

REPORT TO
HONORABLE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES
BY
MYRON TAYLOR
ON HIS TRIP TO THE
VATICAN, EUROPE AND BRITISH ISLES
SEPTEMBER 12 - OCTOBER 12, 1942

²
Franklin D. Roosevelt

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MEMORANDUM

His Holiness Pope Pius XII gratefully assures His Excellency the President of the United States that he will be happy to receive Mr. Taylor.

The Italian Government will make no difficulty about Mr. Taylor's transit through the Kingdom of Italy, although it is necessary to wait upon the arrangements of the Military Authorities. They will fix an opportune day for the journey, sometime between the seventh and the twentieth of this month. For the present the matter should be kept strictly secret.

Therefore, this requires that His Excellency the Representative of the President be in Lisbon by September the seventh. The Papal Secretariat of State will appreciate being notified in advance of the exact date of his arrival at Lisbon.

There will be no difficulty about providing residence for Mr. Taylor in Vatican City. Mr. Tittmann offers him the hospitality of his apartment.

September 1, 1942.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

September 3 1942

Your Holiness:-

I am very happy that Mr. Myron C. Taylor is going back to the Vatican to see you and that apparently the passage has been assured.

He will tell you of all that has gone on in America since he last saw you, and he will tell you how important I believe it to be that we maintain close contacts and close understandings.

I well know what great difficulties surround you and I know that you are praying for us in the United States just as you are praying for all humanity.

I hope especially that your health is good and that you will take care of yourself -- for we all need you in this critical time.

With my warm regards,

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

His Holiness
Pius XII,
Vatican City.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FROM HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII
SEPTEMBER 25 1942

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Once again We have welcomed with especial satisfaction your Personal Representative, His Excellency Mr. Myron C. Taylor, whose untiring and devoted efforts serve so effectively to foster the relations between Your Excellency and Us.

We continue to strive with every means at Our disposal, for the foundation of a world order that will have as its basis the fundamental principles of justice and charity, and it is Our confident prayer that in the post-war work men and nations may unite in a new spirit of understanding and collaboration. As Your Excellency has remarked, Our labors for the alleviation of suffering and for peace encounter obstacles and difficulties, but We place Our trust in God and are confident that We shall enjoy the understanding collaboration of all good people.

In reviewing to Your Excellency the expression of Our good wishes, We assure you of Our fervent prayers for your personal welfare and for that of the people of the United States of America.

A

SUMMARY OF THE CONVERSATIONS

between

HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII

and

MYRON TAYLOR

Personal Representative of the President
of the United States of America to
His Holiness Pope Pius XII

at

VATICAN CITY

September, 19, 22, and 26, 1942.

I left New York by CLIPPER on September 12th (Saturday) and, without special incident, arrived in Lisbon on September 13th (Sunday). Arrangements had been made by the Vatican and the Italian Government for my flight to Rome on September 17th (Thursday), accompanied by Monsignor Vagnozzi, until recently Counselor at the Papal Delegation in Washington and now accredited to the Nunciature in Lisbon. En route, I had conversations with Ambassador Hayes at the airport in Madrid and Consul General Frost at the airport in Barcelona.

At the Rome airport I was met by several representatives of the Vatican, including Father Carroll, American Member of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness, and Monsignor Carlo Grano, also of the Secretariat of State; and, without incident, was driven in a Vatican car to Vatican City and the Palazzo Santa Marta, which is the residence of the American Charge d'Affaires at the Vatican, Mr. Harold Tittmann. Mr. and Mrs. Tittmann, Miss Flaminia, and others welcomed me to their home, which I find to be modest and comfortable and in keeping with the character of the surroundings.

FIRST AUDIENCE, SEPTEMBER 19th (SATURDAY).

On Saturday I was accorded an audience by His Holiness Pope Pius XII at 11:00 o'clock. His Holiness appeared to me in good health, though he had suffered from a bronchial ailment during the spring and early summer. He seemed somewhat thinner, heightening his ascetic appearance, and indicated the signs of strain due to world conditions, which, apart from his concern for the spiritual welfare of mankind, impose very difficult problems upon the Holy See, particularly in respect to the invaded countries.

After presenting the President's letter and responding to inquiries about the President's health and other personal questions, I introduced the subject of America's position in the war by presenting a memorandum which I had prepared and which follows:

Upon the occasion of my audience with Your Holiness in September of last year, I had the honor to present, among other matters, a brief Memorandum stressing certain aspects of the International situation owing their origin to a state of war which then existed in Europe and their reaction upon other countries, particularly America, then at peace.

Those points were as follows:

- (a) That in our view Hitler cannot win the war;
- (b) That while America is a peace-loving country, the spread of the war and general opinion that Hitler is unreliable leads America to feel insecure, and thus to arm on a vast scale for defensive purposes;

- (c) A large majority are in favor of aid to Britain and her allies. This aid, supported by Congressional action and the appropriation of large sums of money, is being given;
- (d) If Germany interferes with American shipping by attacking and sinking of ships, American opinion, which is volatile, will quickly support retaliation.
- (e) It is confidently asserted by authoritative American opinion that if the defenders of civilization were in desperate need to save the world from Hitlerism, America would use every means to prevent its accomplishment.
- (f) America has no hatred of the Italian people. American feeling for the German people is tempered by the growing conviction that they uphold the aggressions of their leaders. American opinion is one of sympathy for the Russian people but it is particularly Russia's alleged propaganda in other countries which public opinion in the United States disapproves.
- (g) The vituperative Italian press, and particularly that of Gayda, which is in contrast to the present attitude of the American press, does much harm to American and Italian relations, and is therefore harmful to Italy's future interests.
- (h) Preparedness in America has progressed by leaps and bounds. Today in practically all items it is at or above scheduled anticipations.
- (i) A few points for discussion:
 - (1) Self-determination of peoples;
 - (2) The four freedoms as described by the President;
 - (3) Trusteeship in place of mandate;
 - (4) Substitute for League of Nations;
 - (5) Police Power to enforce decrees of a new body;
 - (6) Disarmament;
 - (7) Economic collaboration.

Supplementing the statements above given, I am undertaking to review briefly the present position as affecting the American position in world affairs due to the events of the year which has since passed.

I have the honor to submit to Your Holiness the following synopsis:

1. America continued her efforts to abstain from actual warfare, but was conscious of a growing conviction that expanded defensive measures were essential to its safety.

2. The unexpected Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, followed by declared war by other Axis powers, brought America actually into the armed conflict.

3. The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the declarations of war by the Axis did, in fact, consolidate the American nation into a war-minded entity that did not previously exist. Our ever-expanding Army and Navy and an ever-mounting production of all materials essential to large scale warfare evidences the complete unanimity of our nation in its war effort.

4. America, under the influence of foreign propaganda or other subtle means, was not to be led into a full-out attack until trained men and adequate equipment for complete success were available. It proceeded to establish strategic bases for its operations. Its first productive program, in a volume greater than anticipated, has been realized and America is able to choose its own time and place to bring its force to bear upon its enemies. America is convinced that Russia will neither surrender nor that its armies will be destroyed; that yielding territory while extending the supply lines of its adversary in the face of another Russian winter is not without great strategic value. The Axis, meantime, is scattered over many fronts of greater or less importance farther and farther from its bases.

5. The Allies have an abundance of material resources; the Axis has diminishing resources and its production centers of war materials and communication lines are, and will be, the object of ever-increasing air attack.

6. War in the Far East will not tempt the United Nations to weaken the accumulation of strength for total war upon their first and most important adversary, the Axis.

7. There exists the most fixed determination, in due course and in America's way, to thrash Japan thoroughly and completely and definitely to settle all questions in the Pacific area.

8. The imposition of the most cruel forms of slavery in occupied Europe in itself renders impossible the creation of a sound European economy under Nazi dictatorship. The slumbering hatreds existing throughout the European field, aroused by German brutality and greed, will break into rebellion at the first evidence of a real offensive.

9. American interest is in defense of an ideal of government and of a way of life for mankind. Material objectives are absent from the American defense effort. It seeks no political, financial, or territorial aggrandizement in the defense of the great moral principles involved and for which America prepares its armored forces. It moves in harmony with all those who would defend human rights and justice under the moral law.

10. All of North and all but two States of South America have joined the United Nations defense efforts. The two exceptions in South America do not pretend to defend or sympathize with the Axis; they profess to an effort to preserve their so-called neutrality.

11. The Axis professes no justification of its deliberate war upon its neighbors except greed and vaulting ambition under a vile and anti-Christian code of conduct, which, if permitted to function, would destroy all semblance of a Christian Europe.

12. I can conscientiously repeat item "f" in last year's Memorandum, as follows:

"(f) America has no hatred of the Italian people. American feeling for the German people is tempered by the growing conviction that they uphold the aggressions of their leaders."

Even yet it may not be too late for the people of Italy to find their eventual position at the end of the war determined in a great measure by their conduct from this point forward. In our view Italy made a wrong choice in 1939-1940. Italy, which has all to gain by collaboration with America, both North and South, should, in due course, dispel the illusion of Nazi benefits. In days to come they will be found as ephemeral as the fabric of a vision.

In the general discussions of the war in America one seldom hears in words the condemnation of others than Hitler and his Nazis and the Japanese.

13. We have seen how the Vatican and America were not self-seeking, were and are free from materialistic or ambitious motives; how the parallel efforts of His Holiness and President Roosevelt for the maintenance of peace were energized by their very spiritual qualities. We have seen the Encyclical of Pope Pius XI and the allocutions of Pope Pius XII. We have seen the points laid down in the declaration of President Roosevelt, styled the Four Freedoms, and latterly of the declaration of the Atlantic Charter. All have harmonized in upholding the moral code which aims to protect mankind in freedom and justice under moral law. These principles are the only hope for the freedom of mankind. Sad it is to admit that they can now be upheld and made effective only by the application of force, force in such strength that it may conquer the powers of evil and bring peace to a sorely troubled world.

I then presented a prepared statement which had been approved by The President, the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State, Archbishop Mooney, Archbishop Spellman, Bishop Hurley and Monsignor Ready. I read the statement, His Holiness following the reading from his copy - as follows:

It is of high importance that, at this juncture when the Allied Powers are passing to the offensive in the conduct of the War, the attitude of the United States Government with respect to the present world struggle be restated to the Holy See.

Before the war became general, President Roosevelt, in parallel effort with the Holy See, explored every possible avenue for the preservation of the peace. The experience of those days of fruitful cooperation, when the high moral prestige of the Holy See was buttressed by the civil power of the United States of America, is a precious memory. Although totalitarian aggression defeated those first efforts to prevent world war, the United States looks forward to further collaboration of this kind when the anti-Christian philosophies which have taken the sword shall have perished by the sword, and it will again be possible to organize world peace:

In the just war which they are now waging the people of the United States of America derive great spiritual strength and moral encouragement from a review of the utterances of His Holiness Pope Pius XII and of his venerated Predecessor. Americans, Catholic and non-Catholic, have been profoundly impressed by the searing condemnation of Nazi religious persecution pronounced by Pope Pius XI in his "Mit Brennender Sorge;" by the elevated teaching on law and human dignity contained in the "Summi Pontificatus" of Pope Pius XII; by the famous Five Points laid down in 1939 by the same Pope as the essential postulates of a just peace; and by the forthright and heroic expressions of indignation made by Pope Pius XII when Germany invaded the Low Countries. Now that we are fighting against the very things which the Popes condemned, our conviction of complete victory is one with our confidence in the unwavering tenacity with which the Holy See will continue its magnificent moral leading.

Because we know we are in the right, and because we have supreme confidence in our strength, we are determined to carry through until we shall have won complete victory. The only thing that would make us lay down the arms taken up in defense of national security and world decency would be the complete and forthright acceptance of the Atlantic Charter and the Manifesto of the United Nations - the provisions of which, by the way, are in substantial agreement with the Holy Father's above-mentioned postulates for a just and lasting peace. Our cause is just. We fight, with conscience clear, for the moral rights of our nation, and for the liberties of our people; our victory will ensure those rights and liberties to the world. Even our enemies know that we seek no aggrandizement. Precisely for the reason that our moral position is impregnable, we are not open to the compromises usual to those who look for merely material gains, and who will bargain for half a loaf if they cannot have the whole. A peace-loving people, we exhausted every honorable means to remain at peace; in the midst of peace negotiations, we were foully attacked by Germany's partner in the Orient. Like Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the rest, we were made the victims of Axis aggression at the very moment when their diplomats were talking peace. How then could we have confidence in the word of any Axis Power? In the conviction that anything less than complete victory would endanger the principles we fight for and our very existence as a nation, the United States of America will prosecute this war until the Axis collapses. We shall not again allow ourselves to be imperilled from behind while we are talking peace with criminal aggressors of

the kind referred to in the "Summi Pontificatus" as men without faith to the plighted word.

Our confidence in final and complete victory is based upon the most objective foundations. There is nothing of emotional optimism or wishful thinking in it. We are prepared for a long war. We foresaw early reverses. But in the end, we know that no nation or combination of nations can stand against us in the field.

In the first place, we are a nation united as never before in our history. Axis propaganda had made itself felt in the United States as elsewhere before our entry into the war, and we know they are boasting of division among us. Let no one be deceived. Our very love of peace made it difficult for some of our people to see the world menace of Nazism. Pearl Harbor opened their eyes. The dishonorable attack of Japan at the very moment when her special ambassador was talking peace at Washington united overnight Americans of all shades of opinion. Among the architects of this unity are the foremost Catholic leaders in our country, the bishops and the prominent laymen of all racial strains. Their public utterances and the editorial statements of Catholic papers after the aggression of Pearl Harbor can be summed up in these words: Prosecute the war to a victorious conclusion; and then bend every effort for a peace that will be just, charitable and lasting. Most notable of all Catholic pronouncements was that contained in the letter of the Catholic Hierarchy to the President of the United States pledging the whole-hearted cooperation of Catholics in the national war effort. This letter, individually authorized by the Bishops of the United States, solemnly engaged "the lives, the treasure and the sacred honor" of American Catholics in the defense of their freedom against aggression. The response of the President was historic. "We shall win this war," wrote Mr. Roosevelt, "and in victory we shall seek not vengeance but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts of men and of nations."

The same unity based on high purpose pervades all the people of the United States. Contrary to Axis propaganda claims, the vast majority of our people are responsive to Christian inspiration, even though many may not be practical church-goers. The Axis charge that there are sixty million Atheists in the United States is sheer nonsense - a perversion of statistics on church members and attendance by which the persecutors of religion are

trying to use the church for their own sinister purposes.

It would be equally misleading for outsiders to be influenced by Axis propaganda about political differences in the United States. We are a democracy and even in war time we insist upon our political freedom. Members of the Democratic and Republican political parties are even now contending for many public offices, and no one, whatever his position or power, can or will force people to vote in any predetermined manner. We glory in that freedom. It is a practical demonstration of the liberty we are fighting to preserve. But let it be remembered that in these political contests no candidate would have the slightest chance of election unless he declared himself to be whole-heartedly in favor of the national war effort. Only recently, the whole country applauded the court prosecution and punishment of certain men who had tried to sabotage our national unity. In fact, any individual or group who would presume to go against that unity or suggest compromise with the enemy would invite the odium of his fellow citizens, would be thoroughly discredited as a patriotic American and would forever disqualify himself from any further role in national affairs.

Finally, our certainty of victory is based upon military considerations. The justice of our cause and the unbreakable unity of our people are supported now by a growing military establishment which, when it reaches its peak, as shortly it will, cannot be withstood. Germany has already lost heavily in men and in material; Her war industry and Her reservoir of man power have been tapped to the utmost. She still has to face an England with forces intact, fully mobilized and in crescendo. Above all She still has to face America. With four million five hundred thousand men under arms, we have not yet called but a small part of our man power. And the youth of America knows machines. Our production of the engines of the war has already surpassed the forecast of the President which but a few months ago seemed fantastic. Our shipyards are producing ocean-going ships for combat and commerce at a rate hitherto undreamed of. The entire industry of the world's greatest industrial nation is now directed to one only objective - to manufacture, by mass production methods in which we excel, the implements of war. We have only begun and yet we have already surpassed the arms output of Germany at Her peak. The world has never seen such an avalanche of war weapons, manned

by skilled mechanics and stout-hearted freemen, as we shall loose in 1943 and 1944 against the Axis. In some few sectors, we have already taken the offensive, months ahead of our original plans. That offensive will rise in irresistible crescendo, more and more rapidly, more and more powerfully, until totalitarianism, with its menace to religion and freedom, is finally and utterly crushed.

The Axis knows this, knows that its ill-gotten gains cannot be held by continuing the war. What they won through treacherous war, they may now try to retain by a treacherous peace. They timed this war to begin when they were at the zenith of their strength, and when the freedom and peace-loving nations were unprepared. Their plans have miscarried; now, we have reason to believe, they are casting about for someone to make a peace proposal which will enable them to escape the inexorable results of defeat in the field. It is the first sign of a break in Nazi confidence; their peace offensive is a confession of weakness.

We Americans are new at world politics. Our geographical position in the past isolated us from Europe and the other continents. Modern communications have forced us from our isolation into world affairs. We are learning. One of the first lessons we have grasped is this: that cunningly timed and craftily planned peace proposals may be used by faithless aggressors as instruments of war. A peace move may be a snare; for the Nazis, it has always been a part of military strategy. Their record in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and elsewhere is too recent to be forgotten. Japan talked peace to us at Washington while she was preparing and consummating the treachery of Pearl Harbor. Thus world experience of Axis "peace" has been bitter. In our case it has also been salutary. Since the Nazis, conscious of their waning power, are likely to be searching for an intermediary to put forth peace-feelers, it is well that those whom we trust should know in advance the position of the United States Government on any tentative proposal from such a source; we shall not be led away from principle by any stop-gap peace. Our Christian ideals, as well as our national existence, would be in jeopardy if we consented to forego now our manifest advantages. An indecisive peace would be a partial victory for the Axis, and would lead later to a resumption of the conflict under conditions which might be disadvantageous to us and what we stand for.

We want none of it. We will have nothing of an armed truce which would be a breathing space for the enemies of Christian civilization. We will not permit Axis strategy, which includes in its arsenal the hypocrisy of false peace, to hold the initiative in the conduct of war. We have determined that we cannot deal with faithless men; that the peaceful ways of diplomacy have utterly failed against Axis duplicity, ruthlessness and insensibility to all moral considerations. This is no time for a recourse to diplomacy. Having made every effort to avoid this war, we shall not now be weakened by Axis cunning when we have taken the field. We consider that Axis inspired proposals of "peace" would be nothing less than a blow aimed at us.

There is reason to believe that our Axis enemies will attempt, through devious channels, to urge the Holy See to endorse in the near future proposals of peace without victory. In the present position of the belligerents, we can readily understand how strong a pressure the Axis powers may bring to bear upon the Vatican. We therefore feel it a duty to support the Holy See in resisting any undue pressure from this source. It is for this reason that we feel impelled to make known our views on the subject of peace, and to point out that the growing power of the United States is now being applied to re-establish those principles of international decency and justice which have been so well expounded by the Holy See. We are not so close geographically to the Vatican as some of our enemies, nor are we in a position to enjoy as many of the indirect day-to-day contacts as they. Nonetheless, we have the fullest confidence that due weight will be given to the considerations advanced by a nation which numbers among its citizens so many millions of devoted Catholics, and whose government is in such close agreement with the principles enunciated by the Holy See on the issues of this war and the kind of peace which must follow it.

The people of the United States have a deep and sympathetic understanding of the Holy Father's desires for peace as he looks out upon a world convulsed with the harrowing spectacle of death and destruction on every side. The promotion of world peace, we know, is one of the great functions of the Holy See. Though deferred, that peace will come - not a specious peace of strategy nor a short-lived peace of compromise. It will be the peace of "justice and charity" for which the Holy Father

has so often prayed; it will be the peace "in which the spirit of Christ will rule the hearts of men and of nations" as promised by the President of the United States. The United States and its allies will win that peace. And in its consolidation, we should want nothing better than a continuation of those parallel efforts made by the Pope and the President before the war became general. In such a continuation, so devoutly to be hoped for, much can be accomplished to ensure that the peace will be lasting.

The war aims of the United States are peace aims. The world knows them. The Atlantic Charter lays down conditions which in our deepest conviction are irreducible. Any proposal under the plausible title of a "negotiated peace," which falls short of these aims, would only tend to confuse issues which we are determined to keep clear and to decide definitively.

With renewed assurances of esteem and respect, I offer the foregoing in the hope that they may be helpful in furthering the cause to which our nation has dedicated itself.

The attendant discussions served to clarify, in the mind of His Holiness, the several points as stated. The prompt reaction of His Holiness to the positive statements of American attitude was one of surprising satisfaction, of immediate and happy response and the repetition, several times, by His Holiness of words to the effect that America would not compromise but would continue the war until victory was achieved.

It was understood that His Holiness would give careful consideration to the Memorandum and that at our next audience, which was fixed for Tuesday, September 22d, would further discuss the same. The audience lasted more than one hour and fifty minutes, the longest ever granted by the Pope since his coronation.

My immediate and continuing reaction was, and is, that the visit was timely, that the approach to the subject as indicated by the review of last year's points, and the statement of the points in the Memorandum now presented, was convincing and conclusive, and that whatever doubt or uncertainty, if any, had found its way into the thoughts of His Holiness, they had been promptly removed and a real basis established for resisting future efforts by our adversaries to gain aid and comfort through the medium of the Holy See.

SECOND AUDIENCE, SEPTEMBER 22d (TUESDAY)

At an audience between His Holiness the Pope and Myron Taylor at 11:15 a.m., His Holiness introduced the subject of the Memoranda presented as a basis for discussion by Myron Taylor at his first audience on September 19th. His Holiness quoted from a prepared Memorandum in English. I requested, and it was understood, that a copy of the Memorandum prepared by His Holiness, and to which he referred during the audience, would be given to Mr. Taylor for the confidential information of the President of the United States. It may be well, however, briefly to recite the general meaning of the Pope's Memorandum, which was as follows:

1. The Pope again expressed great satisfaction for the visit of the President's Representative and indicated that great happiness had come to him to have this direct contact with the President and the American people.

2. It was pleasing to His Holiness to be made definitely and personally aware of the war aims of America; that they "were inspired by justice and charity," and "the vital needs of all nations, governments, and peoples;" that they were based not on utility but upon the sanctity of contracts, the inviolability of the moral law, and the preservation of human dignity and of religious freedom that mankind may worship God each in his own way."

Despite all propaganda, His Holiness "would never propose or approve of peace by compromise at any cost;" "there can be no compromise of moral principles," and "it is gratifying to know that the peace aims of the United States uphold this approach to the ultimate conclusion of the war."

He emphatically asserted that "we need have no fear that any pressure from outside the Vatican will ever make it change its course."

The Pope "deeply feels the separation of the Vatican from America," but, "though the distance is great, the moral principles for which both America and the Vatican asserted support will not suffer by such separation." The Pope again asserted "that the visit of the President's Representative was more than welcome;" that he should "always be happy to have him return whenever the occasion permitted."

I found in my first interview with the Pope, and later conversations with Monsignor Montini and Monsignor Tardini, of the Secretariat of State, that they were keenly interested in post-war aims. I thereupon prepared Memorandum No. II and discussed the several points with His Holiness without undertaking to be specific as to our precise alternative conclusions.

His Holiness Pope Pius XII

From

Myron Taylor
Personal Representative of the President
of the United States to His Holiness

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Grievous as the occasion is that leads peace-loving people to take up arms against a common foe, after an unprovoked attack upon the United States by Japan on December 7th and by declarations of war against the United States by other Axis powers, sufficient time has already elapsed to give America the opportunity to organize its forces and its great productive facilities not only to ensure a successful defense but now, with confidence unlimited in its ability and in its own time and at those points which it may deliberately select, to wage an all-out offensive against its enemies. Those great efforts which have already achieved such remarkable results and promise with certainty the attainment of planned objectives have in no sense diminished the adherence of the nation to those principles embodied in President Roosevelt's Message to Congress on January 7, 1941, styled the "Four Freedoms":

"The first is freedom of speech and expression - everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way - everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor - anywhere in the world."

Nor to those declarations of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, in the "Atlantic Charter," which were as follows:

"FIRST, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

SECOND, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

THIRD, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

FOURTH, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

FIFTH, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.

SIXTH, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

SEVENTH, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

EIGHTH, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

These historic statements of principle are no less a guide to human conduct in the presence of a war-torn world than the Christmas 1939 Allocution of His Holiness Pope Pius XII, which follows:

"First, The fundamental condition of a just and honorable peace is to assure the right to life and independence of all nations, large, small, strong, or weak. One nation's will to live must never be tantamount to a death sentence for another. When this equality of rights has been destroyed, injured or imperiled, juridical order requires reparation, the measure and extent of which are not determined by the sword or selfish, arbitrary judgment, but by the standards of justice and reciprocal equity.

Second. That order, reestablished in such a manner, may be tranquil and durable--the cardinal principles of true peace--nations must be liberated from the heavy slavery of armaments and the danger that material force, instead of serving to protect rights, become the tyrannical violator of them...

Third. Any reorganization of international neighborliness should conform with the maximum of human wisdom for all parties concerned to remove the consequences of past lapses or deficiencies. And, in creating or reconstructing international institutions which have a mission so high but at the same time difficult and full of serious responsibilities, account should be taken of experiences which arose from the inefficacy or defective functioning of similar previous projects...

Fourth. A point which should be given particular attention if better arrangement of Europe is sought, concerns the real needs and just demands of nations and peoples as well as of ethnical minorities; demands which, if not always sufficient to form a strict right when there are recognized or confirmed treaties or other juridical documents which oppose them, deserve at all events benevolent examination to meet them in a peaceful way and, where it appears necessary, by means of equitable, wise and unanimous revision of treaties...

Fifth. But even better and more complete settlements will be imperfect and condemned to ultimate failure, if those who guide the destinies of peoples, and the peoples themselves, refuse to permit themselves to be

penetrated ever more by that spirit which alone can give living authority and obligation to the dead letter of articles in international agreements--by that spirit, namely, of intimate, acute responsibility that measures and weighs human statutes according to the holy unshakable rules of Divine Law; by that hunger and thirst for justice which is proclaimed in the Beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount, and which has, as a natural presupposition, moral justice; by that universal love which is the compendium of and most comprehensive term for Christian ideal."

And those of 1940-1941:

"One, triumph over hate, which is today a cause of division among peoples; renunciation therefore of the systems and practices from which hate constantly receives added nourishment.

Two, triumph over mistrust, which bears down as a depressing weight on international law and renders impossible the realization of any sincere agreement.

Three, triumph over the distressing principles that utility is a basis of law and right, and that might makes right; a principle which makes all international relations liable to fall.

Four, triumph over those germs of conflict which consist in two-sided differences in the field of world economy; hence progressive action, balanced by correspondent degrees, to arrive at arrangements which would give to every state the medium necessary for insuring the proper standard of living for its own citizens of every rank.

Five, triumph over the spirit of cold egoism which, fearless in its might, easily leads to violation not only of the honor and sovereignty of states but of the righteous, wholesome and disciplined liberty of citizens as well.

It must be supplanted by sincere juridical and economic solidarity, fraternal collaboration in accordance with the precepts of Divine Law amongst peoples assured of their autonomy and independence.

It should also be borne in mind that the Atlantic Charter, since adhered to by 29 Governments, including the United States of the Soviet Republic, presents a basis for world organization to which the peoples of the world may look forward with hope and assurance that their rights and liberties and their well-being will not be betrayed or ignored in those days when active hostilities have ceased and post-war problems urge their attention upon the world. Whilst in the present such war preparations continue to develop and expand, America, before it became actually engaged in the struggle, had for many months initiated the study and consideration of post-war questions, with the purpose of envisaging the needs of mankind when hostilities have ceased, when men and women everywhere undertake to readjust their lives to the conditions of peace. To this end, during 1941, President Roosevelt, acting in collaboration with Secretary of State Hull, authorized the creation, within the State Department, of several groups composed of members of wide knowledge and experience, supported by adequate technical staffs, to explore post-war problems. Studies of specific features, such as food supplies, migration and refugee problems, and finance, were also planned throughout many other Departments of the Government having special knowledge of, or particular relationship to such subjects. Under the over-all chairmanship of Secretary of State Hull and the vice-chairmanship of Under Secretary Welles, the various sub-committees, each presided over by an Assistant Secretary of State, began active work in the several fields to be explored. On broad lines some of the problems which were envisaged, and, in the order of their chronological importance in the post-war period, might be mentioned the following:

SECURITY

The first great post-war aim is security that war may not recur. The development of this field begins with the cessation of hostilities. It seeks to fix the terms under which hostilities cease and to preserve order in the war-torn countries; to disarm militant countries so that they may not again take up the sword; that the burden of cost of the war shall rest lightly upon the people; to prevent civil disorder until dependable governments can be set up by and with the adherence of the people; to assist in bringing about order and normalcy with peace.

RELIEF

Upon the cessation of hostilities there will arise in many countries an immediate need for relief of the suffering

peoples; much thoughtful, generous attention has been given to this feature of post-war conditions. Guided by the experience of our nation in the relief of populations at the conclusion of the first World War, it is contemplated that an errand of mercy in behalf of stricken people, bringing them food, medical supplies and attention to meet nutrition deficiencies, and all that endless chain of attendant relief activities can swing quickly into action, once the tyranny of war has subsided.

POLITICAL

A great variety of political questions, due to the vast area over which war now holds sway, the varying capacity of peoples for self-government, and in order to buttress the security of the future from a renewal of war and for the welfare of the people, will require prompt and continuing consideration and settlement.

In this field the world's best minds will find a task of transcendent importance; but, out of such efforts, if successfully concluded, will flow the greatest blessings for mankind through long years to come.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

In the realm of economics, the close, ever-quickenning contacts which modern transportation and communication have brought about between the nations will call for a new orientation of mind and practice by the leading nations in world economy. In this field the life-blood of trade, of communications, of transportation, of enlarged opportunity, of new conceptions of trade barriers, of exchange and finance, and the manifold possibilities for increased dealings between the peoples of different states and nations, and of reconstruction, offer an opportunity for tremendous economic benefits and a better way of life to all the people, which can so buttress those elements of security, political and social well-being that peace itself may rest upon more enduring foundations.

TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

Not the least important of the studies is the territorial one, involving territorial adjustments between States based upon justice and by their fair settlement to add additional assurance for the permanent maintenance of peace.

REFUGEES AND MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

The conscience of mankind has been shocked by the cruel and inhuman practices exerted against people of varying races, religions and political beliefs, by some of the Axis powers, particularly Germany and Japan. Persecution of the Jews forms only one page in this black record of violence and crime.

Efforts to alleviate this situation have been continuous since the Nazi regime initiated it. Many have been rescued, but the practice has expanded as each invaded country offered a new opportunity for violence and oppression. Accompanying this statement will be found a survey of the field for post-war action.

UNITED NATIONS

In the post-war period an expanded United Nations, or a substitute of an international character, must be created with the ultimate adherence of all the nations to govern their relationships. In specific fields where disagreement might be provocative of war, the surrender by states of some aspects of sovereignty is not too great a price to pay for an international authority with adequate power to enforce decrees. Study is likewise being given to the long considered and debated International Court of Justice, the scope of its jurisdiction, and the means for enforcement of its decrees.

The foregoing present only a few features of the many post-war problems. They are brought to Your Holiness' attention in order that it may be realized that, though at war, we have not overlooked or delayed the consideration of the ways of peace.

We are prone to cry out against the doubts, the perils, the tragedy of war. Sad as it is, with the ultimate triumph of good over evil, the vastness of this conflict brings to us a great opportunity, and an unprecedented obligation on a world-wide scale, to set up an order for international adherence that excludes the weaknesses of all past systems; and, in proportion as our wisdom, our faith, and our courage are employed in the task, so shall the result be effective in creating a new era of "peace on earth, good will toward man."

Myron Taylor
The Personal Representative of the
President of the United States of America
to His Holiness Pope Pius XII

At the Vatican,
September 21, 1942.

My impression was that this presentation was very effective. His Holiness indicated that he would reply to these statements (Memorandum No. II) at our next audience. He indicated that while post-war problems were the basis of frequent discussion in the Vatican, it had not undertaken such a formal and detailed study as our Department of State has initiated. My own impression is that whilst the Vatican will lend its support to the making of a just and enduring peace, it would abstain from controversial post-war problems which might involve it in civil antagonisms between States making it a partisan in affairs outside the spiritual sphere.

The question of Russia and its post-war position, as well as its relation to religious freedom, had been brought up in the first audience. To point the way to discussion, I prepared an informal Memorandum on the Russian position marked No. III, which we discussed. I shall have a reaction from this in a special paper at my next audience, which is fixed for Saturday, September 26th. Continuing the action already taken by our Government, I introduced the subject of arrests and deportations, the fate of refugees, and the imprisonment and execution of hostages in occupied countries, and left with His Holiness Memoranda No. IV and No. V, copies of which are attached. I had been urged to do this by the British Minister, by our Charge d'Affairs at the Vatican, Mr. Tittmann, and many others with whom I have come in contact. From my discussion with the Pope, I have the impression that His Holiness will, in due course, issue a condemnation, possibly in terms somewhat like the last paragraph of my memorandum. There is a disinclination in the Vatican to condemn individuals or States by name, but a general condemnation of such inhumanities which the Pope has heretofore made on several occasions may be repeated.

I delivered to His Holiness the Pope a copy of the Intergovernmental Committee letter dated August 11, 1942, from Sir Herbert Emerson, its Director, to Myron Taylor, with the accompanying survey of refugee problems in the post-war period, and also a copy of a tabulation showing the distribution of Jews in the world, in both of which His Holiness exhibited active interest. (Under Secretary Welles has copies of these documents.)

THIRD AUDIENCE, SEPTEMBER 26th (SATURDAY)

I was much impressed with the cheerful attitude of His Holiness this morning which has been patently developing through the last fortnight. It has been remarked upon by nearly everyone with whom I have come in contact in the Vatican, as well as by those who have had audiences with His Holiness. There is an air of confidence about the Vatican which reflects a very deep desire to see the war come to an end, and there is no mistaking the fact that the Vatican, as well as the Italian people generally, would like to see themselves divorced from Germany. We have at least sown a deep-seated doubt in their minds that the Axis can win the war, and a greater confidence that the United Nations will win the war; that Italy, when she can with reasonable safety sever relations with Germany before it is too late, and can benefit by it; and, that our serious study of post-war problems under the principles of the Four Points of the President and of the Atlantic Charter will greatly help to save the world from disaster.

His Holiness presented me with a letter to President Roosevelt and three Memoranda, in a leather case emblazoned with the Papal Arms. They are self-explanatory. They are as follows:

REPLY OF
HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII
TO MEMORANDUM OF MYRON TAYLOR
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 22 1942

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We have read your Memorandum very carefully, and We have found it intensely interesting. The issues are so clear cut; of the definite, determined stand of the United States Government it leaves no shadow of doubt.

It gave Us great satisfaction to know from Your Excellency how united in this hour of national trial are all the Catholics of the United States, under the enlightened leadership of the Bishops, and that between the Bishops and the President and his Government there exist such sincere relations of mutual trust.

It has been a pleasure for Us to hear Your Excellency recall President Roosevelt's aim and efforts to bring about a peace that will be worthy of man's personal dignity and of his high destiny. This peace, as We have constantly repeated, must be based on justice and charity. It must take into consideration the vital needs of all nations; all must find it possible of fulfillment; it must bear within itself the seeds of longevity. Moreover, to Our mind, there is not the slightest chance of a peace being genuine and lasting, unless, to begin with, the mutual relations between governments and peoples, as well as those between individual governments and their own peoples, are based not on utilitarianism, arbitrary decrees or brute force, but on fulfillment of contracts made, on the sacred observance of justice and law, tempered by Christian charity and brotherly love, on reverence for the dignity of the human person and respect for religious convictions; and unless the worship of God again exercises its due influence in the individual and national life of all peoples.

For this reason, despite what any propaganda may say to the contrary, We have never thought in terms of a peace by compromise at any cost. On certain principles of right and justice there can be no compromise. In Our Christmas allocutions of 1939, 1940 and 1941 the world may read some of these essential principles expressed in unmistakable language, We think. They light the path along which We walk and will continue to walk unswervingly. It is deeply gratifying to Us to know that the peace aims of the United States have given full recognition to these basic principles of the moral order. The world need have no fear, nor hope either, that any pressure from without will ever make Us change Our direction or falter in Our clear path of duty. Geographic and other circumstances do make it possible for Us to have more frequent contact with some nations than with others which are at war. And how deeply We feel this separation from so many of Our dear children, how it pains Our paternal heart, God alone knows. Hence, the visit of Your Excellency has been all the more welcome and pleasurable to Us. But the principles guiding Our hopes and efforts for world peace have their foundation deep, and We shall never approve of, much less further a peace, that gives free rein to those who would undermine the foundations of Christianity and persecute Religion and the Church.

His Holiness also presented a Memorandum with respect to the Information Office which he had set up in Vatican City, intended to secure and exchange information regarding prisoners of war and civilians in foreign lands - a copy of which follows:

MEMORANDUM OF
HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII
RE
VATICAN INFORMATION OFFICE
SEPTEMBER 26, 1942.

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Impressed very forcefully by the increasingly numerous and insistent appeals directed to Him from all quarters for news of close relatives and intimate friends in the United States of America, His Holiness is desirous that, if at all possible, the information service of the Holy See, which is carried on in the interest of prisoners, refugees and civilians alike, now be extended to the United States. In expressing this desire, His Holiness is deeply encouraged by the knowledge that this activity has already provided for countless thousands in many parts of the world a measure of tranquility and peace of mind and by the assurance that the inestimable benefits of this merciful enterprise might easily be extended to the United States.

To this end, therefore, His Holiness would request that His Excellency the President of the United States seek to facilitate the arrangements necessary for the establishment of this service.

A very large number of requests for such information from the United States have already been received; that the number has not been multiplied many times is due solely to the fact that, unfortunately, the Holy See has been obliged to let it be known that, temporarily at least, it cannot accept such requests.

In the case of those few requests of an urgent nature, which have been forwarded to the United States on the recommendation of Ecclesiastical Authorities, the obstacles and difficulties that have been encountered have been such as to counsel the complete cancellation of this very important service.

In the United States, as elsewhere, the Apostolic Delegate would be charged with the direction and control of this service. He would receive and forward the small, open forms on which it is permitted to write a message of not more than twenty five words of a purely personal character, intended to relieve the anguish or preoccupation of a distant loved one. These messages are rigidly censored before being sent from Vatican City, but the Holy See is quite willing that they be submitted for censorship in the United States if this would facilitate the matter.

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MEMORANDUM OF
HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII
RE
PRISONERS OF WAR

There is scarcely need to stress the fact, already well known, that His Holiness has done all in His power to alleviate the suffering and misery caused by the war, and this particularly in the interest of prisoners and internees, striving very especially to procure for them and for their families the comfort of an exchange of news.

Receiving countless heart-rending appeals, especially in recent months from Italy and Rumania, for news of prisoners of war in the hands of the Russians, His Holiness has sought to give His attention also to these unfortunates, availing Himself, in this mission of mercy, of the good offices of the Government of the United States of America, very especially, and of several others.

Because all these efforts have thus far failed and in view of the constant increase in the number of requests received from all quarters, official and non-official, for some news of these prisoners, His Holiness does not hesitate now to make an appeal directly to His Excellency President Roosevelt, whose influence can be inestimable and perhaps decisive, especially since at present the desires of the Holy See in this regard could be easily satisfied. It is only asked that, in accordance with the usual international regulations, some information, of a general and innocuous nature, regarding these prisoners be made available.

It is well to recall at this time that the Holy See has not ceased to interest itself in the Russian prisoners in the hands of their enemies, and is disposed to devote itself still more assiduously to this task if that were to meet with the pleasure of the Russian Authorities.

September 26th, 1942.

October 30 1942

NOTE:-

Since my return I have had this matter up with Assistant Secretary Long after discussing it with Under Secretary Welles and the Apostolic Delegate. It has been settled by subjecting all information requests and the replies to United States censorship. This solution was readily accepted by the Apostolic Delegate.

MYRON TAYLOR.

MEMORANDUM ON
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR
PRESENTED BY MYRON TAYLOR
TO HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS
SEPTEMBER 1942

Your Holiness has doubtless noted the condemnation of the President and Secretary Hull of the inhuman treatment of prisoners of war, Catholics, Jewish and civilian populations, and the execution of hostages in all occupied countries. It is today reported that the executions alone number two hundred thousand.

It is widely believed that Your word of condemnation would hearten all others who are working to save these thousands from suffering and death.

A statement that the war had unleashed in some places uncontrolled passions leading to atrocities that shock the conscience of mankind, it is considered, would be helpful.

His Holiness also presented a
Memorandum in respect to the Bombing
of Civilian Populations - a copy of
which follows:

MEMORANDUM OF
HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII
RE
BOMBING CIVILIAN POPULATIONS
SEPTEMBER 26, 1942

The Holy See has always been, and still is greatly preoccupied, out of a heart filled with constant solicitude, with the fate of civil populations defenseless against the aggressions of war.

Since the outbreak of the present conflict no year has passed, that We have not appealed in Our public utterances to all the belligerents, - men who also have human hearts moulded by a mother's love - to show some feeling of pity and charity for the sufferings of civilians, for helpless women and children, for the sick and the aged, on whom a rain of terror, fire, destruction and havoc pours down out of a guiltless sky. (Nov. 1940, Easter 1941): Our appeal was little heeded, as the world knows, and tens of thousands know to their own personal grief.

Now We have been asked to take occasion of this visit of Your Excellency to repeat Our appeal in a personal way, and to ask you to carry it to your esteemed President of the United States, of whom Your Excellency is so worthy and so valued a Representative. To refuse to comply with such a request would seem to bespeak little confidence in the noble sentiments of Christian brotherhood and generous sympathy for innocent victims of wrong, of which Your Excellency and the President have given conspicuous proof.

We lay Our appeal, therefore, before you in behalf of countless human beings, children of our one, same Father in Heaven; and if aerial bombardments must continue to form part of this harrowing war, let them with all possible care be directed only against objectives of military value and spare the homes of non-combatants and the treasured shrines of art and religion.

The third one, referring to bombing of civilian populations, one that I will refer to in the preparation of an informal memorandum which I shall leave with Mgr. Montini at a meeting we are having at 11: o'clock on Sunday morning and which, in substance, tempts briefly to make more clear the distinction between bombin

military objectives, including munition production plants, and the ruthless bombing of cities and towns, where no military objective is important. His Holiness showed great interest in the several Memoranda presented at previous audiences and intimated that the points raised are of interest and importance to the Holy See. I reverted to the uncertainty of mind that followed my first interview with His Holiness in which I was not clear whether he held distinction between Hitlerism and Nazism, and if he felt there were features of Nazism which could not be wholly condemned. His response was that he saw no distinction between Hitlerism and Nazism and that the only distinction he had in mind at my first audience was a clear distinction between Hitlerism, Nazism, on the one hand, and the people of Germany on the other. He recalled that he had spent many years as Nuncio in Germany and gained a great respect for the German people, generally speaking. It is obvious that he would like to see the German people rescued from their present leaders, and he entertained for the people the most prayerful consideration.

I found that the Cardinal Secretary of State had discussed with the Pope the limits of possible Holy See participation in peace proposals and the peace conference. He indicated that this raises a very important question, and while he was in accord with the general statements that the Cardinal had made to me on the subject, he would like to make a careful historical survey of the problem and would forward to me, in confidence, through the Papal Delegate in Washington, a memorandum presenting the views of the Holy See. This will, I am sure, be a matter of considerable interest. I asked what the reaction of the Holy See would be to a separation of Austria from Germany along the lines that I had suggested to the Cardinal Secretary of State. The answer was similar in character, but I could see a very definite undercurrent of hope that some method would be found whereby the menace of Germany on the borders of Italy would be lessened or removed and that if Austria could be segregated on territorial lines which would not lead to too great dissatisfaction with neighboring states, it would be desirable. These conclusions of mine are more the result of a series of questions than a definite statement by the Pope, so delicate is the position at the present time in the relationship of the Vatican to Italy and of the Church to Germany.

We then discussed to some extent the position of France at the present time and as a post-war problem having more relation to the personnel of a possible new government than of the question of disorder and methods for its control which admittedly are expected to be very serious before the end of the war, or certainly in the post-war period. I can find

no favorable reaction toward Laval. I inquired of His Holiness if he had any impression in regard to the Count de Paris. His reply was that he knew him quite well; he had great respect for his character and ability, as he had also for his sister, the Duchess of Aosta, who recently called upon him. I asked then if His Holiness thought it was desirable to revive the idea of monarchical government and his response was that an objection was that it put too much power in the hands of a small group and probably destroyed the principle of democratic government.

I then spoke of the position of Yugoslav internees in Italy. I urged upon His Holiness that he show interest in these internees and persuade the Italian Government to allow the Red Cross to minister to their very urgent needs. We were informed by the Yugoslav Counselor of Legation that adequate funds were available in America, gained through private contribution, but their transmission had been barred and distribution of relief prevented in Italy. I hope the American Red Cross may find ways to assist in establishing cooperation with the Italian Red Cross so that this deplorable situation can be reduced. The Pope said that he would do everything in his power to bring this about.

The Pope spoke to me of the Information Office at the Vatican for contacting soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians in various countries. Mr. Tittmann and I had already visited the Information Office and saw the way the work was conducted. It is a very desirable activity, fostered as a special interest by the Pope himself and in it he shows the utmost concern. He presented a memorandum, attached to this statement, expressing the hope that our government will forward the plan of cooperation through the Papal Delegation in Washington which he seeks. The basis of a telegram which we sent was that a representative of the Pope called upon us and indicated that His Holiness expected to raise this question in our last audience. The Papal Delegate in Washington had wired that the American Government (as it was reported to us) had now indicated this activity must cease, based upon the fact that the agency was being used for the transmission of military secrets and that this statement made very unhappy repercussions upon the Pope. Our information here as to American action in the premises was, of course, lacking, and we therefore sent a telegram immediately to ask that consideration be given the matter and a reply made to us so that in my interview with the Pope I could indicate that we had already given the matter prompt consideration by telegraph. The reply came after the audience; therefore, my only alternative was to indicate that our Government would give the whole question serious consideration.

His Holiness was most generous in his appreciation of The President and the Secretary in sending a special Representative at this time to confer with His Holiness. He expressed the greatest confidence in and admiration for the American Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Harold Tittmann, and asked that messages of respect and friendship be conveyed to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Mr. Sumner Welles, whose visit he recalled.

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MEMORANDUM RE BOMBING ROME
GIVEN MYRON TAYLOR
SEPTEMBER 17 1941
BY
HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII
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According to a B. B. C. broadcast from London August 24th, the Commander of the British bombing forces stated that they intend to bomb even Rome, since they entertain no false sentiments. The Secretariat of State has pointed out to Mr. Osborne and to Mr. Tittmann that, if the Vatican City State or any of the basilicas, churches or pontifical buildings and institutions in Rome (and they are very numerous and of very great historical and artistic importance) were to be hit, the Holy See could not remain silent. Nor would it be well that, with cordial relations existing between the Holy See and England, anything should happen to modify or disturb them. Mr. Tittman gave assurance that he would bring the matter to the attention of the American Government which would undoubtedly appreciate the importance and gravity of the matter.

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(Note. Mr. Taylor presented this subject to the Prime Minister at "Chequers" on Sunday, September 28, 1941, and on Monday, September 29, 1941, to Foreign Minister Eden. Later Mr. Taylor presented this Memorandum to The President.)

October 21 1942

Memorandum for The President:

Following my statement to His Holiness the Pope in respect to the friendly attitude of the American people toward the Italian people, I made a further statement to the effect that our friendliness would be destroyed in an instant if an Italian submarine became active against our shipping, particularly along the North or South American coast. I also referred to the folly of Italian planes taking part in the bombing of England, and enlarged on the need of relief and of capital in reconstruction in Italy after the war. I believe this statement will be passed to the Italian Government and will have some effect.

MYRON TAYLOR.

MINUTE FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE
AT ITS MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 9 1942
PRESENTED TO HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS
AT THE THIRD AUDIENCE

Since July 16th arrests and deportations of men, women and children from France have proceeded with mounting fury and intensity spreading from the occupied zone, where 28,000 were arrested, to the unoccupied zone, from which 11,500 have already been deported. Men, women and children of all ages have been included. The victims seem to be those refugees who entered France since 1933. Only those who have United States visas actually stamped in their passports are exempted. Women convalescing from operations and from childbirth, men who have fought in the French armies in the present war and children as young as two years of age have been included. In the early days of the deportations women were given the choice of leaving children as young as two years of age behind. Most mothers accepted this choice. Later cables indicate that all children as young as two years of age are now themselves under threat of deportation. They are being taken from homes and camps maintained by private organizations in unoccupied France, such as the OSE and the Swiss Red Cross.

Cables from churches, nonsectarian organizations, Jewish organizations, and offices of the J.D.C. in Geneva, Marseille, and Lisbon report that 5,000 children are now being cared for in unoccupied France and that 1,000 to 3,500 of these are under immediate threat of deportation. The cables which are received almost hourly by all refugee organizations in New York beg urgently that immediate action be taken to rescue these children through emigration to the United States.

On August 13th, Messrs. McDonald, Baerwald and Warren requested Honorable Sumner Welles to intervene with the Vichy Government to halt the deportations. On the same day a request was wired to Archbishop Rummel to consider the possibilities of requesting intervention by the Vatican. Later the Department of State reported that Mr. S. Pinkney Tuck, Charge d'Affaires at Vichy, had been instructed to intervene vigorously to request that deportations be cancelled at least with respect to those whose emigration was in prospect. No report on the results of this action has been received from the State Department although it is noted that United States visa holders in the meantime have been exempted from deportation. Archbishop Rummel reported that he had conferred with the Apostolic Delegate immediately.

On Saturday, September 5th, the State Department was requested to instruct the Consuls to issue visas to those to whom advisory approvals had already been granted without requiring the possession of French exit visas. This was important as all exit visas extant had been cancelled in the early days of the deportations and must now be reapplied for at the Foreign Office at Vichy. The Visa Division immediately complied with this request and cabled these instructions the same day.

During the past week the U.S. Committee for the Care of European Children and the Joint Distribution Committee have been in daily conference to organize plans and finances in anticipation of a formal request to the Departments of Justice and State for the issuance of 1,000 to 3,500 United States visas to children who may still be rescued. These plans are nearing completion. In the meantime on August 29th, Foreign Minister Arturo Despradel of the Dominican Republic stated that President Trujillo had informed Marshal Petain through the French Minister in Ciudad Trujillo that he would give immediate asylum in his country to 3,500 Jewish children and would pay for the transportation of the children to the Dominican Republic out of his personal funds. The New York Times carried a report on August 28th that Mr. Georges Theunis, Belgian Ambassador to the United States, announced that a cable had been received from the Belgian authorities in the Belgian Congo that 3,000 Greek refugees, mostly women and children, had arrived at Leopoldville. Ambassador Theunis is at the moment endeavoring to secure further information. This news is significant as evidence of direct government action with respect to refugee children.

The points to be considered by the Committee are:

1. A recommendation to the President or the Departments of State and Justice, or both, that United States visas be issued to 1,000 to 3,500 children.
2. The manner of presenting this.
3. The Dominican offer.

Memorandum of Conference Between
The Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione
and Myron Taylor

September 25, 1942, 12:15 p.m.

Mr. Taylor's and Father Carroll's Interpretation

Follows the Third Audience

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN
THE CARDINAL SECRETARY OF STATE MAGLIONE AND MYRON TAYLOR
SEPTEMBER 25, 1942, 12:15 p.m.
(Mr. Taylor's Interpretation.)

After the usual courtesies, having discovered that the Pope and Monsignor Montini had discussed with the Cardinal the points covered in my two Memoranda presented to His Holiness the Pope as the basis of our discussion at the two audiences, I reviewed briefly the points involving the maintenance of order in occupied countries after the conclusion of war. This feature of the immediate post-war period is one that excites a great deal of interest here due to the fact that it is the opinion in Vatican circles, expressed both by the Pope and the Cardinal, that great disorder will prevail, and both have some doubt as to the ability of the United Nations or other influences to suppress it. Naturally, I took the opposite course, indicating that, at least in some of the states, the military authorities, in collaboration with those of the United Nations, might effectively prevent general disorder. The other points, in the order which we touched upon them in a general way, were: the need of relief immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, the ultimate goal of security in the interests of world peace; the economic improvement in backward nations, involving advice and such assistance as was possible; the necessity for a world organization equipped with power for the enforcement of its decrees. It must be borne in mind that I did not go into any of the details of studies we have made or conclusions we may have tentatively reached in respect to these several problems; but it greatly impresses the Holy See that serious consideration is already being given to these and other vital questions. The Cardinal, in reply to an inquiry, confirmed the statement of the Pope that particular study was not being made in the Vatican of these problems, but that many of them are the subject of current thought and discussion.

I inquired of the Cardinal if he had developed any thoughts in respect to the reconstitution of political, territorial, or economic position of the various European States in the post-war period, reminding him, as an example, of the plans which were put forth by Briand and others relative to a Federation of European States. He replied that it would be very difficult

to envisage the political, territorial, and economic position of the European States in the post-war period and that, with a great variety of languages, political traditions, and the hatreds engendered by war, as well as those which have for long previous periods existed, make very difficult the organization of such states in a cooperative way.

I sketched on a broad line the relationship between Russia on one side and Germany on the other, and whether both could not be benefited if the intervening areas were brought together in such fashion as to prevent a recurrence of war among themselves and as an insulation against a recurrence of war between Germany and Russia. He replied emphatically that if that could be accomplished, it would be a very great help to Europe and world peace. These discussions aroused serious thoughts in his mind and his interest became obviously more aroused as we progressed. I asked what, in his opinion, should be the future of Austria; to which he responded that if Austria were to be restored to its pre-World War II position, it would be economically undesirable, as, from the time of the Versailles Treaty down to the present war, it was so constituted as to be economically weak. In response to further questioning he admitted that to restore Austria to its pre-Versailles condition might be desirable as reducing the strength of Germany, but would involve readjustment of territory of its neighbors. He was quite uncertain whether this could be accomplished but would be dependent upon the conditions which confront the post-war peace.

I inquired of his thoughts in regard to France and its future. That seemed to give him pause. He indicated that the position of France was very difficult and would be found to be so.

For some time past it has appeared to me that we were not well informed as to the position of the Holy See with respect to peace proposals, or the extent of the possible participation of the Holy See in the post-war peace conference; and, by a series of questions I undertook to explore the mind of the Cardinal on these points. It developed into a very interesting conversation which required considerable time. The substance of this exchange of questions and answers might be stated as follows:

It has been the traditional function of the Holy See, when requested to do so, to act as intermediary by the passing of information regarding the desire, or even some of the basic proposals for peace, from one belligerent government to another,

while hostilities were still in progress. I inquired if my recollection was correct that Germany, in 1918, indicated to the Holy See that it might indicate to President Wilson that Germany was prepared to discuss terms of peace. He confirmed this statement and stated that similar action had been taken in a number of cases in recent times involving disputes of a more or less restricted character; that, in the role of mediator or conciliator, the Holy See was free to act. On a second feature as to the participation of the Holy See in a post-war conference, he confirmed that this raised many questions. The Holy See did not wish to involve itself directly but only as an adviser or conciliator in respect, for instance, to territorial settlements, political adjustments, or economic plans; that its functions in the spiritual field were limited to the interpretation of the moral code as applied to human conduct and that it could not become involved in disputes the aftermath of which might bring enmity towards the Holy See, based upon its participation in respect to questions over which it had no proper authority. I then inquired if this would indicate that the Holy See would not be inclined to take part in a peace conference and, at its conclusion, to sign the peace treaty. This question caused some thoughtful consideration by the Cardinal and the answer was not entirely satisfactory for the reason that, while the Vatican could sit in at a peace conference and could sign the peace treaty, it would have to conform strictly to the principle last discussed, that is, that it could not involve itself in questions of political, territorial, or economic character in a way that would, if disappointment followed in the case of a particular nation, engender enmity towards the Holy See. Another reason for this series of inquiries on my part was based on the fact that, in the last peace conference, I recalled that the Holy See was proposed as a party but was prevented from becoming a participant by the objections of Italy. It should be recalled that the so-called "Roman question" had not then been settled. The Lateran Treaty provides:

"Article 24

"The Holy See, in consideration of the sovereignty belonging to it in the international field, declares that it wants to remain and will remain outside of temporal disputes between other States, and of international congresses called together for such purpose, unless the contending Parties make a collective appeal to its mission of peace, the Holy See reserving for itself in each case the right to assert its moral and spiritual power.

"In consequence thereof, the Vatican City will be always, and in every case, considered to be neutral and inviolable territory."

However, it may be that the Italian Government might have a different view in the future if the Holy See were called upon to take part in such deliberations if the British and the Americans proposed it be a participant. The Lateran Treaty is an engagement between the states only and, I assume, by the consent of each could be modified to suit a particular case. It was obvious to me that the limits of this field were not very clearly defined, so much so that Father Carroll, who accompanied me during the interview, was asked by the Cardinal to prepare a review of our conversation, and I am confident that the Cardinal will study and revise his own remarks. It is possible that I shall have a copy of that Memorandum.

I then mentioned the subject of refugees, imprisonment and execution of hostages, the transfer of populations, the impressment into work into foreign countries by unwilling peoples of occupied countries, and I again urged upon the Cardinal, as I had upon His Holiness, that a further condemnation of these practices by the Holy Father would meet the hopes of many in America, Great Britain, and in the occupied countries. It was indicated to me that such a statement in general terms will be made at the first opportunity, which, I am told, will be early in October,

I introduced the question of Russia, which is very much in the minds of everyone here, and her post-war attitude in the case of United Nations, with which it is now collaborating, would find it to her advantage if a strong buffer organization of states were set up in the area between Germany and Russia; and if the world organization, backed by powers to enforce its decrees, were created, Russia, feeling secure (having adequate territory for a large growth of population and possessing vast resources) might find her own security of such importance that efforts to exploit her original ideologies, now considerably revamped, or to gain territory in the less rich areas surrounding her on the west, would seem to offer a reasonable opportunity for Russia to become a real member of the family of nations and to participate whole-heartedly in their objectives. I suggested that even if that were not a reasonably promising prospect, what could be gained by adopting the alternative based upon an admission of defeat and envisaging a world based upon doubt and uncertainty and upon the theory that war between Russia and her neighbors was in the future inevitable. The response to this argument was quite prompt and satisfactory.

I then touched upon the acceptance of a Japanese Mission to the Vatican and the shock that it caused to American sensibilities when it was announced. The Cardinal indicated that Japan had twice made application, that it had previously been favorably acted upon, and that on his own initiative, when it was finally agreed to receive a Japanese Mission, he stated emphatically to the proponent that the Vatican was also prepared to receive a Chinese Mission. He indicated at that moment that there was no indication China would seek representation at the Holy See. He had made it clear to the Japanese that the Chinese would be received.

I indicated that I was greatly impressed by the skill with which the Cardinal conducted diplomatic matters, but that our experience with the Japanese had taught us to be on the alert. He smilingly responded that they were under no illusions. I indicated that the attitude of America towards Japan was to give the Japanese a sound thrashing. He said, in reply, that that was a natural human reaction which, in this instance, he would neither approve nor condemn.

The conference lasted an hour and a half and was marked by every consideration of friendliness, of interest and admiration for President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, and Under Secretary Welles, whose visit he recalled with much pleasure.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN

THE CARDINAL SECRETARY OF STATE MAGLIONE AND MYRON TAYLOR

SEPTEMBER 25, 1942, 12:15 p.m.

(As reported by Father Carrol)

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AMERICAN STUDIES OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

His Excellency Ambassador Taylor told the Cardinal Secretary of State that for some time past the American Government has been giving serious study to this question of post-war reconstruction. He explained that this study is being carried out under the direction of the State Department in Washington and that several committees of competent men are giving serious consideration to various aspects of this complex problem. It is the opinion of the American Government, Mr. Taylor declared, that because of the complexity of the problem it is urgent that long and serious study be given to it beforehand, so that, if possible, at least a general plan may be available at the end of the war. His Eminence agreed that the problem will indeed be complex and difficult and expressed his pleasure at learning that the United States Government had begun so early to examine the many problems involved. When asked by Mr. Taylor if the Holy See were making any similar studies in this direction, Cardinal Maglione replied that, of course, the Holy See's principle interests are in the welfare of religion and the Church and in the well-being of all men. Hence the Vatican is not making any study of the political aspects of the problem, such as territorial settlements, financial questions, and the like, but that study is constantly being given to the general situation inasmuch as it affects mankind in general, the preservation of man's God-given rights, assurance of justice for all and the vital interests of the Vatican and of the Catholic Church.

I. ORDER. Ambassador Taylor explained that in all these studies attention is being directed first to the necessity of maintaining or restoring order in every country. This, he said, will be of paramount importance and must be a fundamental aspect of the post-war period. He asserted that the success of a post-war reconstruction plan may well depend on this immediate establishment of order. His Eminence agreed and added that there may indeed be grave danger of upheavals and revolutions in countries now at war if strong measures are not taken to preserve order.

II. SECURITY.

III: RELIEF. Cardinal Maglione, in commenting on the importance of preserving order after the war and of ensuring for all peoples a sense of security in the immediate post-war period, declared that for the success of these plans relief must be provided at once, for a people without the absolute necessities of life always constitutes a fertile ground for the seeds of internal strife and revolution. Mr. Taylor then assured His Eminence that this matter, too, was being given very careful consideration and that, after that of the maintenance of order, was considered of highest importance in the American studies. Ambassador Taylor then told something of what is being done in a concrete way to meet this post-war need. He asserted, by way of example, that huge reserves of food-stuffs are already being set aside in America for this purpose. As the work of harvesting the wheat crop of 1942 began, he said, the United States had a surplus of an entire year's wheat crop, which has been stored and will be ready for immediate shipment to Europe after the war; and similar reserves of other commodities will also be ready. Mr. Taylor also pointed out that more than enough ships will be available for this work of relief. Cardinal Maglione seemed greatly impressed and very pleased to learn of these preparations.

IV. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

V: WORLD ORGANIZATION. Mr. Taylor expressed the view that in the post-war period a real effort must be made to establish a world organization, for, with modern means of communication, the world has become small and no nation can safely separate itself from the rest of the world. His Excellency suggested that this new world organization might be formed somewhat along the lines of the League of Nations, but with wider participation and with the necessary power to enforce its decisions. Mr. Taylor stressed the importance of this power of enforcement, explaining that without it there is no assurance that any world organization will function properly or be able to guarantee enduring peace or justice. Cardinal Maglione, mentioning that the League of Nations had, indeed, failed in its task, agreed that the solution of the great problem seems to lie in the direction of world organization and that some kind of an international police force might be the best guarantee, once a just and equitable peace has been concluded.

VI. WORLD COURT. Considerable thought is being given too, Mr. Taylor said, to the eventual establishment of an international court, which could be called upon to give an

unbiased decision in the many minor disputes between nations-disputes which, because they are not settled, often lead to more violent disagreements and even to war. Cardinal Maglione approved of the plan.

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I. CIANO. Ambassador Taylor suggested that His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State might find occasion to convey to Count Ciano the expression of His Excellency's appreciation of the courtesy which had been extended to him upon his arrival on Italian soil and of his gratitude for the permission to pass through Italian territory. Cardinal Maglione replied that he would certainly make it a point to have the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See inform the Italian Foreign Minister of Mr. Taylor's sentiments in that regard.

II. JAPANESE. Mr. Taylor pointed out to the Cardinal Secretary of State that the admission of a Japanese representative to the Vatican Diplomatic Corps, coming as it did about the time of the attack on American territory, had made a very bad impression in the United States. Cardinal Maglione declared, in reply, that it must be remembered that the Japanese request had been received a long time previous to that date and that, though it had lapsed from time to time, it was always under consideration, thus when the renewed request was presented the Holy See felt that it could not refuse. This explanation was given to the American Government, the Cardinal declared, and had, apparently, proved satisfactory. Ambassador Taylor again stressed the point that this event had, indeed, made a bad impression in the United States - on the American people in general. At this point His Eminence stated that he could understand how, under the circumstances, and especially in view of the attack on America, this could be so, but that he counted on the good sense and intelligence of the American people to comprehend the entire situation, especially if it were to be explained to them. His Eminence added that the Holy See could not, under the circumstances, have told the intermediary, who presented the Japanese case, that the Vatican would not accede to the request of the Japanese Government because the latter had ordered an attack on the United States. This would, as is evident, have been a descent to the field of politics from which the Holy See must hold itself aloof. Cardinal Maglione pointed out, however, that even though he could not refuse the request, he did seize that opportunity, while agreeing to receive a Japanese representative, to state quite clearly to the intermediary that a Chinese representation would also be accepted by the Holy See. His Eminence declared that this was a very delicate point at the time, since he did not know then that the Chinese would seek to open diplomatic relations with the Holy See.

He added that he had done this principally as a precautionary measure, and he thought that it was an important point. He added, by way of an "aside", that the Japanese were not very pleased to hear of it.

III. Ambassador Taylor stated that there is a general impression, not only in America, but also in Europe and elsewhere - an impression of which His Excellency has personally seen much evidence - that the Holy Father should again speak out against the inhuman treatment of refugees and hostages - and especially of the Jews - in occupied territories. Mr. Taylor also pointed out that this general call for a statement from His Holiness comes not only from Catholics but from Protestants as well, and added that he had heard it in America, in Lisbon, in Madrid, and anywhere that he has gone in recent months. His Eminence, in reply, declared that the Holy See has been working incessantly for the relief of the unfortunate peoples of the occupied countries and very particularly for the refugees and for the Jews. The Secretariat of State and other Vatican agencies, he said, are constantly devoting themselves to these problems. Furthermore, Cardinal Maglione declared, representatives of the Catholic Church in various countries have interested themselves in the question and have been quite outspoken in their condemnation of this inhuman treatment of the peoples of their countries. His Holiness has on many occasions condemned this treatment of peoples and of individuals and has declared that the blessing or the malediction of Almighty God would descend upon rulers according to the manner in which they treat the peoples under their rule. This, Cardinal Maglione intimated, was quite a strong statement - as strong, in fact, as it is possible to make without descending to particulars, a course of action which would immediately draw His Holiness into the field of political disputes, require documentary proof, etc. Manifestly, His Eminence added, the Pope should not do this. Mr. Taylor agreed that His Holiness would not be expected to descend to particulars, but only to make His appeal on the higher level. His Excellency pointed out that these declarations of His Holiness has been made some time ago and that it is generally felt that a renewal of the appeal might now be in order and would most certainly be welcomed. To this Cardinal Maglione replied that he had the impression that as late as June 1942 His Holiness had denounced the maltreatment of the peoples of the occupied countries. The difficulty, His Eminence said, lies in the fact that people have short memories in matters of this kind and that many would have the Pope speak out daily in denunciation of these evils. At any rate, His Eminence assured Ambassador Taylor, the Pope will certainly avail Himself of the first opportunity to restate His position in very clear terms.

IV. RUSSIAN SECURITY.

V. EUROPEAN STATES.

(a) EASTERN. Ambassador Taylor told His Eminence that, in the American studies of the post-war problems, much importance is attached to Central Europe - to that part of Europe bound roughly by Germany and Austria on the one side and by Russia on the other. That sector he intimated, has been a constant source of trouble and will require special attention. Mr. Taylor added that if, as seems quite possible, Russia can be brought into line in the post-war Europe, then it may well be possible to provide for each of those small countries in Central Europe a kind of autonomy and independence which would be guaranteed by Russia on the one hand and the United Nations on the other. His Eminence agreed that this would, indeed, be a good plan and expressed the hope that it will work.

(b) AUSTRIA - SHOULD IT BE SEPARATED FROM GERMANY. Next Mr. Taylor asked if His Eminence might venture an opinion as to what should be the future of Austria. His Excellency explained that in the general plan for a post-war Europe that will ensure tranquility, prosperity and a durable peace, it is generally felt in American circles that provisions must be made for the division of Germany. It is thought, for instance, that Austria might be separated from Germany. To the question as to whether he thought this advisable, His Eminence replied that it would depend on what was meant by Austria. He emphasized at this point that He had not given much serious consideration to this question, since it is a purely political matter which, as such, does not interest the Holy See. However, the Cardinal added, that at the moment it occurred to him that the Austria which was set up by the Versailles treaty was a nation in name only and was bound to be a source of trouble because it was not self-sufficient. Here Mr. Taylor explained that he had in mind rather the old Austria, the Empire. His Eminence pointed out that there would then arise the problems of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc. - all nations demanding autonomy and independence. If it were possible to have these various peoples accept a restoration of the former empire, then it might be possible to establish a new Austria, but on the face of things it would seem to be a very difficult task.

(c) BRIAND FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN STATES. There was little comment on this subject. Ambassador Taylor indicated that he thought that the Briand Plan might bear some study.

(d) GERMANY.

(e) FRANCE.

VI. PARTICIPATION OF VATICAN IN POST-WAR CONFERENCE.
(See Cardinal Maglione's Memorandum on this point.) Cardinal Maglione repeated time and again in the course of the discussion of this point that circumstances will naturally play a great part in determining the Vatican's decision regarding participation in a peace conference.

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ADDENDA: II. JAPANESE, P.4. At the end of the discussion on the matter of Japanese representation at the Vatican, Mr. Taylor warned Cardinal Maglione that he and others at the Vatican should be cautious in their dealings with the Japanese representatives, lest the latter get the Vatican into serious trouble. His Excellency declared that the Holy See might profit from America's sad experience with the Japanese. His Eminence enjoyed this very much and assured Mr. Taylor that the Holy See would be on its guard always and intimated that it would not be taken in as easily as "some of our friends."

I had a conference with Monsignor Montini on Sunday morning, September 27th.

Mr. Harold Tittmann and I introduced the subject of bombing, without leaving a copy of the Memorandum attached on the problem of bombing as related to civilian casualties.

The Memorandum attached was prepared prior to the conference and was used as a basis for the presentation of our argument.

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INFORMAL NOTES
OF
MYRON TAYLOR
FOR DISCUSSION WITH MGR. MONTINI
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 27th 1942
ON THE SUBJECT OF BOMBING

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I am not clear whether the Holy See has condemned the bombing of London, Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade, Coventry, Manila, Pearl Harbor, and places in the South Pacific. A list, together with photographs of Catholic Church property in England damaged by German bombs up to February 1, 1941, is attached.

It might be misunderstood, now that the United Nations are strong enough to bomb military objectives in Germany, to raise the question, because there will be many conflicting reactions. Of course, civilian populations will suffer because of the very character of bombing itself, as it can not be controlled as can some other features of war making; but it is not intended that the United Nations would engage in indiscriminate bombing as was done in the British towns and is evidenced by the long list of hospitals, churches, private residence, and commercial centers which a visit to those communities will indicate. That is especially true in London, where the whole region around St. Paul's is leveled to the ground and where no military objectives existed; nor did munition production plants exist in that area. There is the danger of the Vatican's being called partisan. It has already been called so. Deplorable inhumanities in Germany against civilian populations are even more reprehensible than the attacks on all her neighbors whom she invaded. The Germans set a pat-

tern for ruthlessness; the United Nations have not initiated it nor copied it. The Germans deliberately bombed many of the peaceful cathedral towns of England. The United Nations have no such objective. Their objectives are carefully planned. The civilian population in military areas, munition and vital transportation centers, have been warned and should leave those centers. The workmen in the military and munition plants in those areas are as truly military as those at the front line of battle. Now that the rising power of the United Nations's air forces has exceeded that of Germany, it might be interpreted that pressure was being exerted by the Axis on the Holy See in an effort to limit an important military arm which the United Nations did not introduce in this war but to sap its strength and render it ineffective in the face of German military claims that through air alone would the war be won. We quote:

"All German authorities who have dealt with the subject have made it clear that they believe air superiority to be decisive. General Goering, speaking on January 11th, 1941, said: 'When you consider the power of the Luftwaffe, no one can doubt the issue of the war.' Major Wolf Bley, the German air expert, said on June 27th last: 'The Axis leaders have turned the decisive importance of the Luftwaffe into a weapon which ensures victory.' Field-Marshal Kesserling, of the Luftwaffe, when asked in April, 1941, which weapon of war would prove decisive, replied: 'The air arm must decide the issue. We shall regard the Luftwaffe's aim as achieved when military occupation can follow more or less without fighting.' Hitler evidently considered overwhelming air power to be decisive when he referred to the projected conquest of Britain in 1940 with the words: 'There are no longer any islands.'"

I shall undertake (1) to discourage, in London and Washington, indiscriminate bombing and to urge that targets be confined to munitions plants and communication centers; (2) to have the public warned to move away from danger zones.

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vatican City, September 30, 1942.

Dear Myron:

I enclose a copy of Informal Notes on Bombing as furnished to Mgr. Montini on September 30, 1942. At D'Arcy Osborne's suggestion, Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade, etc., were added to your enumeration of bombed cities. The original lists, together with photographs, of Catholic Church property in England damaged by German bombs up to February 1, 1941, as furnished by D'Arcy, were enclosed with the Notes.

With regard to pronouncements by the Pope against wholesale bombing of civilians, the following passage occurs in the Pope's Homily and Prayer at a Special Mass in St. Peter's on behalf of War Victims, November 24, 1940 (soon after the bombing of London):

"May the whirlwinds, that in the light of the day or in the dark of the night, scatter terror, fire, destruction, and slaughter on helpless folk, cease. May justice and charity on one side and on the other be in perfect balance, so that all injustice be repaired, the reign of right restored, etc."

The Cardinal Secretary of State informed Osborne at the time that this passage was the result of a suggestion made by Osborne that the Pope should condemn the wholesale bombing of civilians.

In the same Homily and Prayer the Pope said: "May the souls of the faithful buried beneath the ruins of cities and villages have eternal rest." This, of course, may refer to artillery bombardments as well as aerial bombardments.

The foregoing seem to be the nearest ad hoc pronouncements made by the Pope so far in connection with bombing. However, we are making further investigations and will let you know the results.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) HAROLD.

Enclosure: Copy of Informal
Notes on Bombing.

MEMORANDUM OF STATEMENT GIVEN OVER THE TELEPHONE
TO THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE BY M.C.T.
Saturday, October 31, 1942
After his talk on Friday with Secretary Hull

"Having promptly conferred with Mr. Myron Taylor, I am advised that he has presented the Rome bombing question to the Secretary of State and next week will present it to the President, who is not now available, when I will make further reply. He advised your present memorandum referred to a more general statement than that of last year, which was specific as to Rome. On both occasions he presented the matter to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Eden in London, enroute to America. I can assure you of his personal interest in the Roman question."

(November 2 1942)

Ref. 2945/2/42

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 6th, 1942

Dear Mr. Myron Taylor:

At the request of the Foreign Office, I send you herein two lists, one giving details of the damage caused by enemy action to Roman Catholic church property in England up to February 1st, 1941, and the other giving particulars of the air raid damage done to churches of all denominations in the United Kingdom.

The first of these lists was communicated by Osborne to the Vatican early last year. Osborne told the Foreign Office that he had shown you the list when you were recently in Rome, and that you had asked to be given a copy of it and also a list showing the damage done to other church property and to hospitals in the United Kingdom. The Foreign Office had hoped to be able to give you the two lists when you passed through London, but in the event this proved impossible and they have now sent the lists to me with the request that I pass them on to you. In addition, I have been asked to explain that the second list was drawn up at very short notice in order to have it ready by the time you reached London. It may therefore be incomplete. Nor was it possible in the time available to prepare a list of hospitals which had been damaged.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX.

Mr. Myron Taylor,
c/o Mr. Wesley Jones,
European Division,
State Department,
Washington, D. C.

AIR RAID DAMAGE TO CHURCHES
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The following interim report by the Religions Division of the Ministry of Information must not be taken as necessarily complete, but as an attempt to bring together the information as available.

This report was originally drawn up in Midsummer 1941. Where possible, the figures have been revised up to Autumn 1942, but in any case air raid damage to churches during the last 18 months has been limited mainly to coastal towns and cities which were bombed during the so-called "Baedeker" raids. For these see addendum to the Report.

I STATISTICS (for whole country; for London see III)

Churches destroyed and seriously damaged

ANGLICAN

England
Wales

350 (understatement)
10

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND

32

FREE CHURCH

Baptist 89)
Congregational 155)
Methodist 130 (minimum))
English)
Presbyterian 28)
Other Free)
Churches 22)

FREE CHURCH TOTAL 424

ROMAN CATHOLIC

74

Total - all denominations

890

Churches damaged less seriously

ANGLICAN

England
Wales

1,200
40

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND

89

FREE CHURCH

Baptist	136)		
Congregational	150)		
Methodist)	Free	
English	500)	Church	
Presbyterian	37)	Total	873
Other Free)		
Churches	50)		

ROMAN CATHOLIC

158

Total - all denominations 2,360

Grand total of Churches destroyed
and damaged 3,250

II STRIKING FACTS

More than 1,000 Methodist Trust properties destroyed or damaged by enemy action by May 1, 1941.

One-third of Methodist London mission centres damaged in one fortnight.

Above figures do not include a very large number of other church properties -- vicarages, halls, schools, convents -- destroyed or damaged.

Cathedrals destroyed or seriously damaged - Coventry, Llandaff and St. George's R. C. Cathedral, Southwark; serious but not irreparable damage done to St. Paul's, Westminster Abbey and many provincial cathedrals.

III LONDON

The following figures are available for London but in some cases have been arrived at by rough estimate.

12% of Anglican Churches in London Diocese destroyed or rendered unusable for duration of the war (figure perhaps 150).

Congregational	70	Badly damaged	69	Slight
Methodist	say 80			
Baptist	123	(includes some manses)		
Roman Catholic "	20			
Jewish				
Synagogues:		(only London figures available)		
	15	Completely destroyed		
	10	Badly damaged		

List of main church buildings destroyed or damaged in London:

St. Paul's Cathedral, Westminster Abbey, Westminster Cathedral, Southwark Cathedral, Southwark R. C. Cathedral, The Temple Church, The City Temple, Our Lady of Victories, Kensington, St. Columba, Pont Street, Christ Church, Westminster Bridge Road (links with U.S.A.), All Hallows'-by-the-Tower, Islington Parish Church, Dutch Church, Austin Friars, St. Margaret's, Westminster, Chelsea Old Church (Tomb of Sir Thomas More), Church of the Pilgrim Fathers, Southwark, St. Stephen's, Coleman Street, St. Giles', Cripplegate, St. Mary Woolnoth, St. Mary Ab Church, St. Olave's, Hart Street, St. Clement Danes, St. John's, Smith Square, St. Martin-in-the-Fields (not serious), St. Alban's, Holborn.

Among the Wren Churches are:

St. James's, Piccadilly, St. Lawrence Jewry, St. Bride's, Fleet Street, St. Mary, Aldermanbury, St. Andrew-by-the-Wardrobe, St. Mildred's, Bread Street, Christ Church, Newgate Street, St. Andrew's, Holborn.

ADDENDUM ON RECENT DAMAGE

From June 1941 to September 1942 the main Church damage has been in coastal or cathedral districts. The most important case was the serious damage to Exeter Cathedral. Canterbury Cathedral was damaged in the heavy raids on that city, though fortunately the damage was mainly confined to the Library. Among parish churches the destruction of St. Nicholas, Great Yarmouth, reputed to be the largest parish church in England, is notable.

Before the war the most famous parish churches of England, from the architectural point of view, were those of Great Yarmouth, Plymouth, Coventry and Hull. The first three of these have now been entirely destroyed by air raids.

In addition to Roman Catholic Churches included in above figures 16 other R. C. buildings (schools, convents, etc.) have been destroyed in recent months.

DAMAGE TO ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH PROPERTY IN
ENGLAND OWING TO ENEMY ACTION UP TO FEBRUARY 1 1941

ARCHDIOCESE OF BIRMINGHAM

Churches

Destroyed:

St. Osburg's, Coventry.

Badly damaged:

St. Chad's Cathedral, Birmingham.
St. Anne's, Birmingham.
Holy Rosary, Birmingham.
Holy Family, Birmingham.
St. Hubert's, Warley.
All Souls', Coventry.

Slightly damaged:

St. Patrick's, Birmingham.
St. Catherine's, Birmingham.
St. Mary's, Maryvale, Birmingham.
St. Mary's, Coventry.
St. Elizabeth's, Coventry.
Holy Trinity, Sutton Coldfield.
Sacred Heart, Coventry.

Schools

Destroyed:

English Martyrs', Birmingham.
St. Osburg's, Coventry.
St. Mary's, Coventry.

Badly damaged:

St. Chad's, Birmingham.
Holy Family, Birmingham.
St. Vincent's, Birmingham.
St. Michael's, Birmingham.
St. Hubert's, Warley.

ARCHDIOCESE OF BIRMINGHAM (Cont'd)

Schools

Slightly damaged: St. Patrick's, Birmingham.
The Oratory, Birmingham.
St. Augustine's, Birmingham.
Holy Rosary, Birmingham.

Presbyteries

Destroyed: St. Osburg's, Coventry.

Badly damaged: Bishop's House, Birmingham.
Holy Family, Birmingham.
English Martyrs', Birmingham.
Holy Rosary, Birmingham.
St. Anne's, Birmingham.
St. Vincent's, Birmingham.
St. Hubert's, Warley.
All Souls', Coventry.
St. Mary's, Coventry.

Orphanage

Slightly damaged: Father Hudson's Homes, Coleshill.

Convents

Destroyed: St. Anne's Convent, Birmingham.

Slightly damaged: Maryvale Convent, Birmingham.
St. Agnes' Convent, Birmingham.
St. Joseph's Convent, Stafford.

DIOCESE OF BRENTWOOD

Destroyed: The Presbytery at Canning Town.
The Priest's House at Barkingside
S. Elizabeth's Convent, Walthamstow

Badly damaged: S. Margaret's Church, Canning Town
S. George's Church, Walthamstow.
S. Michael's Convent & Children's
Hospital, Clacton on Sea.
The S. Union Convent, Grays.
Ursuline Convent, Brentwood.

DIOCESE OF BRENTWOOD (Cont'd)

Slightly damaged: The Church at East Ham.
The Church at Tilbury.
S. Thomas of Canterbury Church.
Woodford.
The Church at Barking.
The Church at Upminster.
The Church at Rainham.
S. Margaret's Convent Chapel,
Canning Town.
The Convent at Dagenham.
The Convent at Chigwell.
The Convent at Upton, Forest Gate.
S. Mary's Convent, Walthamstow.
S. Philip's Priory, Chelmsford.
New Hall Convent, Chelmsford.
Convent of Mercy, Romford.
Marillac Sanatorium, Warley.
Church at Halstead.
Parish Hall at Romford.

DIOCESE OF HEXHAM AND NEWCASTLE

Destroyed: St. Joseph's Catholic School,
West Hartlepool.

Slightly damaged: St. Bede's Church, South Shields.
St. Oswin's Church, Tynemouth.
Sacred Heart Church, Byermoor.
Church of Our Lady, Easington
Colliery.
St. Mary's Cathedral, Newcastle-on-
Tyne.
St. Mary's Convent and Orphanage,
Tudhoe, Co. Durham.

Schools, Pres-
byteries & Halls: St. Bede's Schools, South Shields.
St. Gregory's School, South Shield
Sacred Heart School, Byermoor.
St. Mary's Cathedral Presbytery, N
Sacred Heart Presbytery, Byermoor.
St. Bede's Presbytery, South Shiel
The Catholic Parish Hall, Byermoor

ARCHDIOCESE OF LIVERPOOL

Churches

Badly damaged: Our Lady Immaculate, Liverpool.
Holy Cross, Liverpool.
St. Sebastian's, Liverpool.

Slightly damaged: St. Nicholas' Pro-Cathedral,
Liverpool.
All Saints, Liverpool.
All Souls, Liverpool.
Holy Trinity, Liverpool.
Our Lady of Good Help, Liverpool.
Our Lady of Reconciliation,
Liverpool.
St. Alban, Liverpool.
St. Anthony, Liverpool.
St. Brigid, Liverpool.
St. Charles, Liverpool.
St. Francis of Assisi, Liverpool.
St. Francis Xavier, Liverpool.
St. Joseph, Liverpool.
St. Patrick, Liverpool.
St. Peter, Liverpool.
St. Sylvester, Liverpool.
St. Alexander, Bootle.
St. James, Bootle.
St. Winefride, Bootle.
St. Michael, Ditton, Widnes.
St. Edmund, Waterloo, Crosby.

Convents

Badly damaged: Poor Clares, Wavertree, Liverpool.
Convent of Mercy, Mount Vernon,
Liverpool.

Slightly damaged: La Sagesee Convent, Grassendale,
Liverpool.
Bellerive Convent, F.C.J., Liverpool.
Convent of Missionary Sisters of Our
Lady of Africa, Liverpool.
St. Joseph's Convent, Sisters of
Charity, Liverpool.
Convent of Sisters of Cross and
Passion, Liverpool.
Convent of Sisters of St. Joseph
of the Apparition, Oakhill Park,
Liverpool.

ARCHDIOCESE OF LIVERPOOL (Cont'd)

Convents

Slightly damaged:

Nazareth House, Wavertree,
Liverpool.
Nazareth House, Great Crosby,
Liverpool.
Nazareth House, Ditton, Widnes.
Convent of Notre Dame, Everton
Valley, Liverpool.
Convent of the Good Shepherd,
Ford, Liverpool.

Other Ecclesiastical
Property

Destroyed:

Pro-Cathedral Presbytery, Liverpool.
Presbytery, Ford, Liverpool.
St. Gerard's School, Liverpool.

Badly damaged:

St. Joseph's School, Liverpool.
St. Anthony's School, Liverpool.

Slightly damaged:

St. Francis Xavier's College
(Jesuits), Liverpool.
St. Martin's College (Xavierian
Brothers), Bootle.
St. Nicholas's School, Liverpool.
All Saints' School, Liverpool.
All Souls' School, Liverpool.
St. Matthew's School, Liverpool.
St. Patrick's School, Liverpool.
St. Michael's Presbytery, Ditton,
Widnes.

DIOCESE OF NOTTINGHAM

Derby: St. Mary's; Roof of Church
slightly damaged and many win-
dows broken in the school.
Melbourne: Our Lady's; Windows
of Church destroyed and Parish
Hall seriously damaged.
Leicester: Holy Cross; Many Win-
dows broken in the school.
Padley: Martyrs' Chapel; Roof
seriously damaged.

DIOCESE OF LEEDS

Churches

Destroyed: St. Wilfred's, Sheffield.

Badly damaged: St. Vincent's, Sheffield.
St. Charles', Sheffield.
St. Peter's, Bradford.
St. Patrick's, Leeds.

Slightly damaged: St. John Fisher, Sheffield.

Schools

Destroyed: St. Marie's, Sheffield - girls.
St. Vincent's, Sheffield- "
St. Wilfred's, Sheffield- "

DIOCESE OF PLYMOUTH

Churches

Slightly damaged: Holy Cross, Plymouth.
St. Peter's, Plymouth.

Convents

Slightly damaged: Little Sisters of the Poor, Plymouth
Chapel of Carmelite Convent, Effingham
Plymouth.

School

Badly damaged: Holy Cross School, Plymouth.

DIOCESE OF SALFORD

Buildings

Destroyed: St. Augustine's Church, Presbyterians
and Schools (York Street, Chorlton
on Medlock, Manchester 1)
St. Joseph's Mission to the Deaf
Dumb, Chapel, Club and House.
(366/368, Chester Road, Old Trafford,
Salford, Manchester 16).

DIOCESE OF SALFORD (Cont'd)

Buildings:

Badly damaged:

St. Joseph's Church, Presbytery and Schools. (Ellesmere St. Salford 5)
St. Mary's Church (Swinton Hall Road, Swinton, Manchester).
St. William's School-Chapel (Simpson St. Angel Meadow, Manchester 4).
Loreto Convent & College (Secondary School) (Institute of B.V.M.) (Moss Lane, Manchester 15).
St. Joseph's Elementary School (Plymouth Grove, Manchester 13).
All Souls' Elementary School (Weaste, Salford 5).
Corpus Christi Basilica and Priory (Premonstratensians) (Varley St. Miles Platting, Manchester 10).
English Martyrs' Church and Presbytery (Alexandra Road South, Manchester 16).

Slightly damaged:

St. Anthony's Church, Presbytery, School & Club. (Eleventh St. Trafford Park, Manchester 13).
Holy Name Church (Jesuits) (Oxford Road, Manchester 13).
St. Lawrence's School-Chapel and Presbytery (Chester Road & Westminster St., Old Trafford, Manchester 16).
St. Winefride's Church and Presbytery (Didsbury Road, Heaton Mersey, Nr. Stockport).
St. Kentigern's Church and Presbytery (Wilbraham Road, Fallowfield, Manchester 14).
St. Alphonsus' Church and School (Ayres Road, Brooks's Bar, Manchester 16).
St. Gabriel's Convent and University Hostel (Cross and Passion) (1, Oxford Place, Victoria Park, Manchester 14).
Convent of the Sisters of the Christian Retreat (High Lane, Chorlton-cum-Hardy, Manchester 21).

DIOCESE OF SALFORD (Cont'd)

Buildings

Slightly damaged:

- St. Wilfred's Church and Presbytery
(Bedford St., Hilms, Manchester 15)
- St. James's Church and Presbytery
(Church St., Pendleton, Salford 6)
- St. Boniface's Church, Presbytery &
School (Gerald Road, Lower Broughton,
Salford 7)
- All Souls' Church and Presbytery
(Liverpool St. Weaste, Salford 5)
- Our Lady of Mount Carmel, Church,
Presbytery and Junior, Infant and
Senior Schools (Oldfield Road,
Salford 5).
- St. Thomas of Canterbury, Church,
School and Presbytery (Great
Cheetham St., Higher Broughton,
Salford 7).
- St. Michael's Church, School and
Presbytery (George Leigh Street,
Manchester 4).
- Holy Family School-Chapel, XX
(Lower Ormond St., All Saints,
Manchester 1).
- Adelphi House Convent (Faithful
Companions of Jesus) (The Crescent,
Chapel Street, Salford 3)
- St. John's Cathedral Church
(Chapel St., Salford 3)
- St. Peter's Church and School
(Greengate, Salford 3).
- St. Mary's Presbytery and School
(Swinton Hall Road, Swinton, Man-
chester).
- Wardley Hall, Worsley, Manchester
(Bishop's House).
- Wardley Cemetery Chapel, Worsley,
Manchester.
- Alexian Brothers House, Wardley,
Worsley.
- De la Salle College (Brothers of
Christian Schools) (Weaste Lane,
Pendleton, Salford 6).
- Carmelite Convent (Vine St., Ker-
sal, Salford 7).

DIOCESE OF SHREWSBURY

Our Lady', Birkenhead. Slight damage.
St. Laurance's, Birkenhead. Cracks
in walls which might become serious.
St. Werburgh's, Birkenhead. Slightly
damaged.
St. Joseph's, Seacombe. Slight damage.
St. Albans's, Liscard. Slight damage.

Convents

Little Sisters, Birkenhead. Slight
damage.
Sisters of Charity, Birkenhead.
Serious damage.
St. Margaret's Home, Rock Ferry.
Church badly damaged.

School

St. Joseph's School, Upton. Slight
damage.

DIOCESE OF SOUTHWARK

Churches completely destroyed or made useless

Rotherhithe	Our Lady
Sydenham	Our Lady and S. Philip
Brockley	S. Mary Magdalen
Newhaven	Sacred Heart
Greenwich	S. Joseph
Dockhead	Holy Trinity
Camberwell	Sacred Heart

Churches badly damaged but repairable

Dover	S. Paul
Brixton	Corpus Christi
Battersea	B.V.M. and S. Joseph
Greenwich	Our Lady
Addiscombe	Our Lady
Newington	S. Wilfred
W. Norwood	S. Matthew
Wandsworth	S. Thomas
Clapham	S. Mary
Peckham	S. Francis
SOUTHWARK	CATHEDRAL

DIOCESE OF SOUTHWARK (Cont'd)

Churches slightly damaged

Stockwell	S. Helen
Brighton	S. John Baptist
Deal	S. Thomas
Clapham	S. Vincent
Catford	Holy Cross
Nottingham	Our Lady
Clapham Park	S. Bede
Esher	Holy Name
Rotherhithe	S. Peter
Epsom	S. Joseph
Oxted	All Saints
S. Leonards	S. Thomas
Chislehurst	S. Mary
W. Wickham	S. Mark
Lewisham	S. Saviour
Nunhead	S. Thomas
Walworth	English Martyrs
Canterbury	S. Thomas
Streatham	English Martyrs
Forest Hill	S. William
Borough	Precious Blood
Beckenham	S. Edmund
Dulwich	S. Thomas
Shoreham	S. Peter
Bermondsey	Our Lady
Bermondsey	S. Gertrude
Deptford	Assumption
Mitcham	SS. Peter and Paul
Lee	Our Lady
Stockwell	S. Francis
Goudhurst	Sacred Heart
West Malling	

Presbyteries

Completely destroyed:
Rotherhithe

Rotherhithe St.

Badly damaged but repairable:
Tunbridge Wells
Dover
Nunhead

DIOCESE OF SOUTHWARK (Cont'd)

Presbyteries:

Slightly damaged:

Lewisham
Brixton
Deptford
Mitcham
Catford
Stockwell: S. Helen
Streatham
Stockwell: S. Francis
Greenwich: S. Joseph
Nowington

Goudhurst
Bermondsey, Melior St.
Clapham Park
Cornwall Rd., Lambeth
Bermondsey South
Dulwich
Balham
Epsom
Wandsworth East
BISHOP'S HOUSE

Parish Halls:

West Norwood
Greenwich East
Lee
Nunhead

Convents:

Rotherhithe:
Balham
Richmond
Roehampton
Newhaven
Southwark
Greenwich
Charlton
Lewisham

Sacred Hearts
Bethany
Marists
Sacred Heart
Imm. Heart B.V.M.
Notre Dame
Ursulines
Obls. of Assumption
Sacred Hearts

Schools:

Downham
Dockhead
Brixton
Borough
Cathedral
Greenwich East
Walworth

Lee
Welling
Mitcham
Battersea East
Clapham Park
Lewisham
Melior Street

Other Buildings:

Lambeth
St. Anne's School

Catholic Nursing Institute,
together with the new hospital.
Orpington

DIOCESE OF WESTMINSTER

Destroyed:

St. Boniface (German Church), Adler Street, Commercial Road.
Our Lady of Victories, Kensington.
St. John's Wood School.
St. Mary's, Canton Street, Poplar.
St. Mary's High Road, East Finchley.

Badly damaged:

St. Mary's, Cadogan Street.
Our Most Holy Redeemer, Oakley Street.
St. Ansolm and St. Cecilia, Kingsway, Lincoln's Inn Fields (& Presbytery).
St. Edmund's, W. Ferry Road, Millwall.
St. Patrick's, Soho Square.
St. Aloysius, Phoenix Road, Somers Town (and Schools).
St. Francis de Salis, 729 High Road, Tottenham, (Presbytery & Schools).
St. Patrick's, Green Bank, Wapping.
St. Edmund's College, Old Hall, Ware.
Church of the Guardian Angels, 377 Mile End Road, Mile End (School of the Good Shepherd).
Holy Child School, Grundy Street, Poplar.
Presbytery of St. Catherine's, Money Lane, West Drayton.
Holy Trinity, Brook Green, Hammersmith.
Our Lady and St. George (Church, Presbytery & Hall), London Road, Enfield.

Slightly damaged:

St. Aidan's Old Oak Lane, East Acton (Church & Presbytery).
St. Scholastica, Kenninghall Road, Clapton.
St. Philip's, Regents Park Road, Finchley, (Church, Presbytery & Hall).
Church of the Sacred Heart, Ware, Herts.
The Cathedral, Westminster and Cathedral Clergy House.
St. Dunstan's, Gunnersbury Avenue, Gunnersbury.
Gunnersbury Catholic Grammar School.
Our Lady of Lourdes, High Street, Acton.
Church of the Most Sacred Heart, Park Way, Ruislip.

DIOCESE OF WESTMINSTER (Cont'd)

Slightly damaged:

St. Madeleine Sophie Barat, St. Charles Square.
St. Edmunds, 115, Hertford Rd., Edmonton.
St. Joan of Arc, Kelross Road, Highbury.
R.C. Schools (3), Limehouse.
Our Lady of the Assumption, Warwick Street.
St. Mary's School, Acton Green.
Holy Cross School, Parsons Green.
St. Agnes Presbytery & Schools, Cricklewood.
St. Thomas More (Church & Presbytery),
Maresfield Gardens, Swiss Cottage.
SS. Peter & Edward (Church, Presbytery
& Hall), 43 Palace Street, Westminster.
St. John Fisher, Western Avenue, Perivale,
Middlesex.
St. John the Baptist, Mare Street, Hackney.
Church of Holy Apostles, Claverton Street,
Westminster (& Presbytery).
St. Joseph's, Lambs Buildings, Bunhill Row.
Polish Church, Revonia Road, Islington.
St. Thomas of Canterbury, Rylston Road,
Fulham. (Also Presbytery & School).
Our Lady Help of Christians, Fortress Road,
Kentish Town.
St. Peter & Paul, Northfields, Ealing.
St. Teresa, Boreham Wood, Herts.
SS. Peter & Paul, Amwell Street, Clerkenwell.
Finchley Grammar School, Finchley.
St. Margaret's, Twickenham.
Church of the Sacred Heart (& Presbytery
& School), Kingston Road, Teddington.
St. Joseph's, Eleanor Road, Waltham Cross.
Our Lady of Lourdes (and Church Hall),
Rothamstead Avenue, Harpenden.
Our Lady of Lourdes (& Rectory), Bowes
Road, New Southgate.
SS. Mary & Michael, Commercial Road,
Stephney.
Our Lady & St. Joseph, Kingsland.
Our Lady of Willesden, Acton Lane, Willesden.
St. John the Evangelist, Brentford.
St. Anne's, Abbey Orchard Street, Westminster.
St. James (Church & Presbytery), Popes Grove,
Twickenham.
St. James (Church & School), Spanish Place.
Our Lady & St. Catherine of Siena, Bow.
Immaculate Heart of Mary, Sidney Road,
Homerton. (Church & Presbytery).
Our Lady of Compassion, Harlesden Road,
Willessden Green.

DIOCESE OF WESTMINSTER (Cont'd)

Slightly damaged: The Five Wounds, Stonebridge (Church & Presbytery).
School, Station Road, Wood Green.

Convents and Catholic Institutions:

Destroyed: Hostel, 27, 28 & 29, Bedford Way.

Badly Damaged: "Devon Nook," Home, Duke's Avenue, Chiswick.
Convent, Rosary Priory, Bushey Heath, Herts.
Convent, St. Vincent's House, Hammersmith.
Hillingdon Court Convent, Hillingdon.
La Sainte Union Convent, Highgate Road.
Sacred Heart, St. Charles College, Notting Hill.
Convent of the Good Shepherd, East Finchley.
Convent of the Sacred Heart, Roehampton (Southwark).

Damaged: Convent of Mercy, Claverton Street.
Convent, Beaufort Street, Chelsea.
Convent and Church, Convent of Perpetual Adoration, Horseferry Road.
Westminster Catholic Club, 98, St. George's Square, Westminster.
Convent, 8, Endsleigh Place.
Convent of Our Lady of the Cenacle, West Heath Road, Hampstead.
Convent, Bexley Heath, Erith, Kent (Southwark).

APOSTOLIC DELEGATION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3339 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, D.C.

No. 23/40

This No. should be prefixed
to the answer

November 19 1942

Your Excellency:

In reference to our conversation of last week I am pleased to forward to Your Excellency the enclosed memorandum containing the substance of my response to the interrogation of the Holy See.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my personal regard, I beg to remain,

Yours very sincerely,

S. G. CICOGNANI,

Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate

His Excellency
Mr. Myron C. Taylor,
Ambassador to the Holy See.

MEMORANDUM

In a recent issue of the Italian newspaper "Regime Fascista," it was stated that Mr. Myron Taylor had declared upon his return from Europe that he was convinced that a few bombardments of Italian cities would be sufficient to break Italian resistance and the confidence of the people.

Since the intention of the article was evidently that of attributing directly or indirectly to the Holy See, the present military operations against Italian cities, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, requested the Apostolic Delegate in Washington to furnish pertinent information regarding the alleged statement of Mr. Taylor.

After a conversation with Mr. Taylor, the Apostolic Delegate reported to the Holy See that the only statement made by Mr. Taylor on his return was contained in the following sentence: "They treated me with the utmost courtesy. The Pope is in good health and is most courageous." The same expression was used by Mr. Taylor at Lisbon, with an additional brief expression of praise for Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal. It was further reported to His Eminence Cardinal Maglione that the foregoing statement had been widely published in the American Press.

The Apostolic Delegate declared to the Holy See that Mr. Taylor is well known in America for his reticence in regard to confidential and official matters, and for his consistent refusals to discuss such matters with the representatives of the press.

Furthermore, His Eminence was informed that Mr. Taylor when questioned on the subject had firmly and completely denied the allegation, while at the same time not being greatly surprised by such fabrications. The Apostolic Delegate was able to report that Mr. Taylor had spoken about bombardment confidentially to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain and to the President of the United States, only inasmuch as this subject was contained in a plea of the Holy See for the immunity of the City of Rome from aerial attack, and for the purpose of recommending that petition.

November 19, 1942

STRICTLY PERSONAL MEMORANDUM
GIVING SUMMARY OF CONSIDERATIONS
EXPRESSED BY H.E. MONSIGNOR TARDINI
IN CONVERSATION WITH H.E. MR. MYRON C. TAYLOR
SEPTEMBER 26th, 1942.

1. There is no indication that any of the numerous churches closed to the faithful in past years have been re-opened, nor that high taxes, imposed for the exercise of public worship on those few churches which have remained open, have been reduced. Father Leopold Braun, Rector of the only Catholic Church in Moscow, writes: "There is talk of a re-opening (of the churches) but I have no certain proof."

2. Nor is there any indication that any priest, who is a Russian citizen, has been freed from prison or from the sentence of deportation to which he had been previously condemned.

According to latest available statistics it would seem that there are still approximately one hundred Catholic priests of the Archdiocese of Mohilew detained in prison or in concentration camps.

3. For more than a year now there has been no news of His Excellency Mons. Edward Profittlich, Titular Archbishop of Adrianopoli and Apostolic Administrator of Esthonia. Archbishop Profittlich, a citizen of Esthonia, was arrested at Tallinn June 28, 1941 and deported to the Urals, probably to Kasan.

4. Communists in Albania and Montenegro were recently found to be in possession of "instructions" from Moscow recommending that they "cultivate the division between the various religions and direct their attack particularly against the Catholicism."

5. Father Braun has pointed out that the organization of the militant Russian atheists ceased some time ago to be active and that, furthermore, official anti-religious publications are no longer printed; but he noted that copies of some such publications are still on sale.

Father Braun has also communicated that excerpts from Russian authors "inspired by lofty patriotic sentiments" have been broadcast from Moscow and in official newspapers (Pravda and Izvestia) certain references to religious practices have been published.

These few simple facts, like the content of the newspapers (which Father Braun has forwarded and which have been closely scrutinized) may be explained easily in the light of the circumstances of the present state of war, without supposing a change in the general program of Communism with regard to religion.

MEMORANDUM ON RUSSIA
BY H. E. MONSIGNOR TARDINI
PRESENTED TO MR. TAYLOR
SEPTEMBER 1941

- - - - -

1. There is no indication that any of the numerous churches closed to the faithful in past years have been reopened, nor that high taxes, imposed for the exercise of public worship on those few churches which have remained open, have been reduced. Father Leopold Braun, Rector of the only Catholic Church in Moscow, writes: "There is talk of a reopening (of the churches) but I have no certain proof."
2. Nor is there any indication that any priest, who is a Russian citizen, has been freed from prison or from the sentence of deportation to which he had been previously condemned.

According to latest available statistics it would seem that there are still approximately one hundred Catholic priests of the Archdiocese of Mohilew detained in prison or in concentration camps.

3. For more than a year now there has been no news of His Excellency Mons. Edward Profittlich, Titular Archbishop of Adrianopoli and Apostolic Administrator of Esthonia. Archbishop Profittlich, a citizen of Esthonia, was arrested at Tallinn June 28, 1941 and deported to the Urals, probably to Kasan.
4. Communists in Albania and Montenegro were recently found to be in possession of "instructions" from Moscow recommending that they "cultivate the division between the various religions and direct their attack particularly against the Catholicism."
5. Father Braun has pointed out that the organization of the militant Russian atheists ceased some time ago to be active and that, furthermore, official anti-religious publications are no longer printed; but he noted that copies of some such publications are still on sale.

Father Braun has also communicated that excerpts from Russian authors "inspired by lofty patriotic sentiments" have been broadcast from Moscow and in official newspapers (Pravda and Izvestia) certain

references to religious practices have been published.

These few simple facts, like the content of the newspapers (which Father Braun has forwarded and which have been closely scrutinized) may be explained easily in the light of the circumstances of the present state of war, without supposing a change in the general program of Communism with regard to religion.

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM OF MYRON TAYLOR
FOR DISCUSSION WITH HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS,
CARDINAL MAGLIONE, MONSIGNOR MONTINI AND
MONSIGNOR TARDINI
ON THE RUSSIAN POST-WAR POSITION
SEPTEMBER 1942

Early in the Russian campaign distinction was made, to accord with Christian principles, between the rights and well-being of the Russian people, and those mistaken theories of Government and the practices of the Government then in power.

It was not sought to divorce the Russian people from the enlightened benefits of and salvation through religion and its observances, but rather to hold out to the Russian people the promise of a better life, with real religious freedom.

That government and people are giving their lives and all they possess to fight the Hitler peril to their freedom.

Who shall say that, as an ally in a Cause so just, even the Russian Government itself may not yield to the influence of an association with Christian allies and the great moral force of their Cause and become a responsible and beneficent member of the family of peace-loving nations dedicated to the future prevention of war. Certainly, without Russian adherence to the United Nations Charter, and to those settlements which will be made at the end of hostilities, the future stability of Europe, and of the world, will be less certain of attainment.

It would seem logical, both from a moral as well as a practical standpoint, that the effort should be earnestly made to bring Russia more and more completely into a world family of nations, with identical aims and obligations.

The Russian Government's present intentions may be illustrated by its signature to the Atlantic Charter and its preamble, which, among other things, asserts adherence to the principle of Religious Freedom, and by its expressed attitude toward Poland, the Baltic and Balkan States, in the discussion of post-war settlements. We are led to believe that the field is open for collaboration - and generous compromise. This attitude, if encouraged and translated into reality, means much for the future security and welfare of the Baltic States, the Balkan States, and of Europe.

Great importance can likewise be attached to the value to Russia of a developed International organization to prevent Germany (Prussia particularly) from rearming and precipitating another war. This consideration is of very practical value, Russian economic self-containment considered. She is asked to surrender, in return for the advantage of security, only that she cease her ideological propaganda in other countries, and to make religion really free within her borders.

M A D R I D

MYRON TAYLOR'S VISIT WITH
AMBASSADOR AND MRS. CARLTON J. H. HAYES
IN MADRID, SEPTEMBER 28 - 30 1942
AS PREPARED BY AMBASSADOR HAYES

MYRON TAYLOR'S VISIT WITH
AMBASSADOR AND MRS. CARLTON J. H. HAYES
IN MADRID, SEPTEMBER 28 - 30 1942
AS PREPARED BY AMBASSADOR HAYES

Mr. Taylor arrived at the Madrid Airport in a commercial Italian plane from Rome, after a brief stop in Barcelona, at 3:30 p.m., Monday, September 28. He was greeted by the Apostolic Nuncio, the Counselor of our Embassy (Mr. Beaulac), and myself, and was then driven to the Embassy where he stopped during the next three days.

At 6 p.m., the officers of the Embassy and the American newspaper correspondents in Madrid met Mr. Taylor at an informal tea given by Mrs. Hayes, and in the evening, after dinner, I had a lengthy conversation with him about his mission in Vatican City and read the report on it which he had prepared for the President.

CONFERENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

On Tuesday I took Mr. Taylor to call on the new Foreign Minister, General Jordana, who received us most cordially and kept us in spirited conversation for a full hour -- from noon to one o'clock. The Minister began by expressing hope for an early termination of the war and establishment of a just peace, explaining that this was very much in Spain's interest. Mr. Taylor responded that he too was anxious for peace but that what stood in the way was Hitler and the Nazi regime in Germany and that until this stumbling-block was beaten down and destroyed the United States must and would prosecute the war, no matter how long it might last or what sacrifices it might entail. Mr. Taylor then sketched the organization and functions of the Commission set up within our State Department to study the problems of a future peace-settlement. Here General Jordana evinced the greatest interest and asked several questions, which, together with his general attitude, appeared to me to imply (though he did not commit himself in so many words) that he expected us to win the war and wondered what we would do with the ensuing peace. He spoke at some length and with emphasis of the "unrest" which prolongation of the war would intensify all over Europe, particularly in Spain, and he eventually made clear that what he most feared was stimulation of the "unrest" by Russia's association with the victorious coalition and its consequent ex-

exploitation in the cause of revolutionary Communism. Mr. Taylor frankly admitted the dangers inherent in the unsettled political and economic conditions which most likely would attend the concluding stages of the present worldwide conflict, but he went on to expound the theses that "Communism" cannot be overcome by war, that even if it went down in defeat in Russia it would crop up again wherever economic conditions were bad and unjust, that therefore it had to be dealt with primarily not as an international problem but as a national problem requiring for its solution the maintenance of order and at the same time the satisfaction of economic wants within each country, and that meanwhile Russia's association with the non-Communist democracies tends to abate her Communism and render it less dangerous, whereas otherwise it might become more fanatical and insidious. Mr. Taylor added that the United States would be able, he believed, to contribute to post-war security, and, by assisting in the feeding of Europe, to counteract a chief cause of social unrest and resultant "Communism." General Jordana observed that security was the great desideratum of Europe -- both internal and external -- and that Spain had now attained to a degree of security which he ardently hoped the United Nations would not disturb. Mr. Taylor said we had no thought of imposing our particular form of government on any foreign people, but we did look forward to building an effective league of nations to enforce peace -- a league which might evolve naturally out of the present practical cooperation of the United Nations against Hitler's pagan, bellicose and intolerant imperialism. Mr. Taylor cited the Atlantic Charter and assured General Jordana that the United States, like the Pope, is concerned with spiritual, not material, values and seeks no imperialistic ends or territorial gains. General Jordana, in conclusion, made a plea for Spain's participation in the eventual peace-settlement on the grounds of her great cultural heritage, her relationship with Hispanic America, her recent sufferings in the cause of "civilization," and her "just and very modest" claims to "certain historic revindications." When asked by Mr. Taylor what these last might be, the Foreign Minister said he would prefer not to specify them at the present time but we could be sure they were "few" and "just." The Foreign Minister requested Mr. Taylor to convey his highest regards and best wishes to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and yourself.

Afterwards, Mr. Taylor asked me what I imagined were the "revindications" to which General Jordana had referred. I told him I imagined they were Gibraltar, Tangier, and the Sale-Oran line in Morocco.

MISCELLANEOUS CONFERENCES

At one o'clock on the same day (Tuesday, September 29) I took Mr. Taylor to call on the Apostolic Nuncio in Madrid, Monsignor Gaetano Cicognani, who received us most cordially and chatted with us for half an hour.

At two o'clock Mr. Taylor lunched at the Embassy. Also present was Mr. Rives Childs, our Charge at Tangier, who had just arrived for a brief vacation in Spain and Portugal. As the result of subsequent conversations among Mr. Childs, Mr. Taylor, and myself, we found ourselves in substantial agreement that, in the event of an Allied landing in French Morocco and occupation of French North Africa, Spain would probably (though not certainly) remain neutral and might conceivably even resist German counter-moves into Spain if the Allies fully respected the neutrality of the Canaries, the Azores, and Madeira, and of Spanish Morocco as well as of the Peninsula, but that any attempt on our part to occupy the Canaries would be resisted and would lead most likely to the precipitation of Spain into the war against us.

On Tuesday evening I gave a dinner at the Embassy in Mr. Taylor's honor. It was attended by the Foreign Minister (his first public appearance since his appointment), the Under-Secretary Pan de Soraluce, the Introducer of Ambassadors Baron de las Torres, the Protocol Officer Maycas, the military aide of General Jordana, the Chilean Ambassador, the British Minister Arthur Yencken (Sir Samuel Hoare is still in England), the Irish Minister, and some twenty others. After dinner Mr. Taylor had a lengthy conversation with Sr. Pan de Soraluce, who was much impressed, while the Foreign Minister told me that he had been pondering what Mr. Taylor had said to him earlier in the day and that he wished within a week or two to pursue with me the subject of Russia and Communism.

On Wednesday morning (September 30) the Nuncio called on Mr. Taylor at the Embassy and talked confidentially with him for nearly an hour. Mr. Taylor told me it was an interesting and important talk and he was sure we could count on the cordial cooperation of the Nuncio and the Pope.

At 12:30 I drove Mr. Taylor to the Madrid Airport to see him off on a Spanish plane for Lisbon. At the airport, also to see him off, were the Nuncio and two representatives of the Foreign Office. Presently, however, a Spanish official informed us that, on account of the rain-soaked condition of the

landing field at Lisbon, the plane would not leave Madrid and that consequently Mr. Taylor would have to postpone his departure until Thursday.

Shortly after our return to the Embassy, I telephoned our Minister at Lisbon to tell him of the postponement of Mr. Taylor's arrival there, and Mr. Fish expressed surprise inasmuch as according to his latest advices the landing field at Lisbon was in good condition. Then came a telephone message from the Caudillo's secretary, that General Franco would be glad to have me bring Mr. Taylor to see him at the Pardo Palace at 5:30 that afternoon and that he would send a car to fetch us. Of course, I accepted.

CONFERENCE WITH THE SPANISH CHIEF OF STATE

Circumstantial evidence appears strong that the Generalissimo, in order to make sure of seeing Mr. Taylor, went to the length of ordering a day's postponement of the latter's scheduled departure from Spain.

Be that as it may, Mr. Taylor and I went out to the Pardo in an "official" car and were closeted with General Franco for an hour and twenty minutes -- from 5:30 to 6:50 p.m. The Caudillo looked, as usual, like a marionette, and managed in rather droll manner to alternate a natural bonhomie with an artificial and slightly ridiculous regal air. After an interchange of friendly greetings, and after Mr. Taylor had said a few words about all of us (Pope, Spain, United States, et cetera) being desirous of a just peace but unable to attain it so long as Hitler and his Nazi regime remained, the Caudillo launched into a series of lectures. In previous conversations I have had with him, he has asked questions and obviously expected me to do most of the talking. Now, however, he did most of the talking and left Mr. Taylor to ask a few questions.

The Caudillo began by remarking that Spain is an old country with an old civilization, while the United States is a new country with a new, and chiefly material, civilization. He then grew mystical and even incoherent about "spiritual values" and Spain's "devotion to spiritual values." Whence he plunged into his principal and most pretentious discourse (which, with only slight pauses, consumed a half hour) on The Menace of Communism. The burden of this was that Communism is the greatest menace to present and future Europe, that it emanates from Russia (which is an extremely barbarous and "Asiatic" country), that it has to be kept down by force, that Ger-

many is the Power which can keep it down by force, that the democracies by allying themselves with Russia are trying (vainly, it appears) to prevent Germany from fulfilling her mission, that there are two wars (not one) -- one in Europe against Russia and Communism, the second in the Pacific -- which are only incidentally related, that the United States should concentrate on the war in the Pacific and leave Europe to combine against Russia, that Hitler is a much misunderstood man, really a good man, a lover of peace, especially desirous of preserving England as a Great Power and intact -- "the Fuhrer told me so himself" -- and that an early peace is essential to Europe's preservation from the Menace of Communism.

I had the feeling throughout this disquisition that the Caudillo was showing himself a rather pitiful victim of cliches and slogans, of his own propaganda during the Spanish Civil War, and of an almost incredible naivete about Hitler. Mr. Taylor told me afterwards that he interpreted the speech as coming from a sinister man, a second Hitler, who thought only of military force and forceful imperialism, but that such an interpretation was probably faulty in the light of what Franco proceeded to say in response to specific queries.

Mr. Taylor asked him if he didn't think Communism primarily a domestic problem whose solution depended on the ability of each country to maintain order and remedy economic and social ills, regardless of whether Germany or Russia won the war. The Caudillo agreed and expatiated on current social reforms in Spain. He emphasized that he himself was a real social reformer.

Mr. Taylor asked him what he thought should be done with Russia. He said it should be driven back. To the Volga? Mr. Taylor asked. Well, hardly that far, replied the Caudillo -- he could not say how far.

What then, asked Mr. Taylor, should be the fate of the peoples between Russia and Germany -- Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, et cetera? At first the Caudillo intimated that they might be made dependent upon Germany though with "autonomy in local matters," but then, in answer to further questioning, he hedged and finally concluded that no Power, not even Germany, had any right to violate the principle of national self-determination and that no one nation had ever succeeded, through Europe's long history, in imposing its will permanently on others.

Mr. Taylor asked if the Caudillo really thought the United States was not involved in the European War when he recalled that Japan's outrageous attack upon us was followed almost immediately by declarations of war from both Germany and Italy. The Caudillo readily admitted that we had been attacked from both sides and had to defend ourselves against both, "as would any nation in like circumstances."

Mr. Taylor asked the Caudillo if when Hitler spoke about preserving England as a Great Power and intact, he had said "England" or "The British Empire." The Caudillo replied that Hitler had simply said "England."

Mr. Taylor after paying tribute to the Caudillo's military "genius", asked him if, as an expert on military matters, he would be willing to express an opinion on Germany's ability to put Russia out of the war this fall or winter. The Caudillo, obviously pleased by the compliment, replied that he did not see how Germany could possibly perform such a feat and that an Eastern Front would almost certainly continue throughout the winter and into next year.

Finally, the Caudillo expressed the hope that for the sake of Christian mercy and civilization, the Allies, as their air power increased, would refrain from bombing non-military objectives on the Continent, especially historic monuments and populous centres. He observed that anyway the British had twice as far to go for aerial bombarding as did the Germans, to which Mr. Taylor replied that the British and Americans had over twice the number of planes and bombs.

The Caudillo specially commissioned Mr. Taylor to convey his respectful greetings to President Roosevelt.

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Mr. Taylor left Madrid for Lisbon on Thursday, October 1, at one o'clock. Two representatives of the Foreign Office were again at the airport to say good-bye.

A FEW REFLECTIONS

1. While the Spanish press was permitted to publish accounts of Mr. Taylor's movements in Portugal and Italy and of his interviews with the Pope, it was not allowed to make any reference to his presence or activities in Spain. So far as Spaniards knew from their newspapers, he flew direct from Lisbon to Rome, and back from Rome to Lisbon.

Yet the censors, after some delay, permitted the local representatives of the AP and UP to transmit to America and Great Britain news-reports of Mr. Taylor's sojourn here, including his visits to the Foreign Minister and the Nuncio (though not to the Caudillo) and even the list of guests at the Embassy dinner in his honor.

The explanation of this anomaly, I believe, is to be found, in part in the chronic unreasonableness and bungling caution of censorship officials, and in part in a studied effort by the Foreign Office to avoid possible criticism and counter-representations by Axis diplomats and their ultra-Falangist Spanish sympathizers.

2. Despite the silence of the press, everybody in Spain seemed to know all about Mr. Taylor's visit and to be greatly interested in guessing its purpose. Some pro-Axis persons guessed it represented a confession of defeat or disillusionment on the part of the "Yanquis" and an overture for a negotiated peace. A much more common guess was that it aimed at detaching Italy from the Axis and making a separate peace with her. Many persons have characterized it as "sensational" and "boding no good to Germany." The very fact that the Spanish Foreign Minister and the Caudillo himself were so anxious to see Mr. Taylor is excellent evidence of the importance generally attached here to his mission.

To numerous questions asked me regarding the mission, especially by members of the diplomatic corps, I have replied that its main purpose was to exchange views informally about general features of a future peace-settlement and to make clear that any such peace-settlement could only be arrived at after the rout of the Axis and the overthrow of Hitler and his Nazi regime.

3. The Caudillo exhibited a third-rate mind, illogical, contradictory, uncritical, subject to flattery, and greatly influenced by the catchwords of German and anti-Communist propaganda. He brightens about a strictly military subject but lapses on other subjects into dimness and dullness. He obviously wanted us to listen to a speech which he had prepared, probably as early as 1939, as an official apologia for Spain's "non-belligerency" favorable to the Axis, and which he has recited so many times that he almost, if not wholly, believes it. It is a speech, moreover, which can serve the useful purpose of appeasing the Germans and letting us know that he is no "traitor" to old-time friends. For Franco has a reputation for honesty and personal honor which in his slow lumbering way he must maintain. And yet, in the following

"question-period", he made admissions that belied a good deal of his set speech and suggested that he is becoming uncertain of ultimate German victory and even of its desirability. I think he is floundering.

The Foreign Minister is different. He has a good (though not a brilliant) mind. He is clear, logical, and straightforward. Moreover, he is practical and looks ahead, with a fairly clear eye, to what Spain's position might be in case of Axis victory or in case of our victory. I feel reasonably sure that he expects our victory, though with some misgivings about its consequences. He wants to be assured that we will not encourage the reestablishment of a "Red" regime in Spain and that we will admit Spain to a share in the final peace-settlement. "Security" is Jordana's prime concern -- security internal and security external.

There has been much talk in Madrid since Jordana became Foreign Minister of his being Franco's man, a kind of efficient rubber-stamp for the directing Chief of State. There is no doubt that Jordana and Franco are intimate personal friends, with sincere mutual trust. But in the light of Mr. Taylor's conversations with them and of other personal observations of my own, I am disposed to think that Jordana will exert a greater influence on Franco than Franco will exert on Jordana, that Jordana has a policy which gradually the slow and cautious Franco will be brought to understand and follow. That policy, unless I am a very bad guesser, will involve a gradual (at first, hardly perceptible) shift of Spain from "non-belligerency" to correct neutrality and then on to diplomatic and moral alignment with the United Nations, provided, of course, that in the meantime the United Nations do not violate Spanish sovereignty or territory and can afford to be patient with Spain.

C.J.H.H.

Madrid, October 6, 1942.

DINNER GIVEN BY
AMBASSADOR AND MRS. CARLTON J. H. HAYES
AT THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR
MR. MYRON TAYLOR
September 29, 1942

His Excellency, Monsignor Gaetano Cicognani,
Apostolic Nuncio
Their Excellencies, The Foreign Minister and
Countess Jordana
Their Excellencies, The Ambassador of Chile
and Mrs. Figueroa
Their Excellencies, The Minister of Ireland and
Mrs. Kerney
Their Excellencies, The Minister of Great Britain
and Mrs. Yencken
The Most Illustrious Sr. Pan de Soraluze, Subsecretary
of Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Pan de
Soraluze
The Duchess of Lecera, (Spanish, very pro U.S.)
Mr. and Mrs. Milans del Bosch (His father was the
General who defended the Alcazar in
Toledo)
Mr. and Mrs. Tomas Maycas y de Meer, (Spanish
Protocol)
Mr. and Mrs. Willard Beaulac, Counselor of the
American Embassy
Mr. William Butterworth, First Secretary of the
American Embassy and Head of the U.S.C.C.
His Excellency, Baron de las Torres, Chief of Protocol
Monsignor Vagnozzi
Lt. Col. Carlos Rodriguez de Souza, Military Aide to
Foreign Minister, and Mrs. Rodriguez de Souza
Miss Frances Willis, Second Secretary of the American
Embassy
Mrs. Florence Wainwright, Custodian of the Embassy

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Personal and Confidential

Madrid, October 6, 1942.

My dear Mr. Taylor:

Mrs. Hayes and I are immensely appreciative of the visit you made us in Madrid. It cheered and informed us. We hope very much that your visits in Lisbon, London and Dublin were pleasant and satisfying, and that you have returned to America safe and sound.

Enclosed is a copy of the confidential report which I have sent to Mr. Sumner Welles concerning your doings in Madrid. I trust you will find my account of your interviews with Generals Jordana and Franco not too unfair to the participants or too free with the facts.

With the highest regards and personal best wishes, in which Mrs. Hayes shares, I am,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) CARLTON J. H. HAYES.

Enclosure:

1/ Copy of report,
as stated.

The Honorable
Myron Taylor,
Department of State,
Washington.

RCA RADIOGRAM

1942 NOV 9 PM 10:57

W175/SPK42 MADRID 35 9 20

NLT MYRON TAYLOR
SECSTATE WASHINGTON

Very happy to have your letters. Many thanks
for your interest and all you have done STOP
Our letters on way but clippers delayed.
Cordial greetings.

(Sd) CARLTON and EVELYN HAYES.

Personal and ~~Confidential~~.

M a d r i d.
November 13 1942

Dear Mr. Taylor:

I was delighted to have your letter and its reassuring news from Washington, and I am particularly appreciative of the great assistance you have been to us in helping to provide needful funds for the Madrid Embassy.

Your visit here, as I look back upon it now, marked something of a turning-point in Spain's foreign policy. From then until now, the Government has shown a constantly increasing desire to be on good terms with us, and especially during the past critical week of Allied military operations in French North Africa, its attitude has been very friendly and reassuring.

I am sorry there was such a protracted delay in the receipt by you and by the President of the report I prepared on your sojourn in Spain, including your conversations with General Jordana and the Caudillo. I prepared the report within a day or two of your departure from Madrid and put copies for you and the President in the pouch which left shortly afterwards for Lisbon and New York. Unfortunately, just at that moment a serious interruption in our courier service occurred, and then, for over two weeks longer, no clipper reached or left Lisbon. Hence at Lisbon the report reposed for an unconscionable period.

When eventually you did receive the report, I trust you found it fair and reasonably accurate. From a re-reading of it yesterday and in the light of events here since it was first written, I now think I may have been a little too hard on Franco and may have over-emphasized his "lecture" to us on Communism and the honesty of Hitler. At any rate, he now apparently sees eye-to-eye with Jordana, and Jordana gives every evidence of transforming Spanish foreign policy into one of at least real neutrality and probably of benevolent neutrality toward us. I have it pretty straight that he has issued positive instructions to all Spanish diplomatic agents in the New World that they are to refrain from any Falangist or pro-Axis activities and not in any respect to lend themselves to intrigue against the United States.

Moreover, Jordana has intimated to me, as well as to the Nuncio and the Portuguese Ambassador, that he expects the Caudillo to resist Axis violation, as well as any possible

United Nations violation, of Spanish neutrality, territory, or sovereignty. Of course, the Germans may decide to come into Spain anyway, and if they do, they may be able to seize strategic points by overwhelming force. I am reasonably sure, however, that if they so decide and so act, it will be against Spanish wishes and probably against serious Spanish resistance and that the onus, in Spanish public opinion, will be upon the Germans.

Which only confirms the President's--and Mr. Churchill's--wisdom in giving solemn guarantees to the Caudillo that the United Nations will leave Spain alone and not violate its territories, metropolitan, insular, or overseas. The Government is obviously pleased with the guarantees and has published them in every newspaper in the country; and yesterday I received from the Caudillo an intimate and most cordial letter of thanks which he has addressed to President Roosevelt and which contains these words: "I express my intention of avoiding anything which might disturb our relations in any of their aspects." I suspect the letter was composed by Jordana, but its signature--and obvious confirmation--is Franco's.

For weeks and months ahead, the situation here is bound to be tense, with Allied forces to the south and Axis forces to the north, and with aerial and submarine warfare very close to, if not actually within, the Peninsula's areas. The American Embassy at Madrid will have to be all eyes and ears--and, on occasion, many tongued.

Three things, in my opinion, will be helpful to us immediately and in the near future: (1) An enlargement of our economic program, with a view to supplying Spain liberally with wheat and other commodities which are needed here and whose importations from the United States would tend to gravitate Spain toward us and to lessen her "communist" obsession; (2) A brief visit by Nelson Rockefeller, with a view to coordinating our propaganda in Spain with that in Hispanic America and discussing means of reconciling "Hispanidad" with "Pan-Americanism;" and (3) An "inspired" editorial or feature-article in some responsible American journal which would actually (and properly) commend Spain and the Spanish Government for resisting Axis allurements and maintaining neutrality and which we could then use with telling effect over here.

You gave us great pleasure and benefit by your visit. Mrs. Hayes joins me in most cordial greetings.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) CARLTON J. H. HAYES.

P O R T U G A L

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION

BETWEEN

H.E. DR. ANTONIO DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR

PRIME MINISTER OF PORTUGAL

AND

MYRON TAYLOR

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES TO HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION
BETWEEN
H.E. DR. ANTONIO DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR,
PRIME MINISTER OF PORTUGAL
AND
MYRON TAYLOR
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES TO HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS XII

Accompanied by the American Minister, I called this afternoon on Dr. Salazar, the Portuguese Prime Minister. The following is a summary of our conversation, which lasted nearly two hours. Mr. Mallard acted as interpreter.

After an exchange of amenities, I referred to the books of Dr. Salazar which I had taken back with me after my last visit and said that they had been read by the President with much pleasure and appreciation of the clarity of the Prime Minister's views on economic and political questions.

I then referred to my last talk with Dr. Salazar a year ago when I had set forth the attitude of my Government toward certain world problems. We were not at that time actively engaged in the war; now we are. I would not take his time to go over the same ground now but would like to tell him of some of the preparations which my Government was making.

I said that I was not a man of war but a man of peace and my work in the Department of State had been in this field. The President had set up seven committees composed of distinguished experts in the subjects with which those committees were charged to examine. The committees were composed partly of Government officials and partly of experts on these subjects from private life. I wished to emphasize that they were studying the problems in the spirit of peace, not of war. I said that the American people are not naturally versed in foreign affairs; we are not internationalists by nature. I trusted that the work of the committees would be fruitful and that when the time for the Peace Conference is reached, my Government would have ready the necessary plans and information on which to take prompt and effective action to cope with the problems which will arise immediately on the cessation of hostilities.

I would mention only a few of the more important points which are being covered by these committees. The first point which we regard as absolutely essential is that order shall be established immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. This, I said, was one of the questions which preoccupied all the statesmen I had talked with during this trip, and my Government was fully conscious of its prime importance. Other points I mentioned to Dr. Salazar were the problems of bringing prompt relief to the suffering peoples of Europe, the flight and enforced migrations of vast populations in Europe and the question of territorial adjustments. On this latter point our guiding principle is that the countries which have been deprived of their independence by the invader shall be restored - not necessarily with exactly the same frontiers.

I referred to the question of Communism and the fear prevalent in Europe that the cessation of hostilities will lead to the immediate spread of this doctrine throughout the continent. I explained that I believed these fears to be greatly exaggerated. In my own country, in cases of dissatisfaction among laborers in the steel industry or automobile plants, for example, the community was inclined to describe this as Communism. Wherever there was want there would be dissatisfaction, but with adequate relief measures and the prompt establishment of an orderly system of control, I felt sure, we would be able to cope with this question.

Needless to say, all of these measures which we are planning to take are predicated on the assumption that the war will end in a complete defeat of Germany, of which the American people and Government are convinced.

I said that I had also conveyed the foregoing to His Holiness the Pope, to the Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione, and other important officials in the Vatican. I had had a most satisfactory visit with General Jordana, of whom I formed a very high opinion. He received my Government's views with cordial comprehension. I had also had the pleasure of an interview with General Franco whom I described as a soldier whose mind is focused on military events rather than on the problems of peace. Dr. Salazar's amusement at these observations seemed clearly to indicate that he shared my estimate of the General's mental processes.

As regards Russia, I said that I was conscious of a feeling in the Vatican and Madrid that the British Alliance with

Russia and our association as members of the United Nations was regarded askance in those capitals. I explained to Dr. Salazar that we regarded the Russian Government as a wayward child, and I was not convinced that that country would not prove to be a useful and beneficial factor in the post war world. I mentioned that a year ago when I was at the Vatican and met some of our delegates proceeding to Russia, I had counseled them to impress upon Mr. Stalin the necessity for permitting religious freedom in Russia and freedom in other respects. I pointed out to Dr. Salazar that this was specifically mentioned in the Atlantic Charter, of which the Soviet Government was a signatory.

As regards territorial changes, I did not attempt to do more than touch lightly on this intricate problem, but mentioned that with good will and the application of moral principles we could avoid many of the mistakes of the last peace.

I stated specifically that none of the statesmen with whom I had talked believed it possible that a country of 80 millions could control the hundreds of millions and the vast areas which are now under the occupation of Germany. The religious, racial and political problems involved were too vast. I asked the Prime Minister if he were familiar with Monsieur Briand's plan for a reorganized Europe and he replied that he was. I said that I felt that this plan would be too difficult. I thought, however, that if a means could be found to insulate Russia on the one hand, Germany on the other and give a sense of economic, political and military security to the Baltic States, Poland and the Central European countries, we might achieve a more durable peace. Economic and political councils would be necessary; customs barriers must not be allowed to stifle the economy of these countries. I did not, however, mean that there should be a United States of Europe but a system whereby Europe could be protected from the fear of Russia, Russia from the fear of Germany and the smaller countries from the fear of these two great powers.

I pointed out that the foregoing did not apply to our attitude toward the Pacific, that here our feelings were deeply aroused and, though it might seem unchristian to Dr. Salazar, we were determined to crush Japan. Here Dr. Salazar interposed to say that this depends upon the means at our disposal. I replied that we would deal with Japan in our own good time and, though I was no military expert, I thought we would finish with Europe first. We had now five million men under arms and by the end of next year we would have ten million.

In this relation I mentioned that the present steel production of the United States is now 85,000,000 tons a year as against 71,000,000 tons for the whole of the Axis and Axis controlled countries. Dr. Salazar at once asked with a smile why it is if our steel production is so enormous, we cannot spare a little for Portugal and I replied that we needed a good deal to shoot at the Japanese.

I recalled a reference made in our conversation a year ago to the difference between Hitlerism and Nazism. I said, as I remembered it, that Dr. Salazar had then made a distinction between the two. Dr. Salazar replied that the question arose in connection with the Atlantic Charter. This states in the preamble that the United Nations will not interfere with the internal regime of countries, while in the body of the Charter it is stated that Nazism must be crushed. Was this a contradiction or did he not understand this point? Was it only Hitlerism that we were determined to crush? I replied that we certainly did intend to crush Hitlerism and again referred to my inquiry regarding the possible distinction between the two.

Dr. Salazar said that this was very difficult to define. Nazism as a political and social philosophy was largely, but not altogether, the creation of Hitler. It had borrowed many features of Fascism and contained Socialism. Though the political philosophy of Portugal was remote from that of the Fascist and Nazi States, they had some points in common as they had with other European States. Hitler had added to these philosophies that of revenge, conquest, and hegemony. Dr. Salazar felt it was these international features of Nazism which were the preoccupation of other countries, not just the basic internal policy which, as he had pointed out, were shared to some extent by other States. Had Nazism been merely confined to the internal features of its philosophy, the feeling of antipathy for Nazism would not, he believed, have arisen. To be sure, there would always have been some criticism on materialistic or other grounds. Although Dr. Salazar did not make any statement to that effect, from the manner in which he referred to Hitler and his policy of revenge, conquest, and hegemony, he clearly conveyed the impression that this was wholly distasteful to him and I think it fair to interpret from the tone of Dr. Salazar's cautious remarks that he would be relieved to see the last of Hitler.

Dr. Salazar then said that when I was last here I had expressed the view that Germany might suffer a collapse and asked whether I still felt this was the case. I replied that the tremendous losses in men and material which Germany was suffering at the Russian front - and the most competent military advisers had assured me that the struggle would continue throughout the winter - might lead to the downfall of Hitler. His disappearance and that of the men surrounding him was essential to peace. Dr. Salazar replied that though this might be conceivable, he could not see any likelihood of a collapse in Germany in the near future.

Dr. Salazar added that all reports from Germany seemed to indicate that the German people themselves are sick of the war and are weighed down with acute consciousness that the series of victories in the last war had only culminated in Germany's ultimate defeat. To be sure the German army and the party members, buoyed up by German victories are still animated by a warlike spirit, but this is definitely not shared by the German people.

I mentioned that all Italians, excepting, of course, Mussolini, who is gambling everything on the war, were desperately anxious for peace. The food situation was serious, the Italians disliked the Germans before and loathed them now - a feeling which the Germans reciprocated - and they would give anything to be out of the war. Italians had come to me in a pitiable state some with tears in their eyes in the hope that I could bring them peace. Of course, I could do nothing. Dr. Salazar indicated that his information regarding Italy was similar. He said that the Italians were not a warlike people, they were artists, that this was the fourth war that Mussolini had led them into and of course they had no stomach for it. The Germans, he said, were a different breed. They were naturally a military people who regarded war as one of the highest of human expressions. He said this in an oratorical manner in such a way as to imply his contempt for such a philosophy.

I recalled Dr. Salazar's statement in my conversation of a year ago that he could not visualize the battleground for the decisive battle of the war. Did he still hold this view? Dr. Salazar replied that he had heard much talk of a second front. The British had made landings on the coast of Europe and had withdrawn. Most of Europe was occupied and defended, a word which

he used with some emphasis. Could a successful invasion be made on a large scale on the continent? It was not clear to him that this was feasible. At present, Britain's battle was on the sea where the struggle was being conducted with great intensity. To Great Britain, a maritime power, blockade was the major weapon. Conversely, Germany's military philosophy was the defense against the blockade and her strength was based primarily on her Army. Germany had occupied most of Europe as a defense against the blockade. Which strategy would be successful? Two important points occurred to him in this relation.

If Germany is able to organize and control vast resources from the countries she has occupied, and he mentioned Russia specifically, he felt that Germany could continue the struggle for a very long time. The second point, which was perhaps of equal weight, was the question whether Germany could establish an effective and direct link with Japan and thus tap the enormous resources of the Indies. He cited specifically the Dutch Indies. Alternatively, he thought in such an event, Germany could also continue the struggle for a very long time.

I asked what he thought, then, would be the end? He replied at once that there could be an arranged peace; the alternative was to fight on to the complete annihilation of the two sides in the struggle. Dr. Salazar said that Britain was laying great store on the efficacy of bombing German industry with British and American planes. Of course, if Britain was right and Germany's ability to arm is progressively reduced, then the United Nations might bring Germany to her knees. But what would happen if these calculations were not accurate?

Dr. Salazar then said that he was particularly gratified in my earlier statement that the Committees set up in Washington were working in an atmosphere of peace and not of war. He said he felt very strongly that men who make war are not suited to the task of making the peace. With considerable emphasis and even a touch of emotion, he said that he dreaded a peace bred of the bitterness of war and based on hatred and revenge. Making war was easier than making peace. In war one needed only armies and armament, which can always be found; but peace called for vision and understanding. I expressed a confident hope that Dr. Salazar would play a very important roll in the peace.

After thanking Dr. Salazar for his cordial reception, I asked him if there was any message which he might wish to send the President or the Secretary of State and he replied that he would be glad if I would convey his most respectful regards.

He was good enough to say that he hoped I would be returning soon again. I replied that if the war lasted that long, I might not be back for a year but, if there were an earlier peace, I would probably return.

As I was leaving, Dr. Salazar said, "Let us pray to God for an early peace."

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P O R T U G A L

BRIEF SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN
THE CARDINAL PATRIARCH OF PORTUGAL,
MR. MYRON TAYLOR, THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO HIS HOLINESS, THE POPE,
MR. BERT FISH, AMERICAN MINISTER TO PORTUGAL,
AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH RODRIGO,
AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE

OCTOBER 3 1942

BRIEF SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN
THE CARDINAL PATRIARCH OF PORTUGAL,
MR. MYRON TAYLOR, THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO HIS HOLINESS, THE POPE,
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AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE
October 3 1942

The President's Special Envoy to the Vatican, Mr. Myron Taylor, Mr. Bert Fish, American Minister to Portugal, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Rodrigo, American Military Attache, called on His Eminence, Dom Manuel Cerejeira, Cardinal Patriarch, at 4 o'clock p.m. on October 3, 1942. They were received in the Salon of the Nobility, and, after the exchange of greetings, the following is a brief digest of what transpired:

Ambassador Taylor referred to his great pleasure in having an opportunity to call on the Cardinal Patriarch and present to him a few details of his trip. He stated that he had had three conferences with His Holiness, the Pope, and had an extended talk with Cardinal Maglione as well as one or two other officials at the Vatican, all of whom were intimately known to His Eminence. Mr. Taylor also brought out the fact that on his return to Madrid General Franco had sent for him and he had had an extended talk with him in regard to the future peace. He pictured the Caudillo as a man of rather closed mind who was weighed down by the bogey of Bolshevism and its terrifying implications for Western Europe in case the Allies should win. Mr. Taylor also recited the fact that he had called on Count Jordana and found him to be a man of open mind and appreciative of the efforts which were being made. He also stated that he had called on the Papal Legate at Madrid and had discussed with him the various items of his trip. The Cardinal then replied that he appreciated Mr. Taylor's news relatory and understood the position and fears of General Franco, and had long ago been told of Franco's tendency to close his mind to many of the changes which were coming on. He stated, however, that the information which was reaching him from Spain indicated that Spain, more and more, was getting out from under the Axis influence.

Mr. Taylor then went on to state that while in the United States he had had many occasions to call on Archbishop Spellman, the Papal Nuncio in Washington and others,

and had discussed with these leading Catholics many of the problems which face all Christians during the present war. The Cardinal replied that he knew these people well and understood their views and sympathized with them. Mr. Taylor then went on to remark that his present mission was to present to His Holiness, the Pope, a Memorandum which had been drawn up in conjunction with the leading Catholics and clergy of America and which had been approved by the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary, Mr. Welles. He stated that while he had not shown this document to any of the people mentioned in Madrid, government or clergy, that he would be most pleased to have the Military Attache bring the one available copy which he had at his hotel for the perusal of His Eminence after the conference was terminated. This was to be treated by His Eminence as confidential. The Cardinal was delighted and stated that he would be most pleased and would treat it in the manner desired. (The document was brought to the Cardinal's house at 5:30 and he read it over in the presence of the M/A, returning it to the latter when he had finished).

General discussion was had in regard to the Christian aims of the United Nations and in regard to the ideals of the coming peace. Mr. Taylor explained to the Cardinal that the United States stood in a unique position in having no territorial ambitions or economic designs as ultimate aims after this present conflict. He stated that the United States was determined to win, and had geared its life and its production facilities along those lines. Discussion was also had of the position of Portugal to Western Europe, and here the Cardinal brought out the fact that while Portugal had tried to remain strictly neutral, it realized its responsibilities as the open door to Europe and the strong position which it occupied vis-a-vis Spain. He stated that it was the desire of Portugal to keep Spain neutral and on an even keel. The Cardinal then went on to explain that Portugal had suffered because its authoritarian form of government had been compared unfavorably as being the same as that of the Axis dictatorships. This was untrue because the aim of the Portuguese government was the eventual economic and spiritual improvement of the individual and not his enslavement. Mr. Taylor expressed the great admiration that he had for Dr. Salazar, and the Cardinal much appreciated such a sentiment. The subject of the Russian people and Communism was brought up and Mr. Taylor explained to the Cardinal that he, in turn, had spoken to His Holiness on these questions. He explained to His Holiness his thesis that in the Christian endeavor of the United Nations, the

subject of interest in regard to Russia was the Russian people and not their particular form of government. He explained that the Russian people were Christian people and should not be condemned for a form of government which was not in conformity with those of the western world. He also stated the Pope's recent Encyclical on the subject, specifically referred to the communistic form of government rather than the Russian people. The Cardinal was very much interested in this and appeared to understand and appreciate the distinction brought out.

Throughout the entire conference, it was apparent to the interpreter at all times the deep and bounding admiration that the Cardinal had for Ambassador Taylor. Repeated often was the message that Ambassador Taylor's moves have been watched not only with great interest but with the greatest hope, and had been the subject of prayers for his well-being and for the success of his various missions. At the time that Ambassador Taylor closed the conference and stated that he would be at the call of His Eminence through the American Minister in Lisbon, the Cardinal spoke the old Latin phrase, "Bless you, my son; my prayers go with you", and then stated to the interpreter to express to Mr. Taylor that the Cardinal's daily prayer would go with him on his return trip for the success of his mission and for his continued health so that he would be able to carry on and return for his next annual visit, or sooner.

WINANT REPORT

RE

MR. MYRON TAYLOR'S DISCUSSIONS WITH
PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

AND

FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN

AT LONDON

OCTOBER 5 1942

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMEMBASSY, LONDON
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON
DATED: DECEMBER 8, 1942, 8 p.m.
NUMBER: 6952

FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE:

Reference is made to your telegram no.6119 of December 3, 1942.

Ambassador Taylor requested me in the above message, which was addressed to me, to transmit to you a reply from my recollection of his conversation with the Prime Minister regarding bombing with as full a statement as possible of his request that Mr. Churchill issue a statement relating to the bombing of Rome and the bombing of non-combatant civilians.

At a dinner party on October 5 at which were present Mr. and Mrs. Churchill, their eldest and youngest daughters, Mr. Taylor and myself, these conversations took place; I being absent from the room during part of the conversation. As to what was said upon this occasion, I will be dependent upon my memory, as I made no notes of the matter at the time.

I felt that Mr. Taylor convinced Mr. Churchill of the genuine friendliness of the Vatican toward the United Nations' cause during the discussion of Mr. Taylor's visit to the Pope. It will be recalled by Mr. Taylor that he asked that the conversation be kept confidential, owing to the personal character of the information he brought from the Vatican. Mr. Taylor requested that Rome be excluded from bombing during this conversation with Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill replied that he felt unable to commit himself upon this subject. An endeavor to persuade Mr. Churchill to make a public statement limiting bombing to military objectives was then made by Mr. Taylor. The Prime Minister again seemed to feel that it was impossible for him to comply with this request. Night bombing he recognized does not lend itself to accurate bombing of military objectives only, the Prime Minister stated, and therefore he did not feel that a statement that night bombing would be confined to military objectives only would be an honest one. Furthermore, he could not issue an order for

the discontinuance of night bombing, Mr. Churchill said. I could not help thinking of General Sherman's statement that "war is hell" as I sat listening to Mr. Taylor and Mr. Churchill arguing with great sincerity and eloquence their two points of view.

WINANT.

MEMORANDUM OF THE STATE OF IRELAND
AS DISCUSSED BY
THE AMERICAN MINISTER, DAVID GRAY,
OCTOBER 11 1942

MEMORANDUM ON THE STATE OF IRELAND

NEUTRALITY

Under Mr. de Valera's leadership, Irish neutrality had become a synonym for Irish Independence. Notice has, in effect, been served on all political opponents of the Fianna Fail (de Valera) Party, now in power, that discussion of the advisability of neutrality is tantamount to treason. There has been no dissent on the part of the Opposition, except in the case of James M. Dillon, who resigned from his Party, the Fine Gael, on that issue and declared himself unreservedly in favor of joining the United States in arms. His utterances even in the Irish Dail are forbidden publication by the Censor.

Although all shades of political opposition, with the exception of Dillon, subscribe to the de Valera policy, there is evidently anxiety among the Fianna Fail leaders lest, in the event of general elections, discussion break out and the advisability of neutrality, both as a short-range and long-range policy be seriously questioned.

Operating as it does to handicap the common defense of the two Islands, the transport of supplies which maintain Irish economy, and to intrench German intelligence and Fifth Column agencies on Irish soil, the effect of Irish neutrality is overwhelmingly in the interest of the Axis Powers. This a great many of the more intelligent Irish people know to be a fact, which puts them on the defensive and troubles the conscience of more honorable minds, but, as long as only immediate advantage accrues from neutrality, it is probably true that the sentiment in favor of it is almost unanimous. Among the lunatic fringe of Irish Nationalism, it has become a fetish. They speak of being proud of Irish neutrality, of being ready to die for it, as if it were some heroic principle.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The effect of Mr. de Valera's protest against the presence of American Armed Forces in Northern Ireland has been twofold. It has tended to crystallize such anti-American sentiment as is inherent in the situation because of American aid to Britain, and has made him appear again as the champion of Irish Nationalism against British Imperialism, but, in strengthening his influence with his political Left, he has also embarrassed himself by encouraging I.R.A. activities both in the North and in Eire, which react against his own Government, for the I.R.A.

consider him the head of an illegal Government and a traitor to the cause of the Republic. In this strategy of using elements hostile to himself to strengthen his position generally, he has shown his old-time skill and astuteness, but the time may come when he will have to make a choice between our friendship and that policy of domestic politics which plays the game of the Axis.

There can be little doubt that the I.R.A. is being financed and in part directed by German agencies in Eire. The money needed for the recent activities in Northern Ireland can derive from no other source than Germany. The question that concerns us now is whether or not the agents directing these subversive efforts will consider the murder of American soldiers profitable from their point of view. The well-meaning but somewhat ill-balanced Cardinal Primate has recently played into the hands of the Germans by referring to American troops in Northern Ireland as overrunning the country against the will of the Irish Nation. This in the circumstances is tantamount to offering the sanction of the Church to I.R.A. groups who have already issued a manifesto, probably instigated, if not prepared, by German agency, declaring war on America, as well as Britain.

On the occasion of the execution of one Williams, who, in company with five other young men, murdered a Belfast policeman, a widespread agitation for reprieve was conducted with the approval of the Eire Government throughout the whole of Ireland. On my own responsibility, I protested very strongly to Mr. de Valera that his approval through the Censorship of publication of reports of reprieve agitation engendered dangerous anti-American and anti-British sentiment, the while the Censorship banned publication of any expression of sentiment calculated to incite anti-German feeling. I pointed out that this was not that benevolent neutrality which he had promised after Pearl Harbor. He answered naively, "We would be fools to permit anything to appear against the Germans." He also stated that while the Irish Government was in fact neutral, they were not neutral in feeling as long as the "enemy" (Britain) remained on their soil. I asked him if I could take this as an interpretation of Irish neutrality and he said, "Yes."

The effect of the authorization of this hysterical reprieve agitation culminated in large and general demonstrations throughout Eire during the hour at which Williams was executed. Thousands of people knelt in the streets and groups of I.R.A. or hoodlum sympathizers compelled the closing of all shops and the half-masting of flags. The police made no effort to prevent these disturbances until after the hour was over. The consequences of glorifying Williams as a patriot-hero was embarrassingly felt within the next few weeks by the assassination of

two Detective Officers of the Eire police. I am creditably informed that the Minister of Justice protested vigorously against the course which produced these results but was overruled by Mr. Aiken and Mr. de Valera.

Following these events, Archbishop MacRory, Cardinal Primate for All Ireland, in the course of remarks at the dedication of the new Cavan Cathedral on September 27, 1942, took occasion to refer to British and American soldiers as "overrunning our country without the consent of the Nation." On the 7th of October, I addressed him a letter calling attention to the probable consequences of his utterance on Irish-American friendship and requesting a meeting in order to seek for at the least a modus vivendi for the duration of the crisis. In spite of the attitude of the Eire Government and of the Cardinal Primate toward our troops, the Nationalist Catholics as individuals in the main receive them with friendliness. The danger is from Irish Republican Army groups under German direction.

IRISH CENSORSHIP

The nucleus of anti-American and anti-British influence in Eire is the censorship group controlled by Frank Aiken, Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures. The Censorship was originally inaugurated and consented to by the Opposition on the understanding that it was to have control over local news but only to prevent publication of what might compromise Irish neutrality. That is to say, it was designed to prevent publication of editorial opinion favorable to either of the combatants. In practice, this group, under Mr. Aiken, have not only prevented editorial utterance as to the merits of the combatants, but also much editorial comment unfavorable to the Government and put into effect a fantastic suppression and coloration of the daily news in the interest of the Axis Powers. Some of the details of this are unbelievable outside of a totalitarian state. The same anti-United Nations bias operates in the censorship of American films. I have recently received from a confidential source a mass of information bearing on this subject from Irish newspaper men. It indicates a strong pro-Axis influence.

The recent demonstration throughout Eire, glorifying Williams, the only one of the six I.R.A. youths who murdered a Catholic Belfast constabulary officer, as a patriot-hero, was encouraged and probably arranged by this group. Mr. de Valera refused to stop it. Whether German money or anti-British feeling is the dominating motivation in this activity, I cannot say. Both factors are probably responsible.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

The Irish economic situation had steadily deteriorated, but not as rapidly as I had anticipated. Roughly speaking, Eire still obtains about two-thirds of the imports which she formerly obtained, chiefly from Britain. Reduction of coal and petrol supplies has reduced gas and electric consumption to a minimum and has stopped private motoring, but the essential services still function on British bounty. The demand for labor, skilled or otherwise, in Britain has taken up the slack of Irish unemployment, and provided generously for dependent families. This will probably continue, though British supplies of coal, petrol, and raw materials for Irish manufacture will probably be reduced.

The wheat, barley, oats and potato harvest promised exceedingly well, although an April drought threatened both winter and spring wheat. In the north and south of Eire the wheat harvest was got in under reasonably favorable conditions, but in the midlands continued rain has damaged, if not ruined, a considerable proportion of the grain. A few weeks ago it was intimated that the wheat position was so favorable that unlimited white bread would shortly be announced, but the probability of this is now receding. Statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture have been so wide of the facts that little reliance can be placed upon them. They have been juggled for political purposes in the first place and have been computed from unreliable data in the second.

The consequences of an unwise maximum price arrangement for wheat, oats, barley, and pork products has reduced pig production to a point where the supply is at present insufficient for home consumption. I have been exploring the possibility of stimulating this supply for American dollar purchase, but have met with no practical encouragement. I have also explored the possibility of purchasing other foods and manufactures for our army. The Ministry of Supplies promises great things, but, upon examination, it appears that the supplies do not exist or that the manufacturers cannot be made without raw materials which we must furnish.

The British absorb Irish surplus cattle at a price not too profitable for the Irish farmer. But apparently they are unwilling to increase price levels in order to stimulate production. Through our Embassy in London, I have suggested that we take over the whole purchase of Irish food supplies for the duration of the emergency, in order that we might raise prices and impose an economy which would result in highly stimulated production

without creating a precedent embarrassing to Britain in her post-war resumption of the inter-island trade. Not unexpectedly, the British appear reluctant to assent to this, although a considerable saving of tonnage would probably result.


AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY TOWARD IRELAND:

It grows clearer as time passes that with regard to winning the war the single vital question is the importance of Irish bases and of Irish Fifth Column agencies operating on Eire soil. Our President appreciates this, but the British view is apparently confused. The Prime Minister I suspect sees the matter as does the President, but many of his Ministers hesitate to recognize Eire as a foreign power exercising a neutrality unfavorable to the war effort, and refusing to contribute to the common safety or even to contribute to the safety of the supplies which she receives. Pro-Irish elements in America tend to obscure the issue with us also. Mr. de Valera very astutely plays on this confusion and steals his free ride. My own recommendation is that for the present we should at least encourage the reiterated publication of the basic facts of this situation. They will not be allowed to reach the Irish people, but they probably will exert influence through Irish-American circles.

It must be remembered that, in spite of the unfriendly and sometimes unneutral attitude of the Irish Government, there is great personal good-will both toward the British and ourselves. There is also friendly cooperation on such matters as air communications and trade interchanges. But these happy contacts appear to be utterly without political influence. It is apparent that Mr. de Valera rests his political power on the anti-British feeling of his Left and intends at all costs not to let its emotional support die down.

D. G.

Dublin, October 10, 1942.



OPINIONS

There is a growing fear on the part of those in Italy who would welcome the disappearance of Fascism that without a foreign military power on the spot here ready to maintain order, the transition period would be one of complete chaos and therefore more undesirable than the present situation. This would suggest that with the Germans already occupying the country, the anti-Fascists are beginning to look to them for protection in the event of an internal revolution. Since it is likely that this tendency will become more rather than less pronounced with the passing of time, it is urgent that the Anglo-Saxon countries convince their anti-Fascist friends in Italy that they are capable of handling any revolutionary situation that may arise.

Even though the great majority of French people detest the Germans, the growth of a somewhat similar feeling is said to be perceptible in France. In other words, large sections of the French population would prefer to have the Germans remain on in France in order to maintain order rather than experience chaos without them. Here again some tranquilizing indication from the Anglo-Saxon powers is urgently needed. Time is not working for us either in Italy or in France.

The Yugoslav Counsellor of Legation, who is violently anti-Italian, made the statement that "the Italians would follow Mussolini to the last man." By that he meant that as long as the Duce offered them any prospect of victory i.e. loot, they would want him as their leader. The Italian people are not yet sufficiently mature politically to rise up and overthrow a dictator for ideological reasons.

(Memorandum from Count Dalla Torre, director of the Osservatore Romano, Vatican City.)

The anti-fascist opposition consists of our groups:

I. Politicians (former Secretaries of State, Members of Parliament, Senators; (a) Liberals; (b) Popolari (Christian Democrats); (c) Social reformers (like Bonomi, former President of Cabinet Council); (d) Socialists.

II. Generals, like Badoglio, Caviglia.

III. Writers, professors, members of liberal or Catholic aristocracy, like Prince Doria-Panfilii; Duca T. Gallarati Scotti, Conte Visconti Venesta, Conte Iacini Stefano, Conte Casati, Alberto Albertini, B. Croce, De Ruggero, Calogero, Parri, Calamandrei, Carneluti, Salvatorelli, Brecchi, Galletti, La Pira. Some of these are in prison, like Calogero and Parri.

IV. Communists. It is very difficult to estimate the real forces of the Communist Party; their chiefs and organizers are confined on the island of Ventotene, near Ponza (population, about 2,000), whence they keep in touch secretly with their partisans. Many infiltrations are noted in the war factories.

After the breakdown of fascism, the constitution of a stable Government, based on the solidarity of I a,b,c and perhaps d, II and III with the cooperation of the American emigrants (like Sforza and Sturzo) is possible, on condition that this Government is able to save money and to preserve Italy from essential mutilations. Such a Government will certainly find the support of the members of the very strong Catholic Associations, of the Liberal intellectual youth, of the bureaucracy and of many business men. However, the manifestation of Montivedeo and the nomination of Pacciardi to be Chief of the Italian Legion (Pacciardi was already a member of the Partito Repubblicano Italiano) caused in the quarters of the opposition some perplexity. The politicians sub I and III are not all and not unconditionally for the monarchy, but many consider an intervention of the dynasty would facilitate the solution of the crisis (traditions of the carabinieri) and avoid the advent of Communists. Every effort must be made - they say - to

win over the Prince and it is reported that the Princess Mary seeks to get into contact with the aristocrats of the opposition.

Concerning the future chief of the government, it is true, that the dictatorship blocked the way to the development of great personalities, but there are still former presidents of Cabinet Council and leaders of former parties or generals who have the qualities and capacity to preside at least for a first period over the united forces of anti-fascism.

October 3, 1942

AIDE MEMOIRE

Reliable information has reached London and has been published by the B.B.C. to the effect that the Axis authorities in Greece are robbing the starving population of the entire harvest of corn, grapes, olives and currants; even vegetables, fish, milk and butter are being seized.

During the week of September 9th to 15th there was a strike in the Athens and Piraeus district as a protest against the seizure of the harvest. As a result there were a number of executions, 800 arrests and 380 deportations, largely among mine-workers.

It is estimated that last winter about 500,000 Greeks died of starvation. Regular shipments of wheat are now being brought from Canada in Swedish ships to relieve the desperate conditions prevailing. But with the seizure by the Axis of this year's harvest and of all kinds of food products, the situation is likely to be equally desperate during the coming winter and, as a result of the weakness of the population after a year of starvation, mortality even higher.

But it may be that the Axis Powers welcome the decimation of the Greek people on the grounds that it will provide living space for their own nationals.

Italy is the Occupying Power and Italy is responsible for the proper feeding of the Greek people. The death of half a million Greeks last winter, out of a pre-war population of about seven millions, is the best comment on the fulfillment of this duty and responsibility.

After the war the story of Greece will be an indelible blot on the good name of Italy, at any rate of Fascist

Italy. First the perfidiously planned and executed aggression; its failure in the face of the heroic Greek defense; the rescue by the German armies after the loss of thousands of young Italian lives owing to the culpable negligence and incompetence of the Italian military authorities; the joint occupation of Greece in the name, and on the responsibility, of Italy; the denuding of the country by the Germans by a system of mixed extortion and pillage; the ensuing famine and death of half a million Greeks; the exploitation of the black market and the capitalization of starvation by Axis officials and officers; and now the seizure of this year's harvest, with the resulting almost certain condemnation to death by starvation of many hundreds of thousands more Greeks.

The fate of Greece is also a striking illustration and warning of the Nazi New Order in Europe for which Italians are fighting and from which they themselves are suffering.

His Excellency the Minister of Lithuania to the Holy See has requested that the Secretary of State of His Holiness inform His Excellency Myron C. Taylor of the lively fears felt in his country in regard to the question of national independence, by reason of the fact that the attitude and statements of Official Soviet circles would lead one to understand that the Government of the U.S.S.R. persists in its plans to reoccupy Lithuania at the opportune moment.

The Lithuanian Minister has also expressed the hope that the Government of the United States may exert its influence in order that Lithuania may be freed of all foreign occupation and that its independence may be guaranteed.

September 2, 1942 .

SEGRETERIA DI STATO
Di Sua Santità

No. 55580

Da Citarsi Nella Risposta

DAL VATICANO, September 26 1942

The Secretariat of State takes the liberty to inform His Excellency Mr. Myron Taylor, Personal Representative of the President of the United States of America, of the contents of a note received from the Lithuanian Legation to the Holy See.

Some time ago, His Excellency the Apostolic Delegate in Washington was directed by the Secretariat of State to make representations to the Government of the United States with a view to obtaining permission for the payment of the expenses of the Lithuanian Legation to the Holy See from Lithuanian funds now blocked in the United States. The Legation would now request that His Excellency Ambassador Taylor be so kind as to lend his authority and support to this proposal. It is pointed out that certain other Lithuanian Legations and Consulates have already been favored in this way by the Government of the United States.

Translation of Letter from M. Lozoraitis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rome, September 25 1942

Mr. Ambassador:

The attitude which the United States has adopted towards Lithuania, victim of two aggressions, and towards other oppressed nations, as well as the high role which Your Excellency plays in President Roosevelt's policy, prompt me to take the liberty of drawing your attention upon a fact which gives the situation in which my country finds itself a particularly tragic character.

As is known, the Soviet Union does not cease making efforts to gain international recognition of the situation which it created in Lithuania following the aggression and military occupation of the country by the Red Army in June, 1940. I do not need to recall that what confronted us was a military conquest pure and simple, that the Moscow Government tried to conceal the truth by falsifying the will of the Lithuanian people by electoral manipulations effected in a regime of occupation and of terror, as well as by the elimination of any legal guaranty. Nevertheless, the true will of the Lithuanian people was manifested in a general insurrection against the Bolsheviks on June 22-24, 1941, which cost them 4,000 dead and 8,000 wounded, but which ended in the restoration of independence and the reestablishment of the National Government before the German troops arrived. A few weeks later this Government was appressed, this time by the German occupation authorities.

The aims of the Soviet Union directed against the independence of Lithuania are dictated by the plan to establish a common frontier with Germany with a view to reaching, after the defeat of the latter, a super-Rapallo conclusion, the consequences of which for the future of Europe are easy to foresee. It is clear, furthermore, that the claims which the Moscow Government advances towards this end on the subject of

Lithuania lack any moral or juridical basis, as much today when the Soviet Union is constrained to take sides with the United Nations and to adhere to the declarations of the Atlantic Charter, as in the past when the U.S.S.R. deemed it useful to collaborate with the Reich against the same United Nations and to accept the principles of German policy.

The Soviet Union can plead only one circumstance in support of her claims, namely, the occupation of Lithuania by the Red Army--an occupation begun by the introduction of Soviet garrisons in October, 1939, and completed in June, 1940.

Now, that occupation--and here I come to the tragic aspect of the situation of Lithuania--was brought about solely by the fact that the Lithuanian Government, in September, 1940, refused to accept the proposals of the Government of the Reich to undertake, in accord with it, military operations against Poland, Great Britain's ally, and to agree to enter into a German sphere of influence.

Indeed, these proposals from the Foreign Minister of the Reich had been transmitted to the Lithuanian Minister in Berlin, M. Skirpa, by Dr. Kleist, member of "von Ribbentrop's office" (Party office for Foreign Affairs), in the course of three visits which he made between September 8 and 14, 1939. Although the Lithuanian Government had replied to these demarches by the confirmation of its firm decision to maintain its neutrality, the German Government had continued to exercise pressure on Lithuania in order to oblige it to accede to its demands. Two days after the aggression by the Soviet Union against Poland, the pressure was increased, and this time it was the Minister for Foreign Affairs who took matters into his own hands. On September 19, the Lithuanian Minister was summoned by von Ribbentrop, who confirmed to him the proposals made in his name by Dr. Kleist. On September 21, M. Skirpa was summoned to the High Command at Zoppot, where von Ribbentrop, after having set forth the necessity of establishing spheres of influence for Germany and for the Soviet Union, and having announced his imminent trip to Moscow for the purpose of dividing these spheres, stated that the Reich considered Lithuania as belonging to its sphere. Von Ribbentrop concluded by expressing a desire to see M.

Urbsys, Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Berlin in order to come to an agreement on the matter. In reply, the Lithuanian Cabinet reaffirmed once more Lithuania's strict neutrality, and, upon this, the German Minister at Kaunas said that, under these conditions, there was no longer any purpose in M. Urbsys' trip to Berlin. On September 27th, von Ribbentrop went to Moscow to sign the treaty concerning the demarcation of spheres, as well as a declaration in which the German Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. as well attributed to Great Britain and France the responsibility for the continuation of the war. A week later, Stalin was already talking to M. Urbsys of spheres of influence and delivered to him an ultimatum imposing Soviet garrisons on Lithuania.

Under these conditions, it must be admitted that Soviet claims, at bottom, tend to create a situation in which Lithuania, who refused to act manu militari against Poland, Great Britain's ally, would be condemned to death, while the Soviet Union, which had committed the aggression against this same Poland, would receive a prize. I speak of condemnation to death, for, after the experiment of twelve months of Soviet occupation there can be no doubt that the return of the Bolsheviks to Lithuania would mean the physical death of the entire Lithuanian people.

Now, I am firmly convinced that a really new Europe can never be reduced to a level where such injustices would be possible. I believe, furthermore, in the noble mission of the United States in the reconstruction of international order—a mission which has found expression in the Atlantic Charter.

It is in this order of ideas and with the intention of serving the cause of the independence of my country, which rejects the eventuality of foreign domination from whatever quarter, that I have permitted myself to inform Your Excellency, without having the honor of knowing you personally, of the events which preceded and caused the occupation of Lithuania. Moreover, I like to believe that the Department of State is acquainted with the policy which I followed as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Lithuania during 1934-1938, that is to say, at the

time when Lithuania was alone in facing the German threat which later upset the whole world.

In view of the place and exceptional circumstances in which I address these words to Your Excellency, I have the honor to request that you kindly consider the present letter as confidential.

I beg you to accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my highest consideration.

Stasys Lozoraitis
Formerly Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Lithuania

Vatican City, September 26, 1942

My dear Cardinal Maglione:

I have the honor to bring to the attention of Your Eminence the following memorandum which has been received from my Government:

"The following was received from the Geneva Office of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in a letter dated August 30th, 1942. That office received the report from two reliable eye-witnesses (Aryans), one of whom came on August 14th from Poland.

"(1) Liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto is taking place. Without any distinction all Jews, irrespective of age or sex, are being removed from the Ghetto in groups and shot. Their corpses are utilized for making fats and their bones for the manufacture of fertilizer. Corpses are even being exhumed for these purposes.

"(2) These mass executions take place, not in Warsaw, but in especially prepared camps for the purpose, one of which is stated to be in Belzek. About 50,000 Jews have been executed in Lemberg itself on the spot during the past month. According to another report, 100,000 have been massacred in Warsaw. There is not one Jew left in the entire district east of Poland, including occupied Russia. It is also reported, in this connection, that the entire non-Jewish population of Sebastopol was murdered. So as not to attract the attention of foreign countries, the butchering of the Jewish population in Poland was not done at one single time.

"(3) Jews deported from Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, and Slovakia are sent to be butchered, while Aryans deported to the East from Holland and France are genuinely used for work.

"(4) Inasmuch as butcherings of this kind would attract great attention in the west, they must first of all deport them to the East, where less opportunity is afforded to outsiders of knowing what is going on. During the last few weeks a large part of the Jewish popula-

tion deported to Lithuania and Lublin has already been executed. That is probably the reason why the deportees were not permitted to have correspondence with any one. A great number of the German refugees were taken to Theresienstadt. This place, however, is only an interim station and the people there await the same fate.

"(5) Arrangements are made for new deportations as soon as space is made by executions. Caravans of such deportees being transported in cattle cars are often seen. There are about forty people in each cattle car. It is especially significant to note that Lithuanian non-Jews are entrusted with fetching the candidates from the death Ghetto in Warsaw.

"(6) It is a tragedy that the Polish population is being incited by the Germans against the Jews and the relationship between the Poles and the Jews has been aggravated to the last degree. In Lemberg this is particularly true."

I should much appreciate it if Your Eminence could inform me whether the Vatican has any information that would tend to confirm the reports contained in this memorandum. If so, I should like to know whether the Holy Father has any suggestions as to any practical manner in which the forces of civilized public opinion could be utilized in order to prevent a continuation of these barbarities.

I avail myself of this occasion to express to Your Eminence the assurance of my highest consideration.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 21 1942

My dear Mr. Taylor:

A telegram dated October 10 has just been received from Harold Tittmann. It reports that the Holy See replied on that date to your letter concerning the plight of Jews in Poland. The reply was an informal unsigned statement which was handed to Mr. Tittmann by Cardinal Maglione. In thanking you for bringing the matter to the attention of the Vatican, the statement admits that reports of severe measures taken against Jews have also reached it from other sources. Up to the present time, however, it has not been possible to verify their accuracy. Every opportunity is being taken by the Holy See, however, to mitigate the suffering of these unfortunate people:

Mr. Tittmann regrets that the Holy See was not more helpful but he received the impression from the Cardinal Secretary of State that the Vatican had no practical suggestions to make. Mr. Tittmann is of the opinion that the belief exists in Vatican City that there is little hope of restraining Nazi barbarities except through sheer physical force coming from without.

Sincerely yours,

(Sd) SUMNER WELLES.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

NOTES HANDED TO MR. TITTMANN ON OCTOBER 2, 1942
BY M. PAPEE, POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE HOLY SEE.
- - - - -

There will be, after the German defeat, three remaining forces in Germany; what is left of the Prussian army, the Communist Party and the Catholic Church. The Prussian army will be always the protagonist of the same idea: Great Germany ruling Europe and - through Europe - the world. The Communists will make - after the Nazi defeat - their great gamble with the object of achieving power in Germany and of undoing the defeat by means of an alliance with Soviet Russia. It would be a very delicate and dangerous moment. We should never forget that Soviet Russia fights only Nazi Germany: A Communist Germany would be on the contrary the most valuable ally in reaching world domination and revolution. With one move Soviet Russia would be the master of the Continent - from the Caspian to the Atlantic. It could exclude - as the Nazis did - the Allies from the European Continent. It would become the most powerful element at the Peace Conference with Communistic propaganda installed in the heart of Europe. To avoid this the Allies should never allow Soviet Russia to occupy any European country; Soviet Russian troops and administration should never be allowed to rule vanquished Germany. There would be no doubt about the result. Only military detachments under allied administration and control should be used. The main force of the Soviet Russian troops should remain along the old Polish-Lithuanian frontier.

The third remaining force in Germany after Nazi defeat would be the Catholic Church. It is the only positive one. We should strengthen her situation and furnish her with forces that would attract. Her role could be not only moral, but also political.

To weaken the German army's remaining structure and ideology the Allies will be obliged to weaken Prussia itself. There is only one way of doing this: to cut from Prussia the two springboards of her potential onslaughts against Eastern Europe: East Prussia and Upper Silesia. In this case Berlin can no longer remain the capital of Germany. It is too near the frontier. The Capital will have to be moved towards the center of Germany: Prussianism will receive a mortal blow. It would be opportune

to facilitate this by good treatment of Western and Southern Germany, after having secured the line of the Rhine, i.e. the Catholic part of Germany. It may be possible to unite Austria, Bavaria, and the southwestern Catholic provinces, making use of their antagonism for the North and East of Germany and of their common religion.

In the long run there is only one way of assuring lasting peace in Europe: it is to prevent any future collusion between Germany and Soviet Russia. To prevent this, the Allies should create a strong confederation of all centripetal states of the region between Germany and Soviet Russia. They all fear either Germany or Russia, or both. They can form a very strong union of states supporting each other against any exterior danger. They ought to be strong enough to be confident of their future and to be able to resist. This bloc of 85 millions of people - more than Germany possesses - would be a strong unit and a powerful ally for the Western Democracies.

October 3, 1942

AIDE MEMOIRE

I understand that Pavelic is likely to visit Rome shortly and it may well be that he will ask for an audience with the Pope.

His reception in 1941 by His Holiness caused a very bad impression in official and unofficial circles in England where he is regarded as a regicide, or at any rate as the organizer of regicide.

Since then the Croatian regime over which he presides and his Ustachi have been responsible for the murder of some 600,000 Serbs and at the present moment his troops are destroying Serbian villages in Bosnia and exterminating the Serbian population.

Consequently his reception by the Pope, whether as a private person and a Catholic, as last time, or as head of the present Croatian regime, will undoubtedly arouse strong and adverse criticism in Great Britain.

Vatican City, October 13, 1942

Memorandum

Mr. Ernesto Gaviria, Charge d'Affaires of Colombia, and Mr. Arturo Borrero Bustamante, Charge d'Affaires of Ecuador, both residing in the Vatican City, have not succeeded in receiving funds from their Governments for a number of months.

Before the money stopped coming, they were receiving their salaries in Swiss francs (proceeds of dollars on deposit in New York) placed at their disposal by the Colombian and Ecuadorian representatives in Switzerland.

Messrs. Gaviria and Borrero ask that payments be resumed to them through the same channels as before, but if, they say, our Treasury should find it easier to release dollars for the purchase of Portuguese currency in Lisbon, instead of Swiss francs, this would also be agreeable to them.

Messrs. Gaviria and Borrero state that payments to them would amount to approximately \$600 per month each.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vatican City, October 13, 1942

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Mr. Ernesto Gaviria, the Charge d'Affaires of Colombia, and Mr. Arturo Borrero Bustamante, the Charge d'Affaires of Ecuador, both of whom you met at our reception in Santa Marta, have come to me with their financial troubles.

I understand that Gaviria has been without funds from the Colombian Government for three months now and that Borrero is even worse off, not having received anything from the Ecuadorian Government for over five months. It is very natural that both of them should be embarrassed by this predicament, and I am told that the latter was obliged to borrow from his friends in order to meet his expenses when he moved into the Vatican City several weeks ago.

Up until a few months after we entered the war both these gentlemen were receiving regularly their funds in Swiss francs through the Colombian and Ecuadorian representatives in Switzerland from dollar funds on deposit in New York. Then the money stopped coming. They are inclined to attribute the trouble to the regulations of our Treasury regarding the release of dollar funds for payments abroad. They also suspect that our Treasury might be willing to release the dollar funds if they agreed to be paid in lire through the Vatican, but for obvious reasons they would prefer to continue to be paid as before, that is, through Switzerland. They say that if it would be more convenient for our Treasury to transfer the dollars into Portuguese currency that would also be satisfactory to them.

If possible, I should like very much to help these very agreeable Latin American colleagues of mine. I, therefore, am venturing to ask you to turn the matter over to someone who you believe might be

helpful and understanding. The monthly sum that each was receiving is not large--in the neighborhood of \$600, I believe, and I see no political reason why their wishes should not be met. I attach a short memorandum for ready reference.

Would you mind having some sort of reply telegraphed to me after the necessary investigation has been made and a decision come to one way or the other?

Sincerely yours,

(Sd) HAROLD H. TITTMANN.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
Department of State,
Washington.

Lisbon, October 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Taylor:

In response to your request, I am submitting the following observations with respect to religion in Russia and its relation to the present situation.

These are my own personal views. I do not know to what extent they coincide with those of my colleagues in the Department of State, whose information is more up-to-date and whose opinions should bear more authority.

The conditions under which the early Communists fought their way to power in Russia made it necessary for them to claim the full spiritual devotion of their own followers. This caused them to see in the Church not only a stronghold of conservative feeling and therefore a political opponent, but also a spiritual rival.

As a result of this, they entered into power in violent opposition to the Russian Orthodox Church. In the course of a few years they were entirely successful in smashing the Church's economic position, its organization, the independence of its leadership, and - to a very great extent, its spiritual authority, particularly among the youth of the country.

The outwardly moderate provisions of the Soviet Constitution, which was promulgated some six years ago, have been rendered largely ineffective by the restrictions placed on religious education and by the predominant role played in the Soviet system by the Russian Communist Party and the Communistic League of Youth, with their subsidiary organizations. Participation in these organizations remained practically irreconcilable with the public profession of religion; and without participation in such organizations the individual had very few chances of advancing his own interests in any field of Soviet life.

In addition to its open opposition to the Christian Church, the regime did all in its power to build Communist ideology into something like a competing religious life in its own right, with similar requirements of spiritual devotion and even of public profession in ceremony and symbol.

That this latter effort could not be successful--that Christian faith could not be adequately replaced by a materialistic economic doctrine which had no answers to the problems of suffering and death--is obvious to all of us who have been brought up in a Christian atmosphere.

When, consequently, the Germans began to occupy large portions of Soviet territory, they found a genuine hunger for religious experience in large parts of the Russian population. The Nazis have been exploiting this situation for their own purposes with characteristic cynicism and, I am afraid, with some success. While they have been careful not to give the religious element in Germany any indirect support by permitting them to take part in the restoration of religion in the occupied areas of Russia, they themselves claim to have reopened churches on a large scale and to have encouraged a "great resurgence" of religious life among the people. Reports from German correspondents in the East to the Nazi-controlled newspapers in Germany last winter described striking manifestations of religious enthusiasm in the occupied territories, which - if not actually encouraged - were certainly not being opposed by the German authorities. It was said that in the city of Pskov, for example, where there had been some 40 active churches in 1918, the Germans found no priests left in the city at all, but that they promptly imported two priests from the Russian Orthodox Church in Riga to take charge of religious life, that the great Cathedral was reopened in time for the Russian Christmas in January, and that on Christmas Eve not only was the Cathedral packed with worshippers but that thousands of people stood in the square outside in 30 degrees of frost to participate in the service. Other stories are told of how untrained laymen, in some cases even old women, conducted services informally in railway stations and other premises at their disposal, and how people flocked to these meetings. These tales, however much truth there may be in them, are naturally not without their effect on the religious populations of the other eastern European countries. They doubtless tend to increase the horror with which these people view the prospect of Russian occupation after the war, and to reconcile them to the hardships of German rule at the moment.

It should, in these circumstances, be evident to anyone that a greater real tolerance of religious life in Soviet controlled territories would be in the interests of the Soviet Government itself, both now and in the future. Possibly, an appreciation of this fact is already present in the minds of the Soviet leaders, and is finding expression in the reported present relaxation in their hostility toward religion.

Undoubtedly when this war is over, understanding and cooperation in the religious field would present one of the best means of bridging the psychological gulf which two decades of Communist education and intellectual isolation have created between the present mature generation of Russia and the countries of the outside world.

It would be idle, however, to underestimate the difficulties of achieving such cooperation and understanding. It would be possible only if it could be proved to the Soviet leaders that religion need no longer constitute a challenge to their political authority. Of this they will not be easily convinced. They are extremely suspicious of all suggestions from foreign quarters, and fearful--as Russian rulers have always been--of foreign influence of any sort on the Russian popular mind. Just as in the 15th and 16th centuries the Czars of Russia fought Roman religious influence, not so much out of convictions of dogma as out of fear of foreign influence on a backward and credulous people, so the present rulers tend to feel that any foreign influence, religious or otherwise, challenges the security of their rule.

If these preoccupations could be overcome and if the Kremlin could be induced to tolerate religion at home and to receive the proffered cooperation of western religious movements in the spirit of friendliness and confidence, I believe one of the greatest barriers to a sound future peace would have been removed.

(Signed) GEORGE KENNAN:

MEMORANDUM ON RUSSIA

Even today, we frequently find the opinion still expressed that Bolshevism is an experiment which, without leaving behind it special traces on the peoples of the Soviet Union, will soon belong to the past. Even if development has outrun certain of its principles and at present, in particular, is directed in quite different channels, such an assertion on the true state of affairs is not correct. As a matter of fact, Bolshevism has developed many philosophies which have created valid concepts for the social life of the peoples of the Soviet Union that extend timelessly beyond a revolutionary epoch. They have shown themselves so full of vitality that they might possibly also serve for pacification of post-war Europe. The following lines are intended chiefly to subject the labor and educational purposes of the Soviet Union to critical examination in this connection. The questions arising when this is done are not to be answered very easily, because, on the one hand, the newspapers and broadcasting stations of the occupied eastern territories attempt to paralyze and to condemn as heresy any idea of this kind, with the consistency peculiar to National Socialism; on the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the propagators and beneficiaries of the new social teaching left the country in each case with the Soviet troops. The Soviet intelligentsia who remained have frequently learned to hate the regime from frightful personal experiences and have thus lost any view of relationships. The fact that, in spite of this, two fundamental ideas of the new social philosophy, the will to work and to develop culture, are plainly recognizable in the mass of those who have taken no part in political or economic work, proves at once its missionary force.

In the first place there is the duty of every Soviet citizen to work - to speak like the propagandists, the right to work. In a satire, the Soviet writer has a vain school-girl, represented like a pea-fowl, and coming from a lovingly depicted circle of narrow-minded people, say boastfully to her school comrades: "We are fine folk at home. In our family only Papa works; Mama is busy with household duties." But in the story Mama lies on the sofa with a headache and reads esthetic books. Such witty stories, written with strong power of observation, have evidently not been without effect. "The French women are certainly very beautiful and well groomed. But I would not like to have them, because they devote themselves only to care of the body and to

the art of pleasing men and do not work," is the judgment that is frequently heard. A woman teacher will marry, to be sure, if a man pleases her exactly. But the most important thing for a female citizen of the Soviet is to be able to practice her profession like a man, in order in that way to serve the advancement of the country with her whole life. The same thing is said by a woman teacher in the secondary schools, belonging to the old middle class, whose husband was deported ten years ago. "The Bolsheviks are right when they declare that there are other things for women than children, kitchen and church. I am glad to be able still to practice a profession and to be permitted to do so," declares this woman, who ten years ago was declared an "enemy of the people" as the wife of a deportee. The young people in the country with whom one opens a personal conversation ask immediately where one works and where his father works. In this connection, a low estimate of mental work can never be detected. The best selling book of recent years depicts the wooing of a child of the people by a Caucasian aristocrat, who is told by her over and over that as long as he only wants to ride, hunt and dance, but not learn anything, she cannot marry him. She then opens up to him the new world of labor and provides him with a profession, which he then practices at her side, for the benefit of the socialistic country. The people felt these things in detail. The spectators of a German film immediately left the performance when the action dealt with the life of an idle film aristocrat in Riviera hotels, bars and gambling houses.

For the accelerated industrialization of the country, the manifest result of the Soviet regime, the Bolsheviks have developed the "stakhanova worker." "Hero of social labor, herald of progress, the boast and pride of the country," he is called by the newspapers; opponents call him a sycophant, a political spoilsman and a babbler. But it is evident that this principle of specially paid top production has roused the energy of the workers. Experience in harvesting with the civil population has shown that when the population is put in together, it works poorly and slowly. But if the workers were separated and then divided into equal groups on equal plots of ground, no group wanted to lag behind the others around it, and labor output was doubled. In industry also, according to the statements of persons engaged in it, considerably higher outputs have been attained in this

way, since the workers, perhaps in the child-like zeal that is given to more primitive men, want to be counted among the best.

Outsiders may frequently take the undoubtedly genuine position toward labor to be feigned, because at first only fine words or harshness appear as actuating motives. In reality, however, efficiency was also paid for. While the truck drivers of an industrial plant in the vicinity of Moscow got between 300 and 400 rubles a month, the "stakhanova workers" there got from 3000 rubles upward. While the family allowance for a member of the Red Army amounts to 95 rubles a month, plus 15 rubles for each child, a lieutenant receives a base allowance of 800 rubles a month. Even though there was no possibility of buying a detached house on the outskirts of the city, the well-paid Soviet intelligentsia could, however, rent houses in the country for the summer months, just as they could get to enjoy an automobile. Regardless of membership in political parties and class affiliation, the government provided generously for every gifted student with scholarships, including even plentiful amounts of spending money for trips and cultural cultivation of spare time. The Russian language has formed a slang word of its own for the government's care of these people, which can be most closely translated as "to coddle." This has resulted in the remarkable picture, confirmed by all persons of the older generation, that despite the absence of the capitalistic idea of property, efficiency is paid in the Soviet Union in such a way that distinction of classes stands out more strongly than under the regime of the Tsars. Almost every city of the Soviet Union has its Culture Park; every collective farm and every factory has a Cultural Club, which is to take the place of the church and the tavern; supervisors of culture are often assigned to active troop units, such as young teachers and students in pedagogical institutes. Cultural institutions enjoy government support throughout the country. The commandments of the Orthodox religion are evidently to be replaced by the commandments of culture and of a culturally restrained human being. The measures aiming at this have undoubtedly found likewise an echo in wide strata of the population. A young country girl declared that in difficult situations of her life she sought advice from the teacher in the village. Only the old people went to the priest. She

made a depreciative gesture, because as a cultured person one could certainly not go to a medicine man. The priest is actually dirty and lousy, when (clad) in peasant costume; with a dirty stole, he reads out of old Bibles before the ikon corner of his house, warding off the flies only with difficulty. (That is like the clergy of the Catholic Church before the French Revolution, a Russian conservative says, who spent seven years in Red Centers* of the Bolshevists. The Orthodox clergy, like the Catholic Church, will recover, he says.) It is erroneous, however, to conclude from this fundamental attitude of modern young people toward the visible pillars of a religious organization that there is a loss of interest in religious questions. In the eyes of the Soviet citizen, the cultural obligation also requires a knowledge of metaphysical matters. Among the first questions put by a male or female student, no matter in what branch, in a serious conversation, there belongs the question: "Do you believe in God?" On their part, they would probably recognize a higher being, but no dogma. An engineer stated that he had recently read the text of the New Testament, in which some very good things are contained. One might almost say that a religious rebirth may be favored by the critical understanding brought about by Socialism. Nor was genuine humanity inherited from the old Christianity and the old Europe destroyed by the desire for culture of those in authority; in many cases it was even decidedly emphasized. Many soldiers who were billeted with farmers during the winter were blessed by the old peasant woman according to the Orthodox rite, when they departed. It has never been observed that when this was done the young men made scornful remarks or laughed. The attitude toward war is based, with the older and the younger generation, on a deep ethical value, which recognizes the obligations of a civilized man with respect to the enemy. The idea that war is a "lark" in the Prussian sense is unknown. Nowhere could any indications be noted that warfare as a state of affairs is glorified. All strata of the population were imbued with the devastating effect of the war on the cultural development of mankind and therefore cursed, first of all, the hostile giant of destruction. There is in the East a half contemptuous, half good-natured instructive saying on many measures of the troops of occupation that has gone far beyond everyday usage. If condemned persons are hanged in the center of a city, before a crowd of human beings numbering hundreds or are disposed of by a shot in back of the neck, the people of culture say: "No culture." If officers smoke cigarettes in the presence of a female mem-

*In the original only KZ. The translation "Red Centers," therefore, is not quite certain. - TR

ber of the Russian intelligentsia and do not offer this woman a cigarette, in conscious denial of her mental equal status, the woman says: "No culture." A peasant girl looks at the pictures of a German illustrated magazine and sums up her opinion in the words "no culture." The official propagandist who has to concern himself with this expression time and again would like to conjure away this "culture of the semi-barbarous" with an egg dance around the German intellectual inheritance. Nevertheless, it would be ridiculous, in the face of the facts, to dispute the connection of the Soviet citizen with the store of European thought, even if through the roundabout way of the French Revolution and the German Socialists. From many conversations one does recognize the historical mental connection of the Soviet intelligentsia with the German Socialists. Thus every child defines Leninism as Marxism in the age of enslavement of the individual by militarism. Every school book contains extracts from German classics, and Goethe is honored together with Pushkin as a (free) progressive spirit, because in the last act of Faust he glorifies, not in the last place, free people on free land. All that has been transmitted to the Soviet citizen, to stay with him, by the Bolshevik desire for culture.

In particular, South German soldiers, who possess great power of understanding the essential ideas of foreign peoples, are aware of the positive results of Bolshevism. The large scale system of education, with its free scholarships and stipends, appears in conversation especially often. Propaganda reports are frequently passed from hand to hand laughingly, as more and more people sign as authors, who know conditions only from a short stay at the front. Long association with staff personnel in position warfare may also have given the ordinary man notions. It could be observed that Russian illustrated magazines of the pre-war period, textbooks from schools and scientific works were collected and sent to Germany. However, these things are not to be interpreted as propaganda, because the little man who is sensitive to propaganda confuses the primitive standard of living with the cultural level and makes Bolshevism responsible for this, supported by the official propaganda of his own side. In addition, the Soviet Russian propaganda directed at the enemy makes no allusion to in-

ternal political conditions in the Soviet Union, does not praise the workers' Paradise and does not push the idea of class combat at all. Besides, the ordinary soldier is so burdened with the everyday duties of the service that he does not have much time left for pondering. The fundamentally materialistic attitude that is demanded by the long war to a really horrifying extent also acts to prevent independent thinking.

The soldier in the East would, on the whole, not take up Bolshevist ideas unless a break-through on a large scale compels capitulation. Let everything be done to bring about a decision before that in subsidiary theaters of war.

September 9, 1942.

TR:JWP:JMC

Vatican City, September 25, 1942

Your Excellency:

With reference to the conversation which I had the pleasure of having with you on the 23d, I take the liberty of sending you the following memorandum about the tragic situation of the Yugoslav internees in Italy.

There are tens of thousands of people, including women and small children, scattered throughout Italy and their number constantly increases as a result of new mass deportations. In one single camp there are more than 5,000 persons and in another, when it is full, there will be room for 20,000 persons.

The fate of this unfortunate people is far worse than that of the internees of other nations, because Italy, against all the principles of international law and without waiting for the end of war, has annexed large tracts of Yugoslavia. For this reason Italy regards these unfortunate people as Italian subjects and does not allow the Yugoslav Red Cross to have any dealings with them or to help them in any way. So these unhappy people have no one to protect them but are left at the mercy of Italy, i.e. of an enemy who is responsible for the death of many of their relations and the destruction of many of their homes.

In these circumstances I take the liberty of begging Your Excellency to draw the attention of the United States Government to the pitiful plight of the Yugoslav internees in Italy, with a view to some steps being taken in their favour. Since Italy has so many of her subjects in the United States, to the welfare of whom she cannot be indifferent, the Government of your country should be easily able to bring pressure to bear, by appropriate means, on the Italian Government in order that Italy may put a stop to her illegal acts and may permit either the Yugoslav Red Cross or the British, American or other Allied or neutral Red Cross, to take over charge of the Yugoslav internees in Italy.

I feel sure that Your Excellency will accede to my request and will do anything you can to attain this charitable end for the good of our people, who are making such great sacrifices in blood and property for the Allied cause for the freedom of the world and safety of civilization.

I take this opportunity of thanking Your Excellency in advance for your kind intervention and of assuring you of my highest consideration.

Counsellor of the Royal Yugoslav
Legation to the Holy See

His Excellency
The Honorable Myron Taylor,
Personal Representative of the President
of the United States of America to
His Holiness the Pope.

Translation of Memorandum from Yugoslav Representative, Vatican City, September 24 1942

1. Over a long period of years no authoritative voice has made itself heard publicly against the totalitarian regime. The political victims of the regime are almost exclusively the young Slavs of Trieste and Goritzia, a large number of whom were executed during the past twenty years.
2. It is said that there are some military personalities (Badoglio and a few others) who do not approve fighting on Germany's side, but these personalities have always obeyed, and received titles, promotions, and other favors from the regime, and either retired or were removed only after their failure.
3. No hope is to be placed in the Dynasty, which has always shown the most absolute submission to the regime, a submission that goes so far as to acknowledge the right of the Grand Council of the Party to change the order of succession to the throne.
4. It is true that grumblings and secret criticism are very frequent. It is a kind of fashion, even among the high "hierarchs" of the party and Mussolini's close collaborators. But one must not look among ideological reasons for the motives of this criticism; they are rather motives of a practical character. If there is a bread shortage and if the war news is bad, criticism increases; if, on the contrary, the news is good and hunger less acute, criticism diminishes! An instructive experiment was made in this sense when Tobruk fell and Rommel advanced into Egypt. It cannot be denied that there are sincere critics, honest persons and faithful christians who see the absurdity of this war for Italy, but all these Italian friends, when they talk among themselves or with foreigners, come to the same conclusion: it's true, but what can we do?
5. There is poverty. But poverty is relative, more acute in cities than in the countries. Italy is an agricultural country where, because of a favorable climate, the land produces a great deal in all seasons. The Germans now arriving in Italy find it a real paradise in

comparison with their own country. It is everybody's ambition in Germany to visit Italy in order to satisfy the demands--legitimate ones, to be sure--of their stomachs.

For Germany the Italian alliance is a real piece of luck, which permits her not only to carry the war into the Mediterranean and Africa, but also to lighten her economic difficulties and to continue the struggle.

6. As the country has been spared the horrors of war up to now, it is possible to sleep here tranquilly and to live in a certain measure of security. The Italians hope, in the end, to benefit by the indulgence of the English and the Americans, whose weakness for the "beautiful country" is well known.

7. Finally, one must not forget that the country finds itself, at least partially, in a state of German occupation and under German control.

Consequently, all allusions to the subject of a movement in favor of the cessation of hostilities and the abandonment of the Protector-Ally are without foundation. The present regime in Italy will be overthrown, perhaps even noisily, only when Germany's defeat has been accomplished.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
W A S H I N G T O N

November 18 1942

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Subsequent to speaking with you on the telephone the other day, I have had an opportunity to examine the Bishop's statement and I am tremendously impressed by its breadth of vision and spiritual force. I take this occasion to tell you once more how highly I value your most able and effective cooperation in this respect.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) CORDELL HULL.

Mr. Myron Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

CATHOLIC APPEAL FOR VICTORY, PEACE.

American Prelates Call for
Unity in War Effort and
a Just Settlement.

November 14 1942

THE BISHOPS' STATEMENT ON VICTORY
AND PEACE

Our country has been forced into the most devastating war of all time. This war which is the absorbing interest of all the world involves unquestionably the most important moral issue of today. Some nations are united in waging war to bring about a slave world--a world that would deprive man of his divinely conferred dignity, reject human freedom and permit no religious liberty. We are associated with other powers in a deadly conflict against these nations to maintain a free world. This conflict of principles makes compromise impossible.

While war is the last means to which a nation should resort, circumstances arise when it is impossible to avoid it. At times it is the positive duty of a nation to wage war in the defense of life and right. Our country now finds itself in such circumstances.

Even while we meet here, the exigencies of war have driven our armed forces into unexpected areas of conflict in Africa. Our President in letters addressed to the rulers of all the friendly nations concerned, has given solemn assurance that the United States has no designs of permanent conquest or sordid interest. Our aim, he pledged, is to guarantee to countries under temporary occupation as well as to our own the right to live in security and peace. We Bishops are confident that the pledge of our Chief Executive, not lightly made, faithfully mirrors the mind and conscience of the American people. That pledge is in full harmony with the expression of high purpose which the President made to the Catholic Bishops of the United States when our own country was plunged into war: - "We shall win this war and in victory we shall seek not vengeance but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts of men and of nations."

From the moment that our country declared war we have called upon our people to make the sacrifices which, in Catholic doctrine, the virtues of patriotism, justice and charity impose. In every section of this nation the voices of our bishops have been heard. Their instructions, their pastorals, their counsels, their appeals for prayers are an encouragement and an inspiration

to their flocks. Our priests as chaplains on the war front have inspired confidence in the men whom they so zealously serve. Our men in the armed forces deserve unstinted gratitude for their heroic services to our country and high commendation for the faithful practice of their religion.

In every diocese prayers have been incessantly offered, asking God's pardon for the sins of individuals and nations, begging divine mercy for all, pleading for a victory which will have the sanction of infinite justice and for an enduring peace founded on the love of God and the love of all men. Priests and people have earnestly prayed that the Holy Spirit may guide our President and all who share with him the heavy responsibilities of directing the war efforts and of winning the victory from which all peoples will derive a just and lasting peace.

In the discharge of our pastoral responsibility, we are gravely concerned about the world peace of tomorrow.

Secularism cannot write a real and lasting peace. Its narrow vision does not encompass the whole man, it cannot evaluate the spirituality of the human soul and the supreme good of all mankind.

Exploitation cannot write a real and lasting peace. Where greedy might and selfish expediency are made the substitutes of justice there can be no securely ordered world.

Totalitarianism, whether Nazi, Communist or Fascist, cannot write a real and lasting peace. The State that usurps total powers, by that very fact becomes a despot to its own people and a menace to the family of nations.

The Spirit of Christianity can write a real and lasting peace in justice and charity to all nations, even to those not Christian.

In the epochal revolution through which the world is passing, it is very necessary for us to realize that every man is our brother in Christ. All should be convinced that every man is endowed with the dignity of human personality, and that he is entitled by the laws of nature to the things necessary to sustain life in a way conformable to human dignity. In the post-war world, the profit element of industry and commerce

must be made subservient to the common good of communities and nations if we are to have a lasting peace with justice and a sense of true brotherhood for all our neighbors. The inequalities of nations and of individuals can never give to governments or to the leaders of industry or commerce a right to be unjust. They cannot, if they follow the fixed principles of morality, maintain or encourage conditions under which men cannot live according to standards befitting human personality.

Unfortunately, in our day we must wage a global war to secure peace. War is abnormal and necessarily brings on abnormal conditions in the life of a nation.

During the war crisis free men must surrender many of their liberties. We ask our people to be united and prepared to make every sacrifice which our Government deems necessary for a just and enduring peace through the victory of our armed forces. We are confident that they will perform their wartime duties gladly because they know that our country has been the defender, not the destroyer, of liberties, and has in the past always reestablished the full measure of peacetime freedom, on the conclusion of hostilities.

Our Government has announced that the war emergency makes it necessary to employ an unprecedented number of women in industry. While we are wholeheartedly cooperating with our Government in the prosecution of the war, we must, as shepherds of souls, express our grave concern about the Christian home in our beloved country in these crucial days. When mothers are engaged in industry a serious child care problem necessarily arises. Every effort must be made to limit, as far as necessity permits, the employment of mothers in industry, particularly young mothers. Due provision in harmony with American traditions should be made for the day care of the children of working mothers. The health and moral welfare of mothers employed in industry should be thoroughly safeguarded. With a full realization of the role which women must play in winning the war and of the extreme measures that our Government must take, we ask that all try to realize the dangers involved, especially the moral dangers. We urge that there be a wholesome moral atmosphere wherever women are employed.

We know that patriotic mothers are generous in giving their sons to the defense of our country. We express

their concern, and ours, about youths of eighteen years of age who may be called to the armed forces. We hope that special moral safeguards will shield them, so that they may serve their country without moral blemish.

We express our deepest sympathy to our brother bishops in all countries of the world where religion is persecuted, liberty abolished, and the rights of God and of man are violated. Since the murderous assault on Poland, utterly devoid of every semblance of humanity, there has been a premeditated and systematic extermination of the people of this nation. The same satanic technique is being applied to many other peoples. We feel a deep sense of revulsion against the cruel indignities heaped upon the Jews in conquered countries and upon defenseless peoples not of our faith. We join with our brother bishops in subjugated France in a statement attributed to them. "Deeply moved by the mass arrests and maltreatment of Jews, we cannot stifle the cry of our conscience. In the name of humanity and Christian principles our voice is raised in favor of imprescriptible rights of human nature." We raise our voice in protest against despotic tyrants who have lost all sense of humanity by condemning thousands of innocent persons to death in subjugated countries as acts of reprisal, by placing other thousands of innocent victims in concentration camps, and by permitting unnumbered persons to die of starvation.

The war has brought to the fore conditions that have long been with us. The full benefits of our free institutions and the rights of our minorities must be openly acknowledged and honestly respected. We ask this acknowledgment and respect particularly for our colored fellow citizens. They should enjoy the full measure of economic opportunities and advantages which will enable them to realize their hope and ambition to join with us in preserving and expanding in changed and changing social conditions our national heritage. We fully appreciate their many native gifts and aptitudes, which ennobled and enriched by a true Christian life, will make them a powerful influence in the establishment of a Christian social order.

We recall the words of Pope Pius XII expressing his paternal solicitude for the colored people of our country. In a letter addressed to the American bishops on the oc-

casation of the 150th Anniversary of the establishment of the American Hierarchy, His Holiness said: "We confess that we feel a special paternal affection which is certainly inspired of heaven for the negro people dwelling among you; for in the field of religion and education we know that they need special care and comfort and are very deserving of it. We, therefore, invoke an abundance of heavenly blessing and we pray fruitful success for those whose generous zeal is devoted to their welfare."

We send our cordial greetings to our brother bishops of Latin America. We have been consoled by recent events which give a sincere promise of a better understanding by our country of the peoples of Central and South America. Citizens of these countries are bound to us by the closest bonds of religion. They are not merely our neighbors; they are our brothers professing the same faith. Every effort made to rob them of their Catholic religion or to ridicule it or to offer them a substitute for it is deeply resented by the peoples of these countries and by American Catholics. These efforts prove to be a disturbing factor in our international relations. The traditions, the spirit, the background, the culture of these countries are Catholic. We bishops are anxious to foster every worthy movement which will strengthen our amicable relations with Central and South America. We express the hope that the mistakes of the past which were offensive to the dignity of our southern brothers, their culture, and their religion will not continue. A strong bond uniting in true friendship all the countries of the Western Hemisphere will exercise a most potent influence on a shattered post-war world.

We urge the serious study of the peace plans of Pope Pius XII which insists that justice be inspired by love-- first, love of God and, then, love of every human being. "The command of love among individuals found in the Gospels," said Benedict XV, "differs in no respect from that which should reign among states and peoples." (Pacem Dei, Benedict XV, 1920). If we are not to have a Christian peace, then we shall be given only an armistice and we shall begin to prepare for a third world conflict.

We conclude by urging, again, unceasing prayers: the prayer of all prayers by priests, the Holy Mass; prayers

addressed to the Blessed Virgin that she will intercede with her Divine Son for mercy on a war-blighted world. We ask that Tuesday, December eighth, the Feast of the Immaculate Conception of our Blessed Mother, the Patroness of our Country, be set aside as a special day of prayerful supplication. In its observance, the priests and faithful of every diocese will follow the timely instruction of their bishop. We recommend the recitation of the Rosary in common, both in our churches and in our homes. We trust that the children of our country will, in response to the many appeals of our Holy Father, offer their innocent prayers to God for peace. Let us all unite in praying for a victory and for a peace acceptable to God.

Signed in the name of the one hundred and two Archbishops and Bishops attending the Conference, by the following members of the Administrative Board, N.C.W.C.:

Edward Mooney
Archbishop of Detroit

John T. McNicholas
Archbishop of Cincinnati

Samuel A. Stritch
Archbishop of Chicago

John J. Mitty
Archbishop of San Francisco

Joseph F. Rummel
Archbishop of New Orleans

Francis J. Spellman
Archbishop of New York

John Mark Gannon
Bishop of Erie

John F. Noll
Bishop of Fort Wayne

Karl J. Alter
Bishop of Toledo

John A. Duffy
Bishop of Buffalo

TRANSLATION OF LETTER
FROM
M. THEBAUD, HAITIAN MINISTER
SEPTEMBER 24 1942

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Your Excellency:

I apologize for having sent you in rough form the Memorandum you asked Mr. Tittmann for; but I understood that Your Excellency was leaving very soon. Also, I appeal to the spirit characteristic of the great people, of which you are the elite, to ask you to consider only the substance and not the form of this Memorandum, which I have the honor to confirm in all its tenor.

While awaiting the time when I might be of some use to our Cause, I shall try to continue to rear my children in a stoical spirit and with a taste of war, since only those who fight live and only men of courage know how to fight--those who are inaccessible to fear and grapple themselves to a spirit of justice. For, after this great conflict, in which we must be victors, it will be necessary to fix the equilibrium of this giant body, and, for that, men of courage will be needed.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest and most deferent consideration.

L. THEBAUD.

Vatican City.

TRANSLATION OF MEMORANDUM
FROM
M. THEBAUD, HAITIAN MINISTER.
SEPTEMBER 24 1942

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From a reliable source it is reported that, in all territories occupied by the Germans, the population is in a state of unrest as a result of the lack of food, fuel, and other products necessary for human existence; and also as a result of the repercussion which the reports of German cruelties has had. In some sections, the lower classes are said to be the most riotous against the Germans. For some time past, there have been strikes and frequent incidents.

It is believed that the plan of the Nazis is to conquer Russia at all costs - Russia, the richest country in Europe, they say. Then the Nazis will thrust themselves upon the United States of America, attacking through the north of America. It seems that the entry into war of the United States of America is the event which caused the most fear in the Nazis.

SUGGESTIONS

Create in Washington a propaganda center which would publish complete works recounting all the cruelties and misdeeds of the Nazis, the sufferings of all kinds that are extant in Europe (Greece, Poland, etc.), and expose the plans of the Nazis. These works to be distributed in all countries of the American continent.

At the same time, organize lectures and daily appeals by radio, addressed to all the peoples of the continent.

Coordinate the program of the propaganda center in such a way as to swell the just indignation of all the peoples of the New Continent and make them realize that the future of mankind is at stake. Thus each person will seek, of his own initiative, active participation in the war to defeat the common enemy.

As regards me, I have already written to the Chief of State of my country that I am ready to leave at the first word for any front to which I might be destined, and for all missions, even the most dangerous. I am convinced that I would expose my life in order to contribute to the future of generations to come and to the safeguarding of christianity and humanity.

For this cause I have also the honor to be at the disposal of the Government of Washington, acting in accord with my own Government, for all missions, even the most dangerous.

Mankind is at a turning-point in its existence and finds itself facing a danger which it must conquer or die.

In my opinion, all the countries of the American continent without exception should immediately prepare as many men as possible to send off to fight.

I shall be ready to address an appeal by radio to all Chiefs of State of these countries.

L. Thebaud.

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E X H I B I T S

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

In reply refer to
FA

August 29 1942

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I take pleasure in informing you that the Department has received from Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Foreign Service Officer at the Vatican, a cablegram dated August 25 (received August 28) which contains the following message for you:

"The prospect of seeing you soon makes me rejoice and I expect that you will share my apartment."

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

(Sd) HARRY A. HAVENS
Acting Chief, Division of
Foreign Service Administration

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N. Y.

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington.
From: American Legation, Bern.
Dated: September 4, 1942.
No. 148, August 31, from Tittmann.

~~SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL.~~

1. The Nuncio at Vichy reported to Cardinal Maglione that the results of his demarche on behalf of the Jews in unoccupied France were not encouraging. Thus recent press reports to the effect that the Nuncio had asked Laval to ease the severity of his anti-Semitic measures were thus confirmed by the Cardinal Secretary of State himself. It was learned from the same source that Petain had been approached earlier on the same matter by the Nuncio.

2. Several weeks ago the Nuncio mentioned to Laval his anxiety for the fate of 12,000 Jewish women and children concentrated in Paris and in that instance arrangements were made by Laval that families should not be divided.

3. In Italy the Vatican's intervention on behalf of the Jews has been much more successful, according to Cardinal Maglione, because the feeling of the people was strongly opposed to prosecution and German pressure not so effective.

4. The information outlined above should be treated in the most confidential manner at the request of the Cardinal Secretary of State. The Vatican fears that their channels for the alleviation of suffering might be closed to them if their various demarches became generally known and talked about.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 23 1972

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington.

From: American Embassy, Bern.

Dated: September 4, 1942.

No. 4052

From: Tittmann. No. 149, August 31.

On August 31 the Vatican Secretariat of State received assurances in writing from the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See that there would be no objection to Mr. Taylor passing in transit through Italy en route to the Vatican. The exact date of this transit is to be fixed by the Italian military who have been informed by the Italian Foreign Office that Mr. Taylor will be crossing the Italian border sometime between the 7th and 20th of September. Between these dates accommodations will be provided on the plane from Lisbon to Rome and it is suggested that in connection with final details Mr. Taylor should communicate with the Italian diplomatic mission at Lisbon after he arrives in Portugal. For Mr. Taylor's information this information is being telegraphed by Monsignor Montini to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington.

I sent a brief telegram directly to the Department from Vatican City today, August 31, concerning the Italian approval in order that the Department might be informed as soon as possible.

It will be best if the press release concerning Mr. Taylor's visit could be postponed as long as possible, according to the recommendations made to Monsignor Montini by the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See. Because of the recent American refusal to grant safe sea passage to the Italian Ambassador-Designate to Buenos Aires, it appears that the proposal to permit Mr. Taylor to cross Italian territory met with some opposition in the Italian Foreign Office. Ciano made the final decision himself by stating that the treaty rights of the Vatican with Italy must be maintained. Thus the opposition was overcome only by the intervention of the Foreign Minister himself.

Should the international press carry premature stories of the visit, however, the Italian Ambassador here feels that the question may again be raised by the "opposition members" of the Italian Foreign Office.

HARRISON:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

September 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MYRON C. TAYLOR

It is believed best to leave to your discretion your conversation with the Papal Nuncio at Madrid. We should, of course, be interested in anything the Nuncio may have to say concerning the recent changes in the Spanish Government.

Beyond your conversations with Mr. Atherton on September 3, we have no suggestions for matters to be discussed with Mr. Gray in Dublin or Mr. Hayes in Madrid.

C. H.

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September 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MYRON C. TAYLOR

While in London, it is suggested that you take occasion to discuss with the British Foreign Office the British Government's attitude towards the Vatican. Among other things you may wish to ascertain what the reaction of the Foreign Office has been to the recent rumors that the Vatican will be used by the Axis in the near future to support peace proposals. Do the British believe that the Pope would lend himself to a maneuver of this character?

Since you go to London after Rome, you may, of course give the British the benefit of your opinions in the light of your recent visit to the Holy See.

C. H.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

September 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MYRON C. TAYLOR

In Lisbon it is suggested that you express to Dr. Salazar the satisfaction which your Government feels in having concluded with a measure of success the difficult wolfram negotiations with the Portuguese Government. For your information we recently closed our negotiations with Portugal, which had extended over a period of months, by signing an agreement designed to insure us a share of the Portuguese wolfram production. While in signing this agreement we did not actually cut into the supply of wolfram already pledged to Germany, it may be assumed that we did preempt the enemy by voiding the possibility that an even larger supply would be released to Germany than the quantity agreed upon in the German-Portuguese agreement.

We now have under negotiation with Portugal a general supply agreement, and in this connection you may care to remark that we look forward to an early and satisfactory conclusion of these negotiations. We hope that they will prove mutually beneficial and for our part we are bearing in mind the very difficult position in which Portugal finds herself today. Dr. Salazar may be assured that it is our earnest desire to assist Portugal whenever possible to overcome her difficulties, and that we trust he will realize the difficulties we often have to surmount over here in order to make available to Portugal needed supplies. In our conduct of the war we have to consider the demands of our war industries and in many cases those of the other nations fighting with us to destroy the powers of aggression and create a situation in which all nations may again share in the benefits of freedom and independence.

C. H.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of European Affairs

September 9 1942

Mr. Taylor:

Attached is a paraphrase of a telegram which was received from Harold Tittmann yesterday and which I thought would interest you.

(Signed) J. WESLEY JONES.

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington.

From: American Embassy, Bern.

No. 4099.

Dated: September 7, 1942.

From: Tittmann, No. 152, September 5.

The Holy See has been informed telegraphically by the Delegate at Washington that the Italian military authorities have been requested to arrange as soon as possible after Mr. Taylor's arrival in Lisbon on September 13 accommodations in an airplane. Upon his arrival at the Lisbon airport and at Rome Mr. Taylor will be met by appropriate Vatican representatives.

HARRISON.

Il Maestro Di Camera
Di Sua Santità

Vaticano 18 Settembre 1942

Eccellenza,

Mi onoro prevenire l'Eccellenza Vostra che il Santo
Padre La riceverà in Udienza domani sabato alle ore 11.

Nel PresentarLe i sentimenti della mia profonda con-
siderazione godo confermarmi

della Eccellenza Vostra

A Sua Eccellenza
l'Ambasciatore Myron C. Taylor
Rappresentante di S.E. il Sig. Presidente
degli Stati Uniti d'America

TELEGRAM SENT

To: Department
Drafted: September 23d

No. -159-

Code: Conf.

RUSH

No. 159, September 23, from Tittmann.

For the President from Myron Taylor.

The Vatican is in receipt of a message from the Papal Delegate which interferes greatly with our mission here and casting doubt upon the bona fides of the Vatican in the transmission and terminating the exchange of information regarding war prisoners and nationals of our respective countries.

We hope there exists a misunderstanding in this matter and that present unsatisfactory situation may be promptly corrected. We are advised that His Holiness is much distressed and intends to raise this question in our final audience on Saturday. After examination of the considerable organization and the systems employed here in aid of this world-wide activity, comparable to those of other agencies, we are of the opinion this facility for exchange of information should be preserved and encouraged in order to avoid partiality and offense in this quarter.

It appears at the moment that the prospect of securing information from some countries by the Vatican organization is more promising than we understand to be the case with other similar organizations.

TITTMANN:

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From: Department

Date: September 25,
7:10 pm

Code: Clear (Via Vatican City)

Received: September 26,
5 pm

RUSH

Twenty-fifth:

Problem mentioned in your message of Wednesday will be
cleared up on your return here.

HULL.

Il Maestro Di Camera
Di Sua Santità

Vaticano 25 Settembre 1942

Eccellenza,

Mi onoro prevenire l'Eccellenza Vostra che il Santo
Padre La riceverà in Udienza domani sabato alle ore
11,30.

Nel PresentarLe i sentimenti della mia profonda con-
siderazione godo confermarMi
della Eccellenza Vostra

A Sua Eccellenza
l'Ambasciatore Myron C. Taylor
Rappresentante di S.E. il Sig. Presidente
degli Stati Uniti d'America

No. 2919

MR. TAYLOR'S PERMIT BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
TO LEAVE VATICAN AND PASS THROUGH ITALY TO SPAIN BY AIR

APPUNTO

A conferma delle comunicazioni fatte verbalmente l'Ambasciata d'Italia ha l'onore di informare che l'Ambasciatore Myron Taylor potrà repartire il 28 corrente e che gli è stato assegnato un posto sull'aereo per Lisbona.

Come per l'arrivo saranno adottate le seguenti misure di cautela:

-scorta dalla Citta del Vaticano all'Aeroporto del personale di P.S. che seguirà con autovettura a parte;

-il percorso fino all'Aeroporto dovrà essere compiuto senza soste.

Si prega di voler cortesemente informare questa Ambasciata dell'ora in cui il predetto diplomatico lascerà la Citta del Vaticano.

Roma, li 26 Settembre 1942-XX

At Madrid
September 29, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

I have returned from Rome and am spending two days with Ambassador and Mrs. Hayes at Madrid. My running notes are sent herewith. If you find time to read them please bear in mind the two cardinal points that governed my conduct.

- I. Absolutely to convince the Pope and the Vatican authorities that we would prosecute the war until Hitler and Nazism were destroyed or made harmless. That we had the men and materials to do it.
- II. That Italy when adequate assistance could be given her should in her future interest abandon Hitler. You will note that I never referred to the present regime in Italy but only to the Italian people. This impressed the Pope and the Vatican authorities greatly.

I shall have an interview with Salazar on Thursday and leave for London Saturday, October 2.

Ambassador Hayes is said to be doing well here. He is presenting me to the new Foreign Minister and others of the Government today and tonight when a number dine here.

With kind regards,

Faithfully,

(Sgnd) MYRON TAYLOR.

P.S. Your representative has been received with the greatest consideration everywhere and avoided the "catacombs" as you expressed it, though I did inspect the new excavation underneath St. Peters which are wonderful.

The President,
Washington.

NOTE BY MR. TAYLOR

The statement referred to was the proposed statement which I presented to His Holiness the Pope relative U.S.A. war position.

AVIZ HOTEL
AVENIDA FONTES
LISBOA, PORTUGAL

October 1 1942

Dear Mr. Myron Taylor:

I am much obliged to you for giving me the opportunity to have the document copied for my most confidential information. Let me add that a further study of it convinces me that it is a statement of very great importance, and that I shall be very much disappointed if it does not have an impressive attack. Do, I beg you, make the fullest possible use of it in your talks with Churchill and Eden. I wish indeed that we could have had further time for our talk.

With all good wishes, and congratulations on the certain success of your mission,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) SAMUEL HOARE.

1 GROSVENOR SQUARE
LONDON, W. 1

Saturday, 3d

Dear Myron,

I am so disappointed that I am not able to meet you on your arrival this afternoon. It so happens that I am pledged to go to the country, but expect to return to London tomorrow, Sunday afternoon.

I wonder whether you would lunch with me in my apartment at 3 Grosvenor Square on Monday? It would be such a pleasure to see you, and to hear all your news from Rome. You must have gathered much interesting information.

With the warmest of welcomes,

Ever sincerely,

(Sd) WILLIAM PHILLIPS.

Decoded by tob
Copied by dm

BROWN

Recd. Oct. 4, 1942.

FROM LISBON

AMEMBASSY
LONDON

108, October 3, 5 p.m.

For Ambassador Taylor.

In expressing the thanks of myself and my staff for the enjoyable luncheon and kind words you gave us Friday, I wish to reassure you of a hearty welcome upon your next return to Lisbon.

FISH:

HOUSE OF LORDS,
S. W. 1.

October 5 1942

Dear Mr. Myron Taylor,

I am glad to see that you are in England again. Wish you would come to lunch with me and my wife at the House of Lords (ask for the Lord Chancellor's room) at one o'clock on Wednesday? I say one o'clock because we have a debate beginning at two on Punishment of War Criminals, which might perhaps interest you.

You will have been saddened by Mrs. Greville's lonely death. I enclose a cutting from the Times two days later. "S" means,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd) SIMON.

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE
WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW 1.

Hare Street House,
Buntingford, Herts.

6. X, 1942

Dear Mr. Myron Taylor,

Your kindness in coming to see me on Sunday last, so soon after your arrival in England from Rome and in spite of your inevitable fatigue, calls for my heartiest thanks.

I am also most grateful to you for the copy of the memorandum you presented to the Holy Father. There is no uncertain sound about the language of this document. I wish it were possible to silence the sensational press of this country and of other countries, too, by publishing this uncompromising statement. Rumors and conjectures uttered by irresponsible people do great injustice to you, to your President, and to the Pope.

I pray that Almighty God may keep you safe "under the shadow of His wings," and give you health and strength to carry on your great mission for a just and enduring peace through victory over the powers of evil.

Mr. Douglas Woodroff, Editor of the Tablet, a friend of mine, has asked me to recommend him to you that he may be allowed to call on you while you are in London. He does not want to interview you for publication, but for a private and background conversation. The Tablet is a Catholic weekly journal of importance, which goes out to the Vatican by diplomatic bag; three copies of the paper are widely read in the Vatican and marked for the Secretariat. So in this way useful considerations are brought to the notice of the Vatican unofficially. I hope it may be possible for you to see the Editor for a short time.

With renewed thanks for your great kindness and with every best wish and blessing, I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd) A. CARDINAL HINSLEY.

INDIA HOUSE, S.W. 1.

6th October, 1942.

Dear Mr. Taylor,

Very many thanks for letting me see your statement to the Holy Father. It seems to me admirable, both in sentiment and in purport. It leaves no ground for misunderstanding and I am only too glad to know that it was so well received.

It was a great pleasure seeing you again yesterday, and I hope my wife and I may yet have another chance before you go.*

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd)LS. AMERY.

*I find she is not going to be in town after all for another ten days or so. But possibly I may have an opportunity.

Mr. Myron C. Taylor.

FOREIGN OFFICE
S. W. 1

7th October 1942

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I would like to tell you how much I enjoyed dining with you last night, and to thank you so much for all that you were good enough to tell me.

It was a very great pleasure to see you again and to have such an interesting and useful conversation.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ANTHONY EDEN.

Mr. Myron Taylor.

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

October 8 1942

My dear Mr. Myron Taylor:

I write to thank you for the glorious chrysanthemums you have sent me; but even more for the great privilege enjoyed by myself and my daughters in being allowed to have knowledge of the wonderful and historic document which you presented to His Holiness, The Pope. I feel your visit to the Vatican may have far reaching results.

I hope you are now a little rested from your travels. I shall never forget last Monday evening.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) CLEMENTINE S. CHURCHILL.

P.S.:

It was very charming of you to send my daughter those delicious violets. Unfortunately I was not able to send them to her as her Camp is too distant, so I will tell her and enjoy their fragrance myself!

FOREIGN OFFICE
S. W. 1

October 9 1942

Dear Mr. Taylor:

I return the document you gave me. I have kept a copy and will investigate the matter.

It was so nice to see you for a short while, and most interesting and valuable to me to hear what you had to say.

Best wishes for your journey home.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ALEXANDER CADOGAN.

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Office of W. A. Harriman

London - October 9, 1942.

Dear Mr. Taylor:

At Mr. Harriman's direction I return herewith the letter dated October 7th from Lisbon, with regard to religion in Russia.

Mr. Harriman had this copied and I enclose three extra copies for such use as you may find for them.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. MEIKLEJOHN

Secretary to Mr. W. A. Harriman.

The Hon. Myron Taylor
Carlton Hotel
London

WESTERN UNION

October 17 1942
A.M. 9:51

CDU 78 CABLE LONDON 35 17 1245P

MYRON TAYLOR
MAYFLOWER HOTEL
WASHINGTON DC

Thank you for your kind message. You helped me very much here and all you did was much appreciated by me and others. Love to you both.

(Signed) JOHN GILBERT WINANT.

APOSTOLIC DELEGATION
Washington, D.C.
U. S. A.

No. X-214

34595

or

34959

ADDRESSEE - DESTINATARIO

NAME - Cognome

Major the Hon. M. P. Wingfield (British Prisoner of War)

CHRISTIAN NAME - Nome

Mervyn Patrick

ADDRESS - Indirizzo

c/o Croce Rose Italiana
Via Puglie
Roma.

INQUIRER - RICHIEDENTE

NAME - Cognome

Myron Taylor

CHRISTIAN NAME - Nome

ADDRESS - Indirizzo 71 Broadway, New York, U.S.A.

MESSAGE OF INQUIRER

(Not over 25 words, family news of strictly personal character)

COMUNICAZIONE DEL RICHIEDENTE

(Non superare 25 parole soltanto notizie personali familiari)

Sheila and children well send deepest love are you in good health what clothes and food do you most need some parcels already on way.

ANSWER FROM ADDRESSEE

(Not over 25 words, family news of strictly personal character)

RISPOSTA DEL DESTINATARIO

(Non superare 25 parole soltanto notizie personali familiari)

Nell'ulteriore corrispondenza riferire
sempre il N. del foglio

No. 00325482

Destinatario Major the Hon. WINGFIELD M.P.

Indirizzo Prigioniero di Guerra
Campo N. 35

POSTA MILITARE 3400

Mittente S.E. Myron Taylor

tramite: DELEGATO APOSTOLICO DEGLI STATI UNITI D'AMERICA

Spazio riservato alla corrispondenza

SHEILA AND CHILDREN WELL SEND DEEPEST LOVE ARE YOU IN GOOD
HEALTH WHAT CLOTHES AND FOOD DO YOU MOST NEED SOME PARCELS
ALREADY ON WAY

Per disposizioni internazionali non superar
le 25 parole

Spazio riservato alla corrispondenza

Clothes situation O.K. except for shoes.
Tinned meats are chief food wants also
margarine or butter; many thanks for parcels
on way.

Wingfield.

Translation

QUESTIONS REGARDING THE TAYLOR VISIT

Myron Taylor, Roosevelt's personal Ambassador to the Holy See, left the Littorio airport in Rome on September 28 in his de luxe plane for Lisbon, whence he will return to America. He arrived in Rome on the evening of September 19th, so that his Vatican visit this year seems to have been completed in very brief time. During this period he was received three times in private audience by the Pope: the first time for an hour and a half, the second for fifty minutes, and the third for forty minutes. In addition, he had long conversations with the American Charge d'Affaires at the Holy See, Mr. Tittmann, with the Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione, with the Assistant Secretary of State, Mgr. Montini, and many other Vatican officials and diplomats accredited to the Holy See.

Despite the state of war existing between Italy and the United States, Ambassador Taylor was treated with great courtesy by the Fascist Government. As the Vatican State has no airport, he was permitted to land on Italian soil at the Littorio airport, where an automobile of the Papal Chamberlain awaited him. The same procedure, in reverse, was followed for his departure. During his stay in the Vatican State, the hangar for his plane enjoyed extra-territorial privileges and was kept under special guard. At the end of his visit, Myron Taylor felt obliged to express his thanks to the Italian authorities, through Vatican channels, for the courtesies extended to him.

The whole incident of Taylor's visit hinges on something paradoxical and strange, calculated to increase still more the already mounting interest in this political event--and to baffle it. To begin with, the diplomatic standing of Taylor seems extraordinary and altogether contrary to accepted customs, since the American Congress has not yet given its sanction to the establishment of an embassy of the United States to the Holy See. But, in spite of that, Roosevelt wishes to be represented at the Vatican. Consequently, Taylor was sent to Rome as the President's personal ambassador to the Pope. For some reason or other--the chief one being Taylor's poor health--the Roosevelt ambassador does not remain permanently in the Vatican State, but in the United States, and comes to Rome for a few days once a year to exercise his political function. But that is not all. The continued presence of an American representative in the Vatican State is

necessary for current diplomatic affairs between the United States and the Holy See. This office is held by Taylor's diplomatic adviser, Mr. Tittmann, who, however, carries the title of Charge d'Affaires. Thus the American Embassy to the Holy See, not yet approved by Congress and existing only on the responsibility of Roosevelt, has at the same time an Ambassador and a Charge d'Affaires.

The paradox of the situation becomes snared in gordian knots as soon as the American Ambassador, in the fulfillment of his mission, visits the Vatican State, that is to say, that neutral section of Rome which can be reached only through the territory of Italy, now at war with America. And finally the American diplomat thanks the enemy power for the kindnesses shown him. The man in the street may well ask himself, what do friend and enemy really mean?

Again, the Taylor visit borders on the extraordinary when one considers the varying degrees of value attached to it by political observers. Some, among them a few Vatican groups, treat the visit as a mere bagatelle, attributing to it merely the character of an "acte de presence"; others outdo themselves in interpreting it as of supreme political importance. Seldom has so dense a cloud of rumors darkened the political atmosphere of the Vatican as today, after the Taylor visit. The whole gamut of possible and impossible interpretations has been run-- from the wishful thinking of an American-Vatican peace move up to the naive or antiquated idea that an ambassador must visit his official residence on certain fixed days under penalty of being deprived of his position. In the present case it is very hard even for one acquainted with the Vatican environment not to lose his orientation between the interpretations that are without background and those that are without foundation. Only a forceful appeal to sound common sense can unravel the confusion thrown over the facts by surmises, reports, information, rumors and explanations.

No man, least of all a man in delicate health like Taylor, is going to undertake a long, ceremonious and dangerous journey from America to the Vatican State in war time, if there is nothing of importance at stake. The position of the Pope as the spiritual head of 400 million people is undoubtedly important for the United States. Moreover, one may admit the well-founded view, that the United States is courting the Pope's favor; if it could one day announce to

the world that Pius XII is on its side, its position in the war would be tremendously helped. However, the courteous welcome extended by Italy to Ambassador Taylor shows that the Fascist Government is absolutely convinced that any such attempt to win the favor of the Pope is doomed to failure; otherwise, it would have been very easy to prevent Taylor's plane from landing on Italian soil. The Italian welcome also makes this clear, namely, that there was no fear in Rome of any attempt on Taylor's part to discover the war condition of the country. Ambassador Taylor could see, and above all could hear what is taking place in Italy, and what Italy's present condition is. That all this should be permitted by Italy is proof of the confidence which the Fascist Government has in its own affairs.

While the thesis that Taylor wished to try to bring the Pope to take sides seems weak, it is not to be excluded that the United States, through Taylor, has given assurances to the Holy See in regard to recognizing Vatican interests in the United States, and, as far as their influence goes, also in the Central American countries. In return for this proposed policy, America may have asked the Holy See, in the matter of the November elections in the United States, to bring the Catholic voters, who carry considerable weight, to cast their ballots in favor of the Government. Finally Taylor may have expressed the earnest wish that the Pope fill the vacant Cardinalitial sees in the United States, and, in view of the increasing importance of Catholicism in America, create new ones.

No one can yet know the attitude taken by the Pope in regard to the problems stated. On the other hand, one may speak with considerable assurance of the wishes expressed by the Holy See: the request, perhaps, that the United States remove the obstacles which for so long she has placed in the way of Catholic missions to the advantage of Protestant missions; the suggestion to influence the Chinese Government of Chung-King to adopt an attitude favorable to Catholicism, especially as the present relations between the Vatican and Japan show the possibility of an understanding between the Catholic West and the Far East.

Summing up we may say that the Taylor visit has not been of such world-revolutionary importance as some assume, nor so unimportant as others assert. The conversations and discussions were confined substantially to Vatican-American relations almost exclusively. Italy must have been previously persuaded of this; otherwise, she would not have extended to Roosevelt's Ambassador the friendly escort to the Vatican State.

--Der Bund, Bern, Switzerland,
October 2, 1942

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE

11d Regent Street,
London, S.W.1.

123/60

11th August, 1942.

Dear Mr. Myron Taylor,

As I think I mentioned in a previous letter I have been giving considerable thought to refugee problems after the War and some weeks ago I finished a Memorandum on the subject giving my own personal and provisional ideas. I enclose a copy of the Memorandum. I would emphasize that the views expressed are my own and owe nothing to any official suggestion.

You will see that I have not written either as Director of the Intergovernmental Committee or as High Commissioner under the League of Nations. This was deliberate. First, I did not wish to embarrass either body and, second, it seemed to me that there would have to be a lot of preliminary work before a concrete scheme would be ready for consideration, if necessary, by either of the two international bodies now interested in refugees.

The first step, as it appeared to me was to get your Government and the British Government thinking about the question with the view of agreement being reached on general lines of policy, for there can be no doubt that a solution depends primarily on such agreement.

When I had finished the Memorandum, I therefore got into touch with the British Foreign Office, on the one hand, and Mr. Winant, on the other. The Foreign Office, as you know, is the Department of the British Government immediately concerned, but other departments are closely interested and have to be consulted before proposals could be presented by the Foreign Office to the British Government even for their provisional consideration.

So far all that has happened is that the Foreign Office has now taken up the general question of refugee problems after the War (not necessarily on the lines of my Memorandum), and will, I hope, be soon in a position to consult other departments.

I have had the advantage of two talks with Mr. Winant to whom I sent a copy of the Memorandum. Mr. Winant is very keenly interested in the subject and although, of course, he is not in any way committed to any of the views expressed by me, he was good enough to say that in writing to you I could mention that he is in agreement with the general lines of my Memorandum. In fact he himself suggested that I should write to you, enlisting your help and seeking your advice.

I should indeed have sent you a copy when I had finished the Memorandum, but before I sent copies to you, to Lord Winterton and to the Secretary General of the League for his
information

The Hon. Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

information, I wished to make sure that there was nothing in it to which fundamental objection would be made by Mr. Winant or the Foreign Office, and, that whatever might be the final decisions, the Memorandum furnished a basis for examination. I have not had a personal discussion with Lord Winterton, but I have heard that he is in general agreement with the Memorandum as a line of approach to the problem.

The position is thus that I have started the ball rolling and am naturally anxious that it should go on rolling in the right direction.

2. I have myself no doubt about the main proposition set forth in the Memorandum, namely that there must be an International Refugee Authority to deal with "long term problems" concerning refugees, and that if it is to achieve success this body must have wide functions and be adequately financed. I am also clear about maintaining the distinction between the "short term problems of relief" and the "long term problems of refugees". I do not regard the actual setting up of the Refugee Authority as a matter of immediate urgency. So long as the War continues the opportunities of tackling the refugee problem as a whole are limited, and the High Commissioner of the League, on the one hand, and the Intergovernmental Committee, on the other, can deal with current problems within the limits which the War prescribes.

It is however essential that the U.S.A. Government and the British Government should agree in the first place, and later obtain the agreement of other Governments concerned, regarding the machinery to deal with the post-war problems of refugees and the general lines of policy to be pursued, so that when the proper time arrives there will be no delay in bringing the machinery into being.

3. When the two Governments mainly concerned have each been able to give thought to the question, there will, I imagine, have to be discussions between their Representatives either in Washington or in London. If I can assist these discussions in any way, I shall, of course, be delighted to do so.

Meanwhile, may I beg your help first in forming your own opinion as to whether the Memorandum, as a whole, is a suitable basis for examination, and second, if you think it is, in bringing it, unofficially, to the notice of the State Department, not with the view, of course, to the acceptance of the principles stated in it, but so that your Government may, if it has not already done so, engage in the preliminary examination of problems that are likely to arise and of the means of solving them. I know of course that the question of "short term relief" has already been taken up, but such information as I have, suggests that the same thought has not been given to the "long term question".

With kind regards

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) HERBERT EMERSON

1. Introductory.

Attempts at the present time to make an estimate of the refugee problem after the war, and to suggest measures for dealing with it, must obviously be of a provisional character. Exact information regarding the existing position is not obtainable; the situation changes almost from day to day, and will continue to change for some time after hostilities cease. Any appreciation must therefore be not only tentative, but to a large extent hypothetical in character. In some respects it will certainly be falsified by events. None the less, there are some aspects which can now be envisaged, while the consideration of certain principles at this stage may avoid confusion and mistakes later on. It therefore seems desirable, in spite of the very large element of uncertainty, to attempt some analysis of the very complicated questions that are likely to arise, and to suggest some principles to be observed in their solution. These must assume that the victory of the Allies will be complete, so that they are able to impose the terms of settlement. It is on this basis that I have proceeded. For convenience of treatment it is further assumed that the boundaries of States after the war will be the pre-war boundaries. Unless it is otherwise clear from the context, references to countries are to them as they were before the war.

2. Pre-war Groups of Refugees.

In September 1939 the three main groups of refugees were the following:

- (a) The Hansen refugees, who comprise
 - (i) Russians,
 - (ii) Armenians,
 - (iii) Refugees from the Saar;
- (b) Refugees from Spain;
- (c) Refugees who had to flee from Greater Germany owing to political, racial or religious persecution.

Of the Hansen group, the Russians and Armenians are static, in the sense that they had been settled for many years in the countries of asylum. So far, the war has not appreciably affected this outstanding feature.

The refugees from Spain were those who fled from that country after the Civil War and obtained asylum elsewhere, the great majority in France. They included some Germans, Austrians and Czechs who had fought in the International Brigade, and who come properly under the third group. Practically all the remainder were of Spanish nationality. In September 1939, too short a period had elapsed since the end of the Civil War to regard these as permanent or even long-term refugees. It was hoped that many of them would be able to return to Spain, and this in fact has happened. So far as numbers are concerned, the problems of this group are far less formidable than when war broke out. It is still too early to regard as long-term refugees all those who are still in countries of temporary refuge.

The third group, that of refugees from Greater Germany, constituted the main pre-war problem. They included three

classes, which, however, sometimes overlap, namely,

- (i) those who had to flee for political reasons;
- (ii) those who were the victims of religious persecution, e.g. Protestants and Catholics;
- (iii) the Jews as defined by the Nuremberg Laws.

The last class was by far the most numerous, and probably accounted for ninety per cent of the total.

If we regard as refugees only those who had left Greater Germany before the war, the position has worsened. For, while there has been some emigration during the war to countries of permanent settlement, this has been more than offset by the fate of those who were caught when the Germans occupied the countries of temporary asylum. If we take a broader view of the position, and look at the forces responsible for this problem, then there has been very grave and widespread deterioration. Not only has the policy of elimination of the Jews from Germany been ruthlessly pursued, but their persecution has been extended to occupied territory, and has been actively encouraged and followed in countries in alliance with Germany. So far as can be foreseen, the Jewish refugee problem will be the most difficult, both as regards numbers and remedies.

3. Movement of Populations.

The cessation of hostilities will find millions of people away from their own countries. Apart from the forces fighting in the field or on the seas, there will be numerous groups to whom the general term "displaced persons" may be given. Included in these groups are the following:

- (a) those who have left their own country on account of political, racial or religious persecution, either before or during the war, and have obtained temporary asylum in other countries;
- (b) those transferred from one area to a different area, in another country, on a basis intended to be permanent, e.g., Germans from the Baltic States transferred to former Western Poland;
- (c) persons forcibly deported to places outside their own countries, e.g. Jews from Germany to Eastern Poland;
- (d) those who have fled from war zones to places outside their own territory;
- (e) persons employed on labour outside their own country;
- (f) prisoners of war.

In addition there will be many who, although in their own country, are away from their own homes. In many cases, families will have been broken up, and the members unable to trace their relatives. There will be great physical distress in most of the countries of Europe, and this will extend to nationals as well as to strangers. At this stage, except for one or two clearly defined groups, it will not be possible to distinguish between those able to return

to their homes and those who have to find new homes, in other countries. That is to say, it will not be practicable at first to isolate the long-term problem, nor is it desirable that the attempt should be made prematurely. The object should be to get back to their own countries, and within them to their own homes, as many persons as possible who are willing and able to return, within the least possible time. From the outset, the goal should be to confine the long-term problem within the least compass that is practicable. Otherwise, the problem will be intractable and insoluble. Accordingly, the policy should be to discourage exaggeration of the long-term problem, to be reluctant to accept individuals as permanently displaced from their own countries until it is clear that this in fact is the position, and to distinguish clearly between the ephemeral problems and those which will be of a more enduring character. In this connection, it is unfortunate that the term "refugee" is often used not only to denote the person who, for permanent reasons, is unable to return to his own country, but also the person who, owing to temporary causes, is unable to make his way back. It is the members of the former class who properly come within the meaning of the term "refugee", and for whose problem a special agency is particularly necessary. Generally, the obstacles to their return to their own country are not physical, but arise either from the system or policy of government which practices various forms of political, religious or racial persecution; or from changes in the boundaries of States as a result of military conquest. Since it is difficult to find suitable words which will describe exactly members of these two groups, and which will at the same time differentiate between them, I shall regard them as all coming within the term "displaced persons" and distinguish between them as "short-term refugees", and "long-term refugees" respectively. The principles to which I attach great importance are the following:

- (1) that a clear distinction should be kept between the short-term problems and the long-term problems;
- (2) that the aim from the outset should be to get persons back to their own countries;
- (3) that groups of persons should not be recognized as long-term refugees until it is clear from the facts that they will have to be treated as such.

4. Immediate Measures following the Cessation of Hostilities.

A matter requiring immediate action on the cessation of hostilities will be the relief of physical distress, -- the provision of food, clothing, medical supplies, housing, etc. In some countries, those in need of relief will embrace all sections of the population, nationals as well as displaced persons, including most of the classes of displaced persons mentioned in paragraph 3 above. The Governments of the countries concerned, if there are any Governments, may at first not have the organization or the resources adequately to perform the functions of physical relief without outside assistance. There will have to be an external agency, and I understand that in this connection plans are already under

consideration

- 4 -

consideration for an Inter-Allied Relief Organization, which, either independently or in cooperation with the Government concerned as circumstances may permit, will undertake relief measures. In the early days a great deal of the work will probably have to be done by the military. I would urge that, during this initial period, no distinction should be made for relief purposes between nationals and strangers, whether the latter are temporarily displaced or prima facie long-term refugees. The standards of relief should be the same, and the responsibility should be vested in a single agency. To attempt to set up one authority for the purpose of relief for nationals and another for non-nationals would lead to confusion, conflict, and variation in standards, and would cause a great deal of unnecessary suffering. Still more confusion would result if attempts are made at this stage to distinguish for purposes of relief between short-term and long-term refugees.

Simultaneously with the relief of distress, there will be the movement of displaced persons back to their own countries or homes. This will require a great deal of organization in the countries of departure and of arrival, and will involve the efficient and economical employment of means of transport, which in the early stages will in some countries be under the control of the military. This should again be the responsibility of a sole authority, namely, the agency primarily responsible for the relief of distress. Competition between independent authorities will result in inefficiency and muddle.

5. Gradual Clarification of the Problems.

The process of getting the displaced population back to their own countries and their own homes will obviously take a considerable time. It may occupy two or three years. Meanwhile, many of them, indeed most of them, will be without normal employment, and unless provision is made, they will tend to wander aimlessly from place to place. It will almost certainly be necessary to establish refugee camps, and if these can be associated with employment on public works, e.g., reconditioning of areas damaged during the war, so much the better. Arrangements will also have to be made for the education and the welfare of children, for medical relief, recreation, etc., -- not on a permanent scale, but on a scale sufficient to tide over the transitional period. This period will not come to a close so long as there remains a considerable number of displaced persons wishing to get back to their own countries but unable to do so for physical reasons. The primary responsibility for coping with and disposing of this ephemeral problem should be that of the Allied Relief Organization, working in close concert with the Governments concerned.

Meanwhile, the facts of the long-term problem will continuously be revealed. Some groups, e.g., Nansen refugees, will from the outset come within the long-term category. Others will emerge as future conditions in their own countries of origin become more clear, and as the attitude of the refugees themselves becomes manifest. An important factor which will influence this attitude will be the alternatives open to them if they do not return to their own countries. For instance, if there are fairly wide facilities for permanent emigration, many will prefer to mark time rather than to return. If, on the other hand, there are few open doors,

the reluctance to go back will be less marked. These factors will not be evident for some time, and this is a further reason against premature assumptions regarding the long-term character of particular problems. The problems of the long-term groups will differ in many respects from those of the short-term. Many of these problems will be outside the scope of the Allied relief organization, and it will be essential to have an international refugee authority competent to deal with them. I discuss this question below.

6. Existing International Refugee Organizations.

There are at present two international refugee organizations, namely, the Intergovernmental Committee and the High Commission for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations. The Intergovernmental Committee was brought into being at the Conference held at Evian in July 1938, which was itself due to the initiative of Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America. Its specific object was to find a solution of the involuntary emigration of nationals from Greater Germany by a long-term programme to be arranged, in collaboration with the German Government, within the framework of the existing immigration laws and practices of the Governments concerned.

It was hoped that the cooperation of the German Government would result in an orderly system of emigration, and that its finance would be largely provided from the assets of the emigrants themselves. Early in 1939 a provisional arrangement was reached with the German Government, but the details were not finally completed before the outbreak of war. In the meantime the Committee had been able to obtain facilities for emigration from several of the Governments participating in the Committee. In the late summer of 1939 a Coordinating Foundation was formed, under its auspices, which included among its objects cooperation with the Intergovernmental Committee, with the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and with the voluntary organizations, to assist in the orderly emigration of involuntary migrants and the protection and transfer of their property, and to investigate the possibilities of large-scale settlement and to assist in the work of settlement. The Foundation had been in existence only a short time when war broke out, and it was in fact unable to make practical progress with the objects for which it was formed. Its success in any case depended on factors which will either not exist after the war, or will not be operative to the same extent as when the Foundation was formed in 1939. For instance, it was presumed that there would be close cooperation between it and an internal body in Germany which would administer for the benefit of refugees the property from which they were expropriated. It was also assumed that large funds would be available from private sources, and that it would be possible to carry out large-scale settlements. Post-war conditions will be entirely different, and the new problem will have to be tackled in accordance with the changed facts.

The large part which the League of Nations has taken since the last war in the solution or relief of refugee problems is described at length in Sir John Hope Simpson's survey of the Refugee Problem. Briefly, it may be said that, since Dr. Nansen accepted the appointment of High Commissioner in 1921, there has been no time when the League has not had definite responsibilities for particular groups of refugees. The responsibilities and the groups have varied, but it has a continuous record of refugee service and experience. It has

consistently given special attention to the political and legal protection by it of those groups which from time to time have been brought within its mandate. While acting as a coordinating agency, it has been reluctant to allocate League funds for relief and settlement; but exceptions have been made to its general policy in this respect. In particular cases it has undertaken or financed ad hoc schemes of settlement, and it has made specific allocations towards emergency relief. It was under the auspices of the League that the necessary loans were raised for the settlement of Bulgarian and Greek refugees.

In its present form, the High Commission for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations was established by a resolution of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations (September 1938). The main functions, as defined by that resolution, are the following:

To provide for the political and legal protection of refugees;

To superintend the entry into force and the application of the legal status of refugees, as defined more particularly in the Conventions of October 28th 1933 and February 10th 1938;

To facilitate the coordination of humanitarian assistance;

To assist the Governments and private organizations in their efforts to promote emigration and permanent settlement.

The groups that come within the mandate of the Commission are the following:

- (a) the Nansen refugees;
- (b) refugees from Greater Germany, including the Sudetenland.

The annual reports describe the activities of the Commission during the war.

There are certain characteristics common to the two existing international bodies:

- (1) Jurisdiction is limited to specific groups of refugees;
- (2) Neither body is undertaking any financial responsibility for the relief of distress among refugees;
- (3) Neither body is undertaking any financial responsibility for emigration of refugees, or for their settlement.

The budgetary position of both bodies has been limited to meeting administrative expenses, namely, the salaries of staff, office expenses and travelling allowances, and, in the case of the Intergovernmental Committee, the cost of meetings of the Committee. Following the necessary suspension of most of its activities during the war, the administrative charges of the Intergovernmental Committee have been reduced to the minimum. The Director (myself) works in an honorary capacity, with headquarters in London and with a staff of one personal secretary only. The Secretary of the Committee is in Washington, but his pay is not a charge on the Committee.

The High Commissioner for Refugees is directly responsible to the Assembly of the League. His headquarters are in London, where he is assisted by a Deputy High Commissioner and a staff of a Registrar, a personal secretary and two assistants, with an office-keeper. Previous to the war, the High Commissioner had representatives in Belgium, France, Greece, Lithuania, Roumania and Yugoslavia, who were, however, concerned only with the group of Nansen refugees. They worked either in an honorary capacity, or at a comparatively low salary, their office expenses being met out of the budget of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner has also a small humanitarian fund. No contribution is made towards it from League funds, and it can be used only for the benefit of Nansen Refugees.

7. Functions of an International Refugee Authority.

Before considering the constitution of an international organization competent to deal with post-war refugee problems, some of the functions of such a body may be briefly stated. It would consider and formulate broad principles of policy. It would be fully and continuously informed of the facts of the changing situation relating to refugees, so that it could determine the long-term groups coming within its jurisdiction. Its primary object would be to find a permanent and complete solution for such groups. This would involve their political and legal protection, the organization and coordination of humanitarian assistance, whether from international, State or private funds, the promotion of measures to secure the rehabilitation and economic independence of the refugees concerned, by return to their own countries, absorption within the country of refuge, normal emigration to other countries, or large-scale settlement. In brief, the international organization would be concerned directly or indirectly with all matters affecting the refugees within its mandate, except in so far as particular matters were the responsibility of some other international body. It might also be the most suitable body to deal with schemes relating to short-term refugees requiring international assistance and where the carrying out of such schemes was likely to be spread over a considerable period. Not least, it should be able to exercise a powerful influence in discouraging the kind of action which has in the past been responsible for the creation of large groups of stateless persons.

It is clear that these objects can only be achieved if the international organization has the active support and good will of the participating States, is so organized as efficiently to carry out its duties, and has therefor adequate funds under its control. There must be close contact between its officers and the Governments of the countries most closely concerned. There must be a headquarters staff competent to deal with general questions, and there must be an executive staff able to deal with the problems of each group as a whole, and also with the problems of that group within a particular country. The whole must be under the control of an administrative head, who will keep his finger on the pulse and will be responsible to the international refugee authority for the proper execution of its policy.

Vertically there will be different groups, some large and some small, of long-term refugees. Horizontally there will be dispersal of members of the same group over a number of countries.

The vertical division will require that under the general control of the Director-General there should be Directors responsible for the various groups, namely, a Director in charge of a single group, where this is sufficiently important fully to occupy his time, or a Director in charge of several small groups, where they can be combined for this purpose with economy and efficiency. The Director for a group would deal with problems relating to that group, in whatever countries the members of the group may be.

The horizontal division due to the dispersal of refugees over many countries necessitates the appointment of a local representative in each country where the number of refugees so requires. Perhaps the most important of his functions would be the political and legal protection of the refugees, work which involves close and friendly relations with the Government concerned. For this reason, it is necessary that the local representative should be carefully selected, that he should be a person of sufficient standing to command respect, and that he should therefore be adequately paid for his services. There is, however, no reason why the vertical division should automatically be applied to representatives. It might happen that in the same country there were two groups, each of which would involve the full-time services of a representative. In that case there should be two representatives, one for each group, but ordinarily a single representative should be able to watch the interests of all groups in his country, and this should be the normal arrangement. He should be appointed by and be the representative of the Director-General, but should be responsible to the group Director for work connected with that group.

Each Director will have to do a considerable amount of touring, so as to maintain personal relations with the Governments concerned, and also to obtain personal knowledge of the conditions of the group for which he is responsible in different countries. The Director-General will not be able to tour on the same scale, but he should be able to make visits where personal contacts or knowledge are clearly needed. Special missions may be necessary to countries of emigration and settlement. These could be appointed as required, under the general control of the Director-General. Since economic conditions will have a profound bearing on the solution of the problem, the organization must have access to the best advice obtainable. Many questions, some of them of a difficult character, will arise regarding employment, but this side of the question could best be dealt with by very close cooperation between the refugee organization and the International Labour Office.

8. Constitution of an International Refugee Authority.

It is clear that neither of the two existing international organizations is competent in its present form to deal efficiently with post-war problems. Either could, however, be adapted and developed for the purpose. It would be premature in the present state of uncertainty to make any suggestion as to which would be the more suitable. It is sufficient to say that, if a solution of the refugee problem is to be found, there must be an international body able to carry out the duties briefly outlined in the preceding paragraph, and that it must have the status and resources necessary

for

for its task. For convenience, I will refer to this organization as the International Refugee Authority. The following conditions should be satisfied:

- (1) The Authority must be thoroughly representative. The participating Governments should include
 - (a) those of the countries in which a refugee problem has originated;
 - (b) the countries of temporary asylum;
 - (c) the countries of permanent settlement or emigration;
 - (d) those countries which are willing to assist financially towards a general solution.

Since practically every country comes under one or other of these three categories, there is in fact no limit to State membership. It will not, however, be necessary, and may not be feasible, to secure at once complete representation.

- (2) It is essential to success that the Authority should have the active support of the leading Powers.
- (3) The Authority should include an adequate number of representatives of the International Labour Office, who, for this purpose, would be representatives of the Office, and not of any particular country.
- (4) While the full body should lay down general lines of policy, it should delegate freely its powers to a small Council, on which the I.L.O. should be represented.
- (5) The primary concern of the Authority should be with the long-term refugee, although during the transitional period before the groups become clearly defined, it may properly, and indeed may have to, concern itself with groups which cannot be definitely and finally placed in this category.
- (6) So far, at any rate, as Europe is concerned, it should include in its mandate all long-term groups. Although the character of the problem, and the nature of the solution, will no doubt vary from group to group, there will be many features which are common to all, and efficiency and economy will be best served if there is a single authority embracing all groups.
- (7) The Authority may also undertake the execution of long-term schemes relating to short-term refugees who have returned to their own country.
- (8) The form of the organization is as follows:

INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AUTHORITY

Executive Council

Director-General

Adminis- trative	Represent- tives in various countries	Finance	Statistical	Emigration and Settle- ment	Special Mis- sions and Undertakings
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Director Group A	Director Group B	Director Group (C & D)
Represent- ative (in so far as his work relates to Group A)	Represent- ative (in so far as his work relates to Group B)	Represent- ative (in so far as his work relates to Group C & D)

The above lay-out is on the assumption that the Refugee Authority will be independent and self-contained. It might, however, be part of an international body concerned with functions of a much wider character, as is at present the case with the High Commission acting under the League of Nations. Indeed, if there is such a body after the war which is thoroughly representative, it would be clearly desirable that the Refugee Authority should come within the general framework. The above scheme could, of course, be adapted accordingly. Further, the plan represents a conception of the probable requirements. In some respects it may overstate the requirements immediately after the war; in others, it may understate them. I would certainly deprecate the creation of machinery on an extravagant scale in excess of actual needs, and would prefer to see development of the essential machinery as the needs become manifest. Subject to this, I believe that the proposals are along the right lines.

9. Centrifugal Movements.

The discussion so far has assumed two main classes of displaced persons, the first consisting of those, temporarily severed from their own countries, who are able and willing to return, and the second consisting of those unable to return for other than physical reasons. In forecasting the post-war situation there is a third class to be considered, that of potential refugees, namely, persons who, on the conclusion of hostilities, are in their own countries, but who are unwilling to stay there. There may be an outward as well as an inward movement. This is particularly so in the case of the Jewish nationals of the central and eastern countries of Europe. Horrified by the conditions in which the Jews concerned now exist, there are many who take the view that, with few exceptions, the countries of Europe will not be places in which Jews can continue to live. There is a school of thought which contemplates an exodus on a scale which may run into millions.

In many European countries there is no security of life and property for Jews, and it is undoubtedly the fact that there are many hundreds of thousands of Jews who, if they were free agents, would flee tomorrow from the appalling persecution, torture and humiliation to which they are subject in countries allied with or occupied by Germany. The forces which create refugees in the mass are intensively active over the greater part of Europe, and their inevitable tendency is to encourage an outrush of Jews if and when this becomes possible. If a solution is to be found of the refugee problem, it is absolutely essential that not only should a stampede of this character not take place, but that the centrifugal movement should be actively discouraged and kept within the smallest practical volume. This is as important to the ultimate interests of the Jews as to an orderly solution of the whole refugee question. From the Jewish point of view, it would be suicidal for them to acquiesce in the doctrine that a Government, by a calculated policy of persecution and oppression, should be allowed to divest itself of a particular class of its nationals. It would be a triumph for the Nazi policy, and if other countries acquiesced, it would equally be a triumph for the policy of blackmail by which Germany was able to give widespread effect to its policy before the war. It is extremely improbable that other countries will acquiesce. Many have been willing in the past to give asylum to the victims of Nazi oppression, and it is hoped that, within limits, they will be willing to do so after the war. But good will and humanity will be complicated by economic factors, and any attempt to flood other countries with a large number of Jews would tend to produce in those countries the same policy of the closed door. There would be no widespread extension of anti-semitic feeling. The solution does not lie in this direction.

If, on the other hand, Jews are to continue to live in the European countries of their nationality, and if other States are to be protected against the economic and political disturbance which large incursions would involve, then there must be adequate guarantees for the safety and protection of life and property, for the restitution of their rights as citizens, and for the peaceful enjoyment of those rights. Discriminatory legislation must be annulled, and an end put to administrative measures of discrimination. These guarantees must be part of the peace treaty or equivalent settlement, and they must be backed by the necessary sanctions. Without this, not only will the immediate post-war situation be incapable of control, but the conditions created by Germany from 1933 until the present time will be perpetuated there and in other countries, and the Jewish refugee problem will become insoluble and permanent.

The terms of the peace settlement, far-reaching as they must be, will not by themselves restore at once the confidence of the Jews, or automatically change the feelings of whole populations which have been taught to loathe the Jew and everything connected with him. But they will help to tide over the immediate crisis, and will give time in which ideas of toleration, humanity and fair play can be revived. In some countries, France for instance, the persecution of minorities is completely alien to national traditions, and the return of old ideas should not be long delayed. In other countries, the process will be more difficult and the period more prolonged. The Jews as a community will be able to assist in the recovery. It is right that they should do so. For if they are guaranteed the enjoyment of full citizens'

rights,

rights, and these guarantees are backed by international sanctions, they must themselves accept the consequential obligations of citizens, and strive to develop along lines which will attenuate the more common causes of friction. Much thought is being given by Jews themselves to measures designed to this end. Among them is a broadening of the economic foundations of the community, -- less concentration in particular professions, trades and callings, and a healthier distribution of the population between urban and rural areas. This is as large a part of the long-term solution as is the international protection of minority rights.

10. Some Centrifugal Movement Unavoidable.

In laying emphasis on the necessity of discouraging centrifugal movements of nationals from their own countries, I refer to the emergency period following the war, before the forces which govern migration assume a more or less normal character. Restraints on migration have so complicated the refugee problem in the past that I should be the last to suggest that greater rigour should be a permanent feature of post-war conditions. But time must be given for the creation of more or less stable conditions in countries both of departure and reception, before ordinary migration can be resumed on a considerable scale.

Even during the emergency period there must be some centrifugal movement. Not the least cruelty of Nazi persecution is the break-up of families that it has caused. Children are separated from their parents, husbands from their wives, mothers from their children. Before the war the deliberate policy of the Nazis was to force out the men from Germany so that they could prepare a home in some other country for their wives and children. The first desire of wives and children in German or German-occupied territory will be to join their husbands or parents, and where the husband or the father has made a permanent home for himself elsewhere and is able to support his family, it is right, alike from the economic and humanitarian points of view, that reunion should be brought about as soon as practicable. There will be other cases where, on the particular merits, exceptions should be made even during the emergency period to the principle of discouraging centrifugal movements, but they should be regarded as exceptions to the normal policy.

I have dwelt on the case of the Jews because it is at present the outstanding example. But the same principles should apply to other communities and groups. Control must be exercised for some time after the cessation of hostilities over the exodus of nationals from their own countries, until the normal ebb and flow of migration comes into operation.

11. Methods of Permanent Settlement.

Whatever measures, however, may be taken to mitigate the problem and to reduce it to manageable proportions, there will be a large number of stateless persons or of nationals unwilling or unable to return to their own countries, but who have failed to find a permanent home and livelihood elsewhere. The groups to which they belong will be the long-term refugee groups. The ultimate goal of the International

Refugee Authority will be to find permanent homes, permanent livelihood and a nationality for these persons. Other activities of the Authority, many as they will be, are ancillary to this end. There are the following methods by which this goal can be attained:

- (a) Return of individuals to the country of origin.
- (b) Absorption in the countries of temporary asylum.
- (c) Emigration to other countries by infiltration.
- (d) Emigration to other countries for the purpose of large-scale settlements.

I will deal briefly with these in turn.

(a) Return to the country of origin. Something has already been said about this subject. Further, what has been said about the measures necessary to keep potential refugees within their own countries applies with still greater force to those who have fled elsewhere. Unless conditions are such as will ensure them the rights of full citizenship they will not be persuaded to return. Compulsory repatriation is unlikely to be a practical measure. Repatriation should be on a voluntary basis, and its extent will depend on the confidence felt by refugees themselves in the stability of conditions in their own country.

(b) Absorption in the countries of temporary asylum. The question of absorption will obviously be a difficult one after the war. Much will depend on the condition of the labour market. If employment is plentiful there will be less opposition to the naturalization and absorption of refugees, but if there is unemployment Governments will find it difficult to approve a policy which might involve demobilized nationals remaining out of work while foreigners were allowed to compete in the labour market. Generally, therefore, there is likely to be a reluctance to approve naturalization in considerable numbers until the economic position becomes clarified. A strong case can, however, be made for those refugees who have joined the military forces of the country of asylum. They should certainly be given priority of naturalization in comparison with other refugees, and it is to be hoped that it will be possible to give the opportunity of naturalization to all of them. On the general case, it has to be remembered that there may be great delay in finding permanent homes for temporary migrants, that in the meantime they will have to be maintained if employment is not available and that the greater part of the cost of maintenance, if not the whole, will fall on the state. It is demoralizing to persons to be kept indefinitely in a state of uncertainty, and if in the long run no outlet is found for them by emigration, the State is the worse off by having kept them in suspense. While, therefore, some delay may be necessary (except, it is hoped, as regards members of the military forces) before decisions are reached regarding absorption and naturalization, it is most desirable that decisions should not be delayed too long, and that the policy pursued should be as liberal as economic conditions permit. Twenty-three years after the end of the last war, there are still thousands of stateless

Nansen refugees who have lived for many years in the same country of adoption, have found permanent employment there, are not likely to emigrate, but who are still unable to secure naturalization. It is to no one's interest that the same should happen to refugees after the present war, for the State suffers as much as the refugee when it puts off taking action in accordance with the manifest facts.

(c) Emigration to other countries by infiltration.

Emigration by infiltration is the normal and by far the most important method of disposal. In ordinary circumstances it provides for the overflow of populations by spreading it over countries where it can be economically provided for with benefit to all concerned. In the past, emigration on a large scale to Northern America has prevented what would otherwise have been troublesome refugee problems. Restrictions on immigration, by quota or otherwise, have very greatly reduced the effectiveness of this safety-valve, and unless there are wide changes in this policy, infiltration after the war will still be conditioned by the pre-war restrictions and safeguards imposed by the laws of immigration of the receiving countries. None the less, even before the war, a great deal was achieved in this respect. In August 1939 it was estimated that 400,000 refugees from Nazi oppression had left Germany, of whom 244,000 had been permanently settled. At least eighty-five per cent of the latter had been placed by infiltration. Moreover, as the number of persons permanently settled increases, the difficulties of placing the rest tend progressively to decrease, other things being equal. The early stages include comparatively few who can go to close relations already permanently established, but as the earlier settlers establish themselves, they are able to receive and provide for their relatives.

The war has inevitably caused special restrictions and limitations to be imposed in many countries on immigration, and has also often resulted in the introduction of special and sometimes lengthy procedure. The sooner these war restrictions can be removed after the war, the better, so that a steady and orderly flow of emigrants can be resumed. At the same time, it will be an important duty of the Refugee Authority, assisted in this respect by some of the voluntary organizations, to persuade the Governments of suitable countries of reception to adopt a liberal policy, to try to provide the type of refugee suited to local conditions, and to fit others by training for their new life.

In this connection, there may be opportunities in Europe which did not exist before the war. Pestilence, famine and the ravages of war may so reduce the population in some areas as to make an influx of newcomers almost an economic necessity. One task of the Refugee Authority will be to ascertain and develop these opportunities.

(d) The last method is by emigration to other countries for the purpose of large-scale settlement. Before the war surveys of various areas of potential settlement were carried out. These included British Guiana, Northern Rhodesia, San Domingo

and

and Mindanao in the Philippine Islands. Less complete enquiries were made regarding a number of other areas. A scheme for a refugee settlement in British Guiana, to be backed by certain financial assistance from the British Government, had reached an advanced stage, when war intervened, and for the time being at any rate the scheme had to be abandoned. The same was true of Mindanao. As regards Northern Rhodesia, the estimated cost of settlement was so high, and its potential scope so small, that it was hardly worth pursuing. In San Domingo, on the other hand, a very liberal agreement under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Committee was concluded between the Dominican Republic and the Dominican Republic Settlement Association, a body set up for the purpose and financed from various sources in the U.S.A. The initial object of the Association is to establish a pioneer settlement of five hundred families, in order to determine one way or another whether persons of Central European origin can become self-supporting under sub-tropical conditions in an agricultural settlement combining certain industries closely related to agriculture. The scheme is still proceeding, and by September 1941, 413 settlers were at Sosue. The Dominican Republic Settlement Association has devoted much thought and care to the settlement, and has done a good deal of preliminary work in the breaking up of land, the erection of farm and other buildings, the introduction of new crops, and the physical health of the settlers. So far as any forecast can be made, the present indications are that the prospects of success are not unfavourable, provided that sufficient capital is available to meet the very considerable overhead charges during the period of experimentation in commercial crops before the settlement becomes self-supporting. But as yet no positive answer can be given either on the economic aspect of the experiment, or on the question as to whether Europeans can successfully carry out agricultural work in sub-tropical conditions.

Before the war it was fairly clear that the scope of large-scale settlement was limited. The first difficulty is that of finance. The cost per family is high, and there is usually an initial period of several years before the settler becomes self-supporting. Even after this he can only repay the capital spent on his behalf over a long period of years, and there is always the very real danger of overloading him with a burden of long-term debt. On the other hand, if he does not make a considerable contribution towards this capital expenditure, the cost becomes prohibitive. Again, the only practical form of settlement dealing with large numbers is agricultural, associated in some cases with allied industries. As a producer of primary products, the settler is dependent on world markets, and since the last war, the experience of agricultural producers has fluctuated between a short boom and a long and very deep depression. It is quite impossible to forecast what may happen to primary producers after the present war. Some years may intervene before a safe estimate can be made. At all events, there will be great uncertainty for some time. It will be unsafe to embark on big schemes of land settlement without obtaining the best advice obtainable, and it may be doubted whether the economist will be able to give a positive opinion. Two conditions will most probably have to be satisfied: first, a low capital cost per family; and second, the careful selection as settlers of persons who are hereditary agriculturalists, or who have had a very thorough training. The transfer of peasants from one European area to another may, however, be a practical proposition, when it would not be feasible to transfer refugees with no agricultural traditions to countries where the climate

and other conditions are different from those to which they have been accustomed. While, therefore, big-scale settlement can make a contribution to the general solution, I am very doubtful whether, during the years immediately following the war, it can play a substantial part, except in the case of peasant refugees. So far as Jews are concerned, it must certainly be preceded by a thorough training, and accompanied by a determination to stick to the land.

An important exception must be made in the case of settlement in Palestine. There the scope is not confined to agricultural settlement, and even in the agricultural field religious and racial fervour, supported by first-class organisation, has achieved a very large measure of success. Finance hitherto has not been a difficulty, since the community as a whole has been willing to provide the necessary funds on a very generous scale, and will no doubt be willing to do so in the future. The difficulty in Palestine arises from the fact that absorption is determined by political and economic factors. It is to be hoped that, so far as these will allow, Palestine will make its full contribution.

12. The Voluntary Organisations.

So far little has been said about the voluntary organisations and their part in the post-war solution. In the term "voluntary" are included three types. First, there are voluntary workers who receive no remuneration for their services, or remuneration much below their market value; second, there are voluntary organisations which depend entirely on voluntary sources of revenue, but which maintain in addition to voluntary workers a highly efficient paid staff; and third, there are voluntary organisations which derive part of their funds from State grants, and part from private sources. All three classes were doing refugee work before the war, and they are still doing it in many countries, according to the opportunities open to them. The war has seen some development of the third class, and I believe that after the war there will be much scope for further developments along these lines. During the emergency period, and later, voluntary workers can play a very large part both in the relief of distress and in the solution of refugee problems. They bring to their work a human element often absent from Government Departments. They are not fettered to the same extent by rules and regulations, and they establish individual contacts which a busy official has not the time to make. Apart from the purely voluntary service they give, they are usually economical in their methods, and the reputations they have established enable them to tap private sources of revenue with which to supplement State or international finance. They are often quicker in the field than State agencies. It is therefore essential that their help should be enlisted and encouraged to the utmost extent. At the same time, it will be necessary, especially during the early period, to co-ordinate and to exercise some measure of control over their efforts, so as to avoid overlapping, confusion and waste. In the early stages, and for relief purposes, this will be the business of the Relief Organisation. In some areas and for some purposes, that Organisation may find itself able to use a particular organisation as its recognised agency, and to finance through it certain activities for which it is responsible. Financial assistance would be accompanied by a measure of control, which could be readily arranged between the Relief Organisation and the voluntary body.

13. Finance.

The solution of the short-term problem and of the long-term problem will each involve large sums of money. The combined cost is likely to run into hundreds of millions of pounds. Where is the money coming from? There seem to be the following potential sources:

- Private sources (a. Charitable contributions from the public or particular communities.
- (b. Contributions from the relatives of refugees.
- (c. Contributions from the refugees themselves.
- Public sources (d. State revenues.
- (e. International funds.

I will take the private sources first.

(a) After the last war very large sums of money were contributed by the public, especially by the people of the U.S.A., towards the relief of distress. Before the present war large sums were contributed, though not on the same scale; in particular, very generous gifts were made by the Jews for the assistance of their co-religionists. Indeed, up to the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, very large sums continued to be raised in that country through the United Jewish Appeal. The flow of contributions to refugee organisations in other countries was very greatly reduced by the war, but it has not entirely ceased, even for refugee purposes pure and simple. The total stream has almost certainly increased, but it is diverted into more channels, and spread over many more fields. Its volume has necessarily been affected by the drastic changes in individual incomes and in conditions which the war has caused, and since the effect is cumulative, the longer the war lasts the more will this source be reduced. When hostilities cease, the change-over from war to peace industry is likely to have a still greater effect. While, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that the fountains of charity will dry up, or that the outflow will not be considerable and continuous, it is certain that they can only make a partial contribution towards the total that will be required. It is desirable that there should be co-ordination in the appeal for and collection of funds, as in the use of them when obtained, but this will not be an easy matter. There is one aspect of the case which may be mentioned. An extremely valuable form of private assistance is the system of guarantee, by which a guarantor accepts whole or partial financial responsibility for a particular refugee, sometimes giving him hospitality, sometimes direct financial aid, and sometimes both. This is a system particularly suitable for children who have lost their parents or have been separated from them.

(b) Apart from the contributions which relatives of refugees have made towards funds for general purposes, they have given assistance earmarked for the benefit of particular individuals. The gift may be for maintenance or for training, or, more often, for emigration. Sometimes it is spontaneous, sometimes it is encouraged by persuasion or legitimate pressure by the refugee organisation concerned. Some voluntary bodies have shown much efficiency in this respect. The Joint Distribution Committee

of America, for instance, would not have been able to have carried out its large programme of emigration, had it not succeeded in tapping the resources of relatives. This source should continue to be tapped after the war, and in particular, as regards the expenses of emigration. As already mentioned, reunion of families will be an important post-war activity. Where the breadwinner, himself a former refugee, has established himself in his country of adoption, it is right that he should make his full contribution towards the cost of reunion. Similarly, relatives who are not refugees, but have lived long in the country of emigration, and who are prepared to act as sponsors, should be encouraged to bear a reasonable share of the cost. There is a private as well as an international side to the problem.

(c) Contributions from refugees themselves. Until they are permanently settled, the great majority of refugees are not self-supporting, unless they are allowed to take remunerative employment. Even when they were able to get or bring out some of their resources, these have been exhausted in many cases. This, however, is not always the case. Some have still considerable capital. Moreover, many have been able to earn their own living during the war, e.g., temporary migrants in Great Britain. Even if they are not able to continue that employment after the war, some of them at any rate will not be entirely without resources. The general rule must be that assistance to the individual should be determined by the necessity for it.

Apart, however, from this elementary principle, the question arises as to what contribution, if any, refugees can reasonably be expected to make towards the finance of the problem. The tendency in the past has been too much in the direction of making them dependent on charity. It is obviously necessary to make physical distress independent of any question of repayment. But the benefits afforded to refugees often go beyond this, e.g., training or retraining, the provision of the implements of his profession or calling, the cost of professional education, expenditure on emigration, land settlement, etc. Many of the refugees from Nazi oppression are able, enterprising men, qualified to make a career for themselves, given the opportunity. It is due to their own self-respect, to a charitable public and to the taxpayer, that the assistance given to them should be repaid, at least in part, if and when they are able to repay it. The sums so repaid then become available for others less fortunate. I would like to see a wider application of the principle of loans and repayments than has been the practice in the past.

Again, having regard to the size of the financial problem involved, it will be necessary for the Governments concerned to consider how far refugees should make a special contribution to the State for the purpose of refugee relief. There are several precedents for this:

- (i) In some countries a special duty is levied on the issue and renewal of Nansen passports, the proceeds of which are credited to a humanitarian fund.
- (ii) Switzerland has given temporary asylum to many refugees from Nazi persecution. The Federal Government has made a graduated capital levy,

for the benefit of the refugees as a body, on well-to-do refugees, with a specified minimum of capital. It has also levied a graduated income tax on refugees in remunerative employment with a minimum income.

These examples are sufficient to show that the question will at least merit examination by the International Authority. The financial contribution will be small, but in so far as the principle encourages self-respect and a common bond of union among refugees, it is salutary. It is also of value as tending to mitigate the prejudices of nationals.

For Jewish refugees from Nazi oppression there is another possible source of finance derived from the refugees themselves. This is capital in Germany arising from the confiscation and realisation of property belonging to refugees. The Nazis purport to credit the proceeds, after various deductions, to a fund earmarked for the benefit of Jews. If there is anything left in this fund after the war, it should be made available for the benefit of this class of refugees. There is, of course, the wider question whether Germany should not be required to make good the value of the property confiscated from refugees. But this seems to be a particular instance of the whole question of reparations, to be decided according to general principles.

Financial Assistance from Public Funds.

I have already mentioned the principle accepted at the Evian Conference that the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement of refugees from Greater Germany should not assume any obligations for the financing of involuntary emigration. With few exceptions this principle was observed previous to the war, the whole financial burden being left to private resources. Even before September 1939 the strain, however, was proving very severe, and after the outbreak of hostilities the system of voluntary relief broke down in several countries. It would not have survived so long had it not been for very liberal assistance by private organisations in America, and especially the Joint Distribution Committee. The Belgian, Netherlands and Swiss Governments had to give indirect assistance from State funds, and the French Government were considering similar aid just before the German invasion. Subsequently, the Vichy Government has maintained many unable to support themselves in refugee camps. From the beginning of the war the British Government undertook to share authorised expenses equally with the voluntary organisations, and later it increased its contribution to 100% of maintenance as assessed by the Assistance Board, and to 75% of other authorised expenses. The above relates to a single pre-war group of refugees, which, since it is composed largely of Jewish victims of persecution, has been assisted on a very liberal scale by the Jewish community. It is clear, therefore, both from experience before and during the war, and from the accounts given above of potential private resources, that these will be quite inadequate to finance the long-term programme, while they will not cover the fringe of the problem as a whole. Moreover, it will take some time to mobilise such private resources as are available, and meanwhile, the need for relief will be immediate. It is therefore inevitable that the great bulk of the finance required should be provided out of public funds. There are two possible sources: first, State revenues; and second, international funds.

(d) Assistance from State Revenues. Two assumptions may perhaps be made: first, that in the general reconstruction after the war, of which the solution of the problem of displaced populations is only a part, the policy will be to give international financial assistance to various Governments according to their needs; and second, that the aim will be to get State Governments to undertake, as they are able, a fair share of the expenditure incurred within their territories, and for their benefit. This, however, is a policy of perfection which will present many difficulties in its execution. In some countries considerable time may elapse before stable governments are established; the adverse effects of the war and financial and economic resources will vary greatly from country to country; and as a further complication, the expenditure both on the short-term and the long-term refugee problems will vary with the number of refugees involved, which in turn will depend to some extent on the liberality or otherwise of the policy pursued in the past in giving asylum to the victims of persecution. It is therefore impossible at present to forecast the extent to which contributions from State revenues will be available. But it is reasonable to assume that in many countries, and for some years, they will be inadequate for the purpose. It is possible at this stage only to suggest certain principles which merit consideration.

- (1) Where there is a stable Government, the active co-operation of that Government should be sought and given in the operations financed or carried out by international bodies, and in particular by the Relief Organisation and the Refugee Authority.
- (2) As early as possible, agreement should be obtained between the State concerned and the international financing body regarding the financial contribution of the former. Relief measures should not, however, await such agreement.
- (3) Where an international body gives financial assistance, it should exercise adequate control to ensure the due fulfilment of the objects for which assistance is given.
- (4) While at the outset it will be necessary in some countries, and for some objects, for an International Relief Organisation to carry out relief measures through its own agencies, the aim should be to use the normal machinery of the State, subject to the necessary safeguards. This general principle, however, might well be subject to exceptions, for instance, a scheme of settlement financed entirely or mainly from international funds.
- (5) With regard to actual relief, the Government should apply to a displaced person the same standards as are applicable to its own nationals, or at any rate give the most favorable treatment to them accorded to nationals of a foreign country. In this connection, Chapters VIII and IX of the International Convention of February 1938 concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany states the humanitarian objects at which to aim:

"CHAPTER VIII. - Welfare and Relief.

Article 11.

Refugees residing in a territory to which the present Convention applies who are unemployed persons, persons suffering from physical or mental disease, aged persons or infirm persons incapable of earning a livelihood, children for whose upkeep no adequate provision is made either by their families or by third parties, pregnant women, women in childbed or nursing mothers, shall receive therein the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in respect of such relief and assistance as they may require, including medical attendance and hospital treatment.

Article 12.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to apply to refugees, as regards social insurance laws at present in force or which may subsequently be established, the most favourable treatment accorded to the nationals of a foreign country.

Article 13.

Refugees shall, as regards the setting-up of associations for mutual relief and assistance and admission to the said associations, enjoy in the territories of the High Contracting Parties to which the present Convention applies the most favourable treatment accorded to the nationals of a foreign country.

CHAPTER IX. - Education.

Article 14.

Refugees shall enjoy in the schools, courses, faculties and universities of each of the High Contracting Parties treatment as favourable as other foreigners in general. They shall benefit in particular to the same extent as the latter by the total or partial remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships."

Here one may mention a system of administering State grants which has been adopted in Great Britain since the beginning of the war, and which has proved very successful. It has already been mentioned that the British Government is now contributing 100% of the maintenance charges of refugees from Greater Germany, and 75% of other expenses. These grants are administered through a Central Committee, and are paid by that Committee to voluntary bodies on claims authorized by the Committee after examination and scrutiny in accordance with the principles laid down by Government. The Committee consists entirely of non-officials, and is composed partly of representatives of the voluntary organisations, and partly of members who have no concern with any grant-earning body. The activities and accounts of the Committee are subject to control by the Department of Government concerned. Moreover, although maintenance is paid to the refugee by the voluntary body responsible for his welfare, the rate of maintenance is assessed by the Assistance Board, which is the public authority, in

accordance

accordance with the principles applicable to British subjects in need of relief. This system has several advantages. It maintains the direct link between the refugee and the voluntary organisation; it encourages voluntary contributions in money, kind and especially in service; and it has enabled the voluntary movement to carry on when otherwise it might have had to close down owing to lack of funds. From the Government point of view it has relieved the State of the troublesome task of accepting direct responsibility for the welfare and care of some ninety thousand refugees. At the same time, it has secured close co-operation between Government Departments and voluntary associations.

Similar schemes might well be adopted in other countries where the State makes grants towards refugees. It is capable of modification and adaptation to local conditions. For instance, some Governments might think it desirable to have an official Chairman or official representatives on the Committee which administers the grant. Or they might find it convenient to deal direct with a well-established voluntary organisation. But the principle by which the public authority assesses the rate of maintenance in each individual case while the actual payment is made through a welfare agency has, I believe, many merits.

(e) International Funds. We come to the last source of financial assistance, namely international funds. It is clear that international assistance will be necessary on a very large scale. Without it, reconstruction cannot begin, or continue, or be completed. And without reconstruction there cannot be a revival of international trade, commerce and prosperity. Since the problem of displaced persons is one part only of the general question, it is outside my province, even if it were within my ability, to make any suggestions regarding the system of finance or the fixation of contributions. But I would most strongly urge that, within the general framework, adequate provision be made for the short- and long-term programmes, and that the acceptance of the refugee problem as an international question, as it undoubtedly is, be accompanied by the practical consequence that the financial gulf between expenditure and the revenue available from other sources should be bridged by international funds. This will, of course, mean the complete abrogation of the principle observed by the League of Nations and also laid down at the Evian Conference that, except for administrative expenditure, the refugee problem should not be a charge on international funds.

When we come to consider the nature and scope of the expenditure which the International Refugee Authority will have to incur, it is necessary to form as clear a picture as present circumstances will allow of:-

- (a) the functions which the Relief Organisation will perform;
- (b) the gradual transference of some of those functions for particular groups or particular problems to the International Refugee Authority;
- (c) the initial functions of the International Refugee Authority; and
- (d) the development of its functions as the long-term problems become clarified.

With

With regard to the functions of the Relief Organisation, I assume that it will be the body primarily responsible for measures of relief during the emergency period, which may extend to two or three years. I assume, further, that the relief measures will include the provision of food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., and the control of transport. Both long- and short-term refugees will come within the scope of their activities, not because they are refugees, but because they are in need of relief and it will lead to extravagance and confusion if, in the early stages, different agencies are dealing with the same problems of relief. A position might, however, soon be reached, at any rate in some countries, in which it would be practicable to separate a long-term group or groups, and to arrange for relief measures to be carried out through some agency other than the Relief Organisation. The International Refugee Authority might, for instance, itself undertake direct relief measures for such a group or groups, but I would deprecate this if it would mean appointing a dual and parallel executive staff for the purpose. The more suitable arrangement would be one by which the work of relief for a group of this kind was carried out by a voluntary refugee organisation subsidised from international funds. In that case, the grant should be made through the International Refugee Authority, which would be put in funds for the purpose. This method would be of great practical value in establishing the standing and influence of the Authority, and in bringing it into intimate relations with the voluntary organisations.

Again, I have already suggested that there may be long-term problems relating to groups other than those of long-term refugees. For instance, the return of ex-refugees to their own countries will not always in itself solve their problems. Their rehabilitation may involve long-term schemes of settlement, and in so far as these might require international assistance, the Refugee Authority might be the most suitable body to undertake the work. Further, the time would come when it would be desirable to wind up the activities of the Relief Organisation, even though, apart from long-term refugees and long-term problems which would already have been transferred, there would still be some loose threads to be gathered up. The Refugee Authority might again be a suitable body for the purpose.

In paragraph 7 above, I have stated some of the initial functions of the Refugee Authority. Assuming that several groups of long-term refugees will be immediately included within the mandate of the Authority, it would be at once responsible for all matters of an international character concerned with those groups, except those included within the relief measures of the Relief Organisation. Its work would rapidly develop, first, as it undertook, either directly or preferably through voluntary relief organisations, duties primarily assumed by the Relief Organisation; and second, as new long-term groups came within its mandate. The skeleton organisation outlined in paragraph 8 should be brought into immediate being at the end of the war, and it should be extended and developed as it assumed fresh responsibilities.

In addition to the financial responsibilities suggested above, the International Refugee Authority would probably have to subsidise the following objects:

(1) settlement

- (i) settlement overseas;
- (ii) schemes of training and re-training;
- (iii) refugee camps.

It would also have to assist emigration, but in this respect one would expect very considerable contributions from relatives.

The above is not an exhaustive list of the liabilities which an international body, having as its object the solution of the refugee problem, will have to assume; but is sufficiently comprehensive to indicate that very large sums of money will be necessary. In so far as assistance is given in direct subventions to Governments, it is to be hoped that, when the necessity is established, the grants will be in the form of gifts and not of loans. Much of the delay that occurred after the last war in the settlement of displaced populations was due to the protracted negotiations for loans, and even so, the service of the loans was not always maintained.

14. Long-Term Groups now Apparent.

It is not possible at the present time to make any forecast regarding the number and character of the long-term groups of refugees which will emerge from the war. There are, however, two groups about which it can be said with reasonable certainty that they should be regarded as coming within this category, and should therefore be included within the mandate of the International Refugee Authority as soon as that body is set up. The two groups are, first, the Nansen refugees, and second, refugees from Greater Germany. The problems concerning the Nansen refugees are comparatively simple, but they require that an International Authority should continue to deal with them. The aim should be to liquidate as soon as practicable the problems which remain.

With regard to refugees from Greater Germany, I have made it clear that in my view it would be a mistake to regard each and every member of this group as a long-term problem, in the sense that none will be able to return to his own country of origin. On the contrary, I hope that such conditions will be established in their own countries as will allow the return of many of this group. None the less, there will be some who cannot return, and apart from this there are problems of a long-term character which are now being dealt with and can continue to be dealt with only by an International Refugee Authority.

15. Summary.

I may now summarise the more important conclusions contained in the preceding paragraphs.

(i) The number of persons displaced from their own countries at the end of the war will run into many millions.

(ii) The great majority of these will, however, be willing and able to return to their own countries. They represent broadly the short-term problem. The object should be to get as many back as possible within the least possible time.

(iii) There

(iii) There will be others unwilling or unable to return because of political, religious or racial conditions. These will constitute the long-term refugees.

(iv) A clear distinction should be kept between the short-term and the long-term refugees, and groups of persons should not be recognised as long-term refugees until it is clear from the facts that they will have to be treated as such.

(v) During the emergency period immediately following the war, which may extend for two or three years, widespread measures of relief will be necessary. Such measures will include the provision of food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., and will cover nationals and all classes of displaced persons, including short-term and long-term refugees.

(vi) The primary responsibility during the emergency period for such relief measures, and also for transporting persons back to their countries, should, in so far as international action is required, be that of the International Relief Organisation.

(vii) The same standards of relief should be applied to all persons coming within the ambit of relief.

(viii) There should be an International Refugee Authority, as representative as possible of the various Governments, and including representatives of the International Labour Office.

(ix) Its initial constitution should be along the lines described in paragraph 8 above.

(x) This Authority should include within its mandate all groups of long-term refugees. It should be the Authority which decides whether a particular group comes within this category.

(xi) Except in so far as relief measures are undertaken by the International Relief Organisation, it should be primarily responsible for all matters of an international character relating to long-term refugees, including their legal and political protection.

(xii) The Refugee Authority should not undertake direct relief measures immediately after the war, this being the function of the Relief Organisation. Even later, this should be avoided if it involves the setting-up of a dual and parallel executive relief agency. It should, however, be practicable, for some groups and in some countries, gradually to organise relief measures through voluntary or unofficial refugee organisations, subsidised where necessary for the purpose. This might well be accompanied by transfer of responsibility for relief in such cases from the Relief Organisation to the Refugee Authority.

(xiii) Apart from questions affecting groups of long-term refugees accepted as such by the Refugee Authority, there may be long-term problems relating to other groups which might properly and suitably be brought within the mandate of the Refugee Authority.

(xiv) The activities of the Refugee Authority should not, therefore, be rigidly defined at the outset. The mandate should contain a large element of flexibility in order to permit the Authority to cope with problems and developments as they arise. Similarly, the administrative and executive organisations should be capable of expansion and adjustment.

(xv) The

(xv) The Refugee Authority must be adequately financed efficiently to fulfil its purpose.

(xvi) The following long-term groups will come at once within the mandate of the Refugee Authority when established:

- (a) Nansen Refugees,
- (b) Refugees from Greater Germany.

(xvii) There will probably be centrifugal forces at work, tending to increase the number of long-term refugees by voluntary emigration on a large scale from certain countries immediately after the war. Unless these forces are controlled and centrifugal movements regulated, until the normal ebb and flow of migration becomes operative, the long-term refugee problem will be intractable and insoluble.

(xviii) It will not be practicable either to control centrifugal movements, or to secure the return of certain groups to their countries of origin, unless conditions are established in those countries which will enable the persons concerned to live the normal lives of citizens, with complete protection of life and property. It is therefore essential that every effort should be made to establish such conditions, and, as an indispensable precedent thereto, that all discriminatory legislation be annulled and all discriminatory administrative measures stopped. This must be part of the peace settlement, and must be enforced by the necessary sanctions.

(xix) It will be a particular function of the Refugee Authority to obtain permanent homes for long-term refugees by

- (a) return to their own countries
- (b) absorption in the countries of asylum,
- (c) emigration, and
- (d) large-scale settlement.

(xx) It will be an important duty of the Refugee Authority to secure the closest co-operation and assistance both of Member and non-Member Governments, and to bring so far as possible the administration of internal affairs relating to refugees within the ordinary machinery of the Governments concerned.

(xxi) The fullest use should be made of voluntary assistance, --in money, in kind, and in service. Subject to the necessary safeguards, voluntary organisations, when necessary, should be subsidised from international or State funds.

(xxii) Since the solution of the many problems will depend very largely on adequate finance, all available public and private sources must be encouraged to contribute.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWS IN THE WORLD

TOTAL JEWS IN AMERICA

North America and West Indies.....	4,415,009	
South and Central America.....	<u>324,760</u>	
TOTAL.....		4,739,769

TOTAL JEWS IN EUROPE

Central Europe.....	5,264,907	
Western and Southern Europe.....	1,433,852	
Northern Europe.....	<u>2,538,555</u>	
TOTAL.....		9,237,314

TOTAL JEWS IN ASIA

Palestine and Neighboring Countries..	503,185	
Asia Minor, Central and Northern Asia	222,920	
Eastern and Southern Asia.....	<u>47,944</u>	
TOTAL.....		774,049

TOTAL JEWS IN AFRICA

Northern Part.....	444,497	
Southern Part.....	<u>149,239</u>	
TOTAL.....		593,736

TOTAL JEWS IN AUSTRALIA

TOTAL.....		<u>26,954</u>
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15,371,822

DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWS IN THE WORLD

TOTAL JEWS IN AMERICA

NORTH AMERICA and WEST INDIES

United States (Continental).....	4,228,029
Alaska.....	500
Canada.....	155,614
Mexico.....	20,000
Cuba.....	7,800
Curaco.....	566
Dominican Republic.....	55
Haiti.....	150
Jamaica.....	2,000
Porto Rico.....	200
Virgin Islands.....	70
Panama Canal Zone.....	25

SOUTH and CENTRAL AMERICA

Argentina.....	260,000
Brazil.....	40,000
Chile.....	3,697
Colombia.....	2,045
Guiana.....	1,786
Panama.....	850
Paraguay.....	1,200
Peru.....	1,500
Surinam.....	800
Uruguay.....	12,000
Venezuela.....	882

4,739,769

TOTAL OF JEWS IN EUROPE

CENTRAL EUROPE

Austria.....	191,408
Czechoslovakia.....	356,830
Danzig.....	10,448
Hungary.....	444,567
Latvia.....	93,479
Lithuania.....	155,125
Poland.....	3,028,837
Roumania.....	<u>984,213</u>
	5,264,907

WESTERN and SOUTHERN EUROPE

Albania.....	204
Belgium.....	60,000
Bulgaria.....	46,431
Cyprus.....	75
Denemark.....	5,690
France.....	240,000
Germany.....	350,000
Gibraltar.....	886
Great Britain and N. Ireland.....	300,000
Greece.....	72,791
Irish Free State.....	3,686
Italy.....	47,825
Luxembourg.....	2,242
Malta and Gozo.....	35
Netherlands.....	156,817
Portugal.....	1,200
Yugoslavia.....	68,405
Spain.....	4,000
Switzerland.....	17,973
Turkey (Europe).....	<u>55,592</u>
	1,433,852

NORTHERN EUROPE

Esthonia.....	4,302
Finland.....	1,772
Norway.....	1,359
Russia.....	2,524,469
Sweden.....	<u>6,653</u>
	2,538,555

9,237,314

TOTAL OF JEWS IN ASIA

PALESTINE and NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Palestine.....	375,000
Transjordan.....	200
Syria, Lebanon, etc.....	26,051
Irak.....	72,783
Arabia.....	25,000
Aden and Perim.....	4,151

ASIA MINOR, CENTRAL and NORTHERN ASIA

Afghanistan.....	5,000
Persia.....	40,000
Transcaucasian Republic.....	62,194
Turkmenistan.....	2,041
Turkey.....	26,280
Uzbekistam.....	37,834
Russia.....	49,571

EASTERN and SOUTHERN ASIA

British Malaya.....	703
China.....	19,850
Hongkong.....	250
India.....	24,141
Indo China.....	1,000
Empire of Japan.....	<u>2,000</u>

774,049

TOTAL OF JEWS IN AFRICA

NORTHERN PART

Algeria.....	110,127
Egypt.....	72,550
Libya.....	24,342
Morocco French.....	161,312
Morocco Spanish.....	12,918
Tanger Zone.....	7,000
Tunis.....	56,248

SOUTHERN PART

Abyssinia.....	51,000
Congo (Belgian).....	177
Kenya.....	305
Northern Rhodesia.....	426
Port Ug. East Africa.....	100
Southern Rhodesia.....	2,021
South West Africa.....	200
Tanganyika.....	10
Union of South Africa.....	<u>95,000</u>

593,736

TOTAL OF JEWS IN AUSTRALIA

Australia.....	23,553
Hawaii.....	310
New Zealand.....	2,591
Philippine Islands.....	<u>500</u>
	<u>26,954</u>