

● PSF

Great Britain: Winston Churchill

1944-45

36 PP
missives only

PSF

Churchill folder
file
personal 1-44

January 4, 1944.

Dear Clemmie and Winston:-

I find the enclosed clipping on my return home.

Evidently, from one of the paragraphs, the Deseret News of Salt Lake City claims there is a direct link between Clemmie and the Mormons.

And the last sentence shows that Winston is a sixth cousin, twice removed ~~from the Prophet himself.~~

All of this presents to me a most interesting study in heredity. Hitherto I had not observed any outstanding Mormon characteristics in either of you -- but I shall be looking for them from now on!

I have a very high opinion of the Mormons -- for they are excellent citizens. However, I shall never forget a stop which my Father and Mother made in Salt Lake City when I was a very small boy. They were walking up and down the station platform and saw two young ladies each wheeling a baby carriage with youngsters in them, each about one year old. My Father asked them if they were waiting for somebody and they replied "Yes, we are waiting for our husband. He is the engineer of this train". Perhaps this was the origin of the Good Neighbor policy!

As ever yours,

Z. D. R.

The Right Honorable and Mrs. Winston S. Churchill,
10 Downing Street,
London,
England.

3rd paragraph of
C. & W. S. C letter
removed of the Prophet
etc - Change
signed - J.W.R.

*PSE Churchill folder
1-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

For preparation of reply
for my signature, if you think one
is necessary.

F.D.R.

Message to the President
from the Prime Minister, dated
Jan. 19, 1944, No. 549.

175F Churchill folder 1-44

February 7, 1944

Dear Winston:

This note is brought to you by my friend, Robert E. Sherwood, who as you know is the head of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information.

He will be spending a couple of weeks in London and I hope very much that you can find time to have a talk with him.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Honorable Winston S. Churchill
Prime Minister of Great Britain
London
England

SIR:G

Copy filed - OWI folder, 2-44.

PSF Churchill folder
1-44

file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Per [unclear] folder

February 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE:

As soon as I get back, I want to see the Army film "Know Your Ally" and if I like it, send a copy to Winston Churchill.

F.D.R.

(Copy of this memo filed - War Dept. folder, 2-44.)

FSF Churchill folder 100



file

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

February 23, 1944.

My dear Franklin,

Clemmie suggested to me that we should send you this photograph of some of the rooms of 10, Downing Street after the bombs fell last Sunday night, as it contains a copy of the picture of us both at Argentinia. The carpet in the foreground is the one given me by the Shah at Teheran; luckily it is undamaged.

It is surprising what curious blast effects have followed from these few bombs. Places as much as 500 yards away have been affected, while others quite close to have been missed out. They were very quick at clearing up all the mess and we are back again.

Yours always

W

The President of the United States of America.

PSF Churchill

Churchill to Roosevelt, 2/23/44.

Enclosure: "photograph of some of the
rooms of 10, Downing Street after the
bombs fell last Sunday night."

Transferred to Photo File: England.

London, 10 Downing St. ~~6~~ 48-22:4271.

Erwin

1/26/50

PSF Churchill
MONDAY

| DECEMBER 1955 | | | | | | |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| S | M | T | W | T | F | S |
| | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
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| 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 |
| 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |

SUNDAY

25

DECEMBER

359

CHRISTMAS DAY

6

The photograph, on which FDR wrote "This is terrible," is in the photographic collection. Churchill refused to give permission to publish it.

H.K.



Re Churchill
DSE Churchill folder 1-44



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request, I attach a draft message which you may wish to send to Prime Minister Churchill in reply to his message of March 9, 1944 on the further measures which Mr. Churchill contemplates in relation to Ireland.

CH

*CH, OK, FDR.
Carbon initialed by the President and returned to Lady Hull, with draft of proposed message.
7/3/44.*

Enclosure:

Draft message
to Mr. Churchill



PSF Churchill

DRAFT MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

I have discussed with Secretary Hull your message of March 19 on the further steps which you contemplate in relation to Ireland. We believe that you are pursuing the right line in taking the security measures mentioned without, however, adopting measures of coercion designed only to harm Ireland.

We wonder, however, if measures forbidding Irish ships to go to all foreign ports from Ireland might not be interpreted as economic sanctions. Would not your purpose be accomplished by limiting the prohibition to Irish shipping going to any part of the continent? I realize that, as you say, a ship can start in one direction and turn in another, but any ship violating the prohibition could be dealt with in an appropriate manner. This would leave Ireland free to send its ships to North America to carry wheat and other essential supplies. The fact that no ban was made on Irish shipping to Canada and the United States would in itself constitute proof that the measures against shipping were not in the nature of economic sanctions.

For our part we are considering a further message to Mr. de Valera once more making plain that the continued presence of Axis representatives in Ireland constitutes a danger to our forces and their operations for which the Irish Government cannot escape responsibility. We shall let you see it in advance.

—
PSF Churchill folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY.

F.D.R.

PSF Churchill

Y

May 18, 1944.

TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

I am delighted with your telegram to Marshal Tito and I wish you would tell King Peter that I am heartily in accord. I sent him yesterday a letter in reply to a very nice letter I had from him.

Incidentally, do you remember my telling you over a year ago of my talk with Peter in which I discussed the possibility of three nations in place of the one, he to be the head of a reconstituted Serbia. This created no excitement on his part or that of Pouritch.

The King, with real fire in his eyes, remarked that he was a Serb. I think that you and I should bear some such possibility in mind in case the new government does not work out. Personally I would rather have a Yugoslavia, but three separate states with separate governments in a Balkan confederation might solve many problems.

ROOSEVELT

PSF: Churchill

file
personal

May 20, 1944.

Dear Winston:-

That picture of you I particularly like. So much so that it too becomes an inhabitant of my bedroom wall. I am awfully glad to have it.

I am safely back in Washington trying to catch up and I am really practically all right again though I am still having some tests made on my plumbing and am keeping regular hours with much allocation to sleep. The old bronchial pneumonia has completely disappeared. The real triumph is that I have lost nearly ten pounds in the last couple of months and now I have begun the struggle to maintain the loss.

I do not believe I can get away for over a month. Of course, I am greatly disappointed that I could not be in England just at this moment, but perhaps having missed the boat it will be best not to make the trip until the events of the near future are more clear.

I got awfully good reports of you from Averell and Winant. Remember what I told old Moran to make you do -- obey his orders. Thus the Commander-in-Chief in one country orders around a mere Minister of Defense in another country.

At this writing the news from Italy looks good. I hope old Alec keeps up the good work.

With my affectionate regards,

As ever yours,

The Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.



PRIVATE

Churchill folder
1-44
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

May 21, 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

filed
transferred
1-43

Many thanks for letting me see General Hurley's memorandum on Persia, which I am returning to you herewith as requested. I am sorry to have delayed answering it, but several Departments of State had to be consulted on the points which it raised. The General seems to have some ideas about British imperialism which I confess make me rub my eyes. He makes out, for example, that there is an irrepressible conflict between imperialism and democracy. I make bold, however, to suggest that British imperialism has spread and is spreading democracy more widely than any other system of government since the beginning of time.

As regards Persia, however, I do not think that "British imperialism" enters into the picture. It is true that we, like the United States, are inevitably concerned about our strategic supplies of oil, the more so because, unlike the United States, we have no metropolitan sources. From the same security point of view, we have responsibilities which we

cannot at present abandon for the western frontier of India and the eastern frontier of Iraq. Apart from this, we have the same wartime interest as the United States in the safety of the trans-Persian supply route to Russia. For all these reasons we want a strong and friendly Government in Persia, and have no wish to see the establishment of foreign "zones of influence". In short, we are certainly no less interested than the United States in encouraging Persian independence, political efficiency and national reform.

I agree with what you say about Persia's need for outside assistance. Whether she would welcome the principle of international trusteeship seems open to doubt. It sounds rather like the mandatory system. I think that our best way of helping the Persians is through the American advisers. Dr. Millspaugh and his colleagues have undertaken a very necessary but a long, arduous and thankless task. We are giving them, and intend to continue giving them, all the help in our power, as we have since made clear in our discussions with the Stettinius Mission.

I assume that you have had no reply from Stalin to your suggestion for a free port at the head of the Persian Gulf,

and for international management of the Persian Railway. On this point we might await Russian reactions. I am by no means certain that after the war, when the Black Sea ports are again open, the trans-Persian route will continue to be necessary for Russian trade, or indeed could be operated under such conditions as would enable it to compete commercially with the Black Sea route.

I quite recognize that the position of the U.K.C.C. and the use of Lend-Lease supplies in Persia, to which Hurley drew your attention, required some looking into. I am glad to be able to say that since the date of your letter to me, the matter has been discussed with your people and a mutually satisfactory arrangement reached. I think they also appreciate that we have no intention whatever of trying to establish a British monopoly through the U.K.C.C. which is under instructions not to interfere with private trade unless absolutely necessary for the purposes of the war.

I return General Hurley's memorandum, of which I have kept a copy.

*Yours sincerely,
Winston Churchill*

The President of the United States of America.

file Private
↑.

The President of the United States of America

PRIME MINISTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PS F Churchill

June 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of April 20, 1944, concerning Basic English. It is a matter in which I am most interested and I have discussed it with Mr. Hull. I have asked him to sound out opinion in the Congress and to take appropriate steps with a view to looking carefully into both the scientific and the practical aspects of the matter.

Incidentally, I wonder what the course of history would have been if in May 1940 you had been able to offer the British people only "blood, work, eye water and face water", which I understand is the best that Basic English can do with five famous words.

Seriously, however, we are interested and will look into the matter thoroughly.

Very sincerely yours,

The Right Honorable
Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister,
London.

THE WHITE HOUSE

The Right Honorable
Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister,
London, England.

June 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

If in regard to Basic English we get the views of "competent Government specialists", we shall certainly sound the death knell of Basic English or anything like it. I never knew of any group of such people to agree to anything really different from the existing system -- or, for that matter, anything new.

Honestly, I do not want either to kill the idea or pour icy water on it. The reason is that Basic English has tremendous merit in it. The reason is that for practical purposes it is relatively easy for non-English speaking peoples to pick up a sufficient vocabulary to carry on a conversation.

For instance, if you and Molotov and Eden had had Basic English and if Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek and I had had Basic English, our conferences would have been infinitely easier and far less tiring than having everything go through interpreters.

Secondly, Basic English is extremely easy for English speaking peoples and would soon take the place of French as the so-called "language of diplomacy". You or I could learn it in our spare moments.

I wish you would pursue the check up with the Congressional people first of all. It might be possible for a sympathetic Congressional committee (emphasis on the "sympathetic") to take the matter up with an English committee and see if we can arrive at a complete meeting of the minds that would cover the whole English speaking world.

If this could be done, I really believe that the other nations would go along with us.

F. D. R.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of April 28, transmitting the original of a letter from Prime Minister Churchill concerning Basic English, I enclose a draft of a preliminary reply for your signature. I am also returning the Prime Minister's letter addressed to you.

I have just received Mr. Amery's letter with a copy of the report, and am having soundings taken in the Congress as you suggested.

As you have no doubt noted from the report, there was considerable divergence of opinion in the Cabinet Committee as to the extent to which Basic English, or some other form of simplified English, should be pushed. I think that before we go very far we should take steps to ascertain the views of competent Government specialists and private linguistic experts. If you agree I will have the matter looked into and make specific suggestions to you along this line.

CH

Enclosures:

Draft of letter to
Prime Minister;

Original letter of
April 20, 1944 from
Prime Minister.





Admiral Leahy

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

20 April, 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

When I was with you in the United States last August you expressed to me your interest in Basic English. The Cabinet Committee which I appointed here to consider the possibilities of Basic and means of promoting its wider use have reported and we have adopted the recommendations they have made. I thought it might be of interest to you to see the Report and am sending you copies.

Amery, who presided over the Committee, is also sending a copy personally to Hull.

If the United States authorities feel able to give their powerful support to the promotion of Basic English as a means of international intercourse, I feel sure that that would ensure its successful development. My conviction is that Basic English

- 2 -

will then prove to be a great boon to mankind in the future and a powerful support to the influence of the Anglo-Saxon peoples in world affairs.

Yours ever,

Winston Churchill

The President of the United States of America.

DM

ask CH to conduct the For Ref
Comm of Congress - if they will back
this proposal + if they allow I will
inform that we will do what
is best to back it.



PSIF Churchill folder
1-44
file
personal

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

16th June, 1944.

My dear Franklin,

I am indeed grateful for your kind thought in sending me two electric typewriters. I was greatly struck by the typescript of the letter which General McNarney sent me from Washington, and am delighted to have these typewriters for use in my own office.

Yours always

W

The President of the United States of America.

(3252)

hms Signed original of this letter and 2 packages sent to Col. B. M. Davenport,
for delivery to Hon. Winston S. Churchill, 7/11/44.

735 P

Churchill folder, 1-44

hms

July 10, 1944.

Dear Winston:-

I am enclosing copy of a letter from Captain Powers Symington, U.S.N., Rtd., an old friend of mine during the first World War -- also a copy of my letter to him. The signatures, etc., are for you with full freedom to do what you want with them. Keep them in your personal papers or give them to the Admiralty.

I am also sending along various items which relate to some early Churchills. I thought you would like to have them for your family papers.

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.

(Enclosures)

PSIF Churchill

July 7, 1944.

My dear Powers:-

It is certainly good to hear from you again -- and especially such a nice letter with its enclosures.

I think it is a grand idea that these very interesting documents should be in Britain. I shall send them, at the first opportunity, to the Prime Minister as a gift from you via me to the British Prime Minister and the British Navy.

I do hope to see you one of these days soon.

With all good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Captain Powers Symington, U.S.N., Rtd.,
834 Grove street,
San Francisco,
California.

CAPTAIN POWERS SYMINGTON
834 GROVE STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

PSF Churchill

June 30 1944

Dear Mr President It occurs to me that you might be at a loss to find a suitable present to give Mr Churchill, a gesture of friendship between the two great men of our time. I am enclosing something that I think will interest you and be acceptable to him.

In 1916 I was as you may remember with the Grand Fleet and a short time before the battle of Jutland I got the various Commanders of the Fleet to sign these papers as I could have a souvenir of my pleasant association with that great group of British Seamen. A number of them were killed at Jutland and their documents so became unique. I had thought at one time to give them to the Naval Academy Museum but believe now they should of right be in Britain, perhaps in the Admiralty.

Mr Churchill was 1st Lord when I went to England and I believe he would appreciate the special significance of these papers to the British Navy.

I don't care if you stay in for six terms. More power to you.

Yours with great respect.
P. Symington

Churchill family papers. To be sent to the
Prime Minister.

30/2 - Ches Schmill

Do you want to write the Prime Minister
about these papers or should I just have
them packed for shipping and turn them
over to Maj. Davenport for delivery?

G.G.T.



PSF Churchill

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

10 August, 1944.

My dear Franklin,

Thank you very much for your letter of July 10 sending me the most interesting naval signatures and papers relating to some early Churchills, together with the visiting card signed by my Father in 1886 when, as you know, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Much as I should like to keep the naval documents myself, I feel that the Admiralty should have them for their permanent records, and I am accordingly sending them to the First Lord.

I am very glad to have the papers about the early Churchills, which contain a fine signature of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough. There were two Generals named Charles Churchill. The first was the brother of the first Duke of Marlborough, and was his General of Infantry throughout his great campaigns. The second, to whom these documents mainly

relate, was the son of the first, and was for thirty years
Member of Parliament for Castle Rising in Norfolk.

Will you please thank Captain Powers Symington
very much for his kind thought in sending you these
documents for me.

Yours ever,

W
(

The President of the United States of America.

*file
personal*

*D.S.F. Churchill folder
1-44*

August 18, 1944.

Dear Symington:-

I have just received a letter
from the Prime Minister and I enclose a copy
of it, for I think it will interest you.

Always sincerely,

Captain Powers Symington, U.S.N., Rtd.,
834 Grove Street,
San Francisco,
California.

(Enclosure)

PSF Churchill folder
1-44

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

July 13, 1944

FILE MEMO:

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

For Joint Board & State
Dept. to prepare reply.

F.D.R.

PM DISPATCH TO THE PRESIDENT - Top
Secret. Number 726.

PSF; Churchill folder 1-44

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 17 1972

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
WINSTON CHURCHILL,
PRIME MINISTER,
LONDON.

*Original sent
to the War Room
545 - 7/13/44*

Both you and we are negotiating to exchange Japanese civilian prisoners held by each of us for British and American civilians held by Japan. The likelihood is that such an exchange may be the only way of saving the lives of hundreds of your and our nationals.

There is a snag on both sides. The Japanese want us to release 300 odd divers and pilots held in Australia; my military people do not agree to their release and as a result your exchange negotiation has bogged down.

In our exchange the snag is that the Japanese Government insists that Japanese officials coming out shall not be searched, while your people insist on search. The immediate case concerns officials coming out of Argentina. In result our negotiations will bog down when we inform the Japanese of this requirement.

It seems to me that the military considerations in either case are now very small. Japanese officials cannot carry any effective quantities even of valuable contraband. On the other hand, our naval affairs in the Pacific are

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
THE WHITE HOUSE

-2-

proceeding well, and the Japanese divers and pilots held in Australia cannot be of great help to the Japanese, even in respect of Far Eastern installations, in view of our present sea and air superiority.

My suggestion is that you give directions to your people to waive the search of Japanese officials; I will be prepared to recommend to our people that they let the divers and pilots be exchanged. This at least will give a reasonable chance that both exchanges might go through, saving many hundreds of both Americans and British from slow death. Please cable me your views. I think the technical people are over-emphasizing the importance of considerations quite proper in themselves, but which should be overridden by the higher humanitarian interest.

"ROOSEVELT"

A-B:AAB:LJL:GES

PSF Churchill folder
1-44

July 15, 1944.

Dear Winston:

Henry Morgenthau, Jr. will be in England the latter part of this month. He is going over to discuss currency problems and I hope much that you will be able to see him, if only for a short visit.

With my warm regards,

Always sincerely,

The Right Honorable
Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London, England.

Copy filed - Morgenthau folder, dr. 2-44



PSF Churchill

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

5 August, 1944.

My dear Franklin,

Thank you so much for sending
me the framed copy of the Declaration by the
United Nations of January 1, 1942. I am very
glad to have among my possessions this historic
document.

Yours ever,

Winston Churchill

The President of the United States of America.

file personal

*urgent folder 1-44
Churchill*

REGISTERED
Z-578

The President of the United States of America,

The White House,

WASHINGTON, D.C.,

U. S. A.

**A.K. For
Transmission
By AIR POUCH**

air Pouch

55026

PSF Churchill folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1944

FILE MEMO:

The following messages received by the President were referred to Admiral Leahy by the President:

No. 758 P.M. to the President, dated Aug. 18, with Pres. message to PM 600
759 PM to the President
760 PM to the President with draft of proposed reply

Map Room message from Winant to the President, file number 1815502, dated Aug. 18.

Message to the President from Harriman, Aug. 18 in regard to Poles

(Copy of this memo filed - Winant folder, 1-44
and Russia folder, 1-44
and Poland folder, 1-44)

C
O
P
Y

PSF Churchill folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you and the Secretary of State be good enough to prepare a joint reply to the enclosed for my signature?

Will you show the Secretary a copy of the joint message to Stalin from Churchill and me?

F. D. R.

Message to the President from Premier Mikolajczyk, dated Aug. 18, 1944 - through State Department - re clearance of American crews for flights to Warsaw from Stalin.

*Copies of this memo filed - Poland folder, 1-44
Russia folder, 1-44*

PSF Churchill folder
1-44

1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file
personal

August 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is not surprising if Mr. Stalin
is slow to forget!

E. R.

*Good copy
East 2000000
Y. S. S. R. is
1200000000*

Large sums of money and considerable forces have been employed by the Allies against the Bolsheviki during the year. Britain has contributed the nominal value of nearly 100 millions, France between 30 and 40 millions, the United States have maintained, and are still maintaining, over 8 thousand troops in Siberia, Japan has an army of between 30 and 40 thousand strong in Eastern Siberia, which she is now in process of reinforcing. Admiral Koltchak's armies, equipped mainly with British munitions, reached in May a total of nearly 300,000 men. General Denikin's armies aggregate at the present time about a quarter of a million combatants. Besides these, there were the Finns, who could place 100,000 men in the field. There were also the Esthonians, the Letts and the Lithuanians completely maintaining their fronts from the Baltic to Poland. Lastly, there are the powerful Polish forces, and help could also have been obtained from Roumania and, to a lesser extent, from Serbia and Czechoslovakia.

.....
It is a delusion to suppose that all this year we have been fighting the battles of the anti-Bolshevik Russians. On the contrary, they have been fighting ours; and this truth will become painfully apparent from the moment that they are exterminated and the Bolshevik armies are supreme over the whole vast territories of the Russian Empire. *

*
From a Memorandum written by Churchill on September 15, 1919, quoted in The World Crisis The Aftermath by Winston S. Churchill, Vol. IV, 1929, pp. 256, 259.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY
FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION
OR FILE.

F. D. R.

Message from the Prime Minister to the President, No. 761, dated August 19, 1944, re appeal from Soviet broadcasting stations to Polish population to start a general rising against the Germans.

*(Copies of this memo filed - Poland folder, 1-44
and Russia folder, 1-44)*

PSF Churchill folders
1-54

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

I think these have been
answered and can now file.

F. D. R.

Messages from the Prime Minister
to the President - Nos. 771, 772,
765.



THE CITADEL
QUEBEC

*Personal
N.S.C.
file*

P.S.F. (duchill)

September 16, 1944.

My dear Friend,

I do not think the Chiefs of Staff will be ready before noon. At any rate I believe this would be more convenient for them than 10.30. Moreover I have some amendments to suggest to the report which I have not yet completed.

In these circumstances, would it not be better to tell the Press to come at 3.30 p.m. after the Degrees. This would give plenty of time for you to catch your train around 5 o'clock.

Yours sincerely,

✓

The President of the United States of America.



73 F
file (Churchill personal file)
Stalin

9-19-44

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

MR. MARTIN.

Will you ask the President whether I could see the text of the communication he is making to Marshal Stalin about the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and also any communique that is to be issued.

In view of the fact that this important message will be passing between the President and Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister thinks it might be well to defer the other message about the Greeks, Yugoslavs and Poles, to a later period.

W.S.C.

19.9.44

PSF W.S.C. Personal folder
1-44

September 21, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SUMMERLIN:

Will you please be good enough to
see that this communication addressed to
Prime Minister Churchill is forwarded to him?

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

hms

Sealed envelope postmarked Chicago, Ill., 9/18/44 at 3:00 P.M.,
addressed to Hon. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the
British Empire, Hyde Park, N.Y.

At Sea. ^{Alma} September 22. 44

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

copy part of
Hunt for
file

file

My dear Mrs. Roosevelt
I shall always remember
my delightful visit to Hyde
Park. I enjoyed it all so
much. the picnics, sitting near
the President, & my two
long walks with you through
your woods. This was the
first time I had met
your daughter. She is

copy for
Mrs. Arellano

a wonderful combination of jaw-
-self & the President. The
charmed Winston & me with
her gay & vivacious personality.
Please (though the acquaintance
is short!) give her my love.
My thoughts will be much
with you during the next
two months. I cannot but believe
that your great Country will
honour itself by returning its
great leader - great in
Peace & great in War.
Yours affectionately
Wm. S. Churchill

PSF Churchill folder
1-44

C
O
P
Y

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Do you think any of these
need answers?

F. D. R.

Message No. 791 from the
Prime Minister to the President,
dated Oct. 5, 1944.

Two messages to the President
from Ambassador Harriman, dated Oct. 5,
1944.

*Copies of this memo filed:
Leahy folder, 2-44
Russia folder, 1-44.*

*PST Churchill folder
1-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Message to the President
from the Prime Minister No. 809.

Original of this letter, approved by the President, together with extra copies,
handed to Lt. Rigdon for transmittal.

11/10/44
hms

PSF Churchill folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1944.

My dear Winston,

I realize that it is very trying for many people that we should continue to prevent information from leaking out about anti-submarine methods; but our own submarine campaign in the Pacific is playing such an important role that the Barbarian will seize desperately upon any information that will help him in anti-submarine measures. I do hope, therefore, that we may continue to do all that we can to keep anyone from talking too much. I have no doubt that indiscretions are committed in our press but the enclosed has recently appeared under a London date-line.

I will do what I can to keep the lid on here and I know I may count on you for similar measures.

Cordially yours,

"F.D.R."

The Rt. Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
The Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London, England.

Copy to:

Director of OWI
Director of Censorship
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

White House File ✓

INVENTIONS GIVE U-BOATS NEW LIFE, BRITON ASSERTS.

(By Wireless to the New York Times).

LONDON, Nov. 8 - Air Vice Marshal A. B. Elwood, a senior staff officer of the Royal Air Force Coastal Command, said today that the Germans were fitting an extendable air intake to their U-Boats so that they could recharge batteries and ventilate the submarines without surfacing. This and "certain other improvements" under development have given the U-Boats a new lease on life, he added.

Between May and August, 1943, he said, the Germans lost U-Boats at the rate of thirty a month. The number in the Atlantic was reduced by almost half.

COPY

OK. original
Seibover
to map room
for Mansfield
11/18/44 6.40 PM

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE WHITE HOUSE

U. S. URGENT



THE RIGHT HONORABLE

WINSTON CHURCHILL, M. P.

PRIME MINISTER, LONDON

Early in October you were good enough to agree to defer for a while the signature of a meat contract with the Farrell regime in Argentina. Your refusal to sign a contract has helped us tremendously. It has increased the uncertainty which has driven the Colonels to a desperate condition.

We believe that if our tactics can be continued, we have a very good chance of putting an end within a reasonable time to a Fascist regime that otherwise would be a threat to the peace and security of this continent for many years to come.

I have been concerned to hear recent reports that you may shortly take up the matter of the Argentine meat contract with us again.

It is my strong personal conviction that if you sign a meat contract with the Farrell regime the consequences will be disastrous and much more far reaching than we have been able to make some of your people understand. Such action would be propagandized by the Argentine regime to demonstrate

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date NOV 1 1971



XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE WHITE HOUSE

-2-

a division between us; it would strengthen both their domestic and their international position; and because our own people feel so strongly about the Nazi threat on this continent while their sons are fighting all over the world, such action would have repercussions in the press, in public discussions, and in Congress at a most unfortunate time.

I would not, of course, urge this so strongly if it meant less meat for your people. As you know, you are getting all the meat you can carry from Argentina right now even though you have no contract, and you will recall that this was also the case for ten months prior to the signing of the last contract.

I know that we can continue to count on your help to liquidate this dangerous Nazi threat.

~~I am glad to say that our people tell me the phase two lead-lease discussions are going well.~~

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

11-17-44

RPA:CSB:mct

ARA

BC

EUR

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

1071

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 11/18

TO : Mr. Satta - The White House
 FROM : Miss Moore -
 SUBJECT :

I understand that
 this telegram should be
 sent through White
 House facilities.

Would you be good
 enough to let me
 know late in time
 of night. Thank you.
 S. D. Moore

Longhand folder
PSF Churchill 3-44

file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 20, 1944.

LONGHAND OF THE PRESIDENT:

On quotation by Abraham Lincoln,
taken from frame and given to the
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill,
the President wrote the following:-

"For Winston on his Birthday - I would
go even to Teheran to be with him again.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Nov. 30, 1944"

PS Churchill folder 1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

What do you think of sending the enclosed to Churchill and sending a copy to Eisenhower with the statement that I have sent it to Churchill for his approval and will let him know as soon as I hear.

F. D. R.

Message to Churchill re joint statement to help break down German morale.

(copy filed - Eisenhower folder, 2-44)



W.S.C.

Ever so many happy returns
of the day - I shall never
forget the party with
W.J. that evening, and
we must have those
Birthdays parties that are
ever better -

Affectionate regards

W.S.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE \$300

THE PRESIDENT

PS =
Church, 11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1944

MR. LATTA:

This should go to the State
Department to send but a copy should
also go to the Map Room at the White
House.

djb

*Copy sent - W
Map Room 12/5/44*

PSF:

Churchill folder 1-44

Original initialed "O.K. F.D.R." and
returned to Mr. Stettinius for transmittal, 12/5/44.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

THE RIGHT HONORABLE

WINSTON CHURCHILL, M. P.

PRIME MINISTER, LONDON.

I am deeply grateful for your message (No. 832 November 26, 1944) informing me of your decision to continue purchases on a month to month basis for a further six months' period. We will do everything in our power to satisfy your understanding with respect to other buyers as well as with respect to refrigerated cargo space to which you refer in paragraph four.

I am sorry about the apparent misunderstanding mentioned in the last paragraph of your message, and concerning which I, of course, had no prior information. I believe, however, that you will discover, as I did on further investigation, that the document quoted in your 833 did not refer to the matter of the meat contract, on which we exchanged messages in October, but to the general

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
NOV 1 1971
By W. J. Stewart Date _____

programming of your other imports from and exports to Argentina about which the Department of State submitted inquiries to the Foreign Office in August and September. This message was intended to be an inquiry on a matter of common interest and, of course, in a sense a threat.

I am confident, however, that this matter can readily be adjusted and I want again to thank you for your helpful message.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reply to the Prime Minister on
Argentine Meat.

I hand you herewith a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's message informing us of the British decision to continue purchases of Argentine meat on a spot basis for another six months.

We believe that there is nothing to be gained by pointing out to the Prime Minister that the gradual stiffening of our requests in this matter was prompted by our growing concern with the military-Fascist character of the Farrell regime, and by evidence that the regime would make propaganda and political capital out of the signing of a contract.


As pointed out in the second paragraph of the proposed reply, we find that the Prime Minister mistakenly interpreted the Embassy's communication of November 20 as referring to the negotiations on the meat contract. The Embassy, on instructions from the Department, was in fact trying to stimulate an answer to our inquiries of August and September on the general subject of British trade with Argentina--inquiries, incidentally, to which we have yet to receive a reply.

I am entirely confident, however, that we can straighten these matters out without troubling you further. The net result of the British action on the meat contract is all to the good.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RA/Ph Date FEB 10 1972



1300
7
January 10, 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In connection with the recent posthumous award of an American Distinguished Service Medal to Field Marshal Sir John Dill, I am sending you herewith a copy of a Joint Resolution of Congress enacted on December 20 last, appreciating the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. The fact that Congress saw fit to take this action, which is without precedent, and that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the Honorable Tom Connally, introduced the Resolution, is not only formal recognition of the great service rendered by him in promoting unity of action on the part of our respective countries, but is an evidence of a very wholesome state of mind in the midst of the bickerings that are inevitable at this stage of the war.

I think Sir John Dill rendered both our countries a great service and I am delighted to see it written clearly into the record.

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Prime Minister of Great Britain
London
England

[PUBLIC LAW 516—78TH CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 621—2D SESSION]

[H. J. Res. 317]

JOINT RESOLUTION

Recognizing the outstanding service rendered to the United Nations by Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

Whereas the Congress having been informed of the death of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, in Washington, District of Columbia, on November 4, 1944; and

Whereas the Arlington National Cemetery has been chosen as the final resting place of this distinguished soldier; and

Whereas as the Senior British representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, by his wisdom and devotion to the vital cause of British-American military cooperation, rendered a great service to the United Nations: Now, therefore, be it *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the outstanding service rendered to the United Nations by Field Marshal Sir John Dill be, and it hereby is, recognized by the American people and the Congress of the United States.

Approved December 20, 1944.

PSF: *Chair chair plan 1-14*
File
file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


January 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

Subject: Argentine Meat

I return herewith for your files the letter addressed to the President dated November 22, 1944 from Lord Halifax enclosing the special collection of communications exchanged between the President and the Prime Minister and others on the Argentine and British meat contracts which the President forwarded to me on November 24.

In order that that file might be complete, I am also attaching copies of three outgoing messages which are directly connected with the Argentine meat question.



Enclosures:

Telegrams 10178,
10004, 1761.
Letter from Halifax
of November 22 and
enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By BAK/RS Date FEB 11 1972

(COPY:RPA:MHC)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

THE WHITE HOUSE

December 5, 1944
5 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,
LONDON.
10178

Please deliver the following message: QUOTE

THE RIGHT HONORABLE

WINSTON CHURCHILL, M. P.

PRIME MINISTER, LONDON.

I am deeply grateful for your message (No. 832 November 26, 1944) informing me of your decision to continue purchases on a month to month basis for a further six months' period. We will do everything in our power to satisfy your understanding with respect to other buyers as well as with respect to refrigerated cargo space to which you refer in paragraph four.

I am sorry about the apparent misunderstanding mentioned in the last paragraph of your message, and concerning which I, of course, had no prior information.

I believe, however, that you will discover, as I did on further investigation, that the document quoted in your 833 did not refer to the matter of the meat contract, on which we exchanged messages in October,

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date FEB 11 1972

but to the general programming of your other imports from and exports to Argentina about which the Department of State submitted inquiries to the Foreign Office in August and September. This message was intended to be an inquiry on a matter of common interest and, of course, in no sense a threat.

I am confident, however, that this matter can readily be adjusted and I want again to thank you for your helpful message.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT UNQUOTE
(MVG)

STETTINIUS
(RHG)

(COPY:RPA:MHC)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

~~REPROCESSED~~

NO DISTRIBUTION - NO STENCIL

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON.

November 29, 1944
7 p.m.

10004

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY.

The President has referred to me your telegram no. 1069 of November 26 to him. At the same time the President sent me a copy of the Prime Minister's two telegrams to him nos. 832 and 833 of November 26 in regard to the Argentine meat situation. The President is of course sending a reply direct to the Prime Minister to his messages. In the meantime I want you to know how grateful all of us are for the decision of the British Government to continue meat purchases from Argentina on a month to month basis for a further six months period. We are grateful to you for the assistance which you gave us in obtaining this valuable measure of cooperation from the British Government. It is our earnest hope that before the expiration of that six month period the Argentine situation will have improved and this cancerous growth of fascism will have disappeared from this hemisphere.

I was distressed to learn that the Prime Minister and Eden interpreted our telegram no. 9738 of November 18 in a way totally different from our intention. I am all the more concerned that from the tone of your telegram to the President you apparently shared this interpretation. This telegram did not refer to the meat contract but to the question of the general programming of other British imports from and exports to Argentina. You may recall that we telegraphed you in August and September to make inquiries of the Foreign Office on this subject. We have not even yet received a reply from the Foreign Office. Our telegram no. 9738 dealt with a proposed shipment which is for the reasons set forth in that message a matter of great embarrassment and concern to us. We intended our message to be in the nature of an inquiry on a matter of common interest. We did not intend it to be in any sense a threat. In explaining this orally and informally to the appropriate British authorities I hope that you will tell them that we are still most anxious to receive their reply to our inquiries submitted in August and September in regard to the question of programming imports from and exports to Argentina.


I am sending you in a separate telegram a brief personal message to be delivered to Mr. Eden in my name in regard to this matter.

I hope that you will feel free at all times to take up with me any phase of our relations with and policy in regard to the United Kingdom. If you feel at any that we are about to take action or make inquiries which seem unwise to you I am counting on you to give me the benefit of your views.

STETTINIUS
ACTING

(COPY:RPA:MHC)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

 December 7, 1944
7 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

BUENOS AIRES (ARGENTINA).

1761

For your information, the British Prime Minister informed the President on November 26 that British meat purchases from Argentina will be continued on a month to month basis for six months from December 1, 1944. In thus agreeing to postpone the conclusion of the contract, it was also pointed out that the British desire our cooperation in keeping other buyers out of the Argentine market and in making sure that they do not (repeat not) get refrigerated cargo space.

STETTINIUS

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RH/ks Date FEB 11 1972

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22nd November, 1944.

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED]

Dear Mr. President,

The Prime Minister has asked me to place in your hands the enclosed two copies of recent relevant telegrams, on the question of Argentine meat.

It will no doubt be on the basis of these telegrams that he will be sending you a further communication himself on the subject.

Yours very sincerely,

Halifax

The Honourable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt. Telegram 112/122

By B.H.P.R. Date MAY 5 1972

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued
for the personal use of

 Copy No. /

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED
BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER,
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, MR. HULL
AND MR. STETTINIUS REGARDING
THE ARGENTINE AND THE BRITISH
MEAT CONTRACTS

30th APRIL—13th OCTOBER, 1944

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By E. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN
THE PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT,
MR. HULL AND MR. STETTINIUS REGARDING
THE ARGENTINE AND THE BRITISH MEAT
CONTRACTS

30th APRIL—13th OCTOBER, 1944

MR. HULL to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1012/4. 30.4.44.

Please communicate to the Prime Minister my gratification at the renewed expression of his intention to co-operate closely with us in the present Argentine problem. The need for consultation and parallel action is underlined by the recent manifestations of the willingness of some of the present Argentine authorities to curry popular support and increase their power at the expense of foreign capital.

We have been considerably handicapped in our efforts to develop a formula for recognition by the appearance in the press of statements to the effect that the United Nations are becoming increasingly dependent upon Argentina for supplies of food-stuffs and raw materials. I believe it is particularly important at this time that no official or semi-official statement be issued in either the United States or Great Britain encouraging the extremists in the Argentine régime by stressing bright prospects of Anglo-Argentine trade in the post-war period or by emphasising dependence of the United Nations on Argentina for food and other commodities essential to the war effort.

PRIME MINISTER to MR. HULL.

T. 1018/4. 1.5.44.

You may be sure we shall do all we can to help you in this, as in other affairs. The Foreign Office will send you a more detailed reply to-morrow morning.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1386/4. 30.6.44.

I understand that the Foreign Office is fully informed with regard to the importance which we attach to the proposal that Ambassador Kelly in Buenos Aires be recalled for consultation.

We have announced Armour's recall. Almost all of the other Republics are taking parallel action. However, it is clear beyond any question that the collective effect of this action will be seriously prejudiced if Kelly stays on in Buenos Aires.

In view of the importance of a common stand at this time, I earnestly hope that your decision will be a favourable one.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

T. 1394/4. 1.7.44.

Your No. 575.*

1. I have discussed matter with Eden and we have decided to act as you wish. Eden has telegraphed Buenos Aires recalling our Ambassador for consultation.

* T. 1386/4.

2. This decision has been taken in response to your appeal for a "common stand." There is a good deal of anxiety in the Foreign Office and War Cabinet. I do not myself see where this policy is leading to nor what we expect to get out of the Argentines by this method. I only hope it will not adversely affect our vital interests and our war effort.

3. I hope you will not mind my saying, as is my duty, that we ourselves were placed in an invidious position by this American decision, to which we are now asked to conform, being taken without consultation with us. We were faced with a *fait accompli*.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1415/4. 6.7.44.

Your 723 of 1st July, 1944,* was genuinely welcome. Your favourable decision on the recall of Kelly concurrently with us and others has already produced significant concrete results. The immediate reaction has been prompt, conciliatory and definitely in the right direction, with complete absence of irritation or threats toward any country. If we continue to stand firm, letting the Farrel Régime understand, in a tone not necessarily unfriendly, that it cannot in violation of its pledge of hemispheric unity and solidarity support the Axis in opposition to its sister nations, there is a good chance that this entire matter can soon be cleared up. It is everywhere recognised that the issue at stake in Argentina is the same as that which is involved in the war against the Axis. I am confident, therefore, that there is not any risk in pursuing a firm and forthright policy toward the Farrell Régime. Again my heartiest thanks.

* T. 1394/4.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

T. 1447/4. 14.7.44.

I ought to send you the immediately following* minute I have received from Mr. Llewellyn, the British Food Minister. We wish to do everything we can to help you and Mr. Hull with the South American countries; but we think you ought to have the formidable arguments of this minute before you. Please remember that this community of 46 millions imported 66 million tons a year before the war and is now managing on less than 25 millions. The stamina of the workman cannot be maintained on a lesser diet in meat. You would not send your soldiers into battle on the British Service meat ration, which is far above what is given to workmen. Your people are eating per head more meat and more poultry than before the war while ours are most sharply cut. I believe that if this were put before Mr. Hull he would do all he could to help us to obtain a new contract and nothing which would jeopardise its chances. I therefore hope that you will do so.

* T. 1448/4.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

T. 1448/4. 14.7.44.

Following is minute referred to in my immediately preceding telegram* :—

I am very worried at the position into which we are getting with the Argentine.

I depend upon that country for over 40 per cent. of my imported meat. If I fail to get it, the 1s. 2d. meat ration will have to be reduced by about 5d. Even a temporary loss of supplies will reduce the ration.

We are very grateful to the Americans for the meat they are sending us.

I do not believe that they can send us such an increase as to make up for the loss of our supplies from the Argentine.

In any event, such additional meat would be largely pork and we have too great a proportion of that now.

The meat we get from the Argentine is beef and mutton.

My present contract with the Argentine runs out in October. I am anxious to renew it for three to four years, in order to make sure that the people of this country will get the meat they want and need, not only for the rest of the war, but for the period of shortage afterwards.

It is going to be most difficult for me to persuade the Argentines to let me have all their exportable surplus of meat for this period, unless we can

* T. 1447/4.

surmount the present political difficulties. If we get it it will go to the common pool for allocation by the Combined Food Board. If we fail to get it both the Americans and ourselves are running the risk of those liberated countries which have foreign balances competing independently for the meat, running up the prices and thus benefiting only the Argentines.

I think, therefore, you ought to be warned now of the position which is likely to arise.

The Foreign Secretary has seen this minute and knows that I am sending it to you.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1481/4. 23.7.44.

Your 730.*

I would not do anything in the world to cut down the supply of meat of England. Heaven knows that it is already quite short enough. We would do nothing to prevent your getting a new contract.

I hope, however, that you will, in very firm, clear disgruntled tones of voice let Argentina know beyond a doubt that we are all fed up with her pro-Axis sentiments and practices. She is the only nation of North, Central and South America acting thus. I think it would help if you could instil this into their stubborn heads and, at the same time, get the meat contract. Argentina knows full well that if, on its own initiative, deliveries of meat to England were to be delayed or stopped at this time, its action would everywhere be considered a betrayal of the United Nations.

I suggest that you examine the full statement of our position on Argentina which was transmitted to Winant for delivery to Eden on Thursday of this week.

* T. 1447/4.

MR. STETTINIUS to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1559/4. 4.8.44.

Your clear and direct reference to Argentina in the Commons effectively states our common position toward the Farrell régime. It is a great contribution. There can now be no doubt in Argentina or anywhere else concerning our joint determination to stand firm on non-recognition and to see the business through until we are certain that there is no remaining vestige of Nazi power or influence in this hemisphere. The Secretary, who is away from the Department for a few days, has personally asked that I associate him whole-heartedly with this message.

PRIME MINISTER to MR. STETTINIUS.

T. 1560/4. 5.8.44.

Thank you so much for your message* and Mr. Hull for associating himself with it. Please do not forget our beef and mutton.

* T. 1559/4.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

T. 1655/4. 23.8.44.

I am thankful that you see our point about getting a new Argentine meat contract. We are going ahead accordingly with these difficult negotiations and hope that nothing will happen to hazard them. We have no wish or intention to present the Colonels with anything they can represent as a diplomatic triumph.

2. I hope that you liked my reference to Argentina on 2nd August; from all accounts Argentines do not seem to have liked it. We seem to be agreed as to objectives and I hope that we can also agree as to tactics. We will not send our Ambassador back or recognise the Argentine Government until we have discussed with you what we think the situation requires. Our Embassy have now received our views and passed them to your State Department. Now that we have said in public just what we think of the present Argentine Government I do most earnestly hope that you will ignore the Colonels for a good many weeks, thus giving both of us an opportunity to examine a common policy and the Argentines a chance to mend their ways, which they can never do under the glare of public indictment.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1679/4. 26.8.44.

Your 766.*

We are watching with sympathetic interest your efforts to get Argentina in line with our appetites, and we hope your efforts will be crowned with success. I have no doubt that a satisfactory meat contract will be arranged. After all, they must sell their beef and no other diner is in sight.

* T. 1655/4.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1709/4. 1.9.44.

In connection with the Argentine meat negotiations you have no doubt seen the message to Buenos Aires from the Argentine Ambassador in London in which the Ambassador warned his Government that its difficulties were "no longer centred on suspension of relations with the United States" and that Argentina was being placed "in a position of isolation *vis-à-vis* the Allied and friendly nations." He added that according to a "big meat packer the Allied nations are now in a position to do without Argentine meat for six months with no trouble at all and for twelve months with some sacrifice." The Ambassador also said that his information tallies with that from the Argentine commercial counsellor in Washington and with the view expressed for some time past by the Ambassador himself that the United Nations may make fewer purchases from Argentina.

Since we know that the Colonels are falling all over themselves to get you to buy their meat, I am confident that you will agree that the Ambassador's message was an extremely bad piece of news for them.

All the evidence that has come to my attention reinforces our belief that you are in an excellent position to use the negotiations to support the whole Allied stand in this hemisphere against this broad Fascist movement. You will certainly have no trouble on the beef and mutton matter in any event.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to PRIME MINISTER.

T. 1917/4. 11.10.44.

We have been informed by Winant that the Ministry of Food now intends to conclude a four-year contract for the exportable surplus of Argentine meat with prices firm for the first two years. Winant does not state whether the proposal of the Ministry of Food has been approved by the Government.

I feel very strongly that the conclusion of any contract at the present time would seriously prejudice our entire stand and would create the impression in Argentina, throughout the American Republics and in this country that we are not standing together on this important problem. Your people here in Washington have undoubtedly informed you that the position which we have taken toward Argentina has the overwhelming support of our Press and of all sectors of our public.

You will recall that your people negotiated for ten long months before you signed up your last contract with Argentina, and that was done before the Colonels took over in Buenos Aires.

For the reasons which I have expressed to you on several occasions, and which I recently expressed publicly, I hope you will continue on a month-to-month basis for some time to come. I feel that we can break this problem if we present a firm united stand during the weeks immediately ahead.

PRIME MINISTER to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

T. 1923/4. 13.10.44.

Your No. 628.*

I have given instructions to the Food Minister that no long-term contract is to be negotiated for the next couple of months or so and that we are to proceed meanwhile on a month-to-month basis, during which time we can discuss matters further. We are worried for fear that French, Belgian and presently the Dutch will come into the market with plenty of gold. Nevertheless we shall make no arrangement at present time but later on I must address you again on the subject.

* T. 1917/4.

4010

Photo

*Signed original sent to State for delivery 4/13/45; PSF
Churchill folder
1-45*

January 11, 1945.

Dear Winston:-

I thought you would like to see this copy of the Resolution by the Congress recognizing the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. The other day we had a very charming little ceremony in my office when I presented the Distinguished Service Medal to Lady Dill.

I will see you soon.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.

This was a photograph of the Joint Resolution, the original of which was approved by the President on 12/20/44.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Attached is a photograph of the Joint Resolution of Congress commemorating the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. I thought that this might be useful in connection with the suggestion made by General Marshall in his memorandum of January 2 to the President, a copy of which I enclose, to the effect that the President might forward a copy of the Resolution to the Prime Minister. I also am sending an extra photograph of the Resolution for file in the White House.

B. W. Davenport
B. W. DAVENPORT
Lt. Col., G. S. C.
Asst. Sec., Gen. Staff



January 2, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: DSM and Joint Resolution of Congress regarding the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

The DSM you awarded posthumously to Field Marshal Dill has not been presented to Lady Dill nor has she received the Resolution of Congress appreciating his services which was passed on December 20th. Copies of the citation for the DSM and of the Joint Resolution of Congress are attached hereto.

I should suggest that in view of the fact that Lady Dill is leaving shortly for England you present her with the Distinguished Service Medal and copy of the citation over your signature and at the same time hand her the Joint Resolution of Congress.

I should also suggest that you send a copy of the Joint Resolution to Mr. Churchill with some such comment as the following:

"I am sending you herewith a copy of a Joint Resolution of Congress enacted on December 20 last, appreciating the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. The fact that Congress saw fit to take this action, which is without precedent, and that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the Honorable Tom Connally, introduced the Resolution, is not only formal recognition of the great service rendered by Dill in promoting unity of action on the part of our respective countries, but is an evidence of a very wholesome state of mind in the midst of the bickerings that are inevitable at this stage of the war.

"I think Dill rendered both our countries a great service and I am delighted to see it written clearly into the record."

(Signed) G. C. MARSHALL

CHIEF OF STAFF

1/16/45

MEMORANDUM:

In view of the fact that the President personally dictated a letter to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, transmitting a photograph of the Joint Resolution recognizing the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the attached draft was not sent. This action taken with Miss Tully's approval.

hms

January 8, 1945

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED TO THE
PRESIDENT.

E. W. [unclear]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


January 10, 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In connection with the recent posthumous award of an American Distinguished Service Medal to Field Marshal Sir John Dill, I am sending you herewith a copy of a Joint Resolution of Congress enacted on December 20 last, appreciating the services of Field Marshal Sir John Dill. The fact that Congress saw fit to take this action, which is without precedent, and that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the Honorable Tom Connally, introduced the Resolution, is not only formal recognition of the great service rendered by him in promoting unity of action on the part of our respective countries, but is an evidence of a very wholesome state of mind in the midst of the bickerings that are inevitable at this stage of the war.

I think Sir John Dill rendered both our countries a great service and I am delighted to see it written clearly into the record.

Always sincerely,



The Prime Minister of Great Britain
London
England

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

PSF Churchill folder 1-45
INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DD-1987 *dup file*


PLAIN
London

file confidential

Dated January 18, 1945

Rec'd 5:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
US URGENT
669, Eighteenth



The following is a correct and complete version of the Prime Minister's speech delivered in the House of Commons today: (Please have copies sent to the White House, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy:)

The Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill): I gathered that it was the desire of the House that there should be a further discussion of the war and foreign situations and policies at this time, before any new important international conferences take place. I will try to survey the whole--I cannot say the whole, but large and select portions--of this vast scene to the best of my ability. It has fallen to the hard^{lot} of Britain to play a leading part in the Mediterranean, and particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. We have great responsibilities, and we have made great exertions, there. In Italy the British, or British-Controlled, Divisions under

-2- 7669, eighteenth, from London. 1944.

Divisions under Field Marshal Alexander's command, and still more if the whole area of the Mediterranean is included, outnumber three-fold those of the United States. There is battle along the whole front in Italy, and behind the front, in the hard-stricken peninsula, are many economic and political difficulties. The old structure, with its hateful rigours has been destroyed, and in its place we have had to raise a government of improvisation. We have the Bonomi Government, which has been trying to do its best under extraordinary difficulties, but which of course has no electoral authority behind it. But now, at any time perhaps in a few months, perhaps much sooner--, for no one can tell what is proceeding in the minds of the German war leaders--The Germans will be driven out of Italy, or will perhaps withdraw; and immediately the great populous districts of the north, the cities of Turin, Milan, and other centres of industry and activity and a large population of all kinds of political views but containing great numbers of vehement, or violent politicians, and in touch with brave men, who have been fighting and maintaining a guerrilla warfare in the Alps, all these will be thrown--probably at a time when the northern regions have been stripped bare of food by the retreating

-3-1969, Eighteenth from London

food by the retreating Germans--hungry upon the fragile structure of the Italian Government in Rome, with consequences which cannot be accurately foreseen, and certainly not measured.

Now necessary it is for Britain and the United States, who bear the chief responsibilities, to maintain the closest and most intimate contact in the solution of all these new problems. Let me say once and for all that we have no political combinations, in Europe or elsewhere, in respect of which we need Italy as a party. We need Italy no more than we need Spain, because we have no designs which require the support of such powers. We must take care that all the blame of things going wrong is not thrown on us. This, I have no doubt, can be provided against, and to some extent I am providing against it now.

We have one principle about the liberated countries, or the repentant satellite countries which we strive for according to the best of our ability and resources. Here is the principle. I will state it in the broadest and most familiar terms: Government of the people, by the people, for the people set up on a basis of free and universal suffrage election, with secrecy of the ballot and no intimidation. That is and has always been the policy

-4-#669, Eighteenth: from London"

been the policy of this government in all countries. That is our only aim, our only interest, and our only care. It is to that goal that we try to make our way across all the difficulties, obstacles and perils of the long road. Trust the people, make sure they have a fair chance to decide their destiny without being terrorized from either quarter or regimented. There is our policy for Italy, for Yugoslavia and for Greece. What other interests have we than that? For that we shall strive and for that alone.

The general principle which I have enunciated guides us in our relations with Yugoslavia. We have no special interest in the political regime which prevails in Yugoslavia. Few people in Britain I imagine are going to be more cheerful or more downcast because of the future constitution of Yugoslavia. However, because the King and the Royal Yugoslav Government took refuge with us at the time of ^{the} German invasion we have acquired a certain duty towards the government and peoples on the other side of the Adriatic which can only be discharged in a correct and formal manner such as, for instance, would be provided by a plebiscite. I am the earliest outside supporter of Marshal Tito. It is more than a year since in this House I extolled his Guerilla virtues to

-5-#669, Eighteenth from London

Guerilla virtues to the world. Some of my best friends and the Honorable and gallant member for (*) Preston (Major Churchill) is there with him or his forces now. I earnestly hope he may prove to be the saviour and the unifier of his country, and he is undoubtedly at this time its undisputed master.

Recently Bulgaria and Rumania have passed under the control of the Soviet Military authorities and Russian-controlled armies are in direct contact with Yugoslavia. As we feared that there might be misunderstandings and contrary policies between us and the Soviet Government about Yugoslavia, which can easily arise when armies enter a country which is in great disorder, the Foreign Secretary and I reached at Moscow an understanding with Marshall Stalin by which our two countries pursue a joint policy in these regions, after constant discussions. This agreement raised no question of divisions of territory or spheres of interest after the war. It arrived only at the avoidance, during these critical days, of friction between the great Allies. In practice I exchanged telegrams on behalf of His Majesty's Government personally with Marshall Stalin about the difficulties which arise, and about what is the best thing to do. We keep

President Roosevelt

-6- #669, Eighteenth from London

President Roosevelt informed constantly.

In pursuance of our joint policy, we encouraged the making of an agreement between the Tito Government, which, with Russian assistance, has now installed itself in Belgrade, and the Royal Government of Yugoslavia, which is seated in London, and recognized by us as, I believe, by all the powers of the United Nations. Marshal Stalin and His Majesty's Government consider that agreement on the whole to be wise. We believe that the arrangements of the Tito-Subasic agreement are the best that can be made for the immediate future of Yugoslavia. They preserve the form and the theme of monarchy pending the taking of a fair and free plebiscite as soon as conditions allow. King Peter II agrees in principle with these arrangements, but he makes certain reservations. The nature and effect of these are, I understand, at present under discussion. I should hesitate to prophesy or to promise how all this will turn out, but in all the circumstances, and having regard to the chaotic conditions arising out of this war, I do not see what else except this Tito-Subasic agreement could be done by His Majesty's Government and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics than to contribute what they can to bringing about the widest possible measure of agreement among Yugoslavs, and to ensure that these

-7- #669, Eighteenth from London

ensure that these issues should not become a cause of friction among Allies. It is a matter of days within which a decision must be reached upon this matter, and if we were so unfortunate as not to be able to obtain the consent of King Peter, the matter would have, in fact, to go ahead, his assent being presumed. The King's point of view, as I understood it was that he was anxious about becoming responsible, while he had no power, for any severities or confiscations which might take place in his country before the plebiscite decided whether it was to be a monarchy or a republic. Such scruples must be respected, but cannot necessarily, in these times, indefinitely prevent the march of events.

From the troubles of Italy and Yugoslavia we come naturally to those of Greece. Once again we are guided by our simple policy: victory against the Germans; the establishment of and aid to the most coherent and substantial government machine that can be found; the delivery of such food as we and our Allies can spare and our combined shipping afford; the maintenance of tolerable conditions of law and order; and the holding of plebiscites or general elections fairly and squarely-- then exit at the earliest practicable moment. We toil through a mighty

-8- #669, Eighteenth from London

mage but I can assure the Committee it is not without plan. The story of events in Greece has been told so fully in the newspapers that I shall not attempt a chronological or descriptive account--(Interruption). I beg that I may not be interrupted. Every two or three minutes the Honorable member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) who receives exceptional courtesy in this House thinks it necessary to assert himself by making some half-inaudible and occasionally partially-intelligent interruption. I do not think that is in accordance with the wish of the Committee or the conditions of our debate.

I said that I should not attempt a long chronological account but there is no case in my experience certainly not in my war-time experience where a British government has been so maligned and its motives so traduced in our own country by important organs of the press or among our own people. That this should be done amid the perils of this war now at its climax has filled me with surprise and sorrow. It bodes ill for the future in which the life and strength of Britain compared to other powers will be tested to the full not only in the war but in the aftermath of war. How can we wonder and still less how can we complain of the attitude of hostile or indifferent newspapers in

the United States

-9-#669, Eighteenth from London

the United States when we have in this country witnessed such a melancholy exhibition as that provided by some of our most time-honoured and responsible journals-- and other to which such epithets would hardly apply. Only the solid and purposeful strength of the national coalition government could have enabled us to pursue unflinching and unyielding the course of policy and principle on which we were and are resolved.

But our task hard as it was has been and is still being rendered vastly ^(more?) are difficult by a spirit of gay reckless unbridled partisanship which has been let loose on the Greek question and has fallen upon those who have to bear the burden of government in times like these. I have never been connected with any large enterprise of policy about which I was more sure in mind and conscience of the rectitude of our motives of the clarity of our principles and of the vigour precision and success of our action than what we have done in Greece.

We went to Greece for the second time in this war. We went with the full approval of both our great Allies. We went on the invitation of a Greek Government in which all parties even the Communists were represented and as a result of a military conference at which the
generals of Elas

-10- #669, Eighteenth, from London

generals of Elas and of Edes were equally present. We came with good gifts in our hands stability and assistance to the all-party Greek Government who were formed and had to face the confusion left by the flight of the Germans. We brought food clothing and supplies. We came with a small force of troops. We took up our positions from no military point of view scattering and spreading our troops in a number of places on the coast and at small points inland where we hoped to be able to pour in the largest numbers of supplies as quickly as possible to a very hungry people. We were received with flowers and cheers and other expressions of rapture and we British the wicked British--so denounced by the American correspondents whose names have no doubt been noted by the House and so hounded by some of our own--busied themselves in the distribution of supplies throughout those parts of the country to which we had access.

We had made Greece safe for UNRRA before the outbreak took place. Meanwhile for a period of six weeks or so the Greek Government representative of all parties were distracted by internal divisions and street demonstrations and all the time the Communist-directed forces were drawing down from the north and infiltrating into the city of Athens in which they

had also a

-11- #669, Eighteenth, from London

had also a strong local faction. We had furnished these men for several years with arms in considerable quantities in the hope that they would fight against the Germans. They accepted the arms and they kept them and other arms they procured from the Italians and the Germans in their retreat-- captured or bought or otherwise obtained--and they kept them with a plan to seize the power of the Greek state in Athens once the Germans cleared out and went away. (Interruption) I cannot guarantee to carry unanimous opinion with me at every stage in the discussion of what is admittedly the most controversial matter of the hour in British policy.

I must speak a little about these Greek Communists among whom Macedonian and Bulgarian elements are also found possibly with territorial ideas of their own. They are a very formidable people. They have a theme and ^a policy which they pursue by merciless methods while all sorts of other people in these regions have only been trying to keep body and soul together. I have been told that I made a mistake in under-rating the power of the Communist-directed Elass. I must admit that I judged them on their form against the Germans.

I do not wish to

-12-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

I do not wish to do them any military injustice. Of course it was not against the Germans they were trying to fight to any great extent. They were simply taking our arms lying low and awaiting the moment when they could seize power in the capital by force or intrigue and make Greece a Communist state with the totalitarian liquidation of all opponents. I was misled by the little use they were against the Germans especially once the general victory of the Allies became probable in spite of the arms we gave to them. I certainly under-rated them as a fighting force. If I am accused of this mistake I can only say with M. Clemenceau on a celebrated occasion: "Perhaps I have made a number of other mistakes of which you have not heard."

While the British were busy distributing the food and endeavouring to keep things steady the EAM and Communist ministers who were eventually increased to seven in the Papandreou cabinet were playing a different game. Throughout this has been a struggle for power. They were playing the game of the ELAS bands and of their Communist directors. While sitting in M. Papandreou's cabinet they were working in the closest combination with the forces gathering to destroy it and all that he and other colleagues represented in the every day life of
GREECE.

-13-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

Greece. EAM and Communist ministers threw sand in the wheels of the government at every stage. They did their best to hamper the landing and distribution of food by provoking strikes on some occasions. In addition they fought over every officer in the army which it was necessary for the poor state to raise--you cannot have a state without some kind of national army; I am entirely against private armies and we are not going to have private armies. Every single appointment was wrangled over in this time of crisis till the last minute and then when the moment came when the fierce mountaineers who had been so tame and idle against the Germans had got well into the city of Athens----

Mr. S. O. Davies (Merthyr): That is not true.

The Prime Minister: Well I speak according to the best information I have.

Mr. S. O. Davies: It is not true; it is a slander on the Greeks.

The Prime Minister: I have spared no pains to try to learn what I believe are the facts. I consider myself far better informed on this matter than I was a month or six weeks ago but what I have learned with great pains and patience has led me to a strengthening of my original conclusions and among them is undoubtedly the conclusion that the ELAS armed bands at any rate

for the

-14-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

for the last two years played very little part against the Germans. Now I really cannot argue with my Hon. friend. No doubt he and some of those who hold his views will have an opportunity of extolling their glorious deeds. I personally am not prepared to pay them anything like the tributes which are paid to the heroic French or Belgian Maquis or to the men in Italy who are in the mountains fighting their desperate battle. It seems to me they took aid from us with their eyes on more important local matters after the general war was over.

Every single appointment was wrangled over and when the fierce mountaineers had got well into the city and joined up with their confederates inside them all those seven ministers of the government resigned like clockwork except one whom I told the house about before who was a little late but by running very hard under the threat of death managed to keep his appointment. So far the Allies seemed very content with what had happened in Greece. Our minds rested upon its liberation from the Germans. We expected a certain amount of local ebullition while matters readjusted themselves and food could come in. After all there were other things going on at the same time. We rested on the pleasure which our early reception
in Athens

-15-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

in Athens and other Greek cities and islands had given to all of us especially to those who care deeply about Greece and her future.

Now we come to a new phase about which it was not possible to consult our Allies and upon which action had to be taken immediately. On the night of 4th-5th December I had before me a series of telegrams which showed that the advancing ELAS forces in Athens the Communists and all they could gather with them were within about 1,000 yards of the centre of Greek Government in the Hotel Grande Bretagne and also within the same distance or even less of the British Embassy into which all our womenfolk of the cipher departments and others had been gathered and it seemed that the overrunning of these places or at any rate of the seat of government by this ferocious and well-armed well-directed mob or army if you like-----

Mr. Gallacher (Fife West): Brigands.

The Prime Minister--or army of brigands if the Hon. member wishes---I shall have to tell the Committee much worse about them than that before I have finished. This was about to take place. Almost all the police stations in Athens and the Piraeus had been occupied or stormed by ELAS forces some with the slaughter of every single inmate. Firing was widespread throughout the city--

-16-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

the city--it was growing it was approaching. General Scobie signalled:

"A general strike has been declared in Athens. All power and utility services have ceased working. Unless full order can be restored the situation of the government will be critical. All British troops including the parachute brigade are being held here." We were about to take some of our troops away when this happened. The parachute brigade was needed in Italy. The hour was late or rather early--two o'clock in the morning. Orders were sent to General Scobie to take over the military command of Athens and restore and maintain order by whatever measures were necessary. If I did wrong I take the full responsibility but my colleagues are most desirous to share it with me. For three or four days or more it was a struggle to prevent a hideous massacre in the centre of Athens in which all forms of government would have been swept away and naked triumphant Trotskyism installed. I think "Trotskyists" is a better definition of these people and of certain other sects than the normal word and it has the advantage of being equally hated in Russia. However by the skin of our teeth and thanks to the resolution of the handful of British soldiers on

the spot the

-17-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

the spot the assailants were hurled back and Athens and as I firmly believe Greek freedom were saved.

On Christmas Day I thought it necessary to go to Athens with my right Hon. friend the Foreign Secretary. There was a demand from many quarters for the Regency and for the Archbishop. I was anxious to test that on the spot: I was anxious to see what could be done at the conference of all parties including of course the representatives of EAM and the Communists which I asked the Archbishop to convene in Athens. At this conference those severed by mortal hatred--mortal and living hatred--were seated around a table and found themselves united upon the Regency and in their minds at that time there was obviously only one man who could fill it. So the Foreign Secretary and I on our return laboured with the Greek King in order to procure his assent. We were successful and on 31st December Archbishop Damaskinos was invested with the royal power pending his Regency and I think with more than the royal power.

We did not seek to be consulted about his measures nor did we interfere in the choice of his Prime Minister nor in the character and composition of his government. I did not know when I left with any assurance who would be his Prime Minister or what men would be chosen by that Prime Minister and approved by him to fill the
government.

-18-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

government. I gathered however that there was a general desire to avoid merely getting the leaders of parties together but rather to pick strong and real representatives of those parties the leaders of which are very numerous and not always free from the dangers of being discredited. The Archbishop struck me as being a very remarkable man with his headgear towering up morally as well as physically above the chaotic scene. I am sure he would not have undertaken his responsibilities unless he had been free to exercise his own judgement.

He called upon General Plastiras who under his close guidance formed a government of the character I have described--Liberal Socialist Left Wing Democratic and Republican in fact as we are assured with all the modern virtues but undoubtedly violently against the Communists. People here talk of making a government of all parties and of every one being persuaded to fall upon each others necks or at any rate to work together in a sensible manner. I must admit that I had had some of these ideas when I flew to Athens on Christmas Day but the House must not suppose that in these foreign lands matters are settled as they would be here in England. Even here it is hard enough to keep a coalition together even between men who although divided by party have a

supreme

-19-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

supreme object and so much else in common. But imagine what the difficulties are in countries racked by Civil War past or impending and where clusters of petty parties have each their own set of appetites misdeeds and revenges. If I had driven the wife of the Deputy Prime Minister out to die in the snow, if the Minister of Labour had kept the Foreign Secretary in exile for a great many years, if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had shot at and wounded the Secretary of State or War or the head of one or other of the great spending departments, if we who sit here together had back-bitten and double-crossed each other while pretending to work together and had all put our own group or party first and the country nowhere and had all set ideologies slogans or labels in front of comprehension comradeship and duty we should certainly to put it at the mildest have come to a general election much sooner than is now likely.

When men have wished very much kill each other and have feared very much that they will be killed quite soon it is not possible for them next day to work together as friends with colleagues against whom they have nursed such intentions or from whom they have derived such fears. We must recognize the difference between our affairs and those which prevailed in Athens especially while
the firing

-20-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

the firing was continuous all round us. That cannot possibly be overlooked. We should have been very glad to have seen a united government set up. We left them to it with a strong urge and appeal to unite and save their country no exception being made of Communists or any one at that moment. All next day they struggled. On several occasions the entire Liberal Party left the room and were with difficulty shepherded back into their places. It was absolutely certain that no agreement to form a united front could be reached and since then far worse things have happened than had happened before.

The days passed. Our reinforcements rapidly and steadily arrived. They were found without altering the operations on the Italian front by putting I am sorry to say an extra effort on divisions which were resting and which would otherwise have gone to rest camps. But the troops accepted these duties in the most loyal and hearty spirit and have frequently expressed the opinion that the people they were fighting were even dirtier than the Germans. Street by street Athens was cleared. Progress was very slow because of the care taken to disentangle the women and children and innocent civilians who were all intermingled with people in plain clothes who were firing.

The assailants

-21-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

The assailants have fled; Attica is free; a truce has been signed giving a much larger area of peace and order around Athens and the Piraeus which are the heart of Greece and which have always been the dominant center of the life of Greece. More than one quarter of the entire population lives there and in the region now liberated. I have not the slightest doubt that in the opinions they expressed and in the views they take they represent at least four-fifths of the whole Greek nation if it could express its view with conditions of peace and normal tranquility. Fighting has ceased now except for skirmishes with parties of ELAS troops who probably have not yet heard the news in this primitive country. Now the Greek people can talk things over as they choose under the guidance of Archbishop Damaskinos who is also ready to receive and has invited the representatives of EAM or what is left of EAM in the political structure and ELAS to come to meet him.

What do we seek in Greece? Do we want anything from Greece? What part do they play in our so-called power politics? How much does it matter to us from a national point of view what form their government takes? I repeat: we want nothing from Greece but her friendship and to earn that and deserve that we have to do our
duty.

-22-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

duty. We cannot disentangle ourselves from Greece immediately after what has happened. We cannot do so until there can be either a free vote or a guarantee of a free vote under the most stringent and impartial supervision a vote of all the Greek people as to what they want in the future. Whatever they decide monarchy or republic left or right that shall be their law as far as we are concerned. When I see all the fury expended on this subject and when we are abused without one shadow of truth as far as if we wanted some islands or bases from Greece as if we needed their aid to keep ourselves alive I feel added anxiety for the future which with all its sombre and infinitely complicated problems is closing rapidly upon us.

However the "cease fire" has sounded and the rejoicings of the people of Athens have once again acclaimed the liberating British troops this time with an intense agonised fervour. At any rate there is a region where about 1,500,000 men and women can earn their daily living without fear of pillage or of being killed in street fighting. Meanwhile as a result of these events and also of the complete clearance of the city which proceeded for several weeks with heavy fighting night and day various alphabetical groups like Ska and Eld have I am informed speaking by the best available

leaders they

-23-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

leaders they have--for all is in confusion--subtracted themselves from EAM leaving now only KKE the communist in uncomfortable isolation clinging to their hostages.

Let me now read an extract from a despatch from our Ambassador Mr. Leeper whom I have seen at close quarters in difficult and dangerous circumstances and who I am bound to say has grown in stature with the tests which have been applied so severely and increasingly to him--a man now labouring with the utmost earnestness for a peace on the broadest possible basis. This is what he says:

"Ever since the Germans left the small but well-armed Communist Party"--he wrote this in a despatch a day or two ago--"--has been practising a reign of terror all over the country. Nobody can estimate the number of people killed or arrested before the revolt in Athens actually began but when the truth can be known there will be terrible stories to tell. When the fighting began in Athens the brutalities increased rapidly. Men women and children were murdered here in large numbers and thousands of hostages were taken dragged along the roads and many left to die. Reports from Salonika show that much the same things was happening there."

Mr. A. Bevan (Ebbw Vale): on a point of order. I understand that the right Hon. Gentleman was quoting

from a

-24-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

from a document sent to him by the British Ambassador in Athens. May I be allowed to ask that the papers be laid upon the table?

The Prime Minister: It is fully within the rights---

Mr. A. Bevan: The right Hon. Gentleman is not the chairman.

The Chairman (Major Milner): The Hon. Gentleman has put a question to me. The answer is that except in matters where it is against the public interest it is usual to lay such documents on the table.

Mr. Gallacher: I want to ask if it is in order for the Prime Minister to quote from one of his own speeches 25 years ago about Soviet Russia?

The Prime Minister: Evidently the chance remark which I made the other day to the Hon. Member has stung him deeply. I shall continue to probe carefully the exact political shade which he adopts. With regard to this document I think I should be quite ready to lay the telegram which I quoted.

A Mr. Bevan: The whole document?

The Prime Minister: The whole document subject to anything that may be excluded on the grounds of the public interest.

Mr. Bevan: On account of public security?

The Prime

-25-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

The Prime Minister: Yes, on account of public security. There is a good deal more in it than I have read out. Some of the news may not be any more palatable to the Hon. Member.

Mr. Bevan: But we still want it.

The Prime Minister: I am not accepting it at all as an absolute rule that in time of war documents can be quoted without the most careful survey by the government. That is absolutely necessary. In times when blue books were given to the House even in peace frequent excisions were made and indicated by dots by ministers responsible for the safety of the country.

There is another tale told by a British officer Lieut-Colonel H. G. Morrison the King's Royal Rifle Corps who obtained his information by personal cross-questioning of a large number of hostages whom he met at a field dressing station.

The Colonel said: "on Christmas Day"--I will lay this too--

"A column of hostages composed of men and women dragged from their homes by the insurgents moved northwards from Athens. They were collected in one suburb and after most had been relieved of their footwear and many of their overcoats they were driven in dead of winter along the mountain roads covered with snow. Every day some
died of

-26-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

died of exhaustion and others were executed. For food these miserable bare-footed hostages were left entirely to their own resources. The inhabitants in villages from whom they begged food were mostly too terrorized to do more than look on in impotent sympathy. When their starvation became acute ELAS proposed to buy them food if they supplied the money. The equivalent of about 100 pounds sterling was raised but all they received in return was one half loaf of bread each. A favorite trick of the ELAS guards was to assemble these bewildered people and inform them that after so many hours march they would find a billet a hot meal and a bed. After several days of this they fully realized they would be lucky if they found room on the floor of a stable with no promise of food of any description.

Two characteristic details. A woman discovered to have money was deprived of it and shot. When other hostages protested the guards justified themselves by asserting that she had been working for the British. One man managed to extract a gold tooth from his mouth and barter it for a little food. A few fortunate stragglers from this column were picked up in the last stages of exhaustion their bare feet in ribbons. Hitherto those no longer able to walk had been executed; but their

-27-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

but their guards were in a hurry and received warning that the British armed patrols were on their tail."

Mr. Gallacher: Tell me the old old story.

The Prime Minister: The Hon. Member may not only have the pleasure of having it told to him but of reading it in the document.

Mr. Bowles (nuneaton): Did the Colonel see all this himself?

Sir John Wardlaw-Milne (Kidderminster): Are not these the facts?

Mr. Gallacher: We have heard all those lies before.

Hon. Members: Order.

The Prime Minister: The Hon. Member continues to presume. I am reading the facts and he does not like the facts. I am telling him the truth and he fears the truth. These facts reflect on those whom he has so thoughtlessly championed and I will give him further warning. There is a great deal more to come and I think that the committee has a right to hear it. (interruption) When I quote from the Colonel of the King's Royal Rifle Corps and say he gathered his information from the advanced dressing station where he examined a number of these victims the Hon. Gentleman opposite immediately tries to suggest it is all some fake propaganda. He did not use those words but the whole sense of his interruption was to cast

-28-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

was to cast doubt on an officer who has not the slightest interest political or otherwise to do anything but collect gäther and convey the truth. Mr. LEEPER adds:

"This is the story of one column of 800 hostages of whom about 200 were dead within 10 days. The total number seized runs into thousands and includes many reputable men and women well known to the Greek public. A good many survivors have now returned to Athens to tell a similar tale."

The following is an eye-witness report by another British officer. I cannot give his name. I have telegraphed for it and I will lay it before the committee shortly afterwards. He says:

"Whilst at Peristeri (an Athens suburb) interrogating ELAS prisoners I was informed by civilians and national guards that a great many hostages had been executed by ELAS and buried in ditches on the outskirts. I proceeded to the place where exhumation of bodies had begun and interrogated the cemetery guardian. According to his statement batches of 15 to 20 hostages were brought to the northeast corner of the cemetery every day by ELAS and murdered; Their bodies were then buried in some disused trenches. This system of trenches which covers some 200 yards is now filled with earth but trial diggings have uncovered bodies along most of its length. Further to the north and northwest are more trenches and pits which
according to

-29-#669, Eighteenth, from London.

according to the guardian also contain bodies of hostages who were executed there. He estimates that in all 1,200 to 1,500 people were executed mostly with knives or axes. The latter testimony was borne out by partially exhumed bodies which I saw which had deep wounds in the back of the head or neck probably inflicted by a heavy knife. Apparently they were hostages taken in Athens during the early days of the fighting and who were systematically exterminated up till the ELAS withdrawal from Athens." I am sorry to trespass on the committee. This is one which only arrived this morning. It is from Consul-General Rapp who is at Salonika.

"Between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. yesterday 16th January 31 sick civilians of whom 17 to 20 were in a dying condition were removed by ELAS from the municipal hospital at Salonika loaded on to bullock carts in their pajamas (some had pajama trousers only) and taken off to Verroia. Facts are verified by Mme. Riadis and M. Zannas of the Greek Red Cross who followed the convoy in a car a few hours later and distributed blankets. It is probable that several have already died from exposure. British military authorities are taking all possible steps to secure their immediate return."

Three days ago the roads leading out of Salonika were crowded with long columns of horse and bullock-drawn
vehicles

-30- #669, Eighteenth, from London

vehicles which had been brought in from the countryside and had left with much booty and loot having stripped bare every house rich or poor in which they could find anything worth carrying away. I know perfectly well that the Hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) would not stand for anything of this kind. I know that he would not but would rather throw away the great advantages in an argument that stand for one moment for inhumanity. I am not trying to suggest that Hon. Gentlemen opposite even those who are most excited are in any way associating themselves with this sort of thing and therefore I am taking great pains to show what has been going on and is going on in order that they may carefully watch their steps and choose their language in such a way as to keep themselves clear of all taint of approbation.

I give my warning to what I must call the ELAS-ites in this country and elsewhere. The prisoners are coming home and the truth is coming out. Two horrible stultifications await them. First the revelation and proof of the atrocities committed by those whom they have found it their duty to defend and secondly a great surprise is going to come upon them in the vote which the

Greek people

-31- #669, Eighteenth, from London

Greek people will give about these matters when our purpose of free election has been achieved. I would warn the committee that if we are going to tear ourselves asunder in this island over all the feuds and passions of the Balkan countries which our arms and those of our Allies have liberated we shall be found quite incapable of making our influence count in the great settlement which awaits the end of the war. It is, I believe the intention of the Regent and of General Plastiras to broaden the government continually but we really must leave this process to them and not try to interfere with it from day to day.

It is only fair for me to tell the committee that I do not believe that any of the existing authorities in Athens will ever work as colleagues with the Communist leaders who assailed the city and brought as they think all these miseries upon Greece. There is a violent feeling throughout the liberated area that there should be no amnesty. Even when we were there 3 weeks ago and when we held only a small part of the city most of the roads were dangerous. There were bands of men marching about poor clad men with placards bearing the words "no amnesty." Passions there are tense and I am told
that they

that they tend to become more tense because of questions and answers in this House. We try to allay those passions as much as we can. The Government have been committed by me to the principle of "no proscription." That means that no person whether ringleader or otherwise shall be punished for his part in the recent rebellion unless he is found guilty by a properly constituted court of personal breaches of the laws of war or of the private crimes for which ordinary felons are punished. This principle has been accepted by the Greek Government and all statements to the contrary are over-ridden. Any statement which does not conform to it is over-ridden by the quite definite agreement which I made on the spot in respect of these matters and which I have every reason to believe will be maintained. It is quite possible that General Plastiras under tremendous pressure of people boiling with rage and bursting for revenge may have used some sentences which do not correspond or seem not to correspond with the interpretation which I have placed upon it. But the position of His Majesty's Government has been definitely taken up and our opinion is I am sure one which will be treated with respect and consideration by the Greek Government who are so largely dependent upon our armed forces for their existence.

Mr, Bevan:

-33- #669, Eighteenth, from London

Mr. Bevan: This is of the utmost importance. The Right Hon. Gentleman may have heard that statements are being made to the effect that the Government are already weeding out from the administration in Athens any of those persons who recently sympathised with EAM. I do not say it is true because I do not know what the Right Hon. Gentleman knows. Would he make it quite certain that British arms will not be used to sustain a government which does not honour in full the law and the pledge he has now given to the House?

The Prime Minister: I think there is a great difference between putting people to death for the crime of rebellion or bringing them to penal processes and making sure that your government departments are not full of people who are working for the other side. I am dealing with the whole question of amnesty which relates to the penal processes of law such as imprisonment or sentences of death and an amnesty certainly does not mean that persons who are not trusted by the government of the day will immediately be made Cabinet Ministers or that employees who were found to have left their posts in the crisis and taken part in the fighting on the opposite side to the government of the day should be reinstated

-34- #669, Eighteenth, from London

be reinstated or left in their positions. No one can stand for that and I want to be very careful not to lead the Hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale into any ideas that I am promising something that goes beyond the actual words I have used.

As I say this principle which I have advised has been accepted by the Greek Government and I have no doubt it will be observed while any of our forces remain in the country but after that Greece will be completely free and sovereign and I cannot tell at all by what terrible feuds the wrangle may be carried on. There is, however, one further reservation which I must make. The promise of "no proscription" or amnesty-- whichever term you prefer--is dependent as we see it upon the treatment and delivery of the hostages and no amnesty could be declared while the hostages were held in the grip of ELAS we thought it better that the fighting should stop. It is always a good thing for the firing to leave off in a case like this when you wish to reach a parley. We thought it better for the fighting to stop and that whatever parley took place about hostages would go on more quickly after firing left off than before. But let there be no mistake the name of
Britain and

-35- #669, Eighteenth, from London

Britain and the honour of our country are deeply engaged in this matter of hostages. We cannot let it be said that we made arrangements for all our people to be saved and left anything from 5,000 to 10,000 Greeks men women and children to be carried off to the mountains by ELAS and its remaining associates to be used as a weapon of blackmail not merely to procure their own immunity from the crime of rebellion--for that as I have said is open to them if they take the proper course--but to be used to procure for them political advantages.

I tell the House quite plainly that His Majesty's Government will discharge their obligations however painful with complete integrity whether it is popular or not to do so and that we shall not hesitate to rescue these hostages and punish their slaughter or maltreatment if we are to continue to hold office under the crown.

The Chairman: The sitting will be suspended until 2:15 p.m.

Sitting suspended.

On resuming.

The Prime Minister: I finished before lunch dealing with the Greek question and I quoted a statement by a British officer about the bodies which were being dug up. I had not got his name then but it has since arrived
by telegraph

-36- #669, Eighteenth from London

by telegraph and is Captain R. F. G. Blackmer of the Royal Artillery. He gave an eye-witness account.

Now I turn a very different theme and story. I turn from the pink and ochre panorama of Athens and the Piraeus scintillating with delicious life and plumed by the classic glories and endless miseries and triumphs of its history. This must give way to the main battle-front of the war. In this my chief contribution will be the recital of a number of facts and figures which may or may not be agreeable in different quarters. I have seen it suggested that the terrific battle which has been proceeding since 16th December on the American front is an Anglo-American battle. In fact however the United States troops have done almost all the fighting and have suffered almost all the losses. They have suffered losses almost equal to those on both sides in the Battle of Gettysburg. Only one British army corps has been engaged in this action. All the rest of the 30 or more divisions which have been fighting continuously for the last month are United States troops. The Americans have engaged 30 or 40 men for every one we have engaged and they have lost 60 to 80 men for every one of ours. That is a point I wish to make. Care must be taken in telling
our proud

-37- #669, Eighteenth from London

our proud tale not to claim for the British army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war and will I believe be regarded as an ever famous American victory.

I never hesitate as the committee I think will bear me witness to stand up for our own soldiers when their achievements have been cold-shouldered or neglected or overshadowed as they sometimes are but we must not forget that it is to American homes that the telegrams of personal losses and anxiety have been going during the past month and that there has been a hard and severe ordeal during these weeks for our brave and cherished ally. This implies no disparagement of our own exertions for we ourselves a month or two earlier lost 40,000 men in opening the scheldt. The bulk of our army on this occasion when Von Rundstedt attacked was separated by scores of miles from the impact of the new offensive. They could not possibly have been moved into battle in large numbers without criss-crossing the lines of communication and creating utter confusion. The British Army stood and stands in its northern position between the enemy and Antwerp in a strategic attitude capable of averting all possibility of a major disaster. Our armies are under the supreme

command of

-38-#669, Eighteenth, from London

command of General Eisenhower and we march with discipline wherever we are told to go.

According to the professional advice which I have at my disposal what was done to meet Von Rundstedt's counterstroke was resolute wise and military correct. A gap was torn open as a gap can always be torn open in a line hundreds of miles long. General Eisenhower at once gave the command to the north of the gap to Field Marshal Montgomery and to the south of it to General Omar Bradley. Many other consequential movements were made and rightly made and in the result both these highly skilled commanders handled the very large forces at their disposal in a manner which I think I may say without exaggeration may become the model for military students in the future.

Field Marshal Montgomery at the earliest moment acting with extraordinary promptitude concentrated powerful British reserves at the decisive strategic point. Having been placed in command as he was by General Eisenhower of American forces larger than those he holds from His Majesty's Government or from the Canadian's larger than those he holds in the 21st

Army Group

-39-#669, Eighteenth, from London

Army Group he fell unceasingly on the enemy in the north and has fought the battle all the time from that part of the assailed front. The United States First Army which was one of the group of armies under General Omar Bradley was severed by the inroad. It was reinforced with extraordinary military efficiency from the Metz area by General Patton's army who hurled themselves on the intruders from the south side of Bastogne. But all the movements of the commanders would have been futile but for the bravery of the troops. General Omar Bradley was commanding American troops and so was Field Marshal Montgomery. All these troops fought in magnificent fashion and General Eisenhower balancing the situation between his two commanders gave them both the fairest opportunity to realise their full strength and quality. Let no one lend himself to the chatter of mischief-makers when issues of this most momentous consequence are being successfully decided by the sword.

Lest it should be thought that the British Commonwealth and Empire are not playing their part in the battle of the Continent or in the general war let me

give a few

-40-#669, Eighteenth, from London

give a few facts and figures. We are maintaining at the present time in the field and in our garrisons the equivalent of upwards of 100 divisions apart from the vast Navy and Air Forces and all the workers in the munitions shops. Many of course are not mobile but 67 of them are at the front and in constant or frequent contact with the enemy. We are fighting incessantly on three separate fronts in Northwest Europe in Italy and in Burma. Of all the troops landed in France the losses sustained in fighting by the British Army and the United States troops have been very level in proportion to the numbers engaged. Of course there are over twice ^{as many} American troops on the western front as there are troops of the British Commonwealth. We in fact have lost half as many as our American Allies.

If you take killed only British and Canadians have lost a larger proportion than the United States heavier though the United States losses are. We have taken measures which I announced some weeks ago to keep our armies up to the full strength whatever the losses may be and also to reinforce our divisions--I wish they were more numerous-- by supplementary units brigades

and so forth

-41-#669, Eighteenth, from London

and so forth to add to the strength of the foot who bear the brunt of two-thirds of the losses of war. We therefore felt it necessary to make this demand for movement towards and into the battle of about 250,000 additional men to be drawn from every possible source in the next few months not only men but women. However, in the combatant sphere of the anti-aircraft batteries no woman will go but a volunteer. They have practically all volunteered.

In the United States

-42- #669, Eighteenth, from London

In the United States also extreme measures have been taken. Let the Germans dismiss from their minds any ideas that the losses or set-backs of the kind we have witnessed will turn us from our purpose. We shall go on to the end however the storm may beat and for myself I do not hesitate/^{today}to give my own opinion not dissented from by the experts with whom I live in constant contact that the decisive breaking of the German offensive in the west is more likely to shorten this war than to lengthen it.

We must regard Von Rundstedt's attack as an effort to dislocate and if possible rupture the tremendous onslaught across the Rhine and Siegfried line for which the Anglo-American armies have been preparing. The Germans no doubt hoped to throw out of gear before the on-fall of the Russian armies from the east this main stroke from the west. They have certainly lost heavily in their efforts; they have cast away a large proportion of the flower of their last armies; they have made a slight and ineffectual dent on the long front. The question they will be asking themselves is whether they have at this heavy price delayed appreciably the general advance of the armies of the west beyond the period when it had been planned? This is the question which no doubt today the German headquarters are anxiously asking themselves.

I always

I always hesitated as the committee will bear me witness to speak at all about the military future but it is my hope and belief that by this violent attack in which they have lost perhaps double what they have inflicted they have in no wise delayed or still less averted the doom that is closing in upon them from the west. Harsh as it may seem to say a terrible thing to say in dealing with our own precious flesh and blood it is our interest and the American interest that the whole western front and the air everywhere at all possible flying times should be in continuous action against the enemy burning and bleeding his strength away at every opportunity and on all occasions if we are to bring this horror to an end. I think it was not necessarily a bad thing indeed it was a good thing that large parts of the western front were thrown into counter battles in open country by the enemy counter battles in the forests undulations and hills of the Ardennes rather than that all our troops should be compelled to advance at this season of the year across great rivers and seas of mud against lines of concrete fortifications. It suited the Allies that there should be as much fighting as possible in the open country rather than that the whole front should be crashing up against pillboxes.

In short as I see it the Germans have made a violent
and costly

-44- #669, Eighteenth from London

and costly sortie which has been repulsed with heavy slaughter and have expended in the endeavour forces which they cannot replace against an enemy who has already more than replaced every loss he has sustained. These German forces are needed now not only to support the German front in the west but even more to fill the awful rents only now emerging upon our consciousness as the telegrams come in which have been torn in their eastern line by the magnificent onslaught of the main Russian armies along the entire front from the Baltic to Budapest. Marshal Stalin is very punctual. He would rather be before his time than late in the combinations of the Allies. I cannot attempt to set limits to the superb and titanic events which we are now witnessing in the east or to their reactions in every theatre. I can only say it is certain that the whole of the eastern and western fronts and the long front in Italy where 27 German divisions are still held by no more than their own numbers will henceforward be kept in constant flame until the final climax is reached. The advance of the enormous forces of Soviet Russia across Poland and elsewhere into Germany and German-held territory must produce consequences of a character and degree about which the wisest strategists and the most far-sighted prophets will reserve their opinion until the results are known.

Simultaneously

-45- #669, Eighteenth from London

Simultaneously with the battle of the Ardennes another battle almost as great has been fought by the United States in the Phillipins at the other side of the world. The Phillipins and the Ardennes--two vast military episodes-- have been proceeding simultaneously. When we think of the distances to be traversed in the Pacific and the vast consumption of ships and war material entailed of the mighty fleets and air forces engaged as well as the large armies convoyed and supplied in every detail we must marvel at the triumphant military strenght of the United States now roused from its peaceful free-and-easy life to become against its desire the greatest military power in the world. We also marvel at the folly of those treacherous schemers in Japan who so wantonly called out against them this incredible manifestation of armed power. General MacArthur's recovery of the Phillipins which is in full progress many months before it was expected is a fearful warning to the Japanese of their impending defeat and ruin. We offer our congratulations to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz on the increasing success and speed of their mighty combined operations.

I cannot

I cannot pass from this subject without mentioning the loss which we have sustained and which I personally have sustained in the death in action of my representative with General MacArthus Lieutenant General Lumsden one of our most distinguished and accomplished officers the man who at the very beginning of the war in the first contact with the enemy brought the armoured car back into popularity. He was killed on the port side of the bridge of an American ship approaching Luzon by a bomb which Admiral Fraser himself the Commander-in-Chief of our gathering Navy who happened to be there as a spectator only escaped by the accident of a few seconds. There have been large losses among the high commanders in these campaigns. In Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Admiral Bertram Ramsay we have lost two out of the three British commanders of the expedition across the channel General Montgomery being the sole survivor of the three.

There is one other campaign on which we and India have extended immense effort and where good fortune has attended us--the advance of the 14th Army--not forgotten but watched carefully their movements ever attended by our thoughts. The advance of the 14th Army in harmony with the

Chinese on

-47- #669, Eighteenth from London

Chinese on its northern flank has carried them in an attack against the Japanese Army in Burma at some points almost 200 miles forward from Imphal Kohima and Myitkyina. Now is the time when all the fierce fighting at these places last year is reaping its reward. The stuffing was beaten out of the Japanese troops in these terrible conflicts in which we had very heavy losses--40,000 British Indians and others at least--and in which a far larger toll was taken by disease. I had always dreaded the new campaign in Burma this year on account of the heavy toll of disease which the march through the jungle exacts not only from the British but also from the Indians and the West and East African troops who have been fighting there with great distinction. I dreaded it for that reason and also because of the unimaginable difficulties of supply through all these hundred of miles of gorges from India where every bridge and culvert is swept away by torrential rains where rivers rise 20 to 30 feet in a few hours and over which all means of communication are so primitive and scanty.

I had always

-48- #669, Eighteenth from London

I had always dreaded the beginning of this new campaign in Burma which nevertheless it was necessary to achieve in order that having rid Burma of the invader the large forces there might acquire their mobility to act in the final stages of the war. Moreover the obstinate prolongation of the war in Europe necessarily delayed the movement to the east of many reinforcements of all kinds. Soldiers aircraft vessels of many different kinds used in amphibious operations were all delayed although Admiral Mountbatten had been led to count on them. First things have to come first. But in spite of these disappointments he and his dauntless army have made greater advances than were required or expected of them up to the present by the directives of the high command and they may well be described as "on the road to Mandalay" though I think from a different direction. This reference to the 14th Army, moreover, takes no account of the important capture of Akyab on the coast with its airfield a place for which alone a considerable expedition at one time seemed necessary. It has now been picked up out of hand by the troops of the 14th Army.

I have covered as far as I propose to do today the different military theatres of the war in which His Majesty's Forces with all their elements drawn from every part of the

British

-49- #669, Eighteenth from London

British Empire are contending without a moments surcease of slackening of effort. So it will go on--great efforts pulsating through the heart of this small island arising again all over the vast scope of the commonwealth and the Empire and not dying away even with the long fatigues monotonies and wearisome trials which the war imposes not only on the men who are fighting but on the men and women who stay at home and do all that is in them to back the soldiers at the front.

We have reached the 65th month of the war and its weight hangs heavy upon us. No one knows what stresses are wrought in these times by this long persistence of strain quite above the ordinary normal life of human society. Let us be of good cheer. Both in the west and in the east overwhelming forces are ranged on our side. Military victory may be distant it will certainly be costly but it is no longer in doubt. The physical and scientific force which our foes hurled upon us in the early years has changed sides and the British Commonwealth the United States and the Soviet Union undoubtedly possess the power to beat down to the ground in dust and ashes the prodigious might of the war-making nations and the conspiracies which assailed us. But as the sense of mortal peril has passed from our side to that of our cruel foes they gain the stimulus of despair and we tend to
lose the

lose the bond of combined self-preservation or are in danger of losing it.

There is therefore demanded of us a moral and intellectual impulse to unity and a clear conception and definition of joint purpose sufficient to overbear the fleeting reinforcement which our enemies will derive from the realization of their forlorn condition. Can we produce that complete unity and that new impulse in time to achieve decisive military victory with the least possible prolongation of the world's misery or must we fall into jargon and discord while victory is still unattained. It seems to me to be the supreme question alike of the hour and of the age. This is no new problem in the history of mankind. Very often have great combinations almost attained success and then at the last moment cast it away. Very often by the triumphs and sacrifices of armies they have reached the conference table only to cast away what has been gained. Very often the eagles have been squalled down by the parrots. Very often in particular the people of this island indomitable in adversity have tasted the hard-won cup of success only to cast it away.

I therefore consider that this is a most grave moment to address the House and it is one which affects the members of every party--and all parties have the credit of our war effort; it is no monopoly to be flung from side to side in
some future

-51- #669, Eighteenth from London

some future party dispute--we are all in this for good or ill. We all come through it together. Very often I say these troubles have arisen at a moment of success at a period when no one can doubt what the ultimate result will be and it is the duty of all parties to rouse themselves to their highest sense of their obligations and of the services which this house has already rendered to the cause of freedom.

At a time like this it is necessary to concentrate with clarity and command and mental perseverance upon the main practical issues with which we are confronted and upon which we hope and believe we are in accord with our principal allies. What for instance should be our attitude towards the terrible foes with whom we are grappling? Should it be unconditional surrender or should we make some accommodation with them through a negotiated peace leaving them free to regather their strength for a renewal of the struggle after a few uneasy years? The principle of unconditional surrender was proclaimed by the President of the United States at Casablanca and I endorsed it there and then on behalf of this country. I am sure it was right at the time it was used when many things hung in the balance against us which are all decided in our favour now. Should we then modify this declaration which was made in days of comparative weakness and lack of success now that we have reached a period of mastery and

-52- #669, Eighteenth from London

mastery and power?

I am clear that nothing should induce us to abandon the principle of unconditional surrender and enter into any form of negotiation with Germany or Japan under whatever guise such suggestions may present themselves until the act of unconditional surrender has been formally executed. But the President of the United States and I in your name have repeatedly declared that the enforcement of unconditional surrender upon the enemy in no way relieves the victorious powers of their obligations to humanity or of their duties as civilized and christian nations. I read somewhere that when the ancient Athenians on one occasion overpowered a tribe in the Peloponnesus which had wrought them great injury by base treacherous means and when they had the hostile army herded on a beach naked for slaughter they forgave them and set them free and they said:

"This was not

-53- #669, Eighteenth from London

"This was not done because they were men. It was done because of the nature of man."

Similarly in this temper we may now say to our foes "we demand unconditional surrender but you well know how strict are the moral limits within which our action is confined. We are no extirpaters of nations or butchers of peoples. We make no bargain with you. We accord you nothing as a right. Abandon your resistance unconditionally. We remain bound by our customs and our nature".

There is another reason why any abrogation of the principle of unconditional surrender would be most improvident at the present time and it is a reason by no means inconsistent with or contradictory to that which I have just given. We should have to discuss with the enemy while they still remained with arms in their hands all the painful details of the settlement which their indescribable crimes have made necessary for the future safety of Europe and of the world and these when recited in detail might well become a greater obstacle to the end of the struggle than the broad generalisation which the term "unconditional surrender" implies.

The Germans know perfectly well how these matters stand in general. Several countries have already surrendered unconditionally ^{to} the victorious Allies to Russia to Britain and the the United States. Already there is

-54- #669, Eighteenth from London

there is a tolerable life appointed for their peoples. Take Finland, take Italy: These peoples have not all been massacred and enslaved. On the contrary so far as Italy is concerned there are moments when one has almost wondered whether it was they who had unconditionally surrendered to us or whether we were about unconditionally to surrender to them. This at least I can say on behalf of the United Nations to Germany: "If you surrender now nothing that you will have to endure after the war will be comparable to what you are otherwise going to suffer during the year 1945".

Peace though based on unconditional surrender will bring to Germany and Japan an immense immediate amelioration of the suffering and agony which now lies before them. We the Allies are no monsters but faithful men trying to carry forward the light of the world trying to raise from the bloody welter and confusion in which mankind is now plunged a structure of peace of freedom of justice and of law which system shall be an abiding and lasting shelter for all. That is how I venture to set before the committee today the grave issue called "unconditional surrender" which an Hon. Gentleman opposite referred to--as he was quite entitled to do--the other day at question time,

I now come to the second of the main questions which
lie before

-55- #669, Eighteenth from London

lie before us namely to the principle which I have already dealt with in particular application to Greece Yugoslavia and Italy the question what principle should guide us in regard to countries which we and our Allies have liberated and also in regard to that quite different class German satellite states which are in one way or another working their arduous passage home. Here of course I can only speak for Britain and its special responsibility. The expression "power politics" has lately been used in criticism against us in some quarters. I have anxiously asked the question "what are power politics?" I know some of our friends across the water so well that I am sure I can always speak frankly without causing offense. Is having a navy twice as big as any other navy in the world power politics? Is having the largest air force in the world with bases in every part of the world power politics? Is having all the gold in the world power politics? If so we are certainly not guilty of these offences I am sorry to say They are luxuries that have passed away from us.

I am therefore greatly indebted to my friend the illustrious President of the United States four times summoned by the popular vote to the headship of the most powerful community in the world for his definition of "power politics" With that marvellous gift which he has of bringing troublesome issues down to earth and reducing them to the calm level of ordinary life
the President

-56- #669, Eighteenth from London

The President declared in his recent message to Congress ^{that power} /
politics were "the misuse of power." I am sure I can say
on behalf of all parties in the House that we are absolutely
in agreement with the President. We go further; we define
our position with even more precision. We have sacrificed
everything in this war. We shall emerge from it for the
time being more stricken and impoverished than any other
victorious country. The United Kingdom and the British
Commonwealth are the only unbroken force which declared
war on Germany of its own free will. We declared war
not for any ambition or material advantage but for the
sake of our obliteration to do our best for Poland against
German aggression in which aggression there or elsewhere
it must also in fairness be stated our own self-preservation
was involved.

After the defeat of France in June 1940 for more
than a year we were alone. We stood alone; we kept nothing
back in blood effort or treasure from what has now become
the common cause of more than 30 nations. We seek no
territory; we covet no oilfields; we demand no bases for
the forces of the air or of the seas. We are an ancient
commonwealth dwelling and wishing to dwell at peace with-
in our own habitations. We do not set ourselves up in
rivalry of bigness or might with any other community in
the world.

-57- #669, Eighteenth from London

the world. We stand on our own rights.

We are prepared to defend them but we do not intrude for our own advantage upon the rights of any friendly country in the world great or small. We have given and shall continue to give everything we have. We ask nothing in return except that consideration and respect which is our due and if that were denied us we should still have a good conscience. Let none therefore in our own country and commonwealth or in the outside world misname us or traduce our motives. Our actions are no doubt subject to human error but our motives in small things as in great are disinterested lofty and true. I reprove those calumnies wherever they come from that Britain and the British Empire is a selfish power-greedy land greedy designing nation obsessed by dark schemes of European intrigue or colonial expansion. I ~~reprove~~ these aspersions whether they come from our best friends or worst foes. Let us all march forward against the enemy and for the rest let all men here and in all countries search their hearts devoutly as we shall certainly continue to do.

I have tried as well as I could to cover in a time
which is

-58- #669, Eighteenth from London

which is unconscionably long for a speech but ludicrously short for the subject the more prominent features of the world war. I will just add that we must keep our eye on jet-propelled fighter aircraft on the V-rockets and above all on the renewed U-boats menace. No doubt there are other dangers but taking the position as a whole I have never at any time been able to present a more confident statement to the House of the ever-growing might and ascendancy of the United Nations or of the military solidarity of the three great Allies. Political misunderstandings and difficulties of an essentially minor rank undoubtedly confront us. That is why I was so glad to hear that the President said in public on Tuesday that he was almost immediately starting to meet me and Marshal Stalin somewhere or other and quite soon. The Foreign Secretary and I with our military and technical advisers will be present without fail at the rendezvous and "when the roll is called up yonder we'll be there."

I have great hopes of this conference because it comes at a moment when a good many moulds can be set out to receive a great deal of molten metal and also at a moment when direct advance may be made towards the larger problems which will confront

-59- #699, Eighteenth from London

which will confront the victors and above all advance towards that world organization upon which as we all know the salvation of our harassed generation and the immediate future of the world depend. We shall enter into all these discussions with your sympathy and with the confidence of your support. Whatever happened the British Nation and Commonwealth may rest assured that Union Jack of freedom will for ever fly from the white cliffs of Dover.

WINANT

JMS

Churchill memo 1-45

file

~~SECRET~~


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Exchange of Messages Between
Mr. Churchill and General Franco

I attach for your information and at the request of the British Ambassador the latter's secret memorandum of January 17. Attached to the Ambassador's memorandum is a copy of a letter from General Franco to the Spanish Ambassador at London and a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has addressed direct to General Franco, both letters involving questions relating to Anglo-Spanish relations.



Enclosure:

From British Embassy,
January 17, 1945;
with enclosures.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Order, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAY 5 1972

6549

1945 JAN 17 AM 12 40

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

JAN 17 1945

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to transmit to him a translation of the letter addressed by General Franco to the Spanish Ambassador in London for communication to His Majesty's Government, together with a copy of Mr. Winston Churchill's reply, which will be despatched to the Spanish Ambassador in the course of the next few days. It is desired that the Secretary of State be good enough to show this correspondence to the President.

2. The correspondence is also being communicated to Marshal Stalin.

J.C.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 17th, 1945


DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt. telegram 11/2/72

By R.H.D. Date MAY 5 1972


Text of Prime Minister's reply to General Franco


Your Excellency.

Your Ambassador has communicated to the Foreign Secretary a copy of your letter to the Duke of Alba in which you expressed a desire for a clarification of relations between the British and Spanish peoples, with a view to a closer and more intimate relationship in the future. I have studied this document with much interest and so have my colleagues of the War Cabinet. It is our desire that relations between the British and Spanish peoples should be close and cordial and I notice with some surprise that Your Excellency attributes such difficulties as now exist between Great Britain and Spain to the attitude of His Majesty's Government and of British public opinion and to the activities of British propaganda and British agents in Spain. I can assure Your Excellency that your assertions regarding the activities of British agents in Spain are entirely without foundation and I can only suppose that your Government has been misled by allegations of those persons whose obvious interest lies in disturbing the relations between the British and Spanish peoples. I therefore welcome all the more Your Excellency's suggestion that the time is ripe for a clarification of the position and after full consultation with my colleagues, and in the name of the War Cabinet, I take this opportunity to set out to Your Excellency in complete frankness the serious difficulties which in our view still hamper the satisfactory development of relations between our two countries.

I must first remind Your Excellency of the policy which your Government has pursued so far in the present world war as this policy has appeared to His Majesty's Government and

to the/

~~FORN DISSEM UNCLASSIFIED BY~~ British
State Dept. tel. 3-499-74
By E. H. Barks. Date MAY 5 1972



to the British public which they represent. I do not forget that Spanish policy did not oppose us at the two critical moments of the war, namely at the time of the collapse of France in 1940 and at the moment of the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in 1942. But I also remember that throughout the war German influence in Spain has constantly been permitted to embarrass the war effort of Great Britain and her Allies, and that a Spanish Division was actually sent to give assistance to our German enemies against our ally, Russia. During that period the Spanish Government openly pursued a policy not of neutrality but of non-belligerency.

His Majesty's Government have had to make many complaints against the unneutral activities in Spain which I need not now particularise since they have already formed the subject of repeated representations to your Government by His Majesty's Embassy at Madrid. I feel bound, however, to mention the arbitrary suppression in 1940 of the International Regiment at Tangier in violation of the treaties to which Spain was a party and the series of speeches in which Your Excellency disparaged this country and others among the United Nations and spoke of their defeat as being both desirable and inevitable.

Now that the war is drawing to a close, and plans are being made for the future of Europe and of the world, His Majesty's Government cannot overlook these past actions of the Spanish Government, nor can they overlook the consistently hostile attitude towards this country of the Falange party which is officially recognised as the foundation of the present state structure in Spain, nor the fact that the Falange has maintained an intimate relationship with the Nazi Party Dictatorship in Germany and with the Italian Fascists. I am however less concerned with the past than with the ^{present and the} future and my desire

is to/



is to see all the barriers moved which stand in the way of closer Anglo-Spanish relations. I had indeed been happy to observe favourable changes in Spanish policy towards this country, which began during the tenure of office of the late General Jordana, and I publicly took note of these developments in the speech which I made in the House of Commons on May 24th. Unfortunately, as Your Excellency recognises in your letter to the Duke of Alba, these developments have not yet gone far enough to remove all the barriers between our two countries. While such barriers remain, the development of really close relations of friendship and cooperation with Spain, which His Majesty's Government desires, must meet with difficulties and there can be no question of His Majesty's Government supporting open claims to participation in the eventual Peace Settlement. Nor does it seem to me likely that an invitation would be forthcoming for the admission of Spain to the future world organisation.

In Your Excellency's letter to the Duke of Alba there are several references to Russia which I cannot allow to pass without comment having regard to the relations of friendship and alliance between this country and Russia. I should be seriously misleading you if I did not at once remove any misconception that His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider any grouping of powers in Western Europe or elsewhere on a basis of hostility towards or of the alleged necessity of defence against our Russian Allies. The Policy of His Majesty's Government remains firmly based upon the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 and they regard the continuance of Anglo-Russian collaboration within the framework of future world organisation as essential not only to their own interests, but also to the future peace and prosperity of Europe as a whole.

I would/



I would in conclusion beg Your Excellency to believe that I would not have ventured to put the above case so frankly to you were it not for Your Excellency's own recently-expressed desire for a clarification of Anglo-Spanish relations, and for my conviction that the relations of friendship and cooperation between our two countries are desirable and that they can only be developed and maintained within the framework of the principles which I have set out for Your Excellency's consideration.

I am Your Excellency's faithful servant.

Winston S. Churchill.

TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM GENERAL FRANCO

To His Excellency don Jacobo FitzJames Stuart, Duke of Alba,
Spanish Ambassador in Great Britain.

My dear Ambassador and friend,

The purpose of this letter is to convey to you in frank, explicit and straightforward terms my ideas - which are those of the Spanish nation - on the subject of our relations with Great Britain, so that you may transmit them faithfully and with the utmost frankness to our good friend, the British Prime Minister.

The gravity of the European situation, and the rôle that Great Britain and Spain will be called upon to play in the future concert of Western Europe, make it desirable that we should clarify our relations, eliminating that string of complaints and petty incidents which for two years and more have put such a strain upon them.

The noble words that the Prime Minister not long ago addressed to Spain with such favourable effect upon our public opinion - and which are in keeping with that other gesture of his youth when, with such generosity of spirit, he served under the Spanish flag - are a guarantee that these anxieties of ours will be echoed in his own mind.

I find it perfectly natural that up to now substantial differences should have existed between the British outlook and the attitude which might be adopted by Spain, less burdened as she is, as a neutral country, with commitments, less exposed to passions; but, with the progress of the war, the identity of interests and of concern for the future is assuming a more definite shape, which, indeed, we see revealed in the speeches, statements and commentaries about the Prime Minister's journeyings.

Because we cannot believe in the good faith of Communist Russia, and because we are alive to the insidious might of Bolshevism, we must regard the destruction or weakening of her

/neighbours

neighbours as greatly increasing her power and ambitions and thus rendering more necessary than ever the achievement of knowledge and understanding among the countries of Western Europe.

Events in liberated Italy, and the serious plight of France, where the Government's orders are not obeyed and the maquis bands are brazenly proclaiming their intention of establishing a French Soviet Republic, for which they reckon on the support of the U.S.S.R. - all this is an eloquent commentary on these difficult days.

History teaches us, on the other hand, what has always been the end of all the talk about eternal peace and disinterested friendships: such fine high-sounding words cannot therefore represent for us anything but wishful thinking, the expression of a remote ideal, unattained and indeed unattainable.

With a Germany annihilated, and a Russia that has consolidated her ascendancy in Europe and Asia, and the United States of America similarly dominant in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as the mightiest nation of the world, the European countries surviving in a devastated Continent will be facing the most serious and dangerous crisis of their history.

I realize perfectly well that Englishmen in responsible positions are precluded by military expediency from commenting upon this aspect of the present world struggle; but the reality of the potential menace subsists.

After the terrible ordeal which Europe has endured, three of the nations with large populations and extensive resources stand out from the rest: Great Britain, Germany and Spain. But with Germany destroyed only one country remains to which Great Britain can turn her gaze: Spain. It is likely that the French and Italian defeats, and the process of internal disintegration in these countries, will make it impossible for many years to build up anything stable upon their foundations. To do so would entail the same tragic surprises that Great Britain and Germany

/respectively

respectively have experienced during the present conflict.

The deduction is clear: does it suit Britain and Spain to be on terms of mutual friendship? I have no hesitation in asserting that it does, and, the greater the destruction of the German nation, the more imperative it will be.

Having established the need for such a friendship, let us pass on to review our present relations with Great Britain. We cannot entertain any great illusions on the subject, and indeed we shall have to recognize that those relations are not exactly cordial. For, notwithstanding the generous sentiments voiced by Mr. Churchill and the good will of our own Government, there has been no dissipation of that atmosphere of uneasy hostility which is perceptible in Great Britain and which naturally leads to retaliatory action in the various sectors of Spanish opinion. Neither the British press - including Governmental organs - nor the British wireless has ceased to show periodically a hostile attitude towards Spain, her régime and even towards her Leader: sometimes the tone has been rude and peevish, and at other times they have used insidious phrasing or subtle allusions.

Of still greater importance, however, is this hostility when it is discernible in official representations or when attempts are made to justify it in terms of ideological differences - this from a nation like the British, traditionally accustomed to getting on with the various peoples of the world, whatever their system of government or their ideologies: here you have an attitude which, by its obtrusion into the domestic sphere, has roused every good Spaniard and has produced regrettable consequences in the country.

Great Britain should not forget that the relations of the present time are an immediate consequence of those of the past, and that such relations as we may now maintain are bound to have a considerable influence on those of the future.

I consider that we ought not to conceal from the British the fact that the activities of their secret service and propaganda, involving a clash with the nation's most live and most sensitive elements - the Army, the Police and the Falange with its three million active members, have had throughout the past five years a deplorable effect on our relations. We can state with positive assurance that there has been no petty intrigue nor minor disorder brought to light during these years which has not, in some way or other, been traced back to British agents.

The State had no alternative but to take appropriate measures against all underground activities on the part of foreigners, and the fact that the three elements mentioned above played a most important part in the discovery and prosecution of such activities has drawn on them the ill-feeling, if not the hatred of the foreign agents, which in its turn has provoked much indignation among our own people.

It is advisable that they should know in London that not one of the political and diplomatic stratagems contrived abroad against Spain has passed unnoticed in our country: even those matters that might have been thought to be the most confidential and secret have come providentially to our knowledge; but that the Spanish State, with a clear vision of the future and of its historical needs, has as much as possible avoided publicity and the ensuing scandal.

Another fact to be brought to their notice is that the British Intelligence Service has derived its information, at any rate in our view here in Spain - not to speak of what they may have gleaned from the Reds and malevolent politicians - from the most frivolous and ineffectual elements in the country. I fear therefore that the views and the news which Britain may have about our country are likely to be inaccurate or distorted.

Taking all this into account I have deemed it necessary for the sake of the future needs of both our countries, to try at this historic moment to clarify our relations, in an endeavour to free

/them

them from that tendentious and hostile atmosphere which is incompatible with sincere friendship in the days to come.

The present war has completely altered old ideas of strategy and of the relative strengths of the various Powers; everything has grown in size, and if the nations want to avoid unpleasant surprises, they must throw overboard ancient prejudices and strengthen their continental solidarity.

And just as it would be vain to expect that Spain should now act against her convictions and take advantage of other nations' misfortunes, thus failing in the principles of honour and chivalry that have prevailed throughout her history and have given it the stamp of nobility - principles that are summed up in the typical Spanish saying - "Nobleza obliga" - so, on the other hand, it would be only fitting that we should strive to establish closer relations and make possible common actions in the future.

It is worth emphasising that Spain is a country of strategic importance, and that the Spanish people are sound, virile and chivalrous; that she has given proof of her spiritual reserves and her resources of courage and energy; that she has the will to exist, without harbouring base ambitions, loves peace and knows how to maintain it; that she believes it to be in her own interest and in that of Great Britain that they should establish mutual understanding, for she appreciates the value of British friendship while fully conscious of the value of her own; that she considers this understanding and future friendship to be possible, but believes, nevertheless, that it could not be effective or lasting if confined to a mere enunciation in lifeless words, without a complete change in the premises of our relations, if there is a lack of sincerity, of good faith or of the firm determination to achieve that mutual understanding; it could not endure if, because of old jealousies and the old spirit of domination arousing suspicion of the increasing greatness of the friend and partner, if we could not remove, at whatever sacrifice, the differences that divide us.

To conclude - I think you must make one thing quite clear, in view of the activities of bad Spaniards who from outside the country speculate on the possibility of internal changes, and who, relying only on the strength of their passions, might fancy they could effect a rapprochement by giving Britain a better bargain, - the very idea is so fantastic that we ought not even to discuss such a possibility - you must emphasize that any such hypothetical change of régime, I say this with all due emphasis, would serve the interests of Russia alone. In foreign affairs all of us responsible Spaniards think alike, and history shows that it is not so difficult to win Spain's friendship and her heart.

After laying bare to you frankly and faithfully my ideas, it only remains for me to entrust to your patriotism and active intelligence the task of conveying these sentiments to the man upon whose shoulders rests the greatest responsibility for the future of Europe.

With sincere affection

(Signed) Francisco Franco

Palace of El Pardo, 18th October, 1944.



DSF Churchill folder 1-45
31 m to me at Alexandria. Egypt
FJR

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

15 February, 1945.

My dear Franklin,

Thank you for your letter of February 11
about Italy.

Weighty questions are raised in your letter,
and I should like to consider them at leisure and
send you my considered views after my return to
London.

Yours sincerely
Winston S. Churchill

The President
of the United States of America.

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

Churchill order 1-45-
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

MES-1009
file

PLAIN

London

Dated March 1, 1945

Rec'd, 5:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2126, First

Press today announces impending visit by Mrs. Churchill to Russia on Red Cross mission. TIMES carries it in following item: "Mrs. Churchill has accepted an invitation from the Soviet Government and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR to visit Russia. She has arranged to go early in the spring. In conveying the invitation M. Gusev the Soviet Ambassador in London said that arrangements would be made for Mrs. Churchill to acquaint herself with the work of the Soviet Red Cross and with the hospitals and medical institutions of the Soviet Union. This will be Mrs. Churchill's first visit to Russia. She inaugurated the Red Cross aid to Russia fund which up to the end of last year had raised over pounds 6,000,000 and shipped about 13,000 tons of medical supplies to the USSR."

Please bring this message to attention of White House.


WINANT

RB



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1945.



MEMORANDUM FOR

JIMMY BYRNES:

Do you think this is all
right? Shall I send it?

F.D.R.

(Originals of attached correspondence sent
to Justice Byrnes.)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

5 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Food Relief for Belgium and Liberated Holland.
(Telegram Number 902 dated 2 March 1945 from
the Prime Minister to the President).

1. The Prime Minister advises in reply to your telegram Number 710 of February 28, 1945, on the above subject, that the March and April deficiencies of 109,000 tons of foodstuffs for Belgium and southern Holland will be met in large part from U. K. stocks. The Prime Minister states that his Government will require immediate replacement of a large part of these foodstuffs and the provision of ships to carry them, and he adds that he is sure that the problem will turn out to be bigger than these figures.

2. Eisenhower has estimated civilian relief requirements for Northwest Europe in excess of one and one-half million tons for June, July and August for subsistence alone. He has been advised by the Combined Chiefs (LEM 519, March 1, 1945) that more than 772,000 tons have been allocated for procurement responsibility. Of this amount, only 20 tons have been assigned to the United Kingdom, the remainder being United States procurement responsibility. There is a serious question whether shipping availabilities and the inland transport situation in the United States, in the light of other operational commitments, will make it possible to deliver the quantities in the

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By Authority of SEC ARMY

BY TAG PER 720214

By RDR Date MAY 5 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

time periods desired by Eisenhower. The balance of Eisenhower's civil relief requirements are now under urgent consideration.

3. In the light of these facts, it is recommended that you transmit to the Prime Minister a communication urging that discussions be resumed immediately looking toward the use of United Kingdom stocks. There is attached a draft of such a message.

Secretary of War.

Incl.

Draft of above mentioned communication (President to Prime Minister).

STAFF
FILE 100-1000

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT

DRAFT

DRAFT

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER

FDR

Box 7

Reference your telegram Number 902 of 2 March 1945.

1. I am gratified to learn that you are making arrangements to meet the March and April deficiencies for the 21st Army Group from U. K. stocks.

2. I share your concern that the problem will prove to be larger than the figures involved in this emergency. I am also very much concerned about the problem of the replacement of your foodstuffs as well as provision of the necessary ships. It seems to me now imperative that discussions be resumed in the immediate future as to these questions and as to the availability of foodstuffs from sources in U.K. and elsewhere in addition to United States.

3. Eisenhower's estimates of future requirements for Northwest Europe are of such large proportions that they present most difficult problems of shipping availability and inland transport in the United States. Of the 772,000 tons allocated for subsistence procurement responsibility for Northwest Europe for June and July only 20 tons are allocated to the U.K., the remainder being U.S. responsibility. As the total allocations are only about one-half of Eisenhower's recent estimates it is obvious that discussions leading to definite conclusions must be instituted now between fully authorized representatives of our respective governments and we are prepared to resume such discussions now.

4. I think that the questions you raise in your telegram Number 902 will have to be considered as part of the overall problem which I am most anxious to have fully explored and determined in the immediate future. I should appreciate word as to when your representatives may be expected.

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By Authority of SEC ARMY

BY TAG PER 720214

By RHCR Date MAY 5 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~