This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government agency. (RESTRICTED)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

342, September 2, 11 p.m.

The President of Iceland and party arrived in Reykjavik this morning. He asked me to express his heartfelt thanks for the extraordinarily cordial reception accorded him in the United States and the splendid arrangements made for the entire visit. He also mentioned his appreciation of President Roosevelt's great interest in Iceland and of the generous amount of time spent with himself and the Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Thor expressed similar sentiments of thanks and appreciation.

DREYPUS

WSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SPG)

Rome

Dated September 2, 1944
Rec’d 2:17 p.m., 3rd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

285, September 2, 7 p.m.
FROM TITTMA NN FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT
AND THE SECRETARY.

One. I had an audience with the Pope this morning. Since we are on the point of leaving Rome for the United States, Mrs. Tittmann and our boys were present in order that they might personally say good-bye to the Holy Father and thank him for the hospitality shown us during the years we were his guests in the Vatican City (Taylor’s 300).

Two. During our conversation the subject of the speech he made yesterday was touched upon. The Holy Father immediately volunteered the statement that the paragraph at the end of the speech on peace and international organization had been inserted at the express request of Myron Taylor.

KIRK

BB
LFG-922

Stockholm

Dated September 4, 1944

Rec'd 9:55 a.m., 5th

Secretory of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
3477, September 4, 9 p.m.

As to its policy during the present war Sweden has never left any doubt (paraphrase of second paragraph of Foreign Minister Gunther's reply to joint message from the Secretary and Mr. Eden handed me this afternoon, my 3476, September 4, 8 p.m.). The Swedish Government on the contrary has repeatedly made clear its intention consistently to maintain its policy of neutrality which was announced at the beginning of hostilities. A policy of neutrality appears to the Swedish people as a necessary and natural basis for the preservation in a time of violent disturbances of their vital interests. This policy of Sweden was indeed at the outbreak of the war exactly the same as that of all democratic
-2- #3477, September 4, 9 p.m. from Stockholm

democratic countries in Europe with which it is possible to make a comparison. Several of them have since then been drawn into the war against their will and despite all efforts to preserve peace as result of direct attack from Germany. However, there is every reason to believe that if this had not been the case those countries like Sweden would to this very day have pursued a policy of neutrality. To this group of democratic countries, whether or not taking part in the War Sweden considers itself as belonging entirely.

My 1003, September 4, 9 p.m. repeats this to London.

Mr. Gunther has the honor to forward to the Secretary of State of the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (paragraph one of paraphrase of note) the following statement in reply to the joint message which was addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 24, 1944.

Under these circumstances the Government of Sweden which obviously must reserve its right independently to decide its policy according to Sweden's
-3- #3477, September 4, 9 p.m. from Stockholm

Sweden's proper interests, wishes to refer to the statement made again in reply to the message that has been received. That the points raised in the Allied message, are looked upon by the Government of Sweden in a spirit of due consideration and understanding and that the wishes expressed by the Allied Governments are and will be met in all essentials by a continuation of Sweden's present policy the statement made above should tend to show (fourth and concluding paragraph)

That it regards Sweden's policy of neutrality as entirely justified from the point of view of the country's general international obligations the Government of Sweden is also anxious to point out. Doubtless the Allied Government have the best foundation for their statement that the basic interests of Sweden as a freedom loving country lie in a victory of the United Nations.

However, the Allied Government will certainly admit that through its position on neutrality Sweden has not caused these any disadvantage as belligerents. On the contrary is it not a fact in connection with its clearly expressed intention at any time to meet by force of arms any attack against this neutrality that Sweden's consistent
consistent policy of neutrality has been to the advantage not only of Sweden but also to the advantage of the Allies during the war? The Swedish Government as well as the Swedish people on the other hand refuse to believe that the mere fact that Sweden has not been attacked by Germany could have the effect of causing the Allied powers to take a less sympathetic or confident attitude towards Sweden than otherwise they would have taken. There is in fact nothing in the wording of the message received to indicate an intention on the part of the Allied Governments to induce Sweden to participate in the war. Neither has it been interpreted in that spirit by the Swedish Government. It has been interpreted rather as an expression of the desire of the Allied Governments to do everything in order to shorten the war which may be possible. That it is also the ardent wish of the Swedish people that the war will soon come to an end it is hardly necessary to point out. The Swedish Government, if only for this reason, must in its decisions take into the most serious account this point of view. However, could the policy of a neutral Sweden be said at all to influence the development of the war it obviously could only apply to the trade in
to the trade in Sweden with the belligerent nations. The reference to this question which was made in the message that Mr. Gunther had the honor to receive was as follows:

"Because of direct military activities of the United Nations and the recent action of the Government of Sweden in withdrawing Swedish shipping from Swedish-German trade the ability of Germany to import goods from Sweden is already being more and more restricted and soon may to very small proportions be reduced." (Paragraph three of paraphrased note). The trade of Sweden with Germany has already, as a matter of fact, decreased to such an extent that it cannot be said that it could influence the war's duration. It may be expected that there will be a continued decreasing trend. That this process has taken place and continues to take place in conjunction with and parallel with the development of the war evidently cannot diminish its consequence or importance. A general change in the political attitude of Sweden towards Germany could not be expected to give any further contribution to the shortening of the war. If only for this reason it should not need to be contemplated.

JOHNSON

BB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.]

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT
3476, September 4, 8 p.m.

When Foreign Minister Gunther and Mr. Boheman had handed British Minister and me the reply to our demarche, paraphrase of which is sent in my immediately following telegram No. 3477, September 4, 9 p.m., Mr. Gunther asked us to read it. Mr. Boheman then said that he would like to make the following official comments: (1) Actual Swedish trade today with Germany is very small. The withdrawal of Swedish shipping from that trade had a far more pronounced effect than its previous proportion to the total trade would indicate. German tonnage now in the trade with Sweden is very much less than it has been previously although this Boheman stated was not unexpected; they had believed that this shipping would be largely withdrawn as in fact it...
-2-#3476, September 4, 8 p.m., from Stockholm.

In fact it has been for other purposes. With today's news of cessation of hostilities between Russia and Finland the Finnish shipping is also out of German Swedish trade. There only remain a few German ships and some others including Danish, all in greatly decreased quantity to the normal figures. For several days now there has not been a single ship at Luleå or Oxolosund to take on iron ore although the Germans have announced that twelve will be sent to Luleå and five to Oxolosund. These seventeen ships according to Boheman would represent a tonnage of about 60,000 which is much less than the previous average and he says that they would represent all shipping for that traffic to the Baltic ports for the entire month of September. They have not yet arrived there or even been dispatched according to Swedish information. Foreign Office is of the opinion that other events may soon happen which would have such an influence on German and German controlled shipping to Sweden as to reduce it almost to a vanishing point.

(2) He says that transit of all war material which goes to German occupied Finland has now stopped. Boheman stated that the question of the cessation of the remaining traffic of the same kind to Norway is under serious consideration.
serious consideration now by the Government. He was referring to the 120,000 tons conceded by the terms of the Anglo-American Swedish war trade agreement. The inference was that the transit to Norway will likewise be completely stopped.

My 1002, September 4, 8 p.m. repeats this to London.

Boehem then went on to say that the Allies have often expressed their view that Sweden should make clear her stand in regard to Nazi Germany and that if she did so it would among other things have a strong influence in the direction of forcing Finland to get out of the war. In this connection Boehem pointed out that the Finns have often advanced as one of their main difficulties in attempting to get peace with Russia their precarious situation. Sweden recently, as we know, has informed the Finns that Sweden would supply Finnish food requirements to the necessary extent in the event that the Finns come to an understanding with Russia. This assurance from the Swedish Government Boehem stated has great influence on the Finnish decision. Boehem also drew attention to the reservation made by Sweden at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-American-Swedish war trade agreement that if the situation should change as
change as far as the position of the northern countries was concerned she would reserve the right to export certain necessary commodities to the northern countries.

The present assurance to Finland in regard to food is in line with this Swedish reservation and the Swedes have therefore not thought it necessary to consult with us prior to the decision. Full details of all exports under this obligation will however be given to us through the Joint Standing Commission.

Mr. Gunther then asked me what I thought of the reply. I told him that frankly speaking I was certain that it would be a disappointment to my Government; that what we had expected from the Swedish Government in reply to the joint demarche was an action which would be a clear affirmation of where Sweden's sympathies lay in the present war; that the moment had come when Sweden could take such action without risk of an overwhelming attack from our enemy and that an opportunity had been afforded for Sweden to give public expression to the feeling which we know the country had always had.

Mr. Gunther replied that he understood our reasoning but that it was not the viewpoint of the Swedish Government. He said that from the Swedish view it was not a question of whether
5-3476, September 4th 8 p.m., from Stockholm.

of whether there was the slightest danger from Germany nor or of even seizing the occasion to proclaim to the world a fact which according to Mr. Gunther should be well known -- that Sweden has no sympathy and has never had any sympathy with Nazi Germany. Sweden's position is not a thing which can be lightly repudiated without an overt act having been taken against this country.

Mr. Gunther then argued that although he understood our point of view that the Swedish trade with Germany now remaining still contributed to the resistance of the enemy and thereby to lengthening of the war, he could not personally agree with that opinion. Both the British Minister and I replied that our highest military authorities were of a contrary opinion and that even if that trade contributed to the lengthening of the war by only one day or one hour it should be stopped. I remarked that they could not expect our military authorities to be satisfied with anything less than total cessation of all trade with Germany. Bohemen then intimated that the Swedish Government would in fact eventually go much nearer to meeting our requests in entirety than we possibly even imagined. The minute anything happened in one of the northern countries (he was obviously referring to Denmark
to Denmark and Norway, we would find that Swedish actions would be completely inconsistent with neutrality.

Mr. Boheman then made some remarks which I do not think had been contemplated but which occurred to his mind at the moment. He said he could not but believe that the technical neutrality of Sweden was something which brought substantial advantages to the Allies. Through the Swedish position as protecting power in many countries of the Soviet interests and the smaller Allies, Sweden had been in a position effectively to ameliorate the physical conditions of many allied citizens and had in fact been able to save many lives. These were lives he observed as well as those of the soldiers whom we say are being killed because of Swedish material sent to Germany. He referred to various specific activities such as the exchange of war prisoners, Greek relief, et cetera, which could not have been undertaken if Sweden were not a neutral power. He then queried how the Allies would like to see Switzerland enter the war as an ally. What would become then of the vast machinery for the protection of our interests in enemy countries? The important work done by Sweden for war prisoners would also be impossible if Sweden abandoned neutrality. Boheman queried whether abandonment of
abandonment of Swedish neutrality which would be the result of complete compliance with the joint request would be worth the sacrifice of the many activities in which Sweden is now engaged to our benefit. Both he and Mr. Gunther emphasized that the Swedish insistence on maintaining consistent declared policy of neutrality was based on their Government's conception of their duty to Sweden itself and had no relation to any form of obligation -- moral or otherwise -- to Nazi Germany which they frankly admitted did not exist nor to any apprehension of German counter measures.

JOHNSON
Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
MIUACT

103, September 5, 8 p.m.

Sence your 95, September 4 conveyed to Evatt who was highly pleased and sends thanks for good wishes. He wrote out another message for you which I convey below in paraphrase.

Firstly, he welcomed the President's Puget Sound speech as a statement of positive principles applicable throughout the Pacific and said he would repeat this in his forthcoming statement to Parliament.

Secondly, he expressed gratification at the "great progress" at Dumbarton Oaks and said that if you wanted to call a conference in October for establishing a world security organization he would support you quite irrespective of time limitations. He said he disagrees with Cadogan and feels that things are moving so fast that "one should strike while the iron is hot." He also feels that if Germany gives in before the organization is set up Russia might be less inclined to cooperate.
-2-#103, September 5, 8 p.m., from Canberra
and he said he thought New Zealand felt the same way.

He admitted in conversation that if a conference is
called his presence in Washington would be apropos
time for him to discuss the matters referred to in my Q7,
August 26 thus avoiding the necessity of an invitation
or of explanations here if he went for the special
purpose.

He also expressed the hope that the United States
would support Australia's nomination to the Council if
indeed it could not itself nominate Australia. He
thought that United States sponsorship of Brazil was
natural and unobjectionable but felt that Australia
and New Zealand as Pacific countries most vitally
interested should rotate in the Council.

JOHNSON

REP
Note: Telegram originally undecipherable
SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington,

3328, September 5, midnight.

I believe that the following digest of Donald Nelson's conversation of August 31 with Molotov on the Chinese situation will be of interest to the Department.

Nelson opened the conversation by stating that the President had requested him and General Hurley to call on Molotov in order to acquaint him with the reasons for their mission to China. Molotov sincerely appreciated this courtesy. Nelson explained that he was to deal primarily with economic matters in China and General Hurley military, although each would keep in close touch with the other's work. The President's primary objective was the early defeat of Japan. The fullest cooperation from China was of vital importance. To this end, the United States must support Chiang Kai Chek and bring about complete unity in China. With this in view, certain economic measures should be immediately taken.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaeble Date MAR 8 1972
-2-#3328, September 5, midnight, from Moscow via Army.

immediately undertaken. It was further thought that if the Japanese were to be permanently defeated, a good part of their business should be taken away from them and that industry should be built up in China in order to supply the peoples of the Near and Far East with their requirements formerly supplied by the Japanese. Nelson stated that he and General Hurley were proceeding to China to initiate discussions with Chiang Kai Sek on this and other subjects and to obtain his ideas before making recommendations to the President and the Department of State. He explained that he was not asking for any Russian support of the proposals but would appreciate receiving any views Mr. Molotov might wish to express thereon. Molotov commented on the extremely important nature of the mission and inquired whether Nelson planned to take any practical measures at the present time. Nelson replied that it might be possible to undertake some economic projects immediately in order to assist China in increasing its production. He added that the unification of China was one of the principle purposes of his mission, since without unification no good long-range economic program could be devised for China. Nelson stated that he would appreciate
-3-#3328, September 5, midnight, from Moscow via Army.

I appreciate receiving an expression of Soviet opinion on the situation in China and whether Molotov thought that the economic plans outlined by him could be worked out with the present Government in China. Molotov replied that it was difficult to judge the Chinese situation from Moscow or Washington - it could much better be done on the spot. However, he had some thoughts on China which he would willingly express to Nelson - off the record. He then gave a lengthy account of Chiang Kai Chek's trip to Sian in 1936 and his imprisonment by Chiang Hauch Liang. He maintained that at that time relations were tense between Chiang Kai Chek and the Soviet Government. Nonetheless, the Soviet Government had turned its back on the revolutionary elements led by Chiang Hauch Liang and Wang Ching Wei which included many communists and which had turned to the Soviet Union for sympathy, and had issued a statement to the effect that the events in China, including the uprising in Sian, had transpired as a result of Japanese provocation. Because of Soviet moral and political support, Chiang Kai Chek had been liberated and permitted to return to the seat of his Government, whereas, Chiang Hauch Liang had been arrested. It had been hoped that this
44-3328, September 5, midnight, from Moscow via Army.

Action on the part of the Soviets would mark a turning point to the better in Soviet-Chinese relations. However, since then, the Chinese has shown little desire to strengthen relations between the two countries. On the contrary, during the recent war years, relations had deteriorated. For example, the Soviet Government had been obliged to repatriate from Sinkiang Soviet citizens because of extremely hostile attitude on the part of local authorities. But the Soviet Government did not attach any great importance to the Sinkiang incidents considering them transitory or temporary in nature.

Molotov emphasized that the Soviet Government could bear no responsibility for Internal affairs or developments in China although during recent years, it had been unjustifiably held responsible on various occasions. I was somewhat struck by the similarity in Soviet policy in respect to the recent uprising in Warsaw. (See my 3000, August 15, 8 p.m.). He then explained that in parts of China, the population was extremely impoverished, half starved, miserable. Some of these people called themselves “communists” but they had no relation whatever to communism. They were merely expressing their dissatisfaction at their economic condition by
condition by calling themselves communists. However, once their economic conditions had improved, they would forget this political inclination. The Soviet Government could not be blamed in any way for this situation nor should it be associated with these "Communist elements". The key to the entire situation was to make life more normal, to make the Chinese authorities cope with the tasks before them and to work in the common interest. He concluded by stating that the Soviet people would be very glad if America assisted the Chinese people in improving their economic and military position, unifying China and "in helping the Chinese choose their best people for this task".

I inquired what Molotov would like to see Chiang Kai Chek do in Sinkiang. He stated that the Soviet Government only desired to see Soviet nationals there treated in humane way. I asked how many such nationals were involved. He first replied that he did not know but later added that perhaps several thousand Soviet farmers and artisans in the area have been subject to persecution and discrimination on the part of the local officials.

Molotov clearly indicated his satisfaction that
-G-#3328, September 5, midnight, from Moscow via Army.  

He had been consulted and although he gave little new information, he confirmed previous statements that the Soviet Government would welcome the United States taking a lead in Chinese affairs politically, militarily and economically. He further made it clear, however, that the Soviets had no intention of taking any interest in affairs of the Chinese Government until the Generalissimo made efforts to improve Soviet-Chinese relations by changes in his policies.

A request was made to see Stalin but the following day, word was received from Molotov that Stalin was ill with grippe.

HARRIMAN

LMS
FMH-405
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Rome
Dated September 6, 1944
Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

301, September 6, 10 a.m.
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HULL
This is Taylor's 305.
The Vatican has requested additional information regarding international organization. Thus far I have given the Pope personally only the substance of the President's and Secretary Hull's press release on the preliminary formula. When and if you wish me to go further please advise.

KIRK

BB
LC - 61
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (********)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT
7349, September 8, 2 p.m.

In a personal conversation Chaplin, of the Foreign Office, told Penrose that Ministers have approved of United Kingdom participation in exploratory discussions on reparations with United States and USSR at as early a date as possible, and that formal notification to this effect will be transmitted to us in the next day or two. He said that Ministers as well as civil servants feel that economic security should be included in the discussions. They believe that no decisions on reparations are possible until economic policy towards Germany from the standpoint of security has been decided. In particular they think it is essential at least to get some preliminary ideas of Soviet views on the subject.

The British
The British have done much work on economic security since the time of the Haldin committee and though they have not reached an agreed position among Ministers the EIPS committee which works on economic policy towards Germany has clarified the subject on a number of points by sifting various plans and eliminating those which on close technical examination appear impracticable.

The British representatives in the proposed exploratory talks will not present cut and dried views but may be expected to be well prepared for a realistic appraisal of alternative plans from the point of view of administrative practicability and of probable economic effects. Chaplin said that in their note to us the British will probably suggest that the discussions of administrative machinery and economic controls be separated from the discussion of economic security and reparations policy because the former may have to be set up in a month or two while policy as to the latter will inevitably take time to formulate.

The British consider that in the early stages of occupation German trade should be managed solely on the basis
on the basis of the needs of the Allies and the minimum essential needs of the German people. This would be worked out on a commodity basis and it would not necessarily be determined until later what movements of goods would be chalked up against reparation. European Allies could not be permitted to treat all the goods they got from Germans as reparation, otherwise essential German imports would have to be financed by United Kingdom and United States and the latter might find themselves supplying Germany without return instead of receiving reparation. Full accounts should be kept of the passage of all goods and final settlements would be made later.

The British have moved markedly away from the idea of an elaborate separate machinery for reparations towards the idea of subsuming almost all the operations under general economic control machinery.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

7471, Eleventh.

Prominence is given in London press today to announcement of Prime Minister's arrival for second Quebec Conference with President. Stories from Washington and Quebec, as well as smaller amount of comment originating locally, predict that intensification of war against Japan will be a main topic of conference. Next most important place is given to problem of administration of Germany after surrender.

The Times carries despatch from "our own correspondent" in Washington, declaring in part: "The coming Anglo-American Conference will unquestionably be concerned with a variety of European questions, but by no means with these alone. It is generally recognized that the plans which govern the conduct of the war against Japan must now be brought up to date, and this particularly as they concern Britain's share in Far Eastern military
military and naval activities. The subject is far more complicated than appears on the surface. When long ago the Prime Minister mentioned the possibility of some 'demobilization' after the defeat of Germany had been achieved his words were rather distingusously taken as an indication that British participation in the Orient would be less than loyal adherence to its alliance should dictate. The present discussion in this country of American demobilization seems to have done nothing to set Mr. Churchill's words in the proper light, and there is still less understanding than there should be of the scope and success with which the Indian and British land forces and naval strength under Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser have operated. The suspicion that Britain would give no more than 'token' assistance takes an unconscionable time adding, and Mr. William Phillips revival of the phrase has stimulated those who for one reason or another want to believe or to propagandize it. The fact that it is unjust an ungenerous and has never been true either of the United Kingdom or of the Indian Army makes headway but slowly. But there is something more which needs to be said, or rather there is one question which needs to be asked and answered.

Put bluntly
-3- #7471, September 11, from London.

Put bluntly it is this: How much more than 'token' assistance in the struggle at sea does the American Navy really want from Britain's Fleet? Certainly the average American Admiral strongly believes that so far as sea warfare is concerned the huge and superbly led United States Navy could 'go it alone'. What is more, even since Pearl Harbor this country's sailors have been consumed with a desire to wreak vengeance upon the Japanese Fleet, and the belief that they can do it off their own bat may work to make them less eager to admit anybody else to anything that would look like a major share in this accomplishment. There is every reason to believe that the coming Anglo-American Conference will have to deal with this question—below the surface perhaps, but nevertheless to deal with it".

DAILY TELEGRAPH'S Diplomatic correspondent in London writes: "The Allied scheme for the occupation of Berlin may be modified as the result of the forthcoming talks at Quebec between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. At present the Allied intention is that while the headquarters of the mixed commission to be set up will be in Berlin, the forces in control of the city will be Russian. I learn however that the Russian zone, and indeed the entire scheme, is open to alteration.
#7471, September 11, from London.

to alteration in the negotiations about to take place. Tentative plans were made at Teheran for the Three Powers to occupy special zones of Germany. But it is unlikely at the present moment that British forces will be in entire control, as suggested, of the industrial area, including Hamburg, Kiel and the North Sea Ports. The British will probably share this responsibility with the Americans. The future of German industry will undoubtedly be one of the greatest problems, but the reconstruction of Russia's heavily damaged industries will demand immediate attention, and a call will be made upon German plant and material for the purpose. Claims of a similar nature are also likely to come from Holland, Belgium and France.

Other accounts include forecast that Mr. Eden may participate at later stage of talks, and that they may be followed by another meeting with Marshal Stalin. Mr. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

MANCHESTER GUARDIANS New York correspondent is only one to mention Argentina, stating: "Another theme which the Prime Minister and the President could profitably explore is that of policy in relation to Argentina. There is a popular impression here, without much specific evidence behind it, that the United States
United States wants to apply strict economic sanctions against Argentina, while Great Britain hesitates to do so, even though this country might be able to guarantee Great Britain from other sources the food she now gets from Argentina. Some newspapers here have asked how we can hope to keep down Fascist countries in the post-war period if Great Britain is unwilling now, because of her investments in and trade with Argentina, to bring pressure to bear on a country which is rapidly going Fascist and is already the center spreading totalitarian poison in this hemisphere. It is obvious that this controversy may be dangerous to the all important cause of Anglo-American harmony, and one hopes for that reason that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt will explore the matter fully at Quebec.

DAILY SKETCH editorial asserts: "The conference will be one of the most momentous in history, for the future of Germany and how that country is to be controlled are questions which at the phase of the war are naturally well forward in the public mind. The problems are many, and on their adequate solution depends the peace of the world for generations to come. Three power control, with a supreme commission sitting in Berlin, is generally believed to be acceptable to Great Britain."
Great Britain, the United States and Russia. Such agreement is a good augury for the beginning of the task. It is a foundation of which so much may be built. It means that at one end of the second World War the victorious nations will not surrender the specious German appeals or to fickle German promises. "We have no excuse for repeating our past mistakes. We have every opportunity to help to build for lasting peace-and this time it will be done in Berlin".

Only other editorial, in DAILY TELEGRAPH, links conference with Dumbarton Oaks and pronouncements of American party leaders on post-war policy. It declares: "In the second conference at Quebec, the war against Japan will again be one of the chief subjects. The day is near when much larger resources can be deployed 'in the unflinching and relentless waging' of that war which concerns the British Commonwealth not less than the United States. Still nearer is the day when the Allied Nations must determine their plans for the disarmament and control of Germany and peace in Europe". Editorial speaks of progress which is reported to have been made at Dumbarton Oaks on general nature of an International Security Organization, and European Advisory Commissions draft of Armistic terms. It continues:
continues: "long views must be taken. The supreme duty of the United Nations and their leaders is to ensure that no such horrors as our generation has suffered fall upon the next. No one in this country whose opinion is of any weight would dispute the principles formulated by Mr. Cordell Hull, that the fates of all Nations in the modern world are tied together, that we need a postwar security organization and had better keep the problems of its establishment out of domestic politics. The clashes of election year in the United States are no concern of this country, but we may be allowed to welcome the large measure of agreement between the Republican candidate, Mr. Dewey, and Mr. Roosevelt upon international policy. In the second speech of his campaign Mr. Dewey practically approved the plan for security drawn by Mr. Cordell Hull for Mr. Roosevelt. It was not a surprise. While fighting his party battle with vigor Mr. Dewey had given clear signs of his desire that there should be no party conflict on international questions. His forthright declaration that the Creation of a permanent world peace security organization 'must be a united non-partisan work' is incontestable. As for the form it takes we may be satisfied for the present with the general terms
general term—an assemble representative of all peace-loving nations with sovereignty equal. Its constitution and its machinery will not be built in a day or a year, but on the maintenance through peace of the united effort for freedom each nations welfare depends".

WINANT
Secretary of State,
Washington,
7509, Twelfth.
Embassy's 7471 eleventh.

Press features news stories from Quebec concerning arrival of President and Prime Minister and beginning of talks. Leading editorials forecast that greatest emphasis will be placed, as TIMES states, on "organizing peace in Europe and victory in the Pacific". All accounts report invitation sent to Marshal Stalin and his explanation that he is unable for military reasons to leave Soviet Union.

TIMES editorial begins: "Mr. Churchill has arrived at Quebec for consultations with President Roosevelt at what is plainly the great climax of the war. The battle in Europe is drawing near to its end. The German armies in the west are in retreat and the British and Americans are already probing at the frontiers of the Reich. The choice of Quebec
of Quebec is a happy omen. The world will have cause to be grateful if this meeting is one half as fruitful as the last Quebec conference in 1943. The choice of Quebec is also symbolic of the concerns of the President and Prime Minister, which must be almost equally divided between east and west; for the closing stages of military operations in Europe are the signal for the concentration of all the paraphernalia of war in the Pacific. The new Quebec conference unlike its predecessor will have little occasion to discuss European strategy whose tasks are now almost fulfilled. But there is still much to be done in reinforcing and completing the plans already laid for the control and restoration of Europe. The armistice terms are ready; but through the responsibilities of the three major powers for the policing of Germany and the joint measures to be pursued there are understood to have been determined by the European Advisory Commission, some revising of the plan now appears to be demanded." Editorial says that in absence of Marshal Stalin no fresh decisions of principle on European affairs can be expected, but that there may be useful clarification
clarification of supplementary issues of organization. It mentions physical rehabilitation of occupied countries, question of neutral asylum for Nazi criminals, issue of Poland, and progress made at Dumbarton Oaks on fundamentals of security organization. TIMES asserts: "But while President and Prime Minister organize peace in Europe, they must also organize victory in the Pacific. Here much of the bitterest fighting still lies ahead. Since the assault on Pearl Harbor, the Americans have been deeply engaged in the war against Japan. The setting of the rising sun is very close to American hearts. Partly for this reason, partly because British commitments in other theaters have up till now prevented the full exertion of her strength in the Pacific, certain unfriendly American circles have taken the opportunity of circulating rumors that Britain has no intention of undertaking her full share in the defeat of Japan. Nothing could be farther from the truth. There has even been a tendency to underestimate the handsome first instalment of the Australians in the clearing of New Guinea. There is a tendency too to forget that the British
Commonwealth has quite as large an account to settle with the Japanese as the United States. Singapore rankles as deeply as Pearl Harbor. Nor should American interests and responsibilities in the Pacific be allowed to obscure the fact that four members of the British Commonwealth are Pacific powers and consequently have as deep and abiding an interest in Pacific security as the United States. Military and technical preparations for the transfer to the Japanese theater are already far advanced in this country. What is to be determined at Quebec is the coordination of the American and British efforts. The smoothness with which operations have been combined in Europe promise well for collaboration in the Pacific." Remainder of TIMES editorial is devoted to current American discussion of postwar policy. It declares that normally party animus would be at its most reckless during this stage of a Presidential campaign, and might severely limit President's freedom to act as his country's most distinguished representative abroad; but that fortunately agreement has been reached in past few weeks to keep great issues of international
international policy out of domestic political conflict. TIMES holds that this is partly due to statesmanship of Governor Dewey, whose fears concerning place of small powers in projected international organization have been met by Secretary Hull's reassurances. It adds that Mr. Dewey's offer of cooperation has been cordially accepted by Secretary. It then continues: "Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull have striven unceasingly to impress upon the American people the urgent need of continuity and responsibility in foreign policy; and Mr. Hull has taken the unique step of consulting with a bi-partisan Senate group at each stage in order to assure a solid foundation for American participation in the peace." TIMES also gives credit to Mr. Willkie's contribution, declaring that after having been snubbed by Republicans at Chicago he has shown no inclination to sulk in his tent, but "has turned all his crusading zeal to the task of persuading his fellow Republicans that it is their duty to eliminate any vestige of a Congressional veto upon the power of the President to use American forces to put down aggression" in accordance with projected security
security organization. Concluding paragraph reads: "President Roosevelt is credited with a deep determination to avoid the pitfalls which engulfed President Wilson, and to prevent this time, if it be humanly possible, the disengagements of the United States from world affairs. Without the participation of the United States, there can be no peace. Yet it had until very recently a strong and vocal tradition of isolation. The fragile and tentative agreement between the two parties can hardly eliminate all the special difficulties. The Senate's deep consciousness of its special prerogatives in regard to foreign policy undid President Wilson, and it shows no signs of abdicating this time. There is an especial sensitiveness to the rights of small nations in the United States, not neglected by politicians anxious to secure votes of the many racial minorities situated at critical points in the electoral machine. There is the insistence of men like Senator Vandenberg that it would be as well to see what the peace settlement is to be before committing the United States irrevocably to its support."
support. President Roosevelt is incontestably the shrewdest judge of the currents of opinion in his own country. His understanding of what the United States is prepared to accept and support in the sphere of world organization and united action is the surest guarantee of American participation on a scale commensurate with the great resources and responsibilities of the United States."

Like TIMES, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN places great emphasis on Pacific war aspect of Quebec talks. Again like TIMES, GUARDIAN points out to its readers that for many Americans this war comes first in importance. It asserts: "There can no longer be any doubt that Britain will take her full share in the Pacific war, but it remains true that our interests begin in Europe. Britain is a world power with business in the seven seas, but she is also a European power; the United States is not. When Germany is defeated we must therefore expect to find that public opinion in America may to a certain extent lose interest in the European settlement (for which indeed much patience and understanding is necessary) and that would be
would be unfortunate, for it is becoming increasingly clear that the combined wisdom and leadership of all the Allies will be needed if we are to create a new Europe from the ruins of the old. Editorial declares that, at last peace conference the American delegation brought to Paris noble ideals and scholarly research, and that "it was not their fault that much of their work was rendered valueless by political stupidity at home." It holds that this time world will need a more "the calm judgment which only distance and safety can give to balance the fears and hatreds of Europe." GUARDIAN believes it inevitable that those nations which have suffered Nazi tyranny will think of peace in terms of vengeance and security; and that even in Britain, "public opinion is both less idealist and more vengeful than in 1918." It says that this time all are agreed that Nazi criminals must be punished and that Germany must never be permitted to plunge world in war again; but that this very obsession with German menace "may blind us to other dangers and to the overriding need to create a new European order."

For these
For these reasons, GUARDIAN hopes that though Quebec conference may be chiefly concerned with military plans, it may find time to consider future of Europe once more. It maintains that "a new declaration of policy at this moment might have great effect both now and after the war is over." It does not believe that there is left in Germany any organized opposition to which an appeal could be addressed, "but at least we could indicate to the German people what is expected of them when Hitler has gone, how they will be treated, what they must do to be saved." Editorials says: "The plans for a new league are good so far as they are known, but limited in scope; UNRRA is a patchwork though well intentioned. But more is wanted. There should at least be a vision of a Europe in which economic cooperation and political federation will make nationalism unreasonable and even frontiers unimportant. Racial discrimination will not be abolished merely by transference of population; the causes of war must be removed and not only wars prevented or quashed." Asserting that aim must be to prove to all nations that peace pays,
pays, GUARDIAN concludes: "Nor should plans be fixed for eternity. When peace has been forced upon the world by Allied power for ten years or so, a new advance may be possible transcending the limits of national sovereignty. At present the best we can hope for is that the weariness and disillusion of Europe should be tempered by American idealism. For all his limitations, it was not President Wilson who failed the world in 1919 but the world who failed President Wilson."

DAILY HERALD is another paper which looks to Quebec Conference to widen the approach to postwar settlement, especially for Europe. It begins: "The chief item on the agenda for Mr. Churchill's meeting with President Roosevelt in Canada may be the Pacific war. Not much lower on the list must stand the question of the future of Germany. Indeed, the preparation of more detailed plans for the treatment of the defeated Reich is now urgent. A peaceful Europe probably means a peaceful world." Editorial says that many plans for dealing with problem of Germany will have to be improvised once our forces are on German territory, but that nothing could be
could be worse than "an opportunist peace -- a peace of shreds and patches, of private and particular bargains." Recalling lesson of last peace, HERALD declares: "Neither: vengeance nor pity nor fear will save us. All these counselors sat around the conference table at Versailles. The peace will be a good peace only in so far as it applies the great principles discovered in the war and pre-war periods."

It says that peace must apply to Europe as a whole, outlawing destitution wherever it may arise, and that object must be not merely to prevent German military resurgence, but to assure Europe's economic resurgence. It also holds that Britain must be supporter of "libertarian constitutions", adopting a criterion in this connection "which could have ostracized Germany when she was weak and saved a world of blood." It declares that eventually Germans must be found who are prepared to undertake posts of responsibility; and that "our occupation must have a direct social purpose of breaking the power of German industrialists, landowners and militarists, and of assisting a different
"12-#7509, Twelfth, from London

a different Germany into life." HERALD concludes however that none of these principles will avail without one more - that United Nations must remain together, ready to accept obligations which will necessarily reduce their absolute sovereignty. It says: "Nothing less can succeed in the end. The wisdom of the peacemakers will be seen in how far they are prepared to advance towards the ideal of world government."

Editorials in NEWS CHRONICLE, DAILY TELEGRAPH and YORKSHIRE POST strike same notes of British determination to throw full strength into war against Japan, and of need to accelerate decisions on postwar European problems.

WINANT

WFS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated September 12, 1944
Rec'd 1:18 p.m., 13th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2852, September 12, 8 p.m.
PERSONAL FOR MATTHEWS.

From the same source as that mentioned in my 2807, September 8, 7 p.m., I have been informed that Monsieur Dastier de Lavigerie, named de Gaulle Ambassador to Washington, is an undesirable character, a user of opium and cocaine and is described as a homosexual. The source went so far as to say that the appointment of such a man constituted an insult to the American Government.

See August 24, 1942, issue of LIFE magazine for background. He said that de Lavigerie entered the United States under the name of Durand and gave the interview to LIFE on which that article was based and he is mentioned therein as Durand. His photograph appears in the article but was taken from the back.

NORWEB

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Rio de Janeiro
Dated September 13, 1944
Rec'd 6:45 a.m., 14th

Secretary of State
Washington

3294, September 13, 4 p.m.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

Velloso showed me a telegram from the Brazilian Ambassador to Mexico transmitting a request of ex-King Carol to be permitted to come to Brazil accompanied by Madame Lepeccu et cetera. Carol said that he would remain there until about the middle of October when he hopes to take a boat to Portugal.

Velloso told me that he is not inclined to grant his request but before replying would like to know if the Department has anything to say on the subject.

CAFFERY

RR
Secretary of State,
Washington.

318, September 13, 6 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY AND OTHERS
INTERESTED IN ITALIAN RELIEF.

At a meeting with the Prime Minister at his office this morning, Bonomi agreed to become honorary chairman of the "National Committee for Distribution of Relief Supplies in Italy." There were present beside myself and Gowen: Prince Filippo Doria representing the Italian Government, who is to be active chairman of the full committee of nine; Prince Carlo Pacelli representing the Vatican who is to be chairman of the Executive Committee of three; Dr. Umberto Zanotti-Bianco, President of the Italian Red Cross; Marchese Ugo Theodoli, Secretary General of Italian Red Cross, and the following representing respectively:

One. The Italian Government: Dr. Zaniboni, High Commissioner for War Refugees; Professor Giovanni Can-aperia, General Medical Inspector and

Dr. Emilio Tamborlini
-2-#318, September 13, 6 p.m. from Vatican City.

Dr. Emilio Tamborini of the Department of the Interior,

Two. The Vatican: Monsignor Walter Carroll, American member of Vatican Secretariat of State, and Monsignor Baldelli in charge of Vatican refugee work.

The statute of which a copy was wired by my telegram No. 311 of September 9 was approved; the amount of the initial Government contribution is anticipated to be 10,000,000 lire, and the amount of the Vatican's initial contribution is not yet stated.

On my own behalf and as chairman of American Relief for Italy, Incorporated, I offered a personal contribution of 1,000,000 lire.

The Ministry of Finance will pass upon the document today and submit it to the Allied Control Commission for approval tomorrow.

The importance political and economic, of having a distinctive Italian agency created to participate in the relief field, is, in the opinion of thoughtful observers, very great, this being the first example of effort to make Italians help themselves and it is anticipated that other contributions to this cause will be forthcoming as the character of the enterprise is understood.

In our own behalf, it solves the question of the allocation
allocation of contributed materials through American Relief for Italy Incorporated as it brings together the possible competing interests which relate back to the particular donors in America.

It has been exceedingly difficult to find a basis for common action, as it now turns out, in this committee. The only possible complaining element might be the labor organizations reflected from America in similar groups here, but the general opinion is that Italian labor is not yet so organized in a single bloc that any representation would reflect the entire labor community and the representing faction might bring into the committee confusion and disorder. The Door, however, is open to the admission of such a national group if, in course of time, such a body emerges as representative of all Italian labor.

No release, privately or to the press, is permitted until the final draft of release is approved by the Prime Minister.

TAYLOR

LMS
London
Dated September 14, 1944
Rec'd. 7:29 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

7669, fourteenth.

TIMES devotes its leading editorial today to Far Eastern war, and attention being given by Quebec Conference to acceleration of attack on Japan. It begins: "Although it may have been temporarily obscured in the public vision by the tremendous events of the hundred days that have passed since the Allied landing on the beaches of Normandy, the war against Japan will before long be dominating the world outlook as surely as the assault upon Germany dominates it today. Pacific and Far Eastern strategy cannot fail to be the principal preoccupation of the military and naval experts assembled at Quebec, and the situation in China, which is arousing growing anxiety in Washington, will be closely studied". Editorial speaks of dangerous progress being made in Japanese effort to
biseect China from north to south, expressing belief that Japanese objective is airfields from which General Chennault's bombers have attacked their shipping and communications, and raided industrial centers in Japan and Manchuria. TIMES refers to indications by Japanese of intention to limit their major naval activities in future to seas extending from Kuriles to Southern China, and indications that they have withdrawn their airfl eet as well from southwestern Pacific. Speaking of enemy, editorial says: "It can be deduced that he was resolved to cut his losses and abandon his surviving garrisons from Bougainville Island to New Guinea, which is probable enough; and that he intends to concentrate his strength in an offensive defense based upon his 'inner fortress' and the bastion of the Philippines, in which the many airfields on those islands and his fleet based on Formosa and the Pescadores will play a predominant role. At the same time this dedication seems to neglect the supply of fuel, which is an essential condition of a defense that will depend mainly upon his airpower and his battlefleet. No doubt he has accumulated important
reserves of oil in Japan, but his heavy losses of tankers and transports are likely to diminish his power to maintain these supplies at a safe level. On a long view indeed the Netherlands East Indies seem an even more important factor in his new defensive dispositions than the Philippines."

TIMES continues: "The coming months will show how the military and naval experts assembled at Quebec and the statesmen who will review their plans will solve any problems presented by Japanese advances in China and retreats in the Pacific. They will naturally desire as rapid a decision as distances and seasons permit, but the speedy defeat of the enemy can only be effected by the closest cooperation of all the Allied forces engaged from Burma and the Indian Ocean to New Guinea and the Pacific Isles. This cooperation is increasing and, now that the defeat of Germany is in sight, the British contribution to the common victory in the east can be expected to make itself felt over a wider range than had been possible while Hitler's
Hitler's Reich remained the first and the most dangerous enemy to the cause of the United Nations. It asserts that British forces will play their full part; and, after listing present British and Australian contributions to war effort in Far East, declares that "it is no token contribution that the British Commonwealth and Empire are making and are resolved to make to the final defeat of Japan."

WINANT

MB
Secretary of State,
Washington.

7614, fifteenth.

London papers have given full coverage in news stories to Quebec conference throughout week. Despatches published today from correspondents in Quebec deal largely with reports of possible conference decisions on prosecution of war against Japan. Prominence is also given to arrival of Mr. Eden, inference being drawn that diplomatic matters will now come to fore, but statement being made that he has not been summoned to deal with any special problem that has arisen since conference began.

TIMES carries despatch from "our own correspondent" in Washington, based largely on Paul Ward's Quebec story in BALTIMORE SUN that Secretary Morgenthau has been summoned there "to help to persuade the British that they can afford only a minor share in the conquest of Japan."
Japan." TIMES correspondent states: "This should be taken as a suggestion only, as something skimmed from the surface of speculation on the spot, but Mr. Ward adds something of the attitude discoverable among 'American Naval and Military authorities'. They apparently use the argument that the British 'cannot possibly finance a larger share than a mopping-up operation in Southeast Asia, and have neither the equipment nor the supplies for the sort of undertaking that they seek as their lot'.

By way of example he adds that only on the west coast of the United States are there railway facilities sufficient to implement the impending offensive operations in the Orient. The despatch, it should be noted, contains no reference to Lend Lease. There is still more on the American Naval side, however. It is argued that the commingling of British and American forces in the larger tasks involved would demand of the British 'at least preliminary training' in American methods.

And, Mr. Ward has something to say of the determination of the American side to put this country's 'seven-ocean Navy' --- a single task force of which is sometimes comparable with the pre-war idea of a whole Navy --- to the full use for which it was designed and constructed.

'Entering into the problem, too,' says Mr. Ward, 'is the matter of Army and Navy "politics" --- the compulsion to provide
to provide the nearly half a dozen Admirals in the Pacific, plus General MacArthur, with shares in the final conquest of Japan measuring up to their ideas of what is their due'. In short the Quebec conference is dealing, because it cannot help dealing, not only with Anglo-American strategy but with Anglo-American relations at a point of high sensitivity. One of the elements of the British 'case' is said to be a desire to recapture prestige — or 'face' — in the Far East, but it would be strange indeed if this were not present in the American 'case' also. In the large sense, on the eve of the German defeat and at mid-most of the increasingly victorious campaign against Japan, each of the two great Allies has regained whatever 'face' it had lost, and in doing so has demonstrated how completely interdependent strategically the British and American territories are. This fact and its economic and other implications have become painfully apparent in what Professor Eugene Staley has called 'this shrinking world'. Anything that weakens the United States, weakens the United Kingdom and its great dominions; and, whether some Americans like it or not, the reverse is equally true. Mr. Charles Taft, Director in the State Department of the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs, said the other
"d- 7614, fifteenth, from London.

day, 'it is essential for our national interests to have a strong England', and he was talking of trade as others might talk, and do talk, of finance and a handful of other matters. The confusion on the subject of this, mutuality of vital interests is not peculiar to one side or the other, but the confusion has had tragic results. How much did inability to establish a common British-American policy for the attainment of common objectives contribute to the outbreak of the Second World War?"

The same reports are mentioned more briefly in dispatch from DAILY TELEGRAPH correspondent in Quebec. After discussing rumors as to possible appointments to high commands in Pacific War, he states: "Whatever decision has been reached concerning Lord Louis Mountbatten's command there is likely to be criticism. If the British are permitted by the American High Command to do as much as they are willing and ready to do in the war against Japan, they may be criticized in the United States as trying to steal the credit away from the American Commanders. If on the other hand some American suggestions that the Southeast Asia Command of Lord Louis Mountbatten should occupy a subordinate position are accepted, then all elements in the United States unfriendly to Britain who have been declaring that she only intended..."
only intended to play a 'token' role in the war against Japan anyway will claim that their criticism has been justified."

NEWS CHRONICLE columnist in London, A. J. Cummings, speaks of Prime Minister's pledge that Britain will make full contribution to destruction of Japan, and declares that this pledge has never been challenged by any section of British people. Concerning doubts which are still however expressed in certain American circles he declares: "There is a type of mind in the USA which would remain convinced of British artfulness, of British stratagems to fight to the last American soldier, even if our bona fides were vouched for in a special ordinance from the Deity". Admitting that till now attention of British people has been directed almost exclusively toward European War, Cummings asserts: "The people of this country are to be forgiven if they continue for the time being to concentrate most of their attention and most of their national effort on the war which has raged so long close to their shores and over their own cities and has threatened the very core of their existence. After Pearl Harbor the Americans were smitten with the sudden fear of an invasion by the Japanese, nearly 5,000 miles away. After Dunkirk the British feared an
feared an imminent invasion by the Germans, 21 miles away. For us that is just the difference".

In connection with Mr. Edens arrival DAILY MAIL correspondent declares from Quebec that purpose of his visit is widest possible review of political aspects of international situation, with special reference to Germany, but that particular prominence is apt to be given Soviet-Polish problem.

WINANT

FS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Lisbon

Dated September 15, 1944

Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2693, September 15, 5 p.m.

The formal meeting in the staff talks has been fixed for next Monday. The best present estimate of their duration is from two to three weeks.

NORWEB

LMS
Secretary of State,

Washington.

18, September 15, 9 p.m.

For Secretary

Duff Cooper informed me this morning that the Prime Minister had told him of his intention to visit Paris the end of this month after the opening of Parliament. Duff Cooper felt that unless Mr. Churchill was content to stay with SHAEF at Versailles, he would have to go through the formalities usually attending the visit of a Prime Minister to a friendly Allied capital including the laying of a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and "triumphal" march down the Champs Elysees, as otherwise French public opinion would be greatly offended. Duff Cooper queried whether this would be possible unless recognition had meanwhile been extended to the French Provisional Government and he said that the Foreign Office sent a strong telegram urging recognition to the Prime Minister in Quebec.

Duff also
2#19, September 15, 9 p.m., from Paris via London.

Duff also stated that the Foreign Office "whether accidentally or not" had transmitted Massigli's agreement in the exact words "French Ambassador to His Majesty."

CHAPIN

RB LMS
Secretary of State,

Washington.

7636, September 16, 4 p.m.

FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

The full text of the highly confidential home intelligence weekly report on British public opinion put out by the Ministry of Information covering the period September 5 to 12 will be sent as customary by despatch but the Department may be interested in a summary of the general contents in the report. These are as follows:

(1) General.

A further rise in spirits for the sixth week running is due to (a) the spectacular war news particularly the fact that fighting is now occurring on German soil; (b) relaxation of the blackout and the reduction in civil defensive ties, including the home guard and fire guard; (c) apparent end of the flying bomb attacks.

(2) Western Europe.

There is widespread admiration for the execution and planning of
planning of the campaign in northern France with particular reference to the superb supply system.

Belgium's liberation has given keen pleasure because it was the British who liberated Brussels thus demonst- ing to the world, and particularly to the United States and Russia, that the British can also perform spectacular feats in warfare. Despite Eisenhower's explanation resentment has not been eradicated over the fact that British troops were not included in the parade through Paris.

Conditions inside France and Belgium as indicated in FNB newscast photographs and stories have caused a widespread feeling that the French and the Belgians to a lesser extent are much better off than was generally believed. People want to know what is the true picture because of the discrepancies between the propaganda about starving occupied countries and what appears to be the case now.

There is a good deal of discussion about Montgomery's promotion which has caused delight but some suspicion of the motives behind it. Eisenhower's explanation has given only limited satisfaction.

Some feeling exists about the publicity accorded American and British troops
British troops, it being feared that Britain's case will have suffered in the eyes of the world and that Americans in the United States will hardly know that British troops are on the continent this feeling having resulted from resentment at the early silence imposed by security which resulted in the United States Army getting all the kudos.

(3) Germany.

Intensification of hatred against Germany continues and her complete defeat and unconditional surrender are urged increasingly. The problem of post-war Germany is becoming an increasingly important topic. It is agreed that Germany must never again be in a position to wage war but there is a variety of suggestions as to how this can be accomplished - splitting up the country, long term occupation and complete extermination are favorite suggestions. It is also felt necessary that the Nazi youth must be reeducated. There is a strong demand for the punishment of war criminals and the majority continue to hope that the Russians will prevent the British from being too lenient. There is increasing fear that the criminals may escape to neutral states but it is hoped that if they should the country concerned will be made to give them up if necessary by
necessary by force. There is criticism of the Pope's appeal for mercy.

(4) Flying bombs.

There is widespread satisfaction and relief at the capture of the bomb sites. Although the flying bomb menace is believed to be ended speculation continues about the use of other weapons. Most people expect some "final viciousness".

(5) Evacuees.

Although many evacuees are returning to London it is suggested that it be made compulsory for children to be left in reception areas.

(6) Middle and Eastern Europe.

(a) Soviet British relations. Bewilderment, uneasiness and distress overshadow the widespread discussions on this topic. Suspicion of Russian policy dominates and it is asked why Warsaw has not been captured many believing the delay to be deliberate. Furthermore people cannot understand the Soviet refusal to grant the Western Allies the use of air fields nor to help the patriots in Warsaw. Conviction exists that the Russians probably for some political reason have let the Poles down; and there is comparison of the comparatively generous treatment by Russia of
Russia of Rumania and Finland. There is great sympathy for the Polish patriots but the Poles themselves are not considered blameless and Soantowski's order of the day is thought especially regrettable.

(b) Comment on Russia except for Polish relations is much reduced. Although there is disappointment and surprise at the slow advance in the north there is general satisfaction with the continued progress and particular pleasure is expressed at the gain in the Balkan area. Although concerned about Russia's post-war policy many hope that the Russians will reach Berlin first.

(c) No sympathy is felt for Finland and it is not believed that that country can be trusted.

(d) There is satisfaction at Rumania's defection and the capture of the oilfields but suspicion and contempt continue towards the country. A few feel that the British attitude toward Rumania is weak.

(e) Widespread admiration for Russia's realistic policy towards Bulgaria many believing that it is a model for dealing with neutrals who are shiftly an dubious. Contempt continues for Bulgaria and it is hoped that severe punishment will be meted out to that country for her behavior during this war.
(7) Far East.

Comment is very limited but satisfaction continues. There is a feeling that this theatre of war is eclipsed by events elsewhere and that it is accorded too little publicity especially the Burmese campaign. How long the Japanese will hold out after the European war is finished continues to be a matter of speculation.

WINANT

WSB
Caserta via Naples
Dated September 16, 1944
Rec'd 12:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

413, September 16, 11 a.m.

To SECRETARY FOR THE SECRETARY

General Wilson has telegraphed Churchill that he has given orders for certain small scale operations on eastern coast of Peloponnesus which he hopes will result in establishment there of such control as is desired by Prime Minister (reference my 397, September 14, 8 p.m.) while at same time leaving intact the force for immediate occupation of Athens area as soon as an appropriate situation develops. SAC added that he is endeavoring to avoid committing the force set aside for the Athens operation as it is no more than adequate for the task of immediate entry and establishment of control after German withdrawal and for subsequent initiation of relief operations. He points out that if this force should be used in the Peloponnesus area there will be no other resource available and adequate to execute the Athens operation.

General Wilson commented in his reply to Churchill

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schenble Date
MAR 8 1972
-2- 413, September 16, 11 a.m., from Caserta via Naples.

that would appear that further westward advance of Soviets would in itself precipitate total evacuation of Greece by Germany and thus create the conditions in which operations against Athens could be launched in sufficient time to forestall the Russians.

General Wilson also informed Churchill that the Greek Prime Minister is strongly opposed to a landing anywhere in Greece other than the Athens area.

KIRK

MJX
SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT

One. I called on the Generalissimo accompanied by Atcheson afternoon fifteenth by appointment, pursuant to our 1196, September 9, 4 p.m., and had friendly conversation of almost hour and half. His attitude was agreeable throughout and he obviously strove to give appearance of being receptive to suggestion and comment and even of ready, or theoretical, concurrence. But I do not feel that there has been any fundamental change in his attitude toward the communist problem or that he has acquired any realization that it would be practicable or desirable to work for unity in China by other than the means he has pursued through the years of disposing of opposition and recalcitrance. There is reason to believe that in the light of his limited background experience...
experience and training, he does not have any realistic conception of either the character or uses of democracy.

As regards suggestion that I talk with the communist representative Lin Tsu Han he at first seized upon it as a springboard to ask that as a first essential I impress upon Lin that the Chinese communists must submit unconditionally to the principle of unified military command under the Generalissimo and to the political control of the National Government. I stated that while I could not of course mediate between the Kuomintang and the communists, I could appropriately express to Lin the views of the American Government in general in regard to the need of Chinese unity and the achieving wholehearted unity with the Kuomintang both for the sake of defending China from the Japanese and of China's future. The Generalissimo later raised question whether if proposed conversation with Lin should take place, communists might not publicize it for their own purposes perhaps to indicate that American Government was countenancing or supporting them or at least was mediating between them and National Government. I said that of course matter rested with the Generalissimo.

I would
I would undertake to talk with Lin only if Chiang so wished, and would await further word from him in the matter.

Two. As regards question of coalition war council or similar arrangement Chiang said he was already considering steps looking to that end but changed immediately to a dissertation on the People's Political Council now in session. Upon my mentioning that People's Political Council was purely advisory body he said he assumed that our suggestion did not contemplate change in government structure, something which should not be attempted at this time. I replied that I looked upon participation of minority parties in government as desirable; that a National Government is frequently resorted to in times of crisis; but my suggestion did not contemplate immediate reorganization of government but rather setting up of a War Council on which civilian and military leaders of other parties or groups would participate to face the problems of the present situation, and to share responsibility. I hoped that in this manner the distrust now so evident between KML and communist could gradually be dissipated and from
and from there on the unification of China could go on to a more satisfactory basis in due course, but the Council should in my opinion have both authority and responsibility, responsibility being the sobering element in a council of factions established to meet a crisis. Chiang said again that he was "considering steps" and expressed hope that "time would come" when representatives of parties other than Kuomintang could be taken into the government.

Three. Whether expected early fall of Kweilin will result in crystallization of so called southeast joint defense movement is unknown. Meantime our impression from Chiang's remarks is that he is not actually taking any steps to bring the dissident military and other elements into line with the government except as subordinates to himself who must unquestionably obey his orders. From our various sources we have had no indication that anything constructive is being attempted or accomplished except that the Lim Hi Sen group in the southeast is reported to have been persuaded not to make an open break with the government at this time for the sake of
#1587, September 16, 4 p.m., from Chungking via War
sake of China's interests as a whole and that as the
Japanese campaign progresses they may move eastward
and in their isolation merely set up some kind of
autonomous organization without publicizing it.

Hurley and Nelson were informed of your 1196.
Stilwell was absent from Chungking.

GAUSS

NPL
Secretary of State,
Washington.

202, September 18, 4 p.m.

I understand consideration being given by Navy Department to withdrawing from Casa as base which has been used as such since our landings in North Africa. This would not (repeat not) involve any contemplated change however in continued use of Ft. Lyauty as naval air base.

In light of conversations at Department early this year I believe it desirable for us to maintain at least until end of war naval and air bases acquired by War and Navy Department since end of our two in Morocco it may very well be that we may not find it necessary or desirable to retain Casa as naval base and may find our security and other needs in Morocco are amply provided for so far as former consideration is concerned by retention of air base at Lyauty, Casa and Mauiaksh. Even in those circumstances it would seem preferable for us to maintain
us to maintain for time being status quo in regard
to our enforced establishments in Morocco in view of,
if for no other reason, the better bargaining position
the retention of a naval base in Casa would (#) final
details regarding our interests in Morocco are concluded
with France at end of war size of establishment to be
maintained is of little importance; a token establishment
consisting of a skeleton staff would be sufficient to
maintain our position in Casa for purpose indicated.

I submit the foregoing recommendation without of
course knowledge of higher political or other con-
siderations which may be involved.

CHILDS

(*) Apparent omission.

WSB
Secretary of State,

Washington.

Eighteenth

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Following are letters, dated September 18, which passed between Prime Minister Bonomi and myself today.

"Your Excellency:

At the time of the release to the press of the announcement of the organization of the National Agency for Distribution of Relief Supplies in Italy I feel it my duty to offer Your Excellency, in the name of all the Italians who will receive assistance and comfort through this agency, the expression of my warmest gratitude for the activity which you have displayed with so much nobility of purpose and whole-heartedness in promoting this philanthropic organization.

The fact that Your Excellency sustained so warmly and with so much tenacity and constructive willingness
Eighteenth, from Vatican City

the setting up of this agency in so short a time, and
the fact that you have overcome every difficulty in the
arduous preparatory period is another proof of Your
Excellency's praiseworthy efforts which are being
guided solely by a desire to consider the requirements
of our country which has suffered so greatly.

Even after the conclusion of peace, this agency
will continue to afford comfort to our populations which
will be grateful to the great and friendly American
Nation and to its Chief, President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt who, by entrusting to Your Excellency the task of
representing him, has given proof of his sympathy and
of his interest for the Italian people.

I take this occasion to renew my most sincere
thanks for the generosity which prompted you to give as
your personal contribution the conspicuous sum of one
million lire for relief to Italy.

This National Agency will strengthen with new
ties of human solidarity the sentiments which bind
spiritually our respective countries in a traditional
friendship which has always been alive and felt even
when the will of one single man tried to overcome the
will of the people.

It is
-3- Eighteenth, from Vatican City

It is with such a wish that I express to Your Excellency the sentiments of my highest consideration and of my cordial regards.

- (signed) Bonomi

"My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In behalf of President Roosevelt and American Relief for Italy, Inc., I wish to express appreciation of the generous and cooperative spirit which you, in behalf of the Italian people and Government, have displayed in promoting the organization of the "National Agency for Distribution of Relief Supplies in Italy" donated by American Relief for Italy, Inc.

The National Agency, thus promoted, if adequately encouraged, may well serve as medium for all national relief distributions in released Italy. The elements presently associated, viz: The Italian Government, The Vatican and The Italian Red Cross, bring together representative forces of the greatest competency and should, in cooperation with existing Allied government agencies and other contributors, meet the emergencies of the coming winter.

American Relief for Italy, Inc. of which I have the honor to be chairman, American Red Cross, Allied Force Headquarters
Eighteenth, from Vatican City

Force Headquarters Advance, Allied Control Commission and other agencies will, I am sure, render all assistance within their power to forward these humanitarian activities.

I should like further to associate myself with this undertaking by donating one million lire to the Italian fund for the relief of distressed persons in Italy.

With assurances of respect and esteem, believe me, Mr. Prime Minister,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to His Holiness Pope Pius 7th.

TAYLOR

DU
Secretary of State,

Washington,

Eighteenth

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Following is the text of press release issued today by Prime Minister Bonomi concerning American relief for Italy:

"The Prime Minister H. E., Ivanoe Bonomi announced the formation of a 'National Agency for Distribution of Relief Supplies in Italy' of which he has consented to become Honorary Chairman. His Holiness Pope Pius 7th has given hearty support to the formation of the agency. President Roosevelt, acting through H. E. Myron C. Taylor, his personal representative to his Holiness Pope Pius 7th has greatly aided the project. Plans for the formation of the agency were proposed in behalf of American Relief for Italy, Inc. by its chairman Mr. Taylor, Mr. W. W. Jefferson, Director Mediterranean Theater, American Red Cross War Relief; Dr. Umberto Zanotti -
Zanotti - Bianco, President of the Italian Red Cross, and a number of leading Allied and Italian officials and citizens have acted as consultants.

The National Agency will be composed of 9 members representing the Italian Government, the Vatican and the Italian Red Cross. The Italian Government is to be represented by H. E. Prince Filippo Doria Pamphili, Mayor of Rome; Dr. Zaniboni, High Commissioner for War Refugees; Prof. Dr. Giovanni Canapera, General Medical Inspector. The Vatican is to be represented by H. E. Prince Carol Pacelli, Legal Counselor of the Vatican; Mons. Walter Carroll, of the Vatican Secretariat of State, and Mons. Ferdinando Baldelli. The Italian Red Cross is to be represented by Dr. Umberto Zanotti - Bianco, its President; Marchese Ugo Thodoli, its Secretary General and by Dr. Lapponi.

It is anticipated that supplies contributed by American Relief for Italy, Inc. will be augmented by other contributions of funds and needed materials, foodstuffs, medicines, etc. which it is expected will be provided by other donors, including the National Italian Government - which has made an initial contribution of 10 million lire - The Vatican - which has contributed an initial
-3-, Eighteenth, from Vatican City.

initial sum of 5 million lire - and by other nations, organizations and individuals.

It is anticipated that the most useful facilities for distribution, both in respect of personnel, equipment and experience, will be enlisted to participate in this humanitarian undertaking.

Its first meeting occurred on September 13 in the office of the Prime Minister, its Honorary Chairman.

H. E. Prince Doria Pamphili has been elected Permanent Chairman of the National Committee. H. E. Prince Carlo Pacelli has become chairman of an Executive Committee of 3, chosen from the National Committee and representative of the National Government, The Vatican and The Italian Red Cross.

TAYLOR

DU
Vatican City
Dated September 19, 1944
Rec'd 9:12 a.m., 20th.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

324, September 19, 10 a.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Regarding national agency for distribution of relief supplies in Italy founded yesterday, please give consideration to status of a participating belligerent as entitling Italy to special treatment and the wisdom of special contribution in cash or in kind to national fund by an appropriate American Government agency. Have described to diplomatic representatives of other countries to Vatican now in residence the action taken last evening in forming committee. I asked no participation but indicated importance of strengthening new government by adequate relief particularly for this winter. Those present represented following government: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Portugal, Spain, and the Order of Knights of Malta. Bolivian Ambassador volunteered a personal subscription. All proposed telegraphing documents to their respective countries. All expressed satisfaction with the plan.

RR

TAYLOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

AMT-257

Stockholm

Dated September 19, 1944

Rec'd 9:31 a.m.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

U.S. URGENT

3724, September 19, Noon.

Grafstrom advised this morning that Finns have accepted Russian armistice conditions.

JOHNSON

LMS
SECRET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY

3572, September 19, 1 p.m.

SFSEC

Before receiving this morning your personal message No. 2234, September 18, 10 a.m., I had drafted the first part of a message on this subject. I am now sending you this part of the message as background and will follow shortly with more specific answers to the questions which you have raised. Original message follows:

"I submit the following for such value as it may have in your consideration of Marshal Stalin's reply to the President's message on the question of voting of the permanent members in the council of the world security organization.

The British Ambassador has informed me of his discussion with Molotov on this subject, report of which I assume you have received. Molotov's reaction followed precisely the same line as Stalin's message to the President."
From the evidence we have, it would appear that the underlying reason for the position of the Soviets on voting is their unwillingness to allow the council to deal with any dispute in which the Soviet Government is a party affecting their relations with at least their neighboring countries. Some of the evidence we have in mind is the following:

(One) You will recall that at the Moscow Conference when the question of European problems was discussed Molotov stated that the Soviet Government was prepared to consult with the British and ourselves on matters relating to all questions except those between the Soviet Government and its immediate western neighbors. On these matters the Soviet Government was prepared to keep us informed but would take no further commitments.

(Two) Light on the Soviet Government's attitude toward small nations was reflected in an informal conversation Mr. Eden and I had at the British Embassy with Litvinov and Maiski in which Litvinov expounded the concept that it was unreasonable to consider that the interests of thirty million Poles should be given equal weight with those of one hundred eighty million Russians. Where the interests
September 19, 1 p.m., from Moscow via Army

interests of the Russians conflicted with those of the Poles, the Poles would have to give way.

Recently Litvinov expounded the same philosophy to the Norwegian Ambassador when he said "The glory of the small nations is past".

(Two) Throughout the year we have seen evidence of the Soviet Governments intention to prescribe unilaterally the manner in which the Polish political problem should be settled.

(Four) Throughout the period of occupation of Iran the Soviet Government has shown unwillingness to collaborate to any substantial degree with the British and ourselves and in fact has been unwilling to allow our observers to study conditions in northern Iran.

(Five) The Soviet Governments agreement with the Italian Government for the exchange of representatives was reached without consultation.

(Six) As soon as the Soviets decided that Turkey's entry into the war was no longer vital they took the first pretext to break away unilaterally from their agreement at Moscow and Tehran to work with the British and ourselves for Turkey's entry into the war.

(Seven)
(Seven) The Soviet Government declared war on Bulgaria without consultation with the British and ourselves, giving us thirty minutes notice. It would appear probable that the reasons for failure to consult were political even if the move itself may have been based on military considerations as well.

(Eight) Molotov's attitude in the discussions preceding the Romanian armistice has been cold to say the least toward real collaboration of British and American political representatives in Romania. It is of course too early to judge the manner in which the Soviets will use their powers under the armistice.

(Nine) We have seen an unbending and impatient attitude toward Chiang Kai Shek particularly regarding the difficulties in Sinkiang. Our air force as well as China are being penalized by an unwillingness to allow the use of the overland route through the Soviet Union in order to bring political pressure on the Generalissimo.

I do not attempt to appraise whether the Soviets are right or wrong in their objectives in any one of the above cases. I refer to them only as indicative of their attitude and consistent method of unilateral action in accomplishing their objectives. I believe we have
have thus sufficient evidence to foresee that if the world organization is established requiring agreement of all permanent members for the consideration of any dispute regardless of whether or not one of them is involved the Soviet Government will ruthlessly block consideration by the council of any question in which it considers its interests affected and will insist that the matter be settled by the Soviet Union within the other country or countries involved particularly any disputes with their neighbors.

I am convinced that Stalin and his principal advisers place the highest importance on the association of the Soviet Union in a major way with the three great powers in world affairs but have expected that their political and military strength would enable them to dictate the conditions. There is no doubt the Russian people crave peace and have been led to believe that the intimate relationship developed during the war with the British and ourselves will continue after the war and will be a guarantee of a lasting peace. I do not believe Stalin can forego the material as well as the psychological value of this association without causing grave concern among the Russian people. On the other hand
hand it seems evident that there are powerful groups within his immediate circle who are unwilling to give up right of independent action where Russia's interests are affected and to see Russia depend solely on an untried world organization with associates none of whom do they fully trust. As Stalin traditionally likes to have two strings to his bow, it has not appeared to him inconsistent to pursue these two methods at the same time to obtain security for the Soviet Union and to advance its national interests as he sees them."

HARRIMAN

WJC
Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S. URGENT
3600, September 20, 8 p.m.
SFSEC

I must confess that a telegram is a difficult medium in which to attempt to answer the questions raised in your 2234, September 19, 10 p.m. and feel that I could only adequately do so if I were permitted to come to Washington. My cable 3572, September 19, 1 p.m., gives some background. I will now address myself to your specific questions.

One. I do not (repeat not) believe that Stalin and the Kremlin have determined to reverse their policy of cooperation decided upon by them at Moscow and Tehran. The difficult thing for us to understand is precisely their concept of the understanding that was reached at these conferences. Molotov has on a number of occasions indicated to me that he considered that after they had put us on notice of a Soviet policy or plan and we did not at
not at that time object, we had acquiesced in and accepted the Soviet position. Point one of my cable of yesterday referred to above is a case in point. I believe the Soviets consider that we accept at Moscow their position that although they would keep us informed they had the right to settle their problems with their western neighbors unilaterally. Then too, words have a different connotation to the Soviets than they have to us. When they speak of insisting on "friendly governments" in their neighboring countries, they have in mind something quite different from what we would mean. With Czechoslovakia they have insisted upon a military alliance. Although they guaranteed Czechoslovakia non-interference in internal affairs, they insisted that Benes should agree to give a prominent position in his national government to the Communist Party. As they appeared satisfied with the attitude of Benes' government, these were the only conditions imposed. In the case of Poland, however, where there is not the same political stability and where greater suspicion of Soviet good intents exists, they are insisting on a hand-picked government which will insure Soviet domination. It is too early.
too early to judge how far this policy will be carried in other neighboring countries or how far they will insist in the future on subservience to the Moscow will. In terms that we would understand I believe that it is their intention to have a positive sphere of influence over their western neighbors in the Balkans. It is also too early to judge how far they expect to extend Soviet practices in these states on such questions as secret police (thereby eliminating personal freedom), control of the press, and controlled education. It can be argued that American interests need not be concerned over the affairs of this area. What frightens me however is that when a country begins to extend its influence by strong arm methods beyond its borders under the guise of security it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn. If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical. In my talks with Molotov about Poland he has given me the impression that he does not understand why we and particularly the British are unwilling to support their demand for a friendly government, and all arguments that I have used regarding our policy
policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country appear not to have impressed him.

It seems to me that we have a basic issue with the Soviet Government on the definition of the term "friendly governments". I am not optimistic that we can in the near future arrive at an understanding with the Soviet Government on this matter. At the present time I believe they certainly expect us to give them a free hand with their western neighbors. They are therefore most suspicious that this policy will be affected if they agree to refrain from voting on disputes in which the Soviet Government is involved.

Before discussing the problem as it relates to world organization it is my strong feeling that the only way we can eventually come to an understanding with the Soviet Union on the question of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is for us to take a definite interest in the solution of the problems of each individual country as they arise. If we give them a free hand with any one country the precedent will be established whereas if through our influence we can temper Soviet domination in each situation, I believe we have a chance to lead them to a behavior in international affairs that
that is compatible to our concepts. Specifically I have in mind not only the Polish situation but now also the former enemy satellites Rumania and Bulgaria. In the case of Rumania I strongly recommend that we appoint an experienced political representative on the Control Commission and insist that he shall have freedom of contact with the Rumanian Government and freedom to obtain information outside of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Wherever we find that Soviet behavior offends our standards we should call it forcibly to the attention of the Soviet Government. I recognize that this will lead to unpleasant situations but for reasons which I will explain later I am satisfied that the Soviets will accede at least to a reasonable degree to our insistent demands. I have particularly in mind objection to the institution of secret police who may become involved in the persecution of persons of truly democratic convictions who may not be willing to conform to Soviet methods and also to suppression, under the pretense of military requirements, of public information not only in Rumania but in the outside world. I refer to the interpretation which the Soviets will, I am afraid, place on their powers under Articles I, V and XVI of the

Rumanian
Rumanian Armistice Agreement. I believe it was not an incident of drafting but design which motivated the Soviet Government in insisting upon the words "in particular to the Soviet Union" in Article XV. The same principles should be applied in my opinion to Bulgaria. I hope I have made it plain that I am not (repeat not) recommending interference in Rumanian affairs but quite the reverse insisting that the Soviets do not unduly interfere in exercising their responsibilities as the occupying power.

The Polish question is of course far more complicated. I consider it so partly because of my lack of sympathy with the attitude of a number of the men in the Polish Government in London. I refer of course particularly to General Sosnkowski and Messrs. Kot and Kukiel. I cannot help but agree with the insistent demands of the Soviet Government that these men play no part in Poland's future. I feel their objection is equally well founded as is ours against Colonel Farrell in Argentina. But when it comes to forcing on the Poles with the support of the Red Army the handful of individuals making up the Polish Committee of Liberation I don't see how we can afford
afford to stand aside without registering the strongest of objections.

Two. In attempting to answer the questions you raise in the last two sentences of the second paragraph of your cable I can first say with confidence that the meeting of the two Allies at Quebec without Soviet participation has not (repeat not) affected the Soviet attitude expressed at Dumbarton Oaks. It is however more difficult to put one's finger on the causes for the change in Soviet attitude toward the United States and Great Britain. I am not certain that there is a change in fundamental policy or attitude. It might well be that the change in developments has brought to the surface the underlying attitude. A clearer understanding on their part however of our and the British attitude on different problems may well have had an influence on the Soviet attitude.

As to their attitude toward us as distinct from the British, it is my feeling, without being entirely clear, that when the Soviets saw victory in sight they began to put into practice policies they intend to follow in peace. In order to get our cooperation during the war they have to a small degree at least bent their policies to foster
8- 3600, September 20, 8 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

to foster our cooperation. True it has been meager in comparison with what we considered we were entitled to but this policy did permit the approval of granting to U.S. the use of bases for shuttle-bombing and in other ways giving our people certain consideration and information. It would seem that their post war policy will be to have the Soviet Government and its officials participate in world affairs, but to protect the Russian people from almost all contact with and influence of western civilization and ideas. There is evidence that the NKVD and the party never liked the idea of our troops coming into Russian bases. Influence was perhaps brought to bear from these sources to close them down as soon as possible. On the other hand, although we have had less consideration of the many matters that we have taken up with the Soviet Government in which our interests are involved, we have frequently had the quickest of action on the part of the Soviet Government on matters in which they consider their interests are affected. I mention as an example the quick response which was obtained when I was instructed to inform the Soviet Government that Mr. Morgenthau would announce the report of the experts on monetary matters without Soviet participation unless word was received.
was received the same day. Within three hours of leaving my meeting with the Commissar of Finance, Molotov called me over to give me the Soviet aide memoire. Although this case is somewhat more dramatic than others it is not the only case. The Soviet Government, as we well know, is not handicapped by the need to be consistent and when it found that it was up against a stone wall of British opinion in regard to aid to the insurgents in Warsaw, backed up by our own representations, the Soviet Government gave in, with bad grace it is true, but the fact remains that it did give way. This incident is the most encouraging we have experienced and I will refer to it again later.

As to the British there is no doubt that the Soviet attitude is less friendly to and more suspicious of them than U. S. However I do not feel we should place too much importance on this. This is due not only to the historic clashes but also to the greater insistence of the British in their demands. For example, the British have been more aggressive in opposing the Soviet policy vis-a-vis Poland and you are familiar with the difficulties that the Prime Minister had with Molotov in April over Rumania. They are also suspicious of the British
British moves in Turkey, Greece, et cetera. The Soviets also do not feel that they have as much to look forward to in aid from Britain in reconstruction as they have from us and have been somewhat more careful not to offend us. I believe they have the feeling also that we are not going to oppose their policies in Europe to the same degree as the British. However, as I have explained above our long term interests may compel us to take issue with Soviet policy in Europe as it unfolds. When it comes to the Far East, we may also find ourselves in conflict with the Soviet policy at various points.

Three. On the constructive side I desire to make the following brief comments. In spite of what I have said in this cable and in my background cable of yesterday referred to, it is my conviction that Stalin and his principal advisers place the greatest importance and reliance on the newly won relationship with the British and ourselves and desire above all else to take a leading role in international affairs. We must realize that very few of them have ever been abroad and those who have for any extended period of time are suspect in the minds of the others. Thus they, the group as a whole, have little understanding of the real concept of western civilization.

They
They are fearful of the antagonism of the world against them. They are always conscious of the fact that they are a backward country materially and culturally. Now they take great pride in the strength of the Red Army. All of this makes them unduly sensitive and suspicious of our motives and actions. With it all they are realists and have developed a fairly clear idea of what they want. I believe the time has come to develop a more definite policy toward them than has been possible up to now. In general we should be understanding of their sensitivity meet them much more than half way, encourage them and support them wherever we can, and yet oppose them promptly with the greatest of firmness where we see them going wrong. In the latter there can be no compromise or indecision if we are to build a sound foundation for future relations with this strange country. When we oppose them we must be certain that we are right and be clear in advance how far we are ready to go.

In minor matters, the registering of our objection may be sufficient but in these cases we must make it plain that we do not intend to take further action. When it comes to matters of greater importance, we should make it plain that their failure to conform to our concepts
-12- #3600, September 20, 8 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

will affect our willingness to cooperate with them, for example, in material assistance for reconstruction. They should be made promptly to feel specific results from our displeasure. Lastly on matters that are vital to us and on which we can find no compromise (as I understand from what you say is the case in connection with the voting of the four powers) I believe we should make them understand patiently but firmly that we cannot accept their point of view and that we are prepared to take the consequences if they adhere to their position. In such cases, I am satisfied that in the last analysis Stalin will back down. We have seen him reverse his decision in connection with aid to the insurgents in Warsaw.

We should bear in mind always in connection with the Soviets that many of Stalin's counselors see things to a degree at least as we do, whereas others are opposed. The Soviet Government is not one mind. Through our actions we should attempt to encourage his confidence in the advice of the former group and make him realize that the others get him into trouble when he follows their advice. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the Russian people want friendship with us, and my contacts in Moscow lead me to feel that the principal
-13- #3600, September 20, 8 p.m., from Moscow via Army.

principal men in the government hold the same view.

If a general policy of the kind that I have outlined is adopted and consistently pursued by all branches of our government, I have confidence that in time we can find common ground with these people.

HARRIMAN

WPD
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Vatican City

Date: September 20, 1944

Read 1:37 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

325, September 20, 5 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

For your information Prime Minister Bonomi's official announcement of the creation of the National Committee for the Distribution of Relief in Italy was prominently carried by the local Italian press and the OSSERVATORE ROMANO under front page headlines together with full text of the letters exchanged between Bonomi and myself on September 18. The initial reaction in private circles throughout Rome has been most favorable and gratifying.

We have made no attempt to cover the American Press believing that you may wish to do this in your way.

TALON

RR
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government agency. (RESTRICTED)

Dated September 21, 1944
Reo'd 2:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

327, September 21, 4 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

On Wednesday September 20 I had the following visitors: H E Lucifero Minister of Royal Household; H E Tugnini, Minister of Justice and others all commanding organization of National Agency for Distribution of Relief Supplies in Italy and indicating it was first strictly Italian constructive step that had taken place and pleased that it was fostered by America. Text of letter (in translation) from Crown Prince Lieutenant General of Kingdom follows separately.

Minister of Justice, after praising relief undertaking referred to public demonstration on trial of Caruso on Monday against Fascist regime and its cooperation with Nazis and their barbarous cruelties and executions as finding vent in unfortunate occurrence on Monday. This sudden outbreak seems to have completely subsided and no further disturbance
disturbance occurred when trial was resumed yesterday.

Among others I had visit from Baron Apor former Hungarian Minister to Holy See, who is greatly concerned as to Russia permanently disturbing political independence of his country. Venturing only personal opinion I assured him that I would not credit such a rumor or probability.

TAYLOR

MRM
Secretary of State,
Washington.

328, September 21, 5 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

Referring to my 327 of today following is text in translation of letter received by me from Lieutenant General of the Kingdom.

"His Royal Highness the Prince of Piedmont Lieutenant General of the Kingdom has learned with the utmost gratification of the announcement of the generous contribution of 1,000,000 lire made personally by Your Excellency toward the constitution of the initial fund at the disposal of the National Committee for Distribution of Relief in Italy in connection with American Relief Inc., which is so worthily presided over by Your Excellency. The Prince takes an intimate part in the sincere gratitude of the Italian people for your contribution which is inspired
-2- #328, September 21, 5 p.m., from Vatican City.

inspired by such lofty sentiments of human solidarity. The Prince desires to express to Your Excellency the sentiments of his very deeply felt thanks. His Royal Highness sees in the noble gesture of Your Excellency a most auspicious sign for the activity of this philanthropic organization which has been set up through the personal impulse of His Excellency President Roosevelt and which will be carried out in the vast scheme of welfare requirements caused by the endless disasters caused by the war. In thus interpreting the sentiments of the Prince I am happy to seize this occasion to beg of you to accept Your Excellency the expression of my high consideration.

Signed: F. Lucifero Minister of the Royal Household.

TAYLOR

MRM
Rio de Janeiro
Dated September 21, 1944
Rec'd 12:20 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
3403, twentyfirst

Rio noon papers carry following AP despatch over Washington dateline: "in authorized circles here it is learned that President Roosevelt has chosen Mr. Jefferson Caffery as first Ambassador of the United States in Paris.

Mr. Caffery Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro who was called to Washington by the State Department will first replace Mr. William Philipps as Political advisor to General Eisenhower on French affairs after which he will be designated United States Ambassador to the Government of Liberated France. In connection with the nomination of Mr. Jefferson Caffery as political advisor to General Eisenhower and thereafter as United States Ambassador in Paris it is learned that if these plans should materialize the most likely substitute in the Embassy at Rio de Janeiro would be the present United States representative in Lisbon Ambassador Henry Norweb".

DONELLEY
Vatican City
Dated September 21, 1944
Rec'd 12:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

329, September 21, 1 p.m.

SECRETARY ONLY

I have been informed this morning during
lengthy audience that the following statement from
what is described as usually authoritative source
had been made:

"Russia has proposed separate understanding
with Germany on the basis that prior frontiers would
be granted to Russia. Once the proposal is
accepted, Germany would join with Russia and Japan against
Allies. German political leaders refused preferring
understanding with the Allies. If not possible on
the basis of negotiated peace German political
leaders will be obliged to accept the Russian
proposal."

My informant has no confidence in the
statement

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 8 1972
-2- #329, September 21, 1 p.m., from Vatican City

statement but felt that because of its source it was necessary to bring it to my attention. Naturally I replied that it was ridiculous. My inquiry as to who the German political leader were provoked some levity. If used in any communication do not disclose my source of information.

TAYLOR

WFS WWC
Secretary of State,
Washington,

7896, Twenty-second.

Embassy's 7835 21st: DAILY MAIL again gives prominence to its story alleging that American businessmen have permitted to go to France in uniform, carrying another article by Colin Bednall, based largely on comment which story was received in United States.

Today's article declares: "A thorough investigation into the allegations of American 'carpet bagging' activities in France is promised by the United States authorities, states the DAILY MAIL special correspondent in Washington in a cable received last night.

Reports from all quarters show that the repercussions to the DAILY MAIL'S demand for an inquiry into the allegations are very great indeed. The matter is to be raised at President Roosevelt's press conference today. When it was referred yesterday to Mr. Henry L. Stimson,
United States
United States Secretary of War, he said that although he could not comment officially he would point out that General Eisenhower had recently issued a directive to reduce the number of non-combatants in the European theater of war. Those already there would be required to justify their presence. Mr. Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, also questioned about the article in the DAILY MAIL, said that no American civilian business men had been granted visas to go to France.

The first reaction of all official spokesmen in Washington was to deny vigorously that American business men were being allowed to infiltrate into France in the guise of officers. Late last night however it was stated that fuller statements were expected. A statement issued on behalf of the American Red Cross declared that there was no knowledge of any member of that organization having left it to open an office in Paris for business purposes. "Practically all the Red Cross representatives now in France were drawn from among those who previously served in Italy and England before the invasion of France began," added the statement.

Spokesmen for
Spokesman for both the United States State Department and the United States War Department declared that each day requests were received from American businessmen wishing to enter France, but they were all refused.

The Associated Press News Agency last night circulated the following cable from its Washington bureau: 'THE DAILY MAIL'S contention that American commercial interests are moving into France behind the Allied armies while British subjects are being refused entry has brought a State Department assertion that the British Government has never raised any such point. American officials flatly denied it but said they were not surprised by its publication. The British public and Parliament, they explain, naturally are nervous about the future of Great Britain's business interests'.

After quoting comment by Senator Brewster, expressing gratification that Americans "have been able to move quickly," but that they do not seek any undue advantage DAILY MAIL story says it is considered possible in Washington "that the State and War Departments acted in all innocence in granting permits to businessmen, and were unaware that some American officers sent to Europe were engaged in a dual role".

It goes on to state: "In London yesterday Mr.

Shinwell, M.P., read
Shinwell, MP, read extracts from the DAILY MAIL at a public luncheon organized by the Engineering Industries Association. 'I have remarked elsewhere', he added, 'that the Americans seem to be getting in on the ground floor, and with the greatest respect to them and with humblest gratitude, I suggest that Great Britain and her industries will want a place in the sun when this war is over'.

The DAILY MAIL office was besieged yesterday with telephone and personal calls which made it clear that the circulation of the allegations prior to their publication in the DAILY MAIL had been very much wider than was at first thought. In almost every case, again, the persons who contacted the office were men in responsible positions. The exceptions yesterday were serving officers — not all British — who called, they said, because they wished to shake the hand of the author of yesterday's article.

It must be repeated however that nobody will be better pleased than the DAILY MAIL if the allegations can be completely and utterly disproved'.

NEWS CHRONICLE carries short despatch from Washington, reporting that
-5- #7896, Twenty-second, from London

reporting that there was no official statement there on DAILY MAIL story, but that "spokesmen indicated that the charges were erroneous".

VIN. NP

DU
On 21 September in two evening papers sharp attacks on non-recognition by the US of the provisional government appeared. DEFENSE DE LA FRANCE says, under the heading of "Absence of Ambassador" says "Several Ambassadors were just named for Europe by Mr. Roosevelt"

"We rejoice to see the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Norway, and Yugoslavia accredited with envoys from Washington, before some of them have even had their territories liberated. This is excellent. But it seems to be forgotten by the American friends that their jeeps plow our capital's streets, where a high functionary of Mr. Roosevelt recently opened the blinds of his Embassy in the place De La Concorde, where he could see the vitality of the French people which has just broken their own chains.

"Therefore, we express the desire that the American Government reconsider its attitude toward us, as it today appeared likely, and we point out that the exchanging of Ambassadors would be a sign of the certain imminent return to the rank of great world powers of France."

It is also stated in the same newspaper that "It astonishes us that our English, particularly our American, friends show themselves to be so careful about a government that has always represented the French people, and yet they have recognized other Governments that have not had the peoples of their country behind them. Before he believed, St. Thomas wanted to see for himself; our American friends have seen; let us recognize now the fact that they believe, in fairness."
In the US or elsewhere there are perhaps people who were inclined to hamper the committee by reminding it that one day it would have to render an account to the French people. If today anywhere these people still exist, they must be struck with stupor before the unforgettable welcome that was given General de Gaulle from the French people. Will they quickly understand then? They have one last chance to understand. Let them face the evidence that there has been a plebiscite even before the French elections and that this plebiscite gave support overwhelmingly to General de Gaulle (as long as the Government got its only support in the cramped atmosphere of Algiers) certain Great Powers could perhaps contest its representative and national character.

It is declared in the rest of the editorial that now de Gaulle has taken into his government resistance groups and therefore has their full support.

Under the heading "France will not be an ante-chamber" CE SOIR repeats the rumors that London and Washington will soon recognize the provisional government and then it says that "The French press favorably receives these rumors and also the public but this is the time for action. France has had to wait for justice too long. There is no sense to this humiliating state of suspense that has been imposed on us. France rendered as great services as any other European people to the Allies from 1914 to 1944".

CHAPIN

WFS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (S.G.)

Chungking via NR
Dated September 24, 1944
Read 12:59 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1605, September 24, 9 a.m.

One. Military Attachés summary week ending 23rd

in Hunan Kwangsi area Japs reached Hsingan on railway

and are apparently consolidating before moving on

Kweilin. Chinese retook Tachien southeast of Chuanhsien

when Japs withdrew to join main thrust on Kweilin. Japs

now closing on Peking. In Kwangtung Kwangsi area Japs

moving west from Tedgyuan took Wuchow and Tchching and

other units moving north from Liuchow peninsula seized

Pailiu and Junghsien. These units may eventually merge

with Jap forces driving on Kweilin for attack on Liuchow

and Nanking. Little effort seemingly made to stop Jap

drives on Kwangsi. Commander 93rd Army executed for

failure to hold Japs at Chuanhsien. 14th Air Force

completed evacuation of Kweilin air base. Continuing

operations against Jap land and sea forces and communi-

cations from other bases with main attacks concentrated

in Nanyang Kweilin and Canton Wuchow areas. Liberators

particularly
2- #1605, September 24, 9 a.m., from Chungking via NR

particularly successful in destroying Jap shipping off China and Indo-China coasts.

Two, MA who has just returned Chungking from inspection Hunan Kwangsi front expresses belief Chinese forces neither capable of attack nor of holding in face of prolonged Jap assault and states he saw nothing to substantiate Sino claims of heavy action. He said number of Sino troops deserting is large and improved medical care sick and wounded urgently needed.

GAUSS

WPS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (xxxxx)

Dated September 24, 1944
Rec’d 7:33 a.m., 25th.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY.

I cannot refrain from stating my thoroughgoing approval of the President’s statement contained in your 196, September 23, 8 p.m., just received and my sincere hope that it will be issued without delay and without alteration except as may be required to meet UNRRA terms of reference.

From the viewpoint of this area it is important that a prospect be offered of such practical assistance as may be found necessary and justifiable at the present moment and that the expectations may be fulfilled of a realistic attitude towards Italy on the part of the Allies. Any delay in implementing the foregoing would jeopardize its effects and reduce its benefits.

Kirk

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schonfield Date MAR 8 1972
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

London

Dated September 25, 1944

Rec'd 11:59 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT

NIAC, 7991, September 25, midnight

At today's meeting of the E A C, Strang reported the substance of information contained in Department's 7792, September 24, 9 p.m., COMRA 99. He further announced that his government had approached United States and Soviet Governments on September 24, proposing that armistice terms be presented as soon as possible to General Nadoy in Italy by MacMillan and by United States and Soviet representatives there, and asking whether this procedure was acceptable to the two other governments and whether they would empower their representatives on the E A C to draft the terms. In accordance with Department's 7791, September 24, 9 p.m., and Department's 7124, September 2, midnight I stated that my government was willing to discuss Hungarian armistice terms in the E A C. To my query Strang stated that
stated that it was not clear whether the Hungarian Government wished to fight Germany or merely to withdraw from the war. Strang felt that despite the absence of written credentials Nadoy's approach is an authorized one and that he is a suitable channel for the communication of terms. The Soviet Delegate is referring to his government for instructions.

The British Delegation proposes that a joint communication be made to the Hungarian Government on behalf of the three governments, setting forth the evacuation of non-Hungarian territory as a pre-condition to presenting armistice terms. "The Governments of the United Kingdom, USA and USSR, having considered the request of the Hungarian Government for an armistice have decided that it is an indispensable prerequisite to the opening of armistice negotiations that the Hungarian Government should give an undertaking to withdraw all Hungarian troops and officials within the frontiers of Hungary as they existed on 31 December 1937. Such withdrawal must begin at once and must be completed within fifteen days from the date of this communication. The Hungarian Government must undertake to receive in Hungary and afford all requisite facilities to such military
military representatives or missions as the three Allied Governments may send for the purpose of verifying and controlling the withdrawal. In addition the British Delegation presented a draft armistice as follows:

The following conditions have been presented by blank acting on behalf of the United Nations Governments at war with Hungary and have been accepted by the Hungarian Government: (1) Hostilities to cease between Hungary and the United Nations at blank hour blank date. (2) Hungary to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers; to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property. Enemy war material and property to be held at the disposal of the Allies. (3) Hungarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw forthwith within the pre-1938 frontiers of Hungary. (4) The Supreme Allied Commanders to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Hungarian territory if the military situation requires or if the Hungarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice. (5) Hungary to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization as may be required. Hungarian war material to be held at the disposal of the Allies.
-4- #NIAC 7991, September 25, midnight, from London.

the Allies. (6) Hungary to release and take all necessary steps for the protection, maintenance and welfare of Allied prisoners of war and internees until repatriated. Lists of all such persons indicating their places of detention to be furnished. Hungary to supply information on United Nations displaced persons, to accept financial responsibility for them and to take such measures for maintenance, welfare and control as may be required by the Allies. Hungary to be responsible also for the control of enemy refugees and displaced persons under the direction of the Allies. (7) Hungary to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of shipping and transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities. (8) Hungary to release all persons detained for political or racial reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed and the effect of such legislation to be reversed. (9) Hungary to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes. (10) Hungary to protect and restore all United Nations property; to make reparation for war loss and damage; and not to dispose of any of her assets without the consent of
-5-\#NIAC 7991, September 25, midnight, from London.

consent of the Allies. (11) Hungary to furnish free of cost supplies, services and facilities as the Allies may require for the use of their forces, missions or agencies and such local currency as they may require for expenditure within Hungary. Hungary to redeem and hand over to the Allies free of charge any currency issued by them in Hungary. (12) Hungary to furnish such further supplies (including foodstuffs), services or facilities as the Allies may require. (13) Hungary to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice and to the Allied interpretation thereof; to give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security. These instructions and requirements will be communicated to the Hungarian Government by an Allied Control Commission which will be appointed to Hungary for that purpose. Footnote to Articles II and V: war material includes all material or equipment belonging to, used by, or intended for use by enemy military or part-military organizations and members thereof in connection with their operations. In the case of the negotiations over armistice terms for Bulgaria
-G-NIAC 7991, September 25, midnight, from London.

For Bulgaria it will be essential for me to know at an early stage the Department's views concerning the mode of signature, the character of the Control Commission and the proposed degree of the participation of smaller Allies particularly Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the formulation and presentation of the terms (my 7280, September 6, 8 p.m.).

WINANT

NPL
Secretary of State,
Washington.

332, September 25, 1 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

Prince Chigi, grand master of sovereign military order of Malta through his Foreign Minister, has called to indicate an initial contribution of 500,000 lire to National Agency for distribution of relief supplies in Italy. Mrs. Anne O'Hara McCormick has offered a contribution. It is likely that contributions of scarce materials as well as cash will be forthcoming from many united and neutral nations. Am told purchases of materials scarce in Britain and America can be made in Spain, Portugal and South America if shipment permitted. I fully realize that care should be taken that efforts be made by Italian Government and not by ourselves to implement such activities.

TAYLOR

WSB
Secretary of State,
Washington.

330, September 25, 1944.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

We have received the following telegraphic message from Prince Doria, Mayor of Rome.

"To Myron Taylor. Executive Committee of National Agency for Distribution Relief in Italy on the occasion of its first meeting today expressed to Your Excellency its profound gratitude for your work and generous personal contribution and pledges itself to carry out the work of the National Committee in the spirit of the promoters of this benevolent organization."

TAYLOR

RR
SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON,

7990, Twenty-fifth.

London papers all carry excerpts from President's speech to International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Washington correspondent of TIMES comments: "Mr. Roosevelt's political advisers were delighted with him and what he said. (**) He looked well, and was visibly happy in the occasion and opportunity it gave him to speak his mind to just such an audience -- brawny teamsters who understand and expect hard hitting in their speakers. This they saw was the Roosevelt of the earlier campaigns, and certainly no 'tired old man.' But it was certainly a Roosevelt with a shrewd knowledge of realities, as was evident when he spoke of the politicians of the opposition 'who think they may have a chance if only the total vote is small enough.' It is a small vote -- either as a result of apathy, or of technical disfranchisement of men in service and migratory workers -- which..."
workers - which deepens the uncertainty of the returns next November. Mr. Dewey may be elected not by those who go to the polls but by those who stay away. Dispatches to DAILY TELEGRAPH report that President spoke "with punch and sustained vigor", and that general opinion in Washington of "Roosevelt's first speech of his election campaign (403) is that it was one of the most effective of his career". DAILY HERALD correspondent asserts that "President Roosevelt launched his election campaign with the hardest-hitting speech of his life", and that it "reassured followers who feared he was slipping back on a conservative path, that he is to fight as an out and out radical and New Dealer". Despatch to DAILY MAIL also states that President "made two things clear - that the New Deal is not dead but will march on after the war if he is elected, and that he is relying almost entirely on the labor vote to bring him victory".

Editorial in DAILY HERALD asserts: "It may not be the business of British newspapers to interfere in United States politics, but the opening speech delivered this weekend by President Roosevelt in his election campaign deserves
campaign deserves to be studied all over the world. This was the utterance of a world statesman. He had a warning for all men and women about the coming peace. It must be heard in this country no less than in the great republic across the seas. 'These peace-building tasks', says Mr. Roosevelt, 'were faced once before nearly a generation ago. They were botched. I repeat botched, by the Republican administration. That must not happen this time. We'll not let it happen this time'. Are these merely the words of an electioneer? They are more and much more. They are an appeal to the American people to avoid the blunders and crimes of 25 years ago. They mark the attempt to kill and bury isolationism for ever'. HERALD says that this lesson of remembering the past must be learned in connection with next British election too, and that in making coming peace and building a sane international organization to secure freedom from want and from fear, British people must exclude advice and influence of those who botched the last peace.

Only other editorial is in MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. It states: "The American Presidential campaign is now warming up."
warming up. Mr. Dewey is in full mood of exposition and the President has fired his opening shot. Mr. Roosevelt's speech was biting. It was directed not so much at Mr. Dewey's measured oratory but at the lower sides of the Republican campaign, the inventive stories of the newspapers, and the rapid outbursts of hate. All that does not concern us here, but what must interest any student of politics is the way in which Mr. Dewey is developing. Many observers have seen in the recent trend of American politics a pronounced reaction against government intervention. Britain was being criticised for demanding 'full employment' with state help; the Republicans, it seemed, were determined to rely on free enterprise alone. GUARDIAN gives quotation from speech by Mr. Dewey, stating that government's job will be to see the conditions exist which promote jobs, and that government must create additional opportunities if necessary. Editorial concludes: "When one goes on to read how it is to be done one finds Mr. Dewey approving of most of the measures of recent years individually, though collectively he assails them because as parts of the 'new deal', and he thinks they have created
have created a 'towering bureaucracy'. The Democratic comment on the sincerity of Mr. Dewey's progressivism can be read in Mr. Roosevelt's speech. But if words mean anything the difference between the two parties is certainly less than many outsiders might imagine".

WINANT

MRM
Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT
334, September 26, noon.
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

The pledges made to Judge Marchisio for shipment of materials to Italy contributed through American relief for Italy, Incorporated, remain unfilled. The first shipment should have been made in August. The definite statement that 850 tons would be shipped in September and monthly shipments thereafter has failed of performance. We were advised yesterday by Supreme Allied Command Mediterranean theater Caserta "the supplies have been called forward for early December arrival" upon the basis of previous understanding we encouraged organization by Italian Government, Vatican and Italian Red Cross of the "national Agency for Distribution of Relief Supplies in Italy" which has already been fully established and widely publicized receiving most favorable
#334, September 26, noon, from Vatican City.

favorable popular approval. Unless this shipment arrives promptly no explanation can repair loss of prestige both here and at home which is important enough in our opinion to request your personal directive that shipment be made at once. Judge Marchisio is now in Rome. Would appreciate your further advice.

TAYLOR

WSB
GEK-579
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Chungking via Navy
Dated September 26, 1944
Rec'd 1:57 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1613, September 26, 10 a.m.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

I am informed in strictest confidence by high official sources that President Chiang has finally decided situation necessitates important military and civilian changes in Government and that he is prepared to make liberal agreement with communists but desires that no indication this intention become known, fearing communists may increase their demands.

Gauss

LMS

DECLASIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schamba Date MAR 8 1972
Vatican City
Dated September 27, 1944
Rec'd 9:40 a.m., 28th

Secretary of State
Washington

336, September 27, 6 p.m.
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

Referring to my 313 September 11 and message which I quoted in my 334 and in order that your records may be complete I sent paraphrase copy of my 313 to General Wilson with following message: "anticipating our meeting on Friday I believe it would expedite matters in relation to general subject of relief if transmitted to you three papers which bear upon present crisis in that situation which will enable you perhaps to familiarize yourself with the shipping difficulties which are the main obstacle. I am still of opinion that a ship of suitable size, perhaps an Italian ship, could be found that could be put into service to bring over nothing but relief materials partly contributed by American Relief for Italy and partly made up by stocks which we understand are to be built up in Italy to ensure against winter shortages. The time saving and economy of loading and unloading would seem to be well worth this special arrangement thus saving military transportation from being..."
-2-#336, September 27, 6 p.m., from Vatican City

from being confused and delayed by the admixture of materials intended for other use. In short, this is the way we would operate a business where time and the profit and loss account were of importance. I am sure from my talk with you when you displayed such practical understanding of matters this sort of arrangement would find favor with you. We have arranged a meeting with General Wilson Ambassador Kirk Captain Stone Judge Marchisio Messara Jefferson Dobson Barrantonini Brigadier General Parkinson, UNRRA representative Sorieri in Rome, Gowen and myself for Friday noon when we hope to bring into more unified cooperation the several agencies which they represent.

TAYLOR

OSB
ECC-974
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Moscow, via Army
Dated September 29, 1944
Rec'd 12:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3721, September 29, 6 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

Supplementing my 3600, September 20, 8 p.m.

Several weeks ago the Embassy and the military mission adopted a somewhat firmer and more uncompromising policy toward the Soviets with whom we have relations here, particularly in those matters which were within our controls. Among other things at that time General Deane, with my approval, wrote a firm but friendly letter to General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff, to the effect that the Red Army's constant neglect to give consideration to the United States Army proposals could not help but create a feeling in American Army circles that the Red Army did not wish to cooperate with us and react unfavorably on our previous all-out desire to assist Russia particularly in allocations of items not immediately
not immediately needed for the war. Whether it is the result of this policy or a coincidence, there have been recently more quick and favorable decisions by the Red Army than for months previous. For example: (one) approval within 24 hours for visit to Bulgaria by American party to investigate mistreatment of our prisoners, (two) immediate approval by NKVD General to OSS Mission remaining in Bulgaria, (three) when the Anglo-American technical experts were finally allowed to visit German experimental rocket installations in liberated Poland, they were given the most complete collaboration and attention, (four) for the first time, a partially satisfactory reply was made to our many proposals regarding the improvement of air transport between Washington and Moscow, (five) Stalin's immediate approval when I asked him for permission to send 500 trucks through Russia to our Air Force in China (the Foreign Office called up the next day to find out what arrangements we wanted) (six) General Deane has been called over several times recently by Red Army staff officers and received satisfactory answers to previously neglected matters.

I do not want to give the impression by any means that all our
-3-#3721, September 29, 6 p.m. from Moscow via Army.

that all our problems are solved as we still have no decision or even reply on many important subjects. We all feel, however, that some little progress is being made.

I am reporting this to you as it is our feeling that more satisfactory results of the last few weeks is an indication of what might result from the general adoption of the above policy.

HARRIMAN

MB
Secretary of State,  
Washington,  

417, Twenty-Ninth.  

Following message from President of Council of Ministers for the President has been received through Allied Control Commission.  

"As Prime Minister and honorary chairman of National agency for distribution of relief supplies in Italy' and in behalf of Italian people I deeply appreciate generous assistance indicated in announcement of the gift UNRRA donating fifty million dollars for relief for benefit of certain categories of the population the lives and health of many of whom are in great danger. Our ability to purchase needed materials and supplies in the open market where they exist is so severely restricted by war shipping and exchange conditions that we must rely upon generous and well intentioned nations to assist us in this hour of our great emergency. We are offering the fullest cooperation of this
of this government and in behalf of recently formed national agency which with all its facilities will cooperate wholeheartedly in this magnanimous assistance. Signed Bonomi."

KIRK

WSB
SECRETARY OF STATE

London
Dated: September 30, 1944
Rec'd: 9:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
8217, Thirtieth

The Times again devotes its main editorial to American election. Beginning with assertion that President's first political speech and Governor Dewey's reply have dispelled any illusion that campaign "would be a muted, nonpartisan affair", editorial says Mr. Dewey has made no secret of his hope to limit election controversy to domestic issues. It states: "his agreement with Secretary Hull to eliminate political bias from his discussion of foreign policy, and his whole-hearted commendation of the conduct of the war, have been designed to concentrate his attack upon the administration's weaker side, its management of home affairs". TIMES says Mr. Dewey has shown that he intends to take a progressive stand on internal issues, and
that he realizes that belief still cherished by some influential Republicans that clock can openly be turned back is a fatal delusion. Referring to his pronouncements in favour of a program of social security, labor rights and high wage levels, TIMES declares: "He promises all these without what he calls the present 'planned confusion', the duplication and overlapping, the delays and the discensions of the administration. This is admittedly the most vulnerable side of the present government. It is less than a month since the lid was taken off an unsavory quarrel in one of the most important agencies, the War Production Board." Continuing its discussion, editorial says: "Governor Dewey has refused to admit that the main handicap to his present program is the Republican record. Instead, by rather far-fetched references to the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and President Taft's creation of the Department of Labor, he implies that the Republicans rather than the Democrats were the original New Dealers."
He has even accused the Democrats of aggravating wartime strikes through the passage of the Smith Connally Act, forgetting to mention that the measure was only passed over President Roosevelt's veto by a coalition of Republicans and anti-Administration Democrats. This has given President Roosevelt the opportunity for devastating rebuttal. In his speech to the International Teamsters Mr. Roosevelt showed no inclination to let Mr. Dewey's present restraint on international issues blind him to the Republican record on war preparedness, Lend Lease and aid to the Allies. He traced the Republican record back to the wrecking of the peace in 1918 and did not forget Governor Dewey's maladroit references to General MacArthur's position. He was even less willing to let the Republicans steal the Democrats clothes on home issues." TIMES says that President has pulled no punches in attacking Republican obstructionism in international affairs, but has welcomed "all sincere supporters of effective collaboration" among Republicans. It goes on to state: "It is frequently pointed out that in the United States, if a stable government is to be maintained
maintained, there can only be slight differences of principle between the two great parties. A national party in a country so large and diverse as the United States can exist only by a series of compromises; and these compromises cannot differ very greatly between the two parties. New wine is constantly being poured into old bottles; and Governor Dewey's espousal of social insurance, of labor's rights and of limited government control is clearly the latest manifestation of this process. The dropping of Mr. Wallace at Chicago was a similar adjustment, a concession to the conservative wing of the Democratic Party.

It would be idle to deny, however, that during the past twelve years, partly by necessity but always under the leadership of Mr. Roosevelt, the Democrats have established a unique record for social legislation. Governor Dewey will have some difficulty in convincing labor that President Roosevelt is its worst enemy. His record of efficient administration in New York State remains his greatest asset."

WINANT

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  [ redacted ]

RA-981
Dated September 30, 1944
Rec'd 11:47 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
8179, September 30, 4 p.m.

The intentions of the Ministry of Food in regard to subject mentioned in paragraph one of Department's 7928 of September 28, are, as far as duration and price are concerned, to make a contract similar to that recently made with New Zealand, namely, for four years duration (beginning October 1, 1944) with prices firm for the first two years. Ministry is prepared to pay current prices but no more. (REMEMBS 8144, September 29, 7 p.m.).

Quantities would be the "exportable surplus" as heretofore defined, i.e., the total quantity of meat produced in Argentina less quantities required to meet human consumption and the normal requirements of South America countries and Spain and Portugal.

In all other pertinent respects the agreement would be identical with the memorandum of understanding currently effective, copy of which is being forwarded airmail today as requested in Department's 7712 of September 21.

RR
WINANT