

● PSF

Great Britain: Winston Churchill

Nov. 1942-43

212

W.F.
Churchill

11-17-42

family
file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Former Naval Person -

Mrs. Roosevelt arrived
safely this morning & I met
her at airport & found her
well and thrilled by every
moment of her visit -
My thanks to you and Mrs.
Churchill for taking such
good care of her.

Roosevelt

PSF Churchill folder
1-42

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

November 20, 1942

File under Churchill

Plans for ^a possible apartment
in London for the President
in case he should visit
there. Brought back
by Mrs. Roosevelt

November 17, 1942.

Curzon Street.

The following is the information you require:-

Shelter.

Main Corridor - 3' clearance between walls.
Entrance Door - 2' 10" width with 2 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " clearance
when open.
Doors to Main Rooms - 2' 10" width 2' 9" clearance.
Doors to Lavatory 2' 4" width 2' 2" clearance

4th Floor Flat

Inner Vestibule door 3' wide by 2' 9" clearance
to entrance

All doors to principal rooms 3' by 2' 9" clearance

Doors to bathrooms and lavatories 2' 6" wide. 2' 4" clearance.

W.C. door 2' 3" " 2' 3" "


Lift Clearance between outer Bostwick gates 2' 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
It should be noted perhaps that the gate lock
and receiver project approx. 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ "

Clearance between inner lift gates is 2' 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ ".

PST C.C.
Churchill

Architect's plan of flat seen
by Tina Roosevelt in London,
Nov. 14, 1942.

Daisy Fisher
Second Secretary of Embassy



PART THIRD FLOOR PLAN (EAST)

SCALE 1/8 FEET = ONE INCH


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
CURZON STREET HOUSE
 ALTERATIONS TO THIRD FLOOR (EAST)

MINISTRY OF WORKS
 CLEVELAND HOUSE
 LONDON E.W.

A.S.W.
 13/1/42

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.





SCALE 1/8" = 1' 0" = 1" IN

Abt
18/1/42

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed for your consideration a draft message to Prime Minister Churchill in answer to his message to yours of today. If you approve this draft, we shall send the message to Lord Halifax for communication to Mr. Churchill. The messages will be made public in London.

CH

12/7/42 - GGT OK'd this to Secy Hull's office and message was sent.

*File
Personnel
Confidential*

P.S.F. Churchill folder
1-42

December 7, 1942

I deeply appreciate your message. Much has happened since the treacherous attack in the Pacific one year ago today. For months, most of the news was bad despite heroic resistance of Chinese, Dutch, British Commonwealth and American forces. The injuries that all of us have suffered at the hands of Japan are indeed grievous. A partial retribution in kind has been meted out to the Japanese forces during the last seven months. This is only the beginning. We will continue to strike them, with ever increasing force. I welcome your statement and join with you in the resolution that Japan's aggressive power must be utterly destroyed. In no other way can we be certain that their infamous aggression will not be repeated.

Roosevelt

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Renchard, in the Secretary of State's office, called to say that they feel -- and this is agreed upon by the War and Navy Departments as well -- that it would be unwise to give these messages to the Press. They think the less emphasis put on this anniversary the better. However, the Secretary is sending over a proposed draft of reply to the Prime Minister.

G.

P.S. F. Churchill

INDIAN AGENCY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

On the anniversary of the
barbarous and unprovoked attack of the
Japanese forces upon us, India greets
the United States of America and renews
her resolve that, in company with all
the United Nations, she will fight on until
victory be won and the forces of aggression
finally routed.

PS F
Churchill

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 7th, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose a message addressed
to you which I have just received from
the Prime Minister.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D. C.

I feel it is right that I should address you, Mr. President, on this day since our country no less than the United States was the object of the infamous outrage of a year ago. The injuries that we have all suffered at the hands of Japan during the past year are grievous indeed. The peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations are deeply conscious of their duty. We look forward one and all to the day when our full strength can be joined to that of our United States, Dutch and Chinese allies for the utter and final destruction of Japan's aggressive power.

73F Churchill

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 7, 1942


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The covering memorandum from the British Embassy stated that the Ministry of Information in London wished to be informed if you decide to release the Prime Minister's message to the press, and if so at what time. Perhaps, therefore, someone at the White House could telephone my office about your decision so that it could be communicated to the British Embassy.

A

45-2
100
COPY

Signed original of this letter sent to Hon. Sumner Welles for delivery. hm



*PSF: Winston Churchill folder
1-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943

My dear Winston:

Our good friend, General Sikorski, has been urging us to assign at least six B-24 aircraft for the maintenance of his liason with Poland.

I have just written him that the United States cannot take action on his request without jeopardizing basic agreements in which the United States and Great Britain have each accepted definite responsibilities for the provision of aircraft within the various theaters of operations. In accordance with these agreements, Poland is within a British theater of operations and responsibility.

I feel, however, that his proposal has a great deal of merit, and I told him, therefore, that I would refer the matter to you, with the request that you give it all possible consideration. It was my thought (which I did not, however, convey to him) that you might perhaps be able to spare him six out of the total of 398 B-24's allocated from U.S. production under the recent Arnold-Evill-McCain-Patterson agreement.


Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Right Honorable Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister
London, England.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date NOV 1 1971



*Orig. comes with cover. re above + Pres ltr 1/8/43 to Gen. Sikorski
filed - Poland folder, 1-43*

PSF: Churchill - 1943

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

Original memorandum signed by
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S.
Churchill at Casablanca, January 25, 1943.
Signed: F.D.R. - W.S.C.

File - ~~Famous People~~

IN
ATTN: M
CHIEF OF STAFF
MAY 1945

In cordially approving the Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff drawn up after thorough examination of the problems, the President and the Prime Minister wish to emphasise the following points which should be steadily pressed in all preparations:-

(1) The desirability of finding means of running the W.J. Russian convoys even through the HUSKY period.

2

(2) The urgency of sending the air reinforcements to General Chenhault's force in China and of finding means to make them fully operative.

(3) The importance of achieving the favourable June moon for HUSKY and the grave detriment to our interests which will be incurred by an apparent suspension of activity during the summer months.

(4) The need to build up more quickly the United States striking force in the United Kingdom so as to be able to profit by favourable August weather

for some form of SLEDGEHAMMER. For this purpose not only the scales of initial equipment and monthly maintenance should be searchingly re-examined but the priorities of material and manpower shipments from the United States to Great Britain should be adjusted to the tactical situation likely to be presented at the target date.

F. J. R.
hms
—

25. 1. 43

of a
...ed raid Monday
...ermo, Sicily, killed six
...ans and wounded an equal num-
ber, the bulletin said. Two raiders
were shot down by anti-aircraft
fire and one by Italian night fight-
ers.

**Deprived of His Cigars,
Churchill Described as
'World's Worst Patient'**

LONDON, Feb. 23 (I.N.S.).
The condition of Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, who is suf-
fering from severe catarrh and a
lung inflammation, is un-
changed, an official bulletin said
today. He spent a comfortable
night.

According to London news-
papers, Churchill has turned out
to be the "world's worst pa-
tient." He is cantankerous and
restless, it was said, keenly re-
sentful over being deprived of
his famous cigars, and insists on
working and conferring with his
cabinet officers despite all medi-
cal advice to the contrary.

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day for use in
stamp in War Ration
No. 1—March 21.

SUGAR—

No. 11 stamp in War Ration Book No. 1 good for three pounds until March 15.

GASOLINE—

Last day for use of No. 4 gasoline rationing coupons—Midnight of March 21.

TIRES—

Last day for first tire inspection—"A" cards, March 31; "B" and "C" cards, bulk coupons and operators of fleets of vehicles, February 26.

SHOES—

No. 17 stamp in War Ration Book No. 1 good for one pair until June 15.

FOOD—

Sale of all canned fish and canned meat suspended until meat rationing begins. Sale of all canned, processed food, all frozen food, and dry beans, dry peas, and dry soups suspended until March 1. Registration for canned foods under point system rationing in District schools begins today. Point system rationing begins on March 1.

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PSF-1050

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10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

5 March, 1943.

My dear Mr. President,

I hope you will accept the accompanying copy of the new film "Desert Victory", which I saw last night and thought very good. It gives a vivid and realistic picture of the battles, and I know that you will be interested in the photographs of your Sherman tanks in action. I am having the film sent to you by Air so that you may see it as soon as possible.

I was so sorry to see that you had been ill, and I hope that you have fully recovered. I am feeling very much better and hope soon to return to full work.

With kindest regards and all best wishes to Mrs. Roosevelt, Harry and yourself,

Yours always,

W

The President of the United States of America.

*Signed original of this letter sent to Churchill folder
Hon. Sumner Miller for delivery
3/18/43
Sum*

March 17, 1943.

Dear Winston:-

That new film "Desert Victory" is about the best thing that has been done about the war on either side. Everyone here is enthusiastic. I gave a special showing for the White House Staff and tonight the Interior Department employees are having a special showing because everybody in town is talking about it; and I understand that within ten days it will be in the picture houses. Great good will be done.

I think I picked up sleeping sickness or Gambia fever or some kindred bug in that hell-hole of yours called Bathurst. It laid me low -- four days in bed -- then a lot of sulphadiathole which cured the fever and left me feeling like a wet rag. I was no good after 2 P.M. and, after standing it for a week or so, I went to Hyde Park for five days; got full of health in glorious zero weather -- came back here last week and have been feeling like a fighting cock every since.

Anthony has spent three evenings with me. He is a grand fellow and we are talking everything from Ruthenia to the production of peanuts!

It is an interesting fact that we seem to agree on about 95% of all the subjects -- not a bad average.

He seems to think that you will manage rather well with the leadership in the House of Commons -- but both of us are concerned over what you will do with the Foreign Office! We fear that he will not recognize it when he gets back.

Please, please, for the sake of the world, don't overdo these days. You must remember that it takes about a month of occasional let-ups to get back your full strength.

Harry is in grand form and all goes well here.

Tell Mrs. Churchill that when I was laid up I was a thoroughly model patient and that I hope you will live down the reputation in our Press of having been the "world's worst patient".

God bless you.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.



file personal Churchill folder

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

March 19, 1943

My dear Mr. President,

Thank you so much for your letter of March 2. I have shown the photograph and Mrs. Harrison's letter to Mrs. Churchill, and we are both much interested in them. Would you please thank Mrs. Harrison so much for letting us see the photograph?

Several good judges think there is a singular resemblance.

Yours ever.

W

The President of the United States of America.



**NOTIFY
YOUR
CORRESPONDENTS
OF CHANGE
OF ADDRESS**



The President of the United States,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.

By Air Parcel

PSF Churchill folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

To read and return for my
files.

F.D.R.

Secret No. 273 - March 24
Personal and secret former Naval
Person to Pres. "Your number 264".

Churchill folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1943.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

SOME BABY!

ROOSEVELT

URGENT

AMWAR 6
filed 30/6P
mm

CCWD
March 30, 1943
1719Z

~~SECRET~~

U R G E N T

From: Amembassy London
For: The President of the United States

In reply cite: No. 276 March 30, 1943

To President from Former Naval Person personal.

Your letter of March 19. My first visit to America was in December 1895 when I was already too big for any baby carriage.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Signed original of this letter sent to
Hon. Sumner Welles for delivery.

hm

P. R. F.

7683

March 19, 1943.

Dear Winston:

I did not know you came to
the United States when you were at the
baby carriage age, nor did I know you had
visited Amenia. It is in Dutchess County
about twenty miles back of Hyde Park.

x 997 905

My best to you.

As ever,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Winston S. Churchill #
Prime Minister of Great Britain
London, England.

Enclosure. - Letter which the President received from
Jerome F. P. Tobin, NYC, 3/15/43 in re visits
of Winston Churchill and His Mother, Many Years
Ago, To Amenia, New York. Copy retained for
our files.

x48
x20

JEROME F. P. TOBIN
60 East 42nd St.
New York

March 15, 1943

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Re: Visits of Winston Churchill
and His Mother, Many Years Ago,
To Amenia, New York.

Dear Mr. President:

I thought you might be interested in the following story.

A short while ago, we had an old lady, who formerly lived at Amenia, N. Y., for dinner. She is now over 84 years old but is still spry enough to travel about alone.

She told me that she remembers that Mrs. Churchill used to visit at Amenia, when Winston was a baby in a carriage. They were guests at the hotel near the railroad station. Today it is quite out of date but at that time it was considered quite fashionable, as country hotels used to be.

Perhaps you are already familiar with the facts. Thinking that possibly you might not be, I decided to write you. Very few people remember things that happened that long ago.

Respectfully yours,

s/ Jerome F. P. Tobin

March 19, 1943.

Dear Mr. Tobin:

The President asks me to thank you very much for your letter of March fifteenth in which you tell him about the visits of Honorable Winston Churchill and his mother to Amenia, New York. He had never heard this story before.

Very sincerely yours,

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

~~Mr. Jerome F. P. Tobin, x~~
~~60 East 42nd Street,~~
New York, N. Y.



File Personal

PSF Churchill folder 1-43

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

16th April, 1943.

My dear Mr. President,

Many thanks for the letter you sent me to introduce McCullagh, who is now returning to America. I saw him and he has also discussed his proposals with Brendan Bracken. I hope that much good will result.

Yours always

Winston S. C.
✓

The President of the United States of America.

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Winston Churchill from
1-43

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1943


*File
Confidential*

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a letter from Halifax giving me the text of a telegram he has received from the Foreign Office containing certain changes which the Prime Minister has made in his message to Stalin (quoted in his message No. 289 to you). Mr. Eden has asked that you be informed immediately of these changes and I consequently enclose copies of the two messages for your information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.

Text of a telegram received from the Foreign Office
on April 30th.

Prime Minister agrees to make following changes
in his message to Stalin.

Message should begin as follows:-

I cannot refrain from expressing my disappointment
that you should have felt it necessary to take action in
breaking off relations with Poles without giving me time to
inform you of results of my approach to General Sikorski
about which I had telegraphed to you on April 24. I had
hoped, in spirit of our treaty of last year, we should always
consult each other about such important matters, more
especially as they affect combined strength of United Nations.

Original paragraphs 1 and 2 should then follow
as paragraphs 2 and 3.

First sentence of original paragraph 3 (now
paragraph 4) stands. This paragraph should continue as
follows: "He is now busy suggesting that U.S.S.R. will set
up a Polish Government on Russian soil and deal only with
[? President]. We shall not of course be able to recognize
etc."

Original paragraphs 4 and 5 should then follow
as new paragraphs 5 and 6.

Prime Minister thinks it necessary to maintain
his references to Poles in Soviet Union for following
reasons:-

(a) one of our main objects has been to shift
argument from past to future and to concentrate attention
upon the living rather than the dead;

(b)/

(b) we do not want to gloss over all the legitimate grievances of Poles of which this is one of the greatest. We have also given Poles definite impression that we propose to take this matter up urgently;

(c) this issue, affecting as it does the morale of Polish troops fighting at our side, is a military question of direct interest to us. We therefore have special reasons for taking it up with Soviet Government;

(d) moreover President has already mentioned this point in his message to Stalin.

Text of a telegram received from the Foreign Office
on April 28th.

Following message sent by the Prime Minister
to the President on April 28th.

Personal and ~~Secret~~

Poles are issuing tonight communiqué in my
immediately following telegram. You will see that we have
persuaded them to shift the argument from the dead to the
living and from the past to the future.

2. I have therefore sent memorandum of the message
to Stalin feeling it will be in accordance with your views.
Anything that you can put in now will be most helpful.

Message begins.

(1) Mr. Eden and I have pointed out to the Polish
Government that no resumption of friendly or working
relations with Soviet Russia is possible while they make
charges of an insulting character against the Soviet
Government and thus seem to countenance atrocious Nazi
propaganda. Still more would it be impossible for any
of us to tolerate enquiries by the International Red Cross
held under Nazi auspices and dominated by Nazi terrorism.
I am glad to tell you that they have accepted our view and
that they want to work loyally with you. Their request
now is to have dependents of the Polish army in Persia and
fighting Poles in the Soviet Union sent to join the Poles
you have already allowed to go to Persia. This is surely a
matter which admits of patient discussion. We think the
request is reasonable if made in the right way and at the
right time and I am pretty sure the President thinks so
too. We hope earnestly that remembering the difficulties
in which we have all been plunged by brutal Nazi aggression

UPGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Cort., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72

R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

you/

you will consider this matter in a spirit of magnanimity.

(2) Cabinet here is determined to have proper discipline in the Polish press in Great Britain. Even miserable rags attacking Sikorski can say things which the German broadcast repeats open-mouthed to the world to our joint detriment. This must be stopped and it will be stopped.

(3) So far this business has been Goebbels' greatest triumph. It has now been suggested that the U.S.S.R. will set up a left wing Polish Government on Russian soil and deal only with them. We could not recognize such a Government and would continue our relations with Sikorski who is far the most helpful man you or we are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause. I expect this will also be the American view.

(4) My own feeling is that they have had a shock and that after whatever interval is thought convenient, the relationship established on July 30th 1941 should be restored. No one will hate this more than Hitler and what he hates most is wise for us to do.

(5) We owe it to our armies now engaged and presently to be more heavily engaged to maintain good conditions behind the fronts. I and my colleagues look steadily to even closer cooperation and understanding of the U.S.S.R., the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire, not only in the deepening war struggle but after the war. What other hope can there be than this for the tortured world?

Message ends.

3. Foreign Office are sending a fuller statement through our Ambassador in Moscow setting out our formal

and/

and official view and dwelling more in detail on the Polish grievances and on the dangers to the United Nations which would follow from their being incessantly aired all over the world. Ambassador Winant is being kept fully informed.

*Churchill
Folder*

THIS IS THE LIST OF PEOPLE WHO ACCOMPANIED THE
PRIME MINISTER TO THE CAPITOL WHEN HE MADE HIS SPEECH BEFORE
CONGRESS ON MAY 19, 1943.

5-19-43

PSF
Churchill

REQUESTS FROM HARRY HOPKINS FOR THE PRESIDENT

- ✓ Mr. McKenzie King
- ✓ Lord Moran (Mr. Churchill's personal physician)
- ✓ The Crown Princess of Norway
- ✓ Countess Ostgaard
- ✓ Mr. Bernard Baruch
- ✓ The Duke and Duchess of Windsor.

REQUESTS FROM MISS TULLY:

- Mrs. Myron Taylor
- Mrs. Wilson Brown - two tickets *16*
- Lt. and Mrs. Rutherford

REQUEST FROM MRS. ROOSEVELT:

- ~~Mrs. Gaspar Bacon (John Cutter, telegram attached.)~~

m.c.t.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

*file
Secret*

May 21, 1943.

FILE MEMO:

This is Winston Churchill's order to General Alexander to undertake the advance which started at El Alamein and ended in Tunisia.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED



BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

Directives to General Alexander
Commander in Chief in the Middle East

1. Your prime & main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity the German Italian Army commanded by Field Marshal Rommel together with all its supplies & establishments in Egypt & Libya.
2. You will discharge or cease to be discharged such other duties as pertain to your Command without prejudice to the task described in paragraph 1. He must be considered paramount in His Majesty's interests.

W.L.
10.8.42

A.S.B.
W.L.
10.8.42

*file
confidential*

PSF

*Churchill folder
1-43*

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

May 27th

[43]

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT: 3:05

Mike Reilly says the P.M. landed
at Gibraltar O.K.

PSE Churchill folder
1-43
file
Confidential

May 28, 1943.

My dear Lord Leathers:-

It was so good to have you with us and I do hope you will find it possible to return again before too long, as I want to talk over with you the whole post-war shipping problem.

Jerry Land and Lew Douglas have told me how greatly they have benefited by your trip.

I am enclosing a letter addressed to the Prime Minister, which is self-explanatory.

I do hope you have a pleasant journey home.

Cordially yours,

Lord Leathers,
Hotel Weylin,
New York City,
New York.

(Enclosure)

May 28, 1943.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:-

When you were with us during the latter part of December, 1941, and the first few days of 1942, after we had become active participants in the war, plans for a division of responsibilities between your country and mine became generally fixed in certain understandings. In matters of production as well as in other matters, we agreed that mutual advantages were to be gained by concentrating, in so far as it was practical, our energies on doing those things which each of us was best qualified to do.

Here in this country in abundance were the natural resources of critical materials. Here there had been developed the welding technique which enables us to construct a standard merchant ship with a speed unequalled in the history of merchant shipping. Here there was waiting cargo to be moved in ships to your Island and to other theatres. If your country was to have carried out its contemplated ship construction program, it would have been necessary to move large tonnages of the raw materials that we have here across the Atlantic to your mills and yards, and then in the form of a finished ship to send them back to our ports for the cargo that was waiting to be carried.

Obviously, this would have entailed a waste of materials and time. It was only natural for us then to decide that this country was to be the predominant cargo shipbuilding area for us both, while your country was to devote its facilities and resources principally to the construction of combat vessels.

You, in your country, reduced your merchant shipbuilding program and directed your resources more particularly to other fields in which you were more favorably situated, while we became the merchant shipbuilder for the two of us and have built, and are continuing to build, a vast tonnage of cargo vessels.

Our merchant fleet has become larger and will continue to grow at a rapid rate. To man its ever increasing number of vessels will, we foresee, present difficulties of no mean proportion. On your side, the British merchant fleet has been steadily dwindling. Depending upon the way in which the calculation is made, it has shrunk somewhere between six to nine million deadweight tons since the war began, and you have in your pool as a consequence about 10,000 trained seamen and licensed personnel. Clearly it would be extravagant were this body of experienced men of the sea not to be used as promptly as possible. To fail to use them would result in a wastage of manpower on your side, a wastage of manpower on our side, and what is of equal importance, a wastage of shipping facilities. We cannot afford this waste.

In order that the general understanding that we reached during the early days of our engagement together in this war may be more perfectly carried out and in order, as a practical matter, to avoid the prodigal use of manpower and shipping that would result from pursuing any other course, I am directing the WSA, under appropriate bareboat arrangements, to transfer to your flag for temporary wartime duty during each of the suggested next ten months a minimum of fifteen. I have furthermore suggested to them that this be increased to twenty.

We have, as you know, been allocating to the British services on a voyage-to-voyage basis large numbers of American controlled ships. What I am now suggesting to you and what I am directing the WSA to carry out will be in the nature of a substitution, to the extent of the tonnage transferred, for the American tonnage that has been usually employed in your war program. The details of the arrangements we can properly leave to the national shipping authorities for settlement through the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board whose function it is to concert the employment of all merchant vessels and will, in accordance with its usual practice, do so in connection with these particular ships.

Always sincerely,

The Honorable
The Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.

PSF Churchill
D

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 24, 1943

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins,
The White House.

Dear Harry:

I have your letter of May 24th regarding the bareboat chartering of some of our ships to the British Government.

I understand that it was agreed late in 1941 and early in 1942 that we were to be the shipbuilding nation for the two countries and that accordingly the British not only did not expand their merchant shipbuilding program as they had previously contemplated, but in addition actually substantially reduced their program as it then was.


I understand, too, that there are approximately 10,000 unemployed British seamen in the British pool.

It is on this statement of fact that I have drawn the attached draft of a proposed communication from the President to the Prime Minister.

There is, of course, one further thought that I had not included in the draft, ~~but that perhaps might well go in.~~ The use of this body of unemployed seamen provides insurance to us against a deficiency in similarly trained men that may well develop here in the light of the extraordinarily heavy expansion in our merchant shipping fleet.

The proposals in the attached draft have been agreed to by Lord Leathers as within the capabilities of his available crews. I consulted Admiral Land before he left for the West Coast and, although he has not seen the draft, it was prepared in accordance with the program that we discussed and that he approved. Mr. Harriman has seen the draft and joins me in recommending its acceptance by the President for the reasons expressed therein.

Sincerely yours,



L. W. Douglas,
Deputy Administrator.

Draft - 5/28/43

~~MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.~~

Dear Mr. Prime Minister

When you were with us during the latter part of December 1941 and the first few days of 1942, after we had become active participants in the war, plans for a division of responsibilities between your country and mine became generally fixed in certain understandings. In matters of production as well as in other matters, we agreed that mutual advantages were to be gained by concentrating, in so far as it was practical, our energies on doing those things which each of us was best qualified to do.

Here in this country in abundance were the natural resources of critical materials. Here there had been developed the welding technique which enables us to construct a standard merchant ship with a speed unequalled in the history of merchant shipping. Here there was waiting cargo to be moved in ships to your Island and to other theatres. If your country was to have carried out its contemplated ship construction program, it would have been necessary to move large tonnages of the raw materials that we have here across the Atlantic to your mills and yards, and then in the form of a finished ship to send them back to our ports for the cargo that was waiting to be carried.

Obviously, this would have entailed a waste of materials, ~~a waste~~
and ~~of time, so precious to us both, and a waste of shipping space.~~ It was only natural for us then to decide that this country was to be the predominant

cargo shipbuilding area for us both, while your country was to devote its facilities and resources principally to the construction of combat vessels, ~~escorts, as well as other implements of war. It would have been un-~~ natural had we done otherwise, because the case for our assuming this division of responsibility was irresistible. Each of us has faced up very creditably indeed to our respective share of the general task that we then laid out.

You, in your country, reduced your merchant shipbuilding program and directed your resources more particularly to other fields in which you were more favorably situated, while we became the merchant shipbuilder for the two of us and have built, and are continuing to build, a vast tonnage of cargo vessels.

Our merchant fleet has become larger and will continue to grow at a rapid rate. To man its ever increasing number of vessels will, we foresee, present difficulties of no mean proportion. On your side, the British merchant fleet has been steadily dwindling. Depending upon the way in which the calculation is made, it has shrunk somewhere between six to nine million deadweight tons since the war began, and you have in your pool as a consequence about 10,000 trained seamen and licensed personnel. Clearly it would be extravagant were this body of experienced men of the sea not to be used as promptly as possible. To fail to use them would result in a wastage of manpower on your side, a wastage of manpower on our side, and what is of equal importance, a wastage of shipping facilities. We cannot

afford this waste.

In order that the general understanding that we reached during the early days of our engagement together in this war may be more perfectly carried out and in order, as a practical matter, to avoid the prodigal use of manpower and shipping that would result from pursuing any other course, I am directing the WSA, under appropriate bareboat arrangements, to transfer to your flag for temporary wartime duty during each of the next ten months *a minimum of fifteen, and have further or added* ~~twenty~~ merchant vessels, ~~more or less.~~ *to them that this be increased to twenty*

We have, as you know, been allocating to the British services on a voyage-to-voyage basis large numbers of American controlled ships. What I am now suggesting to you and what I am directing the WSA to carry out will be in the nature of a substitution, to the extent of the tonnage transferred, for the American tonnage that has been usually employed in your war program. The details of the arrangements we can properly leave to the national shipping authorities for settlement through the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board whose function it is to concert the employment of all merchant vessels and will, in accordance with its usual practice, do so in connection with these particular ships.

Draft - 5/22/43

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MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

When you were with us during the latter part of December 1941 and the first few days of 1942, after we had become active participants in the war, plans for a division of responsibilities between your country and mine became generally fixed in certain understandings. In matters of production as well as in other matters, we agreed that mutual advantages were to be gained by concentrating, in so far as it was practical, our energies on doing those things which each of us was best qualified to do.

Here in this country in abundance were the natural resources of critical materials. Here there had been developed the welding technique which enables us to construct a standard merchant ship with a speed unequalled in the history of merchant shipping. Here there was waiting cargo to be moved in ships to your Island and to other theatres. If your country was to have carried out its contemplated ship construction program, it would have been necessary to move large tonnages of the raw materials that we have here across the Atlantic to your mills and yards, and then in the form of a finished ship to send them back to our ports for the cargo that was waiting to be carried.

Obviously, this would have entailed a waste of materials, a waste of time so precious to us both, and a waste of shipping space. It was only natural for us then to decide that this country was to be the predominant source of manpower on your side, a wastage of shipping facilities. We cannot

cargo shipbuilding area for us both, while your country was to devote its facilities and resources principally to the construction of combat vessels, escorts, as well as other implements of war. It would have been unnatural had we done otherwise, because the case for our assuming this division of responsibility was irresistible. Each of us has faced up very creditably indeed to our respective share of the general task that we then laid out.

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afford this waste.

In order that the general understanding that we reached during the early days of our engagement together in this war may be more perfectly carried out and in order, as a practical matter, to avoid the prodigal use of manpower and shipping that would result from pursuing any other course, I am directing the WSA, under appropriate bareboat arrangements, to transfer to your flag for temporary wartime duty during each of the next ten months twenty merchant vessels, more or less.

We have, as you know, been allocating to the British services on a voyage-to-voyage basis large numbers of American controlled ships. What I am now suggesting to you and what I am directing the WSA to carry out will be in the nature of a substitution, to the extent of the tonnage transferred, for the American tonnage that has been usually employed in your war program. The details of the arrangements we can properly leave to the national shipping authorities for settlement through the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board whose function it is to concert the employment of all merchant vessels and will, in accordance with its usual practice, do so in connection with these particular ships.

PSF Churchill folder
V1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

To take this up with General
Marshall.

F.D.R.

Paraphrase of three one one from naval
person to Hudson Most secret re Wavell
etc. June 13.

PSF church 11

Lila Churchill

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

SCHEDULE OF SPECIAL TRAIN
MOVING FROM QUEBEC VIA NIAGARA
FALLS TO HYDE PARK.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 11, 1943

LV. QUEBEC..(C.P.RR).....6:00 P.M.

TRAIN WILL MOVE VIA MONTREAL
AND TORONTO TO NIAGARA FALLS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 12, 1943

AR. NIAGARA FALLS, ONT.....8:30 A.M.

LEAVE TRAIN AND MOTOR ACROSS
BRIDGE TO AMERICAN SIDE.

LV. NIAGARA FALLS, N.Y....10:00 A.M.
(N.Y.C.RR)

AR. HYDE PARK ESTATE.....6:30 P.M.

PARTY WILL DETRAIN AT REAR
OF HYDE PARK ESTATE.

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Churchill folder 1-43

file
Personal

[REDACTED]

12 August 1943

WHITE NUMBER TWO

From: The Prime Minister.
To : The President.

No. 412.

I am most sorry to say that Clemmie is so much exhausted by the journey and sleeplessness that Moran feels she ought to rest here for the next few days. This is a great disappointment both to her and me, as I so much wanted her to see you and Mrs. Roosevelt in your beautiful home and she wanted so much to come. I'm sure, however, that she must regather her strength. Mary and I and the others will arrive as planned.

NO SIGNATURE

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972



(7)

*From
W.S.C.
Aug. 43
LHR*

*File PSF
Churchill*
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

MR. PRESIDENT.

The first of these two papers is a grim, well-written story, but perhaps a little too well-written. Nevertheless if you have time to read it, it would repay the trouble. I should like to have it back when you have finished with it as we are not circulating it officially in any way.

The second, about Yugoslavia, I had prepared for the discussions at Abraham. I am not sure that your people have quite realized all that is going on in the Balkans and the hopes and horrors centred there. You might find it convenient to keep it by you. Much of it is taken from the Boniface sources, and it certainly makes one's blood boil. I must add that I am not in any way making a case for the employment of an Allied Army in the Balkans but only for aiding them with

supplies, agents and Commandos. Once the Adriatic is open we should be able to get into close contact with these people and give them aid sufficient to make it worth their while to follow our guidance.

LM

13. 8. 43

May 31, 1943.

POLAND.

SECTION 1.

[C 6160/258/55]

Copy No. 03

Mr. O'Malley to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st May.)

British Embassy to Poland,
45, Lowndes Square, S.W. 1.
24th May, 1943.

(No. 51.)
Sir,

MY despatch No. 43 of the 30th April dwelt on the probability that no confederation in Eastern Europe could play an effective part in European politics unless it were affiliated to the Soviet Government, and suggested that so long as the policy of this Government was as enigmatic as it now is it would be inconsistent with British interests that Russia should enjoy a sphere of influence extending from Danzig to the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. The suppression of the Comintern on the 20th May may be considered to have brought to an end what was in the past the most objectionable phase of Soviet foreign policy and to entitle the Soviet Government to be regarded less distrustfully than formerly. It is not, then, without hesitation that I address this further despatch to you, which also gives grounds for misgivings about the character and policy of the present rulers in Russia.

2. We do not know for certain who murdered a lot of Polish officers in the forest of Katyn in April and May 1940, but this at least is already clear, that it was the scene of terrible events which will live long in the memory of the Polish nation. Accordingly, I shall try to describe how this affair looks to my Polish friends and acquaintances, of whom many had brothers and sons and lovers among those known to have been taken off just three years ago from the prison camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov to an uncertain destination: how it looks, for instance, to General Sikorski, who there lost Captain Fuhrman, his former A.D.C. and close personal friend; to M. Morawski, who lost a brother-in-law called Zoltowski and a nephew; or to M. Zaleski, who lost a brother and two cousins.

3. The number of Polish prisoners taken by the Russian armies when they invaded Poland, in September 1939, was about 180,000, including police and gendarmerie and a certain number of civilian officials. The total number of army officers was round about 15,000. At the beginning of 1940 there were in the three camps named above round about 9,000 or 10,000 officers and 6,000 other ranks, policemen and civil officials. Less public reference has been made to these 6,000 than to the 10,000 officers, not because the Polish Government are less indignant about the disappearance of other ranks than about the disappearance of officers, or were less insistent in enquiries for them, but because the need of officers to command the Polish troops recruited in Russia was more urgent than the need to increase the total ration strength of the Polish army. There is no reason to suppose that these 6,000 other ranks and the police and the civilians were treated by the Soviet Government differently to the officers, and mystery covers the fate of all. For the sake of simplicity, however, I shall write in this despatch only of the missing officers, without specific reference to other ranks, to police prisoners or to civilians. Of the 10,000 officers, only some 3,000 or 4,000 were regular officers. The remainder were reserve officers who in peace time earned their living, many with distinction, in the professions, in business and so on.

4. In March of 1940 word went round the camps at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov that, under orders from Moscow, the prisoners were to be moved to camps where conditions would be more agreeable, and that they might look forward to eventual release. All were cheered by the prospect of a change from the rigours which prisoners must endure to the hazards and vicissitudes of relative freedom in Soviet or German territory. Even their captors seemed to wish the prisoners well, who were now daily entrained in parties of 50 to 350 for the place at which, so they hoped, the formalities of their discharge would be completed. As each prisoner was listed for transfer, all the usual particulars about him were rechecked and reregistered. Fresh finger-prints were taken. The prisoners were inoculated afresh and certificates of inoculation furnished to

[42-49]

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of British

Just, telegram 1/12/72
By RNER Date 5 1972

2

them. Sometimes the prisoners' Polish documents were taken away, but in many such cases these were returned before departure. All were furnished with rations for the journey, and, as a mark of special regard, the sandwiches furnished to senior officers were wrapped in clean white paper—a commodity seldom seen in Russia. Anticipations of a better future were clouded only by the fact that 400 or 500 Poles had been listed for further detention, first at Pavlishchev Bor and eventually at Griazovetz. These were, as it turned out later, to be the only known survivors of the lost legion, and some of them are in England now; but at the time, although no principle could be discovered on which they had been selected, they supposed that they had been condemned to a further period of captivity; and some even feared that they had been chosen out for execution.

5. Our information about these events is derived for the most part from those routed to Griazovetz, all of whom were released in 1941, and some of whom—notably M. Komarnicki, the Polish Minister for Justice—are now in England.

6. Entrainment of the 10,000 officers from the three camps went on all through April and the first half of May, and the lorries, lined with cheerful faces, which took them from camp to station, were, in fact, the last that was ever seen of them alive by any witness to whom we have access. Until the revelations made by the German broadcast of the 12th April, 1943, and apart from a few words let drop at the time by the prison guards, only the testimony of scribbblings on the railway wagons in which they were transported affords any indication of their destination. The same wagons seem to have done a shuttle service between Kozielsk and the detraining station; and on these some of the first parties to be transported had scratched the words: "Don't believe that we are going home," and the news that their destination had turned out to be a small station near Smolensk. These messages were noticed when the vans returned to Smolensk station, and have been reported to us by prisoners at Kozielsk, who were later sent to Griazovetz.

7. But though of positive indications as to what subsequently happened to the 10,000 officers there was none until the grave at Katyn was opened, there is now available a good deal of negative evidence, the cumulative effect of which is to throw serious doubt on Russian disclaimers of responsibility for the massacre.

8. In the first place there is the evidence to be derived from the prisoners' correspondence, in respect to which information has been furnished by officers' families in Poland, by officers now with the Polish army in the Middle East, and by the Polish Red Cross Society. Up till the end of March 1940 large numbers of letters had been despatched, which were later received by their relatives, from the officers confined at Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov; whereas no letters from any of them (excepting from the 400 moved to Griazovetz) have been received by anybody which had been despatched subsequent to that date. The Germans overran Smolensk in July 1941, and there is no easy answer to the question why, if any of the 10,000 had been alive between the end of May 1940 and July 1941, none of them ever succeeded in getting any word through to their families.

9. In the second place there is the evidence of the correspondence between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government. The first request for information about the 10,000 was made by M. Kot of M. Wyshinsky on the 6th October, 1941. On the 3rd December, 1941, General Sikorski backed up his enquiry with a list of 3,845 names of officers included among them. General Anders furnished the Soviet Government with a further list of 800 names on the 18th March, 1942. Enquiries about the fate of the 10,000 were made again and again to the Russian Government verbally and in writing by General Sikorski, M. Kot, M. Romer, Count Raczynski and General Anders between October 1941 and April 1943. The Polish Red Cross between August and October 1940 sent no less than 500 questionnaires about individual officers to the Russian Government. To none of all these enquiries extending over a period of two and a half years was a single positive answer of any kind ever returned. The enquirers were told either that the officers had been released, or that "perhaps they are already in Germany," or that "no information" of their whereabouts was available, or (M. Molotov to M. Kot, October 1941) that complete lists of the prisoners were available and that they would all be delivered to the Polish authorities "dead or alive." But it is incredible that if any of the 10,000 were released, not one of them has ever appeared again anywhere, and it is almost equally incredible, if they were not released, that not one of them should have escaped subsequent to May 1940 and reported himself to the Polish authorities in Russia

or Persia. That the Russian authorities should have said of any Polish officer in Soviet jurisdiction that they had "no information" also provokes incredulity; for it is notorious that the N.K.V.D. collect and record the movements of individuals with the most meticulous care.

10. In the third place there is the evidence of those who have visited the grave: first, a Polish commission including, among others, doctors, journalists and members of the Polish Assistance Committee, a former president of the Polish Academy of Literature and a representative of the Mayor of Warsaw; secondly, another Polish commission which included priests, doctors and representatives of the Polish Red Cross Society; thirdly, an international commission of criminologists and pathologists, of which the personnel is given in Annex I. The report of this commission forms Annex II to this despatch, and the reports of the two Polish commissions add little to it. It is deposed by all that several hundred identifications have been established. All this evidence would normally be highly suspect since the inspections took place under German auspices and the results reached us through German broadcasts. There are fair grounds for presuming that the German broadcasts accurately represented the findings of the commissions, that the commissions' findings were at any rate in some respects well founded, and that the grounds were sound on which at any rate some of the identifications were made.

11. In the fourth place there is the fact that a mass execution of officer prisoners would be inconsistent with what we know of the German army. The German army has committed innumerable brutalities, but the murder by them of prisoners of war, even of Poles, is rare. Had the German authorities ever had these 10,000 Polish officers in their hands we can be sure that they would have placed some or all of them in the camps in Germany already allotted to Polish prisoners, while the 6,000 other ranks, policemen and civil officials would have been put to forced labour. In such case the Polish authorities would in the course of two years certainly have got into touch with some of the prisoners; but, in fact, none of the men from Kozielsk, Starobielsk or Ostashkov have ever been heard of from Germany.

12. Finally there is the evidence to be derived from the confusion which characterises explanations elicited from or volunteered by the Soviet Government. Between August 1941 and the 12th April, 1943, when the Germans announced the discovery of the grave at Katyn, the Russian Government had, among other excuses, maintained that all Polish officers taken prisoner in 1939 had been released. On the other hand, in conversation with the Polish Ambassador, a Russian official who had drunk more than was good for him, once referred to the disposal of these officers as "a tragic error." On the 16th April, immediately after the German announcement, the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow suggested that the Germans were misrepresenting as victims of Russian barbarity skeletons dug up by archaeologists at Gniezdowo, which lies next door to Katyn. On the 26th April M. Molotov, in a note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, said that the bodies at Katyn were those of Poles who had at one time been prisoners of the Russians but had subsequently been captured by the Germans in their advance at Smolensk in July 1941 and had been murdered then by them. On a later occasion, and when the German broadcasts gave reason to think that some bodies were sufficiently well preserved to be identifiable, the Russian Government put forward a statement that the Polish officers had been captured by the Germans in July 1941, had been employed upon construction work, and had only been murdered shortly before the German "discovery" was announced. This confusion cannot easily be understood except on the assumption that the Russian Government had something to hide.

13. The cumulative effect of this evidence is, as I said earlier, to throw serious doubt on Russian disclaimers of responsibility for a massacre. Such doubts are not diminished by rumours which have been current during the last two and a half years that some of the inmates of Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov had been transported towards Kolyma, Franz Joseph Land or Novaya Zemlya, some or all of these being killed *en route*. It may be that this was so, and it may be that some less number than ten thousand odd were destroyed and buried at Katyn; but whether the massacre occurred (if it did occur) in one place or two places or three places naturally makes no difference to Polish sentiments. These will accordingly be described without reference to the uncertainty which exists as to the exact number of victims buried near Smolensk.

14. With all that precedes in mind it is comprehensible that the relatives and fellow-officers of the men who disappeared should have concluded that these had in fact been murdered by their Russian captors and should picture their

last hours—somewhat as follows—with bitter distress. The picture is a composite one to which knowledge of the district, the German broadcasts, experience of Russian methods and the reports of visitors to the grave have all contributed, but it is not so much an evidentially established description of events as a reconstruction in the light of the evidence—sometimes partial and obviously defective—of what may have happened. But it—or something like it—is what most Poles believe to have happened, and what I myself, in the light of all the evidence, such as it is, incline to think happened. Many months or years may elapse before the truth is known, but because in the meantime curiosity is unsatisfied and judgment in suspense, we cannot, even if we would—and much less can Poles—make our thoughts and feelings unresponsive to the dreadful probabilities of the case.

15. Smolensk lies some 20 kilom. from the spot where the common graves were discovered. It has two stations and in or near the town the main lines from Moscow to Warsaw and from Riga to Orel cross and recross each other. Some 15 kilom. to the west of Smolensk stands the unimportant station of Gniezdowo, and it is but a short mile from Gniezdowo to a place known locally as Kozlinaya Gora or "The Hill of Goats." The district of Katyn, in which this little hill stands, is covered with primeval forest which has been allowed to go to rack and ruin. The forest is mostly coniferous, but the pine trees are interspersed here and there with hardwoods and scrub. The month of April normally brings spring to this part of the country, and by early May the trees are green; but the winter of 1939-40 had been the hardest on record, and when the first parties from Kozielsk arrived on the 8th April there would still have been occasional patches of snow in deep shade and, of course, much mud on the rough road from the station to the Hill of Goats. At Gniezdowo the prison vans from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov discharged their passengers into a barbed-wire cage surrounded by a strong force of Russian soldiers, and the preparations made here for their reception must have filled most of the Polish officers with disquiet, and some indeed with dismay who remembered that the forest of Katyn had been used by the Bolsheviks in 1919 as a convenient place for the killing of many Czarist officers. For such was the case, and a Pole now in London, Janusz Laskowski, tells me that when he was eleven years old he had to listen every evening to an account of his day's work from one of the executioners, Afanaziev, who was billeted in his mother's house. From the cage the prisoners were taken in lorries along a country road to the Hill of Goats, and it must have been when they were unloaded from the lorries that their hands were bound and that dismay gave way to despair. If a man struggled, it seems that the executioner threw his coat over his head, tying it round his neck and leading him hooded to the pit's edge, for in many cases a body was found to be thus hooded and the coat to have been pierced by a bullet where it covered the base of the skull. But those who went quietly to their death must have seen a monstrous sight. In the broad deep pit their comrades lay, packed closely round the edge, head to feet, like sardines in a tin, but in the middle of the grave disposed less orderly. Up and down on the bodies the executioners tramped, hauling the dead bodies about and treading in the blood like butchers in a stockyard. When it was all over and the last shot had been fired and the last Polish head been punctured, the butchers—perhaps trained in youth to husbandry—seem to have turned their hands to one of the most innocent of occupations: smoothing the clods and planting little conifers all over what had been a shambles. It was, of course, rather late in the year for transplanting young trees, but not too late; for the sap was beginning to run in the young Scots pines when, three years later, the Polish representatives visited the site.

16. The climate and the conifers are not without significance. The climate of Smolensk accounts for the fact that, though the Germans first got wind of the existence of the mass graves in the autumn of 1942, it was only in April of 1943 that they published to the world an account of what had been unearthed. The explanation is surely this: not that the German propagandists had chosen a politically opportune moment for their revelations, but that during the winter the ground at Smolensk is frozen so hard that it would have been impossible to uncover corpses without dynamite or such other violent means as would have destroyed the possibility of identifying dead bodies. The winter of 1942-43 was exceptionally mild and the German authorities probably got to work as soon as the soil was sufficiently soft. The little conifers also deserve more attention than they have received. In the first place they are presumptive evidence of Russian guilt; for, considering the conditions under which the German army advanced through Smolensk in July 1941 in full expectation of early and complete

victory, it is most unlikely, if the Polish officers had been murdered by Germans and not Russians, that the Germans would have bothered to cover up their victims' graves with young trees. In the second place, one of these young trees under examination by a competent botanist would reveal beyond any possibility of doubt whether it had last been transplanted in May 1940 or some time subsequent to July 1941. Perhaps this test of Russian veracity will presently be made.

17. The political background against which the events described in paragraph 15 are viewed by Poles is by contrast a matter of undisputed history, including as it does all the long story of partitions, rebellions and repressions, the Russo-Polish war of 1919-20, the mutual suspicions which this left behind it, the unannounced invasion of Poland by Russia in September 1939, the subsequent occupation of half Poland by Russia and the carrying into captivity of some million and a half of its inhabitants. More recently comes the virtual annexation of the occupied eastern parts of Poland, the refusal of the Russian Government to recognise as Polish citizens the inhabitants of the occupied districts, the suppression of relief organisations for Poles in Russia and the persecution of Poles refusing to change their own for Russian nationality. When Poles learned that, in addition to all these misfortunes, round about 10,000 men of the best breeding stock in Poland had (according to Russian accounts) been either dispersed and "lost" somewhere in the Soviet Union or else abandoned to the advancing German armies, or had (according to German accounts) been found to have been murdered by the Russians, many of them naturally concluded (though I do not here give it as my own conclusion) that the Soviet Government's intention had been to destroy the very foundations upon which their own Poland could be rebuilt. This sinister political intention imputed by Poles to Russia poisoned the wound and enhanced the sufferings of a nation already outraged and dismayed by the conduct of the Soviet Government. Some Poles, remembering Lenin's attitude to the holocausts of 1917 and subsequent years, and probing the dark recesses of Stalin's mind when he took (if take he did) the dreadful decision, compare disciple with master. Lenin would have broken apart the heads of ten thousand Polish officers with the insouciance of a monkey cracking walnuts. Did corpses pitching into a common grave with the precision of machines coming off a production-belt similarly satisfy a nature habituated to manipulate blood and lives with uncompassionate detachment? Some at any rate so interpret Stalin's mind. "These men are no use to us," they imagine him as saying; "in fact they are a nuisance and a danger. Here is an *élite* of talent, here is valour and a hostile purpose. These stallions must not live to sire a whole herd of hostile Christian thoroughbreds. Many of the brood-mares have already been sold to Siberian peasants and the camel-pullers of Kazakstan. Their foals and yearlings can be broken to Communist harness. Rid me of this stud farm altogether and send all this turbulent bloodstock to the knackers."

18. The men who were taken to Katyn are dead, and their death is a very serious loss to Poland. Nevertheless, unless the Russians are cleared of the presumption of guilt, the moral repercussions in Poland, in the other occupied countries and in England of the massacre of Polish officers may well have more enduring results than the massacre itself; and this aspect of things, therefore, deserves attention. As I have as yet seen no reliable reports on public feeling in Poland and German-occupied Europe, my comments will relate only to our own reaction to the uncovering of the graves.

19. This despatch is not primarily concerned with the reaction of the British public, press or Parliament, who are not in such a good position as His Majesty's Government to form an opinion as to what actually happened. We ourselves, on the other hand, who have access to all the available information, though we can draw no final conclusions on vital matters of fact, have a considerable body of circumstantial evidence at our disposal, and I think most of us are more than half convinced that a large number of Polish officers were indeed murdered by the Russian authorities, and that it is indeed their bodies (as well, maybe, as other bodies) which have now been unearthed. This being so, I am impelled to examine the effect on myself of the facts and allegations, and to adjust my mind to the shocking probabilities of the case. Since the Polish Government is in London and since the affair has been handled directly by yourself and the Prime Minister with General Sikorski and Count Raczynski, it may seem redundant for me to comment on it, as I should naturally do were the Polish Government and I both abroad; but, though all important conversations have been between Ministers and the leaders of the Polish Government, my contacts have doubtless been more numerous than yours during the last few weeks

with Poles of all kinds, and they have possibly spoken to me with less reserve than to yourself. I hope therefore I may, without impertinence, submit to you the reflections which follow.

20. In handling the publicity side of the Katyn affair we have been constrained by the urgent need for cordial relations with the Soviet Government to appear to appraise the evidence with more hesitation and lenience than we should do in forming a common-sense judgment on events occurring in normal times or in the ordinary course of our private lives; we have been obliged to appear to distort the normal and healthy operation of our intellectual and moral judgments; we have been obliged to give undue prominence to the tactlessness or impulsiveness of Poles, to restrain the Poles from putting their case clearly before the public, to discourage any attempt by the public and the press to probe the ugly story to the bottom. In general we have been obliged to deflect attention from possibilities which in the ordinary affairs of life would cry to high heaven for elucidation, and to withhold the full measure of solicitude which, in other circumstances, would be shown to acquaintances situated as a large number of Poles now are. We have in fact perforce used the good name of England like the murderers used the little conifers to cover up a massacre; and, in view of the immense importance of an appearance of Allied unity and of the heroic resistance of Russia to Germany, few will think that any other course would have been wise or right.

21. This dislocation between our public attitude and our private feelings we may know to be deliberate and inevitable; but at the same time we may perhaps wonder whether, by representing to others something less than the whole truth so far as we know it, and something less than the probabilities so far as they seem to us probable, we are not incurring a risk of what—not to put a fine point on it—might darken our vision and take the edge off our moral sensibility. If so, how is this risk to be avoided?

22. At first sight it seems that nothing less appropriate to a political despatch than a discourse upon morals can be imagined; but yet, as we look at the changing nature of the international world of to-day, it seems that morals and international politics are becoming more and more closely involved with each other. This proposition has important consequences; but since it is not universally accepted I hope the following remarks in support of it are not out of place.

23. Nobody doubts that morals now enter into the domestic politics of the United Kingdom, but it was not always so. There was a time when the acts of the Government in London were less often the fruit of consultation and compromise in the general interests of all than of the ascendancy of one class or group of citizens who had been temporarily successful in the domestic arena. It was realisation of the interdependence of all classes and groups of the population of England, Scotland and Wales which discouraged the play of intestine power-politics and set the welfare of all above the advantage of the strong. Similar causes are producing similar results in the relations of States to each other. "During the last four centuries of our modern era," writes Professor Pollard, "the last word in political organisation has been the nation; but now that the world is being unified by science and culture" the conception of the nation state as the largest group in which human beings are organically associated with each other is being superseded by the conception of a larger, it may be of a European, or indeed of a world-wide unity; and "the nation is taking its place as the bridge, the half-way house, between the individual and the human family." Europe, and indeed the world, are in process of integrating themselves, and "the men and women of Britain," as you said at Maryland, "are alive to the fact that they live in one world with their neighbours." This being so, it would be strange if the same movement towards the coalescence of smaller into larger groups which brought about the infiltration of morals into domestic politics were not also now bringing about the infiltration of morals into international politics. This, in fact, it seems to many of us is exactly what is happening, and is why, as the late Mr. Headlam Morley said, "what in the international sphere is morally indefensible generally turns out in the long run to have been politically inept." It is surely the case that many of the political troubles of neighbouring countries and some of our own have in the past arisen because they and we were incapable of seeing this or unwilling to admit it.

24. If, then, morals have become involved with international politics, if it be the case that a monstrous crime has been committed by a foreign Government—albeit a friendly one—and that we, for however valid reasons, have been obliged to behave as if the deed was not theirs, may it not be that we now stand in danger

of bemusing not only others but ourselves : of falling, as Mr. Winant said recently at Birmingham, under St. Paul's curse on those who can see cruelty "and burn not"? If so, and since no remedy can be found in an early alteration of our public attitude towards the Katyn affair, we ought, maybe, to ask ourselves how, consistently with the necessities of our relations with the Soviet Government, the voice of our political conscience is to be kept up to concert pitch. It may be that the answer lies, for the moment, only in something to be done inside our own hearts and minds where we are masters. Here at any rate we can make a compensatory contribution—a reaffirmation of our allegiance to truth and justice and compassion. If we do this we shall at least be predisposing ourselves to the exercise of a right judgment on all those half political, half moral, questions (such as the fate of Polish deportees now in Russia) which will confront us both elsewhere and more particularly in respect to Polish-Russian relations as the war pursues its course and draws to its end; and so, if the facts about the Katyn massacre turn out to be as most of us incline to think, shall we vindicate the spirit of these brave unlucky men and justify the living to the dead.

I have, &c.

OWEN O'MALLEY.

Annex 1.

List of Personnel composing the Commission of Criminologists and Pathologists.

- Dr. Spoleers, Professor of Ophthalmology at the University of Ghent.
- Dr. Markow, Instructor in Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Sofia.
- Dr. Tramsen, Assistant Professor of Anatomy at the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Copenhagen.
- Dr. Saxen, Professor of Pathological Anatomy at the University in Copenhagen.
- Dr. Palmieri, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Naples.
- Dr. Miloslawich, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Agram.
- Dr. de Burllet, Professor of Anatomy at the University of Troningen.
- Dr. Hajek, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology in Prague.
- Dr. Birkle, Coroner of the Roumanian Ministry of Justice and First Assistant at the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Criminology in Bucharest.
- Dr. Naville, Professor of Forensic Medicine at the University of Geneva.
- Dr. Subik, Professor of Pathological Anatomy at the University of Bratislava and head of the Public Health Service of Slovakia.
- Dr. Orsos, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Budapest.
- Dr. Buhtz, Professor of Forensic Medicine and Criminology at the University of Breslau.
- Dr. Costedoat, Medical Inspector.

Annex 2.

Katyn Wood : Text of Protocol, Berlin.

The report of the international commission of scientists on the examination of the mass graves at Katyn Wood in the main section reads as follows : From the 28th April to the 30th April, 1943, a commission composed of leading representatives of forensic medicine at European Universities and other prominent University professors of medicine have conducted a thorough scientific examination of the mass graves of Polish officers in Katyn Wood. The discovery of those mass graves, which was recently brought to the attention of the German authorities, prompted Reich's Chief Health Officer, Dr. Conti, to invite experts from various European countries to inspect the Katyn site in order thus to contribute to the clarification of this unique case. Members of the commission personally heard the testimonies of several Russian native witnesses who, among others, confirmed that during the months of March and April, 1940, almost daily big railway transports with Polish officers arrived at the station of Gniesdovo, near

Katyn, where the Polish officers alighted and were then transported in a prisoners' motor van to Katyn Wood and were not seen again; the commission further took cognizance of the discoveries and facts thus far established and inspected objects of circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, up to the 30th April, 1943, 982 bodies were exhumed, of which approximately 70 per cent. have been identified, while papers found on others must first be subjected to careful preliminary treatment before they can be used for identification. Bodies exhumed prior to the commission's arrival were all inspected, and a considerable number of bodies were dissected by Professor Buhty and his assistants. Up to to-day seven mass graves have been opened, the biggest of which is estimated to contain the bodies of 2,000 Polish officers. Members of the commission personally dissected nine corpses and submitted numerous specially selected cases to post-mortem. It was confirmed that all those so far exhumed died from bullets in their heads. In all cases, bullets entered the nape. In the majority of cases only one bullet was fired. Two bullets were fired only rarely and only one case was found where three bullets had been fired into the nape. All the bullets were fired from pistols of less than eight mm. calibre. The spot where the bullets penetrated leads to the assumption that the shot was fired with the muzzle pressed against the nape or from the closest range. The surprising regularity of the wounds . . . permits the assumption that the shots were fired by experienced hands. Numerous bodies revealed a similar method of tying the hands, and in some cases stabs from four-edged bayonets were found on bodies and clothes. The method of tying is similar to that found on the bodies of Russian civilians that were earlier exhumed in Katyn Forest. The assumption is justified that a ricocheted bullet first killed one officer, then went into the body of one already dead in the pit—the shootings apparently being made in ditches to avoid having the bodies transported to graves. The mass graves are situated in clearings in the forest, the ground being completely levelled off and planted with young pines. The mass graves were dug in undulating terrain which consists of pure sand in terraces, the lowest going down as far as the ground water. Bodies lay, practically without exception, face down, closely side by side and in layers one above the other, clearly ledged methodically at the sides of pits and more irregularly in the centre. The uniforms of the exhumed bodies, according to the unanimous opinion of the commission, were, especially with regard to buttons, rank insignia, decorations, form of boots, etc., undoubtedly Polish. They had winter wear. Frequently furs, leather coats, knitted vests and typical Polish officers' caps have been found. Only a few bodies were those of other ranks. One body was that of a priest. The measurements of the clothes correspond with the measurements of the wearer. No watches or rings were found on the bodies, although from the exact date and time found in entries in several diaries, the owners must have had these objects up to their last days, even hours. Comments found on bodies—diaries, correspondence, newspapers—are from the period of the autumn of 1939 to March and April 1940. The latest hitherto established date is that of a Russian newspaper of the 22nd April, 1940. There were varying degrees of decomposition of the bodies, differing according to the position of the bodies within the grave and their juxtaposition to each other. A large number of skulls were examined for changes which, according to the experiences of Professor Orsoa, are of great importance for the determination of the time of death. These changes consist of various layers of calcareous tuft-like incrustation on the surface of the already loamy brain matter. Such changes are not to be observed on bodies that have been interred for less than three years. But this change was observed to a marked degree on the skull of the body No. 526, which was found with a surface layer in one big mass grave.

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By RT NARS Date 12/26/79

RECENT ACTIVITIES AND PRESENT STRENGTHS (JULY 1943) OF OPPOSING FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA AND GREECE.

REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE, 14TH JULY, 1943.

I.—YUGOSLAVIA.

(See Sketch Map A.)

1. IN order to make the present situation intelligible it is necessary to retrace the course of operations in the last half-year. The final months of 1942 saw a considerable extension of guerrilla activity in Yugoslavia over anything that had taken place previously in that year, more especially on the part of the "Partisans" in Bosnia; and 1943 opened with an extensive operation against them by the Axis forces. This operation began towards the end of January. Initially four German divisions, three Italian divisions and two Croat mountain brigades were employed; and subsequently one further German and four additional Italian divisions were involved. We know that some of these formations suffered considerable losses, and in the case of the Italians, divisions had to withdraw for periods of many weeks to build up again. The strain on the Italians was at one time so great that they refused to respond to strong German demands for an additional division; and their refusal resulted in the postponement for several weeks of another operation to take place in Montenegro. This further operation was eventually staged, and elements of five German and three Italian and one Bulgarian divisions took part.

2. The operation which began towards the end of January was designed as a converging attack on the Partisans' headquarters in the Grimec Planina, the mountains between the upper Sava River and the Dalmatian coast. The three Italian divisions advanced towards the Sava from the coastal fringe, with the object of driving the outlying Partisans into the hills, where a net in the form of four German divisions was prepared for them. Of these, only three were heavily engaged; the fourth was to guard against a Partisan breakthrough to the North-East between the Vrbas and Una Rivers. It was apparently hoped to encircle and annihilate the Partisans by mid-February. The German forces moving down from the North at first made rapid progress, but despite the obvious superiority of the Axis in all the heavy weapons of war and despite their complete control of the air it is quite clear that the guerrillas maintained a formidable resistance and probably caused as many casualties as they received. An even more stalwart defence was made against a subsequent drive directed northwards by German and Croat troops, which with difficulty advanced 10 miles in as many days.

3. The Partisan resistance was, in fact, so strong that a gap was left between the prongs of the intended German pincers, through which the Partisans began to withdraw in mid-February. Moving southwards they captured first Glamoc and Livno and then several other considerable towns. Italian communications between Mostar and Sarajevo were cut, and, worse still, from the Axis point of view, the valuable bauxite mines South and West of Mostar were

imperilled. A second Axis operation was therefore designed in order to save Mostar and complete the destruction of the Partisans. Four fresh Italian divisions were employed and a German battle group was drawn from a division in Serbia. The general aim of the operation seems to have been to surround and destroy the Partisans in the area around Livno between these fresh forces and the three original German divisions which were attempting to press South. Again the Germans met with preliminary success and Livno was recaptured on the 3rd March. Confused fighting then developed in the Neretva valley, which progressed not unfavourably for the Partisans.

4. A new element was, however, now introduced into the situation. The Italians had announced their intention of bringing up Cetniks from Montenegro to check the southerly movement of the Partisans. The Germans, who deplored Italian relations with the Montenegrin Cetniks and who still regarded the whole Mihailovic movement as a grave menace to their security, protested in vain against this decision. One reason for their dislike of this step was that they contemplated an operation against Mihailovic when once the Partisans had been destroyed. Mihailovic himself expected this and was anxious to drive the remnants of the Partisans back to the North in order that they might continue to give the Axis trouble in Bosnia. By the middle of March some 13,000 Cetniks, supplied with Italian arms and ammunition, had arrived from Montenegro in the battle areas, and the main body were brought into line on the upper Neretva with the duty of preventing a Partisan break-through to the South-East. It is interesting to note that the Germans insisted that the Cetniks should be employed in areas where they could not encounter German troops since the Cetniks were everywhere determined to fight them. The Germans were also fearful lest local conflicts should take place between Germans and the Italians who were backing the Cetniks.

5. By the middle of March the operation against the Partisans was, from a German point of view, over. One of the German divisions, despite Italian indignation, was in Mostar and the bauxite mines were again operating in safety. Another had moved East of Sarajevo, while the remaining two were patrolling and mopping up in what had been the battle area. Communications were restored between Sarajevo and Mostar. The battle had now moved into Hercegovina and had taken the form of a conflict between Cetniks and Partisans, though Italian troops were also involved. Despite Cetnik claims it is clear that the battle at first went against them and the first assault of the Partisans carried them across the Neretva, and in spite of the arrival of Cetnik reinforcements, the Partisans continued to gain ground. The internecine conflict was obviously to German taste and once they had seen the Partisans cross the Neretva into an area in the Italian sphere of influence they ceased their pursuit. Their forces, helped only inadequately by those of their two satellites, the Italians and the Croats, had dislodged the Partisans from their stronghold in the Grimec Planina and had harried them for 150 miles over exceedingly difficult country, whose wild character and bad communications gave every advantage of terrain to irregular troops. The Germans, had, however, failed to surround or to annihilate their enemy.

6. As the campaign progressed the Germans had freely expressed their doubts as to whether they could adequately garrison the districts which they had cleaned up. Their apprehensions were soon justified. It became evident that only a part of the Partisans had been driven southwards. Others had somehow gone into hiding, whence, as the Axis troops moved on, they began to emerge. Rallying at local centres they then collected in the hills, South-West of Bihac. To such good effect did they reorganise that in the middle of April they were able to descend on Otocac and force the Italians to abandon the town and valuable stores of food. Other bands simultaneously began to assemble in other upland areas of northern Yugoslavia. It is difficult to give any exact estimate of their strength, which varied from day to day.

7. This major operation, extending from late January to mid-March, was not the only occasion of fighting in Yugoslavia through these months. The Partisans north of the River Sava were increasingly active and threatened the two railway lines from Zagreb to Belgrade. On the last day of January the Germans commenced a ten days' attack in this area and succeeded in driving the guerrillas temporarily into the remoter and wilder regions. But at the end of February they were forced to undertake a further operation, presumably against remnants of the same bands. Even then there was no appreciable abatement in insurgent activity in these districts, and at the end of March the

Axis embarked on a third operation. The Slavonian Partisans were, however, no easier to destroy than their Bosnian colleagues, and the German troops did not succeed in eradicating them from their hilly strongholds. Axis forces amounting to the equivalent of rather more than one division were involved in these operations.

8. Another appreciable centre of unrest in Yugoslavia in the first months of 1943 was in Eastern Bosnia. All over this district there existed not only stray bands of Partisans but also groups of Mihailovic's Cetniks. Here again, however, divergent tendencies were becoming apparent. All Cetniks were prepared to fight the "quisling" Croat Army, but not all were ready to join with the Partisans in doing so, while others, faithful to the orders of Mihailovic, attacked the Partisans and the Croats with equal zest. These dissensions served as an indication of the difficulties into which the policy at Cetnik headquarters was leading the whole Cetnik movement. This confusion culminated on the 28th February in a somewhat wild speech by Mihailovic in which he bitterly abused the British (despite the presence of our liaison officer) for the paucity of our help, and declared that he would never abandon the Italians, who were his only friends. The outburst provoked a sharp reprimand from the exiled Yugoslav Government, in which Mihailovic was ordered to give up all compromising relations and was roundly told that the British were his allies. But before this message could reach him the course of events had swept the Cetniks into battle with the Partisans, for which the Cetniks received from the Italians, arms, equipment and even food by air.

9. At the end of March the main Partisan body in Hercegovina (see paragraph 5 above), at this time more than 15,000 strong, had advanced southwards and eastwards, after the passage of the Neretva, with the object of crossing the Drina and breaking through into the Sanjak. From there they could either pass into Serbia or continue their migration southwards towards Greece. It seems that the severe fighting of the last few months had served to harden and train them; from then on, in any case, Partisan troops began to operate more definitely as "divisions," and their leader, Tito, began to dominate the scene. Leaving a weaker force to hold the Cetniks on their flank, the main body, under Tito, struck at the Drina line. Two Partisan divisions succeeded in crossing the river near Gorazde, but early in May their further progress eastwards was arrested by the arrival of a German division, and they turned southwards towards Albania.

10. At this juncture the Germans decided to stage the operation which had originally been designed to round up Mihailovic's Cetniks in Montenegro, but was now directed primarily against the Partisans, who had replaced them. It involved elements of five German, three Italian and one Bulgarian divisions and met with strong opposition from the Partisans. German figures for the casualties at the end of the operations have been obtained from our intelligence. There were some 3,000 German casualties as against 7,489 Partisans, killed, plus further Partisan losses in wounded and prisoners amounting to nearly 5,000 men. Some 3,500-4,000 Cetniks were also taken prisoner. About 1,500 sorties were flown by Axis aircraft in the course of the operations and 600 tons of bombs were dropped. During the course of the operations it appeared at one moment as if the whole Partisan force was surrounded, but most recent messages from our liaison officers state that Tito and some 10,000 men succeeded in extricating themselves from the Axis net and reached the area north-east of Sarajevo, where they are now re-forming. Meanwhile, other Partisan groups have continued active. There have been constant clashes in the area of Travnik; other bodies are active between the Kupa and Una rivers, and others again to the west of the lower Drina. Reports from British liaison officers have also been received of activities in Slovenia and Slavonia. The total Partisan strength in all these areas may number 65,000 armed men.

11. In Serbia, where Mihailovic is still supreme, sabotage also continues and is being actively directed by our liaison officers. Most important has been an attack on the important copper mine at Majdenpek in the north-eastern corner of Yugoslavia and the sinking of shipping on the Danube. Mihailovic's following in Serbia is very considerable, amounting to perhaps 20,000 armed men. Our liaison officers consider that in the event of success and provided arms could be made available, a further 130,000 men could be put into the field. It should be also remembered that prior to the period under review Mihailovic had carried out many successful operations against the enemy.

12. According to our information, a further large-scale operation against Tito and his Partisans in the Sarajevo area is planned for mid-July. This is likely to involve not less than six divisions. Elsewhere sporadic activity by the guerrillas calls for repeated action by German, Italian and Croat troops and there is evidence that from no area can troops be spared for operations elsewhere.

A detailed analysis of Axis forces appears at Annex A.

A summary of air operations appears at Annex C.

An analysis of sabotage carried out since the 1st May, 1943, appears at Annex D.

A statement of brutalities committed by the Axis and their satellites appears at Annex F.

A German order on method of carrying out mass executions appears at Annex G.

II.—GREECE.

(See Sketch Map B.)

13. Serious guerrilla activity in Greece is much more recent than in Yugoslavia and it is only since the beginning of this year that it has begun to cause the Axis really grave concern. But by January the guerrillas had succeeded in obtaining control of most of the mountainous districts of Central and Northern Greece except for the towns and the lines of communication, and since that time their power has regularly increased, until now they constitute a very serious menace to Axis forces in the country. Political differences unfortunately exist between the various groups, the most important of which are that of Zervas (Right Wing) in Western Greece and that known as E.L.A.S., under Left-wing control, in the rest of the country. Though collaboration between these parties has in the past not always been all that can be desired, serious quarrels resulting in civil war which have done so much harm in Yugoslavia have been avoided. The most recent reports from our liaison officers in Greece state that for the present the various bands have agreed to work together satisfactorily under British guidance. They will accept the orders of C.-in-C., Middle East, issued through the numerous British liaison officers in so far as the planning and timing of operations are concerned.

14. The first important move was the destruction, under British direction, of the Gorgopotamos Bridge on the Athens-Salonika railway late in 1942; this took some six weeks to repair. During January 1943 there were no large-scale activities, but in February and early March a series of harassing moves were undertaken by the guerrillas in Thessaly and Pindus, which resulted in fairly serious Axis casualties; we know that in February a column of some 250 Italians was routed, only ten of whom escaped, and that in another action quite a large number of Germans were shot. These small actions continued throughout April and caused such difficulties for the Axis that by May troop movements in Central Greece were only possible when made in considerable force, and main routes of communication could be kept operative only if constantly guarded and patrolled. On the 16th April the guerrillas captured and held for 36 hours the town of Amphiclea (15,000 inhabitants) and destroyed all the railway facilities, including nine locomotives. In addition, during April and early May four bauxite mines in the Parnassus region were put out of action and the production of the chrome mines in Thessaly was reduced by two-thirds.

15. In Western Greece, in order to counter these activities, the Italians undertook an operation involving at least one division; this was unsuccessful. The Germans, finding that the protection afforded by the Italians to chrome mines in Thessaly and to the Athens-Salonika road and railway was ineffective, sent troops to Lamia, Larissa and Katerine and took over most of the policing of the railway. Sweeps on a large scale into the surrounding country were made from these centres, but on each occasion the guerrillas escaped, thanks to their mobility and good intelligence. As a result of this ill-success, offensive action was initiated on a more extensive scale in the last week of May. This included the wholesale bombing and burning of villages. At the same time two additional German divisions were despatched to Greece, one of which was probably sent more with the object of engaging the guerrillas than with that of resisting a possible Allied invasion; it was soon engaged in Epirus.

16. With the month of June more extensive sabotage was embarked upon under British direction. A tunnel was blown up on the 1st June at Kournovo on the Athens-Salonika line; six bridges, one 100 feet long, were destroyed on the 20th/21st June between Katerine and Gravia; on the same night bridges on the Kozani-Servia road were destroyed; a large steamer used for supplying Axis forces in Crete was sunk in Piræus harbour; finally, the Asopos Viaduct was blown up, causing an interruption of the vital Athens-Salonika line, estimated to take a minimum of two to three months to repair.

17. Axis counter-action met with little success. A drive in the Parnassus area ended on the 8th June after several Italian defeats, in one of which some 500 men were lost. In another action on the 9th-10th June the Italians lost 700 men; the guerrillas had few casualties, though many villages in Thessaly were destroyed in reprisal. In Epirus another action was fought against the Italians, and it appears to have been so successful that in early July an additional Italian division had to be sent to that area from Athens. The Italians were also heavily engaged in Western Macedonia, while a German column was attacked near Kozani on the 19th June.

18. During the last weeks there has been a considerable increase in the Axis garrison of the mainland of Greece; the Italian divisions have remained at 8; the Germans have, however, increased from two in March to six, possibly seven, and, according to an intelligence report Bulgarian control is to be extended in Macedonia, and may perhaps embrace Salonika. It is unlikely that either the Germans or, even more, the Italians would wish to see the Bulgars in that city unless severely stretched themselves. It cannot, of course, be claimed that the four additional German divisions have been sent to Greece as a result of guerrilla action alone. But there is evidence that those in Epirus and Northern Thessaly were particularly intended to operate against the guerrillas, and even if the threat of an Allied invasion were removed, it is improbable that the Germans could hope to reduce their forces by more than three divisions.

19. British liaison officers state that there are approximately 20,000 armed mobile guerrillas in the field; in addition, a very large proportion of the whole population would fight the Axis in propitious circumstances if they could be armed and organised.

Details of Axis forces in Greece are given at Annex B.

A summary of Air Force operations appears at Annex C.

An analysis of guerrilla activities from May-July 1943 appears at Annex E.

A statement of brutalities committed by the Axis and their satellites appears at Annex F.

III.—ALBANIA.

20. Guerrilla activity in Albania has never assumed the proportions seen in Yugoslavia and Greece, nor have the Axis forces there ever exceeded about four divisions. A considerable quantity of minor incidents have, nevertheless, occurred all over the country since early in 1942. Hitherto these have not assumed proportions which have called for serious military action by Italy, but early in July the garrison of Premeti in Southern Albania was asking urgently for reinforcements in view of a strong attack by guerrillas. Incidents of this type would undoubtedly increase in degree and in number as soon as more British liaison officers were infiltrated and money and ammunition introduced. This is now in hand.

ANNEX A.

AXIS FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA.

| | January 1943. | March 1943. | May 1943. | July 1943. |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------------|
| German divisions* | 7 | 8 | 8-9 | 9 |
| Italian divisions | 18 | 18 | 18 | 17 |
| Bulgarian divisions | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Croat divisions | 6 | 6 | 6 and 2 divs. forming | 8 |

ANNEX B.

AXIS FORCES ON THE GREEK MAINLAND.

| | January 1943. | March 1943. | May 1943. | July 1943. |
|----------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|------------|
| German divisions* (equivalent) | 2 | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Italian divisions | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Bulgarian divisions (Thrace) ... | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

* Whereas in January 1943 the bulk of the German divisions were defensive divisions, of the 15 German divisions now in Yugoslavia and Greece the bulk are offensive divisions.

ANNEX C.

AXIS AIR OPERATIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA AND GREECE.

German Air Force Operations.

The G.A.F. has the following forces employed in operations in Yugoslavia :—

| | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | <i>a/c.</i> |
| Ju. 88 Bombers | 35 |
| Do. 17 Bombers | 20 |
| He. 46 Bombers | 10 |
| He. 126 Close Recce. | 15 |
| Total | 80 |

Above force is composed of Training and Croatian units; no first-line units are engaged. Sorties during the past 6-8 weeks have averaged 40 per 24 hours comprising bombing and reconnaissance, but the daily scale of effort has frequently been in the region of 80-120, the relatively low average being due to lengthy periods of bad flying weather on which only small-scale reconnaissance (5-10 sorties) was flown. A force of some 15 Ju. 87 formerly operating in Yugoslavia is believed to have been transferred to Russia about mid-June. There are further R.T. Stuka units available at Zagreb and Belgrade-Pancevo; operations by these have been only occasional and are thought not to have exceeded some 5 sorties per 24 hours.

For similar operations in Greece formations from first-line units operational in Greece have been detached. It is estimated that on an average some 15 Ju. 87 and 10 L.R. Bombers (Ju. 88 and He. 111) are assigned for these duties daily.

The main G.A.F. bases in Yugoslavia are Semlin, Butmir, Mostar and Zagreb. In Greece, Jannina and Larissa have been used in anti-guerrilla operations.

Italian Air Force Operations.

The I.A.F. have the following forces employed in operations in Yugoslavia and Albania:—

| | |
|--|------|
| B.R. 20 Bomber Recce. | a/c. |
| C.R. 42/G.50/MC.200 S.E.F. | 40 |
| C.A. 311/312/314/R.C. 37/B.R.20 Army Co-op. | 30 |
| Cant. Z. 501/506 Seaplanes | 80 |
| | 10 |
| Total | 160 |

Units are based at Durazzo/Sciak, Tirana, Zemonico, Valona, Scutari, Berat/Devoli, Mostar, Ljubljana and Split.

During the past two months a relatively small scale of effort has been put up, for the most part in direct support of ground operations.

ANNEX D.

SABOTAGE CARRIED OUT IN YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1ST MAY, 1943.

May.

Engine blown up at Pocekovina through ammanol in the coal.

Collision between a fast train and a German troop train at Stevanac, near Stalac, was organised. Two railway engines and tenders, six passenger coaches and two motor cars were completely destroyed. A railway bridge 1,000 yards south of Priboj was destroyed by Cetniks from Pristina. 2,500 Partisans carried out wrecking of 5 miles of the Karlovac-Metlika line. Four miles of the Zagreb-Metlika-Ljubljana line were wrecked.

The Ogulin-Fiume line was being continually attacked and Partisans claim an average of one locomotive and ten trucks daily.

The ship *Johann Walner* was attacked and sunk south of Dobra in the Danube. One tanker sunk, tug and other tanker driven on the rocks by the Roumanian bank. Traffic was not reopened for 5 days, and subsequently important traffic has been accompanied by tanker or motorised units on the Roumanian bank.

200 yards of track wrecked at Ponivak on Karlovac-Ogulin line.

One engine and 1 wagon on the Karlovac-Ogulin line between Tounj, Zdenac and Gornje Dubrave damaged and resulting in one day's hold-up.

Karlovac-Ogulin line wrecked between Generalski Stol and Zvecaj.

A troop train attacked by Partisans west of Ogulin resulted in a 3½-hour battle, causing Axis losses of 100 killed and wounded, including 6 Italian officers, 26 Italian and Pavelic prisoners taken, engine destroyed and 24 wagons burned.

50 yards of track and 2 block-houses on the Karlovac-Ogulin line between Zvecaj and Belovic.

A German tug damaged by limpet fixed in the harbour of Velike Gradiste and had to be towed to Vienna in an unserviceable condition.

Train wrecked at Gomirje on Ogulin-Susak line, 30 coaches burnt, 200 prisoners, 14 machine guns and other weapons captured.

Engine and many coaches of a freight train were mined between Zvecaj and Generalski Stol in the Gorski Kotor sector.

Four trains blown up on the Ogulin-Susak line, 2 locomotives and many coaches wrecked; 5 days' hold-up.

June.

Three freight trains with war material for Greece wrecked on the Belgrade-Zagreb line with large enemy losses. The station of Desinac on this line has been wrecked. The Zagreb-Osijek line has been wrecked in 5 places each for a length of 500 yards.

A big railway collision was organised at Vircin station, about 50 Germans killed and injured and a 36-hour delay caused.

Partisans raided the German glider school at Samabor, destroying two trainer planes and thirty gliders.

Stemnica, Melnica and Ranovac mines were put out of action by Cetniks by demolition of the main working junction.

A railway bridge 40 yards long, 6 miles west of Kruselac, was destroyed.

300 yards of line have been wrecked between Daruvar and Bijela. One locomotive and 6 coaches wrecked at Metlika on the Karlovac-Ljubljana line. 1,000 yards of line, including steel bridges 28 yards long and a stretch of embankment, was wrecked; 20 days needed for repairs.

96 yards of line of the Karlovac-Susak railway wrecked near Zvecaj.

350 yards of line wrecked at Belavici.

70 yards of the Zagreb-Belgrade line destroyed at Pjesčenica, causing a hold-up of 24 hours.

One German freight train destroyed between Belgrade and Zagreb.

Freight train with one engine destroyed at Gradeska. Freight train destroyed at Zdencina, between Zagreb and Karlovac, and line torn up at Metlika, on the Karlovac-Ljubljana line.

ANNEX E.

ANALYSIS OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN GREECE FROM MAY-JULY 1943.

May.

Railway line south of Tempe blocked for 14 hours by blowing culvert.

Three bridges on railway Volo-Larissa blown up, 27 Italians killed, 45 carabinieri captured.

Fifty Italians ambushed by 37 guerrillas near Omolion, 7 Italians killed.

Metamorphosis chrome mine attacked, plant destroyed.

Chrome mine at Agios Demetrios destroyed.

Rhodiani chrome mine attacked, machinery smashed, buildings burnt.

June.

Kournovo tunnel on main line Athens-Salonica blown up with German troop train inside. Blocked for 6 days.

Skirmish between guerrillas and Italians near Gardiki. Column of Italians engaged by guerrillas, who inflicted 300 casualties on Italians.

Battle of Pavliani. Italians retreated, losing 300 prisoners and transport, including considerable booty to guerrillas.

Action near Aliakmon Bridge in Kozani area. Wooden arch burnt and 2 concrete pillars blown up.

Italian ship "Citta di Savona" sunk in Piræus harbour by limpeting.

Asopos viaduct blown up.

Four bridges destroyed on main railway line between Dhokara and Lake Xinias.

Three road bridges destroyed on road between Kozani and Elasson. In the Katerini area Papa girder bridge, having a span of 100 ft. and another 3-girder bridge destroyed. All telephone wires cut.

Demolitions carried out on roads Yannina-Philippiada and Paramythia-Kanallakion.

Chifliki bridge blown.

Telephone line between Elasson and Larissa destroyed over a length of 12 miles. Two-thirds of the line from Elasson to the Sarandoporon Pass destroyed.

In the Vale of Tempe railway destroyed for a stretch covering 100 lengths of rail including 2 bridges. In the Katerini area, 3-arch girder bridge 30 yards long destroyed, telephone lines cut.

On Katerini-Elasson road at Km. 17 wooden bridge 30 yards long burnt and west abutment blown.

At Km. 26 the road foundation on the precipice cut away at 2 places.

At Km. 28 an 11-yards concrete bridge over a gorge destroyed and abutments blown.

Bridge at Petrana blown. Road cut in 2 places in Stena-Portas Pass.

Action in area south-west of Yannina. Italian losses 30 dead, 70 wounded and some M.T. destroyed.

Demolitions on Yannina-Malakasi road. Bridges destroyed; estimated time of repair five weeks.

July.

Dubri Bridge successfully demolished.

Demolition of Stenos Bridge at Lidhorikion-Navpaktos road. 30 yards bridge blown.

Road and telephone communications between Arakhova and Levadia cut.

Action in Aigion area, railway bridge between Diakogio and Zahloron successfully attacked. 1,000 yards of line demolished.

ANNEX F.

BRUTALITIES COMMITTED BY THE AXIS AND THEIR SATELLITES.

YUGOSLAVIA.

There is little doubt that our Liaison Officers in Yugoslavia have seen and heard enough to bear ample testimony to the innumerable brutalities perpetrated by the Germans and their satellites.

One of them now with the patriot forces in Western Croatia has sent in a report based on evidence given by trustworthy officers formerly serving in the forces of Pavelic, from which they deserted when they discovered the full significance of his policy. This report refers to the many bodies of murdered persons lying about in mountain gorges and to the mutilated people still alive to tell the tale of their sufferings. He instances such horrors as the following:—

Men invited to meetings in churches and then locked in and burnt to death.

A captured Ustashi was found to have in his possession 2 kilog. of human eyes intended as a gift for Pavelic.

Photographs have been seen of children dashed to death against walls; of individuals with ears cut off and finger-nails pulled out.

Pregnant women ripped open.

Children tied together round haystacks which were then set alight.

A priest buried alive at Brinje.

Girls raped and made to dig their own graves.

Our Liaison Officer goes on to say that the systematic burning of towns and villages and of crops is a mere incidental to the other widespread brutalities of which there is plentiful evidence.

From General Mihailovic countless reports have been received over a period of many months. These reveal the indescribable brutality of the occupying and quisling forces. Reports received since the 1st May, 1943, but covering the period since the beginning of 1943 to the present day show that some 7,000 to 8,000 people, including many women and children, have been put to death or tortured. Countless instances are given of villages burnt and plundered, crops seized, heavy fines imposed on villages and settlements for what was considered insufficient surrender of food-stuffs and other produce, cattle driven off, hostages shot, thousands of people thrust into concentration camps, of the inhabitants of entire districts being driven to take refuge in the inhospitable mountains, where they have inevitably been overtaken by famine.

The following few instances chosen at random from the General's reports illustrate the state of affairs which has existed ever since the German invasion:—

In Eastern Srem German, Gestapo, Ustashi and other Croat troops are said to have sent 5,000 people to Germany in sealed waggons soon after Himmler's visit to Zagreb, in reprisal for sabotage on the railways imputed to the Serbs, but in fact carried out by the Ustashi themselves.

At Metchija two train-loads were filled, mainly with women and children, and taken to the concentration camp at Zemun.

At Kraljevo 107 women, 3 three-year-old children and 30 fourteen-year-old boys were shot by order of Josef Eckart, the local Gestapo chief.

At Kozevi 70 hostages shot in reprisal for the demolition of a bridge.

At Belgrade 50 Serbs shot in reprisal for the sabotage of Danube traffic in May.

In the Jablanica district, 2,000 people were taken to Germany from 14 villages, which were burnt to the ground.

Quotations of the same character from this source could be multiplied endlessly. Doubtless the reports do not err on the side of understatement. Nevertheless, even if heavily discounted, they disclose a sufficiently horrifying state of affairs.

The Axis-controlled press also provides illuminating evidence as the following typical examples will show :—

- (1) In June 1943, eight German policemen were killed and seven wounded, accordingly 575 persons, described as " supporters of Mihailovic and the Communists," were shot. (*Zora*, Sofia, 9.7.43.)
- (2) In August 1941, the German military authorities decreed the destruction of the village of Skela for the shooting of a German military official. (*Donauzeitung*, 16.8.41.)

A " Memorial of the Orthodox Church " presented to the German C-in-C. in Croatia gave a horrifying picture of the massacres of Serbs, especially of priests and intellectuals in Bosnia, Hercegovina, Slovenia and Serbo-Croatia in May-July 1941.

In Slovenia and Croatia the Italians and their local quislings have not been far behind the Germans. The shootings of hostages is generally carried out on a scale of ten for each Italian or quisling killed. Many villages have been burnt down in districts where guerrilla activity has occurred, and it is said that tens of thousands of Yugoslavs have been put into concentration camps. In June 1943, the Bishop of Veglia protested to the Vatican against the actions taken by the Italian military and civilian authorities in the Fiume and Kupa districts. Numerous cases of the partial or complete destruction of villages by way of reprisal are cited.

The Hungarians, too, have taken a hand in such brutalities: The outbreak of resistance at Zsabya in the Backa in January 1942, was savagely repressed—many civilians being killed. The Prime Minister, Kallay, himself, frankly admitted in the Hungarian Parliament that excessive severity had been applied. The total number of Serbs killed was 2,250. (*Magyarország*, 15.7.43.)

GREECE.

Bulgarian-occupied Thrace has been the scene of the worst brutalities perpetrated in Greece by the Axis and their satellites. A movement of revolt in September 1941 resulted in fearful reprisals, and it is estimated that some 10,000 Greeks were shot or otherwise massacred between the 6th and 9th October of that year. Those killed by the Bulgars might now total some 15,000-20,000 souls; in addition, some 150,000 Greeks have been evicted from their homes and deported with what they can carry away with them.

In Greece itself every sabotage operation has been regularly followed by the shooting of hostages. For example :—

4th June, 1941—

Railway bridge at Liossa blown. 25 hostages shot. 45 lawyers taken as hostages.

24th/25th November, 1942—

Railway viaduct at Gorgopotamos blown. 12 officers executed. 300 senior officers, including several generals and admirals, placed in concentration camps.

6th January, 1943—

Demolitions in Salamis Arsenal. 17 hostages shot. Many hostages arrested.

1st June—

Kournovo tunnel demolished and troop train wrecked. 60 officers shot.

17th June—

Citta di Savona limpeted in Piræus. 80 hostages taken, 19 shot.

All the above acts of sabotage were carried out by collaborators of S.O.E. at the direct request of British authorities.

The recent widespread guerrilla activity has led to an increase of brutal measures by the Axis. British liaison officers have reported that enemy columns in Thessaly are systematically burning villages and crops, murdering, raping and

torturing inhabitants, so as to prevent by this ruthless treatment their giving aid to the guerrillas. The destruction of food supplies will in fact make the task of the guerrillas increasingly difficult throughout the coming winter.

The Metropolitan of Kozani, who, cross in hand, rides at the head of the guerrillas of Western Macedonia, has telegraphed through a British Liaison Officer:—

“The Greek race within Greece, as in the time of Alaric, suffers persecution aimed at its annihilation. All the nation is in revolt, and His Majesty's Government from outside must give all priority to this second war in Greece against these savage occupiers, and must take even stronger measures to aid its prosecution, urging on the day of liberation.

Haste, that the great fire be not extinguished, that the nation be not annihilated!”

In Crete a particularly revolting execution of hostages was reported by a British officer. On the 14th June, 1942, the day after our sabotage raid on the Heraklion aerodrome, 50 hostages already held in Heraklion were shot. Amongst the victims were a former Governor-General of Crete, a Cabinet Minister, a former Mayor of Heraklion, a lawyer, the nephew of the former G.O.C., Crete, the editor of a Cretan newspaper, bank managers, school masters, &c. The names of the German Air Force Colonel Schlange and Captain Litzenger, the Garrison adjutant, were prominently connected with the above offence.

Also after our Commando raid on Crete during the night of the 4th/5th July, 1943, fifty hostages were shot by the Germans in Heraklion alone, by order of General Brauer. The execution of a further eighteen hostages in Agua gaol was reported from West Crete.

ALBANIA.

Resistance in the towns has mainly shown itself in demonstrations by students and others of both sexes. These have been brutally repressed; for example, on the 20th August, 1942, in Tirana, according to the Foreign Office Research Department, sixteen girls were killed and twenty-five wounded when they demonstrated outside the city prison for the release of political prisoners and the Italian guards opened fire on them. In the country a more calculated brutality is evident. In December 1942 villagers in the mountains of Tragjas were tortured in the hope of inducing them to disclose the whereabouts of the patriot forces.

Villages which the Italian columns find difficulty in reaching are indiscriminately bombed, and those which are occupied are burned to the ground before the Italians retire to the safety of their nearest fortified camp.

In January 1943, to take just one example from the underground press, two women at Pojan were soaked in petrol and burned alive because they had given children supplies to take to the guerrilla bands in which their husbands were serving.

ANNEX G.

GERMAN ORDER ON METHOD OF CARRYING OUT MASS EXECUTIONS.

The following is a translation of an order issued by H.Q., 125 German Infantry Regiment, on the 28th October, 1941:—


“Supplementary regulations by G.O.C., Serbia, concerning the manner of carrying out executions make necessary the following amendments to Regimental Orders of 16.10.41:—

- (a) When a large number of persons have to be dealt with, they are to be distributed for shooting among units.
- (b) The bodies are to be buried in sufficiently deep graves. Burning of bodies is to cease. The placing of flowers on graves is to be prevented.
- (c) In order to avoid unnecessary contact with the bodies, those to be shot are to be led directly to the edges of their graves. In the case of mass executions, it is allowable to cause the hostages to kneel with their faces towards the grave.

- (d) Shooting of large numbers is to be carried out in groups of five to eight, one after the other. Those to be shot have to have their legs tied.
- (e) Before the execution takes place, those to be shot should have all papers removed. A short report is to be made on the execution, showing—
- (i) Names of those shot.
 - (ii) Reasons for shooting.
 - (iii) Name of officer i/c.
 - (iv) Place, time.
 - (v) Name of the officer ordering the execution should be rendered.
- (f) The execution is to be carried out in a very regimental manner *with an officer in charge*. Two to four men are to be detailed for each man to be shot. Aim for the heart and head. After the volley, the officer responsible will, on orders from the Medical Officer detailed to attend, fire a final shot into the body of each with a regulation pistol 08 or 38 (no other calibre). Death is to be certified by the Medical Officer.
- (g) Articles of clothing (including footwear) and personal effects of those shot will on no account be given to the local population. They are to be handed in, in exchange for a receipt, to the appropriate local military authority. Until the burial has been completed, one officer is to be present.

The order of 16.10.41 by the Commanding Officer, Infantry Regiment 125, is hereby cancelled and will be destroyed."

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.





O.R. 5586
GREECE

SCALE: 1/2,000,000 OR 32 MILES TO 1 INCH
MILES 0 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

REFERENCE

- Railways (Normal Gauge).....—————
- Railways (Narrow Gauge).....- - - - -
- 1933 Frontiers.....- - - - -



SKETCH MAP A.





PSP

13. Aug 43
(Oleuming say)!

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

file
Primal

My dear Franklin,


Thinking things over will it not
be better to go straight from here to
the Citadel & let us ^(Chummi & I) come back
here to the White House after the
conference? ~~Because~~ The eyes of the world
are upon the conference & I doubt if much
progress will be made till we are on
the spot - when I think it should be ^{on} Sunday
or Monday. I do not know of course
how important or urgent is the business
in Washington, but I am quite sure
that the sooner we are up ~~there~~ in
the North the better. Will you think this
over.

Yours always

W

The President

Hyde Park



PRIME MINISTER



file

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

8-14-43

MR. PRESIDENT.

1. Would you kindly send a two line message of thanks to Nicholas Macaskie saying you were glad to hear from the Treasurer and Masters of Gray's Inn, and that you had not forgotten your dinner with him in 1918, or words to that effect.

2. The King considers that you should publish his telegram of congratulations on the American feat of arms at Floesti with any reply you may care to make. It need only be a line or two, but I advised him officially to send the telegram of congratulation on account of the magnificent performance.

Wm

14. 8. 43

(comes re Gray's Inn filed downstairs)

PSF
Churchill

The President of the United States
of America,

The White House,

Washington, D.C.,

U. S. A.

PRIME MINISTER

THE CITADEL
QUEBEC

trap file

PSF Churchill

8-18-43

MR. HOPKINS.

Will you suggest to the President that he sends a message to General Eisenhower and I will advise the King to send one also, release to be simultaneous. I will then myself the next day send a personal message to General Alexander in reply to the telegrams which he has sent me reporting the execution of the Directives he received from General Eisenhower. I will also telegraph to General Eisenhower.

W.S.C.

18. 8. 43.

Today Aug. 2/1943. file ^{PSF} Churchill
11 am. Visit Lincoln Memorial,
National Gallery

Lunch here

p.m. Mrs. C to go to Arlington

Friday -

Mrs. C. & Mary to lunch
with Gen. Marshall -

Mt. Vernon?

Dinner. Byrd.

Sat. Williamsburg, all day.

Sunday

Mary out for picnic.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~Nat. gallery
Lindbergh man.~~

~~Lunch today? Mit Vernon?~~

~~Williamsburg Friday am
or Saturday?~~

~~(lunch with Gen. Marshall on
Friday.)
Lord Moran~~

PSF Churchill folder 1-43



File Personal

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

8-29-43

COLONEL WARDEN TO PRESIDENT.

PERSONAL

Your No. 348.

As sworn evidence was not available
Colonel Clarke and I send you the goods by the
hand of Mary.

[Handwritten signature]

29. 8. 43

[Handwritten signature]

(This refers to some very delicious
trout which the Prime Minister caught at Lac Des Neiges
and sent me via his daughter Mary)
F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
under
Churchill* PSF

PRIME MINISTER.

To remind you to explain to the President that you have asked the people at home to warn Clark Kerr that the various messages are on the way and to ask him to concert with the United States Ambassador in Moscow for approximately simultaneous delivery.

T.L.R.

September 4, 1943.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF Churchill
Miss
Churchill

4 September 1943.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bolling Field advises that it is impossible to fly from Washington to Williamsburg today owing to the weather. Accordingly, Mrs. Churchill's trip has been cancelled.

At present Mrs. Churchill and Miss Churchill are down town shopping, where they will be until time to change for luncheon. They are having luncheon with Mrs. Hopkins outside the White House.

At present she has no plans for this afternoon.

Very respectfully,



CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.



On the train.
Quebec.

PSF: Churchill folder 1-43
file Personal
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

September 13, 1943.

My dear Franklin,

I send you herewith a number of notes and telegrams which I have prepared, arising out of our talks yesterday. These include a telegram to U.J. which, as it mentions your affairs, I have asked my Government to hold till I get your okay with any alterations.

We have all greatly enjoyed this trip, and I cannot tell you what a pleasure it has been to me, to Clemmie and to Mary to receive your charming hospitality at the White House and at Hyde Park. You know how I treasure the friendship with which you have honoured me and how profoundly I feel that we might together do something really fine and lasting for our two countries and, through them, for the future of all.

Yours ever,

W

The President of the United States
of America.

file

WELFARE NO. _____.

PRIME MINISTER TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY
[REDACTED] and Personal.

The President agreed with my minute to him of September 10 regarding recommendation in C.C.S. 310/2 (bracket) about setting-up of Anglo-American Emergency Propaganda Committees for Pacific, European and South-East Asian theatres (bracket), as follows: (Begins)

As there seems to be general agreement on this proposal I think we should accept it. In spite of the increased number of Committees which it involves, it clearly would in no way affect any guidance which you or I might wish to give separately or jointly on ~~the~~ special occasion. I am therefore recommending my Government to concur. (Ends)

W.S.C.

13.9.43

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

51111
file
PRIME MINISTER TO FOREIGN SECRETARY
[REDACTED] and Personal.

Reference Concrete 679 and 797+

The President has vetoed the publication of
the Council of Four minutes of the last war.

W.S.C.

13.9.43

+Publication of the Minutes of the Paris Peace
Conference.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

file

WELFARE NO. _____.

PRIME MINISTER TO FOREIGN SECRETARY.
[REDACTED] and Personal.

Reference CONCRETE 798.

The President is sending a message in terms suitable for publication. His angle as Head of a Republican Government is not necessarily identical with ours but there is no difference in aim. Meanwhile I see no reason to delay indefinitely the publication of my two messages.

W.S.C.

13.9.43

(message to the King of Greece)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

File

WELFARE NO. _____.

PRIME MINISTER TO FOREIGN SECRETARY.
~~Most Secret~~ and Personal.

Reference WELFARE 677.

It is agreed that Count Sforza's visit to the Mediterranean is put off till further notice and that we shall be consulted again.

13.9.43

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date **MAY 5 1972**

13F Churchill-1943

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY
CAR "MOUNT ROYAL"

13th September 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I find it very difficult
to tell you just how
much I have appreciated
all the kindness you
have shown me during
the last few weeks.

We all of us loved
our visit to you at
the White House.

and Hyde Park - and
for me it has been
a privilege and an
experience I shall
remember all my
life.

It was so kind
of you to arrange
for Mummy and ^{me} ~~me~~
to visit Williamsburg
and so many other
thrilling and

2.

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY
CAR "MOUNT ROYAL"

interesting pla
we especially
enjoyed drivin
you to visit
Vernon. And
grateful for the
opportunities
and some

2.

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY
CAR "MOUNT ROYAL"

interesting places; and
we especially
enjoyed driving with
you to visit Mount
Vernon. And I am so
grateful for the
opportunities I had of
seeing something of
the work, in or out of
uniform, which women
in America are doing.
And so, for a

2
CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY
VAN NUNY HOTEL
wonderful visit —
but most of all
for your great personal
kindness to me —
thank you very, very
much indeed.

Yours affectionately,
Marys. Churchill

file
personal

PSF Churchill folder
At Sea 1-43

September 16. 1943.

Dear Mr. President,
I shall never
forget my first meet-
-ing with you in
Quebec after hearing
so much about you
from Winston - & then
your great kindness.

& gracious hospitality
to me & Mary at
the White House &
Hyde Park.

It was a
sickening disapp.
-pointment that I
couldn't, the first
time come to Hyde

Park, & when I tumbled
down the stairs & hurt
my elbow I thought: "There-
now I'm fated never
to go to Hyde Park!"
I am glad that I
spent a lovely long
day there & have I
is enjoy it, although

- Ship to me. Yours very sincerely
S. Chas. Child
in a rather crooked up
condition! - especially being
shown its weakness by
Mr. President.
I hope you know
how much you know
- ship means to Winston
personally, quite apart from
its world aspect & im-
portance. I feel privileged
& proud to have met you
at last, & so thank
you for your kindness &
for extending your friend-

T-151

*PSE Churchill folder
1-48*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. CORDELL HULL:

PLEASE READ AND RETURN
TO ME.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President from Winston
Churchill, 9-13-43, re Civil Aviation.

PSE Churchill folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1943.

MEMO FOR GRACE:

Take up with General Arnold and find out what is the latest date that I can deliver a Christmas tree for Winston Churchill and send it over by a bomber or otherwise in order to reach him at Chequers, England, before Christmas.

If I am away, tell Mr. Plog a week beforehand that it should be packed in burlap and sent to wherever General Arnold says.

F.D.R.

(Original in Christmas folder, 3-43)

5/3/55-RJ

For books referred to

all Grp. 7 - Historical
Mss.

Box 8 (~~1-1~~)

October 25, 1943.

Dear Winston:

Those two little books are gems -- and I can well understand why they should not be made public at this time. Perhaps "The Burden of Jerusalem" should wait until you and I are strong enough to carry Ibn Saud to Jerusalem and Dr. Weizman to Mecca. I have thanked Sir Alfred Webb-Johnson. I did not know until he wrote that you are an Honorary Surgeon. I am an Honorary Veterinarian!

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London, England.

October 25, 1943.

Dear Sir Alfred:

I am most grateful for those two delightful Kipling items; and it is good of you to tell me their history. I had read "The Burden of Jerusalem" before and I could understand why Mrs. Kipling thought it would be best not to publish it. Nevertheless, it is a gem. I had not read "A Chapter of Proverbs" before and I like it much.

By a twist of fate, I never had a chance of meeting Rudyard Kipling. I was to have lunched with him on a day in July, 1918, but at the last minute I was called to make a visit to the Destroyer Base in Queenstown with Sir Eric Geddes. My cousin, T.R., had sent messages to him by me.

Thank you much for your thought of me. I shall always cherish these perfect little volumes.

Very sincerely yours,

Sir Alfred Webb-Johnson, K.C.V.O.,
C.B.E., D.S.O.,
Royal College of Surgeons of England,
Lincoln's Inn Fields,
London, England.



10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

17 October, 1943.

My dear Mr. President,

I am sending you with this letter two small unpublished works of Rudyard Kipling which I think I mentioned to you.

Similar copies were given to me recently by the President of the Royal College of Surgeons of England on the occasion of my admission as an Honorary Fellow of the College, and I thought that you would like to have both books for your library.

I understand that Mrs. Kipling decided not to publish them in case they should lead to controversy and it is therefore important that their existence should not become known and that there should be no public reference to this gift.

*Yours sincerely,
Winston Churchill*

The President of the United States of America. ~



Helborn 4699

*Royal College of Surgeons of England,
Lincoln's Inn Fields,
London, W.C.2.*

14th October, 1943.

To Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.

Dear Mr. President,

The Royal College of Surgeons has just celebrated the Centenary of the institution of its high diploma of Fellow and the Council marked the occasion by awarding several Honorary Fellowships.

Mr. Winston Churchill, who, by virtue of his Office as First Lord of the Treasury, is one of the Trustees of our unique Museum, honoured the College by allowing us to add his name to our Roll of Honorary Fellows. As a token of our gratitude we asked him to accept two works by Rudyard Kipling which have not been published. Mr. Churchill was very interested in these literary curios and suggested that you, Sir, would like to possess copies. I am, indeed, proud that the Prime Minister has given me the opportunity of offering you these two works. I ask you to accept them as a token of our admiration for the great contributions that your countrymen have made to the advancement of the science and art of Surgery and of our gratitude for their comradeship and help in this war and in the war of 1914-19. On this memorable occasion in the history of our College we have tried to show our appreciation of their work by conferring the Honorary Fellowship on four American Surgeons - Colonel Elliott Carr Cutler, Professor Evarts Ambrose Graham, Professor Robert Bayley Osgood and Professor Howard Christian Naffziger.

I had the privilege of being a friend of Rudyard Kipling and of looking after him during his last illness. After his death Mrs. Kipling, as literary executor, had a great responsibility in regard to those of his writings which had not been published. She feared that the two works which I have the honour of offering to you, might lead to some controversy and she decided not to publish them. She evidently shrank from destroying them, however, for she entrusted copies to me. After her death I felt it my duty to ensure their preservation, although naturally respecting

Mrs. Kipling's decision that they should not be published. I accordingly deposited copies in the British Museum. In addition to those which are now in Mr. Churchill's possession I also gave copies to Queen Mary, and Her Majesty has placed them in the Library at Windsor Castle. I am deeply grateful to the Prime Minister for giving me the opportunity of offering copies to you, Sir. I am not only proud to do so, but am particularly pleased, for I am sure that Rudyard Kipling would have liked you to possess them. He had a great love for your Country and was a great friend and admirer of Theodore Roosevelt. This is made clear in his poem "Great-Heart" and in the references to Theodore Roosevelt in Kipling's Autobiography "Something of Myself".

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Yours very truly,

Alfred North-Johnson

President.

(7084)

hmc

Originals of these papers returned to the
Acting Secy. State 11/8/43.
hmc

PSF: Churchill folder
1-43

Suggested Message from the President to
Prime Minister Churchill

George Kennan, our Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon is returning to his post after brief consultation with us here. He expects to take up with Salazar immediately upon his return the urgent question of obtaining what we consider minimum necessary facilities in the Azores for the operation of the air transport, ferrying, anti-submarine and convoy operations by United States forces in that area.

I hope that he can depend on the full support of the British Ambassador to Lisbon in impressing upon the Portuguese the compelling importance to our common war effort of the early use of these facilities by United States forces and would appreciate your sending him instructions in that sense.

"Roosevelt"

(copy filed in Portugal folder, 1-43)

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


"O.K.
7.D.R."

November 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As you know Kennan, our Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Lisbon, in his few days consultation here with our Army and Navy people has obtained a clear picture of their minimum requirements and the urgency of obtaining them. He is en route to Lisbon to open negotiations with Salazar. Immediately following his first talk Salazar is almost certain, in the name of the alliance, to ask the British Ambassador what he thinks of our requests for facilities. Salazar would love to detect and take full advantage of the slightest indication that the British are not in full accord with us. I think consequently it would be very helpful if you could send something along the lines of the attached draft to Prime Minister Churchill.

Enclosure:
Draft message



RECEIVED SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NOV 12 1943

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 11/8/43

ADDRESSED TO

The President.

PSF Churchill



~~10 Downing Street~~
~~London~~

Teheran.

1 December, 1943

My dear Franklin,

I was indeed touched by your kind present. It is a beautiful bowl, and I shall always treasure it as a reminder of our sunlit days in Teheran and of the most memorable of my Birthdays.

I cannot thank you enough for all your friendship and support in the years in which we have worked together, and I am glad of this occasion to send you a message of sincere affection and gratitude.

Yours always

Winston Churchill

The President of the United States of America.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Will you take this up
the first thing in the morning with
General Marshall and Harry Hopkins?

F.D.R.

Map Room dispatch to Harry Hopkins from
the Prime Minister today's date.

*PSF Churchill folder
1-43*

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

December 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

No. 523 from the Prime Minister - Dec. 27
re postponement of Polish Prime Minister's
visit to Washington.

C
O
Y

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 31, 1943.

PRIVATE

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE


I am sending you herewith a copy of a memorandum I sent to Churchill. Thank the Lord I don't have the same trouble with the State Department that he has with his Foreign Office!

F. D. R.

(Orig. copy filed - Hull folder, 2-44)

P
Y

December 31, 1943.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

I have received the enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of State.

When you and I look back eleven months we realize that de Gaulle and his Committee have most decidedly moved forward by "the process of infiltration" -- in other words, here a little, there a little.

This is another example. This puts France on to the Allied Commission for Italy, even though the memorandum says that the French representative will not have anything to say about it. However, he will still be a member of the Commission.

For the life of me I cannot see why France is entitled to anybody on the Allied Control Commission for Italy. His presence there will, as we know from experience, cause controversy and more trouble with the French Committee.


I know what problems you have with your own Foreign Office -- and I wish you and I could run this Italian business. We would not need any help or advice.

I am holding up cabling until I hear from you.

F. D. P.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date NOV 4 1971



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The United States member of the Advisory Council for Italy has strongly recommended that a French as well as a Soviet representative be attached to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The "British formula" which is acceptable to the Soviets and French provides only for token representation by accepting a representative of the U.S.S.R. and France on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission and avoids placing Soviet and French representatives throughout the entire structure of the Control Commission; in other words it provides for a kind of superior "liaison officer".

Our representative further reports that the British and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a French representative on the Control Commission.

Consequently, if, after consideration, you perceive no objection, I shall instruct our representative on the Advisory Council to concur in the British formula recommending the acceptance of Soviet and French representatives on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission.

C. H.