THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please read the enclosed.
Do you think it needs a reply?

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from
Lord Halifax, dated February 11, 1941,
re leaks which are at present occurring
in the blockade -- the offending ships
in the main are Russian and Japanese.
(W.S.36/86/41) 11th February, 1941.

My dear Mr. President,

You will remember that on Saturday afternoon I mentioned to you the gravity which my Government attach to the leaks which are at present occurring in the blockade, and said that we were feeling obliged to stop a few of the offending ships which in the main are Russian and Japanese.

I am writing to the Under-Secretary of State about this matter in some detail, but in view of my promise to let you have a few facts relating to this traffic, more particularly via the Far East, I should like briefly to draw your attention to one or two items which I am quoting in a memorandum to Mr. Sumner Welles.

On Saturday we mentioned cotton in particular, and I think you felt that the case had not been made out that Russia has been supplying Germany. On this I do not suggest that the cotton which Russia has been buying here in recent months was necessarily itself going to Germany. The position is that Russia herself grows American-type cotton and that she has not for some years imported any cotton from the United States. In the last quarter of 1940 she imported some 28,000 tons from your country although her own cotton

harvest/

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, Washington, D. C.
harvest was an extra large one and although there was no reason to believe that her normal imports of cotton from adjacent Asiatic countries had been reduced. My Government have definite evidence of actual shipments from Russia to Germany of over 60,000 tons of cotton in the first 10 months of 1940. Russia has committed herself to supply Germany with 90,000 tons of cotton per annum and recent reports have indicated that this figure has been increased to 120,000 tons. The Soviet Government are also exporting cotton to other various European destinations, such as 8,000 tons to Slovakia and at least 6,000 tons to Hungary. It seems evident therefore that the Soviet Government imports have been made in order to enable them to replace the domestic cotton which they are supplying to Central Europe.

Perhaps of more immediate relevance in connection with the question of the interception of ships in the Caribbean are exports of important commodities from South America to Germany by way of Russia and Japan. I am giving Mr. Sumner Welles detailed information on this point and would just quote one or two particular items here. Germany, for instance, has bought three million dollars worth of rubber in Brazil and one million dollars worth of this rubber.
rubber has already reached Japan on its way to Germany, it having been carried in Japanese ships via the Panama Canal.

My Government continue to receive convincing evidence of the ultimate German destination of Japanese imports of lard, glycerine, castor and cotton oils, tallow, etc., and it is interesting to note that the Berlin branch of Mitsubishi were recently explicitly instructed to stop sending notices of remittances to New York in case it should leak out that grease, lard and beef tallow were being sent from Japan to Germany. In the latter connection it is known that the Japanese firm of Mitsubishi in September opened a three million Yen credit for purchases in Uruguay and Argentine. These include tallow and casein, which Japan does not normally import from South America, and 50,000 cases of canned beef, and all were to reach Germany via Siberia.

I will not give in detail particular items of the cargoes of Japanese ships which in the last month or so have sailed from South America to Japan via the Panama Canal. They include such items as cocoa butter, wool, tallow, wolfram, vanadium and other commodities urgently required by Germany. I just wish to give you this rather general picture so that you may be aware of the problem which is confronting/
confronting us, and which we believe to be seriously prejudicing
our war effort at a time when it is vital to us to display our strength
and our resolution.

Believe me, dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

(sgd) Halifax.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to the Spratley Islands, I thought it was perhaps better not to mention them in our talk with Nomura yesterday.

I suggest, in view of your message, that we use the routine method of asking Grew to question the Japanese claim to them by asking them how they justify their occupation.

They may come back and say that like Canton Island and Enderberry Island, the Spratley group was uninhabited, but we have a perfectly good answer in the fact that both Great Britain and the United States each claimed those islands by virtue of discovery and occasional Guano use later, but also that the United States and Great Britain entered into a friendly agreement in regard to the future.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Secretary of State called to say that he and his associates do not think it is a good idea for us to lay claim to the Spratly Islands but rather to question the Japanese claim instead. If we are going to make a formal representation to the Japanese Government on this Spratly Island situation, my associates think it would be better to do it in a routine way through our Ambassador in Tokyo in a note.

The Secretary thinks it is all right to mention the Japanese occupation of these Islands and question it without claiming it ourselves.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

February 20, 1941

I have read Lane's #115 from Belgrade, February 13 and think that in the case of Yugoslavia we should find some means of getting across to the Prince Regent and others that the United States is looking not merely to the present but to the future, and that any nation which tamely submits on the grounds of being quickly over-run would receive less sympathy from the world than a nation which resists, even if this resistance can be continued for only a few weeks.

The examples of Abyssinia, China and Greece are in point. Abyssinia won world sympathy by a brief though useless resistance -- and Abyssinia will be restored in some way not now foreseeable.

China seemed capable of making no resistance in the modern sense of the word -- but after four years China is still resisting and has the sympathy of the world -- with an excellent chance of being reconstituted in her independence in some way at some date.

The Greek cause looked completely hopeless in view of an Italian army and air force of overwhelming proportions. Even if Greece goes down fighting in the next few weeks, the cause of Greek independence will win in the end.

The rear guard action fought by Norway for two or three months means that all of use will work for the restoration of Norwegian independence.

On the other side of the picture, the attitude of Denmark inspires no enthusiasm. Neither does the attitude of Rumania. Neither does the attitude of Bulgaria.

Our type of civilization and the war in whose outcome we are definitely interested, will be definitely helped by resistance on the part of Yugoslavia and almost automatically resistance on the part of Turkey -- even though temporarily Yugoslavia and Turkey are not successful in the military sense.

How can we best get these thoughts across?

F. D. R.
3/1/41

MEMO FOR THE PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL FILES

Sent to Secretary Hull 3/1/41 confidential resume of Colonel Donovan's dispatch No. 81 received from Cairo -
dated 2/26/41 dictated by Lt. Mott and typed by R. Bulloch
forwarded to the President by memo from Capt. Callaghan 2/27/41

Memo in the President's handwriting - "C. H. Will you or
Sumner speak to me about this Saturday? FDR"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have this strictly confidential copy of the German report on their raw material needs. This should be shown to no one except Sumner, as the source must be protected.

In regard to Russia, you will see that in certain items, Germany is getting raw materials from Russia.

For example on page 22, at the bottom, it speaks of expected imports of cotton from Russia. At the same time, we are letting cotton go through to Russia. The net result is that Russia is enabled to send cotton -- either theirs or ours -- to Germany in greater quantities.

Please return when you have read.

F. D. R./tmb

Enclosure
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

March 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Thank you for your second part of the memorandum about Germany, sent to me by you on March fifth.

Please take the same action in regard to it as we did in regard to part one.

F. D. R.

(Second part of memo in the President's locked box) Memo re status of War Raw materials - Memo II - Berlin 24, Jan. 41)
Parts 1 & 3 are not present
RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON
Dated March 30, 1941
Rec'd 9:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1243, March 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Today this ship passed the Straits of Gibraltar in French convoy escorted by French destroyer SIMOUN. We intercepted to enforce contraband control. French escort did not fire but ships persisted on their course. A concealed French battery opened from the Moroccan shore upon our intercepting cruiser, and battery was severely mauled in return. BANGKOK and other French vessels took refuge in French Moroccan port of Nemourz while action with battery was in progress. We now learn that BANGKOK had already discharged her rubber at Casablanca. All this rubber will of course be ferried across the Mediterranean, and practically all of it will go to Germany. Enemy are short of rubber and will want a lot for campaigns against Greece and Yugoslavia. I wonder whether you would feel inclined to say that delivery of the 100,000 tons of wheat in the two ships depends upon your being satisfied that this rubber is either (A) handed over, or (B) kept in France. Case seems a very good one, and it is sometimes easier
#1243, March 30, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from London.

easier to take steps on practical instances than on general principles.

**Five. We have here Ambassador Winant and Harriman as well as Menzies, Commonwealth Premier, all of whom send their respects.**

*(END OF MESSAGE)*

WINANT

CSB
April 7, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to the three thousand tons of rubber recently unloaded (according to the French) from the S. S. Bankok at Casa Blanca, Africa, why not offer to buy this rubber and pay for it with some commodity like gasoline which is much needed in French Morocco. This would assure the British that this rubber would not go to France in any alleged food ship.

Furthermore, we need it. Furthermore, it can be processed anywhere in Africa.

We might even make the same kind of an offer in regard to any kind of rubber or similar raw materials now in northern Africa which might be of value to the Germans if it were secretly transported to Marsailles.

F. D. R.

mal/tmb
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

April 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached is a copy of a telegram sent this evening to Algiers in accordance with your memorandum.

C.H.

S: ASB
March 8, 1941.

AMERICAN CONSUL

ALGIERS (ALGERIA)

PERSONAL FOR COLE.

Please take the first opportunity to discuss informally with Chatel the status of a shipment said to amount to three thousand tons of crude rubber recently landed at Casablanca from the S.S. BANKOK. You will recall that the S.S. Bankok is one of the ships which participated in the recent incident off Nemours and it was the reported presence on board of the rubber in question which attracted the interest of the British authorities. There is much curiosity here regarding the reasons for landing such a comparatively large quantity of rubber at Casablanca in view of the absence of processing facilities in French Africa. Obtain whatever information Chatel may have on this subject and inquire confidentially whether the French would be disposed to consider the eventual sale of the
the rubber to the United States, possibly in consideration of the purchase of commodities now listed as urgently needed in French Morocco.

Repeated to Vichy.

Hull
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please prepare reply to this. I think it is all right.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Dispatch #1362 from London, 4/7/41 from Winant re permission for Prime Minister Churchill to publish in facsimile FDR's letter introducing Willkie for distribution.
This copy of a letter from James A. Moffett to FIR, April 16, 1941, was obtained from the files of either State Dept. or Navy Dept. The original was missing from our files in 1947 when search for it was conducted. (See FIRL Admin. Files, "Roosevelt Estate," letter of Earle Koons to Pres. Truman, 4/21/47)

G.W. Roach
April 16, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Referring to the interview which you so kindly granted me on Wednesday, April 9th, and in line with your request, I am attaching hereto a memorandum covering the existing situation in Saudi Arabia. Also a proposal which we hope will be acceptable as a means of providing funds for the Saudi Arabian Government.

Our representatives have had numerous conferences with the King. His financial situation is desperate. The British Government has advanced him four hundred thousand pounds and he is endeavoring to have this increased to nine hundred thousand pounds. His budget requirement is conservatively estimated at $10,000,000.

You referred to the four Danish tank steamers which might be utilized to transport finished petroleum products. If the United States Government will advance to the King of Saudi Arabia $6,000,000 annually for the next five years, the Calarabian Standard Oil Company will agree to deliver to the United States Government, for account of the King:

- 1,800,000 bbls. of Gasoline at 35¢
- 2,660,000 bbls. of Diesel Oil at 75¢
- 3,400,000 bbls. of Fuel Oil at 40¢

totaling approximately $6,000,000 worth of petroleum products annually.

The King's normal revenue (from pilgrimage and customs) has practically disappeared. His expenses have very materially increased, not only on account of the war, but due to the drought this past year, so that he has been forced to feed two or three hundred thousand of his subjects.

I sincerely trust that some way may be found under existing legislation to provide King Ibn Saud financial assistance, which he so urgently needs in order to maintain his government in a stable condition. We believe that unless this is done, and soon, this independent kingdom, and perhaps with it the entire Arab world, will be thrown into chaos.

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) J. A. Moffett

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For your information and
to speak to me about on Monday.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from J. A. Moffett, 130 East 43rd St.,
NYC, 4/16/41 to Miss LeHand, with enclosed letter
to the President, and a memorandum, in re situation
in Saudi Arabia and what the King might be able to
do in furnishing finished petroleum products.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

April 18, 1941

In view of the cable in the original French text of the so-called letter of recall of the Danish Minister from the King of Denmark, please let me have draft of reply at the earliest possible moment.

I think in this reply I should show great friendship for His Majesty and the Danish people. At the same time, I should make it clear that in the judgment of the President of the United States the appointment of Minister de Kauffmann was, of course, without question a free and untrammeled act on the part of the King; whereas, most unfortunately, and in view of the events subsequent to April 9, 1940, the acts of the Government of Denmark which as in the present case of a minister, are a part of governmental action, such actions cannot be viewed as independent and untrammeled acts. Of necessity it must be considered that the acts of the Government of Denmark are under the duress of German occupation.

His Majesty will, of course, recognize the fact that while the sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland has been recognized by the United States Government under the fundamental principle that Greenland though lying in the Western Hemisphere has been for many centuries under actual colonization by Denmark and Norway, no change of sovereignty to another European nation can be agreed to.

It is well known to Your Majesty that German planes have flown and are now flying over Greenland.

It is well known to Your Majesty that in the light of the history of the past year and a half there can be no assurance against German occupation of Greenland.

It is therefore necessary that the United States take certain steps to prevent such occupation by any non-American nation other than Denmark.

The United States, therefore, finds it necessary to hold Greenland in trust for Denmark with the objective that full control will be restored to Denmark just as soon as the Government of Denmark ceases to labor under any form of duress on the part of any other nation.

F. D. R.
Memorandum for the President

The accompanying memorandum was prepared in the European Division after some discussion in my office. It may be of use to you in making your decision about seeing, in a body, the representatives of the conquered nations, as is suggested.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you speak to me about this?

F. D. R.

Confidential memorandum to the President from Mr. Greenbaum, dated March 28, 1941, re Lease-Lend Bill and the President's powers under it, together with memorandum prepared in the European Division of the State Department.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is the proposed reply of the Secretary of State to the inquiry of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations relative to our position on the Tobey Resolution, placing the Senate on record as opposing the use of convoys.

My proposed reply is as follows:

"If there were no other reasons against consideration of the proposed Resolution, it is manifest that its passage would be misunderstood abroad. My recommendation, therefore, is against the passage of the Resolution".

C. H.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please speak to me about
No. 1716, dated May 2nd, from
Winant, in relation to French
gold and dollar assets.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

I can not express in sufficient terms the appreciation of myself and the people of Stanton for the honor of your visit to Stanton and for dedicating the birthplace. You made it a perfectly wonderful speech.
I kept the ceremony as simple as possible and short introductions, to save you time and strength. My only regret was the seeming lack of hospitality for not doing much as a mistake I could I trust.

I understood, but I do hope some day you can come again, the third side of the home and the interior.
With my warmest thanks, always
with affection and admiration,

Frances Hull

May 8
There is no memorandum on "Consequences." Enclosed are two memos of Mr. Hull and Mr. Needham dealing with details.

---
The British Ambassador called at his request. He inquired regarding my comment to the Portuguese Minister and the press about the Pepper statements to the effect that we should take over the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. I replied that I stated that a member of an independent branch of the Government speaks for himself and his individual views, and he does not speak for the Government. I then said that as to the Portuguese matter, there was no foundation for the rumors that we might occupy one of the islands in question, and that the friendly relations between our two countries exists as heretofore.

He inquired what was said by the Portuguese Government in
in the way of requesting us not to land a naval vessel at present at the Azores. I replied that through fear of Germany they had requested that we not send such a vessel into Portuguese waters just now.

G.H.
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: May 17, 1941

SUBJECT: President's desire to send emissary to Lisbon

PARTICIPANTS: British Ambassador, Viscount Halifax;
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, A-B, PA/D, Eu

The British Ambassador called this morning at my request.

I told the Ambassador that the chief reason I had asked him to call was that the President had yesterday discussed with Secretary Hull the President's desire to send immediately to Lisbon some confidential emissary to talk with Prime Minister Salazar in order to ascertain from the latter specifically whether, in the event that the Portuguese Government was obliged to move from Lisbon to the Azores as a result of a threat of German occupation, Dr. Salazar would be willing to accept the defense of the Azores by some friendly power opposed to the Axis powers, with, of course, the clear understanding that the
sovereignty of Portugal and of its colonies would be scrupulously respected by such friendly power and that, at the end of the present emergency, Portugal would have returned to her full measure of sovereignty. I said that it seemed desirable to us here that we ascertain from the British Government whether the British Government had made any similar approach to Dr. Salazar and, if so, what the result might have been.

The Ambassador replied that no such action had been taken recently by his Government. He said that the question had come up last summer while he was still Foreign Secretary, but that the British Ambassador in Lisbon had strongly urged the British Government not to discuss this possibility with Dr. Salazar as the Ambassador felt that a conversation of this character would only alarm the Portuguese Prime Minister and would create the impression in his mind that the British Government was planning to undertake immediate occupation. Lord Halifax said that he would inquire of his Government whether any more recent soundings had been made by the new British Ambassador in Lisbon and that he would also let us have the views of his Government with regard to the question involved.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 22, 1941.

The British Ambassador handed me the attached copy of a message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Willkie, and requested that I transmit it to you. I did not say to him that I thought you were also familiar with this matter.
Message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Willkie.

"Most grateful for your telegram and for all you are doing. Please have a talk with Lord Halifax who knows the situation."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 25, 1941

I think I spoke to you on the question of whether the Monroe Doctrine would be proclaimed as applicable to Dakar and the northwestern Atlantic coast, and suggested that the threat of danger to Latin America and this hemisphere from German occupation of this area could better be stated nakedly without raising a technical Monroe Doctrine issue.

I merely send this in order that you may not overlook the suggestion in the final drafting of your address.

S/CH: MG
NAVAL MESSAGE

From: ALUSNA LISBON
To: OPNAV
Re: 26 MAY 1941
TOR Code Room: 1945
Decoded by: AMES
Paraphased by: HNS

Message Priorities:

Phone Ext. No. Addressees

26 MAY 1941

TOR Code Room 1945

Decoded by AMES

Indicate by asterisk the address on which mail delivery is satisfactory

TOR Code Room 1945 CR 926

Unless otherwise designated, this dispatch will be transmitted with DEFERRED precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for DEFERRED and MAIL DELIVERY.

TEXT

INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATES THAT BEST PORTUGUESE TROOPS ARE BEING AND HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE AZORES. AN ESTIMATED 10,000 MEN ARE THERE BUT THEIR DISPOSITION IS UNCERTAIN; ASSUME ONE THIRD TO BE IN EAST PORTUGAL IS PRACTICALLY DEFENSELESS WITH TROOPS BEING WITH DRAWN TO AVOID CAPTURE IN CASE OF INVASION. THE DESTROYER LIMA IS IN HORTA.

SHIP HERE IS PREPARED TO TRANSFER GOVERNMENT TO THE AZORES IF THE NAZIS MAKE A MOVE TO CROSS BORDER. THE STOCK OF COAL AND OIL HERE IS LIMITED TO 8 DAYS. THE GENERAL HOPE IS THAT US WILL OCCUPY THE AZORES IF THE GERMANS INVADE PORTUGAL. THE NAZIS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO TRY FOR THE AZORES IF THE US GETS THERE FIRST BUT WILL MAKE A STRONG PROTEST TO "THE WORLD." GERMANS STILL DO NOT WANT TO ENTER A CONFLICT WITH US. PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT US "PROTECTION".

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76(4), Navy Regulations.)
May 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to the possibility that we may be asked to send a protective defensive force either to the Azore Islands or the Cape Verde Islands, I think you might explore the possibility of inviting Brazil to send a small token force as a part of this defense of the Americas.

All of this would be with the distinct understanding that both groups of Islands would be fully restored to Portuguese sovereignty as soon as Portugal regains that sovereignty.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
and the UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

I note telegram from Walton in
Monrovia No. 55, June 7th.

I can understand the feeling of
Liberian officials that they do not want
British bases or troops in Liberia.

I think, however, that we should
consider the possibility of a request
from the Liberian Government that in
accordance with the historic, unwritten
protectorate, which the United States at
least feels toward Liberia, the United
States should send a protective force
there. Such a force could be considered
more as a token -- i.e. let us say 500
marines with 6 or 8 antiaircraft guns,
and a couple of 155 mm guns (6") for the
protection of Monrovia from shelling from
the sea.

I recognize that a force of this
size is wholly inadequate if a major
attack is made on Liberia -- but, on the
other hand, it is enough of a force to
protect Monrovia against a raid and could,
if necessary, either be withdrawn or
added to.

F.D.R.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

This matter of Liberia is a military one and for this reason it is not a question of substituting Bathurst or Freetown for Liberia. Bathurst is only about 110 miles from Dakar and, therefore, too close for air safety. Freetown is a little further, but is also a bit too close to Dakar for comfort. What I want is the possibility of an American plane hopping off from Natal, Brazil, with the option of landing at any one of three places in Africa -- Bathurst, Freetown or Liberia. I regard this as an essential.

I know all about the difficulty of landing supplies and materials in Monrovia, but, by using the facilities of the Firestone Company, the material for temporary housing of white troops can be landed on lighters.

In regard to sleeping sickness and malaria, this is, of course, a danger on the whole west coast of Africa and is a risk which must also be taken at Bathurst, Freetown, Takaravia and even Lagos.

Therefore, please expedite effort to make the arrangements.

F. D. R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 18, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to the memorandum you sent to the Secretary of State and myself under date of June 11 with regard to the possibility of requesting the Liberian Government to agree to have the United States send a protective force to Liberia.

I agree in principle that such a step as that contemplated would be desirable should it be found that more satisfactory arrangements of the same character could not be made at Freetown and at Bathurst. While I believe that the Liberian Government in all probability would gladly accept such a suggestion from us as that which you have in mind, there are, of course, certain immediate practical problems which would have to be taken into consideration. There is at present in Liberia an epidemic of sleeping sickness, and malaria is very prevalent. All of the accommodations which

The President,
The White House.
would be required for white troops would have to be constructed by us and the lack of any harbor or harbor facilities for the landing of materials required for such construction is, of course, well known to you.

In brief, it seems to me that the objective which you have in mind could probably be achieved far more rapidly and with far less trouble by making some arrangement of this character in Bathurst or in Freetown rather than in Liberia unless and until the situation in Liberia appears to be more critical than it does at this moment.

Believe me

Faithfully yours
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
and THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

If it is true that the Robin Moor was torpedoed, I am inclined to think that we might consider telling the Brazilians to let the WINDHUK go and then pick her up with our own cruisers in payment for the destruction of the Robin Moor.

F.D.R.
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing Parts I and II of Mr. Hopkins' report of his trip to Moscow. They include certain hitherto undisclosed military information.

I wish this report to be carefully restricted.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State.

Identical letter also sent to Secy. of War & Navy.

HLH/1mb
8/20/41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think there is no hurry about setting up any committee. You might tell Dean Acheson to speak to you about it when he thinks any change should be made in the present arrangements.

F. D. R.

Enclosure
My dear Mr. President:

The Secretary of the Navy has suggested that a small committee composed of representatives of the Navy Department, the War Department, and the Department of State, be set up to make a preliminary study of repayment by countries which have received assistance under the Lend-Lease Act.

All of the Lend-Lease agreements, with the exception of the British agreement, are being prepared by the office of Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with the cooperation of the Lend-Lease office. As you know, Mr. Acheson's office is also preparing the British agreement, subject to your directions. Although I believe that the present arrangement is satisfactory, I should like to know your wishes in the matter before replying to the Secretary of the Navy.

Faithfully yours,

The President,
The White House.
September 6, 1941

SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I forgot to mention today something which I wish you would think over and carry out if you agree. Otherwise, talk with me about it on Monday.

I have been more and more inclined to the view that the field losses of Finland have been so heavy during the past two and a half months that they cannot afford to continue in battle more than a couple of months longer.

I wonder, therefore, if you should see Procope "off the record" and tell him that wholly unofficially and wholly as an old friend of Finland and a strong supporter of her independence, you feel it only fair to say to him:

The United States is taking no part and no action in bringing about a termination of the war between Finland and Russia and is sending no word to the Government of Finland as to our position or desires.

But, for his own information, he should know that in our view sympathy for the cause of Finnish independence lost ground in the United States because of General Mannerheim's rather bombastic speech; that public feeling in the United States is all in favor of Finland regaining the territory she lost to Russia last year but that American public opinion has been much upset by the thought that Finland will invade Russia proper or, in other words, cross her old boundaries into enemy country. Thousands of well-wishers of Finland will be alienated by such a move but would be made very happy if Finland could regain her old boundaries, and stop there.

You could even say, if you want to, that I have suggested this as a piece of personal information in regard to American public opinion which, as an old friend, I think he should have.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Copy of this memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State.
September 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. TOM CONNALLY:

It must be remembered that throughout the earlier
days of America -- indeed up to the time of the War Between
the States -- the arming of privately-owned merchant vessels
was a very different problem from later days. In Colonial
days, and through the earlier days of the Republic, arming
a vessel to repel attack was a very simple thing. A small
number of brass or iron cannon on each side of the ship was
sufficient to put off many privateers or pirates.

These cannon were articles of commerce -- not modern
guns which call for special ammunition and special gun sides
and special knowledge to handle. In the old days any ship
owner could buy cannon at shops on the waterfront. In the
old days any merchant captain could train his crew in a few
days to serve these cannon and fire the round shot ammunition
from them.

Therefore, the arming of merchantmen in the old days
was not considered a government task, and it was in accordance
with international law that the ship owner could do the job
himself if he wanted to. As is well known, the early American
ships which went into dangerous waters -- the West Indies or
the Indian Ocean or the South Pacific -- always carried guns,
and there are many accounts of the successful putting off of
privateer vessels or pirates in those waters.

All of this was done with the full knowledge of the
Government of the United States -- and it is a matter of fact
that the Government often sold their own guns to ship owners
for the use of the latter.

This was in complete conformity with the American
policy of the right of ships to sail the seas in freedom from
attack.

I am disgusted with recent editorials and cartoons
which imply that we have no obligation to protect ships flying
the Panama Flag. There is no question that today freedom of the
seas includes very definitely the protection of this Western
Hemisphere and all of the twenty-one Republics therein. All
these Republics have ships which fly their national flags on
the seas -- with the sole exception of Bolivia and Paraguay,
which are inland countries. It is even possible that Paraguay
has ships on the ocean which sail down the Rio Plato.

F.D.R.
Note in President's handwriting on the Secretary of State's birthday.

Dear Cordell:

Just realized it is your birthday.
You are still a mere stripling -- old Tennessee stock is proving that. Ever so many happy returns.

Affec.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Oct. 3, 41

My many thanks for your very kind note and the beautiful flowers.

C F
My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your memorandum of October 2 to the Secretary of the Treasury and to Mr. Morgenthau's memorandum to you of October 3 concerning a published report that the Italian Government would soon send jewels to Lisbon to be sent to the United States by clipper pouch to finance Italian agents in the Americas.

I note that the press report refers to the possibility of sending these jewels by clipper pouch. As you know the clipper planes crossing the Atlantic cell at Bermuda or Trinidad and the British censorship authorities have access to the mails. I am therefore bringing this press report informally to the attention of the British Ambassador in order that he may suggest to the appropriate authorities of the British Government that they be on the lookout for any activities of this kind on the part of the Italian Government.

Apart

The President,
The White House.
Apart from transportation by clipper planes referred to in the press article, there is the possibility of transportation by Italian planes of the Lati Service to South America. It is understood that some Italian pouches are sent to South America over this Service where they may be opened and rerouted to destinations in the Western Hemisphere. Mail which might proceed to the United States, however, would have to pass through British controlled points with the possible exception of an occasional one which might come through Panama and Mexico. It would, of course, be contrary to all understandings giving immunity to diplomatic pouches for the Italian Government to transport such jewels in diplomatic pouches to the United States. In any event, the British censorship authorities are understood to have access to practically all Italian mails destined to the United States, including probably diplomatic pouches.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Hyde Park, N. Y.,
October 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The enclosed came to me this morning and I wish you would take up the matter.

I will see the French Ambassador, if you so recommend, on Tuesday. I suggest about 4.30 P.M., and I think probably that it would be well for you to be present.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1941.

CABLE TO SAYRE

(TO GO THROUGH INTERIOR DEPT.)

State Department feels Manila such focal point at this time it is preferable postpone proposed visit. Also that when you make the trip you go to visit Gauss instead of as guest. Sumner suggests we ask Gauss to make brief visit to you for consultation in order to establish closer liaison in defensive preparations.

Furthermore I think you should be at Manila on account problems export and freezing controls in addition to general Far East activities.

F.D.R.

The original of this message sent to the Secretary of the Interior.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and general developments relating to the Far East, it is believed that Manila has at this time special significance as a focal point. It is therefore suggested that it would be preferable that Mr. Sayre postpone his proposed visit to Chungking. It is suggested further that when he makes a trip to Chungking he go to visit Ambassador Gauss rather than go as the guest of General Chiang Kai-shek.

In the meanwhile, might it not be well for me to suggest to Ambassador Gauss that he make a brief visit to Manila for purposes of consultation with Mr. Sayre? Such a visit at this time would have, it seems to me, two advantages: (1) Such a visit would be generally interpreted as directed toward establishing closer liaison between American defensive preparations in the Philippine Islands and this country's interest in China's
China's defensive activities, and (2) Mr. Gauss has been going through a specially trying period at Chung-king and would doubtless be considerably benefited by a brief change.

As you know, we now have a number of important problems relating to the Philippine Islands connected with our export and freezing controls. Also, there is the constant problem relating to coordination of our activities in the Far East and the activities of the British and the Dutch in that area. In reference to these problems the presence of Mr. Sayre at Manila seems advisable and, in view of their importance, there does not seem to be available a suitable replacement for Mr. Sayre at this particular juncture.

A proposed radio message to Mr. Sayre is attached for your consideration.

Enclosure:
Proposed radio message to Mr. Sayre.
The White House
Washington
October 22, 1941.

Memorandum for
The Secretary of State

For recommendation this afternoon or evening, if possible.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President, dated October 8, 1941, from United States High Commissioner Sayre, asking permission to accept invitation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to visit China sometime in December, if approved by the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR RECOMMENDATION THIS
AFTERNOON OR EVENING, IF POSSIBLE.

F. D. R.
October 22, 1941.

Radio message from the President to Mr. Sayre.

Referring to your personal and confidential letter of October 8.

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and of developments in general in and relating to the Far East, I believe that Manila has at this time unusual significance as a focal point and your work there is especially important. I therefore believe that it would be inadvisable for you to be absent at this time. I am considering suggesting that Ambassador Gauss make a visit to you.
Via airmail

October 8, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I have just received a letter from Mr. Owen Lattimore in Chungking dated September 21, 1941, saying:

"Now that the really bad bombing season in Chungking is over, and visitors need not feel that most of their time is likely to be spent in dugouts, the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek would like very much to have you and Mrs. Sayre come to China for a visit.

"Before sending a formal invitation, the Generalissimo has asked me to find out what time would suit you best. *** If I may add a word for myself, I should like to say how eagerly I hope that you will be able to come. Your visit would have the very greatest constructive value in Chinese-American relations."

Such a visit would have so direct a bearing upon Chinese-American relations that I do not feel that I ought to act in the matter without the advice of yourself and perhaps the State Department. I, myself, believe that such a visit would be useful in marking still closer cordiality and cooperation between China and the United States and might have a very wholesome and happy effect. On the other hand, you may feel that the international situation in the Pacific is so tense that you do not want me to leave Manila even for a short visit. What is your desire? If you approve of my going, would it be preferable to accept the invitation of the Generalissimo and go as his guest, or to go perhaps as the guest of Ambassador Gauss on a private visit to him? I shall greatly appreciate a radio from you letting me know what answer you would like me to give to the invitation of the Generalissimo.

If

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
If I go, the timing might be of some importance from the international standpoint. I should suggest the month of December unless you prefer some different time.

Such a visit would mean my being away from Manila presumably about two weeks. In this event, do you desire the appointment of an Acting High Commissioner? If so, I should suggest the appointment of Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, my Financial Adviser, or, if he is here by that time, Mr. Stewart McDonald, about whom I have written you and who, I hope, will be appointed as my Legal Adviser.

Everything is going smoothly here and the ship is sailing on even keel. Manila is becoming a crossroads in this part of the world and we have a continual stream of important visitors with whom I am glad to have the chance of making contacts. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Air Marshal in command of the British Forces in the Far East, was here over Sunday and day before yesterday Sir Earle Page, Minister in the Australian Cabinet, stopped over on his way from Australia via the United States to London. Each of them came to dine with me and I much enjoyed the chance of talking with them. This afternoon Mr. Merle Cochran, Special Assistant in the Treasury Department, arrives by plane on his way to China and in a few more days I expect to see Henry Grady, representative of the Federal Loan Agency, who is now in Hong Kong bound back for America.

With warmest wishes, believe me,

Ever sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Respectfully forwarded to the President:

[Signature]
THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

Via airmail

October 8, 1941.

My dear General Watson:

Will you be kind enough to give the enclosed letter to the President personally? I shall appreciate your kindness.

Ever sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1941

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Would you do some checking on Mr. Winton? He might be the answer.

F.D.R.

Letter from Wayne Johnson, 1 East 57th St., NYC, 10/19/41 to Hon. James H. Rowe, Jr., enclosing a personal history statement in re David J. Winton. Mr. Johnson recommends appt. of Mr. Winton to a Diplomatic post. Attached is a memorandum for the President from Mr. Rowe, 10/28/41, in re above, and stating that he understand the New Zealand post is still open.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Hyde Park, N. Y.,
November 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think it is of vital importance that you send a "pat on the back" to the Liberian Government for turning down this so-called French effort to get into Liberia. It is a key spot.

F. D. R.

State Department dispatch from Walton in Monrovia, dated Oct. 31, 1941, returned to the Secretary of State with this memo.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Do you think there is enough in this to have it leak to someone in this country to publish -- not any government organization or individual?

F. D. R.

Dispatch No. 506 from Stewart at Zurich, dated November 2, 1941; re the religious situation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM ROWE:

You were going to let me know about David Winton after you checked with Ed Flynn.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your memorandum regarding the attached correspondence on Mr. Winton I find the following:

He was a popular and well-liked member of his class in Princeton, who left school for service in the last World War, receiving the D.S.C. After the war he entered the lumber business in Minneapolis in which he has had a successful career. He is Vice President of the Blake School for Boys and is a Presbyterian. All of his contacts, associates and friends from whom comment has been received do not hesitate to endorse Mr. Winton and what he stands for.

C H
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The enclosed memorandum which was given to Bill Donovan has some merit in it, especially because it proposes to organize guerrilla warfare in North China. It is probably the kind of work that would not be successfully undertaken and put through by General Magruder's Commission.

I wish you would talk this over with Harry Stimson, then send for Donovan and tell him what you think.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of the Navy, 11/7/41, with enclosed list of French vessels in U.S. Ports, as of 11/1/41. The Secretary urges that notice of taking immediate possession of these ships be given to the French Govt. accompanied by a statement that, simultaneously we are depositing an amount of money with the banks equivalent to their fair value. States that the Normandie could be adapted quite readily to service as an aircraft carrier.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am inclined to think that this
should be paraphrased and sent to
Churchill for his information.

Evidently a copy has been sent
to Leahy who should, I think, get
the gist of it to Marshal Petain.

These sources have been fairly
reliable in the past.

F. D. R.

Dispatch No. 248 from Harrison
in Bern, dated November 7, 1941,
re the German intention to issue
this month a manifesto of European
solidarity based on the "freedom"
acquired through German conquests
in the East, etc.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of November 11, 1941, enclosing the recommendation from the Secretary of the Navy that notice of taking immediate possession of French vessels in United States ports, particularly the "Normandie", be given the French Government, I have given careful consideration to this recommendation. Before proceeding to requisition these vessels I believe that certain preliminary steps should be undertaken in the light of our present relations with the French Government.

The Maritime Commission has before it a proposal initiated by the French Government which would place five of the nine French vessels now immobilized in American ports into service under American

The President,

The White House.
American charter. The others would be utilized in an approved service. It would seem desirable to await the outcome of these negotiations before proceeding to requisition the vessels. If the negotiations fail because of the refusal of the German Armistice Commission to permit the French Government to dispose of its own vessels, we would then inform the French Government that it is not a free agent in this matter and proceed to take over these eight ships.

The "Normandie" has up to the present remained outside the scope of these discussions. I suggest that since the "Normandie" is of such importance to French prestige, we make a preliminary effort to purchase the vessel. I understand the Secretary of the Navy is prepared to pay a fair price, having in mind the original cost of the vessel which latter would be far in excess of any price it could command at the present time.

There is attached a telegram to Ambassador Leahy directing him to approach the French Government in this matter, which may be sent if you approve. If this course of action meets with your approval the Secretary of the Navy will be so informed.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure: 
Telegram to Vichy.

BRECKINKRIDGE LONG
November 13, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

VICHY.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

You are requested to inform Marshal Pétain that the question of the use of the French vessel NORMANDIE has become of urgent interest in this country on account of its continued immobilization and consequent deterioration at a time when shipping space is badly needed.

A proposal has been made by private interests in this country to purchase the vessel at its original cost (£40,000,000) which would be far in excess of any sum that could be realized by any other sale of the vessel at the present time. You should urge upon the Marshal favorable consideration of this proposal, pointing out that if some arrangement cannot promptly be made a situation could develop where it might be necessary for this Government to requisition the vessel. Before proceeding to do so, however, it would be preferable to explore immediately this suggested sale.

Eu:SR:NNB

FDR.
President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, undated, entitled "6 months."

Basis of possible agreement with Japan embodied in 4 points.

[Notation attached to the original: "Pencilled memorandum given by the President to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written shortly after November 20, 1941)"]

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, [Washington,]
November 26, 1941.

Proposes that he call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand
them a proposal for a general peaceful settlement and withhold
the **modus vivendi** proposal.

**SEE:** Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,

(This message was delivered orally by Hull and agreed to by FDR)
The White House
Washington

December 1, 1941

Memorandum for The President.

Minister to New Zealand

You wrote me some time ago about David Winton. Ed Flynn says he is all right. His paper record on foreign affairs looks very good. I have not personally checked him because I understand the State Department already has.

J.R.R.
James Rowe, Jr.

"C. R.
Seems O.K. - Why not go ahead?
F.D.R."

The original of this memorandum, together with original of President's memorandum of 11/10/41 to Mr. Rowe, with attached letter of 10/19/41, from Hon. Wayne Coy to Mr. James Rowe, enclosing personal history sheet of David J. Winton, in connection with consideration of Mr. Winton for Diplomatic post, sent to the Secretary of State as per President's notation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM ROWE:

Your were going to let me know about David Winton after you checked with Ed Flynn.

W.D.R.

Pencilled notations:
"New Zealand (?)
Also Radcliffe of Maryland"
Mr. James Rowe,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

I have finally gotten out of David J. Winton a fairly comprehensive personal history statement.

Would you please take it up with the President and put the thing in the works for investigation if the President thinks well of him.

I have written the President previously about him, and he is certainly the type of man who would fit well in our Diplomatic Service. He has a knowledge of what is going on and what it is all about. He has had excellent business experience. He would make a fine representative of this country.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

(Signed) WAYNE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I wish you would let me have a memorandum in regard to the status and communication facilities of certain Embassies, Legations
and Consular staffs because I am not wholly clear on this matter.

1. Where are the Embassy and Consular representatives of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Thailand?

2. Have any of these Embassies, Legations or Consular offices the privilege of sending any communication of any kind in code?

3. Have Spanish and French Embassies and Portuguese Legation the right to send in code and, if so, are we in any way monitoring such messages?
4. Are any of the above Embassies, Legations and Consuls being checked on their communications with Mexico, Cuba or other Central and South American Republics?

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

After a thorough canvass of the situation, I am inclined to believe that General Burns would be more useful here in carrying out Lend-Lease operations than if we sent him to Moscow as Ambassador.

What would you think of asking Joe Davies to go back to Moscow? I think Joe would be really persona grata, would have access to Stalin, and in a couple of weeks could get into complete touch with the airplane and tank situation. If you think well of this, will you speak to him?

F. D. R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 17, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Referring to your telegram of January 7 in regard to General Orgaz, High Commissioner for Spain in Morocco, the competent officials of the Department have fully discussed the suggestions made by the American Chargé d’Affaires at Tangier, and a background memorandum of information about General Orgaz has been prepared.

However, as any approach to General Orgaz would inevitably be met with a request for specific proposals or assurances on the part of the United States Government, I have requested the War Department to submit its views on the subject. As soon as a reply has been received, further study will be devoted to the problem.

Faithfully yours,

The President,  
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Your cable from Childs Tangier #4, January 5. I am inclined to agree with his suggestion about ORGAY. What can you work out on this.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Dear Cordell:

Enclosed has just come from the Prime Minister and I wish you would prepare a suggested reply.

You will remember that your last memorandum to me before the Prime Minister left, was what I gave him and he took my only copy with him. You might send another copy for my files.

F.D.R.

Halifax transmits message from the Prime Minister dated Jan. 23 on the subject of St. Pierre and Miquelon.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of January 31 (copy attached), there is enclosed a copy of an identical letter which is being sent to Senator Connally and Representative Bloom with respect to the declarations of war on the United States by Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Thailand.

[Signature]

[Handwritten note: CH]
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think that for the record it would be a rather ingenious thing to do if you were to send a letter to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations telling them that for their information Hungary and Roumania and Bulgaria and Siam have all declared war on the United States, giving the date of the action of each country. Then I would merely add that this is sent for the information of the Committees only and that in your judgment no action is necessary, either by the Congress or by the Executive Branch of the Government.

F. D. R.

P.S. If my boy Johnny were doing it he would add as a postscript "SO WHAT!"
February 7, 1942.

My dear Senator Connally:

The Department has previously advised you informally that Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania had declared war on the United States. However, in order that your information may be in more tangible form I have thought it desirable to supplement the informal communication as follows:

1. On December 12, 1941 the American Chargé at Bucharest was officially informed in writing by the Rumanian Foreign Office that Rumania was in a state of war with the United States.

2. On December 13 the American Minister at Budapest was informed by the Hungarian Prime Minister that Hungary considered war to exist between Hungary and the United States.

3. On December 13 the American Minister at Sofia reported that the Bulgarian Government had just declared to the Parliament that Bulgaria was in a state of war with the United States.

In a telegram dated February 2 from the American Chargé in Switzerland, it is reported that the Swiss Consul at Bangkok, who represents American interests in Thailand, had been informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a declaration of war on the United States had been made by the Government of Thailand as from noon of January 25.

This is sent for the information of your Committee. No special action is recommended at present, as these are merely declarations of war by four puppet governments.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

The Honorable
Tom Connally,
United States Senate.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think that for the record it would be a rather ingenious thing to do if you were to send a letter to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations telling them that for their information Hungary and Roumania and Bulgaria and Siam have all declared war on the United States, giving the date of the action of each country. Then I would merely add that this is sent for the information of the Committees only and that in your judgment no action is necessary, either by the Congress or by the Executive Branch of the Government!

F. D. R.

P.S. If my boy Johnny were doing it he would add as a postscript "SO WHAT!"
January 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Secretary:

The Thai Minister is coming in tomorrow. Undoubtedly he will refer to the fact that Thailand has now declared war on Great Britain and may do so on the United States (perhaps already has though we have no direct knowledge); and he will probably express the hope that we will ignore the action just as we have in the case of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

The Chinese Counselor of Embassy has called by to express the hope that nothing would be gained by our declaring war on Thailand.

My impression is that we ought to follow the policy in the case of Hungary, at least for the time being -- that is, simply ignore the situation. I propose telling the Thai Minister that we see no reason to be precipitate about taking cognizance of the declaration of war as things now stand -- unless you see some reason to the contrary.

A.A.B., Jr.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.
263, twenty-eighth.
AMERICAN INTERESTS THAILAND.
Department's 217, twenty-sixth.
Press reports Thailand declared war January 25.
If correct, Department may desire amend paragraph two of its 217 before request made by Legation for Swiss communication of message to Thai Government.
Please instruct.

HUBBLE

HD
JH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Huddle's dispatch from Bern, No. 495, dated February 10th, should be communicated at once to the British Embassy, if this has not already been done.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of State.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

For the Secretary of State from the President:

RE BASE LEASE NEGOTIATIONS ATTORNEY GENERAL TENTATIVELY SUGGESTS PROBABILITY PRESENT POWERS OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF ARE ADEQUATE TO CONTROL OUTGOING AND INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS UPON MILITARY RESERVATION STOP CONTROL OF BOTH AREA AND PERSONNEL THEREON IS PLINARY STOP EVEN IF STATUTE FORBIDS CENSORSHIP WHILE IN HANDS OF POSTAL SERVICE REGULATION OF RESERVATION PERSONNEL CAN PROHIBIT POSTING OR RECEIPT UNTIL PASSED BY CENSOR STOP THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE EFFECTIVE ONLY AS TO POSTING OR RECEIPT ON RESERVATION BUT ANY COMMUNICATION POSTED OR RECEIVED OUTSIDE WOULD OF COURSE BE SUBJECT BRITISH CONTROL BECAUSE BRITISH POSTAL SERVICE WOULD HAVE TO BE USED STOP PLEASE CHECK STATUTE ALSO CHECK WITH TOWNSEND OF JUSTICE AND ADVISE ANY DIFFERENCE WITH THIS VIEW STOP PREFER IF POSSIBLE TO ADVISE BRITISH THAT PRESENT POWERS ARE ADEQUATE RATHER THAN PROMISE TO SEEK LEGISLATION.

21 March 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have been thinking over your memorandum of April 28th in regard to Martinique.

I fully approve the civilian mission and the working for a peaceful settlement of the whole matter.

However, if it fails it would be necessary, before the meeting, for a complete arrangement with the Army and Navy in regard to any necessary action by them. We simply have not got the force to occupy the Capital of either Island without at least a week or two of preparation in order to concentrate the ships and troops.

In regard to the French cruisers and the aircraft carrier, I do not think we can afford to let them go peacefully on their way -- for the

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
very good reason that while they are not now in effective fighting condition, they would undoubtedly
(a) be stopped by the British on their voyage across the ocean or
(b) get into a French port where they could be put into good fighting shape within a couple of months.

I suggest, therefore, that if they be put up to Admiral Robert that the cruisers should not be sunk but that they should be demobilized within the harbor of Fort de France, continuing to fly the French flag and be restored to France at the end of the war. The French crews can live on board. All that is necessary is to lift out an essential part of their machinery.

Will you consult with the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral King and General Marshall on this before the mission leaves?

Let me know.

F. D. R.
Memorandum for the President

April 28, 1942.

Herewith is attached memorandum proposing method of dealing with the French authorities in command of French Caribbean Colonies. It is my present judgment that our mission sent to Martinique should not be accompanied by naval and other forces, but the mission should undertake to have a full peaceful conference with Admiral Robert, and if he does not agree at once we should have forces sufficiently near by to move in immediately so as to observe on the scene all developments. We could then give an ultimatum to Admiral Robert and support it by force if deemed advisable.

It has been suggested that on account of the lack of real value of the two French cruisers for any effective fighting purposes, it might be better to tell them to get out and go their way, rather than to have a shooting affair with them and French blood shed in order to sink and destroy them. There is something in this suggestion, in my opinion.

The mission
The mission should leave here at once for Martinique. Just as soon, therefore, as I hear from you on this proposal, I shall ask the mission to take steps to leave.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

April 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Proposed Method of dealing with the French authority in command of French Caribbean Colonies.

The following premises seem indicated in dealing with the situation prevailing in Martinique and the French Caribbean colonies:

(1) In view of the advent of Laval and his collaborationist declaration, it is impossible to leave these colonies in their present position. The commanding authority, Admiral Robert, while he has agreed with Admiral Horne that he will take no action changing the status quo without previous notification nevertheless insists that he remains subject to the orders of the Petain Government. Since these orders very probably will be dictated by Laval, this amounts to a potential enemy force inside an American defense area.

(2) A peaceful arrangement, if one can be made, is preferable to a forcible solution, because:

(a) It would avoid an armed clash tending to alienate sentiment in France;

(b) It would make possible orderly development of
of the economic life of the colonies, which is entirely dependent on the United States;

(c) It would avoid complications under the Monroe Doctrine arising from possible demands of the Free French, or the British to be placed in control;

(d) It would avoid complications arising from having to call a conference of the twenty-one American republics under the Act of Havana; and

(e) It would maintain the French flag and the sovereignty of the French people over these colonies.

(3) Prompt action appears to be required, because:

(a) Relations between the United States and Vichy may be expected to deteriorate rapidly, in part under the impetus of the break between Canada and Vichy.

(b) Further contact between the colonies and France or French Africa may lead to the infiltration of German or pro-German agents and elements, and there are indications now that these colonies are being used as a line of communication for German elements in South America;

(c) The threat of the French warships, though not great, nevertheless does immobilize a certain amount of American naval force.
It is recommended that:

(1) A mission consisting of Admiral Hoover, as Commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, and a representative of the State Department, be authorized to proceed at once to Martinique to confer with Admiral Robert and other appropriate French officials.

(2) Simultaneously, sufficient naval force be assembled so that, in case of necessity, French warships seeking to escape may be stopped, and so that, in case of absolute necessity, the naval force there may be overcome.

(3) Measures be taken capable of effecting full blockade of the French Caribbean colonies.

(4) The mission should be authorized to propose to Admiral Robert the following arrangement:

That provided certain conditions are met, the United States would be prepared to deal with Admiral Robert as the governing authority of these colonies, on behalf of France and under the French flag, but acting independently of the Vichy Government. Assurance might be given that in such case, the French administration will be maintained, and the Caribbean colonies will be preserved to the French flag. The gold and French Government funds held in the colonies will be frozen and held for the ultimate use of
of the French people, subject to the expressed needs of the local government.

The conditions should include:

Effective steps to immobilize the French warships now in the French West Indies;

The effective control of communications by American authorities. This would include not merely mail censorship, but also American personnel in control of all radio and cable communication.

Supervision of inter-island commercial traffic, immigration and travel.

Military and naval personnel now in the colonies should be immobilized, with the exception of forces needed for police purposes. Arrangements might be made to evacuate all or part of this personnel to French Africa.

French commercial vessels presently immobilized in the colonies should be made available on equitable terms for use by the United States.

The United States would enter into an economic arrangement to assure necessary supplies for the island, which should come solely from the United States or points chosen by the United States.
States. Such an agreement might likewise cover arrangements for trade under American supervision between these colonies, the neighboring islands, and the American mainland. Included in such agreement should be an understanding that the United States would purchase the principal exports of these colonies and thereby assist in maintaining the economic life of the colonies.

Stationing of appropriate American personnel in all of the various colonies to supervise the carrying out of the agreement.

The arguments which might be used with Admiral Robert are not detailed here. In brief, they would center on two points: First, that this probably is the only way by which the French flag can be kept flying over the French Caribbean colonies; and second, that Admiral Robert, whose loyalty is principally to Pétain, can no longer consider any orders, however signed, which he may receive from Vichy as being in fact the orders of Pétain, who has been virtually ousted from authority in the French state.

The Commission should be authorized to point out that the results it seeks to get must be attained in any event; it is therefore merely a question whether they must be attained
attained by economic or military pressure, or whether they can be attained peacefully. Should Admiral Robert, on personal grounds, desire not to negotiate such an arrange-
ment, the Commission should be authorized to permit him to depart for France, and to enter into a similar arrangement with the responsible officer who would be accepted as his successor and who would be prepared to assume the task.

In effect, this is an expansion of the Greenslade-
Robert and the Horne-Robert agreements. A copy of those agreements is already in the hands of the British and of the Canadian governments. Both have acquiesced in this procedure up to the present. It is believed that their acquiescence can be secured to the present procedure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Secretary Hull just dictated the following:

Foreign Minister Molotoff is due in London right away, evidently to close out the territorial agreement with the British.

This is going to be terrific in its effects, as you and I agree.

Do you not believe it advisable to communicate with Churchill urging that instead of taking title in fee simple to these little Baltic states, Russia establish a sort of protectorate and announce that that is solely for the purpose of defense against possible invasion in the future.

E.M.W.
2:43 p.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

If you approve of this telegram it can be sent.

F. D. R.
May 6, 1942

AMERICAN MISSION,
NEW DELHI.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
Your 263, May 4, 8 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR COLONEL

JOHNSON:

QUOTE I want you to know how much I appreciate your efforts to solve the difficult problems involved in the Indian situation. The position in India today is largely military. Therefore any proposal for settlement has to be weighed from the viewpoint whether, if successful, it would aid the military effort to an important extent and whether, if unsuccessful, it is likely to hamper that effort. As far as we can judge there is little chance that the formula which you propose would be acceptable to an important element in the Congress Party, even if it were accepted by some elements in the party, by other Indian groups and by the British. An unsuccessful attempt to solve the
problem along the lines which you suggest would, if we are to judge by the results of the Cripps mission, further alienate the Indian leaders and parties from the British and possibly cause disturbances among the various communities. On balance, therefore, I incline to the view that at the present moment the risks involved in an unsuccessful effort to solve the problem outweigh the advantages that might be obtained if a satisfactory solution could be found. UNQUOTE
May 7, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to Colonel Johnson's telegram, no. 263, of May 4, 9 p.m., addressed to you and the Secretary, in which Colonel Johnson submits a formula whereby he hopes that a settlement of the Indian problem, at least for the duration of the war, may be effected. The formula involves agreement by the British to changes in the method of functioning of the Viceroy's Executive Council and of the Central Legislature, and the creation of a national government in India through collaboration by those Indian nationalist leaders who might be willing to participate in the war effort against the Japanese.

Colonel Johnson's untiring efforts to improve the political situation in India are deeply appreciated by the Department. It is felt, however, that the problem in India is today largely military and that, even if successful, the scheme as proposed by Colonel Johnson might

The President,
The White House.
might not materially improve the military position. In addition, further discussion of the political situation must excite communal feeling and unrest already intensified by the failure of the Cripps mission. A second failure might well create a situation which would further and seriously impede efforts at defense of the country. The attached telegram has therefore been drafted for dispatch to Colonel Johnson in the event it meets with your approval.

Faithfully yours,

Summer Welles

Enclosure:

Draft telegram to Colonel Johnson.

545.01/176 Conf.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I suggest on Page #3, after
the paragraph about French crews
living on board the French war
ships, that there be added a
sentence "That the United States
will arrange for the repatriation
of any French military, naval or
civilian persons wishing to
return to France.

At the bottom of Page #3,
I am not certain about a forty-
eight hour ultimatum. I think
this could be changed to a
request for an immediate reply.

On Page #4, the same thing
would apply in the proposed
written statement to be handed
to Admiral Robert.

F. D. R.
The Secretary:

I have seen the telegram you sent Louis Johnson yesterday after you had spoken with the President. In the light of this report, however, do you not think it would be wise to authorize him to come home?
ELF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi
Dated May 14, 1942.
Rec'd 4:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
282, May 14, 10 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

Operated on at Irwin Hospital last Monday and physical condition causes English, Indian and American Army doctors and agree highly imperative I should leave India at once for urgent additional medical attention in United States. Papers here have given report of operation and indicated I would return to America temporarily. Will issue statement saying I am returning for consultations and I am sure there will be no misinterpretation here (Department's 197, May 13, 3 p.m.). I am personally convinced that results may be fatal if after this illness I do not follow uniform medical advice and get away from the dust and to American hospital at earliest date. This is more imperative than first cable would indicate. Have tentative arrangement transportation tomorrow Friday and will appreciate confirming cable in light of the above explanation.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scholzle Date       MAR 3 1972

JOHNSON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

In reference to this suggestion of Kirk in his No. 810, May 19th, I am inclined to believe it is an excellent one.

I have known General Smuts since we were together in London in the Summer of 1918, and I have maintained a desultory correspondence with him every since. He is a truly great man.

What would you think of our inviting him to come here sometime this Summer, at his convenience? He could fly here and back very easily. Even though there is no especially important thing to take up with him, such a visit would do good and I cannot see that there could be any particular objection.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

The Secretary of State telephoned to say that Lord Halifax had called up to say that the British and the Soviets had signed their Treaty this morning. They signed it virtually as it was sent to us by Winant and they said that it would be satisfactory to all.

You will recall that in that Treaty, which I gave to you this morning, the section as noted as possibly relating to the territorial question but not expressing referring to it. While I had assumed that the British and the Soviets would imply something in that section that would give authority to deal with the territorial question, the statement of Lord Halifax to the effect that the British consider it to be satisfactory and it was intended to omit the territorial question.

In other words, it would seem that out of deference to our protest they have omitted the troublesome territorial question from the Treaty.

C. H.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Secretary of State just telephoned to say that he is sending over a draft of a Message to Congress recommending the recognition of a condition of a state of war between the United States and Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania. The Secretary hopes it will meet with your approval.

The Secretary also said that he and his associates think it would be unfortunate if we did not have an arrangement with the Soviet Foreign Minister to let us have a newsreel made to give out here at the same time he gives one out on his return to Moscow. He thinks the Press, etc., will be very disappointed if this is not done.

G. G. T.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In view of Steinhardt's conversation with Saracoglu, I still think that it would be a pious idea to lend-lease these four planes to Turkey or else tell the Turks that if they use them for transport purposes, the United States will not make a diplomatic episode out of it!

F. D. R.
June 17, 1942.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your private and confidential memorandum of June 9 in regard to the High Commissionership to the Philippines, I see no objection to acceptance of Sayre's resignation on June 30. There would probably be some advantage in making the new appointment promptly, although if this should not prove feasible the situation would probably be taken care of satisfactorily by your letting it be known that you intended to fill the position.

With regard to the question of devising some way by which a new High Commissioner would get only a portion of the salary, I am enclosing a memorandum prepared by our legal people which may be useful to you and others concerned with this problem.

The situation is not clear-cut, but seems to be about as follows:

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972
No one (with perhaps the exception of the persons mentioned in the last paragraph) could be appointed to the position of High Commissioner without his being legally entitled to full salary. Any appointee could, of course, agree to waive any portion of his salary. Retired Army and Navy officers could be appointed to the position while retaining their status on the retired list; such an officer might more readily agree to waive the High Commissioner's salary or a portion thereof.

A member of the staff of the High Commissioner or an officer of the Army or Navy could be appointed Acting High Commissioner and need not receive any salary other than his salary as a member of the staff or as an Army or Navy officer.

There is a possibility that certain Ambassadors and Ministers who are unable to function at their posts because of the existing emergency and whose compensation would be limited by law to $9,000 per annum might be appointed either as High Commissioner or as Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure:
Memorandum.
Of course, the President has legal authority to appoint any person to the office and with the title of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines with the advice and consent of the Senate and subject to the law prohibiting appointment to an office to which compensation is attached if the appointee already holds an office with compensation of $2,500 per annum. Under this law appointments would be limited to (1) persons holding no office under the Government, (2) persons whose office carries compensation of less than $2,500, and (3) Army and Navy officers on the retired list.

Any person appointed to the office and with the title of the United States High Commissioner would be legally entitled to demand the full salary of the office, but if the person selected agreed to accept a smaller salary there would appear to be no legal objection to such procedure.

Some of the difficulties incident to an appointment to the office and title of High Commissioner at a salary less than the full salary of the office might not arise if someone were designated to act as United States High Commissioner. Specific authority for such designation
is contained in Title 48, Section 1237(b), United States Code, under which the President is authorized to "designate a member of the staff of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands or an officer of the Army or Navy of the United States to act as the High Commissioner in the event of a vacancy in said office."

Pursuant to this authorization the President could direct that the person designated as Acting High Commissioner receive only the salary of his office as a member of the High Commissioner's staff or as an Army or Navy officer.

With a view to examining all possibilities, reference is also made to the first deficiency appropriation act approved April 1, 1941 (Title 22, Section 41, United States Code), which provides that any one of certain Ambassadors or Ministers who are unable, because of the existing emergency, to function at their posts "may be appointed or assigned to serve in any capacity in which a Foreign Service officer is authorized by law to serve". Salary under such authorization is expressly limited to $9,000 per annum. While it is not entirely clear whether the authorization of this act would justify the appointment of one of these Ambassadors or Ministers as United States
States High Commissioner to the Philippines, it cannot be said that such an appointment would conflict with the authorization, since the High Commissioner to the Philippines might be regarded as performing a function comparable to that of a diplomatic representative (also because there is already legal authority for the assignment of Foreign Service officers to the Philippine Islands to perform the functions customarily performed by Foreign Service officers and to advise and assist the High Commissioner (Title 48, Section 1238(a), United States Code)).

Should it be considered advisable to appoint someone as Acting High Commissioner, one of these Ambassadors or Ministers might be so appointed -- especially if he were first made a member of the staff of the High Commissioner.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the attached telegram of July 1 from Ambassador Winant, you are aware that for some time we have been considering the question of the adherence of Ethiopia to the Declaration by United Nations. I shall send you shortly the views of the Department.

C H
HEI
This telegram must be
closedly paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated July 1, 1942
Rec'd 6:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3666, July 1, 9 p.m.
Department's telegram No. 2321, May 23, 1 p.m.

We were informed at the Foreign Office this
morning that the Emperor of Ethiopia has through the
British Minister at Addis Abebe expressed his desire
to adhere to the United Nations declaration and has
inquired the views of the Foreign Office both as to
such adherence and as to the procedure. The Foreign
Office is raising no objection to such proposed adher-
ence and is suggesting that the Emperor communicate
directly with the President. We gather that while the
views of the Foreign Office as set forth in the Embas-
sy's telegram No. 2967, May 27, midnight, as to the
possible embarrassment of such adherence have not
changed, it certainly does not desire to place any
obstacle in the way of the Negus adherence. In fact
this was so implied by Eden recently in the House of
Commons (Embassy's despatch No. 4372, June 29).

JRL
WINANT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The more I think of it the more I feel that we should say nothing about the Near East or Palestine or the Arabs at this time. If we pat either group on the back, we automatically stir up trouble at a critical moment. Furthermore, the question of arms for Palestine ought not to be mentioned because it is impossible from the military point of view to get them just now.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCINTYRE:

Mr. Gray in Secretary Hull's office phoned the following which he says the Secretary would like to have the President's approval on. Says perhaps it could be read to the President over the phone or sent up by wire and they would like an answer as soon as convenient.

"The Secretary would like to issue this as a statement or declaration and wanted me to say that it has his approval and the approval of his colleagues in the Department including the Legal Adviser, Mr. Hackworth.

DECLARATION OR STATEMENT

"Some uncertainty appears to exist as to the attitude of the government of the United States toward the peoples of the Near East, with particular reference to their future. It is therefore desirable to make known this government's attitude, which is as follows:

"The war objectives of the government as stated in the Atlantic Charter include the 'desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned' and respect for 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.'

"This government is of course dedicated to the application of these principles in the Near East as elsewhere. In Palestine, despite past difficulties, it is highly desirable that a political solution be reached through agreement between the Arab and Jewish communities and this government earnestly hopes that outstanding problems will be settled on that basis."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1942

VERY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR BILL HASSETT

Mr. Hull would appreciate as speedy action on this as possible.

MMH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McINTYRE

Mr. Gray in Secretary Hull's office phoned the following which he says the Secretary would like to have the President's approval on. Says perhaps it could be read to the President over the phone or sent up by wire and they would like an answer as soon as convenient.

"The Secretary would like to issue this as a statement or declaration and wanted me to say that it has his approval and the approval of his colleagues in the Department including the legal adviser, Mr. Hackworth.

"Declaration or Statement"

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"This Government is of course dedicated to the application of these principles in the Near East as elsewhere. In Palestine, despite past difficulties, it is highly desirable that a political solution be reached through agreement between the Arab and Jewish communities, and this Government earnestly hopes that outstanding problems will be settled on that basis.

"The record shows that the Axis powers have repeatedly and cynically dishonored their promises and engagements. Therefore it is inconceivable that any Near Eastern peoples place [REDACTED] either faith or credence in them. The Axis aggressors threaten the extension and maintenance of freedom in the Near East; consequently increased participation in the war effort by all Near Eastern peoples would be in their own interest and naturally would be welcomed by the United States Government.

"The participation of the peoples of Palestine in the war effort obviously presents a difficult problem. The British
Government as the mandatory is responsible for the defense of Palestine. It is understood that the British army is open to able-bodied Palestinians, and that numbers of them have already enlisted. However, if it should be deemed preferable to form separate Arab and Jewish military units and if the necessary equipment can be made available, such an arrangement would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. In the same way that United States forces are used wherever danger threatens these units would be utilized, under United Nations command wherever their services are required.
July 10, 1942.

C. H.

Some food for babies to Belgium via Lisbon?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 21, 1942

It is assumed that this refers to an interchange between this Department and the British Foreign Office on the subject of code-breaking activities. No such activities are carried on in this Department.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE:

Some time ago the Prime Minister stated that our cipher experts of the United States and British Navies were in close touch but that he was under the impression that there was not a similar intimate interchange between our State Department and the Foreign Office. I wonder if you could take this up with the British Ambassador and let me know.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

King Peter gave this to me when he came to say good-bye. I am inclined to think that we should take some action -- possibly a public warning to the Bulgarian and Hungarian Governments, using a part or all of King Peter's letter.

Will you take this up with the Yugoslav Minister?

F. D. R.

Letter from King Peter to Pres. July 22 in which he tells of latest reports on conditions in Yugoslavia, tragic accounts of cruelties, persecutions, death which he asks the Pres. to find a way to compel enemy to stop slaughter.
MEMORANDUM FOR

CORDELL HULL:

Private and Confidential

I talked with Claude Pepper about Bert Fish. Claude says that two months ago Fish had a very complimentary letter from Sumner Welles, but Claude fears that in some way Sumner has acquired a "down" on Fish. Claude Pepper will send a note to Fish at once telling him to get in better reports and put some enthusiasm into his staff.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

A-3

July 28, 1942

Mr. Secretary:

At the present time Lisbon is obviously a post of first-rate importance, particularly from the point of view of gathering information. We are receiving little or none of this information and the reason, as reported to us from a number of sources, official and unofficial, is simply that our Minister, Mr. Bert Fish, leads the life of a recluse and refuses to have any effective contacts with Salazar, the Foreign Office or with anybody else in a position to give information. Furthermore, Mr. Fish's attitude towards the work of his staff is such that they are seriously hampered and discouraged in any effort to supplement his inadequacies. The result is that our Legation is not playing the part which it should play under present circumstances.

G. Howland Shaw
Mr. President:

You said you wanted to be reminded to call Senator Pepper today about this.

GOT
August 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Referring again to your suggestion that Tuck at Vichy endeavor to ascertain Darlan's position with respect to the reported possibility of turning over French submarines to the Germans, I call your attention to telegram from Vichy no. 1117, July 31, 7 p.m., a copy of which is hereto attached.

Any further data received on this subject will be communicated to you at once.

C. Hull

File will be found in France Folder — 1-42
Memorandum for the President

Mr. S. Stanwood Menkin, whom you personally know, accompanied by Senator Murray of Montana, came in and desired that you and I, and other appropriate officials, become acquainted without delay with his plan, which is hereto attached, for a truce pending the establishment of Indian sovereignty.

Mr. Menkin said that he would be in readiness to call on you or any of us, in the event that this proposition appeared to be feasible to any practical extent.

I made clear to him that the British and the Indians under Gandhi's leadership were absolutely firm in their respective positions, one of which was freedom now, and the other was independence in accordance with the Cripps proposal, and that you had given every possible attention to every suggestion for a friendly adjustment, but had found both sides adamant, etc. etc.
A Plan For A Truce Pending
The Establishment of
Indian Sovereignty

by

S. Stanwood Merdin
A PLAN FOR A TRUCE PENDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY

Mr. Gandhi has said that he would appeal to the United States, first at one time and then another, and now suggests that he would appeal to us and China as arbiters of the destiny of his country. This opening should be taken advantage of in view of desperate conditions.

The British certainly cannot back down before Gandhi; and Gandhi and his followers would lose prestige, if he willingly abandoned his position at this time, unless new proposals were presented.

The following plan is conceived with the idea, subject of course to England's approval, of giving England a chance to obtain its objective in the main and to take definite steps toward India's sovereignty immediately as an answer to the "Freedom Now" cry of the National Party Congress. If the start can be made at once, the hope is

* 1 *

* 1 *
that such a course would be acceptable to Mr. Gandhi and his associates and terminate the present passive resistance.

To do this, it is suggested that there be presently created a Committee with final authority to deal with the entire Indian situation. What I suggest would be the presentation of a plan by our State Department, under the direction of the President, for the establishment of a Planning Committee for India, directed and pledged to immediately take up the basis of India's sovereignty and all related governmental questions. The membership of this Board might be three members of the National Party (Hindus), one representative of the Moslems, a representative of the "depressed people" and one from the Chamber of Princes, which would give India six members. I would suggest that England and the United States each have three members. It might be that President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Viceroy, be considered ex officio members of the body without voting power. The voting
control of the Committee on this basis should be reasonably protective to both China and England.

The ability and philosophy of the personnel of the Commission will determine its success. It should be composed of forward-looking men with broad concepts of the right of the future citizens of a free world, and who while respecting treaty obligations of Britain and hereditary vested rights to office and property, would be ready to boldly take the essential steps to terminate privilege, providing reasonable compensation for loss of property. New India is entitled to a New Deal, provided its people rise to the responsibilities of democracy. It cannot start its statehood weighted down by premedieval burdens, traditions, and autocratic control.

Preliminaries:

This Committee should immediately proceed to India, provided:

(a) That Mr. Gandhi agrees to postpone all further passive resistance and

* 3 *
pledges himself not to take any steps in the interval in preparation for its renewal.

(b) That Britain releases Mr. Gandhi and other followers now in prison.

(c) That both parties adopt the principle of the status quo prior to August 8th and abandon propaganda while the Committee is in session.

Work of the Committee in General Outline:

Britain has stated repeatedly since 1935 that India could make its own constitution, provided it respected minorities and British treaty obligations. The first question for the Committee should be to determine whether India is to be a single country or divided, much as Africa is, into separate states. The so-called Communal Question is not as simple as it seems, owing to the intermingling of Hindus and Moslems, but with all working towards a common end, geographic adjustments would be arrived at.
The question of the various territories ruled over by the princely class, with more or less degree of control, varying with treaty obligations of Britain, is difficult especially as the National Party Congress will undoubtedly claim that much territory included within certain princely domains has no historic justification and has been so adjusted for administrative purposes. A partition of the country into varied states would be a problem not without acrimony, but there should be some reasonable geographic, linguistic and historical grounds for compromise or at least trial.

This question resolved, the Committee will be able to consider

(a) The separate constitutions for each state;

(b) The relations of one state with another; and

(c) The building of a central body representative of all India, resulting in the extent and operation of dominion status. (This may not be essen-
tial, but it has international, definitive and economic advantages. Checks and balances as planned for our state and federal governments could be provided.)

(d) Administration of the several governmental units.

This brings up the question that underlies all Indian problems and that is the 60,000-000 in the "depressed classes" and the safeguarding of their welfare on a truly democratic basis. They must be protected and yet cannot be segregated in a single country or state of their own. (The attitude of the Brahmins to the Untouchables will require delicate treatment.)

Another problem is the economic one—improvement of the standard of living. Economics, currency, interstate relations, tariff barriers, if any, limitation of state armament, social questions, foreign relations, national defense and many other basic questions, all determining factors of India's future, must be worked out by the Planning
Committee in association with the best minds in the English service, and, the many well educated native Indians.

This plan, once outlined and developed, with an adjustable agenda, should be fully gone into by the Committee in a spirit satisfying Mr. Gandhi that immediate sovereignty is just around the corner. He would have every reason to accept our pledge with the conviction that India will gain far more under this plan than through civil war, political or social conflict.

England should promptly provide for cooperation in making constitutional and legal changes, approved by the Committee, as necessary to India when free dominion status is granted.

One of the difficulties of the Indian situation is that no one knows quite whom Mr. Gandhi represents. The matter of franchise in India or in allied states is undetermined, and, as education is the cornerstone of democracy, it may well be that its suffrage be limited to those qualified by education or experience.
This is a bare outline of a tentative plan. It is an absurdity to suggest a detailed charter for 400,000,000 people covering a territory as great as Europe, excluding Russia, and yet the undersigned has had the temerity to present the above with full knowledge of its shortcomings. His motivating principle has been that desperate situations require bold remedies.

S. Stanwood Menken.

August 11th, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Secretary Hull called to say that he earlier this morning, before your message from Currie was received by him, dictated a memorandum of reply to the Generalissimo which he thought you could use as a basis. He is also preparing a reply to your message from Currie.

GGT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1942.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE:

This came in five days ago from Atlee in the absence of his chief.

Frankly, I think it is best not to reply to it.

What is your view?

F.D.R.

Secret text of message for the Pres. from Mr. Attlee, dated Aug. 7 regarding India and the British Govt. attitude, etc.

See India Folder for this message referred to.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR EYES ONLY. PLEASE
RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

Let. to the Pres. from Ambassador Biddle
confidential information a report dated
"Buenos Aires, Aug. 7" which was received
from secret sources in the Argentine.

(Returned & in Biddle folder)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
Dear Mr. President:

I am grateful beyond measure for the fine sentiments contained in your birthday greetings. I cannot thank you in terms at all sufficient. I am, however, everlastingly appreciative of what you say.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.
Oct. 2, 1942

(In President's handwriting)

Dear Cordell --

Ever so many Happy Returns of the Day --
Keep up the grand work.

Affec.

F.D.R.

(The Secretary of State)
Cordell Hull
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What would you think of Paul Appleby to go to India as head of our Mission?

F. D. R.
November 11, 1942.

FROM: THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

TO: THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

A letter dated November tenth from the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed to Mr. Milo Perkins, Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare, has come to my attention. It suggests that Mr. Perkins initiate conversations with the Washington representatives of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare in regard to economic measures to be taken in North Africa.

This letter should not have gone to the BEW but should have been addressed to the Secretary of State.

It is obvious that all matters relating to economic measures in North Africa fall directly into the larger field of foreign relations.

Please withdraw the letter to Mr. Perkins and send a similar letter to the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State will, of course, then, with full cooperation of BEW, Lend-Lease and other organizations, discuss this matter with the British representatives.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to The Joint Chiefs of Staff. (The envelope was addressed to Brig. Genl. John R. Deane, Secy., The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Public Health Bldg.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Vice President asked that you be given the following message right away:

"I understand Secretary Hull has some very strong convictions with regard to the administration of civilian life in North Africa. Many other people in the Executive Branch of the Government also have strong convictions. Let me suggest before you arrive at a firm decision, that you have some level-headed person like Harold Smith make recommendations to you. The entire structure of the post war world may depend in considerable measure on the way in which this matter is handled in North Africa."
The attached communication from the Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Mr. Milo Perkins states first that General Eisenhower has been instructed to leave, so far as possible, political and economic matters to "the appropriate branches of the civil government", and second, directs Mr. Perkins to get in touch with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and arrange for such action as may be necessary in the economic field. Such result will, in my opinion, produce confusion in political and economic decisions in North Africa. It is impossible to separate political and economic decisions and action in that area. Mr. Perkins, I understand, has already offered to attach some of his personnel to General Eisenhower's staff.

As I understand it, Mr. Murphy has been attached to General Eisenhower as the personal representative of the President, responsible to the President for political decisions and responsible to General Eisenhower in the field. I earnestly recommend that all political and economic personnel and activity in North Africa be centralized under Mr. Murphy's direction and control. To
that end I recommend that all civilian personnel sent to North Africa so far as possible be covered under the Auxiliary Foreign Service and placed under Mr. Murphy's orders, and that all communication with agencies of the government be by Mr. Murphy in order to insure unified policy and action. Among the senior appointments would be an officer to be selected by the Secretary of State to exercise under Mr. Murphy, and in agreement with the military, general direction of our economic and financial activities in that area. I also recommend that if it should be necessary for Mr. Murphy to use channels of communication other than through the Department of State, the War and Navy Departments be instructed to forward communications for other agencies through the Department of State at the Washington end.
November 16, 1942

My dear Cordell:

I am referring to our conversation the other day concerning the economic, political and fiscal questions which were developing in the wake of the advancing American armies in North Africa. While our conversation related especially to developments in that particular area, it is very apparent that similar or similar problems will develop throughout the world as the scene changes. While it is a Mediterranean question today, it will later be extended to Pacific and to other areas.

Consequently, the policies of our Government will develop towards dependent and independent peoples under the relevant parts of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

All this concerns foreign relations and international cooperation in the immediate present and after the war, and involves both political and economic elements.

As the conduct of these affairs lies in your hands, you have my full authority to designate to serve under you a person to whom you will look to carry out our policies.

You, yourself, have full authority to secure the cooperation of persons in your Department and can make such transfers as you deem necessary.

You are hereby authorized to draw upon any of the other departments or agencies of the Government for any assistance that may be needed.

I consider that full cooperation and coordination is not only important but is necessary to the proper fulfillment of our objectives in the field of foreign relations.

Very sincerely yours,

(Franklin D. Roosevelt)

Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State,Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

This is the matter I talked to you about last night.

If you think it will be helpful I know the President will be glad to sign it.

If not, please don't hesitate to say so.

[Signature]

R. H. McINTERE
Secretary to the President

Attachment
November 17, 1942

My dear Cordell:

I am reverting to our conversation the other day concerning the economic, political and fiscal questions which were developing in the wake of the advancing American armies in North Africa. While our conversation related especially to developments in that particular area, it is very apparent the same or similar problems will develop throughout the world as the scene changes. While it is a Mediterranean question today, it will later be extended to Pacific and to other areas.

Consequently, the policies of our Government will develop towards dependent and independent peoples, towards economic questions involving raw materials, towards free opportunity for trade, and towards varying problems of relief, both as a humanitarian and as a political instrument in the immediate future and over an extended period.

All this concerns foreign relations and international cooperation in the immediate present and after the war, and involves both political and economic elements.

As the conduct of these affairs lies in your hands, you have my full authority to designate to serve under you a person to whom you will look to carry out our policies.

You, yourself, have full authority to secure the cooperation of persons in your Department and can make such transfers as you deem necessary.

You are hereby authorized to draw upon any of the other departments or agencies of the Government for any assistance that may be needed.

I consider that full cooperation and coordination not only important but is necessary to the proper fulfillment of our objectives in the field of foreign relations.

Very sincerely yours,

Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
November 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

This is the matter I talked to you about last night.

If you think it will be helpful I know the President will be glad to sign it.

If not, please don't hesitate to say so.

M. E. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

Attachment: Rough draft, per attached copies, with pencilled correction by FDR.

[Handwritten note: [Intaglio] This file held [Signature]
My dear Cordell:

I am reverting to our conversation the other day concerning the economic, political and fiscal questions which were developing in the wake of the advancing American armies in North Africa. While our conversation related especially to developments in that particular area, it is very apparent the same or similar problems will develop throughout the world as the scene changes. While it is a Mediterranean question today, it will later be extended to Pacific and to other areas.

Consequently, the policies of our Government will develop towards dependent and independent peoples, towards economic questions involving raw materials, towards free opportunity for trade, and towards variating problems of relief, both as a humanitarian and as a political instrument in the immediate future and over an extended period.

All this concerns foreign relations and international cooperation in the immediate present and after the war, and involves both political and economic elements.

As the conduct of these affairs lies in your hands, you have my full authority to designate to serve under you a person to whom you will look to carry out our policies.

You, yourself, have full authority to secure the cooperation of persons in your Department and can make such transfers as you deem necessary.

You are hereby authorized to draw upon any of the other departments or agencies of the Government for any assistance that may be needed.

I consider that full cooperation and coordination as not only important but is necessary to the proper fulfillment of our objectives in the field of foreign relations.

Very sincerely yours,

Honorable Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
I am reverting to our conversation the other day concerning the economic, political and fiscal questions which were developing in the wake of the advancing American armies in North Africa. While our conversation related especially to developments in that particular area, it is very apparent the same or similar problems will develop throughout the world as the scene changes. While it is a Mediterranean question today, it will later be extended to Pacific and to other areas.

Consequently, the policies of our Government will develop towards dependent and independent peoples, towards economic questions involving raw materials, towards free opportunity for trade, and towards variegating problems of relief, both as a humanitarian and as a political instrument in the immediate future and over an extended period.

All this concerns foreign relations and international cooperation in the immediate present and after the war, and involves both political and economic elements.

As the conduct of these affairs lies in your hands, you have my full authority to designate to serve under you a person to whom you will look to carry out our policies. You are free to secure the cooperation of persons within your own Department or from private life and you are authorized to draw upon any of the other Departments or agencies of the Government for the assistance
assistance you may need.

I consider full cooperation and coordination as not only important but necessary to the proper fulfillment of our objectives in the field of foreign relations.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Frankly, I think it would be a mistake to send this letter to
Ambassador Gauss because of two things:

a. I think this letter is stringing him along for an indefinite period;

b. I really think we must replace him and I think it would be simpler to find his successor
and then bring him back to the State Department to work for awhile in the Far Eastern
Division as a consultant.

In my judgment, the sole question is the selection of his successor followed
by letting him down easy and easing him out of his post via the State Department.

What do you think?

F. D. R.
November 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed a draft letter to Ambassador Gauss at Chungking for your consideration. If you approve and return it to me after signature I will have it forwarded to Mr. Gauss by diplomatic air pouch.

In reaching a decision on whether or not to send this letter you will, I think, wish to bear in mind that, if sent, it will have the effect of giving Mr. Gauss a more or less indefinite period to bring about an improvement and consequently would make difficult any removal of him in the near future should you be intending to make such a move. Also, there is the question of calling Gauss home for "consultation" and thus giving him a much needed furlough.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Draft letter.

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1942

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What would you think of putting Francis Sayre into Judge Moore's old place, as Counsellor?

F. D. R.

/DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3, 1972
My dear General Watson,

Will you please give this letter to the President? I shall appreciate your getting it to him as soon as possible.

Ever sincerely,

[Signature]

Oct. 4, 1942
Oct. 4, 1942

My dear Mr. President,

I have been trying to see you since my return to Washington last month, but I realize how pressed and burdened you are and am therefore sending this brief note.

In your letter to the last June you wrote that my release from the post of High Commissioner to the Philippines "is merely a commutation, since we have a mutual understanding that you are available for any call that is made on you in this war effort."

I am eager to be put to use. No man should be idle at this time. Once before I spoke to you about serving on the Supreme Court Bench. Justice Byrnes resignation
has raised this question again in my mind. Since I spoke to you I have given up my legal residence in Massachusetts, which overcomes that difficulty.

The idea has also occurred to me of throwing myself into work and planning for post-war economic reconstruction. I suppose this would mean an appointment in the State Department, possibly to Judge Moore's old position as Counselor.

Very possibly you have in mind some other better idea. I do want to serve the country under your great leadership through these crucial days, and should appreciate the chance of a short conference with you.

Ever sincerely yours,

Frank B. Sayre
My dear Mr. President:

When in August we discussed the relief program for territories occupied by United Nations forces it was decided that study and preparatory work should be pressed forward intensively, that all of the United Nations should be invited at an appropriate time to join on a fair and equitable basis in a relief and rehabilitation program to be commenced as soon as the aggressors began to be driven from occupied countries, but that until that point was reached publicity or formal discussion of administrative details should be avoided.

Our domestic preparatory work has, as you know, made rapid progress. The British and Chinese Governments have informally accepted in principle our draft of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, with certain suggestions, and a similar reply from the Soviet Government is anticipated shortly. This progress, the favorable

The President,
The White House.
development of the war, and Governor Lehman's appointment
to "undertake the work of organizing American participation
in the activities of the United Nations in furnishing relief
and other assistance to the victims of war in areas re-
occupied by the forces of the United Nations," leads me now
to suggest for your approval the following outline of steps
to be taken in the international field.

As soon as a favorable reply is received from the
Soviet Government our draft agreement, amended in so far
as may appear desirable in accordance with the suggestions
of the British, Chinese and Soviet Governments, will be
communicated to the representatives here of the Governments
of the occupied countries and by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross
to the representatives of those Governments on the Inter-
Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements in London.
Shortly thereafter a draft, with possible further revisions,
will be communicated to the representatives here of the
other United Nations and invitations issued to a conference
of the United Nations to discuss the problem here at an
early date.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
FDR to Secy State, 12/12/42
published in Elliott Roosevelt,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In further reference to the desire of the Pope that Rome be not bombed, I really think that England and the United States could agree not to bomb Rome on condition that the City itself, outside of the Vatican, be not used in any shape, manner or form either by the Germans or the Italians for war purposes.

I understand that today most of the Italian Departments have left Rome with their civil and military personnel, but that Germans, who are of course all military, are using Rome as their central headquarters.

I should think that we might consider that it is up to the Vatican itself to propose that Rome be demilitarized. If that is accomplished there is no reason for us to bomb it.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM MYRON TAYLOR

December 17, 1942

I am attaching hereto a memorandum, being a paraphrase of a message received by the Apostolic Delegate from Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione for the Vatican on the subject of the immunity of Rome from aerial bombardment, and the photostat of an article on the same subject which appeared in the New York Journal of December 12. I believe you will find them of interest.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM

In a recent communication to His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, on the subject of the immunity of Rome from aerial bombardment, the Apostolic Delegate suggested that the Holy See take steps to impede any provocation on the part of the Axis powers which would lead to an attack on the city of Rome, the See of the Holy Father and the center of Catholicism. The Apostolic Delegate further indicated that for the purpose of obtaining such immunity it would be well to counsel the removal of all military objectives from the city.

His Eminence Cardinal Maglione has now replied that the Holy See has already undertaken negotiations with the Italian Government for this purpose. In fact the Government of Italy, on December 13th, gave oral but nonetheless official assurance to the Holy See that the Supreme Command and the General Staff of the armed forces, together with the Premier, were about to leave Rome.

His Eminence states that the Minister of His Britannic Majesty to the Holy See and the Chargé des Affaires of the United States have already been informed of this decision on the part of the Italian Government.

The Apostolic Delegate is directed by His Eminence to make known that the Holy Father is deeply grateful for the consideration given to this problem by the Government of the United States. His Holiness also expresses his continued trust in the benevolence and understanding of the President of the United States in regard to this matter.

December 16, 1942.
DOUBTS ROME WILL BE BOMBED

By Samuel Crowther

I'm the program to blast Italy out of the war, the bombing of Rome is still an open question. The unthinkable is being thought about.

It can be stated that the charges on the Axis radio that the Americans insist on the inclusion of Rome in the bombing program are utterly untrue. They are less put out in the hope of alienating the people of Italy from their brothers in this nation. In fact, the President and the American representatives in civil and military, have not only been shocked at the bombing of Rome. They could even be debated but have also voiced their opposition in words that go beyond the diplomatic.

But the High Command in the Italian operation is British and while Prime Minister Churchill, who will make the final decision, has said publicly that the R.A.F. will bomb Rome, he refused to give any assurance that he will not. With the Italian collapse, the American representatives expressed their opposition to the bombing and the President has written to the Italian government that the American Embassy in Rome is to be closed.

It is imperative for Americans to express their will and to see that their will prevails. If the President decides to bomb Rome, it would be an insult to the American people to do so. If the decision is reached, the American people can prevent a tragedy that would echo through the ages and might cause a breach among the Allies that could lose the war.

It is true to note that this war has uncovered in supposedly Christian nations a strange, wanton, deplorable savagery that goes far beyond anything we have been pleased to call barbarism. The savagery is the more repulsive because it has no element of rational warfare. It is mechanical, calculating and impersonal. The crew of the airplanes, high in the clouds, do not see the wretched mass that follows a hit—a mass of innocent human beings, if the bombing is not to be stopped. In the same mark and hands among the women and children. To the men in the skies, the death lists have no more meaning than the ordinary columns of a metropolitan newspaper.

BOMBING OF ROME URGED

LONDON, Dec. 4 (UPI) Lord Wedgwood urged today that Rome be bombed. He put the Government in the House of Lords, the question "whether in view of the fact that Rome is a battlefield for transport from Germany to North Italy, and as Palestine headquaters, Rome may not solve the attention of the Royal Air Force."

Two men fight their only battle in the skies. It is a merely brutal, if direct, drop their bombs as directed and get home as well as they can. The record of their hits turns up in the photographs and only an expert can get anything out of an aerial photograph. I am speaking, of course, only of aerial raids by bombers. The airman taking part in them is a combat weapon in a different category, for the elements of personal combat enter.

There is a principle of modern warfare that nation or other factors for military or naval needs are as much a part of the armed forces as the tanks and the other units in the combat areas and their destruction by bombing may even have more effective results than the bombings of the forces in the field.

It is accepted as a necessary evil that, if these military establishments are located in congested areas, innocent civilians, unconnected with war work, and non-military establishments will be hit.

For instance, the Cologne Cathedral is magnificent, but the Cologne area contains some highly important military industries and crops. In the raids on Cologne, the Cathedral has been hit, it is a deplorable but inescapable consequence. Likewise there can be no complaint as to what else is hit when a Coventry is reduced to dust.

The Allies have thus far bombed only objectives of military importance and whatever damage they have caused to non-military establishments has been sequential and incidental. If the planes carry through Turin, Milan, Genoa, Naples and the other cities of the Italian naval and military power, they will be destroyed and with them will go some of the great treasures of the world—treasures which belong only momentarily to Italy, such as the grand cathedral at Milan.

But, after all, these are only things made by the hand of man.

Rome, too, from one point of view, is only a collection of buildings, and as are Jerusalem, Mecca, Cairo and those other places on the earth which from another point of view are regarded as holy. The Germans in their strategic blindness have thought that by training death and destruction from the skies they could cow peoples into submission. Somehow they did not learn in the last war that a campaign of frightfulness can destroy any material objects and cannot destroy the spirit. With a cold, inhuman mockery, they bombed the abodes of the Christians in London and Canterbury, courageously hoping to pretend that these were points of military importance.

They thought through murder and arson to kill the spirit of Britain and force the people to beg for clemency. Instead, they only revived and strengthened the spirit of Britain. They intended to bomb out the courage. Instead, they bombed out the flakiness and strengthened the courage. It has been demonstrated that the wanton bombing of civilians, while spreading death and destruction, fuels the flames of resistance and strengthens the will of those who remain. That is, the effect is exactly the opposite of what was intended.

It is generally recognized that the bombing of London was an empty exhibition of sheer brutality and, from a military standpoint, an utter waste of valuable materials and men. Germany seems to have learned a lesson, for there have been no mass air raids on the cities of England or of Russia.

Rome is more than an Italian city. It is more than the capital of Italy and the quarters of a puppet king and a frustrated tyrant who is fast becoming a puppet. It is more than the result of that ancient Rome which ruled the world.

Rome is more than the site of Vatican City with the Throne of St. Peter and the residence of the Pope whom the millions of Catholics revere as the Vicar of Christ. Rome is more than the center of Christian faith and the symbol of all Christianity. It is more to Christians the world over than Jerusalem is to the Jews, the Christians of the Mohammedans—by all of whom it is held sacred. It is more to Christians than Mecca or Cairo is to the Mohammedans.

Rome has been struck down by infidels and it has recovered. For the Church is not an affair of brick and mortar. Rome might be struck down by the German rulers—who set up as infidels. And it would recover. But no one can envisage what might happen if the banner of Christ were struck down by Christians. For then it might not get up again.

And hopes would vanish from the Christian world.

Americans must prevent this from happening.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you speak to me about this?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Memo for the President 12/18/42 from Lauchlin Currie regarding the Recent International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations with enclosure - mimeographed: "Memo on a suggested method of beginning now to move toward a more perfect union of the United States."

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 0 1972