

● PSF State Dept. Dispatches

June - ~~Sept.~~<sup>Aug.</sup> 1944

LFG-194

PLAIN

Vatican City

Dated June 26, 1944

Rec'd 8:24 a.m., 27th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

212, June 26.

FROM MYRON TAYLOR. FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY,  
GENERAL HILDING, JOSEPH DAVIES, JUVENAL MARCHISIO OF  
AMERICAN RELIEF FOR ITALY.

After conferences with General Johnson Military  
Governor of Rome, Colonel Poletti Civil Governor Rome  
District, Monsignor Carroll, Sir Darcy Osborne British  
Minister to Vatican, Honorable Harold Tittmann, Honorable  
Samuel Reber Joint Vice President Allied Control Commission,  
Honorable Robert Murphy Political Advisor to Commander  
in Chief Mediterranean Area, Honorable Alex Kirk United  
States Representative Advisory Council for Italy, it is  
obvious additional relief for Italy is urgently needed  
accentuated by shortage of trucks to move food from  
coastal points to relief centers. The following items,  
prepared as result of these discussions, are urgently

needed

-2- #212, June 26, from Vatican City

needed in the order in which presented: (one) workshoes for men and women (two) childrens shoes (three) workingmens trousers overalls shirts (cotton for summer) (four) underwear of all types (five) stocking socks (cotton) (six) thread yarn and needles for repair of clothing (seven) buttons (eight) homemade first-aid kits consisting of bandages cotton adhesive iodine or mercurochrome aspirin et cetera (nine) vitamin tablets brewers yeast tablets or similar products (ten) toilet and laundry soap (eleven) powdered milk. Similar items of clothing including overcoats for men women and children will be necessary for fall and winter. Preparation should now also be made for their provision in due time. We also talked with Dr. Castellani and Dr. Bastianelli who will furnish today a list of vital medicines needed here, the most urgent being quinine. Regarding my suggestion that General Hildring instruct Colonel Rounds to visit Italy with Judge Marchisio, I believe a survey on the ground would be helpful in a practical solution of both relief needs and transportation difficulties. The clothing already collected by American Relief for Italy should be shipped at once.

TITTMANN

MJF

KEM-560

PLAIN

Vatican City

Dated June 27, 1944

Rec'd 7:35 a.m., 28th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

221, June 27th.

FROM MYRON TAYLOR TO THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY,  
GENERAL HILDRING, JOSEPH DAVIES, JUVENAL MARCHISIO OF  
AMERICAN RELIEF FOR ITALY.

My 212, twenty-sixth.

Following is list of drugs and materials urgently  
required in Italy provided by Professor Castellani of  
the Ospedale Policlinico: (one) iodine; (two) castor  
oil; (three) magnesium sulphate and sodium sulphate;  
(four) quinine; (five) atebirin and similar preparations;  
(six) bismuth (subnitrate carbonate, et cetera); (seven)  
tannic acid; (eight) sulphanamides (sulphadiazin et cetera);  
(nine) penicillin; (ten) salvarsan and neosalvarsan  
preparations; (eleven) rhubarb; (twelve) camphor; (thirteen);  
opium (morphia codein et cetera); (fourteen) insulin;  
(fifteen) liver extracts; (sixteen) thyroid and other  
common

-2- #221, June 27, from Vatican City.

common glandular extracts (adrenalin et cetera);  
(seventeen) therapeutic sera (antitetanic et cetera).  
Also soap disinfectants (carbolic acid cresol et cetera)  
other alcohol films for radiographic work and chemicals  
for developing cotton wool, gauze, bandages rubber  
material (rubber tubes hot water bottles et cetera)  
hypodermic syringes and needles clinical thermometers.  
Please give copies of this telegram and my number 212  
to Chairman Norman Davis American Red Cross.

TITTMANN

RR

Published in

Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill,  
Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman

1941-45 Vol. 11 Page 149

DEPARTMENT

OF

MJK-536

STATE

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

INCOMING

TELEGRAM

Moscow

Dated June 27, 1944

Rec'd 2:41 p.m., 28th

PSF: State (Despatches)

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

8-11-44

file

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2308, June 27, Midnight.

FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Reference my Army cable last night advising of my presentation to Marshal Stalin of the Stalingrad and Leningrad scrolls. Following is approved text of Marshal Stalin's statement in accepting them: "I accept the scrolls of honor from the President as a symbol of the fruitful collaboration between our governments which is being effected in the name of the freedom of our peoples and the progress of humanity. The scrolls of honor will be presented to representatives of Leningrad and Stalingrad."

I have given this to the American correspondents here for release for Wednesday morning papers. I have told them that I presumed the White House would release the text of your letter to Marshal Stalin and the scrolls, but that as Stalin's statement was a Moscow story, I would ask that it be not (repeat not) released from the White House but allowed to come from them.

HARRIMAN

WMB  
EH

*Pres*

*file*

HIS-591

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

London

Dated June 28, 1944

Rec'd 10:46 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

URGENT 28, 1944

5101, June 28, 1 p.m.

After reading your 5009 of June 24, I asked Mr. Eden to give me a note on the chronology of events and the British position. He has just forwarded me the following memorandum:

"As I promised I am writing to confirm what I told you today in reply to your enquiry about the recent Soviet communication to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to future Turco-Soviet cooperation in the Balkans.

Two. It was Numan who made the initial proposal to M. Vinogradov for an agreement to cover collaboration and consultation between the two countries in the Balkans, both now and after the war.

Three. The Soviet reply, which was handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the substance of which M. Vinogradov gave to Sir H. Knatchbull--Hugessen, points

out that the

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

MAR 8 1972

-2-#5101, June 28, 1 p.m., from London

out that the agreement as proposed by Numan would have provided for safeguarding the security of the two countries in certain defined zones of interest, for preserving the community of interests of the two countries as well as for collaborating politically in those zones which are of immediate interest to the two countries, and for constant collaboration regarding their mutual interests. It would thus be seen, the reply goes on, that the proposal was one for political collaboration in the Balkans.

Four. The reply continues that if Turkey wishes to give a more friendly and direct character to her relations with the USSR the Soviet Government would be, however, to ignore the fact that the Balkans are in the hands of Germany who is at war with the USSR, but with whom Turkey is not at war but has a pact of friendship and to whom she gives economic aid. The Soviet reply then points out that given the above conditions the Turkish suggestion loses its sense unless the Turkish Government radically change their relations with Germany, and that the only road to such an agreement as that suggested is a complete and immediate rupture of Turco-German relations and the entry of Turkey into the war at the side of the Allies.

On this basis

-3- #5101, June 28, 1 p.m., from London

On this basis the agreement could have an even wider form which would include consultation on questions of mutual interest in the Balkans. Such an agreement, the reply concludes, would be of equal interest to the Allies.

Five. I am sure you will agree that the Soviet reply was entirely on the right lines, and that it was a friendly act on their part to communicate the exchange of views to their Allies. There is no question of the Soviet Government having gone behind our backs".

WINANT

NPL

This was sent to Admiral Leahy  
"for the Joint Chiefs of Staff."  
A paraphrased copy has been  
sent to them.

*file*

*President.*

FMH-547

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

New Delhi via Army

Dated June 28, 1944

Rec'd 4:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

471, June 28, 11 a.m.

~~SECRET~~  
FOLLOWING FOR PRESIDENT FROM WALLACE (Message No. One)

One. Reference your message, delivered to me by  
Ambassador Gauss noon of June 23, with regard to  
United States Army observer group proceeding to North  
China (including Communist controlled areas) to obtain  
vital military intelligence. Prior to receipt of  
message, G-MO had indicated to me very positively  
his assent to the dispatch of group as soon as it  
could be organized. Accompanied by General Ferris,  
I again discussed the matter in detail with the G-MO  
on the afternoon of 20th. And we obtained what I  
hope will prove to be his full cooperation for the  
early despatch and effective operation of the group.

Two. Discussion between Government and Communist

representatives

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.,

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 8 1972

-2- #471, June 28, 11 a.m. from New Delhi via Army  
representatives is taking place in Chungking but the  
G-MO's attitude toward the problem is so imbued with  
prejudice that I perceive little prospect of a satis-  
factory long-term settlement. G-MO assures me that  
only "political" measures will be employed.

Three. G-MO indicated desire for improved  
relations with USSR and desires that we assist in  
bringing about meeting of Sino-Soviet representatives.  
I emphasized importance of reaching understanding.

Four. I have found economic, political, and  
military situations in China extremely discouraging.  
Chinese morale is low and demoralization is a  
possibility with resultant disintegration of central  
authority. There is little that we can do about the  
economic situation. The Chinese appear incapable of  
coping with it but a general collapse does not seem  
imminent. The political situation is unstable and  
tense with rising lack of confidence in the G-MO and  
his reactionary entourage. Of the military situation  
I can only say that it might be worse. In Hunan it  
is critical. Although potentialities and plan exist  
for stiffening Chinese defenses out of Hengyang,  
there is serious threat of severance of East China  
from West with consequent effect on morale in remaining

FREE

-3- #471, June 28, 11 a.m. from New Delhi via Army

Free China.

Five. The G-MO seems bewildered regarding economic situation; unsure regarding political situation; and, while expressing confidence in his army, is obviously distressed regarding military developments. He attributes recent and current reverses to low morale due to economic difficulties. He is convinced that all-out Burma offensive early this year would have strengthened Chinese will to resistance and prevented military reverses. He assures me that Chinese will continue to resist up to their ability but he displays discouragement rather than optimism.

Six. I consider vital our need for a more vigorous and better coordinated American representation in China -- in Chungking. Our effort in China, in its military and related political aspects, requires more positive direction, and closer cooperation from the Chinese, if this area is to be employed as an effective base of operations against the Japanese. (I am dispatching immediately a separate telegram on this subject).

MERRELL

HTM

MJK-911

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ( )

Algiers

Dated July 1, 1944

Rec'd 10:54 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT.

2230, July 1, 9 p.m.

Palewsky informed me today that de Gaulle is returning 24 hours earlier than planned and according to a telegram from the General the party for the United States has been tentatively limited to eight people headed by Palewsky. Although no commissioners will be included he is taking with him Bethouart, Baube Press Attache in Washington, just returned and some military and civilian aides. Present plans call for departure Algiers late evening July 4 and arrival Washington afternoon July 6 thus permitting three full days July 7 to 9 inclusive in Washington.

Palewsky reiterated that the General envisages only a general discussion without seeking any particular commitments. However, in his conversation with me he let it be known that draft text of the London agreements would be received in Algiers in time for examination before departure. Alfand is expected in Algiers this afternoon and may possibly be added to official party.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

Local

By J. Schaubis Date MAR 8 1972

-2-, 2230, July 1, 9 p.m., from Algiers.

Local political circles are speculating on possibility that Edén may visit Washington at same time (see in this connection my 2079, June 18, 5 p.m.).

CHL:PIN

EDA  
JJM

*P. 50*

KEM-953  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Ankara *file*

Dated July 1, 1944

Rec'd 1:23 a.m., 2nd.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

1198, July 1, 8 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

I called on the Prime Minister today to support the British Ambassador's representations in the matter of the rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany. The following is the gist of an hour and a half's conversation in the course of which I pointed out that the war was progressing so rapidly to the inevitable Allied victory that the present might be Turkey's last opportunity to actively associate herself with the United Nations.

In outlining the Turkish position Saracoglu said that his Government did not understand and had been "hurt" by the British policy of "sulking" since the departure of the British Military Mission in February. He referred to the fact that the Turk embargo on chrome deliveries

-2- #1198, July 1, 8 p.m., from Ankara.

deliveries to Germany and the prohibition of the passage of certain classes of German ships through the Straits had failed to evoke any indication of appreciation from London. He remarked that when he had sent cordial messages to Eden and Molotov he had received a most cordial reply from Molotov and a "frigid" reply from Eden. He said that all in all his Government had come to doubt during recent months that Britain really wanted Turkey to enter the war. He knew the Russian position because the Russians spoke plainly and had made it clear that they desired Turkey's entry into the war but insofar as concerned the British "their legalistic and devious methods of approach" had left the Turk Government perplexed as to Britain's real desire with respect to Turkey's entry into the war. As matters stood today whereas the Russian position was clear that Turkey's entry into war was desired the British were requesting merely a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. In consequence in the light of the relatively limited amount of war material previously requested by the Turks and the abrupt departure of the British Military Mission could the Turk Government be criticized for wondering whether the British were serious in their

-3- #1198, July 1, 8 p.m., from Ankara.

in their request at Cairo that Turkey enter the war? Could it be that British international interests of which the Turks had no knowledge dictated a rupture between Turkey and Germany without active participation by Turkey in the war?

The Prime Minister emphasized several times that the Turks "are a proud people" remarking that "if the British continue to treat us as slaves, inferiors or colonials nothing can be accomplished but if they treat us as full Allies, for example accord us the same treatment shown the refugee Governments in London which rule no countries, we are ready to go to the end of the road with the Allies".

Saracoglu then made the following statement "I have suggested to Hugesen that the British determine what additional war material we should receive and send their experts here for that purpose and have informed him that we will abide by their decision and will let the British fix the date for Turkey's entry into the war.

In outlining his views as to the part Turkey could play on entering the war Saracoglu stated that the Turk Army could eject the Germans from Bulgaria observing that he was convinced that within 48 hours after the

Turk Army

-4- #1198, July 1, 8 p.m., from Ankara.

Turk Army entered Bulgaria the Bulgarians "would shift over to our side". He said that in his opinion Bulgaria would not offer prolonged or serious resistance to both Turkey and Russia observing that he assumed the Russians would be prepared to carry out the offer previously made to declare war on Bulgaria if Turkey entered the war. Thus he said the road to Yugoslavia would be opened and it would be for the British to decide whether they wished to cross the Adriatic into the Balkans.

Saracoglu then told me that the Council of Ministers would meet on July 3 to consider the reply to be made to the Anglo-American request for a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany. He said that without undertaking to forecast the decision the Council of Ministers might arrive at, a negative reply to the specific Anglo-American request would not mean that the Turk Government was not (repeat not) prepared to discuss Turk entry into the war along the lines outlined above. I gained the impression from everything the Prime Minister said that the Turkish reply to the Anglo-American request will in effect amount to a proposal that Turkey enter the war. I also gained the impression that

Saracoglu

-5- #1198, July 1, 8 p.m., from Ankara.

Saracoglu himself had not yet made up his mind as to how best to deal with the Anglo-American request for a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations. However he made it unmistakably clear that the Turk Government is much more interested in entering the war than in a mere rupture of economic and diplomatic relations. Thus if the Council of Ministers agrees to break off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany it will be in anticipation of Turkey's entry into the war.

I am now more convinced than ever that the Turk Government is not only willing but anxious to enter the war and that if Turkey's entry into the war at some time in the near future is deemed desirable for either political or military reasons this result can be achieved if account is taken in London of Turkish susceptibilities. I am persuaded that by offering to the Turks additional war material in quantities commensurate with the military operations to be undertaken by them, promising them that delivery will be made within the time agreed upon, assuring them of fighter protection for their principal cities and obtaining the assurance that the Russian Government will declare war against Bulgaria the Turk Government would undertake to enter the war as of an agreed date.

STEINLARDT

REP

*file*

GAR-990  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. [REDACTED]

Algiers  
Dated July 2, 1944  
Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

US URGENT  
2243, July 2, 1 p.m.

Palowski, Chief of Civil Cabinet to General  
de Gaulle, states that it is definite that the  
General is coming to the United States but that  
official notification of his trip has been delayed  
pending the formal ratification by the FCNL which  
meets tomorrow. (Department's 2069, July 1, 10 p.m.)  
Since all members of the Committee have been con-  
sulted in private capacity and given assent this  
action is mere formality.

I am seeing de Gaulle tomorrow morning and will  
cable urgently any further developments.

CHAPIN

WTD

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date            MAR 8 1972

GIY-40

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Algiers

Dated July 2, 1944

Rec'd 9:49 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2251, July 2, 9 p.m.

Present plans call for De Gaulle departure Algiers  
3 a.m. Wednesday arriving Washington afternoon Thursday,  
July 6. Department's 2063, July 1, 4 p.m. I am accompany-  
ing General in same plane.

CHAPIN

WFS  
WMB

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date            MAR 8 1972

MAE-91

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

*File*  
London

Dated July 3, 1944

Rec'd 12:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

5240, July 3, 4 p.m.

TO THE SECRETARY AND FOR THE PRESIDENT.

The documents covering the discussions which  
have taken place between the British and French  
delegations on official level were given to me by  
the Prime Minister last night.

He told me that they would not be placed before  
the Cabinet for action until the President had had an  
opportunity to consider them and to state his views.  
Since the British wanted them forwarded in code and  
as there were texts both in the hands of the British  
with copies forwarded to Algiers, I did not want to  
use our machine code. Therefore, I asked the Foreign  
Office to transmit them over their wires with a  
directive that these documents be delivered to you  
personally.

WINANT

JMB

WSB

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1944

FILE MEMO:

THE President asked that the State Dept. give Admiral Leahy a copy of attached. I have asked that it be sent to him.

djb

FMH-547  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ~~XXXXXXXX~~

New Delhi via Army

Dated June 28, 1944

Rec'd 4:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

471, June 28, 11 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

FOLLOWING FOR PRESIDENT FROM WALLACE (Message No. One)

One. Reference your message, delivered to me by  
Ambassador Gauss noon of June 23, with regard to  
United States Army observer group proceeding to North  
China (including Communist controlled areas) to obtain  
vital military intelligence. Prior to receipt of  
message, G-MO had indicated to me very positively  
his assent to the dispatch of group as soon as it  
could be organized. Accompanied by General Ferris,  
I again discussed the matter in detail with the G-MO  
on the afternoon of 20th. And we obtained what I  
hope will prove to be his full cooperation for the  
early despatch and effective operation of the group.

Two. Discussion between Government and Communist  
representatives

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2- #471, June 28, 11 a.m. from New Delhi via Army

representatives is taking place in Chungking but the G-MO's attitude toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I perceive little prospect of a satisfactory long-term settlement. G-MO assures me that only "political" measures will be employed.

Three. G-MO indicated desire for improved relations with USSR and desires that we assist in bringing about meeting of Sino-Soviet representatives. I emphasized importance of reaching understanding.

Four. I have found economic, political, and military situations in China extremely discouraging. Chinese morale is low and demoralization is a possibility with resultant disintegration of central authority. There is little that we can do about the economic situation. The Chinese appear incapable of coping with it but a general collapse does not seem imminent. The political situation is unstable and tense with rising lack of confidence in the G-MO and his reactionary entourage. Of the military situation I can only say that it might be worse. In Hunan it is critical. Although potentialities and plan exist for stiffening Chinese defenses out of Hengyang, there is serious threat of severance of East China from West with consequent effect on morale in remaining

Free

-3- #471, June 28, 11 a.m. from New Delhi via Army

Free China.

Five. The G-MO seems bewildered regarding economic situation; unsure regarding political situation; and, while expressing confidence in his army, is obviously distressed regarding military developments. He attributes recent and current reverses to low morale due to economic difficulties. He is convinced that all-out Burma offensive early this year would have strengthened Chinese will to resistance and prevented military reverses. He assures me that Chinese will continue to resist up to their ability but he displays discouragement rather than optimism.

Six. I consider vital our need for a more vigorous and better coordinated American representation in China -- in Chungking. Our effort in China, in its military and related political aspects, requires more positive direction, and closer cooperation from the Chinese, if this area is to be employed as an effective base of operations against the Japanese. (I am dispatching immediately a separate telegram on this subject).

MERRELL

HTM

HMK-644  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (████████)

Moscow

Dated July 5, 1944

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

*file*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY

2424, July 5, noon

FROM HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

At lunch yesterday I asked Molotov for his further impressions regarding the four delegates and the Polish National Council they represent. He said that he did not believe the council had so far developed a large organization throughout Poland but that he believed that it represented the majority of the Polish people. The delegates during their visit to Russia had found that they talked the same language as the Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish Army here and had come to an understanding with them. He realized that the traditional suspicion of Russia by Poles was a factor that would have to be taken into account but he believed that when Poland was liberated and the Polish Army came into Poland the overwhelming majority of the Poles would be convinced of the Soviet Unions friendly intents.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

Molotov told

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2- #2424, July 5, noon; from Moscow

Molotov told me that they intended to supply the Parisans of the Council with arms in so far as they were able to get them through considering all the difficulties.

In discussing the personalities in the Government in London he thought that if Mikolajczyk and the democratic members of the Government returned to Poland they would be welcomed by the Poles to take part in the development of a government. He said again that he hoped some Poles from the United States would return to assist as well. I asked him whether Dr. Lange had been persuaded to do this. In reply he said that was entirely Dr. Lange's personal affair but that he thought Dr. Lange was a Polish patriot at heart.

I asked him if the aristocrats were eliminated and with most of the Jews who had conducted the business affairs of Poland massacred by the Germans whether he considered the remaining Polish population could conduct orderly governmental and the economic affairs of the country. He replied that he did not see why the aristocrats should not play their part. He thought  
that many .

-3- #2424, July 5, noon; from Moscow

that many of them were true patriots and would adjust themselves to the new democratic order of things in Poland. Romer's name was mentioned without antagonism. Molotov said the Polish people had a strong national spirit and he firmly believed that they could establish a democratic government and sound economy.

I found nothing in Molotov's comments to substantiate Mikolajczyk's hope as expressed in Department's 1512 June 17, 10 p.m. that the possibilities of reestablishing relations with the Soviet Government were more propitious today than heretofore" based upon "the fact that the Soviet Government having tried by various methods to build up without success strong pro-Soviet support inside Poland was more disposed to consider the resumption of relations with the Polish Government in exile as the first step".

Throughout the conversation Molotov talked with less of the usual Soviet reserve. He made it clear that he was reserving judgment as to just how things would develop and that the Soviet Government was not at present time committed to the final support of any particular group. He gave me the impression that the Soviet Government was hopeful that by bringing  
all democratic

-4- #2424, July 5, noon; from Moscow

all democratic minded Poles together and allowing them a free hand the situation would be worked out satisfactorily. It appeared his present feeling that the Council might well form the nucleus of the future Government of Poland.

HARRIMAN

RB  
RR

BJR - 617

*file*

PLAIN

Canberra

Dated July 5, 1944

Rec'd 7:54 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

78, Fifth  
FOR THE SECRETARY

Prime Minister Curtin called personally upon me at the office yesterday and asked me to convey to you and to the President his personal greetings. He spoke of the gratitude of the people of Australia for the assistance rendered by the United States to Australia and left with me a copy of his personal message to the President. A copy of the personal message and statement made by the Prime Minister is being forwarded by air mail.

JOHNSON

RR

RECT-70

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

*file*  
London

Dated July 6, 1944

Rec'd 11:08 a.m., 7th.

*JEB Jr.*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT.

5358, July 6, 10 p.m.

FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO MATTHEWS.

Please see that the President and the Secretary  
get copies of my 5330 of today.

WINANT

MRM  
JRL

*Copy attached  
For the President  
S/444*

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date            MAR 8 1972

PLAIN

London

Dated July 6, 1944

Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

U.S. URGENT  
5330, Sixth.

Prime Minister made his anticipated statement on German flying bombs at noon today to a crowded and attentive House of Commons. Satisfaction with what he himself termed his "brutally frank" account was expressed on all sides of House and members cheered his assertion that London and other affected areas would victoriously surmount all difficulties of present attack.

Mr. Churchill began by emphasizing--and later reiterated several times--that it would be a mistake to underrate serious character of flying bomb attack. Declaring that since early 1943, its possibilities had been under constant study he outlined measures which had been taken by Royal Air Force with wholehearted assistance of American Air Force to destroy bases for new weapon in France and manufacturing and proving centers in Germany and praised the precautionary

measures

-2- #5330, Sixth, from London.

measures by civil defense services in Great Britain. He declared: "If it had not been for the bombing operations in France and Germany, the bombardment of London would no doubt have started about six months earlier and on a much heavier scale." He said that continued battle with Germans over their preparations for new methods of attack had been exacting to both sides explaining: "Quite a considerable proportion of our flying power has been diverted for months past from other forms of offensive activity. The Germans for their part have sacrificed a good deal of manufacturing strength which could have increased their fighter and bomber forces working in conjunction with their hard-pressed armies on every front."

Again saying that he did not minimize effects of flying bombs, he asserted that enemy had made most absurd claims about them. The fact was that between 100 and 150 bombs each weighing about a ton had been discharged daily for past fortnight or so. Considering their modest weight and small penetration power, their blast damage had been extensive. Up to 6 o'clock this morning, 2,754 flying bombs had been discharged from launching stations in France. A large proportion had  
either

-3- #5330, Sixth, from London.

either failed to cross Channel or been shot down or destroyed by various methods. Thus far 2,752 people had been killed and about 8,000 injured sufficiently to require hospitalization. Due to fact that hospital accommodations prepared for Normandy casualties had thus far greatly exceeded requirements, there were at present considerable reserve facilities for bomb casualties and adequate penicillin for their treatment.

Prime Minister said that a very high proportion of the casualties had fallen on London which presented a unique target in the world for use of a weapon of such proved inaccuracy. Declaring it to be "a weapon literally and essentially aimless in its nature, purpose and effect", Prime Minister said that "the introduction by the Germans of such a weapon obviously raises some grave questions upon which I do not propose to trench now". Mr. Churchill said new form of attack was of a trying character because it was spread throughout the 24 hours but that "people have just got to get used to that". He said everyone must go about his duty and seek safest shelter he could find for sleeping. He outlined measures for assisting

evacuation

-4- #5330, Sixth, from London.

evacuation of small children and their mothers and those having no essential work to do in London. He repeated in this connection that others must remain at their posts and discharge their duties and was cheered when he said that Commons would be affronted at any suggestion that they should leave London. He declared: "Here we began the war and here we will see it end."

Prime Minister said this battle might be a long one. He also refused to give any assurance that strength of attack might not be increased or new weapons employed. He expressed every confidence, however, that London would again stand up to any trials and received loudest cheer of speech when he announced that nothing would deflect military command from pursuing its strategic plans for campaign on continent and bombing of selected targets.

His statement was followed by a short discussion in which members sought to ask specific questions concerning measures being taken against new bombs. Prime Minister had general support of House in his stand against such detailed discussion at this time on grounds that it would be difficult to avoid statements of utility

-5- #5330, Sixth, from London.

of utility to enemy and against an early debate in open session. In response to one member who said he had received a volume of correspondence urging reprisals, Mr. Churchill referred to his earlier statement as to questions raised by German use of such a weapon but repeated his unwillingness to pursue the matter at this time. In course of his remarks, Mr. Churchill paid notably warm tribute to assistance which American troops and authorities have given in every way to victims of these new attacks and said he thought it would prove one more tie between the two countries.

WINANT

LMS  
MRM

BE-645

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Ciudad Trujillo

Dated July 8, 1944

Rec'd 8:12 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

U.S. URGENT

317, July 8, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The Foreign Minister tonight showed me text of  
motion which according to telephone report from  
his Minister Caracas, was presented July 6 in  
Venezuelan Senate by Boni facion Mendez attacking  
new world dictatorships in general and Trujillo  
in particular. Motion referred to "liberation" of  
El Salvador and Guatemala, expressed solidarity with  
struggle suppressed peoples and mentioned responsibility  
democratic governments that have adhered to Atlantic  
Charter. Motion was according to report result of  
memorial presented.

BRIGGS

RR WSB

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

MAR 8 1972

BE-646

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ~~SECRET~~

Ciudad Trujillo

Dated July 8, 1944

Rec'd 6:09 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

U.S. URGENT

317, July 8, 2 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

By Dominican exiles Caracas who allegedly attended  
session.

Dominican Foreign Minister went on to say that  
although Mendez motion has not been passed in that  
form one to same effect had been unanimously adopted  
by Venezuelan Congress. Penabatlle attributes alleged  
increased activity of exiles as well as adoption of  
motion to visit of President Lescot who he claims is  
actively engaged both in Venezuela and Cuba in promoting  
Titi Trujillo agitation.

I remarked that

BRIGGS

WSB RR

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Scheuble Date      MAR 8 1972

BE-661

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Ciudad Trujillo

Dated July 8, 1944

Rec'd 8:22 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

U.S..URGENT

317, July 8, 2 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

Since Lescot had apparently already left Caracas  
timing might well be coincidental to which Penabattle  
reiterated "Lescot is to blame" and that adopted  
resolution is "equally insulting" as Mendez motion.  
He concluded that Trujillo has been exceedingly  
patient in face of increasing provocation but now  
his patience is wearing thin and this is not to be  
borne (sic).

He then at midnight summoned Venezuelan Minister  
to Foreign Office but in

BRIGGS

RR BB

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

DMH-651  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

Ciudad Trujillo

Dated July 8, 1944

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

317, July 8, 2 a.m., SECTION FOUR

response to my suggestion that it would be prudent not to  
push matters until in possession of all facts, stated he  
would limit himself to confronting Minister with Mendez  
motion and informing him that this morning he would in-  
struct Dominican Minister in Caracas to submit protest  
and request explanation. Dana Battle said his represen-  
tations would "leave the door open" implying, however,  
that if satisfaction is not obtained, Dominican Republic  
will break relations with Venezuela.

BRIGGS

WSB  
LMS

BJR - 660

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (████████)

Ciudad Trujillo

Dated July 8, 1944

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

317, July 8, 2 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)

He offered to show me text of his instructions  
to Caracas prior to despatching them and likewise  
stated that local press will not be permitted to  
carry story.

Repeated to Caracas. Substance will be sent  
to Port au Prince by courier this morning.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BRIGGS

WSB:BB

EOC-807  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated July 8, 1944

Rec'd 5:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

US URGENT

5397, July 8, 5 p.m.

Both Embassy and MEW believe that military situa-  
tion is changing so rapidly that it would be disadvan-  
tageous to us were we to make an approach to Swedish  
Government at this time which could be interpreted as  
indicating that it was our belief that trade between  
Sweden and enemy countries and territories could be  
continued in 1945 on same basis as at present. See  
Embassy's 5339, July 6. (SECRET. Reference Department's  
5338 July 6 to Embassy 1347 to Stockholm.)

Two. Aide memoire suggested by Department in its  
5338, July 6 was discussed with MEW immediately upon  
its receipt. In view of considerations mentioned in  
paragraph one above, Embassy and MEW believe most  
strongly that it would be inappropriate for American  
and British Ministers in Stockholm to present this  
aide memoire as drafted since it would permit the im-  
pression that we were ready to open shortly negotiations  
for a war

-2-#5397, July 8, 5 p.m. from London.

for a war trade agreement for next year on a basis somewhat similar to present one.

Embassy and MEW therefore strongly recommend that American and British Ministers in Stockholm be instructed to make a joint formal demarche to Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain an immediate assurance from his Government that it will not enter into any commitment with the enemy regarding export of any commodities and, more especially, bearings et cetera in 1945, without previous consultation with Allied Government. Actual wording of aide memoire is to be left to our Minister in Stockholm. MEW is instructing British Minister in Stockholm to join with his American colleague in presenting an aide memoire in this sense immediately upon latter's receipt of similar instructions.

We both believe this would completely hold our position without indicating the course of action we may plan to pursue.

Thres. Waring is at present in London, he points out: (a) that he has no definite proof that SKF accepted orders based in inquiry made to it by Germans and reported in Stockholm's 2331, June 27, to Department (628 to London), although such an acceptance is not impossible,

-3-#5397, July 8, 5 p.m. from London.

impossible; (b) that no order accepted by SKF is definitive or can be fulfilled until such time as it has received the approval of Swedish Government; (c) that it is of paramount importance that secrecy of information he has received from SKF be maintained, and that under no circumstances should the fact that we are in possession of this information be divulged to Swedish Government.

Message repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 250.

WINANT

HTM

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

841-NCB

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Rio de Janiero

Dated July 8, 1944.

Rec'd 7:57 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2451, July 8, 3 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Referring again to the Department's telegram  
1806 of June 13, 6 p.m. and referring to my telegram  
2182, June 15, 3 p.m., Aranha tells me that steps  
are being taken to put the well-known Broccio house  
in order for receiving Madame Chiang Kai Shek and  
her party who are expected to arrive here in the  
near future.

The Brazilian Ambassador at Chungking has been  
informed that Madame Chiang Kai Shek is suffering  
from a skin disease of nervous origin.

CAFFERY

LMS

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
~~SECRET~~  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

PARAPHRASE OF WAR DEPARTMENT CABLE

FROM: <sup>EOG-37</sup> Moscow telegram must be  
TO: War Department closely paraphrased be-  
NUMBER: M-20101 communicated  
DATE: 8 July, 1944  
Moscow  
Dated July 9, 1944  
Rec'd 3:20 a.m. 10th

This is from Harriman for the Secretary of State signed Deane

When I saw Vincent and Mr. Wallace at Tashkent, reference my number 2237 of 22 June, it was decided that a telegram would be sent me from Chungking covering Vincent's and Mr. Wallace's conversations on Soviet-Chinese relations with the Generalissimo and others in Chungking. As yet no such information has been received, though from the press releases I see that there must have been some very useful conversations.

It would be very much appreciated if I could be sent complete information on what took place. This information is of the greatest urgency as it would be helpful in regard to current negotiations concerning the movement of American trucks through Russia to the United States Army in China, besides its usefulness during my talks with Molotov and Stalin.

Since General Deane is being pressed by the War Department for action I hope helpful ammunition will be given me through the Vice President's discussions. Because of their present differences with Chungking the approval of the Soviets for the movement of trucks has been withheld.

An urgent reply would be most appreciated, sent by the new fast army radio channel and Army code, as I expect on Monday to see Molotov. All our coding machines are out of order again.

to leave the initiative in French policy to the British and ourselves.

HARRIMAN

HIM

~~SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

*file*  
EOC-37

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone ██████████

Moscow

Dated July 9, 1944

Rec'd 3:20 a.m. 10th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY

2490, July 9, 9 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

One of my more reliable colleagues has reported to me that the French representative here told him that when he approached the Soviet Government asking for recognition of the French Committee as the Provisional Government of France he was informed that the Soviet Government would take no action vis-avis the French at variance with the Anglo-American position (FROM HARRIMAN) Molotov has told me several times since I have been back that it was the Soviet policy to leave the initiative in French policy to the British and ourselves.

HARRIMAN

HTM

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Scheuble Date MAR 8 1972

DMH-173

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Moscow via Army

Dated August 12, 1944

Rec'd 8:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

2970, August 12, 9 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

I asked Molotov last night whether Mannerheim was  
going to sue for peace. He was not optimistic, saying  
that the new Prime Minister Hackzell was pro-German.  
This in itself was suspicious although the elimination  
of Ryti, Tanner and Linkomies was a favorable sign.

He considered the present government changes were  
"a manifestation of hesitation" and as a transitory move.  
He did not know whether to appraise the chances of favor-  
able action as "one percent or several percent".

HARRIMAN

WWC

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

KEM-707  
This telegram must be  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone  
other than a Government  
agency. (RESTRICTED)

Chungking via Navy

Dated August 14, 1944

Rec'd 10:10 a.m., 15th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1402, August 14, 5 p.m.

Note from Foreign Office dated twelfth states that Chinese Government has named Victor Koo administrative Vice Foreign Minister, Wellington Koo Ambassador to Great Britain and Ambassador Wei Tao Ming and General Shang Cheng as delegates and Major General Mao Pang Chu, Rear Admiral Liu Tien Fu, Major General Ghu Shih Ming, Fu Hsueh Feng, Counselor of Supreme National Defense Council, and Chang Cheng Fu, Director of American Department of the Foreign Office, as technical experts for peace and security discussion and that selection of two or three additional technical experts is being made.

GAUSS

RR

KD-712  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Chungking via War  
Dated August 15, 1944  
Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1407, August 15, 1 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

In course of same conversation Soviet Military Attache  
(our 1406, August 12) said he did not think Jap drive in  
Hunan would continue much beyond Hengyang because of diffi-  
culties of bringing reinforcements and supplies from  
north but that Japs would launch fresh troops into South  
China from Hainan Island and strike at Kweilin via Sanning  
and Liuchow. Indicating he was aware of the coalition  
movement among southwestern Chinese military commanders  
(our 1397, August 12 and previous) he said that primary  
objective of the movement was not to oppose Generalissimo  
but rather to force him send sufficient good Central  
Government troops to the area to defend it against Japs,  
but they were not strong enough either to force Central  
to meet their wishes or to defend alone area against  
Japs and consequently they would accomplish nothing.  
Northwestern communists he said were not interested in  
movement. In

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2- #1407, August 15, 1 p.m., from Chungking via War

movement. In this connection Embassy informed from another source that alleged communist interest in or support of the coalition movement in southwest has relation to the communist groups in southeast China near Hong Kong area rather than communists in the northwest although we understand latter are aware of movement.

GAUSS

NPL

DMH-661  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (██████████)

Moscow via War  
Dated August 15, 1944  
Rec'd 2 p.m., 16th

Secretary of State  
Washington

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Scheuble Date            MAR 8 1972

2987, August 15, 10 a.m.

President's report on his Pacific trip received a column and half in PRAVDA for August 14 and was day's most prominent foreign news. All parts of speech were well covered including statements regarding untrustworthiness of Japan and delivery of planes to Russia via northern route. Following are Political portions of speech omitted by PRAVDA.

(1) Comparison of possible development of Alaska to levels attained by Norway, Sweden and Finland.

(2) Reference to necessity of America keeping great circle air route to Siberia and China passing near Alaska under its control and accompanying statement that everybody in Siberia and China knows America has no ambition to acquire territory on Asiatic mainland.

(3) Reference to United States and Latin American need of island bases nearer to Japan than Hawaiians.

(4) Statements

-2- #2987, August 15, 10 a.m., from Moscow via War

(4) Statements regarding apparent approval by Japanese people of Japan's acquisitive policy.

HARRIMAN

DU  
MRM

KD-767

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Canberra

Dated August 15, 1944

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

91, August 15, 8 a.m.

CFSEC

President's speech at Bremerton has been well received here. In conversation last evening Prime Minister commented to the effect that he had only seen summary but that for one thing the President had settled for all time what he termed "foolish questions" which had existed in certain quarters here as to possible American claims to bases in this area.

JOHNSON

RR

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-14-77  
By J. Schauble Date            MAR 8 1972

HMK-799

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (██████████)

Caserta

Dated August 15, 1944

Rec'd 5:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

133, August 15, 6 a.m.

At SAC'S conference August 21 SAC confirmed that  
from point of view of Mediteranean theatre as whole  
Turkish belligerency would be unwelcome (repeat unwelcome)  
Regarding any staff mission which might be sent to  
Turkey in event of belligerency it is believed that it  
should be permanont mission because Service Attache  
would be unable by themselves to cope with a belligerent  
situation in Turkey.

Air Marshal Slessor suggested that additional air  
protecting for Turks should not (repeat not) be volunte-  
ered by mission.

SAC also directed that G3 discuss with POLADS AFHQ  
what action might be taken to secure diplomatic approach  
to Turks designed to freeze Axis shipping in Turkish  
ports. I should be grateful for Department's prompt  
comment on this latter point.

Repeated to Ankara.

RR

MURPHY

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaubie Date MAR 8 1972

FBM-981

This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Wellington

Dated August 16, 1944

Rec'd 5:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

324, August 16, 6 p.m.

Prime Minister in welcoming me today expressed hearty approval of recent speech of President at Puget Sound on South Pacific and the conviction that Australian reaction would be equally approving.

PATTON

MRM EMB

FBM-204  
This telegram must be  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone  
other than a Government  
Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Managua

Dated August 16, 1944

Rec'd 10:12 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

522, August 16, 4 p.m.

Department's circular telegram August 5, 7 p.m.

A note from the Nicaraguan Foreign Office states that Nicaragua applauds the idea contained in the President's declaration of June 15 and agrees that the maintenance of peace and security ought to be a combined task of large and small nations. It believes that a body representative of all nations should be formed, not with a view to the creation of a super state but which would have facilities to promote and facilitate international cooperation and prevent war by means of the pacific settlement of disputes. Nicaragua also agrees that the inter-American system should have a more important role in the future than in the past and that all the countries of this hemisphere should participate in discussions regarding policy and institutions of international cooperation.

Copy of note by air mail.

STEWART

RR

FBM-981  
This telegram must be  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone  
other than a Government  
Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Wellington

Dated August 16, 1944

Rec'd 5:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

324, August 16, 6 p.m.

Prime Minister in welcoming me today expressed hearty approval of recent speech of President at Puget Sound on South Pacific and the conviction that Australian reaction would be equally approving.

PATTON

MRM EMB

DMH-117

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated August 16, 1944

Rec'd 4:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

6596, August 16, 5 p.m.

Reference my 5884, 8 p.m., 25 July and Department's  
6242, midnight, 7 August, I learn that British Government  
have approached Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington,  
through their Joint Staff Mission, with a view to a  
directive being issued to SHAEF to give an order to the  
German authorities, after Germany's surrender, to deliver  
up the King of Belgium. (FROM PHILLIPS)

British Ambassador in Washington has also been  
instructed to approach State Department and invite your  
support and Belgian Government have been informed by  
Foreign Office of action proposed.

WINANT

WTD  
JRL

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

LL-435  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (████████)

London

Dated August 20, 1944

Rec'd 9:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT

NIACT 6753, August 20, Midnight.

██████████

British have instructed Mallet to proceed with joint formal statement and accompanying oral comments in accordance with Department's 6607, August 19, 6 p.m. (1656 to Stockholm) as modified by Department's 6614, August 19, 10 p.m. (1659 to Stockholm), unless in the opinion of the British, Russian and American Ministers the making of this approach on Monday, August 21, would jeopardize Swedish Government ratification of the decision taken by Boheman on August 18 to withdraw insurance from Swedish ships sailing to Baltic ports as reported in Stockholm's 3163, August 18.

Sent to Stockholm as 352 and repeated to Department as 6753 and Moscow as 90.

WINANT

LMS  
WTD

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

KEM-470

PLAIN

London

Dated August 21, 1944

Rec'd 12:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

6758, Twenty-first.

LONDON TIMES today carries following cable from  
United States headlines "U.S. election strategy":

"Questions of strategy stand high on the agenda  
of the President now that he has returned from his  
Pacific trip, but not military strategy alone. The  
large issues of political strategy in election year  
under the two-party system, which in its long develop-  
ment has come to represent a rough balance of social  
forces, cannot be neglected. Mr. Roosevelt has not  
yet taken his stand on the highly contentious issue  
of the unemployment compensation standards which should  
be written into the reconversion legislation but he  
cannot long delay a statement of his views. Senator  
Truman, his partner on the Democratic ticket, has called  
the bill passed by the Senate 'entirely inadequate',  
which may show the way the wind is blowing, but some-  
thing definite and more detailed will be needed from  
his leader.

his leader. It is entirely possible that the President may find himself at odds again with Congress upon a question coming as close to business and the bosom of the working man and his employer as any in the domestic field. It is, in other words, highly charged with 'politics'. In a country as huge and as various as the United States it is not easy to divide voters (more than 88,000,000 of them) neatly into categories, but it can be done roughly. In the first group would fall those whose interests are in the field of business and banking, whether as directors, large and small, or as white-collar workers; in the second would come those who own or work the port labor. It would be difficult to devise any method of grouping more inclusive or more likely to be reliable as an attempt at a generalization, and the question then arises of their relative numerical strength. So far as an examination of the census returns of 1930 by a mere amateur could determine, they were at that time near enough to equality one with another to make political calculation in 1936 seem a simple matter. The business group was against Mr. Roosevelt, labor was overwhelmingly for him, and the Republicans went to the agricultural state of

Kansas for

Kansas for their candidate Mr. Alfred Landon. In the result they failed egregiously, for not only did the farmers rally to Mr. Roosevelt but the white-collar workers also. Only Maine and Vermont cast electoral votes for Mr. Landon never in all the history of the Democratic Party had there been such a victory. Yet by 1940, when Mr. Roosevelt won again, it had become clear that the shift towards restoration of the party balance was taking place. What prevented its possible manifestation in the election of Wendell Wilkie was the war crisis collapse of France and deadly peril of Britain. The Republicans were strong again where normally they are strong, in the rural precincts, in the villages and towns and smaller cities. Mr. Roosevelt carried every city of more than 400,000 population except Cincinnati and wiped out his opponents' lead in the dairy regions, the corn belt and the wheatland prairies. It is worth noting moreover that six out of every 10 voters under 35 years of age cast a democratic ballot in that year. What of 1944? Clearly the strategy of the party in power will be to concentrate upon the northern, eastern and Pacific coast states to carry them by votes large enough to offset what is called the 'upstate' vote;

-4- #6758, August 21, from London.

the 'upstate' vote; and the strategy of the opposition will be to nurse the rural areas and to do all they desperately can to keep the democratic vote low in the cities. When this is so-and it is unescapably so-the importance of the issue of unemployment insurance becomes painfully evident.

It is curious to find in the history of the beginnings of the union that the founding fathers had not anticipated the growth of parties as such. They had as realists expected politics to be based on the combination of groups in support of their interests, but they had assumed that interests would shift so rapidly that no combination could have a long life and that they saw therein the greatest safeguard of the nation. They were wrong. Parties did arise, and an enduring mechanism has been established. The process, as Professor Wilfred Binkley has said in a recent study, had made automatic the absorption by the party happens to be out of power of the frustrated, exploited and new interests, and it is this he thinks, not the instability of combinations, that has been the true safeguard. It has prevented violent extremes and suppression of minorities. It has been a conservative, a centripetal and stabilizing force.

This is very

-5- #6758, August 21, from London.

This is very true and very well but one more thing remains to be said. The Republican Party after the Civil War made itself almost impregnable to assault by giving away public domain to farmers, laborers, railway promoters, and lumber, cattle, sheep and mining interests, all of which was accepted at that time as right and desirable. Yet the beneficiaries of this bounty and their descendants, when the great depression broke upon the United States in the early thirties, cried out in horror when public money and not public domain--which had gone--was distributed to victims in the middle and lower income groups. There are, for the time being and as a result of the war, no more victims, unless the white-collar fixed-income group considers itself a victim. But what if the plans for reconversion from war to peace are not wisely and truly laid? What if in the name of conservatism the counsel of timid men should prevail? When in favor of more liberal unemployment compensation the argument was made that high unemployment payments now would mean low unemployment payments later, because purchasing power would be increased, Senator Vandenberg of Michigan cried, 'you might as well argue that a man can drink himself sober'.

Was he betrayed

-6- #6758, August 21, from London.

Was he betrayed by false analogy? Professor Binkley, himself obviously a Republican, has said sadly that 'there would not seem to be no other way to a permanent Republican Party revival than deliberately to outbid the Democrats for the middle and lower income groups'. They might do less and win, he thought, but victory might prove to be merely a rally before the patient's end".

WINANT

BB

LC - 507  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated August 21, 1944

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

6761, August 21, 7 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM THE  
AMBASSADOR.

In Embassy's 6758 today I sent you a column  
article from this morning's LONDON TIMES, from "our  
own correspondent" in the United States. I  
presume it to be by Sir Willmott Lewis, although  
it bears a New York dateline. I thought that perhaps  
both you and the Secretary might find it worth  
reading. It is seldom that you find in the British  
press such a thoughtful, analytical statement on  
American politics.

WILMANT

BB

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

KEM-518

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (████████)

London

Dated August 21, 1944

Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

6763, August 21, 8 p.m.

██████████

The Russian Ambassador just called and left me  
a letter stating that his government has resolved to  
confirm the terms of unconditional surrender for Germany  
agreed and signed by the European Advisory Commission  
on July 25. COMEA 75.

WINANT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

LL-900

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via Army

Dated August 22, 1944

Rec'd 6:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY

3107, August 22, 6 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

Molotov came to the Embassy this afternoon to receive the 195 decorations awarded by the United States to officers and men of the Red Army. He was accompanied by Vyshinski, Colonel General Kuznetsov, Chief of Staff to Marshal Vasilevski, Colonel General Nikitin, Deputy Chief of the Red Air Staff and other officers of the Red Army and the Foreign Office.

In reply to my remarks in making the presentation, he spoke of the effect of the awards as strengthening still further the friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States and referred to the conference that opened yesterday in Washington, the success of which, he said, was assured by the good will of the peace-loving countries and the consciousness of the need of real guarantees against the instigators of new wars.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date      MAR 8 1972

-2- #3107, August 22, 6 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

new wars.

He stayed for an hour and we had a most cordial conversation. He said that he had received favorable reports of the opening of the conversations in Washington. He spoke with great respect of the Secretary and the work he did at the Moscow Conference in laying the foundations for the present discussions.

He said that Marshal Stalin had a very high personal esteem for the President and was confident that he was in agreement with the President on all fundamental questions.

HARRIMAN

LMS  
EMB

DSH-271  
The telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (████████)

Algiers  
Dated August 23, 1944  
Rec'd 11:26 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

2733, August 23, 4 p.m.

French authorities have been making plans for their transfer to France as soon as conditions permit. Although there had been talk of a temporary capitol in south France, liberation of Paris may render it possible to move directly there in immediate future. Plans call for first echelon composed of small number of commissioners and other high officials to go by plane as soon as possible with balance of administration to follow some weeks later probably by steamer.

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has addressed identical notes to British representative and to me dated yesterday referring to these plans and requesting that British and American authorities provide air transportation to France both for their own diplomats and for other diplomatic missions to extent of Chief of Mission and one assistant each. (Sent to Department as 2733,

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2-, 2733, August 23, 4 p.m., from Algiers.

as 2733, repeated to AMPOL/D as No. 65).

Duff Cooper's tentative plans which have not yet been approved by British Foreign Office are that his senior counselor and first secretary accompanied by approximately eight stenographers, code clerks and other personnel will go first echelon, the Ambassador and remainder of mission to proceed later.

CHAPIN

WFS  
NPL

DSH-299

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Ankara

Dated August 23, 1944

Rec'd 3:34 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

1549, August 23, 7 p.m.

The Prime Minister informed me today that he  
had received a telegram from the Turk Charge in  
Bucharest to the following effect:

I have just been with the Prime Minister. He  
told me that the situation was very serious. In two  
days all Bessarabia will be occupied by the Russians.  
We desire you to act as our intermediary in obtaining  
an armistice. I am speaking in full agreement with  
the King, the Marshal and all the leaders of the  
opposition. Please obtain within 24 hours the reply  
of the British and American Governments to the following:  
The Prime Minister of Rumania would like to know which  
of the three following alternatives are preferred by  
the British and American Governments; (one) despatch  
of a Rumanian representative to Moscow to conclude an

armistice;

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2-, 1549, August 23, 7 p.m., from Ankara.

armistice; (two) to enter into contact simultaneously with the Americans, British and Russians to fix the conditions of an armistice; or (three) to discuss the armistice conditions in Cairo with the Allies.

The Prime Minister said he would appreciate it if I would let him know as soon as possible the views of the American Government.

KELLEY

NPL

RA-353  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (S ~~SECRET~~)

Rome  
Dated August 23, 1944  
Rec'd 9:14 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State  
Washington

225, August 23, 5 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY  
FROM MYRON TAYLOR.

No. 289.

We dined at the British Embassy last night  
August 22 and met Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Following dinner we had a private talk. He is  
not so vigorous as when I saw him last but is very  
active having met yesterday and on Monday represen-  
tatives of Greece, Yugoslavia, Premier Bonomi, Marshal  
Badoglio and others.

The Prime Minister was received in audience by  
his Holiness the Pope today.

For his guidance and following the agreed  
practice of previous years I reviewed in general my  
reports to you regarding Vatican audiences which led  
to brief discussion of the general conception for  
treatment

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2- 225, August 23, 5 p.m. from Rome

treatment of Germany and the proposed world organization.

I noted a definite modification of attitude toward post-war Germany and a hardening toward Russia as contrasted with past statements. I could not illustrate this by quoting specific words used but it left me most uncertain whether the fear of Russia gaining strength in Europe might not be causing even the British to become somewhat disturbed. Further I am not convinced that he would insist upon unconditional surrender which is indicated as the basis of all our plans for dealing with Germany. He cited treatment accorded Italy. The cases are not comparable as we recognized for at least temporary purposes legitimate government in Italy which hardly could be envisioned in Germany.

The Prime Minister showed little present interest in world organization or post-war plans saying "I am not prepared to give attention to those questions as I am now wholly interested in winning the war". Since Bowman discussed this question with him in the spring and now since my own conversation I am wondering if it would not be good strategy for  
British

-3- 225, August 23, 5 p.m. from Rome.

British this time to let us lead and become fully committed before British showed too much interest. I did not press it.

He showed little interest in Russian Vatican religious question. I did not enlarge upon it but outlined the problems as in previous messages to you. Possibly lack of active interest may be due to relatively small Catholic population in British Commonwealth.

He mentioned war criminals and punishment. He showed a definite trend toward publishing a list of world outlaws to be tried and summarily dealt with by United Nations. Did not believe it should be a long list but disapproved of indictment and punishment of great numbers of Germans.

The Prime Minister leaves here today, expecting to meet the President soon.

KIRK

BB

KD-499  
This telegram must be  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone  
other than a Government  
agency. (RESTRICTED)

Madrid  
Dated August 23, 1944  
Rec'd 4:41 p.m. 24th

Secretary of State  
Washington

2877, August 23, 2 p.m.

Following message dispatched by Flexer from San  
Sebastian August 22, 5 p.m. received today by Embassy  
and is hereby repeated.

"August 22, 5 p.m.

FROM FLEXER

French inform me that first critical night passed  
without incident at Hendaye and that all Puns are now  
gone (?) to this morning there were still German military  
at St. Jean de Luz and Biarritz where demolitions of  
stores were continuing.

General command of whole frontier from Atlantic to  
Mediterranean's vested in Captain (?)ide, who arrived  
from Algiers last week and immediately announced him-  
self to Spanish authorities at Irun in his proximate  
capacity. Hirigoyen, ex-mayor of Biarritz has local  
jurisdiction. These were the two who with two other  
officers crossed

-2- #2877, August 23, 2 p.m., from Madrid

officers crossed (?) Hendaye at 5:30 yesterday afternoon shortly after German withdrawal and raised tricolor. Some 150 FFI were found for police duty, but these are deficient in arms and equipment.

Details of arrangements for transition were worked out by Spanish authorities, principally at Irun but with Foreign Office kibitzing. It is noteworthy in connection with relation with French Committee that the Foreign Office ordered the frontier commander formally to receive Truelle when the latter arrived to cross into France and that the civil governor also was present. Miraflores and Baraibar rode with Truelle I believe (?) into France. General Torr followed.

French immediately provisionally closed frontier pending administrative organization.

WYES

NPL

RP-548

PLAIN

Istanbul

Dated August 24, 1944

Rec'd 7:03 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

492R103, 24th

Following are highlights of important speech of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Draganov to Parliament on August 22nd.

One. Bulgaria joined Tripartite Pact in March 1941 not to suffer fate of Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway. Russia and Germany were then on friendly terms; America neutral and isolationist. But Bulgaria did not attack her neighbors.

Two. Germany and Bulgaria suffered similar injustice after last war. Despite this and Tripartite Pact Bulgaria did not participate in German war in Balkans but accepted German invitation to occupy long claimed territories to protect Bulgarian populations there.

Three.

Three. Now Bulgarians can take their destiny into their own hands having strong army to defend United Bulgaria frontiers (applause).

Four. Relations are now good with Italy, Japan, Rumania, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia and Albania, (though Minister's words sounded like gesture of farewell to first two). Bulgaria's desire for friendly relations with Turkey is now menaced by factors beyond desires of the two peoples. President Inonu at Lausanne supported Bulgarian claim to eastern Aegean region.

Five. In long discourse on Bulgarian-Russian relations Minister said new Bulgarian Government came to power when relations were about to be broken. Task of Government now seeking good relations with Russia would be facilitated if it received Russia's full confidence.

Six. Minister quoted Churchill's statement of desire to see France regain its place in the world saying this expresses desires of Bulgaria also.

Seven. Saying Bulgaria finds herself today at war with America and Great Britain as result of  
too literal

43-#492R103, 24th, from Istanbul

too literal interpretation of obligations under Tripartite Pact Minister made it plain that Bulgarian Government would try to repair the mistake of its predecessors and find a way to agreement with United States and Great Britain (applause).

Eight. He made it clear that Bulgaria expects to hold Belomorie but to withdraw from Serbia where Bulgarian occupation has been mild and beneficial to the population.

Nine. Government is concerning itself with Jewish question, not as matter of Foreign policy but to eliminate a situation not corresponding to morality and dignity of Bulgarian people and their religious and racial tolerance. Minister could mention this as religion falls under Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cults.

Ten. New Government is only carrying forward policies of late King Boris for peaceful solution of Bulgarian and Balkan problems without involvement in conflicts between Great Powers.

Eleven. In this struggle Government needs

united

1  
-4-#492R103, 24th, from Istanbul

support of Bulgarians. A Government might be found which under pressure of events would be forced to accept an unjust solution like Treaty of Neuilly, but Bulgarian people would never approve it.

BERRY

DU  
MRM

KEM-419  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Moscow via War  
Dated August 24, 1944  
Rec'd 1:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY

3135, August 24, 5 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE SECRETARY

I called on Vyshinski this afternoon at 3:30 to inquire what information the Soviet Government had on the developments in Rumania. He stated that the Soviet authorities had no information whatsoever except what had been heard over the radio and that he had no instructions from his Government to make any statements on this matter at the present time. (Sent to the Department. Repeated to London as 153, to Ankara, to AMPOLAD for Murphy and to Cairo for MacVeagh, Secret for the Ambassadors). In reply to my question he said he did not know whether the Rumanian military command had been in touch with the Red Army or whether the Rumanians had laid down their arms. Vyshinski stated that he had no reason to feel that the surrender terms as discussed in April would not still hold but that the matter would

have to be

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2- #3135, August 24, 5 p.m., from Moscow via War.

have to be studied in view of the changed conditions. He also had no present suggestions to make as to procedure to be followed in dealing with this matter between the three governments. I explained how anxious I knew you would be to get information and he agreed to keep me informed promptly of any developments.

HARRIMAN

WSB

LC - 905

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

Moscow

Dated August 24, 1944

Rec'd 8:30 p.m., 25th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3146, August 24, midnight

SURVEY OF SOVIET PRESS FOR AUGUST 14-21.

The Allied advance in Northern France and landings  
in Southern France received prominence this week.  
Press comment referred to Allied successes as opening  
up brilliant prospects; toward the end of the week  
the papers began to talk of the Allies soon reaching  
the Rhine.

At the same time, the press, despite the immobility  
of the front of the Red Army this week, cited the  
foreign press to prove that the eastern front held the  
center of world news. The point was stressed that  
Allied successes were made possible to a great degree  
because Hitler had sent all available reserves to  
join the main German forces on the eastern front.  
Moreover, the press played up reports of weakness  
of German

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2- #3146, August 24, midnight, from Moscow

of German resistance.

As before disproportionate credit for Allied victories in France was given to the French internal resistance forces.

Thus the press indicated a strong desire on the part of Moscow to claim credit not merely for paving the way for the final blow at Germany, but for the coup de grace itself.

The Polish question, outstanding among European political problems this week was brought into the immediate military sphere by Soviet handling of the Warsaw rising. Beginning with quotations from the foreign press, and later in editorials, the press accused those responsible for the rising for needlessly sacrificing Polish lives. The rising itself was dismissed as foolish and futile. In this attitude the press reversed the usual Soviet position of favoring daring independent exploits by popular resistance movements.

The Warsaw rising occurring while the Red Army was losing ground apparently embarrassed Russian commentators whose contention has been that only the Red Army and the forces of the Polish Committee of

National

-3- #3146, August 24, midnight, from Moscow

National Liberation are freeing Poland. It took place while the Polish Committee was passing decrees on Army conscription and land reforms and was thus more and more openly assuming the functions of provisional government.

A PRAVDA editorial on the Polish Constitution made it clear that if Mikolajczyk and his followers wish to deal with the Russian oriented Poles they must do so on the basis of the 1921 and not the 1935 Constitution which the present Polish Government regards as legal.

Soviet interest in the Washington conversations on postwar security was shown by the favorable press given American official release regarding the Dumbarton Oaks meeting.

The outstanding home event was Soviet Aviation Day. Stalin issued an Order Of The Day congratulating Soviet aviators and engineers on their efforts which had given them air supremacy over the enemy. The press declared that Soviet aviation could claim first place among the leaders of world aviation. It had in many ways surpassed that of Europe and America.

The Soviet

-4- #3146, August 24, midnight, from Moscow

The Soviet comment on aviation reflected the usual nationalistic sentiment expressed in connection with all contemporary Soviet achievements. Soviet aviation was declared to have its own original national characteristics of breadth and daring. Stalin, the Party and the Soviet system, had permitted these Russian traits to flower.

The week's other important domestic news was the publication of a ukase describing the "Heroic mother" and other medals for mothers of many children and of a decree prescribing the schedule of benefits for mothers of many children and unmarried mothers.

HARRIMAN

WTD NPL

*file*

DSH-20  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

London  
Dated August 25, 1944  
Rec'd 3:55 a.m., 26th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

6928, August 25, midnight.

Department's No. 6717, August 23, 4 p.m.

Your helpful telegram received August 24, con-  
cerning Mushanov approach at Ankara. On the same  
day Eden expressed his keen interest in taking  
advantage of this approach (which by them seemed  
much more serious than was at first assumed), to  
hasten Bulgaria's exit from the war. An emergency  
meeting of the EAC was arranged for that evening.  
Prior to the meeting my staff met with Foreign Office  
experts to draw up a list of topics for inclusion  
in a Bulgarian armistice, taking our EAC-21 and the  
British EAC-22 as the basis. At the meeting the  
three delegates found themselves in close agreement  
except for three questions, which were held over for  
further discussion, and it was agreed to draft armis-  
tice terms on the basis of the list of topics

approved

-2-, 6928, August 25, midnight, from London.

approved at that meeting.

Today my staff drafted an armistice instrument, stating the basic requirements in rather full and exact language, and based on the materials furnished by the Department. This draft was circulated to the British and Soviet delegations at noon. A briefer British draft covering exactly the same points was likewise circulated. Then my staff and the British experts worked through the two drafts, bringing the British draft closer to American thinking but keeping the briefer form of the British statement. This third draft was discussed tonight in detail in the EAC. The new draft was explained thoroughly to Gousev and a number of clarifications were made in the wording. In its present form the armistice terms would seem to satisfy all our essential requirements and provide a firm basis for dealing with Bulgaria.

The text of the draft armistice follows:

"ARMISTICE TERMS FOR BULGARIA.

The following conditions have been accepted by the Bulgarian Government:

One. Hostilities to cease between Bulgaria and  
the United

-3-, 6928, August 25, midnight, from London.

the United Nations at blank space.

Two. Bulgaria to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers, to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property.

Three. Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.

Four. The Supreme Allied Command to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Bulgarian territory at the cost of Bulgaria if the military situation requires or if the Bulgarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice.

Five. Bulgaria to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization, as may be required.

Six. Bulgaria to release Allied prisoners of war and internees.

Seven. Bulgaria to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.

Eight. Bulgaria to release all persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation.

-4-, 6928, August 25, midnight, from London.

legislation. Such legislation to be repealed.

Nine. Bulgaria to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

Ten. Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage.

Eleven. Bulgaria to make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her.

Twelve. Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; and to meet Allied requirements for the re-establishment of peace and security."

At the close of the meeting Strang informed us that he approved the draft document on behalf of his government. Eden is telegraphing the draft terms to Moyne in Cairo for his information. He has been selected by the Prime Minister to negotiate for the British. Moyne will be instructed not (repeat not) to act on these terms pending instructions from Washington to our representative. Gousev seems personally satisfied with the terms and hopes to inform us tomorrow of his government's attitude. I recommend  
this instrument

-5-, 6928, August 25, midnight, from London.

this instrument for approval by our authorities in Washington. If it is approved I hope that suitable instructions can be sent to Cairo so that the opportunity for speedy action will be seized.

In view of our government's emphasis on assuring Bulgaria of its future independence as a means of easing its exit from the war, I suggested to my colleagues that some such statement be made orally or in writing to the Bulgarian Delegate at the time of signing the armistice. Accordingly, it was recommended in the EAC that the representatives of the Allied governments in Cairo be given authority at their discretion "to reaffirm the recognition by their governments of the independence of Bulgaria". It was our feeling that such a statement might hasten the acceptance of the armistice and encourage more willing execution of its terms.

At Thursday's meeting Strang expressed a desire to have Greece and Yugoslavia associated as signatories of the armistice.

-6-, 6928, August 25, midnight, from London.

of the armistice. The Foreign Office suggested that the British dominions also join in signing if the other two governments were included. After tonight's meeting Strang explained that his people were hesitating between inviting the Greeks and Yugoslavs to sign and inviting them to assent to the terms without signing, with a slight preference for the second course. In accordance with the tenor of the papers furnished me by the Department I urged that the Greeks and Yugoslavs be allowed to assent to the terms without participating as signatories. I believe the British will agree to this. Meanwhile the British are trying to hasten the arrival of the Bulgarian emissary in Cairo. Nothing has been said here about making release of Allied prisoners a prior condition for receiving the emissary. I heartily agree with the department's view in this matter.

WIN/NT

NPL

RA-827

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

Canberra

Dated August 25, 1944

Rec'd 4:34 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

97, August 25, 11 a.m.

Evatt who is at home ill yesterday asked the  
counselor to see him for informal talk and following  
is gist of what he voluntarily said regarding a Pacific  
conference:

"I don't think we ought to hold a conference with  
all those Dutchmen, Chinese, et cetera. I would prefer  
to have private conversations with the United States  
so that we shall be at perfect understanding regarding  
bases when a conference for general settlement takes  
place. We are committed to call a conference but we  
can just let a hat pass over. It may entail a visit  
by me to the United States but I realize it should not  
take place before your November elections. I should  
prefer the official initiative to be on the American  
side".

Air mail despatch follows.

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

MAR 8 1972

LL-150

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Cairo

Dated August 26, 1944

Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

GREEK

264, August 26, 4 p.m.

In a release today obviously inspired by apprehension  
lest Bulgaria's present overtures toward the Allies  
nullify her enemies and permit her to the detriment of  
Greece to escape consequences of her past, the Hellenic  
News Service here after detailing grounds for condemnation  
of course Bulgaria has followed lists five seemingly  
not unreasonable Greek demands in regard to Bulgaria which  
the Department may find of interest as an expression  
of views by an official Greek Government agency (repeated  
to Murphy as 22).

These five demands are quoted in my immediately  
following telegram. The full text of the release is being  
transmitted by despatch.

SHANTZ

WSB

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

LL-428

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Rome

Dated August 26, 1944

Rec'd 11:25 a.m., 27th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

248, August 26, 5 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MYRON TAYLOR.

In my audience yesterday morning, the Pope alluded to  
the visit of Prime Minister Churchill and volunteered  
the information that he was a very forthright and  
powerful personality; that they had a very satisfactory  
audience which lasted forty minutes; that they discussed  
Germany, Poland, Russia, Communism and Italy, and that  
the Prime Minister was equally concerned about Communism  
(Taylor's No. 291).

The Pope announced an address on September first.  
This will doubtless indicate the influence of his talk  
with the Prime Minister.

KIRK

LMS

DSH-6  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (████████)

Moscow via Army  
Dated August 26, 1944  
Rec'd 1:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT

3159, August 26, 3 a.m.

████████ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Molotov called the British Ambassador and myself  
over at one thirty a.m. and made the following oral  
statement.

"In order to support the prestige of the new  
Rumanian Government and in view of present develop-  
ments the Soviet Government does not (repeat not) deem  
it advisable to introduce new armistice conditions.  
An agreement should be reached with the Rumanian  
Government on the signing of an armistice based upon  
the conditions that were proposed in April with the  
three additions requested by the Rumanian representa-  
tives in Cairo:

(One) The allocating to the Rumanians of a free  
zone for their seat of government, (two) the granting  
of a period of fifteen days for the German troops to  
evacuate

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scheuble Date MAR 8 1972

-2-, 3159, August 26, 3 a.m., from Moscow via Army.

evacuate from Rumania, (three) regarding the reduction in the size of the indemnity.

The new armistice conditions proposed by the British Government, may be discussed in Moscow with the representatives of the three Allied governments.

These negotiations according to the view of the Soviet Government should take place in Moscow".

Molotov agreed to the British proposal that the British Ambassador and myself participate in all negotiations with the Rumanian delegates. He explained that he had been informed that two Rumanian officers had been sent to Istanbul to contact representatives of the Allies and Molotov proposed that these men should come on to Moscow at once. He had informed the Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara and Cairo to this effect.

Molotov explained that the Red Army had trapped twelve German divisions in the region of Kishenev. These divisions would not be permitted to be evacuated. He was confident they would be made prisoners of war by the Red Army.

Molotov asked for the most urgent reply and

Clark Kerr

-3-, 3159, August 26, 3 a.m., from Moscow via Army.

Clark Kerr said he felt sure it would be forthcoming from the British Government in the morning.

Sent to Department as number 3159 (repeated for the Ambassadors to Cairo and to Ankara as secret).

HARRIMAN

WWF  
NPL

LL-290  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (REDACTED)

Moscow via Army  
Dated August 26, 1944  
Rec'd 8:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT.

3178, August 26, 8 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM  
HARRIMAN.

In the conversation with Molotov this evening on  
other matters, (reference my 3159, August 26, 3 a.m.)  
he told the British Ambassador and myself that the Soviet  
Government had not communicated with the Rumanian Government  
nor invited representatives to Moscow pending receipt of  
a reply from the British and ourselves. He expressed  
the hope that this would be forthcoming very soon.

HARRIMAN

LMS  
WTD

DSH-304  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Moscow via Army  
Dated August 26, 1944  
Rec'd 9:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3179, August 26, 7 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM  
HARRIMAN.

Molotov called the British Ambassador and myself  
over this evening to consult the British Ambassador  
and inform me as representing our respective Governments  
of developments in regard to Finland. Madame Kollontay  
had been approached in Stockholm by Gripenberg with a  
letter from the Finnish Foreign Minister asking whether  
the Soviet Government would receive representatives of  
the Finnish Government in Moscow to discuss a peace or  
armistice. In addition Gripenberg told Madame Kollontay  
that he had been instructed to inform her that Mannerheim  
had declared to Keitel that he did not feel himself  
bound by the agreement which Ryti had concluded with  
Germany.

The Soviet Government proposed to make the following  
reply:

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date \_\_\_\_\_

MAR 8 1972

-2-, 3179, August 26, 7 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

reply: "On August 25 the Soviet Government received the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Karl Enkel, and the note verbale of the Finnish Minister in Stockholm. Gripenberg requested that a delegation of the Finnish Government be received in Moscow to negotiate an armistice or a peace.

The delegation of the Finnish Government can be received by the Soviet Government only in case the Finnish Government accepts the following preliminary terms: It must be publicly declared by the Finnish Government that it will break off relations with Germany; that it will demand that Germany evacuate its troops from Finland during a period of two weeks from the day of the acceptance of the present proposal of the Soviet Government by the Finnish Government and in any case no later than September 15, 1944 and that if Germany does not evacuate its troops from Finland within the period named, the German troops will be disarmed and handed over as prisoners of war to the Allies.

If these preliminary terms are fulfilled by the Finnish Government, the Soviet Government will be

prepared

-3-, 3179, August 26, 7 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

prepared to receive a delegation of the Finnish Government in Moscow in order to carry on negotiations for either or both a peace and an armistice".

Molotov said he had no more information.

He explained that the above were the Soviet Government's preliminary conditions and that the remaining terms would be negotiated in Moscow. He agreed to discuss promptly with the British Government through Clark Kerr the armistice terms including the British proposals to be presented to the Finns.

Before leaving the subject, he asked me whether I had any comment to make. In reply to my question, he expressed the belief that the Finns could disarm the Germans without the aid of the Red Army.

Are there any comments you wish me to make?

HARRIMAN

LMS  
WFS

HIS-449

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Rome

Dated August 26, 1944

Rec'd 2:13 p.m., 27th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

249, August 26, 6 p.m.

THIS IS TAYLOR'S 290.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

At an audience with his Holiness this morning,  
I presented the condolences of the President and the  
Secretary. His Holiness was visibly moved by our  
sympathetic consideration. We discussed the fall  
of Paris, the Rumanian peace and the probable action  
of Bulgaria. We sympathized with one another over  
destruction done in Florence having particular regard  
to the damage to the Duomo, the ancient church of San  
Lorenzo, Giotto's Campanile and the looting of the Villa  
Schifanoia presented by Mrs. Taylor and myself to the Pope,  
and our other villa, both of which are still occupied by  
the Germans. We are informed that Florence is shelled nightly  
by three to four hundred shells one third of which are duds  
made at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia and which are  
loaded with cotton instead of explosives indicating success-  
ful sabotage.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Scheuble Date \_\_\_\_\_

MAR

8 1972

We discussed

-2-#249, August 26, 6 p.m., from Rome

We discussed relief for Italy on basis of contributed American supplies by American relief for Italy and the very serious situation which all seem to admit may prevail in Italy the coming winter in respect to food and fuel. The Pope has named two members of the Vatican organization to meet the little group that we had brought to-get-her to discuss distribution of American relief for Italy contributions and is alert to needs of definite planning to relieve entire Italian situation over period until next crops are available.

We have broached this subject on basis that committee mentioned our airgram No. 3 should be Italian in membership and that Amercross and other interested agencies should be advisory only. We have another meeting Monday afternoon and shall bring into the meeting representatives of UNRRA at present here in Rome. We discussed the two ships at Spanish ports awaiting permission to transport food and supplies to Vatican and one ship at an Argentine port for which navicert and other permits have been delayed. We urge that these permits be given at once.

KIRK

WSB

EOC-303

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

Moscow

Dated August 26, 1944

Rec'd 9:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3180, August 26, 10 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

Molotov in his conversation with the British Amba-  
sador and myself this evening told us that the Bulgarian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed the Soviet  
Charge in Sofia that the Bulgarian Government had decided  
to adopt a policy of "complete neutrality". Under this  
new status the German Government had been asked on August  
25 to withdraw its troops from Bulgaria and if it failed  
to do so they would be disarmed. Also any German troops  
attempting to enter Bulgaria from Rumania would be dis-  
armed and interned in accordance with international  
practice. He said that the Soviet Government was releas-  
ing a statement to this effect on the radio tonight and  
in the press tomorrow.

HARRIMAN

WFS

NPL

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

RP-235

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. [REDACTED]

Ankara

Dated August 26, 1944

Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORITY

[REDACTED] T AND MOST IMMEDIATE

1573, August 26, 3 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY AND UNDERSECRETARY

The Prime Minister asked me to call to see him this morning and said that he had just received a telegram from the Turkish Minister in Sofia to the effect that during the night the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent for him and made the following statement:

"The Russians are approaching the mouth of the Danube. The approach of the Russians to the Danube is not in the interest of either Bulgaria or Turkey. The British and Americans are acting much too slowly. To arrive at an understanding, speed is now essential. We Bulgars count on the support and diplomatic intervention of Turkey."

The Prime Minister

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972

-2-#1573, August 26, 3 p.m., from Ankara

The Prime Minister stated that Moshanoff has full authority to act for the Bulgarian Government and is in Istanbul awaiting a reply.

STEINHARDT

LMS  
WTD

DSH-202

PLAIN

Moscow via Army

Dated August 26, 1944

Rec'd 4:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3170, Twenty-sixth.

About one third of foreign page of press for August 26 was devoted to statements by President.

President's letter to Congress accompanying quarterly Lend-Lease report is quoted in three paragraphs.

Coverage of report includes figures for dollar value of Lend-Lease aid received by Allies from March 11, 1941 to June 30, 1944, value of aid given England, Russia and other countries and statistics of plane, ship, armament, foodstuffs and other categories of help given to Soviet Union. Reference is made to percentages of total American production represented by Lend-Lease contributions. One paragraph is quoted from "eastern front" section (\*)mements of Red Army and noting role of Lend-Lease and English and Canadian deliveries in contributing to Soviet victories.

President's

-2-, 3170, Twenty-sixth, from Moscow via Army.

President's statement that despite difficulty larger tonnage is being sent to China than was formerly shipped via Burma Road is reported.

Another Tass despatch publishes President's unofficial speech at reception for Dumbarton Oaks Conference delegates.

HARRIMAN

MRM  
(\* Apparent Omission

HIS-153

PLAIN

Cairo

Dated August 26, 1944

Rec'd 2:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

GREEK

265, August 26, 4 p.m.

Greece demands from Bulgaria: (A) A strategical guarantee of her northern frontier, so that the keys of her house be not held in foreign hands, and especially Bulgarian hands. (B) The punishment of the Bulgarian rulers and military chiefs, and also of all those who have committed crimes against the populations of Macedonia and Thrace, according to the principles on the punishment of war criminals, proclaimed by the United Nations. (C) The payment of indemnities to the families of the victims, who died executed, or from hunger, privations, and hardships; also to the persons who were forced to leave their homes and their possessions on the territories occupied by the Bulgarians, and to those who were forcibly driven to labour camps. (D) That all measures to be taken against Germany for her "reeducation," by the United Nations be equally applied to

-2-#265, August 26, 4 p.m., from Cairo

applied to Bulgaria. (E) Occupation of Bulgaria by the crimes of the United Nations, as a guarantee for the execution of the sanctions which will be applied on her, so that the Bulgarian people should be convinced that violence and crime do not pay for nations as well as for individuals."

Repeated to Murphy as No. 23.

SHINTZ

RR