

● PSF

State Dept.: Sumner Welles

Jan. - May 1940

PSF

Welles.  
1-1939

Letter to General Watson from Welles ---January 5, 1940.

Enclosing despatch No 539 of Nov 28, 1939 from Ambassador  
Davies in Brussels.who reports conversationshe had with  
\*Prime Minister Peirlot and Foreign Minister Spaak.

See:Belgium folder-Drawer 1-1939

Copy

Wells  
1-43

January 10, 1940.

My dear General Watson:

I am enclosing a copy of Ambassador Biddle's strictly confidential despatch No 5 of November 29, 1939 which was marked for the President.

In this despatch the discontinuance of the protection of Polish interests in Germany by the Swedish Legation at Berlin is reported.

Sincerely yours,

Sumner Wells

Enclosure:

From Angers, No 5,  
November 29, 1939

For despatch--See Poland folder-Drawer 4-1939

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

You said you wanted to  
talk with Sumner Welles about  
this at lunch today.

G.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1940


My dear Mr. President:

I mentioned at lunch today that I had given the Secretary of State a memorandum a few days ago for his consideration but, as he said when we were with you, he has been so swamped recently with his Ways and Means Committee hearings that he has not had a chance to go into it or to talk over the problems involved with you.

I am sending you a copy of this memorandum, thinking that you may have time to give it some thought before I have the opportunity of seeing you at lunch on Monday.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "W. Phillips". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "W" and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Enclosure:  
Memorandum.

The President,  
The White House.

PSF:WILLIAMS

### Organization of Neutrals

The President would inquire of the following governments whether they believe it desirable and in the highest interest of the neutral powers, to undertake conversations between them, with the view to determining the best means of strengthening moral and economic cooperation between them during the duration of the war, and with the view to determining what the judgment of the neutral states might be as to the most effective means, upon the conclusion of the war, of securing a stable world order based upon international law and a sound international economic system.

This inquiry would be addressed to the following governments: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Spain, Portugal, and Thailand (Siam).

In the event that the replies received by the President were favorable, or preponderantly favorable, the President would suggest, in further communications addressed to these governments, that the following

governments designate representatives to meet in Washington with representatives of the United States to study and to formulate recommendations to all of the neutral powers listed covering the subjects mentioned in his original communication:

The American Republics would be requested to elect five representatives of the twenty-one American Republics. The six Oslo powers would be requested to select two representatives to represent the Oslo group. The Governments of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq would be requested to select one representative in representation of that group (it might be desirable to suggest that Afghanistan be included in this group so that it might likewise be represented). All of the other powers mentioned in the above list would be requested to designate one representative each.

It would be understood that before any actual meeting in Washington took place, all of the governments mentioned would have agreed upon concise and detailed agenda and would have been afforded an opportunity, through diplomatic channels, of reaching an agreement as to the general lines of the recommendations to be formulated.

PSF  
1/12/40  
1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I have received your report in regard to the information which was given to the press by the Department of State in regard to the departure of the SS. CITY OF FLINT.

The explanation is that there was a newspaper story published, dated from Bergen on January second, that the CITY OF FLINT "is expected to resume her adventures tonight or tomorrow." Actually, of course, she did not sail until several days later, and even if she had sailed immediately that would have been no justification for the State Department to give out the word which we received from our representative in Norway.

The point of the matter is this: The giving out of this information by the State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

-2-

Department might easily cause the death of many persons on the CITY OF FLINT and the sinking of the ship itself -- if the Germans decide to retaliate.

If we did not live under such an easy-going government, the Division of Current Information would be held responsible for this publicity by summary dismissal of the person or persons responsible. Please tell the Division of Current Information that the utmost care must be given in the future to information given to the press which might be used by the belligerents in war operations, and that if such a thing happens in the future, the persons responsible will be dismissed.

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our conversation of this morning concerning the newspaper stories regarding the departure of the City of Flint and the information which the Department of State had given to the press last night with regard thereto, I am enclosing herewith an item which appeared in the New York Times of January 3 containing an A.P. story from Bergen announcing the expected departure of the City of Flint from that port.

I have made it clear to the Division of Current Information that no further statement is to be given out by the Department regarding the voyage of the ship.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Clipping from New York Times,  
January 3, 1940.

The President,

The White House.

JAN 3 1940

# New York Times

Q 1

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## CITY OF FLINT TO SAIL

Freighter, Freed From Germans,  
to Leave Norway With Ore

BERGEN, Norway, Jan. 2 (AP)—The United States freighter City of Flint is expected to resume her adventures tonight or tomorrow, when she leaves the Norwegian port of Narvik for the United States.

The American crew that was aboard during her wanderings in Northern waters in October will be in charge. She is loaded with iron ore.

When en route to British ports from the United States in October, the City of Flint was seized by the German raider Deutschland and was taken to Murmansk, Russia, by a German prize crew. Later en route to Germany, the City of Flint put in at Haugesund, Norway, and the German prize crew was interned.

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1940 Vol. I General

pages 1-4.

RS - Sep 1959

Sept. 18, 1959

Memo for files

this item was detached this date  
from Dept State Press Release, Feb. 9,  
1940 and also <sup>from</sup> an undated message from  
Prime Minister [1940] because this  
item is classified "Secret" by British  
and because it is not related  
specifically to matter to which  
formerly attached.

Filed: PSF, State: Welles, 1940

R B Jacoby  
Archivist

[c. Feb 1, 1946]

PSF  
Welles

Following from Prime Minister.

Begins.

You may certainly take the earliest opportunity of informing the President that I am most interested in his proposal and appreciate fully the motives that have inspired it.

2. The information which the President has received from Germany corresponds with what has been reaching His Majesty's Government, but in estimating the value of this information the President has no doubt observed that no announcement by any leading Allied statesman would justify the belief in Germany that Allied Governments intend upon victory to partition Germany. If German people do believe this it is because the German Government by means of their propaganda are forcing this belief upon them in the hope that by this means they may counteract any craving for peace among the German people and may be better able to reconcile them to further hardships and sacrifices.

3. As to the inevitability of a tremendous offensive in the spring this too has for some time past been put about by German propaganda as part of the war of nerves on which they are engaged. It must be realized that this war of nerves is directed not only against the belligerents but also against the neutrals. By keeping the neutrals on tenterhooks,  
especially/

especially those neutrals in close proximity to Germany, the German Government hope to create among them the general fear lest a continuance of the war will eventually involve them in hostilities either directly or indirectly. We do not therefore feel that this kind of propaganda is necessarily conclusive as to peace being more difficult of attainment later. It is not unreasonable to suppose that it is precisely the policy of the German Government to produce this impression under the mistaken idea that by this means they can mobilize world public opinion against the Allies who would be represented as being the sole obstacle in the way of peace.

4. I am gratified to note that the President is convinced of necessity that any peace settlement must include "guarantees that there would be no renewal of aggression during any of our life-times". That is really the kernel of the difficulty and it is clear that the President appreciates the fact. It might not be so difficult to devise a settlement that apparently righted the wrongs done in recent months: whole difficulty is to find some means of assuring Europe that this could not be followed sooner or later by a renewed attack on the rights and liberties of the weaker European States.

5. We cannot imagine how such an assurance could be attained so long as Germany remains organised on the present lines and is under the  
direction/

direction of her present rulers. To demand as the condition of a peace that the present German régime shall be overthrown or changed may have one or other of two effects. It might encourage the German people to throw off Hitler's régime or it might unite them behind Hitler from fear that the Allies and America are trying to disrupt Germany so as to destroy her. The former alternative is rendered rather remote by the fact of the complete grip which Hitler, the party and the party machine seem to have on a population that is traditionally and remarkably amenable to discipline. The latter alternative is to be feared because it is the obvious line for Hitler's propaganda machine to take and because we should have to anticipate that they would use it skilfully and to the full.

6. But to be quite frank there would be the utmost difficulty in persuading people of this country and I believe of France that any settlement is worth signing with Hitler or present régime.

7. We have hitherto felt best method of handling this difficulty is to state the conditions which while not such as to invite rejection by considerable elements in Germany, are yet such as Hitler would find it impossible to accept. I infer that this is not far from the President's thought, and three of the President's four "freedoms" imply the disappearance of the present régime in Germany which could neither allow nor survive "freedom of information, freedom of religion and freedom for trade."

8. We should of course fully subscribe to these but I should like further to make it plain that our [group corrupt] consider that any territorial or other settlement would have to be conditional on [group corrupt] provisions whereby these conditions were reasonably assured.

9. As to the President's proposed procedure I should feel considerable diffidence in making any suggestions as he alone can know what will afford him best means of obtaining data on which to form a judgement.

10. In any discussions however it would surely be desirable that Polish Government should be associated with those of Great Britain and France. Invasion of Poland was the immediate cause of the war; Poland is the ally of Great Britain and France in this war; and all three Governments are pledged not to make separate peace. Moreover as the President recognises, restoration of Poland is a prerequisite of any peace negotiations. I venture to hope therefore that Mr. Sumner Welles will while in Europe make a point of consulting Polish Government now established in France as well as other Governments mentioned by the President.

11. The President doubtless has in mind problem arising out of Soviet aggression on Finland and in view of the strong feeling thereby aroused throughout the world in support perhaps may consider whether it would be desirable to extend Mr. Sumner Welles' enquiry in that direction.

12. The announcement of mission of Mr. Welles will of course produce a sensational impression throughout the world more particularly if it makes public full purpose of this initiative.

13. It may be that the President feels he cannot obtain data that he requires from his regular representatives in various capitals. But such a sensational intervention will raise hopes in some quarters and give rise to discussion - much of it ill-informed - in nearly all and if the President after weighing all considerations that I feel bound to submit to him feels full disclosure would best contribute to the ends he has in view, it would seem of great importance that he should give clear indication in announcement of his own conviction that first essential purpose to be achieved is durability of any settlement arrived at.

14. I must frankly admit to a good deal of anxiety lest the effect of this move however carefully presented should be to cause embarrassment to the democracies from which Germany, still unconvinced of the failure of policy of force, will reap advantage.

15. There is no doubt greater unity in France and England than there is in Germany but there are always elements in the community which do not share general opinion, and what I fear is that public announcement of the President's initiative will at once bring these elements into open and vocal prominence in countries where "freedom of information"

already/

already exists. Since German public and press will remain dragooned and controlled there will ensue a false appearance of unity in Germany which will contrast very unfortunately with an apparent disunity in democratic countries. Period of waiting while Mr. Welles collects his information will be a critical one, and I am concerned at the thought that it may be used by German Ministry of Propaganda to emphasise divisions in ranks of their opponents, and thus alter the situation to our disadvantage.

16. I am most anxious to avoid giving the President the impression that I do not fully appreciate the impulse which has inspired him to courageous proposal. On the contrary you may assure him that I will certainly cooperate to the best of my ability. But I earnestly hope that he will consider very seriously possible effects of a public announcement of purpose of Mr. Welles' mission before this becomes absolutely necessary.

17. I am sure that he will not object to my putting my views on this most important matter to him with the same frankness which he has displayed to me (and for which I am deeply grateful).

18. You may if you wish show this telegram to the President and leave him a copy.

PSF  
Wallas

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


February 1, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I am sending you herewith a copy of the proposed message to the neutral countries.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'P. S. Wallas'. The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'P' and a long horizontal stroke.

Enclosure.

The President,  
The White House.

More than five months have passed since the armies of the German Reich invaded the Republic of Poland, and since shortly thereafter the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions comprising the British Empire, together with the Government of France, declared war upon Germany. Within that period the hostilities which have engulfed Europe have shown no signs of abating. On the contrary, the scene of actual warfare has become enlarged in scope. Soviet Russia has attempted to invade the Republic of Finland, and hardly a week goes by that reports are not current that additional nations may be forced into a spreading conflict.

And in the Far East the long-protracted hostilities between China and Japan continue.

During these same months the neutral powers in all parts of the earth have been confronting an increasingly serious and, in several instances, a gravely critical, situation. They have suffered the impairment of their legitimate commerce by belligerent action with resultant dislocation to their national economy and to the well-

ligerent nations are in no sense superior to the rights

being of their nationals. They have seen neutral vessels, engaged in peaceful trade, sunk, and the lives of neutral passengers and seamen destroyed. Not only have the principles of international law, agreed upon by the great majority of the nations of the world, been openly violated, but the belligerent powers would seem in practice to maintain that the clearly established rights of neutral peoples--rights secured to them by international agreement, by the enlightened precedents established throughout the course of the last century, and by every precept of justice and of reason--must give way to whatever rights may be asserted by the belligerents themselves.

The twenty-one sovereign American Republics, by common accord, have agreed upon measures destined to preserve and maintain their neutrality. They share the conviction that hostilities in which they are not involved should not jeopardize the normal peaceful life of the independent peoples of the Western Hemisphere.

In harmony with those agreements, the Government of the United States does not admit that the rights of belligerent nations are in any sense superior to the rights

of neutral states, save insofar as belligerent rights are defined by the generally accepted principles of international law or by international agreements to which the United States is a party.

I believe that it is the overwhelming aspiration of all neutral peoples that the warfare which is now laying waste so many lands should spread no further. It would seem to be evident that this objective might be the more readily attained were neutral rights to be more clearly reasserted, and were the neutral countries, during the continuation of the present hostilities, to be afforded the opportunity of maintaining intact the standard of living of their peoples through the enjoyment of legitimate commerce so far as it may be permitted them by the previously established rules of international law.

It has seemed to me, therefore, that the highest interests of all of the neutral nations would be well served if a closer cooperation between them might be established throughout the duration of the existing conflicts.

For that reason I inquire of Your Excellency's Government, as I am inquiring of the Governments of Argentina,

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Spain, Portugal, and Thailand (Siam), whether the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ believes it desirable that conversations be undertaken between all of the Governments above named, including the Government of the United States. Such conversations would be held with a view to determining the best means of strengthening moral cooperation and commercial interchange between them during the continuation of the wars now being waged. They might well further determine what the judgment of the neutral states might be as to the most effective means, upon the cessation of hostilities, of securing the reaffirmation of, and scrupulous respect for, the essential principles of international law, together with a practicable method of assuring the limitation and progressive reduction of armaments, and the establishment of a sound international

economic system.

In the event, as I trust, that the replies received to this inquiry are favorable, I shall lay for their consideration before the governments which indicate their desire to take part in such conversations, more detailed recommendations as to the exchange of views suggested.

PSF: Miller

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

FEBRUARY 9, 1940

It is announced by the Secretary of State that in view of existing hostilities in many parts of the world, in view of the effect of such hostilities on the neutral nations of the world and in view of the evident desire of all neutral nations for the eventual restoration of world peace on a sound and lasting basis for all nations, diplomatic conversations of an informal character have been commenced with neutral governments and will probably be continued with all neutral governments.

It should be emphasized that these conversations involve no plan or plans but are in the nature of preliminary inquiries relating to a sound international economic system and, at the same time, world-wide reduction of armaments. Matters involving present war conditions are not a part of these preliminary conversations. These conversations can, of course, be extended to belligerent nations in so far as they involve these two common problems of future peace.

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ST 77

President's draft

~~It is announced by the Secretary of State that~~

in view of existing hostilities in many parts of the world, in view of the effect of such hostilities on the neutral nations of the world and in view of the evident desire of all neutral nations for the eventual restoration of world peace on a sound and lasting basis for all nations, diplomatic conversations of an informal character have been commenced with neutral governments and will probably be continued with all neutral governments.

It should be emphasized that these conversations involve no plan or plans, but are in the nature of preliminary inquiries relating to ~~essential principles~~ *of peace* ~~of looking toward~~ world-wide reduction of armaments and, at the same time, a ~~sound~~ sound international economic system. Matters involving present war conditions are not a part of these preliminary conversations. These conversations can, of course, be extended to belligerent nations insofar as they involve common problems of future peace.

*These two*  
^

~~(sound economic policies)~~

PSF: Sumner Welles  
1

Feb 8, 1940.

Longhand Note to Sumner Welles from the President  
asking him to send in code a message to Bill Phillips

Re-His getting word to Sec of State at Vatican about appt  
of Bishop or Archbishop for Washington etc etc.

See: Italy folder-Drawer 4-1940

~~SECRET~~

Following from the Prime Minister.

- A. I am very grateful to the President for giving sympathetic consideration to the points which you, on my instructions, put to him and am grateful to note that in some cases at least he is disposed to recognize their force.
- B. In order that he may be fully acquainted with the inner movement here and thus have before him all possible repercussions of the action he has in mind, I feel that I ought to tell him in confidence the upshot of our consultations with the French Government on February 5th.
- C. We found them, as we are indeed ourselves, deeply concerned over the Finnish situation. All reports show that there must be a limit to Finnish resistance, which must crumble sooner or later in default of substantial help. It will not be sufficient merely to send the Finns what we can spare in the matter of war material. It will probably be necessary to fight at their side.
- D. The complete overthrow of Finland would arouse in France and in this country the most intense feelings of indignation and rage and it is almost certain that, however unjust, these feelings would express themselves in an indictment of the Allies for having betrayed the cause for which we took up arms. All this apart from the material fact that conquest of Finland would mean the

practical/

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

practical subjugation of Scandinavia to Germany and Russia.

E. Our principal difficulty is that we cannot render direct and substantial assistance to Finland without Norwegian and Swedish cooperation or at least consent. At present time Norway and Sweden hesitate to take any action which exposes them to the joint threat from the Soviet and Germany. Though they might welcome our assistance against the Soviet threat to Finland and Northern Scandinavia they would naturally ask us how we could guarantee them against a German threat to Southern Scandinavia if that should result from our action.

F. The French and we agreed that the most practicable plan for saving Finland would be the immediate preparation of a Franco British expeditionary force to go to the assistance of Finland across Northern Scandinavia. At the same time we should prepare another force with which we should assist Norway and Sweden if the German threat against the South should materialize, though we ourselves are doubtful whether in fact the Germans would care to extend their liabilities.

G. We anticipate that (when) the critical period approaches, probably not later than the third week in March, Finland would be likely to send out a last appeal to save her from destruction. We and France would then ask the Scandinavian countries to give us the necessary facilities for the passage of our forces and we should hope to obtain their consent if we could show them that we had

sufficient/

sufficient means at hand to save Finland and to give them reasonable protection. We are therefore pressing on with our preparations with all speed.

H. The President will understand that this is a most highly confidential communication and that he is entrusted with a secret that has been divulged to no one.

I. At the same time he will perceive our anxiety lest the action he proposes to take should interfere with the success of this plan. What we fear is that if Governments of Sweden and Norway get the idea that some peace suggestions are likely to be set on foot, they will refuse the facilities we want in order to save Finland, and will excuse themselves on the ground that Finland will no doubt be looked after in coming negotiations and that, if they should fail and Finland be destroyed, the responsibility will not be theirs.

It was this contingency which I had in mind in my allusion to Finland in my earlier telegram 173.

J. You may show this telegram to the President and leave him a copy.

Given out at Press Conference: <sup>PSF: Welles</sup> Feb 9, 1940

At the request of the President, the Under Secretary of State Mr. Sumner Welles will proceed shortly to Europe to visit Italy, France, Germany and Great Britain. This visit is solely for the purpose of advising the President and the Secretary of State as to present conditions in Europe.

Mr. Welles will, of course, be authorized to make no proposals or commitments in the name of the Government of the United States.

Furthermore, statements made to him by officials of governments will be kept in the strictest confidence and will be communicated by him solely to the President and the Secretary of State.

At the request of the President ~~and the~~  
~~Secretary of State~~, the Under Secretary of State Mr. James W. Wells  
Italy will proceed

shortly to Europe to visit <sup>Italy</sup> France, Germany and Great

Britain. This visit is solely for the purpose of advising

the President and the Secretary of State as to <sup>present</sup> ~~whether~~  
~~conditions in Europe.~~

~~or not there would seem to be any possibility of ending <sup>an</sup> to~~  
~~the existing war between these powers in the near future.~~

Mr. Wells will, of course, be  
authorized to make no proposals <sup>or commitments</sup> in the name of the  
Government of the United States.

Furthermore, statements made to him by officials  
of governments will be kept in the strictest confidence  
and will be communicated by him solely to the President  
and the Secretary of State.

DRAFT

The President has today directed Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ to proceed to Europe to visit Germany, England, and France. It will be the purpose of Mr. \_\_\_\_\_'s mission to ascertain whether the governments of those belligerent powers will state for the confidential information of the President the basis upon which they would be prepared to make peace. Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ will be empowered to make no proposals in the name of the Government of the United States to the governments mentioned, but only to inquire what the peace terms of the contending powers may be and to report the statements he may receive to the President and to the Secretary of State.

In view of the confidential nature of Mr. \_\_\_\_\_'s mission, any statements which may be made to him by officials of the governments of Germany, England, and France will be communicated by him solely to the President and to the Secretary of State.

Attached are the President's  
letters of Feb 14, 1940 which  
were presented by Sumner Welles  
to the following on his mission  
abroad:

Chamberlain  
Mussolini  
Deladier

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1940.

*file  
personal  
PSF: 1-40  
Wallas*


My dear Mr. President:

You told me last night that you wished to give me three autograph letters addressed to Signor Mussolini, to M. Daladier, and to Mr. Chamberlain so that I might present them when they receive me.

I am submitting herewith three drafts which are identical in substance for your consideration.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures.

As stated.

The President,  
The White House.

February 12, 1940

February 12, 1940

My dear Signor Mussolini:  
My dear Mr. President:

This letter will be handed to you by Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, when he has the privilege of being received by you.

You may be sure that whatever views you express to him will be maintained in the strictest confidence, and will be transmitted by him solely to myself and to the Secretary of State of the United States. At this grave moment I am led to believe that this exchange of views between us may be of real value.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

His Excellency

Monsieur Edouard Deladier,

President of the Council of Ministers,

Paris, France.

February 12, 1940

My dear Signor Mussolini:

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This letter will be handed to you by Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, when he has the privilege of being received by you.

You may be sure that whatever views you express to him will be transmitted by him solely to myself and to the Secretary of State of the United States. At this grave moment I am led to believe that this exchange of views between us may be of real value.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

His Excellency

Benito Mussolini,

Chief of the Government,

Rome, Italy.

COPY OF ORIGINAL LETTER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1940

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This letter will be handed to you by Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, when he has the privilege of being received by you.

You may be sure that whatever views you express to him will be maintained in the strictest confidence, and will be transmitted by him solely to myself and to the Secretary of State of the United States. At this grave moment I am led to believe that this exchange of views between us may be of real value.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

The Right Honorable  
Neville Chamberlain, M.P.,  
London, England.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Feb. 14  
1940

My dear Signor Mussolini:

My old friend Mr. Sumner Welles, my Under Secretary of State, will give you this when he has the privilege of being received by you.

You may be sure that whatever views you express to him will be transmitted by him solely to myself and to the Secretary of State.

At this grave moment I deeply hope that this exchange of views between us may be of real value to Italy, to the United States, and to the future of the world.

I still hope to meet you some day soon!

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

COPY OF LONGHAND LETTER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Feb. 14  
1940

My dear Mr. President:

My boyhood friend Sumner Welles will give you this. What you tell him he will maintain in the strictest confidence and will be transmitted only to me and to Mr. Hull.

At this grave moment I deeply hope that this exchange of views may be of real value -- and that the world may eventually obtain a peace which is neither "inconclusive nor precarious".

Bill Bullitt is just back and gives me your very much appreciated messages -- and I send to "mon ami Daladier" my very warm regards.

Faithfully,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

COPY OF LONGHAND LETTER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Feb. 14  
1940

My dear Chamberlain:

Sumner Welles, my Under Secretary of State, and an old boyhood friend will give you this. What you tell him will be maintained in the strictest confidence and will be told solely to myself and to Cordell Hull on my talk with him on his return. At this grave moment I deeply hope this exchange of views may be of real value towards a peace which is neither "inconclusive nor precarious". Enough said.

My warm regards,

Faithfully,

(Signed)

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

file  
personal

PSF: Welles  
10/11/40

I just wanted to say to you that I have been authorized to offer you a friendly word of advice or a word of friendly advice. To wit: Not to write yourselves out on the end of a limb or to attribute what you assume the President, Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles are discussing to any allegedly authorized or unimpeachable or reliable sources or to friends close to the President or to the Secretary of State or to the Under Secretary of State. That neither the President, the Secretary of State nor the Under Secretary of State will have any word to say to the press or to any of their friends or to anyone anywhere following their conference.

Stov's statement  
done Mar 28 '40  
on return of Willis

PSF: Welles  
1

Memorandum to Sumner Welles from the President-March 30, 1940

Attaches for his information a message from Larry Fly sent through Jim Rowe.

Re:Conference between Hitler and Mussolini and re cables to both Americas which can only mean that the Italians plan to carry German messages etc etc.

See:Administrative Assts folder-Drawer 1-1940(March 30, 1940 memo)

PSF: Welles

April 1, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR SUMNER WELLES FROM THE PRESIDENT:

RE: Inquiry President had from Myron Taylor who asked if the Pope's letter of March 16, 1940 to the President was to be given to the Press. The President asks Welles to make decision.

Attached is Welles reply of April 6, 1940, saying that after due consideration it was decided not to publish the letter unless the President wished otherwise.

Also attached is Welles letter to the President of March 30, 1940 and the Pope's letter of March 16, 1940.

See: Italy folder-Drawer 4-1940 (April 6, 1940 letter)

This memo came to file April 1, 1940

PSF

1  
Welles

MR. EARLY:

McDermott says the A. P. has the following  
bulletin from Rose:

"Undersecretary Welles disclosed today that no peace plan or mediation proposal had been offered him by any belligerent government or any other government during his conversations.

"He also declared emphatically that he had not conveyed any suggestions for peace to any European powers. He said he was taking facts and no peace proposals back to President Roosevelt."

-----

Mr. Hillman of Colliers will be at the  
press conference today.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Here is Chamberlain's letter  
to me. Do you think it needs a  
reply?

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1940

PSF  
Halls  
open


Johnson  
Boydell

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith Mr. Chamberlain's personal letter to you since I believe you will wish to keep it in your own file. As I said to you this morning, Mr. Chamberlain's letter is a reply to your personal letter to him which I handed him when I was in London and, consequently, I do not believe that his letter to you requires any acknowledgment.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. H. Halls". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed phrase "Faithfully yours,".

The President,

The White House.



10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall,

March 13, 1940

My dear Roosevelt,

Your very kind letter of the 7<sup>th</sup> ult. was duly handed to me by Samuel Wells, whom it was a great pleasure to me to meet. We have had two frank and intimate talks and he knows exactly how the situation appears to me.

I sincerely hope that his mission may have fruitful results, if not immediately, yet in time to avert the worst catastrophe.

Meanwhile may I say how deeply I admire the courage and

(24)

1914

PRIME MINISTER

hamasah with which you are  
striving to grapple with this last  
and culminating effort to reestablish  
the rule of law.

Yours sincerely

J. Smith Chamberlain

Personal

By kindness of  
Mr. James Waller.

The President

The White House

U. S. A.

PRIME MINISTER

PSF Welles

April 4, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SUMNER WELLES:

Encloses two drafts of telegrams to Minister Gunther in Rumania for the Presidents approval re Colonel Beck proceeding to U. S. at this time etc. Attached is copy of Sec Hulls' telegram to Gunther of April 1, 1940 re President's desire to have conversation with Col. Joseph Beck--suggests he take matter up with King Carol etc. Attached is Gunthers reply of April 3, 1940 re having seen Foreign Minister Gafencu and his discussion about Beck leaving the country, also attached is Welles letter of April 15, 1940 with copy of memo from Murphy, Charge d'Affaires at Paris Embassy dated March 21, 1940 reporting conversation re Beck's activities etc.

See: State Dept-Drawer 1-1940(April 15, 1940 letter)

PSF:Welles  
1

April 4, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON FROM SUMNER WELLES:

Enclosing despatch from Ambassador Biddle of Feb 28, 1940 re attached copy and translation of authenticated copy of confidential instruction recently issued to the press in Germany and German occupied Poland, by the German propaganda Ministry.

Minister Zaleski gave the copy to Amb Biddle and informed him in strictest confidence that it had been secured and forwarded to him by Prince Janusz Radziwill.

See: France folder-Drawer 4-1940(April 4, 1940 letter)

PSF: Welles  
1

Confidential letter to the President from Sumner Welles of April 8, 1940  
with

Encloses memorandum of conversation he had with Mr. Radu Irimescu,  
Minister of Rumania on April 5, 1940.

Re: Situation in the Balkans and <sup>stories of</sup> alleged threat of Bill Bullitt  
that relations between the U. S. and Rumania would be broken  
unless the Rumanian Government permitted the former President and  
Foreign Minister of Poland to leave that country.

See: State Dept-Drawer 1 -1940

PSF, Welles  
1

For the President's memo of April 8, 1940  
to Sec Hull re subject of having Embassy in  
Lisbon and asking him what he thinks? And  
original of Welles reply attached.

See: State Dept-Drawer 1-1940 (April 11, 1940 letter)

April 11, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to your memorandum of April 8 with regard to the possibility of raising the rank of our mission in Lisbon to that of an embassy, I fear that Bertie Pell has exaggerated the facts. According to your memorandum he has told you that practically every other important nation has an embassy in Lisbon. Upon investigation I find that there are only four embassies in Lisbon, namely, the Vatican, Brazil, Spain, and Great Britain. France, Germany, and Italy have legations only.

The general policy of the Department has been that we would not recommend to you the raising of a European legation to an embassy unless the principal European countries had done likewise, and in view of present circumstances, that condition does not exist.

I think also that it would be hard on the basis of our interests involved to justify raising the legation in Lisbon to an embassy ahead of our legations in countries like Uruguay, Holland, and Sweden.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

The President,  
The White House.

U:SW:EE

P.S.F. Welles.  
1

Re: Memo from Sumner Welles office dated April 12, 1940

Subject: Telephone conversation to Welles from Max Truitt,  
of Maritime Commission re urgent situation in-  
volving transfer of Danish shipping to American  
flag and if not effected soon is afraid ships will  
be comandeered by British. (about 97 ships involved)  
(Longhand notation by President at top of letter--  
reads as follows: "Not Approved-FDR"

See: Maritime Commission-Drawer 2-1940

PSF; Welles

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1940

Personal and  
Strictly Confidential


*file*

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you for your information memoranda of two conversations which I have had within the past twenty-four hours which I believe should be submitted to you for your information. If we could find out the way in which Dewey and his advisers had obtained prior knowledge of these alleged German plans, we might be quite interested.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Encs.  
Two memoranda  
of conversation.

The President,  
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: April 12, 1940

SUBJECT: ~~SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~

PARTICIPANTS: The Minister of Yugoslavia, Mr. Constantin Fotitch;  
the Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.

COPIES TO: 8

---

\*\*\* 1-1483

The Minister of Yugoslavia called to see me this afternoon and said that he wanted to give me a personal and confidential message.

The Minister read to me a cable which had been sent to him in an indirect way by the Yugoslav Minister in Berlin. The latter reported that in a conversation which he had had with one of the Assistant Secretaries of the German Foreign Office the Assistant Secretary had stated that the German Foreign Office was fully convinced that if President Roosevelt had followed out his own inclination, the United States would now be at war on the side of the Allies, and that it was only because of national and

political considerations that President Roosevelt had refrained from insisting upon that course. The German Foreign Office was further confident that if President Roosevelt was re-elected for a third term and if the war had not already been won by Germany before that time, the United States would be in the war on the side of the Allies before February 1941.

The Yugoslav Minister told me that he believed this information was significant in connection with the publication of the alleged White Book documents. The Minister further said that he believed that less sensational and apparently less important documents had been made public in the first batch so as to have the question of their authenticity threshed out at this stage, and that later, after the American people had got used to the controversy about the authenticity of the documents, far more sensational documents would be published involving the name of President Roosevelt himself. The Minister stated that he believed the German strategy had completely failed but that he thought Ribbentrop would nevertheless persist in publishing further documents of the kind he had described.

U:SW:DMK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: April 11, 1940

SUBJECT: ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Constantine Brown;  
The Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.

COPIES TO:

ofo 1-1403

Constantine Brown told me today that he had learned through Allan Dulles, who is acting as adviser to Thomas Dewey on international questions, that the next batch of White Book documents to be published by the German Foreign Office relating to the United States would contain three reports sent by Ambassador Potocki of alleged conversations which he had had with President Roosevelt and a memorandum of a conversation which is purported to have taken place between Foreign Minister Beck of Poland and Ambassador Biddle.

Constantine Brown gave me to understand that Dewey had been advised of these German plans and was intending to give a sensational interpretation to them.

U:SW:DMK



24/10

Countess of Oxford & Asquith.

44, Bedford Square, W.C.1.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PSF: Welles  
Stats

April 13, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

13 Apr

SUMNER WELLES:

Dear Sumner:

Here is a real job for you and you alone. How in the blankety blank am I to answer Lady Oxford? I knew Elizabeth Bibesco, of course, very well but I only saw Mommer once in New York, when she came and spent an hour while I was recuperating from infantile paralysis.

It is because she evidently loves you so (just as much as she does me!) that I wish you would try your hand at something for me to send in reply!

F.D.R.

FDR/dj

TELEPHONE.  
MUSEUM 6464.

*Private*



44, BEDFORD SQUARE, W.C.1.

22<sup>nd</sup> March 1940

Dearest Franklin -

How you have not forgotten  
me & my sculptor *Stigebeli*  
(Bites) because you are  
a faithful friend, & be all  
like those who were, &  
admire us. This he both  
do. I look to the Tom what  
a wonderful impression  
you have Summer Welles.

made on Wing - me he had  
was here. I dined alone  
with the Prime Minister  
last week (I have a high  
reputation for hostile Vancouverian)  
& he told me how  
charming, & how true  
distinctive he had found you  
friend. Why don't you send  
him here as your ambassador.  
It is curious to me why  
the Americans think

44 BEDFORD SQUARE W.C.1

2

TELEPHONE MUSEUM 6494

Very interesting we  
that we're  
Country but better  
I think a lot  
to be Kennedy's As  
from purpose  
make

TELEPHONE,  
MUSEUM 6464.

2



44, BEDFORD SQUARE, W.C.1.

That very rich men sh<sup>d</sup> be the  
best representatives of their  
Country: they are wrong.  
I think Mr. Sumner Welles  
w<sup>d</sup> be a far better fellow  
than Kennedy for your  
purpose. As far as I can  
make out, & from all I  
hear, Mr. Kennedy dislikes  
the Allies. This may not be  
true, but his public  
utterances lack definiteness.

Speaking for my self I feel  
no great confidence in  
him. Over here he is calm,  
& confident; but at all  
complacent - but he feel  
that if the world allows  
all that is Evil, & vile  
of triumph over all that  
is Good, & beautiful then  
God will punish us, & we  
shall deserve His Censure.

Fear is what is  
uppermost in the minds of

3



TELEPHONE.  
MUSEUM 6464.

44, BEDFORD SQUARE, W.C.1.

the nations of Europe. You  
are fortunate in having  
nothing to fear; nevertheless,  
prosperity, s! not be the  
main object of <sup>my</sup>  
Great Country.

This is only a line  
of love from me who  
received the greatest  
kindness when she was  
in America & has an  
earnest admiration.

for the Comall of her  
President. his one has  
described as well as you  
have what our War  
aims is, & indeed  
which they are.

Your affec

Mark Oxtord

my  
my  
my

The United States of America



President Roosevelt

The White House  
Washington  
America

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1940

*file  
personnel*

My dear Mr. President:

Your memorandum of April 13 has given me, as you anticipated, a very puzzling job to do.

Like you, I have seen Lady Oxford once in my life, when she was visiting her daughter in Washington. Again like you, I knew Elizabeth Bibesco very well, but -- perhaps unlike you -- I found her one of the greatest pests I have ever encountered. I did not see either one of them when I was in London nor did I hear from them.

Lady Oxford's letter to you seems to me amazingly impertinent but in that, of course, she is running true to form. I should not think that you would wish to take any notice of her remarks about Joe Kennedy since, as you know, she will carry your reply around with her and show it to every one she meets in London.

I am enclosing a suggested noncommittal answer. I should also like to suggest that your answer should


The President,

The White House.

not be sent either through the open mail or through Kennedy in London, and consequently, if you approve, I could ask Lord Lothian to send the reply through the British pouch.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "D. H. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Enclosure:  
Draft letter.

April 15, 1940

My dear Lady Oxford:

I have just received your letter of March 22. Of course I have not forgotten you and your daughter Elizabeth. I well remember your kindness in coming to see me when I was ill in New York.

I am glad that Sumner Welles made a good impression in London. He has told me of the consideration and helpful assistance in carrying out his mission which he received on all sides, and I am, of course, most appreciative of the courtesy shown him as my representative.

Your words that "fear is uppermost in the minds of the nations of Europe" are tragically true. There can surely be no stable peace until confidence in national and individual security banishes the causes of fear. But do not think that prosperity is the sole object of this nations. The American people, like the people of so many other countries, seek the restoration of the rule of international law and order among the nations in place of the rule of aggression and of force, so that they and their children may once more live in a decent and a peaceful world. Only thereby can they themselves achieve security.

The Countess of Oxford and Aquith.

Thank you for your personal message. It  
was good of you to send it. Please give my  
warmest remembrances to your daughter and

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

April 29, 1940

*State* *BF* *Welles*

My dear Mr. President:

I have received this morning a personal letter from Jeff Caffery under date of April 22 of which I am sending you a copy for your information. "Bouças" referred to in the letter is the Rio de Janeiro manager of the International Business Machines Corporation, a very close friend of President Vargas and a very able and understanding friend of the United States.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

For original of this letter and enclosure from Caffery  
See: State Dept-Drawer -1940

The President,  
The White House.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1940

*PST: Welles*  
*file*  
*Confidential*

My dear Mr. President:

Bert Hulen, correspondent of the New York Times, has just left my office. After a series of preliminary questions, he inquired whether you had addressed any appeal to Italy to remain at peace. I replied that I knew of no peace proposal that you had in mind under present conditions and that your statement after my return from Europe had made that situation, in my judgment, very clear.

Hulen is about the most reliable correspondent attached to the State Department and is, in my judgment, quite incapable of undertaking any underhanded means of getting news. He works very closely under and with Arthur Krock. It would seem to me possible that Arthur Krock, who is on intimate terms with Lothian, may have learned from the latter that the British Government had requested that you make an appeal to Italy and that Arthur Krock had told Hulen to find out if you had made any move in this regard.


The President,

The White House.

No one in the Department has seen the telegrams sent last night except myself, although, of course, the matter was talked over with various people by the Secretary before the suggested draft was submitted to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "R. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "R" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

ASF Mills  
1

May 2, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a memorandum I have made of your conversation of today's date with the Italian Ambassador.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

*For original of this letter and strictly  
Conf-Memorandum of conversation -  
See: Italy - Drawer 4-1940.*

PSF  
Miles

May 4, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of May 3, I am enclosing herewith a suggested reply for you to send to Daladier and a covering letter addressed to Bill Bullitt.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Encs.

The President,  
The White House.

Re: Above correspondence  
See: Bill Bullitt-Drawer 4-1940 (May 3, 1940 memo)

PSF Welles  
1

May 4, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I believe you will be amused by a recent interchange of personal letters between our Minister in Budapest, John Montgomery, and Count Csáky, the Foreign Minister. This correspondence constitutes an unusual page in diplomatic history.

However, as a very positive sign that neither the Regent nor the Prime Minister feel that Montgomery's position has been in the slightest degree affected by this row with the Foreign Minister, the Regent only last week conferred upon him the highest decoration of the Hungarian Government which, naturally, Montgomery had to refuse.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Encs.

Sumner Welles

The President,  
The White House.

See: State Dept folder for correspondence mentioned.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1940

*file  
personal*


My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith Mr. Smith Hart's letter of April 20 and your memorandum of May 4 which you were good enough to send me on that date so that I might read them.

I am, of course, heartily in accord with the opinions set forth in your memorandum. I believe there is nothing that would more rapidly and completely destroy the relationship between the United States and the other American Republics which you have built up than for the United States herself to acquire territory in South America. If, as a result of the present war, steps have to be taken to prevent the Guianas or other European possessions from passing into different European hands, I believe the Pan American trusteeship idea would be the only possible solution.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:  
Memorandum, May 4, 1940.  
From Mr. Smith Hart,  
April 20, 1940.

The President,

The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1940.

Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUMNER WELLES:

To read and return.

F.D.R.

Letter from Smith Hart, St. Marc Arms,  
504 West 112th St., NYC, 4/20/40 to Mrs.  
Roosevelt, in re the British, Dutch, and French  
Guianas, which represent a solution of a large  
part of our unemployment, and copy of the Presi-  
dent's memorandum to Mrs. Roosevelt.

May 4, 1940.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR E.R.

There is much to be said for the development of British, French and Netherlands Guiana. The climate along the Coast and adjacent lowlands is vile -- so vile that it would cost huge sums to make life there inhabitable for white people.

The interior of all three Guianas is, in large part, unexplored and inaccessible. It would cost vast sums to open up the interior of the country.

Nevertheless, there is probably a good chance, through careful planning, of building up a stable population of several million people over a period of years -- with the possibility, though only a possibility, that the expenditures would come back in time.

There are, of course, two difficulties. The first is the price that would be demanded by the three present owners.

The second is that it is very doubtful if the United States should undertake sovereignty or sole charge of development. I am, confidentially, considering the broad thought of creating a form of Pan American trusteeship for situations of this kind. It is a new idea in international or Pan American relationships but it is worth studying -- especially if there is a remote possibility that the American Republics may be forced to do something about European possessions in this Hemisphere.

I think it is best not to discuss this out loud, however.

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

For the President

RECORDED  
AND INDEXED

*JHR*

*and  
5-1  
APR 23 1940  
St. Marc Arms  
New York, N. Y.  
April 20, 1940.*

St. Marc Arms,  
504 West 112th St.,  
New York, N. Y.  
April 20, 1940.

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt,

Almost at our doorstep across the Caribbean lie the British, Dutch, and French Guianas. They represent, potentially, a solution of a large part of our unemployment problem; a vital need to the defense of the western hemisphere; and, perhaps, a decisive link in the future integration of the nations of the new world into a United States of Pan America.

The Guianas, comprising some 167,000 square miles, could absorb the energies of many of our people in the production and processing of numerous products which we now import in vast quantities -- chiefly from areas where inefficient, low paid coolie labor provides no market whatever, in return, for our manufactured goods. If we could put our own people to work producing some of these items in the Guianas (negro and white southern sharecroppers and farmers on the tropic coast, northerners in the temperate uplands) using modern American production methods, we would automatically create a large new market for our own goods.

To cite only one of the advantages which would accrue to us through possession of the Guianas -- we now import rubber that is produced by coolie plantation laborers to whom we can sell nothing from sources half way around the world from us. If we are ever involved in a war with a major naval power the trade routes over which our rubber supplies must come could be cut by enemy forces at such distances from our naval bases that it is doubtful whether we could effectively clear them. In the Guianas we could produce all the rubber we need (and we consume vast quantities) -- virtually in our own front yard and employ our own people in its production.

Too, as a new American frontier the Guianas would furnish a great, new field for the investment of idle capital. There would be railroads and highway systems, new towns and cities to be built -- the innumerable things a new land in the process of development must have and which the industrial plant of the United States is so well equipped to turn out.

American development of the Guianas should be undertaken with a view to their ultimate incorporation into the nation as states rather than as mere colonial appendages. It would be wise to keep in mind, in this regard, that their resources are large, that similarly situated South American nations of comparable size boast populations running into the millions, and that,

with the construction of interior highways and the opening up of the country to homesteading, free play would be given to the enterprise of hundreds of thousands of Americans who are eager to find just such an outlet for their energies.

Taking the war situation in Europe into full consideration and remembering particularly the imperative need of the Allies for both American goods and American good will -- it should not be too difficult to arrive at a fair agreement to purchase the Guianas through (1) the war debts owed us, (2) our surplus products, (3) credits for manufactured goods or (4) cash on the line -- or perhaps a combination of all four. Their Guiana holdings are not in any sense integral parts of the British, French or Dutch Empires. They themselves bought them or appropriated them to begin with and have done nothing with them because they have vaster holdings of a similar character with huge supplies of coolie labor in the Far East.

Strategically, the Guianas are of no value to any European nation save as a threat to the security of America -- a reason for leaving them in the possession of foreign powers that we could hardly be expected to appreciate.

German seizure of the Netherlands (which the world is momentarily awaiting) and a subsequent "break" through the British fleet would force us to occupy Dutch Guiana for our own protection. And we might be confronted with the necessity of waging war in the process. Similarly, in the case of British and French Guiana, while most of us feel relatively sure that the Allies will win the present war, we do not, after all, have any assurance whatsoever that they actually will -- particularly if Germany is joined openly by Russia, Italy and perhaps Japan. If the totalitarian nations do win, they can naturally be expected to assume proprietorship of Allied colonial possessions. In such case the United States would automatically be thrust into war against them for possession of these footholds on the South American continent.

Geographically situated to be of great strategic importance in the defense of the Americas, the Guianas are at present a dangerously vulnerable "weak spot". Their seizure by hostile naval powers would bar us from all access to South America through the Atlantic -- would leave the southern Caribbean door to the Panama Canal in enemy hands.

To us, therefore, the Guianas are of incalculable strategic value. Possession of them would give us (1) the means of closing the door through the southern Caribbean to the Panama Canal (a door which now swings ajar) and (2) a base from which an American fleet could effectively bar access to South America to hostile European powers.

To recapitulate briefly: full exploitation of the Guianas would (1) give work to great numbers of our people;

(2) provide a wide new field for the profitable investment of idle funds; (3) solve our relief problem at least in part in so far as it affects employables; (4) facilitate the defense of the western hemisphere.

These factors are of vital concern to America.

A nonpartisan citizens' committee should be formed to work out a program for the acquisition and development of the Guianas by the United States, and to push that program through to a successful conclusion. This is a program in which all America could cooperate wholeheartedly since it would be of benefit to the entire nation.

Will you help me to get the ball rolling? I am working on a new book and have neither the time nor the means to get out and organize such a committee by myself -- though more than willing, of course, to do my share. I feel sure that if you get behind this thing and give it an initial push, it will soon travel along on its own momentum. Publicity is, of course, the greatest need at the moment and a person in your position could give it that easily.

Can you see your way clear to serve on such a committee? Perhaps as a sponsor if not as an active member?

Sincerely,

  
Smith Hart

PSF, Welles

May 7, 1940.

MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT FROM SUMNER WELLES:

Transmits copy of a confidential despatch  
from Embassy in Caracas dated April 27, 1940.  
Subject:-Possible threats to the islands of Curacao and Aruba

See:Netherlands folder-Drawer 4-1940

PSF

Miller  
1

May 7, 1940

Dear Lincoln:

Thank you for your letter of March 26 giving your estimate of the situation in Greece. As you know, I am always glad to have your comments and I hope that as occasion warrants you will continue to send them to me in personal letters.

Very sincerely yours,

Sumner Miller

The Honorable  
Lincoln MacVeagh,  
American Minister,  
Athens.

cc: Greece - Drawer 4 - 1940  
for correspondence -

PSF:  
Welles  
1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you speak to me  
about this?

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from  
Under Secretary Welles in re Admiral  
Courtney's pro-German attitude. He  
is in command our our special squadron  
now based at Lisbon.

PSF: Wellas

May 17, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Weddell dropped in to see me this morning. He has just returned on leave from Madrid and, on account of the critical situation, is planning to fly back within the next ten days.

He told me that Bertie Pell and the Counselor of our Legation in Lisbon both spoke to him of the embarrassment the American Legation was caused by the openly pro-German attitude taken by Admiral Courtney in command of our special squadron now based at Lisbon. Mr. Weddell told me that he himself had known Admiral Courtney when the Ambassador was Consul General in Athens and at that time -- twenty-five years ago -- Admiral Courtney was notorious for his pro-German inclinations. The Ambassador said that he had consequently taken the trouble of talking with Admiral Courtney when he stopped at Lisbon ten days ago and that from indications given to him in his conversation with Admiral Courtney, he believed that the

The President,

The White House.

complaints made by Bertie Pell and the Legation staff were thoroughly justified.

This information seems to me of sufficient importance to warrant its being submitted to you in the event that you consider it justifies the replacement of Admiral Courtney by some other officer.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. FORSTER

Action has been completed on the matter outlined in the attached letter. I have made an oral report to the President, and this letter may now be filed.



D. J. CALLAGHAN,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you speak to me  
about this?

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Weddell dropped in to see me this morning. He has just returned on leave from Madrid and, on account of the critical situation, is planning to fly back within the next ten days.

He told me that Bertie Pell and the Counselor of our Legation in Lisbon both spoke to him of the embarrassment the American Legation was caused by the openly pro-German attitude taken by Admiral Courtney in command of our special squadron now based at Lisbon. Mr. Weddell told me that he himself had known Admiral Courtney when the Ambassador was Consul General in Athens and at that time -- twenty-five years ago -- Admiral Courtney was notorious for his pro-German inclinations. The Ambassador said that he had consequently taken the trouble of talking with Admiral Courtney when he stopped at Lisbon ten days ago and that from indications given to him in his conversation with Admiral Courtney, he believed that the

The President,


The White House.

complaints made by Bertie Pell and the Legation staff were thoroughly justified.

This information seems to me of sufficient importance to warrant its being submitted to you in the event that you consider it justifies the replacement of Admiral Courtney by some other officer.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bertie Pell". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed phrase "Faithfully yours,".

PSF: Welles  
1

Letter from Sumner Welles of May 20, 1940  
to the President re attached telegram from  
Bullitt of same date re 25 old PM obsolete  
planes which France would like to buy etc.  
President's memo to Welles of May 22, 1940  
attached.

See: Bullitt folder-Drawer 4-1940

*BF Welles*

May 20, 1940

**My dear Mr. President:**

In response to your request of May 15, I am transmitting herewith a draft of a reply to Ambassador Weddell's letter to you of April 18, 1940. The letter from Mr. Weddell, together with its enclosure, is returned herewith.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

**Enclosures:**

1. From Ambassador Weddell, dated April 18, 1940, with enclosure.
2. Draft of reply.

**The President,**

**The White House.**

*For file on the above -  
See: Spain - Drawer 4-1940*

PSF

File

May 20, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I attach a draft letter to Mr. David Gray, American Minister at Dublin, which you may wish to send in response to his letter dated April 30, 1940 in regard to the Legation residence at Dublin. An official instruction is going forward to Mr. Gray at an early date. The instruction will be in greater detail than the proposed letter to Mr. Gray.

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Under Secretary

Enclosures:

- 1. Draft letter to Minister Gray.
- 2. Copy of despatch returned.

The President,  
The White House.

*For David Gray's letter of April 30, 1940 and other  
Memos - Subject: - Legation Residence -  
See: Ireland folder - Drawer 4 - 1742*

PSF: Welles memo

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

The enclosed dispatch worries me. Is there some way in which the Ministry of Uruguay in Washington and Mr. Wilson in Montevideo can get word to the Uruguayan Government that the United States is concerned and that it would be a pity for Pan American solidarity if reports of this kind were to get into the public press, whether they are true or not?

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1940


My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of May 20 concerning Nazi activities in Uruguay, the Uruguayan Government authorities, the day following the receipt of this telegram from Minister Wilson, took steps to investigate Nazi activities in Montevideo, and it is my understanding that several alien propagandists are being tried.

I am, however, talking to the Uruguayan Minister here with regard to the report and I am asking Mr. Wilson to do the same thing in Montevideo, since I think that this indication of interest on our part would probably be useful and stimulate effective action by the Uruguayan Government.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:  
No. 68, May 15,  
from Montevideo.

The President,  
The White House.

*File Personal*

TOP SECRET  
RECEIVED  
LIVE ORDS SECURE

MA  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.  
(C)

Montevideo

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

68, May 15, 10 a.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER  
SECRETARY.

Since my return from Brazil ten days ago I have noted an increase in Nazi activities here. In the face of this there is indifference and apathy on the part of government officials and in certain cases something worse. While there is no immediate danger the situation has serious possibilities.

Report by mail follows.

WILSON

KLP

May 20, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of May 20 concerning Nazi activities in Uruguay, the Uruguayan Government authorities, the day following the receipt of this telegram from Minister Wilson, took steps to investigate Nazi activities in Montevideo, and it is my understanding that several alien propagandists are being tried.

I am, however, talking to the Uruguayan Minister here with regard to the report and I am asking Mr. Wilson to do the same thing in Montevideo, since I think that this indication of interest on our part would probably be useful and stimulate effective action by the Uruguayan Government.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure:  
No. 69, May 15,  
from Montevideo.

The President,  
The White House.

U:SW:LS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1940

*Lil  
personal  
&  
confidential*


My dear Mr. President:

After my conversation with him regarding the reports of Nazi activities in Uruguay, the Minister of Uruguay cabled his government and has today communicated to me the contents of a message he has received from Montevideo. The Minister tells me that his Foreign Minister informs him that the Uruguayan Congress has appointed a committee which is now investigating subversive activities in Uruguay and that as a result of the investigation, a law will probably be enacted prohibiting in stringent terms any activities of the character mentioned. The Minister was further informed that his government is not aware of any immediate danger as a result of these activities.

I shall continue to be in touch with the Minister regarding developments.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



The President,  
The White House.

*PBF*  
*Welles*

May 22, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am submitting for your consideration, and for your signature should you approve, a letter addressed to Dr. Frank B. Jewett, President of the National Academy of Sciences.

I have discussed the subject matter with General Marshall and he has today written me to say that he is in full agreement and believes that the work which it is suggested be undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences would be of very great value.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure:  
To Dr. Frank B. Jewett.

The President,  
The White House.

*See: - Ten Copies - Jewett - for copy of President's letter to Dr Jewett.*

PSF: Welles folder - 1940


THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1940

Dear Mr. President:

With reference to your request for a complete file of official despatches received at the Department of State from Europe in the period April 9 - May 22, 1940 which contain evidence of the bombing from the air by German forces of civilian populations or refugees, I enclose an itemized memorandum which I believe contains the information you desire.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:  
Memorandum

The President,  
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU  
DIVISION

Eu

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 5/21/40

ADDRESSED TO

The President

Norway

- April 9 Oslo's 55, April 9, 6 p.m., reports bombing of homes in the Norwegian capital.
- April 11 Oslo's 67, April 11, 9 p.m. gives Naval Attache's report on the bombing and machine-gunning at Frederickstadt and states no resistance possible or given to this incredible bombing.
- April 12 Stockholm's 230, April 12, 6 p.m., gives Mrs. Harriman's eyewitness account of the bombing at Elverum
- April 15 Stockholm's 276, April 15, 10 a.m., gives Mrs. Harriman's opinion that German bombing and machine-gunning at Elverum and Nybergund had no military objective.
- Stockholm's 264, April 15, quotes King Haakon to the effect that Germans had bombed civilian population causing terrible suffering to women and children.
- April 23 Stockholm's 369, April 23, reports machine-gunning of two small fishing vessels.

The Netherlands and Belgium

Communications between our missions at The Hague and Brussels were severed so soon after the German invasion that few reports have been received from those capitals.

May 10

The Consul General at Antwerp reported on May 10 that the Ford Motor Plant at Antwerp was bombarded that day and 4 Belgian employees were wounded.

Ambassador Bullitt in his 601, May 10, 9 a.m. reported a telephone conversation with Ambassador Cudahy in Brussels to the effect that without any warning a large fleet of German bombers bombed Brussels at 5:15 that morning. One of the bombs dropped 300 feet from the American Embassy which is in the residential quarter of the city.

Ambassador Bullitt in his 623, May 10, 8 p.m., reported a telephone conversation with Ambassador Cudahy to the effect that the Germans during the day had dropped many incendiary bombs.

The Hague's 164, May 10, noon, reports bombing of the Dutch capital.

May 11

Ambassador Cudahy reported in his 108, May 11, noon, that the Germans were bombarding Brussels from the air.

France

May 10

Ambassador Bullitt reported in his 600, May 10, 8 a.m., that the Germans had dropped bombs on various open towns in France, notably Laon and Villers-Cotterets.

Ambassador Bullitt in his 602, May 10, 10 a.m., reported that the Germans had bombed the open towns of Colmar, Nancy, Vitry-le-Francois, Dunkirk, Calais and Lille. Civilians in all these places were killed and wounded.

Ambassador Bullitt's 604, May 10, 11 a.m., stated on the authority of M. Rochat that the Germans had bombed entirely civilian quarters in Nancy, killing 16 civilians and wounding 30.

The Ambassador reported from Paris in his 605, May 10, 11 a.m., word from Consul Carter at Calais that the Germans had bombed that town, killing 10 people with an unknown number of wounded.

The Ambassador's 622, May 10, 7 p.m., reported the investigation of the Assistant Naval Attaché for Air and the Assistant Military Attaché for Air into the bombing at Mery. Bombs fell on the outskirts of the town demolishing a two-story stone house and damaging others, killing and wounding several people. The raid was made in daylight in good visibility conditions.

Ambassador Bullitt's 624, May 10, 10 p.m. reported a further list of open towns which had been bombed.

May 12.

May 12

Ambassador Bullitt's 635, May 12, 11 a.m., reported that 147 civilians, among them many women and children, had been killed in German air raids.

May 14

Ambassador Bullitt in his 657, May 14, 7 p.m., reported eyewitness accounts of German bombings in Belgium and Luxemburg. He said: "Neither men, nor women, nor children are being spared. The tales of horror pass all belief."

May 15

Ambassador Bullitt's 677, May 15, 3 p.m., reported an investigation by the Military and Naval Attachés for Air into bombings at Toul, Nancy and Morhange. This report gives details of the bombings of the military hospitals at Toul.

May 18

Ambassador Bullitt's 747, May 18, 7 p.m., described the viciousness of the German attack in which every living thing in the fighting area is considered legitimate prey of the Germans. Pathetic refugees are considered good game by German machine-gunners and pilots.

May 20

Ambassador Bullitt's 761, May 20, noon, reported bombing of LeHavre.

The Ambassador's 775, May 20, 6 p.m., gives further details of the bombing at Le Havre, including the sinking of a ferry-boat with a loss of 13 lives.

The Ambassador's 778, May 20, quotes Vice Prime Minister Chautemps regarding the machine-gunning of women and child refugees.

The Ambassador's 772, May 20, 5 p.m., reports the bombing and machine-gunning of columns of refugees. He

gives

gives the eyewitness account of Madame Morf<sup>et</sup> of the  
machine-gunning of a group of children who were leaving  
Soissons. He quotes an American, Mr. Barton Hall, regarding  
the bombing of Compiègne, including hospitals and trains.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1940

PSF: Welles


*File  
personal +  
confidential  
x/11/40*

My dear Mr. President:

I believe you will be interested in a personal letter I have received today from Norman Armour in Buenos Aires of which I am transmitting a copy.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:  
From Norman Armour,  
May 17, 1940.

The President,  
The White House.

COPY

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Buenos Aires, May 17, 1940

Dear Sumner:

I have sent off my reply to your telegram received this morning to the effect that we cannot agree to give approval to the Argentine Government's proposed change in the Uruguayan draft note, even though not to be used.

Cantilo accepted it with pretty good grace. He was inclined to bluster a bit at first but then calmed down and assured me he realized that unity was the great thing, particularly at this time, and that what he and the President especially desired was to keep step with us. He wished at times we could make this a little easier. He realized, however, that we had our difficulties, although he thought perhaps we did not always appreciate theirs to the full. He showed me a poster they had just confiscated, several thousand of which had been printed, demanding in big red letters the resignation of Cantilo because of his alleged attempt to bring Argentina into the war through his stand on non-belligerency. The poster called on all Argentines to stand firm for neutrality and for keeping out of war. This was, Cantilo said, of course Nazi-inspired.

I have no doubt that what he had in mind was that had we been able to support their proposal in principle--that is, a strengthening of the Uruguayan text--this would have helped the Government here, particularly Dr. Ortiz and himself, in a somewhat difficult situation they are facing in the pro-Nazi group which appears to be making some gains due to the very effective German propaganda directed by the German Embassy and the unlimited funds the latter seem to have at their disposal apparently through levies on German firms and members of the German community.

Dr. Ortiz, is, I think, becoming really worried both by the internal situation as well as what would be in store for them in the event of a German victory in Europe. I see this reflected in Cantilo who in his calmer moments seems at last convinced of the necessity of cooperating more closely with us.

The Honorable  
Sumner Welles,  
Under Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

In this connection he asked me particularly to give you a message. He said that he feels that many in the United States do not understand Argentina and incorrectly interpret their attitude as unfriendly to the United States. He admitted that in the past, at any rate, there may have been justification for this feeling. He feels sure that you do understand them and appreciate their difficulties. He also feels, however, that you may still have in mind the Saavedra Lamas days but hopes you will realize that those days are now gone, not to return. He was in Rome, far from the scene of action, when Saavedra Lamas took his stand on our proposed lease of destroyers to Brazil, a position which he quite understood must have irritated you--justly--beyond measure. All he asks now is to cooperate with us: to keep in step with us: and if the worst comes to the worst and we are forced into the war, he wants his country to be shoulder to shoulder with us. To be sure, their assistance from a material point of view would perhaps not prove very effective, but he does feel the moral effect at any rate might be worth quite a little. There was more along these lines but this is the gist of what he had to say. Cantilo, as you know, is a difficult man to fathom. He is not overly intelligent, inclined to be superficial and very much swayed by his feelings at the moment. In fact he is so changeable and moody that at times I am almost at a loss as to how to keep our reports to you at all clear and reasonably consistent. But today at least I really received the impression, whatever the motives prompting him, that the man felt deeply what he was saying.

May I suggest, if not too much trouble to you, that you might write him a personal line, saying that you have received this message from me of his desire to work closely with us and to keep Argentina in step with our Government on the larger questions in which we are all so vitally interested. I know this would be greatly appreciated and I feel sure it would have a good effect.

Incidentally, as evidence of one of the smaller points of difficulty, he mentioned earlier in his conversation this morning our Government's selling subsidized wheat and corn abroad, making it increasingly difficult for Argentina to dispose of its large surplus crops, particularly corn. I do not know whether there is anything that you can do, perhaps through Wallace, or whether this is a matter which has come to your attention through Espil. But could anything be done or perhaps some explanation be given as to the necessity leading to our action in this respect, I think this might have a good effect.

I hope I have not bothered you too much during these last days by my telephone calls. I know how frightfully busy and anxious you must be with the grim events in Europe apparently becoming worse and worse and hope you will forgive these interruptions.

With all good wishes,

Always sincerely yours,

NORMAN ARMOUR

PSF  
Welles

May 24, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. SUMNER WELLES

Do you think it would be all right  
to send the following messages via Berlin --  
even if the Germans do read them?

1. To John Gudahy, Brussels

You and yours are much in my thoughts  
and I am proud of you.

2. To Gordon, the Hague -- same message
3. How about a personal message to  
Daisy Harriman -- same message.

All to be signed Franklin D. Roosevelt.

F. D. R.

for/gmb

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1940


*File  
personal +  
confidential*

My dear Mr. President:

I heartily approve the suggestion contained in your memorandum of May 24 and I have, consequently, sent by telegram today the personal messages you desired addressed to Cudahy, Gordon, and Daisy Harriman.

Believe me

Faithfully yours



The President,  
The White House.

PSF: Waller  
Watts  
1

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1940

file  
personal


My dear Mr. President:

With further reference to Nazi activities in Uruguay you may be interested in an editorial which appeared on April 18 in the newspaper La Línea Sigfrido, a German Nazi paper published in Montevideo by Nazi propagandists.

During the past few days, Uruguayan public opinion has turned very strongly against Nazi activities of this kind and the Government has already taken strong measures to suppress the more dangerous forms of German activity.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:  
Copy of editorial.

The President,  
The White House.

WELLES THE RUFFIAN

Sumner Welles, the ruffian, was sent by Roosevelt, the Jew, to Europe to interview the chiefs of state of the nations involved directly or indirectly in this great conflict.

The whole world, except La Línea Sigfrido, thought that the gentleman crook (caballero de industria) Sumner Welles was going to Europe inspired in the most sacred principles of humanity.

Welles promised, before God and before History, to take with him to his grave the secrets of his interviews with Hitler, with Mussolini, with the armament manufacturer Churchill, with the has-been Daladier and also with the Holy Father Pius XI.

It appeared, or at least he gave the impression before the newspapermen who bombarded him with questions, that his lips would not utter a word of what had been confided to him by the European chiefs of state.

It goes without saying that neither Hitler nor Mussolini (here the expression "Mira que nenes" - Spanish plural equivalent of the ejaculation "What a man") said anything to him that would be useful to England or France.

In the midst of his interview with Hitler he had to ask for permission to leave the room for a few minutes: Hitler's gaze, which is quite different from that of Roosevelt's, made the same effect on him as that of Pagliano (a strong purgative imported from Italy by Don Vicente Costa) and when he called on Mussolini the latter offered him a glass of Chianti and Grignolino wines which intoxicated the envoy of Jaccibo (sic) Roosevelt.

This is how it happened that, in his unawareness, he said that England and France had already prepared the map of the new Europe as it would appear when this war ended.

This farce of Roosevelt's, like all farces of democracy, will end in a gigantic catastrophe.

The Earth will be blown to bits and we will go forth to form part of those other worlds which inhabit space.

There are eighteen million bayonets in Germany and ten million bayonets in Italy.

The gigantic aerial fleet of Goering (30,000 air dreadnoughts) is now ready: it only awaits the signal to start.

The long distance cannons (1,000 kilometers) are already set in various places of Germany.

The Italian aerial fleet has in readiness its "presents" for all the English strategical points in the Mediterranean.

And giving life to all this gigantic material are the spirits of those two farseeing geniuses, those two supermen named Hitler and Mussolini.

There was a terrifying calm in Europe, Now the cyclone has broken out.

This is the result of the "peace mission" which was undertaken in Europe by the man who had his photograph taken with Capitalist Reynaud, the background for such important personalities being the map of the New Europe.

Unfortunate fruits of capitalism!  
They will soon know what is what!  
Democrats!  
This is the most fitting insult...

PSF  
Hills

May 25, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with the request contained in your memorandum of May 24, I have checked up on the complaint made by John Cudahy in his letter to you of May 3. I find that his telegram of April 18 - No. 87 - was distributed only to the Secretary of State and myself in addition to you. No other official of the Department of State had access to it.

The newspaper report which disturbed John Cudahy was a story to the effect that the King of the Belgians had advised you that the invasion of Belgium was imminent. At that time, you will remember, the newspapers were filled every day or so with stories reporting that the Low Countries were about to be invaded, and it is not unnatural to suppose that the fact that the press knew that the King had received the American Ambassador would be linked with the then rumored invasion of Belgium.

As I told you the other day, we are having the most rigorous check-up made in the Department, and I will keep

The President,

The White House.

Drawn 4-1940  
See: Belgium folder for Memo of 24th & Cudahy's  
letter of May 3-1940

you informed if we run across anything that is disquieting.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

PSF:Welles  
1

Letter to President from Welles-May 28, 1940

Re:Frank B. Jewett and conference he had with  
him--has arranged interview for Jewett with  
General Marshall to discuss plans the President  
would like carried out by the National Academy  
of Sciences.

See:Frank B. Jewett-Gen corres-Drawer 2-1940

BF  
Killed  
1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

In the matter of clippers stopping occasionally at Bermuda on voyages from Europe, the theory seems to be that if the voyage on which the stop is made is not known, securities will not be sent here for German accounts.

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

Juan Trippe came in to see me this morning and referred to the question of the Pan American Clippers stopping at Bermuda going to and coming from Europe. I understood him to say that he had discussed this matter with you and that you had indicated that a start might be made by having them stop at Bermuda every third or fourth voyage, the company to allege, at least at the beginning, that the Clippers were doing so because of weather conditions.

Mr. Trippe said that in a conversation which he had had last night with Lord Lothian, the latter had stated that the British authorities believed that negotiable American securities which the Germans had picked up in the Netherlands and in Belgium were being sent back to this country for sale here through mail sent on the Clippers and that if this were not in some way stopped, the Germans would be able to obtain very considerable credits in the United States.

The President,


The White House.

I fully appreciate the difficulties involved, but it would seem to me clear that if the reports mentioned by Lord Lothian are accurate, a search by British authorities of the mails on the Clippers coming from Europe only every third or fourth trip would not interfere very materially with the efforts of the Germans to market seized securities in the United States.

I shall be grateful if you will let me have your views with regard to this question since I am not certain whether Mr. Trippe quoted you correctly.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. H. Kelby". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "R".