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PSF: State Department: Sumner Welles June-Dec. 1941

**RESTRICTION CODES**

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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My dear Mr. President:

While I am reluctant as you know to take up your time with memorandums of conversations, I believe the attached memorandum of a conversation I had with the Argentine Chief of Naval Operations will be of interest to you, and I think you will wish to read it.

In any event, I think it constitutes signal proof of the value of having our Navy Department invite the chiefs of naval operations of the other American republics to visit the United States at this time.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
Amiral Guisasola, Chief of Naval Operations of the Argentine Navy, dined with me informally at my house last night. There were present only the Argentine Ambassador and Captain Brunet, the Argentine Naval Attaché.

Amiral Guisasola was exceedingly cordial with regard to his recent visit through the United States upon the invitation of the Navy Department and exceedingly frank and outspoken.

The Admiral expressed his amazement with the progress which had been made by the United States Navy during recent years. He reminded me that he had been in this country some twenty years ago and that he had always had the greatest sympathy for the American Navy but that he had had no conception of the efficiency and present expansion of the
American Navy until he came here in person this past month. He had been particularly impressed with the battleship **Indianapolis**; with the volume and quality of aviation production which he had seen in the plants he had visited in California; in the volume, efficiency and morale in the naval training base at Pensacola; and with the quality and thoroughness of the planning work being undertaken here in the Navy Department in Washington.

He expressed in unmeasured terms his admiration and regard for Admiral Stark and for many of the other naval officers with whom he had talked during his trip to the United States.

He expressed likewise his amazement that this Government did not make better known in Argentina and in the other American republics the speed with which rearmament was being carried out in the United States. He said that no one, not even the military services in Argentina, had any conception of the volume of the military production in this country.

The Admiral then launched into a very vigorous statement as to the need for a closer cooperation between Argentina and the United States. He said it seemed to him that at a time like this, in its own interest if for no other reason, the United States should make available to Argentina the material which was required for the defense
of Argentina and for the defense of the countries adjacent to Argentina.

I said to the Admiral that as he well knew, in September 1940 and again in January 1941 this Government had, as it had with all of the other American republics, desired to have the most far-reaching conversations with the Argentine Navy in order to reach agreements in principle as to what the two countries might do by way of cooperation in the event that an attack upon the Western Hemisphere took place. I said that unfortunately the Argentine Navy had made it clear in September 1940 that it did not care to discuss these issues in any detail with us and consequently there had been no opportunity for the United States to learn what assistance the Argentine Government might desire. I said that, as I had made known to the Argentine Ambassador only a few weeks ago, this Government, however, stood prepared under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act to make available to Argentina a very large amount of naval equipment as well as military equipment, although, as the Admiral probably knew, discussions in this latter regard had not been broached to the Argentine Army.

The Admiral then said that while, of course, he could only speak as Chief of Naval Operations of the Argentine Navy, he felt that that position entitled him to considerable weight in councils with his own Government and that
he wished me to know specifically that the opinion which he was about to express to me was shared by more than 95 per cent of at least the higher ranking officers of the Argentine Navy. He said that the reply given to the United States initiative in September 1940 had been due solely to one officer of the Argentine Navy who had unfortunately at that time occupied the position of Minister of Marine. He said the negative response given to the United States, as the Admiral in question well knew, was contrary to the expressed desires of the overwhelming majority of the Argentine naval officers themselves. He said that throughout its history, the Argentine Navy had looked to the American Navy for leadership and for guidance. He said that only five years ago, when the British had attempted to have British naval officers selected as instructors in the Naval War College in Buenos Aires, he himself and some of his associates had been responsible for the decision of the Argentine Government to select American naval officers. He said that today American naval tactics were the only tactics studied by the Argentine Navy and that he could assure me, speaking with the responsibilities now encumbered upon him fully in mind, that if the United States went into war for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the Argentine Navy would desire to be at the side of the American Navy. He stated further and with much emphasis
that his constant efforts from now on were going to be
directed to the end that, if the United States went to
war, the Argentine Government would see to it that at
least one Argentine unit was placed in each division of
the American fleet operating in the Atlantic Ocean to be-
come a part of the fighting force of the American Navy
and run all of the risks which would be incurred thereby.

The Admiral further said that without any delay what-
ever there should be a close understanding between the two
fleets so that the Argentine Navy would know exactly what
patrol work and what defense work it should undertake in
full cooperation with the American Navy.

The Admiral stated that as soon as he returned to
Buenos Aires he would insist that conversations in this
sense be immediately undertaken between the American and
the Argentine Navies and that the offer of the American
to Government/make available to the Argentine Navy naval
material be promptly accepted and worked out through
common agreement.

The Admiral spoke with considerable emphasis like-
wise as to the impossibility of undertaking any real
inter-American naval cooperation. He said that he had
been more and more impressed by this fact during the
course of his recent trip through the United States. He
said that with the exception of the Chilean and Brazilian
Admirals, none of the other chiefs of naval operations from the other American Republics had the faintest knowledge of what a fleet was nor of what tactics were. He spoke with utter contempt of most of the other naval officers and as an illustration of their lack of experience and knowledge, said that when he and the Uruguayan Admiral were in an airplane flying over Pensacola recently and he himself had been inconvenienced by the noise of the motors, he had said as a joke to the Uruguayan Admiral when they landed that the next time they took a trip of that kind he thought he would get out on one of the wings of the plane in order to have less noise, and that thereupon the Uruguayan had replied that he had not realized that it would be safe for a passenger in a plane to sit on one of the wings. The Admiral very firmly expressed the opinion that while the Brazilians and Chileans at least knew what a navy was, the only two navies in the Hemisphere were the United States and the Argentine Navies and it was imperative that an agreement between them be made as a basis for any inter-American collaboration that might be undertaken.

The Admiral said that there was nothing that would stimulate a better feeling in the Argentine Navy at this time than for the United States Navy to go back to its old practice exercised until a year or so after the last
World War of permitting Argentine officers actually to serve on some of our fighting ships.

I remarked that I was sure that the Admiral would understand that while our Navy people would undoubtedly have full confidence in the ability and discretion and loyalty to our interests of our friends in the Argentine Navy, it might be difficult for them to have the same complete confidence in naval officers from some of the other republics and that, of course, this Government would have to follow a policy of non-discrimination as between the other American republics. The Admiral said he understood the difficulty involved, but wondered if it might not be obviated by having it undertaken on a reciprocal basis, and since it was obvious that the United States would not wish to send American officers to train, for example, on a Paraguayan gunboat on the River Paraguay, the opportunity he had in mind might be limited by this Government to officers from the fleets of the other American navies to which American officers were sent, ostensibly for training purposes. I replied that the importance of his suggestion was, of course, evident and that he might be sure I would take the matter up with Admiral Stark and other officers of our own Navy.

Before he left, the Admiral said that he wanted me to know that this country in these times of danger could
count upon the sympathy and friendship of an overwhelming majority of the Argentine people and that he could further assure me of the complete support of the Argentine Navy. He said he would like to be able to communicate with me personally after his return to Buenos Aires in the same way in which he had undertaken to communicate with Admiral Stark. I said that nothing would give me greater pleasure and I knew it would be of the utmost service to Admiral Stark and myself.

The Argentine Ambassador subsequently told me that the Admiral had spoken to him privately in exactly the same sense as that in which he had spoken to me and that he had never seen anything more useful, from the standpoint of cooperation between the American and Argentine Navies, than the visit to the United States of Admiral Guisasola.
This document was originally declassified March 9, 1972 and has been stamped incorrectly.

EKD

4-13-73
My dear Mr. President:

I have received from the British Embassy a confidential communication regarding the steps which will be taken by the British Government in order to make it possible for the Jews in Palestine to participate more actively in defense measures. Since I know this matter has been brought to your attention, I am enclosing a copy of this communication for your information.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. Under-Secretary,

You may recollect that on May 8th you passed to the Ambassador a message from Rabbi Stephen S. Wise containing a request that the Jews in Palestine be permitted to form regiments and a Home Guard. We have now received from London a statement of His Majesty's Government's attitude in this connexion. They realise of course that the Jewish desire for the means of self-protection in Palestine is natural, and have been considering how best to meet it.

2. We have now been authorised to inform you in confidence that they have approved the following proposals submitted by the High Commissioner:

(1) Expansion of the Jewish settlement police to its former strength during the disturbances, with the possibility of future expansion if this is successful.

(2) More intensive training of the special rural constabulary.

(3) Expansion on a more restricted scale of the urban special constabulary.

The Honourable Sumner Welles,
Under-Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.
(4) Continued equal opportunity for enlistment into the Palestine Infantry battalions for both Jews and Arabs, and completion of the accepted recruiting programme on the Jewish side irrespective of the rate of enlistment of Arabs.

3. In addition, the possibility is not excluded, provided equipment and assistance are available, of expanding the above on the following lines:

(1) Conversion of Jewish settlements into strong points.

(2) Training Jewish settlement police (a) to deal with parachute troops and minor air borne landings (b) to engage in tank hunting (c) to adopt guerilla tactics against enemy detachments and lines of communication (d) to protect without assistance from British troops or police the Jewish settlements against rebellious Arab bands.

4. The above have been communicated in strict confidence to Dr. Namier of the Jewish Agency, who has expressed much satisfaction. It is not however intended to make any public announcement, since apart from giving valuable information to the enemy this might have the worst possible effect upon Arab opinion in the Middle East. It will be appreciated that with the present situation in Iraq and Syria any precipitate arming of the Jews might lead to deterioration
in the internal security in Palestine, which could only be restored by the diversion of the British troops from more vital operations.

5. Even if arms were available for general distribution, such action would not in the judgment of His Majesty's Government contribute to local security and would have little military value against trained troops. They feel that the military authorities must be left full discretion to use the equipment available to them to the best advantage.

6. We are arranging to inform Rabbi Wise orally and in confidence that the question of the Jews forming regiments and a Home Guard has been under active consideration by His Majesty's Government who have approved certain proposals for action submitted by the High Commissioner, and that the gist of these steps has been communicated in strict confidence to Dr. Namier in London and Mr. Sher-tok in Jerusalem, both of whom have expressed their satisfaction. The details of the proposals are not being disclosed to Rabbi Wise.

Yours very sincerely,

NEVILLE BUTLER
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I received from our Embassy in Berlin which will be of interest to you. You will remember that the "our friend" is Dr. Schacht.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, May 27, 1941

Dear Mr. Welles:

"Our friend" has been back in Germany, at his country place, for some weeks now after a two months honeymoon with his young bride in Switzerland. Since he had written me from Switzerland wanting to know if I had any news for him, I asked his confidential secretary whether I could make a personal call on him but to date I have heard nothing from him nor do I expect to at this time.

Our friend has been most anxious to maintain contact with the States through the Embassy. His sudden inaccessibility is undoubtedly due to his desire to avoid contacts with officials of non-friendly nations during the present increased flurry of suspicion and Gestapo spying which was brought about by Mr. Hess' flight to England.

Hess' flight has caused, I believe, an irreparable crack in the Party's reputation and has stimulated the -- latent -- opposition. If only the German armies were definitely checked -- an occurrence which seems impossible in the immediate future -- I believe a gradual movement towards revolt might start, particularly if America and Britain made clear that there is an acceptable alternative to continued support of the regime. As long as Hitler can win victories, however, he personally will maintain control and prestige but even with a definite victory I do not think that with the defection of Hess, the prestige of the Party in its present formation can ever be restored. On the other hand the reputation and influence of the army is increasing.

Sincerely yours,

DONALD R. HEATH
First Secretary of Embassy

The Honorable
Summer Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO DO THE NEEDFUL

F. D. R.

Message to the President from Emile Detruit, President Comite de Gaulle, saying that the Free French people can no longer recognize the Vichy Government.
June 14, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am not certain that this telegram has been brought to your attention and I am therefore sending it to you for your information.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
WT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)  

SOFIA
Dated June 13, 1941
Rec’d 4:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

276, June 13, noon.

An airmail letter from my wife today states that she has heard from certain members of the State Department rumors that I am drinking hard and that Colonel Donovan and myself were drunk together when he lost his passport.

Permit me to say that I drink even less than any member of this Legation (*) a political opponent of mine was the soberest, best behaved and hardest working American that has come to Sofia during my tenure of office. You have the report of one thorough, fair inspector who was here. I shall welcome another at the earliest possible moment.

Since the subject of criticism has been brought up may I make a constructive suggestion regarding the personnel of the Department though certainly not resorting to the personalities to which apparently I have been subjected.

I have read many telegrams from many of our posts.

Ignorance
June 13, noon, from Sofia.

Ignorance of the English language displayed therein with the resultant redundancy of 75% of them is appalling. This means an annual cost to the American taxpayer of literally hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in telegraph charges and work in coding and decoding.

I therefore respectfully suggest that far more importance be given to the knowledge of our language in the examinations for the career and that a copy of Professor A. S. Hill's Principles of Rhetoric be sent to those members of our service whose telegrams show a lamentable lack of conciseness and clarity.

I shall appreciate it if a paraphrase of this telegram will be forwarded to my wife.

EARLE

WWC
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I think this story from Morris about the closing of the Christian Science churches in Germany should be leaked to the newspapers here.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

In the belief that it may be of interest to you, I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram which Lord Halifax gave me this morning and which he had received from his Government relative to recent movements of German troops and German ships in Norway and in Norwegian waters.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
Telegram from London dated June 14th.

Reports continue to be received showing that

(1) A considerable movement of troops to North Norway is taking place.

(2) Heavy tonnages of shipping from German-Baltic ports have been proceeding in the same direction.

(3) Reinforcements of long-range bombers in Norway have recently been effected.

(4) A large quantity of shipping is now concentrated in Norwegian ports. Air reconnaissance on June 5th reported 30 ships at Bergen, 30 ships at Trondheim, 4 at Narvik and 12 at Kirkenes.

The natural assumption would be that these concentrations are directed against the U.S.S.R. but in view of United States interests in Iceland we think it only right to point out that if for one reason or another they were no longer needed for use against Russia, it would be possible for them to be employed at short notice for an expedition to Iceland instead.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our telephone conversation, I am sending you herewith a copy of the suggested note to be handed to the German Chargé d'Affaires this coming Monday, June 16.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
June 16, 1941.

Sir:

It has come to the knowledge of this Government that certain agencies of the German Reich in this country, including German consular establishments, have been engaged in activities wholly outside the scope of their legitimate duties. These activities have been of an improper and unwarranted character. They render the continued presence in the United States of those agencies and consular establishments inimical to the welfare of this country.

I am directed by the President to request that the German Government remove from United States territory all German nationals in anywise connected with the German Library of Information in New York, the German Railway

Herr Hans Thomsen,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of

Germany.
and Tourists Agencies, and the Trans-Ocean News Service, and that each of these organizations and their affiliates shall be promptly closed.

I am also directed to request that all German consular officers, agents, clerks, and employees thereof of German nationality shall be removed from American territory and that the consular establishments likewise be promptly closed.

It is contemplated that all such withdrawals and closures shall be effected before July 10.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.
The Under Secretary of State
Washington

June 18, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Last week John Cudahy called me from New York to say that he would like to come down to Washington to have a confidential talk with me in order to relate to me an interview which he had had with Ribbentrop before he left Berlin.

I replied saying that I felt it was better for him not to come to Washington, but if he had any confidential information which he thought it desirable to transmit to me, I would be glad if he would transmit such information to me in any way he saw fit.

He has now transmitted to Secretary Hull the information in question in the form of a memorandum of which I am enclosing a copy herewith for your information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
June 14, 1941

The Honorable the Secretary of State,  
Cordell Hull,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am sorry to learn of your illness, and sincerely hope you will be back at your desk as fresh as ever within a day or two.

In your absence I spoke to the Office of the Under Secretary and told him that I had had a long discussion with von Ribbentrop which I thought might be of interest. But he sent me a message stating that he did not think it advisable for him to see me at this time.

Accordingly, I am leaving with your secretary a confidential memorandum of my conversation with von Ribbentrop. I gave my word to von Ribbentrop that what he told me during my meeting with him would not be published.

It is impossible, as you can readily understand to give you my views of von Ribbentrop's attitude; to tell you of his position in Germany, and to evaluate the discussion with him. All these I can set forth only at the personal meeting with you or the Under Secretary. But in the belief that the enclosed report, inadequate as it is, may be of some service I am leaving it in your hands.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN CUDAHY
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

for

The Honorable Cordell Hull

On May 3rd, 1941 I had a long talk with von Ribbentrop at his office on Wilhelm Strasse, Berlin, and set forth herewith the salient features of the discussion.

von Ribbentrop spoke with a great deal of confidence, which I believe he sincerely felt, when he said that England was already defeated, and that Germany could not be dislodged from "our hemisphere". He said that the African campaign might be slowed up during the approaching hot weather months, but there could be no question of German military domination over that Continent.

He said that England would be subjected to a terrific aerial bombardment during the summer months and would be surrounded by submarines "like sharks" which would lay down an increasingly effective blockade of the British Isles.

He went on to say that his information was that the Dominions and Colonies were giving negligible support to the British and that there was a great feeling of dissatisfaction and adverse criticism against the British
high command on the part of the Dominion and Colonial forces. He insisted that Germany did not intend to destroy the British Empire which it considered a necessary power for stability and order during these times, but, he said, the longer the war continued, the more severe would be peace terms imposed on the British.

Concerning German aggression against the western Hemisphere, von Ribbentrop spoke of this as a matter for expert military opinion and said that he was satisfied that American experts would confirm the view of the German high command that an attack upon the western hemisphere was impossible of successful accomplishment.

He was very frank in his comments upon the subject of American active belligerency and I got the same impression that I got from Hitler that the Germans expect us to enter the war before many weeks. But he assured me that our participation in the conflict would be ineffectual. We came too late. Again he referred to the experts and said he was sure they would advise that a military campaign against Germany by an expeditionary force either by landing in Africa or Europe was a military impossibility. He said that even supported by our Naval forces, that the greater part of our airplanes and war materials
would never reach the British Isles, and that even if our airplanes did arrive in England they would be smashed on the ground there before they could take off for combat.

He predicted that the American people would become very impatient, disillusioned and wrathful against statesmanship which drew them into a strictly European war. It would be, he said, a war without heroics as far as the United States was concerned; a series of minor naval engagements with no great flag waving or stirring exploits to fire the American imagination. Our participation, he said, would mean a prolongation of the war probably for many years but we could not possibly defeat Germany.

The military phase of the war, he said, was practically ended. Germany had discontinued the manufacture of munitions and was concentrating its industrial military output on submarines and airplanes.

JC

June 14, 1941
My dear Mr. President:

In the absence of Lord Halifax, Mr. Butler called to see me this morning with the following message from the British Government:

Mr. Churchill apparently feels optimistic with regard to the probability that Dr. Salazar will be willing in the event of imminent German aggression to request Great Britain and the United States to assist in the defense of the Azores. Mr. Churchill feels, however, that plans should now be formulated as to the action to be taken in the event that such a request were not forthcoming at the crucial moment. He therefore suggests that joint staff conversations be undertaken immediately between the United States and British staff representatives in order to determine the details of the action to be taken respectively by the two Governments in such a contingency.

I told Mr. Butler that I would lay this request before you immediately.

The President,

The White House.
Will you let me know what reply you wish me to make to the British Government?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,
June 23, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

The Greek Minister has inquired whether this Government would have any objection to the visit to the United States in about two months' time of the Greek Prime Minister. It is the Minister's feeling that Greek national feeling should be kept alive and that the visit of the Prime Minister would be helpful in that regard, as was the recent visit of General Sikorski in keeping alive a spirit of national resistance to Germany on the part of Polish nationals in the United States.

If you have no objection, I shall inform the Minister that while this Government has not extended and is not extending any invitations to officials of foreign governments to visit the United States at this time, should the Prime Minister of Greece visit the United States, his visit would be most welcome to this Government.

I shall appreciate it if you will let me know what your decision may be.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

This is an additional reason
for us to afford some kind of pro-
tection to Liberia. They ought to
welcome it.

F. D. R.

State Department dispatch from
Wasson at Dakar, dated June 22, 1941,
saying German agents in Liberia obtain
information from Syrian merchants
established at Freetown regarding
arrivals and departures of convoys.
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your immediate attention a telegram received from Monrovia this morning.

I propose sending a reply at once clarifying points 1, 2 and 3 and making it clear with regard to point 4 that an agreement will, of course, be reached in advance as to the location of the air base or bases.

With regard to the question raised by President Barclay concerning Liberian neutrality in the event that the United States enters the war, it is my purpose to reply, if you agree, that the status of Liberia in such event is, of course, a matter for the Liberian Government to determine; that the steps contemplated by this Government will, of course, make it possible for Liberian independence and integrity to be preserved, but that this Government feels confident that a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out which would give the United States full power to protect the bases selected and yet

The President,

The White House.
leave Liberia free to determine her own status in the light of what she construes to be her best interests.

If you see no objection to the nature of the reply I contemplate sending, I shall send a telegram in that sense immediately.

Believe me

Faithfully yours

Encs.
Telegram 62 from Monrovia;
Telegram 37 to Monrovia.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

62, June 25, 5 p.m.

Department's no. 37, June 21, 3 p.m.

President Barclay has favorably received suggestion. Before committing himself he requests clarification:

One. Regarding withdrawal of troops upon termination of emergency. He feels there should be a full definition of the term "emergency".

Two. President Barclay's only information with respect to arrangements made in British territories in Western Hemisphere has been from radio broadcasts and desires to be more fully apprised.

Three. Is the sending of Marines essential for the preparation of air base as might likely be established.

Four. Question as to location of air base or bases should be fixed in advance.

President Barclay posed the question: If America eventually became a belligerent would it involve a departure from Liberian neutrality or would arrangements be
-2- 62, June 25, 5 p.m., from Monrovia

be similar to those regarding British naval bases in Egypt? President Barclay's attitude toward Marines can be attributed to reports of alleged reprehensible conduct in Central America.

My conviction is that all points can be settled to the mutual satisfaction of the two governments.

WALTON

ALC
NO DISTRIBUTION

June 21, 1941

AMERICAN LEGATION,
MONROVIA.

FOR THE MINISTER ONLY AND TO BE DECODED BY HIM.

Your mail despatch 544, November 14, 1940 and your telegram no. 14, March 15, 1939.

Please seek an immediate interview with President Barclay and, referring to earlier discussions concerning the defense of Liberia, inform him that this Government is now prepared to give immediate and favorable consideration to any request he may make for the establishment of an American air base in Liberia. Explain that this suggestion is put forward in the light of the traditional relations of close friendship between the United States and Liberia which have existed for more than one hundred years. Add that such a base, if established, would of course be with full recognition on the part of the United States of the sovereign and independent status of Liberia and that American military personnel would of course be withdrawn from Liberia as soon as the
emergency had passed. We would envisage implementing the plan by sending to Liberia at an early date a small force of say five hundred United States Marines, who would prepare the way for the construction of the air base. Necessary details, including assurances with respect to full recognition of Liberian sovereignty and regarding the withdrawal of troops upon the termination of the emergency, could be worked out subsequently. These arrangements might well be along the lines of those which have been made in regard to the establishment of American bases in British territories in the Western Hemisphere.

\textit{STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.} The President attaches the utmost importance to the establishment of the proposed base and you will therefore spare no effort in endeavoring to induce President Barclay to make a request in the sense desired. In view of the need for absolute secrecy you will refrain from discussing the matter with anyone except President Barclay.

NE: WSM
The Under Secretary of State  
Washington  
June 24, 1941  

My dear Mr. President:

I have received today your memorandum of June 23 enclosing a proposed questionnaire to be answered by our consuls who are returning from Italy, Germany and territories occupied by the Axis powers.

I am heartily in accord with the idea and the questionnaire you have enclosed will be submitted to our consular officers as soon as possible. You will, of course, be informed of the results obtained.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I am enclosing a proposed questionnaire for us to give to all Consuls who have been thrown out of Axis or Axis-occupied territories.
What do you think of doing this?

F. D. R.

(Enclosure)
June 21, 1941

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

Based upon our talk of the other day relative to information that Consuls abroad might have, I am enclosing a questionnaire which you might think advisable to have sent to all those Consuls who are about to return home.

Very sincerely yours,

Bill Danman
Proposed Questionnaire for United States Consuls Returning from Posts in Axis or Axis-Occupied Territories

Returning Consuls should submit all information in their possession with respect to the following subjects:


2. **Bomb damage,** including locality, time of damage, percentage of unexploded bombs, value of new bombs, and types of bombs causing most damage.

3. **Vital bombing targets,** with reasons therefor, such as impairment of communications, transportation, morale, etc. Times when bombing would be most effective.

4. **Health** of population and of the Axis armed and naval forces, including nutrition hygiene, epidemics, deficiencies in particular medicines, shortages of food, clothing, fuel, lack of housing facilities, etc.

5. **Current rumors.**

6. **British propaganda.** Efficiency thereof, number of listeners, quality of reception. Means for improvement in dissemination thereof. Extent to which means other than radio might be used.

7. **Economic and industrial intelligence** of a specific nature with respect to all military, naval and air activities, including current and contemplated military movements, new developments in weapons and technique, new types of equipment, means of transportation, etc.

8. **Civilian defense.** Efficiency thereof, including fire fighting, shelters, number of gas masks. Means for impairing same.

9. **Prestige of Party and popularity of individual party members.** Vulnerabilities of Party and leaders and means for taking advantage thereof.

11. Main sentiments or emotions of people, e.g. war weariness, fear of America, hatred of Russia, etc.

12. Migrations of population, including size and locality, and whether due to bombing or Axis orders.

13. Channels for obtaining future information. Identity of contacts through whom information obtainable and means of getting same in and out.


15. British Blockade. Effect thereof and means being used to evade same.

16. Any further remarks, including observations of apparently trivial matters, including general day-to-day picture as seen by informant.
7-24-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. This is the copy of Colonel Donovan's letter, which he just sent direct to me.

2. Also a report that General Burns has made in response to your recent directive.

I thought you would probably want to see both of these tonight before you leave.

E.M.W.

E.M.W.
General Watson,

this comes to you
from Colonel Donovan.

Thursa M. Bakey

7-24
June 21, 1941

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

Based upon our talk of the other day relative to information that Consuls abroad might have, I am enclosing a questionnaire which you might think advisable to have sent to all those Consuls who are about to return home.

Very sincerely yours,
Proposed Questionnaire for United States Consuls Returning from Posts in Axis or Axis-Occupied Territories

Returning Consuls should submit all information in their possession with respect to the following subjects:


2. Bomb damage, including locality, time of damage, percentage of unexploded bombs, value of new bombs, and types of bombs causing most damage.

3. Vital bombing targets, with reasons therefor, such as impairment of communications, transportation, morale, etc. Times when bombing would be most effective.

4. Health of population and of the Axis armed and naval forces, including nutrition hygiene, epidemics, deficiencies in particular medicines, shortages of food, clothing, fuel, lack of housing facilities, etc.

5. Current rumors.

6. British propaganda. Efficiency thereof, number of listeners, quality of reception. Means for improvement in dissemination thereof. Extent to which means other than radio might be used.

7. Economic and industrial intelligence of a specific nature with respect to all military, naval and air activities, including current and contemplated military movements, new developments in weapons and technique, new types of equipment, means of transportation, etc.

8. Civilian defense. Efficiency thereof, including fire fighting, shelters, number of gas masks. Means for impairing same.

10. **Prestige of Services and popularity of individual officers.** Vulnerability thereof.

11. **Main sentiments or emotions of people,** e.g. war weariness, fear of America, hatred of Russia, etc.

12. **Migrations of population,** including size and locality, and whether due to bombing or Axis orders.

13. **Channels for obtaining future information.** Identity of contacts through whom information obtainable and means of getting same in and out.

14. **Identity of Axis espionage agents** acting in allied territories, United States or elsewhere.

15. **British Blockade.** Effect thereof and means being used to evade same.

16. Any further remarks, including observations of apparently trivial matters, including general day-to-day picture as seen by informant.
CONFIDENTIAL

Urgent

The Honorable
Edwin Martin Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I agree with you that steps are necessary to deal with these reports circulated by former President Herbert Hoover -- but what steps? This does not merit a Government statement but I do think it merits a communication to Mr. Hoover.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a portion of a memorandum of conversation which I had with Lord Halifax on Sunday. It is possible that you may feel it desirable to have some steps taken in order to deal with the reports which Mr. Hoover is circulating.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enc.
Memo. of conversation
with Lord Halifax,
June 22, 1941.

The President,

The White House.
DATE: June 22, 1941

SUBJECT: Statements of Mr. Herbert Hoover regarding alleged German peace proposals

PARTICIPANTS: British Ambassador, Lord Halifax; Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO:

Lord Halifax called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador brought up the subject of information which had reached him to the effect that Mr. Herbert Hoover was busily engaged in spreading the report in many circles in the United States that Hess had brought to Great Britain specific and concrete German peace proposals. The reports emanating from Mr. Hoover further allege that when the leaders of the Conservative Party in England learned of this fact, they called upon Mr. Churchill and demanded that he give these proposals full consideration, with the threat that, in as much as the Conservative Party constituted the chief support of Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, such support would be withdrawn unless
Mr. Churchill agreed to discuss these peace proposals; furthermore, that it was for this reason that Mr. Churchill had urged Ambassador Winant to return to Washington by air immediately in order to lay these facts before the President and obtain the President's acquiescence to consideration by the British Government of these peace proposals. Mr. Hoover further was claiming that Hess was the seventh peace emissary sent to England since the outbreak of the war and that the other emissaries had been sent from Germany to Dublin in a German plane and returned in a British plane. Mr. Hoover was maintaining that he was absolutely positive that these facts were correct as he set them forth since he obtained his information from Hugh Gibson who is now in London and who got them from reliable inside sources.

Lord Halifax said he merely wished me to know of the information he had obtained in this regard in order that the Administration might be able to deal with these reports in any way it saw fit. He said that it was unnecessary for him to say that the reports were entirely untrue and that, of course, this Government was aware of the general nature of the statements that Hess had made upon his arrival in Scotland.
Mr. Foster:

Mr. Welles has requested that this copy of the letter which has received the President's approval be made available to you this afternoon.

E. G. Collado
June 28, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Reference is made to a letter of April 22, 1941 addressed to you by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, presenting for your approval a program of furnishing the other American republics with a total of $400,000,000 of military and naval matériel. At that time you indicated your approval of this general program.

The Department has now worked out in consultation with the Division of Defense Aid Reports a draft text of basic agreement which would be entered into by this Government with each of the other American republics. The draft, which is enclosed, is worked out with special reference to Brazil, and it is suggested that the only changes to be incorporated in the drafts relating to the other American republics would be in respect of the financial details appropriate to each country. There is attached a table indicating the total amounts of matériel which it is proposed to transfer.

The President,

The White House.
transfer to each of the other American republics and the total amounts to be paid into the United States Treasury over a period of six years.

This program is based on deliveries of material over a period of at least three years and payments by the other American republics into the Treasury over a period of six years. In the event that the emergency is terminated before the expiration of these periods of delivery or payment, it would probably be necessary and desirable to reconsider the program and perhaps to modify the basic agreements in accordance with the new circumstances.

If you approve the draft basic agreement and suggested schedule of payments, the Department is prepared to begin immediate negotiations with the representatives of Brazil, Colombia and eventually all of the American republics.

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enclosure:

Draft text of basic agreement, with attached table.
June 26, 1941

The President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of the Congress of the United States of America of March 11, 1941, that the defense of each of the American republics is vital to the defense of all, and for that reason the United States of America proposes to provide certain defense articles and defense information to the United States of Brazil.

The United States of America and the United States of Brazil do here agree to the terms and conditions on which the obligations of the United States of Brazil to the United States of America which thereby arise shall be discharged.

Article I

The United States of America and the United States of Brazil declare that in conformity with the principles set forth in the Declaration of Lima they, together with all the other American republics, are united in the defense of the Americas, determined to secure for themselves and for each other the enjoyment of their own fortunes and their own talents. To that end the defense articles hereunder are to be delivered and in that cause they shall be used.

With
With that purpose in their minds the United States of America and the United States of Brazil make this agreement.

Article II

Should circumstances arise in which the United States of America in its own defense or in the defense of the Americas shall require defense articles or defense information which the United States of Brazil is in a position to supply, the United States of Brazil will make such defense articles and defense information available to the United States of America on terms similar to those expressed in this agreement.

Article III

The United States of America proposes to transfer to the United States of Brazil under the terms of this Agreement armaments and munitions of war to a total value of about $100,000,000. The United States of America proposes to begin deliveries immediately and to continue deliveries as expeditiously as practicable during the coming twelve months to an approximate total value of $15,000,000 for use by the Brazilian Army and an approximate total value of $1,000,000 for use by the Brazilian Navy.

The United States of America, however, reserves the right at any time to suspend, defer, or stop deliveries whenever
whenever in the opinion of the President of the United States of America further deliveries are not consistent with the needs of the national defense of the United States of America or the Western Hemisphere.

Article IV

Records shall be kept of all defense articles transferred under this agreement, and not less than every ninety days schedules of such defense articles shall be exchanged and reviewed.

Thereupon the United States of Brazil shall pay in dollars into the Treasury of the United States of America the total cost to the United States of America of the defense articles theretofore delivered less all payments theretofore made up to a total of $35,000,000, and the United States of Brazil shall not be required to pay more than a total of $15,000,000 before July 1, 1942, more than a total of $19,000,000 before July 1, 1943, more than a total of $23,000,000 before July 1, 1944, more than a total of $27,000,000 before July 1, 1945, or more than a total of $31,000,000 before July 1, 1946.

Article V

The United States of America and the United States of Brazil, recognizing that the measures herein provided for their
their common defense and united resistance to aggression are taken for the further purpose of laying the bases for a just and enduring peace, agree, since such measures cannot be effective or such a peace flourish under the burden of an excessive debt, that upon the payments above provided all fiscal obligations of the United States of Brazil hereunder shall be discharged; and for the same purpose they further agree, in conformity with the principles and program set forth in Resolution XXV on Economic and Financial Cooperation of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Habana, July, 1940, to cooperate with each other and with other nations to negotiate fair and equitable commodity agreements with respect to the products of either of them and of other nations in which marketing problems exist, and to cooperate with each other and with other nations to relieve the distress and want caused by the war wherever, and as soon as, such relief will be sewer to the oppressed and not aid to the aggressor.

Article VI

The United States of Brazil undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President of the United States of America, transfer title to or possession of any defense article or defense information transferred under this
this agreement, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the United States of Brazil.

Article VII

If, as a result of the transfer to the United States of Brazil of any defense article or defense information, it is necessary for the United States of Brazil to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect, pursuant to the Act, any of the rights of any citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the United States of Brazil will do so, when so requested by the President of the United States of America.

Article VIII

The parties to this Agreement, and the officials signing this Agreement on their behalf, each for itself, himself, or themselves, represent and agree that the execution and delivery of this Agreement have in all respects been duly authorized, and that all acts, conditions, and legal formalities which should have been performed and completed prior to the making of this Agreement have been performed and completed as required by, and in conformity with, respectively, the laws of the United States of America and the United States.
States of Brazil.

Signed in Washington in duplicate this day of , 1941.

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(Title)

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL

(Title)
### Program of Transfer of Military and Naval Material to the Other American Republics

(Millions of Dollars)

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Material to be Transferred</th>
<th>Total Amounts to be Paid to the United States Treasury During 6 Years</th>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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<td>142.48</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Held out to meet requirements of Argentina, Mexico, Panama, and as a general reserve 26.7

**Grand Totals** 400 142.48

* Navy only; Army not yet determined.

**Amounts not yet determined.**
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a copy of a letter I have received today from Monsignor Ready, General Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. I believe you will find it of particular interest.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.
2 July, 1941

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I beg to submit for your information and consideration the following observations resulting from my stay in St. Paul, Minnesota, last week. The occasion, you will recall, was the National Eucharistic Congress. Practically the whole hierarchy of our country attended. Besides, there were sixteen Bishops from Canada and five from Mexico. There was no general meeting or conference of the Bishops. They gathered jointly only at ecclesiastical functions.

Tuesday, June 24, I was asked to attend a small conference of the Archbishops and Bishops, called to discuss the advisability of arranging for a general meeting of the Bishops in St. Paul for the purpose of issuing a statement referring to the United States' present attitude to Russia.

It seemed certain at first that those sponsoring a general meeting would prevail. It seemed equally certain that the statement issuing from such meeting would oppose our Government's giving aid, in any form, to the Soviet Union. After a long discussion, it was decided to defer the meeting and to leave the question of a statement of attitude to the Administrative Board of Bishops, N.C.W.C.

Particularly from this meeting, but likewise from conversations with other leaders during the week, I was impressed by the vigorous opposition to any form of cooperation or collaboration on the part of our Government and the Soviet regime. Pressing the unchanged motivation of our Government's policy for national defense is not easy against what Russia stands for in the minds of our people. The idealism of saving the democratic and Christian manner of life suffers disastrously if Russia must be considered an object of our national aid.

I am pleased to say that good use was made of the statement you issued on the question (June 22). The
definition of our Government's position, which you so well expressed, had much to do in the postponement of the meeting I spoke of above.

But before the confusion becomes more exaggerated and before the most vocal of our orators do their work, it would be most effective if the President soon could find an occasion to demand of Russia, as a condition for United States aid, a declaration of adherence to the four freedoms. A repetition of the principles of our present national policy, as expressed in your recent statement, would have a compelling effect if spoken by the President.

I fear the confusion that will result soon if the President does not speak out on the question. Dr. Rufus Weaver, the representative of the Baptists, has already called me to subscribe to a joint statement of religious leaders condemning aid to the Soviet Union. Dr. Morrison of the "Christian Century" is reported as directing the opposition of the Protestant groups.

You will forgive the length of this letter. I thought the importance of the St. Paul events deserved your immediate consideration. There are numerous other sidelights on the same subject, but those can wait until another occasion.

Assuring you of my great respect, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

MICHAEL J. READY

General Secretary

The Honorable Sumner Welles
The Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
Note: Letter of May 8 addressed to Asst. Secy. Long by Ambassador Steinhardt, returned to State Dept. as per their request.

djb
My dear Mr. President:

In response to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of June 27, I am transmitting herewith a memorandum covering the information which the Department has with regard to this situation and I am likewise enclosing for your information a letter dated May 8 addressed to Assistant Secretary Long by Ambassador Steinhardt which deals with this problem.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Encs.

The President,

The White House.
The Agudas Chasidei Chabad is one of several organizations of orthodox Jews in the United States. Each of the agudas has approached the Department through its rabbis to secure special treatment for its fellow religionists as prospective immigrants. Rabbi Schneersohn, Rabbi Silver, Rabbi Teitelbaum - each representing different agudas - and various other rabbis associated with them or acting independently have been to the Department time and again during the last twelve months. In all, they have submitted to the Department in the neighborhood of 10,000 names. In many instances, the name of the individual does not include the persons of his household who desire to accompany him and for whom application is automatically made. Relatives include wife, children, children-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law and persons of varying other degrees of consanguinity or relationship by marriage. A great many of
of them are stated to be rabbis and a large number are alleged to be rabbinical students. They mostly found themselves in Poland, Lithuania, Eastern Germany, Latvia and Southwestern Russia before either the Russian or the German armies moved into Lithuania and back into Russia when they were closed by the Russian absorption of the Baltic states. At that time communication became very difficult, even practically impossible, because of restrictions imposed by the Russian Government and by the action of that Government in closing our Consulates.

Notwithstanding the restrictions and the impediments, the Department showed every inclination to be of assistance to them as far as the law and a regard for other sects would permit. One list that was submitted contained 3,800 names but the rabbis were asked to restrict it further and to cull from it names, and they returned a list of approximately 980 culled out of the larger list.

A great many of these persons to whom visas were issued have arrived in the United States. A large number of rabbis have arrived and large groups of rabbinical students came to the United States not necessarily as groups but were entitled to entry into the United States because as individuals they belonged
belonged to one of these groups which were endorsed by rabbis resident in the United States.

Many of the persons who left Russia left prematurely and not only without American visas, but without any provision whatsoever for American visas, stating, however, that they were coming to the United States and on the basis of that statement received exit permits from the Russian Government. A number of these people got as far as Manchuria and Japan and there are a thousand or 1,500 of them still in Japan, others having left there and proceeding to Shanghai, where they presently reside. While the Japanese Government has not been hospitably inclined to refugees, they have permitted them transit permits and have extended their stays from time to time, and apparently would always afford them an opportunity to proceed from Japan to Shanghai. The Japanese Government has not indicated its intention to send them back into Russia. Consequently, because of the Government of the United States, they have been able to escape from the localities where they were in danger and now find themselves in a place where they are not to be persecuted and where their lives are not in danger.

Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, in a comparatively few cases persons who held visas to the United States were caught by the Department's general orders. These orders were issued after careful consideration of all the facts concerned and envisaged the danger to the safety of the United States because of the practices of the German and Russian Governments in connection with persons emigrating from territories under their jurisdiction to the United States. These persons have been told that when they assemble their families and can come to the United States with their families and when the immigration quotas permit visas to be issued to them, there will be no reason why they might not be favorably considered for immigrant visas - of course with the precautionary proviso that each case will be examined on its own merits.

See letter attached.
CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

I have been handed today by Mr. Heath, until recently our First Secretary of Embassy at Berlin, a confidential memorandum reporting a conversation had in Berlin on June 6 with Dr. Schacht. I am enclosing herewith a copy of this memorandum for your information. I believe you will find it particularly interesting.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
July 7, 1941

U.
Mr. Welles

Conversation with Dr. Schacht

I saw Dr. Schacht by confidential appointment on June 6. He opened the conversation with two positive predictions:

(1) That Germany would invade Russia within 14 days. (NOTE: Actually it occurred within 16 days.) Nothing could prevent this. For his own sake, Stalin "should not and, in fact, could not make concessions sufficient to avert the invasion."

(2) That in a relatively short time German-American diplomatic relations would be broken off. He was uncertain which side would initiate the rupture.

Churchill, he said, would undoubtedly "celebrate Germany's invasion of Russia by drinking the best bottle of whiskey in his cellar". The German high command did not anticipate that the invasion of Russia would be as brief as other campaigns, although it was certain of success. It would probably take three or four months to destroy the Russian armies.

He asked that no memorandum of the conversation be written in the Embassy but that this information and his
views be orally communicated to Mr. Welles. To my remark that it would be a month before I would be in Washington, he replied that that would be time enough; that it would be three months before opposition to the present course would develop in Germany.

Every responsible man in Germany, he asserted, and many party leaders were against the course of German policy. I said that I assumed that he meant the opposition was to the régime and he assented with a nod. I asked what he thought would be the form of Germany’s future government. He replied that the army would have to maintain order at first but he could not predict what would be the nature of the eventual civil régime. Knowing his leanings, I inquired whether he thought the monarchy would be reestablished, to which he replied that he personally considered a constitutional monarchy to be the only practicable government for Germany.

He complained that England and the United States had never lent assistance to those elements in Germany which were opposed to the National Socialist régime and went on to say that he had always considered Eden a fool and he felt convinced of it when the latter in a recent speech spoke of the destruction of Germany. Such remarks, he asserted, played into Hitler’s hands.
In conclusion he said that he regretted losing contact with me and inquired whether I would be likely to be in Switzerland in the future. He said that if it were later desired to communicate with him this could be done through the Chinese Ambassador in Berlin, who was reliable and discreet.

D. R. Heath
Dear Summer:

One of the quickest ways to help the British with respect to their very critical situation in regard to oil would be to find a way to adjust the load line treaty on oil tankers.

I imagine it is one of those close questions of international law about which lawyers love to write long dissertations. Perhaps you could see Francis Biddle and get him to write a good one for you.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Summer Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 16, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

The matter of the load lines on tankers and other vessels, referred to in your letter of July 12, was taken up by me in a cable instruction to our Embassy in London on July 10 in which was set forth the text of a note to be delivered to the British Government, the depositary of the Convention, requesting that the Convention, so far as it restricts the rights of the contracting parties to regulate load lines, be regarded as suspended for the duration of the emergency.

Before sending the telegram we had conferred with officials of the British Embassy, who felt that a prompt and favorable response would be forthcoming from the British and allied Governments and the British Dominions.

I at the same time sent instructions to our Embassies in those of the Latin American countries that

The President,

The White House.
that are parties to the Convention asking them to impress upon the respective foreign offices the importance of prompt and favorable action. We featured the urgency of the matter.

We have a telegram from Ambassador Winant dated July 11 stating that our note had been delivered, also one of the same date from Ambassador Bowers stating that the Chilean Government has promised to act speedily. I should be able to give you something more definite within the next few days.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Acting Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LAND:

For your information.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1941

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR SUMNER WELLES:

In view of the suggestion in today's dispatches that Darlan is again discussing with the Germans the use of Casa Blanca and Dakar, what would you think of having Leahy tell Petain and having Murphy simultaneously tell Weygand that if any further German occupation occurs in Morocco or Dakar, the United States would, as a matter of course, be compelled to stop all conversations relating to supplies to French Africa.

We would have to do the same in regard to any further American food for unoccupied France. All this could be couched in polite but decisive terms.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1941

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR
SUMNER WELLES:

In view of the suggestion in today's dispatches that Darlan is again discussing with the Germans the use of Casa Blanca and Dakar, what would you think of having Leahy tell Petain and having Murphy simultaneously tell Weygand that if any further German occupation occurs in Morocco or Dakar, the United States would, as a matter of course, be compelled to stop all conversations relating to supplies to French Africa.

We would have to do the same in regard to any further American food for unoccupied France. All this could be couched in polite but decisive terms.

F.D.R.
July 11, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I have redrafted the suggested letter to Dr. Salazar and I am enclosing the new copy herewith.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.
Draft letter to
Dr. Salazar

The President,
The White House.
My dear Dr. Salazar:

I am writing this entirely personal and informal letter to you in the belief that it may be easier for me, in this manner, to put an end effectively to certain misunderstandings which have regrettably arisen during recent weeks between our two Governments.

May I say first of all that, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the continued exercise of unimpaired and sovereign jurisdiction by the Government of Portugal over the territory of Portugal itself, over the Azores and over all Portuguese colonies offers complete assurance of security to the Western Hemisphere insofar as the regions mentioned are concerned. It is, consequently, the consistent desire of the United States that there be no infringement of Portuguese sovereign control over those territories.

This policy of the United States I made emphatically clear in the message which I addressed yesterday to the Congress of the United States concerning the steps which had been taken to assist the people of Iceland in the defense of the integrity and independence of their country.

I feel sure that there has never been any doubt in your own mind with regard to this question and that the questions which have been raised with regard thereto in the press have had their origin in false reports deliberately circulated by propaganda emanating from governments which have desired to impair the traditional relations between our two countries.

For all of the reasons I have mentioned above, this Government views with the greatest gratification the steps which already have been taken and which are being taken by your Government to strengthen the defense of the Azores and other outlying portions of the colonial possessions of Portugal so as to render any surprise attack upon them by Germany, or by powers cooperating with Germany, less likely of success.
I need merely add that in view of the vital importance to the United States that Portuguese sovereignty over the Azores and certain other outlying Portuguese possessions remain intact, this Government will stand prepared to assist the authorities of Portugal in the defense of those possessions against any threat of aggression on the part of Germany, or of the powers responsive to Germany, should your Government express to me its belief that such aggression is imminent or its desire that such steps be taken. Any such measures would, of course, be taken in full recognition of the sovereign rights of Portugal and with categorical assurances that any American forces sent to Portuguese possessions would be withdrawn immediately upon the termination of the present war.

In the event that this contingency were to arise and the Government of Portugal considered it desirable, because of the close relations which happily exist between Portugal and Brazil, to ask that the Brazilian Government participate in these measures of defense, such a step would be most satisfactory to the Government of the United States. I feel certain that Brazil and the United States would cooperate effectively and whole-heartedly in assisting the Portuguese Government and people in the defense of the Azores.

I have felt it desirable to clarify the situation completely in order to have the assurance that there may not be the slightest misunderstanding of these facts between you and myself.

Frankly, I have felt particularly chagrined that any question should have arisen concerning my own attitude with regard to complete respect for the sovereignty of Portugal. I say that because, as you will remember, during the World War of 1914-1918, the Government of Portugal made available to its allies and subsequently to the United States the port of Horta as a fueling base and the port of Ponta Delgada as a naval base. At that time, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I had the privilege of visiting those ports in the interest of the United States Navy and I was thus afforded the opportunity of seeing for myself how particularly close and friendly the relations between the Portuguese people and the members of the naval forces of the United States had become. There existed a complete spirit of cooperation between them and of course as soon as the
international emergency had passed, all of the forces of the allied and associated powers were immediately withdrawn without the slightest detriment to the sovereign jurisdiction of the Portuguese Government. Because of this experience which I had, I should have a personal interest in seeing to it that the relations between our two Governments and between the peoples of our two countries were always conducted with a full reciprocal respect for the sovereign rights of each and that in any form of cooperation which might be undertaken between Portugal and the United States the best interests of the Portuguese people were completely safeguarded.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my personal regard, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
Prime Minister,
Lisbon.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 11, 1941

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

SENIOR GORGE
SENIOR CONNALLY

I am enclosing a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State. I wish you would give me a little unofficial and private opinion as to what you think would be the best policy at the present time -- try to put over now or hold over.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

one copy each of attached memo 6/28/41 to Mr. Welles sent to George and Connally.
My dear Mr. President:

Some days ago I discussed with you the possibility of repealing or amending the Neutrality Act in order to remove certain restrictions which interfere with the giving of full effect to our policy of assistance to Great Britain and other countries whose defense is deemed to be vital to our own defense.

I enclose a memorandum suggesting changes which it would seem desirable to make by way of amendments to the Neutrality Act. Both the Secretary and I approve the proposed changes.

Senator George and Senator Connally have informed me that, while in their judgment there would be an undoubted majority in both Houses in favor of a revision of the act, they feel that the debate would be prolonged and that the isolationist group

The President,

The White House.
group would filibuster on the issue.

You will know whether, in the circumstances, it is desirable to take any action at this time.

Faithfully yours.

[Signature]

Acting Secretary.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of June 28, 1941.
June 28, 1941.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE NEUTRALITY ACT APPROVED
November 4, 1939

Mr. Welles:

With respect to amendments of the Neutrality Act, I submit the following comments:

Section 1:
This section, giving the President authority to bring into operation provisions of the act by proclamation, requires no change.

Section 2:
Paragraph (a) of this section prohibits, following the President's proclamation, American vessels from carrying passengers or cargoes to states named in the proclamation. Paragraph (c) requires the transfer of title to merchandise going to belligerent countries. Subsequent paragraphs of the section make exceptions with respect to transportation in certain areas. They also make exceptions with respect to the transfer of title to goods with specified designations. These exceptions do not cover arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

The same section provides that losses incurred in connection with any transportation prohibited by the section or incurred in connection with any transportation excepted under the section, other than that relating to lakes, rivers, and inland waters bordering on the United States, shall not be made the basis of any claim by the Government of the United States.

These
These provisions were designed to prevent controversies between the United States and belligerent governments, such as those which arose during the World War, 1914-1918, with respect to the seizure or destruction of cargoes and vessels. There was a vast accumulation of claims against belligerent governments during the World War, some of which have not yet been settled.

There would seem to be little objection to the provisions so far as they relate to goods going to belligerent countries, since the shipper in many cases will have been paid for his goods, but the inadvisability of retaining the restrictions on vessels is amply demonstrated by the Robin Moor incident. It virtually invites the commission of lawless acts by belligerents.

The section, at least as regards ships, is out of step with our previous pronouncement regarding freedom of the seas and with the effectuation of our present policy under the Lend-Lease Act.

Section 3:

This section relates to combat areas to be prescribed by the President. There would seem to be no reason for changing it.

Section 4:

This section, as amended June 26, 1940 (Pub.Res.No. 87, 76th Cong., 3d sess.), makes provision for authorizing American Red Cross vessels to go to belligerent countries. If the provision in section 2 with respect to vessels is repealed, there would seem to be no purpose in retaining section 4, as amended.

Section 5:

This section relates to travel by American citizens on belligerent vessels. It should be retained.

Section 6:
Section 6:

This section prohibits the arming of American merchant vessels. The argument in support of the section at the time it was before the Congress was that if such vessels were unarmed there would be no excuse for sinking them without warning. It is difficult to estimate the value of the provision during the present war in view of the fact that, for the most part, American vessels have been prevented from entering active combat areas. If the section were repealed and authority lodged in the President to arm, or permit to be armed, such vessels or not as he might deem proper, the question of arming could be left to later developments in the submarine and aerial warfare.

Section 7:

The section prohibits loans and credits to belligerent governments. Its repeal would greatly facilitate our aid to some of the present belligerents as, for example, the British Dominions, but loans to others would be prohibited by the Johnson Act. That act makes illegal the purchase or sale by any person within the United States, or any place subject to its jurisdiction, of bonds, securities or other obligations of a foreign government in default on its obligations to the United States. It also prohibits the making of loans to any such government. These inhibitions apply, for example, to Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia. The Johnson Act, however, has been held by the Attorney General not to interfere with ordinary banking and commercial transactions. There would seem, nevertheless, to be sufficient justification for repeal of section 7.

Section 8:
Section 8:
This section prohibits persons within the United States from soliciting or receiving contributions on behalf of countries declared by the President to be belligerents. It does not apply to the solicitation or collection of funds to be used for medical aid and assistance, food and clothing to relieve human suffering, provided the funds are not for a person or organization acting for a belligerent government. It requires that all such solicitations and collections shall be in accordance with "such rules and regulations as may be prescribed".

It would be well to retain this section since it gives the Government control over such matters and enables it to prevent unauthorized people from engaging in questionable activities ostensibly for relief purposes but actually for other purposes.

Section 9:
The section excepts from the operation of the act, other than section 12 relating to the National Munitions Control Board, American republics engaged in war against a non-American state. No reason is seen for disturbing it.

Section 10:
This section, which was drafted to implement the provisions of our basic neutrality laws, authorizes the President to require bonds from persons in command of vessels when there is cause to believe that they expect to deliver supplies to belligerent war vessels, or prohibit the departure of a vessel which has previously so supplied belligerent war vessels, etc. Inasmuch as the President is given discretion in these matters, there is no
no reason for disturbing it.

Section 11:
This section authorizes the President to prohibit armed merchant vessels or submarines from entering our ports. The invoking of the section is left to the discretion of the President. It might well be retained.

Section 12:
This section relates to the National Munitions Control Board. It provides for the licensing of the importation and exportation of arms, etc. It has served a useful purpose and should be retained.

Section 13:
This section has to do with the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the act and should be retained.

Section 14:
This section relates to the improper use of the American flag by foreign vessels and prohibits those which have improperly used the flag from entering our ports or territorial waters for a period of three months thereafter. It should be retained.

Sections 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19:
Section 16 provides for penalties. Section 18 contains definitions. Section 17 has to do with the constitutionality of provisions of the act. Section 18 authorizes appropriations, and Section 19 repeals certain prior resolutions. I see no reason for disturbing any of these sections.

To summarize, it would seem that Sections 4 and 7 should be repealed. Sections 2 and 6 should be amended as indicated above, or repealed.

Le GH;MKS;AD