THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What do we do about this
next?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from Hon. Myron Taylor, Department of State, 1/1/43, to the President, enclosing memorandum which Mr. Taylor received from the Apostolic Delegate in Washington under date of 1/1/43 and relates to the subject of the bombing of Rome.
Dear Mr. President:

The accompanying memorandum has been received by me from the Apostolic Delegate in Washington and relates to the subject of the bombing of Rome, which will be of interest to you.

With best New Year's Greetings,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Accompaniment:
Memorandum.

The President,
The White House.
The following is a memorandum for the President and the Secretary which I have received from the Apostolic Delegate:

"The Apostolic Delegate has recently received a communication from His Eminence Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of State, Vatican City, relative to the immunity of the city of Rome from aerial bombardment. As already stated in the memorandum of December 16th, the Government of Italy, on December 13th, gave oral but, nevertheless, official assurance to the Holy See that the Supreme Command and the General Staff of the Armed Forces together with the Premier were about to leave Rome.

"Now, Cardinal Maglione communicates the information that on December 20th, at the request of the Holy See, the Italian Government gave an official statement in writing to the effect that the Premier with the rest of the Supreme Command was moving away from Rome. The statement also declares that, besides the Supreme Command, Dependent Offices of the Italian Army and Navy and the Military Headquarters of the German Army and Navy there are actually being transferred from Rome. The Secretary of State notes that he has already informed the Chargé des Affaires of the United States about the written statement.

"The Archbishop of London, as well as the Apostolic Delegate in England, have spoken to the Prime Minister of England about the question of possible bombardment of Rome, giving the reasons why it should be avoided.

"His Eminence adds that from conversations he had with the Minister of England to the Holy See he got the impression that the British Government was of the opinion that the Holy See was not acting to avoid the bombardment of Rome entirely of her own volition but that the Italian Government was behind all the activity done for this purpose. To correct
In this opinion the Cardinal spoke to the Minister of England to the Holy See, and likewise notified the Apostolic Delegate in England, telling them substantially the following: "The movement to avert the bombardment of Rome was started exclusively and totally by the Holy See. The Holy See has stated again and again that, should Rome be bombed, she would be compelled to protest because Rome is a Holy City, the Diocese of the Supreme Pontiff and the Center of the Catholic World. The Holy See is certain that the reasons she offers for non-bombardment are valid and of great moment. Spontaneously, therefore, she called to the attention of the Italian Government the fact that the English Government has frequently indicated that the city of Rome is a military objective. As a consequence of this the Italian Government, first orally on December 13th, then in writing on December 20th, assured the Holy See that the Military Commands were leaving the city. In fact, their departure is under way."

The Secretary of State requests that all these matters be treated with the utmost secrecy."

MYRON TAYLOR
My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your memorandum of January 2, 1943 enclosing a letter of January 1 from Myron Taylor and a memorandum concerning the steps being taken by the Holy See to remove military objectives from Rome.

On December 26 I wrote to the British Ambassador setting forth our views with respect to the possible bombardment of Rome and the approach which had been made to us by the Vatican authorities on the subject. I am informed that the substance of the letter was telegraphed to London and that the Embassy is now awaiting further instructions from its Government.

The reaction of the British Government to our position will determine what steps, if any, we should take next. I suggest that we wait for it.

The

The President,

The White House.
The memorandum from the Apostolic Delegate indicates that the military objectives, both Italian and German, are actually being transferred from Rome and that the initiative for this action has been taken by the Holy See. This confirms the position which we took with respect to the British proposals, that is that those officials, both Vatican and Italian, interested in saving Rome from bombardment should more fully and actively pave the way for their objective by causing the removal from Rome of the objectionable military agencies, properties and interests.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Letter from Mr. Taylor returned.
Miss Tulley:

The attached letter from Mr. Myron Taylor to the President was inadvertently omitted from the blue leather folder bearing the Papal coat of arms and containing the various memoranda from the Pope which Mr. Taylor returned to the White House when he saw the President on January 4. Would you be good enough to see that it is enclosed with the other papers in the leather folder to make the file complete?
At Madrid
Apr 29, 1944.

Dear Mr. President,

Your returns from Rome and standing two days with Ambassador and Mr. Hay at Madrid. My written note are sent herewith. If you find time to read them please throw in mind the two Cardinal joint that forward my conduct.

I absolutely to convince the Pope and the Vatican accord. is that must proceed
the war until Hitler and Mussolini are destroyed or made harmless - that we have the men and matériel to do it.

That Italy when adequate assistance comes to give her chances in her future interest, abandon Hitler. For me not that from referre to the nevast regime in Italy. But only to the Italian people. The American people the Pope and the Vatican authorities greatly.

Since have an interview with D'Alagie on Thursday and leave for London.
Saturday Oct 1

Ambassador Lincoln has visited the King

of Russia. He is presenting one
to the new Foreign Ministers and others
of the Government. Today and tonight
will show what a member does last.

With this regard

Sincerely

Reynolds

To The President

Washington

P.S. Your Representative in Rome

resembles the greatest ancient

architects. The "Catacombs" or

Catacombs of St. Peter's which are

impressed
Conference with Success Fuerns. Foreign Ministry. 
At 12 o'clock at Foreign office, Madrid, Sept 29. 
Laying one hour.

Miss Militä Edmunds.
I. Order - Visit Order.
II. Relief - Ford.
III. Collaboration with the 
Italians.
IV. Spanish demands -
Aeromote.
V. Russia.
To the President,
The White House,
Washington.
Dear Mr. President:

In 1941 as I went from Rome I took up with the Prime Minister and Mr. Anthony Eden in London the question of equipping 100,000 Polish soldiers in Russia and moving them to the southern part of the Russian line so that they might, in case of Russian collapse, escape into Iran and join the Allies.

The attached clipping from "The New York Herald Tribune" of January
24th indicates that they have arrived in Iran, although I am happy to say that there has been no sign of the Russian collapse which many prophesied.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

To the President.
1,500,000 Poles sent to Russia.

Number of Germans killed and captured not more than
300,000. Russians also less than represented.

8,000 in the mountains armed.

100,000 Polish soldiers in Russia, need food, clothing, arms and munitions. While fighting with the Russians are really fighting Germany. The Ambassador fears Germans and Russians will get together, in which case if Poles were armed now by us in Russia they would fight on and join up with the Allied forces.

He urges that our aid to Russia be concentrated in a substantial way on arming the Poles.

I mentioned this point to Prime Minister and Eden. Both agreed, but said the special aid to Polish soldiers in Russia would have to be a percentage of the whole aid to Russia, but a definite percentage would be fixed.

I urged on Winant this point in case he communicated with Harriman, and for him to follow up with Churchill and Eden.

(Oct 7 1941)
100,000 Polish Troops Reach Iran From Russia

Force Will Augment Army Serving in Near East

LONDON, Jan. 24 (Sunday) (AP). —More than 100,000 Poles have arrived at an Iranian port from Soviet Russia to bolster the Polish army in the Near East under General Wladyslaw Anders, the India Office announced today.

The force was sent from Russia under a November, 1941, agreement between the Soviet government and the Polish government-in-exile at London for release of Polish war prisoners for service with other Polish forces against the Axis.

A reception camp covering three square miles has been built to house the Polish force, which is supplied with British food and clothing and Russian arms.

The latest contingent to arrive completes the movement of these troops to the Near East, it was said.
My dear Mr. President:

You will doubtless recall the correspondence I have had during the past nearly two years with my friend the Right Honorable Leopold Amery, Minister for India and life-long friend and political ally of the Prime Minister. This correspondence touched on many postwar questions. It was confidential and personal in its discussion, i.e., it did not purport to represent the views of his Government - nor of ours. My contribution was limited to propounding questions. His replies are the important features.

Late in January I sent him a "thesis" I had privately prepared on Germany calling particular attention to future measures to prevent Germany from rearming. Through Sumner Welles I sent you this "thesis" last autumn. I asked his comments. I had not previously given him any study or impression as to our "thinking" here.

I now have his reply which I enclose. I find it very interesting in many ways - especially as in some ways it parallels our own discussions. If you would care to re-read the whole file of correspondence and my own German thesis I will send or bring them to you.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.
India Office,
Whitehall.

12th February, 1943.

My dear Myron Taylor,

I have read with great interest the memorandum on Germany which you enclosed in your letter of January 23rd. Herewith my comments for what they are worth. They are of course purely personal and not based on any discussion with colleagues in the Government.

The memorandum falls into three parts: firstly, a diagnosis of the reasons why Germany has gone amok; secondly, what should be done with Germany at the end of the war by way of punishment; and thirdly, what is the right permanent treatment of the German problem.

I am afraid I do not agree at all with your friend's diagnosis that the dominating cause which has driven Germany on her present course has been an economic fear haunting her for generations. I would say on the contrary that the dominating cause has been the Prussian military tradition, based on Prussia's success in building up a powerful and wealthy state by means of successful war. Hitler is simply a vulgarisation of Bismarck, making use of modern demagogy and of the passionate resentment of Germany over her last defeat. Undoubtedly the great depression of twelve years ago swelled the discontent that gave him his chance, but it was not the real cause.

It is quite true that in more recent times, since Germany acquired a dominant position on the Continent, German publicists have dragged in economics and the need for raw materials as a justification of colonial expansion or for the domination of South Eastern Europe.
But expansion has been the real motive and the economic argument an excuse.

Turning to what should be done with Germany immediately after victory I entirely agree with your friend that a long-range policy of continued suppression and penalisation would be a fatal mistake. Just as after the last war we should all begin disagreeing among ourselves as to its application and we should only invite the passionate effort of Germany to free herself from Allied interference. I also agree with him when he rules out the extermination of the German people. That does not however exhaust the alternatives. There is the third alternative of immediate and drastic reduction of Germany's power to become formidable in the future. That can be achieved most simply by taking away from her part of her fundamental resources in territory. My own solution would be immediately on the end of hostilities to allow the Poles to take East Prussia, expelling the German inhabitants and replacing them by the Polish population of those Eastern districts which Russia will undoubtedly insist on retaining. Similarly the Poles and Czechs might divide and repopulate Upper Silesia with its great coal and iron resources and also expel the German population, or most of the German population, of the Sudetenland. Alsace Lorraine naturally goes back to France, and I see no reason why the Saar should not be added to it and the German population cleared out. Austria of course should be restored to independence. Such measures, coupled with the appalling losses in the war, should permanently weaken Germany vis-à-vis her neighbours whose resources and ultimate population would be strengthened.
Having done this I would, in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, make it clear that Germany would have a fair start on her new basis, at any rate on the economic side, leaving of course a period during which she must continue disarmed. That brings me to your friend's prescription for the future, and there I find myself wholly in agreement with him. The only prospect to my mind of peace and prosperity in Europe is that Europe, west of the Russian border and the Russian economic system, should come together to form an economic unit, and not only an economic unit, but so far as possible a political and moral unit. A rigid federation on American lines is not I think in the picture. But something like a commonwealth of Europe, based on the principle of certain general European political rights both to individuals and to minorities, and on an acknowledgement of the common economic interests of Europe, something in fact on the lines of the British Commonwealth, is I believe possible. That to my mind should be the avowed policy of the United Nations, and they should step in, as your correspondent suggests, as receivers concerned with tidying up Europe in preparation for such a new start and then, to quote his words, "give up their membership in the West European sphere council and permit the latter to become a fully self-governing body".

The essential economic condition for such a regenerated Europe must be mutual cooperation for mutual development. In other words the economic forces of the different European countries must be encouraged to sustain each other. That means, pending the possibility, at present still remote, of complete inter-European free trade, at any rate of the right of the European countries to treat each other
preferentially in all trade matters. Your Government has in fact already recognised that principle as applying to the South American nations. In the case of Europe it will be a question not merely of recognising a principle but of urging it forward as the absolute key to economic recovery and also to political cooperation. In such a scheme a chastened and reduced Germany might very well play a useful, and even a prominent, but not an arrogantly dominating part.

You will realise that any such scheme for the regeneration and unifying of Europe does cut directly across the references in the Atlantic Charter and the Lend Lease agreement to non-discrimination, and to Mr. Cordell Hull's policy of treating the Most Favoured Nation Clause as a matter of cardinal importance. There I confess I must frankly differ. I believe the Most Favoured Nation Clause to be the most serious obstacle to the general liberalising of world trade under modern conditions. I enclose an old paper of mine on the subject which, however, is I think still very fairly up to date. Trade is so essentially interwoven today both with defensive and with social policy, that no nation can regard it as merely a matter for its individual citizens or treat the trade of different countries equally regardless of its general political or economic relations to those countries. Whether actually conducted by the State or by individuals, trade will increasingly be trade between nations as such. That does not mean that it need be restrictive.
On the contrary, nations can make the most liberal deals with each other, and that is what I contemplate the nations of the European group doing. But the deals will be based on a sense of community of general interest, political and economic, and confined to those who realise such a community among themselves.

That brings me to the question you asked about Russia. I doubt myself whether Russian Communism is any longer the fanatical propagandist doctrine that it once was. It has toned down in many ways ever since Stalin got rid of Trotsky and the Internationalists, and, in this war, from all I gather, the dominant note has been nationalism.

In any case the external policy of countries is generally determined by geographical considerations and by old traditions which re-assert themselves whatever may be the internal revolution. Russia has behind her a long tradition of territorial expansion, mainly eastwards, and with long intervals of quiescence. Whether, after this war, the main tendency will be towards internal reconstruction, or whether the heads of her soldiers and leaders may be turned by military success and Russia once more become a danger to her neighbours, is a matter of which no one can judge at present. In any case I imagine the Russians will insist on retaining the Baltic States and most of what they secured in the way of Polish territory in 1939, and there is no one who can stop them. In so far as Russia may in the future wish to expand her territory or her influence, she will very naturally pursue the old policy of playing off one neighbouring country against another, and if so would naturally encourage Communist movements if they subserve that purpose, but not for the sake of
Communism so much as for that of Russian power. From that point of view I have no doubt that Russia will be inclined to look unfavourably upon any kind of scheme of European union. But that is no reason why such a scheme should not be in itself desirable, or why the United States and ourselves should not encourage it, so long as it is not directly pointed against Russia but based on the need of permanent peace within Europe. It might of course be a result of any form of mutual European union that Russian expansionist ambitions would tend eastwards and that we might be faced with difficult problems in Persia, or China with similar difficulties in Mongolia and elsewhere. These are matters which must be left to be dealt with when they arise. For the time being I see no reason why we should not continue to aim at the maximum of friendly cooperation with Russia over the whole field of foreign policy, though without abandoning such objects as, for instance, a better coordinated Europe, as we think essential to future peace. All this is of course just thinking aloud on my part, entirely personal to myself.

Yours very sincerely,

P.S. Since dictating the above I have seen the enclosed article in "Free Europe" written I imagine by some Central European refugee. It states very fairly the alternative possibilities of future Russian policy in Europe.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

Would you be good enough to hand the enclosed confidential letter to the President and greatly oblige.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington.
Mr. President:

This personal letter to me from Ambassador Hayes may interest you, and perhaps you would find it as illustrative of the situation in Spain as the previous time.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF SPECIAL RESEARCH

P.S. Vatican M. Taylor folder
Dear Mr. Taylor:

Having come to Sevilla for part of Holy Week, I have at last the requisite respite from regular duties to write you at some length about various aspects of the developing situation in Spain which I imagine may interest you.

Despite the perversities of the present regime, with its uncertain Caudillo and its very officious Falange, I feel sure that we are making substantial progress in securing the sympathy and good will of the bulk of the Spanish people. I have never regarded our policy of respecting the neutrality and territorial integrity of Spain and of supplying this country with petroleum and other products essential to its domestic economy as any sort of "appeasement" to antidemocratic forces here or elsewhere or as an instrument for strengthening and prolonging the life of the Franco government. I have regarded it rather as in line with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and as an effective means of binding Spanish people to us commercially and politically and thus rendering them potential friends and allies of the United Nations instead of the Axis. This, I am convinced, is precisely what the policy is achieving. For our territorial guarantees and our petroleum supplies reassure and benefit the Spanish people at large, including monarchists and republicans, rich and poor, and the Spanish people know, if the present Government fails to acknowledge, that all such reassurances and benefits come from democratic America, not from Nazi Germany. And if the prospect of our ultimate military victory dismays Franco and his precious Falange, it encourages every one of the numerous dissenting elements among both the classes and the masses of the Spanish people.

Franco still occupies the centre of the stage, and he still talks to Archbishop Spellman in March 1943 much as he talked to you in September 1942 -- the horrors of Communism, the necessity of suppressing it by force, the honesty of Hitler, the regrettable conflict between civilized Britain and Germany when they should be united against barbarous Russia, the theory of the two wars (the one in Europe and the other in the Pacific), the destructiveness of aerial warfare, the disastrous effects of a long war, the need for a negotiated peace of compromise. Yet Franco, in his slow thinking, has moved a trifle during the past six months.
He admitted to Archbishop Spellman that Germany couldn't possibly win the war, though he added, most pessimistically, that no one would win the war except Russia and Japan, whose victory would mean only the triumph of Communism and of the "Yellow Race!" Also, he has latterly qualified his earlier public pronouncements: whereas a year ago he pledged a million Spanish soldiers to defend Berlin against the Red Menace, he declared six months ago that three million would defend the Pyrenees, and most recently he has indicated a further strategic retreat by confining himself to talk about police measures against Communism within Spain. And in the volume of his "memorable addresses," which has just appeared, he has suppressed those which most clearly aligned him with Germany, even the one welcoming the last German Ambassador to Madrid, and has included the almost pro-American speech he made when I presented my credentials to him last June.

As yet nobody in Spain seems disposed to precipitate a revolt against Franco or his regime of Falange censorship and police. This is attributable in part to dissension among the many factions antagonistic to the Falange and critical of the Caudillo, and in part to widespread belief that the latter is for the present, as he has been in the past, the surest guarantee against Spain's being involved by Germany in the war. It is gratitude for continuing peace which explains whatever popularity Franco still enjoys; and this has certainly been enhanced by Jordana's tenure of the Foreign Office and his obviously sincere efforts to pursue a practical policy of neutrality and peace.

But as time goes on and the Axis is ejected from Tunisia and the incentive and ability of the Germans to invade Spain disappear, the domestic situation here is bound to become acute. The one service which Spaniards believe Franco is now rendering them -- that of staying out of the war -- can then be performed without his assistance. And with the removal of the external German menace, all the latent internal opposition to the present regime, especially to the Falange (which Franco has so ostentatiously fostered and featured), will emerge into the open and demand a fundamental change.

Hence, the big question is not whether the present regime will endure but whether evolution or revolution will put an end to it. If the monarchists, churchmen, army officers, and such persons as Jordana and Gil Robles can pull together, they may succeed, with or (more probably) without Franco's consent, incurring and eventually abolishing the Falange, its censorship and its police, and by effecting an
evolution toward liberal monarchy with pronounced pro-Allied leanings. But if such "moderates" quarrel too much among themselves or delay decisive action too long, the radical groups of republicans, socialists, communists, and Basque and Catalan separatists will resort to rioting and forceful revolution. In any event the policy which we are now pursuing in Spain, particularly our economic policy, can be counted upon to ensure us wide popular support in Spain and to render any future government here a satellite of ours rather than of the Axis. With our oil and cotton and other commodities, as with our propaganda, we are pointing and paving the way.

Meanwhile, Jordana is cooperating splendidly with us. He is permitting the unofficial representatives of the French North African regime to function in Madrid almost as if they were accredited diplomats; and he has finally gotten the backing of the Caudillo for the release and evacuation of refugees. Two hundred Poles (of military age) have already departed for Portugal whereas they are being taken by boat to North Africa, and today a thousand Frenchmen are en route to the Portuguese frontier. The Germans are making a terrible fuss about it, but Jordana refuses to be shaken by their clamors and assures me that as soon as we can make the necessary arrangements he will authorize the departure of the rest of the French refugees (now estimated to number some fourteen thousand.)

Our Embassy staff has greatly increased its size and functions since you were last in Madrid. Our press and propaganda section is now installed in a handsome "Casa Americana," and in three additional apartments which we have recently acquired I have installed our refugee and relief section, our oil-control section, and the consulate. And thanks to your efforts in our behalf, Mrs. Hayes and I have been enabled by the increased "representation allowance" to extend our hospitality commensurate with the increased need and opportunity.

I suspect that the importance of the Iberian peninsula will wax, rather than wane, in months to come. It should be a convenient depot for certain kinds of commodities useful to our armed forces in North Africa and later in France, Italy, or the Balkans. It might also play a highly useful role in expediting post-war reconstruction, especially in France and Italy.

With the kindest personal regards, in which Mrs. Hayes shares,

Faithfully yours,

(Sd) CARLTON J. H. HAYES.
May 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Archbishop Mooney and Mgr. Ready have been with me for the last hour and among other things the question of religion in Russia was brought up, in view of the proposed visit of Mr. Joseph E. Davies.

My attention was directed to the fact that both in his book and in the movie he, I am informed, asserts that religion in Russia was in fact free. This is quite contrary to the generally accepted opinion. In the opinion of those above named it would be helpful to future negotiations on this point if an assertion of the sort above mentioned was not made in his visit to Russia.

This is a rather delicate subject but I thought it my duty to present it to you in this confidential manner.

M. C. T.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 27, 1943

I return herewith your file concerning Mr. Taylor's suggestion, about which we talked on the phone this afternoon.

QH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do you think of Myron Taylor's suggestion of going to Madrid, Lisbon or the Vatican, so as to be in closer touch with developments?

Please return enclosures with your reply.

F.D.R.

(Handwritten note: Ill M.T. not time just now to go over. FDR)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In October, 1942, I sought in Rome to secure confidential information re individuals and groups of Italians who might be of potential value in the transition period from War to Peace. The attached statements resulted. In addition I requested some time ago a confidential appraisal of personnel of similar character by the Vatican. This has not yet come to hand.

The conquest of Africa now completed may have produced some quite definite changes in the Italian situation in the respects above referred to as defeat may have inspired individuals or groups to appear from retirement.

Italy's occupation of parts of Yugoslavia and parts of France remain to be broken but the whole peninsula of Italy proper remains to be conquered. An invasion at the "heel" would involve a long and bloody march to the Brenner - unless surrender took place en route either through negotiation due to national revolt, or by puncturing a vital spot. It may thus be important for me to keep more conveniently in touch with Italian developments in Lisbon and Madrid or perhaps at the Vatican itself. The Axis powers
have sent some of their top diplomats to the Vatican in recent months. Developments may come with suddenness due to many possibilities not the least of which is the emotional character of the Italian people.

I arranged with the Pope in October last for the Vatican official who traveled with me in and out of Italy last autumn to meet me in Madrid or Lisbon at any time when conditions seem to us or to the Vatican to warrant direct communication with the Pope.

Myron C. Taylor
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Propaganda has injured American prestige in Italy of late, the principal charge being bombing of civilians -- and especially machine gunning, from low altitudes, citizens on roads and in the streets by American bombers as shown in the attached statement.

Myron C. Taylor
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On April 27 the Cardinal Secretary of State informed my assistant at Vatican City that about two weeks earlier a streetcar filled with workmen had been machine gunned in the outskirts of Naples by American aviators. The Cardinal said that he had positive evidence of this incident. He said that other instances of American aviators machine gunning Italian civilians had come to his attention although he had not had an opportunity to verify them. He said that the reputation of the Americans in Italy was suffering by comparison with British practice as thus far experienced by the Italian public and hoped that instructions would be given our aviators to refrain from deliberately using their machine guns on civilians.

On May 6 Cardinal Maglione again raised the question with Mr. Tittmann, this time in connection with the American air raid on Grosseto. He stated it as a fact that the civilian population of the city had been deliberately machine gunned.
gunned from the air. The whole country, he said, was surprised and indignant at such action. Heretofore Americans of all the belligerents had been regarded as the most humane in Italy, that it was a matter of regret to him personally that we should persist in indulging in this kind of warfare.

The Department of State has instructed Mr. Tittmann to request precise details in connection with the two alleged incidents in order that they may be identified or disproved. On the basis of a report from General Eisenhower concerning these allegations, Mr. Tittmann is being instructed, moreover, to inform the Cardinal Secretary of State that American bomber missions are invariably conducted at very high altitudes; that their fighter escorts likewise remain at or above the prescribed levels; and that, with respect to the alleged incident at Naples, General Eisenhower has informed the War Department that no American combat crew has ever reported the machine gunning of a tram in Naples, and in view of all the circumstances, it is extremely improbable that the reported attack was executed by American aircraft.
May 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do you think of Myron Taylor's suggestion of going to Madrid, Lisbon or the Vatican, so as to be in closer touch with developments?

Please return enclosures with your reply.

F.D.R.

Memorandum to the Pres. 5-14-43 from Myron Taylor re importance of his keeping in touch with Italian developments in Lisbon and Madrid or perhaps at the Vatican itself.
MEMORANDUM ON ITALY
FROM
MYRON TAYLOR
TRANSLATION OF MEMORANDUM
PUBLISHED BY MR. MYRON TAYLOR
BY AN UNDISCLOSED SOURCE

September 1942

The anti-fascist opposition consists of four groups:

I Politicians (former Secretaries of State, Members of Parliament, Senators; a) Liberals; b) Popolari (Christian Democrats); c) Social reformers (like Bonomi, former President of Cabinet Council; d) Socialists.

II Generals, like Badoglio, Caviglia.

III Writers, professors, members of liberal or Catholic aristocracy, like Prince Doria-Panfili; Duca T. Gallarati Scotti, Conte Visconti Venesta, Conte Iacini Stefano, Conte Casati, Alberto Albertini, B. Croce, De Ruggero, Calogero, Parri, Calamandrei, Carmelutti, Salvatorelli, Bresciani, Galletti, La Pira. Some of these are in prison, like Calogero and Parri.

IV Communists. It is very difficult to estimate the real forces of the Communist Party; their chiefs and organizers are confined on the island of Ventotene, near Ponza (population, about 2,000), whence they keep in touch secretly with their partisans. Many infiltrations are noted in the war factories.

After the breakdown of fascism, the constitution of a stable Government, based on the solidarity of I a, b, c and perhaps d, II and III with the cooperation of the American emigrants (like Sforza and Sturzo) is possible, on condition that this Government is able to save money and to preserve Italy from essential mutilations. Such a Government will certainly find the support of the members of the very strong Catholic Associations, of the Liberal intellectual youth, of the bureaucracy and of many business men. However, the manifestation of Montevideo and the nomination of Pacciardi to be Chief of the Italian Legion (Pacciardi was already a member of the Partito Repubblicano Italiano) caused in the quarters of the opposition some perplexity. The politicians sub I and III are not all and not unconditionally for the monarchy, but many consider an intervention of the dynasty would facilitate the solution of the crisis (traditions of the carabinieri) and avoid the advent of Communists. Every effort must be made - they say - to win over the Prince and it is reported that the Princess Mary seeks to get into contact with the aristocrats of the opposition.
Concerning the future chief of the government, it is true, that the dictatorship blocked the way to the development of great personalities, but there are still former presidents of Cabinet Council and leaders of former parties or generals who have the qualities and capacity to preside at least for a first period over the united forces of anti-fascism.
POINTS ON THE ITALIAN SITUATION.

1. The European States would be much more enthusiastic about the prospect of an Allied victory in Europe if it could be assured that this would not mean a period of anarchy after victory. Have the Allies practical plans for maintaining order after the cessation of hostilities? There is a belief in some of the neutral Mediterranean countries that the Axis, if victorious, would have the means to keep order, while the Allies, on the other hand, would not.

2. Count Ciano has no popular following in Italy. He is very obviously keeping as aloof as possible from present developments. He is anti-German and the Germans know it and therefore do not trust him. He desires to fade out of the picture altogether, but the Duce will not let him. Grandi and Bottai would also like to retire, as they are opposed to present policies; but Mussolini will not let them either, saying "You must see this business through with me."

3. The man to lead the future Italy has not yet appeared. Marshal Caviglia comes nearest to measuring up to the job, but he is nearly eighty years old. Marshal Badoglio has the reputation of being too much out for himself to be a popular leader. He might, however, prove an adequate chief during the transition period after the fall of the present regime. He has the confidence of the Royal Family and the Army. Count Volpi is out as a possible leader. He is generally known to be too "slick" a character. Grandi is too fundamentally weak. Count Sforza has no following in Italy. He is an "unsympathetic" person to the Italian people.

October 1942
1. Over a long period of years no authoritative voice has made itself heard publicly against the totalitarian regime. The Political victims of the regime are almost exclusively the young Slavs of Trieste and Gorizia, a large number of whom were executed during the past twenty years.

2. It is said that there are some military personalities (Badoglio and a few others) who do not approve fighting on Germany's side, but these personalities have always obeyed, and received titles, promotions, and other favors from the regime, and either retired or were removed only after their failure.

3. No hope is to be placed in the Dynasty, which has always shewn the most absolute submission to the regime, a submission that goes so far as to acknowledge the right of the Grand Council of the Party to change the order of succession to the throne.

4. It is true that grumblings and secret criticism are very frequent. It is a kind of fashion, even among the high "hierarchs" of the party and Mussolini's close collaborators. But one must not look among ideological reasons for the motives of this criticism; they are rather motives of a practical character. If there is a bread shortage and if the war news is bad, criticism increases; if, on the contrary, the news is good and hunger less acute, criticism diminishes! An instructive experiment was made in this sense when Tobruk fell and Rommel advanced into Egypt. It cannot be denied that there are sincere critics, honest persons and faithful Christians who see the absurdity of this war for Italy, but all these Italian friends, when they talk among themselves or with foreigners, come to the same conclusion: It's true, but what can we do?

5. There is poverty. But poverty is relative, more acute in cities than in the countries. Italy is an agricultural country where, because of a favorable climate, the land produces a great deal in all seasons. The Germans now arriving in Italy find it a real paradise in comparison with their own country. It is everybody's ambition in Germany to visit Italy in order to satisfy the demands—legitimate ones, to be sure—of their stomachs.
For Germany the Italian alliance is a real piece of luck, which permits her not only to carry the war into the Mediterranean and Africa, but also to lighten her economic difficulties and to continue the struggle.

6. As the country has been spared the horrors of war up to now, it is possible to sleep here tranquilly and to live in a certain measure of security. The Italians hope, in the end, to benefit by the indulgence of the English and the Americans, whose weakness for the "beautiful country" is well known.

7. Finally, one must not forget that the country finds itself, at least partially, in a state of German occupation and under German control.

Consequently, all allusions to the subject of a movement in favor of the cessation of hostilities and the abandonment of the Protector-Ally are without foundation. The present regime in Italy will be overthrown, perhaps even noisily, only when Germany's defeat has been accomplished.
May 31st 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. MYRON C. TAYLOR

The enclosed is from Benes. Do you think I should get this informally to the Vatican and, if so, how?

F. D. R.
I. On January 7th, 1941, a communication was transmitted by President E. Beneš to His Grace Msgr. W. Godfrey, the apostolic representative in Great Britain, emphasising the following points:

Immediately after the Armistice /in 1918/, I entered, as Foreign Minister of the Republic, into diplomatic relations with the Holy See and began negotiations regarding the delimitations of the dioceses, the Church property, etc. There were many difficulties: in 1924, and again in 1927 new and very serious disturbances occurred in this sphere. But in 1927 I definitely succeeded in settling all those questions, in creating a definitive juridical basis for future relations: the so-called modus vivendi between the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic was agreed upon, and normal and friendly relations...
were definitely established. From that date the mutual relations were good and collaboration was developing without difficulties. I cannot forget especially the most sympathetic attitude of His Holiness, Pope Pius XI towards Czechoslovakia during the September crisis in 1938 and the message he sent to me in the most critical moments of the history of my people.

It is for all these reasons that I thought a time had come when some sort of unofficial contact should be reestablished between the new Czechoslovak Government now in London and the Holy See. All arrangements that had previously been made regarding ecclesiastical questions between the Vatican and the Republic were destroyed by the Nazi Government. The conditions in Slovakia are very bad and the servitude of the present Slovak Government of Father Tiso will have a very deep influence upon the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia after the war. The persecution of the Czech Catholics in the Czech "Protectorate," by the Nazis will also be of great importance for the post-war policy of the Czech people.
The Poles, the Belgians and others continue to have such contacts and are able to discuss with the Holy See their common interests and their post-war policy in respect of these matters. For the Czechoslovaks no such opportunity, - from March 1939 till to-day, - has yet been provided. The Slovak delegate to the Holy See is the representative of a State which is completely in the hands of the Nazi Government. I think that in these circumstances it is highly desirable to make preparations in good time for the future.

I must apologise for offering you such a frank explanation of my point of view. But in this terrible war, in which the whole of Christian civilisation is at stake, and in which the Holy See, - as I have observed from the Christmas message of His Holiness Pope Pius XII - take an unequivocal position in standing for a Just Peace for all the small nations, I think that it is incumbent upon responsible personalities not to let pass the slightest opportunity of doing what they consider necessary in the interest of their so terribly afflicted people.
II. On May 10th 1941 His Grace Msgr. Godfrey handed President Beneš the reply of the Holy See, in which the following details were set forth:

His Eminence writes that he has been much interested to read what Your Excellency wrote concerning your part in the negotiations which, in spite of considerable difficulties, were brought to a conclusion by the „modus vivendi„ in 1927. His Eminence is particularly pleased to receive your courteous reference to the Church and to the August Pontiff, Pius XII, who has nothing more at heart than a just and lasting peace „sealed, not with hatred and revenge, but with the noble majesty of justice„. His Holiness has already given expression to this desire, both on June 2nd, 1940 and more recently in his Christmas message to the world.

The Pope and the Holy See is with every nation in its suffering, and strives always to fulfil faithfully the pastoral mission divinely entrusted to the Church, and to succour the distressed in every possible way.

Naturally, therefore, the Czechoslovak
people in their tribulation have a special place in the maternal heart of the Church. As regards the step taken by Your Excellency with a view to establishing unofficial contacts between the Czechoslovak Government recently formed in London, and the Holy See, His Eminence is sure that Your Excellency will understand how delicate is the present situation and how difficult it would be at the present time to benefit the Czechoslovak people by means of such contacts. His Eminence is of opinion that the time for such a development has not yet come.

III. Since then more than two years have elapsed and the situation throughout the world, both in a military and political respect, has undergone a fundamental change. The military struggles of the United Nations have been joined in particular, by the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the United States of America in December 1941. In this way the potential preponderance in a military respect has shifted to the side of the United Nations. Since November, 1942, the development of hostilities has shown that the Axis
States cannot win the war, and to-day this has become completely clear within those States themselves. The Czechoslovak Government considers it, therefore, a certainty, especially since the Casablanca conference, that the main military and political aims of the United Nations will quite undoubtedly be fulfilled. One of these aims is the complete restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic. The fact that this aim is supported by the four chief Powers of the United Nations, Great Britain, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, as well as by all the other members, is a guarantee to the Czechoslovak Government that Czechoslovakia, in common with all the other countries occupied by the Axis States, will be liberated and reconstituted.

IV: In respect of international politics so much in this direction has also been already accomplished that from the point of view of diplomacy and international law there are to-day no doubts in our minds as to this result of the war. First and foremost, as far as we are concerned,
the Czechoslovak Republic never ceased to exist in an international respect, and this view was shared by a number of other States. Great Britain and the United States of America, for example, never recognised the act of violence which the German Government committed on March 15th, 1939, by bringing the Czech territories into the scope of the Nazi Reich and proclaiming Slovakia as an independent State under the Protectorate of Berlin. Further, by the development of events in the war the representatives of the Czechoslovak people in the Allied countries were then enabled to establish, on the basis of the irreconcilable opposition of all sections of the Czechoslovak people at home to the Germans, an organised military and political movement; this movement which created its national army and a Czechoslovak Government, was then granted in July, 1940, juridical recognition in a political and international respect as the Government and Army of an Allied nation and State waging war with Nazi Germany and as the rightful political representative of the Czechoslovak people at home and of the Czechoslovak State from the period before
its occupation in 1938 and 1939.

For it should be noted that from July, 1940 onwards the Czechoslovak State and its internationally recognised Government acquired once more their former rights and were, in respect of international law, restored to the same authority and to the same complete political, diplomatic, military and international legal position as is to-day the case with Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Czechoslovak Government, with its former President at its head, was once again recognised as the legal Government of a former State by almost all those Governments and States who, before the outbreak of the second World War, had maintained a strict neutrality or later entered the war against Germany, and did not recognise, on the one hand the settlement at Munich in September, 1938, and on the other hand the violent action taken by Nazi Germany, contrary to all its commitments, in March, 1939, against the Czechoslovak Republic.

In this sense the full diplomatic and international recognition of Czechoslovakia was put into effect by Great Britain /including all the Dominions/ and the Soviet Union.
on July 16th, 1941, by the United States of America on July 31st, 1941, and by China on August 27th, 1941. Diplomatic relations and mutual recognition with Norway were established on October 12th, 1940, with Poland on November 27th, 1940, with Belgium on December 13th, 1940, with Egypt on March 13th, 1941, with Holland on March 15th, 1941, with Yugoslavia on May 19th, 1941, with Iraq on July 28th, 1941, with Luxemburg on February 27th, 1942, with Mexico on March 26th, 1942, with Iran on May 27th, 1942, and with Greece on August 19th, 1942. In addition, the new Government of the Czechoslovak Republic was recognised by Bolivia on June 5th, 1942, by Uruguay on June 29th, 1942, by Cuba on July 4th, 1942, by Peru on July 6th, 1942, by Dominican Republic on July 10th, 1942, by Brazil on September 16th, 1942, by Columbia, Venezuela and Ecuador on January 9th, 1943, and by Chile on March 31st, 1943. The representation of the Czechoslovak Republic with the League of Nations and the International Labour Office had never ceased to operate and in a number of neutral States the representation and contact de facto continues.

I emphasise this juridical position in its
international bearings, since it best shows the present
international political situation of the Czechoslovak Republic
as well as of Czechoslovak people and its Government in
London, and to-day actually constitutes an expression of
the situation which will exist after the war.

With regard to this, the Government of the
Czechoslovak Republic adds that a united Czechoslovakia
/Czech lands and Slovakia/ has been recognised by all these
Governments, and further that the Munich Agreement of
September 30th, 1938, was violently infringed by Germany
herself and was expressly revoked by the Government of Great
Britain on August 5th, 1942, as also by the National French
Committee presided over by General de Gaulle. The Soviet
Government, too, has expressly recognised the Czechoslovak
Republic within the frontiers from the period before
September, 1938. The other states and nations did not particip­
ate in the Munich settlement. The violent occupation of
Carpathian Ruthenia by Hungary in 1939 has not been recognised
by any of the above-mentioned States.
V. The Czechoslovak people and later the newly recognised Government of the Czechoslovak Republic followed with particular attention the course adopted by the Holy See with regard to Czechoslovak affairs during the present terrible international crisis. They gratefully welcomed the action of the Holy See with regard to the occupation of the Archbishopric of Prague after the death of His Eminence Cardinal Kašpar. They fully realised the difficulties with which the Holy See was confronted as a result of the proceedings of the German and Hungarian Governments, both in the Czech territories and in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. In view of the fact that the issue here concerns war events which have not yet been finished, their desire is that all States and Powers with which the Czechoslovak Republic maintained diplomatic relations until September, 1938, should preserve a neutral attitude at least, if possible, in the same spirit as the United States of America or Great Britain, who never, not even before or after the outbreak of war in 1939, discontinued their international relations with the Czechoslovak legations in
Washington and London. The Czechoslovak Government has seen that the Holy See has not found it possible to adopt the same point of view, which of course might cause certain complications between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Holy See at the end of the present war.

Taking into account this point of view of the Holy See hitherto and especially the presence in the Vatican of the delegate of Slovakia the Czechoslovak Government is already now considering how these difficulties might be avoided in good time. It takes this opportunity of putting on record the following facts about the present internal situation in the Czechoslovak territories:

Apart from an insignificant number of individuals, the whole of the Czech people are opposed to present-day Germany. They never recognised and never will recognise what Germany has done against our country since September, 1938, and unconditionally support the present Czechoslovak Government with its headquarters in London.

The same attitude is adopted by the great majority of the Slovak people. In Slovakia the political,
social, economic and moral conditions are utterly deplorable. The majority of the Slovak people considers that the present Government at Bratislava brought this situation about and betrayed the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republic. The former Slovak Government Parties from the period before March 15th, 1939/agrarians, liberals, socialists/ almost in their entirety support the Czechoslovak Government and are opposed to the present regime in Slovakia, while of the former Catholic People's Party, which in 1939 took over from the Germans the conduct of Slovak affairs, to-day, according to our reports, at least 60 per cent are opposed to the present regime. They are dissatisfied with it for having allied itself with pagan German Nazism, with having permitted a declaration of war against Poland, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as against the Czechoslovak Government, and also for having caused the present politically untenable state of affairs in Slovakia. The Holy See may have other information about the conditions in Slovakia. But I consider it as my duty to hand over objectively to the Holy See the information based on reports which have been regularly received from home in the course of the last two years.

Under these circumstances Slovakia, at the end of the war, could be the scene of grave disturbances, the results of which, if they are not coped with in time, may be
of a far-reaching character. The fact that this Slovak regime, which, at the end of the war, will undoubtedly meet a very disastrous end, is recognised by the Holy See, and that the Holy See received its representative, causes great concern to all true Czechoslovaks and particularly Czechoslovak Catholics.

VI. The object of this memorandum is to indicate the entire international situation of the Czechoslovak people and Czechoslovak State in connection with these ecclesiastical questions affecting Czechoslovakia. Slovakia will, without any doubt, again be a part of the Czechoslovak Republic. The Czechoslovak Government in London takes the view that, after the war, the Czech and Slovak people itself will freely and democratically adjust its mutual relationship by a revision of the former constitution. The Government therefore is anxious to prepare the situation now so that religious and ecclesiastical questions after the war may not be unduly complicated and, in particular, that the relationship

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of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Holy See may not be complicated nor become the subject of special and lengthy negotiations or disputes either internal or international, as a result of events in the course of the war.

I myself conducted all negotiations between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Holy See from 1919 and I recall how difficult it often was. I should be unwilling for this to be repeated. After long and difficult discussions I achieved, not only complete agreement with the Holy See but, in particular, an approval by the Czechoslovak people and Parliament of the settlement of the 17th December, 1927, known as the modus vivendi and gladly accepted by all Czech and Slovak Catholics. I consistently saw to it that the terms of this settlement were kept, and thus in the period from 1927 to 1938 the individual conditions of the modus vivendi were successively put into effect. In my view our simplest course would be to revert, before the end of the war, to the former relationship without any further complications, discussions or settlements, by merely renewing the former normal diplomatic relations between the Holy See and
the Czechoslovak Republic and, on the collapse of Germany, concretely settling, in the spirit of the modus vivendi, the problems with which this terrible war will confront us. The Czechoslovak Government would welcome this. Such an arrangement would undoubtedly prevent many difficulties which will otherwise certainly arise as a sequel to the chaos which the defeat of the Axis States is certain to leave in its train in Central Europe.

VII. If the Holy See does not consider this course of action possible or suitable for itself, or if the Holy See judges that such a course of action could be acceptable only in a restricted measure in view of the events of the war, the Czechoslovak Government would be grateful for an expression of opinion on the part of the Holy See in this extremely delicate matter. The Czechoslovak Government would here emphasise that it regards it as its duty to take steps now towards the consolidation of post-war conditions. In view of the chaos which will undoubtedly arise throughout Central Europe after the defeat of Germany, and //.
in view of the influence which will probably remain in Central Europe as a result of the present military effort of the Soviet Union and its future post-war position, the Czechoslovak Government is anxious to rally in good time all factors of internal and international consolidation for post-war co-operation. Such factors will include the Czechoslovak Catholics, whose co-operation in the Government after the war we desire to maintain, and a timely adjustment of the relationship between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Holy See would undoubtedly have a very fundamental bearing upon such co-operation.

I believe that Czechoslovakia will again be one of the first States in Central Europe to achieve post-war consolidation. The Czechoslovak Government accordingly desires to complete all preparations in due course, so that after the war, it may continue the policy which it was pursuing at a time when the relations between the Holy See and our country were consolidated, normal and amicable.

I regard it as my duty at the present moment, when, on the whole, I have — as, of course, I personally venture to believe — a clear idea of how
conditions will develop in the course of this year and how
the present grim events of the war will conclude, to approach
the Holy See with this memorandum. I desire after the war
to render to the Czechoslovak people an account of the
activities of our Government also in respect of our ecclesiastical policy, and to show them that we neglected no aspect of our international relations. I should be happy if we were really able to take a step forward and thus ensure in the future a propitious development of the relations between the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic. This is a benefit which is surely deserved by our Czechoslovak people, so sorely tried, so terribly persecuted and so unspeakably martyred both in the Czech territories and in Slovakia under the present regime controlled there by Nazi Germany.

The difficulties, too, which after the war might confront us in ecclesiastical and religious matters as a result of the strain of the war events could be avoided or at least reduced to a minimum. Such a result would redound to
the advantage of both interested parties, the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic.

London, May 12th, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Following the suggestion of your memorandum of May 31 I have delivered the Benes memorandum for the Holy See to the Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop Cicognani, who will transmit it as you suggest.

Myron C. Taylor
My dear Mr. President:

The Apostolic Delegate has asked me to transmit to you personally a letter which has been addressed to you by the Pope and which I enclose herewith.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enc.

[Enclosure]

The President,

The White House.
The letter to the Pope
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1943 Vol. 11 Europe
Pages 919-920
From the President

I received a letter from the Pope yesterday and have replied as follows: Quot;

Your Holiness:

The communication of May 19, 1943 from Your Holiness setting forth in eloquent language the deep feelings of emotion with which Your Holiness views the devastating effects of war on Italy strikes a very responsive chord in my heart. No one appreciates more than I the ceaseless efforts of Your Holiness to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and subsequently to limit its contagion. Your Holiness is familiar with the repeated efforts which were made in 1940 by this Government, and by many elements within the United States to deter the Chief of the Italian Government from plunging his country and countrymen into a ruinous war whose outcome, I reminded him even at that time, could only prove disastrous.

The sympathetic response of Your Holiness to the many appeals of the Italian people on behalf of their country is understood and appreciated by me. May I say that Americans are among those who value most the religious shrines and the historical monuments of Italy. However, my countrymen are likewise united in their determination to win the war which has been thrust upon them and for which the present government of Italy must share its full responsibility. My countrymen and I deplore the loss of life on both sides which must result and the destruction of property and resources.

Attacks against Italy are limited, to the extent humanly possible, to military objectives. We have not and will not make warfare on civilians or against non-military objectives. In the event it should be found militarily necessary for Allied planes to operate over

Rome

His Holiness

Pius XII,

Vatican City.
Rome our aviators are thoroughly informed as to the location of the Vatican and have been specifically instructed to prevent bombs from falling within the Vatican City. This may be an opportune time to warn Your Holiness that I have no reason to feel assured that Axis planes would not make an opportunity to bomb Vatican City with the purpose of charging Allied planes with the outrages they themselves had committed.

My country has no choice but to prosecute the war with all force against the enemy until every resistance has been overcome. Your Holiness will understand, I am confident, that in this struggle for human liberty no exception can be made to the full prosecution of the war against any legitimate military enemy objective. Any other course would only delay the fulfillment of that desire in which Your Holiness and the governments and peoples of the United Nations—and I believe the people of Italy likewise—are joined—the return of peace on earth.

Yours very sincerely,

[Handwritten note]

His letter to me was not a request not to bomb Rome but the safety of the historic places and also spots of the Holy See which I suppose includes the Churches outside the Vatican.
June 15, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your signature, if you approve, a reply to the Pope's letter of May 19. The pertinent portions of Admiral Leahy's memorandum of June 14 have been included in the communication to the Pope.

If you approve of this reply I suggest that it be returned to me for delivery to the Apostolic Delegate. The latter will undoubtedly wish to send the text thereof to the Pope in Vatican code by radio. It seems to me that this would probably be the most secret and most expeditious means of transmission.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
1. From the Pope, returned.
2. Draft reply.

The President,

The White House.
To His Excellency
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
President of the United States of America

Almost four years have now passed since, in the name of God the Father of all and with the utmost earnestness at Our command, We appealed (August 24, 1939) to the responsible leaders of peoples to hold back the threatening avalanches of international strife and to settle their differences in the calm, serene atmosphere of mutual understanding. "Nothing was to be lost by peace; everything might be lost by war." And when the awful powers of destruction broke loose and swept over a large part of Europe, though Our Apostolic Office placed Us above and beyond all participation in armed conflicts, Wc did not fail to do what We could to keep out of the war nations not yet involved and to mitigate as far as possible for millions of innocent men, women and children, defenseless against the circumstances in which they have to live, the sorrows and sufferings that would inevitably follow along the constantly widening swaths of devastation and death.
cut by the machineries of modern warfare.

The succeeding years unfortunately have seen heart-rending tragedies increase and multiply; yet We have not for that reason, as Our conscience bears witness, given over Our hopes and Our efforts in behalf of the afflicted members of the great human family everywhere. And as the episcopal See of the Popes is Rome, from where throughout these long centuries they have ruled the flock entrusted to them by the divine Shepherd of souls, it is natural that amid all the vicissitudes of their complex and checkered history the faithful of Italy should feel themselves bound by more than ordinary ties to this Holy See, and have learned to look to it for protection and comfort especially in hours of crisis.

In such an hour today their pleading voices reach Us — carried on their steady confidence that they will not go unanswered. Fathers and mothers, old and young every day are appealing for Our help; and We, whose paternal heart beats in unison with the sufferings and sorrows of all mankind, cannot but respond with the deepest feelings of Our soul to such insistent prayers, lest the poor and humble shall have placed their confidence in Us in vain.

And so very sincerely and confidentially We address Our selves to Your Excellency, sure that no one will recognize more
clearly than the Chief Executive of the great American nation
the voice of humanity that speaks in these appeals made to
Us, and the affection of a father that inspires Our response.
The assurance given to Us in 1941 by Your Excellency's esteemed
Ambassador Mr. Myron Taylor and spontaneously repeated by
him in 1942 that a America has no hatred of the Italian peoples
gives Us confidence that they will be treated with consideration
and understanding; and if they have had to mourn the untimely
death of dear ones, they will yet in their present circumstances
be spared as far as possible further pain and desolation, and
their many treasured shrines of Religion and Art - precious herit-
age not of one people but of all human and Christian civilization
will be saved from irreparable ruin. This is a hope and prayer
very dear to Our paternal heart, and We have thought that its
realization could not be more effectively ensured than by expressing
it very simply to Your Excellency:

With heartfelt prayer We beg God's blessings on Your
Excellency and the people of the United States.

From the Vatican, May 19, 1943.

Pius XII
June 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN
MR. MYRON C. TAYLOR AND LORD HALIFAX

Pursuant to the discussion with Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles this morning and with Assistant Secretary Long yesterday, I called upon Lord Halifax this afternoon and he brought to the meeting a Mr. Hayter, one of the British representatives at the Bermuda Conference on Refugees.

I gave them the substance of the letter of Secretary Hull to the President, May 22, and left with them a brief résumé of the important points modifying to some extent the Secretary's letter to the President. The plan which I presented seemed to meet with immediate approval by Lord Halifax and Mr. Hayter. Lord Halifax promptly raised the question whether the State Department had cleared with the War Department the question of the admission of refugees in North Africa. I indicated that I would take this subject up with Secretary Hull on my return to the Department. The simplicity of the plan and the fact that it avoids an advertised meeting of the Inter-Governmental Committee in Washington or London found immediate favor with both Lord Halifax and Mr. Hayter.

Myron C. Taylor
I. Agreement between Britain and U.S.A. on place of temporary refuge.

II. Agreement to bear expense jointly.

III. Meeting of Intergovernmental Executive Committee in London to

1. Appoint a full time Vice Director (American) ?
2. Appoint a full time Secretary (?)

IV. Agreement that after arrival at place of temporary refuge, International Relief Organization (Lehman) will maintain refugees until end of war when they may

A. Return to their homes
B. Be transferred to places of permanent residence.

British and American Embassies or Legations in the countries concerned would delegate each a representative to carry out the plans for transit and reception of refugees.

With these agreements the Directors Office in London may contact all countries represented upon the Intergovernmental Committee to secure

A. Offers to accept refugees
B. Contributions to the fund for support of the office
C. Contributions to the funds for transit of refugees and their maintenance in places of temporary refuge.

Under these conditions no meeting of full Intergovernmental Committee would be necessary at this time.

Any change of authority by Intergovernmental Committee enlarging scope to include all refugees can be accomplished without Intergovernmental Committee full meeting by letters to be secured from representatives of government members in London.
July 16, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

Will you be good enough to hand the attached letter to the President and greatly oblige

Yours sincerely,

Myron C. Taylor

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.
July 16, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

With my letter to the President yesterday I failed to enclose a copy of the memorandum referred to. I am now enclosing it herewith. I ask you to please attach it to the original letter.

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, 6/13/43, transmitting letter which Mr. Myron C. Taylor received from A. G. Cicognani, Archbishop of Laodicea, Apostolic Delegate, 3339 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D. C., under date of 6/15/43, stating that in reply to a recent communication to the Holy See, the contents of which are known to Mr. Taylor, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, requests that the Apostolic Delegate bring to Mr. Taylor's attention certain points to be communicated direct to the President. The points all relate to the possibility of the bombardment of Rome.
June 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I think it is worthwhile to get word to Monsignor Cicognani in very polite language:

(a) That we fully realize all that the Pope has said about Rome as a whole and that we have no desire to destroy any church property or historic monuments.

(b) That, nevertheless, because war is war we must recognize that Rome is the center of the Italian Government and is of definite use to that government in conducting the war against us. This applies also to the fact that many Germans help to run Italy, with German staffs located in Rome itself.

(c) Therefore, in order to be fair and equally just to both sides, we suggest that the Vatican try to have Rome declared an open city i.e. that all military installations, activities and personnel of Italy be removed from Rome, together with the use of all railroad facilities in and about Rome for military purposes. This, of course, would require the cooperative consent of the British, but I agree with Myron that it is worthwhile discussing.

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Myron Taylor, 6/25/43, to the President, with enclosed letter which Mr. Taylor received from Archbishop of Laodicea

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your memorandum of June 28 enclosing a letter from the Apostolic Delegate to Mr. Myron Taylor with further reference to the bombardment of Rome and certain suggestions of Mr. Taylor concerning the nature of the reply to be made.

It is believed that the enclosed letter to the Apostolic Delegate for your signature, which was drafted in compliance with your memorandum of June 23, embodies an appropriate reply to the first two points in your memorandum under reference. With respect to the third point based upon Mr. Taylor's suggestions, certain practical difficulties are foreseen. If proposals for the removal from Rome of military objectives were made to the Vatican, it would be necessary in all justice to withhold our bombardment of Rome and vicinity during the period of negotiations. These might well be protracted to a degree

harmful

The President,

The White House.
harmful to the effective prosecution of the war. The limits of Rome would require some definition since we could not accept a definition of the city which would include the civil and military airports and railroad yards and tracks on the outskirts. In view of Rome's strategic position with relation to rail traffic between northern and southern Italy, it is not believed that the Italian Government would contemplate in any sincerity a proposal to abandon the use of the railroads in and around Rome for military purposes.

In my opinion, however, the most important consideration is the inability to obtain satisfactory assurances that the evacuation of military objectives from Rome had in fact been carried out. The Germans and the Fascist Government would have no scruples particularly in this critical moment in taking advantage of the Vatican's anxiety to preserve Rome from bombardment. The Vatican obviously does not have facilities to control the carrying out of the various commitments which the Fascist Government might undertake. Furthermore, in view of Italy's position within the Axis I do not believe that the Italian Government is a sufficiently free agent to fulfill any engagements which it might give to the Vatican City in
this respect even should it desire to do so.

Several months ago the Holy See informed us that it had received written assurances from the Italian Government that Mussolini, the Italian Supreme Command, the independent offices of the Italian army and navy and the military headquarters in Rome of German armed forces were being transferred away from Rome. However, we have no information that these transfers have been accomplished and in fact there is every evidence that Mussolini continues to use Rome as the capital of Fascist Italy.

In December last the British presented for our consideration certain proposals, looking to the evacuation of military objectives from Rome, which might be made to the Italian Government in return for a commitment not to bomb the capital. We maintained the attitude that those interested in the preservation of Rome from bombardment should take the initiative in demonstrating that it had been emptied of legitimate military targets. We have, up to the present, avoided specifying conditions under which we would give up our freedom of action with respect to the bombardment of Rome. It is my understanding that the Allied air forces will make every effort to avoid bombing Vatican property, churches or historical monuments in Rome.

However,
However, the marshaling yards and railroad tracks outside the city walls, as well as the commercial and military airfields on the outskirts of the city, are legitimate military targets. In my opinion we should not relinquish our rights, should military necessity require the bombing of the Italian capital, in return for conditions which cannot be satisfactorily assured.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

To Apostolic Delegate.
My dear Archbishop:

The Secretary of State has shown me your letter of June 15 containing a further communication from His Holiness concerning the position of Italy in the present unhappy conflict.

His Holiness again expresses his concern over the fate of the Italian people. Unfortunately, the government of Italy for a period of twenty years has glorified the use of force and has used it ruthlessly against the Greeks, the Ethiopians, the Albanians – to mention only a few of the victims of Fascist aggression. The people of Italy have been made the instrument of this pagan policy. When the Italians are liberated from Fascist domination and are free once more to demonstrate their innate good judgment, they will be given an opportunity to choose the kind of government based on democratic principles that they may wish to establish. It is my intention, and in that I am joined by the people of the United States, that Italy will be restored to nationhood after the defeat of Fascism and will take her place as a respected member of the European family of nations.

I have noted the observations of His Holiness with respect to the possibility of the bombardment of Rome. As in the past careful consideration has been given to the expressions of opinion of His Holiness. I recently reassured His Holiness with respect to the bombing of Vatican City. I trust His Holiness will understand that should the conduct of the war require it, recognized military objectives in and around Rome cannot be ignored. There is no intention to attack or damage non-military objectives or the historic and art treasures of Rome.

Very sincerely yours,

His Excellency
The Most Reverend
Amleto Giovanni Cicognani,
Archbishop of Laodicea di Frigia,
The Apostolic Delegate,
Washington, D. C.
July 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND

PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Letter from the Apostolic Delegate to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, dated June 28, 1943, re question of immunity of the city of Rome from aerial attack.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

JUL 3 - 1943
NOTE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUL 2 - 1943
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Your Excellency:

In further reference to the question of the immunity of the city of Rome from aerial attack, I have just received a communication from His Eminence Cardinal Maglione, Secretary of State to His Holiness.

His Eminence now informs me that the Holy See presented additional Notes to the Italian Government on February 28th and May 22nd, with the purpose of obtaining the removal from Rome and the immediate vicinity of all military objectives.

In response to these communications the Italian Ambassador to the Vatican, by order of his Government, presented a Note on June 9th, outlining the steps taken for the demilitarization of Rome.

In accordance with its Note of December 20, 1942, to the Cardinal Secretary of State, the Italian Government has been effecting the removal from Rome of the Military Commands, and has in fact transferred the Supreme Command and the General Staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Forces.

The Supreme Command and the General Staffs are now in rural districts. At present the only military offices remaining in Rome are the local military office, the historical military office, and other offices of financial and administrative character. However these too are in the process of being removed from the City.

Similar steps have been taken in regard to the German offices of liaison, which have either already followed the respective Italian Commands or are about to do so.

His Excellency
Mr. Myron C. Taylor
Ambassador to the Holy See
The removal from Rome of these military objectives is being carried out not only in response to the plea of the Holy See for the demilitarization of the City, but also as a part of the process of decentralization which constitutes a necessary phase of the national defense. It is clear however that the local garrison, necessary for the protection and security of the civilian population, must remain in the City.

His Eminence has directed me to make known the sad and dangerous situation in which the Holy See now finds itself. In fact, on several occasions and from various sources, including some newspapers, the Holy See has already been reproached for harboring within the walls of the Vatican the representatives of the United States and of other powers hostile to the Axis.

In the event of a bombardment of Rome there would be considerable probability of an incited or spontaneous uprising of the people, and it would be difficult if not impossible for the Holy See to guarantee the security of the Vatican itself and of the Allied diplomatic personnel. Wherever the responsibility of such violence might lie, it will readily be conceded that the Holy See does not dispose of adequate means for preventing it.

His Eminence has taken full cognizance of the possibility that Vatican City State itself may be bombed, either accidentally or deliberately, by one or other of the contending forces. He is obliged however to reassert that in the calm judgment of posterity the full responsibility would fall on the Allies if they give occasion for such a tragic disaster by bombing any part of the City of Rome.

I shall be most grateful if Your Excellency will present the contents of this Note to your Government, and I foster hope that due consideration will be given to the precarious situation that would result for the Holy See if Rome is made the objective of aerial raids.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my deep personal regards, I beg to remain

Yours very sincerely,

+ A. G. Cicognani
Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Does this require a reply?

F. D. R.

Letter from the Apostolic Delegate, dated July 2, 1943, re the bombardment of Rome.
July 7, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my letter of July 1, 1943 relative to the British suggestion that it might be inadvisable for Mr. Taylor to go to Rome at the present time, there is enclosed, for your approval, a draft telegram to Mr. Harriman on this question.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

O. K.

F. D. R.

Enclosure:

Draft telegram.

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE

July 7, 1943

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR HARRIMAN

I have given careful consideration to Eden's and the Prime Minister's suggestions as outlined in your 5135, June 29, relative to the proposed trip of Myron. I agree with the British reaction that Myron's return to his post now would give rise to undesirable rumors and might generally be misconstrued by the American public and our Allies. Furthermore, although I am certain that it would be very helpful if Myron were there at this time, I feel, under the circumstances, that Tittmann, our Chargé at the Vatican, can adequately handle any problems which may arise. For the above reasons, I concur that Myron should not go to Rome for the time being.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

I refer to Lieutenant Colonel Hammond's secret memorandum of June 30, 1943 enclosing a paraphrase of a telegram from Mr. Harriman at London concerning Mr. Myron Taylor's return to Vatican City.

I suggest that you reply that you agree with the Prime Minister's and Mr. Eden's views on the proposed trip and have decided not to send Mr. Taylor to Rome at this time. I am in agreement with the British reaction that Mr. Taylor's return to his post now would give rise to undesirable rumors and be generally misconstrued by the American public and our allies. While it would undoubtedly be desirable to have Mr. Taylor in Vatican City now, I feel that, in view of the circumstances set forth above, Mr. Tittmann can adequately cope with any problems which

The President,

The White House.
which may arise. Mr. Taylor's happy relations with the Apostolic Delegate in Washington make him particularly useful here.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
TAYLOR, Hon. Myron C.
New York, N. Y.
July 7, 1943.

The President wrote Mr. Taylor asking him to continue his work on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. The President said, in part, - "I am sure that your continuing identity with the work would be particularly welcome to the groups directly interested in it and would likewise assist greatly in the successful completion of its labors." -- Mr. McIntyre, July 7, 1943, referred the above letter (copy) for the information of the Secretary of State.

-- Attached - Memorandum for the President, July 5, 1943, from the Secretary of State in which he said that the attached is a suggested note that the President may care to address to Mr. Myron C. Taylor in connection with the refugee problem.

See - 5186
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

Ltr of 7/16/43 from Myron C. Taylor, Dept.
of State, encl a ltr he just rec from Arch-
bishop Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate at
Washington; conveying message to the Presi-
dent from the Pope expressing gratitude that
respect will be shown to religious institu-
tions and to the City of the Vatican; the
Pope is sending a letter to the President by
diplomatic courier.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:
FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JUL 17 1943
NOTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUL 17 1943
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Department of State
Washington

July 16, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am handing you herewith a letter which I have just received from His Excellency, Archbishop Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate at Washington, to which I would invite your prompt attention.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Myron C. Taylor

The President,
The White House.
Your Excellency,

In accordance with the instructions which I have just received from the Cardinal Secretary of State, I have the honor to write to you that His Holiness Pope Pius has taken note of the message which the President of the United States of America recently had transmitted to Him through me by radio. His Holiness expresses profound gratitude to the President for having given assurances that respect will be shown to religion, to churches and religious institutions and to the City of the Vatican by the allied authorities and forces, although He is unable to conceal His regret at finding in the President's message no indication of an explicit intention to avoid bombing the Eternal City. In this regard, therefore, He presents anew the recommendations which He made on other occasions. Moreover, His Eminence informs me that the Holy Father is sending a letter in response to His Excellency the President, by diplomatic courier.

Will your Excellency be so good as to convey the foregoing message to the President, together with my respectful greetings.

With the assurance of my highest consideration and of my profound personal regard, I have the honor to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate

To His Excellency

Mr. MYRON C. TAYLOR
Ambassador to the Holy See
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States
1943 Vol. 11 Europe
Pages 931-933
To His Excellency
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
President of the United States of America

Our Secretary of State acknowledged at once by telegram the receipt of Your Excellency's message of the tenth instant, and he expressed our grateful appreciation of the assurances given that the neutral status of the Vatican City as well as of the Papal domains throughout Italy will be respected during the military operations abroad.

The neutrality of the Holy See strikes its roots deep in the very nature of our apostolic ministry, which places us above any armed conflict between nations. Yet it is this same God-given mission to safeguard and defend the eternal, spiritual interests of all men redeemed by Christ that makes us the more sensible of human pain and sorrow. The war continues to multiply these sufferings a hundred-fold for so many millions of peace-loving, innocent men and women that Our paternal heart can find no rest except in constant, increasing efforts to dry the tears of aging mothers, of widow and orphaned children, and to hold back by every
means at Our disposal the mounting flood that threatens to bury completely beneath its raging waters once fair lands of Europe and Asia.

Moved by this strong, insistent love for humankind We cannot but take this occasion of the message which Your Excellency has kindly addressed to Us to repeat an appeal made by Us more than once in these past few years. It is a prayer that everywhere, as far as humanly possible, the civil populations be spared the horrors of war; that the homes of God's poor be not laid in ashes; that the little ones and youth, a nation's hope, be preserved from all harm - how Our heart bleeds when We hear of helpless children made victims of cruel war; that churches dedicated to the worship of God and monuments that enshrine the memory and masterpieces of human genius be protected from destruction. We repeat this appeal unwilling to yield to any thought of its hopeless necessity, although almost daily We must continue to explore the void against which We pray. And now even in Rome, parent of western civilization and for well nigh two thousand years centre of the Catholic world, to which millions, one may risk the assertion, hundreds of millions of men throughout the world have recently been turning their anxious gaze; We have had to witness the harrowing scene of death leaping from the skies and stalking -
pityfully through unspecting homes striking down women and children; and in person we have visited and with sorrow contemplated the gaping ruins of that ancient and priceless Papal basilica of St. Lawrence, one of the most treasured and loved sanctuaries of Rome, especially close to the heart of all Supreme Pontiffs, and visited with devotion by pilgrims from all countries of the world.

God knows how much we have suffered from the first days of the war for the lot of all those cities that have been exposed to aerial bombardments, especially for those that have been bombed not for a day, but for weeks and months without reprieve. But since divine Providence has placed its head over the Catholic Church and Bishop of this city so rich in sacred shrines and hallowed, immortal memories, we feel it our duty to voice a particular prayer and hope that all may recognize that a city, whose every district, in some districts every street has its irreplaceable monuments of faith or art and Christian culture, cannot be attacked without inflicting an incomparable loss on the patrimony of Religion and Civilization.

Meanwhile the war proceeds at a quickened pace; and as the peoples of the world are being told to prepare themselves for increasingly destructive battles that will drain the life-blood of many thousands of the armed forces and, to our grief be it said, of civilians, our own soul makes ready for a more grievous ordeal
of sorrow and anxiety. But it is with no diminished hope and confidence
that in this very hour We call on God, Our sole stay and comfort, to
hasten the dawn of that day when His grace will erect the glorious
temple builded of living stones, the nations of the earth, wherein
all members of the vast human family will find tranquility, sec-
urity in justice, and freedom and inspiration to worship their Cre-
ator and to love their fellow men. It is the day, as Your excellency
says, longed for by all men of good will. But not all realize that
that temple will stand and endure only if set on the foundation of
Christian, more than mere human charity, not alloyed with vindictive
passion or any elements of hate. Such charity the divine Redeemer
of mankind proclaimed as His commandment, illustrated by His example
and sealed with His blood. Through it men can once again be united
as loved and loving children of their divine Father in heaven.

We avail Ourselves of this occasion to renew Our good wishes,
while We pray God to protect Your Person and the people of the
United States.

From the Vatican, July 20, 1915.

Pius XI
To His Excellency
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
President of the United States of America
Dear Mr. President:

I am returning a letter of July 2, 1943 from the Apostolic Delegate acknowledging receipt of your reply of June 15 to the Pope. A copy has been made for the Department's files.

I do not believe that the Delegate's letter requires a reply.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

From Apostolic Delegate, returned.

The President,

The White House.
Mr. President,

Hereewith another message from the Vatican. I will recall the one sent you last week relating to my suggestion. This one is partly along the lines of that suggestion.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, D.C.

His Excellency

Mr. MYRON C. TAYLOR

Ambassador to the Holy See.
Mr. President:

I have just received Your Excellency's communication containing a response to the message from His Holiness which was forwarded by me in a letter of June 15th. In the name of the Holy Father I wish to express deepest gratitude for the consideration which has been given to this appeal.

With hope and firm confidence I have always noted in the pronouncements of Your Excellency the resolve to give the Italian people an opportunity to choose the kind of government based on democratic principles which they may wish to establish, and I have not failed to call it to the attention of the Holy See. It is my conviction that the Holy Father will be gratified to learn of the hope that is fostered by Your Excellency for the restoration of Italy as a respected member of the European family of nations.

In regard to the possibility of bombardment of Rome, the Holy See has been informed of the efforts made by the Government of the United States to reduce this possibility to a minimum. In this regard nevertheless I recently received a communication from His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, and in a letter to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, under date of June 28th, I had the honor to present further considerations of His Eminence on the demilitarization of Rome, and on the precarious situation facing the Vatican now, and especially in the event of a bombardment of Rome.

The President

The White House
I am confident that the plea of the Holy Father will continue to meet with the benevolent consideration of the part of Your Excellency and of the Allied Governments, and it shall be my duty to inform His Holiness of your courteous letter directed to me.

With the assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to remain

Very respectfully yours,

+ A. J. Ciegnani
Archbishop of Naodica
Apostolic Delegate
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF SPECIAL RESEARCH

Dear Miss Tully,

These seem to be good enough to put the Enamel Memo before the President.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

July 24/43
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

July 24, 1943

I had a long visit with the Apostolic Delegate Friday afternoon. His reaction to the Pope's statement regarding the bombing of Rome was that it was intentionally moderate and phrased so that it might not be used by the Nazis or Fascists to the disadvantage of the Allies. He believes that the Pope will continue his efforts which he has exerted for a long time to persuade the Government to remove everything of a military character from Rome. He does not believe that the possibility of the Holy Father being a medium for the removal of Italy from the war is at an end.
Dear Miss Tandy,

Will you once again oblig me by
putting before the
President the enclosed Memo. to Italy.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

July 26, 43.
I called upon the Apostolic Delegate this morning, and give in the following items the substance of our conversation.

1. The pattern that is being followed by the Italian Government so far is in its initial stages in conformity with the discussions which took place several weeks ago between the Apostolic Delegate and myself which, at that time, I reported to the President and the Secretary of State.

2. In our past talks I have questioned the wisdom of appointing Badoglio as head of the Government. The only alternative through the many months of inquiry that seemed of equal influence was General Caviglia. The main difficulty in his case was age, he being, I believe, eighty-two years of age. Badoglio's anti-Fascist attitude in general has been good. Whenever he has undertaken military activities it has been at the instance of the King whom he has loyally supported throughout his career.

3. Marshall Badoglio has today declared martial law in Italy.

4. In the opinion of the Apostolic Delegate the events of the last day will be followed by ultimate withdrawal of Italy from the war. This may occur in a reasonably short time. In viewing this one must consider how the German Army can be eliminated from Italy and still permit the Italian, in the first instance at least, to keep faith with an ally.

5. It seems obvious that the negotiating medium now can only be General Eisenhower and the King and/or Marshall Badoglio. The effort that is being made in New York and elsewhere to assemble a group of Italian-Americans to

undertake
undertake some activities in respect to peace with Italy
and the control and administration of Italian affairs would
in the opinion of the Apostolic Delegate be a very great
mistake. He believes that Americans, in the sense that they
are generally accepted in Italy, would be more welcome and
would accomplish quicker and better results than if these
efforts were in the hands of Italian-Americans. It might
also be that Italians would expect more and demand more of
Italian-Americans than they would of Americans of Anglo-Saxon
stock.

May I make a further personal observation with respect
to the Italian fleet which is the fourth largest fleet in
being today. Whether it be true that the Italians have
refused permission to the Germans to man the ships, or that
the Italians similarly had refused the demand of the Germans
to engage the Allied fleet, or that the men of the fleet had
threatened to mutiny rather than engage in battle, the fact
remains that the greater part of the fleet is intact. That
it would be of immense use to the Allies against the Japanese
in the Pacific or replacing heavier armored ships of the
Allies in continental waters for the use of the more suitable
Allied ships in the Far East. Whether unconditional
surrender would gain for the Allies the same advantages which
a negotiated peace might produce raises the question what
facilities, naval and military, could the Allies gain through
a modified negotiation, and what value would those facilities
be in bringing about an end of the war both in the West and
in the East. These are considerations which will affect the
lives of thousands of men and the time when the war could be
ended.

I have discussed the above several points with the
Secretary of State in an informal way before dictating this
memorandum, of which both the President and himself are
receiving a copy.

Myron C. Taylor
President to Myron C. Taylor - July 28, 1943 regarding the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

See O.F. 3186
FMH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

4742, August 5, 4 p.m.

Two. General feeling Vatican circles appears to be that German menace to assume political control of Italy has become very real and consequently position of Badoglio Government extremely difficult. Possibility that Germansway recall Fascists and even insist upon substitution of a Gauleiter of Farinacci type for present government does not seem to be excluded. Completely lacking in aviation and modern armor, Italian armed forces are not considered to be in a position effectively to oppose military occupation of Rome. It is believed there is at present time German armored division within 50 miles of capital ready to move in at moment's notice. Under circumstances it is felt temporizing tactics or part of Badoglio Government are justifiable on grounds that if Germans could be held off long enough some military or other event might intervene to ease situation. Suggestion has again been heard that early Allied landing on peninsula
peninsula would be desirable and that if this could be effected in north of Italy Germans would be obliged to retire immediately from south and center. It has been intimated that good will toward Allies of Italian people at present time is evident and Allies should not fail to take advantage this state of mind while it lasts.

Four. Great deal of foregoing is of course speculative and question also arises as to how Vatican may be playing game of Badoglio Government. In any event it seems to be fact that this government has had support of Vatican from beginning.

Tittmann's 140, August 3.

My 131, July 31.

One. There is of course no truth in reports appearing Swiss press to effect that either my British colleague or myself have been "negotiating" with Badoglio Government through Vatican.

Three. I understand that Badoglio Government now has internal situation under control and that fear of social disorders is for moment in abeyance. Apparent apathy of people suggests popular uprising against Germans near future is unlikely. Also suggests that while desire for peace undoubtedly very strong people
#4742, August 5, 4 p.m. from Bern

people are counting on us rather than own efforts to get them out of war.

HARRISON

NPL
The President read the proposed draft of reply to Apostolic Delegate and wholly approves.

—oo0oo—

(Telephoned to Under Secretary Welles) 6:51pm

(Copy of this message attached to original draft of Apostolic Delegate letter which was returned to Mr. Welles)
The White House
Washington

AUGUST 8, 1943

FOR GENERAL WATSON
FROM MR. LATTA

FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
UNDER SECRETARY WELLES WITH COPY OF LETTER
FROM THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE AND PROPOSED
DRAFT OF REPLY:

""

THE UNDER SECRETARY WOULD APPRECIATE AN EXPEDITIOUS
ANSWER TODAY IF POSSIBLE.

M.C.L.
My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a letter from the Apostolic Delegate of which I enclose a copy.

Secretary Hull and I believe that I should reply along the lines set forth in the draft which I am also enclosing herewith.

Will you let me know if this meets with your approval.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. Welles:

I have just received from His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State a radiogram urgently requesting a definitive reply to his previous message advising of the decision of the new Italian government to declare Rome an open city. I shall be most grateful for anything you may do to expedite the securing the desired response so that I may make the relative report to His Eminence.

With every best wish and sentiments of high personal regard, I remain

Yours very sincerely,

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate

3339 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, D. C.
August 7, 1943

The Honorable

Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.
The Under Secretary of State
Washington

August 8, 1943

My dear Archbishop Cicognani:

I have received this morning your letter of August 7 in which you inform me that you have just received from His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State a radiogram urgently requesting a definitive reply to his previous message advising of the decision of the new Italian Government to declare Rome an open city. You add that you will be grateful for anything that I can do to expedite the securing of the desired response so that you may be in a position to report such reply to the Cardinal Secretary of State.

As I informed Your Excellency in my letter of August 4, the message under reference was immediately submitted by me to the highest authorities of the Government of the United States. The matter is receiving their fullest consideration.

His Excellency
The Most Reverend
Amleto Giovanni Cicognani,
Apostolic Delegate,
3339 Massachusetts Avenue,
Washington, D. C.
In the meantime I am instructed by the President to state that, in accordance with the accepted principles of international law and of pertinent international agreements, there is nothing to prevent the Italian Government from undertaking unilaterally to declare Rome an open city.

With the assurances of my highest consideration, believe me

Yours very sincerely,
August 28, 1943

Dear Myron:

I refer to your memorandum of August 11, 1943 submitting certain suggestions with respect to the Intergovernmental Committee.

The proposal in regard to the transfer of refugees from Spain to North Africa is now being put into effect and it would be difficult to alter it in any material way. You will recall that this plan was presented by the British delegates at Bermuda and again raised by the British Embassy in Washington on instructions from the British Government. After obtaining the views of the interested American authorities, I discussed the matter with the British Prime Minister and then gave my approval of it.

I suggest that if you go to London in September, your views on this subject should be presented to the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee for consideration in the light of the points outlined above.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.
August 28, 1943

Dear Myron:

I have your memorandum of August 11, 1943 in which you inform me that the Holy See has never replied to the Apostolic Delegate's request for a safe conduct for your return to the Vatican.

In view of events, I think this is just as well. If you were actually at the Vatican, I should be delighted, but I think you will agree that your return at this time would cause unnecessary and undesirable speculation.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.
My dear Mr. President:

I have your memorandum of August 16, 1943 enclosing a memorandum from Myron Taylor concerning the Vatican and the Inter-Governmental Committee.

In compliance with your suggestion I am enclosing two letters in reply to Mr. Taylor for your signature if you approve.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:

Two letters to Mr. Taylor.

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from Hon. Myron Taylor, 9/11/43, a copy of which has been retained for our files, in re the VATICAN and INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.
August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM HON. MYRON TAYLOR:

Before your departure I wish to call your attention to two matters.

1. VATICAN. The Apostolic Delegate firmly believes that on any day we may expect the safe conduct message for my visit to the Vatican. No reply to his message proposing safe conduct for my return of June 4th, has yet been received. Events in Italy and the growing breach and final rupture between the King and Mussolini probably prevented earlier action. The Germans have steadily opposed my return.

2. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE. Following our correspondence, I sought an American Vice Director for the London office, finally selecting Patrick Murphy Mallin, who has had previous experience in migration and settlement work. He is about forty years of age, in a position to give full time and able to travel where needed. He was elected by the Executive Committee last week and left for London, where he will function under Sir Herbert Emerson, Director. I am considering a trip to London in early September, to meet with the Executive Committee. I also have it in mind to visit Spain to explore the possibility of arranging for the continued temporary residence of about 7,000 refugees now there, rather than to hold them to a tent camp in Algiers or elsewhere. My preoccupation is that if the campproved to be in any way unsatisfactory, the charge would be made that it was a concentration camp operated by the Allies, and in some respects no better than the German. It would probably be a much cheaper operation to provide for maintenance in Spain, Portugal, or wherever they may be, if in neutral countries. The instability of the Franco Regime might prove to be a reason against this plan, but it needs careful consideration. In due course I would like your approval of these suggestions.

E. C. T.
My dear Mr. President:

I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum of conversation which I have just had with the Apostolic Delegate.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.
The Apostolic Delegate called to see me this evening for the second time today. The Archbishop brought with him a copy of a telegram which he had sent to the Cardinal Secretary of State on August 19 and which he read to me. In this telegram the Delegate had informed the Holy See that in his judgment public opinion in the United States was exceedingly uncertain as to whether the policy of the present Italian Government of apparently continuing the war on the side of Germany was a spontaneous decision on the part of the Italian Government or whether it was a decision which was forced upon it by German power. He also said that American public opinion was equally uncertain as to whether the Italian Government sincerely desired to find the ways and means of bringing to an end Italian participation in the war against the United Nations.

The Archbishop then read to me the reply which he had just received from Cardinal Maglione. In this message the Cardinal Secretary of State stated that the Italian Government desired to find as promptly as possible the means of ending its war against the United Nations, and second, that its continued collaboration with Germany was not spontaneous but was forced upon it by the German Government.

I thanked the Delegate for bringing this information so promptly to my attention and I said I would of course immediately refer the message he had given me to the President for his knowledge.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Does this require any reply?
If not, please return for my
files.

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, 8/21/43, to the President, marked "Urgent", attaching letter he received from The Most Reverend A. G. Cicognani, Archbishop of Laodicea, Apostolic Delegate, 3339 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D. C., 8/20/43, attached to which is a memorandum regarding the Italian war situation which the Holy See wishes to place before the U. S. government.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think you should talk this over with General Marshall. Does it need a reply? My first reaction is that it is not satisfactory in that it allows a "mere transit line" to go through Rome -- and it is of the highest military importance that this transit line be eliminated.

F. D. R.

(In President's handwriting:

"Telegram explaining Italian plans to make Rome an open city.")
MEMO FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I do not seem to have the enclosure for this memorandum. Do you have it?

C. C. T.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmirAL LEAHY:

FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, 8/30/43, with attached copy of a note from the Minister of Switzerland, which the Secretary states transmitted a communication from the Italian Govt. setting forth the measures the Italian Govt. claimed to have put into effect in order to have Rome declared an open city. Acknowledgment of this note is being made by the State Dept. to the effect that the matter is receiving the attention of the highest military and civilian authorities of the Govt.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

For whatever action is necessary.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Myron C. Taylor, Department of State, 8/27/43, to the President, with attached letter which Mr. Taylor received from The Most Reverend A. G. Cicognani, Archbishop of Laodicea, Apostolic Delegate, 3339 Mass. Ave., Washington, D.C., under date of 8/25/43, with attached memorandum dated 8/25/43, which was conveyed to him by the Cardinal Secretary of State, with regard to a notification from the Italian government of the steps taken to make effective the declaration of Rome as an open city.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Myron Taylor called to say that he had been up to the Apostolic Delegation this morning and had direct news from the Cardinal. He understands they have been pouring troops and supplies in from the north. He thought of asking for an appointment, but in view of the news today he felt it was not important enough to bother you.

GGT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAMMOND

Mr. Renchard phoned at 1620 this afternoon with the following information:

The Apostolic Delegate has received a message from the Vatican, dated 9 September, which states that Italian troops have successfully resisted German troops trying to enter the city of Rome up to 8:00 p.m., Rome time, (2:00 p.m. EWT.)

[Signature]

ODEN KNIFFIN,
Captain, CE.
INFORMAL ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS

MEETING held in Department of State,
Room 474 at 3:00 P.M.

PRESENT:
Hon. Myron Taylor (In the Chair)

BRITISH GROUP
Rt. Hon. R.K. Law
Lord Keynes
Sir David Waley
Mr. P. Liesching
Professor L. Robbins
Mr. N.B. Ronald
Mr. J.H. MacGowan
Professor D.H. Robertson
Mr. F.G. Lee
Mr. G.L.M. Clauzon
Mr. R.J. Shackle
Mr. J.E. Meade
Mr. S.L. Holmes
Mr. L.P. Thompson McCausland
Mr. R.L. Hall
Mr. R. Opie
Mr. P.W. Martin
Mr. P.H. Gore-Booth

Secretariat
Mr. W.J. Hasler
Mr. A.W. Snelling
Mr. A.S.J. Baster

AMERICAN GROUP
Mr. Leo Pasvolsky
Mr. Harry C. Hawkins
Mr. John D. Hickerson
Mr. Leroy D. Stinebower
Mr. Harry White
Mr. Will Clayton
Mr. Amos E. Taylor
Mr. Paul Appleby
Mr. Leslie A. Wheeler
Mr. Oscar B. Ryder
Mr. Lynn R. Edminster

Secretariat
Mr. John H. Fuqua
Mr. Bernard F. Haley

Mr. Myron Taylor

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date _FEB 22 1972_
Mr. Myron Taylor extended a warm welcome to the British group in behalf of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State.

He pointed out that those present were officials of two Governments who were meeting to have a confidential, informal exploratory exchange of ideas regarding post-war economic problems; they would talk in their individual capacities as officials of departments and agencies of their respective Governments.

While the officials of neither Government could make even the most tentative commitments, those discussions nevertheless should serve the very useful purpose of providing an exchange of views between the officials of the two Governments with regard to the international economic problems that face the two Governments.

Mr. Taylor pointed out that the purpose of the discussions as set forth in the exchange of communications between the two Governments was to obtain a broad agreement on an orderly agenda for the discussion of the economic policy objectives of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement; such an agenda to constitute the basis for later discussions of a more definitive character. This should include more than merely listing and discussing in general terms the broad fields in which the economic problems group themselves. It requires close examination of the problems themselves in each of the broad fields; a consideration of the tentative suggestions for meeting these problems that may be under consideration by various officials of the two Governments; and a determination of the directions in which further parallel study in both countries is likely to be fruitful.

It may be possible to decide that certain concrete measures developed in the course of the discussions to have sufficient promise to warrant their further careful consideration by each Government with a view to the adoption of a position with regard to them at a later time.

These discussions, Mr. Taylor went on to say, should not be confined to the problems of the more remote future. Within each of the fields under consideration it may well be that there will be problems calling for agreed action during and immediately following the war which may affect the attainment of ultimate objectives.
The problems to be considered, he concluded, are in most cases world-wide problems, and solutions must be sought in which all nations can participate. Each of the Governments presumably expects to have similar informal exploratory discussions with officials of other nations. It is to be hoped that these discussions may develop policies of international application; and may contribute somewhat to the solution of problems which must be solved if the world is to be spared a recurrence of the scourge of war and of economic collapse.

Mr. Law thanked Mr. Kyron Taylor for the welcome given to the British group. It was a great pleasure for them to be in Washington and to see, from the remarks which Mr. Taylor had made, how closely their views on the nature of the discussions which would follow agreed with the views of the United States group. The discussions would be exploratory and non-committal, but would, he hoped, show the manner in which joint action could best be organised.

The subjects which Mr. Taylor had mentioned in his statement seemed to him to be inter-related, and he felt that they should be considered as a whole. The attitude taken, both by creditor and debtor nations, towards commercial policy, for instance, would be influenced by what was done in the field of the foreign exchanges: likewise, no country would commit itself to any degree of economic disarmament unless it could expect an over-all expansion in international trade, the absence of uncontrolled fluctuations in the prices of raw materials, and a steady flow of capital for the development of the world's resources. Because of this inter-connection, he felt that it would be useful if, in the discussions to come, it would be possible for those concerned with the various sub-committees to meet together at frequent intervals to report on the progress made, so that the British and American groups could see how far they were advancing all along the line. He thought that, in the long run, this method of procedure would be the quickest.

The United
The United Kingdom Government felt that it was essential to approach the problems which were to be discussed as multilateral problems rather than matters for bilateral agreement. The present discussions were bilateral, but they looked towards multilateral discussions with others of the United Nations, and it would be our endeavour to reach the stage of multilateral discussion as soon as we could. A multilateral approach was, furthermore, necessary in another sense. The method of bilateral negotiation on questions of international economic relations was the sure method, and a method which was attractive to the British temperament, but in the special circumstances of the moment, something more was required. The bilateral method progressed step by step, but at this moment, time was the essence of the problem. We were in a stage at which men's ideas were fluid and their minds were open to new methods and new policies. People were capable, at this moment, of sacrificing immediate advantage for the long-term gain, but when the moment of danger was removed they would be in a different mood, and could not be moved to take the long view which was necessary if we were to make that long step forward which was possible.

It was always difficult to make people take the longer view. This involved a political risk, but one which he thought we were bound to take. In accepting this risk we had in front of us the example of Mr. Cordell Hull, who had been a true leader of democracy in his willingness to set himself against the rising tide of autarky and self-sufficiency policies, and to take his stand on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. The Secretary of State's example showed that it was possible to direct the minds of men in the right direction. We had an opportunity to do so now, but a brief opportunity only.

It was not possible to say in advance what progress could be made in the discussions on the various topics, but he thought that it should be possible to emerge from the talks with a set of principles agreed on each side, which could be used as a basis for wider discussions. Such principles would be a foundation for the building of the international institutions which would be required in the post-war world, and for the policies to be pursued by the two Governments towards all nations. Finally, in addition to the inter-connection between the different sides of international economic relations, it must be remembered
that a solid foundation of economic reconstruction was necessary if the future political relations between nations were to be on a sound footing.

In conclusion, Mr. Law said that he had been impressed by seeing, in the ship in which he had travelled to the United States, the young men in the uniforms of the various United Nations. He felt that these young men and the sacrifices they were called upon to make on the battlefields were a challenge to all who were responsible for planning the future. It should be remembered that we should be asked to render an account of our stewardship to these young men. We must not fail them.
October 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HULL FROM MYRON TAYLOR

RE: Russia

The many political, security and economic problems of Great Britain, Continental Europe and Russia are so inter-related that it is doubtful if Russia would make a firm commitment of any sort unless she were assured

I. That her territorial ambitions could be satisfied
II. That her security is assured
III. That her economy would not be adversely affected.

I. Territorial Questions. Dr. Bowman's memorandum has brilliantly covered the Russian territorial problem. It is quite obvious that if all Russia's known territorial ambitions are consented to by Great Britain, U.S.A., and China, all the countries affected will be hostile and will create a lasting enmity and in time even unrest if nothing worse. Russia must be willing to commit herself to certain restraints in order to make possible any true sense of security.

II. Security. The treatment to be accorded Germany and its satellite countries, i.e., continuing disarmament and the means to enforce it, is vital to peace and particularly to Great Britain, France, Russia and to the smaller countries whether now among the Allies or enemy. It seems to me this question is bound to be raised, and adequate preparation in advance should be made. Germany should be forced to prohibit all military training, utterly disperse any general staff, root out her military class by economic and social as well as political and military measures. The treatment
of Axis states in the Balkans might easily arise in the conversations.

One might ask - 1. Should Germany be completely disarmed? 2. Partially disarmed? 3. Shall a continuing system of inspection and control of her production be exercised by the four powers or the World Organization, to prevent rearmament? 4. Shall areas of minerals and/or vital industrial centres be put under international ownership, part ownership or regulation? 5. Shall her imports of vital commodities essential to war production be put under the control of the four powers or an international body?

III. Economic. The vital problem of reparation and restitution, which the British group have discussed with our group, and on which a British tentative memorandum has been provided, raises the question to what extent and in what space of time do we wish to see Germany recover as a prosperous world factor. This consideration affects the amount, means and time of settlement of reparations and restitutions. Shall the provision of manpower, as well as materials, by Germany to Russia, France and the other countries be acceptable as a credit on reparations and restitutions accounts? What effect will the provision of manpower have upon the economic adequacy of Germany's internal economy, as avoiding serious unrest or worse? What will the United States demand of Germany by way of reparation and restitution?

In due course some of the economic questions which will confront the nations in which the attitude of Russia will be of vital importance, are:-

a. What role will Russia play in any international monetary and exchange institution that may emerge:

b. Will Russia be desirous of any foreign capital assistance (loans) to hasten its reconstruction? Will Russia have an interest in participating in an international investment organization?

c. Does the Russian Government contemplate that its participation in international trade will be greater after the war than before the war, either in relation to its own domestic production or in relation to the total of world trade? On what terms is Russia prepared to conduct its export trade? Is it prepared to sell abroad at the same prices as obtained for the same commodities internally or will it "dump"? What effect will its trade have on world markets? Will it attempt to maintain
to maintain a relatively steady flow of imports and exports or will its imports be variable and unpredictable? How about the regularity of its exports?

d. Will it be prepared to participate in any international commodity arrangements that may be worked out (at least to the extent that it is an exporter or importer of the commodity in question)?

e. What place will Russia expect to occupy in (a) participating in (or (b) influencing any regional economic arrangements that might be worked out, especially in East or Central Europe? If it desires a place is it prepared to participate in furnishing capital to these areas which may be required for initiating regional arrangements (for example power or transport development and unification, or industrial development, or agricultural rationalization etc.)?

General. What part, other than as a full member under the Four Power Pact or a later World Organization, will Russia expect to play in the political affairs of the Mid-European countries, or in Spain and Portugal, or in France, and Germany particularly. Will Russia remain true to the terms of the Atlantic Charter? We should explore Russia's attitude toward an Eastern European union or unions as primarily economic and political rather than military protection alliance or alliances. Will Russia in fact grant freedom of religion to its people, thus removing the suspicion and fear under which she lives among the Christian nations? It would seem helpful, in the interest of every high stake in the post-war world, even though intangible, for Russia to clarify whether her policy toward religion will be such as to eliminate the old antagonism and fears against her which arose from her official atheism.
THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest the extent to which the utilization of economic resources in preparation for war has retarded economic progress and reduced the scale of living of the world's populations. The statistical data used here, which are discussed in some detail in a separate memorandum, are not adequate for obtaining an exact answer to the question. In particular, official figures on national defense expenditures often understate the facts, since they do not include hidden items or indirect expenditures such as those for a military highway, a steel plant for armament or expenditures for stockpiling. It has been estimated that official figures of national defense outlays in recent years should be more than doubled to obtain an approximately adequate estimate of total expenditures made in preparation for wars. In spite of these limitations, however, the figures used here suffice to indicate broadly the degree of economic importance of such expenditures in recent times.

Such expenditures have tended to increase over the years, but during the latter part of the 1930's grew especially fast. They had become so large, and the proportion of the world's economic resources wasted on war preparations was so high, that standards of living were materially affected. In some countries this was particularly conspicuous, notably Germany, Russia, Italy, and France.

The data on expenditures in preparation for war presented below are from previous studies based on official statistics, where these are available (Germany published no figures after 1935), supplemented with the most reliable data available from other sources. These data are all subject to the above limitations.

Before 1914

In 1913, armament expenditures, although swollen by the growing international tension, accounted for only a moderate proportion of national incomes in the major countries. In Great Britain, despite the naval building race
with Germany, about 3.5 percent of the national income was devoted to national defense. This may be compared with a net of about 10.5 percent invested productively, that is, devoted to raising the national income.

In the United States, not directly influenced by the European tension, national defense expenditures in 1913 were modest. Less than one percent of the national income was devoted to defense.

Even allowing for the possibility of important omissions from the official data, these figures are surprisingly low. They seem to contradict the impression, prevalent at the time, that defense outlays were extremely burdensome. The apparent contradiction is resolved when it is remembered that national budgets in those days were relatively small, and people not accustomed to anything like the heavy taxation of the present day. Immediately prior to the first World War, Great Britain was devoting over 40 percent of its budget to preparedness for war, while Germany was devoting nearly 60 percent. Such expenses for military or naval establishments undoubtedly tended to limit the amount of money which governments could devote to more humanitarian purposes.

In terms of dollars the amount spent by the world in 1913 directly on war preparations was about $2.5 billion.

Recent Years

From 1920 to 1934 the relation of defense expenditures to national incomes was not materially different, so far as the available data indicate, from that prevailing in 1913. Expenditures expanded during this period, but national incomes also grew. Outlays for war, though great in absolute amount, were still not large enough to exercise a major retarding influence on economic progress. In value, world expenditures as reported fluctuated around $4 billion per year from 1925 to 1934.

Since that period, however, the situation changed rapidly, as shown in the following tabulation:
Expenditures in Preparation for War, in Percent of National Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the important exception of the figure for Germany in 1937, which is a rough estimate, these figures are derived from official data, and for reasons noted above are likely to understate the relevant facts. The German figure is computed from Hitler's statement, in his last speech before the Reichstag, that 90 billion Reichsmarks had been spent from 1934 to 1938 inclusive in arming the German people. This estimate probably includes expenditures of a mixed military-civil character.

The above figures illustrate the well-known fact that in Germany, Russia, Italy and France, preparation for war had become a heavy economic burden, and that its removal would have made possible a substantial increase in the welfare of the populations of these countries. In Great Britain the burden was somewhat less. Such figures as are available suggest that the burden in many of the lesser European countries was comparable at least to that of Great Britain. On the other hand, in the British Dominions and the United States the burden was relatively light. Official figures for Japan give a percentage of 8.2 in 1936, doubtless an understatement.

Monetary expenditures in preparation for war totaled about 40 billions in 1939, excluding additional expenditures for the conduct of war. This figure is an estimate of M. M. Sloutzki, formerly of the League of Nations, and is based upon budgetary data for 1939.

**Economic Nationalism**

None of the above data take into account the disastrous economic consequences of the policies of autarchy pursued by many countries in the 1930's. These restrictive policies, including what would be considered economic warfare activities, were motivated to a significant extent by preparedness for war. The huge economic loss resulting from these developments, however, is not susceptible of numerical measurement.

**The Argument**
The Argument That Armaments Are "Costless"

It is sometimes argued that armament expenditures in peacetime employ labor and other resources which would otherwise be unemployed, and hence cause no withdrawal of productive resources from truly productive uses. This view has been advanced seriously with respect to Germany.

Such an argument can have no validity, except in periods of depression or economic stagnation and for a country in which the government is unwilling to engage in productive employment-creating expenditures. Expenditures for armament could, with equal effect on unemployed labor and resources, be directed toward more productive ends. It is, however, impossible to appraise the social consequences, good as well as bad, of a year's mobilization with the discipline and other effects on the late adolescent male population.

CONCLUSION

The burden of armaments can be visualized concretely by comparing their cost with that of public utilities and other socially desirable investments. In 1938 Great Britain spent the equivalent of $1,820 million on armaments. This amount was more than enough to have built and equipped the Santa Fe Railroad (operating about 13 thousand miles of track) one and one-half times, or to have constructed well over three Panama Canals.

The comparison made above between the costs of preparations for the first and second world wars, indicates how total war has increased the cost of preparedness. It suggests also that in the future, adequate preparations for defense by any single country, or a limited group of countries, can be made only at ruinous cost.
What is needed is a constructive suggestion as to what kind of a statement on religious freedom would be adequate if the Soviet authorities were disposed to make it and mean it.

First of all, it is not thought that any such statement need include an explicit reference to the past. A justification of the past would not be accepted, and a confession can hardly be expected in the circumstances.

The following might meet the face-saving requirements of the situation and constitute a declaration which, if sincerely made, would be meaningful:

"In view of the loyal participation of all our people in the defense of the Fatherland under the direction of constituted authority in the State, the Soviet Government, interpreting and applying Article 124 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution, publicly proclaims complete religious freedom, including freedom of worship and freedom of religious teaching, in all the territories of the Soviet Union.

"Abuse of these freedoms to incite or organize political movements will be dealt with in individual cases according to law."

If the Soviet Government will take action that justifies a statement of this kind, it will have contributed immensely to present morale and future harmony among the United Nations. If it will not, then it is evidently better not to make, even by implication, a commitment on the acceptability of an ambiguous statement which would only aggravate the difficulty of post-war discussions by having another untrustworthy declaration on the record."
September 13, 1943.

TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VII OF THE LEND-LEASE MASTER AGREEMENT

I. Measures for stimulating international commerce
   A. Reduction of trade barriers
   B. Reciprocal trade agreements
   C. Customs unions
   D. General problems connected with the above measures:
      1. Uses and limitations of the doctrine of "equal treatment"
      2. The status of preferential treatment agreements within the British Commonwealth, and between United States and other nations.

II. Desirability of international commodity controls and agreements.
   A. Dangers of bilateral negotiation of commodity agreements
   B. A buffer stocks program
   C. Consideration of functions and powers of an international organization to deal with international commodity arrangements:
      1. To facilitate transition from war economy to peace economy
      2. To mitigate fluctuation in price and production
      3. To promote orderly expansion of world economy

III. Desirability
III. Desirability of control of private international business agreements of the cartel variety

A. Prevailing attitudes in Great Britain and America in respect to international industrial combinations and related matters.

B. Possible consequences of pursuit of inconsistent policies with regard to these problems by governments of Great Britain and the United States.

C. Problems involved in maintaining free commercial relations while safeguarding national and international security requirements.

D. A proposal for a joint Anglo-American body to consider types of private business actions in international trade which both Governments will recognize as contrary to public policy.

1. Arrangements for the exchange of information

2. Arrangements for joint or international action

3. Possible arrangements for compulsory registration of all private international business agreements of an enduring character (including patents) and exchange of information concerning subsidiaries and affiliates of any corporation engaged in international trade

4. Methods of preventing the resumption of Axis cartel ties on the part of enemy firms.

IV. Coordination of Full Employment Policies

A. Dangers to international stability of domestic policies directed to maintaining full employment

1. Stimulus
1. Stimulus to bilateral and preferential approach to problem

2. May intensify import restrictions and exchange controls.

B. Difficulties in way of international action in this field

1. Lack of agreement between different countries on parallel action to be taken for maintenance of full employment

2. Difficulty of obtaining consent of any one country to establishment of international control over what are frequently regarded as matters of purely domestic policy

C. Desirability of establishment of a permanent international advisory commission in this field

1. To gather data

2. To conduct research

3. To make recommendations

4. To facilitate consultation and international agreement on full employment policies

V. Consideration of a proposed European Power Board

A. To act as trustee for power facilities coming under control of United Nations' military authorities in enemy countries

B. To formulate program for reconstruction and ultimate development of European power systems

The following are additional subjects with regard to which it may later be found desirable to have conversations:

VI. Commercial
VI. Commercial Aviation

A. The disposition of air bases developed during the war and the possibility of an international airport authority to develop, maintain and operate airports

B. The problem of international competition between national airlines.
   1. Competition vs. "Chosen agent."
   2. Regulation of rates, routes, etc.
   3. Subsidies

C. Multilateral vs. bilateral agreements with regard to right of innocent passage, technical stop, and commercial entry.

D. The relationship between airlines and other forms of transport

VII. Ocean Transportation

A. Problems of post-war readjustment of unequal distribution of shipping tonnage
   1. Problem of excess tonnage
   2. Subsidies
   3. Desirable conventions and agreements regarding such subjects as registry and measurement

VIII. Telecommunications

A. Disposition of and compensation for enemy property

B. Problems of unregulated competition; agreements with regard to rates, through services, extent and adequacy of service

C. Allocation of frequencies in the radio spectrum

D. Censorship
D. Censorship of objectionable programs
E. Desirability of some form of international organization to facilitate agreement on these matters

IX. Migration, Resettlement, Labor and Social Security
A. The refugee problem and the resettlement of displaced populations
B. The long-run problem of immigration policies, the standardization of national procedures with regard to the rights of foreigners, the attainment of citizenship.
C. International supervision of labor standards, and other aspects of social security
D. Place of the ILO in the post-war structure of international organization
My dear Mr. Taylor:

The president has decided that vigorous and intensive work needs to be done now in preparation for this country's effective participation in the solution of the vast and complicated problems of international relations which will confront us and the world after the final defeat of the forces of aggression. He has, therefore, directed that there be created in the Department of State an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State and the vice chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State, to be charged with the conduct of the necessary studies and with the preparation of recommendations to be submitted to him. The Committee will work in the interrelated fields of political, territorial, and economic reconstruction and of general security.

With the approval of the President and at the request of the Secretary, I take great pleasure in inviting you to become a member of this Committee. Would you be good enough to inform me at your earliest convenience whether you find it possible to serve on the Committee and to attend its first meeting, which will take place in my office on Thursday, February 12, 1942, at 3 o'clock?

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) SUMNER WELLES.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N.Y.
His Excellency,
The Honorable Myron C. Taylor
Hotel Mayflower
Washington, D.C.

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to enclose herewith a Memorandum which I have drawn up in accordance with instructions just received from His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State. I would be most appreciative if Your Excellency would find means to bring this urgent matter to the attention of the President of the United States and of the Department of State.

With sentiments of esteem and with every best wish I remain

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate
MEMORANDUM

The possibility of an eventual evacuation of the city of Rome by the German forces of occupation gives rise to serious concern regarding the period in which, while awaiting the arrival of the Allied forces, the city will remain exposed to danger from uncontrollable forces operating from within.

The authorities directing the occupation of the city have already suppressed the "Carabinieri", or national police, and the scant police protection thus remaining would hardly be sufficient to control numerous turbulent elements which would then assert themselves. Particular misgivings are engendered because of the possibility of uprisings staged by the Communists. From reliable sources it has been learned that the Communists are plentifully supplied with arms, and might embark upon a program which would result in wholesale robbery and the complete sacking of the city. Such an eventuality would inevitably expose to danger, among others, the numerous religious houses of practically all nationalities located in the Eternal City, and would hardly exclude the possibility of an attack upon Vatican City itself.

These considerations show the need of making preparations well in advance, in order to shorten as much as possible the period which will elapse between the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies.

* * * * * *

Another source of preoccupation is the extreme want of food supplies to which Rome will then be reduced. In his paternal concern for the welfare of the people of Rome, his Episcopal See, the Holy Father asks, in the interests of human and Christian charity, that every effort be exerted to assure the prompt arrival of the most essential foodstuffs.

October 12, 1943
MEMORANDUM FOR

E. R. S. Jr.

What are we doing about this?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Memorandum for the President from Hon. E. R. Stettinius, Jr., 10/9/43, in reference to his memorandum of 10/7/43 to the President, in re question of recognizing the open city status of Rome. Encloses copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary of State by The Most Reverend A. G. Cicognani, the Apostolic Delegate, under date of 10/8/43, regarding the matter.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMiral LEAHY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory. I am confident that you already have its contents in mind, but our political advisers in the Department felt that it was important that this be emphasized again.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have been informed by the British Embassy that the question of recognizing the "open city" status of Rome is again under active consideration.

We believe that a military campaign for the possession of Rome, with the unavoidable destruction by bombing and shelling which would be required to dislodge the Germans, would affect adversely public opinion, not only in this country, but in Christian countries throughout the world, particularly Central and South America. Aside from the religious significance of the city, the historical importance of its monuments to the Western World make it highly desirable that we avoid the responsibility for destroying large sections of Rome while liberating it from the Germans. Consequently, we believe that serious consideration should be given to this public attitude on the subject whenever it may arise for decision.

I am sure you have the above in mind, but the Department felt it important to emphasize again.

[Signature]
October 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

Does this require any action? I am appending the original memorandum sent to me by President Benes through Mr. Myron Taylor.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 10-4-43, from Hon. Cordell Hull, enclosing memorandum, signed by Dr. Eduard Benes, and left at Dept. by Czechoslovak Ambassador, concerning relations between Czechoslovak Republic and the Vatican in years 1918-1938 - this is a revised text of a memo which Dr. Benes handed to the Pres., dated May 12th, 1943, which is also attached. (Taken from ACT files)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With your note of October 16 you forwarded to me Mr. Hull's memorandum to you of October 4 and supporting papers relative to a memorandum submitted by President Benes on relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Vatican.

I have had this reviewed carefully by the Department and the opinion is that no action is required on this memorandum at this time.

Enclosure: File returned.
My dear Mr. President:

On the occasion of a recent visit at the Department the Czechoslovak Ambassador left a memorandum, signed by Dr. Eduard Benes, concerning the relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Vatican in the years 1918-1938, and requested that it be transmitted to you.

I observe that this memorandum is dated May 10, 1943 and I believe that it is a revised text of a memorandum which Dr. Benes handed to you during his recent visit to the United States.

I may be able to suggest what may have been the occasion for revising the memorandum in question. In an aide-mémoire of June 10 from the British Embassy the Department was informed that a communication on this same subject had been sent to the British Government, and that upon its examination the British Government had objected.

The President,
The White House.
objected to certain passages. The aide-mémoire stated:

"... His Majesty's Government have had an opportunity to study the memorandum and have certain amendments to propose in some passages which relate to the attitude of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions towards Czechoslovakia which is incorrectly described by the Czechoslovak Government. His Majesty's Government obviously cannot undertake the responsibility of forwarding a document to the Vatican containing misleading references to their own policy and they are informing the Czechoslovak Government accordingly."

Though I cannot be sure, because the Department received no copy of the earlier text, I presume that the present text is to be considered a substitution for the memorandum which Dr. Benes handed to you, the necessary revision having been made, in view of the British objections mentioned above, after Dr. Benes' return to London.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Memorandum from Dr. Benes,
May 10, 1943.
MEMORANDUM

I. On January 7th, 1941, a communication was transmitted by President E. Beneš to His Grace Msgr. W. Godfrey, the apostolic representative in Great Britain, emphasising the following points:

Immediately after the Armistice (in 1918), I entered, as Foreign Minister of the Republic, into diplomatic relations with the Holy See and began negotiations regarding the delimitations of the dioceses, the Church property, etc. There were many difficulties: in 1924, and again in 1927 new and very serious disturbances occurred in this sphere. But in 1927 I definitely succeeded in settling all those questions, in creating a definitive juridical basis for future relations: the so-called modus vivendi between the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic was agreed upon, and normal and friendly relations were definitely established. From that date the mutual relations were good and collaboration was developing without difficulties. I cannot forget especially the most sympathetic attitude of His Holiness Pope Pius XI towards Czechoslovakia during the September crisis.
crisis in 1938 and the message he sent to me in the most critical moments of the history of my people.

It is for all these reasons that I thought a time had come when some sort of unofficial contact should be re-established between the new Czechoslovak Government now in London and the Holy See. All arrangements that had previously been made regarding ecclesiastical questions between the Vatican and the Republic were destroyed by the Nazi Government. The conditions in Slovakia are very bad and the servitude of the present Slovak Government of Father Tiso will have a very deep influence upon the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia after the war. The persecution of the Czech Catholics in the Czech "Protectorate" by the Nazis will also be of great importance for the post-war policy of the Czech people.

The Poles, the Belgians and others continue to have such contacts and are able to discuss with the Holy See their common interests and their post-war policy in respect of these matters. For the Czechoslovaks no such opportunity, from March, 1939 till to-day, has yet been provided. The Slovak delegate to the Holy See is the representative of a State which is completely in the hands of the Nazi Government. I think that in these circumstances it is highly desirable to
to make preparations in good time for the future.

I must apologise for offering you such a frank explanation of my point of view. But in this terrible war, in which the whole of Christian civilisation is at stake, and in which the Holy See, - as I have observed from the Christmas message of His Holiness Pope Pius XII, - take an unequivocal position in standing for a Just Peace for all the small nations, I think that it is incumbent upon responsible personalities not to let pass the slightest opportunity of doing what they consider necessary in the interest of their so terribly afflicted people.

II. On May 19th, 1941, His Grace Msgr. Godfrey handed President Beneš the reply of the Holy See, in which the following details were set forth:

His Eminence writes that he has been much interested to read what Your Excellency wrote concerning your part in the negotiations which, in spite of considerable difficulties, were brought to a conclusion by the "modus vivendi" in 1927. His Eminence is particularly pleased to receive your courteous reference to the Church and to the August Pontiff, Pius XII, who has nothing more at heart than a just and lasting peace "sealed, not with hatred and revenge /
revenge, but with the noble majesty of justice". His Holiness has already given expression to this desire, both on June 2nd, 1940 and more recently in his Christmas message to the world.

The Pope and the Holy See is with every nation in its suffering, and strives always to fulfil faithfully the pastoral mission divinely entrusted to the Church, and to succour the distressed in every possible way.

Naturally, therefore, the Czechoslovak people in their tribulation have a special place in the maternal heart of the Church. As regards the step taken by Your Excellency with a view to establishing unofficial contacts between the Czechoslovak Government recently formed in London, and the Holy See, His Eminence is sure that Your Excellency will understand how delicate is the present situation and how difficult it would be at the present time to benefit the Czechoslovak people by means of such contacts. His Eminence is of opinion that the time for such a development has not yet come.

III. Since then more than two years have elapsed and the situation throughout the world, both in a military and political respect, has undergone a fundamental change. The
military struggles of the United Nations have been joined in particular, by the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the United States of America in December 1941. In this way the potential preponderance in a military respect has shifted to the side of the United Nations. Since November, 1942, the development of hostilities has shown that the Axis States cannot win the war, and to-day this has become completely clear within those States themselves. The Czechoslovak Government considers it, therefore, a certainty, especially since the Casablanca Conference, that the main military and political aims of the United Nations will quite undoubtedly be fulfilled. One of these aims is the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic. The fact that this aim is supported by the four chief Powers of the United Nations, Great Britain, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China, as well as by all the other members, - is a guarantee to the Czechoslovak Government that Czechoslovakia, in common with all the other countries occupied by the Axis States, will be liberated and reconstituted.

IV. In respect of international politics so much in this direction has also been already accomplished that from the point of diplomacy and international law there are to-day
no doubts in our minds as to this result of the war. First and foremost, as far as we are concerned, the Czechoslovak Republic never ceased to exist in an international respect, and this view was shared by a number of other States. Great Britain and the United States of America, for example, never recognised de jure the events of March 1939 as instanced by the continued recognition of the Czechoslovak Legations in London and Washington. Further, by the development of events in the war the representatives of the Czechoslovak people in the Allied countries were then enabled to establish, on the basis of the irreconcilable opposition of all sections of the Czechoslovak people at home to the Germans, an organised military and political movement; this movement which created its national army and a Czechoslovak Government, was then granted in July, 1940, juridical recognition in a political and international respect as the Government and Army of an Allied nation and State waging war with Nazi Germany and as the rightful political representative of the Czechoslovak people at home and of the Czechoslovak State.

For it should be noted that from July, 1940, onwards the Czechoslovak State and its internationally recognised Government acquired once more their former rights and were, in respect of international law, restored to the same
same authority and to the same complete political, diplomatic, military and international legal position as is to-day the case with Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Czechoslovak Government, with its former President at its head, was once again recognised as the legal Government of a former State by almost all those Governments and States who, before the outbreak of the second World War, had maintained a strict neutrality or later entered the war against Germany, and did not recognise, on the one hand the settlement at Munich in September, 1938, and on the other hand the violent action taken by Nazi Germany contrary to all its commitments, in March, 1939, against the Czechoslovak Republic.

In this sense the full diplomatic and international recognition of Czechoslovakia was put into effect by Great Britain (including the majority of the Dominions) and the Soviet Union on July 18th, 1941, by the United States of America on July 31st, 1941, and by China on August 27th, 1941. Diplomatic relations and mutual recognition with Norway were established on October 12th, 1940, with Poland on November 27th, 1940, with Belgium on December 13th, 1940, with Egypt on March 13th, 1941, with Holland on March 15th, 1941, with Yugoslavia on May 19th, 1941, with Iraq on July /
July 28th, 1941, with Luxemburg on February 27th, 1942, with Mexico on March 26th, 1942, with Iran on May 27th, 1942, and with Greece on August 19th, 1942. In addition, the new Government of the Czechoslovak Republic was recognised by Bolivia on June 5th, 1942, by Uruguay on June 29th, 1942, by Cuba on July 4th, 1942, by Peru on July 6th, 1942, by the Dominican Republic on July 10th, 1942, by Brazil on September 16th, 1942, by Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador on January 9th, 1943, and by Chile on March 31st, 1943. The representation of the Czechoslovak Republic with the League of Nations and the International Labour Office had never ceased to operate and in a number of neutral States the representation and contact de facto continues.

I emphasise this juridical position in its international bearings, since it best shows the present international political situation of the Czechoslovak Republic as well as of the Czechoslovak people and its Government in London, and to-day actually constitutes an expression of the situation which will exist after the war.

With regard to this, the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic adds that a united Czechoslovakia (Czech lands and Slovakia) has been recognised by all these Governments, and further that the Munich Agreement of September
September 30th, 1938, was violently infringed by Germany herself. In consequence of this, His Majesty's Government in their note to the Czechoslovak Government of August 5th, 1942, stated that they regarded themselves as free from any engagements in respect of the arrangements concerning Czechoslovakia reached in 1938 at Munich. The French National Committee presided over by General de Gaulle took similar action. The Soviet Government, too, has expressly recognised the Czechoslovak Republic within the frontiers from the period before September, 1938. The other States and nations did not participate in the Munich settlement. The violent occupation of Carpathian Ruthenia by Hungary in 1939 has not been recognised by any of the above-mentioned States de jure.

V. The Czechoslovak people and later the newly recognised Government of the Czechoslovak Republic followed with particular attention the course adopted by the Holy See with regard to Czechoslovak affairs during the present terrible international crisis. They gratefully welcomed the action of the Holy See with regard to the occupation of the Archbishopric of Prague after the death of His Eminence Cardinal Kašpar. They fully realised the difficulties /
difficulties with which the Holy See was confronted as a result of the proceedings of the German and Hungarian Governments, both in the Czech territories and in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. In view of the fact that the issue here concerns war events which have not yet been finished, their desire is that all States and Powers with which the Czechoslovak Republic maintained diplomatic relations until September, 1938 should preserve a neutral attitude at least, if possible, in the same spirit as the United States of America or Great Britain, who never, not even before or after the outbreak of war in 1939, discontinued their international relations with the Czechoslovak legations in Washington and London. The Czechoslovak Government has seen that the Holy See has not found it possible to adopt the same point of view, which of course might cause certain complications between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Holy See at the end of the present war.

Taking into account this point of view of the Holy See hitherto and especially the presence in the Vatican of the delegate of Slovakia, the Czechoslovak Government is already now considering how these difficulties might be avoided in good time. It takes this opportunity of putting on record the following facts about the present internal situation: /
situation in the Czechoslovak territories:

Apart from an insignificant number of individuals, the whole of the Czech people are opposed to present-day Germany. They never recognised and never will recognise what Germany has done against our country since September, 1938, and unconditionally support the present Czechoslovak Government with its headquarters in London.

The same attitude is adopted by the great majority of the Slovak people. In Slovakia the political, social, economic and moral conditions are utterly deplorable. The majority of the Slovak people considers that the present Government at Bratislava brought this situation about and betrayed the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republic. The former Slovak Government Parties from the period before March 15th, 1939 (agrarians, liberals, socialists) almost in their entirety support the Czechoslovak Government and are opposed to the present régime in Slovakia, while of the former Catholic People's Party, which in 1939 took over from the Germans the conduct of Slovak affairs, to-day, according to our reports, at least 60 per cent are opposed to the present régime. They are dissatisfied with it for having allied itself with pagan German Nazism, with having permitted a declaration of war against Poland, Great Britain, the

United /
United States, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as against the Czechoslovak Government, and also for having caused the present politically untenable state of affairs in Slovakia. The Holy See may have other information about the conditions in Slovakia. But I consider it as my duty to hand over objectively to the Holy See the information based on reports which have been regularly received from home in the course of the last two years.

Under these circumstances Slovakia, at the end of the war, could be the scene of grave disturbances, the results of which, if they are not coped with in time, may be of a far-reaching character. The fact that this Slovak régime, which, at the end of the war, will undoubtedly meet a very disastrous end, is recognised by the Holy See, and that the Holy See received its representative, causes great concern to all true Czechoslovaks and particularly Czechoslovak Catholics.

VI. The object of this memorandum is to indicate the entire international situation of the Czechoslovak people and Czechoslovak State in connexion with these ecclesiastical questions affecting Czechoslovakia. Slovakia will, without any doubt, again be a part of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The /
The Czechoslovak Government in London takes the view that, after the war, the Czech and Slovak people itself will freely and democratically adjust its mutual relationship by a revision of the former constitution. The Government therefore is anxious to prepare the situation now so that religious and ecclesiastical questions after the war may not be unduly complicated and, in particular, that the relationship of the Czechoslovak Republic to the Holy See may not be complicated nor become the subject of special and lengthy negotiations or disputes either internal or international, as a result of events in the course of the war.

I myself conducted all negotiations between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Holy See from 1919 and I recall how difficult it often was. I should be unwilling for this to be repeated. After long and difficult discussions I achieved, not only complete agreement with the Holy See but, in particular, an approval by the Czechoslovak people and Parliament of the settlement of the 17th December, 1927, known as the *modus vivendi* and gladly accepted by all Czech and Slovak Catholics. I consistently saw to it that the terms of this settlement were kept, and thus in the period from 1927 to 1938 the individual conditions of the *modus vivendi* were successively put into effect. In my view our simplest /
simplest course would be to revert, before the end of the war, to the former relationship without any further complications, discussions or settlements, by merely renewing the former normal diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic and, on the collapse of Germany, concretely settling, in the spirit of the *modus vivendi*, the problems with which this terrible war will confront us. The Czechoslovak Government would welcome this. Such an arrangement would undoubtedly prevent many difficulties which will otherwise certainly arise as a sequel to the chaos which the defeat of the Axis States is certain to leave in its train in Central Europe.

VII. If the Holy See does not consider this course of action possible or suitable for itself, or if the Holy See judges that such a course of action could be acceptable only in a restricted measure in view of the events of the war, the Czechoslovak Government would be grateful for an expression of opinion on the part of the Holy See in this extremely delicate matter. The Czechoslovak Government would here emphasise that it regards it as its duty to take steps now towards the consolidation of post-war conditions. In view of the chaos which will undoubtedly arise throughout Central /
Central Europe after the defeat of Germany, the Czechoslovak Government is anxious to rally in good time all factors of internal and international consolidation for post-war co-operation. Such factors will include the Czechoslovak Catholics, whose co-operation in the Government after the war we desire to maintain, and a timely adjustment of the relationship between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Holy See would undoubtedly have a very fundamental bearing upon such co-operation. I believe that Czechoslovakia will again be one of the first States in Central Europe to achieve post-war consolidation. The Czechoslovak Government accordingly desires to complete all preparations in due course, so that after the war, it may continue the policy which it was pursuing at a time when the relations between the Holy See and our country were consolidated, normal and amicable.

I regard it as my duty at the present moment when, on the whole, I have - as of course, I personally venture to believe - a clear idea of how conditions will develop in the course of this year and how the present grim events of the war will conclude, to approach the Holy See with this memorandum. I desire after the war to render to the Czechoslovak people an account of the activities of our Government /
Government also in respect of our ecclesiastical policy, and to show them that we neglected no aspect of our international relations. I should be happy if we were really able to take a step forward and thus ensure in the future a propitious development of the relations between the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic. This is a benefit which is surely deserved by our Czechoslovak people, so sorely tried, so terribly persecuted and so unspeakably martyred both in the Czech territories and in Slovakia under the present régime controlled there by Nazi Germany.

The difficulties, too, which after the war might confront us in ecclesiastical and religious matters as a result of the strain of the war events could be avoided or at least reduced to a minimum. Such a result would redound to the advantage of both interested parties, the Holy See and the Czechoslovak Republic.

London, May 10th, 1943.

[Signature]
Memorandum for Admiral Wilson Brown from FDR - 10-18-43

Stettinius to FDR - 10-16-43

See O.F. 4675-P
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

In regard to this memorandum from Tittmann, I think all you can do is to send a copy of it to General Marshall and General Eisenhower.

F.D.R.

Carbon of letter from Hon. E. R. Stettinius, Jr., State Dept., 10/25/43, attached to which is carbon of a copy of a telegram which has been received through British channels from the American Charge d'Affaires at Vatican City, concerning an audience with the Pope. Original papers retained for our files.
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram which has been received through British channels from the American Chargé d'Affaires at Vatican City, concerning an audience with the Pope. Mr. Tittmann reports that the Pope is concerned about the food situation in Rome and irresponsible Communist activities before the arrival of the Allied Troops in the Italian capital.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
October 19, 1943.

The President,
The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 10/25/43

ADDRESSED TO

The President,

The White House.
"I had audience today with the Pope whom I had not seen since last year. He appeared to me serene and in good health but, of course, anxious with regard to the turn Military developments may take in connection with Rome. He said he hoped that the Allied troops might find it possible to circumvent Rome and thus oblige the Germans to retire without subjecting the city to havoc due to combat. I reminded him that the President had said that the Germans alone would be responsible for any destruction wrought in Rome. The Pope did not bring up the subject of 'Open City'.

"2. The Pope also seemed preoccupied that, in the absence of sufficient police protection, irresponsible elements (he said it is known that little Communist bands are stationed in the environs of Rome at the present time) might commit violence in the City during the period between the German evacuation and arrival of the Allies. He also expressed apprehension regarding the food situation. He hoped that these two points would be given consideration by the Allies and necessary measures taken by them in time. The Pope said that so far the Germans had respected the Vatican City and the Holy See's property in Rome and that the German General Officer Commanding in Rome seemed well-disposed towards the Vatican. He added, however, that he was feeling restrictions due to the 'abnormal situation'.

"The Pope asked me to convey his greetings to the President and to Mr. Myron Taylor."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
October 30, 1943

With reference to my letter of October 25 transmitting a copy of a telegram from our Chargé d'Affaires at Vatican City concerning the precarious position of Rome in the coming days, I am enclosing a copy of a communication from the Apostolic Delegate expressing the Vatican's hope that at the moment of the Allied occupation of Rome sufficient quantities of powdered milk to meet the needs of the children of the city will be made available by the occupying forces.

A copy of this letter has been furnished the War Department.

The memorandum of October 12 to which the enclosed communication refers was, it is understood, sent to you through Mr. Myron Taylor. I am enclosing a copy for reference.

Enclosure:
Letter from Apostolic Delegate
My dear Mr. Stettinius,

On October twelfth I had the honor to present to the President of the United States and to the Department of State, through the good offices of the Honorable Myron C. Taylor, a Memorandum which the Cardinal Secretary of State had instructed me to draw up with reference to the possibilities of serious disorders in Rome in the period between evacuation by the Germans and the arrival of the Allied forces. This memorandum made reference, in conclusion, to the extreme want of food supplies to which the City of Rome will then be reduced, and asked that every effort be made to assure the prompt arrival of the most essential foodstuffs.

In another communication just received from His Eminence the gravity of the food situation in Rome at that time is stressed very forcibly. His Eminence observes that with the passage of days, and in view of the methodical and continued requisition of foodstuffs and animals by the occupying forces, the city of Rome is exposed to dire want of even the necessaries of life, including milk for children. Because of this last point, the Cardinal Secretary suggests that it would be an act of great humanitarianism to provide supplies of powdered milk for immediate transportation to Rome at the moment of the Allied occupation. He also directs me to make known to the United States Government the deep concern of the Holy Father for his afflicted faithful of Rome, and his confidence that every effort will be exerted to meet the exigencies of the serious situation which threatens his Episcopal See.

Sincerely yours,

A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate

The Honorable
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM

The possibility of an eventual evacuation of the city of Rome by the German forces of occupation gives rise to serious concern regarding the period in which, while awaiting the arrival of the Allied forces, the city will remain exposed to danger from uncontrollable forces operating from within.

The authorities directing the occupation of the city have already suppressed the "Carabinieri", or national police, and the scant police protection thus remaining would hardly be sufficient to control numerous turbulent elements which would then assert themselves. Particular misgivings are engendered because of the possibility of uprisings staged by the Communists. From reliable sources it has been learned that the Communists are plentifully supplied with arms and might embark upon a program which would result in wholesale robbery and the complete sacking of the city. Such an eventuality would inevitably expose to danger, among others, the numerous religious houses of practically all nationalities located in the Eternal City, and would hardly exclude the possibility of an attack upon Vatican City itself.

These considerations show the need of making preparations well in advance, in order to shorten as much as possible the period which will elapse between the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies.

* * * * *

Another source of preoccupation is the extreme want of food supplies to which Rome will then be reduced. In his paternal concern for the welfare of the people of Rome, his Episcopal See, the Holy Father asks, in the interests of human and Christian charity, that every effort be exerted to assure the prompt arrival of the most essential foodstuffs.

October 12, 1943
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Myron C. Taylor, Department of State, 11/5/43, to the President, enclosing copy of letter he received from the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, 10/27/43, incorporating a telegram from His Holiness, the Pope; Mr. Taylor asks if the President would send a personal message to His Holiness.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I return herewith Mr. Myron Taylor’s letter of November 5 to the President, and enclosure, which the President sent to me with his note of November 9 asking my opinion.

I discussed this with him yesterday and it was decided that no personal message should be sent by the President to the Vatican until something specific could be said about the status of Rome as an open city.

Enc.
From Myron Taylor, 11-5-43, with enclosure.
Dear Mr. President:

As a matter of passing interest to you I am sending a copy of a letter from the Apostolic Delegate incorporating a telegram which he has received from His Holiness, the Pope, in response to a message which I recently sent expressing concern and interest in the situation in which the Holy Father finds himself at this time in view of the German occupation of Rome and the policing of the Vatican property by German soldiers.

I wonder whether if at some appropriate moment you would consider it desirable to send a personal message to His Holiness? If you so desire, such message can be sent over the Vatican radio service. If not opportune, no reply to this letter is necessary.

With kind regard and best wishes, believe me

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

The President,

The White House.
Your Excellency:

Some days ago I transmitted to the Holy Father, through the kind offices of His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, the message which Your Excellency had left with me for that purpose.

His Eminence now directs me to communicate the following message to Your Excellency, and I take great pleasure in so doing:

"His Holiness was deeply gratified by the renewed expression of lofty sentiments. The August Pontiff while united with all his heart in the prayerful wishes for the rapid attainment of a just and lasting peace, continues to lend himself in every possible manner for this noble and arduous purpose, ever trusting Divine protection.

"The Holy Father prays that God may bless His Excellency, the Ambassador, and Mrs. Taylor with health and prosperity."

With the assurances of my highest consideration, and of my deep personal regard, I beg to remain

Yours very sincerely,

A. G. CICOGNANI

Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate

His Excellency
Mr. Myron C. Taylor
Ambassador to the Holy See
Mr. Merry Tully:

Will you be good enough to make copy of my note to the President and mail it to me in New York?

Thank you for your going about me. I am all right or will be after
a few days rest

[Signature]
To the President.

In August I prepared an informal memo for Secretary Hull regarding some aspects of the State Department. I think you should have a confidential copy. I gave one at the time to Hon. Davis and to Dr. Bowman.
Thus since his appointment given one to Edward Stettiner.

There are vital questions of permanent post-war organization involved. I have informally brought them to the surface. They may be of interest to you. I hope so.

With kindest regards,

[Signature]

[Name]
August 14, 1943

Mr. Secretary:

In these pages, most informally written, I have endeavored to present some thoughts regarding organization, having particular reference to Post-War problems, as follows:

I. A clear definition of authority in the fields of State Department activity; i.e., in fields within which under law and by custom the Department is charged with responsibility, particularly as to--

(a) 1. Current diplomatic affairs.  
2. Diplomatic affairs related to the War.  
3. The Peace and Post-War Problems.

II. The analysis of "Current diplomatic affairs" and "Diplomatic affairs related to the War," and of a proper distribution of subjects between Divisions of the Department.

III. An increase of higher official personnel.

IV. The segregation of Post-War Problems in a continuing Division with temporary but ultimately permanent chairmen of the three proposed sections.

V. Decision as to who shall exercise negotiating authority.
VI. The selection of top personnel based on merit more than upon political consideration.

VII. Clarification of inter-departmental authority.

May I repeat that I am not sufficiently familiar with the workings of the Department to have any opinion of the system that prevails in the Divisions below your and your Assistants' offices.

My principal thought is that—with the war progressing, peace an ultimate certainty, and with post-war problems numerous and of vast consequence to the nation today and for the long future—the staff is inadequate in number, and that a segregation of post-war problems into a SEPARATE PERMANENT BUREAU, SEPARATELY OFFICERED, should take place at once. As the time approaches for policy determination and detailed negotiation with foreign powers, it is essential that the situation involving leadership, authority and responsibility be clearly defined.

Our committees will now need revision, reduction in numbers, and full time in their more vital composition. The time to bring this about is NOW, before the resumption of meetings in September. Changes if now made offer an unusual opportunity to readjust from a temporary to a permanent basis
of membership, without appearing to drop anyone, as the preliminary phase is over, and a suitable letter of thanks for service rendered will salve the retiring members.

It is my opinion that the vital moment has arrived for you to appoint an over-all full-time Chairman to take command of ALL POST-WAR ACTIVITIES, which can be easily divided into three broad sections:

- Political
- Security, Mr. Norman H. Davis;
- Economic, at present M. C. T.?

The latter (Economic) requires clarification in view of Mr. Acheson's new responsibilities as Coordinator of some phases in the Economic field, taken over from Economic Warfare, etc. I am not at all clear as to its scope and the extent of its authority.

If the above plan is followed, and harmony achieved among the discordant elements, the future will be insured just in proportion as the talent, the cooperation, and the self-sacrifice of the personnel permit it to be.

In any event I shall be in Washington and will call upon you on Wednesday, August 25th, if you care to discuss the subject further.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

MYRON C. TAYLOR.

The Hon. Cordell Hull,
Wardman Park Hotel, Washington.
POST-WAR PROBLEMS

August 14, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
TO MR. HULL:

You repeated to me last week that you would like suggestions for Departmental organization in regard to Post-War problems.

As a participant in post-war studies, and as an observer for several months past, some ideas have occurred to me which I have set down in an informal way for what they are worth. With your long experience as the head of the Department they may seem elementary, but even if so, they may be fundamental.

There is never a harmonious working organization in any large enterprise unless there is a clear definition of authority. Neither an individual nor a group can function intelligently or wholeheartedly if they are not clearly within a sphere of action that has been defined. All men like to feel they are competent enough in their main responsibility, subject to control or policy of the head of the enterprise or the State or the Department, to discharge specific tasks with authority. Where overlapping is necessary, it must be regulated by the chief in command. It can be done without friction or bad feeling. It has to be so done, or the work suffers in consequence.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
FEB 2 2 1972

This

By J. Schauble Date——
This is an old, old question in business. The chief who grants his subordinates no authority is just as wrong in the interest of the work as the subordinate who asserts full independence or operates or interferes in fields outside his proper authority.

As an example, when you suggested last winter that I assist you in respect of the post-war economic field of policy, we first explored the field to discover what special subjects were involved. We then listed them, and in consultation with you, the Under Secretary and certain of your Assistant Secretaries, we undertook to allocate those topics among your Assistant Secretaries, as chairmen of groups and of subjects with which each seemed particularly fitted to deal (see Addenda A). We have revised only slightly those distributions of topics. We then created a special committee for each subject under the chairmanship of each such Assistant Secretary. Each such special committee was provided with a special chairman and a working inter-government and in some cases a non-governmental membership of experts. That work goes on in the special committees, and we believe will solve the problems which developed in the general field of post-war economics while the subjects were being explored in their preliminary stages.

The point I am trying to make is, that each Assistant Secretary was made responsible for specific subjects. Then authority, subject to the General Chairman and to the Secretary
tary of State, was given, and responsibility automatically
flows from it.

The Department as such, apart from its consular and passport service, seems to me to present three major responsibilities:

I. Current and customary diplomatic (i.e., International) affairs.

II. Current diplomatic (i.e., International) affairs related to the War.

III. The Peace and Post-War Problems.

I. My impression is that your higher staff is inadequate to carry the burden of all these activities--nor should it be expected to do so, being inadequate in point of numbers, and unfairly placed by the lack of directives and clear definition of individual authority and consequent responsibility.

I believe it is customary for career men to carry the burden of No. I (i.e., "Current and customary diplomatic affairs"). I believe that is the correct principle. These men select this field usually when young, and intend to devote (generally speaking) their lives to it. They need every encouragement, and advancement when merited. Many could be better fitted in advance for such a career if facilities for training were available (I have long held that opinion).

I believe there is a fine body of men in this field, both
in the Department and in the service about the world. I am not convinced that they are always adequately directed through their superiors. Policy making is Chief Executive responsibility. If there is no policy there can be no cooperation--and usually no success.

Administrative subordinates cannot and should not make policy, but subordinates who do not know policy cannot meet with dignity or with safety for themselves or for the Department the competition of clever and informed opponents. A business with no policy uniformly fails in the end.

It is obvious that the higher officers of the Department are overloaded with work. It is also obvious that their fields of authority are not clearly defined; thus their responsibilities are not fairly determined.

II. The unusual burdens imposed on the Department by the War necessitate a survey within the Department, to determine whether the same Assistants who carry the burden of No. I (i.e., "Current and customary diplomatic affairs") can with reasonable effort and with efficiency carry this day-to-day burden as well as No. II ("Current diplomatic affairs related to the War").
This also raises the question of how policy (U. S. A. policy) is to be defined—when and by whom. In the War field is it to be the problem of the Secretary, the President, or of both? Someone must define it clearly, and before the event, in broad general terms as related to each nation involved in the War. From such general policy the Secretary and in turn his Assistants must be permitted at the right moment to act—not to evade or avoid action. I understand that the Under Secretary is the clearing house for the Secretary in administration matters, leaving the Secretary free to shape policy with the President and to be the consultant of his staff in administering policy.

QUERY. The question then arises as first stated in this section II. Do the Assistant Secretaries, having the responsibility for No. I., have in addition the time and the strength competently to carry the burden of both I and II? If not, the remedy may be to add to their number by appointing additional Assistant Secretaries.

III. "The Peace and Post-War Problems."

These problems arising now and in prospect will gradually expand into action involving all the terms of surrender, of occupation and administration, of boundaries,
of relief, migration, rehabilitation, of air, sea and land transportation, communications, of monetary problems, of food, trade problems, raw material provision, power, and the vast field of political questions which will arise in all enemy and occupied countries--so vast is the upheaval of the War in all the countries of the world. Beyond this lie the great problems of world organization, security, the proposed councils of Europe, Asia, etc., etc., the European organizations, political and economic systems.

(The research work which has already been done has been of great scope, and much of it with intelligent thoroughness. It is being collated, has been largely discussed, and many conclusions subject to the ultimate turn of events will not be too difficult to evolve. The pains of creative effort have largely been spent upon this colossal undertaking. The product awaits the final moment of use, when in right hands it can be made to guide toward correct decisions. Many of these problems will continue as permanent responsibilities.)

QUERY. Can the small official top Departmental staff add this continuing responsibility to the burden of I and II, with safety to themselves and to the Department, the safety of American interests considered as the goal of all effort? My own answer is, No.
PERSONNEL

In the foregoing I have not considered individuals, but existing offices; not occupants of offices, for that is quite a different matter.

If the plan of organization is imperfect, the personnel cannot function properly or successfully--and, vice versa, inadequate, incompetent or inharmonious officials cannot function successfully.

CONCLUSION

My opinion is that for the War period at least the Department is under-staffed at the top.

If many or even a few of the post-war plans result in continuing commitments by this country, the work begun in the War will continue in the peace. This emphasizes the need for a schooled group of permanent Departmental officials, with adequate staff to carry forward the plans, treaties, world organization, security measures, economic engagements, political commitments, etc., etc., which peace with security will demand. I do not believe all these responsibilities can be borne by men whose time is interrupted by current diplomatic problems. I believe special and permanent officials of the Department are necessary to head this work.
work, once the preliminary stage is passed.

The period of research and discussion of the wide range of problems nearing an end, the field will narrow down to three principal topics:

**Security**, involving peace terms, invasion, armament control, enforcement, including military bases and contribution of armed forces to ensure security.

**Political**, including political, territorial world organization, and related topics.

**Economic**, the relation of U. S. A. to all world economic problems on trade and security considered.

The great burden of responsibility should rest upon a special group, with a clear definition of authority and responsibility, but selected with a view to permanency. In that direction lies continuity of control, of effort, of responsibility, and, I am sure, the nearer approach to safe and wise conclusions and ultimate intelligent administration.

**NEGOTIATIONS RE**
**SECURITY, POLITICAL**
**AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS**

Good negotiators are men of especial qualities. In industry they are designated salesmen. In action they soon either develop qualities which sell the products favorable to the interests of the employer, or an absence of such qualities
qualities. In industry the ones who do not demonstrate their fitness are dropped or shifted to work for which they have more suitable talent. Another type of negotiator or salesman is the one who tries to sell himself to the opponent or customer. This is the climber type who is trying to impress his opponent with his importance and ability. In industry he does not survive very long. In foreign affairs, it has been said, too many men are seeking contact with important or less important foreign representatives or members of their staffs. The stock in trade is to give advance intimation of Government policy in small and oftentimes in important matters without the knowledge of superiors. This sometimes carries even to advance hints to the press. One is often astounded here and abroad to read in the press or hear on the radio the general trend of secret discussions. How can these matters be controlled in a field so extensive and especially in time of a world war?

I. Of course discipline is essential.

II. The real negotiators must be clearly separated from the inefficient.

III.
III. The authority of negotiators must be clear and their authority must be made known and supported.

IV. In the matter of war measures affecting the peace and post-war problems there now exists no organised authority for negotiation, except in the single field of POST-WAR ECONOMIC POLICY. It was there, as you will recall, we introduced the section referring to negotiations with foreign governments, as follows:

"5. After approval or modification by the Secretary of State and the President of the final conclusions presented by the Committee, the respective Assistant Secretaries of State (subject to the approval of the Secretary of State) will—with their developed knowledge of the subject in question and with the appropriate advice and assistance of the Adviser on International Economic affairs, and of other officers of the Department, when desired—be the negotiating medium in the preliminary negotiations between our Government and similar representatives of the other interested Governments." (Organization and Procedure of Committee on Post-War Foreign Economic Policy, April 2, 1943.)
In conclusion, the field of negotiation further illustrates the need outlined previously for a separate Departmental section to deal with all post-war problems, subordinate only to the Secretary of State, or under the general chairmanship of the Secretary of State, with three special chairmen, one each for Security, Political, and Economic Policy.

POLITICAL HINDRANCES

The foregoing excludes the question of political influence in the choice of Departmental officials. There is no doubt that this factor differentiates Government from industry. While business has a profit-and-loss account, and Government none, industry at least is free to choose its officers and employees (subject to in the latter to only/the encroachment of union organizational control). If political obligations can only be met by official appointment, then the system suffers because of the lack of free choice by those who must be responsible for results. For me to comment on this feature would be unwise and unproductive.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL RIVALRY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

That inter-departmental rivalry exists is well known.
When it invades the field of foreign affairs it becomes dangerous, wasteful and unproductive. Some of the defects of governmental organization in this respect have recently been corrected. Others exist—one of which in international monetary affairs is at this time quite certain to create unrest, misunderstanding and uncertainty both in the State Department and in foreign capitals. This as an example indicates the lack of recognition of the clear line of authority in the functions of the State Department which discipline and orderly procedure require.

The recent memorandum, Addenda B (copy attached), which some time ago I asked to be prepared for your information illustrates the problem. No action has been taken. My justification for urging attention to it is that you designated me as Chairman of the Committee on Post-War Economic Policy. And one of the Special Committees we jointly set up was on Post-War Monetary Problems. Stabilization, long and short term credit, world bank, and other related problems, fall within the scope of that Committee's authority. Shall the State Department lead in this avowedly international field, or shall some other Department assume independent control, including negotiations with foreign governments, over State Department responsibility? This question can only be solved by the Secretary and the President.

MYRON C. TAYLOR
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF
COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

1. The present interdepartmental Economic Subcommittees will be reorganized as a single Committee on Post-War Foreign Economic Policy.

2. The Committee will set up, as necessary, continuing or ad hoc special committees on various topics, which will report to the Committee.

3. The organization of each particular special committee and supervision over its work will be in the hands of Mr. Berle or Mr. Acheson as Assistant Secretaries of State in accordance with whether the subject matter taken up by the special committee falls within the province of their respective departmental duties, or as may otherwise be agreed upon. The respective Assistant Secretaries will each select, with approval of the Secretary or Under Secretary, the members inside or outside the Department who will compose such committees.

4. A small departmental committee will be set up. It will be composed of the Under Secretary of State as Chairman, the Chairman of the Committee on Post-War Foreign Economic Policy, the two Assistant Secretaries of State, Dr. Feis, and Dr. Pasvolsky. It will be responsible for the work of the Committee and for coordinating the work of the special committees. It will report to the Secretary on the work of the Committee.

5. After approval or modification by the Secretary of State and the President of the final conclusions presented by the Committee, the respective Assistant Secretaries of State (subject to the approval of the Secretary of State) will—with their developed knowledge of the subject in question and with the appropriate advice and assistance of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs, and of other officers of the Department when desired—be the negotiating medium in the preliminary negotiations between our Government and similar representatives of the other interested Governments.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schoule Date FEB 22 1972
MEMBERSHIP OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
Revised List - July 5, 1943

Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Chairman
Mr. Dean Acheson
Mr. Paul Appleby
* Mr. Louis Bean
Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Mr. Isaiah Bowman
Mr. Benjamin Cohen
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Mr. Chester Davis
Mr. Brooks Emeny
Mr. Marriner Eccles
Mr. Herbert Feis
Mr. William Green
Mr. Harry Hawkins
Mr. Eric Johnston
Mr. Marvin Jones
Mr. Breckinridge Long
Mr. Philip Murray
Mr. David Niles
Mr. Leo Pasvolsky
Miss Frances Perkins
Mr. William T. Stone
Mr. Nelson Rockefeller
Mr. Wayne C. Taylor
Mr. Harry White

Mr. Leroy D. Stinebower, Executive Secretary

*Observer
MEMBERSHIP (SO FAR AS COMPLETE)  
OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

SPECIAL COMMITTEES UNDER MR. BERLE'S SUPERVISION

Monetary and Banking Relations
Harry D. White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of Monetary Research, Chairman 
(Mr. White to use his Inter-Departmental Committee on Stabilization as this Special Committee with the Secretariat in the Treasury)

Long-Term Investment
Warren Lee Pierson, President, Export-Import Bank, Chairman
Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President
Marriner Eccles, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board
Harry D. White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury

Migration and Settlement
H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, Department of State, Acting Chairman
Governor Herbert Lehman, Office of Foreign Relief, Department of State
Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State
*Major General John H. Hilldring, Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department
Captain H. L. Pence, Head, Civil Affairs Section, Navy Department
Dean Jay, American Red Cross
Philip Young, Office of Lend-Lease Administration
Laurence Duggan, Department of State
Bernard Gufler, Department of State, Adviser
Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, Public Health Service
Eleanor L. Dulles, ES, Secretary
*(Col. H. J. Haskell, Deputy Chief, Civil Affairs Division, alternate)

Aviation
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Chairman
Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air
Wayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of Commerce
L. Welch Pogue, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
(Wayne Coy, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget)
Robert Hooker, Secretary

Inland Transportation
(To be set up later)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 141-72
By J. Scholz Date FEB 20 1972
Power

Leland Olds, Chairman, Federal Power Commission, Chairman
Major General Thomas M. Robins, Army Engineers
Charles Carey, Bureau of the Budget
Abe Fortas, Under Secretary of the Interior
Walter Radius, ES, Secretary

Labor Standards and Social Security

Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, Chairman
A. F. Hinrichs, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
Isador Lubin, Assistant to the President, Department of Labor
Katharine Lenroot, Chief, Children's Bureau, Department of Labor
Verne A. Zimmer, Director, Division of Labor Standards, Department of Labor
Mary Anderson, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor
Carter Goodrich, Columbia University, New York City
Herbert Feldman, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.
Professor Douglas Brown, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
Amy Hewes, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass.
Emil Rieve, General President, Textile Workers Union of America, New York City
Dr. Raymond J. Walsh, Director, Education and Research, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.
David Dubinsky, President, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, New York City
William Green, President, American Federation of Labor
Arthur J. Altmeyer, Chairman, Social Security Board
SPECIAL COMMITTEES UNDER MR. ACHESON'S SUPERVISION

Relaxation of Trade Barriers

(Identical with Trade Agreements Committee)
Harry Hawkins, Chief, Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, Department of State, Chairman
H. P. McGowan, Chief, Trade Agreements Unit, Department of Commerce
Walter Salant, Office of Price Administration
Leslie A. Wheeler, Director, Division of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture
(G. B. L. Arner, alternate)
Harry D. White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury
Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman, Tariff Commission
Lynn R. Edminster, Vice Chairman, Tariff Commission; Chairman, Committee for Reciprocity Information

Private Monopolies and Cartels

Mr. Acheson, Chairman
Hugh Cox, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Vice Chairman
Edward Mason, Member of the Board of Analysis, Office of Strategic Services
Louis Domeratsky, Chief, European Unit, Department of Commerce
Donald Wallace, Director, Industrial Manufacturing Price Division, Office of Price Administration
Homer Jones, Chief, Division of Investigation and Research, Alien Property Custodian
Lynn Edminster, Vice Chairman, Tariff Commission
John Wharton, Chairman, War Staff, Board of Economic Warfare
E. G. Collado, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary and Associate Adviser on International Economic Affairs, Department of State
Robert Terrill, ES. Secretary
Mordecai Ezekiel, Economic Adviser, Department of Agriculture
Corwin Edwards, Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, Department of State
(L. A. Morrison, Tariff Commission, alternate for Edminster)

Commodity Agreements and Methods of Trade

Lynn Edminster, Vice Chairman, Tariff Commission, Chairman
Leslie Wheeler, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture
Howard Tolley, Chief, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture
Seymour Harris, Director, Office for Export-Import Price Control, Office of Price Administration
Robert Carr, Assistant Chief, Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, Department of State
E. G. Collado, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary and Associate Adviser on International Economic Affairs, department of State
Horace B. McCoy, Chief, Division of Industrial Economy, Department of Commerce
(Julian Wadleigh, Assistant Chief, Division of Economic Studies, Department of State)
Max Gideonse, ES, Secretary
(Prentiss Dean, Tariff Commission, alternate for Mr. Edminster)

Food and Agricultural Products
Marvin Jones, Judge, Court of Claims of the United States, Chairman
Paul Appleby, Under Secretary of Agriculture
W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, Public Health Service
Murray Lincoln, Executive Secretary, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation
Josephine Schain, Chairman, Chautauqua Women's Club

Metals and Heavy Industries
Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs, Chairman
William Y. Elliott, Director, Division of Stockpiling and Transportation, War Production Board
G. Temple Bridgman, Executive Vice President, Metals Reserve Company, Department of Commerce
Elmer W. Pehrson, Chief, Economics and Statistics Service, Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior
Donald Davenport, Chief, Employment and Occupational Outlook Branch, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
Charles Will Wright, Chief Technical Consultant, Metals and Minerals Branch, Board of Economic Warfare
Brooks Emeny, Director, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland, Ohio
Howard Trueblood, EA, Secretary

Petroleum
Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs, Department of State, Chairman
Brigadier General Boykin C. Wright, War Department
William C. Bullitt, Navy Department
Everett DeGolyer, Assistant Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War
S. S. Snodgrass, Assistant Director, Foreign Division, Petroleum Administration for War

Rubber
Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs, Department of State, Chairman
Ross Cissel, Assistant Chief, Division of Defense Materials, Department of State
Stanley Osborne, Special Assistant to the Deputy Rubber Director
Atherton Lee, Chief of the Natural Rubbers Branch, Office of the Rubber Director
Douglas H. Allen, President, Rubber Development Corporation, Department of Commerce
Stanley T. Crossland, Vice President, Rubber Reserve Company, Department of Commerce
A. L. Viles, President, Rubber Manufacturers Association, New York City; American representative on the Consumers' Panel of the International Rubber Regulation Committee

SPECIAL COMMITTEES UNDER MR. LONG'S SUPERVISION

Telecommunications

Breakinridge Long, Department of State, Chairman
Green A. Hackworth, Department of State Adviser
J. H. Dellinger, National Bureau of Standards
James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
Joseph F. Gartland, Chairman, Operations Board, Post Office Department
Major General Dawson Olmstead, United States Army
Warren Lee Pierson, President, Export-Import Bank
Rear Admiral Joseph H. Redman, Director of Naval Communications
C. I. Stanton, Civil Aeronautics Administration
Francis Colt de Wolf, Department of State
Paul Culbertson, EA, Adviser
Louis J. Halle, Jr., RA, Adviser
Walter Radius, ES, Adviser
Harvey B. Otterman, Department of State, Secretary

Shipping

Breakinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, Chairman
Vice Admiral Russell R. Waesche, United States Coast Guard
Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, Maritime Commission
Dean Acheson, Department of State
W. L. Clayton, Department of Commerce
Green H. Hackworth, Department of State
Huntington T. Morse, Maritime Commission
Herbert E. Gaston, Treasury Department
J. E. Saugstad, Department of State
Paul T. David, Budget Bureau
Walter Radius, ES, Secretary

MR. PASVOLSKY'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF ANTI-DEPRESSION POLICIES

(In the process of formation)
Addendum B

June 24, 1943

MEMORANDUM

Re: PROCEDURE IN DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING MONETARY STABILIZATION

Mr. Myron Taylor: (Chairman, Committee on Post-War Economic Policy, one section of which deals with monetary stabilization)

S - Mr. Secretary:

It seems both to Dr. Pasvolsky and myself that the time has now come when this Department, through the Secretary, should establish:

(1) The procedure by which a determination of policy in monetary stabilization shall be made, and

(2) The method by which future negotiations shall be carried on.

The present state of the record is this: the Treasury has been conducting informal discussions with technicians representing the various governments. These are on an informal and technical level and bind no one. These culminated in a group discussion at the Treasury which technical experts from some 16 countries attended and expressed various views for the enlightenment of all concerned.

Pursuant to the Secretary's instructions, Dr. Pasvolsky and I attended but did not take any very active part in the discussion, representing rather the Department's paramount interest than any commitment to a particular plan.

Subsequent thereto meetings have been had between experts of Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, Board of Economic Warfare and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Both Dr. Pasvolsky and I were at one of those meetings. No final conclusion was reached or could be reached, although harmonization of the views of the Treasury and Federal Reserve was affected. It would seem, therefore, that there was considerable measure of agreement between technicians of the United States Government.
Thereafter, the Treasury continued certain talks with technicians representing the British Government -- still, however, on an informal level. This was principally to keep the British happy.

It seems to Dr. Pasvolsky and myself, however, that there is now a sufficient concurrence in possibilities so that the Secretary of State will have to determine the line which this Government is to take in any further negotiations. Presumably the Secretary will wish to talk to the President about it, and will also wish to have his views worked out with the Secretary of the Treasury.

Likewise, the future procedure should be determined. The Secretary of the Treasury would like to call a purely "Treasury" conference. It would seem more appropriate to have the Secretary of State call a conference on monetary stabilization under the auspices of the Department, -- probably having the Secretary of the Treasury as Chief of the Delegation -- or some other appropriate recognition of the paramount technical position of the Treasury in the subject. If this form works out, appropriate instructions would no doubt be issued by the President; the Secretary of State would then consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and when the time was ripe, call such a conference.

A. A. B., Jr.
THE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE
Mr. Taylor, Chairman
Mr. Bowman
Mr. Berle
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Feis
Mr. Pasvolsky
Mr. Hawkins
Mr. Stinebower
Mr. Haley

COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
Mr. Taylor, Chairman
Mr. Stinebower, Executive Secretary

SPECIAL COMMITTEES UNDER MR. BERLE'S SUPERVISION
Monetary and Banking Relations
Mr. White, Chairman

Long-term Investment
Warren L. Pierson, Chairman

Labor and Social Security
Frances Perkins, Chairman

Migration and Settlement
H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, Chair.

Aviation
Adolf A. Berle, Chairman

Inland Transportation
Paul T. Curberton, Chairman

Power
Leland Olds, Chairman

SPECIAL COMMITTEES UNDER MR. LONG'S SUPERVISION
Communications
Mr. Long, Chairman

Shipping
Mr. Long, Chairman

SPECIAL COMMITTEES UNDER MR. ACHESON'S SUPERVISION
Relaxation of Trade Barriers
Mr. Hawkins, Chairman

Commodity Agreement and Methods of Trade
Mr. Edminster, Chairman

Private Monopolies and Cartels
Mr. Acheson, Chairman

Production and Consumption Policies in Relation to Trade

Food and Agricultural Products
Marvin Jones, Chairman

Metals and Heavy Industry
H. Feis, Chairman

Petroleum
H. Feis, Chairman

Rubber
H. Feis, Chairman

Special Committee on Problems of International Coordination of Anti-Depression Policies
Mr. Pasvolsky, Chairman
December 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State.

After discussing this matter with the British military authorities I consider it inadvisable to reopen the matter at this time.

F.D.R.

Letter from the Secretary of State, 11/21/43, to the President, a copy of which has been retained for our files, together with letter prepared for the President's signature addressed to His Holiness Pius XII, which has not been signed by the President, concerning the recognition of Rome as an open city.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to Mr. Stettinius' recent conversations with you concerning the open city status of Rome, we have been informed that General Eisenhower has recently submitted his recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For important considerations other than military, it is desirable that this Government make a sincere effort to spare Rome to the extent possible the devastation resulting from modern military operations and, in the event an agreement cannot be reached, of placing the burden of refusal upon the Germans.

Consequently, I am submitting a draft letter to the Pope, for your signature if you approve, recognizing the open city status of Rome on the general basis of the conditions outlined by the Italian Government in August last. In considering the communication to the Pope, the War Department suggests that you may wish to consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that the military as well as the political aspects

The President,

The White House.
aspects of the problem are fully examined. The draft communication incorporates, in a satisfactory manner we believe, General Eisenhower's reservations.

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) CORDELL HULL

Enclosure:

Draft letter.