July 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ACHESON

In regard to the enclosed, I think that the aide memoire "A" is all right but that "B" is not satisfactory -- principally for the reason that it is so vague that I do not understand it myself.

In regard to "B-I", I would leave out "the common purpose" because it could be put six different ways and no two people would agree. In regard to (2) under "B-I", why is it necessary to single out for mention "the signal advantage secured by the United States"? There are certain advantages secured by Britain. In regard to "B-I" (3), neither Britain nor the United States ought to eliminate the possibility of a cash account later because such a cash account might be highly advisable, for example, in setting up some form of world currency standard or in putting to use American-owned gold.

On the whole it seems to me that "B" could be limited to two or three paragraphs somewhat as follows:

1. The British Government agrees to return, at the end of the war, all goods received under the Lease-Lend Act which have not been destroyed or consumed -- such goods shall be returned if the President shall determine that they are useful for the defense of the United States or the Western Hemisphere, or can be otherwise of use to the United States.

2. Due consideration will be given by the United States to the capacity of the British Commonwealth to purchase American goods and services and to restore normal economic relations not only between the two nations but in conjunction with the bettering of world-wide economic relations.

3. In consideration for such goods received by Britain under the Lease-Lend Act which have been destroyed or consumed, the United States will give due weight to the value of war information, inventions, and other knowledge received from the British Government, and will also give due weight
to the value of munitions and similar production created in the United States through Lend-Lease Act operations.

4. The British Government agrees to continue discussions with the United States Government in regard to further details covering existing transfers and covering further measures of aid and of cooperation over a wider sphere.

F. D. R.
Mr. Maynard Keynes called upon me today at his request. He told me that he had received cable instructions from the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. He stated that they were very pleased with his and the Ambassador's report of their conversation with the President.

He then handed me two papers which I attach, marked "A" and "B". Paper "B" was the cable outline of what the Prime Minister and the Chancellor believed should be in the preliminary Lease-Lend Agreement. Paper "A" is Mr. Keynes's suggestion of the opening part of an aide-memoire which should be the vehicle for the agreement.

After reading the papers, I told Mr. Keynes that I had very considerable doubts whether this paper "B" would be in accord with the President's views, but that I would report our conversation to you and you would undoubtedly discuss the matter with the President. I pointed out that the agreement as suggested, while negating the creation of a money debt, did not provide for any obligation on the part of the British, except to return "so far as practicable" goods which might be
in existence at the end of the emergency. I said that it would seem to me very difficult for the President to leave the matter in so vague and unsatisfactory a situation.

Mr. Keynes then informed me that he had been instructed not to put forth proposals except as authorized by cable and that probably the best procedure would be, after we received instructions from the President, to propose a draft to him. He said that he wished to return by Clipper to England if possible on July 23 and that it would be helpful if he could take back a draft with him so that he might discuss it personally with the Prime Minister and the Chancellor in London. I told him that I would report to you and that I would get in touch with him within the next day or two.

Dean Acheson
Aide-Mémoire

As reported by the President to Congress on June 10, 1941, discussions were entered upon between the Government of the United States and the British Government early in June with a view to an agreement to fix the terms and conditions under Section 3(b) of the Lease-Lend Act, upon which the foreign governments receive the aid authorised by the Act.

After an interchange of views between the President and the British Prime Minister through the intermediary of the British Ambassador in Washington, it was agreed between them that it would be premature at the present time to give final definition to the terms and conditions which the President would deem satisfactory under Section 3(b) of the above Act, and that the President should reserve with his position until in due course the progress of events it was clearer to him what proposals it would be in the mutual interest of the two countries and of the world for him to make; but that it would be right and proper to declare and agree forthwith certain main purposes and intentions of the final agreement to be reached at a later date.
I.

(1) A declaration of common purpose.

(2) A declaration by the President that the carrying out of this common purpose is the main object of the aid accorded under the Lease-Lend Act and that the benefits thereby obtained are, in his judgment, the signal advantage secured by the United States under Section 3(b) of the Act.

(3) In respect of the balance of aid accorded under the Lease-Lend Act not thus compensated no cash account shall be set up and no delivery of goods or assets shall be asked which would interfere with the normal economic relations between the United States of America and the British Commonwealth after the war or with the capacity of the British Commonwealth to purchase American goods and services.

II.

The British Government agree to return at the end of the war so far as practicable all goods received under the Lease-Lend Act which have not been destroyed or consumed in any case in which the President calls for their return.

III.

The British Government will be happy to discuss with the United States Government in due course further measures of aid and of cooperation over a wider sphere.
July 19, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your reference a telegram dated July 7 received from Ambassador Winant which transmits the text of a letter he had received under date of July 4 from Mr. Eden.

I am also transmitting a copy of the telegram I propose to send in reply. In view of the importance of this subject, I wish to be sure that the suggested reply meets with your approval.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
Telegram from Ambassador Winant;
Proposed telegram to Ambassador Winant.

The President,

The White House.
July 15, 1941.

AMBASSADOR,

LONDON.

Your 2867, July 7.

Careful thought has been given to (a) the letter from Mr. Eden; (b) the proposed draft note to the "allied" Governments; and (c) the draft resolution.

The question of dealing with the problem of commodity surpluses, actual and potential, has been a subject of discussion in letters exchanged between Leith-Ross and officials of the Department and more recently of some discussion with Keynes. As stated in this correspondence, this Government shares the view that the subject distinctly merits attention as one of great interest to the economies of all countries. In conformity with this belief, it has been maintaining initiative in regard to said prospective surplus problems as illustrated by the discussions on wheat now in progress in Washington.

This question is, of course, very broad in character and steps taken to deal with it, as the effort is carried along, must inevitably involve consideration of production, of export
controls, tariff and trade policies of different countries as well as financial policies. All steps taken in this field are, therefore, of interest and significance to the United States.

It is recognized that the matter of provisioning the occupied countries, when and as they may be free of occupation, and ultimately all countries of Europe with foodstuffs and raw materials does to a certain extent, in the immediate present and future, connect with the surplus situation, while by no means being identical with it. Various commodities, for one thing, likely to be desired then are now in short supply rather than the contrary. Any plans worked out and any agreements reached may be of importance to us for any or all of the following reasons: (a) steps taken towards the accumulation of supplies now or in the immediate future may affect the availability of supplies in the American and British defense effort; (b) according to their form or character, they may potentially affect future commercial relations; (c) again, according to their form and character, they might even affect plans for post-war settlements; (d) both currently and in the future, the shipping arrangements may likewise affect all of
the foregoing matters.

These are the guiding thoughts and considerations in mind in connection with the following reply which it is suggested the American Embassy make to Mr. Eden.

QUOTE. I immediately transmitted to Washington your letter of July 4 in regard to the proposed inter-allied meeting to discuss the supply of food and raw materials to European countries when they are free from German occupation. My Government joins in the view that this undertaking is of great prospective usefulness. It understands that the discussions at this stage will be of an exploratory nature and stands ready at the appropriate time to consider in what respects it can cooperate in accomplishing the aims in view.

It has asked me to point out that while this matter is, in some of its aspects, connected with that of present and prospective commodity surpluses, it, of course, has many differentiating elements, among which attention may be called particularly to the following: first, that any steps taken to acquire supplies in the immediate future might affect both the American and British defense effort and should, therefore,
be coordinated with them; second, that the form of arrangement which may be executed may affect both commercial policies and relationships; third, it is even possible that the measures which might be undertaken, and the form and manner in which they are undertaken, would affect both the economic and political arrangements of the post-war period. It is quite possible, for instance, that at some stage of the deliberations the question will present itself as to whether the plans worked out should be restricted to the supplying of the needs of the seven countries, or whether there should also be some plan for the provisioning of the whole of Europe. For all these reasons, my Government requests that it be fully and currently advised, either through this Embassy in London or through the British Embassy in Washington, as to (1) the course of discussions at this meeting, (2) of the work of the Bureau which the United Kingdom contemplates establishing, and that it be consulted regarding any plans that emerge from these exploratory discussions before they are decided upon.

In the opinion of this Government the declaration in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution is too categorical. The reprovisioning of Europe will require the most efficient employment
of the shipping resources controlled by each government and
of allied resources as a whole and it is desirable that plans
to this end be worked out. But such plans would obviously
have to be coordinated with other demands upon shipping at
the time which cannot now be foreseen nor the degree of their
urgency appraised.

In regard to your inquiry as to whether the United
States Government would be prepared to allow anything to be
said on their behalf at the meeting, my Government suggests
that the British representative might make the following brief
statement if it is agreeable to the British Government:

INNER QUOTE. The Government of the United States has
been advised of the purpose of this meeting and acquainted with
the terms of the draft note which has been distributed and of
the draft resolution which is to be presented for consideration.
It has requested my Government to state to this meeting its
opinion that the undertaking is of great prospective usefulness.
It understands that the present discussions will be of an
exploratory nature and states that it stands ready at the
appropriate time to consider in what respects it can cooperate
in accomplishing the aims in view.
It has pointed out that any plans that may be worked out are of great potential interest to the United States for various reasons. They might affect the current American defense effort. According to their substance, form and method they might also affect commercial policies and relationships and even broader post-war arrangements. For these reasons it makes the request that it be kept fully advised regarding the course of these exploratory discussions and that it be consulted regarding any plans that might emerge therefrom.

END ALL QUOTES.

The Department would appreciate your views as to the advisability and adequacy of all of the foregoing before you communicate a reply to Eden.

Acting.

EA:HF:LWW
SECRETARY OR STATE
WASHINGTON

URGENT
2887, July 7, midnight.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

I have received following letter dated July 4 from Mr. Eden:

With reference to our conversation this afternoon about the proposed inter-Allied meeting to discuss the supply of food and raw materials to European countries when they are free from German occupation, I enclose a copy of a draft note which I am proposing to send to the Allied governments, and of a draft resolution which will be sent to them for their concurrence.

Before I take action it would be a help to me to know whether you think that the general idea would concord with the views of the United States Government and also whether the United States Government would be prepared...
prepared to allow anything to be said on their behalf at the meeting which would assist the deliberations."

Following is the text of draft note:

"One. As the government are aware, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have announced their intention to promote measures for the supply of food and raw materials to the countries of Europe as soon as these countries have fully regained their freedom from German Domination. In the view of his Majesty's Government, this policy can only be achieved with the cooperation of all countries concerned, and accordingly I have the honor to propose that a meeting of the Allied governments concerned should take place as soon as convenient to consider what steps can best be taken to further this common aim.

WINANT

EMB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
FROM London
Dated July 7, 1941
Rec'd 6:45 a.m., 8th

(SECTION TWO)

Two. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have already taken some preliminary steps to give effect to this policy. Last autumn Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to His Majesty's Government, with the assistance of a committee of officials and reporting to a committee of ministers under the chairmanship of the Minister Without Portfolio was entrusted with organizing the work in connection with surplus commodities. This covered in the first place immediate action where necessary to assist the economies of producing countries whose markets had been closed by the blockade and in the second place plans for the supply of Europe's post-war needs which is obviously closely related to the disposal of current surpluses. I understand that Sir Frederick Leith-Ross has in fact been in consultation informally with representatives of certain of the governments concerned on the subject of their estimated future requirements and
and the action which they themselves have in contemplation; but it appears desirable to put these consultations on a more formal basis and to arrange for the work to be more closely coordinated.

Three. It is proposed that the meeting should be opened by an explanation of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of the action which they have already set on foot to give effect to that policy; the representatives of the allied governments would then be invited to state their views; and finally a general resolution would be submitted for approval.

I realize that, at the present stage, it is difficult to formulate concrete propositions, and the resolution must therefore be directed in the main to organizing the preparatory work. It appears to be the common interest of all the allied governments to secure that the post-war needs of their respective countries will be effectively provided for.

WINANT

NPL
These needs will necessarily vary in accordance with the economic position of each country and each government would naturally be primarily responsible for the requirements of its own people. At the same time, these different requirements will require to be coordinated and an order of priority established as between the various needs.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be ready to offer any assistance which they can give in this task of coordination. As a first step, they would suggest that, insofar as this has not already been done, each of the allied governments should draw up estimates of the commodities required for its people, on comparable lines, and indicating the order of importance attached to each item. In the next place, shipping will be a common difficulty, and the efficient employment of the tonnage available will plainly require collaboration in the allocation of the resources available. To this question of collaboration
collaboration in shipping His Majesty's Government attach the utmost importance, regarding it as fundamental to the establishment of any concrete programme. Thirdly, it would appear desirable to establish a control bureau, in order to carry forward the present informal exchanges of views between His Majesty's Government and the allied government's and to coordinate their results. In due course, other questions, such as the distribution of stocks, their allocation to particular needs and financial arrangements, will have to be tackled.

Four. In order that the business of the meeting may be conducted smoothly and rapidly, it is proposed that the resolution to be adopted should be agreed beforehand. Accordingly, I enclose herewith a tentative draft which we hope will meet with the approval of the (***) government. Should you have any questions to raise or amendments to suggest on the draft resolution, I should be grateful if you would arrange for the competent authorities to get in touch with Sir Cyril Hurcomb at the Ministry of War Transport insofar as it relates to shipping (paragraph 5) and with Sir Frederick Leith-Rose at the Ministry of Economic Warfare, insofar as it relates to other matters.

Five. Accordingly I have the honor to inquire whether the (***) government is in agreement with the proposal to hold
hold a meeting with the agenda suggested. If so, a date will be fixed and the necessary arrangements made.

It is hoped that the meeting can be held in the early part of July."

WINANT

NPL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
FROM London
Dated July 7, 1941
Rec'd. 8 a.m., 8th

(SECTION FOUR)

Following is text of draft resolution:

"The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Governments of Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, agree:

(1) That it is the common aim of the Allied Governments to see that supplies of food and raw materials should be made available for the postwar needs of their countries as soon as they are fully liberated from German domination:

(2) That while each of the Allied Governments will be primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs for its own people, their respective plans should be coordinated, in a spirit of collaboration, for the successful achievement of the common aim:

(3) That they welcome the preparatory measures which have already been undertaken by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for this purpose and express their readiness to collaborate to the fullest extent"
extent of the treaty power in pursuing the action required:

(4) That accordingly, each government should prepare estimates of the kinds and amounts of foodstuffs and raw materials required for the reprovisioning of their countries, and the order of priority in which they would desire supplies to be delivered as soon as the blockade can be lifted:

(5) That the reprovisioning of Europe as a whole should have prior claim on the shipping resources of each government and thus on Allied shipping resources as a whole and that the method of giving effect to this principle should be worked out between the Allied Governments and the Ministry of War Transport.

(6) That a bureau shall be established by the Government of the United Kingdom under the direction of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross—which the Allied Governments could consult in framing estimates of their requirements and which would collate and coordinate these estimates."

Before speaking to Mr. Eden again about this matter I would appreciate your comments with particular reference to second paragraph of his letter.  

(END OF MESSAGE).

WINANT.

RR
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Hutch Robbins let me see this copy of his report to Nelson Rockefeller, which is the result of his trip with Douglas Fairbanks. Hutch would say me if he knew I had let you see this, but I do so on condition you do not tell a soul and let me have this back!

The point of it is that Hutch is half Argentinian, as you know, and has worked in Venezuela, and I think that though he is young, he has lots of common sense and that you will be interested in what he says.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much indeed for letting me see Hutch Robbins' report which you sent over with your memorandum of July 21. I am returning it to you herewith and I will of course regard it as confidential.

I found the report extremely interesting, constructive and really helpful.

The specific steps which he recommends with regard to our own missions in this Hemisphere have already been taken care of by a material increase in the staffs of all of our missions in the other American republics.

There is, of course, much that still can be done by the utilization of the American colonies in the other American republics along the lines of his recommendations. A program to accomplish this is already under way, but I know you will realize that it is not an easy matter to solve promptly.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
June 6, 1941

Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Council of National Defense,
Office of Coordinator,
Commerce Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Nelson,

I am going to try to outline for you the situation as I see it after our trip through Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, reducing a very complex situation to simple fundamentals, excepting all details and proofs which I can furnish on my return. I would appreciate your giving the plans I present some consideration, and realize that most of it will be merely a repetition of what you already know.

THE SITUATION CONFRONTING THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMERICA:

a) Axis propaganda. Although at the beginning of the war the Axis propaganda was directed mainly against Great Britain, the Axis authorities feel that their work in this line has been successful to a degree. The form of their propaganda is now being directed towards a hatred on the part of the various Latin American peoples against the United States.

Besides the creation of hatred against the United States and Great Britain, the second and equally important goal of Axis propaganda is the creation of NATIONALISM in each of the separate republics. This form of propaganda falls on fertile ground, and is directed towards the eventual disruption of all foreign capital in the respective countries, which, as you know, is mostly American and British; leaving the German elements - who are for the most part citizens - a free scope in the economic control, which aids towards political control.

b) Organization. This propaganda is made doubly effective and successful by reason of the extraordinarily able organizations in the various republics, whose central authority and control lies with the respective German embassies. The German embassies, with their consular offices, throughout the interiors, work with the full cooperation of the German colonies, and depend on them for the necessary ground-work and financial support. These, in turn, are aware of the small political situations in all parts, and are in constant association with all the newspapers, radio stations and movie theaters,
to say nothing of the universities and cultural societies.

Their relationships are kept up by personal contact and effective use of funds. Finally, the Axis elements have the best informed, best organized and most efficient machine existing in South America, who employ every available mechanism in order to further their own ends.

**WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES DOING TO COUNTERACT THIS ORGANIZATION?**

a) Our embassies and consular offices are still pathetically under-staffed, especially with regard to secretarial help. This seriously affects the work of the executives, imposing on them detail work which takes time away from their more important activities. I understand that this situation is being remedied, but I mention it as this problem exists now.

b) Except in isolated cases, the Missions are not made up of technically trained men, in either the field of publicity or economics, or in lower class psychology.

c) Just beginning, and to a minor degree effective, is there an important relation between the Missions, the American colony and existing cultural societies.

d) The Missions have not received the authority from the State Department to operate in the way they often would like to, towards counteracting what they obviously know exists.

To sum up, what advantages remain, economically, culturally and communications-wise, towards enhancing the American position in these countries, are being put to ineffective use.

**WHAT MUST BE DONE BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA:**

a) The use of existing groups. With the full knowledge and support of a well-staffed and equipped Mission, the American colony should be brought together, and be instructed in the policy of the United States government and the part that they, as citizens of the United States, should play in the development of that policy.

b) A local organization should be formed, preferably as a part of the American Chamber of Commerce, under the
leadership of a first-class coordinator with special experience in the field of publicity, and some business and economic background.

c) This organization should be financed to whatever extent possible by the local American business organizations, and government subsidy.

d) This organization should then organize the members of the American colony into various groups for the purpose of carrying out the work of the following main fields:

1) Press and publicity.
2) Radio.
3) Moving picture distribution.
4) Cultural.
5) Commercial.

(Axis agencies, export licenses and priorities, exports for the United States).

USE OF VARIOUS GROUPS IN DIFFERENT FIELDS OF OPERATION:

1) Press and Publicity. With the intelligent advice of the press association representatives, and by means of the utilization of advertising effected by United States firms, further advertising in the form of paid articles, dissemination of news and photographic service, a detailed survey of the editorial policies, the use of American press association news, financial structure and political aspects of every newspaper and publication in the country, in addition to many other obvious and effective means and methods, the Axis propaganda could be counteracted almost immediately. As is being done in Brazil, and contemplated in Argentina, the most effective method to accomplish these ends, aside from the advertising power, is the use of a developed national publicity and news agency. This is no problem.

2) Radio. The complete study of the facilities, power and audience of every broadcasting station, its financial structure and its owners, and the study of available local talent should be on hand. Paid local broadcasts should be arranged, the advertising should be used as a weapon, and this field should be operated in cooperation with the press and publicity division.

3) Moving Picture Theaters. A careful local study should be made of every movie theater, the contracts it
maintains with the United States movie industry, the type of movie and short subject it releases, its owners, financial structure and grade. As the main countries of South America have agents representing the major moving picture companies in the United States, pressure could be placed on the theaters, by the agent, in order to accomplish what the local committee desires.

4) Cultural. In certain cases in South America there exist American cultural institutes. These at present have some local backing. These institutes can be developed into taking a vital cultural part in the lives of the communities in countries of the respective republics. Where an American cultural institute is lacking, one should be developed. Through them should be funneled the various art, music, literature, publications projects, as well as the fellowship interchanges. The subsidization, enlargement of activities, and subsequent build-up of these institutions would leave a permanent organization of vital importance in the cultural interchange between the United States and the various republics.

5) Commercial. Of equal if not greater importance than an adequate press and publicity operation is that of the effective use of the bargaining and boycott position that can be imposed through commercial and economic means. There is no possibility of controlling Axis agencies without local supervision and local authority based on government policy. Blanket export licenses may facilitate the work in Washington, but they take away the trump card of the United States when desiring to make local purchases, or wishing to control materials imported by Axis agencies. If we, in the United States, are to make a sacrifice by giving priorities to South America, we should be certain that our strategic materials are not falling into hands which aid the Axis organizations set up to undermine us.

I have not touched on travel, sports, transportation, development, public welfare and other fields, in order not to overburden a possible organization during its early life, and because some of these fields, like transportation, are better taken care of directly from Washington. The five fields already discussed are obviously the most vital ones to get under way immediately.

In conclusion, it is my firm conviction that, although the above facts are for the most part realized, and that information is readily available, not only to
the State Department but also to the Coordinator's office, the situation changes daily, and very little is being done on location to put the information on hand to good use. We must have an active diplomatic and effective organization in each separate country, in order to counteract a machine which is undermining the work that the Good Neighbor Policy has been trying to develop throughout the past eight years.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD H. ROBBINS.

ehr/emv.
July 22, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

With regard to the discussion which took place in Cabinet on July 18 concerning the application of certain embargo measures relating to Japan in the event of some overt action by Japan, I consulted General Marshall regarding the attitude of the War Department towards any restrictions which might be imposed by this Government upon the importation of silk into the United States.

I have today received from the War Department a brief memorandum which I attach herewith for your information and which indicates that the War Department has no objection to the imposition of restrictions upon the importation of silk into this country.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE LIAISON OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE:

Subject: Raw Silk.

The Chief of Staff directs me to request that you inform the Under Secretary of State that from the War Department point of view, there is no military objection to the action which it is proposed to take with respect to this item.

L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt, Washington, July 22, 1941.

Forwards to the President a memorandum from General Marshall stating that the War Department has no objection to the imposition of restrictions upon the importation of silk into this country.

July 22, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a telegram received today from Murphy reporting upon a conversation he had with General Weygand in pursuance of the instructions I sent him after my recent conversation with you upon this matter.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ALGIERS
Dated July 21, 1941
Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
338, July 21, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE)
PERSONAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM MURPHY.
Our 184, July 17, 10 p.m.

I saw Weygand alone a few minutes ago and informed him of your message reading to him a translation of the message and stating that I was authorized to deliver it only orally. This was the first opportunity to talk with him since my return from Morocco Saturday eve.

COLE

CSB
BS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

338, July 21, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Weygand listened with the greatest interest. His first comment was an expression of his evident pleasure and satisfaction over the President's complimentary references to him personally. He said with a smile that he would be sure to make no allusions to them in any report he might make to Vichy as strangely enough jealousy was known to exist in that neighborhood. The General made careful mental note and when I had finished repeated what he had told us before, namely, that he would not enter into a commitment regarding the general policy of his Government without authorization, neither had he any intention of taking independent military action.

COLE

KLP
KD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
338, July 21, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)
Weygand said that he was quite willing to state the fact that the best of his knowledge there had been no recent action changing the status of French African ports nor conceding their use to the Germans nor to any power affiliated with the Germans. He said that he could assure the President that there is no (repeat no) French African port at present occupied by or under the control of the Germans or any power affiliated with them aside from the verification of military equipment and control of shipping exercised by the Armistice Commissions of which activity the President is informed.

COLE.

WWC
RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ALGIERS
Dated July 21, 1941
Rec'd 10:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

338, July 21, 5 p.m., (SECTION FOUR)
He said that his attitude remains unchanged and that he will oppose to the best of his ability any act of aggression against French Africa or affiliated power. In reply to my question he said that neither German nor Italian nor affiliated naval craft of any description are or have been using French African ports for refueling or as bases generally; neither are they or have they been using French African bases for the purpose of military operations.

The General then made an oral resume of the message to insure that he retained its essential feature clearly in mind.

COLE

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
338, July 21, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

He inquired whether in my opinion the United States would enter the war as a belligerent. I replied that the President had by his recent public utterances stated American policy with a clarity that left no doubt about the American position and that naturally I could not amplify my Government's declarations. I mentioned that there is of course an element of public opinion in the United States which apparently believes that the entrance of the United States as a belligerent may be inevitable. Weygand remarked that he had always hoped that the United States might remain aloof exercising its enormous power as an arbiter in whose impartiality the world could have confidence. He felt however that things are developing in a different direction. That fact did not appear to distress him.
MD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated July 21, 1941
Rec'd 5:50 a.m., 22nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
338, July 21, 5 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

The General expressed his satisfaction over the operation of the economic plan and his repeated thanks to the Department and the President for their support the value of which he recognises.

His principal interest however related to that portion of the message regarding military supplies. I feel that possibly he may be slightly disappointed that the message did not go further to the extent of a preliminary outline of what volume of supplies might be forthcoming and what the possible time lagg might be in the event of an emergency. I therefore took the liberty to inquire whether if my Government saw fit to provide data in that respect he would be interested in receiving it. He quickly replied that of course he would adding as an after thought that this should not be interpreted as a commitment on his part. I am confident that he is only mildly interested in the volume
-2- 338, July 21, 5 p.m. (SECTION SIX) from Algiers.

of our national defense expenditures but reasonably interested in actual production figures.

COLE

HPD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

Algiers  
Dated July 21, 1941  
Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington  

TRIPLE PRIORITY  
338, July 21, 5 p.m., (SECTION SEVEN).

He has, I am sure, an active interest in learning the volume of what material we could deliver within a given period of time and whether we have such a program under study.

The General was visibly pleased over the President's reference to the necessity for the complete defeat of Hitlerite Germany and the provision of the eventual Treaty of Peace which would restore France to the position she previously occupied.

The General referred to the Russo-German campaign with satisfaction. Notwithstanding his ardent dislike of the Soviet regime he said the Russians were putting up a gallant fight. He said that naturally every one deplored bloodshed but that the contemplation of the mutual liquidation of Nazis and Communism is far from displeasing to him.

COLE
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State, Washington,

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

338, July 21, 5 p.m. (SECTION 338)

The General referred to his hope to achieve French unity in Africa as the only satisfactory means of opposing aggression. He said that the activity of communists and De Gaullists in French mitigates against national unity which is necessary if France is to emerge from her present prostration.

He again referred to Syria pointing to General Dentz humiliation which he said would have been less bitter if the occupation had been restricted to British troops to the exclusion of De Gaullists.

Weygand concluded the interview, throughout which he evinced the greatest cordiality and understanding, with an expression of satisfaction over the recent consolidation of his authority (he is now Governor of Algeria by the elimination of Admiral Abrial which authority is in addition to his powers as Delegate General for French Africa). "END OF MESSAGE"

COLE

KLP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE

July 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Jimmy carried no message from me to the King of Yugoslavia, which was not then at war with Germany when Jimmy left here.

Personally I think what happened is that the King expressed a desire to come to America and Jimmy, of course, could not say no.

My own thought is that it is a mistake for the young King to come here this Summer. He would be a target for Croats and would be hard to guard.

How can you get that thought across?

F. D. R.
July 21, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

The Minister of Yugoslavia called to see me this morning and by instruction of his government asked me to let you know that, pursuant to a conversation which the King of Yugoslavia had had with Jimmy in Jerusalem, the King would be glad to visit the United States, accompanied by his Prime Minister and by his Foreign Minister.

I told the Minister that I was not informed of the message you had sent to the King through Jimmy and that I would consequently refer the subject to you immediately. The Minister added that, should the arrangement be agreeable to you, the King and his party would like to come to the United States in August. Will you let me know what reply you wish me to make?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.
Please return to me when you have read. Thanks, Grace.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I spoke to the Acting Secretary of State about the young King and he said that he did not give you in full detail the message which made it clear that the King wanted to come here with his Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister and make a tour of the country.

He says he will handle the reply saying that he understands the King is thinking of going to Canada with his pilots. Then, of course, if he wishes to visit the United States you would be glad to see him here some time -- perhaps in September.

G.G.T.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

The British Ambassador informed me yesterday, by instruction of his Government, that the Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr. Salazar, had informed the British Ambassador in Lisbon of his great satisfaction and pleasure because of the personal letter which you had written him. Lord Halifax was requested to say that the British Government felt that the letter in question had completely removed the misunderstandings which had existed and had greatly facilitated the course of British policy in Portugal.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt, Washington, July 31, 1941.

Discusses licensing of exports to Japan and imports from Japan. Submits to FDR a suggested statement of policy on categories of exports and imports.

[Pres. Roosevelt approved the recommendations with the notation, "SW OK, FDR."]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. SUMNER WELLES

Please take this up with
the Secretary as soon as he returns.

F. D. R.

Enclosure
State Dept.
Cable 7/30/41 #379 from Grant, Bangkok via N. R. - personal and confidential for Asst. Sec. Berle re "the unjust action indicated in the Department's 82 accepting my 'resignation' which incidentally I have not offered" etc.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Senator Clark:

It is as I expected. I felt very certain that your remarks the other day in regard to a virtual act of aggression against the other twenty American Republics and the establishment of puppet governments therein by the United States would result in these remarks being played up and used in Europe by the Nazis and Fascists.

I said nothing about this, however.

Now, though, I think it is only right that you should know that my fears have been realized. A dispatch from Rome quotes the Italian Press as alleging that your statement ends the Good Neighbor policy and represents the real opinion of the President and of the State Department. It goes on to say that your remarks amount to a frank statement made out of turn and that the statements of the President and the Acting Secretary of State are mere camouflage because they are not yet ready to assume the role of the aggressor in South America. Finally, the Italian papers plead with the Latin-American countries to take warning and abandon all cooperation with this country.

Simultaneously the German newspapers are "congratulating Senator Clark" on his "touching frankness in letting the cat out of the bag and that the real aim of the United States is not that of the Good Neighbor but of the Big Stick".

As I said before, I think it is only fair that you should know just what the result has been.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Honorable D. Worth Clark,
The United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

Carbon copy to Hon. Sumner Welles
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For your information.

F. D. R.

State Dept. dispatches re resignation of Grant at Bangkok.
August 2, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am personally enclosing herewith two further telegrams from Mr. Grant.

To the best of my knowledge none of the matters referred to in Mr. Grant's telegrams have had the slightest effect upon the opinion, which Secretary Hull and I, or any other responsible official of the Department, have formed with regard to Mr. Grant's inability to handle the situation in Bangkok.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
No. 382, July 31, noon,
No. 385, July 31, 8 p.m.,
from Bangkok.

The President,
The White House.
DES
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

BANGKOK VIA N.R.
Dated July 31, 1941
Rec'd 6:17 a.m. August 1st.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

39, July 31, noon. (SECTION ONE)

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY.

My telegram No. 372, July 28, 9 a.m., addressed to you personally Mr. President appealing that I be given the opportunity to be heard by you and by Secretary Hull before I am executed, to urge that you examine personally some documents which will prove that this plot has been engineered by your enemies with the assistance of jealous career officers in the Department who have been "gunning" for me from the time I entered the Department in 1933. I refer you to the following telegrams which are on file in the Department: My strictly confidential telegram to Secretary Hull (dated December 23, 1940); telegram No. 19, January 12, 8 p.m., section three and section four; my strictly confidential telegram to Secretary Hull No. 66, September 2, 10 a.m.; my strictly confidential telegram to Secretary Hull No. 254, May 3, 10 p.m.; strictly confidential telegrams Assistant Secretary Shaw No. 333, July 5, 9 p.m. and 340, July 12, 1 p.m.

GW

GRANT
TRB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Bangkok via N.R.
Dated July 31, 1941
Rec'd 11:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

382, (SECTION TWO).

As you will observe from these telegrams your arch enemy Roy Howard publisher of Scripps-Howard and his close friend Herman Scholtz an American citizen of German lineage who directed the sabotaging campaign against me in Bangkok and in certain circles in the United States are in the background of this affair. It was Scholtz who brought Howard to the Legation to see me last September when Howard made a bitter personal attack on you which I reported to Secretary Hull over the vigorous protest of John H. Chapman, the ranking career Foreign Service Officer. And yet notwithstanding the fact that I loyally supported the administration's policies towards Thailand in the face of a vigorous opposition from resentful Thai and by Herman Scholtz, friend of Howard, I am now to be peremptorily executed without even a hearing. I cannot believe that you will allow yourself to be a party to such
such an injustice to an officer who has represented his government both at home, in the Department and abroad for eight years and whom you and the Secretary complimented highly at the time of the difficult crisis situation in Albania. There is a major crisis on in this ( ) now. I feel I am fully capable of handling the situation and I think I am entitled to have the opportunity.

I appeal to you again Mr. President that you hold this order in abeyance until I can be heard.

Cordial regards.

(END OF MESSAGE).

GRANT

MPL

( ) apparent omission
RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

BANGKOK
Dated July 31, 1941
Rec'd 10:08 a.m., August 1.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

385, July 31, 8 p.m., (SECTION ONE)
PERSONAL ATTENTION ACTING SECRETARY WELLES.
Your telegram No. 83, July 30, 7 p.m.
I repeat that I am convinced that the President did not (repeat not) take the initiative in this matter and is not in possession of all the facts of the case. I am convinced I have been railroaded and that I am the victim of a plot which was engineered by parties who are enemies of the President assisted by men in the Department who have shown their jealousy since the date of my appointment in the Department in 1933 and subsequently during my termination of office in Albania. I stand on my record of achievement which is on file in the Department including the expression of appreciation of both the President and Secretary Hull of my work during the difficult days of crisis in Albania. I have handled a most difficult situation here now for one year in face of great obstacles such as the unpopular policies of the Government towards Thailand including the stopping
the stopping of the bombing airplanes and in addition
the active opposition of the ranking Foreign Service
Officer of this Legation who has given every indication
that he was not (repeat not) in sympathy with the policy
of administration which I upheld wholeheartedly. I
have not (repeat not) offered my resignation and I con-
sider that I am being dismissed from the service and
in a manner that surely must be without precedent

GRANT

HPD
LET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

385, July 31, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
I am even denied the opportunity to return to the Department for consultation which I have understood is the courtesy always extended to chiefs of missions under such circumstances. On the contrary I am, without any advance warning, informed that my "resignation" has been accepted, and further I am instructed to leave Bangkok within eighteen days while a major political crisis is on and transportation facilities are most uncertain and hazardous for my family. I am of the opinion that such action is grossly unjust, I am being humiliated and I repeat that I am convinced that the President has not (repeat not) taken the initiative in the matter and does not have all the facts. The statement is made in your telegram that the acceptance of my "resignation constitutes no reflection whatever upon" my "ability, capacity, loyalty or patriotism" and reference is made to "many considerations". I think I am entitled to know what those "considerations" are since
-2- 385, July 31, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO) From Bangkok.

since they apply directly to me, or (?) be dismissed from my post if I have the "ability, capacity, loyalty or patriotism" for job. I respectfully request that you inform me of these considerations.

GRANT

HSM
LET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Bangkok via N.R.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

385, August 1, 1 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

I submit that no matter what statements may be made to me to the effect that there is no reflection on my "ability capacity loyalty or patriotism" the judgment of the public including many of my good friends will be that I have failed. After eight years of loyal, diligent and hard service for my government during most difficult times I am to be held up as incompetent to carry on the job here and my whole career is thereby ruined at the time when I am at my best physically and mentally. It is grossly unfair. There is something wrong with a Foreign Service that picks out a Chief of Missions who has been through one crisis at the very moment of another crisis when it is accepted in the highest authority that this chief of mission with a record of eight years of service has "ability capacity loyal/or patriotism". I cannot bring myself to believe that the President whom I have supported loyally and actively since before his first in 1933 can be a party to this thing.

It does
-2- 385, August 1, 1 a.m. (SECTION THREE), From Bangkok.

It does not (repeat not) fit the picture of the President as I have always regarded him.

May I repeat that I should like to be informed by telegraph of the other "considerations"? Will you please show this telegram to the President and inform me to that effect by telegraph?

(END OF MESSAGE).

GRANT

PEG
August 19, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

The Minister of Luxembourg called to see me yesterday afternoon by instruction of the Grand Duchess. The Grand Duchess wanted to let you know that she and the Prince of Luxembourg were leaving tomorrow for London where they intend to remain between a month and six weeks. They then intend to return to Canada and the United States.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

In response to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of August 20 concerning Whitney Straight, I am sending you a copy of a telegram dated August 16 received from our Embassy in Vichy. The contents of this telegram should already have reached Mrs. Elmhirst, but it may be, since she is traveling, that she has not yet been informed of the news contained therein.

I would suggest when you telephone her that you refer to this telegram and suggest that the money her son desires be sent by her through the Department of State to the Embassy in Vichy.

I will ask the Embassy to do everything possible in Whitney Straight's behalf, but since, as you know, he is a British subject, the French Government would not agree to our Embassy taking the matter up officially. I assume from the fact that he asks that half of the amount desired be deposited with the Consul General.

The President,

The White House.
in Barcelona that he is planning to escape into Spain.
Believe me

Enc.

Faithfully yours,
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated August 16, 1941
Rec’d. 4:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1035, August 16, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
FROM FULLERTON:
Whitney Straight, naturalized British subject of American birth and son of Willard Straight, squadron leader R.A.F. who recently made forced landing northern France but escaped into unoccupied zone, was arrested by French police near Pau a few days ago while endeavoring to reach the Spanish frontier boundaries. He is now confined with other British prisoners of war at Camp Saint Hippolyte du Fort near Nimes but was permitted to visit Consulate eleventh. He is well and in no immediate danger.

LEAHY.

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1035, August 16, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Straight requests that his mother Mrs. Dorothy Elmhurst, 162 East 92d Street, New York be notified and asked to transfer $1000 to his credit, one-half to be deposited with Consul, Marseilles and the remaining half with the Consul at Barcelona. Authorization for me to pay Straight $500 desired by him here should be cabled in code through Embassy, Vichy and no publicity given his whereabouts as Straight fears if German attention is attracted his transfer to Germany will be demanded. (END OF MESSAGE)

LEAHY.

PEG
Dear Miss Le hand,

In these days of decisive events when our minds are filled with the new hope given by the President and Mr. Churchill it seems entirely out of place to be writing you about a purely personal matter. But perhaps after hearing the story you will tell me whether you feel we would be justified in asking you to put it before the President.

My son, Whitney Straight, has been flying for two years in the R.A.F. In the early spring of 1940 he was badly wounded in Norway but after a few months' rest he recovered completely and returned to the Air Force. During the last seven months he has been leading his squadron in daily raids over Occupied Territory and twice he has been decorated. On July 31st he was shot down by anti-aircraft fire while attacking a German convoy in the Channel and made, according to the official report, a forced landing in France. We heard nothing of him for eight days and then, suddenly, out of the blue, came a cable direct from him to his wife in New York which read as follows—Darling—well and safe—interned—Detachment W. St. Hipolyte du Fort—Gard—Send food, cigarettes—Tell Mother, no one else, Whitney. Of course this was joyous news for us but we were uncertain whether it would be wise to make any public inquiries since obviously he had escaped from the Germans and reached a point in unoccupied France close to Marseilles before being discovered.
We feared that any attempt to get into touch with him might only reveal his whereabouts. However, his wife cabled him asking whether she should return to England and wait for him there. Today she has received this answer—"Stay. Ask Mother do all she can Washington for my release".

I'm afraid I have no clear idea as to how to proceed in the matter. My one thought is that the President, through the State Department, might be able to get into touch with Admiral Leahy and ask for the release. But perhaps this is impossible. Obviously Whitney believes there are ways of getting him out. Have you any idea what can be done? I imagine the strictest secrecy is necessary and no doubt any cable sent about him should be in code. It is just possible that he has given his name as Whitney and not Whitney Straight, since the two cables to his wife were signed only by his Christian name and the cables to her were addressed to Daphne only and not Daphne Straight.

Leonard and I are in this country for three months on the invitation of M.L. Wilson of the Department of Agriculture. We are speaking twice a day to farm groups all over New England telling them of the ways in which the British farmer is adapting his practice to the farm defence program. I am also trying to give an idea of living conditions in England today and of the kind of spirit that animates the whole country. We shall be here at Cornell until the morning of the 21st—then we can be reached at the following places
Aug 23rd- Agricultural College at Storrs, Conn. We could re reached through E.H. Woodward, Dean & Director.

Aug- 25th & 26th- Burlington Vermont- the College again. Care Mr J.E. Carrington -Director of Extension.

Aug 27th & 28th- Durham, New Hampshire- Care H.B. Stevens, Director of Extension.

Aug. 29th & 30th- Maine College at Orono. A.L. Deering- Dean and Director.

Perhaps, instead of asking you to get into touch with me at one of these places it might be better if I rang you on the long distance one day next week. If I don’t hear from you before the end of next week I shall do this, if it is not asking too much of you.

I wish I could tell you of the fine impression Mr Winant has made. I believe he is really one of the great figures of the present day.

You’ll forgive my typing, won’t you? I can’t ask anyone here to do it for me.

In another letter I shall try someday to tell you what the President has meant to us in England all through these terrible years.

Yours sincerely, Dorothy Eshleman
My dear Mr. President:

I am bringing to your attention this telegram from our Embassy in Vichy, which relates to Whitney Straight. I question the desirability at this stage of bringing the information contained in this telegram to the attention of either Mrs. Elmhirst or Mrs. Straight.

Admiral Leahy is away on a brief vacation in Switzerland, but is, I think, due to return to Vichy tomorrow or the day after. You will undoubtedly hear from him as soon as he returns concerning this question.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.
Telegram 1076,
Vichy

The President,
The White House.
TEM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated August 23, 1941
Rec’d 11:30 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY:

Your telegrams 644, August 20th, 6 p.m. will be brought to the Ambassador’s attention immediately upon his return. Meanwhile, I am looking into the possibilities as carefully and discretely as possible. Fullerton believes that the individual may be able to visit him again and that possibly something can be arranged. He dined quietly with Fullerton on the 11th and was in excellent health and spirits. He is apparently known to the authorities only under his first name.

MATTHEWS

WBB
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our talk on the telephone last evening concerning Willard Straight, I am sending you for your information a telegram received this morning from Admiral Leahy. This telegram refers to your message which I transmitted to him suggesting that if he thought it wise, he might let Marshal Pétain know of your lifelong friendship for the boy's mother.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[signature]

Enclosure:
No. 1083, August 25, 3 p.m. from Vichy.

The President,

The White House.
DES
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (3c)

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1083, August 25, 3 p.m.

STRANGELY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.

Your telegram 644 August 20, 6 p.m.

I believe that it would be unwise to discuss this question with Marshal Petain until I have exhausted other possibilities.

LEAHY

CSB
MEMORANDUM

Have answered this by telegram - same evening. Get copy of answer from Code Room State Department.

FDR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sept. 4, 1941.

Telephone message.

For The President:

The following received by telephone from Mr. Myron Taylor's secretary:

"For The President:

"You spoke of my calling upon Salazar in Lisbon. Subsequently Mr. Welles said he thought you had covered that point. If you conclude to have me do so, I can best do it on my return to Lisbon from Rome. Please telegraph Lisbon your definite wishes.

"Myron Taylor."

Telephone Room,

mc-
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Miss Tully gave me yesterday on the telephone your message with regard to Myron Taylor.

The report which he had telegraphed he was sending you by special courier had not been received and I consequently sent him a brief cable telling him that you had not as yet received his report and that, consequently, he would have to use his own discretion in determining what he should say to Mr. Churchill regarding his conversations in Rome and in Lisbon.

I have just now, Sunday morning, received the report which he had addressed to you and I am enclosing it herewith. I have read the text of the report except for the confidential and personal letter he enclosed with it, and I do not see anything in it which you would consider it unwise for him to mention to Mr. Churchill. I have, consequently, not thought it necessary to send any further

The President,

The White House.
telegram to Myron Taylor with regard thereto.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the approval you sent me covering the recommendations contained in General Marshall's letter to me of October 6 concerning Brazilian participation in the defense measures to be undertaken in Surinam, I instructed Ambassador Caffery to inform President Vargas that we believed the Netherlands Government would convey an invitation to the Brazilian Government along the lines indicated in the last message to you from the Netherlands Government in London.

At the same time, a cable was sent to Ambassador Biddle in London instructing him to suggest to the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands that an invitation be sent to the Brazilian Government along these lines.

I have today received a telegram from Ambassador Caffery telling me that he has seen President Vargas and that the latter states that he agrees in principle

The President,

The White House.
to the Dutch suggestion and that he will await the invitation from the Netherlands Government.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
October 21, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your consideration a suggested telegram to be sent to Ambassador Biddle for communication to the Netherlands Government in London.

I have consulted the War Department with regard thereto and the War Department approves the contents of this suggested message.

I shall be grateful if you will let me know whether this draft instruction meets with your approval.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Under date of October 7th I signed a letter to Mackenzie King which was forwarded to the State Department to be sent in the pouch. It was apparently not sent to Canada until the fourteenth or fifteenth -- a week later -- and I am not certain that Mackenzie King has received it yet.

If this sort of thing happens to my letters to the Prime Minister of Canada, I shall have to have the State Department send them direct to Mackenzie King by special courier. 

F. D. R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
October 23, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of October 22 concerning the delay which occurred in the delivery of your letter of October 7 to Mr. Mackenzie King.

I find that your letter reached the Department on October 9. Normally it would have been sent out under cover of an instruction to the American Minister at Ottawa in the pouch of October 11. Due to the illness of the officer handling these matters, however, the instruction was not drafted until October 13. As pouches leave for Ottawa on Wednesdays and Saturdays, it was placed in the pouch on Wednesday, October 15. It was received by the Legation at Ottawa on October 17. In reply to a telephone inquiry, Mr. Moffat states that he, in person, took the letter immediately to the Prime Minister's office and handed it to Mr. Turnbull, the Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister, who promised to bring it promptly to Mr. Mackenzie King's attention on his return to Ottawa, the following day, Saturday, October 18.

The President,

The White House.
I greatly regret the delay which has occurred in this instance. I did not myself know of the fact that you had sent this letter to Mr. Mackenzie King until I received your memorandum. I wonder if you will not in the future have your office send letters of this kind directly to me and I can then assure myself that no delays of this character will take place. There is, of course, no excuse whatever for what occurred in this instance and I have already taken the necessary corrective measures.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,
October 23, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Some time ago Jimmie Rowe recommended on behalf of the Democratic National Committee the name of Mr. Stephen A. Lynch of Miami for a diplomatic appointment. I submitted this recommendation to you in connection with the filling of the vacancy in New Zealand and you asked me to get in touch with Claude Pepper in order to get his opinion with regard to the candidate.

I telephoned to Claude Pepper who was then in Florida and he promised to send me an immediate report and I have only today received the promised message from him.

I am enclosing herewith for your information a copy of Claude Pepper's letter which contains the report in question.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
October 24, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

You will remember that I saw Prince Carl Bernadotte at your request just before he left the United States. In accordance with your desire I had the necessary arrangements made covering the export of toluol in which he was interested.

Some difficulty subsequently developed on the part of the British with regard to the granting of navicerts for 100 tons of the 680 ton total and Prince Carl called me up personally from Stockholm a few days ago to ask if I would intervene with the British in order to get a favorable decision expedited. I saw the Swedish Minister subsequently and suggested that he personally see the British Ambassador with regard to this question since the American export license had already been issued. I have not spoken myself with the British Ambassador concerning this case.

After the conversation I had with Prince Carl, I telegraphed the American Legation in Stockholm the

The President,

The White House.
status of the case in order that they might inform Prince Carl accordingly. I have today received a confidential telegram from our Legation in reply to my cable, of which I am enclosing a copy for your information. Under these circumstances I imagine you will agree that we had better do nothing further at this end, at least for the time being.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
No. 679, October 23,
from Stockholm.
DE
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Stockholm
Dated October 23, 1941
Rec'd 4:43 a.m., 24th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

679, October 23, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.

In connection with your telegram 382, October 20, 8 p.m. and your telephone call from Prince Carl Bernadotte, I feel you should be informed of the following:

The Belgo-Baltic Corporation, of which Prince Carl is managing director, is being considered by the British Government for inclusion in its statutory list or its blacklist and the Swedish Government has strictly confidentially indicated to the British that it can offer no reason for its non-inclusion in the former. Eric Sigfrid Ericsson, manager of the firm Bensin Penn Company, collaborates with Belgo-Baltic and uses Prince Carl for the transaction of business deals requiring contact with high officials. Ericsson, long under the suspicion of the British, has stated to a member of the staff of this Legation that he considers a German victory in the
in the war to be certain, and British Secret Service reports show that while in Berlin recently he showed his sympathies for the Germans and expressed a desire to cooperate in establishing the "new order" in Europe. He has been involved in the questionable transaction of the Norwegian tanker JANKO in Curacao and in the sale of a ship in Constanza to which the British object. He is in frequent contact with Ohwlenz, a German who has been attempting to establish a news agency Radio Mundial with the backing of the German Government. He has business connections also with Henrik Mannerfrid, a Goteborg business man now believed to be in New York, whose reputation for straight dealing is questionable.

There is a possibility that Ericsson used Prince Carl to obtain the toluol which the Swedish Government needs for the navy with the idea that this transaction might be a wedge to obtain at a later date other materials for his company or the Belgo-Baltic, not for the Swedish Government.

It is understood that the Swedish Foreign Office is concerned over Prince Carl's connections with Ericsson; that Prince Carl has been warned but does not
679, October 23, 7 p.m. from Stockholm

does not wish to sacrifice the financial remuneration he receives. He for the present refuses to sever his connection with Ericsson but pressure particularly from members of the Royal Family may eventually force him to do so.

GREENE

HSM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR SUMNER WELLES:

Do not let anyone know that you have seen this but bring it over and talk to me about it.

F.D.R.

Letters to Ickes from Rex Tugwell re Caribbean situation, for Pres. confidential information. Oct. 15 and 20.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of November 6, I am enclosing a suggested reply for you to send to Weddell in response to the telegram he sent to you under date of November 1.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Draft telegram.

The President,

The White House.
November 7, 1941

AMERICAN EMBASSY
MADRID.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have already selected George Messersmith as the successor to Ambassador Daniels. For the present I feel that your services would be more valuable to the Government in the post where you now are because of the personal contacts you have established and because of the experience you have acquired during these critical days. My kindest regards.

[Signature]

U:SW:1J
RECEIVED AT 1112 CONNECTICUT AVE., WASHINGTON, D.C., AT STANDARD TIME

WB107JH ETAT MADRID 19 GHR 1 1610

1941 NOV 1 PM 1:30

THE PRESIDENT

WHITEHOUSE WASHINGTON

I WOULD BE DEEPLY GRATEFUL IF I MIGHT BE CHOSEN TO SUCCEED DANIELS ALEX WEDDELL

Telephone: National 2600 To secure prompt action on inquiries, this original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the office of R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the place of origin.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR ED FLYNN:

I meant to show the enclosed to you yesterday, but it slipped my mind. This for your confidential information and please return for my files.

F.D.R.

Transmitting letter which the President received from Hon. Sumner Welles, 10/23/41, in re Mr. Stephen A. Lynch of Miami, who was recommended by Jimmie Rowe, on behalf of the Democratic National Committee, for a diplomatic appointment, attached to which is copy of letter which Mr. Welles received from Sen. Claude Pepper, 10/23/41, giving his report on Mr. Lynch.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1941.

GRACE:
I want to show this to Ed Flynn the next time he comes down.

F.D.R.
November 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I enclose confidential memorandum just received from the Treasury. Perhaps Caffery should be confidentially advised.

F.D.R.

Letter from Morgenthau to the Pres. 11/14 in which he says the Treasury Cryptanalytical unit has just decoded following messages sent by radio from German agents in S.A. to Germany on the dates indicated. H.M. Jr. says "aside from the information contained in these messages the important thing is that they indicate someone inside office of the Pres. of Brazil is in the employ of the Nazis".
November 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum to the Secretary of State and to myself of November 15 with which you enclose a confidential memorandum from the Treasury Department, I have communicated the contents of this memorandum to Ambassador Caffery for his confidential information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure

The President,

The White House.

See Morgenthau folder for decoded messages which the [illegible] Cryptanalytical Unit has picked up.
December 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

This may be of real importance. I do not know.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from Secretary Morgenthau, dated Dec. 4, 1941, giving contents of message from a German agent in Brazil reporting to Germany Nov. 17, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum to me of December 5, enclosing a letter sent to you under date of December 4 by the Secretary of the Treasury, which indicates that some member of the staff of our Embassy in Rio de Janeiro is turning over information to German agents, I have today arranged for a representative of the F.B.I. to be sent secretly immediately to the Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to conduct the necessary investigations.

I shall, of course, inform you of any results which may be obtained.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
Dr. T.V. Soong to the Under Secretary of State (Welles),
Washington, December 12, 1941.
Reports receipt of a cable from General Chiam-Kai-shek expressing
the opinion that a Russian declaration of war against Japan is
only a matter of time.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV,
The Far East, page 746.

[Copy forwarded by Welles to FDR on Dec. 12, 1941]