

PSF

State Dept. : Cordell Hull Oct. 1939 - 1940

state-hull folder

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pages 869-870.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PSF Hull folder  
1939

October 2, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This is a wholly original thought with me and I have discussed it with no one else.

We have, I think, all of us the thought that at the termination of the European War, whether it comes soon or next Summer or three years or five years from now, there will be a very large number of refugees -- refugees of various Christian faiths, as well as Jewish -- refugees coming not from one country but from many countries, including even England and France and Italy.

These people may be refugees because the place they live in will no longer allow them to stay; or they may be refugees whose homes and property have been utterly destroyed and have no chance to start life anew in the old setting; refugees who for reasons of conscience, Christian and Jewish, feel that they can no longer tolerate the civilization in which they have been brought up; refugees whose family ties have been destroyed and who want to start life in a wholly new environment.

It is my personal belief that there will be, in all probability, more Christian refugees than Jewish refugees.

A problem is, therefore, raised as to whether, because a very large number of them will be Catholics, the Vatican itself may not desire to take an active interest in helping the Catholic refugees to find homes in wholly new surroundings.

I am wondering, therefore, if you and I should not begin the consideration, while the war is still on, of discussing the whole subject with the Vatican and with the representatives of the Federal Council of Churches in America and some similar organizations in Europe.

The contact with the Jews has already been made through the Myron Taylor Committee, which will meet here in October, and which has concerned itself directly with the Jewish problem.

The contact with Protestant churches can readily be made in this country and with the equivalent organizations abroad.

But a contact with the Catholic Church ought to be made directly with the Vatican itself, because this question is of infinitely more importance to European Catholics than to American Catholics.

It is my thought, therefore, that while there is no particular reason for haste, we might give consideration to sending at a later date a special Minister or Ambassador on Special Mission to the Vatican, in order that we could have a direct system of communication covering the subject of European Catholic refugees.

I am inclined to think that this is not only a practical idea but that it also puts the whole refugee problem on a broad religious basis, thereby making it possible to gain the kind of world-wide support that a mere Jewish relief set-up would not evoke.

You might think this over and talk with me about it at your convenience.

F. D. R.

PSF Hull

October 3, 1939

Memo to the President from Cordell Hull  
enclosing conf message of Oct 3, 1939 from Amb Phillips

Re-message which Hitler sent to Mussolini on Sept 1st  
and because of text now becomes of special interest.  
It appears that it was drafted by Mussolini himself  
and all Hitler did was to sign it etc etc.

See:Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939

D. Jones said that the President  
kept the conf telegram from Sterling  
in his Dip file.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1939.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

How are you going to answer Sterling's telegram from Stockholm about the Swedish ship KORSHOLM with wood pulp and granite from Finland to Wilmington, Delaware, which was seized by German warship in the Baltic?

F.D.R.

dj

*file  
Confidential*

*BSF  
Hull*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In response to your memorandum of today's date concerning a telegram from Mr. Sterling, our Minister in Stockholm, reporting the detention of the Swedish vessel KORSHOLM with a cargo of wood pulp, paper and granite from Finland consigned to the United States, I may say that yesterday afternoon the Swedish Minister called at the Department and informed us of the detention of this vessel. Mr. Boström stated that his Government was making representations to Germany and expressed the hope that we could see our way clear also to make representations to the German Government. Prior to the receipt of your memorandum the following telegram had already been sent to our Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at Berlin:

"Department

The President,

The White House.

"Department is advised that Swedish M/S KORSHOLM, also Estonian SS MINNA and Norwegian SS BROTT, each with a cargo of wood pulp or wood pulp products, consigned to various concerns in the United States, have been detained at Swinemünde, Kiel, and Sivinemunde, respectively.


"In the general interest of American commerce, ascertain the reasons for such detentions and what action German authorities contemplate taking with reference to the cargoes."

A telegram had also been sent to Mr. Sterling telling him of this message to our Chargé at Berlin.

The detention of the Estonian vessel MINNA and the Norwegian vessel BROTT had been reported to us by the American Chargé at Tallinn.

Subsequent to the sending of this message the Swedish Minister has informed us, by telephone, that the Swedish motor ship KORSHOLM has been released by the German authorities.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

PSF Hull

October 6, 1939

Telegram to the President from Cordell Hull  
Explaining a memo from Pierrepont Moffat--Quotes message of  
explanation from him in reference of error about transmitting  
London's telegram to the Navy and the Maritime Commission.

See: Pierrepont Moffat-Summer Welles folder-Drawer 1-1939

*PF Hull*

October 7, 1939

Code Cablegram for the President and Sec Hull from Amb. Davies

See: Belgium folder-Foreign File-Drawer 1-1939

*BT Hull.*

October 8, 1939.

In re-Cable ~~from~~ Ambassador Davies to the President and Secretary Hull in re-request from high source to state that the President of the United States is the only person in the world who can possibly avert a holocaust, etc.

The President sends original telegram to Sec. Hull-Oct 13, 1939 with memo--to read and return, saying that he does not think telegram requires any action at the Present time.

See: Belgium folder-Drawer 1-1939.

*RF* *Hull*  
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October 9, 1939.

Memorandum for Secretary Hull from the President

"This is interesting. Please read and return."

Signed--F.D.R.

Encloses Memo to Morgenthau from Ed Foley, General Counsel, Treasury.  
Re-Anti-Smuggling Act

See: Morgenthau folder-Drawer 1-1939

*PSF 4/11/39*

October 10, 1939

Memorandum for Sec of State from the President

Suggests Hull send telegram to Phillips to intimate at his convenience to the Papal Sec of State that the President is happy by the impartial printing of American News in the Osservatore Romano etc etc.

See:Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939

BF Hull.

October 14, 1939

Memo to Sec. Hull

Sends him letter which was sent to him-dated Oct 14, 1939 proposing three amendments to the Neutrality Bill--H.J. Res. 306 and asks him to bring these with him when they draft final recommendations.

See:Neutrality folder-Drawer 2-1939

BF Hull  
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October 14, 1939.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State  
From the President

Asking him to bring with him the enclosed letter, of Oct 14th from  
Senator Bailey with attached revised amendments regarding  
Neutrality Legislation for the final recommendations.

See: Neutrality folder-Drawer 2-1939

BF Hull  
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October 17, 1939.

Memorandum for the President from Hull

Submits two despatches from Rome

Subject: Osservatore Romanos (Vatican Paper)

See: Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939

BSF Hull 1

October 19, 1939.

Letter to Ambassador Davies from the President in answer to his letter of October 7th which was brought by Mr. Stanley Richardson from Belgium via Pan American Airways Clipper and the President's answer of the 19th which he took back to Belgium via clipper on Oct 22, 1939.

Davies letter of Oct 7th was written after he had had a 3 hour conversation with the King of Belgium who wished to send the President a message. The President's letter of Oct 19th carried the answer to the King through Davies.

See:Belgium folder-Drawer 1-1939

State Dept. copy

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Hull

Department of State copy published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1939 Vol. II General, The British  
Commonwealth, and Europe

page 698.

10-19-39

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 19, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Now that a definite Polish Government has been set up in France and former President Moscicki is no longer President, I recur to the historic United States friendship for Poland and the historic fact that we have always welcomed refugees from defeated democracies.

I wonder, therefore, whether it would not be a fine thing to do if we were to tell the Roumanian Government that the United States would be glad to receive former President Moscicki if he cares to visit this country; that we have held no communication with him and that this message is being sent without his knowledge.

He is an old man, in poor health, and I think the moral

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

-2-

effect of such action on our part  
would be good throughout the world.

We might even make it easier  
for the Roumanian Government to  
release him if we send it in the  
form of an invitation to the  
former President to visit us.

F. D. R.

PSF  
Hull

October 20, 1939.

Letter from Sec. Hull to the President

In re-attached cablegram from the Secretariate of State of the Holy See which was left by Monsignor Ready at the State Dept.

Subject: Secretariate of State of Holy See received information from Unknown source that Chinese officials "desire the Holy See to take steps to establish peace between China and Japan".

Sec Hull also encloses for the President an analysis of the above subject. Both the cablegram and analysis were returned to the State Dept.

See: Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
October 21, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you please look into this personally and see what we can do for Dodd? Personally I feel awfully sorry for him.

F. D. R.

Letter from Ambassador Dodd to the President in re money he owes the State Department in the amount of \$2,300. Lists his debts and asks the President to request the State Department to recognize his estimate of \$556 instead of \$2,300.

See: Joe Kennedy folder for his letter of  
Oct 17th regarding Australasian wool.  
Drawer 1-1939

PSF Hull  
1

October 21 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with my letter of October 7, 1939,  
with which you concurred, a telegraphic instruction  
was sent to the Embassy at London to approach the  
British Government concerning the quantity and price  
of Australasian wool which it intends to release to  
the United States.

I enclose for your information the substance of  
the reply which has now been received from the Embassy.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:  
Paraphrase of telegram  
from London

The President,  
The White House.

See: Phillips-Italy folder-Drawer 1-1939  
for confidential message of Oct 21st.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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PSF

October 23, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

Confidential message to the  
President from Ambassador Phillips  
in Rome dated October 21, 1939.

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October 23, 1939

Memo from Hall enclosing a memo from Max Truitt to him regarding The City of Flint Vessel.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

For the note of Oct 19th mentioned in  
the attached  
See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF Hull -  
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October 23 1939

My dear Mr. President:

You may be interested in the enclosed copy of the translation of a note dated October 19, 1939 from the German Chargé d'Affaires ad interim concerning neutral merchant ships traveling in the escort of English or French convoys.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

Translation of note  
from German Embassy,  
October 19, 1939.

The President,

The White House.

For original memorandum--See--Steve  
Early folder-Drawer 2-1939

10-26

CONFIDENTIAL - MEMORANDUM  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PSF  
Hull  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 26, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

Confidential memorandum of telephone conversation Mr. Early had with Huston Thompson had with Ambassador Qumansky before he left for Russia in re the Russians attitude toward negotiations with the British in which he says it can only be done if the British put their negotiations in the hands of Winston Churchill.

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Hull

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1939 Vol. II General, The British Commonwealth, and Europe

page 701.

10-28

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

On the proposed telegram to Bucharest about President Moscicki, I do not see any reason for letting the matter drop. I think our Minister can properly present it to King Carol as a verbal message from the President of the United States to the King, without anything in writing and without an "aide memoir". This can be done without any publicity whatsoever but, frankly, I want for my own conscience to have made some further move in behalf of the poor old ex-President of Poland.

F. D. R.

PSF  
Hull  
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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

The Norwegian, Danish and Finnish Ministers have all left with me a memorandum couched in the same terms as the memorandum which was handed to you yesterday by the Swedish Minister. This was to thank you for your interest shown in the northern countries, notably in connection with the Stockholm Conference, and to add the hope that the contact thus established with the United States might be maintained, especially should "possibilities be deemed to exist for the re-establishment of peace in Europe." The Swedish Minister had promised his colleagues to tell you that they had received these instructions but would present them through the State Department in order to spare you. He forgot, however, to do so and asked me to write you this line of explanation.

Faithfully yours,



The President,

The White House.

PSF Hull -  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please see Steinhardt's No. 833 regarding holding up by the Soviet authorities of our telegram of the twenty-eighth until three-thirty on the morning of the thirtieth.

I think it would be worthwhile sending something like the following to Ambassador Steinhardt:

"Please ask for appointment with Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and deliver following message:

'The Secretary of State of the United States presents his compliments to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs and requests an explanation of the delay in delivery to the Ambassador of the telegram sent from Washington on the evening of October twenty-eighth and not delivered until the morning of October thirtieth.'"

HULL

F. D. R.

*File personal + Confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

Replying to your memorandum of October 30th I find that the Soviet authorities did not delay our message as Steinhardt thought. The telegram in question which quoted the text of our lengthy press statement on the CITY OF FLINT was sent out on Sunday morning, October 29th, (we had at first thought that the evening Radio Bulletin via Berlin would suffice to carry Steinhardt the text, but decided Sunday morning that on account of possible delays a copy should be telegraphed him directly) and thus, given the eight hours difference in time between Washington and Moscow, it only took some five or six hours in transit, which is not excessive. Probably the date group was garbled in transmission which led Steinhardt to think that it had been despatched the 28th rather than the 29th. We have many complaints against the treatment accorded us  
by

The President,  
The White House.

by the Soviet authorities, but in this particular case they do not seem to have been at fault.

I have been re-reading the telegrams sent out to Steinhardt and although I do not think we overlooked any points I am today sending him a telegram, of which a copy is attached, directing him to assure himself that the record is clear, and asking for explanations of the Soviet attitude on certain specified points.

Faithfully yours,

*Cordell Hull*

Enclosure:  
Copy of telegram  
to Moscow.

October 31, 1939.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

MOSCOW

1. In reviewing your telegrams regarding the detention in Murmansk of the City of Flint the Department has noted that:

a. Although Tass was in possession of sufficient information relative to the arrival in Murmansk of the vessel to enable it to issue a somewhat detailed statement on October 23 regarding its cargo, it was not until about 48 hours later that the Embassy was able to obtain any information from the Soviet Government regarding the whereabouts and safety of the American crew.

b. Subsequently Tass was able to inform the public that the German prize crew had been released, that the vessel had put into Murmansk because of damaged machinery, and that the Soviet authorities had decided to permit the German crew to depart in possession of the vessel and cargo long before the Soviet Government conveyed such information through diplomatic channels to the American Government.

c. The Soviet Government had failed to furnish the Embassy detailed information regarding the nature of the alleged damage to the vessel's machinery, or to state who had verified that there had been such damage, or to give further details surrounding the detention of the vessel which would be helpful to the American Government in determining the circumstances of the case.

d. The Embassy received no answer to its telegrams addressed to the American Captain of the vessel, it was unable to get into telephonic communication with the Captain and crew, and the Captain and crew apparently were not allowed while in Murmansk to communicate with representatives of their Government or with members of their families.

e. Representatives of the Embassy were unable to obtain permission from the Soviet authorities to visit Murmansk.

2. It is assumed that you have already brought all of the facts mentioned above to the attention of the appropriate Soviet officials and have pointed out that they represent an attitude on the part of the Soviet Government towards The American Government and its

representatives in the Soviet Union, which has been the cause of astonishment to both the American Government and the American people.

3. If in your various conversations you have not already expressed the views of this Government with regard to any of these facts please do so at once.

4. Please also inform the appropriate authorities that since the lives of the American Captain and crew may have been at stake your Government had considered it extremely important that the Embassy be able to communicate with them and that your Government feels that it has a right to, and therefore asks for, an explanation as to why they were apparently held incommunicado during their stay in Murmansk. It is also desired that you request on behalf of your Government an explanation as to the failure of the Soviet Government to cooperate with the Embassy in ascertaining all the facts connected with the detention of the vessel and the crew which this Government has a right to expect of a government with which it maintains friendly relations.

-4-  
(CONFIDENTIAL CODE)

5. The Department is appreciative of the difficulties which you are encountering in carrying out your duties in trying and unpleasant circumstances, and commends you for the vigorous and able manner in which you have handled this case.

Eu:LWH:RMB

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November 1, 1939.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Memorandum for Bernard M. Baruch:

I had a check-up made by various embassies on the recent visit of that world-renowned, selfless statesman, Honorable Ham Fish, to Europe this past summer. Here is an excerpt which I think will amuse you because I am quite certain that neither you nor I, who belong to the more practical school of thought, would ever have commissioned Honorable Ham to represent us or speak for us.

I wish this great Pooh-bah would go back to Harvard and play tackle on the football team. He is qualified for that job.

F. D. R.

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"From London,  
August 3rd.

"Charge d' affaires Johnson received a telegram from Fish, who was then in Dublin, asking for immediate appointments with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. August 4th, Fish saw Lord Halifax. His desire was to acquaint Lord Halifax with a proposal which he intended to place before the Interparliamentary Conference at Oslo, containing a suggestion that a large area of

British territory in Central Africa be set aside for the settlement of Jews, and Fish assured Lord Halifax that the people with whom he was connected in the United States would be able to finance such an undertaking.

"Fish left London the next day for Paris. On his return to England he met Mr. McDonald, Minister for the Colonies. The only subject then discussed was Mr. Fish's proposal, originally suggested to Lord Halifax, that a large area in Central Africa be set aside for settlement of Jewish refugees.

"While in Paris on August 10th, he saw M. Bonnet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and M. Mandel, Minister of Colonies. He spoke of the refugee problem in general, mentioned his interesting talk with Lord Halifax and said that the idea was advanced by a private American group who authorized the Congressman to speak in their behalf, looking to colonization of an area south and west of Lake Tchad -- land to be provided by Great Britain and France -- colonization to be financed by the American group. He told the French that he also planned a similar discussion with Herr von Ribbentrop and, if possible, with Herr Hitler.

"He contemplated a sweeping attack of the entire problem on a large scale. He talked in terms of two million or three million persons; that it is up to Great Britain and France to make available suitable land from their colonial possessions in Africa. He said it is not a question of money as the American group will make available ample funds, as much as one hundred million dollars.

"M. Bonnet referred him to M. Mandel.

"He repeated to Mandel what he had said to Bonnet and added that in his opinion Madagascar could accommodate several tens of thousands of refugees, and in addition, New Caledonia, the Hebrides and the Marquesas Islands would be available.

"He pointed out that the study of the American Committee had shown that seventy thousand francs per family would be enough in a French colonial possession. He repeated the willingness and the ability of his group to raise one hundred million dollars. He spoke of a ten year period.

"He seemed to be under the impression that the Cameroons is still German territory and said he would talk with Ribbentrop and Hitler about this.

"Our American Embassy man, Counselor of Embassy, Murphy, asked Fish who were included in the American group and Fish said that the matter boiled down more or less to Bernard Baruch, from whom he had gotten the idea. He said that Mr. Baruch had assured him it would not be difficult to raise as much as one hundred million dollars for the purpose. Mr. Baruch said that he and a number of his friends would be willing to give ten per cent of their fortunes to such a project. Mr. Baruch alone would contribute about three million dollars."

\*\*\*\*\*

Honorable Bernard Baruch,  
597 Madison Avenue,  
New York City.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of August 29, requesting that a report be made on Representative Hamilton Fish's activities in Europe, I enclose copies of despatches which have been received respectively from the American Embassies at London, Paris and Berlin, and from the American Legations at Helsinki and Oslo.

Mr. Fish visited London on August 3 and 4 and later at the close of the Interparliamentary meeting at Oslo. During his visits to London Mr. Fish arranged appointments through the Embassy with Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Malcolm McDonald, the Minister for Colonies, with whom he discussed on behalf of the "people with whom I am connected in the United States"--whom he subsequently identified to the Counselor of the Paris Embassy as Mr. Bernard Baruch and some  
unspecified

The President,

The White House

unspecified persons who are associated with Mr. Baruch-- an ambitious scheme for the settlement of Jewish refugees in Central Africa.

After London, Mr. Fish visited Paris where he arranged through the Embassy appointments with M. Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, and M. Georges Mandel, the Minister of Colonies. In his conversations with MM. Bonnet and Mandel Mr. Fish adverted to his plan for the settlement of refugees on land in Africa to be provided by Britain and France and financed by the American group. In his conversation with M. Bonnet he also touched upon political questions and explained his views with regard to American neutrality. parliamentary Union should not not over the heads

On August 12 Mr. Fish arrived in Berlin. During his visit in the German Capital he was accompanied by a member of the staff of the German Foreign Office and was received, at Salzburg, by Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. Mr. Fish refrained from taking the Embassy into his confidence with regard to his conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop. He made various statements to the press, however, which indicated that he had discussed major political questions with the German Foreign Minister and, among other things, that he was willing to act as arbitrator of the Danzig issue.

Mr. Fish

Mr. Fish made a second visit to Berlin at the close of the Oslo meeting but had to leave suddenly due to the outbreak of war.


Mr. Fish arrived in Oslo on August 15 in Herr von Ribbentrop's private airplane. He left Oslo on August 19 upon the termination of the Interparliamentary meeting. Mr. Fish distinguished himself at the Oslo meeting notably by moving a resolution that the Conference request the British, French, German and Italian Governments to arrange a thirty-day or more "moratorium on war". His motion was not well received by the meeting and Mr. Hambro, President of the Norwegian Storting, made the point that the members of the Interparliamentary Union should not act over the heads of responsible Governments at the risk of complicating rather than aiding their task.

From Oslo Mr. Fish went to Helsinki, where he conferred with the Foreign Minister. He referred to his conversation with Herr von Ribbentrop and expressed his opinion that there was no problem in Europe which would justify war and that Danzig was overwhelmingly German and should be returned to Germany. From Helsinki Mr. Fish returned to Berlin, which he was obliged to leave almost immediately, and sailed to the United States from England.

Mr.

Mr. Fish gave out numerous interviews to the press during his visits in the various European Capitals, expressing his views on the current political situation. The texts of those interviews are enclosed.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

Enclosures:

Despatches from:

1. Helsinki
2. Oslo
3. London
4. Paris
5. Berlin

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November 3, 1939.

Memorandum from Cordell Hull to General Watson

Enclosing report for the President from Claude  
G. Bowers, Amb to Chile in his capacity as Chairman of the  
U. S. delagation to the First Pan American Housing Conference  
held at Buenos Aires from October 2 to 7, 1939.

See: Chile folder-Drawer 1-1939

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 9, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached map and memorandum by Mr. Moffat are self-explanatory of the situation in relation to Belgium and Holland in the event of a possible German invasion. It occurred to me that these might be of interest to you.

CH

*File personally  
confidential  
Hall  
PS F*

Short summary of attitude of various officials on the German-Low Country Crisis as reported to the Department of State, November 8 and 9.

6. High Dutch Officials:

1. Chamberlain:

Will turn down Dutch-Belgian mediation offer. "Would not remain quiet if Holland were invaded." The crisis is not according to the usual Hitler pattern in that he has given unnecessary advance advertising to any plans for invading the low countries.

6. Louvain: (Netherlands Minister to Washington)

2. Spaak: (Belgian Foreign Minister)

Calls attention to large concentrations of German troops, including units of veterans from Poland. Disturbed by persistent flights of German airplanes over Belgium. Worried over adverse German reaction to Dutch-Belgian mediation offer. Admitted that invasion of Holland did not strategically call for invasion of Belgium. Thought British and French would come into Belgium to protect their flank if the Germans took southern Holland.

3. King Leopold:

Stated that the Dutch were convinced that a German invasion was imminent. Personally he doubts this on the ground that the intelligence of the German high command would prevent an attempt at large-scale action of this character on account of the lateness of the season and for other reasons.

4. Daladier:

Reports 110 divisions on the Western Front. Has been told that the Dutch were offered possession of the quadrilateral containing the main cities of Holland if they did nothing more than put up a pretense of resistance to German invasion south of the Rhine. Reported that Belgium had not replied to the question of what it

would

would do if the Germans invaded Holland. Felt real doubt as to a genuine resistance on the part of the Dutch. If they did not fight, what would be the future of the Netherlands East Indies?

5. High Dutch Officials:

Convinced that the situation is rapidly deteriorating. Believe that conversations have been going on between belligerents, but that these will be stopped. Chiefly worried by increasing air activity and by German press attacks accusing Holland and Belgium of too great leniency vis-à-vis England.

6. Loudon: (Netherlands Minister to Washington)

Brought message that situation is most grave and that an early invasion cannot be discounted. Instructed not to suggest directly or indirectly any form of American intervention. Fears that blame for the attempted assassination of Hitler will be placed on Holland or on English agents who might have come to Germany through Holland. Does not know how effective Dutch resistance would be, but is convinced that the entire country would fight. Referred in conversation to Belgium as an "ally". Emphasized the deep waters in southern Holland which would be ideal for submarines.

7. Fotitch: (Yugoslav Minister to Washington)

Worried over the situation in the Netherlands and Belgium, but feels that the ever-present threat of a German or Russian attack on Rumania must not be overlooked. Does not feel that Hitler can remain inactive much longer.

Eu:Moffat:DG

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November 9, 1939.

**Letter to the President from Cordell Hull**

Enclosing a draft of a letter to General Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his letter of July 20, 1939 which was handed to the President on Nov 3 by Dr. W. W. Yen, former Chinese Minister to the United States; also a draft of a letter to Dr. H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese Government in reply to his letter of August 17, 1939 which also was pre sented to the President.

Letters sent.

For----Carbons of letters sent and Chiang Kai-shek's letter of July 20th and Dr. Kung's letter of August 17, 1939

See: Famous People folder-Drawer 3-1939

For original letter-See-Canada folder  
Drawer 1-1939

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Hull  
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November 10 1939

My dear Mr. President:

Following your press conference on October 27th at which you stated what you proposed to do with regard to the membership of the International Joint Commission, Mr. Christie, the Canadian Minister, spoke to an officer of the Department and said he had received a telephone call from Dr. Skelton, the Canadian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, urging that nothing be done until he had had time to make representations. Mr. Christie was informed that we were rather surprised at Dr. Skelton's request since the matter had been cleared with the Prime Minister, as reported by Mr. Roper in two letters copies of which were sent to you by Mr. Welles on August 2 and 23, 1939. It was suggested to Mr. Christie that Dr. Skelton might therefore wish to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister.

Later

The President,

The White House.

Later Mr. Christie telephoned again and said that Dr. Skelton had talked to the Prime Minister and heard about this for the first time. In order to be fully informed, Dr. Skelton also discussed the matter with Mr. Key, an officer of our Legation, who has informed me that it appears that the Prime Minister's version of what was said during the first conversation tallies substantially with that reported by Mr. Roper in his letter of July 29th (enclosure to Mr. Welles' letter of August 2nd).

However, with regard to the second conversation between Mr. Roper and the Prime Minister it would seem that the latter apparently failed to make his views entirely clear. According to Dr. Skelton the Prime Minister stated to Mr. Roper:

"that he regarded the International Joint Commission as a symbol of North American good neighborhood and was afraid that the prestige and effectiveness of the Commission would be jeopardized if its present composition were changed as contemplated by the American Government. He claims that during the second conversation he emphasized to Mr. Roper that the Commission was a judicial rather than an administrative body and that, in consequence, it would be difficult, if changed, for it to retain the independent and judicial attitude which was its essential feature. The second point which the Prime Minister claims that he stressed was the belief that it would really be to the interest of both governments to have the Commission continue

as a buffer which could deal with any tangled questions without involving the governments directly in their determination."

Mr. Key further informed me that he gathered that Dr. Skelton shares the Prime Minister's views with regard to the personnel of the International Joint Commission but feels that it will be difficult for the Canadians to retain the present character of the Canadian membership of the Commission in view of the changes about to be made in the American section and that, consequently, in due course, the Canadian Government may, with what appears to be considerable reluctance, appoint officials to be Commissioners who more or less will correspond with ours.

It is clear that the Canadians have some objections which are stronger than those reported to us heretofore. While I do not believe that it is necessary that there should be any change in your program, it seemed desirable, however, to bring this situation to your attention.

In the meantime we are continuing to give attention to the selection of an appropriate officer to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Governor Bartlett.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Dec 1, 1939.

G.G.T. said that the letters to King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina were sent to them via State Dept

PSF:  
Hull  
4

~~VERY CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 11, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What would you think of my sending something like the following as personal and unofficial messages to King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina? In view of the fact that Leopold is an old friend of mine and that I have ancestral Dutch connections it would be a decent thing to do and, in addition, whether they accepted or declined, if war comes to them it might be a helpful political gesture for the future.

"To King Leopold:

In the event of a new invasion of Belgium, and because of our long-time friendship, I hope you will feel free to send your children and any other members of the family to the United States during the danger period. You can rest assured that Mrs. Roosevelt and I would gladly look after their safety and well-being and that we would regard them as members of our own family. As a matter of precaution it would probably be best for them to go by train and motor to Bilbao or Lisbon and I would gladly send a cruiser there to bring them to Washington or to our country place at Hyde Park.

I am thinking much of you in these grave hours.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

"To Queen Wilhelmina:

I am thinking much of you and the House of Orange in these critical days, and it occurs to me that in the event of the invasion of Holland you may care to have the Crown Princess and the children come to the United States temporarily to be completely safe against airplane raids. It would give Mrs. Roosevelt and me very great happiness to care for them over here as if they were members of our own family and they could come to us either in

-2-

Washington or at our country place at Hyde Park.

I am telegraphing my old friend Leopold in regard to his own children, and I want you to know that I want to help in any personal way which lies in my power.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

F. D. R.

Copy

PSF Hull -  
1

November 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Secretary Hull asked me to give you the following respectful suggestion:

"That the idea of transfer of title or sale of the U.S. Shipping Line vessels in controversy, be held in abeyance until we know whether or not we will need these vessels. He thought perhaps the ships could be told to make certain runs that might be profitable and the hope held out to them that the recommendation would be made to Congress on its convening in January, to indemnify these vessels for any loss they might have incurred on these runs."

E.M.W.

For original memo--See: Neutrality folder-Drawer 2-1939

Null -  
1

November 17, 1939.

Memorandum for the President  
From Louis Johnson

Subject: Proposed acquisition by the War Dept of U.S. Ships made  
surplus by the Neutrality Act

See: Neutrality folder-Drawer 2-1939

COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

RF  
Hull  
1

Warm Springs

Nov 25, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I hear from an outside source that Bullitt is very tired and needs a couple of weeks holiday. What would you think of sending him the following telegram:

If the situation does not greatly change in the next two weeks, why not come home for Christmas? If while you are here something breaks loose you can always get back in three or four days. If you decide not to come, why not go to Algiers and Tunis for a couple of weeks and make report on general situation North Africa?

F.D.R.

For original carbon of this memo and the President's letter to B. Bullitt of Nov 25, 1939--See: Bill Bullitt folder-Drawer 1-39

For original letter attached  
and other memos regarding same  
subject  
See:Australia Folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF  
November 28 1939

Hull  
1

My dear Mr. President:

The British Ambassador this morning left with me a sealed envelope addressed to you by the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Robert G. Menzies. At the same time the Ambassador left a memorandum citing the intention of the Australian Government to establish a Legation at Washington. I enclose for your information a copy of the memorandum, together with a copy of my reply in which I expressed pleasure at the move and indicated that we would at once take steps preparatory to the establishment of a Legation at Canberra. I added, however, that the Legation would not be officially opened until a Minister had been duly appointed and confirmed by the Senate. As the Australian Minister will only be appointed two or three months hence, the arrival of an American Minister at Canberra should,

in

The President,

The White House.

in general, synchronize with the arrival of an Australian Minister in Washington.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Sealed envelope to the President.
2. Memorandum from the British Embassy.
3. Memorandum in reply to the British Embassy.



*file  
personal*

*PSI-  
Hull  
1*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Hereto attached is copy of my Chicago address tomorrow (Tuesday) night. I hope you can read it, together with my Capper letter heretofore sent to you.

The view I express about one phase of the trade agreements is that the Trade Agreement Act thus far has been considered a temporary emergency program to deal with emergency economic conditions; and since the present war extends and makes more acute than ever an economic emergency, it makes a strong case to continue to present our reciprocal trade policy as an emergency program to meet emergency conditions. This prevents critics in Congress from saying that we are attempting to take the tariff-making authority permanently away from Congress.

*CH*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

DECEMBER 4, 1939  
No. 654

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**FUTURE RELEASE**  
**NOTE DATE**

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 10:00 P.M., E.S.T.,  
DECEMBER 5, 1939. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY FUR-  
LISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY

ADDRESS OF THE HONORABLE CORDELL HULL, SECRETARY OF STATE, AT THE HOTEL STEVENS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ON THE OCCASION OF THE BANQUET HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, DECEMBER 5, 1939, AT 9 P.M., CENTRAL STANDARD TIME. (THE SECRETARY'S ADDRESS WILL BE BROADCAST ON THE BLUE NETWORK OF THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY)

WAR, PEACE, AND THE AMERICAN FARMER

This annual meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation is an appropriate occasion for examining every essential phase of our agricultural problem, in both its domestic and its international aspects. Both phases are of the utmost importance, and both should be given the fullest attention.

In the present world crisis, it is the first duty of every nation still at peace to be on the alert for its safety and security. To this end, in a country like ours, an informed and unified public opinion in support of a sound program of foreign policy was never more important. Tonight we may well consider, in the light of recent experience, some outstanding problems as they affect the future welfare of American farmers and of all other citizens as well.

Throughout the long period of tension which preceded the outbreak of present hostilities, our Government strove untiringly to strengthen the forces of peace. For many months it had been all too clear that, unless policies of peaceful and constructive cooperation could be made to prevail over policies of armed threat and conquest, the only possible outcome would be a major war.

Our efforts for peace failed. Today a large part of

the

of the world is engaged in armed conflict. With the same zeal with which we strove to avert this catastrophe, our Government is now seeking to provide every possible assurance against our being drawn into it. The recently enacted neutrality legislation and other measures which have been and are being taken testify to this fact. This country should not, and must not, be drawn into war.

But even though we remain at peace, we cannot insulate ourselves from the economic and other effects of a major war anywhere in the world. Already we have begun to feel the impacts of this conflict. Wartime controls, with their disrupting effects, have replaced the normal processes of trade with areas where hostilities are in progress.

As the warring nations readjust their import trade increasingly to war necessities, both agriculture and industry in this country feel the effects. Some branches of industry experience the temporary stimulus of war demand. On the other hand, tobacco growers, fruit growers, and other producers of farm products not regarded as strictly essential to the prosecution of war are suddenly cut off from important markets. Many kinds of manufactured exports likewise feel the weight of such restrictions.

For the duration of the war we must be prepared to accept as unavoidable many of these temporary disarrangements. Nations at war give their first concern to military purposes. Naturally, this Government is striving to keep foreign markets for our products open, and to secure a relaxation of restrictions newly imposed. But there are broader and more far-reaching problems involved. Temporary difficulties must not blind us to the importance of following policies which will both cushion the shock of current developments and enable us to grapple successfully with the colossal problems of the future.

In the welter of disruptive forces unleashed by the war, it is vital that we omit no step which will help to keep this country united and strong. One of the foundation stones for such unity and strength is a sound and prosperous agriculture. In February 1938, before the National Farm Institute, at Des Moines, I said:

"I believe it to be vital for the nation's stability and security that our farming population be adequate in proportion to other parts of the population. A wise policy for the nation requires that the conditions under which those engaged in agriculture live and labor shall be just and fair, and that life on the farm should be attractive and adequately rewarding."

No one will question the soundness of this objective. The only problem is how best to promote it.

To attain that objective one of the basic facts that must be recognized is that the prosperity of agriculture in this country is tied in with that of the nation as a whole. Upswings and downswings in factory payrolls are reflected in rising and falling demand in our cities for products of the farm, just as ups and downs in farm prosperity influence factory payrolls and thus affect the incomes and purchasing power of city people.

Second, full and stable prosperity for our nation is definitely linked to economic conditions in the rest of the world. Fullest promotion by domestic measures of our national economic welfare is, of course, always essential. But it is idle to expect a satisfactory degree of sustained economic recovery in this country while the buying power of other countries is reduced to a mere fraction of what it ought to be. When we cannot sell abroad our great exportable surpluses of farm and factory products, agriculture, industry and labor -- all three -- must pay a heavy penalty. Agriculture suffers from the loss of its foreign markets. It also suffers from the shrinkage in its home market that takes place when great manufacturing industries find their export outlets curtailed, with resulting unemployment and reduced purchasing power in our cities for products of the farm.

In brief, the thing that I want strongly to emphasize is that the prosperity of agriculture and of the whole nation is closely tied up with the presence or absence of a healthy flow of trade between nations. The existence of actual military warfare abroad, with its disrupting effects upon production, trade and finance, does not in any sense change the fundamentals; it only aggravates the problem and delays the solution.

On this subject of foreign trade, unless every farmer and every other American citizen thoroughly understands the lesson of what happened after the World War, we shall merely repeat the disastrous experience of that period.

By the close of that war the whole international economic machine had been thrown violently out of gear. Normal channels of trade and finance had been disrupted. Everywhere the condition was one of serious maladjustment and dislocation in both agriculture and industry.

The obvious need was for the restoration of normal and healthy trade relations among nations as the only possible means of establishing secure foundations for enduring peace and for the economic well-being of the peoples of all nations. But that is exactly what did not happen. Instead, the world pressed headlong down the perilous road of narrow nationalism. On all sides there grew up a vast network of trade restrictions and other impediments to normal economic intercourse imposed on the mistaken theory that such extreme measures would bring greater prosperity. Instead, new dislocations were added to old. Agricultural and other surpluses piled up in some parts of the world, with no way to sell them. At the same time, other regions were living on short rations, their purchasing power seriously reduced by inability to sell their industrial and other surpluses to foreign lands.

Finally, at the end of the Twenties, came the sharp descent into the severest depression the world has ever known -- followed by a further intensification of the very same policies of narrow nationalism which had done so much to bring on the general economic collapse. Every conceivable device for restricting trade was brought into play. Higher tariffs, quotas, import licenses, exchange control, barter arrangements, currency manipulation, and many other devices increasingly choked off international trade.

Grave mistakes of policy on the part of the United States, as well as of other countries, contributed greatly during the Twenties to the impairment of the whole world economic situation, culminating in the general breakdown at the end of that decade.

We refused to face the realities of the situation. We raised our tariff sharply and indiscriminately and thus made it impossible for

other countries to keep up their purchases of our farm and other products and at the same time make payments on their debts to us. We then tried to escape the consequences by loaning the money to pay for our own exports. Finally, after announcing in 1928 our intention of once more raising our tariff, we capped the climax of an ever-narrowing economic policy by putting on our own statute books in 1930 one of the most ill-timed and costly pieces of legislation in the entire history of this country-- the Hawley-Smoot Act.

What followed is painful history. Foreign countries retaliated by drastically increasing their tariffs and other trade barriers against our products. Our exports of farm and other products slumped heavily. The claims of those who had blandly asserted that farmers and others would be assured permanent prosperity by this embargo tariff legislation were at once exposed to the relentless test of facts. Surpluses of farm and other products were dammed up; prices collapsed; factories were closed; many millions were thrown out of employment; and agriculture was in a state of bankruptcy.

It was to cope with this extreme economic emergency that Congress enacted the trade-agreements program. This program, while retaining thoroughly ample safeguards for our domestic producers, is designed to reopen the clogged-up channels of mutually beneficial trade between our country and other countries. An emergency program to deal with emergency conditions, the trade-agreement policy is the only practicable method open to us for the purpose in view. The only suggestions seriously put forward today by opponents of the program are poorly disguised maneuvers to return this country to the Hawley-Smoot embargo policy, or its equivalent.

Solid progress has been made during the past five years in the operation of the trade-agreements program. We have negotiated agreements with countries that account for practically three-fifths of our total foreign trade. Valuable benefits, through safeguarding or improving our access to foreign markets, have been secured for literally hundreds of products, both agricultural and non-agricultural. On farm products these benefits (including guarantees of continued duty-free entry of certain items, notably cotton) cover nearly half (47 percent) of our total exports of farm products to all countries. They affect about three-fourths of our total exports of farm products to the trade-agreement countries themselves.

A few illustrations will be helpful.

After a period of less-than-average supplies, the corn-hog industry is again becoming heavily dependent upon export outlets. Reduction of barriers against our exports of pork, ham, or bacon has been obtained in ten countries. On lard nine countries have reduced barriers, while three others have agreed not to impose new restrictions. Of special significance is the removal in the agreement with Great Britain of a burdensome preferential duty on lard, originally imposed in retaliation for some of the superprotectionist provisions of the Hawley-Smoot tariff.

On grains and grain products, foreign-trade barriers have been lowered in most of the agreements now in effect. Great Britain has removed its discriminatory duty on wheat, also originally imposed in retaliation for our action under the Hawley-Smoot tariff, and has agreed to keep corn on the free list.

Fruits, vegetables, and a long list of other farm products have also materially benefited from the concessions obtained in the trade agreements.

That these benefits have been helpful in disposing of our agricultural surpluses is sufficiently indicated by the fact that, between 1935 and 1938, our exports of farm products to trade-agreement countries increased by nearly 50 percent, whereas to other countries they did not increase at all, but declined slightly. In addition, of

of course, the benefits obtained for exports of non-farm products have created employment in our cities and hence a better domestic market for farm and other products.

We have thus gone far toward safeguarding and reopening important foreign markets for our farm and other products. The agreements which we have negotiated are standing us in good stead now, at a time when, as a result of the war, our exports are faced with severe new trade restrictions in many countries. They provide an effective means of insuring better access to those markets than we would otherwise be able to get.

The work of rebuilding international trade on a sound basis, thus begun and substantially carried forward, has been, for the present, rendered more difficult by the outbreak of a new major war. The scope of operation of the trade-agreements program in the immediate future will, of course, be restricted by war conditions. But that is no reason, as some contend, for abandoning the entire program for the duration of the war. These counsels of despair and defeat overlook the all-important fact that the chances of sound economic restoration after the war, in which we shall have a vital interest, will be almost non-existent if we now abandon our work in behalf of sound trade policies and cease our efforts to induce other nations to keep alive the imperative need for such policies. This is no time to strip ourselves of necessary means of action.

If there is anything certain in this world, it is that, after present hostilities come to an end, there will be an even more desperate need than there was in recent years for vigorous action designed to restore and promote healthy and mutually beneficial trade among nations. The fact that, during the past five years, 21 nations showed their willingness, by entering into reciprocal trade agreements with us, to modify their trade policies in a more liberal direction offers a solid basis for the hope that, with peace regained, there will be a good opportunity for completing the work of trade restoration. That precious opportunity will be lost if we, who have in the recent past taken a position of leadership in this vital work, should now reverse our own policy and turn our face straight back toward suicidal economic nationalism, with its Hawley-Smoot embargoes.

It is in all these implications, that the trade-agreements program should be considered by our people. Much of the propaganda that is being poured out upon the farmer brushes aside lightly not only the inherent soundness of the program itself in its relation to domestic prosperity, but also its decisive significance in connection with the whole problem of the restoration and maintenance of enduring peace and of general economic reconstruction and progress. The central claim of such propagandists is that the trade-agreements program has caused an increase in our imports of agricultural, or so-called agricultural, products, and that this has hurt agriculture.

Let me say to you in perfectly plain language that if there were the slightest suspicion in my own mind that farmers in this country were being hurt, rather than helped, by the trade-agreements program, I would be the first to favor dropping it. But the facts tell a different story.

Let

Let us look at the latest figures. During the first nine months of 1939 we imported into this country \$795,000,000 worth of agricultural, or so-called agricultural, products. Those who use our agricultural import figures as a basis for attack on the trade-agreements program would have the country believe that these imports mean that American farmers have lost that much of their home market. Never was a more palpable and insidious falsehood perpetrated on our farm people.

What are these imports of agricultural products that you hear so much about? None of the self-styled friends of the farmer will ever tell you the fact that two-thirds of what we brought in during the first nine months of 1939, or about \$530,000,000, were products which even the authors of the Hawley-Smoot tariff considered so incapable of displacing our own farm production and so indispensable for our people that they were left on the free list in the Tariff Act of 1930. Among these were such products as coffee, rubber, raw silk, bananas, cocoa beans, tea, carpet wool, and sisal, et cetera, which we do not produce at all in this country. What farmer was hurt by the \$121,000,000 of rubber we brought in during this period? Or by the \$101,000,000 of coffee? Or the \$75,000,000 of raw silk? Or the \$28,000,000 of bananas, the \$20,000,000 of cocoa beans, the \$19,000,000 of carpet wool, or the \$15,000,000 of tea, and so on?

The products comprised in the remaining third of the total agricultural imports are predominantly of the two types: first, commodities of which we do not produce enough for our domestic requirements, notwithstanding that we have for years imposed--and still today impose--high tariffs on most of them; and second, products--most of them also subject to high duties--which we import because of special quality or use, or differences in marketing season, or other special considerations. These imports do not displace--they supplement--our deficient domestic supplies. Without hurting our domestic producers, these imports are also necessary for the economic well-being of our nation and the comfort of our people.

Those who are responsible for the maneuver of laying so much unwarranted stress on farm imports claim that these limited importations are materially hurtful to American agriculture. Where is their evidence? If farmers had been hurt, it would be reflected in farm income. That is the real test for every farmer.

By 1932, after two and one-half years of Hawley-Smoot tariff embargoes, farm cash income had fallen to 4.6 billion dollars. By 1938, after four years of trade-agreement policy, it had risen to 7.5 billions, excluding benefit payments. Were farmers hurt by this 3 billion increase in farm income?

The most reckless claims of injury have been made regarding the dairy and cattle industries. Yet the fact is that the income of the dairy industry--which had declined, under tariff embargoes, from \$1,844,000,000 in 1929 to \$991,000,000 in 1932--rose, under our trade program, to \$1,398,000,000 in 1938. Does this indicate injury? The income of the cattle industry--which, under tariff embargoes, fell from \$1,495,000,000 in 1929 to \$820,000,000 in 1932--rose, under our trade program, to \$1,144,000,000 in 1938. Does this indicate ruin?

And bear in mind that even in the period of our heaviest dairy importations, back in 1924-29, imports of dairy products never exceeded 1 1/3 percent of our domestic production. In 1938 the imports were only 1/3 of 1 percent. Bear in mind, too, that the cattleman has today, as he has always had, 95 to 98 percent of the home market.

What about farm prices? None of us can ever forget how prices crashed between 1929 and 1932, when the Hawley-Smoot embargo ruled the day. But let us not forget either how they have come back in recent years.

What farmer was hurt by the increase in the average farm price of wheat from 39 cents a bushel in 1932 to 66 cents in 1938? What was injurious about the increase in the farm price of corn from 28 cents in 1932 to 49 cents in 1938? What farmer was aggrieved by the increase in hog prices from \$3.34 a hundred in 1932 to \$7.74 in 1938? What cattleman suffered from the rise of cattle prices from \$4.25 a hundred to \$8.53 a hundred? What dairyman was hurt by the increase of butterfat prices from 17.9 cents a pound to 28.3 cents? What wool grower found reason to complain over the rise of wool prices from 8.6 cents a pound to 19.1 cents? On most of these products prices today are higher than they were a year ago. Hog prices are off at present, but are still nearly double the 1932 figure.

Not for one moment would I want to suggest that conditions for farmers today are nearly as good as they ought to be. First, last, and all of the time, I am for improving them. But I know that agricultural conditions cannot be satisfactorily improved without the expansion of both domestic and foreign markets. That is precisely why I have faith in the effectiveness of the trade-agreements program, which is the best method in the continuing emergency for accomplishing this result.

If experience is any teacher at all, it should have taught every one of us by now that the notion that farmers can be saved by embargo tariffs is a snare and a delusion. It is politically impossible to grant tariff embargoes to some groups and withhold them from others. When such embargoes are granted generally, the result, as was the case in 1930-32, is a collapse of our foreign trade, vanishing foreign markets for our farm and other surpluses, a prostrate agriculture, and a prostrate nation.

It is not a question of giving the American market to the American farmer or taking it away from him. He has already got practically all of the American market, as he has always had it, except--as I have said--for a few types of products that we do not grow in sufficient quantities for our own needs even though we impose high tariffs on most of them. Nobody proposes to adjust any tariff rate in such a way as to diminish the sales of American farm products in the home market. The sole aim is, rather, to increase such sales in both the domestic and the foreign markets.

We all know that the home market just will not absorb our large surpluses of cotton, corn and pork products, tobacco, wheat, and fruits of various kinds, not to mention other products. We must either find outlets abroad or else see these surpluses back up on us until we are overwhelmed by them.

The contrast between our present trade policy, which contemplates an expansion of both the domestic and foreign markets for farm products, and the embargo policy, which shrinks both of these markets, has been admirably stated by Secretary Wallace, as follows:

"By all means, let us make the most of the home market. But I want you to think seriously about the fact that farmers have more to lose through nationalistic policies than any other group. In the present year, 1936, farmers are cultivating probably 35 to 45 million acres that are going to produce things which will be sold abroad. The most additional land they could use by cutting out imports would be perhaps 10 million acres. It just wouldn't be good sense to risk having to leave 35 or 45 million acres idle in order to try to gain a market for 10 million acres. I don't think farmers are foolish enough to trade dollars for quarters, no matter how strong the pressure may be by those who are busy grinding their own axes."

To sum up, the case for trade agreements comes down to the simple proposition that, by reducing excessive and unreasonable tariff barriers and inducing other countries to do likewise, thus permitting a healthy growth of mutually advantageous trade, we greatly enlarge the purchasing power and the market outlets for our farm and other surpluses, both at home and abroad, to the benefit of American agriculture, American industry, and American labor.

The best test of the trade-agreements policy and its administration is to be found in the 22 agreements already negotiated. No tariff adjustments have been made in our trade agreements without the utmost care to see to it that the branches of production concerned, in agriculture or in industry, are amply safeguarded. What warrant is there for assuming that whatever tariff adjustments may be made in the future will not be as carefully considered and as adequately safeguarded as those made in agreements already negotiated?

The record of achievement under the trade-agreements program is an open book. I invite any person to show a single instance of general tariff readjustment either upward or downward, in the entire fiscal history of the nation, wherein there has been exercised as much impartiality, care and accuracy as to facts as has uniformly characterized the negotiation of our twenty-two trade agreements--or any more solicitude for the welfare of agriculture, labor, business, and the population of the country in its entirety.

Full and stable prosperity for our nation can be achieved only in a world which is at peace. War and threat of war, even when we succeed in keeping ourselves free from embroilment in actual hostilities, imposes upon us a heavy burden of expenditure for armament and an even heavier burden of economic dislocation. This burden of economic maladjustment persists long after the guns of war are stilled. And hope of enduring peace among nations is little short of an illusion unless there can be provided for it a solid foundation of economic well-being for all nations. For this, healthy and sound international trade relations are indispensable.

In the difficult days which lie ahead, the greatest of all issues will be whether or not the world will be reconstructed along lines of economic security and of firmly established order under law, which will make unthinkable a repetition of conditions of international lawlessness and of economic chaos such as we have witnessed in recent years. In the resolving of this issue, the weight of our country's influence may well prove to be decisive. By adhering to the trade policy which we now follow, we can throw our influence on the side of economic progress and of peace and order--to our own immense benefit. Were we to abandon this policy, under the pressure of narrow and short-sighted attitudes on the part of some of our people, we would render infinitely more difficult the process of building an orderly and prosperous world, and would thus inflict upon ourselves an incalculable injury.

This is a truly national problem. With so much at stake in the dangerous world of today, a united public opinion in support of the type of trade policy we have so far pursued has never been so essential to our country's welfare. A nation cannot prosper in a disordered world any more than an individual or a group can prosper within a nation when the country as a whole is in the throes of destructive chaos. Upon each and every one of us rests the responsibility for the choice of the course of action which we as a people shall pursue.

PSF  
(2/11/41?)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO READ AND PREPARE  
REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter from Ambassador MacMurray (Turkey)  
to the President dated November 9,  
1939, giving his impressions of the  
effect of the Russo-German alignment  
upon Turkey and her policy.

PSF 9/11  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you speak to me  
about this?

F. D. R.

Memorandum telephoned in by  
Senator Guffey for the President  
in re George Earle.

PSF  
Neill  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
2

Will you speak to me  
about this?

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Moscow - No.  
1059 - in re examination of  
baggage of foreign consular  
officers regardless of diplomatic  
passports, including Americans.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

December 14, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am sending you herewith a copy of a telegram received from Mr. Jay Rice, representative of the Pan American Airways in Brazil.

CH

For telegram--See: Jay Rice-South America folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF

Hull  
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PSF  
9/11/39  
1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I agree that we should defer action applying the 10% tonnage levy on Japanese ships beginning January 28, 1940.

However, I am inclined to think that information should be unofficially conveyed to the Japanese that this has been done by me, on your recommendation, as a temporary measure and to show that we have no desire to push them into a corner or bear down on them unduly as long as there is any reasonable possibility of reaching a new commercial treaty. I think it should be made clear to them, however, that this is a temporary action on our part and that if in the future it should unfortunately become necessary to impose the additional 10% levy, a thirty day notice would be given them.

F. D. R.

(See other side of memo)

The following enclosures accompanied original memorandum to the Secretary of State:

Copy of memorandum from the State Dept., 12/11/39 for the President, with attached draft of letter which it is proposed that the Dept. of State send to the Secretary of Commerce, if President approves, dealing with the question of the applicability of certain limited statutory provisions of our shipping and customs laws to the situation which will obtain upon the termination on January 26, 1940, of the 1911 treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan, and various other papers pertaining to the matter.

I agree that we should delay action applying the 10% tonnage levy on Japanese ships beginning January 26, 1940.

However, I am inclined to think that instruction should be unofficially conveyed to the Japanese that this has been done by us, as your recommendation, as a temporary measure and to show that we have no desire to push them into a corner or hurt them on this subject as long as there is any reasonable possibility of reaching a new commercial treaty. I think it should be made clear to them, however, that this is a temporary action on our part and that if in the future it should unfavorably become necessary to impose the additional 10% levy, a thirty day notice would be given them.

F. D. R.

(See other enclosure)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

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THE SECRETARY

December 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum pertaining to the proposed letter which is also attached, relates to the question of whether we should by affirmative action apply the 10% tonnage levy on Japanese ships at the expiration of the present commercial treaty in January. I think most of us here are of opinion that we should not do so, at least for the present.

CH



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter which it is proposed that this Department send to the Department of Commerce, if you approve, deals with the question of the applicability of certain limited statutory provisions of our shipping and customs laws to the situation which will obtain upon the termination on January 26, 1940, of the 1911 treaty of commerce and navigation with Japan. The letter has been discussed with and approved by officials of the Customs Bureau and by officials of the Maritime Commission. We have made a thorough study of the statutes involved and the related data, and the conclusion at which we have arrived is believed to be consistent with opinions which the Attorney General has in the past rendered in construction of these statutes.

Briefly, the relevant statutes provide for the levying, in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, of (1) discriminatory tonnage duties on foreign ships and of (2) discriminatory import duties on goods brought to the United States in foreign ships. The President is authorized to suspend these duties by proclamation as to all countries which do not impose similar discriminatory duties on our vessels

vessels or their cargoes. Technically, the absence of a Presidential Proclamation (whether warranted or not) would result in the imposition of the duties.\* As Japan does not at the present time in fact discriminate against our shipping in the particular manner contemplated by the statutes, we believe that imposition of the duties should continue to be suspended. However, it does not seem wise under present conditions to issue a proclamation declaring such suspension. Such action would quite probably be interpreted as a formal and significant declaration by this Government that Japan is in general not discriminating against our trade and that we have in contemplation no action against Japanese trade when the treaty terminates. A proclamation with respect to Japan, issued in 1872 by President Grant, is still in effect and, if that proclamation is not revoked, imposition of the discriminatory duties will continue to stand in suspense when the treaty terminates on January 26 next. As that proclamation correctly reflects the present situation, we suggest that it be allowed to stand and no new proclamation be issued. The Treasury Department and other interested Government agencies would, in their public

statements,

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\*(NOTE: Opinion of Acting Attorney General William D. Mitchell, of October 30, 1925, in 34 Op. Att. Gen. 577, 582-583.)

statements, treat the matter as one of routine, pointing out that there is involved only one phase of our commercial relations with Japan and that, as in the case of other phases of those relations, the mere termination of the treaty does not of itself bring into operation any change in existing practices.

American commercial interests have stressed the point that knowledge on their part whether these duties are or are not to go into effect, well in advance of the date on which the treaty is to terminate, is highly desirable. What they wish in the matter is certainty. It seems practicable and desirable that the Government give out this information on or before December 21. It is suggested, therefore, that action on the letter herein under reference be taken as soon as possible.

Enclosure:

Draft letter to  
Department of Commerce.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

---

THE UNDER SECRETARY

December 5, 1939

FE ✓

Mr. Hamilton:

I approve this letter and I have initialed it. I suggest that you take it up with the Secretary upon his return. I also believe this question should be submitted to the President for his approval.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
A DEC 5 - 1939  
Department of State

ADVISER BY POLITICAL RELATIONS  
MR. HAMILTON  
DEC 12 1939  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U:SV:MW

PSF Hull  
1

December 20, 1939.

Memo of Cordell Hull to the President

Re-Despatch to Amb Grew concerning negotiations for a  
new treaty with Japan etc.

See: Japan folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF

Hull  
1

December 22, 1939.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FROM THE PRESIDENT

RE\*\*\*Soviet Restrictions against American citizens connected  
with the Diplomatic Corps

See: Russia folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF Hull  
1

December 25, 1939.

Dear Cordell:-

This is not a  
suggestion that you resume  
smoking but you still have  
to entertain smokers.

My best wishes  
to you for a Merry Christmas.

As ever yours,

*file  
personal.*

*PSF  
Hull!*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


December 27, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

I am sincerely thankful for your very desirable and practical Christmas remembrance. It was kind of you thus to think of me, and I am correspondingly appreciative.

I wish for you at least thirty more such holiday periods.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed recipient information.

The President,

The White House.

PSF Hull  
4

December 28, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your memorandum of December 27, there is attached for your approval a draft of a letter to Ambassador Biddle in acknowledgment of his letter to you of December 4, 1939.

In connection with the memorandum sent to you by Ambassador Biddle on the subject of Russo-Japanese relations, there is enclosed as of possible interest a copy of the memorandum referred to in the draft letter of reply to him.

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Draft letter to Ambassador Biddle.
2. Copy of memorandum given to British and French Ambassadors by the Under Secretary of State.
3. From Ambassador Biddle to the President, December 4, with enclosure, returned.

See: Norway folder-Drawer 1-1939  
for the rest of correspondence  
concerning the Nobel Peace  
Prize for Cordell Hull.

PSF Hull  
1

December 29, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

I cannot thank you in sufficient terms for your letter of the twenty-seventh instant, informing me that for a number of years you have been recommending me for the Nobel Peace Prize. I am everlastingly grateful to you for your generous action in so doing. I shall never forget this fine exhibition of good opinion and good will on your part.

I must earnestly urge that you do not further continue your efforts on my behalf. It is so singularly appropriate that you should receive this recognition that I am very earnestly recommending you to the proper committee at Oslo. Needless to say, it gives me the greatest personal satisfaction to do so.

Again my lasting thanks and my warmest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

The President

The White House.

[1939?]

BSF

Hull  
1

Memo for Capt. Callaghan from Robt B. Carvey  
Sends it for Pres. information

Subject: Question of Russian destroyers.  
Pres. stated he would take up with  
Hull at Cabinet.

See-Capt. Callaghan folder-Drawer 2-1939

[ 1939? ]

PSF

Hull.

REPORT FROM--Secretary Hull, Acting Secretary Hanes  
and the Attorney General

IN RE--Action that may be taken upon outbreak of  
hostilities in Europe (1) WITHOUT declaration  
of a national emergency and (2) WITH dec-  
laration of a national emergency.

EXHIBITS Mentioned in attached report in folder

See--Raw folder

✓ See: Great Britain folder - for  
the correspondence.

PSP Hall  
1

January 3 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose copy of a confidential note from the  
British Ambassador in which he requests me to bring  
to your attention the text of the communication the  
British and French Governments have just made to the  
Swedish and Norwegian Governments.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Note from the British  
Ambassador.

The President,

The White House.

RE: [unclear]  
1/3/40

Hull  
1

Memorandum from Cordell Hull to the President---Jan 3, 1940.

Encloses conf note from the British Ambassador in which he requests that it be brought to the attention of the President as it outlines the text of communication the British and French Governments have made to the Swedish and Norwegian Governments.

See:Great Britain-Drawer 4-1940 (Jan 3, 1940 letter)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PSF:  
Hull -

January 11, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have read Kirk's No. 63, January ninth, from Berlin, relating to closing of American Consul Generalship at Warsaw. I gather also that the Consulate at Danzig is not to be kept open. I am wondering whether it might be possible for you to talk with the German Charge here and explain to him that Warsaw and Danzig are both very important centers and, while not nearly as large, would correspond in a sense to our own cities of Chicago and San Francisco. Furthermore, that if the United States is not to have Consuls in Warsaw and Danzig, we see no special reason why Germany should have Consuls in Chicago and San Francisco.

This, after all, is the kind of language that the Germans understand -- about the only kind -- though we can be perfectly polite in expressing the thought.

F. D. R.

*file  
confidential*

*PSF Hull*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMO: January 14, 1940.

By telephone from Secretary Hull.

THE PRESIDENT:

"The Netherlands Legation has received a telegram from the Hague, to the effect that their information as well as that of Belgium is that a German attack on the low countries is to be expected sometime this week."

Tel. and Tel.  
ab.

*file  
Confidential*

*PSF  
Hull  
1*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to the Dutch Islands off  
Venezuela and in that area, I think the  
Monroe Doctrine would protect them against  
any effort on the part of Germany to  
interfere with their sovereignty.

There could be no objection to  
sending more of our patrol vessels down  
to that Carribean oil area to cruise about  
briefly in view of rumors about German  
submarines.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PSF: Full

January 19, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am inclined to think  
we should take action on this  
directly with the German  
Government and give it publicity.

F. D. R.

No. 39 from Rome in re appeal  
to the President by Polish  
professors of the Jagellonian  
University at Cracow to help  
them. They are in concentration  
camps and are inhumanly treated.

PSF  
Hull  
1

Jan 27, 1940.

Memo to Hull and Berle

Re-Curtailment of gasoline shipments to Russia; also shipments of scrap iron. Asks them to get report from American owners of Romano Americana and ask them if they are going to deliver more oil to Germany or if they would consider American purchases of Roumanian oil for U.S.Navy ships in Mediterranean waters--a portion of it to be stored in some neutral country such as Egypt or Spain.

Report from Romano-Americano Co re deliveries of oil to Germany attached-report sent in by Berle on Feb9, 1940. Also, attached is memo of Feb 1, 1940 to Berle from FDR to "follow up with proper authorities".and Berle's reply of Feb 20, 1940.

See:Berle-Drawer 1-1940

PSF Hull -

Memo to the President from Cordell Hull --January 30, 1940.

Re-aide-memoire handed to the President on Jan 27, 1940  
by Chinese Ambassador in company with Dr. W. W. Yen.

See:China folder-Drawer 4-1940

*File personal PSF Hull*  
*State 1-19-40*  
*Wen*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Palm Beach, Florida,  
Feb. 10, 1940

The President,  
The White House.

Dear Chief:

Personal

The appointment of Sumner Welles for this exploratory mission in Europe is timely and splendid. Sumner is just the man to get an objective perspective and procure it simultaneously from the principals involved. No single Ambassador assigned to a European post could do that, in view of personal antipathies which have been unwarrantedly aroused.

Moreover, his report to you will be steady, very able and sound.

Personally, and strictly for your consideration, I have little hope that any peace discussion will fructify or even germinate now. The principals involved are too far apart - their real or avowed purposes too extreme and too set in passions.

Germany might offer a facade of an autonomous Poland and Czechoslovakia, and even a plebiscite for Austria, so eager are they for peace but it must be "a victorious peace".

But to yield military dominance in central and eastern Europe? No. That would destroy any regime in Germany now.

Nor are the French ready yet to be content with anything short of "a clean job this time". That means depriving the Germans of any possible means of aggression (whether Hitler or someone else).

I regret to say that in my judgment that they are so "set" on both sides that it will take a major reverse on one side or the other to get them to even sit down and talk things over. I hope I am wrong! Nevertheless it is worthwhile. If there is one chance in a thousand it is worth the try.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

- 2 -


Even though it should fail, it will renew the faith of the liberty and peace-loving people the world over in the fact which you have so frequently demonstrated that you are doing everything within human power to try to stop this terrible tragedy.

Enclosed herewith are two K. H. news letters from London which you might find time to scan thru. These letters have been very accurate in the past and have a large following. The editor is an ex-Navy man, who was recently elected to the Commons.

I hope you will have a much deserved rest and a grand trip.

With devoted affection from us both and with great respect always, I am

Sincerely, your friend,

  
Joseph E. Davies

2 Enclosures

*"The assertion of truth, the unveiling of illusion, the dissipation of hate,  
the enlargement and instruction of men's hearts and minds."*

FIRST CLASS MAIL EDITION

No. 185  
(Copyright)



HARTFIELD HOUSE, HEADLEY, BORDON, HANTS. ENGLAND

26th January, 1940.

DEAR MEMBER,

Certain newspapers in Britain have led their readers to believe that a large part of the Netherlands is under water in order to stave off a Nazi invasion. Such is not the case. Only a very small proportion of the floodable areas has been inundated; in fact, only those sections necessary to make it possible to put the full flooding programme into effect with the minimum of delay. It has also been suggested that the system of flooding has meant sudden and precipitate evacuation on the part of residents in the areas concerned. This is not correct. Certain sections have been designated as floodable areas since the war of 1914-18, and the people living in these localities are aware that if and when Holland is threatened, the waters may be let in, and they must be prepared to move. Houses in these areas are marked with a white cross and have a lower rentable value than if they stood in other parts of the country.

One of the most difficult problems the Dutch have had to contend with has been that of A.R.P. Cities like Rotterdam, built in the midst of a series of canals and estuaries, lack solid ground in which to build underground shelters. Some-air raid shelters have been constructed above ground in the large Dutch towns, but from what we hear the available accommodation is limited. Preparations for blacking-out key areas have also been in progress.

There has been a good deal of discussion behind the scenes in London during the past few weeks on the problem of how to bring home to the British public the seriousness of a war in which—except at sea—nothing much seems to be happening. We believe that democracies respond to frankness. Recent experiences in Holland confirm this view.

Last November, the Dutch Government made the mistake of pretending

that no menace existed, when everyone knew that such was not the case. In the period of tension a fortnight ago, however, they took the wise precaution of explaining to the people of Holland, with admirable frankness, the danger which was believed to be overhanging the nation, and the preparations that had been undertaken to deal with any attack. The response of the Hollanders showed that frankness on the part of a Government, even when it means saying some unpleasant and disquieting things, may be the best way to reassure the public. Let us now return to Great Britain and consider that aspect of sacrifice on the home front which is represented by rationing.

Almost three weeks have passed since the first stage of rationing came into force, and certain facts are becoming clear: (a) The present very limited scheme is on the whole working smoothly and efficiently; (b) the people of this country approve of the principle of rationing in war time and appreciate its necessity in order to conserve our shipping and foreign exchange.

As for (a), a friend who goes up to London for several days each week, said: "I never think about rationing, except when my wife insists on chucking my ration book into my bag as I am leaving. She tells me she uses it at home and I haven't heard her complaining yet. When I am in town I just eat things that are not rationed, and the choice is wide enough."\*

So long as the British people are convinced that rationing is a vital step towards victory, there is no doubt what their answer will be, no matter how great are the sacrifices asked of them.

It is possible, however, to envisage two different sets of circumstances in which the answer of the British people might be otherwise. The one is if they did not have faith that the hardships they were bearing were a necessary part of a comprehensive and positive plan for winning the war; the other is if they felt that there was discrimination among different sections of the population with regard to the sacrifices they were asked to make.

As for the first of these considerations, we shall say no more at the moment than to point out that there are certain searching questions which many in these islands are asking at the present time: has the Government worked out the broad outlines of the grand strategy which will bring victory in the shortest possible time? And has the whole force of our effort in the military, economic, diplomatic and propaganda fields been brought together and co-ordinated in that scheme? We hope that the Government have got answers to these questions. If they have not, there will have to be a good many more resignations.

A section of the press has been suggesting that the introduction, at

\*Our friend is apparently oblivious of the fact that since he now eats margarine instead of butter, the "rationing" he thinks he has contracted out of, is producing exactly the effect on his consuming habits which the Government desire.

the outbreak of the war, of a wide scheme of rationing in Germany meant that that country was on the verge of starvation and, by implication, would soon have to give in. These suggestions are very dangerous. In a smug and superior way, those newspapers look down their noses at Germany and say in effect: "See how poor Germans are rationed, while we have practically no rationing in this country." Although Germany had very substantial stores of many foodstuffs in September, 1939, to say nothing of retaining access to those of all Europe east of France, it may be that the Germans have been wiser than we in undertaking, so early in the struggle, a careful husbanding of resources.

In this connection we have received, from persons who have recently been in widely separated parts of the Reich, reports about rationing in Germany which may be summed up as follows: although the population, in view of its remembrances of the last war, was at first shocked by the introduction of rationing it has now allowed itself to be persuaded that this is merely a development resulting from carefully prepared organisation. People believe that there are stocks, and that rationing has only been introduced as a precaution. They are therefore rapidly adapting themselves to the position. The Nazis are also trying to make the rationing system look just, from a social point of view, by purposely neglecting, from time to time, the better-off section of the population and favouring with considerable supplementary rations the workers engaged on heavy or very strenuous work.

In this matter of rationing we agree with what Mr. Harold Macmillan said nine days ago in the House of Commons when he argued that rationing should be extended with the least possible delay to cover all commodities both of food and of raw materials essential to our war machine and to our export trade. Special efforts should be made, by rationing and other means, to restrict to the minimum our consumption of all luxury goods. In addition to releasing shipping and exchange for the necessities of war, such a policy would have two other vitally important effects: first, it would help to equalise, as between different sections of the public, the inconveniences and hardships of war; secondly, it would result in a genuine saving of income which (directly or through the banks) would be available to the Government for carrying on the war.

We consider that one of the most important events of the past ten days has been the Chancellor's announcement that the 4½ per cent. Conversion Loan, 1940-4, is to be converted into a new short-term Conversion Loan which will bear interest at 2 per cent. This means that the profit-making urge is to be subordinated to the national war effort. There are to be no more war-memorials on a 5 per cent. basis. We have insisted (see News-Letter 169) that if the State is to have the right to call upon men's lives in its defence, how much more should it

have the right to call upon our whole economic and financial resources. A policy of enforced savings through rationing and other controls, and of borrowing by the Government at low rates of interest from these savings, will tend to equalise the burdens of war and do much to avoid a dangerous spiral of wages and prices with the resulting disastrous inflation which occurred during 1914-18. It will also help to avoid some of the most troublesome problems which Britain, in common with her Allies and with the neutral countries, will have to face at the conclusion of the war.

This News-Letter Service makes no apologies for reminding you from time to time of the need of keeping in mind that if this war is to be justified, it must produce a satisfactory settlement.

In connection with the problems of post-war settlement, we commend to your attention the Report of the League of Nations Committee, under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London. This document constitutes one of the most practical contributions which have been made to date.

Even its bitterest critics cannot deny that the League has accomplished much useful and important work in the field of economic and social questions. The value of this work has been limited, however, by the fact that a number of States—including some of the major Powers—are not members of the League.

The Bruce Report recommends that the economic and social activities of the League should be entrusted to a new body, enjoying in effect the same independent status as the International Labour Organisation. Such an organisation, separated from the *political* aspects of the League, might commend itself to those nations which for one reason or another, are unwilling to share in an international organisation concerned with political questions. Its advocates believe that, based on universal membership, it would provide the machinery for settling economic problems which are an important factor in the causes of war, and for raising economic and social standards throughout the world.

The report was adopted unanimously and warmly by the Assembly on the very day on which the expulsion of Russia from the League was decided upon, and the U.S.A. has shown a decided interest in its recommendations.

Yours sincerely,

*K-H News-Letter Service.*

The K-H News-Letter was founded by Stephen King-Hall 30.6.36; is owned by K-H Services Ltd., and printed by Chiswick Press Ltd., at New Southgate, N.11.

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**FROM THE NOTE BOOK**


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*Sweden.*—A correspondent writes that Swedish soldiers of the frontier regiments are deserting in considerable numbers in order to join the Finns in their fight against the Russians.

*Czech Newspapers.*—One set of instructions issued by the German Government to the Czech press (new instructions are constantly added) contained some forty-four different "do's" and "don't's" (mostly the latter) from which we quote the following:

"9. Ambiguous remarks will be punished as sabotage."

"18. Forbidden are all notes on the following—standard of factories, unemployment, waste of energy, questions of supply and nourishment, traffic, railway time-tables, catastrophes, condition of roads and motor roads, seeds, black-out, air raid precautions, wages, price of food and other articles, unfavourable economic conditions, weather, military movements, defence, education, military essays."

"21. Suppression of desires to change present conditions."

"24. No news of activity of the Gestapo or the Reich authorities is permitted."

"35. No information on the economic measures against the Jews."

"38. Suppression of criticism against officials and authorities."

"44. No mention of suicides and arrests."

Having observed that the pages of Czech newspapers are still filled with print, we take our hats off to the ingenuity of the editors.

*A Denial.*—We are authorised by Commander King-Hall to state that the news recently published in Germany to the effect that he had been dismissed by the K-H News-Letter and "that is the end of him", is as ludicrously incorrect as most of the statements published by Dr. Goebbels.

*New Zealand.*—In News-Letter Supplement 182 we mentioned the opposition among the primary producers in New Zealand to the Government's control of marketing and prices. In this connection a member of this Service, whose firm has wide business connections in New Zealand, gives us the following information: (1) The New Zealand importer is not allowed to buy British goods except under licence by the New Zealand Government, and for the current licensing period he is allowed to buy only 60 per cent. of the value of goods purchased during January-June, 1939; due to rises in prices and freights this means less than 50 per cent. of his last year's purchases. (2) There is a long list of British manufactured goods, of which the importation into New Zealand is at present forbidden. (3) The New Zealand importer must secure a licence from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in order to pay for goods the Government allows him to import. It is also claimed that while the New Zealand Government makes wide use of the radio to explain its aims and policies, opposition groups are not permitted to do likewise. One such group, "The New Zealand Freedom Association", alleges that the Government has refused it any use whatever of the broadcasting services. It has therefore been sending out pamphlets entitled "Prohibited Broadcasts".

*Problem Pictures.*—The world-wide publication of some of the photos taken by the R.A.F. over Germany, showing battleships and aircraft at German naval bases and aerodromes, has led some press-commentators to argue that if the

photographs could be taken, bombs could have been dropped on the battleships and aircraft with equal ease and precision. The analogy is almost completely false. A bomber travelling at 10,000 feet, speed 200 miles an hour, must be in one position in space, and *only one*, if its bombs are to hit a given target. It can photograph the target from many positions.

*The Straits Settlements.*—A member writes to us from Penang: "Things would have been unpleasant enough no doubt if Hitler hadn't antagonised Japan by double-crossing her with Russia. But we should have tried and ought to have been able to give a good account of ourselves, if it had come to that. As things are, this must be one of the few oases of the world at present not unduly upset by war; nothing to show that there is one at all. A slight rise in prices, but no rationing as yet. One feels hopelessly out of it here, but it would do no good rushing home, even if one could. The local races show a fairly lively interest in the war, although I doubt if there is much real appreciation of what it is all about."

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## NEWS FROM FRANCE

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### FRENCH WAR EFFORT.

In the opinion of neutral observers, a plebiscite taken in France to-day on any peace proposal which left Germany in possession of the gains of aggression, and the means of aggression in the future, would reveal an 80 per cent. vote for fighting on until the German will-to-war is smashed. The minority would include some extreme Conservatives, who hold the view that a war to the bitter end will destroy much without achieving anything constructive.

The French war effort is on the same "all in" scale as in 1918. France still has the best army in the world—the one mass-army which has suffered no break in its tradition through revolution, disarmament or otherwise. At the moment the French have more troops under arms than they know what to do with—hence suggestions for reconsidering the claims of industry, at present suffering from the withdrawal of so many trained workers. One French publicist—Kerillis—stated the other day that the whole idea of a mass-army is out-of-date, and advocated the demobilisation of at least 75 per cent. of all troops and their return to the factories and fields. It is unlikely that the French High Command will heed such advanced theories, but the return of some men to industry is probable as soon as more British troops arrive. It is significant of French regard for machine-power in this war that out

of a war budget of 259 milliards of francs, 106 milliards have been earmarked for the Air Ministry.

Despite a certain amount of impatience over the continued stalemate on the Western Front, a *French* (or Franco-British) offensive in 1940 is highly improbable, unless a big German attack is launched—and fails. Gamelin is reputedly a very Fabian type of commander, who fully approved Daladier's emphasis on the need to conserve French lives.

The French Second in Command (General Georges, who was wounded at the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia) is reported a more adventurous type, and boulevard whispers credit him with being stronger and more decisive in temperament than his chief. He is a man to watch as possible future C-in-C, should the fortunes of war suggest any need for change in the Allied land command. For the present, however, the majority opinion in France believes that time is on the side of the Allies, and approves the siege tactics and caution of Gamelin.

Perhaps the truest thing which can be said of France is that in 1940 this country has fewer illusions than in either 1914 or 1918. The basic sentiment is the imperative need of security, expressed in the statement: "*We must make an end of it this time*". This view is shared by the French Trade Union movement, which is co-operating fully with the government, and is

also probably endorsed to-day by a number who were formerly in the Communist ranks.

#### FINLAND

The attitude of the French government would seem to be substantially in accord with the British. Material aid is being sent to the Finns, but the scope of this aid is unknown. The anti-Bolshevism in conservative circles in France is more rabid than in Great Britain, hence suggestions (both in the press and behind the scenes) that France has nothing to lose, and maybe something to gain, by going the whole hog, breaking off diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.—even by sending a contingent of Alpine Chasseurs to Finland as evidence of "solidarity". It is considered in Paris, however, that this is further than the Daladier government is likely to go. But the greatest satisfaction is felt in some circles (both Right and Left) at the showing-up of Hitler's partner, the French view being that it is now clear that Germany was sold a lemon. One form of aid extended to the Finns is believed to be an arrangement with the Swedes to supply arms and munitions to Helsinki under promise of replacement by the Allies. The French view, summed up, is that anything which uses up Russian material, and stresses the military weakness of that nation, is all to the good.

*Le Matin* recently summed up Paris opinion in these words: "Mannerheim towers above Voroshiloff as definitely as the Eiffel Tower lifts its height above the latrines of Paris", while another French journalist expressed a common opinion when he wrote: "The average Finnish private is more intelligent than any Soviet colonel."

French Conservatives favour the building up of a Latin Catholic bloc in Europe—including Italy. Their argument is that Soviet Russia cannot harm France, and if a strong anti-Bolshevik attitude is adopted there will be an ideological "pull" towards France in Italy, Spain and even Japan.

#### WAR AND PEACE AIMS

There unquestionably exists a deep and definite cleavage between the British and French viewpoints, a cleavage, concealed from the average resident of Great Britain,\* destined to

have an important bearing on European developments before the world is much older.

Four-fifths of the whole French people are determined to smash not Hitlerism alone, but the "eternal Germany" which has warred on France three times within living memory. Books and articles exposing German aggression down the ages are flooding off the French presses, and the whole emphasis is on the fact that Germany—and not merely the Nazi regime—is a permanent menace, which must be rendered forever incapable of further disturbing European peace.

There exists in France a pathetically eager urge for security at any price—for that security which they fondly imagined had been gained by the sacrifices of the World War. The French are painfully conscious of a population which has ceased to grow, which factor makes them determined to impose a stern peace before it is too late. It would seem reasonably certain that, unless the prevailing mood changes very considerably, the least France will demand is what Foch wanted in 1918—a French frontier on the Rhine, secured either by the creation of an autonomous buffer state, or a French Protectorate, or otherwise. This supreme war-aim is occupying the minds of Frenchmen of all classes and parties. The nation is ice-cold towards the British idea of "fighting Hitlerism".

One Paris newspaper (*Figaro*) recently published a forecast of French peace aims:

1. No negotiations with a Nazi government.
2. Restoration of Poland and Czechoslovakia.
3. Material and positive guarantees.

The third demand is the crux of the matter. When the French speak of "positive guarantees" for German good behaviour in the future, they probably mean at least a Rhine frontier and unilateral disarmament of Germany, but no prominent politician is prepared to get down to details at this stage.

There would seem to be but one chance of inducing the French even to consider peace aims such as liberal Englishmen contemplate. If some scheme could be devised which would convince the French they will be fully safeguarded against any repetition of recent history, then they would perhaps abandon claims to annex or detach one inch of territory from the Reich, or to interfere in the internal affairs

\* See News-Letter 183

of that country. But it must be emphasised that words will make no impression on a nation which for the second time in twenty years sees business and family life disrupted, gold reserves squandered, the cost of living rising, and its civilisation endangered, "because we were too soft last time to finish off the job". If necessary to secure that feeling of national safety, the French would even face the task of garrisoning the whole of Southern Germany for a long term of years. In short, they refuse to trust the word of a German again, and they refuse to believe that once Hitler is out of the way, all will automatically be for the best in the best of all worlds. They see in the Nazis merely the reflection of the spirit which Germany has repeatedly shown down the centuries, and they consider that the means of aggression must be taken out of the hands of the entire German race.

Among some well-informed neutral observers in Paris there is a fear lest a solution such as the French envisage will involve the ruin of Europe and destroy the standard of living for a century.

#### GENERAL

Superficially, France is far more normal than Britain. The blackout in Paris is a casual affair. Shop-windows are shaded, but show enough light to make any London air-raid

warden die of heart failure. There is no difficulty in moving about after dark, and no one carries either gas-mask or torch. With the solitary exception of coffee, short for a few weeks but now again in good supply, and the institution of two meatless days a week, there has been no hint of food shortage and there is no rationing. An applicant for the renewal of his monthly petrol permit, asking for 100 gallons for the month was told he "could have up to 250 gallons if he wanted it". Travellers need "safe conducts"; there is a plague of forms and permits, but for those who know only Paris, war-time London would come as a profound shock.

Beneath the surface, however, the picture is different. One point which should be borne in mind is that, with 5,000,000 men mobilised, the war is hitting everyone in France. Men who held good positions are serving in the ranks at 2½ francs a day. Their wives receive 8 francs a day allowance *if they have no income or cash in hand.* Dependants of those mobilised need not pay any rent or rates if living on the infinitesimal army allowance—on which it is just about possible for a frugal French housewife to keep alive. Thus nearly every family is directly affected to a degree unknown in Britain—which in turn assists materially in the formation of public opinion favouring a "strong" peace, with no mistake about it this time.

*News-Letter Figures.*—Increase for the week 312.

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**NOTE**.—There are three numbers on the envelope in which you receive this letter. The first is your personal number. The second is the number of the News-Letter at which your current subscription began. The third figure shows you at which number of the News-Letter your current subscription expires unless you have sent us a Bankers' Order. S. K-H.

*John G. ...*

"The assertion of truth, the unveiling of illusion, the dissipation of hate  
the enlargement and instruction of men's hearts and minds."

FIRST CLASS MAIL EDITION

No. 186  
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HARTFIELD HOUSE, HEADLEY, BORDON, HANTS, ENGLAND

2nd February, 1940.

DEAR MEMBER,

In the lull which many people expect will be ended with the coming of Spring,\* two questions are urgent. The first is our relations with the neutrals; the second includes the position of Finland, her ability to maintain her defences against the Russians, and the consequences of her defeat.

Although some of the neutrals have been making money out of the war, others have had to face heavy losses in shipping, trade and human life. For the neutrals in the latter position, there is a deep and genuine sympathy in this country, and a desire to lessen the hardships which the war has forced upon them.

From the stand-point of economic war, the neutral countries of Europe should have been strictly rationed on 3rd September, 1939, in the quantities of oil, minerals and other vital commodities which they would be allowed to import from overseas. Such a plan would no doubt have been welcomed by some governmental departments, such as the Admiralty and the Ministry of Economic Warfare, who were particularly concerned with the problem of supplies for the enemy. There was, however, the feeling in this country that our treatment of the neutrals should be on the most generous basis and in accord with the principles for which the Allies had gone to war. Consequently, the British Government forebore to ration the neutrals, but sought to arrive at freely negotiated agreements.

The methods pursued by the Nazis to force the neutrals to break off all economic relations with the Allies are of a very different character. They include propaganda campaigns, war of nerves (as exemplified in the case of Holland and Belgium, which have had to keep large numbers of men under arms at great cost to the State) and indiscriminate mine, submarine and aerial warfare both on the high

\*Our opinion is that the deadlock is likely to continue.

seas and even in neutral territorial waters. These depredations on neutral shipping are so ruthless and frequent that they are apt to be regarded as an accepted method of warfare. They are barbarous and completely without justification in terms of international law or morality. A typical example of the Nazi methods is that of the Dutch vessel *Sliedrecht*.

According to Pieter Brons, the mate of the *Sliedrecht*, a German submarine signalled to her to stop and have the ship's papers sent over. The vessel was then 150 miles west of Ireland and the weather stormy. The small boat was launched and Brons and four others rowed across. After examining the ship's papers the submarine commander said he would have to sink the *Sliedrecht* and gave only half-an-hour to abandon ship, in spite of the fact that it was a neutral ship bound for a neutral port. "We then asked him to take us aboard the submarine", said Brons, "and transfer us to another vessel, but he refused, saying that he had no room. Before we returned to our ship, the submarine commander warned us that if we gave any distress signals we would be immediately sunk without further warning. The sea was so rough that we took nearly half-an-hour to row back to the *Sliedrecht* and we only had time to yell to those on board to abandon ship as she was going to be sunk. The remaining twenty-six members of the crew launched the lifeboat. Soon afterwards the submarine fired a torpedo which exploded with a terrific flash. We tried to get near the other lifeboat to take off some of the crew, as she was overloaded, but we could not reach her on account of the high seas. We saw her signalling in the darkness. The submarine also saw her signalling and fired a warning shot across the boat. When dawn came the other boat had disappeared." The *Sliedrecht* was torpedoed on the evening of 16th November. The five survivors, too weak to crawl out of the boat, half starved and numb with cold, were picked up by a British vessel on the morning of 23rd November. Many neutral ships have been sunk without any warning whatever by Nazi U-boats.

The methods of the Allies in their treatment of the neutrals have been far removed from brutalities such as the *Sliedrecht* case. But the time has now come for some firmer action on our part. In his speech a fortnight ago Mr. Churchill hinted to the neutrals that their interests also lay in the recognition of what totalitarian war means and of what their future might be if the cause of the Allies were to be lost. Caught between the Allied and the Nazi war machines, the position of these neutrals is unpleasant, but they must realise that the interests of the Allies cannot be allowed to suffer just because the Nazis exert ruthless pressure upon neutrals.

The neutrals protest against the Allied contraband control and the reprisal measures to reduce German exports. While giving their protests sympathetic consideration, it should be stated plainly that they too must make sacrifices if the ideals which we are supposed to share are to be preserved.

The Allies have been and are endeavouring to make trade agreements with neutrals, in order to limit by this method of *voluntary agreement* the usefulness of the neutrals as sources of supply for Germany.

Failing the conclusion of such agreements, the Allies will inevitably have to ration these neutrals in terms of their imports from overseas and to bring other forms of economic pressure to bear on them to prevent them becoming, willingly or unwillingly, the accomplices of Nazism.

As regards the American protests against our searching mails, the honest course is to say to the Americans: "Of course, if you want to put the hooks into us, you can, but do you really want us to be defeated? We are fighting gangsters and you know it, and if we are beaten, do you seriously imagine you can be indifferent to German colonies in the West Indies or would you go to war to prevent such an event taking place?"

Turning to the question of Finland, we include in the Supplement to this News-Letter an account of the Finnish position by one who has just paid a visit to that country. The Finns deserve the fullest praise for the gallant fight they have put up against overwhelming numbers, but how long can Finland hold out, and what are the likely consequences if she is beaten?


Against Russia's 180 millions, Finland has a population of 3,800,000, out of which she can mobilize a fighting force of 300,000 to 400,000 men. Up to some weeks ago, Finland had lost 10,000 killed and wounded, which means a more serious loss for her than the many more casualties suffered by the Russians.

The Finns themselves are moderately confident that, unless the Russians' winter offensive develops on a greater scale than has been the case up to now, they can hold out for three or four months. By the end of April or early in May, spring is normally far enough advanced to make conditions favourable for the full force of Russia's weight being hurled against the Finnish defenders.

We estimate that the minimum requirements of the Finns are 70,000 men and 400-500 fighting planes, in addition to ammunition and other vital supplies. This help must reach Finland before the big Russian push begins. Anti-aircraft guns are less needed, because, while they would be of great assistance in certain important centres like Hangö, the country is too big and the population too small to rely upon this means of defence against air-attack.

While diplomatic relations with Russia need not be broken off, the Allies should give immediate and substantial help to Finland. The Finns are confident that neither transport facilities nor the attitude of Norway and Sweden would prevent volunteers and necessities of war from reaching them through Scandinavia.

If adequate help is not sent, the Finnish plan is to retire as slowly as possible towards the south-west coast of Finland. The Finns hope that by making use both



of the natural defences of the country and their fortified positions they will be able to hold up the Russian advance until sufficient time has been gained in which to transport the non-fighting population into Sweden and Norway.

The Finns have no doubt that if their country is over-run, it will be colonised by the Bolsheviks and it will never again be possible to re-create an independent Finnish nation or culture. Their young man-power would be gone, since it will fight to the last, and the old men, the women and children evacuated to Scandinavia, will be assimilated by the people of those countries.

What effect would Finland's defeat have upon the war against Nazi Germany? This is a very big question indeed and cannot be answered in a few lines. We do not know whether Hitler and Stalin have made a deal to divide up Scandinavia, on the analogy of the Fourth Partition of Poland. We only know that if this should turn out to be the case, the centre of gravity of the war would probably not be found on the Maginot and Siegfried lines.

If we were pressed to do some guessing, we should say that it is more likely that there will be "developments" in either or both the Middle East or Scandinavia in the autumn of 1940 or spring of 1941 than in the next few months.

In the absence of more information, we adhere to our previously expressed view that Stalin's immediate objectives are Russia's 1914 frontiers. If we are wrong and a defeat of Finland were followed by a joint Russian-German assault in Scandinavia, it is worth remembering that though the Nazis might hope to get additional naval bases, we might hope to attack Germany from the North and open up the Baltic. We might also hope that so monstrous an event as the invasion of Scandinavia would produce a powerful effect on U.S. public opinion and perhaps cause the Dutch and Belgians to realise that the hour of destiny had come.

In the meantime, the Finnish economy has been able to carry on. The war has prevented the normal amount of timber and lumber being cut, but the great industries of pulp, paper and cellulose have been able to go on producing amounts but little less than their normal output. Germany, in spite of her relations with Russia has continued to buy what she wanted from Finland. What she did not want, she has tried to prevent the Finns from sending to the outside world. Finnish and other vessels carrying exports have to seek safety from the submarine and mine by steaming at night through the territorial waters of Sweden and Norway. A voyage which took 7-10 days in peace time, now requires 20-30.

Yours sincerely,

*K-H News-Letter Service.*

The K-H News-Letter was founded by Stephen King Hall 30.6.36; is owned by K-H Services Ltd., and printed by Chiswick Press Ltd., at New Southgate, N.11.

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**FROM THE NOTE BOOK**

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*Canadian Elections.*—There is no imperial significance in the sudden announcement of the Canadian Prime Minister to hold a general election in March. Mr. Mackenzie King's Government, and his Liberal followers, wholeheartedly support the Allied cause. The Conservatives under Dr. Manion, the official Leader of the Opposition, promise to increase Canada's war effort. There are two smaller Opposition groups: the Social Credit Party, which approved the decision to declare war, but urged the conscription of men and money; and the C.C.F. (Canadian Commonwealth Federation) which was divided on the question of participation. There are some "isolationists" among the French-speaking population of Quebec (shown by the provincial election of last autumn to be a small minority) and among the followers of the C.C.F. The disunity of the C.C.F. on this point was manifest during the special session of the Canadian Parliament last Autumn when the Leader of the Party, Mr. Woodsworth, said in the House that his convictions prevented him from supporting Canada's entry into the war, but that in this he spoke only as an individual, and he wished his followers to feel free to follow the dictates of their conscience.

An election would have to be held by the autumn of this year, at the latest, unless Parliament, on account of the war, passed a bill prolonging its life beyond the constitutional period of five years. Mr. Mackenzie King has always insisted he would never do this. His reasons were as follows: during the war of 1914-18, Sir Robert Borden, the Conservative Prime Minister at that time, proposed to the Liberal Leader, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, that the term of Parliament should be extended for an additional year. Sir Wilfrid agreed on condition that no seriously contentious measures were introduced during that period. Under pressure of events in Europe, Sir Robert Borden introduced Conscription. This action was regarded by the Liberal Leader as a serious breach of faith. Conscription was bitterly opposed in French Canada and this episode has never been forgotten. The old wound still rankles in Canadian public life and the word "Conscription" is anathema to the majority of French Canadians amongst whom it can still be used with good effect against the Conservative party.

The reasons for an immediate calling of a General Election are to be found in Mr. Mackenzie King's political strategy and in the attacks of Dr. Manion, Colonel Drew, the Ontario Conservative Leader, and Mr. Hepburn. The latter is the Liberal Premier of Ontario who has waged a bitter political feud with Mr. Mackenzie King. All three urge greater vigour on the part of the Canadian Government in the prosecution of the war.

In the elections of 1935, the Liberals won 178 seats out of 245, by far the largest majority any Canadian Government has ever enjoyed. In the by-elections which have since occurred, they have gained two more seats from the Conservatives. The Opposition at present is not united and the probability is that Mr. Mackenzie King's Government will be returned in the coming elections.

*American Steel.*—United States steel production in 1939 was just under 50 million tons as against some 30 million tons in 1938. This is believed to be double the output of Germany, which is the second largest world producer. The 1939 out-

put of steel in the U.S.A., which just failed to establish a new peak, involved an average operating rate of 70 per cent. of the total capacity of the mills.

*Sarawak.*—A member writes to us from Sarawak: "We are too far off here to feel the full stress of war, but there are difficulties in obtaining some of the more essential kinds of goods, for example, manufactured articles of metal. Saw-millers here, find it impossible to obtain fresh saws. In addition, trade in general with Europe is upset. New regulations in work resulting from the war tend to be irksome because we can only realise with difficulty in this delightful but far removed spot how important they are as part of the whole war effort."

*Baptismal Problem.*—An M.P. was puzzled on receiving the following communication. "Dear Sir, In answer to your letter about my family, I write to say I had six children. One of them died, but the parson christened him on an envelope."

*Road Accidents.*—Some startling figures have been given in the House of Commons concerning casualties on the roads since the outbreak of war. The Minister of Transport stated that 4,133 persons were killed during the period from 1st September to 31st December, as against 2,494 in the corresponding months of last year. Of this total 2,657 were pedestrians, an increase of 117 per cent. In the discussion which followed one M.P. claimed that some 100,000 men, women and children had died as a result of road accidents during the past twenty years, while injured numbered between 4 and 5 million.

*Women's Auxiliary Air Force.*—Approximately 11,000 women are serving in the W.A.A.F. To date £16 has been allowed towards the uniforms of officers of this force, the total cost of which averages £38. The Government grant in this connection is shortly to be increased to £30. Women pilots engaged in flying aircraft from factories to aerodromes are paid a basic salary of £280 a year, plus consolidated flying pay at the rate of £8 a month.

*Entertainment.*—Last year Britain imported some £10 million worth of motion picture films from the U.S.A. The cinema provides a popular source of entertainment particularly in time of war, but the importation of films from foreign countries also raises the problem of the conservation of our foreign exchange.

*Poland.*—We have just received information of an indisputably authentic character that the German Government has been making strenuous but ineffective attempts to find a few Poles whom they could count upon to fill the role of Polish representatives in a puppet administration.

*Hitler's Speech.*—It is interesting to note that for reasons of personal security the fact that the Fuehrer was to make a speech on the seventh anniversary of his becoming Chancellor was kept a strict secret up to the last moment. As regards the speech itself, its lies and threats are hardly worthy of serious comment.

*Employers.*—We invite you to try the experiment of taking out a group subscription of the K-H News-Letter for your people. The rates are as follows:

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We believe that your employees will appreciate your action in this respect and that by giving them the opportunity of seeing a copy each week you will help to form an enlightened public opinion.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

### FINLAND.

SIR,

I have just returned from a short visit to Finland, a country I know well and where I have many friends and possibly you may be interested to know the general trend of public opinion there.

The Finns feel they are fighting not only for their independence but for the same principles as the British Empire, namely, the preservation of western democracy, and also acting as a shield to Scandinavia against Bolshevik aggression. If the published war aims of the Allies represent the truth, it seems to them impracticable for two of them—the recreation of a Polish state, and cessation of aggression—to be accomplished unless Russia, as well as Germany, is brought to her senses.

At the present time, the entire life of the country is being dislocated by incessant air-raids, and as the few fighting aeroplanes available are fully occupied on the front, the Finns are not in a position to defend their open towns. Their most urgent need is aeroplanes and anti-aircraft guns, and although they deeply appreciate the substantial help which has been promised from Great Britain and France, the planes of which the Finns stand in such urgent need do not appear to be arriving in any appreciable quantity.

Finland is a small and poor country and is making the most superb stand against heavy odds, but although Mr. Brown, of Upper Tooting, can at present open his newspaper each morning and say with satisfaction: "Splendid, the Finns have defeated the Russians again", the unpalatable fact remains that unless large supplies of planes and other munitions of war are available in the immediate future, there is little hope that the Finns will be able to last the summer.

While quite realising that our own needs must come first, surely with the present relatively quiet state of affairs on the western front it should not be difficult to supply the comparatively small Finnish needs without in any way endangering our position.

Another point: Great Britain wonders why

the neutral states do not rally to her side in her crusade against aggression. One answer to this question is that these states are not sure what aid they could depend on from the Allies, and there is no doubt that our country will be judged by them to a great extent by the amount of concrete aid given to the only small country which so far has had the courage to take up arms for the same principles as the Allies. The question is, can the Allies even for their own sakes allow the heroic nation to be over-run by the Russians? If not, aeroplanes must arrive within the next few weeks.

Yours faithfully,

R. C. ELLIOTT.

Nyköping, Sweden.

22nd January, 1940.

### BRITISH AND DOMINION TONNAGE.

SIR,

In your News-Letter Supplement 182, under the heading *Losses at Sea*, you compare the losses of 117 British ships of 421,404 tons with a total of British and Dominion tonnage of 21,000,000.

The use of such a basis of comparison can only mislead. Similar comparisons misled the Government Departments themselves during the last War, and it was not until the end of the year 1916 that the critical loss of carrying power of our Mercantile Marine was brought home to them, when it was almost too late.

The figure of 21 million gross tons which is commonly quoted as being the strength at the outbreak of War of the British Merchant Navy is that of the total tonnage of ships of 100 tons gross and upwards, including those on the U.K. register and on all Dominion and Colonial registers. It includes as regards, the U.K. register, a mass of small craft—tugs, salvage craft, pilot boats, ferry boats, pleasure steamers, dredgers, hoppers, etc., and as regards registers in other parts of the Empire it includes similar small craft, and tonnage habitually engaged in the coastal trades of India, Australia, New Zealand and on the Canadian Great Lakes. The utilisation of such a basis of comparison

with the extent of losses due to enemy action serves no useful purpose.

In the calculations it has from time to time made of the availability of tonnage under the British flag for the conduct of the overseas carrying trade of the nation, the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association has taken as the relevant criterion the ships on the U.K. register of 2,000 tons gross and upwards. Broadly speaking that criterion is accurate in relation to overseas carriage outside home trade limits, i.e., excluding the short sea trades with the Continent. It is true that it errs on the side of caution inasmuch as ships of between, say, 1,500 and 2,000 tons gross are employed in the trade between the U.K. and the countries bordering the Mediterranean, but these are comparatively few in number and do not impair the broad accuracy of the statement that for the purpose of the calculation in question, 2,000 tons gross is the proper starting point.

On that basis the material figures, on the latest information available to the Association, i.e., as at 30th November, are as follows:

As at 1st September, 1939, the ships of 2,000 tons gross and upwards on the U.K. register totalled 2,475 in number and 15,822,000 tons in gross tonnage.

From those totals have to be deducted losses by war and marine perils since 1st September, viz:

|            |             |                    |
|------------|-------------|--------------------|
| War losses | 51 ships of | 281,000 tons gross |
| Marine "   | 8 " "       | 47,000 " "         |

|                        |           |                |
|------------------------|-----------|----------------|
| A total of             | 59 " "    | 328,000 " "    |
| Leaving a net total of | 2,416 " " | 15,494,000 " " |

News-Letter Figures.—Increase for the week 315.

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These totals are, however, subject to deduction of:

(a) Those few very large passenger ships which are useless for trading purposes in wartime and which are in fact laid up;

(b) that much larger number of ships which have been requisitioned for non-trading purposes, e.g., as war auxiliaries, transports, hospital and supply ships.

And to addition of:

(a) Enemy ships captured since the outbreak of war of 2,000 tons gross and upwards and being used by us for trading purposes;

(b) Dominion and Colonial registered ships of 2,000 tons gross and upwards trading or available to trade with the U.K.

(c) Ships brought into commission since 1st September, 1939.

The final result, making allowance for the items mentioned in the preceding paragraph, approximates to a total of 15½-16½ million gross tons comprising 2,500/2,700 ships; compared with the conception of a total of 21 million gross tons comprising 8,977 ships.

Yours faithfully,

ALFRED BOOTH,

Chairman of the Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association

Cunard Building, Liverpool, 3.  
 1st January, 1940.

## EVACUATION

We have received a large number of letters on this question from members who tell us a different and far nicer story about Evacuation than that described by Miss Janet D. Early in the letter we published on 12th January.

THE EDITOR.

## POST FREE IN EACH CASE

FOLDERS, Limp black "Rexine" to hold 26 Letters and Supplements, 3/6 post free (4/6 overseas).

BOUND VOLUMES: Letters and Supplements: Vols. I (1-26), II (27-52), III (53-78), IV (79-104), V (105-129), VI (130-155), VII (156-181) 6/- each, post free.

BANKERS' ORDER Forms are available on request.

PSF Hall  
1

Memo from Sec Hull to President of Feb 17, 1940

Encloses original letter dated January 15, 1940  
addressed to you by His Majesty, King Haakon VII of  
Norway together with draft of reply.

See:Norway-Drawer 4-1940

PSF

H. Hill  
↓

March 5, 1940.

Conf Memo to "Naval Person" (American Embassy-London)

From the President

Attached is memo to President from Adolph Berle-March 5, 1940  
Re: President's message to Naval Person

See: Berle---Drawer 1-1940

*Watson memo attached -*

BSF Hall

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

(let cabinet  
Mar 8 1940)

The  
Personal

I feel that by  
close watching, the  
trade agreement measure  
is <sup>now</sup> fairly safe —  
Cott

*file  
Confidential*

*RSF Skell*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

Several days ago you asked Mr. Long to have the Department furnish figures which would indicate the number of persons in Europe who are or who might in the future be destitute or in need of food because of the war - east of the Rhine and west of the Rhine.

Proposed legislation now pending in the House of Representatives provides for an appropriation of from ten million to twenty million dollars for relief in Poland.

There is also pending in Congress a bill to send aid to the people in Czechoslovakia. In addition to Czechoslovakia there are hundreds of thousands of needy persons in various countries of Europe.

It has been difficult to tabulate exact figures. But there is attached a statement showing by countries the present needy and the possible future needy,

Summary of relief costs during the World War. geographically

The President,  
The White House.


geographically divided east of the Rhine, west of the Rhine, and the Near East.

Of course you will understand that these are not exact figures but are estimates based on the best information which we have.

These figures are for confidential information and use. Publication of them or even the use of them in letters which might find their way to the public would seem to be inadvisable.

There is also attached a summary of the cost of relief during the last war and during the reconstruction period which followed. I have enclosed this with the thought that it might afford a good basis for estimating the cost to the American Government of proceeding with a policy to feed the stricken people of the war area.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

Enclosures:

Estimate of war-relief needs;  
Summary of relief costs during  
the World War.

March 7, 1940.

The attached table presents estimates (1) of the number of persons at present in need of relief in Europe and the Near East because of war conditions and (2) of the number of such persons who may be in need of relief from sources outside their respective countries before or at the end of the present European conflict. The estimates have been prepared for use in considering the question of the extension of aid by the Government of the United States to the population of Poland which is now before the Congress in the form of several different bills. It is submitted in that connection that this Government should, in deciding to send relief to hungry and destitute people in one case, contemplate the adoption of the practice irrespective of the locality, race or religion of people in other cases who may subsequently stand in need of relief as a result of war.

The estimates given under (1) in the table are <sup>partially</sup> derived from factual material.

Under (2) the figures given are believed to be the maximum for each country. The total for the countries east and west of the Rhine is 167,100,000. It is hardly conceivable, however, that it should so transpire that all the countries listed would have such enormous relief problems as those indicated before or at the end of hostilities since some of them may not become theaters of the war, and since the victors are likely to fare somewhat better than the vanquished and the smaller Powers which may fall a victim to one or other of the larger belligerents. Many determining factors, including weather conditions, methods

of

of warfare employed, amount of consideration shown for the civilian populations, extent of areas included in military operations, internal revolutions, vagaries of dictators, and so forth, cannot be fully evaluated in advance. The figures set forth, therefore, should not be regarded as reliable bases for relief planning.

By "persons in need of relief from sources outside their respective countries" is meant those living in a country unable from its own resources to satisfy their elementary needs for food, clothing and shelter and not in a position, because of lack of purchasing power, to obtain the wherewithal for supplying such needs by making purchases in other countries.

The attached table is, of course, of an extremely confidential nature. Its publication not only would embarrass this Government in its relations with various European countries, but might give rise to criticism in this country, against which, in view of the necessarily conjectural nature of the figures given, there might be difficulty of defense.

A second table is attached as of possible interest, showing the amount and value of food and relief supplies delivered to the European countries during the World War and Reconstruction Period as taken from a book describing the operations of the organizations under the direction of Mr. Hoover from 1914 to 1924

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

March 7, 1940.

ESTIMATE OF WAR-RELIEF NEEDS

-----

| <u>East of the Rhine</u>            | <u>Present<br/>Needy</u> | <u>Possible<br/>Future Needy</u> |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Albania                             |                          | 100,000                          |
| Bulgaria                            |                          | 2,000,000                        |
| Czechoslovakia                      |                          | 5,000,000                        |
| Denmark                             |                          | 1,500,000                        |
| Estonia                             |                          | 400,000                          |
| Finland                             | 600,000                  | 2,000,000                        |
| Germany                             |                          | 20,000,000                       |
| Greece                              |                          | 2,000,000                        |
| Hungary                             | 50,000(1)                | 4,500,000                        |
| Italy                               |                          | 15,000,000                       |
| Latvia                              | 10,000(1)                | 1,000,000                        |
| Lithuania                           | 100,000(1)               | 700,000                          |
| Norway                              | 6,000(2)                 | 1,200,000                        |
| Poland (and Free City<br>of Danzig) | 7,000,000                | 16,700,000                       |
| Rumania                             | 25,000(1)                | 6,000,000                        |
| Russia, European                    |                          | 43,000,000                       |
| Sweden                              | 10,000(2)                | 2,500,000                        |
| Switzerland                         |                          | 1,500,000                        |
| Yugoslavia                          | 1,000(1)                 | 5,000,000                        |
| Totals                              | 7,802,000                | 130,100,000                      |

(1) Polish refugees  
(2) Finnish refugees

West of the Rhine

|               |              |            |
|---------------|--------------|------------|
| Belgium       |              | 6,000,000  |
| France        | 1,000,000(3) | 10,000,000 |
| Great Britain |              | 10,000,000 |
| Netherlands   |              | 5,000,000  |
| Portugal      |              | --         |
| Spain         | 2,500,000    | 6,000,000  |
| Totals        | 3,500,000    | 37,000,000 |

(3) French evacuees

Near East

|                       |  |            |
|-----------------------|--|------------|
| Egypt                 |  | 3,000,000  |
| Iran                  |  | 3,000,000  |
| Iraq                  |  | 750,000    |
| Palestine             |  | 350,000    |
| Syria and the Lebanon |  | 750,000    |
| Turkey                |  | 3,500,000  |
| Totals                |  | 11,350,000 |

GRAND TOTALS 11,302,000 178,450,000

Summary of Food and Relief Supplies Delivered

During the World War and Reconstruction Period

(1914 - 1924)

-----oOo-----

East of the Rhine:

|   | <u>Total Tons</u>   | <u>Total Value</u>         |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------|
| Albania                                   | - -                 | - -                        |
| Bulgaria                                  | 22,862.4            | \$ 4,866,647.53            |
| Czechoslovakia                            | 545,134.6           | 115,438,351.98             |
| Denmark                                   | 19,912.0            | 2,147,059.30               |
| Estonia                                   | 67,358.5            | 21,017,263.56              |
| Finland                                   | 188,520.9           | 30,282,047.90              |
| Germany                                   | 1,272,934.1         | 294,373,692.75             |
| Greece                                    | 20,374.0            | 1,211,949.95               |
| Hungary                                   | 21,393.5            | 4,607,139.37               |
| Italy                                     | 7,479,780.7         | 799,608,264.01             |
| Latvia                                    | 26,366.6            | 7,550,021.69               |
| Lithuania                                 | 12,877.7            | 5,980,781.39               |
| Norway                                    | - -                 | - -                        |
| Poland (including Free<br>City of Danzig) | 751,135.6           | 200,864,857.73             |
|   | 573.2               | 127,700.69                 |
| Rumania                                   | 229,202.8           | 53,637,311.31              |
| Russia, European                          | 768,119.9           | 76,230,318.49              |
| Sweden                                    | - -                 | - -                        |
| Switzerland                               | - -                 | - -                        |
| Yugoslavia                                | 127,359.0           | 45,698,651.43              |
| Totals:                                   | <u>11,553,905.5</u> | <u>\$ 1,655,832,059.08</u> |

West of the Rhine:

|                     |                     |                            |
|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|
| Belgium             | 4,198,855.3         | \$ 697,140,348.91          |
| France              | 8,425,699.7         | 1,289,488,622.47           |
| Great Britain       | 8,652,668.6         | 1,386,102,780.05           |
| Netherlands         | 25,027.4            | 4,219,498.41               |
| Portugal            | - -                 | - -                        |
| Spain               | - -                 | - -                        |
| Totals:             | <u>21,302,252.0</u> | <u>\$ 3,376,951,249.84</u> |
| <u>Grand total:</u> | <u>32,856,157.5</u> | <u>\$ 5,042,783,308.92</u> |

Note: These statistics are taken from the book, "American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period", (Pages 274-275) by Surface and Bland (Stanford University Press) describing the "Operations of the Organizations under the direction of Herbert Hoover 1914 to 1924."

PSF *X Hull*

March 12, 1940

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM SECRETARY HULL

Outlines terms of the Peace Treaty between Finland  
and the Soviets.

See: Finland-Drawer 4-1940

75F Null  
1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 15, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This is for your eyes  
only. As it is in secret code  
please read and return. I will  
let you see the rest as soon as  
it comes in.

F. D. R.

Enclosure  
A Secret Message from Navy Dept

TELEGRAM

The White House  
Washington

*file  
personal  
Hull*

15WU. RA. 24- 4:25 p.m

DeLand, Florida, March 16, 1940

THE PRESIDENT.

So sorry you are ill. I am paying the penalty now for getting  
up too soon, so do be careful. Love and best wishes,

Frances Hull.

*DSF  
Hull*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1940.

*File PSF  
Personal  
Hull*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CRIM:

Dear Crim:

Will you please give this  
to the President sometime this morning.

*E. M. W.*  
E.M.W.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3-16-40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Secretary Hull 'phoned and said he would like to see the President some-time today if the President was feeling like talking to him, but not otherwise. I explained to the Secretary that I would deliver this message to you.

*EMW-*  
E. M. W.

PSF Hull  
1

March 25, 1940.

Memo to the President from Cordell Hull

Re: returning letter of Secretary Morgenthau  
relative to reconstruction survey of Finland.

See: Morgenthau-Drawer 1-1940

April 4, 1940.

*Hull*  
PSF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SUMNER WELLES:

Encloses two drafts of telegrams to Minister Gunther in Rumania for the Presidents approval re Colonel Beck proceeding to U. S. at this time etc. Attached is copy of Sec Hulls' telegram to Gunther of April 1, 1940 re President's desire to have conversation with Col. Joseph Beck--suggests he take matter up with King Carol etc.

Attached is Gunthers reply of April 3, 1940 re having seen Foreign Minister Gafencu and his discussion about Beck leaving the country; also attached is Welles letter of April 15, 1940 with copy of memo from Murphy, Charge d'Affaires at Paris Embassy dated March 21, 1940 reporting conversation re Beck's activities etc.

See: State Dept-Drawer 1-1940(April 15, 1940 letter)

Hull

For the President's memo of April 8, 1940  
to Secretary Hull re subject of having Embassy  
in Lisbon, Portugal and asking him what he  
thinks and for reply from Sumner Welles of April 11, 1940 in  
answer to the memo of April 8th.

See: State Dept-Drawer 1-1940 (April 11, 1940 letter)

BSF  
Hull  
1

April 17, 1940.

Dear Mr. Secretary:-

I, too, had heard of the speech made by Mr. Norem, American Minister to Lithuania. He is, as I understand it, a Minister of the Lutheran Church. There seems to be no doubt that his speech was violently anti-Semitic.

In view of his apparent failure to follow the instructions of the State Department, I suggest the following procedure:

- (1) That you confer with Senator Shipstead and Senator Murray, who were his original sponsors, explaining the situation to them, and tell them that you see nothing for it but to ask for his immediate resignation as Minister to Lithuania.
- (2) Send to Mr. Norem a direct request for his immediate resignation on the ground of the speech and on the further ground that he failed to carry out the instructions of the Department.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 16. 1940

My dear Mr. President:

It is my duty to lay before you what I consider a serious dereliction on the part of Mr. Owen J. C. Norem, American Minister to Lithuania.

As you were advised by Senator Wheeler, Mr. Norem made an address in Minneapolis while he was in the United States on leave which was criticized by former Governor Benson and several other credible and responsible witnesses as being violently anti-Semitic. In addition to the communication from Senator Wheeler the Department was advised by Representative Bloom that he had heard from Rabbi Wise and several others highly critical comment about Mr. Norem's address.

Mr. Norem was summoned to the Department where he prepared from memory a statement of the remarks he had made which were considerably at variance with the statements made by those who heard his remarks.

At the request of Representative Bloom Mr. Norem

was


The President,  
The White House.

was instructed to call upon the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House and to discuss the matter with him. Mr. Norem left Washington without calling upon Representative Bloom. Subsequently he was reached at his hotel in New York and instructed to call Congressman Bloom on the telephone before he sailed. He demurred and said that he had discussed the matter with Senator Shipstead and Senator Murray and that the latter had advised him not to talk to Congressman Bloom. Being again instructed to do so he gave the impression over the telephone of a reluctance to comply with the instruction but did not decline to do so. However, he sailed from New York Saturday, April 6, without having communicated with Mr. Bloom in contravention of the instructions of the Department.

All the circumstances of the case constitute a flagrant violation of the Department's standing instructions and of the Department's specific instructions and are of such gravity that I feel it proper to bring the matter to your attention.

You may remember that Mr. Norem was appointed Minister on the recommendation of Senator Murray of Montana and that Senator Wheeler protested at the time against his appointment.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

PSF Hand  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please find out just  
what the State Department did  
about this on its receipt.

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Antwerp,  
dated May 8, 1940, in re  
professional bicycle team  
Kilian Vopel, which is par-  
ticipating in races in the  
U. S., may be engaged in  
espionage activities for  
Germany.

CLASSIFIED BY 60320  
DATE 10/10/88  
BY SP-5 JWS/STW  
126  
MAY 30 1940  
WASHINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

*file  
confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

---

THE SECRETARY

May 11, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have checked into the disposition of the attached telegram from Antwerp and find that, in accordance with the present arrangement, the information contained in it was forwarded yesterday to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The information contained in the written despatch, mentioned in the telegram, will be forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as soon as it is received.

*CH*

MAY 17 1940

THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (br)

Antwerp

Dated May 8, 1940

Rec'd 1:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

39, May 8, 4 p.m.

Have obtained information from reliable sources that the German professional bicycle team Kilian Vopel, which is now participating in races in the United States, may be engaged in espionage activities for Germany. Recommend investigation. Their address is given as care of Alphonse Tordo, 344 West 48th Street, New York City, and their manager is Harry Mendel, 125 Market Street, Newark, New Jersey. Their former manager was recently convicted of espionage and given a seven-year sentence by a Belgian military court at Ghent. See my despatch No. 456 of May 6, 1940.

SUSSDORFF

LMS

PSF Hull  
1

Memo from FDR to Secretary Hull---May 24, 1940

To prepare reply to attached letter from Myron C. Taylor, Rome, 4/26/40 to the President, with attached Note Verbale, dated 4/26/40, handed to Mr. Taylor by the Cardinal Secretary of State, regarding the unsuccessful efforts that the Holy See has been making to send relief to Poland. Memo from Hull of June 18, attached.

See:Italy folder-Drawer 4-1940



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

JUN 5 - 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference is made to your suggestion, communicated by General Watson to Mr. Summerlin, that a letter of introduction be issued to Major General John F. O'Ryan, who is proceeding soon on a trip to Japan.

Following his call on you, General O'Ryan called here, said that he had given you a general idea as to his trip and explained that he had not gone into the details with you. He then gave us a more complete account of the pertinent facts, of which the following is a summary:

General O'Ryan has entered into an agreement with Eastman Dillon and Company of New York and the Japanese Economic Federation whereunder he is to be paid \$15,000.00 and expenses to go to Japan to make a study of economic and financial conditions, especially as they pertain to relations with the United States. The Japanese Economic Federation is connected with the Japanese Government. In the recent past a number of American citizens who have been approached by the Japanese along similar lines have decided against becoming involved in projects conceived by the Japanese in furtherance of a  
general

*file  
president*

*PSF: Hull*

- 2 -

general objective of enlisting American nationals in procedures contributory to propagandizing, knowingly or unknowingly, in Japan's favor in the United States and elsewhere.

In the present instance, we understand that the study is to be made within a period of approximately three months.

The fact that General O'Ryan has undertaken to make this study in the employ of and for the Japanese Economic Federation raises the question whether General O'Ryan must register as an agent of a foreign principal and of foreign governments under the act approved June 8, 1938, or whether he should file a notification as an agent of a foreign government under the Espionage Act, approved June 15, 1917. General O'Ryan is furnishing us with a statement on the basis of which this question can be definitively considered.

In as much as I feel that you would wish to be informed in regard to certain of the facts and circumstances set forth above which may not have been brought to your attention, I am venturing to send you this memorandum.

Under the circumstances, I suggest that I write Mr. Grew directly and inform him of General O'Ryan's forthcoming visit to Japan and of the circumstances relating thereto.

In

- 3 -

In so doing I would expect to tell Mr. Grew that while we would not desire that he give official cognizance to General O'Ryan's mission we should appreciate it if he would do what he appropriately could toward making General O'Ryan's stay in Japan pleasant and instructive. Unless I hear from you that you wish otherwise, I contemplate proceeding accordingly.

CH-

PSF: H 11  
Kull,  
State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR REPORT

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Ambassador Bullitt in re Italian Government transshipping to the German Government an average of 175,000 tons of oil products per month and asking, in view of Mussolini's announcement that he was about to make war on France and England, whether it would be possible for this Government to call off all supplies to Italy of oil and petroleum products.

PSF  
Hull

June 13, 1940

MEMO TO CORDELL HULL FROM FDR

Re: enclosed disatch from Johnson in Chungking in  
re Japanese planes bombing Chungking---attached  
is Hull's reply of June 13, and copy of statement  
to Press of same date. (Dispatch from Johnson kept  
by State)

See:China-Drawer 4-1940

BF  
Hull  
1

Memo to Welles from FDR--June 14, 1940

Re enclosed dispatch from Amb Bowers of June 11, 1940 re request from Azana, the Spanish Premier and President who is ill in France and wants permission to cross in American ship with Mexico as destination. Reply from Welles of June 15, 1940 with copies of telegrams from Hull to Bowers and Bullitt re same subject.

See:Chile-Drawer 4-1940 (June 14, 1940 letter)

PSF Hull  
1

Letter from Cordell Hull to FDR-June 14, 1940

Attaches memorandum as possible assistance to President in replying to attached letter of Mackenzie King of May 1, 1940--memo contains principal points raised by MacKenzie King and Hull's comments.

See:Canada-Drawer 4-1940

PSF Hull

FDR memo to Hull and Welles-----June 17, 1940

Re their reading the enclosed letter to FDR from Herbert Pell in re possibility of Spanish or Italian troops entering Portugal to prevent the landing of British reinforcements for the protection of Gibraltar and a demand for the use of the Azores. Hull's reply of June 18, 1940 attached.

See: State Dept folder-Drawer 1-1940 for corres

PSF

Hull  
1

Letter To FDR from Cordell Hull of June 18, 1940

re; Taylors' letter and note verbale from Vatican

See: May 24, 1940 cross ref-this folder

RF Hull

Letter to FDR from Hull ----July 5, 1940. enclosing preparation of reply for Pres signature to Ickes in reply to his letter to FDR of June 28, 1940 re advisability of pressing for legislation immediately that would give the Administration full discretion as to the supplies and munitions of war that may be sold to England. The President's reply is dated July 6, 1940 but was not sent out until July 11th.

See:Ickes-Drawer 1-1940

PSF 8/11/40  
1

July 9, 1940.

Memo from Hull to FDR attaching three memoranda relating to his conversation with British Ambassador on July 5,, 1940.

Subject:SITUATION OF BRITISH IN VIEW OF COLLAPSE OF FRENCH

See:Great Britain-Drawer 4-1940 (July 9th memo)

PSF 2/11/40

FDR memo to Hull dated July 11, 1940 enclosing a copy  
of King George's letter to him of June 22, 1940 for his  
information.

See: King and Queen folder--drawer 4-1940

(Come to file - Aug 16, 1940)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I herewith attach proposed statement by you relative to the Stephen Early publicity on the Monroe Doctrine.

CH

*File  
Planned  
Null  
PSF*

RECORDED  
INDEXED  
LHE  
DEPT.

White House Statement

There has been such universal misinterpretation and confusion with respect to the publication growing out of the purported conversation with a White House Secretary, Mr. Stephen Early, on July 6, 1940, in relation to the Monroe Doctrine and its supposed meaning and application, that the White House feels constrained to disclaim any purpose or intention that the President should be quoted at that time on this subject in a way which would suggest the slightest difference or departure from the statement on the Monroe Doctrine, its interpretation and application, as contained in the public statement by Secretary of State Hull on July 5, 1940, after the full knowledge and approval of the President.

In view both of the widespread misinterpretation of the publicity of July 6 and of its misconstruction as evidenced by different meanings set forth in different newspapers, the President desires to and does hereby withdraw in its entirety the statements attributed by the press to Mr. Early on the Monroe Doctrine on July 6, 1940. This leaves the Government of the United States basing its only recent utterance on the Monroe Doctrine solely on the statement which Secretary Hull made public with the knowledge and approval of the President, on July 5, 1940.

PSF *Shull*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
August 28, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

If you approve, will you send the following message to Ambassador Kennedy:

"The destroyer and base matter was handled in part through you and in part through Lothian but the situation developed into a mapping proposition where the Army and Navy are in constant consultation with me here and the daily developments have had to be explained verbally to Lothian.

There is no thought of embarrassing you and only a practical necessity for personal conversations makes it easier to handle details here.

I should be glad to have you explain to former Naval person that I am totally precluded from giving away any Government vessels or equipment and that latest plan covers both angles, British and American.

*For original of this  
See: Navy - Drawer 1-1940 (correspondence  
on destroyers)*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

It is essentially that two of seven bases be donated by free will and accord of Great Britain and that other five bases be transferred by Britain in consideration of simultaneous transfer by us of fifty destroyers.

Don't forget that you are not only not a dummy but are essential to all of us both in the Government and in the Nation.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

COPY

PS: F Hull

August 31, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach:

- (1) Copy of the note to be signed by Lord Lothian;
  - (2) Copy of my reply;
  - (3) A rough draft of a message to Congress (identical communications to be sent to both Houses);
- and
- (4) Copy of the aide-memoire which I handed to Lord Lothian on August 29 and of the Embassy's reply.

As we agreed yesterday, the exchange of notes regarding the bases will be signed on Monday.

Hull

(In longhand the following was added)

There is agreement, but delay until Monday about Fleet matter (Par. 4)

For the original of this memo with  
copies  
See: - Navy - drawer 1 - 1940 (Cores on destroyers)

FSF 9/13/40

Memo from Cordell Hull to FDR-Sept 13, 1940

Attaches memo of his conversation with Henry Hays  
in belief FDR will want to read before he sees  
Amb Hays when he makes his formal call.

See:France folder-Drawer 4-1940

PSF: Hall

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 19, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am getting rather fed up with the continuing German demand that we close American Consulates General. This one about Prague is an unwarranted act, and the only thing the Germans understand is a reply in kind.

I think you might consider, therefore, that we send word to Germany that the closing of the Prague Consulate General is not understood by us, as Prague is an important center of trade, and that we, therefore, see no reason why vis-a-vis Prague, we should not ask for the immediate closing of the German Consulate General in Chicago.

F. D. R.

PSF:Hull

Hull  
1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please read this correspondence.  
What do you think of my sending Bill  
Phillips the enclosed letter?

The problem is that if Bill  
resigns now or in November or  
December, we will have to leave  
the Embassy in Rome open because  
it cannot be filled unless we  
recognize the King of Italy as  
Emperor of Ethiopia, etc. There-  
fore, I hesitate to have Bill  
resign. Can we give him some  
light work that will justify his  
remaining in this country?

F. D. R.

For original of this memo with answer from Hull  
and FDR's letter to Phillips of Sept 24th, Welles  
letter to STE of Sept 18, 1940 and letter from  
Phillips sister, Mrs. Andrew J. Peters.  
See:Italy folder-Drawer 4-1940

PSF 9/24/40

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you speak to me  
about this?

F. D. R.

C O P Y

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Sept. 21, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter of the British Ambassador to me, dated September 19, 1940, is self-explanatory. You will observe that the Ambassador is harking back to earlier conversations which sound more like Col. Stimson talking than the Ambassador (who by the way has had a recent conversation with Col. Stimson on this subject, as per our suggestion).

I think it important that the Ambassador be again disillusioned with respect to any definite, much less binding, commitments in connection with these two or three items which he mentions. I recently said to him over the telephone that the question of any special terms in regard to the purchase and transfer of these items, so far as I knew or could ascertain, is solely one of what you may see fit on your own voluntary initiative to do.

C. H.

PSF Hall  
1

September 25, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your request of September 16,  
I enclose a draft of a possible reply to the communica-  
tion which you have received from Pope Pius XII, which  
is returned herewith.

Faithfully yours,

Gardell Hall

Enclosure:

1. Draft.
2. Communication from  
Pope Pius XII.

The President,  
The White House.

For original of letter & the one from Pope Pius XII  
See: Italy - drawer 4 - 1940



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

PSF; Hull  
File  
Personal  
Hull

Oct 7-1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of October 4th regarding the replacement of the Polish Ambassador, the following telegram was received from London dated September 21st: "~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

"POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER INFORMS ME POLISH GOVERNMENT IN LONDON DESIRES TO APPOINT MONSIEUR JAN CIECHANOWSKI, FORMER POLISH MINISTER IN WASHINGTON AND AT PRESENT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE POLISH FOREIGN OFFICE, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE UNITED STATES AND REQUESTS ME TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THIS APPOINTMENT WOULD BE AGREEABLE.

"MONSIEUR ZALEWSKI ADDS THAT COUNT POTOCKI IS NOT AWARE THAT IT IS PROPOSED TO REPLACE HIM."

The same day Ambassador Biddle received the following telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Government in London:

"HAVE TODAY ASKED AGREEMENT FOR CHICKEN TO REPLACE GEORGE STOP OUR GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPOINTMENT DESIRING TO ACTIVATE WORK EMBASSY AT PRESENT ALSO TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVE

WHO

WHO HAS WITNESSED EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE BE-  
GINNING OF WAR STOP WE RELY ON YOUR INTIMATE UNDER-  
STANDING OF SITUATION AND REQUEST YOUR WHOLEHEARTED  
SUPPORT IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT STOP WARMEST REGARDS  
THANKS."

The most important point in the telegram Mr. Biddle received from Foreign Secretary Zaleski is the desire of the Polish Government in London "to activate work at Embassy at present" and the great importance they attached to the new appointment for this purpose.

To our knowledge the Polish Government in London have during recent months been desirous of launching a campaign in the United States among persons of Polish origin for the following purposes:

- (1) Recruitment of a Polish legion which would have its headquarters in Canada but which might be used as part of the American armed forces "in the event of our becoming involved in the war" while preserving its Polish character.
- (2) The binding together of groups of Polish origin for the purpose of exerting pressure through political channels, particularly upon Congress or upon the appropriate American Governmental authorities.
- (3) The solicitation of funds for expenditures for Polish national propaganda.

(4) The entrance into the United States of great numbers of Polish refugees, many of whom are now in Spain, Portugal, Africa and Canada.

(5) The organization of Polish relief with funds from the United States along the lines desired by officials of the Polish Government.

This Government has taken the attitude that the carrying on of a campaign of the nature described above would not be to the interests of the United States. It is believed that agitation and propaganda work carried on a basis of nationality among any foreign group in the United States does not promote national unity, particularly when such a campaign is under the control of persons who are not American citizens and who are not primarily interested in the welfare of the United States.

The present Polish Ambassador has been aware of the attitude of this Government and has been fully cooperative. He has therefore taken no steps to facilitate the inauguration of the campaign desired, and even at times kept this Government informed of efforts being made along those lines. His failure to encourage agitation among the Poles in this country and to assist in the organization of systematic work among them by Polish officials and citizens has caused him to be subjected to criticism by some elements of

Polish

Polish groups and by members of the Polish Government. It is feared that Mr. Ciechanowski, who apparently is supported for the Ambassadorship by groups who favor the carrying on of more intense activities among the Poles in this country, would follow a policy here that would put him in opposition to the views of this Government. I would consider that it would be most unfortunate at this particular moment to permit any such situation to arise with its resultant disturbing effect on Polish thought in this country.

I therefore, after consultation with my assistants and with Ambassador Biddle who is thoroughly conversant with the situation in the present Polish Government in London and their desire to push forward the activities described above, sent for transmission to the Polish Government in London the following telegram on September 24:

~~"STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL."~~

"YOU MAY INFORM THE POLISH FOREIGN OFFICE THAT ALTHOUGH IN PRINCIPLE IT WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. CIECHANOWSKI AS POLISH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, NEVERTHELESS IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO RECEIVE A NEW POLISH AMBASSADOR AT THE PRESENT TIME."

This

-5-

This message did not of course preclude the withdrawal at any time of the present Polish Ambassador and the subsequent nomination of any successor. In my opinion however this was not the moment to make a change.

CH

October 7, 1940.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 4, 1940.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE:

I am a little horrified -- because I hear today that in regard to a request by the Polish Government for the recall of the present Polish Ambassador and the sending in his place of a new ambassador, the State Department has sent a refusal to approve the agreement.

This was not brought to my attention in any shape, manner or form and, frankly, I doubt if it was brought to your attention.

Will you be good enough to look this up and let me know what happened? I understand that the selection of the Polish Government -- John Ciechanowski, used to be ambassador here, was persona grata, speaks English perfectly and ought to be persona grata.

The main point I would like to have you check on was why this was turned down by somebody in the State Department without my knowledge.

F. D. R.

RECORDED BY 7670  
MAY 1940  
THE WHITE HOUSE

JOHN CIECHANOWSKI

C  
O  
P  
Y

(WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM)

1940 SEP 28 PM 10 02

LONDON  
NLT HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 45 EAST 65 NYC

YOUR TELEGRAM TO GENERAL SIKORSKI URGING CS APPOINTMENT WASHINGTON  
CONFIRMED OUR VIEW OF NECESSITY SUCH CHANGE OUR REPRESENTATION AND  
THE REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT WAS DULY MADE STOP REGRET TO SAY THAT HAVE  
RECEIVED MAGATIVE REPLY PRETEXTED BY GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION  
WHICH WE REGARD RATHER AS IMPORTANT REASON FOR PROPOSED CHANGE STOP  
ATTACHING GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPOINTMENT AND KNOWING YOUR STRONG  
VIEWS ON SUBJECT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD HELP TO OBTAIN AGREE-  
MENT STOP BEST GREETINGS THANKS

SIKORSKI ZALESKI

THE CARLTON

PSF  
Oct. 17<sup>th</sup> Hull

My dear Mr. President.

File

Perman

Thank you

very much for your congrat-  
ulations on the success of  
my work in restoring the  
Woodrow Wilson Birthplace.

I am very proud of my  
undertaking, as I accom-  
plished it entirely alone.

I had no organization or help  
of any kind - just my pen  
and hard work.

I am sending your kind  
note to my Committee in  
Stamton, to be the inspiration  
in my drive for funds  
there on Amistice Day -  
With warmest regards -

Sincerely yours,

Francis Hall

PSF Hull  
1

Strictly Conf memo

Oct 21, 1940

Memo from Hull to FDR 10/21/40 enclosing letter to him from Butler, Charge d'Affaires of same date with attached message from London re information that Hitler has asked Franco to meet him on the Spanish Frontier.

See: Great Britain folder-Drawer 4-1940

BT Hull

Memorandum for FDR from Cordell Hull---Oct 25, 1940

Re: attached report of Chief of Naval Intelligence, W. S. Anderson, 10/21/40 re EXPORT OF AVIATION GASOLINE TO JAPAN (Proposed 60,000 tons of gasoline)

See: Navy-Drawer 1-1940 (Oct 25th letter)

PSF: Hull

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

*Planned  
File  
2/20/40*

November 1, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach herewith the data  
which we discussed this  
morning.

CH

STATEMENTS BY WENDELL WILLKIE

September 21, 1940 - San Francisco Address

Go back for a moment to the year 1933. That was a fateful year. The leading democracies of Europe, with France lagging behind, were just beginning to recover from the world-wide depression that had shaken them to their foundations. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to world recovery was the instability of foreign exchange. And through the efforts of Mr. Hoover in 1932, followed up by Mr. Roosevelt in April, 1933, a conference had been arranged to meet in London to solve this and other problems. ...

... after his delegates had arrived in London, Mr. Roosevelt, violently and without warning, repudiated the instructions he had given them. ... to any immediate hope for stabilized

This rash decision wrecked the conference, and put an end to international exchange. It condemned France and all the gold-bloc nations to three years of deflationary pressure, ending in the collapse of their currencies. It thus weakened the structure of the democratic world and opened the way to the aggressive designs of Hitler. ...

I bring a charge against the New Deal which I have measured carefully. I charge that this Administration has contributed to the downfall of European democracy. I charge that it must bear a direct share of the responsibility for the present war. ... [Quotes statement by Churchill in 1937.]

If ... Germany is victorious, the United States will be left alone to face a hostile totalitarian world.

The loneliness of the United States is a direct result of the foreign policies of the last eight years. If Britain falls we are utterly and savagely alone. No nation on earth, except Britain, owes us anything but disillusionment and ill will.

We must--we desperately must--rid ourselves of the fallacy that democracy can be defended with words, with poses, with political paraphernalia designed to impress the American people and no one else.

We must send, and we must keep sending, aid to Britain, our first line of defense and our only remaining friend. We must aid her to the limit of prudence and effectiveness, as determined by impartial experts in this field.

In the Pacific our best ends will be served by a free, strong and democratically progressive China, and we should render China economic assistance to that end. In addition I favor exploring the acquisition and development of Pacific air bases for the protection of our interest in that ocean.

I favor the building of a defense system adequate to protect our soil from aggression from any quarter--a defense system so strong that none will ever dare to strike.

October 2, 1940 - Cleveland Address

A few days ago there was announced in Berlin a pact between three nations--the three most aggressive nations on earth--Germany, Italy and Japan.

It is a commonly accepted fact that alliance is aimed at the United States. ...

It is clear enough, I believe, that Germany, Italy and Japan are thinking of the United States in terms of war, in terms of our participation in some bloody conflict of the future. Either

they

they have aggressive designs against us or else they suspect us of having aggressive designs against them.

I am shocked by this fact, and I know that you people are. The American people do not want war. They have no idea whatever of joining in any conflict, whether on the Atlantic or the Pacific. They are determined to keep America at peace.

In this determination I stand with them. I am for keeping out of war. I am for peace for America.

And I want to ask this question: Where are we? How did we get into this position? What have we done, overtly or secretly, to cause the most ruthless States in the world to make this aggressive declaration? ...

For my part I have little confidence that the policy of the last seven and a half years has been the policy best calculated to promote peace.

I have still less confidence that the policy at the present time is calculated to preserve peace. And I have no confidence at all in the ability of the present Administration to protect our peace with an adequate defense system. ...

I say that the first plank of our foreign policy is a defense system. I'll even go further than that. Until we get a defense system we cannot have a foreign policy that means anything at all. ...

We talked the nations into holding a conference at Munich in 1938--as the American White Paper says, "Mussolini's anguished pressure, seconded by the President's appeal, had been effective." The Administration was very proud of the results of that conference. The then Secretary of War made a speech in which he declared that "the cool mind, the skilled fingers of one man"--meaning Mr. Roosevelt--had resolved the war crisis.

Yet every one knows how that crisis was really resolved. Not only was Czecho-Slovakia sacrificed to Hitler, but Europe was at war within a year.

The fact is, that in the eyes of ruthless foreign States we are neither a strong nation nor a great nation. Nothing we have to say is of any consequence to them. Because they see how ineffective we have become. Our vast strength has not been brought forth. It is still "on order." ...

It is claimed on behalf of this Administration that it saw more clearly than any one else what the course of events was to be. But if it saw it all so clearly, why are we in this terrible plight?

In 1933 Adolf Hitler rose to power. That was also the year that the New Deal took office. But 1933 was the year when the New Deal crushed the London Economic Conference, thereby destroying the last hope of financial stability for the democratic world.

And in 1937, when the democracies had succeeded in recovering somewhat from world-wide depression and instability, the New Deal launched an attack against commodity prices, against American business and against the Supreme Court.

The result was a violent depression in this country at the exact time when our prosperity might have strengthened the other democracies and enabled them to resist the advance of Hitler.

The New Dealers could see Hitler advancing. What steps did they take to protect us?

In 1929, when there was no Adolf Hitler and Europe was at peace, 21 per cent of total government expenses were for defense. But in 1936, when Hitler was rising to power, we spent only 9 per cent of our money on defense--the lowest percentage in modern history.

In 1938, the year of Munich, we spent only 14 per cent on defense. In 1939, the year of the outbreak of war, we spent only minus 15 per cent.

On the basis of the information that he gets from the State Department and the Army and Navy the present third-term candidate was able to predict the war a year ago last June, four months before it started. But three months later, in August, he had done nothing about it. ...

The reason that we are unprepared is because the present Administration has played politics with preparedness. It has played politics with our safety. ...

Until I had built up the strength of America, I would refrain from inviting aggressive pacts against the American people.

I would continue my efforts to aid the heroic British people--the only people in the world today who are fighting with their lives for liberty. I would aid Britain even if it meant the sacrifice of some speed in building up our own air fleet. I would do so because the longer Britain holds out, the more time we have in which to prepare ourselves.

I favor, finally, taking intelligent steps to coordinate our defense program with that of Canada. And I favor economic cooperation with our neighbors in the south--not with New Deal schemes but on the basis of expanding private enterprise. I favor giving those neighbors every incentive to rid themselves of the German fifth column, which is active in many of them.

We must hurry with these things. The time is short, and the life we have to defend is exceedingly precious. And until we have them--the things and the policies to fight with--we must pause.

#### October 4, 1940 - Philadelphia Address

For I see ahead of us a grim task--the task of arming our democracy so fully and so rapidly that the aggressors will not dare to strike. ...

The fact is that the New Deal has known for many years that we were faced with this problem. The third-term candidate told Congress in January, 1936, that America must save itself from foreign quarrels and foreign attack through adequate defense.

Today is Oct. 4, 1940--nearly five years later. All the democracies on the Continent of Europe have collapsed. Britain fights with her back to the wall. Three ruthless aggressors have banded together in a pact aimed at the United States. Attack is closer than ever. America is still unsafe.

Our defense is still inadequate. Compared with the rest of the world, it is far less adequate than it was in 1936. ...

The New Deal has not lacked information. Through the State Department and the Army and Navy its total knowledge regarding foreign powers and military developments has been as good as any in the world.

The New Deal has not lacked money. In those five years it has spent a total of forty-three billion dollars.

What then has it lacked? It has lacked the ability to get things done.

It has lacked a fundamental understanding of the forces of production.

It has lacked a fundamental regard for the forces that make democracy strong. ...

So long as money and political power remain its only remedies, this Administration will be incompetent to achieve defense. ...

The results of incompetence are written large upon the history of the last few years. Incompetence invites bold action on the part of other powers. The longer the United States remains incompetent to defend itself, the closer are we drawn toward war.

We must stop that drift toward war. We must stop that incompetence.

Fellow-Americans, I want to lead the fight for peace.

I know how to lead that fight; I will lead this nation back to work.

The first step toward peace is to put a job in every home.

The second step toward peace is to mobilize American industry for the production of armaments. This would be the greatest industrial undertaking in the history of the world.

#### October 11, 1940 - Boston Address

All around us the world is at war. All around us a hostile system of government has grown up. The three most powerful states have made an alliance against us.

The next administration will bear the awful responsibility of keeping us at peace.

And we can have peace. But we must know how to preserve it.

To begin with, we shall not undertake to fight anybody else's war. Our boys shall stay out of European wars.

But by the same token we will appease no one. We stand for our democratic institutions and we stand ready to defend them with our lives, if necessary.

How, then, shall we stay out of war and avoid appeasement?

There is only one way. We must become strong. We must build ourselves an air force, a navy, an army so strong that no dictator will dare to tamper with our commerce, our interests or our rights. ...

The President has been making speeches about the necessity for defense. And yet he cut more than half a billion dollars from the War Department's request in 1939.

He did this when the very calamity he warned against was happening.

He seriously thereby delayed the defense program. He delayed the procurement of tools, clothing and even essential medical supplies. Work on five coast defense batteries had to be abandoned. Work on government arsenals, looking two years ahead, was prevented.

Our marines were deprived of important items of equipment.

A request for ammunition--one of our greatest deficiencies--was cut down. The Air Pilot Training Program was cut. The construction of a vital new drydock had to be put off.

The American people want those things, and they want them now. Unless they get them and get them quickly, their future is in danger.

I say that this is irresponsible government. ...

None of us is so simple as to think that Hitler is planning at this moment to send an expeditionary force across the Atlantic to attack us.

Yet none of us is so blind as to deny that he has designs on us. We know, he has said so many times, that he hates democracy. He is aware that if we can really make democracy strong here in America, his own system of blood and tyranny cannot survive forever. ...

I am resolved--and I know that you are resolved--to do everything in our power to strengthen those heroic British people.

But tonight we must solemnly undertake to achieve unity ourselves. We must bring America together. We must come together with a full understanding of what is at stake for our democratic institutions. We must work with each other and for each other to make our democracy strong.

October 15, 1940 - Buffalo Address

Last Saturday night in Albany I gave some concrete examples of how the New Deal, and in particular its Secretary of the Treasury, have obstructed our defense efforts. ...

We now find ourselves in a defenseless condition and subjected to unnecessary and prolonged delays. Why? Because this Administration is incompetent to get things done. ...

Underlying these immediate causes of delay, procrastination and failure is the inability of the New Deal to recognize that our defense depends upon the same thing that our peacetime security depends on. That is to say upon production.

October 17, 1940 - St. Louis Address

We may perhaps take comfort in the fact that Japan is very far away. We may perhaps also take comfort in the recent intimation by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the new alliance is not really aimed at us. We deeply hope that he is right.

Nevertheless, in the light of the record, we must view that alliance with profound misgivings. We cannot afford to assume that it is meaningless. We must be on our guard. ...

I am in agreement with many of the basic international objectives of this Administration at the present time. I shall return to some of those objectives in a moment, to define them.

But I wish to make it plain tonight that I do not think the New Deal has been either wise or effective in foreign affairs. I do not believe that it has contributed to peace. I believe it has contributed to war. And I believe it has done so because of a fundamental misunderstanding--a fundamental failure to understand--the role that America must play among the nations of the earth. ...

The role of the United States among the nations is not the settlement of boundary disputes or racial disputes. It is not the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe. The role of the United States--the peacetime role--is something far more congenial to our people. It is to create purchasing power and to raise the standard of living, first for ourselves and, as a result, for others. ...

As we stand here looking out to the East and to the West we find the British people living on the rim of our freedom. ...

We cannot send an expeditionary force out to that rim. We have no such force. And even if we had the force it would do no good. It isn't what those people need. It isn't what they have asked for.

The reinforcement of that rim of freedom can be accomplished in one way, and only one way. It can be accomplished only by production.

We must produce more and more and more. We must produce airplanes. We must produce hundreds of other things. That is our role. That is the role that we must play to reinforce the rim. ...

for

...for the past five years, this Administration, which knew, which could not help knowing, what was happening in the world, failed--utterly and completely failed--to grasp the real function of America in a war-torn world.

This Administration failed to see--failed most tragically to see--that the key to war, as well as the key to peace, is American production.

I have shown on many occasions that this Administration has been aware of the need for adequate defense for nearly five years. It said so in January, 1936.

But what was done about it? Our agencies of production were abused, attacked, smothered under a wave of political propaganda. Our Navy was not built up. Our Army was not modernized. Our arsenals were allowed to sink into decrepitude. Our aircraft industry was not encouraged--we have today only a few hundred modern military planes. ...

I have said before that I favor aiding Britain at some sacrifice to our own defense program. But I want to point out here, that it is a sacrifice, and that it is the New Deal's fault. ...

War is not the road to peace. Appeasement is not the road to peace. Production is the road to peace--and the only road to peace.

Today the emergency is increased by our own dire need for a defense system. Until we can show power with our air force, our Navy and our Army, and until we have mobilized industry to supply them, no foreign policy that we may devise can be effective.

The primary objects of our system of defense should be to defend ourselves, and to support our neighbor Canada to the north, and other neighbors to the south. When we make that defense system strong--and only when we make it strong--we can realistically hope for peace in this hemisphere.

October 22, 1940 - Chicago Address

With regard to those events beyond our shores I will make you a solemn promise. I promise that that responsibility of government known as foreign affairs will be protected by me from partisan politics.

To fill the post of Secretary of State I shall choose the ablest man in the United States on foreign affairs. I shall choose him for his knowledge, his ability and his integrity - and not for any other considerations whatever.

That man will make use of the ablest career men in the diplomatic service - men who have devoted their lives to the study and practice of diplomacy.

And we shall send out to represent us in the capitals of the world Ambassadors chosen for their diplomatic qualifications. It's safer to keep the playboys right here in America.

I pledge you that our party will not pay off its financial obligations with the safety of the American people by appointing Springtime Ambassadors. I have never owed any man that much. And I never shall. ...

As we look out upon the world today there is one blessing that we all profoundly desire. We desire to remain at peace.

The New Deal promises to keep us out of war. The third-term candidate says that he hates war. He said on Sept. 11:

"I have one supreme determination - to do all I can to keep war away from these shores for all time."

That is the promise.

My fellow citizens: In the light of the record, I challenge it. The third-term candidate has not kept faith with the American people. How are we to know that he will begin to keep it now?

October 24, 1940 - Akron Address

In his discussion last night the third-term candidate spoke of falsification of the record. Many of the things he spoke of in connection with this I did not even recognize as having been said. There was one point he did, however, raise, and that was the reference to the Munich pact. He objects to the statement that he telephoned Hitler and his allies.

As soon as that statement was called to my attention I corrected it, contrary to the practice of the third-term candidate, who never corrects any misstatements that he makes. As a matter of fact the third-term candidate didn't telephone Hitler - he telegraphed him. And just so that there will be no mistake, these are the dates: Sept. 27, 1938, the third-term candidate telegraphed Hitler urging him to go through with the Munich conference and saying:

Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner, I am convinced that hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding historic service to all humanity.

Those were the words of the third-term candidate telegraphed - not telephoned - to Hitler.

The negotiations of which he speaks were held all right, and Senator Wagner and Secretary of War Woodring and the Democratic party in New York expressed themselves as very proud of the results achieved at Munich by the third-term candidate.

But you know I have a feeling that it was not a source of gratification to Czecho-Slovakia and that Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Poland and France may well doubt whether it was a contribution to humanity. ...

Last

Last night the third-term candidate, referring to the Democratic platform of 1940, quotes this language from that platform: "We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our Army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in cases of attack."

I hope, I hope sincerely, that that pledge made last night by the third-term candidate, based upon the 1940 platform of the Democratic party, is remembered by him longer than he remembered the same pledge that he made with reference to the provisions of the Democratic platform of 1932.

If he does not remember it longer, then shortly our boys will be on the transports, sailing for some foreign shore.

October 26, 1940 - Jamaica, Long Island Address

It is superficial to believe that the democracies of Europe - France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and the others - collapsed because they were overwhelmed by a superior military force. They collapsed essentially because they had become divided within.

That is why I have said so often that the proper course for us to have followed in foreign policy during the past seven or eight years was to strengthen those democracies economically and financially and commercially. According to Winston Churchill, the New Deal did the opposite by permitting our depression to continue.

October 26, 1940 - New York World's Fair Address

Trade is the hope of the world. Wherever the birds of trade go they carry with them the seeds of peace, and America, the America of tomorrow, must not measure its strength in terms of armies, navies and air forces. It must measure its strength in terms of how its strength spreads throughout the world in industrial developments, trade, peace and liberty; and trade, peace and liberty are inseparable things.

The reason Europe is torn with war today is because somehow, some way, we failed to spread these great industrial developments throughout the world and to develop the trade of the world. And the new leadership in the world must bring about a restoration of trade and peace and commerce and hope to all nations of the world.

October 28, 1940 - Statement Aboard Train En Route to Louisville

Wendell L. Willkie asserted today that Secretary of State Hull's speech Saturday night was "an extraordinary documentation of New Deal futility."

"The Secretary pointed up more clearly than could any contemporary critic of the New Deal the serious failure to organize a national economy capable of building rapidly an adequate defense ..."

Commenting on the Secretary of State's speech in Washington, Mr. Willkie said Mr. Hull "has made it more than ever obvious that such a defense was essential to the maintenance of our influence in foreign affairs."

"The Secretary's statement that as early as June, 1935, 'speaking for the Government, I pointed out that we would not serve the cause of peace by not having adequate powers of self-defense,' makes the whole tragedy of world conditions and our present precarious position in relation to them even more apparent.

"Had the President not then also been a candidate for re-election, he might have done better than merely send up verbal trial balloons to see how the popular emotion ran toward foreign events. He could have given an effective leadership then that would have saved us from what the Secretary of State now calls 'the gravity of the present situation.'

"Even without raising international questions, or making domestic issues out of questions of foreign policy, the President, who is now a candidate for the third term, could have adjusted our internal economy to the recovery level essential to support a program of adequate national defense, and could have done it without disturbing his purely political interests.

"The President having failed, however, Secretary Hull's picture of world crisis since 1935 makes even more distinctly tragic the now famous sham of last May's 'on hand' and 'on order' speech.

"Certainly those directly and indirectly affected by the recent registration for conscription - especially the mothers, fathers, wives and other relatives of all those lads who were required to register - have cause for concern that our national defense program was not begun five years ago, at the time of Secretary Hull's pointed warning."

# Text of Wilkie's Baltimore Address Setting Forth a Six-Point Defense Program

from the armies will be seeking work. The European countries will be trying to adjust their industries to a peacetime basis after the great effort of wartime production.

A world faced by these economic problems we will find our own grave problems. We will be confronted with the continued task of finding job opportunities for our people, of bringing about increased business opportunities, of achieving parity income for the farmer.

These are the very problems which the New Deal have failed to solve in the past eight years, and which they are wholly untrained to solve. Is there any reason to suppose that they will do any better able to solve them in the still more difficult conditions which will exist after the war?

## Appeals for a Long View

Besides these problems, we will have in addition, the post-war problems. We will have built up a great armaments industry in our national defense effort. We will have to readjust ourselves to the job of beating the swords back into plowshares.

What kind of an administration would be best for America in these troubled years ahead?

Is it the kind of administration we have had for the past eight years?

Is it an administration which with every opportunity has consistently failed to solve our present economic problems?

Is it the kind of administration that has persistently failed to unite our people, the kind of administration that has fostered class antagonism, fear and distrust?

In short, is it the New Deal that we want to guide us through these critical years ahead?

Or do we want an administration that believes in the future of this country, an administration that knows how to stimulate American enterprise, an administration that knows what makes a job and is determined to provide all of our people with the opportunity to work?

We must not, we dare not settle the issue in this election on the basis of the probable European developments within the next few months.

We must have a more foresight than that.

We must settle this election on the basis of the future of America.

We dare not let the pessimists and the defeatists determine that future. The man who knows how to work, and how to produce must determine the future of America.

Now, of course if this is true, the reason for it is that the President makes use of our State Department. That is not a political but a permanent organization. It consists of trained experts. To them information comes in a constant stream from an equally trained permanent foreign service located in our Embassies, Ministries and consulates abroad.

The third-term candidate has no monopoly on this information. It is always available to any President.

It is the people's information. It is the people's property. But, of course, the mere possession of information does not guarantee good judgment in its use.

## Repeats Defense Charges

And by the third-term candidate's own record, we know that during the last many years he disregarded the repeated warnings of his own diplomatic and military experts. Yet from 1933 until 1939 he made no adequate move toward giving the United States modernized defense.

In this threatening year of 1940, in January, he requested an increase in the defense budget of only \$200,000,000. He said that, despite contrary expert opinion, that amount was sufficient.

But a few months after he expressed that opinion, he was forced to ask Congress for \$1,500,000,000 more. After that, he then had to go back to Congress four times. In this year of 1940, Congress increased the defense budget by \$5,000,000,000, including contract authorizations. That is forty times more than the increase the President requested after rejecting expert information he had received.

So much for the doctrine of the indispensably-infused man. He either does not act at all on the information, or he disregards it.

Our economic system has been in a state of depression during his entire New Deal administration. We still have approximately 9,000,000 unemployed. His only defense has been a boast about some recent employment in armament work.

Will you keep an Administration whose only cure for unemployment is the manufacture of armament, which its candidate himself has called a "house of cards"?

Away with them! Away with them!

I want to talk to you tonight about the protection of America—protection in a violent and war-torn world.

The duty of the President is to protect the interests of the United States. These interests come first. All of my policies will start with this question: What is best for the United States?

In protecting America, the maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere will be my objective. The President must be dedicated to the objective of peace in our part of the world.

## Aid to Britain "Essential"

Aid to Britain to the limits of prudence for our own safety is essential to that objective.

I have given you my pledge many times over: I will work for peace. We are against sending our boys into any war other than the defense of our own country.

The third-term candidate has also pledged himself to peace. Some nights ago he said, and I quote:

"I repeat again that I stand on the platform of our party: that we will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our Army, naval or air forces to fight for foreign lands outside of the Americas except in case of attack."

That is his pledge.

And now, let me read you something more he said. I quote: "I reaffirm my attitude on this question. The thing has been said, therefore, in plain English three times in my speeches. It is stated without qualification in the platform and I have announced my unqualified acceptance of that platform. So much for that misrepresentation."

That's what he said.

This second paragraph I just quoted from the third-term candidate is a strong pledge. It is just as strong as the first pledge. They both pledge him to Democratic platform planks. But the

second one was not made about peace. It was made in 1933 about sound money.

And in April, 1933, five months after the third-term candidate had pledged himself to sound money with those strong words, he abandoned sound money, devalued the dollar. And he still retains in his own hands power to devalue it further.

I ask you whether his pledge for peace is going to last any longer than his pledge for sound money.

On the basis of his past performance with pledges to the people, why shouldn't we expect to be at war by April, 1941, if he is elected?

That is the first requirement for the protection of America, a pledge to work for peace and good faith in that pledge, and another requirement has to do with our relationship with other nations. This is the field of diplomacy.

## For a "Consistent" Diplomacy

A nation cannot have an effective diplomacy unless it is a strong and effective nation. But however strong we are, but

diplomacy should be circumspect, wise and consistent. During the last eight years the third-term candidate has made reckless flights into the field of diplomacy. These flights were made entirely on his own initiative. And they have contributed to the confusion of the world.

Statements of the third-term candidate made in 1933 led British observers to publish opinions that the United States would participate in a European war, these statements of the third-

term candidate were probably made with good motives. But they had that misleading effect. The interests of the United States would have been better served if the third-term candidate had been outspoken for peace and nonparticipation at that time, instead of waiting to pledge it in an election.

Even as late as June 10, 1940, he startled the world. He declared of Italy that the hand that held the dagger "has struck it into the back of its neighbor." In the capitals of Europe this bit of oratory was not taken as a move to keep the United States at peace.

On Oct. 9, 1937, the third-term candidate called for the quarantine of aggressors. But his policy with regard to aggressors has really tended to strengthen rather than to quarantine them.

For instance, we have consistently proclaimed our sympathy for China. But at the same time we were exporting millions of dollars' worth of scrap iron and high-proof aviation gasoline to Japan, which was making war on China.

**His Disclaimers**

We have consistently expressed our sympathy for Britain and the need for aid to Britain. Yet just a few weeks ago we released a shipment of \$7,000,000 worth of machine tools to Russia, the ally of Germany.

Thus we are helping those nations which the third-term candidate says should be quarantined. This is no way to protect ourselves.

As President I will not help to mechanize the Red Army so that it may carry out its purpose. We shall feel well content to mechanize the Army of the United States.

Apparement is the surest way to war. No American would stand for apparement. Nor shall we.

But to avoid it we must be prepared to defend ourselves. Under the New Deal we have not become prepared.

And it will take a minimum of eighteen months to equip us with even an inadequate protection.

Under the New Deal it would probably take much longer than that. Have you ever heard of a New Deal building project that was finished on schedule?

We pledge you to donate all our energy and our experience to building you the Army and the Navy that we so desperately need.

We pledge you a defense program that will mobilize the strength

of America swiftly and soundly.

With regard to the defense program, there are a number of things that need to be done at once.

**Program for Defense**

First, we must make certain that there is no delay in providing housing for our new soldiers.

Second, we must obtain supplies of raw materials which are not produced in the United States—rubber, tin and other things essential to national defense.

Third, we must make defense weapons which we need and make them faster and in larger quantities.

Fourth, we must hasten decision on the types of defense arms that we want industry to build. It is far better to have a large number of good and serviceable defense weapons on hand than it is to have a few dream ones on order.

Fifth, we would centralize responsibility. We would like to learn the lessons of the World War which showed that high-speed production of defense weapons can never be obtained if able industrialists are used only in an advisory capacity. That was tried in the World War and it failed. Yet it is being tried again today. We would appoint a chairman and give him and his associates authority and hold them responsible.

If he did not get results, if tanks and planes and guns did not begin rolling off the assembly lines, he would go, and we would appoint some one else.

Sixth, we must devote Congressional defense appropriations to defense purposes, instead of bootlegging them.

For instance, we must never permit the condition which existed in 1937 to 1939, whereby only 3 per cent of the Army appropriations was spent for training. This is outrageous. The Army should train as an army, just as a Navy trains as a fleet.

**After the War is Ended**

Here, then, are three basic elements in the protection of America: good faith in the pursuit of peace for this hemisphere; a wise and consistent diplomacy; and a strong military and naval defense force.

Yet there is one requirement underlying these requirements, which is more important than any other. This is the requirement that we here in America shall live and prosper, that we shall trade with one another, and do business with one another, and that we shall continue the extraordinary progress in the arts of production that characterized our history for 150 years.

The entire purpose of armament and diplomacy is to serve that fundamental requirement.

We cannot hope to sustain the enormous defense program that now faces us, we cannot hope to bear the burden of that debt and of taxes, unless we have production enough to support them.

Production, which has been denied us, is essential not only to assure us peace and the fruits of

peace, but to assure us our freedom, both now and hereafter. Let's look ahead.

Let's suppose that the European war has ended. What kind of a world will we face then?

Regardless of which side is victorious, we will face a world of economic chaos. Europe will be in the throes of a severe deflation. Millions of men demobilized.

**By the Associated Press**

BALTIMORE, Oct. 30—Following is the prepared text of the address here tonight by Wendell G. Wilkie:

People of Maryland: I am deeply touched by this generous welcome. It comes from a people who have contributed much to the free way of life in America.

Here, in the free State of Maryland, your forefathers gave America two great democratic principles: Religious freedom and the right of local self-government.

In 1932, you defended your right to govern yourselves by your own representatives. You rebuked the New Deal with your votes. You rejected an attempt by the third-term candidate to purge one of your United States Senators. And by an overwhelming majority you returned Millard E. Tydings to the Senate. You did well, not only to rebuke the presumption of the purge, but to assure yourselves a good Senator.

Once again you are called on to rebuke the New Deal and reject its attempt to force candidates on you.

You will repudiate its attempt to pervert our free institutions and take us down the road of complete State domination.

With your ballots you will reaffirm the common law of the United States: No man shall serve three consecutive terms as President.

The world across the oceans is in flames. New wars and formidable alliances of forces against democracy are the order of the day. Freedom roads has fallen before the onslaught of the aggressors. Only on the small island of Britain does it still hold out.

**Democracy as a Duty**

We in America are left almost alone. Ours is the duty to hold fast the great traditions of democracy.

Our problem is to protect these traditions and those rights. Our problem is to preserve free enterprise. Unless we do so, our democracy will die.

We can protect our traditions and our rights by asserting them and by practicing them.

One can preserve free enterprise by making America strong.

The third-term candidate has suggested recently that the third-term candidate is the only man who can protect America.

We reject the fatal doctrine of indispensability. One-man rule always leads to the road to war.

The third-term candidate and those who are associated with him have much to say about his foresight. He says he saw the onrush of the present crisis far ahead.

BF  
Hull

November 4, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FROM CORDELL HULL TO FDR

Attaches translation of message from Marshall Petain 11/2/40 in answer to FDR's message to him sent thru Charge d'affaires of U.S. (FDR's message did not come to file--not attached to above)

See: France folder-Drawer 4-1940

file

PSF 9/11/40  
1

November 19, 1940

My dear Mr. Davies:

I have today received with the greatest regret your resignation as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to take effect January 2, 1941.

Your services to this Government as Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as Ambassador to Belgium and Minister to Luxemburg and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State have been characterized by the highest order of ability.

During the years of your service abroad your reports to the Department of State -- which included surveys of political, economic and industrial developments in many parts of Europe which you visited in the interest of this Government -- were unusually accurate and informative and constitute an outstanding contribution to the political and economic history of pre-war Europe. The accuracy of the forecasts which these reports contained disclosed exceptional good judgment and ability.

The Honorable  
Joseph E. Davies,  
Washington, D. C.

During the present recent emergency your contribution to the work in the Department of State was particularly valuable in assessing conditions in Europe as reported from abroad and in handling emergency matters such as the evacuation and repatriation of American citizens from Europe and the Orient.

Throughout the period of your official service the conduct of your duties was in accordance with the best traditions of the Foreign Service of this Government.

Because of your statement to me that you feel it necessary to retire and to devote your attention to your personal affairs, I am reluctantly compelled to accept your resignation. I am glad to know, however, from your letter under acknowledgment, that you will be available for further service in the event of need.

With the assurances of my warm personal regard, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) Cordell Hull.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
NOVEMBER 19, 1940

November 19, 1940

The Honorable  
Cordell Hull,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Under Secretary Welles,  
Acting Secretary.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Herewith I submit my resignation as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to take effect January 2, 1941.

It is with regret that I contemplate retiring from service under your distinguished leadership; but my inability during the four years in which I have served under you to devote any attention to my personal affairs now makes it necessary for me to ask to be relieved of further public service at this time. Should, however, the present emergency become more acute at any time, I want you to know that I shall be standing by, available to your call.

May I express to you and to my colleagues in the Foreign Service my appreciation of the uniform kindness and consideration which have been shown to me during my term

term in the Diplomatic Corps under your distinguished  
administration.

With assurances of my great admiration and respect,  
I am

Sincerely yours,

Joseph E. Davies

SD:JED:LMF  
11/19/40

COPY

PSF  
Hull

November 26, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

Secretary Hull and I have read the letter sent to you under date of November 19 by Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., and which you transmitted to us with your memorandum of November 25.

In accordance with your request, I am returning the letter to you herewith.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure

The President,

The White House.

For FDR's memo of Nov 25th and Fairbanks letter of Nov 19th  
See: Fairbanks-Gen corres-Drawer 2-1940  
FHR's reply of Nov 25th

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Hull  
1-40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to the Ambassadorship to China, if we can find a suitable place for Nelson Johnson, what would you think of transferring Francis Sayre from Manila to Chungking? I think Sayre is the kind of man who would get on very well with the Generalissimo and his wife.

F. D. R.