on his budget—a drastic, war-time budget—and got that too on a strictly party vote. But he has consistently refused to consider suggestions for new legislation on social security, native affairs, the Communist "danger", education, and so forth. At present he is coasting along nicely on the adoption of his Budget estimates one after the other, while the heathen rage.

The Opposition, on the other hand, apparently realizing the truth of what both General Smuts and his chief lieutenant, Mr. Hofmeyr, the Minister of Finance, have said to me, that "the vote-getting possibilities ...."
possibilities of opposing the war are over," is concentrating its attack chiefly on domestic issues and claiming that the Government policy of standing pat on these is dangerous in the extreme. As to foreign affairs, it has so far confined itself to elaborating the local evils which it foresees as a result of the United Nations' victory, suggesting that lend-lease, to which the Government is partial, is likely to result in South Africa's being placed "in bondage" to American "imperialism" after fighting "Britain's war," and demanding a rupture of consular relations with the U.S.S.R., on account of alleged machinations of the Soviet tending to stir up the natives against the whites.

Behind all these manoeuvres stands the possibility of early general elections. Under the constitution, these must be held every five years--and this is an election year--but Parliament can postpone them if, in its judgment, a campaign would not be to the country's good. It has been widely suggested that the General might use his majority to postpone them this year "on account of the emergency", and he has not yet definitely denied that he will do so, thus keeping the Opposition guessing. The probabilities would seem, however, to be that he will call for elections just as soon as possible after this Session is over, in order to capitalize promptly on the apparent success of his war policy. Meanwhile, the parliamentary strategy on both sides, apart from the General's specific war and finance measures, which have ....
have constructive value in implementing present policies, is definitely pre-election and platform-building in character.

If and when elections are held, the General will probably go to the country on the basis of the accuracy of his predictions about the war, and the South Africans will be asked to give him their suffrage as to a Moses who is leading them surely to the Promised Land. His press is already playing up this point of view. His Opponents, on the other hand, will say, "Never mind all that, but just what is this Promised Land to which he is leading us?" and they will claim that it will be a land in which South Africa must be even less her own mistress than in the past, dominated by Anglo-Saxondom and threatened by Communism. Only by turning out this devil, Smuts, they will say, this traitor who would sell us to the British and (who knows?) to the Americans as well, can we save South Africa from foreign bondage and from internal revolution. The "racial" issue will again be made much of in all its forms and much will be said about Anglo-Saxon liberalism on the color question, as well as about Communist plots. In the former connection a rumor is already popping up from time to time, to the effect that "President Roosevelt intends to establish a native state in Africa after the war."

The above is all predicated, of course, on continued success for the United Nations. If Russia should collapse, or the Germans win in North Africa,
or anything else happen to give the Axis plausible
hopes of eventually winning the war, General Smuts
will almost certainly postpone elections here. Mean-
while home conditions appear to be somewhat deterior-
at ing under the strain of keeping the country at war
while the front is thousands of miles away. There are
labor troubles, and signs of Native and colored unrest,
which must be handled gingerly, at least in advance of
elections. Also there are local military troubles
which need the same treatment.

As regards the military situation, the
General apparently promised the First Division, long
ago in Abyssinia, that he would bring it home on leave,
and felt that he had to fulfill that promise after
Alamein. In any case, the First Division has come
home and has been scattered about in the country dis-
tricts where there is little enthusiasm for the war,
and now the men don't want to go north again unless
they are paid better and have other concessions made
to them. There is a small air-force still up north,
but including its members with the others, only about
half the enlisted men in the forces have as yet taken
the Prime Minister's new oath to serve overseas. To
get a division together, the 6th, which could be sent
on such service, the authorities have been forced to
break up another, the 3rd, which has for some time
past been concentrated on the Mozambique border ready
for action if Portugal became involved in the war.
Units of the 3rd are still in place, but it has been
depleted ....
depleted and declassified. South Africa's contribution to the fighting forces of the United Nations, at least for some time to come, is thus likely to be only one division, composed of one armored and one motorized brigade, besides the air force. What can be salvaged out of the 1st Division remains to be seen. The 2nd is captured, the 3rd disrupted, the 4th exists on paper only, and the 5th doesn't exist at all. Defense against submarines continues to be woefully weak and shows no improvement. There are many sinkings off the South African coast whenever U-boats are present, as recently.

Turning now to economics, many imported articles are hard to get here in South Africa, and most articles necessary to civilized life are imported. But aside from petrol and tires nothing is rationed, and life goes on very much as in peace-times. Of war-effort, as we understand the term, there appears very little. One feels tempted to criticize, until one remembers what the Government is up against in connection with the people. Then the war-effort, such as it is, seems somewhat of a miracle. There are actually many boys in the air-force and other combatant units today whose parents are bitter opponents of the war-policy. General Smuts said to me the other day, "If DeValera had joined England in the war he would have been very much in my position today."

I have naturally seen a good deal of the General and his advisers in regard to our supplying South Africa with her essential requirements and getting things ....
things from her which we need. In regard to the former, the General has, as you perhaps know, accepted the idea that we and the British should set up a joint council here with the South Africans to decide on programs of supply from Britain and America; and he has admitted, too, the principle that supplies connected with the war effort should be given precedence over all others. But he wants us, on our part, to agree that categories of supplies which he and the South African Government consider essential to South Africa's maximum war effort will be so recognized by our Government agencies, and the Department doesn't want to do this because it would be agreeing to supply the gold mines before any agreement has been reached as to how far the latter are to be limited! I am hoping that some way of meeting the General on this matter may be found, since he is not one to relish being told that his views about his own country are inadmissible and we have a good deal of other business to transact with him. Actually, we already agree, it seems, that some supplies for the gold mines are necessary, and all he wants is a reassurance on this point, which he suggests we might give him in principle without any embarrassing specific reference to gold.

As regards our purchases of South African supplies for the war effort, we have encouraged the production here of chrome and manganese, but have since decided that because of shipping problems and the availability of these two ores elsewhere, we can now cut out South African chrome entirely and reduce manganese orders ....
orders to a minimum. To the South African Ministry of Mines, this has come as a "blow" which it hopes to "soften" by getting us to accept some sort of compromise. The Board of Economic Warfare people here are working on the matter, but I expect the South African proposals to come through my hands in a few days.

In both cases,--that of supplying the gold mines and that of purchasing chrome and manganese,--our troubles are, from the material point of view, only tempests in a tea-pot. Thus, all the gold mining supplies now provided by us here per annum amount to only a very few average ship-loads, while the local labor to be displaced by stopping chrome shipments from the United States is only 160 white men and 4,000 blacks! But the fact that we have shut down our own gold mining altogether, and the fact that the South African Government has enthusiastically encouraged base metal mining here at our instance, provide aspects under which, from the political point of view, the teapot is considerably enlarged.

More encouraging is the situation regarding coal. Our Government wants the South Africans to step up coal production so that ships returning in ballast from the Indian Ocean can be freighted with this commodity for South America, and thus relieve bottoms now employed in such traffic from the United States and England. The General seized very quickly on the purpose and value of this proposal and I have hopes that despite the necessary local adjustments in labor ....
labor and rail transportation, some good results will eventuate.

We have long wanted a Lend-Lease mission here to find out how our policy can be more closely and helpfully fitted to existing facts, and such a Mission has now arrived and begun its investigations and discussions. It is too soon to report on its success, but I have little doubt that this will be appreciable. South Africa, of course, now enjoys lend-lease as a Dominion, under the master agreement with England, but it is trying to negotiate a reciprocal agreement in Washington on the general basis of our recent agreements with Australia and New Zealand. Our policy at present seems to be to limit South Africa's lend-lease on credit to finished war supplies, and on a cash basis to other supplies, on the grounds that she has, thanks to her gold production, a very favorable trade balance; and so far as reciprocal lend-lease is concerned, to demand inclusion of strategic materials in the reciprocation. Early conversations indicate that the South Africans may contest both these proposals on the ground that this country is part of the British Commonwealth of Nations and should not be treated differently from the rest of that group, whose balance of trade as a whole is not favorable and whose strategic materials are accordingly paid for in cash.

In conclusion, I should like to relate this letter more closely to what I have previously written,
and perhaps I may best do so by referring again to the color question, which I believe to be the most important of all the many vexing problems of this country. The whole point of the anti-Communist campaign now being cooked-up as an election issue by the Opposition lies in the suggested likely effects of Communism on the dissatisfied mass of color in the Union. Much has already been said in Parliament about this "danger," but when proposals were brought up by one of the few white members representing the Natives, to do something for the colored population which would make it immune to Communist propaganda--namely give it labor rights and real representation--the Government shied off. It would not, said the Minister for Native Affairs, consider any alteration of the existing laws, "lest the problem of native affairs be brought into the forefront of politics"! Sidney WATERSO, who has just returned from being High Commissioner in London, lamented to me later (he is a Minister now, for Commerce), "I should have got up and told the House that there is no use blaming Communist propaganda. What we should do is ask ourselves what we ourselves are doing to make the Natives subject to Communist propaganda." Instead of that, however, what he did was to join the vote of confidence in the existing policy of feeding, educating, converting and doctoring without according any of the rights which must be aspired to by an able-bodied, educated, christian and healthy community. The papers have dubbed this policy "a square deal for the Natives," and such flattering function ....
unction may soothe for a while the fears which South Africans of all parties feel on the color question. But sooner or later that question must be faced, and the half-hearted measures now hopefully looked-to to avert this necessity are only rendering the problem itself more acute.

Affectionately yours,

[Signature]

Lincoln MacVeagh
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Field Marshal Smuts
Pretoria

I am grateful to you for your telegram and it is a wonderful thing to think that very soon all of Africa will be free from the Nazis and Fascists. We in America will never forget the brave and important contribution which the troops of the Union of South Africa have given in attaining this success. We all know that we can count on their further aid.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

May 8, 1943

The White House
Washington
TELEGRAM

The White House
1 WNAB 86 PRTY 9:17 A.M. Washington

Union Building Pretoria May 8, 1943

THE PRESIDENT:

MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON MAGNIFICENT VICTORY OF AMERICAN FORCES IN CAPTURE OF BIZERTA SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH BRITISH CAPTURE OF TUNIS POLITICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE THAT OWING TO YOUR WISE ACTION FRENCH TROOPS EFFECTIVELY TOOK THEIR PART IN THIS PROUD ACHIEVEMENT THIS FEAT OF ARMS WILL PROVE HISTORIC FROM NOW ON THE ALLIED TIDE OF VICTORY WILL ROLL ON UNTIL IT COVERS AND REFERTILIZES OUR FAIR WORLD AND SAVES IT FROM THE NEW BARBARISM.

FIELD MARSHAL SMUTS.
Dear Franklin:

I am now back in Pretoria, as you see, and the Parliamentary Session, about which I wrote in my last letter, is over. Comment has been general that it was not a lively session, as such things go in South Africa. Results were quite as expected. As I reported in my last letter, of March 25, the Government passed a Bill allowing it to employ volunteers on military service outside of Africa, and secured a budget sufficient to carry on the war effort for the coming year. Already a small volunteer force has gone to the middle East in the shape of the so-called Sixth Armored Division. Most of the rest of the legislation passed was of a routine domestic character, almost half being financial. In this connection some effort was observable to forestall post-war inflation.

The Opposition, in its attacks on the Government, avoided the war issue as far as possible and made much of the perils of communism, particularly in connection with native unrest. It also put forward a lengthy and cumbersome social security program on the plea that the Government has been so busy with foreign affairs.

The President,

The White House,

Washington.
affairs that it has neglected domestic welfare. It was clear throughout the session that both sides had more than half their minds on the coming elections, which General Smuts has now stated will "probably" be held in August "in the normal course of events." I have been privately given to understand, however, by his chief political adviser, Mr. Louis Esselen, that they may be held considerably earlier, perhaps about the first week in July.

The political campaign is now getting into full swing. General Smuts is holding his coalition together. It consists of his own "United Party" the largest in the country, plus the small Labor Party (a purely white man's affair since natives cannot vote,) and the so-called Dominion or "Jingo" Party, mostly confined to the British of Natal. The Dominion Party has recently been enjoying eight seats in the House as against 70 for the United Party. Labor has had only 4 seats. Because, however, the Communist Party, which has not hitherto contested a National Election, is posting a dozen candidates in this one, and thus threatens to weaken the Labor Vote, the General has agreed that the United Party will not post candidates in as many as nine constituencies where Labor is doing so, and will support the Labor Candidates in those Constituencies, thus giving the little party a chance of more than doubling its recent representation in Parliament. A similar agreement has been made with the Dominion Party, but only covering
covering the same number of constituencies in which it was successful in the last General Election. Labor influence is growing here but is still far from being the factor it is at home.

On the Opposition side, the situation is very different. Dr. Malan, ex-Predikant, recognised Opposition Leader in the House, and head of the Re-United Party, has been controlling 40 seats. Mr. Havenga, heading the Afrikaner Party, has controlled nine, and Dr. Pirow, with his "New Order," 16. These three parties constitute the divided political heritage of the late General Hertzog, who lost a close election to General Smuts on the Neutrality issue in 1939, as you know. Since the war has taken a turn against the Nazis, the "New Order" group has shown some indecision as to whether it will continue to function as a political party, though it still conducts fascist propaganda and has announced that its members will certainly support any candidates who are anti-Smuts and anti-War. In addition, the smaller Afrikaner Party, being professionally moderate in a country of extremes, appears also to be showing some signs of dissolution. It stems from the more liberal side of the great Hertzog's complex political character, a side which led him at one time to "fuse" with Smuts and eventually drove the bulk of his followers, under Malan, into secession. Some of its remaining members are now joining the United Party, others are turning to Malan, and still others appear to be trying to form a new party of their own together with members of the "New Order" and of the Ossewa Brandwag, a quasi-military secret society.
society, formed on the Nazi model to exploit the anti-British feelings of the Boers. Mr. Havenga has recently tried to make an agreement with Dr. Malan similar to that made with Smuts by Labor and the Jingoers, but has been rebuffed. The good Doctor appears to think that most of the Afrikaners will come to him anyhow once his campaign is launched, and that he therefore needs to make no special gesture towards them. But in the meantime the main body of the Afrikaner party, which still coheres, is deploring his "arrogance" and "lack of leadership" and is posting candidates all over the Union. Thus, as the campaign begins, the Opposition house is divided against itself.

As for the issues, it may be said that the struggle is essentially Smuts versus Malan. Smuts has indicated that his side will chiefly stress the war issue, his rightness in joining the United Nations, as proved by recent events, and the benefits to accrue to South Africa from being among the victors. Malan, on the other hand, will apparently make his chief issue of the danger to this country of being allied with communist and propagandist Russia, where no color-bar is recognised. Smuts will belittle this danger, claim that his Government is vigilant as well as constructive. Malan will say that to participate in victory with the United Nations will be only to participate in pulling England's chestnuts out of the fire, to abet the growth of English and American "Imperialism", and help to spread the influence of Russian
Russian communism throughout the world. Minor issues will be interwoven with these, of course. Something may be heard of Lend-Lease, from the Opposition side, as a means adopted by Smuts to "mortgage" or "enslave" South Africa to the United States and England. But this subject is probably too complicated to be made much of on the stump except in very general terms. Certainly the great historical "racial" issue of Boer versus Briton, and the local hatred of England and of Smuts as an English "stooge," will appear at every turn, even if they have to be dragged in by the heels. But mainly the election will turn on whether it is better for South Africa to face the future as one of the victorious United Nations or to retire into a perhaps less glorious but supposedly safer isolationism. Dr. Malan has said that if he is elected he will withdraw the country from participation in the war. This is, of course, pure Hertzogism, and Malan doubtless counts on it to unite behind him the full strength which supported Hertzog, while he adds the fear of communism to give him the added margin to succeed where Hertzog failed. Furthermore, to make his gruel thick and slab and generally more palatable to the platte-land (South African for the "back woods," ) he has announced that he aims at the establishment of an independent white republic. Note the "white?"

It may not seem that a forthright policy like that of Smuts should have much to fear from a witch-doctor's brew.
of old prejudices and new phobias. But to South Africa as a whole this war is still very much a "foreign war." Smuts' appeal is to cool reason, sound business sense, and patriotic sentiments, and he idealizes the future. Malan, on the other hand, idealizes the past, and appeals very largely to passions of fear, jealousy, and hatred ancestrally ingrained. His program is perhaps better fitted to the average mentality in this country than that of his opponent. Furthermore he has the backing of the Dutch Reformed Church. If he had a more popular personality and a greater talent for leadership than he actually enjoys, his chance to win upon his backward-facing platform might be very good indeed. As it is, the divisions in the Opposition ranks, not on issues but on personalities, may well be fatal to his cause.

Smuts should win, but he also has to fear the danger of a "split" vote and the opportunities this gives for a minority victory. Thus, the returned soldiers, despite a raise in pay which he has given to the army, are by no means satisfied with home conditions. Not only is there the usual complaint about promotions for those who have never gone to the front, but the soldiers seem to have found the country as a whole disappointingly disinterested in their sacrifice. Many of these men may vote communist. Then there is disaffection among the normal Smutsite colored voters of the Cape, who are restless over what they feel as insufficient liberalism.
liberalism in the Government on the color question. Many of them may abstain from voting. The United Party's machine, which is the best in the country, is working hard on these problems. Considering the Opposition's disorganized state, the Government doubtless holds a trump card in its ability to spring the elections at an earlier date than expected, but I note that Louis Esselen, who has been called the "Jim Farley" of South Africa, is not sitting back for all that. The election isn't completely in the bag.

In my letters to you from South Africa, I have always had something to say about the color-bar, which I believe to constitute this country's most important and vexing question. Something came up in this connection at the close of the Parliamentary Session and you may have heard of it already, since it has caused some little flurry in the British House of Commons as well as at New Delhi. I refer to the passage of the Indian Restriction Bill, which the Indian Government protested but which the British Government refrained from touching as a purely Dominion affair.

The idea that the passage of this Bill was due to political manoeuvring is fallacious. The Indian High Commissioner has chosen to see it in this light, as it saves his "face" to do so (the British High Commissioner said to me, "One might as well let the poor fellow keep on thinking as he does, since it makes him feel better!") But the truth is that while the Dominion Party, which is
chiefly concentrated in Natal where the trouble precipitating the Bill arose, was first to be agitated on the matter, all the representatives of white South Africa, both in the House and the Senate, voted for the Bill, with the exception of three who only abstained from voting and opposed it only in detail. This Bill which, despite Government apologetics, distinctly and drastically discriminates against non-white, under-privileged citizens of South Africa was passed by privileged white South Africans with hardly a dissenting voice.

The Government had no desire to indulge in such legislation at this session, or indeed at any time, since it is unhappily controversial, particularly as regards foreign relations. But the report of a Commission appointed to investigate charges of increasing penetration by Asians into so-called European districts in the city of Durban turned out to be so alarming, when it was completed and presented on March 31st, that action could not be averted in the face of the feelings aroused. It appeared that rich Indians had been buying up desirable sites at an enormously increased rate during the past year, and that an existing "gentleman's agreement," whereunder the two races were supposed to keep apart, had lost all sense. The Government of India pleaded that the matter of separation be still maintained on a voluntary basis, by any means that might be found possible, in view of the principle involved. But public opinion, that is, white public opinion, was frightened. General Smuts himself said
said in the House, "Durban is a European city and must remain so." The Minister of the Interior said: "Efforts to solve the problem by other than legislative means have failed." To the argument of the local Indians that they must have some place to go, the Minister said that this is up to the Durban City Council, which must provide adequate housing facilities, as well as other amenities, for the non-Europeans and that henceforth the Council would be "on trial" in this respect. The Bill stops all transfers of property, whether on lease or freehold basis, between Europeans and non-Europeans for a period of three years. It also extends for a similar period certain discriminations against the Asians in the Transvaal in connection with business licensing. If the conditions against which the legislation is aimed improve sufficiently during the three year period, legislative prohibition may be raised at the end of that time and the principle of voluntary separation again resorted to. The Bill is therefore called a "pegging" Bill and a "standstill agreement." To solve its conscience, the Government has made much of this feature, and has argued that the Bill does not discriminate against the Indians in Durban since it applies equally to both races. But the Native Representatives (the Indians themselves have no representatives, though nearly all were born here and are called citizens) who alone opposed the Bill in Chamber and Senate, easily showed up the fallacy of this. One of them replied bravely,
bravely, if ineffectively, to General Smuts that, "Durban is not a European city, it is a South African city." The Bill is definitely a segregational measure applied by one portion of the people to another which has had no say in the matter. The Indians did not even get to the bar of the House, though that privilege was asked.

The Opposition was actually more definite than the Government on the question and in this ran true to typical Afrikaner policy. Dr. Malan said that the temporizing policy of pegging was mere "fiddling with the Indian Question." He wanted something more definite and drastic. "Fiddling" may seem extreme, but it has some justification in the fact that what is now called pegging is only too likely to prove a permanent fixation. But in any case, the Government and Opposition showed themselves at one in this, that if the color-bar is not observed by the colored people in this country voluntarily, they must be forced to observe it by legislation in which only the white people share. Progress and liberalism in this matter may be expressed in speeches, but it cannot be expected in fact when the white ox is gored. Similar legislation will certainly be enacted as and when encroachment by Indians (who generally work harder and make money faster than whites in this country) menace other desirable centers of residence and trade.

To pass to pleasanter subjects, General Smuts is a most delightful companion as well as host. I asked him to luncheon in Cape Town with ten or so of my young men - Assistant
Assistant Attachés, Vice Consuls and so forth - for the express purpose of giving them a chance to meet him, and he not only accepted with alacrity, but charmed everyone present with his friendly humor. But the people closely around him say he is getting "crotchety," "difficult," and "dictatorial." His wife has recently had a slight shock which has upset him and though he walks up Table Mountain every Sunday when he is at the Cape (a feat like scaling half a dozen Washington Monuments,) leading his husky young guards a merry chase, he is after all 73 years old. Louis Esselen says he hopes he can get him off to America after the elections. These trips abroad (in the limelight) are what he apparently chiefly relishes these days. Esselen even came to me a month ago to suggest a visit before the elections, but this he told me later was found impracticable. I asked the General himself about the matter the other day and he said that newspaper reports of an impending visit to America are "just talk," but that he anticipates going to London after the elections and thinks that at that time he might be able to make a quick visit across.

His attitude towards the United States is chiefly that "after the war America will call the tune" (his own words;) that our constitution is definitely inferior to the British in not being so flexible; that he lives in fear of our again reverting to isolationism after this war; that in this connection he specially dreads the possibility of the end of the war coinciding with our Presidential elections; and that so far as regards our relations
relations with South Africa, this is a British dominion. His mind is full of lore of all sorts, astronomical, historical, pre-historical, botanical, metaphysical. He thinks Africa the most interesting of all continents, and is likely to throw off at any time remarks which one is unable to forget, - as this about General de Gaulle: "He has a long face like a horse, a horse in blinders which can't see left or right but only straight ahead. He keeps on saying 'Je suis la France! Je suis la France!' But he isn't France at all, he is only a pip-squeak." And about the multiplication of our Governmental boards and commissions at home: "If America ever dies, she'll die of complications."

Affectionately yours,

[Signature]
August 19, 1943.

HON. LINCOLN MacVEIGH

I hear there is a possibility of Prime Minister Smuts going to England. I wish you would tell him that I deeply hope he will be able to visit us in Washington before or after he goes to London. I have written him.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
My dear Mr. President:

I have received from Mr. Lincoln MacVeagh a report of a conversation with Mr. Esselen who is political adviser to Prime Minister Smuts. It appears that Smuts' sweeping victory in the recent South Africa elections makes it possible for him to leave that country.

Mr. Churchill has telegraphed to him asking that he come to England not later than the third week in September for a visit of several months. Although Prime Minister Smuts has not stated his desire to come to the United States, Mr. Esselen believes that he would be pleased to do so.

During the past year you have, on several occasions, extended invitations to the Prime Minister to come to this country. Unfortunately political conditions within the Union of South Africa made it impossible for him to accept. If you find the time convenient, would you desire

The President,

The White House.
desire that Mr. MacVeagh be instructed to inform the Prime Minister that you would like to have him come to Washington?

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

[Name]
August 27, 1943.

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE SENT VIA
STATE DEPARTMENT CODE ROOM

Hon. Lincoln MacVeigh
Pretoria

Please tell the Prime Minister
that I am very happy at the thought
of seeing him toward the end of
October.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE SENT VIA STATE DEPARTMENT CODE ROOM

Hon. Lincoln MacVeigh
Pretoria

Please tell the Prime Minister that I am very happy at the thought of seeing him toward the end of October.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
HEL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Pretoria

Dated August 23, 1943

Recl'd 4:46 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

230, August 23, 11 a.m.

Department's 159, August 19, 6 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT.

General Smuts sends his thanks and has asked me to tell you that he doesn't see how he can leave here before the early part of October, but that he now plans to go to London at that time, visiting his troops in the Middle East enroute, and then on to Washington about the end of the month.

He asked if this would suit you.

MACVEAGH

HPD
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Dear Fe:

The American Legation at Pretoria informs me that several letters have been received from the White House addressed to the Prime Minister, General Smuts, bearing the wrong address. One of the envelopes is enclosed since it may aid in checking with the proper office in connection with the preparation of future communications.

The envelope should of course have been addressed to the capital of the South African Union, which is Pretoria (not Victoria), and the correct form of address for General Smuts, who is both a Prime Minister and a Privy Councillor, is as follows:

Field Marshal
The Right Honorable J. C. Smuts, P.C.
Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa,
Pretoria,
Union of South Africa.

Will you be good enough to pass this along to the interested offices?

(Signed) G. T. SUMMERLIN
George T. Summerlin

Enclosure:
Envelope.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have read with great interest Lincoln MacVeagh's letter to you of October 5 which I am returning to you herewith as requested.

I greatly appreciate your having permitted me to read this letter.

E. R. Stettinius
Dear Franklin:

I am continuing my letters from South Africa, though I fully realize that for you they can contain only a very marginal interest at this time.

There is a nice line somewhere in Robert Frost to the effect that "Yankees are what they always were." The same thing can be said for the South Africans. You will have enough of their history in mind to realize how true to form they are running now. Since I last wrote, General Smuts has won the national elections by a large majority, and it is now considered here that these elections have settled the "war issue." The main issue around which the present campaign for the provincial elections is being waged is accordingly not only a purely domestic one but the same old "racial" issue of Boer versus Briton which has been cardinal in South African history for centuries. The Government is making a great deal of post-war planning for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and even demobilization, but it has chosen to go to the provincial polls principally on its program of abolishing what is called "single medium" instruction in the schools, that is, instruction in

The President,

The White House,

Washington.
one language only, English or Afrikaans. Essentially, this amounts to attacking the very citadel of Afrikaandom, whose leaders must keep alive in the younger generation a consciousness of the difference between the English and the Dutch elements or face the eventual loss of their political raison d'etre. The war is occasionally mentioned in campaign speeches and editorials, but only incidentally.

Of course, this reversion to "politics as usual" is not without a basis in popular sentiment. To South Africans at large the war seems to be as good as over. Ever since the German threat to Egypt was removed, war consciousness here has been diminishing fast, and now that the front has crossed to Europe, is almost non-existent. The war in the East, which once seemed important locally, as likely to affect Madagascar, is now not even front page news. Moreover, not only has there been a switch of popular interest back to domestic problems, but the attitude of the military has deteriorated as well. On the one hand, recruiting for overseas service is practically at a standstill. Though the authorities keep up a certain amount of tub-thumping, the response is negligible. On the other hand, headquarters are being cut down and high ranking officers are leaving the defense forces to take jobs with reconstruction agencies, other officers are being allowed to resign to return to private business, and the spirit of the troops within the Union, as reported to me by both
both my Military and Naval Attachés, is getting lower every day.

All this may seem strange as a sequel to an election won on the war issue by a famous Field Marshal. But it must be understood that by the "war issue" here was not meant the question of whether to wage war with increased intensity, nor even whether to wage war at all. What was at stake, and what was settled, was merely the question of whether the Smuts Government was right, in 1939, in placing South Africa on the side of the Allies. The probability of that decision's meaning that when the war is over South Africa will be on the side of the victors, with all the advantages presumably to accrue, is what carried Smuts through to his overwhelming victory. He and his government know this, of course, and are therefore not presuming on that victory now by flying in the face of popular apathy as regards actual hostilities, but rather are trying to use it to consolidate a position on the home front which they have never had before. Briefly, believing that the vote on the war issue has shown that the forces of isolationism and reaction in South Africa are no longer as great as in the past, they are losing no time in attacking them where it hurts most, in their racial core.

Thus the winds of doctrines agitating South Africa today are very different from those blowing in the great world outside. Progressivism is thinking of the post-war, and Reaction of the pre-war world, and actuality as we
know it is at a premium. General Smuts has gone abroad, and will doubtless talk much about his army there, as he does here in his speeches. He can do no other. But his army has clearly shot its bolt, in Abyssinia and Egypt, and is not likely to be of much account hereafter; and meanwhile, at home, the men he has left behind him have other fish to fry than South Africa's influence at the Conference of the Peace. They must find some way of carrying Smutsism in South Africa beyond the Smuts era. They must make the United Party stand for something other than the "war issue" now dead. They must see to it that when their leader comes home from personal triumphs abroad, he does not suffer the fate of Mr. Venizelos. He himself has given them a lead in this matter. They must concentrate on the need of South Africa for unity, unity above all, and then, reconstruction, rehabilitation - all these things may be added unto her. The dream of a united people and its influence on this continent, which he believes the greatest of all continents, is what he has left them to work with. On the other hand, however, there is also a potent dream being emphasized by the Opposition, and its chief dreamer has not gone abroad. It is the dream of the good old days, a dream of patriarchal white supremacy, Kaffir servitude, and Boer Republican isolation, "Aforetime, in the days of peace, before the sons of the Achaean came" - and let us say also the sons of Shem. It is by no means one of the least factors contributing
contributing to the bitterness of this domestic struggle, which now so eclipses the war in local eyes, that Dr. Malan as a personality, and despite his narrowness, towers head and shoulders above any Smutsite politician except Smuts. Beaten badly in the national elections, and probably to be beaten almost as badly in the coming provincial tests, he is yet a figure whose eventual comeback is so possible as to be dreaded still. He is the Satan of the Dutch Paradise Lost.

Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not to be wondered at that the South African industrial war effort languishes. It may be said, of course, that if South Africa is not producing much for the war there are other reasons for this than her own lack of interest in the world outside. She has been stimulated to produce chromite, and had the orders canceled; she has produced munitions which have found no market; and recently the shipping around the Cape has been so reduced that her ship repairing - perhaps her most useful contribution to the war so far - is faced with reduction too, through no fault of hers. But she can certainly do something by increasing her export coal production, and we have now been pressing for this over a period of months. That the desired results have not yet been obtained is again not wholly her own fault. Organizationally, she is at least fifty or sixty years behind the United States, for
for historical reasons, and psychologically her people do not move at our tempo. Also, we too are not infallible, and dislocation of shipping owing to the war, as well as occasional lapses in coordination between our services, American and British, may be somewhat to blame. Yet there has unquestionably been a lag which even an undeveloped country more keenly touched by hostilities would not have suffered to exist. Perhaps our new Joint Supply Council may be able to speed things up and get some results. In addition to coal, there is a possibility of South Africa supplying foods for export, and this, too, the Council will take up. With the good will and full comprehension of General Smuts and his government, these aims are being and will continue to be pursued, but they are too limited and too few to constitute much of a "war effort" on a national scale as we know it, and the fact remains that the real interest of the people is focusing here progressively rather on getting than supplying. With her feeling that the war, so far as she is concerned, is virtually over, and in her very strong financial position based on gold, South Africa is thinking chiefly of importing things, even luxuries, and recruiting for the industrial war effort, like recruiting for the army, must be drummed up to exist.

It is easy to criticize, but this is a country of amazing contrasts. With a world figure at her head and a whole sub-continent as her area, she numbers in white population the equivalent of only a medium-sized large city
city at home, such as Philadelphia. To be fair while we are firm, I think we should remember these things. At least they will help to understand what would otherwise be inexplicable. Up to now South Africa has done fairly well in this war, considering her limitations. In spots she has actually done magnificently - as anyone would be forced to agree who should see the Honor Roll of a school like Bishop's at Cape Town - and, despite other spots not so brilliant, she has kept the Cape out of enemy hands over a critical period. As to her future contribution, aside from what she might do with the Bantus and the Zulus were her native policy different (and that would necessitate a whole different history), and what she might contribute economically were her house not founded almost exclusively on one industry (and that is also a product of her past, firmly established), her possibilities within her means are very small. Potentially rich in minerals but positively poverty stricken in population, abnormally one-sided in economic development and socially riddled with problems whose answers are not in sight, what she has already contributed may be very nearly all she can contribute, and her present apparently premature preoccupation with things domestic may accordingly be in part, if not wholly, pardonable.

One thing which I have enjoyed above all in my experience here, and which I am sure you would yourself immensely appreciate, has been acquaintance with a number
of South Africans who are still alive and active from the days of the Boer War. As was the case with our country in Revolutionary times, that great crisis produced an amazing crop of unusual men. You know the names of many who have died, and you know General Smuts personally. Others remain. Chief Justice de Wet, now administering the government, a kind of Cincinnatus, who would be Governor-General today but for his dislike of pomp and ceremony and his objection, as he told me himself, to being "paid too much and losing contact with his friends," Louis Esselen of General Botha's staff, now Smuts' chief political adviser, and others of their type, in the and without, are men cast in a heroic mold. They are the best of the real Boers, trained to the saddle, the gun, and the frontier, with clear eyes still, and clear heads. Unfortunately, their children do not reproduce the mold. With the passing of Smuts' generation, South Africa with all her vexing problems before her, will be faced with an era of smaller personalities. There are, of course, a lot of good men among these, but the problems of South Africa today, though perhaps more difficult of solution than any in her past history, do not call so much for nobility of character as for other qualities and other qualities are what they are producing. The days of King Arthur and his Round Table,
when "every chance called forth a noble knight," are no more in South Africa. The future looks petty and confused.

Affectionately yours,

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN FOR

MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Letter addressed to the President, dated October 5, 1943, from Hon. Lincoln MacVeagh, Pretoria, Union of South Africa.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 7, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose for your information a copy of a note dated November 30, 1943 from the Minister of the Union of South Africa, stating that Prime Minister Smuts will be unable to visit the United States at this time but that he hopes to be able to do so late next year.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

1. Note dated November 30, 1943.

The President,
The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

To

Letter drafted

Addressed To

The Secretary of State
My dear Mr. Secretary,

I have received from the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, Field Marshal Smuts, two telegrams dated 24th November, 1943 and 27th November, 1943, respectively, which I should bring to your notice and I hope this will be the most suitable way of doing so. They relate to the question of the acceptance by him of the invitation, sent to him by the President direct, to visit the United States of America.

On the 24th November, Field Marshal Smuts telegraphed to me that the visit was not possible this year but added that no announcement should be made or action taken before he had "conveyed this to the President in ordinary courtesy".

The Honourable Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State,

Department of State,

Washington, D.C.
On the 27th November, Field Marshal Smuts telegraphed to me that owing to his stay in London being longer than was expected by him and owing to the fact that his return to Pretoria is urgently necessary, the idea of a visit to the United States as well as that of a visit to Canada has had to be abandoned - though he expressed a sincere wish that it will be possible for him to pay these visits later next year.

The Prime Minister added a request that I should communicate with you and hence this note.

But I have to communicate as soon as possible with a number of persons and bodies who have sent in to me requests that Field Marshal Smuts accept invitations or address them.

Under the circumstances, shall I be in order, after this communication to you, in telling the inviting bodies, persons etc. - and the press representatives who are continually asking for information - that the Prime Minister is not coming this year but hopes to do so late next year.
In other words shall I, under the circumstances, in doing this be acting in strict compliance with the spirit of the Prime Minister's telegram of 24th November, 1943.

Very sincerely yours,