Dear Mr. President:

Many thanks for your kindness in sending me such an interesting book at Christmas time. I am most appreciative. It forms a welcome addition to my collection.

Sincerely yours,

The President,

The White House.
January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

During the last two or three days, I have had several conversations in regard to Argentina, Bolivia and neighbors which make me more disturbed in regard to the future. It is not yet proved in the sense that we have full documentary evidence, but I believe that the plot is more widespread than most people believe; that it has direct ramifications in Paraguay and that a great deal of preliminary work has been done in Uruguay, Chile, and Peru.

Therefore, I am in hearty accord with the thought that this trend should be nipped in the bud and that we should proceed with the Argentine in strong ways.

At the same time, I think it is essential that we make a move at once to build up the strength of Brazil. This should cover American arms and munitions and possibly more Army instructors, so as to give Brazil an effective fighting force near the Argentine border such as two or three divisions of motorized regiments.

Furthermore, I am inclined to think that we should let Brazil have some Lend-Lease cargo ships to take the place of the many Brazilian ships which have been sunk.

It would be possible to pursue one of two courses -- either announce the whole thing publicly, or let it leak out -- which would occur in a very short time.

F.D.R.

(copied filed - Brazil folder, 1-44)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 15, 1944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

It has been suggested that Hamilton Fish Armstrong would be an appropriate choice for the Deputy Vice Presidency of the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, with the rank of Minister. This position is at present held provisionally by Mr. Samuel Reber, a Foreign Service Officer of Class III.

I have given favorable consideration to Mr. Armstrong's appointment for two reasons: (1) Mr. Armstrong's exceptional fitness for this position on the Allied Control Commission and (2) the need for Mr. Reber's services back here in the Department. Does this appointment meet with your approval? If so, I will inform the appropriate military authorities in the Mediterranean theater and give notice of the appointment to the press.
January 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Frankly, I do not like the idea of conversation to define the term "unconditional surrender". Russia, Britain and the United States have agreed not to make any peace without consultation with each other. I think each case should stand on its own merits in that way.

The German people can have dinned into their ears what I said in my Christmas Eve speech -- in effect, that we have no thought of destroying the German people and that we want them to live through the generations like other European peoples on condition, of course, that they get rid of their present philosophy of conquest. I forget my exact words but you can have them looked up.

Secondly, the German people and Russia should also be told the best definition of what "unconditional surrender" really means. The story of Lee's surrender to Grant is the best illustration. Lee wanted to talk about all kinds of conditions. Grant said that Lee must put his confidence in his (Grant's) fairness. Then Lee surrendered. Immediately Lee brought up the question of the Confederate officers' horses, which belonged to them personally in most cases, and Grant settled that item by telling Lee that they should take their horses home as they would be needed in the Spring plowing.

A few little incidents like the above will have more effect on the Germans than lots of conversations between the Russians, British and ourselves trying to define "unconditional surrender". Whatever words we might agree on would probably have to be modified or changed the first time some nation wanted to surrender.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In his telegram no. 45, January 6, Ambassador Harriman reported that Mr. Molotov on his own initiative brought up with the Ambassador, on December 31, the definition of the term "unconditional surrender" and inquired what was the attitude of this Government on the question. It is my understanding that the Soviet interest in this matter is not based on any desire to weaken the principle of unconditional surrender or to offer milder terms to enemy countries but rather on the belief that the present undefined term "unconditional surrender" affords enemy propaganda an opportunity to play on the natural fear of the unknown in the minds of their people and consequently stiffens their will to fight. As I understand it, the Soviet Government believes that some definition, however general and severe, of the conditions of surrender which will be imposed on the enemy countries would deprive the enemy of this propaganda advantage and consequently weaken the morale of their armed forces and people. In view of the Soviet interest in this matter, do you approve of discussions with the Soviet and British Governments to explore the desirability of some public definition for propaganda exploitation of the terms of unconditional surrender to be imposed on the respective enemy countries?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am inclined to think that we
might tell the Ethiopian Minister
that I think there is no necessity
for an immediate meeting between
the Emperor and myself.

As I told him, I was extremely
sorry not to see the Emperor when
I was in Cairo on the last trip.
I think that sometime later on this
year matters relating to Ethiopia
will be coming up, and I do hope to
see the Emperor at that time either
in Washington or -- if I am over
there -- somewhere in the Medi-
terranean area.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

For your information and to put in Next Trip file.

GRACE G. TULLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 1, 1944

The Ethiopian Minister, Blatta Ephrem Tewelde Medhen, called on me on December 28, 1943, at his own request and stated that you had recently indicated a disposition to have the Emperor of Ethiopia visit you in Washington at some future date.

The Minister stated that he had received instructions from the Emperor to endeavor to discover the nature of such matters of importance as you may have to take up with the Emperor in order that the Emperor might prepare himself in advance of his visit to this country. Blatta Ephrem said that the Emperor had instructed him to return to Ethiopia and acquaint the Emperor at first-hand with the full and true nature of such matters of importance.

The Minister then very earnestly requested that I ascertain, if possible, the nature of these matters and advise him in order that he might know what steps to take relative to the Emperor's instructions to him.

The Department does not have under consideration any matters which would appear to justify the presence of the Emperor in the United States in the near future. If, however, you have in mind any problems which you desire to take up with him in person, it would be appreciated if you could give me an indication of their nature so that the Minister of Ethiopia may be appropriately informed and enabled to comply with his instructions from the Emperor.
Please have a copy made of these forms & send it to Edna Burn for his information & to put in next trip file — then file this done
January 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I saw Halifax last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship. France has had the country — thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.

As a matter of interest, I am wholeheartedly supported in this view by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and by Marshal Stalin. I see no reason to play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence. This is true in the case of Indo-China.

Each case must, of course, stand on its own feet, but the case of Indo-China is perfectly clear. France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 14, 1944

Last week in a conversation which I had with the British Ambassador he stated that, according to information from his Foreign Office, you had spoken rather definitely during your recent trip of your views concerning the future of French Indo-China. According to Lord Halifax's information you had expressed the opinion that Indo-China should be taken away from the French and administered by an international trusteeship. He wondered whether this represented your final conclusions and attached importance to the matter in view of the fact that reports of your alleged conversations would undoubtedly get back to the French. I informed the Ambassador that I did not know whether you had come to any final conclusions on the subject and added that, in my judgment, you and Mr. Churchill would find it desirable to talk this matter over fully, deliberately, and perhaps finally at some future stage.

As of possible interest to you I am enclosing two brief memoranda citing the more important public statements or commitments by ourselves and the British with regard to the future of French territory after the war.

Enclosure: Memoranda.
January 7, 1944

United States Position with Respect to French Territory After the War.

During the past three years there have been a number of public pronouncements, as well as unpublished statements, by the President, the Secretary of State, and other high ranking officials of this Government regarding the future of French territory after the war. The most important of these pronouncements and statements are set forth below.

1. In a statement issued on August 2, 1941, concerning the agreement entered into between the French and Japanese Governments regarding French Indochina, the Secretary of State said:

"This Government, mindful of its traditional friendship for France, has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories and to preserve them intact. In its relations with the French Government at Vichy and with the local French authorities in French territories, the United States will be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories from domination and control by those powers which are seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest, or by the threat thereof." (Department of State Press Release No. 374)

2. In a letter to Marshal Petain in December, 1941, President Roosevelt stated that so long as "French sovereign control remains in reality purely French" the American Government has no desire to see existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or any of the French colonies "pass to the control of any other nation".

3. A State Department press release of March 2, 1942 (No. 86) relative to the situation in New Caledonia, included the following words:

"The policy of the Government of the United States as regards France and French territory has been based upon the maintenance of
of the integrity of France and of the French empire and of the eventual restoration of the complete independence of all French territories."

The above statement was qualified by the following words:

"In its relations with the local French authorities in French territories the United States has been and will continue to be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect their territories from domination and control by the common enemy."

4. In a note of April 13, 1942, to the French Ambassador at Washington, relative to the establishment of an American consular establishment at Brazzaville, the Acting Secretary of State said:

"The Government of the United States recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of the people of France over the territory of France and over French possessions overseas. The Government of the United States fervently hopes that it may see the reestablishment of the independence of France and of the integrity of French territory."

5. At his press conference on May 21, 1942, in reply to an inquiry as to whether the United States considered itself bound to the restoration of the whole French Empire after the war, the Secretary of State said that this question had not arisen.

6. In an unpublished letter of November 2, 1942, to General Giraud, the President's Personal Representative, Mr. Murphy, wrote:

"It is thoroughly understood that French sovereignty will be reestablished as soon as possible throughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew the French flag in 1939."

7. The landing of American forces in North Africa on November 8, 1942, was the occasion for a number of assurances to the French people regarding American motives. Among them were the following:
In his message to Marshal Petain the President said:

"I need not tell you that the ultimate and greater aim is the liberation of France and its empire from the Axis yoke."

The President's message to Admiral Esteva, Resident General at Tunis, concluded with these words:

"I know that I may count on your understanding of American friendship for France and American determination to liberate the French empire from the domination of its oppressors."

In his broadcast to the French people on November 8 the President said:

"We assure you that once the menace of Germany and Italy is removed from you, we shall quit your territory at once."

9. The preamble of the unpublished Clark-Darlan Agreement of November 22, 1942, contains the following words:

"It has been agreed by all French elements concerned and United States military authorities that French forces will aid and support the forces of the United States and their allies to expel from the soil of Africa the common enemy, to liberate France and restore integrally the French Empire."
British Position with Respect to French Territory After the War.

Prime Minister Churchill has more than once expressed the desire to see France, including Alsace Lorraine, restored, and both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden have repeatedly denied any territorial ambitions on the part of Great Britain with respect to the French Empire.

1. On June 10, 1941, the Prime Minister assured the House of Commons that

"We have no territorial designs in Syria or anywhere else in French territory";

and subsequently, on November 10, 1942, he said:

"For ourselves we have no wish but to see France free and strong, with her empire gathered round her and with Alsace-Lorraine restored. We covet no French territory. We have no acquisitive designs or ambitions in North Africa or any other part of the world".

These commitments, however, are not interpreted by the British Government as including any guarantee of particular frontiers or of the integrity of the French Empire. The British Foreign Secretary, in a letter to the American Ambassador on November 16, 1942, stated:

"You will see that we have taken care to avoid guaranteeing the integrity of the French Empire and have concentrated upon asserting our intention to restore 'the independence and greatness of France' and denying any desire to annex French territory".

Much earlier, in connection with his note of August 7, 1940, to General de Gaulle, Mr. Churchill, in an unpublished letter of the same date, had said:

"I think it necessary to put on record that the expression 'full restoration of the independence and greatness of France' has no precise relation to territorial frontiers. We have not been able to guarantee such frontiers in respect of any nation now acting with us, but, of course, we shall do our best."
2. Like the United States, the British Government has made a number of commitments relative to the maintenance of French sovereignty in North Africa, and on March 17, 1943, the Lord Privy Seal stated in the House of Lords that

"North Africa is French territory";

and

"The relationship of the British and United States Commanders is not that of an occupying power toward the local authority of an occupied region".
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Is this still current? I had mislaid it among some other papers.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that on December 30 I sent you a memorandum (copy attached) on the question of Soviet and French representation on the Allied Control Commission in Italy. You had previously approved of Soviet representation on the Control Commission, and we have so instructed the United States representative on the Advisory Commission where the question was raised.

In order to have the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean authorized to accept Soviet representation, it is necessary to have instructions to that effect sent him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Upon our requesting the Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the War Department, to take this action, we have been informed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on the motion of the British Chiefs of Staff, declined to send forward the authorization for Soviet representation unless French representation is also authorized.

The Soviet Ambassador has just called upon me and stated that his Government was at a loss to understand the delay in granting Soviet representation on the Control Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scheuble Date: MAR 3 1972
Commission. I informed him that this was entirely agreeable to this Government but that the authorization was held up in the Combined Chiefs of Staff because of the matter of French representation.

In order to avoid any further delay in carrying out our wishes with regard to Soviet representation, I would suggest that you may wish to send a telegram in the sense of the attached draft to Prime Minister Churchill.

Attachments:

Copy of memorandum dated December 30, 1943.

Draft telegram to Prime Minister Churchill.
DRAFT TELEGRAM TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

British representatives on Combined Chiefs of Staff, under instructions from their Government, decline to authorize Soviet representation on Allied Control Commission for Italy in the form to which we have both agreed, unless request for French representation is also authorized. The Soviet Government informs us that they are at a loss to understand why their representation is still not authorized. In order to avoid further delay in granting Soviet representation, suggest you have instructions sent to British members of Combined Chiefs of Staff to authorize instructions on Soviet representation without waiting for final decision on French representation.

You may recall that I have already had up this question of French representation with you and have not yet received your final reply on the subject. But let us not in any event delay any further on the Soviet request as I feel the Soviets cannot understand the delay.
December 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The United States member of the Advisory Council for Italy has strongly recommended that a French as well as a Soviet representative be attached to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The "British formula" which is acceptable to the Soviets and French provides only for token representation by accepting a representative of the U.S.S.R. and France on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission and avoids placing Soviet and French representatives throughout the entire structure of the Control Commission; in other words it provides for a kind of superior "liaison officer".

Our representative further reports that the British and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a French representative on the Control Commission.

Consequently if, after consideration, you perceive no objection, I shall instruct our representative on the Advisory Council to concur in the British formula recommending the acceptance of Soviet and French representatives on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Is this still current? I
had mislaid it among some other papers.

F.D.R.

Cordell Hull's memo, 1-11-44, in re the
acceptance of Soviet representation on the
Allied Control Commission in Italy - the
authorization being held up by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff because of the French repre-
sentation. Attached is draft of telegram
for the President to send to the Prime Min.
Also attached is copy of Cordell Hull's memo,
12-30-43, re recommendation of the U.S.
member of the Advisory Council for Italy that
a French as well as a Soviet representative
be attached to the Allied Control Comm.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Please tell the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they are exceeding their authority in declining to send forward the authorization for Soviet representation unless French representation is also authorized. I had already authorized Soviet representation, but I have not yet made any decision on French representation.

The Soviet representation should go through at once. You might tell the Soviet Ambassador that I have directed that the Soviet representation be carried out. I cannot understand this action on the part of the Combined Staffs.

F.D.R.

copy to Admiral Leahy
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
January 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that on December 30 I sent you a memorandum (copy attached) on the question of Soviet and French representation on the Allied Control Commission in Italy. You had previously approved of Soviet representation on the Control Commission, and we have so instructed the United States representative on the Advisory Commission where the question was raised.

In order to have the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean authorized to accept Soviet representation, it is necessary to have instructions to that effect sent him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Upon our requesting the Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the War Department, to take this action, we have been informed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on the motion of the British Chiefs of Staff, declined to send forward the authorization for Soviet representation unless French representation is also authorized.

The Soviet Ambassador has just called upon me and stated that his Government was at a loss to understand the delay in granting Soviet representation on the Control Commission.
Commission. I informed him that this was entirely agree-
able to this Government but that the authorization was
held up in the Combined Chiefs of Staff because of the
matter of French representation.

In order to avoid any further delay in carrying out
our wishes with regard to Soviet representation, I would
suggest that you may wish to send a telegram in the sense
of the attached draft to Prime Minister Churchill.

Attachments:

Copy of memorandum
dated December 30, 1943.

Draft telegram to
Prime Minister Churchill

C.H.
DRAFT TELEGRAM TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL FROM
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

British representatives on Combined Chiefs of Staff,
under instructions from their Government, decline to
authorize Soviet representation on Allied Control Com-
mission for Italy in the form to which we have both agreed,
unless request for French representation is also authorized.
The Soviet Government informs us that they are at a loss
to understand why their representation is still not author-
ized. In order to avoid further delay in granting Soviet
representation, suggest you have instructions sent to
British members of Combined Chiefs of Staff to authorize
instructions on Soviet representation without waiting for
final decision on French representation.

You may recall that I have already had up this question
of French representation with you and have not yet received
your final reply on the subject. But let us not in any
event delay any further on the Soviet request as I feel
the Soviets cannot understand the delay.
December 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The United States member of the Advisory Council for Italy has strongly recommended that a French as well as a Soviet representative be attached to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The "British formula" which is acceptable to the Soviets and French provides only for token representation by accepting a representative of the U.S.S.R. and France on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission and avoids placing Soviet and French representatives throughout the entire structure of the Control Commission; in other words it provides for a kind of superior "liaison officer".

Our representative further reports that the British and the Soviet members of the Advisory Council have already committed themselves to recommending the acceptance of a French representative on the Control Commission.

Consequently if, after consideration, you perceive no objection, I shall instruct our representative on the Advisory Council to concur in the British formula recommending the acceptance of Soviet and French representatives on the staff of the Deputy President of the Control Commission.

C. H.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY
THE WHITE HOUSE

The President has already acted on this matter. No doubt you will wish to retain this for the White House files.

Enclosure:
1. Memorandum for the President,
   January 11, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 2, 1944

Since you are leaving soon and since I desire to get a radio speech delivered during the latter half of the present week, I am taking chances on your feeling well enough to glance over the attached draft, which is not yet fully completed, although the main subject matter of importance is near completion except the question relating to the French, on which I want your judgment before the final steps.

I have also instructed that a paragraph detailing the development of allied unity at Tehran and Cairo should be inserted on page 15.

I am keeping open the references to the Argentine with a view to ascertaining the exact political situation there at the last moment. I do not know just what they may call for in the way of abbreviation of the proposed reference.
I want to talk with you this evening about the foreign policy of the United States. This is not, as some writers assume, a mysterious game carried on by diplomats with other diplomats in foreign offices all over the world. It is for us the task of focusing and giving effect in the world outside our borders to the will of one hundred and thirty million people through the constitutional processes which govern our democracy. For this reason our foreign policy must be simple and direct and founded upon the interests and purposes of the American people.

In talking about foreign policy it is well to remember, as Justice Holmes said, that a page of history is worth a volume of logic. For it is the pages of our recent history which are conditioning and giving direction to our foreign policy. There are three points in this history to which I particularly wish to draw your attention. In the first place, since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, we and those nations who are now our Allies have moved from weakness to strength. In the second place, during that same period we in this country have moved from a deep-seated tendency toward separate action to the knowledge and conviction that only through unity of action can there be achieved
in this world the results which are essential for the continuation of free peoples. And, thirdly, we have moved from a careless tolerance of evil institutions to the conviction that free government and nazi and fascist government cannot exist together in this world, because the very nature of the latter requires them to be aggressors and the very nature of free governments lays them open to treacherous and well laid plans of attack.

An understanding of these points will help to clarify the policy which our government has been and is following.

In 1940, with the fall of France, the people of the country and of the free world awoke with horror to find themselves on the very brink of the abyss of defeat. Only Britain in the West and China in the East stood between them and disaster, and the space on which they stood was narrow and precarious. At that moment this country and the other free nations were weak and our enemies and potential enemies were strong and well prepared. From that moment this country started upon the long hard road of mobilizing all its great natural resources, its vast productive potentialities, and its reserves of man-power for the struggle to defend itself, to strengthen those who would fight with it, and to overthrow those who would destroy it. This country determined to throw its resources without stint
stint into the scales.

This was a major decision of foreign policy. Since that decision was made we have moved far from the former position. We are attaining a strength which can leave no doubt as to the outcome. That outcome is far from achieved. There are desperate periods still before us, but we have built the strength which we sought and we need only to maintain the will to use it.

This decision which we have made and carried out to strengthen ourselves and our allies was not and cannot be a decision to make a sporadic effort. An episode is not a policy. We must continue to see after the war, as much as during it, that the strength of the friendly and peace seeking nations does not ebb, but is maintained in full vigor. This does not mean merely strength in armaments; it means strength throughout the entire life of those countries. Methods will differ. In the material field Lend-Lease will give way to other arrangements of finance and commercial policy. War unity will give way to common bonds of peacetime tasks. But the fact remains that we were part of a free world so weak that it was nearly crushed until through unity it achieved strength. Unless we wish to throw away a hard won victory, we cannot withdraw from the concerted effort of free nations after the war to maintain
by common and organized action the political, spiritual, and material basis upon which the strength and vigor of their free life depends. I shall return in a moment to the ways in which this may be done.

This movement from weakness to strength entails consequences in our foreign policy. Let us look first at our relations with the neutral nations.

In the two years following Pearl Harbor, while we were mustering our strength and helping to restore that of our Allies, our relations with these neutral nations and their attitude toward our enemies were conditioned by the position in which we found ourselves. We have constantly sought to keep before them what they, of course, know—that upon our victory hangs their very existence and freedom as independent nations. We have sought in every way to reduce the aid which their trade with the enemy gives it and to increase the strength which we might draw from them. But our power was limited. They and we have continually been forced to accept compromises which we certainly would not have chosen.

That period, I believe, is rapidly drawing to a close. It is clear to all that our strength now makes only one outcome of this war possible. That strength now makes it clear that we are not asking these neutral nations to expose themselves
themselves to certain destruction when we ask them not to prolong the war, with its consequences of suffering and death, by sending aid to the enemy.

And so our attitude can no longer be one of accepting second and third best compromises. We can no longer acquiesce in these nations' drawing upon the resources of the allied world when they at the same time contribute to the death of troops whose sacrifice contributes to their salvation as well as ours. We have scrupulously respected the sovereignty of these nations; and we have not coerced, nor shall we coerce, any nation to join us in the fight. But we have said plainly that we can no longer be patient with aid furnished to our enemy—whether it be by Ireland, which permits official German agents almost within sight of our troops; or the countries of the Iberian Peninsula and elsewhere, which send to Germany the essential ingredients of the steel which kills our soldiers; or still other neutrals, which permit their highly skilled workers and factories to supply products which can no longer issue from the smoking ruins of German factories. We have said to these countries that we can not look upon these acts as the expression of a true neutrality; that they are no longer necessary to purchase protection against aggression. We ask them only, but
but with insistence, to cease aiding our enemy.

There is one chapter in the history of these years of the growth from weakness to strength which will forever be a gallant and glorious one. In it is set down the history of the action of our fellow Republics in this hemisphere. They did not wait for us to become strong before taking the action agreed upon at the Lima conference. Many of them acted as soon as we were attacked. The conference at Rio de Janeiro was held in the darkest days of the war. Immediately eighteen of the twenty Republics broke relations with the Axis. Another followed later on.

With the exception of the temporary, as we hope, clouding of Bolivia's position, only Argentina has failed to follow the course laid down in inter-American conferences for mutual security and protection in this hemisphere. That Argentina has so far taken another course has caused us grave concern and disappointment. We cannot believe that the Argentine people in the light of their history and traditions wish to break the united front of the American nations in meeting the greatest threat ever made to their security. We have vainly hoped that the breach would be closed. We have refrained from every act or appearance of an act of interference with Argentina's right to decide upon
upon her own course, in accordance with her obligations. We have done all in our power to prevent there creeping into the fellowship of the nations of this hemisphere the seeds of bitterness and division. I can assure you that we shall continue to do so, just as we must continue to do all in our power that is essential for the security of the hemisphere and the winning of the war.

Our strength has now grown to the point where we are on the verge of great events. Of military events I cannot speak. It is enough that they are in the hands of men who have the complete confidence of the American people. We await their development with calmness and fortitude. But I can and should discuss with you what may happen close upon the heels of military action.

As I look at my map of Europe, certain things seem pretty clear to me. As the Nazis go down to defeat, they will inevitably leave behind them in Germany and the satellite states of southeastern Europe a legacy of confusion. It is essential that we and our allies do everything possible to prevent the spread of this contagion to the German occupied countries of Eastern and Western Europe while they are in the throes of reestablishing government and repairing the most brutal ravages of the war. If confusion should spread throughout Europe, it is difficult
to over-emphasize the seriousness of the disaster that may follow. Therefore, for us, for the world, and for the countries concerned a stable Europe should be an immediate objective of allied policy. It is hard to imagine a stable Europe without a stable France. What, then, is our policy toward France?

Our first concern is to defeat the enemy, drive him from French territory, and the territory of all the adjacent countries which he has overrun. To do this the supreme military commander must have unfettered authority. But we have no purpose or wish to govern France or to administer any affairs save those which are necessary for military operations against the enemy. It is of the utmost importance that civil authority in France should be exercised by Frenchmen, should be swiftly established, and should operate in accordance with advanced planning as fully as military operations will permit. It is essential that supplies move into the country and are distributed equitably and competently. It is essential that the material foundations of the life of the French people be at once restored or resumed. Only in this way can stability be achieved.

In planning for this end we should look to Frenchmen to undertake civil administration and assist them in that task.
taks without compromising in any way the right of the French people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish. That must be left to the free and untrammelled choice of the French people.

The President and I are clear, therefore, as to the need, from the outset, of French civil administration—and democratic French administration—in France. We believe, therefore, that we should look to the French Committee of National Liberation to launch and provide the initial administration of civil affairs. The Committee has given public assurance that it does not propose to perpetuate its authority. On the contrary, it has given assurance that it wishes at the earliest possible date to have the French people exercise their own sovereign will in accordance with French constitutional processes. We shall give the Committee every support and opportunity to undertake civil administration and make it successful. (We shall leave no stone unturned in urging and assisting all Frenchmen to work with and through it.) The Committee is, of course, not the government of France and we cannot recognize it as such. (But it has kept alive the eternal spirit of France, and it has administered the
the French Colonial Empire. Should it fail in administering French affairs until French people can establish their own constitutional government, other courses will be necessary. But such failure would be a serious setback. We have every interest, therefore, in working with the Committee in the future, as in the past, in providing a democratic, competent, and French administration of liberated French territory.

In Italy our interests are likewise in assisting in the development at the earliest moment of a free and democratic Italian government. As I said some moments ago, we have learned that there cannot be any compromise with Fascism - whether in Italy or in any other country. It must always be the enemy and it must be our determined policy to do all in our power to end it. Here again, within these limits, it is not our purpose or policy to impose the ultimate form or personnel of government. Here again we wish to give every opportunity for a free expression of a free Italy. We had hoped that before this enough of Italy would have been freed so that we might have had at least a preliminary expression of that will. Events have not progressed according to our hopes.

The present situation, then, is this: In October, 1943, the
the President, Mr. Churchill, and Marshall Stalin accepted the active cooperation of the Italian Government and its armed forces as a cobelligerent in the war against Germany under the supervision of an Allied Control Commission. The declaration regarding Italy made at Moscow by the British, Soviet, and American Governments states that the Italian Government shall be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism; that all institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed; that all Fascists or pro-Fascists elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character; and that democratic organs of local governments shall be created. Finally, it recites that nothing in the declaration should operate against the right of the Italian people "ultimately to choose their own form of government."

This policy has been and is being carried out with the exception of that part which calls for the introduction of more democratic elements such as representatives of the six parties which recently met at Bari and formed the Permanent Executive Junta. Thus far the decision has been that
that the military situation which has delayed the liberation
of more than Southern Italy would be prejudiced by a recon-
struction of the Government. This decision rests with those
chiefly responsible for the military situation. It does
not signify any change in the clear and announced policy.
It does not mean that we have deviated an iota from the
historic devotion of this country to the democratic principle
or that we are in any way beholden to the present King or
to the members of the present Italian Government.

and a reconstruction by agreement between
The government which has not
yet been feasible.
What I have said relates to some of the most immediate of our problems and the effect of our policy toward them as we and our allies have moved from a position of weakness to one of strength. There remain the more far-reaching relations between us and our allies in dealing with our enemies and in providing for future peace, freedom from aggression and opportunity for expanding material well-being. Here I would only mislead you if I spoke of solution, because none have been or can be reached now. The problems are not ripe for solutions. The process—the slow, hard process—essential to enduring and accepted solutions among free peoples, of full discussion with our allies and among our own people has only been begun. But the basis upon which our policy is founded is soundly established; the direction is clear; and the general methods of accomplishment are emerging.

The basis of our policy rests upon the second of the lessons which at the outset of my remarks was found in the pages of our recent history. It is that action upon these matters cannot be separate but must be agreed and united action. This is fundamental. It must underlie the entire range of our policy. The free nations have been brought to the very brink of destruction by allowing themselves...
themselves to be separated and divided. If any lesson has ever been hammered home with blood and suffering, that one has been. And the lesson is not yet ended.

However difficult the road may be, there is no hope of turning victory into enduring peace unless the real interests of this country, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union and China are harmonized and unless they agree and act together. This is the solid framework upon which all future policy and international organization must be built. It offers the fullest opportunity for the development of institutions in which all free nations may participate democratically, through which a reign of law and morality may arise and through which the material interests of all may be advanced. But without an enduring understanding between these powers upon their fundamental purposes, interests and obligations to one another, all organizations to preserve peace are creations on paper and the path is wide open again for the rise of a new aggressor who shrewdly plays one of these powers against another and grows stronger and stronger while they become paralyzed by mutual distrust.

This essential understanding and unity of action among the four powers is not in substitution or derogation of unity among the United Nations or the American nations.
But it is basic to all organized international action, because upon its reality depends the possibility of enduring peace and free institutions rather than new coalitions and a new prewar period. Nor do I suggest that any conclusions of these powers can or should be outside the criticism and conscience of men and nations or the institutions which may exist or be created to give organized expression to both. I am stating what I believe the common sense of my fellow countrymen and all men will recognize - that for these powers to become divided in their aims and fail to recognize and harmonize their basic interests can produce only disaster and that no machinery, as such, can produce this essential harmony and unity.

The road to agreement is a difficult one, as any man knows who has ever tried to get two other men, or a city council, or a trade gathering, or a legislative body to agree upon anything. It is not achieved by hurling moral absolute at the other fellow, but by trying to understand his point of view and by going as far as possible to meet it.

Although the road to unity of purpose and action is long and difficult we have long strides upon our way. The Atlantic Charter in August, 1941. Then by the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, these nations
Nations of January 1, 1942, these nations adopted the principle of the Atlantic Charter and agreed to devote all their resources to the winning of the war and pledged themselves not to conclude a separate peace or armistice with their common enemies.

After that came the Declaration signed at Moscow on November 1, 1943, Here the four nations who are carrying and must carry the chief burden of defeating their enemies renewed their determination by joint action to achieve this end. But they went further than this and went on to pledge cooperation with one another, after victory was won, to establish, with other peace-loving states, the effective international organization to maintain peace and security, which met with such overwhelming approval by the Congress in the Connally and Fulbright resolutions.

No one knows better than we and our allies who have signed these documents that they did not and do not settle all questions or provide a formula for the settlement of all questions or even lay down a blueprint for the future. Any man of experience knows that an attempt to do this would have been as futile as it would have been foolish.

There has been discussion recently of the Atlantic Charter and of its application to varying situations. The Charter
Charter is an expression of fundamental objectives toward which we and our allies are directing our policy. It is not a code of law from which detailed answers to every question can be distilled by painstaking analysis of its words and phrases. It points the direction in which solutions are to be sought; it does not give solutions. Least of all does it confer rights upon our enemies, who are devoting every energy to destroy all possibility of obtaining the objectives there set forth. For these reasons, it is futile to search the Atlantic Charter for the solution of the many readjustments of boundaries and other such questions, the solution of which for the most part must await the end of the war.

It is worse than futile to magnify these vexed questions to the proportion of major objectives for which this war is being fought. As the Charter makes clear, neither we nor our allies have any purpose of territorial aggrandizement in this struggle. Whatever the solutions of the questions in this field, they will not be sought for this purpose. We are at all times ready to further an understanding and settlement of questions which may arise between our allies, as is exemplified by our offer to be of such service to the Polish Government and the Soviet Union. Our offer is
is still open.

Our policy upon these matters, as upon all others, is the fundamental necessity for agreed action and the prevention of disunity among us. However pressing any matter of this sort may seem, it is, in my opinion, a far greater service to the cause of human freedom to set the matter down for reasoned discussion and settlement when the war is won than to permit division to arise among us in the heat of battle.

So it is with the basic conviction that we must have agreed action and unity of action that we have gone to work upon the form and substance of an international organization to maintain peace and prevent aggression, and upon the economic and other cooperative arrangements which are necessary in order that we maintain our position as a working partner with other free nations. All of these matters are in different stages of development. For this reason, may I say a word here about the methods which must be followed by a person in my position, who is responsible under the President for the conduct of these affairs?

It is obvious, of course, that no matter how brilliant and desirable any course may seem it is wholly impracticable and impossible unless it is a course which finds basic acceptance, not only by our allies, but by the people of this
this country and by the legislative branch of this government, which, under our Constitution, shares with the Executive power and responsibility for final action.

A proposal is worse than useless if it is not acceptable to those nations who must share with us the responsibility for its execution. It is dangerous for us and misleading to them if in the final outcome it does not have the necessary support in this country. It is, therefore, necessary both abroad and at home not to proceed by presenting elaborate proposals, which only produce divergence of opinion upon details, many of which may be immaterial. The only practicable course is to begin by obtaining agreement, first, upon broad principles, setting forth direction and general policy. We must then go on to explore alternative methods and finally settle upon a proposal which embodies the principal elements of agreement and leaves to future experience and discussion those matters of comparative detail which at present remain in the realm of speculation.

It is a difficult procedure and a slow procedure, as the time which has been required to work out the arrangements for such a universally accepted objective as international relief makes evident. The business of reaching agreement upon complicated questions, particularly
in fields which engage the emotions as do international issues, is often a torturing process. It is a procedure in which misunderstanding, the premature hardening of positions and uninformed criticism frequently cause months of delay and endless confusion, sometimes utter frustration. But it is the procedure of democracy. It is one in which the people, who are sovereign, must not only educate their servants but must be willing to be educated by them.

In this way we are proceeding with the matter of an international organization to maintain peace and prevent aggression. Such an organization must be based upon firm and binding obligations that the member nations will not use force against each other and against any other nation except in accordance with the arrangements made. It must provide for the maintenance of adequate forces to preserve peace and it must provide the institutions and procedures for calling this force into action to preserve peace. But it must provide more than this. It must provide for an international court for the development and application of law to the settlement of international controversies which fall within the realm of law; for the development of machinery for adjusting controversies to which the field of law has not yet been extended, and for other institutions for
for the development of new rules to keep abreast of a changing world with new problems and new interests.

We are in a stage where many proposals have been examined and discussed, some discarded, others developed. We are at a point where it is right and necessary that we should have the advice and help of members of the Congress. Accordingly, I have requested the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to designate a representative, bi-partisan group for this purpose. Following these and similar discussions, we shall be in a position to go forward again with other nations and, upon learning their views, be able to submit to the democratic processes of discussion a more concrete proposal.

With the same determination to achieve agreement and unity we talked with our allies at Tehran regarding the treatment of Nazi Germany, and with our allies at Cairo regarding the treatment which should be accorded Japan. In the formulation of our policy towards our enemies we are moved both by the two lessons from our history of which I have spoken and by the third. This is that there can be no compromise with Fascism and Nazism. It must go everywhere. Its leaders, its institutions, the power which supports it must go. They can expect no negotiated peace.
peace, no compromise, no opportunity to return. Upon that this people and this Government are determined and our allies are equally determined. We have found no difference of opinion among our allies that the organization and purposes of the Nazi state and its Japanese counterpart, the military system and the auxiliary industries upon which all of them rest are, and by their very nature must be, directed toward conquest. There was no disagreement that even after the defeat of the enemy there will be no security unless and until our victory is used to destroy these systems to their very foundation. The action which must be taken to achieve these ends must be, as I have said, agreed action. We are working with our allies now upon these courses.

The Conference at Moscow, as you will recall, established the European Advisory Commission, which is now at work in London upon the treatment of Germany. Out of these discussions will come back to the governments proposals for concrete action which we can and will lay before our own people and our other allies.

Along with arrangements by which nations may be secure and free must go arrangements by which men and women
women who compose those nations may live and have the opportunity through their efforts to improve their material condition. As I said earlier, we will fail indeed if we win a victory only to let the free peoples of this world, through any absence of action on our part, sink into weakness and despair.

The heart of the matter lies in action which will stimulate and expand production in industry and agriculture and free international commerce from the fetters which restrict it. These are the essential prerequisites to maintaining and improving the standard of living in our own and in all countries. Production cannot go forward without arrangements to provide investment capital. Trade cannot be conducted without stable currencies in which payments can be promised and made. Trade cannot develop unless excessive barriers in the form of tariffs, preferences, quotas, exchange controls, monopolies, and subsidies, and others, are reduced or eliminated. It needs also agreed arrangements under which communication systems between nations and transport by air and sea can develop. And much of all this will miss its mark of satisfying human needs unless we take agreed action for the improvement of labor standards and standards of health and nutrition.
I shall not on this occasion be able to explain the work which has been done—and it is extensive—in these fields. In many of them proposals are far advanced toward the stage of discussion with members of the Congress prior to formulation for public discussion. In the not too distant future I look forward to a full analysis of economic matters.

I hope, however, that I have been able in some measure to bring before you the immensity of the task which lies before us all, the nature of the difficulties which are involved, and the conviction and purpose with which we are attacking them. I trust that you will believe that I have not been unmindful of the responsibility which they impose upon me and that I have not spared either energy or such powers as I have in discharging that responsibility.

May I close with a word as to the responsibility which rests upon you. All of these questions of foreign policy which, as I said earlier, is the matter of focusing and expressing your will in the world outside our borders, are difficult and often involve matters of controversy. Under our constitutional system the will of the American people in this field is not effective unless it is united will. If we are divided, we are ineffective. We are in
a year of a national election in which it is easy to arouse controversy on almost any subject, whether or not the subject is an issue in the campaign. You, therefore, as well as we who are in public office, bear a great responsibility. It is the responsibility of avoiding needless controversy in the formulation of your judgments. It is the responsibility for sober and considered thought and expression. It is the responsibility for patience both with our allies and with those who must speak for you with them. Once before in our lifetime we fell into disunity and became ineffective in world affairs by reason of it. Should this happen again, it will be a tragedy to you and to your children and to the world for generations.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

April 8, 1944.

I have the greatest sympathy with the problem of deferments among State Department employees. The real fundamental difficulty is that I have the same feeling about some other classifications of Government employees and that there is just as much to be said for their deferment as there is for full deferment of State Department employees.

There are certain things of which I am pretty sure. As for instance:

(a) Boys who have had less than five years experience in the State Department ought not to be deferred.

(b) Boys who are not pre-Pearl Harbor fathers, under thirty, ought not to be deferred on the ground of parenthood.

(c) Boys who are now doing the kind of work that an intelligent girl could do equally well in a few months ought not to be deferred.

There is a rule of reason in this. I am not getting cooperation toward compromise out of my old friend, Howland Shaw. His attitude is too much that he will compromise if he gets his way 100%. I am perfectly willing to take up individual cases but of the ones I have gone over a large number do not rate deferment. I do have to think of the effect on other departments.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I was not altogether certain that what you said to me at the meeting of the Cabinet this afternoon concerning the continued deferring of professional Foreign Service officers meant what I earnestly hope it means; namely, that you approve Foreign Service officers of military age being deferred. There are 297 of them. I should therefore be grateful if you would indicate whether such deferment does in fact correspond with your wishes.

In all frankness I must say that if our professional Foreign Service is to be wrecked at the present time of crisis, I do not see how our foreign relations can be carried on with the efficiency which the national interest demands.
I had a conversation with Halifax on May fourth and I quote from notes I made immediately after he left:

"I complimented him on his recent speech and observed that there was quite a contrast between it and some of Mr. Churchill's recent utterances which gave the impression that the Prime Minister favored the maintenance intact of Empire preferences and a tightening up of the Commonwealth, while at the same time he was preaching closer relations between the three great Western nations. I said that all of this together had discouraged many people in this country and in many small countries whose governments and people were becoming increasingly fearful that the three great Western nations would draw ever closer together and practice the worst forms of imperialism while neglecting the smaller nations. Mr. Churchill seemed to me to be overlooking this situation. I recalled my attempts to keep alive our views as to economic cooperation and future commercial policy and added that the future would indeed be dangerous unless we could have more cooperation from the British and have it now. I recalled the fight which the President and I have waged in this country for more liberal commercial policies against overwhelming odds and said that if we had faltered as the Prime Minister seemed to be faltering we would have gotten exactly nowhere."

I emphasized to Winant my concern over this matter and said that I counted upon him to take every opportunity to impress our views upon the British authorities.

I took up the French matter with Halifax as follows:

"I
"I referred to the French situation and reminded him that before my speech was delivered the President had sent a draft directive, which in some respects was stronger than my speech, to General Eisenhower, that it seemed apparent that the President had not modified his directive, although he had been requested by the Prime Minister to do so, and that the British are now proposing to use my speech as their formula. I asked the Ambassador to call his Government's immediate attention to the danger of this from the viewpoint of working relations between the President and the Prime Minister. I said that it was bad for the British to go over the President's head, so to speak, and use my speech as a substitute formula without the President's expressed agreement. I emphasized the urgency of straightening this out.

"The Ambassador seemed more or less to agree with my views and said he would advise his Government immediately."
May 11, 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In the near future Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, is proceeding at my request to Mexico and to the Canal Zone.

The purpose of his trip will be to study production problems in Mexico, particularly as they relate to the work being carried on by the Mexican-American Commission for Economic Development, with which he has been collaborating in working out a sound industrialization program for that country.

In the Canal Zone I am asking Mr. Nelson to review the supply and production problems with our military and naval authorities. Immediately upon his return, he will report directly to me regarding this trip.

Mr. Nelson will be accompanied by his Assistant, Mr. E. A. Locke, Jr., and probably by one or two other members of his staff, and I request that you provide them with such courtesies and facilities as may be helpful to them in accomplishing this mission.

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

(copied to Donald M. Nelson folder, 5/11/44)
May 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have your memorandum of May seventeenth in regard to financial investment in foreign airlines by United States interests.

I will write to ask you to consider a stronger statement of policy somewhat along the following lines:

"In connection with the development of local airlines in the Western Hemisphere, the United States hopes to see all domestic airlines in the Western Hemisphere developed and owned by the nationals of the countries served. In other words, this would apply to those airlines which are not international in their service.

In the development of such domestic airlines, the United States is not opposed to American financial participation or to American technical advice to the country served. This is based, however, on the belief that actual ownership or control should be in the hands of the nationals of the countries served.

This policy is, of course, not adverse to investments by our citizens in airlines in any foreign country, provided these investments do not in the aggregate amount to control of the airline and are not contrary to the policy of the countries concerned."

I do not believe that it makes for good relations for American capital to dominate or control, for example, the airline between Belem and Rio de Janeiro, or an airline from eastern Brazil to western Brazil.

I hope that the policy I have expressed will find its way into the international policy which is now being discussed.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of State.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 17, 1944

Subject: Financial investment in foreign airlines by United States interests.

United States citizens and airlines are active in acquiring financial interests in local airlines of other countries of the Western Hemisphere. Where an investment amounts to control, and is on behalf of a United States airline, it is subject to the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Interest in this field is great. The Department of State and the Civil Aeronautics Board are being asked whether such investments in local airlines abroad are consistent with our policy. Except as noted above, there appear to be no legal means of preventing such investments.

This country succeeded, after considerable effort and the expenditure of substantial sums, in expelling Axis interests from airlines of South America. If other countries of this Hemisphere welcome capital and assistance from the outside, they may turn again to non-American countries.

In general we try to encourage ultimate control of local airlines by bona fide nationals of the country served. In some American countries, this is some time away.

Department of State and Civil Aeronautics Board recommend for your approval the following policy:

In connection with the development of local airlines in the Western Hemisphere, the United States hopes to see the largest practicable participation in the development and direction of such airlines by nationals of the countries served. However, this policy is not adverse to investments by our citizens in airlines in any foreign country, as long as such investments are not contrary to the policy of the countries concerned and are not found to be inconsistent with the public interest within the meaning of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, where such Act is applicable.

\[\text{Signature}\]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What would you think of this man as one of the Ambassadors or Ministers to the London governments of the occupied countries?

F. D. R.

Memorandum for the President from Hon. James F. Byrnes, 5/26/44, in re Stanton Griffis, now a special representative in Sweden for FEA, memorandum for Mr. Byrnes from Hon. Robert E. Hannegan, 5/13/44, letter and enclosure from Stanton Griffis, OWI, 2/15/44, to Mr. Hannegan.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 16, 1944

Subject: Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement Concerning Control of Shipping Negotiations.

Attached, agreement concerning control of shipping negotiations between Admiral Land for the United States, and Weston, on behalf of Lord Leathers, for the British. The high points are:

(1) British-U.S. coordinated control of shipping to be continued to meet war needs until six months after hostilities end in Europe or the Far East, whichever may be later.

(2) No ships to be released for non-essential services unless total tonnage is in excess of total requirements.

(3) Release for commercial use to be so handled that each maritime nation shall have an equitable share of the commercial tonnage.

(4) Neutrals as well as United Nations to be asked to put their shipping under this control.

(5) Britain and the United States to consult together to set up a central authority, which shall take over on the expiration of existing time charter from U.S. and U.K. to others; such authority to provide needed tonnage for military and other United Nations purposes. OFF THE RECORD, the plan is to draw in nations other than U.S. and U.K. as they are liberated.

(6) Uniform freight rates be established.

The British are authorized to sign. Admiral Land requests us to consent on behalf of the Government. There is no objection here; Admiral Land has signed. Do you approve?

Enclosure:
Memorandum of Principles, dated May 31, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaubie Deta

MARCH 3, 1972

C.H.
Memorandum of Principles to be proposed jointly and
forthwith by U.S. Government and United Kingdom Government
to the Governments of the Maritime Nations having reference
to the continuance of co-ordinated control of Merchant
Shipping.

1. The Governments shall declare that they accept as a common responsibility
the provision of shipping for all the military and other tasks necessary
for, and arising out of, the completion of the war in Europe and the
Far East and for the supplying of all the liberated areas as well as of
the United Nations generally and territories under their authority.

2. The Governments shall undertake to continue to maintain such powers of
control over all ships registered in their territory or otherwise under
their authority as will enable them effectively to direct each ship's
employment in accordance with the foregoing declaration. Subject to
the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 9, this control shall continue to be
exercised by each Government through the mechanism of requisitioning for
use or title.

3. The Governments shall agree not to release from control any ships under
their authority or permit them to be employed in any non-essential services
or for any non-essential cargo unless the total overall tonnage is in excess
of the total overall requirements, and then only in accordance with a
mutually acceptable formula which shall not discriminate against the
commercial shipping interests of any nation and shall extend to all of the
maritime nations of the United Nations an equitable opportunity for their
respective tonnages to engage in commercial trades.

4. Neutral Governments having ships under their control in excess of the tonnage
required to carry on their essential imports requirements shall be invited
to subscribe to obligations in respect of all their ships which shall ensure
that their employment is in conformity with the general purposes of the
United Nations.

5. All the Governments of the United Nations and the Government subscribing
hereto under paragraph 4(a) shall be invited to undertake to exercise control
over the facilities for shipping available in their territories, under
measures on the lines of the U.S. and British Ship Warrant Schemes,
and to take such other measures as may be necessary to secure that ships
under all flags are used in conformity with the purpose of the United Nations.

6. Without prejudice to questions of disposition or title, the employment of such
ships as may at any time be permitted to operate under enemy flag or authority
shall be determined to serve the requirements of the United Nations.

7. The Governments shall consult together for the purpose of agreeing on measures
to give effect to the foregoing principles accepted by them. In preparing
such measures they shall be guided by the following considerations:

(a) In order that the allocation of all ships under United Nations
control may continue to be effectively determined to meet the
requirements of the United Nations a central authority will be
needed, to come into operation upon the expiry of existing time
chartering arrangements made by the U.S. Government and/or the
The central authority shall be organised on a basis satisfactory
to the signatories to the agreement.
(b) The central authority will determine the responsibilities that each
government must accept in conformity with the general obligations
assumed in paragraph 1 to provide the tonnage required from time to
time to meet current requirements for ships for the military and
other purposes of the United Nations, and ships will be allocated
for those purposes by the Governments in accordance with the decisions
of the central authority. So far as is consistent with the efficient
overall use of shipping as determined by the central authority for
these purposes, and with the provisions of paragraph 7 (c), each
government may allocate ships under its own authority, wholly or
partly to cover the essential import requirements of territories
for which it has special shipping responsibilities.

(c) In general, ships under a United Nations flag will be under the
control of the government of that flag, or the government to which
they have been chartered, but in order to meet the special case of
military requirements those ships which have been taken up, under
agreements made by the U.S. government and/or the U.K. government
with the other governments having authority for those ships, for use
as troopships, hospital ships, and for other purposes in the service
of the armed forces, shall remain on charter as at present to the
War Shipping Administration and/or the Ministry of War Transport,
as the case may be, under arrangements to be agreed between the
governments severally concerned. Any further ships required for
such purposes shall be dealt with in a like manner.

(d) Governments will supply to one another, through the central authority,
all information necessary to the effective working of the arrangements,
e.g., regarding programmes, employment, and projected programmes,
subject to the requirement of military secrecy.

(e) The central authority would also direct action under paragraphs 5
and 6.

(f) The basis and terms of remuneration to be paid by the user of a ship
for a particular shipping service would be determined by the central
authority in such manner as to give effect to the following two basic
principles:

(i) Ships of all flags performing the same or similar services
    should charge the same freight;

(ii) Ships must be employed as required without regard to
    financial considerations.

6. The principles herein agreed shall apply to all types of merchant ships,
irrespective of size, including passenger ships, tankers, and whale factories
(but paragraph 7 (b) would not be applicable to ships engaged in coastal trades
and short trades between nearby countries, the arrangements for control of
which should be appropriate to meet the requirements prevailing in each
particular area.)

The principles shall also be applied, through suitable machinery, to fishing
vessels, whale catchers, and other similar craft to the extent necessary
in those areas where it is agreed that special measures in respect of such
craft are required so as to provide an authority capable of apportioning
such craft available in those areas between naval and commercial services.
9. The foregoing principles shall take effect on the coming into operation of the central authority, and shall remain in effect for a period not extending beyond six months after termination of hostilities in Europe or the Far East, whichever may be the later, unless it is unanimously agreed among the Governments represented on the duly authorized body of the central authority that any or all of the agreed principles may be terminated or modified earlier.

In discussion of the matter with the French Committee of National Liberation, suitable adjustment will be required in the references to Government.
TO TAKE UP WITH SECRETARY HULL
THE NEXT TIME THE PRESIDENT HAS AN
APPOINTMENT WITH HIM.

File Confidential  3/30  Today
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 19, 1944

We have not had the time to take up any Department matters during my last two visits. I had with me on yesterday the accompanying set of papers which are more or less self-explanatory. I am wondering if you can take five minutes and run over these different points and settle some or all of them before you go away. Will you kindly return this collection of original papers. If desirable I can then send copies to the White House.
August 28, 1944

Mr. Secretary:

Memoranda for the President's use are being prepared on the following subjects:

1. Relations of this Government and the British Government with the Soviet Union.
2. Poland
3. Germany
   a. Zones of occupation.
   b. Partition.
4. Italy.
5. Hungary.
6. Civil affairs in the Balkans.
7. The rearmament of France.
8. Use of Santa Maria airfield.

These memoranda should be ready within the next few days.

H. Freeman Mathews
S

The Secretary

Subject: Matters to Raise with the President

During your absence several matters were raised with me which I feel you may wish to refer to the President.

For your convenience I have had prepared an explanatory memorandum for you and a memorandum which you may discuss with the President or forward to him on each of the following subjects:

a. Sending the Secretaries of War and Navy copies of State Department correspondence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Indo-China and French possessions in the Pacific.

c. Moving the Inter-American Defense Board.

d. Matters for the President to discuss with Dr. Kung.

e. Publication of Ambassador Phillips' letter on India.

f. British-American petroleum agreement.

g. Arab reaction to the Palestine planks of the Republican and Democratic platforms.

Attached is a memorandum to you on the subject of funds for the Polish Underground, of which a separate memorandum addressed to the President has been forwarded directly to you.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

August 14, 1944

S

The Secretary:

Subject: Sending the Secretaries of War and Navy
Copies of State Department Correspondence
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In conversation recently, Secretary Stimson referred
to the many political subjects which we were taking up with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on which it would be helpful if
the Secretaries of War and Navy were informed. It was
proposed that with your approval the Department inaugurate
a procedure to furnish the Secretaries of War and Navy
automatically with copies of all letters the Department
sends to the Joint Chiefs.

If you approve, I feel you may wish to discuss this
directly with the President and I enclose a memorandum
for the President which you may discuss with him.

[Signature]

[Initials]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 14, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Stimson recently indicated that it would be helpful to him and to the Secretary of the Navy if they were informed of all communications the Department sends to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I agree with him and I am prepared to issue instructions to the Department to send to the Secretaries of War and Navy automatically copies of all communications from the Department to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

May I have your approval to inaugurate this procedure?
August 14, 1944

S
The Secretary

Subject: Indo-China and the French Possessions in the Pacific.

It would be very helpful to the Department if Mr. Grew has told me it would be very helpful to him if we could learn what, if anything, transpired with regard to Indo-China or any French possessions in the Pacific in conversations between the President and General de Gaulle. I think you may wish to raise this with the President and I attach a memorandum which you may discuss with him.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: *Indo-China and the French Possessions in the Pacific.*

It would be very helpful to the Department if it could have an indication of what, if anything, transpired regarding Indo-China or any of the French possessions in the Pacific during your conversations with General de Gaulle.

I would very much appreciate anything you would care to tell us on this subject.
S

The Secretary:

Subject: British-American Petroleum Agreement.

While you were away I told the President that upon his return we would have waiting for him a summary of the British-American petroleum agreement.

I attach herewith a memorandum for the President summarizing the agreement which you may wish to send to him.

E
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British-American Petroleum Agreement signed August 8, 1944.

The Agreement is substantially the same as the Draft Memorandum of Understanding agreed to in May. It recognizes that the world's petroleum resources are adequate to assure ample supplies to all nations, and it seeks to make them available at fair prices and without discrimination.

Among the principles embodied in the Agreement are the following:

1) economic development and advancement of producing areas
2) development should proceed with a view to providing adequate supplies to all peace-loving states, subject to future collective security arrangements
3) equal opportunity for all in the acquisition of new concessions
4) respect for valid concession contracts
5) freedom of operations from restrictions inconsistent with the purposes of the Agreement.

International Petroleum Commission

A purely advisory International Petroleum Commission is established with four members appointed by each government. The Commission is to estimate world demand for petroleum, suggest
suggest the most equitable manner for allocating this demand among the several producing areas, recommend policies to the operating companies, and analyze problems referred to it.

Areas Covered

The Agreement applies to the United Kingdom and to the British Empire (excluding India and the Dominions), and to all territories under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Cooperation with other Governments

Other interested governments will be consulted when occasion arises, and it is hoped their cooperation will be obtained.

Duration of the Agreement

The Agreement is interim in character, and will be superseded by a multilateral agreement to be negotiated by all interested countries at an international petroleum conference. The present Agreement may be terminated by either party on three months' notice.
August 15, 1944

S

The Secretary

Subject: Arab Reaction to the Palestine Planks of the Republican and Democratic Platforms.

Attached is a memorandum to you which I asked Mr. Murray to prepare suggesting that when you next see the President you may wish to discuss with him orally the reaction of the Arab world to the Palestine planks adopted by the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.
Office Memorandum  •  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO:  S - Mr. Secretary:
FROM:  NEA - Mr. Murray.
SUBJECT: Reaction in Syria to Palestine Planks of Republican and Democratic Parties.

DATE: August 11, 1944

When next you see the President you may wish to discuss with him the attached telegram from our Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus regarding a conversation with the Syrian Prime Minister in the course of which the Prime Minister asked our Chargé to inform us of the anxiety entertained by the Government of Syria with regard to the Palestine planks adopted by the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

The Prime Minister said that while he understood the unofficial character of the party platforms, the Palestine planks were regarded in Syria as a blow to American prestige which was all the more unfortunate in the light of the high esteem which his country has held for the United States.

You will recall that in your memorandum of July 26 you called to the President's attention a telegram from our Minister at Baghdad summarizing the concern of the Iraqi Government with regard to the activities of the Zionists in this country and with particular reference to the Republican plank on Palestine. In addition to attacks, which are continuing, on the Republican and Democratic planks in the Syrian and Egyptian press, we have also seen telegrams of protest sent by the Egyptian Premier to the chairmen of the Democratic and Republican National Committees.

Attachment:

Telegram no. 17,
August 5, 1944,
from Damascus,

Wallace Murray
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government agency. (RESTRICTED)

Dated August 3, 1944

Rec'd 5:08 p.m.

Damascus

Secretary of State

Washington

17, August 3, 5 p.m.

Prime Minister Jabri (in the absence of the foreign minister) sent for me this morning to express verbally and in a friendly manner the anxiety and even provocation which the statements on Palestine in the Democratic and Republican Party platforms have caused in Syria. Remarkling that these statements have been a blow to American prestige here he mentioned the especially high esteem in which the United States has been held in this country since the days of the King Crane commission as expressed at that time in the overwhelming vote for an American mandate. He also mentioned the close cultural relations between our two countries; the moral as well as material interest which the United States has in maintaining Syria's friendship; the fact that Syrians have been at the forefront of Arab movement; and in conjunction with our petroleum policy Syria's very close friendship with Saudi Arabia. He likewise reviewed the familiar arguments
arguments regarding Arab rights in Palestine including that of the comparable justice of giving the United States back to the Indians.

The Prime Minister asked me to transmit the views of his government to my government which I said I would be glad to do notwithstanding the fact that the party platforms were unofficial and could not be considered as an expression of American policy. He said he was aware of this and was for that reason making a verbal rather than a written protest.

Satterthwaite

WSB
September 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I enclose a self-explanatory letter from Governor Dewey and the reply I propose to make, if agreeable to you.

C. H.

Pencilled notation:

"C.H. OK FDR."

Pencil corrected to "C.H. OK FDR."
Hon. Cordell Hull  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am deeply gratified at the result of the discussions you have had with Mr. Dulles, my representative. They constitute a new attitude toward the problem of peace.

Heretofore, war has been the only matter which has been lifted above partisanship during a presidential campaign. I recently said that if we are to have lasting peace, we must wage peace as we wage war.

I feel that we are now making a beginning toward doing that and it is my hope that we shall have great success to that end.

With assurances of my high esteem,

I am,

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS E. DEWEY

TED:LR
September 1, 1944

My dear Governor Dewey:

You may be sure that I appreciate your letter of August 25 expressing gratification at the result of the conversations recently concluded here with Mr. Dulles.

These conversations and your letter constitute a heartening manifestation of national unity on the problem of the establishment of an international peace and security organization. I am convinced that with unity, and only with unity, we can successfully carry forward this project which means so much to the people of this generation and to the people of generations to come.

In order that there may be fuller public understanding of our common ground on this important subject I suggest that, if you agree, your letter of August 25 and my reply be given to the press.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Thomas E. Dewey,
Governor of New York,
New York.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This is just a memorandum as I am leaving to be gone until over Labor Day.

I note in the news that Sweden is taking action to announce that it will not harbor any war criminals.

Don't you think that we might approach the Swiss to make a similar declaration? None of us want to send an Allied army into Switzerland to grab Hitler, etc., and if they make a declaration now it may keep some of the Nazis out or give them a chance later to hand over war criminals.

F. D. R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS

BULGARIA
The Bulgarian Armistice delegates, Moushanov and Zhelezkov, arrived in Cairo August 30 and Lord Moyne proposes that the agreed armistice terms be handed to them at 8 a.m., Cairo time, August 31. The text of the terms has been informally shown to the Greek Premier, who approved them but requested Greek participation in the negotiations and signature. (Cairo (Greek) 272)

POLAND
The text of proposals which the Polish Government, after having received the approval and suggestions of the Polish underground, is to submit to Moscow, has been made available to Mr. Schoenfeld. They provide for the reconstruction of the Polish Government after the liberation of Warsaw to include representatives of the Peasant Party, the National Democratic Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Labour Party and the Polish Worker's Party. The inclusion of representatives of fascist-minded and non-democratic political groups was ruled out. The Government will bring about the resumption of diplomatic relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. A constitutional Diet is to be elected "as soon as normal conditions are established in the country". In regard to Polish frontiers in the East the proposals provide that "the main centers of Polish cultural life and the sources of raw materials indispensable to the economic life of the country shall remain within Polish boundaries." (London, Polish, 88)

SWEDEN
The Swedish Foreign Minister has informed the American Minister that the question of asylum for war criminals is on the agenda for discussion at a cabinet meeting on Friday and that it was his personal belief that the Government's decision would be to issue a declaration that Sweden would not give asylum to war criminals. He added informally that it is impossible to patrol the Swedish-Norwegian frontier effectively and that certain war criminals might succeed in reaching Sweden by this route or by parachute. Public opinion in Sweden, however, according to the Foreign Minister is entirely hostile to any receipt of war criminals. (Stockholm 3389)

PORTUGAL
Belzuly has expressed interest in the reported evacuation of Manila because our progress in the Far East involves the question of Timor. He wishes to utilize the concessions for a global Santa Maria air field project as a bargaining counter to realize his desire to send an expeditionary force to Timor. He likewise desires to defer major decisions on the Santa Maria question until the time of the projected staff talks. (Lisbon 2666)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter 1,117-72
By J. Schaeble Date, MAR 3 1972